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The Frankfurt School  
Its History, Theories, and Political Significance

Rolf Wiggershaus

Translated by  
Michael Robertson

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MICHAEL ROBERTSON  
AUGSBURG, APRIL 1993

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## Introduction

`Frankfurt School' and `Critical Theory': if the terms evoke more than just the idea of a particular paradigm in social science, they will trigger memories of a string of names starting with Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas and associations with the student movement of the 1960s, the `positivist dispute', the critique of culture and perhaps also German émigrés, the Third Reich, Jews, the Weimar Republic, Marxism and psychoanalysis. What is clear at once is that there is more involved than just a school of thought, more than just a piece of academic history.

It has become customary to speak of first-generation and second-generation Critical Theorists, 1 and to distinguish the older Frankfurt School from what has developed from it since the 1970s. This allows us to postpone, at least initially, the question of the Frankfurt School's survival and of its continuity or discontinuity, and makes it easier to put a time-limit on its history which will not be too arbitrary. The time-limit chosen for the present work is the death of Adorno, the last representative of the older Critical Theory who was active in Frankfurt and at the Institute of Social Research.

The term `Frankfurt School' was a label first applied by outsiders in the 1960s, but Adorno in the end used it himself with obvious pride. To start with, it described a critical sociology which saw society as an antagonistic totality, and which had not excluded Hegel and Marx from its thinking, but rather saw itself as their heir. The label has, however, long since become more vague and all-embracing. Herbert Marcuse's media notoriety as an idol of rebellious students along with Marx, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh gave the Frankfurt School a mythical status. In the early 1970s the American historian Martin Jay brought this myth back down to earth, back to its basis in historical fact, and made clear how multi-faceted the reality behind the label `Frankfurt School' was. But the label itself has long since become an indispensable part of the history of the influence of the ideas it represents, quite apart from the question of the extent to which we can speak of a `school' in the strict sense.

Some of the characteristic attributes of a `school' were certainly present, either constantly, temporarily or only from time to time. Among these were:

1 An institutional framework: the Institute of Social Research, which existed throughout the whole period, even if at times only in a fragmentary way.

2 A charismatic intellectual personality filled with confidence in a new theoretical programme, able and willing to co-operate with qualified scholars: Max Horkheimer as a `managerial scholar' who constantly reminded his associates of the fact that they belonged to a chosen few in whose hands the further development of `Theory' lay.

3 A manifesto: Horkheimer's inaugural lecture of 1931 on *The Present State of Social Philosophy and the Tasks Facing an Institute of Social Research* which later accounts of the Institute always harked back to, and which Horkheimer himself repeatedly referred to, for example at the ceremony in Frankfurt in 1951 when the Institute reopened.

4 A new paradigm: the `materialist' or `critical' theory of the general process of social existence, which was characterized by a combination of philosophy with social science, and which systematically integrated psychoanalysis and certain ideas of critics of rationality and metaphysics such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Klages<sup>3</sup> into historical materialism. The label `Critical Theory' was maintained to some extent throughout, although the various people using it understood it in different ways, and Horkheimer himself moved away from his original view of it.

5 A journal and other outlets for publishing the school's research work: the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (*Journal of Social Research*), published by respected academic publishers: first Hirschfeld in Leipzig, and later Felix Alcan in Paris.

Most of these characteristics, however, only applied to the first decade of the Institute's Horkheimer period, the 1930s, and to its New York period in particular. But during its New York period the Institute worked in a kind of `splendid isolation' from its American environment. Only Horkheimer, Pollock and Adorno returned to Germany in 1949-50. Of these three, only Adorno continued to be theoretically productive, and he was the only one to publish works containing new as well as older material. There was no longer a journal after the war, only a series of publications, the `Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie' (`Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology'), which lacked the distinctive character of the earlier journal. Adorno and Horkheimer themselves were only published in this series once, at the beginning of the 1960s, with a collection of lectures and addresses.

For me there was never a consistent theory. Adorno wrote essays on the critique of culture and also gave seminars on Hegel. He presented a certain Marxist background and that was it.<sup>4</sup>

This was how Jürgen Habermas, Adorno's research assistant at the Institute in the later 1950s, saw things in retrospect. When the image of a `school' did appear in the 1960s, it was a mixture of the idea of a critical sociology represented in Frankfurt by Adorno and Habermas, and the idea of an early, radically social-critical, FreudianMarxist period of the Institute under Horkheimer's direction.

The extreme unevenness of the external circumstances of the Institute's history, if nothing else, makes it advisable not to take the term `Frankfurt School' too seriously. Two other points underline this. First, the fact that Horkheimer, in spite of being a `charismatic figure', played an increasingly less decisive part in events, and one increasingly less suited to the formation of a `school'. Secondly, the closely related fact that, looking at the four decades of the older Frankfurt School as a whole, it can be seen that there was neither a unified paradigm nor any paradigm change which would include all the elements now associated with the term `Frankfurt School'. The two principal figures, Horkheimer and Adorno, were working in the same areas from two clearly distinct positions. The former, who entered the scene as the inspirer of a progressive, interdisciplinary social theory, resigned himself in the end to the role of critic of an administered world in which liberal capitalism, as the last outpost in the history of a failed civilization, was threatening to disappear. For the latter, who entered the scene as a critic of immanent thought and as the advocate of a new, liberated music, the philosophy of history of a failed civilization became the basis of a many-sided theory of non-identity, or rather of the forms in which the non-identical could, paradoxically, be given consideration. Adorno represented a kind of micrological-Messianic thought, which closely associated him with Walter Benjamin (who, with Adorno's assistance, became a contributor to the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, and ultimately a member of the Institute) and also with Siegfried Kracauer and Ernst Bloch. The critique of rationality in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*,<sup>6</sup> which Adorno wrote together with Horkheimer in the last years of the Second World War, did not alter Adorno's thinking. But Horkheimer had parted ways with the social psychologist Erich Fromm and the legal and state theorists Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer in the years before his collaborative work with Adorno, and had thus virtually abandoned his programme for an interdisciplinary general theory of society. After the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, he was left with empty hands. Just as, in his capacity as a sociologist, he looked back to the independent entrepreneurs of the liberal era, so in his capacity as a philosopher he looked back to the great philosophers of objective reason. To his own consternation, Horkheimer grew in importance during the 1960s student movement because of the aggressively Marxist tone of his early essays, and he saw himself suddenly being pushed into the vicinity of Marcuse's increasingly aggressive `Great Refusal'. At the same time as this, Adorno, by contrast, was writing the two great testaments of his micrological-Messianic thinking, *Negative Dialectics* and *Aesthetic Theory*.<sup>7</sup> The books

were not very much in keeping with the times at that point. On the other hand, the Marxist side of Walter Benjamin was just being discovered and he was becoming the key figure in a materialist theory of the arts and the media. A decade and a half after Adorno's death, Michel Foucault, one of the most important of the post-structuralists, said: 'If I had known about the Frankfurt School in time, I would have been saved a great deal of work. I would not have said a certain amount of nonsense and would not have taken so many false trails trying not to get lost, when the Frankfurt School had already cleared the way.' 8 Foucault described his programme as a 'rational critique of rationality'. Adorno had used almost exactly the same words in 1962 in a lecture on philosophical terminology, describing the task of philosophy. Philosophy, Adorno had said, should conduct 'a sort of rational appeal hearing against rationality'.9 What is called 'the Frankfurt School' is obviously so diverse, therefore, that one aspect of it or another is always currently relevant, and one aspect or another is always turning out to have been unfinished business crying out to be carried forward.

But what was it that united the members of the Frankfurt School, even if only temporarily in most cases? Was there something all of them had in common? The first generation of the Frankfurt School consisted wholly of Jews or people who had largely been forced back into an affiliation with Judaism by the Nazis. Whether they came from upper-class families or, like Fromm and Lowenthal, from not particularly well-off ones, even the most fortunate were not spared the experience of being outsiders in the midst of society, not even in the period between 1918 and 1933. Their basic common experience was that no degree of conformism was enough to make one's position as a member of society secure. As Sartre says in his *Réflexions sur la Question Juive* (1946),

He [the Jew] . . . accepts the society around him, he joins the game and he conforms to all the ceremonies, dancing with the others the dance of respectability. Besides, he is nobody's slave; he is a free citizen under a regime that allows free competition; he is forbidden no social dignity, no office of the state. He may be decorated with the ribbon of the Legion of Honor, he may become a great lawyer or a cabinet minister. But at the very moment when he reaches the summits of legal society, another society amorphous, diffused, and omnipresent appears before him as if in brief flashes of lightning and refuses to take him in. How sharply he must feel the vanity of honors and of fortune, when the greatest success will never gain him entrance into that society which considers itself the 'real' one. As a cabinet minister, he will be a Jewish cabinet minister, at once an 'Excellency' and an untouchable.10

In their own way, Jews must have had a sense of the alienatedness and inauthenticity of life in bourgeois-capitalist society no less acute than

that of the working class. Although Jews were on the whole more privileged than the working class, even privileged Jews could not escape their Jewishness. Privileged workers, on the other hand, ceased to be `workers' in the second generation at the latest; but it was more difficult for them to achieve more privileged conditions. The Jewish experience of the tenacity of social alienation therefore formed a point of contact with the experience of the tenacity of social alienation which workers as a rule went through. This need not necessarily have led to solidarity with the workers. But at the very least it did often produce a radical critique of society which corresponded to the workers' objective interests.

From Horkheimer's essay on `Traditional and Critical Theory' of 1937<sup>11</sup> onwards, `Critical Theory' became the main label used by the theoreticians of the Horkheimer group to describe themselves. It was a camouflage label for `Marxist theory'; but, more than that, it expressed Horkheimer's and his associates' insistence on identifying themselves with the substance of Marxist theory as a principle and not in its orthodox form, a form obsessed with the critique of capitalist society as a system with an economic base and with a superstructure and ideology which were dependent on that base. This substance of Marxist theory consisted of the specific criticism of alienated and alienating social conditions. The Critical Theorists themselves had their origins neither in Marxism nor in the labour movement. In a way, they were repeating the experiences of the young Marx. For Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, the discovery of the young Marx decisively confirmed the correctness of their own efforts. The publication of Heidegger's *Being and Time*<sup>12</sup> had prompted Marcuse to join Heidegger in Freiburg, because it seemed to him that the question of authentic human existence was being dealt with there concretely. It was when he read the `1844 Manuscripts'<sup>13</sup> of the young Marx, however, that Marx became truly significant to Marcuse for the first time, even more significant than Heidegger or Dilthey. The young Marx, in Marcuse's eyes, was implementing concrete philosophy and demonstrating that capitalism was not merely an economic or political crisis but a catastrophe for the human essence. What was required was therefore not just economic or political reform, but a total revolution. For Fromm, too, who next to Horkheimer was the most important theoretical talent in the early phase of what was later called the Frankfurt School, reading the young Marx confirmed the fact that criticizing capitalist society was a matter of reflection on the true nature of humanity. For Adorno, on the other hand, the young Marx was not a decisive influence. But he, too, in his first long essay on music, `On the Place of Music in Society',<sup>14</sup> published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in 1932, tried to show that under capitalism all paths were blocked, that one came up everywhere against an invisible barrier, and that humanity could thus not achieve authentic existence.<sup>15</sup> Life is not alive this thesis of the young Lukács was a driving impulse for the young Critical Theorists. Marxism was an inspiration to them above all

to the extent that it was centred on this experience. Only Horkheimer's thinking drew its main force from indignation at the injustices being perpetrated on those who were exploited and humiliated. (For Benjamin this only came later, and for Marcuse later still.) For Horkheimer too, though, the point which was ultimately decisive was his indignation about the fact that, in bourgeois-capitalist society, rational action which was responsible towards the general public and whose consequences for the public could also be calculated beforehand was not possible, and that even particularly privileged individuals and society as a whole were alienated from one another. For some time, Horkheimer formed what might be called the group's social and theoretical conscience, constantly urging that the common task was to produce a theory of society as a whole, a theory of the contemporary era, whose subject would be human beings as producers of their own historical forms of lifeforms of life which had, however, become alienated from them.

`Theory' was what Horkheimer enthusiastically set his sights on in the 1930s. From the 1940s onwards he began to doubt its possibility, but he did not abandon it as an ultimate goal. His collaboration with Adorno, which was supposed to lead in the end to a theory of the contemporary era, never got further than the interim findings of *Philosophical Fragments*, which were later published as a book under the title *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. But `the theory' remained the catchword of the `Frankfurt School'. Despite their differences, after the Second World War Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse shared the conviction that, in the tradition of Marx's critique of the fetish character of capitalist social reproduction, the theory had to be both rational and, at the same time, had to offer the right word, the word which would break the spell under which everything human beings, objects, and the relation between them lay. The combination of these two requirements kept alive the spirit from which the theory might begin to grow, even when work on the theory was stagnating and doubts were growing about the possibility of theory in an increasingly irrational society. Habermas stated, in the interview referred to above, `When I first met Adorno, and saw how breathtakingly he suddenly started to talk about commodity fetishism, how he applied the concept to cultural and everyday phenomena, it was a shock at first. But then I thought: try to behave *as if* Marx and Freud (about whom Adorno spoke in the same orthodox way) were *contemporaries*.'<sup>16</sup> He had the same reaction on first meeting Herbert Marcuse (see pp. 544-5 below). The theory which filled Adorno and Marcuse with a sense of mission both before and after the war was a theory of a special sort: in the midst of doubts it was still inspiring, in the midst of pessimism it still spurred them on towards a kind of salvation through knowledge and discovery. The promise was neither fulfilled nor betrayed it was kept alive. Who else could have kept the promise so much alive but those men condemned to be `outsiders within the bourgeoisie' (as Horkheimer put it) because they belonged to a group of people called `the Jews'?

This book deals with the half-century of the prehistory and history of the 'Frankfurt School'. The locations for the story: Frankfurt am Main, Geneva, New York and Los Angeles, Frankfurt am Main. The contexts of the story against the background of its times: the Weimar Republic with its 'twilight character' 17 and its transition to Nazism; the New Deal, the war period and the McCarthy era in the USA; restoration against the background of anti-communism; and the period of protest and reform in West Germany. The various institutional forms adopted in the course of its history: an independent research foundation as a base for Marxist research critical of society; a remnant of the Institute as a collective presence which guaranteed protection for private scholars; and an Institute dependent on state research funds or contracts as the background for a critical sociology and philosophy. As for the variants and alterations to 'the theory' in the course of this history, the scope of these is so large, and they are so unsynchronized, that a division into phases for the 'Frankfurt School' is virtually impossible. The best we can do is to speak of various tendencies to drift apart: the drifting apart of theory and praxis, of philosophy and science, of the critique of reason and the rescuing of reason, of theoretical work and the work of the Institute, of the refusal to be reconciled and the refusal to be discouraged. The various chapters of the book indicate phases of this drifting apart. At the same time, they show the undiminished critical potential of either one or another form of Critical Theory when it is seen in context. At the end, we come to the remarkable continuation of both poles of Critical Theory the Adorno and Horkheimer forms of it by the younger generation of Critical Theorists.

Martin Jay's book has so far been the only available broad historical treatment of the story of the Frankfurt School. But it closes with the Institute's return to Frankfurt in 1950. Jay's presentation was a pioneering work, based not only on the published material but also mainly on discussions with former members of the Institute, on extensive information provided by Leo Lowenthal, and on letters, memoranda, prospectuses of the Institute, etc., contained in Lowenthal's collection. The present work has been able to build not only on Jay's work but also on a series of historical or historically informative works on the Frankfurt School which have been published since Jay for example, by Dubiel, Erd, Lowenthal, Migdal and Söllner<sup>18</sup> and on a series of new publications of Frankfurt School texts including Fromm's inquiries on the working class on the eve of the Third Reich (edited and introduced by Wolfgang Bonss), Benjamin's *Collected Works* (edited with a generous commentary by Rolf Tiedemann), and the publication of posthumous writings by Horkheimer in his *Collected Works* (which have been appearing since 1985 under the editorship of Alfred Schmidt and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr).<sup>19</sup> The present work is based in addition on discussions with former and current associates of the Institute of Social Research and with contemporaries who were observers of it. Above all, it is based on archive material. In particular, mention should be made of the

correspondence with Adorno, Fromm, Grossmann, Kirchheimer, Lazarsfeld, Lowenthal, Marcuse, Neumann and Pollock which is contained in the Max Horkheimer Archive, along with research reports and memoranda. Also important were the correspondence between Adorno and Kracauer (consisting mainly of Adorno's letters), which is held, along with the rest of the unpublished Kracauer materials, in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv in Marbach am Neckar; the correspondence between Adorno and the Academic Assistance Council, which is held by the Bodleian Library in Oxford; the Adorno and Horkheimer personnel files of the Philosophy Faculty of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt; the files and collections on the Institute of Social Research and on individuals which are held in the Frankfurt Stadtarchiv; and the research reports on the Institute's work during the 1950s and 1960s held by the Library of the Institute of Social Research.

And, in passing: if his death had not intervened, I would have taken my doctoral degree (the topic had been agreed) with Adorno.

1

Dawn

Felix Weil, Son of a Millionaire, Found an Institute for Marxism, Hoping One Day to Hand it Over to a Victorious German Soviet State

The 1918 November Revolution had only just begun in Germany when Robert Wilbrandt travelled to Berlin. Wilbrandt was forty-three, and had been Professor of Political Economy in Tübingen since 1908. One of the few German socialist academics, he was frowned upon by his university colleagues as an extreme leftist.

He spent the winter of the Revolution in Berlin. In the mornings he worked for the Demobilization Office, which was in charge of reintegrating into the economy the soldiers who were streaming back from the war. In the afternoons he worked with the Socialization Commission. 'The main thing there was to improvise anything useful fast enough and practically enough to calm the masses, to enable industrialists to go into production, and to solve the organizational problems.'<sup>1</sup> The socialist parties, which had seen socialism as an outcome of decaying capitalism which could not be 'cooked up in advance out of recipes from the soup kitchen of the future' (as Kautsky put it), found themselves, in 1918, suddenly catapulted into power, without any definite picture of what the socialist economic order was to consist of. 'Socialization' had been a household word since the November Revolution. But it was an ambiguous slogan, which even a right-winger like Alfred Hugenberg was capable of using, in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in August 1919, when he described the form of workers' profit-sharing which he supported as anti-socialist but he was nevertheless prepared to call it 'socialization' in order to 'let those involved use one of their favourite words'.<sup>2</sup> In this situation Wilbrandt was one of the few people who made any serious attempt to put Marxist theory into some sort of practice appropriate to the situation. From being the most Marxist of the socialist academics his lecture course on socialism in Tübingen before the war was so crowded it had to be held in the university's main hall he had become the oldest of the Young Marxists or 'practical

socialists'. His pamphlet 'Are the Socialists Socialist Enough?', which came out in the spring of 1919, complained:

I ignore the middle classes, for whom I am in danger of becoming a bogeyman, and the 'Friends of the Fatherland', who, at the moment of danger for the Fatherland, prefer despair to constructive work. I appeal to the Socialists, Yes, you are loyal! You are loyal to a prophecy: that is why you are waiting till the time is ripe. That is why you talk about 'firms ripe for socialization' instead of trusting yourselves to have the maturity to *make* them ripe! Instead of boiling unripe fruit in the jam-pot of the co-operative economy, as *practical* socialism, co-operative and communal socialism, has done with the greatest success (among bakers, and butchers!). Instead of discovering the forms for yourselves, in spite of Marx and Hegel, who have forbidden us discoveries! . . . Only *socialization*, a planned and correctly timed transition to socialist conditions, can protect us from a situation in which the one institution (capitalist enterprise) is at an end and the other (socialist enterprise) not yet installed. What is needed at the moment is the *preservation* of firms, their transferral to a socialist form of management which explains each firm's position clearly, which encourages co-operation and makes room for co-operative control with the profits going to the whole population and to those working in the firm, i.e. *motivating* them, giving them an inner duty to themselves and to the whole population, to *work* and to be content with *what's possible*.

If this is not done, 'Bolshevism' will finish the task with other methods. It will stir up passions, artificially create an army of the unemployed . . . it expressly demands strikes and ever more strikes, and thinks it can force something new into existence by making everything older unsustainable. 3

The fate of the Socialization Commission showed how little the government intended to meet the popular demand for socialization. It was not even prepared to make symbolic concessions in the form of economic reforms which would have done no more than take the wind out of the sails of more radical demands. The Council of People's Representatives, consisting of SPD (Social Democratic Party) and USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party) members, had given the Commission only advisory status, and had shared out the appointments in it between representatives of various different factions. Two Independent Social Democrats, Rudolf Hilferding and Karl Kautsky, were members of the Commission with Kautsky as chairman. There were two Social Democrats, a trade-unionist, some middle-class social reformers and several socialist academics: in addition to Wilbrandt, there were the Professor of Political Economy in Berlin, Karl Ballod; Emil Lederer, a

lecturer in Heidelberg; and a professor from Graz in Austria, Joseph Schumpeter. The Commission's programme was a modest one. The socialization of the means of production could only be carried out 'as a long-term, organic construction'. A start was to be made with those areas of the economy 'in which monopoly-capitalistic conditions of ownership have developed'.<sup>4</sup> But even the activities allowed for within this framework were sabotaged by the bureaucracy. The reports and draft laws on the socialization of the mining industry, on communalization and on nationalization of the fishing industry and insurance were not only left unpublished the Ministry of the Economy attempted to alter them as well. When this happened, at the beginning of April 1919, the members of the Socialization Commission resigned their posts with a letter of protest against the government's attitude. Wilbrandt, despondent, returned to his professorial post in Tübingen.

Felix Weil was one of his students there in the summer semester of 1919. A twenty-one-year-old student of economics and social science, he had put himself, in full uniform, at the disposal of the Frankfurt Workers' and Soldiers' Council during the November Revolution, along with his personal cadet from the student fraternity. He had now come to Tübingen specially to attend the socialist professor's lectures. He wrote an essay on 'The Essence and Methods of Socialization' which was published in the Berlin journal *Arbeiterrat (Workers' Council)*; on Wilbrandt's suggestion, Weil developed this into a doctoral dissertation. But his degree for the dissertation was only awarded (by Frankfurt University) in 1920, as Weil had been briefly arrested for socialist activities in October 1919, and then expelled from Tübingen University and banned from the state of Württemberg. The thesis, *Socialization: an Attempt at a Conceptual Foundation, with a Critique of the Plans for Socialization*,<sup>5</sup> was published as the seventh and final volume of the series 'Practical Socialism' edited by Karl Korsch, who was a *Privatdozent*<sup>6</sup> at the University of Jena. Korsch had been Wilbrandt's assistant on the Socialization Commission, and had opened the series of publications with his own 'Programme for Practical Socialism', published under the title *What is Socialization?* He had been a member of the youth section of the English Fabian Society before the war, during a two-year stay in England, and hoped that this series, like the information pamphlets of the Fabian Society, would give the 'mentally gifted' a correct understanding of the essence of socialism and encourage them to join in helping to realize concrete socialist plans.

There must be a resolute, speedy implementation of decisive socialization measures, or clear abandonment of every effort in that direction this was the tenor of Felix Weil's dissertation. 'One thing is certain,' he wrote,

things cannot continue as they are today, with businessmen frightened to carry out their tasks with the daring needed, by strikes,

high wages, taxes, works councils, mutual distrust and the fear of socialization, with German economic life drying up.

Back to the free market or forwards to socialism? That is the question.

To answer it is not, however, the task of the present work. 7

This was not merely a strategic concession (after all, Weil was hoping to submit the doctoral thesis to professors who were not in any sense socialists). It also had a certain existential significance for Weil. It was evidence of the conflict between his father's position as a businessman and his own socialist sympathies. This was a conflict which existed more often in Jewish than in non-Jewish families, but which was not strong enough to make the sons of such families want to break with their fathers' world at all costs. To the Jews, wealth must have seemed as much a cause of anti-Semitic resentment as it was a protection from it, as much an encouragement to identify with anti-capitalist positions as it was a form of protection only to be surrendered when the future was secure and it was no longer needed. The Bavarian Prime Minister, Kurt Eisner, for example, who was assassinated in February 1919, had been slandered in the press again and again as a 'Galician', an 'Eastern European Jew', a 'foreigner', and as a spy whose real name was 'Solomon Kosmanowsky from Lemberg'.

For Weil, the phrase 'Back to the free market or forwards to socialism' had a special meaning. On the one hand, he was the son of an extraordinarily successful businessman. His father, Hermann Weil, who came from a Jewish provincial mercantile family in Baden, had gone to Argentina in 1890 when he was twenty-two, as an employee of a grain company in Amsterdam. In 1898 he had started his own business, and within a short time had succeeded in building his own company into one of the largest grain enterprises in Argentina, a worldwide undertaking with a turnover in the millions, which he managed in partnership with his two brothers. In 1908, the multimillionaire, who was beginning to suffer from progressive paralysis, returned to Germany. Paul Ehrlich and Sahachiro Hata discovered the drug Salvarsan, a cure for syphilis, in Frankfurt in 1909. Hermann Weil settled there with his wife, his daughter and his son (Felix, born in Buenos Aires in 1898), and, still a keen businessman, expanded the range of his capitalist activities by going into property speculation and meat trading. He continued to live in Frankfurt until his death in 1927.<sup>8</sup>

During the First World War, Hermann Weil had tried to be of service to the national cause. He used his years of experience and his contacts to observe the world markets, the grain markets and the food situation in each of the warring powers, and sent reports to government agencies in Berlin. Kaiser Wilhelm II liked the optimism and the certainty of victory in his reports. But Hermann Weil's over-optimistic estimates of the effects on the Allies of the sinking of grain freighters contributed to

making a pointless war even longer. His role in the war as the 'father of submarine warfare' was in the end seen to have been disastrous. But since economic relations with Argentina, which had remained friendly to Germany, started up again immediately after the war, Hermann Weil's import business soon reached new heights. He was able to appear as a generous patron of Frankfurt University and of various charities, and in the end was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Faculty of Economics and Social Science for his endowment of the Institute of Social Research.

As his father's son, Felix Weil had before him a striking example of the success of free enterprise. On the other hand, a life of that sort could not have appeared very attractive to him. He and his sister had grown up in Buenos Aires, where neither their father nor their mother gave the children very much of their time; they were brought up by a governess and by other servants. In Frankfurt, Felix Weil lived at his grandmother's to begin with, and then, together with the rest of the family, in a hotel, until his father's villa was completed. Perhaps because of a bad conscience over his son's loveless childhood and youth, the father did not insist on his taking up a career in business or any other financial profession. Felix Weil became neither a genuine businessman nor a genuine scholar nor a genuine artist, but instead a patron of the left (after his mother's death in 1913 he had already inherited a million gold pesos) and a part-time scholar. He was one of those young people who had been politicized by the war and the November Revolution, who were convinced of the practicality and superiority of socialism as a more advanced form of economic organization, and who devoted themselves to the study of socialist theories so that they could take up leading positions in the workers' movement or in a new socialist order as soon as possible. But he kept himself at a certain distance while devoting himself to this goal. As a 'salon Bolshevik' (as he described himself in 1973 in a lecture on the fiftieth anniversary of the Institute of Social Research), Weil worked in the 1920s on the periphery of the right wing of the German Communist Party (KPD). He never became a member, although he was a close friend of Clara Zetkin and Paul Frölich,<sup>10</sup> and had married the daughter of an older socialist who was a good friend of Zetkin. He was a principal financier of Malik Verlag in Berlin, which published the first edition of Georg Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*. He assisted left-wing artists such as Georg Grosz. His first gesture of support for Grosz, who was not even personally known to him at the time, was at the beginning of the 1920s, when there was still terrible poverty in Germany. Weil financed a trip to Italy for Grosz and his wife and accommodated them generously in the Castello Brown in Portofino, which he had rented. He also helped the former Communist Party leader Ernst Meyer and his wife, who had fallen into disfavour and were both ill, by financing an extended vacation for them.

Above all, however, he was making efforts to promote Marxist theory.

This too involved fringe contacts with the German Communist Party (KPD). In its early stages, the party was not yet bound down to the interests of the Soviet Union or the Bolshevik path to socialism. The KPD had developed out of a left-wing movement within German Social Democracy, and, unlike other Communist Parties, could claim origins which were independent of the Russian Revolution. Shortly before the merger of the Spartacus League and the International Communists of Germany (the `Bremen Left Radicals') into the KPD at the beginning of 1919, a national conference of the Spartacus League was held in Berlin at which Rosa Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches argued for the name `Socialist Party'. The name recommended itself, they said, since the new party's task was to build contacts between the revolutionaries in the east and the socialists of western Europe, and the masses in western Europe needed to be won over to the party's goals. The ultra-leftists and radical utopians won the day, however, at the party's founding conference. From the very start, the KPD's problem was that it attracted members from working-class fringe groups outside of the established workers' organizations. These new members were thirsty for action, but they had no political experience.

In March 1921 the KPD used the resistance by the workforces of several factories to a disarmament action carried out by the Prussian Security Police as an opportunity to call for a general strike and the arming of the workers. The party tried to goad the workers into action by carrying out bomb attacks on its own party branches, on the Victory Column in Berlin, and so on, but suffered a serious defeat, just as it had done earlier in the Berlin struggles of January 1919 and would do again later in the fiasco of the `German October' of 1923. All this might be condemned as `putschism', but it could also be seen by impatient young left-wingers as evidence of the party's willingness to commit itself to revolutionary action. On the other hand, some aspects of the party's `united front' policy, such as the effort to collaborate with the SPD and the trade unions, showed that it was capable of co-operating sensibly in practical alliances.

In the early 1920s the New Economic Policy (NEP) was being introduced in the Soviet Union and there were the beginnings of a *modus vivendi* between the Soviet Union and capitalist countries, following the failure of the revolution to materialize in the West. The period of crisis, and hopes for an internationalization of the revolution, continued in Germany, however. The `Bolshevization' of the Communist Party had not yet taken place, and there was still apparently opportunity for internal argument and theoretical discussion. At this stage a series of attempts were made by socialist intellectuals to reflect on the character and function of Marxist theory and praxis.

Among these was a `Marxist Study Week' (*Marxistische Arbeitswoche*) which took place at [BAD TEXT] 1923 in a hotel in Geraberg, near Ilmenau, south-west of Weimar on the edge of the Thuringian Forest. Its initiators

were Felix Weil, who financed the undertaking, and Karl Korsch, who had organized 'summer schools' in Thuringia in previous years. Apart from the initiators and their wives, the almost two dozen participants included Georg Lukács, Karl August Wittfogel and Rose Wittfogel, Friedrich Pollock, Julian and Hede Gumperz, Richard and Christiane Sorge, Eduard Ludwig Alexander and Gertrud Alexander, Béla Fogarasi and Kuzuo Fukumoto. These were all intellectuals, most of them with doctoral degrees. They were almost all associated with the Communist Party. Apart from Korsch, Lukács and Alexander, they were all under thirty. Significantly, Hede Massing describes it as a 'Marxist student meeting' in her memoirs. 11 The starting-points for the discussions were mainly seminar papers by Korsch and Lukács on the same topics as those of the books which they published the same year. 12 Korsch was working from the basis of radically democratic conceptions of socialization, and Lukács from the idea of a culture which had been assimilated thoroughly by every member of society. They both agreed, however, in looking forward to a self-confident, active proletariat which would see the world not from the point of view of a Kautskian evolutionism, nor from the point of view of a reformism which accepted an endless continuation of capitalism, but from the perspective of a materialist conception of history filled with the dialectical spirit of Hegelian philosophy. The quotation from Marx at the end of Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy*, 'You cannot transcend [*aufheben*] philosophy without realizing [*verwirklichen*] it', 13 had a special significance in the current situation. It meant that intellectuals who were prepared to ally themselves to the proletariat were to have an important role to play. There could be no question of 'curing' them of their intellectuality. Rather, it was necessary to transmit this intellectuality to the workers. The 'Education and Advancement of the Gifted and the Division of Labour' was considered as a topic for a second Marxist Study Week. 14

The meeting of intellectuals at Geraberg did not take place within a Communist Party framework, but merely on the fringes of the communist movement. It already heralded the difficulties which were to follow for relations between socialist intellectuals and organized communists, when mere preparation for revolution became a lasting state of affairs, and a party of professional revolutionaries started to mistrust both the masses it was supposed to represent and also self-critical members of the opposing camp. At the time of the Geraberg meeting, it seemed that everything was still possible. Korsch, who had been a *Privatdozent* at Jena since May 1920, and a member of the Communist Party since December of the same year, represented a rare attempt by an academic and an intellectual to demonstrate an openly revolutionary attitude. Lukács, who had been unsuccessful in various attempts to get his *Habilitation*, 15 a member of the Hungarian Communist Party since 1918 (see pp. 78-9), represented, by contrast, a Communist Party functionary insisting on the use and recognition of his intellectual abilities. Richard

Sorge, who was an active underground Communist Party member and research assistant for the economics professor Kurt Albert Gerlach, was already a Communist Party member whose intellectual activities only served as a cover for party work. Almost half of the participants in the Geraberg meeting were later to be connected with the Institute of Social Research in one way or another. In fact, the meeting was clearly the 'first seminar on theory' 16 held by the Institute of Social Research, the most astonishing and momentous of Felix Weil's undertakings as a patron of the left.

Weil's desire for an institutionalization of Marxist discussion beyond the confines both of middle-class academia and of the ideological narrow-mindedness of the Communist Party coincided with the reform plans of Richard Sorge's friend, Kurt Albert Gerlach. Gerlach was one of those academic intellectuals for whom academic freedom was part and parcel of a practical interest in the complete elimination of poverty and oppression. Born in Hanover in 1886, he was the son of a factory manager, and took his *Habilitation* in Leipzig in 1913 with a thesis on *The Importance of Protective Measures for Women Workers*.<sup>17</sup> Following this, he worked at the Institute of World Economy and Marine Transport in Kiel. During the war, this Institute devoted itself to solving the problems of the war economy, and was supported in this by Felix Weil's father with financial help, reports and publications. Gerlach became a left-wing Social Democrat and from 1918 on organized student meetings in his house for discussions of socialist theory. In 1920, when he became full Professor of Economic Science in Aachen, he was the youngest and most radical expert whom the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social Policy) consulted during an inquiry into the reform of university political science studies. In 1922 he was offered a professorship in Frankfurt, and at the same time the opportunity to set up, together with Felix Weil, an institute which would be devoted to scientific socialism.

The concurrence of circumstances which Gerlach and Weil enjoyed at the outset of their project was extremely favourable:

1 A wealthy father who wanted to go down in Frankfurt's history as a great benefactor, and who was hoping for an honorary doctorate. In 1920 he had already made an unsuccessful attempt to endow a foundation to promote (as its statutes described it) 'research and teaching in the field of social science, particularly on employment law', to promote social science institutes and support qualified students and young academics who were 'striving to resolve social problems scientifically in the spirit of social peace'. The elder Weil was even prepared to finance a left-wing social science institute on the model of the Moscow Marx-Engels Institute. This may have been merely to relieve his social conscience and advance the academic career of his son, who had turned out to be a sympathizer with Marxism, or it may have been in hopes of

encouraging trading relations between his company and the Soviet Ukraine. 18

2 Frankfurt: a city which had the highest percentage of Jews in the population of any German town and the best-known and, after Berlin, the second largest Jewish community. It was a city in which upper-class charitable activities were particularly strong, especially towards educational institutions connected with social, sociopolitical or economic studies. (The university, which had opened as an endowed foundation just before the First World War, had a Faculty of Economics and Social Science instead of the usual theology faculty.) It was a city in which the number of middle-class sympathizers with socialism and communism was unusually high, and in which the salon and café world formed a grey area of liberal middle-class life in which it was hard to distinguish those who were fully committed from those who were uncommitted in their dissociation from their own class.

3 The Ministry of Culture<sup>19</sup> was dominated by Social Democrats, and, since it was intent on reforming the unmanageable universities, was glad to support any efforts which promised to encourage an increasing orientation towards social studies in further education.

4 Gerlach himself was a left-wing socialist professor who had gained experience at the Kiel Institute of World Economy and Marine Transport (the first institution in Germany in the field of economic and social science), who believed in the possibility of broadening socialist research and teaching at a reformed university, and had already drafted the initial plans for his own subject area.

Weil and Gerlach took two approaches in carrying out their project. Before contacting Frankfurt University, they contacted the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Education in Berlin. Weil, by his own account, stated his plans openly to the ministry, but did not do so in his negotiations with the university. In a letter to the ministry at the end of the 1920s, when there were disagreements over arrangements for the successor to the Institute's director, Carl Grünberg (who had fallen ill), Weil wrote:

The Privy Councillor, Herr Wende, will be able to confirm that in my very first discussions with him I mentioned that we (my late friend Prof. Kurt Albert Gerlach and I) intended to found an Institute to serve first and foremost for the study and broadening of scientific Marxism. When we saw what favourable working conditions were being offered to most of the sciences and even branches of sciences which had not counted as 'worthy of the university' until then (Business Management, Sociology, etc.), the thought forced itself on us that the study of Marxism could and indeed must be encouraged in the same way . . . Our efforts, which were supported by my late friend the former Minister, Konrad

Haenisch, met with the complete sympathy of the Ministry, which even speeded up the negotiations. 20

In the memorandum by Gerlach which formed the basis of negotiations with the university, on the other hand, Marxism was only mentioned in passing:

There can be few people today who can still be blind to the scientific and practical importance of the knowledge of, and research into, social life in its broadest sense. Social life is an extraordinary network of interactions between the economic base, political and legal factors, and so on right up to the ultimate ramifications of intellectual life in communities and societies. We need only mention questions such as international trade-unionism, strikes, sabotage, revolutionary movements for higher pay, anti-Semitism as a sociological problem, Bolshevism and Marxism, the party and the masses, the cost of living for different social classes, the impoverishment of Germany. Just as the theoretician in the empirical sciences can now less than ever proceed without contacting the pulsing life of reality, so too it has become impossible for the purely practical person to survive without cultivating ideas or without using scientific findings and methods to keep track of the whole complex web of economic and social interrelations . . . The economic and social sciences may now be said to have developed to a point at which, after decades of debate over methodology, sufficiently rigorous scientific conditions and prospects have been achieved or identified that it is possible to approach the study of social life with considerable objectivity no matter how the problem of achieving final and complete freedom from value-judgements may be solved. This is all the more so when the principle of pure research is what counts and not mere economic or sociopolitical statements. We may mention in passing that the collection of data and materials has now become such a massive task that it can no longer be carried out by a single individual on his own. It is only possible through large-scale organizations, and in any case the complexity of social interrelations demands intellectual co-operation and collaboration. The creation of an Institute of Social Research specifically dedicated to these tasks is therefore an urgent necessity, and would help to fill a continuing gap in the ranks of established university institutions. 21

For officials at the Prussian Ministry of Culture, the mixture of scientific Marxism and comprehensive social research was probably not a worry. For the Social Democrats, who almost completely dominated the political scene in the 1920s in Prussia (to which Frankfurt belonged at this time), bringing Marxism up to date in some form as a modern social

science was one of the projects they were planning for the universities. Carl Heinrich Becker, who was Minister for Prussian and German Cultural Policy throughout the 1920s, was therefore more or less in agreement with Weil and Gerlach from the start. Although he was not a Social Democrat himself, and by his own account may have even been a good monarchist before the Weimar period, Becker was valued by the Social Democrats as an expert committed to reform, and from 1919 on he encouraged the reduction of specializations in the universities and the introduction of interdisciplinary subjects. He emphasized sociology in particular, as it consisted 'entirely of an interdisciplinary synthesis', and for that reason was an important educational tool: 'The creation of chairs of sociology is an urgent necessity at all the universities. This means sociology in the broadest sense, including the academic study of political science and contemporary history.'<sup>22</sup> Opposition from professors in the established subject areas several of whom attempted to denounce sociology as mere socialism meant that sociology, a controversial and still rather vaguely defined science, was initially only taken up significantly in non-university further education (Adult Education Centres and technical colleges).

Apart from the goodwill and support of the ministry, the decisive factor ensuring Weil and Gerlach success in their project of creating an institute connected to the university but independent from it, and directly answerable to the ministry, was the generosity of its endowment in a period of poverty and financial restriction. The Weils were prepared to finance the building and equipment of the Institute; to pay it a yearly grant of 120,000 marks; to offer the lower floor to the university's Faculty of Economics and Social Science; and even, later on, to fund the professorial chair which the Institute's director held in that faculty. The Economics and Social Science Faculty, which was disturbed by the extent of the Institute's independence, was suffering from such extreme shortage of space as a result of a rapid increase in student numbers that it was soon pressing to speed up the establishment of the Institute. The Institute's opponents, such as the university's registrar, who feared that the premises might be misused for party-political purposes, only succeeded in having a clause included in the contract between the city of Frankfurt and the Society for Social Research to the effect that the use of the building for purposes other than sociological research was only permissible with the written approval of the municipal authorities. Authorization from the ministry for the 'foundation of an Institute of Social Research as an academic institution of the University of Frankfurt which will also serve the University for teaching purposes' came through at the beginning of 1923. Construction began in March.

The Frankfurt Institute was the second social science institute in Germany, following the Research Institute for Social Science in Cologne, which had started work with two of its planned departments, Sociology and Social Policy, in 1919. The establishment of the Cologne

Institute, which was set up by the city of Cologne, had been entrusted to Christian Eckert, who was also the first Rector of Cologne University, itself founded in 1919. Like Frankfurt University, the University of Cologne had been formed partly from an existing business college, and it differed from the traditional universities in its emphasis on economics and social science. Next to the Kiel Institute of World Economy and Marine Transport, which had been founded before the war by Bernhard Harms, and the Cologne Institute, the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research was the most important in the field of economics and social science. The three institutes, which are all still in existence today, had decisive characteristics in common (although this is less true of the Cologne one). They shared the status of university institutions which were not dependent on the university administration but directly answerable to the Ministry of Culture for each of the cities; the primacy of research activity; a readiness to exploit the advantages of a large organization; and a connection between the institute and the university such that, on the one hand, the institute's director was simultaneously a full professor of the university and, on the other, graduate students from the university took part in the institute's research work.

Marked differences existed between the three institutes in their financing and in the way in which their general outlooks had been established. Finance for the Kiel Institute was at first provided entirely by a sponsoring society which had been founded in 1913. The society, which had 200 members at the beginning of the First World War, and 2500 at the end of the 1920s, did not exercise any influence on the way in which the institute used its funds. These were paid into the university's treasury, which put them at the disposal of the institute's director. But a tradition was created by the fact that it had been founded as a 'Royal Institute of Marine Transport and World Economy at the Christian Albrecht University of Kiel', and through the patronage of people such as Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, who made it possible for the institute to acquire a complex of buildings on the Kiel Firth in 1918, that 'fateful year' (as the Kiel Institute's founder, Bernhard Harms, put it). Together with the close collaboration between the Kiel Institute and leading figures from business, the Civil Service and politics, this tradition ensured that the range of acceptable world-views at the Kiel Institute never went beyond the norms usual for a German university.

The Cologne Institute was financed by the city (budget in the first year: 120,000 Reichsmarks). The 'collegial system' and the fruitful 'collaboration between serious-minded individuals on the basis of opposing world-views' which Eckert mentioned in his description of the institute<sup>23</sup> were institutionalized in the form of proportional representation for each of the political parties. The former state minister in Württemberg, Hugo Lindemann, who was a Social Democratic sociologist, became director of the Sociopolitical Department. The directors of the Sociology Department were Leopold von Wiese, a sociologist

with a liberal background, and (at the request of Konrad Adenauer, then Mayor of Cologne) Max Scheler, as a representative of Catholic intellectual traditions.

Specific to the Frankfurt Institute was an institutional structure ensuring that the political spectrum represented at Kiel and Cologne could be extended towards the left. By analogy with the Society for the Support of the Institute of World Economy and Marine Transport at the University of Kiel, a registered Society for Social Research was created to sponsor the Weil family's foundation. But apart from the two Weils, who had the chairmanship, the society's members comprised only a few people who were either friends or acquaintances of the Weils, such as Gerlach, Sorge, Horkheimer and Käte Weil. Since the director of the Institute was to be appointed by the Minister of Culture with the agreement of the Society for Social Research, Felix Weil was able to decide who the director would be. And, since the director had practically dictatorial control over the Institute, Weil was able, through his power over the appointment, to determine the dominant ideological line at the Institute as far as it was humanly possible to do so.

For Weil, Gerlach would have been the ideal candidate: he was young, with a solid university career behind him, an 'upper-class communist'; but Gerlach died in October 1922 at the age of thirty-six from diabetes, a disease against which medicine then was still powerless. Two acquaintances in Frankfurt who encouraged Weil at this time with his plans for an institute were Friedrich Pollock and Max Horkheimer. They were 'rather older than normal for students, since they were originally meant to become businessmen and take over their fathers' factories', and they were 'the only students who were given their doctorates *summa cum laude* in the Humanities and Social Sciences in 1923 at Frankfurt University'.<sup>24</sup> However, they were not yet in a position to be considered for the directorship of the Institute. After Gerlach's death, Weil negotiated for a time with Gustav Mayer, a fifty-one-year-old Social Democrat living in Berlin. Mayer was a former journalist who had made his name with the first volume of his massive biography of Engels, which came out in 1919. He was Jewish, and in the 1920s had become Professor of History at the Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin. It quickly became clear that Mayer's ideological and political position differed from Weil's. For Weil, however, 'sympathetic collaboration' 'towards a common goal' between the sponsor and the director of the Institute was a precondition for the foundation to be able to fulfil its purpose. He had better luck with Carl Grünberg.

Grünberg was born into an Austrian Jewish family in 1861 in Focsani in Romania, on the eastern foothills of the East Carpathian Mountains. At twenty he went to Vienna to study law. His most important tutors there were Lorenz von Stein and Anton Menger. Lorenz von Stein was a conservative constitutionalist, who saw capitalist society as providing the best

possible climate for personal freedom to be achieved, so long as the propertied class, with the help of the state, never grew tired of keeping injustices in check by means of social reform. Anton Menger was a radical lawyer and socialist, who, in his works on the sociology of law, criticized the organization of private property from a rationalistic, liberal point of view. In 1892 Grünberg converted to Roman Catholicism, apparently in order to register as a lawyer in 1893 and take up a university career in 1894 as a *Privatdozent* in Political Economy at the University of Vienna. Günther Nenning's biography of him, the first detailed one to appear, states:

Grünberg came to Vienna from his Romanian homeland to begin his studies without any finances whatever. He financed his studies himself, supporting in addition his younger brother, who was also studying law and had come to Vienna with him. His legal practice does not seem to have produced any improvement in his material situation, as he gave it up again four years later for a modest but regular income as a court official. 25

During these years Grünberg wrote his doctoral thesis, nearly a thousand pages long, on *The Liberation of the Peasants and the Abolition of Manorial-Peasant Conditions in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia*. The thesis had been inspired by Georg Friedrich Knapp, a representative of the younger Historical School, with whom he had studied from 1890 to 1893 as a graduate student. Among Grünberg's other academic publications at this time were a 50-page article on 'Socialism and Communism' and another on 'Anarchism' for Ludwig Elster's economics dictionary, published in 1898.<sup>26</sup>

At the end of 1899, he was appointed temporary Professor of Political Economy at the University of Vienna, with the support of the socialist academic Eugen von Philippovich. This gave him a secure income, and he immediately gave up all his legal activities to devote himself entirely to academic work. In 1910 he founded the journal *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung* (*Archive on the History of Socialism and the Labour Movement*). Grünberg was a 'professorial Marxist', to use Nenning's term. Among his students were the later Austro-Marxists Max Adler, Karl Renner, Rudolf Hilferding, Gustav Eckstein, Friedrich Adler and Otto Bauer. Grünberg's scholarly and theoretical activities were not restricted to the academic field, however. He was one of the founders of the Vienna Adult Education Centre and the Socialist Education Association. Warned by the example of a colleague, the historian Ludo Moritz Hartmann, who was never promoted beyond *Privatdozent* because of his membership of the Social Democratic Party, Grünberg did not commit himself to any party until 1919. It was not until 1912, when he was fifty-one, that he was appointed to a full professorial chair, against considerable opposition; and it was not a chair in political economy as a whole, but only in recent economic history. It was not until the Social Democrat, Otto Glöckel, became director of the Department of Education that political economy was transferred to Grünberg and he was appointed director of the Institute of Political Science.

Grünberg had suggested to Otto Glöckel in 1919 the creation in Vienna of a 'study and research institute on the model of the Paris Musée Social', with Karl Kautsky to be appointed as its director. But the Austrian Social Democrats felt that their position was too weak to carry the project through. When Felix Weil offered him the post of director of the Frankfurt Institute, Grünberg saw a chance to carry out his plans after all, under his own directorship, while escaping the excessive burden of official and unofficial duties which he had in Vienna. For his part, Weil had found in Grünberg a director for the Institute who was both a convinced Marxist and a recognized scholar. The Faculty of Economics and Social Science in Frankfurt agreed to Grünberg at once and voted unanimously at the beginning of January 1923 to nominate him to the ministry for appointment to the professorial chair funded by the Society for Social Research.

Weil could hardly have found anyone more suited to his purposes. Even if Korsch or Lukács had been prepared to take on the directorship of the Frankfurt Institute, they could not have been considered, since they were politically active communists and would have provoked open protests from the whole university. A socialist academic such as Wilbrandt would not nearly have met Weil's ideological and political expectations. Wilbrandt had earlier produced highly intelligent interpretations of Marx and Marxism, but had then rejected them and tended towards an attitude of resignation, due to the way in which the Weimar Republic had developed after the winter of the Revolution. The two other well-known 'socialists' who held professorial chairs in Germany at the time, Franz Oppenheimer and Johannes Plenge, would have met Weil's requirements even less. Oppenheimer had originally been a medical doctor, then an economic scientist, and since 1919 he had been full Professor of Sociology and Economic Theory at Frankfurt. His was the first chair of sociology in Germany, and had been funded by the Frankfurt Consul Dr Karl Kotzenburg especially for Oppenheimer, who was a friend of his. As a universal means of liberating society from exploitation, Oppenheimer favoured the conquest of the 'land barrier', i.e. the abolition of large-scale private landholdings, which he held to be the cause of the migration to the cities that produced a surplus of urban workers. Since 1913 Plenge had been full Professor of Political Science in Münster, where he had founded the Political Science Teaching Institute (Staatswissenschaftliche Unterrichtsinstitut). Prompted by the experience of national solidarity during the war and in the war economy, he favoured a form of organizational national socialism whose task would be to produce a sense of national community between capital and labour.

When Grünberg started work in Frankfurt, the revolutionary period seemed to be over for the moment, although revolution and communism were still current as topics of discussion. Nineteen hundred and twenty-three had been the year of greatest crisis, with strikes and attempted coups from both left and right wings. The influence of the German

Communist Party (KPD) had increased in the regional and district elections, and this development continued even after the value of the mark stabilized in November 1923 and after the temporary banning of the KPD in the winter of 1923-4. In the general election to the Reichstag in May 1924, the KPD, with 3.7 million votes, had 12.6 per cent, trailing the Social Democrats with 20.5 per cent, the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (German National People's Party) with 19.5 per cent and the Zentrum/Bayrische Volkspartei (Centre/Bavarian People's Party) with 16.6 per cent. The fact that the KPD had been banned, following the miserable failure of its attempted insurrection in October 1923, had hardly damaged its image at all. It held its Ninth Party Conference in Frankfurt from 7 to 10 April 1924. Since arrest warrants were still out against many party officials even after the lifting of the ban on the party itself on 1 March, the conference was held illegally. The trade fair was going on at the same time, and the gathering of 163 delegates did not attract any notice. It was only in April that the police (who were under the control of tolerant Social Democrats) found out that the Communist Party Conference had been held in a religious hostel in Frankfurt. This sort of affair could only reinforce the KPD's image as a radical and active political party, giving it influence and weight beyond the numbers of its actual members.

'Weil's heartfelt wish', recalled Rosa Meyer-Leviné, 'was still to create a foundation similar to the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow equipped with a staff of professors and students, with libraries and archives and one day to present it to a German Soviet Republic.' 27

The Professorial Marxist, Carl Grünberg, Establishes an Institute for Research on the History of Socialism and the Labour Movement

On Sunday, 22 June 1924, at 11 a.m., the academic ceremony celebrating the opening of the Institute of Social Research was held in the hall of Frankfurt University. The Institute was a square building designed to be functional both inside and out. Grünberg took the occasion to make a speech outlining his programme. The *Volksstimme*, the SPD newspaper, described the speech as 'fine, deeply felt, clear and courageous', and in the view of the middle-class liberal paper, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, the speech was 'vivid and self-critical'. These descriptions of the speech scarcely mentioned that Grünberg spoke of the universities as teaching institutes, as institutes for the education of mandarins, and as factories providing society with mass education for its future officials. Nor did they mention that he emphasized this aspect in contrast with the significance of research institutes, among which the Institute of Social Research stood out in view of its particularly broad research character.<sup>28</sup> Nor did these descriptions of the speech make any particular mention of the fact that Grünberg contrasted institutes which had a

collegial constitution with the Institute of Social Research, in which 'a dictatorship of the director, so to speak', had been laid down. The newspaper reports referred, above all, to the part of the speech in which Grünberg provided information on how he intended to exploit the advantages of the Institute:

However that may be, in our Institute it seems to me that sharing the directorship, especially with individuals of other ideological or methodological viewpoints, is quite out of the question. It has been our intention here from the outset to maintain uniformity in the way we look at problems and go about solving them, and, so far as it lies in my power, this will in fact be carried through. But to clarify the nature of the scientific tasks which the Institute actually envisages, some general remarks should be made to begin with.

You are all, ladies and gentlemen, aware of the fact that we are living in a period of transition each of us senses this every day for himself . . .

There are pessimists who stand horrified and amazed in the midst of the ruins which the process of change brings with it, seeing so many things they were comfortable with, which were advantageous to them, which they had set their hearts on, fade away and disappear. They see the ruins not just as the ruins of *their own world*, but of *the world as such*. What they see seems to them to be not simply the dying away of something which was historically conditioned, which developed, matured and must now for that very reason decay. It seems to them, rather, to be death and corruption as such. What they really lack, however, is an understanding of the essence of life and in fact, even more fundamentally, they lack the will to live. That is why they cannot be teachers or guides to us, although they would so much like to be . . .

And then, in contrast with the pessimists, there are the optimists. They neither believe in the collapse of Western culture or of culture in general, nor do they alarm themselves or others with any such prospect. Supported by historical experience, they see, instead of a decaying form of culture, another, more highly developed one approaching. They are confident: *magnus ab integro saeculorum nascitur ordo*, a new order is being born out of the fullness of time. And for their part they consciously demand that what is outmoded should stand aside in favour of what is emerging, in order to bring it more speedily to maturity.

Many people, whose numbers and influence are constantly growing, do not merely believe, wish and hope but are firmly, scientifically convinced that the emerging order will be a socialist one, that we are in the midst of the transition from capitalism to socialism and are advancing towards the latter with gathering speed.

As I presume you know, I, too, subscribe to this view. I, too, am one of the opponents of the economic, social and legal order which has been handed down to us from history, and I, too, am one of the supporters of Marxism. A generation ago, I believed I still ought to raise doubts about the central pillar of scientific socialism, the materialist conception of history. But I have been taught my lesson by developments since that time, and have now given up my doubts. 29

With this, Grünberg identified himself with the materialist conception of history coloured by Social Darwinism, which had been publicized in countless Social Democratic pamphlets and speeches ever since the 1880s. Was this open profession of Marxism as an optimistic variant of historical determinism not an open rejection of the scholarly demand for scientific objectivity?

I need not emphasize the fact that when I speak of Marxism here I do not mean it in a party-political sense, but in a purely scientific one, as a term for an economic system complete in itself, for a particular ideology and for a clearly delineated research methodology . . . It has long since been shown that the materialist conception of history is not intent on brooding away over eternal categories or on attaining to the 'thing-in-itself'. Nor does it aim to explore the relation between the mental and the physical world. Real social events, social existence in its never-ending, constantly renewed transformations are the objects of its attention. The ultimate causes of this process of transformation, so far as they can be ascertained, and the laws according to which it develops these are the objects of its inquiries. It is found that the driving pressure of the material interests which are systematically at work in economic life, and their collision one with another, produce a regular progression from lesser to greater perfection. And just as, from the point of view of the materialist conception of history, every single expression of the life of society is a reflection of the current form of economic life, so, equally, all history except in primitive conditions appears to be a series of class struggles. The materialist conception of history considers itself capable of recognizing and demonstrating that socialism is the goal of human development under concrete historical conditions but no more than that. How future socialist society will be structured in detail, and how it will function, lies outside the methodological scope of Marxist research and explanation, since it would otherwise lose touch with reality and lose itself in prophecies and utopian fantasies.

Grünberg saw the scientific nature of the Marxism which he represented as being guaranteed by the fact that he distinguished historical

materialism from metaphysical materialism and presented it as a teleological variant of the later Historical School's view of history. To this he added an argument for pluralism:

Up till now Marxism, as an economic and sociological system, has been to a great extent neglected at German universities, in considerable contrast with those of other countries indeed, in practice, it has been reluctantly tolerated at best. In the new research institute, Marxism will from now on have a home, just as the theoretical and politico-economic doctrines of liberalism, of the Historical School and of state socialism have at other universities. 30

Just as straightforward as this argumentation was the comment with which Grünberg tried to allay the suspicion that he was committed to a dogma. Everyone was guided by ideology; ideology was the very driving force of scientific research. What was required was 'incessant self-examination to see whether mistakes may have been made in the choice of starting-point and goal, or on the path between the two, or in the way in which it has been followed, i.e. in the method of procedure'. Christian Eckert of the Cologne Research Institute of Sociology had seen things in a similarly uncomplicated way when he wrote, 'Certainly every researcher works from the basis of a certain viewpoint, and is consciously or unconsciously grounded in it. He remains dependent on the world-view which the course of his life has prescribed for him. But, with intense self-discipline, he has accustomed himself to remain cautious and critical in all of his inquiries.'<sup>31</sup>

The problem of objectivity in social science, which had been discussed in outline by Max Weber when he took over the editorship of the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik* in 1904, and by others as well, was left suspended. Neither Grünberg nor Eckert asked himself whether a Social Democrat practising self-examination or a middle-class liberal practising self-discipline would ever be able to agree on their research results or even reach mutual understanding to the extent that it would be possible to speak of scientific knowledge. What was 'self-examination' intended to mean for someone like Grünberg, who described the goal of historical-materialist research, i.e. the investigation of the laws of transformation of social existence, as the acceleration of the decline of the old and the emergence of the new? What was 'self-discipline' intended to mean for someone like Eckert, who described the aim of sociological research, i.e. 'true insight into the laws and forms of social co-existence and the preconditions for them', as the 'improvement of what has been handed down to us' and as a 'great social reconstruction of inherited conditions . . . instead of their ruthless overthrow'?

Let us remain for the moment with Grünberg and Eckert as representatives of the two most important German social science institutes of

the period. They were clearly in tacit agreement that, even among established and well-respected scholars, 'the supreme "values" of practical interest' were so decisive 'for the direction taken by the organizing activity of thought in the field of cultural studies' (Weber) that fruitful collaborative research work was not possible. At the Cologne Research Institute of Sociology tolerance and ideological pluralism came to a silent halt when confronted with the representatives of Marxism, even though among these were figures such as Kurt Albert Gerlach or Carl Grünberg, who were going about their scholarly work in accordance with principles which they had learned from generally respected professors. For his part, Grünberg welcomed exchanges of ideas between scholars with different ideologies and methods, but only on condition that research facilities existed through which sociologists guided by Marxist interests could carry out their research with the same freedom from disturbance that most non-Marxist university professors took for granted.

Professors politically to the right of Social Democracy could point openly to the distinction between ideology and science and could count on the setting of very wide boundaries within which their views would still be considered scientific by their colleagues. For scholars professing socialism, by contrast, the boundaries were in the eyes of most professors extremely narrow. In this situation Grünberg did not attempt to make Marxism secretly respectable at the university in the way that Felix Weil thought it could be done; nor did he try to discuss problems openly, as Max Weber hoped to do. What Grünberg did instead was to demand with self-confidence the same things for Marxist scholars which were offered to others as a matter of course, i.e. that their world-view should not from the outset be made a criterion of academic seriousness.

Grünberg's self-confidence sprang from his experiences in Austrian Social Democracy, within which in contrast with Germany there was room for communist positions. It sprang, too, from his belonging to an academic subject-area in which there had for decades been considerable scope for the discussion of social-reformist and socialist views. There had been socialist academics since the middle of the nineteenth century, even though they had had to struggle for recognition. However, a decisive threshold was crossed when someone began to present socialist systems and demands not as academic theories to be discussed among the learned, but as doctrines and programmes directed at the 'lower classes'. After the First World War, membership of the Social Democratic Party no longer meant exclusion from government-paid posts (*Berufsverbot*). But membership still meant being made an outsider and suffering hostility from colleagues.

When Grünberg professed his Marxism, it was thus a profession of Social Democracy. Marxism served the Social Democrats as an ideology, in contrast with their practical activities, which never went beyond the boundaries of middle-class social reformism. Similarly, Marxism

served Grünberg as a kind of regulating concept, in contrast with his practical research work, which never went beyond the boundaries of the historical method. In the preface to the first issue of the journal *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 32 he had described socialism and the labour movement in 1910 as an important subject of research which had been largely neglected by those following the historical method as it was generally recognized. The *Archiv* was to serve socialism and the labour movement as a specialist sociological journal. Grünberg had written to Kautsky, who was the custodian of Marxist theory for the Social Democrats, hoping that he would collaborate with the journal. To avoid giving the impression that the *Archiv* was competing with Kautsky, Grünberg emphasized that he was not concerned with topical theoretical discussions at the vanguard of the labour movement, but rather with the history of the movement and its theories. And the journal's characteristic attitude was indeed that of the historian trying to find out where and when what happened, although it also gave space to contributors such as Lukács and Korsch, publishing Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* in 1923. This produced an attitude to the topics of its research similar to the meticulousness of the textual critic. Grünberg's profession of Social Democratic Marxist ideology offered a corrective counter-prejudice against bourgeois prejudices which made it possible for specialists to give the same degree of attention to proletarian socialist topics as that taken for granted with other topics.

The Institute became a mirror of the *Archiv*: an institute for research on the history of socialism and the labour movement, on economic history and on the history and criticism of political economy. It created the conditions for research work of this sort. It supported others in their research and also carried out research of its own.

To begin with, it offered impressive research facilities. There was a special library, which in 1928 contained approximately 37,000 volumes, 340 scholarly journals and thirty-seven German and foreign newspapers. There was a reading room which, in the same year, was used by more than 5000 people. There was an archive which, as Pollock described it in a prospectus for the Institute published in 1930, contained 'a collection of documents on the history of the 1918 German Revolution and on events significant for the labour movement in the succeeding years, which is today already unique of its sort', and in which 'countless leaflets, posters, appeals, circulars, reports, letters, photographs, etc.' had been collected.<sup>33</sup> There were eighteen small offices for academic staff and for doctoral students, some of whom were supported by Institute grants.

The group of people working at the Institute matched the ideology and research interests of its director. Grünberg's two assistants were Friedrich Pollock and Henryk Grossmann. Pollock had taken his doctorate in economics in Frankfurt in 1923, and had been temporary director of the Institute until Grünberg arrived. When Grünberg offered him a position as research associate at the Institute, he accepted at

once. Grossmann joined the Institute in 1926 at Grünberg's invitation, also as a research associate. Grossmann was born in 1881 in Cracow, the son of a Jewish mine-owner, and had become a student of Grünberg's after studying law and political science in Vienna. At the end of the war, when he was compulsorily made a Polish citizen at the re-creation of the Polish state, he had to abandon his plans for a post-doctoral degree and a career in Vienna, and take up an appointment in the Central Office of Statistics in Warsaw. Eventually he became Professor of Economic History, Economic Policy and Statistics in Warsaw. 34 But in 1925 he lost this professorship on account of his socialist views.

Another of the Institute's very first assistants was Rose Wittfogel, who was the librarian. She worked with Richard Sorge, Gerlach's former research assistant, who later became a Soviet spy, and his wife Christiane Sorge, until the two suddenly disappeared in October 1924. They later surfaced as research associates of the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. In 1925 Rose Wittfogel's husband, Karl August Wittfogel, became a full-time research associate at the Institute. He had been asked to assist at the Institute by Weil and Gerlach once already, during its founding stages. The thirty-year-old Karl Wittfogel had been an active member of the *Wandervogel*,<sup>35</sup> then of the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) and, from 1921 onwards, a member of the Communist Party. He had been acquainted with Korsch since the time when they had taught together at the Proletarian Adult Education Centre in Schloss Tinz in 1920-1, and he had been active in 'Marxist Workers' Education'. His combination of interests in sociology and Chinese studies, and his commitment to socialist education, appealed to Grünberg. The authors of the volumes which came out in the series 'Publications of the Institute of Social Research' up to 1933 were all from the group of Institute research assistants so far mentioned: Grossmann, *The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System* (1929); Pollock, *Experiments in the Planned Economy in the Soviet Union, 1917-1927* (1929); and Wittfogel, *The Economy and Society of China* (1931).<sup>36</sup>

The rest of the group of people connected with the Institute is hard to define. It extended from doctoral students and scholarship holders, some of whom became long-term associates, to sympathizers who occasionally wrote a review for the *Archiv*. Kurt Mandelbaum and Hilde Weiss belonged to the first batch of graduate students who took their doctorates with Grünberg, and both of them worked with the Institute and the journal into the 1930s. Their doctoral theses were on *The Discussion of the Problem of Imperialism within German Social Democracy from 1895 to 1914* and on *Abbé and Ford: Capitalist Utopias*.<sup>37</sup> In 1927 Paul Massing, Julian Gumperz and Heinz Langerhans came to the Institute to write their dissertations all on topics in the fields of the history of socialism, the labour movement and economic conditions. These, too, were figures connected with the Institute who later, in Horkheimer's time, were still associated with it in one form or another.

And all of them were either members of or friendly towards the Communist Party up until the 1930s.

Paul Massing, for example, who wrote his doctoral thesis in Frankfurt on *Agrarian Conditions in France in the Nineteenth Century and the Agrarian Programme of the French Socialist Parties*, 38 became the Berlin correspondent of the Moscow International Agrarian Institute in 1928, and in 1929 a research assistant of the Institute in Moscow itself. In 1931 he returned to Berlin to fight fascism. After being interned in the concentration camp at Oranienburg, he escaped to France and travelled between the USA and Europe. Even after all this, he undertook a trip to Moscow in 1937-8, endangering his life, to announce that he was leaving the Communist Party. During the 1940s he again worked, in the USA, on projects for the Institute of Social Research.

Julian Gumperz was the son of a Jewish factory-owner who had emigrated to the USA at thirteen, become a millionaire, and returned to Germany after the First World War. Gumperz had been editor of the journal *Der Gegner (The Adversary)* from 1919 onward, had become Communist Party delegate on the advisory council of the 'Proletarian Theatre', had travelled to the Soviet Union in the spring of 1923, and was one of the editors of *Rote Fahne (Red Flag)* when he came to the Institute in 1927. After taking his doctorate with a thesis on *The Theory of the Capitalist Agrarian Crisis: a Contribution to the Explanation of Structural Changes in American Agriculture*,<sup>39</sup> he stayed at the Institute as an assistant through most of its period of emigration, during which he finally turned away from communism and became a stockbroker.

While Grünberg was director, there was only one exception in what was otherwise a homogeneous range of research topics. Leo Lowenthal, who had been receiving an Institute scholarship since 1926, was working on a *Sociology of the German Novella in the Nineteenth Century*.<sup>40</sup> When the book was finally published after the Second World War, it became clear that it was a work of Marxist sociology of literature such as hardly anyone else at that time was practising. In addition, Lowenthal appealed to Grünberg because of the extensive social and educational activities which he undertook in addition to his schoolteaching career (see below, pp. 65-6).

The role the Institute played in the preparation of the first historical and critical edition of the complete works of Marx and Engels was symbolic of its position as an academic establishment which was to a great extent beyond the control both of the university and of the socialist parties. Engels had bequeathed his own and Marx's unpublished works to Eduard Bernstein and August Bebel, or rather to German Social Democracy as a whole. The party members entrusted with the editing of these papers, Bernstein, Mehring and Kautsky, made no effort to go through them systematically or edit them conscientiously. They did, however, take the trouble, in their incomplete edition of the letters, to undertake countless excisions and alterations. David Ryazanov, an

early Russian Social Democrat, had already consulted the Marx-Engels unpublished papers before the war in connection with current political problems. With Bebel's support, he had edited a volume of selected works by Marx and Engels, and in December 1920 he founded the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, whose task he saw as investigating 'the genesis, development and spread of the theory and practice of scientific socialism, of revolutionary communism, as it was created and formulated by Marx and Engels'.<sup>41</sup> Under a contract with Bernstein, Ryazanov acquired the right to publish the manuscripts of Marx and Engels in Russian.

This all succeeded only thanks to the Frankfurt Institute's role as a mediator, which involved practical assistance and also the depoliticization of relations between the German Social Democratic Party and the Moscow Institute.

Since the posthumous papers of Marx and Engels are held by the archive of the German Social Democratic Party in Berlin, and a complete edition of their works is not possible without using these papers exhaustively, the first phase of the work will be carried out there . . . Photographic copying will be carried out for the most part by the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, with the greatest possible care and with a complete record of all peculiarities and special characteristics of the originals which cannot be recorded by photography.<sup>42</sup>

But collaboration between the SPD and the Moscow Institute, which had been made possible through the mediation of the Institute of Social Research, went even further. In 1924,

negotiations took place between the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow and the Society for Social Research (regd) in Frankfurt, on the one hand, and the Executive of the Social Democratic Party of Germany on the other, with the effect that an academic publishing house was founded on a charitable basis in Frankfurt am Main. Using the manuscripts in the archive of the SPD in Berlin, this publishing house is to publish a complete edition of the works of Marx and Engels in some 40 volumes.<sup>43</sup>

When the Society for Social Research applied to the City of Frankfurt for permission to affiliate a 'Marx-Engels Archive Publishing House' to itself, with Felix Weil and Friedrich Pollock as its business managers, the registrar, rector and pro-rector of the university protested. The party-political name of the publishing house alone contravened the university's charter, they held, according to which it was to teach the scholarly disciplines independently of parties, and without one-sidedness. The political police took up the case, checked the background of a number

of Institute members and interrogated several people, Grünberg among them. But even the 'findings' which were produced about Pollock, whose name most frequently appeared in police files, only showed how self-important and trivial this sort of snooping around for people's political convictions is. According to these 'findings', Pollock, together with Felix Weil in his capacity as a member of the board of the Society for Social Research, had had 'relations with the central committee of the Communist Party (KPD), had bought an archive belonging to the KPD, and was, like Weil, without any doubt a Communist who had had a not inconsiderable part to play at the time of the Munich Soviet'. 44 Grünberg assured the interrogators that he knew neither of any relation between his assistants and the 'secret archive of the Communist Party in Berlin' nor of any 'communist machinations' at his Institute.

Only Grossmann, as a foreigner, felt the effects of these suspicions at first. His application for a lectureship was delayed. The Faculty of Economics and Social Science had resolutely expressed its positive confidence in Grossmann, and the dean of the faculty informed the university senate in 1926 that the Frankfurt Chief of Police, 'without raising any objections to Dr Grossmann personally, had spoken against his registration as a *Privatdozent* for the sole reason that Dr Grossmann supported radical leftist endeavours although he had not actually drawn any attention to himself politically'.<sup>45</sup> Business at the publishing house continued practically unhindered, however, since the Ministry of Culture turned a blind eye to it. The Society for Social Research withdrew its application to affiliate the publishing house, and announced that the latter would be accommodated outside the Institute. When it was later discovered that the Marx-Engels Archive Publishers had been set up inside the Institute after all, the protests were only weak, as the genuinely academic character of the publishing venture had become apparent. A leading article under the headline 'Against Class Struggle' appeared in 1934 in the right-wing liberal newspaper *Frankfurter Nachrichten*, stating: 'We can confidently leave Marxism, as a theory, to decay naturally after all, we don't fight against Thomism either.' Only the actual practice of class struggle, it held, was to be condemned. However, during the years of stability, practical class struggle had begun to lose its significance. In the 1920s the publications of the Marx-Engels Archive Publishers amounted to only half a dozen volumes of MEGA, the Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe* (*Complete Works*), and two volumes of a journal, the *Marx-Engels Archiv*. Along with essays by Russian Marx researchers, part of Marx's *German Ideology* and the correspondence between Karl Marx and Vera Zasulich were published in the journal.

When Grünberg had to stop work in January 1928 following a stroke, he had been active in Frankfurt for only three and a half years. His health had already been poor when he came to Frankfurt, and he had thrown the last of his strength into setting up the Institute and putting

it on a firm basis. He survived for another twelve years after his stroke, mentally and physically paralysed, until his death in 1940.

He had created in Frankfurt a situation which was unique in the German (and not only the German) academic world. Marxism and the history of the labour movement could now be studied at university level, and anyone who wished could take a doctorate on topics in these fields. There was a full Professor for Economic and Political Science in Frankfurt who openly embraced Marxism. There was an institute attached to the university whose work was specially dedicated to research into the labour movement and socialism from a Marxist point of view, and at which Marxists such as Karl Korsch or the Austrian Marxists Max Adler, Fritz Adler and Otto Bauer could give lectures. The Institute's two assistants, Friedrich Pollock and Henryk Grossmann, were teaching in the university's Faculty of Economics and Social Science, in which Grossmann took his *Habilitation* in 1927, with Pollock following him in 1928. Grossmann was appointed to a professorship in the faculty in 1930. The editing of the works of Marx and Engels came to be recognized in practice as an academic task falling within the area of the university's work.

It was also unique for an institute attached to the university to have assistants and doctoral students who were mostly communists. They all belonged to various different groupings, however, not all of which were still represented within the Communist Party itself. For example, there were the Korschists or Trotskyists, who were in favour of communism, but denied that the development of Soviet Russia was a communist one. Among these were Heinz Langerhans, Kurt Mandelbaum and Walter Biehahn. Then there were the Brandlerians, who were in favour of unity with the Social Democrats and of interim solutions; among these were Ernst Frölich and Klimpt. There were Communist Party members who were (still) following the line laid down by the party, which had in the meantime become Stalinized, or variations on the party line. Among the latter were Fritz Sauer, Paul Massing, Willy Strzelewicz and Karl August Wittfogel.

Controversy over the succession to Grünberg in 1929-30 took place at a time when the special advantages of the Frankfurt situation were beginning to emerge very clearly. The University of Frankfurt was flourishing in the years 1928-32. Many of the professorial chairs were occupied by outstanding scholars. The university had a great number of institutes with modern equipment, and among these were several which had been set up here for the very first time, or were still unique of their sort corresponding to the progressive spirit of the university at that time.' When Paul Tillich accepted an appointment to the chair of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt in 1928 (there was no faculty of theology as at other universities), he saw in Frankfurt 'the most modern and liberal of the universities'.<sup>46</sup> It was not only Frankfurt's Social Democratic and middle-class democratic spirit which was to be thanked

for this, but also the cultural policy of Carl Heinrich Becker, a middle-class liberal who had been Minister of Culture since 1925 in the Prussian Government, led by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Otto Braun and consisting of representatives of the so-called Weimar coalition (SPD, Centre and Democrats). Since the Weimar coalition lasted longer in Prussia than in any other part of Germany, conditions there were more stable than in the rest of the country.

At the end of the 1920s, Marxism and communism were no less respectable in Frankfurt than they had been in the years immediately after the November Revolution. They were particularly important to young people from the better-off sections of the population. Leading associates of the newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung* still ranged from left-wing liberals to socialists, and well-known city figures such as Richard Merton were complaining about 'foreign infiltration' by 'socialists' and 'Reds'. Grünberg's retirement as Professor Emeritus in 1929 meant that his professorial chair was vacant, although he still held the directorship of the Institute by legal contract until 1932. When controversies over a successor to Grünberg began in 1929, Felix Weil defended his position with even more resoluteness than at the time of the Institute's foundation. In a long letter to the Ministry of Science, Art and Education, he emphasized that he saw the work of the Institute and his participation in it as his life's work. Although he had not, as he had originally intended, taken his *Habilitation*, and had only taught a course in one semester, this was only due to the illness and death of his father, which had forced him to devote more time than he would otherwise have wished to the needs of the family firm, which was actually of no interest to him. The task of the Institute, however, was first and foremost to serve in the study and extension of scientific Marxism.

Even though it is not specially mentioned in the name or in the charter of the Institute, the negotiations over its foundation, the published inaugural address by Professor Grünberg, our other publications, and the research and teaching activities of the Institute are all evidence of the fact that there is no question of it being merely an institution devoted to economics or sociology in general.

The Institute's tasks had been clearly discussed in the very first negotiations with the ministry.

At the opening ceremony for the Institute on 22 June 1924 in the University Hall in the presence of the representative of the Minister of Science, Art and Education and of the Senior President, and in the presence in person of the Mayor and other leaders of the state and district authorities, I myself, and Professor Grünberg in particular in his speech, publicly and programmatically laid down the Marxist character of the Institute.

Undisturbed by all the misunderstandings and hostility, the Institute`the only one of its sort in the world'would in the future continue consistently in its efforts to apply and extend Marxist theory in unconditional political neutrality. The appointment of a successor to the professorial post was for Weil not a matter requiring any haste. The first thing to do was to find a suitable replacement for Grünberg as director of the Institute. Such a person could `probably only be selected from among the group of those already at the Institute'. He found it strange that the ministry, in spite of his request, had not postponed the question of a new appointment to the professorship until he was in a position `to present a candidate from our own circle against whom no objection could be made on grounds of age or achievement'.<sup>47</sup> Weil succeeded in getting the ministry to alter the 1923 decree on the establishment of the Institute to the effect that the appointment of the director would not be made `in consultation with' but rather `with the agreement of' the Society for Social Research.

Academic opposition, on the other hand, also became more open. A Frankfurt professor of economic theory, Fritz Schmidt, complained in July 1930 to the Prussian Ministry of Culture that assistants at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research were selected on a prejudiced basis, that `a considerable number of communist and revolutionary students, in many cases foreigners' had recently gathered there, and that lively agitation was developing. He added, threateningly: `The ministry will not be able to remain indifferent to this, when the revolutionary communist movement in Prussia is at the same time being prosecuted as hostile to the state.'<sup>48</sup> He may have been referring to the edict of June 1930 by the Prussian Government, which made it illegal for civil servants to belong either to the NSDAP (Nazi Party) or to the Communist Party, and may have been using this as an excuse to make a more general threat to continue academic disputes with political means.

The Philosopher Max Horkheimer Becomes Director of the Institute. The New Programme:  
Overcoming the Crisis of Marxism by Fusing Social Philosophy and Empirical Social Science

In October 1930 Friedrich Pollock (who had been Felix Weil's executive agent since 1925), representing the board of the Society for Social Research, and Max Horkheimer, who two months before had been appointed Professor of Social Philosophy, signed a contract. Paragraph 3 read:

Professor Horkheimer becomes director of the Institute as of today's date. Should Professor Grünberg unexpectedly recover from his serious illness to the extent that he is able to return to work

as director, Professor Horkheimer will try to reach an understanding with him on the division of the director's duties. Even in the latter case, Professor Horkheimer will reassume sole direction of the Institute on 10 February 1932 at the latest. 49

On Grünberg's retirement as Professor Emeritus, the Society for Social Research and the Faculty of Economics and Social Science had not been able to agree on a successor to his professorial chair who would be acceptable to both sides. The successor also had to be acceptable to the Society for Social Research as Grünberg's replacement as director of the Institute. The following compromise was reached: the Society for Social Research would continue to finance Grünberg's chair in the Faculty of Economics and Social Science, if filled by a candidate acceptable to the faculty, until one of the other professorial posts became free. A new chair, which was to incorporate the directorship of the Institute, was established in the Faculty of Philosophy, and Horkheimer was appointed to this post at the end of July 1930. It was mainly thanks to Tillich, who was, like Adolph Löwe (the immediate successor to Grünberg's chair),<sup>50</sup> a religious socialist, and to pressure from the Ministry of Culture, that Horkheimer received the unusual appointment to a professorship at the university at which he had taken his *Habilitation*. But the Faculty of Philosophy had insisted that the chair be established not as one in philosophy and sociology, but merely as one in social philosophy.

There was an element of surprise in Horkheimer becoming Grünberg's successor as director of the Institute of Social Research. He was in no sense one of the 'close associates' of the Institute mentioned by Felix Weil in his letter of November 1929 to the Ministry of Culture. Pollock and Grossmann, whose books had started the Institute's series of publications, were far closer associates of the Institute than Horkheimer, who before 1930 had published only an unremarkable post-doctoral thesis and three or four articles commemorating other scholars. His wider involvement with the Institute had hardly been noteworthy either. As a *Privatdozent* in philosophy, he had held seminars on social philosophy at the Institute, and a book by him on *The Crisis of Marxism* was listed as volume 6 in the forthcoming issues of the Institute's publications series to which Weil referred in his memorandum to the Ministry of Culture. Horkheimer, in a letter to Felix Weil, later described the appointment as follows: 'We decided, on purely technical grounds, that I should become director of the Institute, simply because this was easier to push through than it would have been with Fritz or with you.' This was true: Pollock and Grossmann were politically suspect, Horkheimer was not. But Horkheimer, who until then had taken almost no part in the Institute, probably succeeded in becoming a candidate mainly because Pollock was prepared to withdraw in favour of his friend. With no hope of attaining a professorship in the normal way, Horkheimer was

pushing for the post of director, which brought with it the prospect of an accelerated academic career. The situation is described in Lowenthal's memoirs:

One of the things that occupied us at that time was the completion of Horkheimer's *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie*, which appeared as a book in 1930 . . . In 1929 a large part of the activity at the Institute was devoted to strategic planning, as it were. And we were successful: Horkheimer became a professor and director of the Institute.

The Faculty of Philosophy accepted his appointment as Professor of Social Philosophy on the basis of his 'great talent, his extensive knowledge, his epistemological training, his exceptional teaching ability' and his 'great success as a teacher'. 51

On 24 January 1931 Horkheimer gave his inaugural lecture on taking up the Chair of Social Philosophy and the directorship of the Institute of Social Research. The lecture was a masterpiece of considered stylization, and its thinking can briefly be summarized as follows.

The history of classical German Idealism reaches its peak in Hegelian social philosophy. According to this, the meaning of the existence of individuals lies in the life of the whole to which they belong. Idealistic speculation makes it possible to see meaning and reason behind the indifference of this whole to the happiness and virtue of individual human beings. In the course of the nineteenth century, with the progress of science, technology and industry, it began to be seen that the means existed of making the social whole less and less arbitrary and unjust towards individuals, and accordingly less in need of transfiguration. This hope was dashed, and the necessity for transfiguration emerged again. The projects of today's social philosophy are an attempt to meet this need. But it is based on a conception of philosophy which is no longer tenable. The present state of knowledge requires a continuing fusion of philosophy and the various branches of science. In both sociological and philosophical discussion about society, a single question has begun to stand out: the question of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychic development of the individual and changes in the cultural sphere. This, however, is a formulation in terms of today's methods and problematics of the old philosophical question of the connection between particular and general reason, between life and the mind (*Geist*). To obtain verifiable evidence here, the question must be posed on a more restricted basis, in terms of specific social groups and specific chronological periods.

One particularly important group is the working class. A start must be made with this group. It is therefore time for a social philosopher familiar with German idealistic philosophy to take his place at the head of a great empirical research apparatus and begin to use it to set up,

along with my associates, at least on a very small scale, a regime of planned work on the juxtaposition of philosophical construct and empiricism in social theory'. This involves a serious approach to the project of 'organizing inquiries, on the basis of current philosophical questions, in which philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians and psychologists can unite in lasting co-operation'. 52 In this way, Horkheimer implicitly concluded, the nineteenth-century project of using science, technology and industry to make the social whole less and less arbitrary and unjust towards individuals, and accordingly less in need of transfiguration, would be taken up once again and continued with the more developed methods of the present day and with far better prospects of success.

This struck a new tone, which was distinctly different from Grünberg's earlier testimony to a sense of living 'in a time of rapid development'. The new tone did not give the sense of melancholy which Horkheimer referred to in his lecture as being characteristic of Heidegger's 'philosophy of individual human existence', presented in *Being and Time*, the 'only modern philosophical work' of a non-transfigurative character. Horkheimer's tone was marked, instead, by a measured hope that real discoveries as opposed to transfigurative ideology could serve humanity as a means of bringing meaning and reason into the world. It was a tone midway between that of the young Marx, who had bargained on the realization of philosophy through the liberating activity of the proletariat, and that of the later Freud, who had bargained on the modest progress of science, still new in the history of humanity, and who had written in 1927 in 'The Future of an Illusion':

It does make a difference, to know that one depends on one's own strength alone. One learns, then, to use this strength properly . . . By withdrawing all its expectations from the other world, and concentrating all the energy liberated in this way on its earthly life, [humanity] may be able to ensure that life will become bearable for all and that culture will no longer oppress any.53

Admittedly, the new director of the Institute, who later published aphorisms in his book *Dawn (Dämmerung, 1934)* accusing philosophers of ignoring humanity's sufferings, left this very topic even more drastically out of his own inaugural lecture than some of the bourgeois thinkers he despised. Horkheimer seemed from the start to be acting from the conviction that he was the bearer of a revolutionary message, the safe preservation of which through all dangers was the most important single task even though this was at a period when the Institute's Marxist orientation had been openly avowed by Grünberg and Weil, when the need was great, and when controversial messages could still expect to gain a hearing. But the advantage of Horkheimer's position was that the Institute now had a director who seemed more trustworthy

to his university colleagues than Grünberg. And an interesting concurrence of factors arose for the development of Marxist theory: Horkheimer was attempting to overcome the crisis of Marxism by taking up modern developments in the realm of 'bourgeois' science and philosophy; he was connecting Lukács's and Korsch's recovery of the philosophical elements in Marxism with Scheler's incorporation of the abundance of empirical knowledge into philosophy and he was doing this against the background of the rejection by Max Weber and by Heidegger of speculation concerning any pre-existing meaning in the world and any supra-historical essence of humanity.

Under Horkheimer's directorship there was no change in the Institute's policy of support for young communist and socialist students and academics. Joseph Dünner, for example, a member of the communist 'Red Student Group' (Rote Studentengruppe), received an Institute grant of 130 marks per month, on the recommendation of Wittfogel in Berlin, to write his dissertation in Frankfurt on the international trade-union movement.

The decisive changes which took place did not imply a break with what Grünberg had achieved, nor with those colleagues still working in his spirit. In fact, the 'independent work of individual researchers in the areas of theoretical economics, economic theory and the history of the labour movement' continued alongside the collective research, as Horkheimer had announced in his lecture. In addition, the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, which in 1932 replaced Grünberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung* (the last issue of which had appeared in 1930), showed continuity both in its publishers and in its presentation. In an enlarged article section and a more systematic review section it continued to give space to those whose work was concerned with topics from Grünberg's time, and who had collaborated on his *Archiv*. However, because of the change in the emphasis of the Institute's work from social history to social theory, topics and points of view which had previously enjoyed a monopoly were relegated to the sidelines. With the new concentration on collective work, such topics became merely areas of interest alongside others. To those who could not sympathize with the incorporation of their previous research into a larger framework, this must have seemed a humiliation and a betrayal.

What in some respects seemed to be a betrayal of the Grünberg period meant in others, however, a return to the Institute's inaugural period and to Gerlach. Even before his memorandum on the Institute in his report on the reform of political science, Gerlach had already pointed out the necessity of reorganizing all areas of the social sciences and the fact that there was an 'urge towards greater philosophical and sociological unity', the ultimate goal of which was co-operation between specialists. He had emphasized the indispensability of 'broad approaches', since these alone could offer the researcher meaning 'from the perspective of life'. 54

A change in emphasis resulting from expansion was also evident in changes in the group of researchers who set the tone at the Institute. On 16 February 1929 the Frankfurt Psychoanalytical Institute of the South-West German Psychoanalytical Association had opened in the same building as the Institute of Social Research. Erich Fromm, an old friend of Leo Lowenthal, was among its researchers. From the winter semester of 1930-1 onwards he was listed as 'Dr Fromm (Berlin)' as a member of the Institute's teaching staff, alongside 'Prof. Dr Horkheimer', 'Prof. Dr Grossmann' and '*Privatdozent* Dr Pollock'. 55

An important collaborator with the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* from the beginning was Theodor Wiesengrund, who, when writing as a music critic, also called himself by his officially registered double surname, Wiesengrund-Adorno. He was a longstanding friend of Horkheimer, Pollock and Lowenthal. His wish to become an official member of the Institute was not met by Horkheimer and Pollock. This may have been partly because of Horkheimer's rejection of the 'interpretative' philosophy supported by Adorno, but it may also have been partly to avoid financial commitments to Adorno, who was well provided for by his family.

Lowenthal had initial discussions with Herbert Marcuse in Frankfurt in 1932 which led to his admission to the Institute after Horkheimer in 1931 had at first shown little inclination to bring to the Institute 'a student of Heidegger recommended by Riezler'. 56

These were all figures who, like Horkheimer himself, represented different sides of Weimar culture from most of those who had been associated with the Institute in the 1920s.

Horkheimer and His Assistants:  
A Biographical Panorama

*Max Horkheimer*

'Born in Stuttgart on 14 February 1895, as the only son of the industrialist Moritz Horkheimer, I was intended from the very first year of my life to become my father's successor as director of an industrial company.' So began the curriculum vitae which Horkheimer enclosed in 1924 with his application for admission to the examination procedure for his *Habilitation*. His father, Moses (called Moritz) Horkheimer, was a businessman, as his grandfather had been as well. Moritz Horkheimer had worked his way up to become the owner of several textile factories in Zuffenhausen, near Stuttgart. Stuttgart was at that time the capital of the Kingdom of Württemberg. Both parents were firm believers in the Jewish religion and, at least during their son's childhood, lived 'in a certain strict I wouldn't say orthodox, but at least conservative, Jewish manner'. 57 His father had achieved social recognition not merely through his commercial success but also through his patronage of the arts, gifts

to charity and patriotic commitments, particularly during the war. In 1917 the King of Bavaria conferred on him the title of *Kommerzienrat*, an award honouring distinguished businessmen, for his 'charitable activities in every possible field of social welfare', and in 1918 he was given the freedom of the town of Zuffenhausen. Horkheimer's father saw himself as a normal German to the extent that, even though he was forced to sell his 'Jewish business' in 1933, and later to give up his villa, he refused to leave Germany until the summer of 1939. His family, after all, had lived there longer than that of Mr Hitler, he wrote to his son in the USA.

Moritz Horkheimer's paternal authority was reinforced threefold: by the structure of the middle-class family, by his success as a businessman and by Jewish tradition. According to plan, the boy was taken out of school in his penultimate year, and started as an apprentice in his father's business in 1910. In the following year he met Friedrich Pollock at a dance. One year older than him, Pollock was the son of a leather manufacturer who had turned away from Judaism, and had brought up his son accordingly. So Pollock became for Horkheimer the first stimulus towards a gradual emancipation from his generally conservative background. It was the start of a close relationship which would last a lifetime. The friendship was sealed by a contract containing exact regulations on how, for how long and at what time of day debates over differences between them and decisions should take place, and the contract defined friendship as an 'expression of critical human energy, the creation of solidarity between all human beings'.<sup>58</sup> It was evidence of an effort, faced with the contrast between ideal and reality, to create a private stronghold from which the battle with reality could be conducted. Their awareness of that contrast was intensified by their reading together of Ibsen, Strindberg and Zola naturalist critics of bourgeois society; of Tolstoy and Kropotkin, social revolutionaries who advocated a form of life marked by asceticism and universal love; of Schopenhauer's 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life'<sup>59</sup> and Spinoza's *Ethics*, of Karl Kraus's paper *Fackel (Torch)* and Franz Pfemfert's *Aktion*, which was a forum of literary opposition to war and to the bourgeois world of prewar Europe, marked by its editor's radical political views.

Seeing that his son was in poor health and plagued by inner conflicts, Horkheimer's father applied the classical remedy in wealthy families: he sent his intended successor on a long trip abroad. Together with Pollock, Horkheimer spent the last eighteen months before the war first as a trainee in Brussels (with occasional sorties to Paris) and then in Manchester and London, free of any duties. When the First World War broke out, Horkheimer had just become junior manager in his father's business. This saved him for the time being from having to take part in the war, which he had rejected on principle from the start. But even his life as a junior manager gave him a bad conscience when he thought of the miserable existence of working people and of the soldiers out there

in the war. In journal entries and in his novellas (which he published towards the end of his life under the title *Aus der Pubertät (From My Adolescence)*), he tried to clarify for himself what it was that motivated children who had rich parents but were plagued with restlessness, what motivated successful but cold-hearted fathers, what motivated workers who were forced to vegetate in inhuman conditions. A key scene from a novella written at the beginning of 1916, *Leonhard Steirer*, illustrates the kind of answers which he found to these questions. The labourer, Leonhard Steirer, surprises his unfaithful girlfriend in the arms of the boss's son, whom he kills, and forces the girl to flee with him. Bitter and despairing, he tells her:

'If people like him can be "good", people whose pleasures, whose education, the very days of whose life are purchased at the cost of so much unhappiness to others, then what I did can't be evil. The difference between him and me is only that I had to act and had courage and strength, while he was able to sit in comfort and enjoy himself and never discovered what his pleasure was costing and that it was tainted with blood. He was no more noble than I am, but enjoyed his whole day and every kind of happiness, and on top of that had a sense of his own innocence; he took life as if it was due to him, he could enjoy it and be happy without a cloud in the sky, with nothing to reproach himself for, without a single thought of sin. I have to bear all of these things, I have been burdened and humbled, and always will be, the things which were good for him are not good for me. Johanna, if you are not inhuman and cruel, you must belong to me, just as you belonged to him! . . .'

Johanna Estland couldn't help thinking of what the dead man had said about life, about his pain and about the vague, mysterious sense of guilt he had had, which she had never understood and had always thought was just a symptom of his illness . . . She saw that Leonhard Steirer was basically right, that he deserved her love no more and no less than the son of the industrialist, and the thought made her shudder. For a moment she saw into the heart of the world with wide, horrified eyes she saw the insatiable, cruel greed of everything that lives, the hard, inescapable fate of every creature, the obsession with desire, which burns and tortures forever, which is the source of all evils and which will never be put out. 60

This passage, which combines radical social criticism with Schopenhauer's pessimism, also indicates the conclusions Horkheimer had drawn for his own behaviour from these sources: to follow the power of love, and to appeal to the bad conscience of the privileged few.

In 1916 a relationship began between Horkheimer and his father's

private secretary, Rose Riekher, who was eight years older than him. She was a Gentile, the daughter of an impoverished hotel-keeper. For Horkheimer, starting the relationship indicated a preference for an ordinary woman's tenderness, and at the same time a kind of symbolic marriage with the world of the socially underprivileged and of the workers. He took it for granted that they must be terribly outraged against domineering businessmen like his father, and expected 'an uprising of the people to achieve conditions of existence which would give them access to true culture', as he wrote in his 1916 novella *Arbeit (Work)*, which was dedicated to Maidon, i.e. Rose Riekher. His girlfriend lost her job, and a conflict between father and son started which was to last almost ten years.

In 1917 Horkheimer was conscripted into the army. Following a medical examination, however, he was listed as 'permanently unfit for service', and was not sent to the front. He observed the collapse of Germany and the November Revolution from a sanatorium bed in Munich.

Still his father's intended successor, Horkheimer took his school-leaving examinations, which had been deferred, together with Pollock in Munich. In the spring of 1919 he started university, studying psychology, philosophy and economics. 'Don't believe the lies about Munich . . . madness and injustice are *not* the order of the day,' he wrote to his girlfriend during the Munich Soviet Republic, which he observed from a rather dignified distance. After one semester, he and Pollock transferred to Frankfurt am Main because as he himself explained it in an interview with Gerhard Rein after the Munich Soviet Republic had been crushed, he had been mistaken for Ernst Toller. 61 He had been arrested, and life in Munich had become too dangerous for him. In the summer of 1920 he wrote to Maidon, 'We are faced with disintegration, demolition, decisive struggle a long way from the rise of a new community, but with all our boats already burnt behind us . . . Contemporary philosophy, together with knowledge of its immediate recent history, will serve me as a guide.' He lived apart from Maidon in his first years at university, until she finally came to Kronberg, an exclusive residential town not far from Frankfurt at the foot of the Taunus mountains, where he and Pollock had bought themselves a substantial house.

The Frankfurt professors who were of the greatest significance to Horkheimer were Schumann, a psychologist, and Hans Cornelius, a philosopher. Together with Adhémar Gelb, Wolfgang Köhler (at Frankfurt University till 1921) and Max Wertheimer (at Frankfurt till 1918 and again after 1929), Schumann was one of the gestalt psychologists, who at that time were thought to be among the most progressive psychologists. Frankfurt was their first centre of influence. They undertook a diversified programme of experimental research into the perception of gestalts (forms) which was concerned with providing evidence for and explaining the independence of the gestalt as a complete whole,

as opposed to individual perceptual elements and their combination. Cornelius, born in Munich in 1863, had come to Frankfurt in 1910 and for a decade and a half was the only full professor of philosophy at Frankfurt University, which had opened in 1914. He, too, had gained a reputation for being one of the initiators of gestalt psychology. His most important partner in the discussions on epistemology which took place at the `Villa Cornelius' in Oberursel, a town which lay, like Kronberg, at the foot of the Taunus mountains, was Max Wertheimer. Cornelius was active as an artist and art teacher, as a natural scientist and as a philosopher. In philosophy he supported one of the many variants of epistemological and psychological neo-Kantianism. What Cornelius claimed to support, freed from all the residues of dogma which were still present in Kant, was a `theory of the conditions of possibility of experience, which are rooted in the unity of our consciousness'. By emphasizing the role of perceptual experience, and the part played by the perceiving subject in giving perceptual experience its general validity, he believed he had overcome the mystical element in Husserl's theory of the `intuition' (*Erschauen*) of states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*). What he said in his address at the Kant Commemoration at Frankfurt University in 1924 gives an impression of his social and political ideas. He expected deliverance from poverty to come only from clarity of knowledge, from philosophy, and from an orientation towards the `members of that great republic of geniuses' who `across the centuries have been carrying on the discussion between spirits, regardless of the dwarves crawling about on the ground beneath them and among them'. 62

Schumann's and Gelb's gestalt psychology, and Cornelius's variant of neo-Kantianism, did not in any sense have a transfiguration of human existence as their goal, but this was only because they did not see it as a problem. They had no clear response to the problems of everyday life, which were particularly pressing in the post-war period. Cornelius sent Horkheimer, with a letter of recommendation, to study with Husserl in Freiburg for two semesters, and Horkheimer was deeply impressed when he met Husserl's assistant, Martin Heidegger. When he had finished his year in Freiburg and gone on to Frankfurt to continue his studies, he wrote to Maidon:

The more philosophy takes hold of me, the further I find myself moving away from what they call philosophy at this university. It's not formal laws of knowledge, which are basically completely unimportant, but material evidence about our life and its meaning that we have to look for. I know now that Heidegger is one of the most significant personalities ever to have spoken to me. Do I agree with him? How could I, when all I know about him for certain is that for him the motive to philosophize does not spring from intellectual ambition or a preconceived theory, but every day afresh out of his own experience. 63

Horkheimer was still being pressed by his father to take up a career in business and to separate from Rose Riekher. In Frankfurt he started to write a dissertation on *Changes of Form in the Colour-blind Zone of the Blind Spot of the Eye* for his doctorate in his main subject, psychology. This project was frustrated by the publication of an almost identical work in Copenhagen. Cornelius then encouraged Horkheimer, as his favourite student, to take a philosophy doctorate with him, with a dissertation on *The Antinomy of Teleological Judgement*, 64 and offered him an assistantship when he had completed his degree. It was only at this point that Horkheimer decided in favour of an academic career as a philosopher and finally turned away from his father's business profession.

Horkheimer's commitment to Marxist theory was just as slow and deliberate as this decision. It remained more or less his own private affair, and all the more so since, unlike Pollock, he was not prominent as an assistant of the Institute of Social Research. Another of Cornelius's students, Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno, who had known Horkheimer since the early 1920s, visited Horkheimer and Pollock in the summer of 1924 to get their help in preparing for the oral examination in psychology which he had just decided to take at short notice. He wrote to his friend Leo Lowenthal:

To cram the stuff up, I came here to Kronberg for ten days, where Max Horkheimer and his friend Pollock, both of them highly unconventional people, took me in in the friendliest possible way and drilled me in the strictest Schumann psychology. Both of them are communists, by the way, and we had long, passionate discussions about the materialist conception of history in which both sides were forced to concede on a number of points.65

In 1925 Horkheimer took his *Habilitation* with a dissertation on *Kant's 'Critique of Judgement' as a Connecting Link between Theoretical and Practical Philosophy*. The dissertation restricted itself to a discussion, based on assumptions drawn from gestalt psychology and Cornelius's transcendental philosophy, of the fact that formal purposefulness in nature, the purposefulness of aesthetic objects on the one hand and of organic objects on the other, did not show any accidental and miraculous correspondence between theoretical and practical reason, as Kant had thought. Instead, these were 'states of affairs necessarily produced by the connectedness of our consciousness' which could be conceived of in a purely epistemological way and indicated nothing more than that the realm of ideas and the realm of nature were not in principle separate.66

Horkheimer only began to step outside of the boundaries set by gestalt psychology and Cornelius's transcendental philosophy in his inaugural lecture as a *Privatdozent*, on 'Kant and Hegel', held on 2 May

1925, and in his first lecture course, in the winter semester of 1925-6, on 'German Idealist Philosophy from Kant to Hegel'. Soon after becoming a *Privatdozent*, Horkheimer married Rose Riekher, and in January 1928 he was given a salaried teaching contract to teach the history of modern philosophy. He had an inhibition which he felt prevented him from holding lectures without a prepared text, and had it successfully treated in psychotherapy by Karl Landauer, the neurologist, psychoanalyst and co-founder of the Frankfurt Psychoanalytic Institute. But Cornelius's hopes that Horkheimer would succeed him in his professorial chair were not fulfilled. Instead, Max Scheler was appointed, and, after Scheler's death, Paul Tillich. The titles of Horkheimer's courses during these years show that, by gradually expanding his range in the history of modern philosophy, he was moving cautiously towards a philosophical articulation of topics which had interested him from the start: summer semester 1928, 'Introduction to the Philosophy of History'; winter semester 1928-9, 'Materialism and Idealism in the History of Modern Philosophy'; winter semester 1929-30, 'Hegel and Marx'; winter semester 1930-1, 'The Enlightenment in England and France'.

The notes, written between 1926 and 1931, which Horkheimer published in exile in Switzerland in 1934 under the pseudonym 'Heinrich Regius' and with the title *Dämmerung* (*Dawn*), 67 illustrate the way in which he saw himself. They demonstrate the fundamental attitudes of a man who, in spite of his characteristic indecisiveness, single-mindedly pursued a smooth academic career in a way which none of the other theoreticians who later belonged to the inner circle of the Frankfurt School did. The notes include the same sorts of observation and reflection already seen in his novellas in *Aus der Pubertät*, along with ideas which were also to appear later, in Horkheimer's first important public statements, *The Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History* (1930), 'A New Concept of Ideology?' (1931) and *The Present Position of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute of Social Research* (1931).<sup>68</sup> The reflections on the role of Marxist theory and on the identity problems of an individualistic, middle-class left-winger found in *Dawn* do not appear so openly in any of Horkheimer's other works.

His primary concern was still indignation about social injustice, about the contrast between wealth and poverty. Horkheimer was here able to draw on his own experience as the son of a millionaire, which protected him from any suspicion that he was merely harbouring resentment. Like a baroque painter with a vision of the worms of corruption that were already stirring within the beauty of the living body, Horkheimer saw that

all of these dignified ladies and gentlemen are not only, at every single moment, exploiting the misery of others. They are producing it afresh, to be able to go on living on it, and they are prepared to defend this state of affairs with any amount of other people's

blood . . . at the very moment when this lady is dressing for dinner, the people she is living off are starting their night-shift, and at the moment when we kiss her delicate hand, because she is complaining of a headache . . . visits after six o'clock, even to the dying, are forbidden in the third-class hospital. 69

At the same time he found drastic, expressionistic words for the misery of workers and the poor. The 'basement' level of society was nothing but a 'slaughterhouse'. 'Most people are born into a prison-house.'

Without money, without any economic security, we are at their mercy. It is certainly a dreadful punishment: having the daily grind wearing you down, being shackled to trivial business, having petty worries day and night, being dependent on the most despicable people. Not just we ourselves, but all of those we love and for whom we are responsible fall with us into the daily treadmill. We become victims of stupidity and sadism.70

Horkheimer remarked on the excellent qualities of the privileged and the hopelessly wretched ones of the poor and the workers:

A millionaire, or even his wife, can afford an upright and noble character, they can develop every admirable quality possible . . . The smaller manufacturer is at a disadvantage here, too. He needs exploitative personal characteristics to survive. This 'moral' disadvantage increases as one's rank in the production process decreases.

The higher one's position in life, the easier it is to develop intelligence and every other ability . . . This is not just true for social achievement, but for every other quality that a person can have as well. Pleasure in cheap amusements, narrow-minded fondness for petty possessions, empty discussion of one's own concerns, comical vanities and sensitivities, in short the whole wretchedness of dejected existence, do not occur wherever power gives men and women contentment in their lives and allows them to develop.

Agreeing with Marx and Freud, Horkheimer also held that inequality, which had in the past been justified by its effectiveness as an instrument of progress, had no legitimacy in the conditions of the present day. It might appear that in earlier times achievements which accelerated material culture were only possible on the basis of a minority having significant privileges, while the majority had to make sacrifices. But at the present time it seemed to be the case that privileges awarded for not particularly brilliant achievements were obstructing the abolition of poverty, which was objectively possible.

To goad egoistic people on to the extent that they will condescend to take charge of an army of workers and employees, you have to offer them cars, fine women, honours and unparalleled security. But to get them to ruin themselves physically and mentally and continually risk their lives by going down a mine every day, a regular supply of watery soup and meat once a week is thought to be tempting enough. A strange psychology! 71

But who was there to read the verdict on this social order and to carry it out? The ones on top were able to develop every possible capacity and were either not aware or suppressed their awareness of the misery which was supporting them. The ones at the bottom were kept stunted and broken, and for their part too were either not aware of or suppressed the extent of their unnecessary suffering and of their own objective possibilities and collective interests. And the ones in the middle were trying to fight their way to the top by every possible means, or at least trying not to sink downwards again. Horkheimer made no mention of any tendencies towards economic collapse, or of any collective learning processes on the part of the proletariat. 'The socialist order of society . . . is historically possible. But it will not be realized through any logic immanent in history. It will be realized, either by human beings trained in theory and determined to achieve better conditions, or not at all.'<sup>72</sup> In Horkheimer's analysis, however, use of the theory to clarify conditions and a determination to achieve better ones were two distinct things. He saw the development of the capitalist production process, characterized by the increasing application of technology, as the cause of the continuing division of the working class into one part that was employed, whose daily lives were colourless but who had more to lose than just their chains, and another part that was unemployed, whose lives were hell, but who were not in a position to be educated or organized.<sup>73</sup> It was to underline the distinction he was making between 'knowledge of the real world', on the one hand, and 'experience of the total inhumanity of this [capitalist labour process]' and 'the urgent necessity for change', on the other, that he wrote:

The world in which the leaders of the proletariat grow up is not an academy but a series of struggles in factories and trade unions, disciplinary measures, sordid arguments both inside and outside of political parties, prison sentences and illegality . . . The career of the revolutionary does not advance through banquets and honorary titles, interesting research and professorial salaries, but through misery, disgrace, ingratitude, and imprisonment towards an uncertainty which only an almost superhuman faith can penetrate . . . It is quite possible that revolutionary faith, at moments like the present, is virtually inconsistent with great awareness of the realities, it could even be the case that the qualities necessary

to lead the proletarian party are found at the moment among men and women who are not exactly of the finest character. 74

However, precisely where theory and suffering coincided, revolutionary action and fearless commitment could not, in Horkheimer's view, be expected. The fact that `many people are poorly off, even though everyone could be well off . . . necessitates the poisoning of the public mind with lies and is driving this social order towards collapse'. Yet, among those people who suffered through this poisoning, Horkheimer considered only the more sensitive members of the privileged classes, who were also able to perceive the evil in the fact that there was no organic relationship between the individual and society, that each person's contribution was not duly recognized and that the good things in life usually fell to the worst sort of people. Horkheimer himself was one of the more sensitive members of the privileged classes. How did he see his tasks? To sympathize with those who were currently engaged in the struggle seemed to him to be rash. `Our bourgeois morality is stricter [than the Catholic clergy]. If anyone is harbouring revolutionary ideas, he is supposed to speak out at least, even when it's pointless, or rather especially when it's pointless so that he can be persecuted.' On the other hand, he criticized some of his colleagues: `Translating Marxism into the academic style seemed, in post-war Germany, like an attempt to break the will of the workers to fight capitalism.' The treatment of the topic by professors, the `professional intellectual representatives of humanity', turned the causes of class conflict into a generalized problem and allowed mitigating circumstances to be taken into consideration. `They support the system by discussing, in cultivated books and journals, the theory of socialist society in "scientific" language alongside many other problems, and by returning sceptically to the business of the day when they are finished.'<sup>75</sup> But how else was one to behave?

Horkheimer's thinking about this problem identified one essential goal: to keep `discontent with the earthly order of things', which had formerly been hidden by religion, free from any new types of camouflage by criticizing every form of metaphysics and by throwing his energies into the `scientific theory of society'. In this way he would be able to combine, at the level of theory at least, what had been split into two at the level of reality by the division of the working class: `factual knowledge' and `clarity about fundamental principles' that is, the `experience of the total inhumanity of this [capitalist labour process]' and `the urgent necessity for change'.<sup>76</sup>

This formulation of the tasks facing him guided Horkheimer in his criticism of his Frankfurt colleague, Karl Mannheim, whose *Ideology and Utopia* was the subject of his first extended article, which appeared in the final volume of Grünberg's *Archiv* in 1930.<sup>77</sup> Horkheimer accused Mannheim of clinging to a diluted variant of classical German Idealism `becoming human' as the metaphysical reality upon which the sociology

of knowledge was supposed to be able to throw some light and of presenting all historically and socially determined truths as being equally relative, and thus ideological. The determinedness and limitedness of knowledge are precisely what gives it its significance for the improvement of conditions which are determining and limiting: this was the version of a concrete, existentialist position (although he did not call it this) which Horkheimer was to support emphatically in *The Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History* as well. A science which took no account of the suffering, misery and limitations of its period would be entirely lacking in practical interest. Anyone who took the historical determinedness of intellectual ideas to be invalidating evidence of their mere relativity and vagueness, rather than evidence of their relevance to current human interests, was only demonstrating a disinterest in the real problems of those mortal human beings who were struggling with the outward afflictions of daily life.

What was lacking in Horkheimer were the audacious theoretical constructions produced by Marx and Lukács, and their view that the proletarian class was driven by the development of history to become a class for itself and to continue, with self-confidence and under its own leadership, what it was already doing anyway in an alienated form that is, carrying out the reproduction of society. Horkheimer's emphasis was on establishing that those living in misery had a right to material egoism and that it was not base to think that 'the improvement of material existence by a more useful structuring of human conditions' was 'the most important thing in the world'. It was 'not merely the principal, immediate goal, a better provision of the necessities for humanity' which depended on this improvement, 'but also the realization of all so-called cultural or ideal values'. 78

In all this there was an echo, which was not heard in his inaugural lecture in 1931, of the Schopenhauerian consciousness of the finiteness, physicality and solidarity of creatures, rather than the activist pathos of German Idealism. It was, in a way, as if an awareness of the finiteness and transitoriness of human existence was being given a historical-materialist backbone. The existential transformation of transcendental philosophy was once again being modified in a sociohistorical direction. Heidegger's position was that 'we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [*eines sachhaltigen Was*] . . . its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own', and Sartre's position later on was that there was no such thing as human nature, but that 'human beings are what they make themselves'. Horkheimer's view was that 'When the sociologist Mannheim speaks of the "being" Man, whose development takes place and is expressed through or within cultural forms, it is hard to know what he is talking about . . . To the extent that history does not stem from the conscious purpose of the human beings who plan and determine it, it has no purpose.' 79 Horkheimer saw himself

as a defender of Marxist theory in the sense that his position was a continuation of a line leading from Kant and the French Enlightenment through Hegel and Marx. But in the director's office at the Institute, which he had occupied since 1930, there hung a portrait of Schopenhauer. A passage from Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy* might occur to someone who saw Horkheimer sitting in front of this picture and who heard him referring in conversation to Schopenhauer as one of his most important influences. Korsch had written that one would have to regard Marxism (as the Marxist theoreticians of the Second International had done) as not implying specific attitudes to philosophical questions, for it not to seem an impossibility that a 'leading Marxist theoretician could in private life be a supporter of the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer'.<sup>80</sup> One of the Institute of Social Research's scholarship holders at that time was Willy Strzelewicz, who had come to Frankfurt in the summer of 1928 and took his doctorate in 1931 with a dissertation on *The Limits of Science in Max Weber*.<sup>81</sup> He was one of the young leftwing intellectuals whose break with the Communist Party was delayed by their enthusiasm for Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* and *Lenin*. Strzelewicz's impression was that Horkheimer was a middle-class philosopher who was close to Marxism and communism, who was half neo-Kantian, half positivist, a lecturer who enjoyed open discussions, who seldom mentioned Marx by name, and who thought just as little of Lukács's Marxism as of the 'interpretative' philosophy of Adorno and Benjamin.

### *Erich Fromm*

He sat there all day in the little shop he made his living out of, and studied the Talmud. When a customer came in, he looked up unwillingly and said, 'Is there not another shop you could go to?' This was the story which Erich Fromm told about his great-grandfather, Seligmann Fromm, who was deeply respected in the family and who became a character-shaping ideal for Fromm himself. Erich Fromm was born on 23 March 1900 in Frankfurt am Main, the only child of Orthodox Jewish parents who both came from the families of rabbis. His father was a fruit-wine merchant, but was ashamed of his trade, and would rather have become a rabbi. After two semesters in Frankfurt, Fromm continued his studies in sociology, psychology and philosophy in 1919 in Heidelberg, where he took his doctorate under Alfred Weber with a dissertation on *Jewish Law: A Contribution to the Sociology of the Jewish Diaspora*.<sup>82</sup> His school and university education were both accompanied by intensive private study of the Talmud. Nehemiah Nobel, rabbi at the largest Frankfurt synagogue, and Salman Baruch Rabinkow, a rabbi from a Hasidic family who had followed a Jewish Russian revolutionary into exile in Heidelberg, were living models for Fromm of

how conservative Judaism and humanism, religious doctrine and life, could be combined.

In the early 1920s Fromm taught at the Free Jewish School (Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus) in Frankfurt. He had helped to found its forerunner, the Society for Jewish Adult Education. It was called 'free' because, apart from the course fees, there were no restrictions on admission, and no one other than the teachers and students was to have any influence on the teaching programme. Its first director was Franz Rosenzweig, one of a marginal group of assimilated Jews from which many supporters of a return to Jewish tradition emerged. This return to tradition took place in response to the fact that before the November Revolution in Germany the great majority of the Jewish community had experienced only nominal equality at best, and even after the November Revolution the social situation of Jewish intellectuals was made extremely precarious by the growth of anti-Semitism. The return to tradition took various forms, among which were Zionism, Jewish settlement projects in Palestine or the USSR, practising a Jewish lifestyle with kosher food and observance of the Sabbath and the feasts, or the modification of philosophical and other positions in the spirit of Jewish mysticism. Rosenzweig hoped that the Free Jewish School would produce a renewal of the Jewish intelligentsia, which, as the core of the community, would provide it with a living relationship to the Jewish texts and thus with an inspired Jewish life.

It became an impressive undertaking. Between 1920 and 1926, there were ninety lecture courses and 180 working groups, seminars and discussion classes, with sixty-four teachers taking part. At its peak, in a town whose Jewish community consisted of some 30,000 people, over 600 registered students were taking part in the school's activities. Rabbi Nobel, who died in January 1922, and Martin Buber, who was active in the school from 1922 onwards, each attracted some 200 students to their courses alone. In the working groups, on the other hand, small numbers of students came together for intensive study. For example, when Gershom Scholem stayed in Frankfurt for some months before his emigration to Jerusalem in 1923, he read and interpreted mystical, apocalyptic and narrative texts in the original Hebrew with a group of less than a dozen students, Fromm among them.

Rosenzweig's hopes were not realized. The lecture courses were intended to finance the smaller, more intensive working groups, and to provide an introductory stage for those seriously interested in Jewish life, but during the second half of the 1920s the attractiveness of the lectures began to decline. The project, although it had been imitated in the meantime in a number of other cities, collapsed and was only revived again in 1933 as a protest against the Nazi rise to power.

Fromm learnt about psychoanalysis in the middle of the 1920s through another Orthodox Jewish institution. In 1924 the Jewish psychoanalyst Frieda Reichmann had opened a private psychoanalytic sanatorium in

Heidelberg. As Ernst Simon (a student in Heidelberg like Fromm and Lowenthal, a teacher at the Free Jewish School and an 'outpatient' of Frieda Reichmann's) recalled it,

The Jewish 'rhythm of life' was an integral part of the intellectual atmosphere of the community, which was purely Jewish. At meals, there were prayers and readings from traditional Jewish scriptures. The Sabbath and Jewish holidays were carefully observed. All of this earned the Institute the joking nickname 'Torah-peutic Clinic'. At that time, this was still very much to Fromm's taste. 83

Fromm trained as a psychoanalyst, married Frieda Reichmann, and opened his own practice in 1927. In the same year, he published his first extended study in depth-psychology, 'Der Sabbat' ('The Sabbath'). He later claimed to have been 'a good Freudian all through my student days',<sup>84</sup> and in the essay he came to the conclusion that 'The Sabbath originally served as a reminder of the killing of the father and the winning of the mother; the commandment not to work served as a penance for original sin and for its repetition through regression to the pre-genital stage.'<sup>85</sup> His knowledge of the sociology of religion and psychoanalysis, and his acquaintance with Buddhism, Bachofen and Marx, meant that Fromm was able to go one step further than his humanist, Rabbinic models, Nobel and Rabinkow, and to become a socialist humanist who had freed himself from Orthodox Judaism. The Fromm of the late 1920s and early 1930s, along with Wilhelm Reich and Siegfried Bernfeld, was one of the left Freudians who made an intriguing attempt to combine the Freudian theory of instinctual drives with Marx's class theory.<sup>86</sup> On top of that, he was simultaneously a practising psychoanalyst in Berlin, a lecturer at the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis and an assistant in social psychology at the Institute of Social Research.

The opening of the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis, with Karl Landauer and Heinrich Meng as its directors, and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and Erich Fromm as lecturers, was the realization of a plan formed by the Heidelberg circle around Frieda Reichmann in 1926. As a result of a whole network of personal connections between Erich Fromm, Frieda Reichmann, Leo Lowenthal, Max Horkheimer and Karl Landauer, the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis (the second to be set up in Germany, following the one in Berlin) was accommodated in offices at the Institute of Social Research. This was the first, even if only indirect, connection between psychoanalysis and a university, and it was followed in 1930 by the highly controversial award of the Goethe Prize to Freud, a public recognition of the founder of psychoanalysis by the city of Frankfurt. The sharing of the same premises also led to an institutional link between psychoanalysis and historical-materialist social research.

At the official opening of the Institute of Psychoanalysis on 16

February 1929, Fromm was one of the speakers. He gave a lecture on 'The Application of Psychoanalysis to Sociology and Religious Studies'. In this short, programmatic lecture, his view was that both psychology and sociology were necessary, precisely for the investigation of the most significant problems, and that among 'the most important psychological and sociological questions' was 'what connections there are between the social development of humanity, particularly its economic and technical development, and the development of its mental faculty, particularly the ego-organization of the human being'.<sup>87</sup> He sketched out the idea of an anti-metaphysical, historical anthropology, which would give a general, historical-materialist form to the historicization of certain psychoanalytical categories which had been undertaken by Wilhelm Reich and Siegfried Bernfeld. This anticipated ideas which Horkheimer was to develop later in *The Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History*. To establish the principle that psychology had a legitimate share in the investigation of sociological problems, Fromm, at the end of his lecture, quoted the words of 'one of the most brilliant sociologists': 'History does nothing. It possesses no monstrous wealth, it fights no battles. It is man, genuinely living man, who does everything, who owns everything and who struggles.'<sup>88</sup> It was a passage from *The Holy Family*, in which Marx and Engels defended Feuerbach's 'genuine humanism' against the illusions of speculative Idealism which were sustained by Bruno Bauer and others.<sup>89</sup> Fromm's reference to early Marx corresponded to the view held by Lukács and Korsch that the decisive element of the Marxist method consisted of tracing all the phenomena of economics and sociology back to social relations between human beings, in order to unmask their fetishistic objectification and conceive of them as being the acts of human beings themselves, which had somehow escaped from human control. But there was also an echo of another viewpoint, supported by religious socialists like Paul Tillich, who emphasized the necessity of radical socialist change for human existence to be fulfilled. They referred to an early Marx whose purpose in criticizing capitalist society was to reflect on the true essence of humanity which had been concealed by the pre-eminence of economic thinking. Heinrich Meng, one of the two directors of the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis, wrote in his autobiography, 'There were personal, academically fruitful contacts between our lecturers and the theologian Paul Tillich. One of his topics of discussion, for example, was 'The Young Marx'. He established in publications and in discussion how strongly the young Marx emphasized humanism as the core of socialism.'<sup>90</sup>

Fromm's work in the following years was seen as 'radical Marxist social psychology', as Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich among others testified.<sup>91</sup> Fromm combined orthodox psychoanalysis and orthodox Marxism to produce a scenario which was, on closer inspection, in fact a gloomy one. He wrote his first extensive study, 'The Development of the Dogma of Christ: a Psychoanalytic Study on the Social-Psychological

Function of Religion' (1930), to oppose the psychoanalytic interpretation of the dogma of Christ, based on the history of ideas, as it was presented by Theodor Reik. Reik had been one of Fromm's teachers at the Berlin Institute of Psychoanalysis, and his essay 'Dogma und Zwangsidee' ('Dogma and Compulsion') had appeared in the journal *Imago* in 1927. Fromm's criticism of Reik was similar to the criticism by Marx and Engels of their 'spiritualistic' Young Hegelian contemporaries:

He takes the uniformness of the masses for granted, and he is not trying to examine them in their objective life-situation . . . Instead, he fixes on to the ideas and ideologies which are produced by the masses and does not really concern himself with the real people who represent these ideas living human beings and their concrete psychic situation. He does not conceive of ideologies as human products. Instead, he reconstructs human beings from their ideologies. 92

Horkheimer was following the same pattern when, at about the same time, he criticized the sociology of knowledge. He accused the sociology of knowledge of 'putting considerations of intellectual history before inquiries into the complex ways in which the objective struggles of human beings condition their ideas', and of 'reinterpreting objectively existing contradictions as oppositions between ideas, "styles of thought" and "systematic world-views"'.<sup>93</sup> With both Fromm and Horkheimer, the nub of the criticism lay in drawing attention to conditions, such as the misery and oppression of the lower classes, which produced various ideas, world-views and religions. They went on to show that any view of intellectual phenomena which did not start with the fundamental role of the mode of production and the division of society into classes would be perpetuating the suppression of any awareness of the misery and injustice which were the basis of such phenomena. It would be doing this even when it was modified by psychoanalysis or the sociology of knowledge.

Fromm's Marxist application of Freudian ideas resulted, however, in an explanation of the stability of class societies which seemed to imply that misery and injustice would last eternally. Fromm's central idea, which gave a class-theoretical edge to Freud, was that the power structure of class societies reproduces the infantile situation for those who are subjected to it. They experience their rulers as the powerful, the strong and the respected. Rebelling against them seems to be pointless, and seeking their protection and goodwill through love and submission appears to be rational. The idea of God demands a willingness, even from adults, to submit to father-figures and to view rulers in a transfiguring light.

Reik had seen the homoousian concept (established by the Council of Nicaea in AD 325) that the Son was of one substance with God the

Father as a victory for the tendency opposed to the father; this was to be understood as analogous to individual compulsive neurotic symptoms. But Fromm saw the concept as an abandonment of attitudes opposed to the father and as the outcome of a centuries-long process of adaptation which did not affect the totality of individual psychological structures, but only a sector which was common to everyone. It was a process of 'adaptation to the existing real social situation', in which any hopes of a collapse of the ruling class and of a victory of their own class were so out of the question 'that it would have been pointless and uneconomical, from the psychic point of view, to persist in the attitude of hate' which was typical of the early Christian proletariat. Fromm's social-psychological procedure was to conceive of ideas on the basis of the lives and destinies of human beings. He insisted that religious ideas could not be reduced to pathological symptoms by analogy with psychoanalytical individual psychology, but had to be seen as the collective fantasies of 'normal' people that is, human beings 'on whose psychic situation reality has an incomparably greater influence than it does on those who are neurotic'. 94 This procedure had surprising effects. While his inquiries seemed, on the surface, to be marked by insights deepened by indignation about the increasing self-denial and psychic alienation of the masses, Fromm nevertheless took with rigid seriousness the Marxist view that being determined consciousness. By way of a general assertion (not based on any more detailed examples) that, in any group, father-hate and father-love must dominate alternately in accordance with the group's objective life-situation, Fromm asserted that religious ideas correspond exactly to objective life-situations, and only serve to reproduce them in an absolutely functional manner. Violent rebellion, powerless hatred of the ruling class and masochistic self-denial all seemed equally valid forms of behaviour for the poor and oppressed, and each type was psychically rational according to the situation. Fromm was clearly guided by the following logic: the real infantile situation of childhood, which neurotic individuals are fixated on in one form or another, comes to an end at some point. A thorough elimination of the illness was therefore possible, and there was some purpose in helping the patient. Class society, however, which condemned the greater part of its members to be infantile, was a lasting reality against which rebellion was understandable but was in no way more rational than psychic acceptance of it, just as the child's rebellion against its father was understandable but was in no sense more adapted to reality than respecting and valuing its parents. For this reason, rebellion did not deserve to be supported.

More or less parallel to the way in which he was applying psychoanalytic social psychology to the historical phenomenon of the development of Christian doctrine, Fromm began to apply it to a contemporary social group: the German working class. He did this in collaboration with the Institute of Social Research, which in 1930 appointed him to

a tenured position as director of its Social Psychology Section. In his letter of 1 November 1929 to the Ministry of Science, Art and Education, Felix Weil had listed research on 'The Situation of the Working Classes in the Past and Present' as one of the six research areas which had been developed in the Institute over the course of time. The larger of the two projects currently in progress, the first stage of which would take at least five years, would

attempt to provide information on the material and intellectual situation of important strata of workers. It is not only using all available material, whether printed or documentary (social security), but is also in the process of undertaking extensive independent inquiries. We have been assured of the co-operation both of experts and of leading workers' organizations in implementing this inquiry.

The first of 3300 questionnaires featuring 271 items were distributed before the end of 1929. Information about the research on the working class is only available from the period after the Institute's flight from the Nazis, i.e. after the final proof that the German working class was powerless. However, on the basis of other works by Fromm from the same period and of the questionnaire itself, we can make reasonable conjectures about what Fromm expected from the research project, which he was responsible for drafting and initiating.

Fromm had concluded his study on the development of Christian doctrine with the view that Protestantism stood at the threshold of an era of society in which it was possible for the masses to take an active attitude, 'as opposed to the infantile-passive attitude of the Middle Ages'. In the medieval period, Catholicism, with its 'veiled regression to the religion of the Great Mother', had offered the utterly infantilized masses the fantasy-gratification of being a baby loved by its mother.<sup>95</sup> When Fromm undertook an investigation of the relation between the objective situation, the psychic structure and the political convictions of workers, it might be considered that he saw Marxist and socialist views as a modern equivalent of the revolutionary religious ideas of the first Christians. In his book on *The Foundations of Christianity*, Kautsky had said of the early Christians that 'The class hatred of the modern proletariat has hardly ever reached the same heights as that of the Christian proletariat.'<sup>96</sup> But did this analogy not also imply that the holding of revolutionary views was a substitute for engaging in revolutionary struggle? And didn't the fact that revolutionary struggles were not taking place mean that, in Fromm's eyes, the mere possession of revolutionary views was an adequate form of adaptation by workers to their objective social situation in the age of monopoly capitalism? There was a question whether the rationalization measures of the late 1920s, which eliminated many jobs, and the outbreak of the world economic crisis in

1929, tended to increase the sense of impotence among wage-earners, rather than increasing their trust in the liberating progress of the productive forces. Even apart from this, the objective social situation was still marked by the division into classes which in Fromm's eyes made a decisive contribution to reproducing the infantile situation among the masses.

On the other hand, if Fromm hoped (in contrast to what the psychoanalytic social psychology which he supported would suggest) that his research would provide confirmation for the view that the majority of the working class was pressing for revolution, revealing unconscious emotional impulses and psychic structures was not necessarily the best way of going about this. Would a social-psychological analysis of those who took part in the Russian Revolution or in the Munich or Hungarian Soviet Republics, for example, have shown that most of those involved were in favour of raising their children without corporal punishment, that they were in favour of married women having jobs, or that they held other views which proved that their attitudes were deeply anti-authoritarian? The fact that such questions spring to mind at once shows how absurd the idea was that an empirical research project, no matter how sophisticated, would be able to reveal the prospects for revolution.

In his essay on 'Politics and Psychoanalysis' ('Politik und Psychoanalyse'), published in 1931, Fromm referred to Engels's letter to Mehring of 14 July 1893, in which Engels complained about the way in which the specific derivation of political, legal and other ideological ideas from the basic facts of economics was being neglected. Fromm praised psychoanalysis as having finally provided a means of following 'the path which leads from economic determinism through the human heart and mind and right on to the ideological conclusion'.

Psychoanalysis will assist sociology significantly here, since the coherence and stability of a society is not merely formed and guaranteed by mechanical or rational factors (compulsion by the authority of the state, shared self-interest, etc.) but also by a series of libido relations within society, and in particular between members of the various different classes (cf. the infantile ties which link the petty bourgeoisie with the ruling class, and the intellectual intimidation resulting from this).

Fromm maintained, with a rigorousness which did not flinch even in the face of glaring paradoxes, that the economy determined humanity's fate. 'The quasi-neurotic behaviour of the masses, which is an appropriate response to the damaging and pointless conditions of life they are inevitably faced with, cannot, therefore, be "healed" by "analysis". It will only be "healed" by the *alteration and elimination of these conditions of life.*'<sup>97</sup> Although he did not acknowledge it, this was reducing the

materialist conception of history to the absurd. First, it was shown that the tight functioning of society would not permit any radical change in the conditions of life; then it was said that only a radical change in the conditions of life would be able to change the behaviour of the masses. But even this sort of change in the conditions of life would only lead to the creation of the new ideological superstructure which the 'economic and social base would require'. With views such as these, it was only a matter of time before someone like Fromm, who was convinced that fulfilment in life was possible for everyone, turned resolutely towards a messianic humanism which offered an ever-present escape from the endless chain of being and consciousness.

### *Friedrich Pollock*

The frank, limitless enthusiasm which the thirty-two-year-old Friedrich Pollock had for Karl Marx was somewhat artless, although it did have its own appeal. Marx, when he was thirty, had 'worked out his philosophical, sociological and political views so clearly that, right to the end of his life, there was never anything he had to retract', according to Pollock. Marx had 'struggled untiringly right up to his death for the proletariat, regardless of obstacles'.<sup>98</sup> This homage to Marx was published in 1926 in a discussion of a pamphlet on *Proletarian Socialism (Der proletarische Sozialismus)* by Werner Sombart, a former supporter of Marxism and correspondent of Engels. During the 1920s, Sombart had begun to support a 'German' form of socialism, and had become an anti-Semite with intellectual links to Oswald Spengler, Johann Plenge and Othmar Spann.<sup>99</sup> Pollock objected to Sombart's reference to the phenomenological 'intuiting of general essences [*Wesensschau*]',<sup>100</sup> demanding empirical research instead. He rejected Sombart's claim that Marx and Engels subscribed to 'plebeianism' as a 'basic value', asserting that scientific socialism had the character of a natural science. And he rejected the accusation that materialist dialectics was part of an exclusively proletarian metaphysics of history mainly by appealing to references in Engels's *Anti-Dühring* showing that Marx and Engels had been convinced that dialectics had universal validity.

All of this was characteristic of Pollock. He was born in Freiburg in 1894, and it had originally been intended that he should take over his father's business, as in Horkheimer's case. With his indifference towards Judaism and certain conventional qualities instilled by his upbringing and reinforced by his simple, phlegmatic manner Pollock made a lasting impression on the sixteen-year-old Horkheimer, and they began a peculiar, but lifelong, friendship. Pollock was less horrified by social injustices than Horkheimer was, but he was also less apprehensive than Horkheimer about committing himself openly to Marxism and communism: when the Munich Soviet Republic was crushed in May

1919, he gave his passport to a Russian who was hoping to escape abroad; the refugee was caught, and Pollock got into trouble with the police. Although Pollock, like the others, studied philosophy, it was only a minor subject alongside his principal interest, economics, in which he took his doctorate in 1923 with a thesis on Marx's monetary theory. In an article 'On Marx's Monetary Theory' published in 1928 in Grünberg's *Archiv*, he complained about the 'unhappy division between the economic and philosophical elements in Marx's system'.<sup>101</sup> But he had a lifelong, philistine contempt for philosophical theory, and held to a pre-Leninist form of Marxist orthodoxy.

At the invitation of David Ryazanov, Pollock travelled to the Soviet Union in 1927 to take part in the celebrations on the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution. One of the results of the visit was his book on *Experiments in the Planned Economy in the Soviet Union, 1917-1927*, with which he took his *Habilitation* in 1928. The book was published as the second volume in the Institute's publications series, the *Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung*, and was written in a style similar to that of Carl Grünberg, the 'master of historical realism in the investigation of social existence', as Max Adler<sup>102</sup> described him in 1932 in the Festschrift published on Grünberg's seventieth birthday. In the preface to his book, Pollock acknowledged his debt to his 'friend, teacher and father-figure, Professor Carl Grünberg'. The reader was informed in the first sentence of the preface that 'a theoretical analysis of the material will follow in a later work', but this was never published. Pollock described the particularly unfavourable conditions which the Russian revolutionaries had faced at the outset, their tremendous, continuing difficulties, the often glaring mistakes they had made, and their constant changes of direction and frequent reorganizations. In the penultimate and longest chapter of the book, 'The State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and its Work', he used all of this to show how plans had been formulated in an absurdly inadequate way from the start, and had only gradually become more realistic. The book's style was soberly informative, but it nevertheless clearly indicated the sympathy, patience, fascination and even admiration which Pollock had for the 'heroes and martyrs of the planned economy' and their tireless efforts to construct 'a complete whole' out of various different plans, one which would, 'at its fullest stage of development, consciously and totally incorporate the entire economic process' and gradually guarantee 'the conscious structuring of the entire economic process and all of its parts'.<sup>103</sup>

Pollock believed that his description of the Russian experiment had disproved the assertion that a socialist planned economy was an impossibility. He put forward this proof in a rather odd way, however. In contrast to Grossmann, Pollock saw capitalism's weakness not in the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, but in the disproportions between the various different sectors of the economy. In his introduction, he remarked:

All socialist theories agree that the socialist economy, in contrast to the `anarchic' capitalist one, must be a planned and directed one, although this should not be thought of as its only characteristic. If the latter were true, economic systems as various as the economy under the Pharaohs, mercantilism, the German war economy, and even a form of capitalism completely dominated by cartels, would all have to be regarded as socialist.

Pollock therefore offered the definition: `When reference is made below to a "socialist" planned economy, it is intended to refer not merely to the economic, but also to the political conditions of socialism (a classless society, and hence the social ownership of the means of production).' But he chose to `leave politics aside entirely' in the book, 104 and his account was in fact basically orientated around the contrast `free market/plan'. The implied logic of his position was: (1) the selection of the topic of the socialist planned economy; (2) the demonstration, from the example of the Soviet Russian economy, that planning and directing the economy was possible; and (3) the conclusion that a statement had thereby been made about the possibility of a socialist planned economy.

But how could he exclude the possibility that his account, which left what was specific to the socialist planned economy `aside entirely', did not equally, or even better, demonstrate that a fascist or capitalist planned economy was possible? After all, his description of the Soviet Union as `socialist' rested essentially only on the Bolsheviks' declarations of intent. He quoted statements such as that of Trotsky from the period of the first attempt to organize a planned, market-free economy in 1920-1: `If we wish to take the planned economy seriously, if the labour force is to be deployed in accordance with the economic plan at each given stage of development, then the working class cannot be allowed to lead a nomadic life. Just like the army, it must be repositioned, redeployed, and re-posted.'<sup>105</sup> Pollock himself concluded: `It would never have been possible to undertake reckless economic experiments of this sort if food production had not been able to continue largely unaffected by them, and if the population had not been satisfied with a very limited supply of industrial productsconditions which do not apply in densely populated industrial countries.' Pollock himself expressly stated that `Ever since Marx, socialist theoreticians have all agreed that one of the necessary preconditions for establishing a socialist economic order is a highly developed capitalist economy.'<sup>106</sup> This all implied that what was happening in the Soviet Union had no implications whatever for the theoretical possibility of a socialist economic system or of a planned economy free of class domination.

With all his scepticism, Pollock did think that Russia seemed to be already nearer to socialism than the highly developed capitalist countries

were. Horkheimer shared this view although not publicly and hoped that humanity would replace 'the struggle between capitalist companies with a classless, planned economy'. In a note written in 1930, Horkheimer's view was that

Anyone who can see the pointless injustice of the imperialist world, which can in no way be explained by any mere technical inability to improve conditions, must see events in Russia as a continuation of the agonizing attempt to overcome horrifying social injustices. At the very least, he will ask, with a pounding heart, whether this attempt is still continuing. If appearances were to suggest the contrary, he would still cling on to the pure hope, just as someone with cancer clings to the dubious news that a cure may have been found. 107

But what was the cure that the Soviet Union was supposed to have found? Was a state monopolized by a party of professional revolutionaries closer to socialism than a state in which workers' parties were able to participate? In his book, Pollock also reported on the first draft of a five-year plan in 1927, and quoted a passage from it mentioning 'the art of the social engineer, whose vocation is to restructure the whole basis of society'. He also noted that, of the twenty-four leading members of the central office of Gosplan in the USSR, thirteen were engineers. His only reaction to this fact was to say that the engineers would need to be legitimized by "specialists and theoreticians closeted in their studies", whose work was usually rather looked down on'.<sup>108</sup> But was a form of social engineering that was legitimized by specialists and theoreticians not just as questionable a road to socialism as the organizing of capitalism?

By a roundabout route, via an acceptance of the need to organize and steer the economy using Bolshevik methods i.e. exploitation of the state's monopoly of power by an active minority methods that were natural to communists but abhorred by Social Democrats, Pollock and Horkheimer came in the end to share the Social Democrats' views on how socialism was to be achieved. In 1927 Rudolf Hilferding,<sup>109</sup> in his paper on 'The Tasks of Social Democracy in the Republic', presented at the Social Democratic Party conference in Kiel that year, wrote:

'Organized' capitalism in fact means fundamentally substituting the socialist principle of planned production for the capitalist principle of free competition. This planned, consciously directed economy is to a far greater extent subject to the possibility of conscious intervention by society, and that means intervention by the only conscious organization within society commanding the power of force, i.e. intervention by the state.<sup>110</sup>

In an extended review article on books dealing with the prospects for capitalism and for the Russian experiment, published in 1930 in the last issue of Grünberg's *Archiv*, Pollock complained that there was a lack of thorough analyses even by Marxists of the structural changes taking place within the capitalist system. 111 This might have encouraged Pollock's and Horkheimer's tendency to continue to put their hopes in the Russian experiment. Their goodwill towards events in the Soviet Union must have focused their attention on economic and political opportunities lying in the grey area between the free-market economy and the socialist economy. But, turning to the analysis of capitalism, it must have been obvious to them, even in the midst of its current crisis, how much room for manoeuvre it still had before the advent of socialism.

Horkheimer was the more talented and ambitious of the two, while Pollock was submissive, satisfied with his role as an administrator and economist. It was this which led to Horkheimer's becoming director of the Institute instead of Pollock, although Pollock was Grünberg's deputy, a close friend of Weil's, and had been a member of the Institute's staff from the start. Pollock's publications and administrative abilities, which were anything but inspiring, meant that there were no protests against this development, or at least none worth mentioning. By the beginning of the 1930s Pollock was thus firmly established in his role as administrative director and financial officer of the Institute, and as chairman of the Society for Social Research.

### *Leo Lowenthal*

Leo Lowenthal was proud to have brought Erich Fromm to the Institute. Among those who later became members of the Horkheimer circle, Lowenthal was, next to Fromm, the one who had the closest ties with Judaism during the 1920s. Like Fromm, he was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1900. Lowenthal's father, a middle-class doctor, had become a supporter of a mechanistic form of materialism and a firm believer in the power of science, in reaction against his own father, who was a strictly orthodox Jew. He encouraged his son to read Darwin, Haeckel, 112 Goethe and Schopenhauer. In the afternoons, Leo Lowenthal joined schoolfriends from prosperous Jewish families to read and discuss Dostoevsky, Zola, Balzac and Freud. While still at school, he also met Adorno, and developed a lifelong love-hate relationship with him, first in connection with Siegfried Kracauer, who was a friend and mentor to both of them, and later on in connection with Horkheimer, who was research assistant with Cornelius to begin with, and eventually director of the Institute of Social Research.

In the last months of the war, Lowenthal was conscripted into military service near Frankfurt, after taking special wartime school-leaving examinations. At the end of the war, he studied in Frankfurt, Giessen

and Heidelberg, 'without a definite goal . . . everything besides medicine'.<sup>113</sup> A tendency towards socialism went hand in hand for him with a return to Judaism. In 1918, together with Franz Neumann, Ernst Fränkel and others, he founded the Socialist Student Group in Frankfurt. In Heidelberg, at the beginning of the 1920s, he joined the socialist and Zionist students. At the same time, he started to work with the Free Jewish School (Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus) in Frankfurt. His first publication was a contribution to the book *For Rabbi Dr Nobel on his Fiftieth Birthday*, entitled 'The Demonic: Draft of a Negative Philosophy of Religion'.<sup>114</sup> Kracauer, who was at that time his 'closest personal and intellectual friend and mentor',<sup>115</sup> criticized the essay. Some of it, according to Kracauer, was reminiscent of Bloch and of what Max Scheler had allegedly once said about Bloch's philosophy, that it was a 'running amok to God'. On the other hand, Lowenthal was enthusiastically praised by Bloch himself, whom he had met in Heidelberg. In 1923, Lowenthal took his doctorate with a thesis on *The Social Philosophy of Franz von Baader: An Example of the Problem of Religious Philosophy*.<sup>116</sup> Baader fascinated him as a representative of an alliance between the church and the lower classes against the secularized middle class. This, too, was written entirely in the spirit of Bloch, who in his *Utopian Spirit*, published in 1918, had sketched out the utopia of a hierarchically structured corporate state, which would

take away everything miserable and disturbing in order to surrender it to a communal mode of the production of goods, an economy for the whole of human society, in which private economic activity is to be abolished. At the same time, it will cause suffering and worry and all the problems of the soul, which cannot be relieved by society, to emerge more strongly than ever, so that they can be linked to the great, superhuman, celestially deployed mercies of the church which is set, necessarily and a priori, in second place to socialism.<sup>117</sup>

Lowenthal and his first wife, who was a Zionist, belonged to the circle around Frieda Reichmann's 'Torah-peutic clinic' in Heidelberg from 1924 on. In addition, Lowenthal worked with a Frankfurt advisory centre for Jewish refugees from the East, who were usually left in the lurch and avoided by assimilated Western Jews because of their conspicuous affiliation with Judaism. During the mid-1920s he edited a *Jüdisches Wochenblatt (Jewish Weekly)* together with Ernst Simon. Like Erich Fromm, Lowenthal had a mixture of interests in Judaism, socialism and psychoanalysis, and towards the end of the 1920s this mixture produced a commitment to a theoretical programme.

From 1926 onwards, Lowenthal and Adorno were competing for the chance of taking their *Habilitation* with Cornelius. In the meantime, Lowenthal had become a teacher in a secondary school, an assistant at

the Social Democratic People's Theatre, and a scholarship holder at the Institute of Social Research. Neither Kracauer nor Horkheimer used their influence with Cornelius in favour of the one or the other, but in any case neither of them was in the end given the degree by Cornelius. Two manuscripts were produced, however, one by Adorno on 'The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Theory of Mind', and one by Lowenthal on 'The Philosophy of Helvétius'. 118

In 1930 Lowenthal became a full assistant at the Institute of Social Research. At the general election for the Reichstag on 14 September 1930, the Nazi Party (NSDAP) received the largest number of votes after the SPD, and 107 seats. Felix Weil, Max Horkheimer, Fritz Pollock and Leo Lowenthal met for a discussion on the following day, in the course of which Lowenthal urged Felix Weil: 'You must get the money together for us to open the branch office in Geneva. We can't stay here any more, we must start preparing for emigration.' 119 Lowenthal's main duty, in view of his previous experience in so many different areas, became the preparation and editing of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (*Journal of Social Research*), the new organ of the Institute, which was to take the place of Grünberg's *Archiv*.

#### *Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno*

'At the moment he consists almost entirely of Lukács and myself' was the sentence Siegfried Kracauer passed on Theodor Wiesengrund in a letter of December 1921 to Lowenthal, who was another of his protégés. Wiesengrund had been allowed to take his school-leaving examinations a year early, with an exemption from oral examinations, and had started university in Frankfurt at the age of seventeen, taking philosophy, music, psychology and sociology.

He perhaps lacks the philosophical eros which you have. There's too much in him which comes from the intellect and the will instead of from the depths of nature. But he has one incomparable advantage over both of us, an admirable material existence and a wonderfully self-confident character. He truly is a beautiful specimen of a human being; even if I am not without some scepticism concerning his future, I am delighted by him in the present. 120

Theodor Wiesengrund was born in Frankfurt am Main on 11 September 1903. (Wiesengrund-Adorno was the name registered at his birth, on his mother's request, and it was the name he used as a music critic in the Weimar period. During his exile in California in 1943, his final, officially registered name became just Adorno, while Wiesengrund shrank to the initial W.) His father, Oscar Wiesengrund, was a German

Jew who had converted to Protestantism around the time of the birth of his son, who was baptized into the Protestant Church, and he was the owner of a wholesale wine business which had been established in Frankfurt in 1822. His mother, born Maria Calvelli-Adorno della Piana, was a Catholic, descended from a French officer who had been a member of the Corsican nobility. Before her marriage she had been a successful singer. Her sister, a well-known pianist, also lived with the family.

Adorno had an extremely protected childhood and youth, marked above all by his two `mothers' and by music. When he was sixteen, already a highly gifted high-school pupil, he began to study at the Hoch Conservatory at the same time. His teacher of composition was Bernhard Sekles, with whom Paul Hindemith had studied before the First World War. Adorno's friend and mentor, Siegfried Kracauer, fourteen years his senior, whom he met towards the end of the First World War, took care of his theoretical education. They worked together on Saturday afternoons for years on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, taking an unconventional approach. Under Kracauer's guidance, Adorno experienced the book not just as an epistemological theory but as a kind of coded writing from which the historical condition of the spirit could be deciphered, and in which objectivism and subjectivism, ontology and idealism were joined in battle. In the spring of 1921, in his last year at school, he discovered Lukács's *Theory of the Novel*. Kracauer, at the same time, wrote a forceful review for the Frankfurt *Blätter für Kunst und Literatur (Magazine for Art and Literature)* of this `essay in the philosophy of history on the forms of great epic', with its distinction between the classical epics, on the one hand, as a form of epic writing concerned with the `closed culture' of a world filled with gods and with meaning, and the novel, on the other, as a form of epic writing concerned with the problematic culture of a world which had been abandoned by gods and meaning, an epoch of perfect sinfulness. In Kracauer's eyes, Lukács had recognized what was important: to keep alive `the flame of longing', longing `for vanished meaning'. In the same year, Adorno, having heard that Bloch was close to Lukács, read Bloch's *Utopian Spirit*. Looking back, he wrote:

The dark brown book, four hundred pages long, printed on heavy paper, promised something of what one had hoped for from medieval books and of what I sensed as a child in the pigskin-bound *Heldenschatz*, a late work on magic from the eighteenth century . . . It was a philosophy which could stand shoulder to shoulder with the most advanced literature, which had not been schooled into the despicable resignation of method. Ideas like `the inward journey' [*Abfahrt nach innen*], which lay on the narrow boundary between a magic formula and a theoretical proposition, were evidence of this. 121

Everything came together to make Adorno into a precocious young man who had been spared the experiences of war, politics and the working life, a 'hothouse plant', as he later called himself in a self-critical aphorism in *Minima Moralia*.

It was thanks to Siegfried Kracauer that Adorno became familiar with the most important ideas of his time on the philosophy of history and on the analysis of the contemporary period. Siegfried Kracauer was born in 1889, the son of a Jewish businessman in Frankfurt, and from his earliest childhood onward suffered from a noticeable speech impediment. After his father's early death, he had grown up with his uncle, who was a professor at the Frankfurt Philanthropin (Philanthropic School) and historian of the Frankfurt Jews. Preparing to build a career and earn his living, he studied architecture as his main subject, and only took philosophy and sociology as minor subjects. He had not been in a position to take the advice of Georg Simmel and devote himself to philosophy completely. When he gave up his architectural practice in 1921 and joined the editorial staff of the literary supplement of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, it was a compromise which he accepted gladly, allowing him as it did a professional involvement with philosophical and sociological topics.

The philosophical positions around which Kracauer orientated himself critically in the post-war years and the first half of the 1920s were, on the one hand, Simmel's relativism and his metaphysically shallow 'philosophy of life', together with the sharp distinction made by Max Weber between value-relativism and the ideal of scientific objectivity; and, on the other, Max Scheler's approbation of Catholicism, or rather of a religiously inclined phenomenology, along with Georg Lukács's approbation of Dostoevsky's work and of the Russian soul as a fulfilment of the longing for a world filled with meaning. He shared with all of them their analysis of the time as involving a demystification of the world and of the relations between human beings together with the inability of the sciences to point to a way out of the crisis. In his first book, *Sociology as a Science: An Epistemological Inquiry*, published in 1921, he expressly referred to Lukács's *Theory of the Novel*, the epistemological content of which he claimed to be bringing out more clearly. The first chapter began:

In an epoch pervaded with meaning, everything is referred to the divine meaning, in which there is neither empty space nor empty time in the way that these are conceived of by science. Rather, space and time form an indispensable envelope around all matters which stand in some definite relationship to meaning . . . The I, the You, all objects and events receive their significance from this divine meaning and arrange themselves within a cosmos of structures . . . the very stones are evidence for the divine being.

When meaning is lost (in the West, since the demise of Catholicism), when clearly formed faith is perceived more and more as a constricting dogma, as an aggravating fetter on reason, the cosmos which was held together by meaning falls apart, and the world divides itself into the multiplicity of existing things and the subject which confronts this multiplicity. This subject, which was previously

contained within the dance of the structures which filled the world, now descends out of chaos as the sole bearer of spirit, and before its gaze there open the measureless realms of reality. Catapulted out into the cold endlessness of empty space and empty time, the subject finds itself faced with matter which has been stripped of all significance. The subject must process and form this matter in accordance with the ideas it possesses within itself (and which it has rescued from the epoch of meaning). 123

For Kracauer and to the same extent for a whole series of related thinkers, such as Walter Benjamin Kant's critique of epistemology became supremely significant when it was viewed as a prolegomenon to metaphysics rather than as a sceptical rejection of metaphysics, as was the case in most forms of neo-Kantianism. The restriction of speculative reason to the sphere of experience had, in Kant's eyes, the positive virtue that it prevented the categories of the world of experience from expanding into every other conceivable sphere in such a way that there would be no more room for the practical application of pure reason. By analogy, Kracauer was concerned with defining the boundaries of a value-free sociology which claimed to be objective and necessary. In this way, categories which were only valid in immanent spheres would not be absolutized in such a way that other categories were suppressed which were appropriate to socialized humanity's sphere of transcendence.

This work is based on the supposition that there is a structured reality which, under highly transcendent conditions, incorporates both the world and the self to the same extent. Thus, it is intended as a contribution to the critique of every form of immanent philosophy, and above all of idealist thinking, so as to prepare on a small scale for the transformation, already barely noticeable here and there, which will lead lost humanity back into the new but ancient realms of a reality pervaded by God. 124

Unlike Scheler and Lukács, whose 'religious urge and metaphysical passion' he admired but could not share,<sup>125</sup> and quite unlike Bloch, whom he held up before Lowenthal as a warning example of 'fornicating with God', Kracauer was one of 'Those Who Wait'. In an article with this title published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1922, the style of which was inspired by Nietzsche, he sketched out some of the paths along which many people at that time believed they had found a new spiritual home, not so much (he believed) in reaction to the 'chaos of the present time' as in reaction to a 'metaphysical suffering from the lack of deep meaning in the world'. Examples were the anthroposophical teaching of Rudolf Steiner, the messianic communism of Ernst Bloch and others, the belief in structure held by the George circle, and the renewed sense of community, not only in the Protestant and Catholic churches, but also in Judaism. The attitude that impressed Kracauer most was that of the sceptic on principle, the intellectual desperado, of which Max Weber was the most striking example. But Kracauer himself pleaded for a form of scepticism which would not degenerate into scepticism as a principle, but which was linked to a hesitatingly open-minded waiting. Those who wait 'do not make a virtue of necessity' as the desperado does 'by denying what they long

for, nor do they entrust themselves rashly to streams of yearning which might carry them away to who knows what sort of false fulfilments.' 126 It was not clear what was to be understood by the attempt `to transfer the centre of gravity from the theoretical self to the general human self, and to return from the atomized, unreal world of formless powers and dimensions devoid of meaning to the world of *reality* and the spheres encompassed within it'. It was only clear that Kracauer saw a reluctance to leap ahead, an inclination to take seriously what was here and now, profane and superficial, as being the precondition for the `invasion by the absolute', the experience of true reality.

Right into the 1920s, Kracauer accused the socialist movement of not being able to add religious commitment to economic commitment. It was only in the mid-1920s that he began to see Marxist theory as the current location of truth to the extent that it stood for the conviction that making the material and the profane into what was fundamental could only be avoided if the material and profane were, to begin with, seriously taken to be fundamental.

With Lukács, Kracauer and Bloch none of them academics Adorno was not able to make very much progress at the University of Frankfurt. As he was a precocious young man, his contempt for the academic world was all the greater. In 1924 he took his doctorate with Cornelius, with a dissertation on *The Transcendence of the Material and Noematic in Husserl's Phenomenology*. 127 `In the middle of May', he wrote to Leo Lowenthal in July 1924, `I planned my dissertation, and on the 26th I reported the substance of its ideas to Cornelius, who accepted it. I finished it on 6 June, dictated it on the 11th, and handed it in on the 14th.' 128 The task which he had set himself was to resolve the contradiction between the transcendental idealist and the transcendental realist components of Husserl's theory of the object (*Ding*). He did this by declaring it to be a false problem from the point of view of Cornelius's `pure immanent philosophy'. 129 This considered the thing to be simultaneously ideal and empirical by taking it to be a law-governed interrelation of appearances, subject to correction by experience and constituted by the unity of personal consciousness. In his letter to Lowenthal, Adorno himself said of the dissertation that it was `less authentic than it ought to be, even for me i.e. it is Cornelian'.

What was to become Adorno's real field at about the same time as he started his studies, and where he was able to be active as a student of Lukács, Kracauer and Bloch, was music criticism and musical aesthetics. About a hundred articles by him on music criticism or aesthetics were published in the years 1921-32. By contrast, his first publication in philosophy, his dissertation on Kierkegaard for his *Habilitation*, only appeared in 1933.

In Frankfurt, Adorno was involved in a musical scene which was unusually open-minded towards modern music, and which could even boast one of the champions of the Schoenberg school, Hermann Scherchen,

who was for a time principal conductor of the Museum concerts. What for Kracauer was the articulation of a particular existential attitude became for Adorno the justification for a certain form of music. Arnold Schoenberg was already the central reference point in Adorno's first review, which appeared in 1921 in the Frankfurt *Neue Blätter für Kunst und Literatur* (*New Magazine for Art and Literature*), dealing with an opera by his composition teacher Bernhard Sekles. In these years Schoenberg had just begun to achieve his world-wide fame, although this was mainly for his early, impressionistic works. At the beginning of 1922 Adorno reviewed a performance in Frankfurt of *Pierrot Lunaire*, and presented Schoenberg as a composer who, 'having been born into a baneful time', was singing, in *Pierrot*, 'precisely about the homelessness of our souls'; for whom 'what had once been the formal precondition for creative work had become the very material and content of it'; whose unique talent succeeded in creating structures with 'strict, externally imposed forms that were thoroughly animated [*durchseelt*]'.<sup>130</sup> He warned another composer, Philip Jarnach, whose 'affirmation of form' he welcomed as 'a fundamental attitude of mind in the art of an age which is anarchic and splintered', that

One cannot achieve objectivity by transferring one's subjectivity to alien forms which depend on different metaphysical, aesthetic and sociological preconditions . . . It is only possible to outgrow the ego by starting from the ego and its effective decisions. There is no objective canopy surrounding us; we have to build our home ourselves.<sup>131</sup>

In a review of Stravinsky's *Histoire du Soldat*, in which the 'formless soul' was said to be feasting itself on the ruins of shattered older forms, he accused Stravinsky of practising Dadaism. But he praised another composer, Rudi Stephan, for his 'relentless passion to create form'.<sup>132</sup>

From the very beginning, therefore, Adorno was making one specific demand of works of art: they must offer inspired (*beseelte*) forms. It was clear to him that reality offered the soul no home. But it was just as clear to him that in such a world it was nevertheless possible, in the sphere of art, to have animated (*durchseelte*) forms: Schoenberg's work was proof of this. At the end of a review of the performance of a work by another composer, in the *Zeitschrift für Musik* (*Journal of Music*) in 1923, Adorno added:

It pales by comparison with Schoenberg's *George-Lieder*, which thrust themselves, beaten out and startlingly large in scale, into all the rest of the music on offer. They even leave the poems they are based on in the shadows beneath them. To speak of their quality and their significance in the course of a hurried review would not be proper; I am not in a position to take a more distanced view of them at present.<sup>133</sup>

And he put this point of view even more resolutely in a review of Schoenberg's *Suite for Small Clarinet* in the journal *Die Musik* in May 1928: 'No criticism is admissible in the face of the works of Schoenberg today; truth itself is established in them. Consideration must be restricted to using material analysis to indicate the stage of cognition to which they have attained.' 134 Schoenberg was thus favoured with what Adorno had first learned from his most important teacher, Reinhold Zickel, who was an obstinately nationalist (and later obstinately Nazi) war veteran, a teacher and a poet. From him Adorno had learnt to abandon the cultural liberalism he had grown up with in favour of the concept of an objective truth transcending any form of *laissez-faire*. 135

Nineteen hundred and twenty-four was the year of Adorno's great crisis, in which he thought that 'it might be possible to reconstitute the world, which had gone awry, through the Catholic *ordo*' and in which he was 'close to conversion' to Catholicism, 'an obvious enough step to take as the son of a highly Catholic mother'. 136 In June of that year he heard the first performance of three fragments of Berg's opera *Wozzeck* at the music festival of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Musikverein (German Music Society) in Frankfurt. *Wozzeck* became *the* work typifying expressionism in music, and the most successful work of the Schoenberg school. It seemed to Adorno that the fragments were 'Schoenberg and Mahler together all at once, and it was in my mind that this really was the new music'. Schoenberg and Mahler together all at once meant, for him: structured longing, a music of longing for vanished meaning, the longing to break out of a baneful and, at the same time, self-satisfied world. Enthusiastically, he had Hermann Scherchen introduce him to the composer. He arranged with Berg to go to Vienna as his pupil as soon as possible, and at the beginning of 1925, with a doctorate in philosophy already behind him, he arrived there, aiming to become a composer and concert pianist.

When I went to Vienna, I thought that the Schoenberg circle, like the George circle, would be more or less organized. But that was already no longer the case. Schoenberg, who had remarried, lived in Mödling; he had been (or so it seemed to the old guard) cut off from his friends of the heroic period a little by his wife, who was young and elegant. Webern already lived out of town in Maria Enzersdorf. People didn't see each other very often. 137

Adorno was lucky to have met and got to know a number of the important figures in the Schoenberg circle before it finally broke up after Hanns Eisler's departure for Berlin in 1925 and Schoenberg's move, also to Berlin, in January 1926. Schoenberg succeeded Ferruccio Busoni, who had died, at the Berlin Akademie der Künste (Academy of Arts).

Adorno was taught composition by Alban Berg and piano by Eduard Steuermann, one of the leading performers in the Schoenberg circle, along with the violinist Rudolf Kolisch, Schoenberg's brother-in-law.

Berg was the friendliest and most liberal of those in the Schoenberg circle, and what he taught Adorno 'unmistakably had the character of a doctrine, the authority of "our school"'. 138 'Everything Schoenbergian is holy,' Adorno wrote to Kracauer in March 1925, 'the only other contemporary music which counts is Mahler, and anyone who is against this will be crushed.' Of Schoenberg himself, whom he had met several times before he first spoke to him, he wrote to his friend in Frankfurt:

His face is the face of a shadowy, perhaps of an evil man . . . nothing 'serene' in it (he is completely without age), it is obsessed from top to bottom. And then a pair of enormous, almost glassy eyes, and a powerful forehead. There's something uncanny and oppressive about the chap, and all the more so when he tries to be conciliatory. Berg gave me his handwriting to analyse without knowing whose it was, I refused, because it looked so much like my own, but I saw that simultaneously hunted and collected quality in it nevertheless. All things considered, I think he's probably all right. 139

Drawing back from someone with whom he thought he could see a certain identity in himself, Adorno seemed at the same time, at the beginning of his stay in Vienna, to be drawing back from the mixture of a demand for recognition together with unscrupulous daring, the combination of banality and obsession, fame and poverty, out of which great art, which was the only thing that meant anything to him, could grow.

Arnold Schoenberg left secondary school before taking his examinations. When he lost his job as a bank employee when the company went out of business, it was a relief to him, and he was able to devote himself completely to music. Born in Vienna in 1874, the son of the Jewish owner of a small shoe business, Schoenberg started to play the violin at the age of eight. At nine he began to compose short pieces. A friend taught him the elements of harmonic theory, and he learnt how the first movement of a string quartet was supposed to be constructed from the article 'Sonata' in Meyer's *Konversationslexikon*, 140 which he and his friend bought in instalments. The only concerts he heard were by military bands in the public gardens. After losing his job, he met Alexander von Zemlinsky, who was two years older than him, in the amateur orchestra 'Polyhymnia'. Zemlinsky became his friend and teacher. He familiarized the 'Brahmsian' Schoenberg with Wagner, and organized the first performance of a work by Schoenberg in 1898. It was a great success. But, when some of Schoenberg's songs were performed in concert in the same year, the first 'scandal' occurred. 'From then on,' Schoenberg later told one of his pupils, 'the scandal never stopped!' 141

Financial difficulties hindered Schoenberg again and again in his own musical work. For many years he had to orchestrate draft operettas for other composers. He started on the *Gurrelieder*, with which he later had

his first really big successes, in response to a prize competition in 1899, but because of constant interruptions and distractions he was not able to finish them until 1911. He left Vienna for Berlin three times in the hope of improving his material situation and finding more openness towards his music and better recognition for it from 1901 to 1903, from 1911 until the First World War, and from 1926 until the beginning of the Third Reich. One of his closest friends in Vienna was the architect Adolf Loos, who in 1903 edited a journal with the title *The Other: A Paper for the Introduction of Western Culture into Austria, Written by Adolf Loos*.<sup>142</sup> Schoenberg himself repeatedly did what many people in Vienna who were dissatisfied with the cultural situation did: he started a club (on the model of the Vienna Secessionists in painting). In 1904, together with Zemlinsky, he founded the Association of Creative Sound Artists (*Verein schaffender Tonkünstler*) with Gustav Mahler as honorary president and conductor; and in 1918 he founded the Association for Private Musical Performances (*Verein für musikalische Privataufführungen*). Schoenberg stated in a circular that the composers' organization was intended to emancipate both artists and the public from the concert agencies and companies, which were trying to exclude everything from their programmes which did not ensure certain financial success, and which had 'already caused a general waning of interest in music with their invariably identical programmes'. Numerous and frequent first-class performances would make familiarity with the new music possible. This was a precondition for any sort of appreciation of it to develop, and it was more necessary than ever, he claimed, because of the increased complexity of the new music.

Since too few people who were talented in composition came to the courses which he gave in Vienna from 1904 onwards, Schoenberg gave up this form of public teaching and took really talented pupils for private tuition instead. Among these were Anton Webern and Alban Berg. Berg was self-taught, and Schoenberg gave him tuition free of charge to begin with, until his family's financial position had improved. From 1919 to 1923 he also gave free tuition to the most gifted of his second generation of pupils, Hanns Eisler, another impoverished autodidact. The practice of giving free tuition resulted from the reverence he had for the true artist, the artist who was driven to create: 'He has the feeling that what he does is being dictated to him. As if he were doing it according to the will of some power or other which is in him, whose laws he does not know.'<sup>143</sup> This concept of the artist as a genius carrying out a will which was concealed from him was a highly traditional one, familiar to the artists of that period primarily from their reading of Schopenhauer. With Schoenberg, however, it was combined with the assumption that musical progress was constant, and the conviction that everything which was produced when the artist 'went down again and again into the dark realm of the unconscious to bring back unified content and form' must be justified.<sup>144</sup> At the time when Schoenberg's *Gurrelieder* were first performed, with triumphant success, in Vienna in 1913, he had long since taken leave of the late Romantic sound world, and was in the midst of a prolonged, but not at all unproductive, crisis. The crisis period of free atonality lasted from about 1905 until the beginning of the 1920s, when he discovered the new concept which guaranteed his works conscious unity: the method of

composition using twelve tones which were related only to one another. His 'need for expression' allowed him to continue where other important artists before him had already attempted to break free of the tonal method of composition. With the twelve-tone technique, he made the forms which he had 'received as if in a dream' 'conscious' and controllable. 145

Although it was Berg he was attracted to, it was Schoenberg, with all his authority, who was the decisive composer for Adorno, the one who seemed to be practising precisely what Adorno had demanded in one of his first pieces of music criticism: 'It is only possible to outgrow the ego by starting from the ego . . . There is no objective canopy surrounding us; we have to build our home ourselves.' It must have been all the more sobering an experience for the enthusiastic twenty-two-year-old, therefore, not to receive any recognition from Schoenberg. Adorno was far from being a prolific artist driven towards creativity, and he was still clumsy in technical analysis, which the Schoenberg school valued highly. Adorno, 'deadly earnest', and loaded with 'philosophical ballast',<sup>146</sup> did not impress Schoenberg either as a composer or as an aesthete of music.

Adorno's report of his encounter with another figure who had been a shining example to him in his youth, Georg Lukács, also showed mixed reactions. In June 1925, with an introduction from another student of Berg's, Soma Morgenstern, Adorno visited Lukács, who was then living as an émigré near Vienna. He wrote to Kracauer:

My first impression was powerful and deep. A small, tender, incongruously blond Eastern Jew with a Talmudic nose and wonderful, unfathomable eyes; quite scholarly, in his linen sports suit, but with a completely convention-free, deadly clear, mild atmosphere around him, through which only shyness quietly exudes from his person. He represents the ideal of inconspicuousness, and of course also the very image of intangibility. I felt at once that he was beyond even the possibility of a human relationship, and during our discussion, which lasted over three hours, I behaved accordingly and kept myself withdrawn.

But he found the discussion itself rather sobering. Lukács 'first basically disavowed his theory about the novel, on the grounds that it was "idealistic and mythological". He contrasted with it the way in which history was given content by Marx's dialectics.' He strongly rejected Bloch's interpretation of his 'agnosticism'. In a review of *History and Class Consciousness* in the *Neuer Merkur* of October 1923-March 1924, Bloch had described Lukács's rejection of inwardness and metaphysics as a 'heroic' 'preliminary and dialectical agnosticism' which, 'in an utterly responsible way, put impediments in the path of transcendence', and expressed 'an aversion to any self-constructing metaphysics which

applies labels too hastily'. 'What for Bloch was "husk" was for him the whole world.' Finally, Lukács had inveighed strongly against Kierkegaard: 'Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel was true for "the Hegel who misunderstood himself panlogically", but not for the purified, Marxist version of Hegel. He did not recognize objectivity or history . . . he was (and here Lukács grew spiteful in his usual way) an ideological representative of the disappearing bourgeoisie.' At one point Lukács had shocked him, 'when he told me that in his conflict with the Third International his opponents were right, but that concretely and dialectically his own absolute approach to dialectics was necessary. In this madness lies his human greatness and the tragedy of the sudden dialectical inversion.' 147

This was Adorno's impression of his encounter with Lukács, who was found guilty of leftist deviation at the Fifth World Congress of the Communist International, and whose *History and Class Consciousness* was, a little later on, to be criticized by communists for its 'idealistic' and 'mystical' tendencies. Lukács seemed to be prepared to integrate himself into the Bolshevized Communist Party at all costs. Kracauer heavily criticized *History and Class Consciousness* both before and after his own conversion to 'Marxist theory', which for him, as for Bloch and Benjamin, amounted to an attempt to supersede theology through an analysis of outward, profane reality. According to Kracauer, exhausted idealism was not transcended in Lukács's work but carried forward, and Marxism was not being pervaded with reality but being weakened and deprived of all its revolutionary energies by the application of an idle and exhausted philosophy. 148

Joseph von Lukács, a bank director, wrote to his only son, who in 1908 at the age of twenty-three had just received a valued prize from the Budapest Kisfaludy Society for his *History of the Development of Modern Drama*: 149

What I wish for you, and thus for myself, is that you should preserve, even with your friends, the calm objectivity sometimes almost cruel in its mercilessness which you are able to show to such a high degree towards your environment. As you say yourself, I am giving you a free hand in your development and in the choice of the paths it may take. I am doing this consciously, because I trust you limitlessly and love you infinitely I am sacrificing everything to be able to see you achieve greatness, recognition, fame it would be the greatest possible happiness for me if people were to say of me that I was the father of Georg Lukács. 150

Lukács's father, the son of a provincial Jewish craftsman, had risen by his own efforts into the upper middle classes during a period of accelerated industrialization in Budapest. He had received an aristocratic title at around the turn of the century. These successes went hand in hand with his political conservatism and generous patronage of the arts. His son, who was intended to step into his father's shoes, took his doctorate in political science after studying law and economics, and took up a post with the

Royal Hungarian Ministry of Trade. Shortly afterwards, he gave up the post to continue his studies, now devoted entirely to literature, the history of art and philosophy. The father became a patron to his own son, who, like many of the sons of assimilated upper-middle-class Jewish families which had experienced sudden social advancement, turned his back on the paternal money-earning world and became an anti-capitalist theoretician.

Under the influence of Dilthey and Simmel, Lukács wrote the first version of his *History of the Development of Modern Drama* during his period of study in Berlin in the winter of 1906-7. The starting-point for the study was a comparison between the Greek city state, the historical social formation in which culture had achieved everyday reality, and bourgeois society, in which anarchic production and competition had alienated labour, had made the bonds of society more abstract and complex and had made individuals more isolated, so that culture in the true sense of the word was no longer possible. Against this background, which was inspired by Simmel's *Philosophy of Money (Philosophie des Geldes)* and, throughout its diagnosis of modernity, by Tönnies's distinction between the paradigms of community and society, Lukács described the epoch of modern drama as a heroic epoch of the decay of the bourgeois class. In Budapest, Lukács was attempting, as a theatre critic, a writer for various journals, and a supporter of a Free Theatre, to introduce modern Western culture to his home city, which he felt to be provincial. His ultimate criterion for this was his vision of a form of art 'on the large scale, an art of monumentality'. 151

The son did achieve greatness, as his father wished. And he did so while maintaining that objectivity which was almost cruel in its mercilessness. It was his belief that he had to renounce the woman who seemed to embody life for him, the painter Irma Seidler, because of his own incapacity for life and his duty to his great work. After her suicide, he put the following words into the mouth of a character in his dialogue 'On Poverty in the Spirit': 'She had to die, so that my work could be completed, so that nothing should remain for me in the world but my work.' And he dedicated *Soul and Form* to her memory. In the essays it contains, he complains that in non-essential life neither essential life nor any communication between those who long for essential life was possible. The only things which stood out, 'incomprehensible and misunderstood', from this customary, 'unlived life' were, on the one hand, the works of artists and philosophers which had grown out of life, and, on the other, the 'formed life' of the heroes of inwardness, who had no illusions about alienated life. 152

After extended visits to Berlin and Florence, Lukács settled in Heidelberg in 1913 at the urging of Bloch, whom he had met through Simmel. In those years, what Lukács and Bloch had in common were their radical negation of the alienated, cultureless bourgeois-capitalist world and their attempts to sketch out millennial conservative, religious utopias. By contrast with Bloch, Lukács concerned himself at the same time with the technical philosophical clarification of aesthetic questions and with the methodological clarification of the relationship between sociology and aesthetics in the consideration of works of art. This combination brought him the interest and sympathy of Max Weber, with whose circle he was connected.

Lukács reacted to the war, which he rejected from the start, by interrupting his work on aesthetics and starting a long study of Dostoevsky, which was to contain both his metaphysical ethics and his philosophy of history. He hoped to prove in this work that he himself was a great thinker, able to point beyond German Idealism and to supplement Dostoevsky's creative work on the philosophical level in the same way that German Idealism had philosophically supplemented the works of the German classicists and Romantics. Ferenc Fehér remarks on the outline for the Dostoevsky book and on Lukács's notes and sketches for it:

'Russia', the land of the approaching revolution, promising and embodying the 'community': this was Lukács's mystical and radical answer to 'western Europe', which was stagnating both in relation to the objective spirit and to the problem of the individual, and which had demonstrated clearly with the war the fact that it was in a blind alley. This 'Russia' was to represent the 'coming light' for 'western Europe'. 153

Only the introductory section, which was published under the title *The Theory of the Novel*, was completed. Lukács dedicated the book to his first wife, Yelena Grabenko, whom he had married in 1914. A former Russian terrorist who had spent many years in gaol, she was, in the judgement of Lukács's friend Béla Balázs, 'a splendid example of a figure from Dostoevsky' and, for Lukács, 'an experimental laboratory, a human realization of his problems and ethical imperatives'.154

Shortly after the foundation of the Hungarian Communist Party, in December 1918, the journal *Szabadgondolat*, published by the left-wing middle-class intellectual Galilei circle, brought out a special issue on Bolshevism. It included an article by Lukács on 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem'. In it, he opposed Bolshevism on the grounds (surprising in someone who admired the greatness of the remark by Hebbel's Judith, 'Even if God has set sin between me and the deed which I must do who am I to try to escape it?') that he could not share the Bolsheviks' belief that dictatorship, terrorism and a final (and consequently particularly merciless) form of class domination could produce the end of all class domination. Nor could he share 'the metaphysical justification for Bolshevism', that 'good could be created from evil, or, as Razumikhin says in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment*, that one can lie one's way to truth'.155 In the middle of December, just after the University of Heidelberg had informed him that his application for a *Habilitation* had been rejected on the grounds that he was a foreigner, he joined the Hungarian Communist Party. After the first Central Committee, with Béla Kun at its head, had been arrested in February 1919, Lukács became a member of the Central Committee himself, and a member of the editorial committee of the party's newspaper. When the middle-class government voluntarily handed over power in March to an alliance of Social Democrats and Communists, Lukács became Deputy People's Commissar for Education, and later Political Commissar of the 5th Division of the Hungarian Red Army during the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which lasted from March to August.

Lukács's first articles after he joined the Hungarian Communist Party

showed that his progression from being a cultural critic of bourgeois-capitalist society to becoming a Marxist and communist implied in the main a certain continuity, and that he was actively adapting communism to his own views at least as much as he was passively conforming to it. His cultural criticism of bourgeois-capitalist society evolved into a cultural-revolutionary interpretation of radical communist change. In earlier references to the proletariat and to socialism, the latest of which had appeared in 'Bolshevism as a Moral Problem', Lukács had criticized both the lack of 'a religious power capable of suffusing the whole soul' and the merely ideological character of the objectives which the socialist world order had in ethics and in the philosophy of history. He now declared that a cultural, intellectual revolution was at the heart of the proletarian class struggle. The awakening of the proletariat to self-consciousness, to class consciousness, in his view, would bring the process of social development as a whole to consciousness; everyday life would be suffused with essential life, human beings would become active agents in true reality. Lukács stated in a speech at a congress of young workers in June 1919 that, prior to the achievement of soviet dictatorship, the struggle for education and culture was only one objective among many. Now, the final objective was

that the sinful, baneful independence of economic life should be eliminated, and that economic life and production should be put at the service of humanity, of humanitarian ideas, of culture. As you now emerge from the economic struggle and devote yourselves to culture, you are devoting yourselves to that part of the control of society which will produce the central idea for a future society. 156

As Deputy Commissar for Culture and Education, Lukács attempted to make artists independent of the sale or non-sale of their works, and so to overcome the commodity character of works of art. The control of art was put in the hands of artists. A music directorate was established, for example, which consisted of Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály and Ernst von Dohnányi. Provided that art could be freed from its commodity character, provided that the economy could be put in the service of culture, and provided that the military defence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic succeeded, then this may have been the thirty-four-year-old revolutionary's hopean essential life would at last be possible again.

After the collapse of the Hungarian Soviet Republic as a result of military attacks by the Romanians, supported by the Entente, Lukács fled to Vienna. Among the Viennese émigrés, he was at first the leading member of the Hungarian Communist Party and editor-in-chief of the journal *Kommunismus*, the Third International's official theoretical organ for south-eastern Europe. Its publication was stopped in October 1921 on the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on grounds of insufficient loyalty. Lukács brought out several of the articles he published in this journal in book form in 1923, supplemented mainly by the essay 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat', under the title *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*.

For Lukács, the book was, in a way, a preliminary summing-up of his attempt to conceive of communism or Marxism as a project concerned with dissolving a social order which had grown soulless and replacing it

with one which did have a soul. The book's title indicated the red thread running through the various essays. 'History' stood for the process by which the apparently rigid, natural, reified elements of social structures were dissolved. 'The nature of history is precisely that every definition degenerates into an illusion: *history is the history of the unceasing overthrow of the objective forms that shape the life of man.*' 'Class consciousness' stood for the discovery of the subject of historical totality, which ought to be in a position to re-establish 'non-reified relations between man and man and between man and nature'.

Only the class can relate to the whole of reality in a practical revolutionary way. (The 'species' cannot do this as it is no more than an individual that has been mythologised and stylised in a spirit of contemplation.) And the class, too, can only manage it when it can see through the reified objectivity of the given world to the process that is also its own fate.

Only one class was capable of fulfilling this Hegelian motif of thought in Lukács's eyes: the proletariat. 'The purely abstract negativity in the life of the worker is objectively the most typical manifestation of reification, it is the constitutive type of capitalist socialization. But for this very reason it is also *subjectively* the point at which this structure is raised to consciousness and where it can be breached in practice.' 157 For Lukács, the decisive element was not a process of radical change directed by knowledge and motivated by indignation. It was a kind of knowledge which was, as knowledge, practical, and an act of achieving consciousness which was in itself an action. The combination of Weber's theory of rationalization and Marx's theory of commodity fetishism with an idealistic class-struggle philosophy of history made the essay on 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat' the most effective in the whole book.

A number of communists among them Karl Korsch, of course, but also, before Lukács was officially condemned at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, Wittfogel, for example hailed *History and Class Consciousness* as a manifestation of revolutionary, activist Marxism. In the years that followed, the book became, for many young intellectuals, a reason for remaining in the Communist Party, which had now been Bolshevized, or for joining it in the first place, or at least for sympathizing with the communist cause. As Willy Strzelewicz (one of the communist doctoral students at the Institute of Social Research before 1933) remembered it, two philosophers were significant above all others for him and for his friends: Lukács and Heidegger. Both put alienation at the centre of philosophical discussion; both took philosophy seriously as something which was drawing to a close in its older form in order to play, in a new form, a decisive part in the achievement of a new, authentic life.

For Kracauer, the new form in Lukács was not new enough, and idealism had not been sufficiently transformed in it. 'The path today leads directly through plain materialism', he wrote to Bloch in an exchange of letters about *History and Class Consciousness*. 158 Kracauer's own position, which was to some extent one of waiting, led him to an almost

montage-like empiricism which held back from theoretical constructions. But Adorno found in Lukács a form of philosophical thinking about history which in the late 1920s was an inspiration for his ideas on the philosophy of music and musical progress. The author of *History and Class Consciousness* whom Adorno visited in 1925, however, was not even prepared to defend his earlier Hegelian attempt to bring the philosophical content of Marxist theory up to date.

Adorno, apparently more suited to writing about music than composing it, feeling that he was not properly recognized by the Schoenberg circle, and unhappy with Vienna, which he accused of economic backwardness and cultural giddiness, was homesick for Frankfurt and longed to be with his friend Kracauer. He returned to his home town in the summer of 1925, and after that only visited Vienna occasionally. He had not yet entirely given up his plan to become a musician, but it was shrinking more and more into the background in favour of his hopes for an academic career as a philosopher, possibly with an emphasis on aesthetics. Nevertheless, his stay in Vienna had finally established the key role of the New Viennese Music for Adorno's aesthetic and philosophical thought, and as a contributor to important musical journals such as the *Zeitschrift für Musik*, *Die Musik*, *Pult und Taktstock* and *Musikblätter des Anbruch* he remained a champion of the Schoenberg school. One of his most fundamental experiences continued to be the fact that a man like Schoenberg, who was only interested in culture and who believed in the monarchy and the nobility, had nevertheless managed to bring about a revolution in music.

In the summer of 1927 Adorno completed an extended study on *The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Theory of Mind*, 159 with which he intended to take his *Habilitation* with Cornelius. He based himself once again, without reservations, on Cornelius's transcendental philosophy. This was from strategic considerations, which he had every reason to take into account. He had met Walter Benjamin in 1923 through Kracauer, and they later met frequently during Benjamin's visits to Frankfurt. In 1925 Benjamin had failed in an attempt to take his *Habilitation* in Frankfurt with his *Origin of German Tragic Drama*. Cornelius, who examined Benjamin's dissertation in his capacity as an art scholar, had written to the author for assistance, asking whether he could explain the art-historical aspects of the work. In the end, even Cornelius, who was well disposed towards it, and Horkheimer, his assistant, both described the work as incomprehensible. But Adorno's decision to tie himself down to Cornelius's transcendental philosophy sprang not just from strategic considerations, but also from the fact that (as he had written to Kracauer, who had suggested that he should do a thesis with Max Scheler on the philosophy of music) he did not yet trust himself to 'use a genuine work as a *Habilitation* thesis'.

Although he wrote his thesis without any great pleasure, and forced everything into the procrustean bed of Cornelius's epistemology, Adorno

nevertheless clearly showed what it was that motivated him: an enthusiasm for the 'primacy of consciousness', for a comprehensive concept of rationality. He interpreted the concept of the unconscious, on the one hand, as a limitation of knowledge, and on the other as a description of unconscious facts which could be related to conscious ones. He considered Freudian psychoanalysis as an empirical science of the unconscious which was capable of filling in the outlines provided by transcendental philosophy. 'We regard the significance of psychoanalysis so highly because it serves the investigation of the unconscious without burdening it with any inappropriate metaphysical pathos, and because its investigations are directed at the elimination of unconscious states and thus offer a decisive weapon against every sort of metaphysics of the instincts and deification of mere dull, organic life.' 160

It was above all Kracauer's influence which was visible again in this enthusiasm for an extended concept of rationality. Since the mid-1920s, Adorno's mentor had seen the decisive evil of capitalism as lying in the fact that it did not rationalize enough, that it came to a halt in an attitude adapted to the exploitation of nature and that it excluded 'the authentic contents of life' from the concept of rationality. Kracauer had put this at its best in an essay published in 1927 in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 'The Ornament of the Masses'.

Adorno gave his thesis quite a surprising Marxist turn in its conclusion. He observed that the theories of the unconscious which he had criticized served as ideologies which partly transfigured the governing economic order and partly distracted attention from it. These social conditions, characterized by 'economic competition' and 'imperialist tendencies', set limits on any process of enlightenment. In brief, without actually naming it as such, he declared his belief in the Marxist theory that consciousness was determined by social existence.

Cornelius did not accept the thesis. After he had read the first two-thirds of it, it was clear to him that it hardly went beyond 'a simple repetition of what he knows from my own lectures and books, although it is embellished with a great many words'.<sup>161</sup> Adorno withdrew his 'request' for a *Habilitation*, mainly irritated by Horkheimer, whom he suspected of not having done enough for his thesis because it was not Marxist enough for him. In a curriculum vitae written to accompany a new application for a *Habilitation* a few years later, he described this course of events by saying, 'In 1927, an unpublished extended epistemological study was written.'

In the meantime, with funds from his generous and tolerant father, he continued his private studies and hoped to make a career as a music critic. From 1927 onwards he visited Berlin frequently. His girlfriend, Gretel Karplus, who was also friendly with Benjamin, lived there. In Berlin he mixed with Benjamin, Bloch, Brecht, Kurt Weill, Lotte Lenya and others. He tried unsuccessfully to get a job as a music critic with the *Berliner Zeitung*, which was owned by the publishers Ullstein. Benjamin

now became perhaps even more important to Adorno than Kracauer, and they met whenever Benjamin was in Frankfurt or Adorno was in Berlin.

'Wickersdorf is a conscious refuge within real, existing culture,' wrote the seventeen-year-old Walter Benjamin to his contemporary, Ludwig Strauss, a Zionist and translator of Eastern Jewish literature. The Free School Community (*Freie Schulgemeinde*) at Wickersdorf had been founded in 1906 by Gustav Wyneken, among others. Wyneken was one of the most prominent leaders of the youth movement of the time, although only a minute fraction of it actually supported him. His ideas could be summed up in catchphrases: the idea of youth, the idea of youth culture and the idea of the youth leader. Benjamin, born in Berlin in 1895, had come into contact with Wyneken when he spent two years (1905-7) in a boarding school in Haubinda in Thuringia, where Wyneken taught for a time. Benjamin had been sent to Haubinda because he was having difficulties at the *Gymnasium* (high school); a protected child, he had previously only had private tuition with a small circle of children from the higher ranks of society. Private tuition was a step above the preparatory school, which trained children specially for the *Gymnasium*, and had seemed to his father appropriate to their station in life. Benjamin's father came from a Jewish mercantile family which after the Franco-Prussian War had moved to Berlin, the up-and-coming capital of the Wilhelmine empire. He had risen to the upper middle classes as an auctioneer and shareholder in an art auction house. From 1910 on Walter Benjamin contributed to the youth magazine *Der Anfang* (*The Beginning*), which propagated Wyneken's ideas, and the 'Wynekenist' Benjamin wrote:

In trusting in youth, which should now start learning to work, to take itself seriously, to educate itself, humanity is putting its trust in its own future, in the irrational which it can only revere youth, which is not only so much richer in the spirit of the future, but is in fact intellectually and spiritually richer altogether youth, which senses within itself the joy and the courage of new representatives of culture. 162

From 1912 onwards, Benjamin studied philosophy, German literature and psychology alternately in Freiburg im Breisgau and in Berlin. As well as contributing to *Der Anfang*, he was an associate of the Berlin Sprechsaal der Jugend (Youth Discussion Room), a youth centre which provided information and discussions about home and school, art and eroticism. He was also a member of the 'Freie Studentenschaft' (Free Students' Association), the group representing students who were not members of the student societies that promoted duelling. He was moving, therefore, in circles in which there was a great preponderance of Jews. This was mainly due to the fact that Jews were excluded or only accepted unwillingly by other organizations, but also partly to the fact that Jews found these other organizations unsatisfactory. Benjamin had a sense that 'whoever I turned to with my ideas, it was mostly Jews who reciprocated intellectually and practically'. From this he concluded that Judaism, 'in

no sense an end in itself', was 'a highly respectable transmitter and representative of intellectual life'. 163

Another text written in 1912, 'Dialogue on Present-Day Religiosity' (which remained unpublished), contains obvious parallels to the writings of other critics of the modern world, such as the young Lukács. At the centre of his thoughts lay a longing for a renewal of the unifying power of culture, intellectual life and religion. In addition to the Jews, he also saw the 'literati' as being representatives of culture, and wrote of them:

They want to be the honest ones, they want to show their enthusiasm for art, their 'love of what is most distant', as Nietzsche put it, but society rejects them—they themselves, in a kind of pathological self-destruction, have to stamp out everything in themselves which is all-too-human and which living human beings need. This is the way people are who want to bring values into life, to make them matters of convention; and our untruthfulness condemns them to be outsiders and to be effusive, which reduces them to sterility. We will never be able to infuse convention with the intellect if we do not want to fill these forms of social life with our own personal intellect. The literati and the new religion can help us here. Religion gives everyday life, convention, a new basis and a new nobility. It becomes a form of worship, a cult. Is it not for a form of intellectual, cultic convention that we are thirsting? 164

In 1915 Benjamin broke with Wyneken because of Wyneken's enthusiasm for the war. The decisive reason was the same that had already led him to distance himself from *Der Anfang* in 1914: he saw politicization as endangering his alignment towards the pure intellect. The war and the collapse of the youth movement put an end to his commitment to youth. But his devotion to the intellectual life and his contempt for philistinism increased all the more. The attitude which the combination of these two elements produced in him is described by his friend Gershom Scholem, who lived closely with Benjamin and his wife from 1918 to 1919 in Berne, where Benjamin had moved to escape the war, and where he hoped to take his doctorate.

There was about him an element of purity and absoluteness, a devotion to the spiritual like that of a scribe cast out into another world, who has set off in search of his 'scripture'. It was a crisis for me when in close contact with him I had to recognize the limitations of this element . . . Benjamin's attitude toward the bourgeois world was so unscrupulous and had such nihilistic features that I was outraged. He recognized moral categories only in the sphere of living that he had fashioned about himself and in the intellectual world . . . Benjamin declared that people like us had obligations only to our own kind and not to the rules of a society we repudiated. 165

According to Scholem, Benjamin saw his future in being a philosophy lecturer. In 'The Student Life', however, a text published in 1915, he had already emphasized that true philosophy was a matter not of 'the questions posed by limited academic specialist philosophy, but of the metaphysical

questions of Plato and Spinoza, of the Romantics and Nietzsche'.<sup>166</sup> These views were given more precision in a manuscript written in 1917, 'On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy'. What Benjamin, who had once praised the younger generation as 'sober and Romantic', had in mind was to combine the soberness of the Kant who did not exclude from philosophy its demand for depth, the Kant who had written *Prolegomena to a Future Metaphysics*, with a Romanticism which insisted on reconciling the conditional with the unconditional and which, for the sake of the highest things, was not prepared to rely on emotions alone. In Benjamin's view, Kant had established a reduced concept of experience. What had to be done now was, 'using what was typical in Kant's style of thinking, to undertake the epistemological foundation of a higher concept of experience', one which would 'allow for the logical possibility not merely of mechanical experience but also of religious experience'.<sup>167</sup> One of Benjamin's more extreme formulations at this period, recorded by Scholem, was: 'A philosophy which cannot include and explicate the possibility of using tea-leaves for fortune-telling cannot be a true one.'<sup>168</sup> This was evidence of the kind of daring contact with the occult and the obscure which Bloch, whom Benjamin met in Berne in 1918, also displayed.

One step towards the carrying out of this programme was Benjamin's dissertation for his doctorate in Berne in 1919, *The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism*. The subject of this study the concept of art criticism was presented as the model of a higher form of experience, one which was capable of sober reflection. In the first pages he wrote:

As soon as the history of philosophy asserted through Kant, explicitly and expressly, although not for the first time, the simultaneous conceivability of an intellectual intuition and its impossibility in the realm of experience, various almost fevered attempts broke out to try to win this concept back for philosophy as a guarantee of its most elevated claims. These attempts started with Fichte, Schlegel, Novalis and Schelling.

The early Romantics, unlike Fichte, regarded works of art (rather than the ego) as the absolute medium of reflection. 'The development of reflection . . . in a creative object', an 'intensification of consciousness', was what the Romantics had declared to be the task of art criticism. Criticism should do no more and no less than to 'discover the secret structures of the work itself, to carry out its concealed intentions . . . to make it absolute. It is clear: for the Romantics, criticism is not so much judgement of a work as a method of completing it.' Benjamin ended his dissertation with the words:

The critical process making the creative work absolute, can be pictured as producing a state of dazzlement by the work. This dazzlement the sober light makes the variety of works fade away. It is the idea.<sup>169</sup>

Much in the tone of the work suggested that what Benjamin had formulated, in his 'Programme of the Coming Philosophy', as the final version of his demands, had already been fulfilled:

To create, on the basis of the Kantian system, a concept of knowledge corresponding to a concept of experience in which knowledge itself is theory. In its more general sections, such a philosophy either could be described as theology in itself, or would take precedence over theology to the extent that it contained historical and philosophical elements. 170

The tone of theological dogma here was characteristic of Benjamin. It allowed him to work in a fruitful and stimulating way with an apparatus whose functioning and solidity he himself had doubts about. Adorno, in a letter to Kracauer of 14 September 1929, described Benjamin as 'a dazzling trap set by heaven'.

The two longest works published by Benjamin during the 1920s, *Goethe's 'Elective Affinities'* and *The Origin of German Tragedy*, were philosophical texts written in the same spirit as his book on art criticism. At the same time, these publications, and his intention to take a *Habilitation* degree, also served as arguments to persuade his father, who was pressing his son to take up a middle-class career, to allow him to live as a private scholar on a long-term basis.

*Goethe's 'Elective Affinities'* was Benjamin's attempt 'to illuminate a work thoroughly from within itself',<sup>171</sup> i.e. to achieve what the Romantics had called 'perfection' or 'absolutization', closely related to what was called 'immanent criticism' in the Hegelian tradition. For this purpose, Benjamin contrasted the four partners in the novel itself with the pair of lovers from the novella 'The Wayward Young Neighbours' which is told within it. The four partners in the novel, he argued, live in a world ruled by the mythical forces of Law and of Nature. Coolness in the face of a collapsing marriage; the wan light under which the whole landscape lies; the narrowness of the choice of names for the characters; the wealth of anticipatory and parallel elements; the 'return of the same'; the significance of the merely material—all of these Benjamin interpreted as symptoms of a concept of Nature burdened with myth, a Nature which human beings had nowhere outgrown, 'a fatal form of existence which encloses living natures within a single structure of guilt and penance'. By contrast, the novella about the wayward young neighbours is marked by 'the bright light', 'the sober light' of those who love one another truly, with genuine abandon.<sup>172</sup> In a daring allegorical interpretation, Benjamin presupposed, as if they were unquestionably valid doctrines, his own theological and philosophical concepts, centred on the key words myth, nature, language, salvation and God. He argued that the unprotected nakedness of the girl who is saved from drowning by the young man points beyond the realm of beauty (which, even in the work of art, does not make visible the idea but only its mystery) towards the idea of God, before whom there are no mysteries. In the love of the young neighbours, which breaks through convention and puts life at risk, the novella points to a reconciliation 'which is quite supernatural, and hardly tangible within the work'. For Goethe, the central point was the 'gentle, veiled beauty' of Otilie. But she is only a reflection of 'the dark, mythical Nature, sunk into itself, which inhabits Goethe's artistry with wordless rigidity'. Otilie is not articulate, and her suicide, according to Benjamin, is for that reason not a moral decision, but merely the result of an instinctual drive. Thanks

to Benjamin's 'absolutization' of the work, philosophy instead of myth was able to become the guiding consideration. Reducing the 'false, mistaken totality' of the work to the status of an unfinished piece, absolutization could rescue it, in its incomparability and uniqueness, as a 'fragment of the true world'. 173

In *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, Benjamin applied the process of 'rescuing criticism' to German *Trauerspiel*<sup>174</sup> and to the kind of allegory which was characteristic in it. German *Trauerspiel* was usually condemned as a caricature of ancient drama, and allegory was usually seen as a means of artistic expression inferior to the symbol. In his 'epistemocritical prologue', Benjamin attempted to combine Kantian epistemological theory with his own theology of language to achieve a general characterization of philosophical reflection. This would on every occasion laboriously start over again from the beginning, plunge into whatever was particular and eccentric, and dissect it in conceptual analysis. 'It is the function of concepts to group phenomena together, and the division which is brought about within them thanks to the distinguishing power of the intellect is all the more significant in that it brings about two things at a single stroke: the salvation of phenomena and the representation of ideas.' It was not, therefore, a matter of achieving security by establishing general concepts about the world—for example, by selecting a few literary works on the basis of something they happened to have in common and summing them up under a single concept—but a matter of conceiving of what was exemplary, no matter how unique or fragmentary it might be, in its essence, i.e. as the presentation of an idea. Concepts were to be stripped of their usual function of generality and were to serve to organize elementary phenomena into constellations which 'do not make the similar identical, but . . . effect a synthesis between extremes' and in which 'the individual . . . becomes something different: a totality'.<sup>175</sup>

Benjamin pointedly expressed his rejection of inductive reasoning and of deductive conceptual links by observing that a great variety of disparate ideas could be found. He answered the question of where all these ideas came from with a linguistic and mystical variant of Plato's theory of recollection. In philosophical contemplation, 'the idea is released from the heart of reality as the word, reclaiming its name-giving rights'.<sup>176</sup> The philosopher was a reader or interpreter of the scripture of reality. And reality was written, for the philosopher, in the original Adamic tongue—a language which Benjamin himself, as he confessed privately in his essay 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man', held to be 'an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical'.<sup>177</sup>

The origin of the idea was to be found wherever, under the eye of philosophical contemplation, the idea was able to break loose from the innermost sphere of reality. 'Origin [*Ursprung*], although an entirely historical category, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with genesis [*Entstehung*]. The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and disappearance.' The analysis of the *Trauerspiel* in the main text showed that it was an affinity with the situation in the philosophy of history which led philosophical thinking back, via the Romantics (for whom 'allegory . . . had begun to achieve a form of self-

contemplation'), to the *Trauerspiel* of the baroque period, which was reacting to a period of decadence, to the experience of a life alienated from God. Benjamin mentioned the inescapable immanence of the situation, its life which had become stale, 'an empty world' in which, just as in the background of Dürer's *Melencolia*, 'the utensils of active life are lying around unused on the floor, as objects of contemplation'.<sup>178</sup> This recalled the way in which Lukács had described the situation of the novel in the philosophy of history and the categories of 'second nature', 'alienation' and 'reification'. The *Trauerspiel* presented history as the natural history of the transience of God's creatures. The core of the allegorical interpretation was the perception of history as 'the Passion of the world', significant 'only in the stations of its decline'. 'Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of redemption, in allegory the observer is confronted with the *facies hippocratica* of history as a petrified, primordial landscape.' 'By its very essence classicism was not permitted to behold the lack of freedom, the imperfection, the collapse of the physical, beautiful nature. But beneath its extravagant pomp, this is precisely what baroque allegory proclaims, with unprecedented emphasis.'<sup>179</sup>

The baroque was a corrective to the conciliatory character not only of classicism but of art itself, more clearly than Romanticism and expressionism were. It was precisely for this reason that the idea of *Trauerspiel* arose from philosophical reflection on seventeenth-century German baroque tragedy. 'Whereas Romanticism, inspired by its belief in the infinite, intensified the perfected creation of form and idea in critical terms, at one stroke the profound vision of allegory transforms things and works into stirring writing.'<sup>180</sup> Products of Romantic irony such as Tieck's ironical dramas or Jean Paul's ragged novels, which made the paradoxical attempt 'to be creative by a process of demolition, by demonstrating in the work itself its relation to the idea',<sup>181</sup> were outdone by baroque *Trauerspiel*, the allegorical construction of which from the very beginning provided 'consciously constructed ruins' which the knowledge of philosophical truth-contents only needed to settle into.<sup>182</sup> Philosophical contemplation, which Benjamin hoped his work would achieve this 'would restore the authentic . . . in the face of expressionist forgeries',<sup>183</sup> would ultimately intensify current awareness of the problematics of art by rescuing allegory, and in this way would help to bring about the experience of the true world.

In his progress from the ideas of youth, of the Jews and of the 'literati' as representatives of the intellect, and through the idea of opening up symbolic works of art and intensifying allegorical works of art, Benjamin approached the threshold of a version of the materialist conception of history which was related to the one which Kracauer and Bloch, with whom Benjamin discussed these ideas, were coming to an understanding about during the same years. The theoretical problems which occupied him during his work on the book about *Trauerspiel* the relation between works of art and history, the peculiarity of the philosophical contemplation of history compared with the philosophical contemplation of works of art and of nature<sup>184</sup> had made Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* into a book which was for Benjamin 'very important, particularly for me'.<sup>185</sup> His interest in Marxist theory was enhanced by his

love for the communist director, actress and teacher Asja Lacis, whom he had met in Capri in 1924 while he was working on the book on *Trauerspiel*. His love for her was also the principal motive behind his journey to Moscow in the winter of 1926-7. His collection of aphorisms, *One-Way Street*, published in 1928, was also dedicated to her. The book was a kaleidoscopic assemblage of the social experiences of a man whose plans for a *Habilitation* degree had failed, who still had an apartment in his parents' villa, although his father had not been prepared to finance the private scholarly life he hoped for, and who had become a freelance literary critic, writer and broadcaster sympathizing with communism.

Benjamin's hope now was to become the leading literary critic in Germany. The surrealist novelists (from 1926 on he visited Paris frequently) encouraged him more than anyone else in his conception of what modern literature ought to be in a period of decadence such as his. But his ambitions in philosophy continued unabated. The project of his *Passagen-Werk* grew out of a plan for an essay on the nineteenth-century arcades in Paris. The *Passagen-Werk* was to occupy him for the whole of the rest of his life. Constantly interrupted by the need to do more remunerative work, Benjamin was always returning to it, but never succeeded in advancing it beyond a fragmentary stage. He wanted 'to take up *the inheritance of surrealism* with all the absolute power of a philosophical Fortinbras' and to see 'how far it is possible to be "concrete" in the context of the philosophy of history', to what extent 'extreme concreteness' could be achieved 'for one era'. 186

The *Passagen-Werk* was concerned with the same problem as historical materialism: acquiring knowledge about capitalism. But the concepts Benjamin used in his definition of capitalism nature, dream, myth came from his metaphysical and theological mode of thought.<sup>187</sup> The *Passagen-Werk* was also the point of contact for the discussions which Benjamin had with Adorno in Frankfurt and Königstein, at which Horkheimer, Gretel Karplus and Asja Lacis were also present from time to time. For Benjamin, these discussions brought to an end the period of 'carelessly archaic, natural philosophizing'. 'It was the end of rhapsodic naivety. This Romantic form of thinking had been overtaken by a precipitate development, but for years to come I still hadn't the faintest idea of a different one.'<sup>188</sup> Possibly through the influence of Horkheimer, Adorno or Brecht (who had been a friend of Korsch since 1928, and whom Benjamin had met in the spring of 1929), at the beginning of 1930 Benjamin stated to Scholem that, to support his own work, he would have to study certain aspects of Hegel's philosophy and some parts of Marx's *Capital*.<sup>189</sup> Thanks to the 'unforgettable discussions in Königstein',<sup>190</sup> Adorno was soon familiar with Benjamin's new motifs and categories such as plushness, interior, fashion, advertising, prostitution, collectors, *flâneurs*, gamblers, boredom, phantasmagoria. The discussions showed Adorno the new perspectives which were opened up by Benjamin's unconventional philosophy of art and history, which looked for materialist aspects throughout the whole extent of the everyday life of society, and buried itself in the interpretation of details.

At the end of the 1920s, Adorno began to make the first striking applications of what he had learned from Kracauer, Lukács, Schoenberg,

Bloch and Benjamin. His most outstanding essays were the articles 'On the Twelve-Tone Technique' ('Zur Zwölftontechnik') and 'Reaction and Progress' ('Reaktion und Fortschritt') which appeared in 1929 and 1930 in the Viennese music journal *Anbruch*, of which he was a co-editor. Lukács's Hegelianizing theory of class consciousness from the point of view of the philosophy of history, Kracauer's critique of half-hearted capitalist rationalization, and Benjamin's contrasting of mythic nature and the sober light of redemption, were all combined by Adorno to justify Schoenberg's revolution in music. He presented this revolution as a 'rational execution, by the most advanced consciousness, of the historic compulsion to purify its material of the corruption of the decayed organic'.<sup>191</sup> The historical condition of the material of music was manifested in its most characteristic form by atonal music. For its part, atonal music was the outcome of historical tendencies towards complete through-construction (*Durchkonstruktion*)<sup>192</sup> on the basis of motifs and variations, and towards chromatic richness. In twelve-tone music, the historical condition of the material of music achieved consciousness, as Adorno put it some years later in an essay on the 'dialectical composer' Schoenberg, the 'dialectic between the artist and his material . . . achieved Hegelian self-consciousness' in Schoenberg. With twelve-tone technique, Schoenberg had created a new conception of the formation of the material, just as it had once been systematized under the concept of tonality at a previous stage of development. By contrast with tonality, twelve-tone technique signified for Adorno progress in 'the process of rationalizing European music', in the process of 'demythologizing music'.

It may be that, in present social conditions, works of the dignity of Beethoven's or even Bach's are radically excluded . . . the material has become brighter and freer, and has escaped for ever from the mythical restrictions of number dictated by the overtone series and by tonal harmonics. The image of liberated humanity, which we were once able to picture so clearly, can apparently be suppressed in today's society, the mythical basis of which it challenges. But it can never be forgotten or destroyed . . . What cannot be changed in nature may be left to look after itself. Where it can be changed, it is up to us to change it. But a nature which stubbornly sticks to its own gloomy and heavy-hearted ways, and which has to shun the light of brightening, warming consciousness, can be justifiably mistrusted. In the art of genuine humanism there will be no more place for it.<sup>193</sup>

The idea of complete mastery of nature moved ambiguously between the orthodox Marxist conception of a releasing of productive forces and the concept drafted by Benjamin in the final aphorism of *One-Way Street*, a controlled mastery of nature. The application of this concept to the

new music made it possible for Adorno to make the practice of composition serve as the vanguard, prosecutor, agent or representative of social practice, just as he wished, and to pursue a musical theory which presented itself as Marxist, although it did not attempt to analyse any concrete sociological mediations between music and society.

In the summer of 1929, Paul Tillich took over, as the successor to Max Scheler (who had died), Cornelius's chair of philosophy. Tillich, who was one year younger than Bloch and Lukács, was one of the young Protestant theologians who, like the `dialectical theologians' Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and Friedrich Gogarten, contributed to a renewed reflection on Christian faith during the 1920s. What was distinctive about Tillich was his interests beyond the field of theology, in German Idealism and Marxism, in social philosophy, psychology and politics. In 1919 he had joined the religious and socialist `Berlin Circle' around Carl Mennicke, which published the *Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus* (*Paper for Religious Socialism*) from 1920 to 1927, continued from 1930 to 1933 as the *Neue Blätter für religiösen Sozialismus*. Tillich saw socialism as an important force opposing bourgeois society, in which the spirit was fettered in the service of rational control over the material world, and had lost its relation to what was eternal. He was concerned to preserve the socialist movement from the danger of embourgeoisement, i.e. limiting itself to the improvement of the material situation of the proletariat, and to strengthen its transcendent element. For this reason he welcomed anarchist and syndicalist movements, figures such as Gustav Landauer 194 and Georg Lukács, and the influence of the youth movement, of which he had been a member himself.

Tillich's arrival was the opportunity for Adorno to bring the theologically inspired materialism of his friends to bear, not just on music, but on philosophy as well, and to make the academic world accessible to it. At the beginning of 1931 Adorno took his *Habilitation* with Tillich up to this point he was, *de facto*, Tillich's research assistant with a thesis on `The Construction of the Aesthetic in Kierkegaard'. It was published in book form in 1933, with extensive revisions, as *Kierkegaard: the Construction of the Aesthetic*, 195 and dedicated to `my friend, Siegfried Kracauer'. Whereas Benjamin had failed, in the mid-1920s, with his book on the *Trauerspiel*, which was examined by Franz Schultz, a professor of German, and by the philosophers Cornelius and Horkheimer, Adorno was highly successful with his thesis, which was examined by Tillich, a theologian and philosopher, and by Horkheimer, now a social philosopher. The book owed as much to Benjamin as to Kracauer; Adorno himself said of it that it stood in a sense between Lukács and Benjamin, and attempted to use the one to correct the other. While he was working on the book, he wrote to Kracauer:

Horkheimer has read the whole of the fourth chapter and is delighted, but finds it extraordinarily difficult; more difficult than

the book on the baroque. I can't do anything about it, it's in the nature of the subject, I have demonstrated the mythical-demonic character of Kierkegaard's concept of existence, and if that can't be translated into Swabian Marxism, I can't help it. 196

Adorno approached Kierkegaard's work in his *Habilitation* thesis in the same way that Benjamin had approached Goethe's *Elective Affinities*: with a destructive critical attitude which attempted to preserve what could be saved. He was attempting to 'complete' Kierkegaard's philosophy, which he classified as a late form of Idealism, within the outlines of a materialist and theological theory. He saw Kierkegaard's unintentional use of images of the interiors of middle-class homes as indicating an 'objectless inwardness' which revealed itself as the decisive characteristic of Kierkegaard's philosophy. He interpreted this objectless inwardness as the historical form in which the self-satisfaction of the spirit came to light in Kierkegaard. This spirit drew all transcendence down into immanence, and so was not able to sever itself from a mythic conception of nature. Applying the procedure used by Benjamin in his books on *Elective Affinities* and on the *Trauerspiel*, Adorno hoped to identify in Kierkegaard a starting-point for an escape from the spell of mythic nature. He saw this in the concept of the aesthetic, which for Kierkegaard was the lowest level of human existence, the level at which it was enslaved by sensual enjoyment. 'The construction of the aesthetic' meant for Adorno arranging diverse elements in Kierkegaard's workselements which Kierkegaard himself had set little store by into a structure in which the aesthetic presented itself as an apparent reconciliation.

'If you have nothing more to say than that you can't put up with this world, then you'll have to go and look for a better one.' What the representative of the 'ethical' is sneeringly accusing the aesthete of here, the hubris of greatness, is actually a trace of his best characteristic. It is the germ of materialism in him which is looking 'for a better world' not dreamingly, in order to forget the present one, but in order to change it through the power of an image which, as a whole, it is true, may be 'sketched out according to the most abstract measurements', but whose outlines are materially and unambiguously filled in at every dialectical moment. Kierkegaard's 'aesthetic sphere' is the embodiment of such images. 197

When he had finished the book Adorno wrote to Kracauer, 'I went into theological categories more deeply than I wanted to, and I'm afraid that I may have brayed rather too long about rescue and above all, of course, about reconciliation.' 198 The revision of the text for publication did not involve any fundamental changes. As an attempted historical-

materialist concretization of theological motifs, it was the first hint of the concept which was to become central for Adorno: the idea that society had interiorized the notion of the blind forces of nature to such an extent that it would only need to recall its own nature properly in order to escape from the compulsions of nature.

In his examiner's report Tillich praised the difficult, 'textured' nature of the thesis, in which Wiesenrund had attempted to strip Kierkegaard free of existential philosophy and dialectical theology, and had pointed, with his 'rescuing of the aesthetic' in Kierkegaard, to the course of his future philosophy 'whose truth lies in the interpretation of the tiniest facts of each historical moment'.<sup>199</sup> Horkheimer, as second examiner, agreed with Tillich's assessment, 'in the knowledge that both the direction of the philosophical interests, and the methods of thought and the linguistic form of the *Habilitation* thesis which has been submitted to us, are not related to my own philosophical aspirations. If Wiesenrund considers that he has recovered hope and reconciliation, of all things, from Kierkegaard's thought, he has thereby expressed a basic theological conviction which points to philosophical intentions radically different from my own, and this is noticeable in every single sentence. But I know that there lies behind this work not merely a strong philosophical will to truth, but also the strength to promote philosophy at significant points.'<sup>200</sup>

On Friday, 8 May 1931, some three months after Horkheimer's inaugural lecture in the Chair of Social Philosophy and the directorship of the Institute of Social Research ('On the Present State of Social Philosophy and the Tasks of an Institute of Social Research'), Adorno gave his inaugural lecture as a *Privatdozent* in philosophy on 'The Actuality of Philosophy'. He said that, in view of certain objections which had been made, he would now formulate explicitly the theory 'according to which I have, up till now, merely been practising philosophical interpretation'.<sup>201</sup> What he then presented was a variant of Benjamin's critique of epistemology in the preface to the book on the *Trauerspiel*. Whereas that had been 'done up as a theory of ideas',<sup>202</sup> Adorno's theory was now presented as materialist and related to science.

Philosophy will be able to draw an abundance of material, and new ways of concretizing problems, from the current status of the various scientific disciplines alone. It will not, however, be able to set itself above the scientific disciplines to the extent that it will be able to take their 'results' as ready-made and consider them from a safe distance. Rather, philosophical problems always in a certain sense ineluctably lie sealed up within the most specific questions of individual scientific disciplines.

Adorno described sociology as being the science which was of greatest importance to philosophy. He emphasized that fundamental ontology

was even more in contradiction with his view of the current tasks of philosophy than thinking which was merely 'scientific'. A more exact definition of the relationship between philosophy and science, however, would show that philosophy should approach the results of the particular sciences with 'an exact form of imagination', with a kind of imaginativeness which

remains strictly within the material science offers it, but which transcends the sciences even in the minutest aspects of its arrangements, admittedly, which necessarily originate in it. If the idea of philosophical interpretation which I have presented is correct, it can be expressed as a demand to take account continually of questions arising from the reality which presents itself by applying a form of imagination to them which rearranges the elements of the question, but does not go beyond the range of those elements. The exactness of this form of imagination can be measured by the disappearance of the question. 203

It was precisely this the interpretative reorganization of minute, apparently more or less meaningless, details which in Adorno's eyes was materialist. And his theory was dialectical, for him, because philosophical interpretation did not take place within closed paths of thought, but was constantly interrupted, in an 'intermittent dialectic', by realities which refused to adapt themselves to the interpretation, and by objections from inter-subjective truth. Interpretation constantly had to start afresh.

Adorno's inaugural lecture seemed to be a step in Horkheimer's direction, but it remained in fact essentially a theological-materialist programme in the spirit of Benjamin and Kracauer. No one liked the lecture neither Horkheimer, nor Mannheim, nor Wertheimer, and even Kracauer wrote to him from Berlin that it had been tactically inept to present himself as a materialist dialectician in a lecture describing his programme, instead of taking up some minor, genuinely dialectical inquiry or other and breaking off at the point at which the dialectical-materialist consequences forced themselves through, thus penetrating the professors' minds instead of antagonizing them. Adorno had wanted to publish the lecture and dedicate it to Benjamin, but publication, and with it his public homage to Benjamin, did not come about.

Adorno remained true to his programme. In practice it meant, above all, presenting Benjamin's ideas in the academic world. In the winter semester of 1932-3, Benjamin reported to Scholem, Adorno was 'already giving a seminar in the second semester, continuing a previous one, on the *Trauerspiel* book . . . but without making this clear in the lecture timetable'.<sup>204</sup> In July 1932 Adorno gave a lecture to the Frankfurt branch of the Kant Society on 'The Idea of Natural History'.<sup>205</sup> As sources for this concept, he cited Lukács's *Theory of the Novel* and

Benjamin's *Origin of German Tragic Drama*. In a way, the lecture was a reply to the lecture Heidegger had given in Frankfurt in January 1929 on 'Philosophical Anthropology and the Metaphysics of *Dasein*'.<sup>206</sup> It was also a reply to the 'Frankfurt Discussion' (as Adorno called it), at which Kurt Riezler defended Heidegger. Riezler, like Adorno, belonged to the so-called 'Circle' (*Kränzchen*), a Frankfurt debating group of which Tillich, Horkheimer, Pollock, Mannheim, Adolph Löwe and Carl Mennicke were also members. In his lecture, Adorno defended a position which, to avoid misunderstanding, he did not call 'historical ontology', but preferred instead to define by using the concepts 'history' and 'nature'. While a historical ontology in the spirit of Heidegger, by means of the category of historicity, devalued history as being merely the location of what was new, the concept of natural history would reveal history up to the present as being bound to nature, as a scene of constantly changing 'historical prisons for the primeval essence of humanity'.<sup>207</sup> At the same time, it would point to the idea of a reconciliation between nature and history in which history, in the form of natural history, would become the location of what was qualitatively new. 'Natural history', Adorno stated in his lecture, 'is a change of perspective'.<sup>208</sup> It was a change of perspective which combined a keen sense of what was old in the new and of what was new in the old. What would be genuinely new would be to transcend links with nature by bringing the mind (*Geist*) to recognize itself as an aspect of nature. In this variant of radical self-recognition, Adorno was supporting precisely the same Hegelian-Marxist position which Lukács had developed in *History and Class Consciousness* but he supported it independently of class considerations and as unashamed speculation. At the same time, Adorno left no doubt whatsoever, in some of his work in musical criticism during these years, that he was a supporter of the theory of class struggle and of the view that works of philosophy and art were attributable to specific classes.

#### *Herbert Marcuse*

The greatest influences on Herbert Marcuse were the two great philosophers of alienation, reification and inauthenticity who came to fame during the 1920s, Georg Lukács and Martin Heidegger. Marcuse was born in Berlin on 19 July 1898. His father, a Jew from the Pomeranian provinces, had moved to Berlin with his brothers and had worked his way up to become a shareholder in a textile factory before finally starting a construction company, 'Friedenthal and Marcuse', together with an architect. He was able to offer his wife and three children the comforts and privileges of an upper-class life. Marcuse, who had been in military service since the beginning of 1918 as an airship reservist, was a non-active member of the SPD, a party his parents looked down on

as a party for the workers. In November of the same year, just after starting his studies, he was voted on to the Soldiers' Council of Reinickendorf in Berlin. He was an admirer of the type of socialist policies most strikingly represented by Kurt Eisner, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Bavaria.

Irritated that ex-officers were soon being voted on to the Soldiers' Council, he resigned from it; indignant over the leadership of the SPD, which he accused of complicity in the murders of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, he left the SPD and devoted himself to his studies. He studied modern German history, in Berlin to start with, and then in Freiburg im Breisgau, with philosophy and economics as minor subjects. In 1922 he took his doctorate in Freiburg with a thesis on *The German Novel about the Artist*. It owed a great deal to Lukács's *Soul and Form* and *Theory of the Novel* and to Hegel's *Aesthetics*. Against the background of antiquity and of Viking culture, in which the artist was subsumed into the life-form of the totality, where life and spirit, life and art, were one, Marcuse characterized German novels concerned with the life of the artist as expressing a period in which the unity of art and life was fractured and in which the artist, who had a 'metaphysical longing for the Idea and its realization', felt isolated within the 'whole pettiness and emptiness' of the life-forms of reality. The thesis concluded:

There is only one of the great European literatures in which the novel concerned with the life of the artist as an ideological conflict does not occur: Russian literature. There, unity of life-forms actually exists: deep unity between the artist and the people. There, the artist is a brother in suffering, a comforter, prophet and awakener of his people. In the German novel about the artist, mutual interest between the artist and the people is not a given fact, but something which has already been abandoned. A piece of humanity's history can be glimpsed through these literary-historical problems: the struggle of the Germans to achieve a new community. 209

After taking his doctorate, Marcuse, who had been married since 1924, returned to live in Berlin. His father provided him with an apartment and a share in a publishing and antiquarian book business, and Marcuse sponsored a kind of left-wing literary salon in which Marxist theory, gestalt psychology, abstract painting and current tendencies in bourgeois philosophy were discussed.<sup>210</sup> When he and his closest friend studied Heidegger's *Being and Time*, just after it was published, they agreed that it was concerned with precisely what they had missed in Marxist theory (in spite of Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*): the existential element, the way that the book took everyday forms of alienation as its starting-point, and its clarification of the question of authentic human existence. Marcuse decided to return to Freiburg, where

he had once attended Husserl's lectures without any particular interest, and to take up an academic career as a philosopher. He moved to Freiburg in 1928 with his wife and child and was appointed as assistant to Heidegger, who had just succeeded to Husserl's professorial chair.

The career followed by the philosophy professor to whom Marcuse was making his pilgrimage was apparently the exact opposite of those of Lukács, Bloch, Benjamin and Kracauer. Heidegger's thinking had been moulded by theology, but his was a theology which lacked any prospect of rescue, reconciliation or salvation. In addition, he was closeted within a safe academic world, and averse to everything political or Marxist.

Martin Heidegger was born in 1889 in Messkirch, in Baden, the son of a Catholic master cooper who was also the local sexton. The first half of his secondary schooling was at the Jesuit College in Constance. From 1909 to 1913 he studied at the University of Freiburg theology and philosophy to begin with, and later philosophy with mathematics and natural science as minor subjects. In 1913 he took his doctorate with the Catholic philosopher Arthur Schneider with a dissertation on *The Theory of Judgement in Psychologism*.<sup>211</sup> It was a critique of the psychologism of his Aristotelian and neo-Scholastic doctoral supervisor and of the dissertation's other supervisor, the neo-Kantian value theorist Heinrich Rickert.

Other things which made an impression on Heidegger in the years before the First World War, as he stated in retrospect in the 1950s, were the `second edition of Nietzsche's *Will to Power*, which was twice as long as the first, the translation of Kierkegaard's and Dostoevsky's works, the growing interest in Hegel and Schelling, the poetry of Rilke and Trakl, and Dilthey's *Collected Works*'.<sup>212</sup>

Heidegger was passed unfit for military service, and took his *Habilitation* degree in 1916 with Rickert, with a dissertation on *The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus*.<sup>213</sup> He was committed to the medieval concept of `speculative grammar', and stated in the conclusion of his thesis that he saw metaphysics as being the true task of philosophy. In 1919 he became a *Privatdozent* and was appointed as assistant to Rickert's successor, Edmund Husserl. What impressed him in Husserl's book, *Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*,<sup>214</sup> published in 1913, was the modern concept of `transcendental subjectivity', which `attains a more original and universal determination through phenomenology'.<sup>215</sup> Husserl's watchword `To the things themselves!', which aimed to establish philosophy as a pure science and had been intended quite unrebellingly, became for Scheler, and now for Heidegger as well, an encouragement to believe once again in the possibility of an authentic, weighty philosophy and in `phenomenological seeing' as an openness of the subject towards the metaphysical.

Heidegger's lectures and seminars soon gave him the reputation of being an outstanding philosopher. Nor did this reputation suffer from the fact that he did not publish anything for more than a decade after his *Habilitation* thesis. To many of those who attended his lectures Horkheimer among them he seemed to be living evidence of the fact that philosophy could mean something for life, something of importance to the individual. Bloch and Benjamin affected Adorno in a similar way.

'The perceptible intensity and obscure depth of Heidegger's intellectual impetus', wrote Husserl's student Karl Löwith, looking back 'made everything else pale into insignificance and lured us away from Husserl's naive belief in an ultimate philosophical method.' 216 And, like Bloch and Schoenberg, Heidegger saw himself, in an expressionist manner, as the mere instrument of a higher necessity. He wrote to Karl Löwith in 1920 that his concern was with what 'I, living in today's revolutionary situation, "necessarily" experience, without regard to whether a "culture" will result from it, or an acceleration of the collapse.' And in 1921 he wrote:

I am doing what I have to, and what I consider necessary, and I am doing it in the way that I can I do not dress up my philosophical works to match the cultural duties owed to a general 'today' . . . I work on the basis of my 'I am' and my . . . factic origin. Existence is raging with this facticity. 217

In 1923 he was appointed to a personal professorial chair in Marburg, still a stronghold of neo-Kantianism, although this was beginning to go into decline. He became a friend of Rudolf Bultmann, Professor of New Testament Studies, who, along with Karl Barth and Friedrich Gogarten, was one of the principal representatives of 'dialectical theology'. The defenders of this position placed a theology of the Word of God in opposition to the 'Man-God' of liberal neo-Protestant theology, and emphasized, with reference to Kierkegaard in particular, that Christian faith was a risk, that humanity and God were incompatibly opposed, and that the separation between religion and science, faith and theology could not last indefinitely if there was to be any claim to theological authenticity.

In the spring of 1927, *Being and Time: Part One* appeared in the journal *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung* (*Yearbook of Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research*), which was edited by Husserl, and the work was published simultaneously in book form. It made Heidegger famous at a stroke, and confirmed his reputation for being a philosopher who had something fundamental to say about life. The book was concerned with more than merely the application of Husserl's phenomenology to history and to the present. It was a work concerned with the fact that humanity had been abandoned by Being, although it was dependent on Being; a work which took being and time, being and *Dasein* ('Being-there') seriously. Heidegger started from the 'priority of the question of Being', and saw the starting-point for the pursuit of the question of the meaning of Being in humanity, i.e. in *Dasein*, as that existent being which 'is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it'. Because of the fundamental role of *Dasein*, he described the analysis of the structure of its being as a 'fundamental ontology'. 218 Heidegger did not touch on the question whether starting with *Dasein* did not mean necessarily, if this choice of starting-point was not to be an arbitrary one that Being was not merely understood by *Dasein* but rather constituted by it, that Being was dependent upon *Dasein*. Neither the second part of *Being and Time* nor the third section of the first part, 'Time and Being', was ever published. This underlined the difficulties which Heidegger experienced in his attempt to reconcile the existentialism which characterized the arguments of the

published parts of *Being and Time* 'existentialism' in the sense which became usual later, an analysis of human existence eliminating the question of Being with the idea of the Being from which everything draws its occurrence.

Taking *Dasein* as a starting-point made it possible for Heidegger to achieve a concreteness in the description of phenomena which was unusual in the field of academic philosophy, and a way of handling standard philosophical problems which suggested that they were derivative or even meaningless. These two aspects of *Being and Time* were responsible for the reception which the book was accorded. In place of the pure consciousness with which Kant or Husserl were concerned, concrete human existence appeared, 'thrown' into the world. This existence, like pure consciousness, was concerned with the highest matters but had loaded them with vital significance. It was a question of authentic or inauthentic life. 'Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself.'

And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be *authentic* that is, something of its own can it have lost itself and not yet won itself. 219

Much of what Heidegger described in the first section of the book corresponded to the metaphysical diagnoses of the times which were undertaken in the philosophy of history by Lukács, Bloch, Kracauer and Benjamin. It was an analysis of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), to use a concept made familiar by the late Husserl, who had, for his part, also been inspired by Heidegger. Heidegger defended this life-world against theorizing and against the absolutization of the scientific world-picture, but at the same time exposed its inauthenticity.

Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen everything, having understood everything, develop the supposition that Dasein's disclosedness, which is so available and so prevalent, and guarantee to Dasein that all the possibilities of its Being will be secure, genuine, and full. Through the self-certainty and decidedness of the 'they', it gets spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic understanding or the state-of-mind that goes with it. The supposition of the 'they' that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine 'life', brings Dasein a *tranquillity*, for which everything is 'in the best of order' and all doors are open. Falling Being-in-the-world, which tempts itself, is at the same time *tranquillizing* [*beruhigend*].

However, this tranquillity in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited 'hustle' [*Betrieb*] . . . Versatile curiosity and restlessly 'knowing it all' masquerade as a universal understanding of Dasein. But at bottom it remains indefinite *what* is really to be understood, and the question has not even been asked. Nor has it been understood that understanding itself is a potentiality-for-Being which must be

made free in one's *ownmost* Dasein alone. When Dasein, tranquilized, and 'understanding' everything, thus compares itself with everything, it drifts along towards an alienation [*Entfremdung*] in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it. 220

*Dasein* is rescued from this fallenness, according to Heidegger, by anxiety. Anxiety, which determines Being-in-the-world, although only potentially as a rule, is an elementary piece of evidence for the existentiality of human beings, their relation to Being. It makes the familiar, everyday world appear as a 'not-at-home' and confronts *Dasein* with 'its *Being-free for . . .* the authenticity of its Being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is'. The permanent characteristic of the *Dasein* which senses the call to authenticity is 'care'. Heidegger saw *Dasein's* 'ownmost possibility' in death. No one can steal one's death away from one. To this extent it is the experience which is most one's own. It signifies 'the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all'.<sup>221</sup> To that extent it is the ultimate possibility. Approaching death, *Dasein* accepts its limitedness. Heidegger demonstrated the ontological constitution of authentic existence from the structure of this approach to death: its futural character. The present springs out of a future which has already been. That is, I am what I have made from my own possibilities. *Dasein* is an occurrence which is finite, extended across future, past and present, all of which are temporalized by *Dasein* itself. The finiteness of this temporality this is Heidegger's transition to 'historicality' makes *Dasein* historical.

Death was also given a key role by Heidegger in the distinction between authentic and inauthentic historical existence.

Only Being-free for death gives *Dasein* its goal outright and pushes existence into its finitude. Once one has grasped the finitude of one's existence, it snatches one back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer themselves as closest to onethose of comfortableness, shirking, and taking things lightly and brings *Dasein* into the simplicity of its *fate*. This is how we designate *Dasein's* primordial historicizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which *Dasein* *hands* itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.<sup>222</sup>

Heidegger's distinction between authentic and inauthentic historical existence was enigmatic. Both modes of existence were characterized by the 'thrownness' of Being-in-the-world and by the past. But in the one case the past was supposed to be a possibility of authentic existence, while in the other it was merely a remnant. In the one case it was supposed to be a matter of resolute acceptance, in the other, by contrast, one of mere preservation. The message to the reader was indistinct. If readers wanted to belong to those who exist authentically, the present would have to appear to them as inauthentic, alienated, dominated by the 'they' which had to be abolished in favour of the possibility of a constitution of *Dasein* which had not been perceived in the past, although it had unmistakably existed. But, since the 'they' was seen as an 'existential',<sup>223</sup> how could a more authentic constitution of *Dasein* than the existing one be possible? And, if the most authentic possibility was an acceptance without illusions

of the thrownness of one's own `there' (*Da*), how could an abolition of the `they' (which is a part of that) bring an increase in authenticity? What remained was a muted protest against existing conditions, which did not describe the causes of those conditions, and whose chief characteristic was an emotional sense of heroic fatalism.

In 1928 Heidegger returned to Freiburg as Husserl's successor. In July of the following year he gave his inaugural lecture there, `What is Metaphysics?', published in 1929. In this text, which he himself saw as an attempt to think of Being by way of thinking about Nothingness, 224 the early Heidegger's existentialism reached its climax. He contrasted philosophy with science, logic and understanding, seeing philosophy as something which `gets under way only by a peculiar insertion of our own existence into the fundamental possibilities of Dasein as a whole'.<sup>225</sup> Just as for Lukács the proletariat became the true philosopher of history, so for Heidegger the true philosopher was the existing human being. `So long as man exists, philosophizing of some sort occurs.' To grasp with the understanding the whole of what exists is not possible. What constantly happens, however, is that the whole of what exists comes in moods for example, in boredom. `Profound boredom, drifting here and there in the abysses of our existence like a muffling fog, removes all things and men and oneself along with it into a remarkable indifference. This boredom reveals beings as a whole.' As a particularly special mood, he emphasized anxiety, already familiar from *Being and Time*. Anxiety `leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole'.<sup>226</sup> In anxiety, *Dasein* experiences itself as being held out into the nothing, where existence appears to it as what is completely Other, in an utter strangeness which had until then been concealed. As a `lieutenant of the nothing', man is essentially transcendent, surpassing beings as a whole, metaphysical by nature.<sup>227</sup> Negation in the fields of science, logic and understanding is merely a diluted form of nihilation. The `leading nihilating behaviour' is shown in `unyielding antagonism and stinging rebuke', in `galling failure and merciless prohibition', in `bitter privation'. Those who are shaken by the breath of anxiety in the most lasting way are `those daring ones' who `are sustained by that on which they expend themselves in order thus to preserve a final greatness in existence'.<sup>228</sup>

In his inaugural lecture, Heidegger had found an approach to the question of Nothingness which seemed partly contrived and partly fanciful, and which built on word-play, examples of which Rudolf Carnap, the best known of the Vienna Circle neo-positivists, used as evidence of the meaninglessness of metaphysical questions. The lecture presented human beings as more or less vulnerable to attack. Freed from everything which might have been sacred to reason, they must be prepared to sacrifice themselves for something of which nothing more was known than that it demanded severity and privation and how this was known remained unexplained.

In the years following the publication of *Being and Time*, this philosophy provided Heidegger with the material for countless lecture evenings and functions. The climax of these was the discussion which took place between him and Ernst Cassirer, a representative of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism, at the university courses held at Davos in March 1929. Heidegger maintained in the discussion that philosophy's

task was to show humanity, 'in spite of all its freedom, the nothingness of its *Dasein*', 'from the corrupt point of view of someone who merely uses the works of the intellect to throw humanity back into the severity of its fate'. 229

When Marcuse went to Freiburg in 1928 to join Heidegger, he already had his own philosophical programme and a definite idea of Heidegger's significance. His programme was 'concrete philosophy'. His idea of Heidegger was that his work represented the point at which 'bourgeois philosophy' was being transcended from within, and moving in the direction of the new 'concrete philosophy'.<sup>230</sup> In the last article he published in Germany, written in exile in Switzerland in 1933 a critical study of Karl Jaspers's work, 'Philosophy of Failure' Marcuse held that 'The determination of human existence as essentially historical should restore to philosophy the long-lost acuteness of its concretion, and the ultimate seriousness of human events in which everything really is at stake, precisely when what counts is what is needed here and now.'<sup>231</sup> From the very start, in his first philosophical publication, Marcuse criticized Heidegger for the fact that, when he did take 'today and its situation' into account, he did not deal with the really decisive questions: 'What is concrete authentic existence? What is its nature, and is concrete authentic existence possible at all?' Heidegger did not go into the 'concrete historical conditions under which a concrete *Dasein* exists'; he fell back on the lonely *Dasein*, instead of promoting resolute action.<sup>232</sup>

For Marcuse, both 'action' and the taking into account of 'today and its situation' were vague, indistinct ideas, and he himself was not politically active in any sense. He considered theory the highest form of praxis, and in the early 1930s was working on research into *Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of Historicity*,<sup>233</sup> with which he hoped to take his *Habilitation* with Heidegger. All of this makes it to some extent understandable that, apart from the lack of concreteness mentioned above, there was nothing which he fundamentally objected to in Heidegger, and that he was completely astonished by Heidegger's public declaration of belief in Nazism in 1933. To the extent that Marcuse was unfaithful to Heidegger, it was only because he discovered other philosophers whose 'tremendous concretion' outdid Heidegger's: Dilthey and Hegel. But all of them were overshadowed for Marcuse by Marx when he discovered the 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' of 1844, which were published for the first time in 1932 as part of the Marx-Engels *Complete Works* (MEGA). In his essay, 'New Sources for the Basis of Historical Materialism', published in 1932 in the journal *Die Gesellschaft (Society)*, edited by Rudolf Hilferding, Marcuse offered one of the pioneering interpretations of the Paris Manuscripts. He saw in them 'a laying of the philosophical foundations for economics in the sense of a theory of revolution'<sup>234</sup>i.e. Marx's ontology, as we might call it by analogy with his book on Hegel. Marx's ontology differed

from Hegel's, according to Marcuse, in that it remained true to its `orientation to the existential concept of life and its historicity', 235 in that it remained always an ontology of the historical human being. At the same time, Marcuse tried in the essay to solve the problem of how historical necessity and the higher value of particular forms of existence were related to one another: why `being free for historical necessity' should serve as a means of progress towards the `truth of existence'.

For Marx, essence and facticity, the situation of the history of essence and the situation of actual history, are no longer separate regions or levels which are independent of one another: the historicity of man *is included in the determination of his essence* . . . But the discovery of the historicity of the essence of man does not mean that the history of the essence of man is to be identified with his actual history. We have already heard that man is never immediately `one with his life-activity', but rather `distinguishes' himself from it and `relates' to it. Essence and existence become *distinct* here: his existence is a `means' towards the realization of his essence, or, in alienation, his essence is a means towards his mere physical existence. If essence and existence move apart in this way, while at the same time the reunification of both of them as an actual achievement is the truly free *task* for human practice, then, where facticity has progressed as far as the complete *reversal* of human essence, the *radical abolition* of this facticity is the supreme task. The unwavering vision of the essence of man becomes, precisely, a relentless impetus towards radical revolution: the fact that in the actual situation of capitalism it is not merely a question of economic or political crisis, but a question of catastrophe for the essence of humanity this discovery condemns every mere economic or political *reform* to failure from the outset, and demands unconditionally the catastrophic abolition of actual conditions by means of *total revolution*.<sup>236</sup>

Talk of the historicity of human essence and its complete reversal was countered by an appeal to an unwavering vision of the essence of man, which holds firm through every actual reversal, and which Marcuse, as a Marxist existential ontologist, held up as an unshakeable standard. Existential anthropology, the theory of man as an undetermined finite being thrown into the world, was diluted by Marcuse into a conception of human beings as able to achieve correspondence with their own essence only indirectly. Marcuse had rejected the philosophy he had demanded at first, which was one of `self-contemplation" by human beings, a contemplation of the current historical situation in the world, constantly revived and ever driven forward" contemplation understood as the contemplation of the possibilities and necessities of being, of acting and of becoming which emerge in this situation'.<sup>237</sup> Instead, he

had arrived at a philosophy which declared sweepingly that the present era consisted of an inhuman capitalist form of existence which only by means of a total revolution could be made to correspond to the essence of humanity, now recognized thanks to the young Marx.

As Marcuse recalled later in a conversation with Habermas, he had discovered a new Marx, one who 'was genuinely concrete and who at the same time went beyond the rigid practical and theoretical Marxism of the political parties'. In that sense he had become a Marxist philosopher, who no longer thought he must depend on Heidegger for a philosophical foundation of Marxism, but saw Marx himself as providing the best foundation. It was after this that he began to see his plan for a *Habilitation* as unrealistic, and published his book on Hegel independently. According to Marcuse's own statement, this came about because in 1932 there was no longer any point in a Jew and a Marxist taking a *Habilitation*.<sup>238</sup> On the evidence of a letter from Husserl to Riezler, however, on the basis of which Marcuse was later accepted in the West German restitution procedure as someone who would in the normal course of events have taken his *Habilitation* and become a professor, Marcuse's *Habilitation* was in reality, or in addition, blocked by Heidegger. Husserl appealed to Riezler on his behalf, and Riezler appealed to Horkheimer. At first these efforts were in vain. It was only in 1933, after a conversation with Leo Lowenthal, who spoke to Horkheimer on Marcuse's behalf, that Marcuse joined the Institute of Social Research in exile in Geneva.

This biographical panorama shows that none of those belonging to the Horkheimer circle was politically active; none of them had his origins either in the labour movement or in Marxism; all were from Jewish families, although the relation of their families to Judaism was extremely varied, extending from complete assimilation to Jewish orthodoxy. For all of them, awareness of the problem of anti-Semitism seemed to have lost its relevance in view of their intellectual activities, which were directed against capitalism. It was only for Horkheimer that horror over the fate of the exploited and humiliated was a fundamental stimulus for his thinking. For all of the others, Marxist theory was attractive purely because it seemed to promise solutions to apparently insoluble theoretical problems, or seemed to be the only radical critique of alienated bourgeois-capitalist society which was both theoretically sophisticated and did not lose contact with reality. In relation to Horkheimer's interdisciplinary programme, the combination of characters they presented was an unpromising one. They were all more or less familiar with philosophy, but none except Fromm and Pollock was an expert in any of the scientific disciplines, co-operation between which was intended to advance the theory of society at the Institute of Social Research.

At the age when they were able to take on a significant social role as

independent thinkers, their thoughts turned to the revolution they had witnessed when they were younger. 'Why, when the name is being revised anyway, should it still be "Dawn" [*Anbruch*]?' asked the musical journal *Musikblätter des Anbruch* (whose editor-in-chief from 1928 on was in practice Adorno) in January 1928 in the editorial introduction to the first issue under its new title.

We have remained true to the name, because we are true to what it represents. We believe that the new music which we defend in these pages belongs, in its best representatives, to an altered, radically altered state of consciousness, and to speak up for the new music means for us to speak up for this new, altered consciousness at the same time. We do not see this consciousness in the stabilized objective spirit of the post-war era; we ask sceptically whether the now reviled period in which one spoke of dawn and twilight did not have more to do with altered consciousness than the present situation, in which a change of consciousness is not even being demanded any more, far from having been created by one . . . As 'Dawn' [*Anbruch*] we hope to carry the impulse of a new beginning forward into a musicaland not only musicalsituation in which such an impulse is desperately needed if we are not to fall victim to the most dreadful reaction: the smug up-to-dateness of a good conscience. 239

This was true with a vengeance in the early 1930s, when the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research was taking a new direction. The Horkheimer circle was approaching a new beginning, while bourgeois-capitalist society was decaying ever more, fascism was advancing, and socialism was stagnating.

PoliticsAcademic PoliticsAcademic Work

But if you will take note of the mode of proceeding of men, you will see that all those who come to great riches and great power have obtained them either by fraud or by force; and afterwards, to hide the ugliness of acquisition, they make it decent by applying the false title of earnings to things they have usurped by deceit or by violence. And those who, out of either little prudence or too much foolishness, shun these modes always suffocate in servitude or poverty. For faithful servants are always servants and good men are always poor.240

Machiavelli, in his *Florentine Histories*, put these words into the mouth of a passionate and experienced revolutionary, and Horkheimer quoted them in his *Beginnings of the Bourgeois Philosophy of History*.241 They

corresponded to the view Horkheimer had held all his life: 'For someone who has achieved power, the greater part of humanity transforms itself suddenly into a mass of helpful, friendly fellow beings. For absolute powerlessness, however that of animals, for instance the same fellow beings are cattle-dealers and butchers.' This was the conclusion of the aphorism 'The Relativity of Character' in *Dawn*.<sup>242</sup> Those who want a good life for themselves need power. Those who want to help others need power even more. Those who want to achieve power, or keep it, must look at reality without illusions and be able to keep up with the power game. Adorno, in an 'Open Letter' to Horkheimer on his seventieth birthday, wrote:

You knew not only how hard life was, but also how complex. You were a person who was able to see right into the driving force behind things, and who wanted to arrange them differently, someone who was resolute and nevertheless able without capitulating to hold his own ground. To look critically at the principle of self-preservation and be able, in spite of that, to wring one's own self-preservation out of the knowledge gained thereby you represented this paradox in physical form.

What Horkheimer wanted, and what he achieved, was a form of existence which was aimed at acquiring knowledge about society, but which still included a comfortable lifestyle at all costs. His partnership with Pollock was characterized both by the way in which Pollock's subordinate role strongly masochistic in tone was firmly established, and by an emphasis on the fact that the explicit goal of the partnership was the achievement of a better life together. 'The interior always takes precedence over the exterior', Horkheimer wrote in 1935 in *Materials for the Reformulation of Basic Principles*,<sup>243</sup> one of the texts which he wrote from time to time to reformulate the principles of his association with Pollock. The 'interior' referred to here was the companionship between Horkheimer and Pollock, the goal of which was the pursuit of knowledge. 'Our attitude to the world: *gaîté*, *courage*, *fierté*.' The Institute was an important part of life for this pair, and Horkheimer mentioned it in his *Materials* under the heading 'Life Together':

Life together should find expression in the mutual joys and worries of everyday life, not just in concerns about larger problems. For example, the attitude to the Institute, its work and its associates. Institute, not a 'firm', not an 'institution', but a group with shared attitudes and goals. Necessity of watching out together to see that the core of the Institute remains as homogeneous as possible, great care to be taken in the choice of closer associates.

In cases of doubt, however, one was to beware of 'over-valuing' the Institute. The Institute was to be set up as far as possible according to

the value-system of the `interior', but was always to remain merely an instrument of the interior.

The `interior' was engaged in struggle with the bourgeois world, but was itself infected by that world from the very start. Anti-bourgeois expressionist pathos, as Horkheimer's autobiographical and self-critical texts of the 1930s confirm, remained the seedbed of his critique of society.

Lack of pride, lack of joy in oneself and others, lack of self-confidence, dejection, feelings of guilt (in spite of a decision at one point to live a definite kind of life for certain definite reasons)all of these have as their common root a bourgeois instinctual structure created by our upbringing (being prevented from doing what is fun). Only conscious pride, which opposes the rights and the value of our partnership to a hostile world, can help to overcome this instinctual structure, which constantly questions the maxims of *gai t * and *courage*.

In *Materials*, Horkheimer drew his own conclusions from this perception of the world as a power struggle, and these only partly corresponded to Marxist conclusions. It was a perception of the world suggested by the collective Jewish experience and by a sober assessment of the conditions associated with both his own and his father's careers.

The correct attitude to society is produced if one constantly keeps the following facts before one's eyes: in today's society, all human relations are distorted, and nothing across the whole gamut of friendship, approval and goodwill is ultimately meant seriously. The only thing which is serious is the competitive struggle within classes and the struggle between classes . . . Every friendly act is offered not to a person but to his place in societythis fact is shown in all its brutality when the same person loses his position as a result of minor or major changes in the conditions of the struggle (stock exchange, persecution of the Jews). But it is not a question of an abstract conclusion. Instead, you must constantly be aware that it is you yourself who are at their mercy when all the friendly, benevolent people with whom you are surrounded every day find out that you have become powerless. Conclusion: never on the same footing as the gaolers; solidarity for ever with the victims. (N.B. In this society, apart from its bureaucrats, there *are* also human beings, especially among women. But they are a considerably rarer species than is generally thought!)

There was only one thing to which this partnership between Horkheimer and Pollock took second place: the loving relationship and community of interests between Max and his wife Maidon. It was a

pleasant, natural relationship, which did, however, have its odd side in Horkheimer's excessive concern to obtain contractual guarantees of a privileged material basis for their married life. He secured from Pollock, in the latter's capacity as executive agent to Felix Weil and his heirs, a number of conditions in addition to the terms of his contract of employment of October 1930 (according to which the directorship of the Institute was set up as an honorary position, but with all expenses for `representations, study trips or other duties connected with his position as academic director' to be paid for by the Society for Social Research without limit and without the need to present any receipts). In January 1932, for example, the condition was added:

Should you for any reason lose your salary as a professor of the University of Frankfurt am Main, we hereby undertake to pay your income in the same amounts and with the same pension contributions as would be your due as a full professor at a Prussian university with an extremely high cost of living.

And again, in February 1932:

In order to secure your academic research on a lasting basis, I undertake hereby for myself and my heirs to grant you for the period of your lifetime a monthly sum in the amount of RM 1500 (one thousand five hundred Reichsmarks) or Frs SS 1875 (one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five Swiss francs) or Hfl. 900 (nine hundred Dutch guilders) or Frs Fcs 9000 (nine thousand French francs) or \$375 (three hundred and seventy-five US dollars). The choice of currency and place of payment remain with you. The income which you receive from the Prussian state or in your capacity as director of the Institute of Social Research is to be deducted from this amount.

Horkheimer himself was an extreme example of the `strange psychology' which he described with bitterness in one of the aphorisms in *Dawn* (see above, p. 49). But in him the Institute had as its director a young academic manager who was able, in difficult times, to create both the external and the internal conditions in which distinguished academic research could flourish. Horkheimer frequently accused Pollock of not showing enough interest in the Institute's intellectual tasks, and of having a tendency to monopolize its business arrangements. Horkheimer himself was interested in both.

The defence of the Institute in the political field and in academic politics went hand in hand. The years 1930 to 1932 brought with them the end of what remained of the class compromise which had been embodied in the parliamentary co-operation between Social Democrats, Centrists and Democrats. The Communists were increasing in number,

although this trend was a precarious one, based on support from intellectuals and the unemployed; and there was a dramatic increase in the strength of Nazism. A development similar to that in Italy was looming: a fascist 'revolution' accepted without opposition by the middle-class parties, and more or less benevolently tolerated by the conservative parties and the organs of the state. As early as 1928, the leader of the Social Democratic Defence League in Austria, Julius Deutsch, had published a survey of *Fascism in Europe*, and the Social Democratic constitutional theorist Hermann Heller had travelled to Italy for six months to gather material for his book published the following year, *Europe and Fascism*, which was one of the first comprehensive analyses of the ideology and practice of this 'movement of renewal' in the broader European context. 244 Up to that point, fascism had achieved power only in Italy, where it protected the 'liberal' economy from the demands of the proletariat, at the cost of destroying bourgeois culture. But as a movement it existed in most of the countries of Europe, kept in check by many governments which themselves were more authoritarian than democratic.

The Nazis became the second largest party in the Reichstag in the elections of September 1930, with 107 members. In the ten days preceding the vote, twenty-four people were killed in Prussia alone, with 285 injured and dozens of bomb attacks taking place. Those concerned with the administration of the Institute Horkheimer, Pollock, Felix Weil and Leo Lowenthal decided to begin to make preparations in case a withdrawal by the Institute might eventually become necessary. The first step taken, on Horkheimer's suggestion, was the opening of a branch office of the Institute in Geneva. Officially, this was purely for the sake of research work using the extensive archives of the International Labour Office there. As early as December 1930, Horkheimer wrote to the Senior President of the Province of Hessen-Nassau, the State Commissar for the University of Frankfurt am Main, asking to be released from his duties 'three or four times, for four to five days each' during the current and the following semester.

The Institute, of which I have been the director since 1 August of this year, intends to undertake extensive inquiries into the social and cultural position of the upper strata of the working class. It requires for this purpose thoroughgoing collaboration with the International Labour Office in Geneva, since its staff of academic researchers and the materials which have been collected there are aids vital to the success of our own academic project. The materials in particular require specialist analysis by our sociological staff under constant supervision. The Institute of Social Research has therefore decided to maintain a long-term research station in Geneva. For this purpose it will be necessary for me, as director of the Institute, to establish the necessary contacts with the Labour

Office and to keep myself informed from time to time on the course of the researches undertaken by our staff. 245

The director of the Institute acquired an apartment in Geneva at once. From 1931 onwards, the Institute's directors withdrew its endowment capital from Germany and invested it in the Netherlands. 'At the Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt we kept only a letter of credit that barely covered the Institute's monthly requirements.'<sup>246</sup> The rights of ownership in the Institute's library were transferred first to the Society for Sociological Studies in Zurich, a subsidiary of the Institute, and then at the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933 to the London School of Economics.

It was against this background that a new orientation in the Institute's research work began. This took place during the heyday of Frankfurt University. At the beginning of the 1930s the professors at Frankfurt included Paul Tillich, the philosopher and theologian; the economist Adolph Löwe; the educationist Carl Mennicke (all three of them religious socialists); the sociologist Karl Mannheim; the sociologist of law Hugo Sinzheimer; the constitutional theorist and sociologist Hermann Heller (from 1932); the financial economist Wilhelm Gerloff; the philosopher of Judaism Martin Buber; the literary historian Max Kommerell; the historian Ernst Kantorowicz (the last two had their roots in the George Circle<sup>247</sup>); the classical philologists Walter Friedrich Otto and Karl Reinhardt; the gestalt psychologist Max Wertheimer; and the social psychologist Hendrik de Man. A student during this period, Karl Korn, recalled in his memoirs the academic and intellectual atmosphere of Frankfurt during those years:

With names and figures like these, we imagined we were the equals of Heidelberg and other universities with similar reputations, and that we had overtaken them not only in reputation but in intellectual and political excitement.

At that time two faculties in Frankfurt, German Studies and Sociology, had become the focus of intellectual and political discussions . . . Philosophers and sociologists on the one hand, and philologists in both German and Classical Studies on the other, knew each other, met up together, and had discussions together. On both sides there was a touch of exclusivity about it. If one wanted to take part in all this as a student, one had to be 'in on it' to know where and when the meetings were taking place. But the decisive point was that between the two extremes of the George Circle and the sociologists, who were virtually friends at first, there was a broad centre which kept the old traditional business of academic life firmly in its hands and carried it forward. This had the healthy effect of making the brilliant outsiders, who occasionally had a tendency to snobbishness, refrain from any academic laxness. Various left-wing tendencies gathered around the philosophy

department at that time, and these had a certain by no means always beneficial fascination for people working in the humanities, and particularly for professors and students of literature. But it would be a mistake to think that they could all be reduced simply to the single label 'Marxism'. . . There was a whole kaleidoscope . . .

If one *were* looking for a common factor on the intellectual left which developed in the philosophy faculty around 1930, then one would have to say that ideology and the critique of ideology became for the first time a systematic topic there, i.e. that connections between ideas, in the broadest sense, and their social base were being examined. 248

The intellectual left consisted of the Sociology Department, headed by Karl Mannheim, the Institute of Social Research, headed by Horkheimer, and the group around Paul Tillich. In a speech of acceptance of the City of Frankfurt's Adorno Prize years later, Norbert Elias, who in his time had come to Frankfurt as Mannheim's assistant, emphasized that there was virtually no contact between the Institute of Social Research and the Sociology Department, although the sociologists were housed in the ground floor of the same building as the Institute. But Mannheim, Horkheimer and Adorno all belonged to the 'circle' and were always ready to co-operate with the group around Tillich. A glance at the lecture timetables of the period gives the impression that the intellectual left then formed a weighty and relatively solid contingent, and that Horkheimer did not stand alone with his programme for interdisciplinary social theory. Horkheimer and Tillich held courses jointly: in the summer semester of 1930, a seminar on 'Reading Philosophical Texts'; in the winter semester of 1930-1, a seminar on Locke; in the summer of 1931, a seminar on a philosophical writer. There were also joint courses by Tillich and Wiesengrund: in the winter semester of 1931-2, a seminar dealing with selections from Hegel's philosophy of history; in the summer of 1932, a seminar on 'Lessing: *The Education of the Human Species*'; 249 in the winter semester of 1932-3, a seminar on 'Simmel: the Main Problems of Philosophy'. In the summer of 1930 there was a seminar course, and in the summer of 1931 a philosophical colloquium, given jointly by Tillich, Riezler, Gelb and Wertheimer. From the winter of 1931-2 until the Institute's break-up in 1933, there was a study group on Social History and the History of Ideas formed by Mannheim, Löwe, Bergstraesser and Noack. The first joint seminar planned by Horkheimer and Adorno, 'Thomas Hobbes's Constitutional Theory', announced for the summer semester of 1933, was never actually held.

Under Leopold von Wiese in Cologne, sociology was being conducted as a sterile theory of relations, with empirical studies restricted to the occasional field trip. Heidelberg, once the centre of German sociology,

lost its most successful sociologist when Mannheim left for Frankfurt. In the early 1930s, then, Frankfurt became the place where all the thinking that was of interest in the area of social theory was concentrated in a way which was, for Germany, unique.

Horkheimer's achievement in the field of academic politics was that he gave the work of the Institute of Social Research a distinct identity and at the same time protected it from defensive reactions among those who felt that their intellectual property was being threatened by the Institute's reorientation. *Vis-à-vis* the Frankfurt public, Horkheimer played up the greater relevance to reality of his project, and his command of 'a great empirical research apparatus'. At the same time, he distanced himself in this way from humanistic and metaphysical tendencies in German sociology. With regard to specialized sociology and its defenders, he emphasized that he did not claim to represent a specific specialist subject, but 'merely' the project of analysing social processes as a whole. To those who were trying to establish sociology as an individual discipline, Horkheimer's project must have seemed megalomaniac, a return to the idea of sociology as a universal science. But they had no need to be concerned that an undertaking of this sort which expressly conceived of itself as not being 'sociology', and which saw specialized sociology as merely a precondition for its own existence would jeopardize their own efforts. Leopold von Wiese was at this time director of the Sociology Department in Cologne, the first social science research institute in Germany, and editor of its academic journal, which was entirely devoted to sociology, and he had published the *Communications of the German Society for Sociology* since 1923. As chairman of this society, he was in a key position with regard to the development of the German sociology of the period. Horkheimer sent Leo Lowenthal to him in order to make it clear that the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* did not intend in any way to compete with his *Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie (Cologne Sociological Quarterly)*. In this way, Horkheimer was largely able to keep the Institute out of the arguments taking place both within sociology and with regard to its existence as such.

But to keep the Institute out of politically coloured arguments was not possible, even though Horkheimer did not, like Paul Tillich, defend socialism or, like Hugo Sinzheimer or Hermann Heller, belong to the committed democrats and declared opponents of Nazism. Since the electoral successes of the Nazis in 1930, political conflicts, even in middle-class, Social Democratic Frankfurt (which the Nazis labelled the 'New Jerusalem on the Franconian Jordan'), had begun to take physical form. One day, following the September elections, hundreds of uniformed SA men appeared in front of the university's main entrance and sang the Horst Wessel song, the anthem to which the Nazis were marching throughout Germany. For one of the Institute's stipendees, Joseph Dünner, this represented sufficient grounds for the setting up of a self-defence group for members of the Red Student Group (Rote

Studentengruppe), Jewish and Catholic student clubs, the Academy of Labour and the trade unions. 'Right up till the first weeks of 1933,' Dünner recalled in his autobiography, 'Frankfurt University was one of the few universities in Germany where the Nazis could be sure of getting their heads bloodied if they tried to occupy the main gates or provoke clashes with left-wing or Jewish students inside the university buildings.' 250 'The Nazis brave lads, by the way recently paid us a violent visit,' commented the 'Georgian' Max Kommerell in the summer of 1932, after an attack by uniformed Nazis on the main university building. 'Maybe it annoyed them that the Goethe University, at least in its philosophical and sociological areas, is a breeding-ground for Marxist thought-microbes. . . A pity the intellectual equipment of the Nazis is still so woefully makeshift!' 251 Even at Frankfurt University, liberal discussions between the left and right wings came to a halt during these years. According to Karl Korn's memoirs, sociology was even spoken of as a 'Jewish science'. 252

It was against this background that the Institute carried out its research on the German working class, which was drafted by Fromm and announced by Horkheimer as the first stage of a large-scale empirical Institute research project. And it was in this atmosphere, which was getting noticeably worse even in Frankfurt, that in the summer of 1932 the Institute's first publication<sup>253</sup> since Horkheimer had taken over as director appeared: the first issue of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (*Journal of Social Research*).

The original goal of the research on the working class was to find out what manual and non-manual workers' psychic structure was actually like. Interest in this topic had been further encouraged by previous research on the working class. The facts behind research in this area were that the number of white-collar workers had increased rapidly as a proportion of those in employment, and that the proportion of blue-collar workers, which in 1925 was already less than 50 per cent, was decreasing, even in areas such as heavy industry and mining, where manual workers were still the great majority. Among the most important works in the field were Emil Lederer's essay on 'Change of Social Stratification in the Proletariat and Inter-Class Social Strata in Capitalism before the Crisis',<sup>254</sup> published in 1929 in the *Neue Rundschau*, and Siegfried Kracauer's study *White-Collar Workers: A Report from the New Germany*, which appeared in instalments in the literary supplement of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1929 and was published in 1930 in book form.<sup>255</sup> Lederer vacillated between two basic assumptions. The first was that the disappearance of every vestige of self-determination, and the experience of acquiring ever greater control over ever more comprehensible processes of production, would one day unite blue- and white-collar workers in an attempt at a fundamental restructuring of the economic order which had condemned them to dependency upon it. Lederer's second assumption was that, to the extent that, among

individuals who were 'not self-employed', the proportion of white-collar workers and officials was increasing in relation to blue-collar workers, there was a growing tendency for society to split into an ever smaller number of rulers and ever greater number of those dependent on them. The tendency would be to react to this by supporting a hierarchical social structure in which passionately defended status differences would rigidify in whatever rudimentary form.

Kracauer's sophisticated report, which brilliantly demonstrated his conception of a materialist theory as one which was deeply embedded in empirical facts, was a crushing argument against the first of these assumptions. All of his descriptions indicated the overwhelming expense and the appearance of consensus which were put into making life for white-collar workers pleasant life consisting of a combination of stereotyped work and stereotyped bourgeois tinsel.

At the very same moment at which the factories are being rationalized, these establishments [i.e. the 'Haus Vaterland', the 'Resi' or Residenz-Kino, and the 'Moka-Efti' in Berlin] are rationalizing the amusements provided for the armies of non-manual workers. When I asked why they provide for the masses in a mass way, I was told by one of the staff bitterly, 'Because people's lives are far too run down for them to be able to do anything sensible with themselves.' Whether that is true or not, the masses are at home in these establishments, and in their own company. And it is not out of concern for the business interests of the owner, but because of their own, unconscious, powerlessness. They keep each other warm, they console each other for the fact that they cannot escape sheer quantity of numbers. Belonging to a mere quantity is made more bearable by their lordly and palatial surroundings. 256

Capitalism, it seemed, could no longer continue in its old forms, and even its supporters were at least discussing its possible collapse, in view of the world economic crisis and the emergence of authoritarian governments. But higher-level employees seemed to want a new economic order less than ever. White-collar workers were compensating for 'the unnoticed horror of normal existence'<sup>257</sup> by adding the business of amusement, with its glitter and its distractions, to the business of work. It seemed that this was becoming an example which blue-collar workers were also wanting to follow, rather than that white-collar workers were moving closer to the attitudes of class-conscious proletarians although the offices of white-collar workers in larger firms had also been the victims of machinery and assembly-line methods during the period of rationalization between 1925 and 1928.

Two contradictory expectations were also operating on Horkheimer. On the one hand, he observed that the lack of independence among the subject classes did not merely consist in the fact that 'they are given too

little to eat, but also in the fact that they are kept in a miserable intellectual and spiritual condition', that they are 'the apes of their gaolers, they worship the symbols of their prison, and are prepared, not to attack their keepers, but to tear anyone to pieces who tries to free them from them.' 258 On the other hand, he thought that

Social development is destroying . . . the healthy family, the only locus of immediate relations between human beings across wide classes of society, above all in the lower middle classes and working class. Instead of natural groupings, which are largely unaware of themselves whose most recent product of decay, the nuclear family, is now on the brink of perishing as well social development sets up, within certain groups of the proletariat, new, self-aware associations based on a recognition of common interests. . . The emergence of this proletarian solidarity results from the same process which is destroying the family. 259

Marx, too, had attempted to connect the disillusionment and horror, which were supposed to stem from the dehumanization of work and from immiseration, with the increase in creative ability which was supposed to result from the worker's all-round flexibility in the capitalist production process. This could only be plausible if precisely those activities which had been disregarded in the older economic form were anticipations of a new, superior economic form. However, this could not be said of the tasks carried out by either blue-collar or white-collar workers; and similar statements were just as implausible for areas such as family life, cultural life, and so on. Neither Lederer, Kracauer, Horkheimer nor Fromm offered concrete evidence of anything which would show, in any sphere, that those who were currently in subjection represented an anticipation of a superior economic system and a superior form of existence. But this could only result in retreat towards a choice between the masses of the working class, who identified themselves with the prevailing conditions, and a few advanced groups. These groups, however, could no longer be expected to have any consistently revolutionary advantages over progressive middle-class groups. A belief in the dialectics of the forces of production and productive relations, a belief that the forces of production were rattling the chains of capitalist productive relations, was more decisive for Horkheimer's faith in the prospects for revolutionary change than the observation of class-specific revolutionary tendencies. But, if the masses were not revolutionary, would they at least go along with the progressive groups? Horkheimer apparently did not want to risk even a provisional answer to this question, because 'Conditions are highly complex. An obsolete social system, which has begun to rot, still fulfils the functions of maintaining humanity's existence at a certain level and renewing it although at the cost of unnecessary suffering.' 260

A total of 1100 questionnaires had been sent out, and the last were returned at the end of 1931. But the analysis of them was not carried out very intensively, not only because of the long illnesses Horkheimer and Fromm suffered, and because of a lack of experience in empirical social research, but probably also in reaction to the earliest signs of the inquiry's results. Theodor Geiger published an article on 'A Critique of Research into Workers' Psychology' in the Social Democratic journal *Die Gesellschaft (Society)* in 1931, indicating in critical terms the main forms which social-psychological research on the working class was taking at that time. 261 The Institute's inquiry into the working class differed from these in one main respect: it had the disadvantage that although, for the sake of representativeness, it was not restricted to a small circle of persons known personally to the interviewer, it was nevertheless, for financial reasons, not able to carry out any in-depth interviews on the psychoanalytical model. The inquiry tried partly to compensate for this disadvantage by including in the questionnaire, which, with its 271 sections, was unusually comprehensive, apparently innocent questions which would permit conclusions to be drawn about hidden personality traits and attitudes. Such conclusions could be checked to a certain extent by comparison with the general impression given by a person's answers.

One of the findings of the inquiry, for example, would have come as no surprise to a reader of Fromm's *Development of Christian Dogma*. Left-wing political attitudes could be shown to be a form of vicarious satisfaction for workers who had otherwise moved into psychological conformity with class society. If published and presented with scientific rigour, the observation that the majority of politically left-wing workers were similar in character to all the other members of bourgeois-capitalist society would not have made the left more watchful and more united; instead, it would have made the right more confident of its victory. For this reason, reservations about methodological faults or uncertainties had to be taken more seriously. In view of this situation, Horkheimer's tendency was quite soon to see the significance of the Institute's first inquiry as lying principally in the way it developed a methodological apparatus, with results to be presented only after further research and an extension of its empirical basis.

The *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* thus became the first demonstration in print of the Institute's aims and capacities under its new director. Like the programme of interdisciplinary research, the journal was Horkheimer's idea. The editorial director of the periodical, which was to appear three times a year, was Leo Lowenthal. On being appointed to a full position at the Institute, he had given up his teaching post, and he had no university duties. He devoted all his working energies to the Institute and to the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* in particular. It came out more or less regularly for a decade. It was published by the same publishers as Grünberg's *Archiv* (Hirschfeld, in Leipzig), and in a similar format, but markedly differed from its predecessor in every other

respect. The article section featured essays exclusively (or, after the Institute's emigration, almost exclusively) by Institute members, so that the journal was presenting itself as the Institute's 'principal organ' (and was expressly described as such in a later Institute prospectus in 1938). Works on social and economic history and above all documentary information (which had always had its own section in the *Archiv*) moved into the background, and articles concerned with grasping the current position in the advanced capitalist countries dominated. The review section consisted of short articles, and was divided into the fields of philosophy, general sociology, psychology, history, social movement and social policy, specialist sociology, and economics (the 'literature' category was discontinued after appearing twice). This showed that the effort towards 'continuing observation of work in the various scientific disciplines', mentioned by Horkheimer in the preface to volume 6 of the journal in 1937, was being taken seriously.

The way in which the article section of the first (double) issue was organized was instructive in many ways. Apart from a general article by Horkheimer, it contained two papers on economics, two on psychology and two on the cultural superstructure. They were not actually arranged, as they might have been, in this substantive order, but instead it had first Horkheimer and his principal assistant and virtual deputy, Pollock, followed by Fromm with his studies on analytical social psychology, giving substance to the interdisciplinary programme. Then came Grossmann, who stood for a certain Institute tradition as a tenured assistant of many years' standing and the Institute's oldest member of staff, a Marxist economist who could not be, and was not intended to be, ignored. Horkheimer mentioned that his work 'corresponds to our views to some extent'.<sup>262</sup> Then came Lowenthal, who was indispensable for Horkheimer as a versatile and self-sacrificing member of staff, and editor-in-chief of the journal. Finally came Wiesengrund-Adorno, who was not a member of the Institute, and whose specialist area, music, looked rather exotic in a journal for social research. His genius, however, impressed Horkheimer so much, even then, that he accepted an article from him which was unusually long for the journal, its second part appearing in the following issue.

In this arrangement, which accurately reflected the reorientation of the Institute and the demotion of the Grünberg tradition to a mere aspect of its work, there was only one person missing: Wittfogel. The directors of the Institute had offered him a monthly grant to give him the opportunity to visit China as a basis for a sequel to his *Economy and Society of China*, which had been highly praised in reviews. But, in view of the critical situation in Germany, Wittfogel had preferred to hurl himself completely into the political conflict. The directors of the Institute accepted this, and continued to support him with a 'small but regular income'.<sup>263</sup> There was thus a concurrence of factors characterizing Horkheimer's strategy: while Wittfogel, supported by the Institute, was

writing and giving talks outside the Institute framework about anti-Semitism and the social and economic causes of Nazism and its successes among the masses, the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* mentioned nothing of any of this, and the catastrophic economic and political events of the period only haunted a few of the articles in the form of colourless concepts like 'crisis' or 'monopoly capitalism'.

The essays contained in the first issue were not so much analyses of the current situation as defences of the materialist or economic conception of history (concepts which at that time were widespread, and not merely restricted to cautious members of the Institute) and its application in the most disparate fields. Apart from Grünberg's two former associates, Pollock and Grossmann, all the authors included a brief sketch of historical materialism in their essays. This indicated the extent to which Horkheimer, Fromm, Lowenthal and Adorno felt themselves to be pioneers of materialism in their own fields as distinct from Grossmann and Pollock, who were economists for whom knowledge of the Marxist position, at least as part of the history of the discipline, was a matter of course.

For Horkheimer, Fromm, Lowenthal and Adorno, the materialist conception of history stood for the observation of the class structure and power structure of the existing society, and of the way in which consciousness was determined by social existence. It stood for support for the release of productive forces which were being suppressed in the interests of the ruling class, the release of science as a productive force as Horkheimer put it in his 'Remarks on Science and the Crisis'.<sup>264</sup> It stood for the unfettering of productive forces in the economy by reorganizing it as a planned economy as Pollock put it in his essay 'The Present State of Capitalism and the Prospects for the Planned Economy'. It stood for the expansion of ego-organization and of the capacity for sublimation, of genital character traits as Fromm put it in his contribution, 'On the Methods and Tasks of an Analytical Social Psychology'. And it stood for the unfettering of musical creativity, as Adorno put it in his article 'On the Social Position of Music'.<sup>265</sup> The writers all seemed to feel themselves to be borne along by the train of history, just as Grünberg had, in his inaugural lecture at the opening of the Institute in 1924. And, as with Grünberg, it seemed that for them, too, their basic convictions were only adjusted to account for delays in progress, and that none of these convictions could be affected by the undogmatic, hypothetical, empirically testable character of the theory that was emphasized by Lowenthal just as much as by Horkheimer.

In reality, things were more complex. Pollock saw 'the economic preconditions for a planned organization of the whole economy as having already been developed to a high degree within the womb of the present economic system'. The bulk of industrial production consisted of large-scale mass production, the process of centralization had reached an advanced stage, and the technical and organizational means

of accomplishing the tasks necessary for central direction of the economy were known, while there were considerable reserves of productivity. But Pollock had no doubt that, from a purely economic point of view, 'this crisis' (the world economic crisis) 'can be overcome by capitalist means and the "monopoly" capitalism is capable of continued existence for a length of time which cannot at the moment be foreseen'. In Pollock's eyes, a capitalist planned economy was just as much a possibility as a socialist planned economy, and only political considerations argued against the former. The owners of the means of production would not let themselves be degraded to the status of mere rentiers. The prospects for the socialist planned economy, however, seemed no better to him within the foreseeable future. The *subjective* interest in it shown by the very classes which had an *objective* interest in it was too limited. 266 A year later, Pollock conceded considerable political prospects to the capitalist planned economy as well. 'The view we expressed earlier that the degradation of the ownership of capital into a mere entitlement to investment income would make the capitalist planned economy unacceptable can no longer be counted as a serious objection, in view of the capacities for controlling the masses which have in the meantime become apparent.' The idea that one day, in the end, the 'relations of production, which will once more have become fetters capable of no further alteration, will no longer hold out against the pressure of the productive forces' this was a prophecy which seemed to be mentioned merely as a matter of duty. 267 Unlike Grossmann, Pollock did not share the view that the tendency towards a rise in the 'organic composition' of capital and a fall in the rate of profit was a fatal flaw in the structure of the capitalist system. Pollock thought the principal problem was the anarchy of production, which in the era of inflexible, state-protected big businesses could no longer be controlled by the self-regulating mechanisms of the market. But he did not make the slightest attempt to show that the range of planned economic measures available within the capitalist system would not be sufficient to master either the anarchy of production or the resulting disproportions between various industrial sectors.

Fromm's contributions to the first volume of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* contained timid references to the concept of the development of character as a 'productive force'. In his first article, he mentioned a 'metabolic exchange' between instinctual drives and the environment, leading to human beings as such being altered in a direction which implied above all an increase in ego-organization and a corresponding growth in the capacity for sublimation. In 'Psychoanalytic Characterology and its Significance for Social Psychology', his contribution to the third issue, he mentioned the difficult problem of how far it was possible to speak of an increase in genital character traits with reference to the proletariat (as opposed to the anal and oral character traits which corresponded to earlier developmental stages), in the same

way that this was possible with reference to the objectively most advanced sections of the bourgeoisie. 268 The daring idea that the proletarian character and the characters of the most advanced members of the middle class, following an ontogenetically pre-programmed developmental pattern, might be adapting themselves to productive forces which were pressing to be unfettered, or to the elements of a more advanced form of society which had already appeared within the womb of the older society this notion hardly raised its head. It might have strengthened an optimistic, Marxist confidence in progress against the functionalist idea pre-eminent for Fromm, that the libido structure of all social classes was adapting itself to relations of production which were still dominant, and the actual conditions of human life. Fromm's view that the growth of objective contradictions within society would mean that the libidinal forces would no longer operate as social cement but as social dynamite, and would lead to the construction of new social formations, 269 remained an ungrounded dogmatic assertion.

Horkheimer, in his 'Remarks on Science and the Crisis', demanded that 'the boundaries set for science by its class limitations' should be demonstrated and ultimately broken through, in order to give free course to 'the rational elements immanent in science'. It was necessary, for this purpose, to grasp the crisis of science through a clarification of the life-process of society as a whole and through 'the correct theory of the present social situation'. But the fettering of science, which was socially conditioned, could only be overcome by 'altering its real conditions in historical praxis'. 270 The fact that scholars were waiting in vain for this alteration, during a period in which humanity was richer in the means of production and in highly qualified workers than it had ever been before, pointed to the need for a new psychology, as Horkheimer stated in his second contribution to the journal's first issue, 'History and Psychology'. The form of psychology he proposed would investigate 'how psychic mechanisms are created by means of which it is possible for tensions between social classes to remain latent, when they would otherwise develop into open conflict because of economic conditions'. Horkheimer emphasized that the view that the 'dialectic between the various forms of human power and the various obsolete forms of society resulting from the conflict with nature' represents the 'motor of history' must not become a universal structural plan which would take the place of concrete research, but was merely 'a formulation of historical experience corresponding to present knowledge'. However, he did not turn to the investigation of 'the real reasons why differentiated state and social systems have superseded less developed ones'. 271 Instead, his interest was focused on progress and rationality in the theoretical field. 'Part of the camouflaging of the present crisis', he wrote, expressing his conviction of the pacemaker role which theory ought to play, 'involves attributing responsibility for it to precisely those forces which are pressing for better human conditions, and even to rational, scientific thinking

itself.' 272 A reference to the unfettering of the productive power of science, only possible through genuine revolutionary change, was merely a stereotyped accompaniment to this.

For Adorno, accepting the materialist conception of history went hand in hand, from the very start, with the relegation of the belief in progress and rationality to the status of aspects of the superstructure. In his contribution to the journal dealing with Schoenberg's music, he wrote:

The most advanced compositional productions of the present time, merely from the force of the immanent development of their problems, put bourgeois categories as basic as the creative personality and the expression of its soul, the world of private feelings and enlightened inwardness, out of action. In their place they put the most extremely rational and lucid principles of construction. Although music of this sort, tied down as it is to the bourgeois process of production, cannot be seen as 'classless', as the authentic music of the future, it can certainly be viewed as the form of music which fulfils its dialectical, cognitive function most precisely.

Schoenberg has

brought the expressive music of the private, bourgeois individual, merely by taking it to its logical conclusion, to the point at which it must be superseded. He has put a different form of music in its place, one to which, certainly, no immediate social function can be assigned, indeed one which has even cut the last thread of communication with its listeners, but which has left all the other music of its period far behind, firstly in its immanent, musical quality, and secondly in the dialectical enlightenment which it brings to its material. The extent to which it is perfectly rational and well constructed throughout means that it is virtually irreconcilable with the present constitution of society, which is unconsciously defending itself with the aid of all of its prominent critical figures, and is calling for help from 'nature' against the attack from consciousness which it has experienced in Schoenberg. With him, consciousness has, perhaps for the first time in musical history, grasped the natural material of music and mastered it.

Nor did Adorno fail to include an assurance that it was necessary

to accept firmly that the alienation of music from society, everything which zealous and rationally unenlightened musical reformism curses as individualism, artistry, technical esotericism, is itself a social fact, is itself a product of society. And, for that reason, it cannot be corrected within music itself; it can only be corrected socially by the alteration of society. 273

The lack of concern for any currently existing tendencies of this sort with which Adorno really viewed a continued 'rationalization' in the musical sphere, and in the sphere of theory, was indicated by his dry observation that there was no prospect whatever of any change in society.

The empirical consciousness of present-day society, which is promoted by class rule for the sake of its own preservation, in narrowness and unenlightenment, indeed even to the stage of neurotic stupidity . . . cannot be considered as a positive standard by which to judge a form of music belonging to a humanity which is no longer alienated, but free. Politics must not take a detached view of such a state of consciousness, which must count as a central factor for social dialectics. Nor can scientific knowledge permit limits to be set to it by a state of consciousness which is itself produced by class rule and which bears with it, even in the form of the class consciousness of the proletariat, the marks of mutilation by the mechanism of class. 274

Was an essential component of the materialist conception of history not being finally abandoned here, with only the concept of a mechanics of the development of productive forces and productive relations remaining? In none of the articles did the expression 'monopoly capitalism' occur as often as in Adorno's. He even saw 'Fazism', as he called it (he was the only one to mention it at all), as being controlled by monopoly capitalists, in accordance with the communist dogma of the time.<sup>275</sup> This gave the impression that, by declaring his belief in the key concepts and thought processes of dogmatic Marxism, he was trying to create a favourable climate for his own interpretation of modern music for himself and for the left, from which he most expected sympathy for the new music.

Lowenthal, more than anyone else, took over the materialist conception of history as a ready-made product in his article 'On the Social Position of Literature'. He used it as a means of putting the demand for a materialist study of literature, based on the positivist and historical methods of the nineteenth century, before the contemporary discipline of literary study, which was more or less metaphysically oriented. 'A truly explanatory history of literature must be a materialist one. That means it must analyse basic economic structures as they present themselves in literature, and the effects which the work of art, interpreted materialistically, has on an economically determined society.' He gave some examples of the results which he had produced using the new method. 'Whereas Gutzkow's tentative, exploratory dialogue reflects the tentative economic groupings of a liberal bourgeoisie in Germany which was still at its very beginnings, Spielhagen's technique embodies the economic victory of the bourgeoisie, and Impressionism provides

ideological camouflage for its crisis, or admits to it with a certain bewilderment.' `Where Storm's petty-bourgeois soul weeps within itself, Meyer pushes out powerfully into the world of his characters, who are able to satisfy the fantasies of the ruling bourgeoisie around 1870.' `Whereas Stendhal is the novelist of Napoleon's bourgeois aristocracy, Gustav Freytag sings the praises of Germany's liberal bourgeoisie around the middle of the century.' 276 Lowenthal saw literature as merely an appendage of economic and social development. He did not discuss progress in the literary sphere, which was able to be in a state of tension in relation to social developments, in the way that Adorno attempted to demonstrate in music. Nor did he discuss progress in the social sphere, which, as Fromm had cautiously suggested, might back the proletariat or the most advanced sections of the bourgeoisie. The only aspect which seemed to interest him was scientific progress towards the application of the materialist conception of history to literary studies.

Taken as a whole, the articles by the members of the Horkheimer circle published in the first volume of the journal showed several noticeable common traits. All the authors enthusiastically declared their belief in the materialist conception of history in the sense of the general results summed up in Marx's famous `Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*'<sup>277</sup> and the Feuerbach section of *The German Ideology*.<sup>278</sup> None of them put any hopes in the working class. Pollock simply identified a lack of subjective interest in socialist change among the working class. Horkheimer, where he spoke of the `lower social classes', only mentioned their reliance on vicarious satisfactions. Adorno expressly denied that the working class had any progressive role to play. Only Fromm, in the first of his articles, distinguished `the proletarian, leading his class but identifying himself with it, serving its wishes', from the `commanding leader, facing the masses as a strong man, as a powerful, magnified paterfamilias'. In the second article, he wrote that `The proletariat'like big businessmen` does not show evidence of anal character traits to nearly the same extent as the petty-bourgeoisie', but he did not engage in any consideration of the possible dynamics of such phenomena.<sup>279</sup> None of the authors concerned themselves with topics such as the constitutional welfare state, Weimar democracy or Italian fascism. But none of them doubted that the future belonged to socialism.

However, such optimism was increasingly undermined by the analyses of the effects of the world economic crisis, and of capitalist crisis policies and the planned economy, which were conducted by the Institute's economists Pollock, Kurt Mandelbaum (alias Kurt Baumann) and Gerhard Meyer who were more concerned with current events. Knowledge of contemporary society was impossible `without studying the tendencies towards planned regulation of the economy which were contained within it', Horkheimer had declared in his foreword to the first issue of the journal, `and the problems connected with this, which

play an important role in today's economic and sociological writing and in studies on the history of culture, will have to be particularly attended to'. Even someone like Thomas Mann was putting his hopes in the planned economy at this time. In his lecture on 'Goethe as a Representative of the Bourgeois Epoch', given in March 1932 on the 100th anniversary of Goethe's death at the Prussian Academy of Arts in Berlin, he stated:

The new, the social world, the organized world of unity and planning, in which humanity will be freed from subhuman, unnecessary suffering, which offends the dignity of reason this world will come, and it will be the work of that immense soberness in which all of those minds already believe who reject rotten, drab, petty-bourgeois sentimentalism, all of those who are worthy of consideration. This world will come, for an outward, rational order, suited to the stage which the human spirit has reached, must be created or, in the worst case, must emerge through violent revolution so that genuine sentiment can regain its right to exist, so that a good conscience, a human conscience, can be restored to it. 280

But what Pollock, Meyer and Mandelbaum presented in their articles up to 1935 allowed less and less room for faith in the tendencies towards the socialist planned economy contained within contemporary society. Pollock's view was that the implementation of a capitalist perversion of the planned economy could be observed more and more clearly. Meyer and Mandelbaum, who reserved the term 'planned economy' purely for a socialist economic order, the basic economic possibility of which they were able to demonstrate, found that only political crisis measures could be seen in the capitalist countries, and that there were no tendencies whatsoever towards planned regulation of the economy. The authors in the Horkheimer circle connected the idea of a continued growth of objective possibilities with the idea of the avant-garde function of certain parts of the superstructure which were allied to mature productive forces, but conscious of their own lack of autonomy. It was this, apart from mere desperation over the progress of fascism, which kept up their hopes for socialism, and enabled them to evade and outflank awkward topics such as the proletariat, Soviet socialism, and the developmental tendencies of Western economic systems.

The most important of the remaining contributions to the first volume of the journal was Franz Borkenau's article on 'The Sociology of the Mechanistic World-View'. It was an extract from the book on *The Transition from the Feudal to the Bourgeois World-View: Studies in the History of Philosophy in the Period of Manufacture*, which he had written as an Institute scholarship holder. Borkenau came from a Viennese 'half-Jewish' upper-class family, and had been a member of the

German Communist Party from 1921 on, becoming national leader of the Red Student League (Roter Studentenbund) in the mid-1920s. He had been expelled from the party in 1929 after disagreements, partly over the 'social fascism' strategy, which declared the SPD to be the main enemy. Inspired above all by Lukács's 'penetrating study on reification',<sup>281</sup> Borkenau attempted to explain, in terms of transformations of social existence, the emergence in the seventeenth century of a new form of thinking, the modern world-view, in which a revolution in epistemology went hand in hand with the formation of a new conception of nature and of human society. He made the manufacturing process into a model of an all-embracing abstraction from everything qualitative. Furthermore, his explanations rested on 'class struggles', 'which begin with the appearance of new methods of production'.<sup>282</sup> 'A thinker', his research motto ran, 'can only really count as having been understood when he has been understood in connection with struggles in which he has taken sides.'<sup>283</sup> Descartes, for example, with his rationalist fatalism, was seen by Borkenau as the ideologist of the French gentry, Hobbes was seen as 'the ideologist of the most advanced sections of the landed gentry'. Borkenau's method, like Lowenthal's treatment of literature, was thus to assign intellectual products to classes or sections of classes which were either in advance or in retreat, optimistic or pessimistic, progressive or regressive, or vacillating. The irritating aspect of such explanations was, as with Lowenthal and Fromm, the seamlessness of their functionalism. Borkenau, however deviating from his own maxim saw the essence of the period he was examining as being accurately summed up by some of the texts he quoted, particularly by Pascal, who articulated 'the abstract need for salvation in the midst of a world wholly alienated from salvation'.<sup>284</sup> But for Borkenau, Pascal, being a 'bourgeois' philosopher, naturally did not see this as the essence of his epoch, but as the essence of humanity as such.

The fact that he also interpreted the 'discoveries' of natural scientists historically and socially made Borkenau's work into a significant component of Western Marxism, which did not share the worship of the natural sciences apparent in orthodox Marxism of both the Social Democratic and Soviet varieties. Borkenau's work was an early example of a critical history of science. However, when this pioneering work appeared in the Institute's publications series, Horkheimer, made uneasy by Grossmann's objections to Borkenau's evaluation of the role of the manufacturing process, and perhaps also by Borkenau's increasingly critical attitude to communism, added only an extremely cautious preface, which neither summed up the substantive issues the work was addressing nor took any position with regard to them.

Extended general review articles in the journal on the subjects of the situation of the working class, the family, unemployment and leisure showed the generous attention which was being paid to the most recent results of scientific research supporting the Institute's own empirical

inquiries. The Institute's second research project, which supplemented the project on the working class, was a questionnaire on sexual morality which was sent to experts and specialists. In 1932, questionnaire sheets were sent to 360 German doctors specializing in skin and venereal diseases and gynaecological and nervous disorders. They contained five factual questions (for example, 'Are the majority of young people sexually abstinent before marriage or not? (a) Have you noticed any change in this respect in the post-war period compared with the pre-war period? (b) Have you noticed any change in this respect in the most recent periodsince 1930?') and three questions on matters of opinion (for example, 'Up to what age should young people remain sexually abstinent?'), which were added principally to assess the subjective element in the experts' information and to enable this to be taken into account as a source of error. The doctors were asked to state which social class their information referred to. This inquiry was expected to provide conclusive information on possible changes in sexual morality, to which Fromm attributed a particularly important role for the adaptation of libido structure to the prevailing social structure. 285 It was apparently hoped that the information gathered for the inquiry into the working class from the subjects themselves could be supplemented by observations by third parties, referring to an area which was particularly important for the assessment of psychic structure.

But even before the research on the working class could be widened, as projected, to take in other 'highly developed European countries',<sup>286</sup> the Institute had to escape from an enemy which, in administrative terms, it had started to take seriously early on, but to which it had not yet given adequate attention in its research programme.

2

## Flight

On Monday, 30 January 1933, President Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor. Up to that point he had refused to do so, referring explicitly to the danger of a Nazi one-party dictatorship. On the very same day, apparently, the house in which Horkheimer and Pollock lived in Kronberg was occupied by the SA (Nazi storm-troops) and converted into a barracks. 1 Horkheimer and his wife had been warned, and at this point were already living in a hotel near the railway station in Frankfurt. For the remainder of the semester, Horkheimer arranged to be chauffeured from his apartment in Geneva once a week to his lectures at the university in Frankfurt. In the few remaining weeks of the semester, the concept of freedom was the only thing he discussed in his 'Introduction to Philosophy' course. The preface to *Dawn and Decline*, which was published in Switzerland in 1934, is dated the end of February 1933 in Germany:

This book is obsolete. The thoughts it contains are occasional jottings made in Germany between 1926 and 1931. . . Again and again, they refer critically to the concepts 'metaphysics', 'character', 'morality', 'personality', and 'human value', in the way that these were valid at this period of capitalism.

Since they belong to the period before the final victory of Nazism, they refer to a world which is today already out of date. Problems such as Social-Democratic cultural policy, or bourgeois literature which sympathizes with the revolution, or the academic embellishment of Marxism produced an intellectual atmosphere which has now disappeared. But the ideas which occurred to its author (who is an individualist in his lifestyle) may perhaps be of interest later.<sup>2</sup>

At the time of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, Wittfogel was in Switzerland on a lecture tour. In spite of warnings from Pollock, who had already moved to Switzerland, he returned to Berlin in February. On 2 March, Lowenthal, the last full-time associate to have stayed on,

left the Institute and Frankfurt. Adorno, who was neither a member of the notorious 'Marxist stronghold' nor politically active, and was 'only' a 'half-Jew', stayed behind. He later complained in a letter to Horkheimer that he had not been informed about the final removal of the Institute to Geneva, and had been left 'without any indication from the Institute as to where to go or what to do'. 3

In the elections for the Eighth Reichstag which took place on 5 March in spite of terrorism and officially sanctioned despotism the ruling coalition between the National Socialists (Nazis) and the German National People's Party won just 51.8 per cent of the votes. But this was enough of a mandate for Hitler to use it as a springboard for the continuing extension of Nazi rule thanks to the compliance of the middle-class centre parties, who legalized the Reichstag's self-destruction with the Enabling Act of 24 March.

On 13 March the Institute was searched by the police and closed. In May, the rooms on the ground floor were opened up and put at the disposal of the Nazi Student League. The Secret State Police (Gestapo) office in Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse, Berlin, sent the following note on 14 July 1933:

To the Institute of Social Research, Frankfurt am Main.

In accordance with clauses 1 and 3 of the Act of 26 May 1933 (RGBl I, p. 293) confiscating Communist property, the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt am Main is hereby seized and confiscated in favour of the Free State of Prussia, as the aforementioned Institute has encouraged activities hostile to the state.

Signed: pp. Dr Richter-Brohm.

Only one of the Institute's principal associates fell into the hands of the Nazis: Wittfogel. He was arrested in the middle of March trying to cross the German frontier at Singen. He was sent to various concentration camps, released in November 1933, and managed to emigrate to the USA via England.

The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* reported on 14 April the first measures undertaken in Prussia to implement the Act of 7 April on the 'Reconstruction of the Professional Civil Service'. The Act was intended above all to provide for the dismissal of Jewish, Communist and Social Democratic civil servants. Among the victims of the 'first batch of suspensions' (dismissal from state service and discontinuation of salary payments were to follow in the course of the year) were the Frankfurt professors Heller, Horkheimer, Löwe, Mannheim, Sinzheimer and Tillich. The newspaper reported: 'Dr Rust, Minister for Culture, intends to tackle the *Jewish Question* (clause 3 of the Civil Service Law) straight away by this means. It will be ensured that the greater part of the

personnel reshuffle will be completed *before 1 May*, so that disturbances at the beginning of the new semester can be avoided.' As was the case throughout Germany, the University in Frankfurt did not stand by its ostracized and persecuted colleagues for a single moment. On the contrary. On 3 April the University Senate had already decided to apply to the Minister for Culture to have the 'present association loose though it was between our university and the "Institute of Social Research" cancelled'. The rector, Wilhelm Gerloff, had held the post since October 1932, and had at the time of his appointment issued a warning against 'chauvinist Nazism'. In May 1933, when he was replaced as rector earlier than scheduled by Ernst Kriek, a convinced Nazi, he did not prepare the usual report on his period of office. 4 In his justification for the application on 3 April to cancel the university's association with the Institute, however, Gerloff wrote: 'The actual development of the Institute and its circle of visitors moved along lines which were not intended by the university, which was nevertheless not able to exert any influence in the matter.' 5

In the initial 'revolutionary' period of the new regime, on average 14 per cent of academic staff and 11 per cent of professors were dismissed throughout the country. At the Ministry of Culture it was estimated that in the first five years after the seizure of power 45 per cent of all tenured academic posts had been reappointed. 6 Frankfurt had the second largest number of university dismissals after Berlin. More than a third of all university teachers in Frankfurt lost their posts. The fact that a particularly nationalistic and conservative institution like the German university system was subjected to such an extensive purge can only be explained in terms of the hatred of Hitler and the Nazis for everything intellectual, for every academic activity not directly in the service of Nazi ideology and strategy. Even a man such as Kurt Riezler was dismissed from his post as early as 1933 for 'national unreliability' in relation to his appointments policy he had brought not only 'Georgians' such as Kommerell and Kantorowicz to Frankfurt but also the sociologist, Mannheim, and the Social Democrat, Löwe. Riezler nevertheless had a decidedly nationalist past. In 1930 he had protested vehemently against the award of the Frankfurt Goethe Prize to Freud, arguing:

The pregnantly un-Goethean, indeed anti-Goethean, quality lies in the basically causal, mechanical nature of the Freudian world, in its excessively rationalistic structure, in its constructedness as opposed to any deeply felt universal idea, in its centring of humanity in distressing sickness, in prudery. . . Whether or not psychoanalysis is correct is quite indifferent. The confection of the two names [Freud and Goethe] in the Goethe Prize must seem, to a public which has a very true picture of their respective attitudes of mind, to be a tasteless stew. 7

In his struggle to keep his rights as a civil servant, Riezler also pointed out that as registrar for professorial appointments he had engaged Heidegger, Schmitt, Neumann and Baumler, the 'outstanding spokesmen for Nazism'. 8

Horkheimer, following a course of 'strict normalization' (Lowenthal's phrase), wrote from Geneva on 18 March to the university rector, Gerloff, and to the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Lommatzsch, referring to newspaper reports on the search and closure of the Institute. In the duplicate letters, he stated:

There seemed to me to be no doubt as to the reasons for the search. My predecessor as director of the Institute had collected the Library of the History of the Labour Movement, which is renowned throughout the world. . . In the nature of things, the library contained a large quantity of socialist literature. To some distant observers, this might have given the impression of political bias. In the earlier years in particular, rather more students who were attracted to various strands of socialism than right-wing ones concerned themselves with the problems of the labour movement, although this situation may have changed more recently. When I took over as director of the Institute, I was aware that its previous history would make it the director's duty to ensure that there could be no doubt about its political neutrality.

Horkheimer requested advice on how to dispel mistaken suspicions of unscholarly partiality, on the basis of which 'subordinate official bodies might delay or even prevent clarification of matters at government level'. The reaction from colleagues who were also aiming at 'normalization' of the situation was that they were themselves unfortunately not currently in a position to give any advice at all.

Following newspaper reports of his 'temporary suspension', Horkheimer sent a letter, three closely written pages long, to the Minister for Science, Art and People's Education in Berlin on 21 April. In the letter, written in the style of a dignified, liberal citizen, he concisely and pointedly gave reasons for the significance of Cornelius, Kant and Hegel in his teaching activities. He admitted in particular having taken into account the economic view of history, among other more recent social theories.

Naturally, I presented this theory positively, to the extent that it seemed scientifically productive to me, and referred to its epistemological value. I consider it to be one of the tasks of a university that students, as distinct from the mass of the population, must also learn to know in detail those theories about which they will have passionate views whether positive or negative in their future lives.

His letter concluded:

At the end of my lectures this winter semester, just as in previous years, I travelled to Geneva. Some colleagues from the Institute, in collaboration with other institutions here, are conducting inquiries concerning the effect of unemployment on family life and on other questions to do with the family. The state commissioner had already given me leave on several occasions to travel here during the previous semester. I have in no sense whatsoever left my post in connection with political events in Germany. In the meantime, the Institute of which I am in charge has been closed, my mail has been confiscated, and finally the action I referred to above suspension from duty has been taken against me without my ever having been informed that any serious accusation had been made against me. I find this procedure incompatible with the high office of a university teacher. In the uncertain sense that I am, today, exposed to every possible form of suspicion, I believed, Minister, that I ought to make this report to you.

I have not belonged to any political party either before or after my appointment. I attempted to carry out the duties of my position in a manner which would be productive for philosophy and for science. The prospect of having to leave it is a painful one, as I have always found my contact with my students, which was never disturbed by any political incidents, a great good fortune. German students, historically, are among the liveliest and most gifted in the world. I do not know whether the actions taken against me took place more with regard to my convictions or to my Jewishness. In any case, both motives would contradict the best traditions of German philosophy. German philosophy has always demanded that decisions concerning its theories and the convictions which correspond to them cannot be taken outside of philosophy itself; they are not at the discretion of the authorities. There is no necessary correspondence between truth and the programme of a government, no matter how strong its will is, no matter how deeply its roots spread among the people. *Caesar non est supra grammaticos*. And Hegel was only expressing a philosophical commonplace when he said that the Jews, too, are 'first and foremost human beings, and that this is not merely a shallow, abstract quality'. Both the independence of the claim to understanding through scientific inquiry and the doctrine of the dignity of humanity were considered by classical German philosophy, at the peaks of its development, to be cultural values whose abandonment would in itself constitute an injury to intellectual life. To damage this even if it is not condemned as such by existing law on the basis of the value-system which is at present in power must, in the end, become a shackle to the development of scientific thought.

Yours sincerely,

Max Horkheimer (Prof.)

Letters like this were as absurd as the current situation, in which dictatorship and legality were inextricably mingled. The conflicts which developed between the Institute, in exile, and Frankfurt University were even more grotesque, since the Society for Social Research wanted to continue to pay Grünberg's pension but not the salaries for the two professorial posts from which Horkheimer and Löwe had been expelled, which were funded by the Society. 9 Although Horkheimer's strategy was not heroic, indeed not even cunning, it was successful, and damaged its opponents in its own way by appealing to the civilized sections among them and giving nothing away. As a refugee, Horkheimer would not have managed to bring with him any of his belongings, which remained in Germany. The same was true of the Institute. As well as writing these letters, therefore, Horkheimer hired `straight away a quite outstanding and extremely influential man as my lawyer . . . who not only succeeded in getting a specific declaration from the authorities that the director of the Institute was not accused of any misdemeanour, but also managed to get my entire property released, along with permission to export a considerable part of my assets'.10

In February 1933 the Society for Social Research had already been replaced by the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales, which had its headquarters in Geneva. The Geneva branch thus became the official administrative headquarters. For academic purposes, however, it could only serve as a provisional head officenot only because of the threatening proximity of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, but also because of the Swiss attitude to emigrants. In an interview with Helmut Dubiel, Lowenthal said:

Only Horkheimer had an unlimited residency permit, so only he could have a home with all his furniture there. Pollock, Marcuse and I could not do this: we had to keep our libraries and furniture in the transit depository of the Customs Office in Geneva. We remained visitors. We had only tourist visas, and every few weeks or so we had to go across the border to Bellegarde and reenter with a new visa. And there was much more. We often found that Jewish emigrants were scrutinized closely, and in their cases regulations were enforced most strictly. We took this as an indication that fascism would eventually spread to all of Europe.11

Offers of help from Paris and London were particularly welcomed by the Institute's directors, even though there was no prospect of developing a new headquarters for the Institute connected with them. A branch was set up in Paris in the Centre de Documentation at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, where Célestin Bouglé, a student of Durkheim's, was director. Up to 1936, Paul Honigsheim was in charge of the Paris office. He had German and French parents, and had been Leopold von Wiese's first assistant. Until he emigrated, he had also been director of

the Adult Education Centre in Cologne. In London, the Institute was given a small office in the Le Play House at the London Institute of Sociology.

The Paris branch grew in importance as the Institute's mainstay in the city in which the new publisher of the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (ZfS) had its headquarters; as a base for internationally organized empirical research projects; and, ultimately, as the European outpost of the Institute. The first issue of the journal's second volume had finally come out in May 1933 with the previous publisher after all, although with some delay. But then Hirschfeld had told Horkheimer that he could no longer take the risk. From then on, the printing and distribution of the journal were taken over by the Librairie Felix Alcan in Paris, a publishing house which was well respected in the field of sociology. The Institute guaranteed the publishers 300 subscriptions, and the publishers committed themselves to an edition of 800 copies plus 50 promotional copies. 12 The Librairie Felix Alcan made it possible for the journal to continue to appear as an academic publication in German, as Horkheimer wrote in the preface to the second issue of volume 2 in September:

The Institute will continue its endeavours to promote the theory of society as a whole and the scientific disciplines related to it. The Institute's research group, which consists of young scholars from several different disciplines, sees theory as a factor contributing to the improvement of society. Conceptual thought by no means has the same value for each of the various powers in society. For some, it is correctly viewed as a damaging encumbrance; but for the progressive forces of humanity it will always be indispensable.

Even after more than six months of exile, Horkheimer ruled out direct references to current emergencies or to political events just as strictly as he had done in his inaugural lecture. This attitude was the sociological equivalent of what Adorno, referring to music, described in his contribution to the first issue of the journal as follows: 'It is of no avail to it to gape at society with helpless horror. It serves its purpose for society far more accurately by offering, within the boundaries of its own material and its own formal laws, a presentation of social problems which it already contains within itself, right down to the innermost cells of its technique.' The constant policy of the Institute under Horkheimer's direction continued to be abstinence, not only from every activity which was even remotely political, but also from any collective or organized effort to publicize the situation in Germany or to support émigrés. In the 1970s Jürgen Habermas asked Herbert Marcuse, 'Did the Institute ever, let us say, take up a position in relation to the more strongly politically organized groups among the émigrés?' Marcuse replied, 'That was strictly forbidden. Horkheimer insisted from the start that we were

the guests of Columbia University, philosophers and academics.' 13 Even for those who were as fortunate, in spite of their misfortunes, as those who belonged to Horkheimer's circle, the trauma and insecurity of existence as a Jew was made very real by the flight from Nazi rule. But for Horkheimer's circle continuity was possible to an unusual extent. They merely intensified an activity they had practised even in 'normal' times concentrating, as outsiders in society with social goals which were unacceptable to that society, on achieving recognition within the social and academic system. The directors of the Institute put all their efforts into being able to continue its academic work with as little disturbance as possible. In spite of a whole series of obstacles, this was surprisingly successful.

Of those who formed the main core of the Institute, Horkheimer, Pollock and Lowenthal, at least, were in Geneva. Fromm had to go to Davos for a considerable time to recuperate from an attack of tuberculosis, but he still took part in the Institute's work. Marcuse collaborated on the journal as its main reviewer of philosophy, from its first foreign issue onwards. Adorno had recognized, in a review of Marcuse's Hegel book, that Marcuse was 'moving from the "Meaning of Being" to the interpretation of existence; from fundamental ontology to the philosophy of history; from historicity to history'. 14 Marcuse was therefore standing in for Adorno, who had previously produced the philosophy review section almost single-handedly with his student, Dolf Sternberger. (The Nazi takeover and the Institute's emigration had destroyed Adorno's hope, which he mentioned to Kracauer as late as January 1933, that the journal, whose philosophy review section he was now officially in charge of along with Horkheimer, could be 'turned into our official organ'. 'The people around us will be very decent,' Adorno wrote to Kracauer, encouraging him to join them. 'Benjamin and Lukács are with us, I'm taking over most of the philosophy reviews myself, I've dismissed all the incompetent people and I want to get real talents like Sternberger and Marcuse involved instead.')

There was no basic change in the way Wittfogel and Grossmann worked as independent researchers. The fact that Wittfogel was unable to carry on with his work until the beginning of 1934, when he reached London, did not affect the day-to-day work of the Institute. Nor did the fact that Grossmann was busy in Paris on a revised French edition of his book on *The Law of Accumulation and Collapse of the Capitalist System* 15 which was never actually published. Collaboration with Walter Benjamin, which Adorno had paved the way for in 1932, only began at the time of the Institute's exile in Switzerland with occasional reviews and the 1934 essay 'On the Current Social Position of the French Writer'. 16 For Benjamin, who as a freelance writer was dependent on press freedom, a journal like the *ZfS* became an increasingly important publishing outlet. However, he wrote to Scholem in June 1933, referring to his first contribution to the journal, which he had written under

unfavourable conditions in Ibiza: 'Fascism is making massive advances even outside Germany. I can see what conditions are like in Switzerland, unfortunately, from certain editorial changes which the *ZfS* has suggested to me in my essay on the current social position of the French writer.' 17 With 'Materialism and Morality' in the first foreign issue of the journal, following his 'Materialism and Metaphysics' in the issue before, Horkheimer published the second of two long essays in which he tried to gather together his various strands of thought and place them in a newly established tradition. A significant description of this tradition was the obligatory labelling of his own position, over a number of years, as 'materialism' or 'materialist theory', and the establishment of a line connecting a specific tradition of materialist thought with a specific form of current social and theoretical insight:

When the desire for happiness, which life from beginning to end proves illusory, was put aside and hope alone was left, the alteration of those conditions which cause unhappiness could become the goal of materialist thought. This goal took on a different shape in varying historical situations. Given the evolution of productive forces in antiquity, even the materialist philosophers were forced in the face of suffering to elaborate techniques of an interior life; peace of soul is the only resort in the midst of distress when all external means fail. The materialism of the early bourgeois era aimed, on the contrary, at developing the knowledge of nature and attaining new powers of mastery over nature and man. The wretchedness of our own time is connected with the structure of society; social theory therefore forms the main content of contemporary materialism. 18

Various views here were characteristic of Horkheimer: (1) the assumption that there was a demand for happiness, which did not require any justification, among human beings who were reliant on solidarity with one another as mortal beings in a world which lacked any 'hereafter'; (2) emphasis on social history as an index of human instinctual structure and of human knowledge; (3) the conviction, in view of the advanced state of human control over nature, that humanity's demand for happiness has as its goal the reconciliation in practice of particular and general interests on the basis of a planned economy. All of these views were now incorporated into the conception of a theory of society which was conscious of its philosophical basis, and in which, according to Horkheimer, humanity achieved articulacy and consciousness. His idea of publishing a reader on materialism, with texts of Western philosophy from antiquity up to the end of the nineteenth century, was intended to provide self-assurance in the history of philosophy. The criterion for materialism in this context was to be the discussion of a range of problems such as 'suffering and poverty in history, the

meaninglessness of the world, injustice and oppression, criticism of religion and morality, the connection between theory and historical practice, encouragement of a better organization of society, etc.' 19

Horkheimer was firmly convinced that the will of humanity was directed towards complete mastery over nature, 'the domination of nature both inside and outside us by means of rational resolve'.<sup>20</sup> Referring to Hegel and Marx, Horkheimer described this concept the perfect domination over nature by means of limitless reason as a dialectical one. He defended it on two fronts against rationalism and against irrationalism, doing so for the first time at any length in his essay 'On the Dispute over Rationalism in Contemporary Philosophy', written while he was in Switzerland. On the one hand, rationalism (represented for Horkheimer mainly by positivism) considered the scientific disciplines in their current form to be the only legitimate form of knowledge, and saw speculative thought as not competent to discuss the problems of society as a whole. In Horkheimer's eyes, rationalism was therefore only an imperfect, inflexible, impoverished rationality. On the other hand, irrationalism represented for Horkheimer by the 'philosophy of life' (*Lebensphilosophie*), for example, and by existential philosophy condemned thought as a destructive force, and made the soul or intuition the sole deciding authority in all the critical problems of life. This school of thought thus demanded less rather than more rationality. Horkheimer saw rationalism as a fitting expression of the over-estimation of his or her own abilities by the type of individual never able to view matters as a whole, a type which had flourished in the liberal period of bourgeois-capitalist society. In irrationalism, by contrast, he saw an expression of the growing powerlessness even of most members of the middle classes in the phase of monopoly capitalism. Irrationalism was a transfiguration of the individual's subjection to a larger whole which was even more obscure than ever. According to Horkheimer,

Irrationalism correctly recognizes that rationalism is bankrupt, but it draws the wrong conclusions. It does not criticize one-sided thinking and egoism in favour of a way of organizing the world which would correspond to the human resources actually available. Instead, it leaves the economic laws which have produced current conditions basically untouched, and serves the interests of those who have economic power, who are merely the executors of economic forces, by encouraging blind recognition of them, demanding submission to the so-called larger, general interest.<sup>21</sup>

Horkheimer did not let any of the topics he discussed in these essays develop into hypotheses which could have been used as material for, or even as the subject of, empirical research. The change of emphasis in the Institute's empirical work which took place during the exile in Switzerland was not the result of a philosophical impulse of any sort (in a way which might have corresponded to the combination of philosophy,

the scientific disciplines and empirical research which Horkheimer demanded in his inaugural lecture), but apparently came about quite naturally, and without any communication between those who were working on the collective research project. Research into the social-psychological mediation between material and intellectual culture in a specific social group, that of skilled manual and white-collar workers, was replaced by research into changes in the structure of the family at a period of particularly severe economic crisis, which many saw as the beginning of the end of capitalism. A footnote to a report by Andries Sternheim on 'Recent Literature on Unemployment and the Family' in the third issue of the *ZfS* in 1933 read: 'The problem of the extent to which long-term unemployment produces fundamental changes (in particular, mental and psychological ones) in the relations between the individual members of a family is currently being investigated by the Institute of Social Research through the organization of an inquiry in various countries into this complex of questions.'<sup>22</sup> Sternheim was a Dutch socialist, described by Horkheimer as an 'upright, hard-working man', who had been recommended to Horkheimer by an official of the International Labour Office in Geneva. In 1934, when Pollock moved to the USA, Sternheim became director of the Institute's Geneva branch.

The change in the emphasis of the research meant, in one sense, a contraction in the scale of the object of study (from class to family), but an expansion in scale in another sense (from class-specific to class-unspecific). At the same time, for Fromm and Horkheimer one particular expectation, which had received new emphasis, gained significance. In his first contribution to the *ZfS*, Fromm had noted in passing that, in the case of a serious crisis of the existing 'authoritarian' society, 'the more a society collapses economically, socially and psychologically, and the more the unifying, formative force of society as a whole or of its ruling class decays, the greater are the differences in psychic structure in the various classes.'<sup>23</sup> In addition, he had already indicated what in his view would be the direction of the development of society as a whole in connection with an increase in class-specific differences in family structure: 'Emotional relations, e.g. those between father and son, in a bourgeois, patriarchal society, are completely different from those in the "family" of a matriarchal society.'<sup>23</sup> When he mentioned the prospect of a 'growth in genital character traits' in the proletariat and in the objectively most advanced sections of the bourgeoisie in his second contribution to the *ZfS*, he mentioned the prospect of a 'decline in paternal authority in the psychological realm' and of 'an increase in traits related to the mother' in the same breath. Even before these ideas became central ones for Fromm in his 1934 essay on 'The Social-Psychological Significance of the Theory of Matriarchy',<sup>24</sup> a contribution to the *ZfS* by Robert Briffault on 'Family Sentiments', presented by Fromm, made it clear what it was that Fromm and Horkheimer saw as so promising about research on the family.

Briffault was a philosopher, psychologist and anthropologist, born in

England, who had emigrated at the age of eighteen to New Zealand and later to the USA, and was now living in Paris. In 1927 he published a three-volume work, *The Mothers: A Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions*, which tried to show that the close connection between mothers and the succeeding generation had meant that primitive societies were centred around the mother, and that the family dominated by the father was the product of later economic changes which made individual property inheritance advantageous. Briffault hoped that this would prevent defenders of the patriarchal family from being able to use the argument that they were merely defending the foundation of human society which had always existed. In his essay on 'Family Sentiments', Briffault repeated these views, and summed them up with the accusation that the 'authoritarian, paternal family', which presents family ties as sacrosanct, demands that its sons and daughters sacrifice their own independent development. He concluded by expressing the expectation that the decay of the patriarchal family as a result of the serious crisis of the individualistic, competitive economy would increase, and that a society no longer characterized by competitiveness would be able finally to release social emotions which went beyond the narrow and distorting circle of the family.

The point at issue herewhether changes were taking place in the family which might threaten its role in reproducing patriarchal characters, without the expectation of a release of proletarian solidarity following on from this (as Horkheimer had still thought at some points in *Dawn* 25) does not seem to have been made clear to those directly involved in the empirical research, neither to Andries Sternheim as its co-ordinator, nor to Pollock or Lowenthal. At any rate, it was in the middle of 1934, when the first drafts for the publication of the results of the collective research project had been written, that Horkheimer and Fromm, who were already in America, noticed with annoyance that the people in Geneva thought it was a question of the family in general rather than a question of authority in the family.<sup>26</sup> This suggests not only that there had been poor division of responsibilities, but also that the theoreticians only gradually began to see the importance of the subject of authority, both for social dynamics and for the mediation between theory and empirical work. In a text handed out by Horkheimer at the beginning of 1937 at an Institute lunch for Columbia University's Sociology Faculty, he wrote:

The first two years of my activity at the Institute were given to experiments in this type of collaboration [between the various branches of science and between theoretical and empirical sciences]. The theme finally adopted as most fruitful to our type of cooperative research was that of the relation of the cultural phenomenon of authority to the alternation of normal economic life and depression periods. The range of the problem of authority, however,

is too extended to be investigated in toto. We selected therefore one of the social institutions where the oscillations in authority-relations as well as their connections with events in economic life were most readily accessible to observation. This institution is the family . . . We thus began to study the family from this viewpoint through various methods and in different European countries.

In the period of exile in Switzerland three separate research inquiries using questionnaires were started.

(1) In 1933 a questionnaire was initiated in France among urban families in which the husband belonged to the category of white-collar or skilled workers and had been unemployed for at least six months. Apart from questions on the job situation, income and accommodation, there were also questions on the use of leisure time, about changes in the relationships between members of the family as a result of unemployment, and about the favourable or unfavourable consequences of unemployment for individual family members. Finally, there were queries on their responses to a series of specific questions (for example, 'What are the causes of the crisis?' or 'Who are the greatest men of the present day?'). The questionnaire was set up in such a way that it was not to be completed by the people who were being questioned themselves but instead by experienced interviewers. Because of the difficulty of finding enough qualified assistants to do this, the project ground to a halt in its initial stages, and was later included in *Studies on Authority and the Family* only as a 'test inquiry' concerning authority and the family among the French unemployed.

(2) Towards the end of 1933 a questionnaire was sent to experts in Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium and Holland by the Geneva branch. It was included in the *Studies* as 'Questionnaire sent to Experts Concerning Authority and the Family'. A total of 589 questionnaires were sent to college and university lecturers in psychology and education, to judges in juvenile courts, social workers, priests and ministers, youth workers, schoolteachers and wardens of homes. The sixteen sections of the questionnaire concerned the authority of the father, mother and older brothers and sisters, changes in authority relations in the family, the connection between the family's financial support and authority (one of the questions here was: 'Does the standing of the father in the family have anything to do with the fact that he is the principal earner?'), and the influence of upbringing on the character of children. On the basis of information given by the experts regarding the social class and size of locality to which their observations related, 99 questionnaires were classified in the course of analysis as belonging to the working class, 27 to the middle-class and 24 as belonging to the rural peasant classes.

We may anticipate here the results of the report, which was published in the *Studies* by Andries Sternheim and Ernst Schachtel (the latter was a friend of Fromm's from their student days in Heidelberg and was an associate of the Institute for a number of years). From the 251 completed questionnaires which were returned, it appeared, with regard to class-specific differences, merely 'that rural peasant families represent a more extreme type of patriarchal family than working-class ones'.<sup>27</sup> For the rest, the experts noted a general decrease in parental authority, or an increase in children's independence, or both. Most of them thought the causes of this related to unemployment, the war, the use of leisure time, a decline in morality, and irreligion.

A project involving supplementary questionnaires, with questions on the consequences of unemployment for family unity, for example, or on the opinions of younger people about sexual morality, apparently petered out.

(3) Inquiries among young people on the subject of authority and the family were begun in 1933-4 at the Institute's branches in Geneva, Paris and London. The Swiss inquiries were the best conducted, and these were the ones which were later used most in *Studies on Authority and the Family*. The drafting of the questionnaire and the implementation of the inquiry had been delegated to Käthe Leichter, an Austrian Social Democrat. She came from a Viennese Jewish, bourgeois-liberal family, and had been a student and friend of Carl Grünberg, having worked with him on the Austrian Commission on Socialization. Because of other commitments, she had not been able to accept Grünberg's invitation to join him as his research assistant at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. After the defeat of the revolt provoked by the Dollfuss regime in Austria in February 1934, she went underground and emigrated to Switzerland, where she worked for the Institute of Social Research in 1934 and again in 1936. (In 1938 she fell into the hands of the Gestapo in Vienna. She was killed in 1942 in a cattle truck in transit from Ravensbrück concentration camp near Magdeburg, in an 'experimental gassing' of 1500 Jewish women by their SS escort.)

The questionnaire, which was answered by 1000 young Swiss people, contained not only questions to do with the young people themselves but also thirteen questions on family life about mother, father, brothers and sisters, and others. (These included, for example, 'Do you turn mainly to your father or to your mother with your problems, and why?'; 'Were you physically punished as a child?'; and questions taken from the working-class questionnaire: 'When you have children of your own, will you punish them physically, and will you bring them up strictly or leniently?' and 'Which great men of the present era do you admire most?') The questionnaires were answered by more or less equal numbers of young middle-class and working-class people. In the analysis of the data for *Studies on Authority and the Family*, however, the following

statement was made on the problem of differentiating family structure according to social class:

Although a clear line can be drawn between the middle classes and the working class in economic terms, the same is not the case in social-psychological terms. The working-class inquiry has already shown the extent to which typically petty-bourgeois character structures also occur among workers. In Switzerland this is the case to an even greater extent, and the working class can be considered as psychologically middle class to a very great extent. The difference is mainly in standard of living. This means that, from this point of view, we ought to distinguish, rather, between better-off and less well-off members of the middle class. We have decided not to do this, so as not to confuse distinct economic categories, but we would stress that this viewpoint needs to be taken into account when authority structures are differentiated according to social class. 28

Since unemployment only began to be a problem in Switzerland from 1933 onwards, the inquiry on the question of changes in family structure in periods of economic crisis was not very fruitful. Even Paul Lazarsfeld's later analysis, in the United States, of half the completed questionnaires produced nothing of any note concerning class-specific differences or changes in family structure.

Even less productive was the research among young people which was carried out in France, where 1651 questionnaires had been returned. Even the preliminary report prepared for the *Studies on Authority and the Family* gave only a general impression of the apparently undisturbed patriarchal set-up of the family in France, and of a role distribution according to which the father was a figure of respect and the mother a confidante. The questionnaires sent out from the London branch from September 1934 onwards, to organizations which had them filled in by their members, were apparently never analysed.<sup>29</sup>

This research lacked the broad-based, systematic quality of the inquiry on the German working class. It was not based on the possibility of a psychoanalytic interpretation, and its only innovations were the questions about relations between young people and their fathers and mothers, and about possible changes in these relationships. While this research was still going on, the essays for the summer issue of the *ZfS* in 1934 expressed what was, in a way, the first interdisciplinary reaction of the Horkheimer circle to the victory of Nazism. Marcuse's 'The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State', Fromm's 'The Social-Psychological Significance of the Theory of Matriarchy', and 'On the Theory of the Planned Economy' by Mandelbaum and Meyer, with an introduction by Horkheimer, together provided a clear distinction

between the bourgeois system, the negative side of which was nakedly exposed in the totalitarian state, and the socialist cause. 'The transition from the liberal to the total authoritarian state takes place on the basis of one and the same social order', as Marcuse put it. 'The total authoritarian state produces the organization, and the theory of society, which are appropriate to the monopoly stage of capitalism.' 30 Fromm stated:

The social contradictions which lead to a restriction of the forces of production function in the same way as a regressive psychological development, a strengthening of the patricentric complex, as seen in the movements growing out of the struggle against Marxism. In place of a demand for the happiness which all human beings deserve, the ideological representatives of these movements once again put a sense of duty at the centre of their system of values. However, because of the economic situation, this sense of duty no longer has any economic content but is merely a demand for heroic action and suffering for the community.<sup>31</sup>

'Humanity does not in any sense have a choice at present between the liberal economy and the totalitarian state order,' wrote Horkheimer, 'since the one necessarily turns into the other, precisely because the latter today best serves the liberal demand for the continuation of the private ownership of the most important social resources.'<sup>32</sup> Mandelbaum and Meyer concluded:

For this reason, whoever tries to achieve socialism with the help of the middle classes, and makes power and policy concessions to them on more than a temporary basis, will accomplish, with the best will in the world, only some forms of socialization, but not socialism at best, formal socialism. In the present epoch, that is in reality monopoly capitalism with state-capitalist trimmings, organized politically and economically on a corporate basis.<sup>33</sup>

Marcuse, the critic of ideology, Fromm, the social psychologist, Mandelbaum and Meyer, the economists, and Horkheimer, the social philosopher, were thus all united in their agreement with the dominant communist interpretation of that period, according to which fascism was both the logical consequence of liberalism and the form of political domination which monopoly capitalism adopted. The similarity in their basic diagnoses was all too clear. What one might have expected from interdisciplinary methods was largely lacking: the development, from the variety of materials and differing perspectives, of something which might goad them on to extend the theory further, or to differentiate it, something which might impel them towards more exact, or freshly oriented, empirical work. From this point of view, Fromm still appeared to be the most productive and important of the Institute's associates.

Exile in Switzerland was only provisional. Developing one of the branches, either Paris or London, into the Institute's headquarters would have led to opposition outside a small circle of sympathizers. But, above all, the impression that fascism was on the advance all over Europe dominated the Horkheimer circle. Pollock's assistant Julian Gumperz, an American citizen by birth, had been sent to the USA by the Institute in 1933 to sound things out. Fromm had already visited the United States on a previous occasion, and had accepted an invitation from the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute to go there again at the end of 1933, when the future of the Institute of Social Research was still uncertain. The reports about the United States by Gumperz and Fromm had given cause for hope. The directors of the Institute therefore began to take the possibility of emigration to the USA seriously, in spite of their misgivings about the New World. Horkheimer wanted to have a look round on the spot himself before making a final decision. Before embarking with his wife on the long journey, he visited the Institute's branches in Paris and London again. On 10 February 1934 he wrote from Paris to Lowenthal, who was then in Geneva, 'Tomorrow we are travelling to Old England. The world is cold. Au revoir . . .' On 26 April he and Maidon boarded the SS *George Washington* in Le Havre. At thirty-nine years of age, he was setting out for North America to decide whether the Institute ought to settle there somewhere.

A week later, on 3 May, the couple arrived in New York, where Julian Gumperz met them at the harbour. 'Physically I am very down,' Horkheimer wrote to Pollock shortly after arriving, 'but if I can stand it here at all it's certainly better than Europe, since everything there seems to be getting darker and darker.' And his wife wrote to Pollock enthusiastically: 'New York is a gigantic city, without seeing it for yourself you've got *no idea at all*, it's simply unbelievable, fantastic Paris, London, the whole of Europe is an African village in comparison!'

Several weeks later, the signs of the way in which things would develop were already there, without Horkheimer having had to make many decisions himself. He was still ill, his wife too in the meantime, and they were living in an expensive hotel on Central Park, which was cooler, quieter and more bearable for them than other parts of New York. Horkheimer wrote to Pollock on 27 May:

On the whole, my impression is that this part of the world will be more suited to quiet academic work in the coming years than Europe. The news in the papers from over there frightens me every day. Admittedly, the economic and political situation in the United States is not rosy either. In fact things are much worse here than I had thought. We must expect rapid developments in the aggravation of the economic situation. Precisely on that account, I'd like to get to know Canada. On the other hand, I think the possibility of secluded academic work here must still be allowed for, while it will soon be almost unthinkable in Europe.

Admittedly, it's questionable whether we should simply work here as isolated private scholars or found some sort of Society for Social Research. G. [Gumperz] assures me that everyone here advises the latter, and it does really seem that an official trademark will be unavoidable.

It was now certain that the main core of the Institute would come to North America. Horkheimer was also almost certain that New York would be the most favourable base in the USA (though he dreamt of later finding a smaller and quieter town in Canada where the group could settle permanently). He was very uncertain, however, about Columbia University.

Columbia was an Ivy League university, one of the most highly respected universities in the United States. The second major department of sociology in the USA (after Chicago's) had been established at Columbia by Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931), one of the founders of sociology in the USA, who had become the first full professor of sociology at an American university in 1894 at Columbia. The most important representatives of sociology in the USA in the mid-1930s were Robert S. Lynd and Robert MacIver. Lynd's goodwill was decisive for the continuing success of the contacts which had been built up by Gumperz. Professor of Sociology at Columbia since 1931, Lynd was by the standards of the left-wing liberalism of the New Deal generation a left-wing radical, and he was one of the pioneers of community sociology. In 1929, with his wife, he had published *Middletown*, an empirical study of Muncie, an industrial town in Indiana, and the book quickly became a sociological classic. Despite its passion for detailed description, the study showed that the town's population clearly fell into the categories 'working class' and 'business class', and that the town belonged to 'them up there'.<sup>34</sup> (Even clearer evidence of Lynd's proximity to critical sociology was given by the study published in 1937, *Middletown in Transition*, which inquired into the aggravation of class contradictions and the possibility of a future fascism; and by the volume which appeared in 1938, *Knowledge for What?*, which pleaded for an activist conception of social science.) Lynd apparently did not see the scholars from Frankfurt as potential competition of any sort, but rather as reinforcements for the kind of social research which he himself stood for. He made representations on behalf of the Frankfurt group to his colleague Robert MacIver, chairman of the Department of Sociology. Robert MacIver, Professor of Political Science at Columbia since 1927, took up the suggestion, and recommended to his friend Nicholas Murray Butler that help should be offered to the Frankfurt academics. Butler was a liberal conservative who had been president of Columbia University since 1902, and in 1912 had been Republican candidate for the vice-presidency of the United States.

On 4 June 1934 MacIver wrote to Butler:

Dear Mr President,

It has come to my notice that a body of scholars, established previously at Frankfurt am Main, is in process of locating themselves in this country. Their journal, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, is a recognized and valuable medium of studies in the social sciences. They are in the fortunate position of having their funds outside Germany fortunate, in view of the fact that they can no longer continue their studies at Frankfurt. They are anxious to receive some recognition from an American university. They have had offers, I understand, from the University of Chicago and also from Princeton, but they would welcome, more than anything else, a connection with Columbia. At this late season, it is probably not possible to work out a scheme of affiliation and there are, no doubt, various questions which should be looked into before definite steps are taken in that direction. But I would suggest that in the meantime a very good purpose could be served, and the beginnings of a closer relationship established, if this body of scholars were offered housing facilities by Columbia. 35

Butler took a decision to this effect. The speed, generosity and casualness of the offer confused Horkheimer. In a meeting with Lynd arranged by Gumperz, he asked whether the decisive figures at Columbia, and above all the university's president, were familiar with the Institute's publications. Lynd answered in the affirmative.<sup>36</sup> Gumperz assured Horkheimer after the discussion that Lynd had circulated the Institute's publications before the decisive resolution was passed. The university's knowledge of their publications therefore consisted, at best, of a swift skimming through of German-language publications and a few English summaries. In this respect, Horkheimer's strategy of avoiding Marxist names and provocative terminology fully proved its value.

However, when the secretary to the university asked Lynd for written guarantees that if the Institute was assigned teaching duties and faculty status its activities would move within the desired channels, Lynd's view was:

The only possible entanglement in this whole affair lies in the fact that the Institute is on the liberal-radical side. I have called this to MacIver's attention, and think he is pretty well aware of it. From what little I have seen of their work, and from my conversation with Gumperz, I think it is fair to conclude that they are a research agency with high standards and not interested in propaganda.

The university had not received any letters from Gumperz's side.

I was told through another person that Gumperz was very anxious not to appear in the light of making a request of Columbia which

might be turned down, and that he wanted the move to come from Columbia. I think this is readily understandable in view of the fact that the whole tenor of the conversations has been in terms of a very loose affiliation with the University, with the possible appointment of one or two members of our Faculty of Political Science to their governing board, and complete autonomy for them. 37

The practical side of the matter the entrusting of premises to the 'Gumperz group' for three to four years was thus clear from the university's point of view. Horkheimer was still hesitant, and had the matter checked by an attorney for its possible legal implications. It was not until the middle of July that he finally accepted Columbia University's offer to take over the building at 429 West 117th Street for three to four years and, where necessary, to carry out any repairs there at the Institute's own expense.

Horkheimer's hesitation was due not only to his tremendous cautiousness and lack of decisiveness, but also to his vacillation between the interior and the exterior, between a need for knowledge and discovery and a need for academic administrative activity and the exercise of power, between a longing for independence and a longing for institutional security and official recognition. This vacillation led in practice, on this occasion as well, to a patriarchally structured enclave critical of society being set up in the very lap of bourgeois society. In the conditions of exile, Horkheimer's dominant position was stronger than ever, the dependency of his associates greater than ever, and the attractiveness of the Institute as an independent, left-wing intellectual community more than ever unparalleled.

Fromm had come to New York at the end of May for a month. 'I often remember those four weeks, and the idea that we may be able to continue them makes me very happy,' he wrote to Horkheimer on 4 July 1934, when he was on his way to New Mexico to visit a clinic near Santa Fé for health reasons. On his return, Fromm moved his psychoanalytic practice to New York and accepted a guest professorship at Columbia University, so that he was once again physically in the vicinity of the Institute. Although, by his own account, he was a loner, and his psychoanalytic practice would have enabled him to live independently of the Institute at any time in the United States, obsessed with psychoanalysis as it was, he set great store by his collaboration with Horkheimer. Horkheimer, for his part, realized that Fromm was independent of him, and treated him as an intellectual equal, with equal rights, because of his importance for the theoretical and empirical work of the Institute.

The first to join Horkheimer was Marcuse, who was brought over from Geneva at the beginning of July. Marcuse was not needed in Geneva, and was to serve Horkheimer as a partner in philosophical

discussions which he hoped would supply the stimulus for a book on materialist logic that he had been planning since the early 1930s. In the course of the years, Adorno, Marcuse and Korsch were all to work for Horkheimer at various times on this project. In the eyes of the directors of the Institute, Marcuse was a specialist in philosophical literature and of limited competence. Pollock went so far as to speak of Marcuse's 'subordinate position as assistant and helper' even if only in order to resist Adorno's demand that Marcuse should be thrown out so that he, Adorno, could take his place.<sup>38</sup> But above all, because of his Heideggerian past, Marcuse was regarded as someone who would still have to prove himself in the long term and learn the correct theory. Marcuse himself saw things in this light as well. At the end of 1935, when he was rewriting yet again his first philosophical contribution to the *ZfS*, 'On the Concept of Essence', he wrote to Horkheimer: 'I should like to say to you, at the end of my first full year in America, how much I feel myself to be part of a humane and academic community here. I believe I have learnt a lot, and should like to thank you for this.'<sup>39</sup>

The next person Horkheimer brought over to America, at the beginning of August, was Lowenthal. He was mainly needed to prepare a prospectus for the Institute before the new term began. In Lowenthal, Horkheimer had an associate who was completely devoted to him. For example, Horkheimer had received a letter from Lowenthal in July 1934 saying he had watched wistfully as the Paris train in which Marcuse left pulled out of the station. He would have liked to have travelled with him, to put an end at last to their period of separation. Lowenthal was impressed that in spite of weeks of difficulties Horkheimer had been able to summon up the energy, not only to give his basic approval to the USA, but also to build up what was obviously a very broad and complex network of contacts. As far as the Institute was concerned Pollock had shown him the Columbia project some time before Lowenthal took the same view as he had with the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales: that posts should strictly be filled only with members of the inner circle. When Lowenthal was at last able to travel to join Horkheimer, he had to leave behind his collection of radical writings from the German Revolution. Horkheimer was afraid that if Lowenthal's book-crates were opened by US Customs the Institute's staff would all be immediately deported.<sup>40</sup>

At the end of August, Pollock too met up with Horkheimer again in Quebec, where the Horkheimers were stopping on a short trip through Canada. Pollock himself had hesitated even more than Horkheimer before agreeing to the Columbia project from worries about the purpose of their conspiratorial community. 'To outward appearances,' he had written to Horkheimer, 'it is a great success. But thanks to our insights we are sceptical about this kind of success. Lix [Felix Weil] will break into cries of triumph when you write to him about it . . . But my main concern is that *your* work gets done, it is more important than

everyone else's put together.' 41 When Wittfogel came to New York as well at the end of September 1934, all the regular staff of the Institute except Grossmann, who joined them in 1938, were together again. The process of removal could be considered completed. While Geneva remained the headquarters of the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales, the New York branch became the academic centre of the Institute, which now called itself the International Institute of Social Research (in English) until, some time during the Second World War, it left out the word 'International'.

3

In the New World I:  
An Independent Institute of Critical Social Research

*Studies on Authority and the Family:*  
A Fragment of a Collective `Work in Progress'

Horkheimer and his assistants arrived in the United States at a moment when, after a year of the Roosevelt administration, the worst of the crisis seemed to be over. At the beginning of 1933 there had been over 14 million unemployed. In 1932-3 emigration from the USA exceeded immigration by 57,000a phenomenon unheard of in the country's history. The Horkheimer circle arrived during a period in which the government was sympathetic towards intellectuals and prepared to entrust them with important tasks. It was a government which, by American standards, was left-wing, but at the same time successful and popular. The group arrived with a great deal of money, and at a moment when the numbers emigrating to the USA to escape the Nazis were still small. In an article in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (ZfS)* on `The Sociology of the American Party System', Gumperz had declared that the US party system was the most advanced in the world in the practice of politics as the art of `producing consent to the political measures of a given system'.<sup>1</sup> The Roosevelt administration had made an impressive attempt, in its very first year, to minimize the effects of the crisis by unconventional methods, under the label `New Deal'; but in 1933 Pollock had mentioned the administration in the same breath as Italy and Germany as an example of state-capitalist intervention and elective dictatorship. Leaving such topics aside, the Horkheimer circle concentrated on continuing its current research.

In the first year of its exile in America, the first report published by the Institute on its collaborative research activities, *Studies on Authority and the Family*,<sup>2</sup> was produced. Apart from the journal, which was continued, this was the last such report for two decades. *Studies on Authority and the Family* was a model of what it meant in practice when

Horkheimer made repeated mention (as he did in the foreword to the *Studies*) of 'continuous collaboration between representatives of various disciplines, and a fusion of constructive and empirical procedures'.

'The drafts Marcuse has brought with him seem pretty useless to me,' Horkheimer wrote to Lowenthal in Geneva at the beginning of July 1934, just after Marcuse had arrived in New York. After finishing an essay on 'The Perception of Dostoevsky in Pre-War Germany',<sup>3</sup> Lowenthal had wanted to start an essay on materialist aesthetics, but had been commissioned by Pollock to make suggestions concerning the co-ordination of the questionnaire and report materials and the organization of the planned book. Pollock, who had commissioned research on various special topics without consulting either Horkheimer or Fromm, had in mind an internationally based inquiry into changes in family structure.

I believe I have discovered, at the very last minute, that the plan for the publication there [in Geneva] has been incorrectly concerned with the family as such instead of with the question of authority in the family. Such a publication, on the basis of the materials of all sorts which we have, would be worse than unscientific. As far as I can see at the moment, the most we can publish for the time being is a volume of 250 pages, in which Marcuse could perhaps write about the status of the problem in the literature (using Sternheim's report and libraries here), Pollock or an economist suggested by him could write the section on economics, Fromm could do the psychological section, and you, in constant touch with me, could do the general theoretical ('sociological') part. Each of these essays, the guidelines for which are to be laid down in joint discussions, would be intended to develop the materialist theory of the family, in each of the various areas, in the form of hypotheses.<sup>4</sup>

These hypotheses were to be concerned with the authority of the family as a factor for social bonding. All the other materials, including the questionnaires, were to be added as appendices, showing, as Horkheimer mentioned in a later letter, 'that our views are not mere intuitions but have developed in the course of extremely wide-ranging research activities in this field of knowledge'.<sup>5</sup>

Horkheimer did not intend to appear in the book himself as one of the authors. He saw himself as having a more important task, the development of dialectical logic. But in the end he wrote the general theoretical section himself after all, probably because the significance of the Institute's first research report for its image in the New World had become clear to him. He wrote the section on the basic assumption that he was discussing 'a number of categories the true place of which is really in logic'.<sup>6</sup>

The final result was a work of nearly 1000 pages, the main part consisting of three essays (the projected economics essay was not in the end written). Instead of the appendices which had been planned at first, two further sections had been included. The first of these contained the questionnaire material, and the second the reports on research and literature, and each of them was longer than the theoretical section. The fact that the theoretical drafts did not refer at any point to the questionnaire material or to the reports on research and literature dramatically illustrated the limited extent to which a 'fusion of constructive and empirical procedures' could be spoken of. At the same time, the letters of Horkheimer and Fromm showed that empirical research, and keeping themselves well-informed about the various scientific disciplines, served the Institute's two chief theoreticians as a kind of protective screen. Behind this screen, a form of theory was being pursued which, on the one hand, was attempting to distinguish itself from pure philosophy, but which was also, on the other hand, sceptical about the various branches of science and about empirical research, and uncertain of its own status.

The 'theoretical drafts' which were intended to be the central part of the book, and which were in fact treated as such in its subsequent reception, developed into a trio of related essays which might just as well have appeared in an issue of the *ZfS*. Horkheimer's essay hardly contained anything new in comparison with what he had previously published. He now used the expressions 'authoritarian' and 'authority' wherever possible. Thus, in referring to the anonymous effects of the unplanned economic process, he spoke of 'reified authority of the economy' or the 'authority of economic facts'.<sup>7</sup> Characteristic of Marcuse's essay on the history of ideas, compared with the reports on the scientific literature contained in the third section of the book, was the way in which it gave support at the level of ideological criticism to the same concept of the bourgeois authority structure which was central to the other two essays. Fromm's essay was the best he ever wrote, although its importance lay not so much in developing new ideas as in finding succinct ways of expressing existing ones.

The most momentous achievement of his contribution was the creation of the concept of the sado-masochistic or authoritarian character the final stage in a series of conceptual formulations which he had used in earlier essays. In 'Psychoanalytic Characterology and its Significance for Social Psychology', he had previously related one to the other the concepts of 'bourgeois-capitalist spirit' (employed by sociologists such as Werner Sombart and Max Weber) and 'anal character' (borrowed from Freud and Karl Abraham).<sup>8</sup> In 'The Social-Psychological Significance of the Theory of Matriarchy', he had connected the concepts of patricentric, bourgeois-Protestant society and the 'patricentric character-type'.<sup>9</sup> Now, in his contribution to *Studies on Authority and the Family*, he connected 'authoritarian forms of society' with 'authoritarian character'. As a

positive contrast, the genital character and the matricentric character-type were followed in the essay by the "revolutionary" character-type', which was, however, only mentioned once, without further explanation and without Fromm making any attempt whatsoever at a sociological classification. There was now no more reference to the prospects he had seen opening up as a result of Protestantism, as described in the conclusion of his work on the development of Christian doctrine.

The degree of fear and intimidation experienced by the small child is to a considerable extent dependent on the degree of fear which, as an adult, it will later have of society. It is therefore not the biological helplessness of the small child which produces a strong demand for superego and for strict authority; the demands springing from its biological helplessness can be met by any unthreatening person who is friendly towards the child. Rather, it is the social helplessness of the adult which stamps its mark on the biological helplessness of the child, and allows the superego and authority to take on such significance in the child's development. 10

But social helplessness, fear and the necessity of suppressing instinctual drives are 'naturally greater among the lower classes than among those who have control of the means of power in society'.<sup>11</sup> The chances of achieving self-confidence and ego-strength through family socialization are therefore at their smallest among the lower classes, and, by corollary, the chances are all the greater that they will fall into situations similar to that of the helpless child, at least, that they will react like children if someone is capable of giving them the impression that they are in such a situation.

If someone else proves himself to be so powerful and dangerous that any struggle against him is pointless, and submission is the best way of protecting oneself, or if he shows himself to be so loving and protective that activity of one's own seems unnecessary in other words, if a situation arises in which the carrying out of the functions of the ego seems impossible or superfluous then the ego disappears, as it were, so long as those functions on which it depends for its emergence cannot, or need not, be carried out.

Monopoly capitalist society was a society 'in which a small, economically dominant class becomes more and more distinct from the vast majority of the masses who are economically dependent on it and at its mercy'<sup>12</sup> and, it was implied, exerts its power more or less anonymously. A form of society such as this produces feelings of mass powerlessness which make the masses susceptible to persons or movements which know how to produce an impression of 'superior power, with its two faces: perilousness and protection'.

Fromm arrived at a new definition of the instinctual structure created by these socio-economic conditions by connecting such conditions both with the masochistic character-type, which had been analysed by several psychoanalysts (Freud, Reich, Horney), and with the forms of relationship promulgated in authoritarian societies. His starting-point was the observation that

The masochistic character in these non-pathological manifestations is to such a great extent that of the majority of people in our society that, because of their lack of distance from the facts, it is not even seen as a scientific problem by researchers who consider the bourgeois human being to be the 'normal' and natural one. In addition, the masochist perversion, as an anomaly of fascination for the psychologist, has had so much attention fixed on it that the more important problem, the masochistic character, has been forced into the background. 13

Fromm now used the term 'character' which he borrowed from Freud and above all from Wilhelm Reich's *Character Analysis*<sup>14</sup> for what he had earlier described as 'libido structure': the product of the adaptation of the instinctual structure to particular social conditions through sublimation and the development of reactions. Character traits were transformed impulses of the instincts, characteristic forms of behaviour often representing the unconscious satisfaction of instinctual drives which had been concealed by rationalization. A character structure in which masochism appeared must also contain sadism, according to Fromm, who referred to psychoanalytic findings. He contrasted the concept of the sado-masochistic character, one which reacted to stronger characters with submission and to weaker characters with contempt, with the concept of the anal character, for which the enjoyment of saving, collecting and possessing as an end in itself was just as important as its un pitying lack of relationship to its fellow human beings. The concept of the sadomasochistic character could thus be applied, in addition, to cases in which the ownership of property was not particularly important or decisive, but in which power relations were all the more so.

Authoritarian forms of society, so termed by Fromm with reference to the widespread discussion which had been going on since the late 1920s about an authoritarian, total state, were characterized by the way in which every member of society was incorporated into a system of dependency relations with those above and below. For Fromm, this represented a precondition for the existence of functional interplay between the sado-masochistic character and the authoritarian form of society. 'We have attempted to show', he stated in conclusion, 'that the authoritarian structure of society both creates and satisfies needs which develop on the basis of sado-masochism.'<sup>15</sup> The expressions 'sadomasochistic' and 'authoritarian' thus became synonymous for him. But

in the term 'authoritarian' the relation to instinctual structure and psychosexual development, and thus to a dimension whose development in response to society would require explanation, was no longer explicitly addressed. 'Authoritarian' related instead to a certain type of society or state.

Fromm shared with Horkheimer a conviction that, during the current period, a particular reality decisive for the whole of history up to that point was becoming glaringly clear. When linked with this conviction, the impressive list Fromm gave of the forms of satisfaction which the authority relationship produced suggested a bleak outlook. 16 Through the crisis of the patriarchal nuclear family, class society was not really being deprived of a necessary psychological service. Rather, the operation of a more authoritarian society on its new members was becoming more and more immediate. According to Horkheimer in his foreword, the Institute's research inquiries were intended to characterize, in a typological form, 'the characterological attitudes to authority in the state and in society, the forms which the breakdown of family authority produced by the crisis takes, the conditions and consequences of stronger or milder authority in the home, the prevailing public views on the purpose of education, and other matters as well'. In the best case, the research inquiries might have been able to show that patriarchal, paternal authority was collapsing, and that matricentric, maternal authority was growing stronger. What they did show, like other research concerned with the family reviewed in the *ZfS*, was that, although in many cases the decreased authority of the father did correspond to an increase in the standing of the mother, this had no positive consequences, owing to the absence of any economic base for a matricentric structure and to the growth in state authority.

True to his dialectical perceptions, Horkheimer also emphasized those elements of the family which stood in an antagonistic relationship to bourgeois society the way in which the family, 'on the basis of human relationships determined by women, represents a reservoir of energy opposed to the complete devitalization of the world, and contains within itself an anti-authoritarian element'. But these anti-authoritarian elements proved, rather, to be stabilizing factors in existing conditions, and were blended into those traits of women's characters which tended to strengthen the effort to conform to the existing relations of authority. Horkheimer mentioned the hopes which had once been set on the proletarian family only in order to continue that, in view of the crisis, 'this type of family, pointing the way to the future, is admittedly becoming rarer; complete demoralization and submission to any master, as a result of absolute hopelessness, is having its effects on the family as well.' For the first time, Horkheimer showed a tendency to present the earlier liberal bourgeoisie in a favourable light a tendency which was perhaps the basis for the conviction he continued to express that the authoritarian system would finally collapse.

During the period in which the bourgeoisie flourished, a fruitful interaction between family and society was possible in which the authority of the father was based on his role in society, while society was renewed with the help of a patriarchal education concentrating on the exercise of authority. Now, however, the admittedly indispensable family has become a mere problem of administrative procedure . . . Although the form of the family itself is ultimately strengthened by recent measures, with the decreasing significance of the entire middle classes it is losing its independent strength, which was based on the free professional activity of the husband. 17

Even more retrospective in tone, and marked by a bourgeois form of anti-bourgeois romanticism, were the examples which Horkheimer chose to illustrate the revolutionary character (although he did not openly refer to it as such). These were Romeo and Juliet and Don Juan, figures symbolic of an area of conflict which in Horkheimer's eyes would always remain relevant, even in authoritarian societies the area in which the demands of single individuals for happiness and love collided with the demands of society.

No authoritarian society could in the end maintain itself without reproducing 'living' experts and authorities this was what could be read, out of Horkheimer's often contradictory views, as his ultimate conviction. But where were the 'living' authorities which could not be reproduced by authoritarian societies and where were the rational authority relations mentioned by Fromm, based on solidarity and common interest, to come from? This was a question which left the authors of the 'theoretical drafts' at a loss.

In the middle of 1935 the 'collective research work' on authority and the family, or, to be more precise, the first collaborative volume on this topic, was completed. At the end of his foreword, dated April 1935, Horkheimer wrote:

This volume is regarded as a preliminary communication, to be followed by others at a later stage of the research; for this reason, the bibliographical materials collected by the Institute have not at present been included as an appendix. While it was more important here to make the problem apparent to its widest extent, the Institute will in future principally concentrate on the collection and analysis of empirical materials which are as comprehensive as possible. But we remain convinced that the direction in which we have started, i.e. continuous collaboration between representatives of various disciplines, and a fusion of constructive and empirical procedures, is justified by the present state of scientific knowledge. 19

As later developments showed, the climax of interdisciplinary work combining theory and empirical research had in reality already been passed in the *Studies on Authority and the Family*. Empirical research continued, but not even a loose-knit collective work like the *Studies* was ever produced again. Empirical research was left to run its natural course, as it were, without any further attempt being made to 'fuse constructive and empirical procedures'.

#### Renewal of Collaboration Between Horkheimer and Adorno

At around the same time as work on the joint volume on *Authority and the Family* was being completed in New York, Fromm sent one of his chatty, thoughtful letters to Horkheimer from his holiday resort at Lake Louise in Canada. He had been thinking over many things: masochism, materialism, religion. Just as materialism was connected with the realization of happiness, religion was connected with masochism.

The analysis of the unconsciously religious person therefore seems to me to be one of the central psychological problems, an outcome and continuation of the critique of religion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . . I think it would be extremely productive if we could work together on these matters during the coming winter. It can be seen ever more clearly that, whatever the problem we start from, we find ourselves coming back more and more often to the same central insights . . . especially now, in peace and quiet, I feel quite strongly how productive and stimulating this last year of our work together has been.

20

At about this time, Fromm, till then the only associate among the group of exiles whom Horkheimer found stimulating in theoretical matters, had discovered that there was now serious competition. In 1934 Horkheimer had taken the initiative and renewed contacts with Adorno, which had been broken off. He accused Adorno of not having contacted him since March 1933.

If it is possible at all for there to be productive relations between people working on theory at the moment, regular collaboration between yourself and the Institute is part of that. It was simply your duty to remain in touch with us. It was hardly possible for us to suggest to you that you should leave Germany and join us here, because you would have had to do this at your own risk. Some kind of *modus vivendi* would certainly have been found.<sup>21</sup>

Adorno, for his part, accused the Institute of having left him behind uninformed and without instructions.

For precisely as long as I was not part of the Institute outwardly or administratively and you know that I had been pressing to become a part of it again and again for many years, more or less like a girlfriend pressing to get married it was not for me, but for the Institute, to take the decisive step . . . I was in no sense an outsider who would have had to be supported: I was I may say, and as I conclude from your letter part and parcel of the Institute itself, just like yourself, Pollock and Lowenthal. You would not have seen it as a betrayal of our friends for the Institute to ensure that these three were materially provided for first of all, since they are its innermost productive forces . . . My own case was no different. 22

Tillich, whom Adorno had used to relay messages between himself and Geneva, had said nothing of any willingness at the Institute to receive Adorno.

Adorno wrote this in Oxford. In April 1933 he had cancelled his university courses in Germany for the approaching summer semester, on the grounds that he wanted to 'complete an extended academic project'.<sup>23</sup> In July the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy informed him that, following a ministerial decree, 'those who had taken sabbatical leave during the summer semester, or had not made use of their authorization to teach, would not be included in the lecture list for the winter semester either.'<sup>24</sup> In September the ministry withdrew his authorization to teach. Convinced that the whole charade would soon be over, Adorno was hoping for a post as music critic with the liberal newspaper, the *Vossische Zeitung*, in Berlin. But the paper was closed down in April 1934. Adorno still believed in the possibility of hibernating through everything that was going on, and in one of his music reviews, which were published increasingly rarely, he produced an example of political opportunism. He wrote a review of Herbert Muntzel's *The Banner of the Persecuted: A Cycle for Male Choir after the Volume of Poems of the Same Title by Baldur von Schirach*<sup>25</sup> which was published in the respected music journal *Die Musik*. At that point the journal had not yet been fully forced into line. Adorno emphasized approvingly the fact that this cycle was 'marked out as consciously National Socialist by its choice of Schirach's poems' and that it called for 'the image of a new Romanticism', 'perhaps of the type which Goebbels has defined as "Romantic Realism"'. He added this praise to the observation that it could very well happen that, 'with increasing compositional rigour, Romantic harmony might break down: certainly not to give way to an archaic form of harmony, but rather to a new one, which incorporates contrapuntal energies within itself.'<sup>26</sup> Adorno was probably thinking of this disguised commendation when he wrote proudly to Horkheimer in November 1934 that he had 'even published some material in Germany, without having to make any concessions'. At the same time, in the

summer of 1934, he had begun to build up hopes of continuing his academic career in England. This proved more difficult than he had thought, and he was relieved when the intervention of the Academic Assistance Council meant that he was able to register as a graduate student at Merton College in June 1934. The council's attention had been drawn to his case by John Maynard Keynes, a friend of Adorno's Anglophile father. He had been advised to take a PhD in Oxford, for which it was necessary to have studied there for two years. Whether his chances of receiving a teaching post would have been improved by the PhD was not certain. For the dissertation, he hoped to use a part of the long book on epistemology which he had begun, the working title of which was 'The Phenomenological Antinomies: Prolegomena to a Dialectical Logic'.<sup>27</sup> His supervisor was the philosopher of 'ordinary language', Gilbert Ryle. Coming from a wealthy family background, Adorno felt from time to time that he was being neglected by the Academic Assistance Council, which was designed to help in urgent emergency cases. He was tormented by worries that financially less well-off German academics would be given preference for appointments to academic posts. He spent the greater part of the year in Germany, and was only in Oxford during term. He saw his situation there and with this he ended his first letter to Horkheimer as being 'that of a medieval student, and in a way an enactment of the anxiety dream about having to go back to school. In short, a continuation of the Third Reich.'

In his next letter, Horkheimer skilfully continued his attempt to win back Adorno's talents for his own work and that of the Institute without having to pay very much for them. He put the blame for the breakup of their collaboration on Adorno once again. He could not conceive that Adorno would shrink from co-operating with the Institute and its journal for fear of difficulties that might be made for him as a result. All the accusations against the Institute had been withdrawn, and one of their colleagues had been able, even while he was under arrest in Germany, to write for the journal. Then Horkheimer appealed to Adorno's desire to belong to a small circle with a sense of mission:

Unless you have greatly changed, you are still one of the very few people from whom the Institute, and the special theoretical tasks which it is trying to undertake, can expect anything intellectually. The numbers of these people and the amount of sympathy on which they are able to count at the moment are dwindling. But for the same reasons, and to the same extent, that they are dwindling, the duty to hold on and to develop one's own position further becomes greater. We are the only group whose existence does not depend on gradual assimilation, the only group which can maintain the relatively advanced state of theory which has been achieved in Germany and advance it even further.<sup>28</sup>

He emphasized his own willingness to make sacrifices and his prudence, and described the situation of the Institute as one of 'splendid isolation': 'Here in America we have met with unexpected generosity and assistance. On the basis of a surprisingly wide knowledge of our publications series, of the journal, and of the research work connected with our questionnaires, a small building has been put at our disposal which is a good place to work in.' After all this, he added: 'At the moment we literally do not have the resources which would permit us to pay more than a negligible salary, one which would do no more than cover expenses . . . [anything more] could result in the financial administration, i.e. Pollock, being exposed to the worst possible accusations . . . Perhaps things will be better next year.' Adorno ought to make a trip to America. If he did so, he might see his prospects 'even apart from any purely material assistance from the Institute' in a more favourable light than he did in England.

In his reply, Adorno once again embraced both Horkheimer and the common cause without any reservations. It was Tillich, he claimed, who had undoubtedly been the person responsible for misunderstandings which had taken place after March 1933. The reasons for his impression that there was a policy of secretiveness towards him at the Institute before March 1933 were clearly not Horkheimer's fault but his friend Pollock's. Pollock had a psychological tendency towards secretiveness, and Lowenthal had used this tendency of Pollock's against him, Adorno, in the manner of power politics. With this, Adorno returned at once to work on the *ZfS*. He suggested converting the two articles he was working on (a critical commentary on an unpublished manuscript by Mannheim on 'Cultural Crisis and Mass Democracy', and his research on Husserl) into contributions for it. He said that writing a review of Pareto might perhaps be a way of 'making Korsch useful'. He gave a warning against Borkenau. He offered a contribution of his own on 'some matters of principle' to do with the complex questions of psychoanalysis ('I might have reservations here about a false, external division of labour'), and would begin with Reich, because Reich, unlike Fromm, maintained that individual psychology could not be smoothly transferred to social theory.

This was just what Horkheimer had wished. Towards the end of 1935 Horkheimer wrote to Pollock from Paris, where he had met Adorno:

Despite a number of disturbing aspects, the source of which lies in his personality, it seems to me a matter of necessity for me to collaborate with him; he is the only person capable of collaborating on completing the logic, apart from the assistance I have from Marcuse. As he has to get his degree at Oxford first, which will take a year to eighteen months, the practical organization of our collaboration is not yet a matter of urgency. For various reasons, I do not think New York can be considered. I might visit Europe

at a suitable point, after doing some more work with Marcuse on the drafts. But in the meantime, T. [Teddy, i.e. Adorno] should document his sympathy with the Institute by producing a plan on how to improve the standard of the journal's review section. T. can probably do something for the article section as well.

The long letters from Adorno, and Horkheimer's short replies, up to the time of Adorno's emigration to New York in February 1938, are evidence of a strange mixture of continuing mutual reserve on some basic points and psychological and theoretical symbiosis, a lasting interaction between Adorno's mental fireworks and Horkheimer's measured and selective application of them. Horkheimer did not react at all to Adorno's enthusiasm for the motif of 'rescuing what is hopeless', drawn from Benjamin's work on Goethe's *Elective Affinities*.<sup>30</sup> Nor did he react to Adorno's tremendous enthusiasm for the prospect which he had in mind as he worked on the Husserl material of 'knocking the last spark of historical concretion out of philosophy precisely where it is at its most abstract', of 'making the most undialectical of all philosophies (nevertheless the most advanced bourgeois epistemology) dialectical through and through', of carrying out an 'immanent liquidation of idealism'.<sup>31</sup> Adorno's articles on Husserl and Mannheim struck Horkheimer as 'not exactly touching on key problems of the current situation, at first sight'.<sup>32</sup> The articles on Mannheim and Husserl, although they were revised many times by Adorno over the years, were never published in the *ZfS*. It was not until the summer of 1936 that an article by Adorno appeared in the *ZfS*, for the first time since 1933 the study 'On Jazz', published under his pseudonym, Hektor Rottweiler.<sup>33</sup> Up to the autumn of 1938, it was the only article by him to be published in the journal.

Nevertheless, Horkheimer did have a genuine interest in Adorno, and not solely because he was convinced that Adorno would be uniquely useful in completing the book on logic. Adorno also fitted perfectly into the psychological structure of the Horkheimer circle. He was fixated on Horkheimer and jealous of all the others. Again and again, he went into raptures about 'our real, common theoretical task, namely dialectical logic', as he put it in a letter to Horkheimer of 22 February 1935, and he dreamed of writing the book somewhere in the south of France, alone with Horkheimer. He assured Horkheimer: 'if I had been in your position, and you in mine, I should not have hesitated to throw anyone out at all if it meant being certain of you . . . Naturally, I am referring here in particular to the position of Marcuse.'<sup>34</sup> But for him Marcuse was only the weakest link; he equally disliked Lowenthal, Fromm and Pollock.

In addition, Adorno was prepared to identify himself completely with the great cause of the Institute, measuring everything by that standard. He had earlier judged Benjamin's *Passagen-Werk* to be foreign to the Institute's research programme, as it was excessively preoccupied with

metaphysics. But after reading Benjamin's résumé he recommended financial support for it on the grounds that:

I have come to be convinced that this work will contain *nothing* which could not be defended from the point of view of dialectical materialism. The character of metaphorical improvisation which it formerly had has completely disappeared. I don't mean merely that this is something positive at long last (that would lead on to the discussion between us which has still to take place); but in any case it is something positive with regard to the applicability of the study within the Institute's plan of work, to which it has *adapted* itself. 35

In Fromm's essay on 'The Social Determination of Psychoanalytic Theory',<sup>36</sup> Adorno saw 'a genuine threat to the journal's line', due to the essay's one-sided condemnation of authority (without which 'neither Lenin's avant-garde nor dictatorship can be conceived') and its 'bourgeois-individualist' demand for more goodness.<sup>37</sup> He began his report on Kracauer's work on 'Totalitarian Propaganda in Germany and Italy' in March 1938 with the words:

To judge Kracauer's work, it seems to me to be inadequate simply to confront him with our own categories and to check to what extent he conforms to them. Rather, one must begin by assuming neither that Kracauer is definitely one of us in his theoretical attitudes, nor that he counts as a scholarly writer by virtue of his method of working. Under these conditions, it must be asked whether his work has anything to offer us which we can make use of, either journalistically or in the formation of our theory.

The conclusion he reached was that Kracauer's essay could be published 'without compromising us politically too much' in a form which he, Adorno, had revised. This plan came to nothing, since Kracauer rejected the publication of Adorno's revision under his name. When Adorno heard in 1938 that his own work on Mannheim would not be published after all in the form which Horkheimer had previously approved, he wrote to Horkheimer:

You probably have tactical reasons for this which I have no clear view of from here. Please do not take this faint whimpering of the wounded deer (myself in this case) as an expression of private vanity. But I think it is simply . . . understandable for symptoms of injury to appear, even in someone who is truly enlightened and self-controlled.<sup>38</sup>

This was the masochistic side of those references to the Institute's special theoretical tasks which Horkheimer was always making.

Adorno held that Hitler was a pawn in the Western monopoly-capitalist powers' manoeuvres against Moscow, and feared in 1936 that 'In two years at the most, Germany will attack Russia, while France and England stand back on the basis of the treaties which will have been signed by then.' On the other hand, he found the show trials and the cultural policies of the Soviet Union disappointing, and thought that 'the most loyal attitude to Russia at the moment is probably shown by keeping quiet'. This was underlined when he emphasized melodramatically that, in spite of everything, it seemed to him that 'in the current situation, which is truly desperate, one should really maintain discipline at any cost (and no one knows the cost better than I!) and not publish anything which might damage Russia'.<sup>39</sup> All this was very much in accordance with Horkheimer's line.

For Horkheimer, what was important was Adorno's 'maliciously sharp eye for existing conditions'<sup>40</sup> and his aggressiveness. He missed this in Fromm, and said to Pollock after their first meeting in New York in June 1934 that Fromm 'does not particularly appeal to me. He has productive ideas, but he wants to be on good terms with too many people at once, and doesn't want to miss anything. It is quite pleasant to talk to him, but my impression is that it is quite pleasant for very many people.'<sup>41</sup> At the end of 1936, after Alfred Sohn-Rethel had visited him in Oxford, Adorno warmly recommended to Horkheimer that support be given to Sohn-Rethel, who was working in isolation towards the same goal as he was, i.e. the destruction of idealism from within. After reading part of Sohn-Rethel's draft of his *Sociological Theory of Knowledge*<sup>42</sup> with Marcuse, Horkheimer responded coolly that, although there was much intellectual power 'behind this dreary sequence of sentences full of words heavy with significance', the work's position 'with regard to history itself, as it is, is not much different from that of a Jaspers or some other professor'. The 'peculiar irony of Marx's categories was nowhere at work'; Sohn-Rethel had succeeded in 'denuding the concept of exploitation of any aggressive content' in a way that not even Mannheim had achieved. What the author had done, with discoveries which were in no way new ones, was 'to gloss over them idealistically, instead of bringing them into focus'. Adorno's enthusiasm for Sohn-Rethel gave Horkheimer an opportunity 'to emphasize the vast difference between your way of thinking and his':

It may be that your work on Kierkegaard still bears some traces of an idealistic way of thinking which you broke away from by writing the book, but in many places it is your maliciously sharp eye for existing conditions which strikes the decisive note. Indeed, I have even observed the irreconcilability of your ideas with the

existing objective spirit where I have doubted the correctness of those ideas. 43

Lowenthal had once criticized Adorno to Horkheimer, saying that, unlike Horkheimer, Adorno showed a zealotry not far removed from a sense of resentment. But it was precisely this that appealed to Horkheimer. For him, all that mattered was that this zealous aggressiveness, which was able to detect concessions to the bourgeois academic system in the work of Lowenthal, Marcuse, Fromm, and even more so in the work of others, should be channelled along the right lines, namely those with significance for social theory.

For Adorno, however, it was a question of opening up Horkheimer's 'Swabian Marxism' (see p. 92 above) towards a more demanding form of materialist theory. His efforts to make Benjamin, Kracauer, Sohn-Rethel and Bloch associates either of the Institute or at least of its journal, strange as they were, did not always fail through Adorno's fault alone. They showed that his old dream lived on the dream of making the theory which he and his theological-materialist friends represented effective in the journal and at the Institute. But the victory of the Nazis and emigration had weakened the social and journalistic position of these friends and strengthened Horkheimer's, to such an extent that Adorno tended to see troublesome behaviour by Horkheimer as part of a sometimes inscrutable strategy for the long-term benefit of the Institute, while he saw troublesome behaviour on the part of Kracauer and his other intellectual partners as pieces of stupidity. 'It is tremendously difficult', he wrote to Horkheimer in a letter of January 1937, 'to find people with whom we can genuinely collaborate, and my attempts to do so in the last six months have brought me round more and more to accepting your view that our work can only be done off our own bat, so to speak.' A few days later he wrote: 'My efforts to attract advanced intellectuals are not supposed to lead to the Institute becoming a madhouse.'<sup>44</sup> But Adorno and Horkheimer agreed that Benjamin was an exception. After Benjamin's 'Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian' had appeared in the *ZfS*,<sup>45</sup> Adorno wrote:

I consider Benjamin to be one of our greatest talents and, after the extremely depressing experience of trying to find new ones, I think he is one of the very few. If he is employed in the right way, a tremendous amount can be expected of him. I would also consider it, therefore, as a matter of objective self-interest, quite reasonable for this to be expressed materially in our public position.<sup>46</sup>

Horkheimer, who had met Benjamin again in Paris during his visit to Europe in September 1937, wrote to Adorno afterwards: 'The best part was a few hours with Benjamin. Of all of them, he is the one who is by

far the closest to us.' 47 In the late autumn of 1937, Benjamin became a regular member of staff at the Institute. By 1935 his *Passagen-Werk* had been adopted as one of the research projects financially supported by the Institute, and the regular payment of an increased salary to Benjamin had been agreed during Horkheimer's visit to Paris in February 1936. 'As you will now be involved more closely in the Institute's work as well,' Benjamin wrote to Adorno after the February meeting, 'I believe I can hope, without being recklessly optimistic, that the results will be good both for our theoretical prospects and for our practical position.'48

All in all, the astonishing process which had begun in Frankfurt at the beginning of the 1930s was thus continued after 1934-5: the collaboration between Horkheimer and Adorno. Horkheimer was a materialist social theorist, attempting, through a philosophically initiated interdisciplinary analysis of society as a whole, to meet the demand for happiness asserted by mortal human beings who depend on the here and now. Adorno was an interpretative materialist who, by means of 'constructive interpretation' and elucidation of what was small, fragmentary, accidental and infused with idealism, aimed to liberate dialectically the elements which would be capable of rescuing these phenomena and producing a better form of rationality. Horkheimer's and Adorno's endeavours coalesced in the critique of idealist positions, and in their common interest in an 'unfinished' (Horkheimer) or 'intermittent' (Adorno) dialectics, a logic of living matters not prescribed either by a system or by some autonomous spirit. But close collaboration seemed hard to imagine unless further assimilation between their two positions took place. The direction in which this assimilation would move was anticipated, even before Horkheimer agreed with Adorno's praise of Benjamin, in the reaction by the materialist social theorist (Horkheimer) to the essay on jazz by the interpretative materialist (Adorno). Horkheimer wrote to Adorno:

The essay on jazz seems to me to be a particularly excellent study. You manage to use a strict analysis of this apparently insignificant phenomenon to reveal society as a whole, with all its contradictions. The essay would have been a *pièce de résistance* wherever it had been published. In this issue of the journal, it also serves to preclude the erroneous impression that our method can only be applied to so-called large-scale problems or all-embracing historical periods, and your presentation alone shows that the correct way of looking at a problem has nothing at all to do with what is superficially considered important or urgent in scientific research.49

In the next prospectus that was produced, Adorno's methods were underlined as a central approach in the Institute's work. In his enthusiasm for Adorno's methods, Horkheimer showed his readiness to take a very broad view of his original project of combining philosophy and

the various branches of science, combining theory and empiricism, `abstract and concrete sciences'leaving room for very different variants.

#### Other Empirical Research Projects at the Institute During the 1930s

Four fieldwork projects formed part of the Institute's programme during the years 1935-8:

1 Research into women students' attitudes to authority (based on a group of students from Sarah Lawrence College in New York).

2 Research into the influence of unemployment on the authority structure within the family (based on a group of families in Newark, New Jersey; it was intended that parallel studies should be carried out in Vienna and Paris).

3 An exhaustive analysis of the questionnaires used for the *Studies on Authority and the Family*, which had received only a cursory examination. These were concerned with changes in authority relations between young people and their parents in various European countries.

4 An exhaustive analysis of the Institute's first research project based on questionnaires, concerned with the German working class.

The inquiry into women students' attitudes to authority at Sarah Lawrence College in New York aimed to discover the students' attitudes to the authority of their professors and of the college as a whole, and to determine which views were typical, and how they related, on the one hand, to the social, cultural and family situation of the students and, on the other hand, to particular character structures. This was therefore the old programme, now being applied to young people in the context of a particular institution. The research, which was begun in the late autumn of 1935 and directed by Fromm, dragged on, never progressing beyond its initial stages.

Research into the influence of unemployment on the authority structure in American families was delegated to Paul Lazarsfeld. Horkheimer and the Institute were closely in touch with him during the whole period of their stay in the United States.

Compared to Horkheimer, Paul F. Lazarsfeld was a more pragmatic and methodologically oriented type of `managerial scholar' in the field of social science, although not entirely without a socially critical aspect. When a research foundation serving to establish Marxist theory in the academic field was not available to provide the basis for research, putting together an empirical social science research group could only succeed if a highly enterprising spirit and a relish for improvisation went hand in hand with a considerable readiness to conform.

Lazarsfeld was born to a Jewish family in Vienna in 1901. Victor Adler, Rudolf Hilferding and Otto Bauer, 50 among others, were frequent visitors to the family home. His mother, Sophie Lazarsfeld, had studied under Alfred Adler,<sup>51</sup> and was a practising psychoanalyst and author of a series of aggressive books about women's liberation.<sup>52</sup> So he was familiar from an early age with Austrian Marxism and with the Adlerian version of psychoanalysis, which Austrian Social Democrats held in high esteem. It was when he was active in the Social Democratic youth movement during the 1920s that Lazarsfeld met Siegfried Bernfeld, who was a student of Freud's and director of the Children's Home for War Orphans (Kinderheim für Kriegswaisen) in Vienna, founded in 1919. Bernfeld's model of children's self-administration was an inspiration to Lazarsfeld in organizing holiday camps for children and young people in the Social Democratic labour movement. On Bernfeld's suggestion, Lazarsfeld, who in the meantime had become a mathematics teacher, attended lectures given by Charlotte and Karl Bühler, who had founded the Psychological Institute at Vienna University in 1922-3. The Psychological Institute acted as a magnet for socialist students, who expected a correct education to do great things to advance the 'new human being'. Karl Bühler had been involved in the school reform programme undertaken by the Social Democratic Minister of Education, Otto Glöckel; Charlotte Bühler's main interest was in child-developmental psychology. Theoretical work and empirical research were linked here from the very start. Charlotte Bühler, who had used a statistical analysis of children's diaries in her book on *The Inner Lives of Young People* (*Das Seelenleben des Jugendlichen*), appointed the young mathematician Lazarsfeld as her assistant.

In 1927 Lazarsfeld founded the Economic and Psychological Research Group (Wirtschaftspsychologische Forschungsstelle) as part of the Psychological Institute. To fund its work, it carried out research contracts, which involved, among other things, the first Austrian market research studies, and a large-scale questionnaire on listeners' preferences for the Austrian broadcasting company. Lazarsfeld was fascinated by methodology, and all these projects seemed to him to be instructive. While engaged in a statistical analysis of consumer choices, for example, he hoped to learn something which would be useful in analysing people's career choices statistically.<sup>53</sup> The research group thus worked not only for the capitalist economy but also for Social Democratic institutions and on its own research tasks.

In one of Lazarsfeld's first books, *Young People and Careers*, there is a sentence which was characteristic of his approach to empirical social psychology research as it had developed in the atmosphere of 'Red Vienna' (Vienna was then 'red' right up to members of the Vienna Circle such as Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn and Edgar Zilsel). The sentence occurs in the section on 'The Young Worker', and it was the strong emphasis on young workers which gave the study its Marxist flavour:

Only a researcher who is so close to the problem in his own life that he only needs to practise introspection to be able to produce a conceptual and methodological apparatus, and who in spite of this personal involvement possesses the scientific brutality to translate this experience into data and formulae which can be checked, or at

least into statements on suspected connections which are in principle accessible to that kind of presentation only a researcher such as this can help to make the problems of the various forms of adolescence noticeably less opaque than they are at present. 54

None of the research which was going on at that time was truer to this insight than the study begun in 1930 on *The Unemployed in Marienthal*, throughout which the standpoint constantly maintained was, according to Lazarsfeld's introduction, 'that none of our assistants should appear in Marienthal in the role of a reporter or observer, but rather that each of them should blend into life there naturally by means of some function or other useful to the people living there.'<sup>55</sup> The modest financial support available for the research was provided by the Viennese Trades Council (*Arbeiterkammer*) and by a Rockefeller fund administered by Karl and Charlotter Bühler.

On the basis of the Marienthal research, the Rockefeller Foundation financed a visit by Lazarsfeld to the USA, which he began in September 1933. In February 1934 the Austrian constitution was annulled, the Socialist Party was banned, fascism on the Italian model was introduced, and most of the members of Lazarsfeld's Jewish family were thrown into gaol. Lazarsfeld successfully applied for an extension of his scholarship in America. When this ran out in the autumn of 1935, he was appointed, with the assistance of Robert Lynd, to a post with the National Youth Administration based at the University of Newark in New Jersey. He was to analyse 10,000 questionnaires filled in by young people aged between fourteen and twenty-five, and give some courses at the university. At his suggestion, the University of Newark set up a social research group in the autumn of 1936, and he became the director of it.

The university was small and poorly off, and the director of the research group was obliged to find half of his salary for himself. Lazarsfeld had to keep the research group going by finding research contracts, just as he had done in Vienna. In this situation, Horkheimer's Institute came to his help by having part of its work carried out at the Newark research centre and paying Lazarsfeld's small staff for supervisory duties. This co-operation was only one episode in the long-term collaboration between Lazarsfeld and the Institute, which had begun when the Institute of Social Research had contracted the Vienna Economic and Psychological Research Group to carry out an inquiry among young workers in Austria. The collaboration had continued in 1935 when Lazarsfeld assisted with the analysis of the inquiries carried out by Käthe Leichter among young people in Switzerland for the *Studies on Authority and the Family*. Horkheimer wrote to Lazarsfeld when work on the *Studies* was completed:

You have been a great help to the Institute, not just through your careful and interesting work [on the study of young people], but also through the truly triumphant speed with which you carried it out.

With the special significance your unique experience has for the Institute's field of research, our pleasure at hearing of the attention you have attracted at the University of Pittsburgh was dampened by the idea that you will be away from New York next year . . . Our

mutual and respected friend, Professor Lynd, had the idea that our Institute should suggest to you that you might come to New York from Pittsburgh for at least a few days every month. This offer is intended to make it possible for you to continue to take part in our work in the future as well.

Lazarsfeld replied (in English):

You certainly did not doubt that I would be very delighted about your offer. It suits my own plans in many ways. First, I myself want very much to stay in contact with you and your Institute; then, it gives me a chance to commute to New York . . . the adornment of the budget will be highly welcome. 56

Co-operation became particularly close during Lazarsfeld's period in Newark. He and his assistants in particular Herta Herzog, who had already worked with him in Vienna and was to become his second wife advised the Institute on questions of methodology and assisted with technicalities connected with data. The Institute listed Lazarsfeld in its prospectuses as one of its research associates. In 1938 Lazarsfeld, who had been asked the year before by the Rockefeller Foundation to undertake a large-scale 'radio research project', told Horkheimer he was interested in offering the directorship of the musical part of the project to Adorno. He thus gave Horkheimer the chance to bring Adorno to New York. Lazarsfeld became a professor at Columbia University in 1940 and moved his research group there, and the mutual co-operation between him and Horkheimer continued into the 1940s, when they agreed on a common strategy for dealing with their financial sponsors. During the Institute's period of exile in the United States, Lazarsfeld served as a mediator between it and the academic environment there. Equally, Lazarsfeld's collaboration with an institute of Critical Theorists from Frankfurt gave him the feeling that he had not entirely betrayed his Austrian Marxist past, even now that he was fully integrated into the American academic scene.

The research project on the effect of unemployment on the authority structure in American families was conceived of by the Horkheimer Institute mainly as a means of demonstrating that it had some knowledge of the country in which it was a guest. The problem in principle was, as Fromm wrote to Horkheimer at the beginning of 1936,

that we are doing the research essentially for tactical reasons, with the intention of leaving Lazarsfeld to do most of the work; while, on the other hand, we do want the contents of the research to meet our own standards to some extent. As Lazarsfeld does not have a sufficiently good grasp of our theoretical points of view, however, we cannot avoid also getting involved in the research ourselves. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to waste too much energy on this research.57

From 1935 onwards the research was carried out, under Lazarsfeld's supervision, by Mirra Komarovsky, a sociologist with whom he was acquainted. The questionnaire was concerned with fifty-nine families in Newark, all living under similar conditions, whose names had been provided by the Emergency Relief Administration, a sort of welfare agency. One of the research methods was a series of interviews with individual family members. Typological classifications of the same kind as those which Lazarsfeld had discussed in his essay, 'Some Remarks on the Typological Procedures in Social Research', published in the *ZfS* in 1937, 58 were used to formulate the questions and analyse the completed questionnaires. The results confirmed once again what Sternheim had written in 1933 in his review article on 'New Literature on Unemployment and the Family,'59 and what had been shown by the *Studies on Authority and the Family*: that the authority of the father within the family was often diminished by unemployment. The older the children, the more it diminished, and the extent to which it did so depended on the family's authority structure in the period preceding unemployment. The report on the Newark research was published in English in 1940, with an introduction by Lazarsfeld, as a publication of the International Institute of Social Research.

In parallel research projects in Vienna and Paris, the Institute's European branches were to collaborate with the institutes of Marie Jahoda and Otto Neurath. Jahoda, who had been an assistant of Lazarsfeld's in Vienna and was his first wife, was the main author of *The Unemployed in Marienthal*, and an active Social Democrat. After Lazarsfeld's departure, she had become director of the Vienna Economic and Psychological Research Group. Horkheimer hoped to maintain the international character of the Institute's work, without undue expense, through the co-operation planned with the Vienna group. But the parallel European research never came about. In 1936 Marie Jahoda was arrested for working illegally for the Socialists, and in 1937 she was expelled from Austria.

Lazarsfeld's involvement was also essential to the further analysis of the questionnaires on attitudes to authority and family among young people. The preliminary processing of the Austrian material was carried out by Käthe Leichter, who had proved her abilities with the Swiss questionnaires. She was also suggested by Lazarsfeld as an assistant for work on the French material. What was to be produced finally from all this was a comparative presentation of the Swiss, Austrian and French research results. Lazarsfeld hoped to be able to analyse the second half of the Swiss questionnaire sheets statistically for this, since they had not been available to him for his contribution to *Studies on Authority and the Family*. But the project was never completed.

The closest collaboration with Lazarsfeld's Newark research group took place with the continuing analysis of the research on manual and non-manual workers. Almost all those who took part in this were listed

in an Institute prospectus of March 1938 as associates of the Department of Social Psychology and Field Studies: Erich Fromm, Paul Lazarsfeld and Ernst Schachtel, as well as two of the three assistants, Herta Herzog and Anna Hartoch. Lazarsfeld and the two women belonged first and foremost to the Newark research group. Fromm hoped for first-rate assistance with the work from Anna Hartoch, who had 'excellent psychological knowledge and wide cultural and political experience with working people'. Her monthly salary of \$50 was to be provided by Fromm, using 'a surplus in earnings resulting from an exchange of badly paid for better-paid consultation hours' at his psychoanalytic practice to pay her directly, 'instead of paying the amount to the Institute's account'.<sup>60</sup> In Paul Lazarsfeld and Herta Herzog, Fromm saw 'no particularly deep appreciation' of the 'subtle psychological problems which are particularly important to make this work worthwhile'. But there was so much rough work and descriptive work to be done that their collaboration would be very useful all the same.

At the beginning of 1936 Fromm expected three results to emerge from the analysis of the questionnaire on the working class:

1 It will certainly offer a picture of the political, social and cultural views which German workers had in the year 1929-30. Such a large proportion of the answers correspond to one another that certain generalizations will certainly be possible, even on the basis of the material presented by 700 questionnaires.

2 A goal which I should like to achieve, although I am not yet certain to what extent it will be possible, is the formulation of social-psychological types: hence, for example, the distinction between the petty-bourgeois 'rebellious' character type and the revolutionary character type. The extent to which various different types are to be found among the various political party groupings will have to be looked into: for example, to what extent the 'rebellious' and the revolutionary types are found among Communists, to what extent the petty-bourgeois individualist type and a more social and collective type are found among the Nazis, and so on. It will certainly be necessary to differentiate more between the different character types than was done with my suggested division into three classes in the book [*Studies on Authority and the Family*].

3 A third possible result, and one which can certainly be achieved, is that this excellent questionnaire can really be used to show what can and cannot be achieved methodologically by means of questionnaires. A number of methodological refinements will be applied to the processing of the questionnaires which are quite new, and which will certainly make publication useful from this point of view as well.<sup>61</sup>

In his introduction to the questionnaire section in *Studies on Authority and the Family* (which he was in charge of) Fromm neatly formulated the most important aspects of his methodological ideas, although these formulations were not noticeably reflected in the individual research reports. The aspects he mentioned were: the attempt to 'infer the character structure of the person answering by taking the answers in each questionnaire as a whole', to include systematically in the questionnaire questions 'from which we can expect answers that allow conclusions to be drawn about unconscious tendencies in the person being asked and thus about the structure of the person's instincts'; 'interpreting the significance of an answer, which may often be hidden from the person being questioned', in relation to other answers, i.e. in relation to the structure of the person's character as a whole. 62 Fromm thought that the formulation of typical character structures should be based on 'an explicit psychological theory', 'influenced by the empirical material of the research itself, and constantly differentiated'. 63 All of these aspects were attempts to develop a methodology which would serve above all to fulfil the tasks of an analytical social psychology, as set out in Fromm's first contribution to the *ZfS*: to reveal libido structures, and to conceive of them, on the one hand, as products of the influence of social and economic conditions on instinctive drives, and, on the other hand, as a decisive factor in the development of emotions within the various classes of society and in the composition of the ideological superstructure. 64

The processing of the results of the questionnaire continued until 1938, and progressed at least to the extent that, four decades later, the social scientist Wolfgang Bonss, with Fromm's agreement, was able to reconstruct a publishable text from the two incomplete English versions that survived, both apparently largely written by Fromm. This text was published in German in 1980. At the centre of the analytical articles written in 1937-8 stood the conclusion of Fromm's formulation of the tasks of an analytical social psychology. In the first chapter, on the aims and methods of the research, he wrote: 'The analysis concentrated on bringing out the relationship between the individual's emotional make-up and his political opinions.' 65 In view of Fromm's programmatic and methodological pronouncements, one might have expected that, on the basis of a complex network of answers enabling someone schooled in psychological interpretation to draw conclusions about deep-seated personality traits, the libido structures of the individual subjects might have been worked out beforehand, so that they could be given a psychological basis and classified empirically according to their types. The significance of political and other consciously held views for the various character types could then have been explained, and the role of differing socio-economic conditions in the development of the various character types might have been examined.

Surprisingly, the analytical articles took a quite different approach.

To begin with, a survey of the personal, social, economic and political composition of the sample was given (584 questionnaires were available). With regard to the occupational status of the subjects, the sample was divided into skilled workers, unskilled workers, white-collar workers and others; further differentiation was dispensed with, as it would have led to groupings which were too small. With regard to political orientation the sample was divided into Communists, left-wing socialists (within the Social Democratic Party), Social Democrats, middle-class and centre parties, Nazis (this was the smallest group, with only seventeen persons), and non-voters; within the two largest groups, the Communists (150) and the Social Democrats (262), further distinction was made between officials, voters and undecided.

Then, disregarding any connections between individual questionnaires, the answers to questions in the areas of political views, general world-view, cultural and aesthetic attitudes, attitudes to women and children, and to one's fellow human beings and oneself, were classified descriptively and also partly interpretatively, even at this stage. (That is, they were interpreted to begin with on the basis of their evidence of deeper personality traits not directly addressed in the questions, and then classified.) The distribution of the various types of answer among the political and mainly among the economic groupings within the sample was then examined.

Finally, each questionnaire was taken as a whole. The questionnaires did not produce a general picture of each personality, but they did offer a general picture of important individual personality traits. Four questions were taken as being of relevance as political views, and six as being of relevance to attitudes to authority, as fellow human beings and to the deeper personality structure. The extent and nature of the correlation between political views and personality structure were examined, most of the subjects were classified under one of three main character types, and finally the distribution of the political and professional groupings among these types was analysed.

The way in which the three main character types were arrived at was no less surprising than this way of structuring the analysis. In no sense did the character types have a psychological basis, and they were not derived from psychoanalytic considerations in any way (e.g. according to the phases of psychosexual development). On the contrary, they were formulated on the basis of 'ideal-typical' differences in social and political views as represented by the German 'ideological' parties. The 'radical attitude' was drawn from 'socialist-communist philosophy' as the image of a particular 'ideal-typical' mental attitude to which the political doctrine was making its appeal. The 'compromise-orientated reformist attitude' was drawn from 'liberal-reformist philosophy', and the 'authoritarian attitude' from 'anti-socialist authoritarian philosophy'.<sup>66</sup> It was expressly emphasized that these attitudes and ideal types had been constructed on the immediate basis of political views as a whole and not

on the basis of the `psychic make-up' of those who held the various views. 67 A relation to the psychic make-up of the subjects was achieved by creating the more generous categories `R-centred' and `A-centred' for radical and authoritarian orientations.

The conclusion of the study seemed to be the observation that only a minority of the supporters of the left-wing parties showed the ideal type of radical attitude, while for most of them there was a greater or lesser discrepancy between political viewpoint and personality structure.

Without doubt, the most important *result* is the small proportion of left-wingers [from the total of the three groups Social Democrats, left-wing socialists and Communists] who were in agreement in both thought and feeling with the Socialist line. In critical times the courage, readiness for sacrifice and spontaneity needed to rouse the less active and to overcome the enemy could only be expected from a rather small group of 15%. Although the Left had the political loyalty and votes of the great majority of workers, it had by and large not succeeded in changing the personality structure of its adherents in such a way that they could be relied upon in critical situations. On the other hand, a further 25% of Social Democrats and Communists were in broad though less firm agreement with their party and showed no signs of any personality traits which would have contradicted their left-wing approach. They could be counted on as reliable, but not as fervent, supporters. In view of this we are left with an ambiguous picture: on the one hand, the actual strength of the left-wing parties appears to have been much less than one might have supposed at first glance, if one looked at the numbers. On the other hand, there was nevertheless a hard core of highly reliable fighters which should have been large enough to pull the less militant along in certain circumstances, i.e. if a capable leadership and correct evaluation of the political position had been at hand.

One must also not forget that 20% of the supporters of the workers' parties expressed, in their opinions and feelings, a clearly authoritarian tendency. Only 5% were consistently authoritarian; 15% displayed this attitude rather ambiguously. Beyond this, 19% of Social Democrats and Communists tended towards the rebellious-authoritarian position with clear contradictions between R- and A-replies. 5% of the Left had a compromise-orientated attitude, and 16% in all came into the neutral syndrome category.68

In a comparison between the most important groupings of leftists, Communists and Social Democrats (not including left-wing socialists), the Communists came out clearly better. For example, 40 per cent of Communist officials, but only 12 per cent of Social Democrat officials,

were definitely radical. Among the Communist officials, none was definitely authoritarian, while 5 per cent of Social Democrat officials were definitely authoritarian. 69 If this detailed result is looked at more carefully, the weak point in the whole construction of the analysis will become clear. It was not possible for anyone to be classified as definitely authoritarian if they had answered the four questions to do with political views faithfully according to Marxist doctrine. For example, if they had answered the question 'What, in your opinion, can improve the world situation?' with the word 'socialism', and the question 'Who, in your opinion, was responsible for the hyperinflation?' with the words 'capitalists' or 'capitalism' (the questions, which were not pre-structured, were classified according to these criteria), then they could no longer be classed as definitely authoritarian. But if those who had given these answers turned out to be 'authoritarian' in their attitudes to authority, or 'individualistic' in their attitudes to fellow human beings, or both, they were classified as a 'contradictory combination' or as a 'rebellious authoritarian type'. It was said of this type:

These people were filled with hate and anger against everyone who had money and who appeared to enjoy life. That part of the socialist platform which aimed at the overthrow of the propertied classes strongly appealed to them. On the other hand, items such as freedom and equality had not the slightest attraction for them, since they willingly obeyed every powerful authority they admired; they liked to control others, in so far as they had the power to do so. Their unreliability finally came into the open at the point when a programme such as that of the National Socialists was offered to them. This programme not only corresponded with the feelings which had made the Socialist programme attractive but also appealed to that side of their nature which Socialism had not satisfied or had unconsciously opposed. In such cases they were transformed from unreliable leftists into convinced National Socialists.70

The possibility that someone could remain loyal to the Communist Party or to its programme and nevertheless be authoritarian was thus excluded. The possibility was also excluded that someone who was not a declared believer in the Communist Party or its programme could nevertheless be definitely radical.

The programme of attempting to 'form a picture of the depth and consistency of individuals' political opinions'71 by analysing their relation to party membership and their character structure led to the conclusion that the supporters of the workers' parties could be accused of not supporting decisively enough their most progressive sections, represented above all by the ranks of the party officials. It was not a very plausible result, in view of the fact that many workers had been prepared to

defend themselves actively and with violence, while officials had failed to organize this demand for defence properly and, above all, Communist and Social Democrat officials had viewed and treated each other as the worst of enemies.

As a historical documentation of the situation and mentality of manual and white-collar workers on the eve of the Third Reich, and as a piece of pioneering empirical research in analytical social psychology, the study was certainly of great interest, and right into the 1940s the Institute repeatedly announced the projected publication of `Erich Fromm (ed.), *The German Worker under the Weimar Republic*'. The failure to publish this particular study was astonishing, since (1) the analysis had to a large extent been completed; (2) none of the later questionnaires attempted to meet the demands Fromm set in the *ZfS* for an analytical social psychology to the same extent as this first one did; (3) qualified scholars such as Fromm and Lazarsfeld had worked on it intensively; and (4) concrete results from empirical research were important for the Institute's image. It is likely that the study, which was to be published in English, did really seem to Horkheimer to be too Marxist, as Fromm later declared to Wolfgang Bonss. For a Marxist study, on the other hand, it was not `polished' enough. In addition, the change in Horkheimer's source of intellectual stimulation from Fromm to Adorno increased his reluctance to publish a work in which Fromm's methodological achievements in the field of empirical social research were at their clearest and most impressive.

The research trip to China by Karl August Wittfogel and his then wife, Olga, also constituted part of the Institute's fieldwork in a sense. The journey lasted from spring 1935 (when the Red Army under Mao Zedong and Chu The had already been engaged for some months in the Long March, by means of which it managed to avoid being annihilated by the Kuomintang forces led by Chiang Kai-Shek) until the summer of 1937 (when the Japanese army started to invade North China, and the Red Army and the Kuomintang government officially proclaimed the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United Front). The expenses for the research trip were shared between the Institute and the New York Institute of Pacific Relations. The result the Institute hoped for was a follow-up volume to Wittfogel's study on *Economy and Society in China*, 72 which had been published in the Institute's series of publications, and questionnaire material on authority structures in the Chinese family which were to be compared with the Institute's European and American studies. The Wittfogels returned with, among other things, recordings of interviews with `modern industrial workers' and traditional clan families, and with questionnaires filled in by 1725 school pupils and students (in which there were questions about `great' personalities and favourite books, films and newspapers, for example), and also with extensive source materials on Chinese economic and social history.

In November 1937 the Institute gave a lunch for members of the

Social Science Faculty at Columbia University, at which Wittfogel reported on the research he had carried out and on his plans on how to exploit it. In the Institute's 1938 prospectus, the publication of a book on 'Family and Society in China' was announced, along with a three-volume work on 'China: the Development of its Society' and provided funds could be found to ten volumes with source materials on Chinese history, in Chinese and in English translation. In the end, all that was ever published of this within the framework of the Institute's publications was Wittfogel's research report and an article on 'The Theory of Oriental Society' in the *ZfS* in 1938, and in 1939 the article 'The Society of Prehistoric China', which appeared as a pre-print of the first chapter of a book, never published, on 'The Social and Economic History of Ancient China'. In his essay on 'The Theory of Oriental Society', Wittfogel again defended the view that only an analysis starting from the structure of the productive forces could provide an explanation for the specific laws of social movement in the East and explain both the stagnation of the East and the rise of the West towards modern industrial society in the perspective of universal history. He saw the explanation for the dominant role played in the East by centralized bureaucratic administrative power as lying in the way that it suited the specifically 'oriental' requirements of the agricultural production process. These appeared not only in the East but also wherever else the vital necessity for large-scale irrigation works arose. Following on from Marx, he mentioned China as a supreme example of the form of society created by the 'Asiatic mode of production', corresponding to 'oriental society' at the level of productive relations, and to 'oriental despotism' at the political level.<sup>73</sup> The article encouraged scepticism and high expectations in equal measure, but none of the publications it announced ever appeared.

The *Studies on Authority and the Family* thus remained not just the only 'collective' product of work involving empirical research in the narrow sense at the Institute, but the only publication of any empirical research results by the Institute at all during the 1930s. This fact cannot be explained merely by referring to financial difficulties at the Institute. The directors of the Institute had more than enough money to publish such studies if it had been important enough to them. Nor does reference to the methodological backwardness of the Institute by comparison with American research standards carry conviction. On the one hand, the Horkheimer circle clearly saw that the social sciences in America constantly risked being satisfied with merely collecting empirical material. One of the most respected US historians, Charles A. Beard, confirmed this in a contribution to the *ZfS* in 1935. Everything depended, however, on being able to organize the burgeoning materials of particular research studies into a real social theory.<sup>74</sup> On the other hand, the Institute had, in Fromm and Lazarsfeld, a team which, with regard to research methods, was very up-to-date and capable of above-average

achievements. The 'development of a methodology for social research' 75 was one of the explicit points in the Institute's research programme. And empirical research carried out by the Institute itself was held to be a particularly suitable topic for methodological review.

It was something else that caused the Institute's reluctance to publish empirical research results. Horkheimer, in his inaugural lecture, had demanded the application of the 'most refined scientific methods', and Fromm and Lazarsfeld both of them inspired by psychoanalysis had, for example, undertaken an important refinement of method by distinguishing between descriptive and interpretative classification and between manifest and latent structures. In Horkheimer's view, the Institute's work could be distinguished from bourgeois science primarily at the level of theory, where it was a question of integrating the results of empirical inquiries and research within the various scientific disciplines into a theory of how society as a whole functioned.<sup>76</sup> In addition, questionnaires could only be undertaken in the present time, and must therefore continue to be only a highly selective procedure in relation to a theory concerned with society as a whole throughout an entire epoch. For that reason, the connection between theory and empirical research had to be kept fairly loose, so that the theory would not be restricted, or seem arbitrarily speculative, at points where it had to do without the results of questionnaires. If this was so, then the Institute's true achievements were at the theoretical level. In the empirical and scientific field, the most it could do was to carry out research studies which others might have done just as well, but did not, because of their interest in other topics.

#### The Dialectics Project

Horkheimer himself put all his writings of the 1930s under the heading of 'dialectical logic'. In February 1939 he wrote to Mme Favez, the secretary of the Institute's Geneva office: 'All of my plans at the moment are directed towards working over the next few years on the book for which all of my earlier studies, published and unpublished, have merely been the groundwork.' This was the book on dialectics, or dialectical logic, which he had already wanted to write when he was in Europe. He had brought Marcuse, who was the first to come to join him, from Geneva to the United States in 1934 to help him with it. Answering a long letter from Horkheimer in July 1934 in which he detailed his thoughts on the distinction between idealist and materialist dialectics at length, Fromm wrote, 'I hope very much that all of this will appear in the "Logic"; the idea that you will write it is one of the few pleasant prospects which one can still dare to hope will be realized.' Horkheimer then thought he would only be able to write it with Adorno's help. In 1938 he wanted to get Karl Korsch to carry out various tasks

connected with it, and in October 1938 Korsch wrote to his friend Paul Mattick, 'Almost everyone (within the narrow circles concerned) is talking about the "Plan".' 77

Korsch had described his book on *Marxism and Philosophy* in 1923 as the first part of a larger work on 'Historical and Logical Inquiries on the Question of Materialist Dialectics'. In the same year, Lukács had given his volume of essays on *History and Class Consciousness* the subtitle 'Studies in Marxist Dialectics'. In the preface, Lukács had referred to Marx's letter of 1868 to Joseph Dietzgen, which stated: 'When I have shaken off my burden of economics, I will write a "Dialectics". The true laws of dialectics are already to be found in Hegel, albeit in a mystical form. What is needed is to strip them of that form.'78

While Marx achieved only a provisional presentation of the dialectical method in his works on the critique of political economy and on social theory, with Horkheimer the opposite was true, as the sequence of his works in the 1930s shows. The 'dialectics' project stood for the constant continuation of his work on the philosophical basis of social theory, and was his response to the restriction of rationality in the sciences which he had diagnosed in his 'Remarks on Science and the Crisis', which appeared in the first issue of the *ZfS*, 79 and to the hypostatization of this restricted rationality by 'scientism'. In the face of the irrationalist rejection of the sciences in various forms of metaphysics, dialectics was intended at the same time to present, as an alternative, a critique of science which would go further, and which would at the same time be able to integrate within itself the corrections which metaphysics could provide. Work on social theory, however, moved into the background. Social theory was constantly being mentioned in essays by Horkheimer and his closest associates, and the Horkheimer circle gave the appearance of having such a theory at its disposal, since it frequently referred to what was simply described as the 'correct theory', although this was presented as something that would follow in the future. In the preface to *Studies on Authority and the Family*, it was stated that the complex of questions to which the inquiries were related 'could only be inferred, in its true significance, from the comprehensive theory of social life into which it is woven'.

In his inaugural lecture, Horkheimer had formulated, as a general demand and as the programme of the Institute, the principle that philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians and psychologists should unite in lasting collaboration and, in the field of social studies, should provide for a continuing dialectical fusion of philosophical theory and specific scientific practice. This was no longer possible for one individual alone. What was required here was not collaboration between those who were only philosophers and those who were only scientific specialists, but collaboration between theoreticians, each of whom was especially familiar with one of the scientific disciplines, philosophy being one of these. The philosophical tradition of epistemology and theory of

science, and the current form of that tradition, made it particularly suited to the clarification of the specific character of their own research approaches. This kind of personal union between theory and scientific speciality in each of those taking part avoided, initially at least, any more precise consideration of what exactly a 'continuing dialectical fusion between philosophical theory and scientific practice' was supposed to mean. What would it mean to apply the methods and results of the various scientific disciplines not mechanically, but according to the specific structure of a comprehensive theory of society and the current state of that theory, and to concentrate on modifying and extending the theory in view of progress within each discipline (as a *ZfS* prospectus put it)? Faced with this question, Horkheimer contented himself with applying Hegel's views of the relationship between understanding and reason to the relationship between the various scientific disciplines and the theory of society. In his essay on 'The Problem of Truth', which appeared in the *ZfS* in 1935, he listed a whole catalogue of 'characteristics of dialectical thought':

It relativizes every multifaceted, but isolated, definition in the consciousness of the alteration of subject and object as well as their relationship. (What results in idealism from a postulated absolute, takes place in materialism on the basis of developing experience.) Instead of ranging attributes alongside one another, it seeks to show, by analysis of each general characteristic in respect to the particular object, that this generalization taken by itself simultaneously contradicts the object, and that in order to be properly comprehended it must be related to the contrary property and finally to the whole system of knowledge. From this follows the principle that every insight is to be regarded as true only in connection with the whole body of theory, and hence is to be understood conceptually in such a way that in its formulation the connection with the structural principles and practical tendencies governing the theory is preserved. Bound up with this is the rule that, while maintaining unswerving fidelity to the key ideas and goals and the historical tasks of the epoch, the style of the presentation should be characterized more by 'as well as' than 'either/or'. A basic principle is the inseparability of the regressive and progressive impulses, the preserving and decomposing, the good and bad sides of particular situations in nature and human history. Instead of accepting the legitimate analyses and abstractions of professional science while turning to metaphysics and religion for an understanding of concrete reality, it tries to place the analytically achieved concepts in relation to one another and reconstruct reality through them. These and all the other characteristics of dialectical reason correspond to the form of a complicated reality, constantly changing in all its details. 80

Horkheimer was outlining a mode of thinking which moved in unfinished, complex totalities. It differed from Adorno's programme of interpretative philosophy, not so much in the extent to which it took the various scientific disciplines seriously, as in the entirely untheological and social-historical character of the reality it was hoping to account for. Unlike metaphysical intuition, social theory did not ignore the results of specialized scientific research. But whether one possessed certain basic insights into the nature of society was more decisive than whether one did or did not possess extensive specialized knowledge.

The boundary which one might draw nowadays between people, according to the amount of knowledge they possess, would therefore have to focus less on the extent of their academic knowledge than on certain signs in their behaviour in which their attitude to social struggles is expressed. When it is necessary, knowledge in other areas will come to someone who already possesses the decisive insights. 81

In 1936 what was probably Horkheimer's greatest essay was published: 'Egoism and the Freedom Movement: on the Anthropology of the Bourgeois Age'. It was one of the few pieces he wrote which was not concerned with the criticism of other tendencies or with the theory and programme of materialist knowledge. It was a contribution to a materialist theory of society. What can be learned from it about the methods of dialectical social theory? How plausible and how fruitful is it? The essay was dialectical to the extent that pessimistic and optimistic tendencies within bourgeois philosophical anthropology were, in Horkheimer's critical eyes, not seen as remaining merely opposed to each other, but as transforming themselves into one another, as being essentially identical.

The same absolute rejection of every egoistic instinct is an obvious presupposition, both in the cynical pronouncement that human nature is evil and dangerous and has to be kept in check by a powerful system of domination (with the corresponding Puritan doctrine of the sinfulness of the individual, who with iron discipline must subdue his instincts in complete submission to the laws of duty), and also in the opposite declaration, that human nature is originally pure and harmonious, and has merely been disturbed by the restrictive and corrupt conditions of the present age.82

This observation was substantiated by Horkheimer's demonstration of the social function which the two fundamentally different anthropological tendencies both served to the same extent, through their shared condemnation of egoism. The more the principle of competition prevails in bourgeois society, the more all of those who are drawn into that

world find themselves forced to emphasize the egoistic and hostile sides of their characters, in order to survive in such a harsh reality. An abhorrence of egoism is able to protect those who are successful from any doubts about their success which might arise if those who are less successful were to emulate them without any restraint.

The accusation of egoism, which anthropology opposes either through the assertion of a more noble human nature or by simply branding it as bestiality, does not basically affect the ambitions of the powerful for power, the existence of prosperity alongside misery, or the preservation of outmoded and unjust forms of society. Philosophical ethics, following the victory of the bourgeoisie, has put ever more ingenuity into being impartial on this point. The greater part of humanity must instead learn to control its demand for happiness, to crush the desire to live just as pleasantly as the minority does a minority which is, on closer inspection, actually quite happy that its existence is condemned by this convenient moral verdict . . . A true specimen of the bourgeois upper class is affected by the moral propaganda of his own class towards the rest of society in such a way that exploitation, and having people and material at his own free disposal, gives him no pleasure, according to his own ideology. Rather, it must be seen as a public service, as a social obligation, the fulfilment of a predestined path of life, so that he can profess his belief in it and approve of it. 83

The demonstration that there was decisive common ground between the pessimistic and optimistic tendencies in bourgeois anthropology, which measured humanity against a caricature of what reality was actually making it into, led Horkheimer to postulate the opposite of what was common to both anthropological tendencies: 'free pleasure, which is non-rationalized, i.e. can be aspired to without any need for justification', the 'unconditional demand for happiness'<sup>84</sup> that form of egoism which was to some extent good. The abhorrence of real egoism not only served the purposes of an unjust distribution of privations and rewards, but also affected the inherently better aspects of egoism.

For the bourgeois character, it is not the case that pleasurable moments radiate happiness out across the whole of life and also brighten up those parts which are not pleasant in themselves. The capacity for immediate pleasure is instead weakened by the idealists' preaching of refinement and self-denial, it is coarsened and often lost entirely. The absence of great misfortunes or of conflicts of conscience, i.e. relative freedom from inward and outward sufferings and fears, a neutral, often quite gloomy condition in which the spirit is accustomed to swinging back and forth between

extreme busyness and mindless monotony this is mistaken for happiness. The idea of abhorring 'common' pleasure has been such a success that the average citizen, if he allows himself any pleasures, becomes base instead of free, coarse instead of grateful, idiotic instead of intelligent. 85

There was, however, nothing in what Horkheimer wrote to suggest how the anthropological doctrines dismissing egoism had developed, depending as they must do on the dialectic between growing human capacities and social structures. Nor was there anything to suggest where the inherently better aspects of egoism came from, how the sudden change in it came about and on what economic and social tendencies it was based. He merely referred to a break, by the representatives of similar historical interests, with the 'catholic tolerance for certain human ways of reacting which disturb the introduction of the new economic order', to the original progressiveness of the principle of free competition, and to the ambiguity of a civilizing process reaching back far beyond the beginning of the bourgeois period which simultaneously emancipated human beings and inwardly enslaved them. 86

The change in bourgeois anthropology was described at the end of the essay:

In the present epoch, egoism has actually become destructive the fettered and distracted egoism of the masses, as well as the outdated egoistic principle of economy, which is today only showing its most brutal side. When the latter is overcome, the former will be able to become productive in a new sense . . . The idealistic morality which is preventing this from being seen is not to be rejected, it must be realized historically and must therefore not yet be eliminated either. There is no definite answer to the question of what fate awaits egoism, that 'urge for death and destruction' now generally condemned, in a more rational form of reality. But there have been signs recently which all point to one and the same conclusion. Certain thinkers, in opposition to the dominating ethos, have neither concealed egoism nor minimized it nor attacked it: they have supported it. Not as the miserable, abstract fiction it appears to be in some economists and in Jeremy Bentham, but as enjoyment, as the greatest measure of happiness, in which the satisfaction of cruel urges is also included. These thinkers have not idealized any of the original instincts history has given them instead, they have denounced the distortion of the instincts caused by official ideology . . . These psychologists [the hedonist psychologists Aristippus, Epicurus, Mandeville, Helvétius, de Sade and Nietzsche] seem to be pointing out, through their own existence, that liberation from ascetic morality with its nihilist consequences can bring about a change in humanity in the opposite

direction to that of spiritualization. This process, transcending spiritualization, does not throw humanity back to the previous spiritual stage, as if the first process had not taken place. It carries humanity to a new and higher form of existence. These thinkers have contributed little to making this a widespread reality; this is above all the task of those historical figures in whom theory and social practice were united. In them, the mechanisms of bourgeois psychology, as the decisive forces in their lives and as the objects of theory, vanish in the face of their historical mission . . . because the dismal ethos of a declining epoch, which denies happiness, has no more power over them. 87

This was a plea for the dialectical development of the elements of an undistorted form of egoism from the opposition between idealist morality and the egoistic aspirations condemned by it, and from the contradiction between ideology and reality in bourgeois society. It would be a form of egoism combined with a form of idealistic morality which would grasp reality rather than attempt to transfigure it. The plea was accompanied by the obligatory materialist observation that all this could only be accomplished through social progress, and the further observation that progressive theoreticians and progressive representatives of the proletariat had already set out to achieve it. This was hardly an example of the fruitfulness of materialist dialectics, but it did perhaps demonstrate the heuristic value of the dialectical procedure as such. Horkheimer gave the procedure its materialist note by connecting changes in the meaning of concepts with changes in the social function of those concepts. The dialectical development which he presumed to exist was based on the assumption that there was a process, effective in every possible field, inhibiting or releasing those forces which were seeking the best possible condition for humanity. There was hardly any distinction between this and the determinism of Hegel's idealist dialectics.

What Horkheimer stated here was said on the basis of his knowledge of the 'dark' writers of the bourgeois period, whom he thought so much of, and it was more or less independent of any particular scientific research. This was one more example, alongside his wide-ranging contribution to *Studies on Authority and the Family*, and his 1938 study on the change in the function of scepticism, 'Montaigne and the Function of Scepticism',<sup>88</sup> of how much faith he put in his dialectical insight into what lay behind the facts, without wasting too much time on research into the facts themselves.

In two long essays of 1937, 'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics' and 'Traditional and Critical Theory',<sup>89</sup> Horkheimer's ideological critiques of changes in the function of ideas and attitudes, which were always social-psychological as well, were combined with studies in the theory of science so as to produce a final social and anthropological treatment of his own dialectical theory. 'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics' represented the

Institute's major attack on positivism. Horkheimer wrote to Grossmann in November 1936:

In the Institute itself, we have been having afternoon or evening discussions, as we did last summer. They are partly to do with economic problems and partly with philosophical ones. In the latter, so-called logical empiricism plays a large part. As is well known, this is currently the favourite philosophical fashion in academic circles . . . It is impossible to exaggerate the way in which this approach has triumphed across the whole field in scientific circles, particularly in the Anglo-American world. 90

Horkheimer's critique was not a mild one. He described the logical positivists as the modern representatives of the nominalist tendency, whose function had now become regressive instead of progressive. The transformation of the specialist sciences, with their ideals of objectivity and exactitude, had betrayed the progressive elements within liberalism by abandoning both the relation to a perceiving subject and the constructive power of reason, which aimed at the complete domination of nature and society. It implied silence in the face of the horrors which the totalitarian inheritors of the reactionary elements of liberalism had brought upon the world. In the spirit of the drastic critiques in *Dawn*, Horkheimer pointed out the significance of central propositions of positivist empirical theory when their implications for practical life were examined.

'The view that thought is a means of knowing more about the world than may be directly observed . . . seems to us entirely mysterious' is the conviction expressed in a work of the Vienna circle. This principle is particularly significant in a world whose magnificent exterior radiates complete unity and order while panic and distress prevail beneath. Autocrats, cruel colonial governors, and sadistic prison wardens have always wished for visitors with this positivistic mentality. If science as a whole follows the lead of empiricism and the intellect renounces its insistent and confident probing of the tangled brush of observations in order to unearth more about the world than even our well-meaning daily press, it will be participating passively in the maintenance of universal injustice.91

Although protest against authoritarian states, for example, was not excluded by positivists, it was treated as an 'evaluation', which was beyond the boundaries of rationality or irrationality. The positivists were thus reserving the prestige and clarification provided by thought and reason for procedures which served to control processes governed by natural laws. For the purposes of clarifying and carrying through what was rational for society, they could be eliminated.

There was another important argument which Horkheimer did not use: that the calculative thinking which the positivists hypostatized was itself by no means value-free. It sprang from an interest in having control over nature, just as the social theory defended by Horkheimer sprang from an interest in having a rational society. The positivists' basic argument for setting limitations on thought thus affected their own thinking as well. But for Horkheimer the concept of domination over nature, whatever he understood by it, was too self-evident for him to see this, and he even wanted to extend it to human nature as well. Instead, he used a classification according to the motif of rising and declining classes`Neoromantic metaphysics and radical positivism alike have their roots in the present sad state of a great part of the middle class. Having given up all hope of improving its condition through its own activity, the middle class, dreading a sweeping change in the social system, has thrown itself into the arms of the economic leaders of the bourgeoisie' 92and extended it into a kind of social and anthropological pendant to the famous passage in Fichte's *Introduction to the Theory of Science*93 in which a distinction is made between two main species of human being or two stages of humanity:

Calculative, `common-sense' thinking belongs to a type of human being which is still relatively powerless. In spite of its active nature, this type tends to be passive in decisive matters. The functions of organization and regulation, which are in any case becoming more and more the privilege of the most powerful, still have much more the character of conformity and cunning than that of rationality in today's divided world. Since the development of greater spontaneity depends on a shared common subject being constituted, the individual cannot simply establish it by decree himself. One of the ways which lead to it is . . . that the individual should not remain stuck in registering and predicting facts, in mere calculation, but rather learn to look behind the facts, to distinguish the surface from the essence (of course, without ignoring the surface), to formulate concepts which are not simply classifications of facts, and to structure his whole experience continuously according to definite goals, without falsifying these goals; in short, that the individual should learn to think dialectically.94

The person acting independently sees unity and dependency everywhere, while the submissive consciousness sees everything as disparate, and vice versa.95

In the second half of 1937, the essay which was later to become his most famous one because of the dichotomy in its title and structure and its generalizing character was published: `Traditional and Critical Theory' (complemented in the third issue of the *ZfS* in the same year by an

article by Horkheimer and Marcuse on 'Philosophy and Critical Theory' 96). 'I have finished an essay on the concept of theory, which is actually an anniversary essay,' Horkheimer wrote to Henryk Grossmann in July 1937, when he had finished writing 'Traditional and Critical Theory'. Grossmann had suggested during the previous year that there should be an issue of the journal on Marx or economics to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the publication of Marx's *Capital*. Horkheimer was justified in seeing his article as an anniversary essay on *Capital* because, although he did not mention the anniversary in it, it presented dialectical logic expressly as the logical structure on which the critique of political economy was based. The new label for social and theoretical materialism, 'critical theory' or 'critical theory of society', did not indicate his closeness to Marxism as much as the old label, 'materialist theory'. The essay impressively combined the Young Hegelian 'desublimation of reason' (Habermas) with the specifically Marxian sharpening of reason into a thinking which actively intervened in the world. The unmediated, almost existentialist character of the critical standpoint was also expressed starkly at the end of the presentation of 'traditional theory', when the presentation of the 'critical theory' opposed to it began with the words: 'There is a form of human behaviour which has society itself as its object.' The note on this sentence added, 'This form of behaviour is described in what follows as "critical".' The main text continued, 'It is not directed merely at the ending of abuses, since these appear to it to be necessarily linked to the entire organization of the social structure.'<sup>97</sup>

The Horkheimer circle never attempted to rescue the various scientific disciplines from the grasp of positivism and the system of bourgeois academic scholarship. Instead, they showed growing contempt for the sciences as well as for positivist philosophy of science. This was made easier by the fact that Freudian psychoanalysis, in the way in which it had been presented in its classic period, could not be classified as a specialized scientific discipline. Instead, Freud's psychoanalysis, which not only Fromm but also Horkheimer and Adorno had to thank for many of their most fruitful ideas, continued the tradition of the psychologically or anthropologically oriented 'dark' novelists of the bourgeois epoch. It was a central factor in giving Horkheimer and the most important of his fellow theoreticians the sense that important insights could also be achieved or even better achieved by skipping over the specialized disciplines. Fromm, for example, who did not think of himself as a trained philosopher in any sense, was able to write to Horkheimer in March 1938, without disparaging himself: 'I have just read such a splendid remark that I shall copy it out for you, although you probably know it already: "Whoever goes into the specialized scientific disciplines without undertaking any philosophy is like Penelope's suitors, who carried on with the women slaves when they could not win their mistress.'" In the course of the 1930s, the relationship to the

specialized sciences became somewhat less honest, although this changed little of the overall picture of the Institute's activities.

Adorno's situation was different from that of Horkheimer from the start. His central interest lay not in social theory but in giving an account of art and of the possibility of art in present-day society. 98 This interest made it seem promising to short-circuit the technical analysis of works of art by using certain ideas from the philosophy of history. One of the most important of these ideas, after Adorno's book on Kierkegaard, was increasingly the idea of elucidating nature by reconciling the mind (*Geist*) with it. This idea stood for the conviction that mythical nature, caught up within itself, and mythical mind, also caught up within itself, did not need to be rescued from outside, that transcendence was immanent in immanence. The way in which this was to be interpreted socially and historically was not mentioned. Adorno was satisfied to observe that there were processes in music which corresponded to his conception of salvation. In his 'Marginalia on Mahler', which appeared in 1936 in the Viennese music journal 23, he wrote:

[Mahler's] critique of musical reification is not one which can forget its reality and, dressed up as a musical Don Quixote, go to battle against it. He is concerned with musical reification in the most rigorous way with rigour so strong that it shatters it. The ruins of reification and the ruins of the feelings associated with it are his materials; and symphonic reason has a powerful, methodical command over them.

But no attempt was made even in pictures to show how it was possible for symphonic reason, which as an autonomous, subjective form of reason always reproduced only immanent relations, to transform itself for the better and become dominant to the extent that mind and nature would complement one another and develop freely. The only link was the ambiguity of phenomena, behind which a rise or a fall, a beginning or an end, collapse or rebirth might be concealed.

Mahler leaves what exists in its place, but burns it out from within. The old barriers of form now stand as allegories not so much for what has been but for what is to come . . . Both are present, perhaps, in Mahler's music: in a crumbling allegory stretched beyond its limits, the final gesture of Lucifer-like defiance may in fact signify reconciliation; and for those who are without hope, the flames of destruction blazing nearby may in fact be the distant light of salvation shining upon them. The fine snowfall at the end of the *Lied von der Erde* is ambiguous in just this way. Just as a lonely person could die of cold in it, dissolved into the panic of mere existence, it might also be the blessed whiteness of rapture, snow as the last remnant of being that links one who has been

saved to existence and stirs those who remain behind like a star of hope, drawing them to the window. 99

With such an allegorical philosophy, it was merely a matter of consistency for Adorno to see himself as a thinker inspired by theology.100

This conception gave Adorno the energy needed to tackle everything possible in a way that would `burst it open' and `rescue' it. In the letters he wrote to Horkheimer in the years leading up to his move to New York, immanent transitions seemed to be more or less his hobby-horse. In his work on Husserl, he emphasized again and again, he was pursuing his programme of bursting idealism open from within. In May 1936 he suggested that Horkheimer write an extended observation on `the philosophy of Nazism' in a `highly dialectical manner, which would have to produce the immanent dissolution of this sort of philosophy', this swindle, `which is tremendously progressive to the extent that it is no longer adequate to conceal the truth'. He offered Horkheimer some suggestions for the essay on positivism which was published in the *ZfS* in 1937 under the title `The Latest Attack on Metaphysics', closing them with the remark: `I would put the greatest emphasis on immanent refutation in the two points referred to: the logic of the roulette table, and experience which lacks a subject, i.e. which lacks human beings. Because, together with the breakdown of the conceptual system as a whole, these are the two points which are really deadly.' In December 1936 he told Horkheimer he had suggested to Sohn-Rethel that he should `dialecticize Klages to the extent that he should appear not merely as a romantic reactionary, which is obvious, but also as a radical critic of the bourgeois ideology of work'. In March 1937 he had only one real objection to a passage in the manuscript of Horkheimer's positivism essay: the passage in which the `impossibility of overcoming logical positivism in an immanent way' was mentioned. This was very weak, and contradicted the elements of an immanent critique which the essay did contain. The objection led Horkheimer to delete the sentence. In April 1937 Adorno urged the greatest caution in the `tremendously difficult case of Knut Hamsun', about whom Lowenthal wanted to write an essay, because it was `terribly easy to show that Hamsun is a fascist, but more difficult to make this insight into a fruitful one, and most difficult of all to save Hamsun from himself', which would presumably be the main point. This warning did not prevent him from adding a footnote on Jean Sibelius to Lowenthal's completely `undialectical' essay on Hamsun that was just as `undialectical' as the essay itself. In October 1937 he defended the manuscript of his essay on Husserl, intended for the *ZfS*, desperately, but in vain, against Horkheimer's objection that the essay did not achieve an immanent refutation of idealism in its most consistent form: the refutation was not immanent, Husserlian philosophy was not the most consistent form of idealism, and in addition the relation of Husserlian philosophy to the current historical situation was not clear to the uninitiated.

Dialectics, for Adorno, thus meant, as Hegel had presented it in his *Logic*, to enter into one's opponent's strengths and, by sharpening up the blunted differentiations between distinct things to make his standpoint move, by itself, towards contradiction. One of the sentences which inspired Adorno most was a remark by the Left-Hegelian Marx in the 'Introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*' that 'these petrified conditions must be made to dance by having their own tune sung to them!' 101

Their proximity to Hegelian dialectics was a link between Adorno and Horkheimer, even though different aspects and applications of this dialectics took precedence for each of them. For Horkheimer, dialectics in the first place meant thinking in relative totalities, and served a critical theory of the sciences as evidence that an alternative to the narrow-mindedness of the various scientific disciplines and metaphysics existed. For Adorno, dialectics meant the possibility of demythologizing and demystifying a broad spectrum of current phenomena. This linked him with Bloch and Benjamin. For Adorno, just as for Bloch and Benjamin, the category of transcendence (*Aufhebung*) was tinged with theology in the sense of a bursting through the limitations of immanent relations and saving the elements of potential escape confined within them. Another point of similarity with Bloch and Benjamin was his conviction that philosophy could gain more from art, i.e. modern art, than it could from the sciences. All four were united in their interest in unrestricted experience and unrestricted rationality, in the conviction that this demand could only be fulfilled by a historical-materialist theory which included a series of things previously omitted, and in the conviction that the most profound struggle across the broadest possible front was going on.

In *Heritage of Our Times*, published in Zurich in 1935, Bloch had sketched out a comprehensive panorama of the battlefield (referring once to the 'Marxist, Horkheimer', more frequently mentioning Wieselgrund, and extensively referring to Benjamin, the philosopher with a surrealist style of thinking. The central idea of the book was that as against the fascist exploitation of euphoria, on the one hand, and the enlightened condemnation of it, on the other, what mattered was to supersede euphoria.

It is not only in the revolutionary rise of a class or in its period of flowering, but also in its decline and in the various contents set free by its decay that a dialectically useful 'legacy' can be found. Seen in itself, immediately, the shimmering or euphoric illusion of fascism only serves big business, which uses it to scatter or plunge into night those classes which are sinking into poverty. Mediatly, however, steam rising out of abysses which are useful not only to capitalism can be seen in irrational euphoria. Beyond the cruelty and speechless brutality, beyond the stupidity and panic-stricken credulousness shown in every hour, every word of the German

horror, there is a piece of older, Romantic contradiction to capitalism, which misses something in present-day life, which longs for a different, as yet obscure, life. The vulnerable position of farm workers and white-collar workers reflects various conditions here, not merely one of backwardness, but also at times one of genuine `temporal disparity' as well, i.e. that of being an economic and ideological remnant from earlier periods. Today the contradictions within this temporal disparity exclusively serve reaction; but a special Marxist problem lies in the way in which it can be exploited almost without disturbance. The *irratio* within the inadequate capitalist *ratio* has been excluded at too abstract a level, instead of being investigated from case to case and instead of this relation's own contradictions being described concretely where necessary. 102

The common ground between Bloch and Benjamin was wide: categories such as dream and myth, Early and Late, and archaic and dialectical images were central for both. Benjamin, too, viewed periods of decay positively.<sup>103</sup> In his eyes, too, what was required in the revolutionary struggle against fascism was a form of power which `sprang from the depths of history no less deep than the power of the fascists'.<sup>104</sup> Benjamin saw surrealism as a significant step along the road to winning `the energies of intoxication for the revolution'.<sup>105</sup> And he emphasized the necessity of going beyond the `undialectical Surrealist view of the essence of intoxication'. In early notes for the *Passagen-Werk*, he wrote, `While Aragon remains in dream worlds, here the situation is that of awakening. Where an impressionist element remains in Aragon"mythology" . . . here it is a matter of dissolving "mythology" in the space of history.'<sup>106</sup> But the tone and general perspective of Bloch and Benjamin differed in the extreme: Bloch was cheerful, Benjamin was bitter. Bloch trusted in the indestructible, rebellious character of `life", which has not yet come to fulfilment in any period';<sup>107</sup> Benjamin observed with despair what Kracauer called the `dangerous game' of the historical process, in which ever more had to be saved with constantly decreasing resources.

In 1937 Adorno, after consulting Horkheimer, asked Bloch to send, without obligation, a sample from the manuscript of his book on the problem of materialism. What he and Horkheimer had in mind was an exchange: they would publish an extract from Bloch's text in the journal in exchange for a mention of the Horkheimer circle's materialist theory in Bloch's book. But on reading the manuscript Adorno's fears were confirmed fears concerning not so much Bloch's `utopianism' or `party loyalty' as a `certain irresponsible philosophical improvisation'.<sup>108</sup> The Institute never published anything by Bloch, and none of his books was ever reviewed in the journal, but it helped him for a time in the early 1940s with a monthly stipend of \$50.<sup>109</sup>

What Adorno did not consider either Bloch or Kracauer to be capable of (Kracauer's book on *Jacques Offenbach and the Paris of his Time*, 110 written in exile in France, was devastatingly criticized by Adorno in a letter to his former mentor as a sorry effort aimed at sales success), he expected Benjamin to produce: a philosophy embodying a way out of the dream state of bourgeois immanence by being concrete and transcendent at once, by combining the density of experience with the rigour of thought. Adorno functioned as a kind of supervisor during the 1930s, trying to commit Benjamin to confronting theology with historical materialism, a confrontation which Adorno thought Horkheimer was showing more and more appreciation for.

Horkheimer displayed both caution and openmindedness, just as he had done when Fromm joined the Institute, by recognizing Benjamin's project as an enrichment of materialist theory and having the Institute support it financially even if he did this in an indecisive and unpredictable way characteristic of the Institute's directors. (The fact that this attitude appears almost sadistic in Benjamin's letters to Scholem was largely due to the difficulty of Benjamin's character. Benjamin still thought that the world was obliged to provide for him, so that he could devote himself to his intellectual work completely.) In Benjamin, Horkheimer was supporting the man who, when the dialectics project became a reality, was to turn out to be virtually its guiding star.

Walter Benjamin, the *Passagen-Werk*, the Institute and Adorno

When Benjamin became a freelance associate of the *ZfS*, he received a monthly sum of 500 francs below the minimum on which it was possible to survive. It did not free him from the need for support from various other sources: his former wife; Adorno; Adorno's aunt and a friend of the Wiesengrund family; Gretel Karplus, a mutual friend of his and Adorno's who at that time was still a shareholder in a Berlin leather factory; and Bertolt Brecht.<sup>111</sup> Benjamin's hopes rested on being paid enough by the Institute to be able to have a decent living and to complete his *Passagen* project. He had started work on it again in 1934, encouraged partly by a commission to write an article on the Prefect of Paris, Haussmann. This article fell through, partly because he took refuge in his *Passagen* studies, having no other short-term commissions which held out any prospect of early remuneration.

The first evidence of Adorno's activity as Benjamin's 'supervisor' that appears in the correspondence comes from this period. Adorno had disliked Benjamin's contribution to the *ZfS* on the social position of the French writer, and also his review of Max Kommerell's book on Jean Paul,<sup>112</sup> so much so that for a long time he had stopped writing to Benjamin. The reason for his displeasure was clear: it was the way in

which Benjamin characterized the role of intellectuals who took an interest in the revolution. In his article 'On the Social Position of Music' in the first issue of the journal, Adorno had emphasized that music would fulfil its social function best if it marched forward in the immanent development of its problems, without gazing outwards towards society, and did not allow itself to be inhibited by the state of consciousness of the proletariat. The proletariat was crippled by class domination. In this Adorno was merely maintaining what he had once learned from Benjamin himself. In 1928, in *One-Way Street*, dedicated to the communist and one-time director of a trade union agitprop theatre, Asja Lacis, Benjamin had written about the current relevance of 'what Mallarmé, monadically, in his hermetic room, had discovered through a pre-established harmony with all the decisive events of our times in economics, technology, and public life'.<sup>114</sup> Now, at the end of his essay, Benjamin had asserted the opposite. The only audience for the most advanced and daring products of the avant-garde in any of the arts had been the upper middle classes. What mattered, however, and the surrealists had taken this point seriously, was to put intellectuals in their proper place as technicians by putting their technology at the disposal of the proletariat: only the proletariat was dependent on the most advanced state of technology. For Adorno, such views were evidence of the influence of Brecht, that 'wild man' (as he called him in a letter to Horkheimer, after reading the manuscript of Benjamin's 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'<sup>115</sup>). Benjamin had spent the summer months of 1934 with Brecht, in exile in Svendborg in Denmark, and in the following years he often stayed with him for extended periods.

When Adorno, in Oxford, heard that Benjamin had returned to work on the *Passagen-Werk*, he rejoiced.

What you write about the end of your essay period, and above all about starting work on the *Passagen*, is really the best news I have heard from you for many years. You know I see this work as truly the one piece of *prima philosophia* which has been given to us, and my one wish is that you will be as strong and as capable of carrying it out, after a long and painful break, as the scale of the task requires. And if I might offer your work something of what I hope for it as it starts on its way, without your taking this as immodesty, then it would be this: that it should ruthlessly bring to fruit all of the theological content and *literalness* in the most extreme theses which have been invested in it. (To be precise, it should have a ruthless disregard for the objections of that Brechtian atheism which, as an inverse theology, we may one day have to save, but which it is not our task to appropriate!) In addition, it should avoid external communication with social theory as much as possible, for the sake of what it has pledged. Because it seems

to me here, where it really is a question of the most decisive and the most serious matters, that for once they must be discussed fully and in their entirety, and that absolute categorical depth must be reached *without* avoiding theology. I also believe that at this decisive level of Marxist theory we can be of more service to it the less we appear to be submissively accepting it, and that the 'aesthetic' can touch on reality in an incomparably deeper and more revolutionary way than class theory would do if it were merely a *deus ex machina*. 116

A talk which Pollock had with Benjamin in the spring of 1935 during a trip to Europe put things in motion. Benjamin started to draft an outline of the *Passagen-Werk*. The Institute increased its payments to 1000 francs per month, provisionally at first, and later on a permanent basis. However, when Adorno met Pollock during his visit to Europe, Adorno warned him that Benjamin's book would be too overloaded with metaphysics to fit in with the Institute's plan of work just as Adorno's own book on Kierkegaard had been. And Gretel Karplus wrote to Benjamin:

I'm astonished that Fritz [Pollock] is interested in the notes are you thinking about an article for the journal? Actually, I see this as a tremendous danger, the scale is relatively small, and you would never be able to write what your true friends have been waiting for for years, the great work of philosophy which will only exist for its own sake, which makes no concessions and which will compensate you, through its importance, for so much that has happened in the last few years. 117

Adorno was still hoping to bring his own position and that of his theological-materialist friends to the forefront in the journal. But he clearly doubted whether the decisive presentation of this position would be possible within the framework of the Institute's work, and, on the other hand, he did not want to take responsibility for anything which might stir up doubts about his loyalty to Horkheimer and the Institute.

Benjamin tried to dispel the doubts of both of them in a letter accompanying the outline 'Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth Century', which he sent to Adorno at the end of May 1935.

The analogies between this book and my book on the baroque are (to my own surprise) much clearer now than at any earlier stage of the plan. You must permit me to see this as a particularly significant vindication of the recasting process which brings the whole mass of thoughts, originally metaphysically motivated, into a state in which the world of dialectical images is secure against any of the objections metaphysics produces.

At this stage of the business (and now admittedly for the first time), I can consider calmly what objections might be mobilized by orthodox Marxism against the method of my work. But I think, on the contrary, that in the Marxist discussion of the method *à la longue* I have found a secure position, even if only because the decisive question of the historical image is discussed here to its full extent for the first time. As the philosophy of a work is linked not so much to its terminology as to its location, I think this is indeed an outline of that 'great work of philosophy' which Felicitas [Gretel Karplus] mentions, although it is a description I am not especially happy with. As you know, for me it is a matter of the protohistory of the nineteenth century. 118

Benjamin's outline, with its accompanying letter, apparently convinced Adorno that the material was not a betrayal of Benjamin's original project and would nevertheless fit into the Institute's plan of work. It promised to achieve something in the order of a materialist transformation of theological motifs. A week after receiving the outline, Adorno wrote to Horkheimer on impulse, resolutely supporting Benjamin. He had become convinced that

this work will contain *nothing* which could not be defended from the point of view of dialectical materialism. The character of metaphysical improvisation which it formerly had has completely disappeared. I don't mean merely that this is something positive at long last (that would lead on to the discussion between us which has still to take place); but in any case it is something positive with regard to the applicability of the study within the Institute's plan of work, to which it has *adapted* itself. And the novelty of the questions it asks and the way it differs completely from the kind of work which is usual in the academic system is an advantage. It is concerned with the attempt to see the nineteenth century as a 'style' by using the category of 'commodity' as a dialectical image.

According to Adorno, Horkheimer himself had, in 'that memorable talk at the Carlton Hotel' at the end of the 1920s, claimed that the character of being a historical image was central for commodities, and had thus himself set in motion the reorientation of Benjamin's and Adorno's ideas.

You may remember my writing to you in a letter a couple of months ago that I consider the decisive category of mediation between society and psychology not to be the family, but the commodity character . . . without knowing that Benjamin was moving in the same direction the outline is a great reassurance for me. The fetish character of commodities is taken as the key to

the consciousness and above all to the unconscious mind of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie. A chapter on the World Exhibition and in particular a superb chapter on Baudelaire contain crucial material on this.

He recommended postponing the studies on the Social Democratic historian of culture, Eduard Fuchs, and on the conception of culture in the Social Democratic weekly *Die Neue Zeit* (*The New Age*, published between 1883 and 1922), which had long since been agreed on between Horkheimer and Benjamin. These did not particularly appeal to Benjamin 'now that productive energies of such power confront us which we should, after all, not tie down with our conditions of production'. 119

Adorno's approval, therefore, stemmed from his fascination with a new variant of the response to the passage in Marx's *Capital* which was always the most important for left intellectuals in the Weimar period: the section on the fetish character of commodities.<sup>120</sup> To look at the world of commodities with the eyes of a philologist interpreting allegories, a philologist who was also linked to Baudelaire, the first representative example of aesthetic modernism: in Adorno's eyes, this promised an interpretation of capitalism in which the theological category of a materially corrupted world was translated into the Marxist category of the commodity fetish. This interpretation did not contradict dialectical materialism, but rather radicalized it by deciphering the world of commodities as a mythical primeval landscape and as a hellish, negative image of the true world.

The outline met with Horkheimer's favour. 'Your work promises to be excellent,' he wrote to Benjamin in September 1935. 'The method of grasping the epoch on the basis of small, superficial symptoms appears to be showing all of its power on this occasion. You are taking a great stride beyond previous materialist explanations of aesthetic phenomena.' The study made it clear that 'there is no abstract theory of aesthetics, but rather the theory always corresponds to the history of a specific period.' When Horkheimer went to Europe in the winter, what he and Benjamin would have to discuss first and foremost was the special responsibility required by the peculiarities and advantages of Benjamin's method. 'You draw upon the economic element, not so much in the form taken by the process of production and its general tendencies, as in specific details. These must therefore be particularly revealing and significant.'<sup>121</sup>

The *Passagen* project was formally included in the research sponsored by the Institute. In the Report of the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales for 1936, Pollock mentioned 'Etudes sur l'histoire de la culture française' among other items under the heading 'Research Fellowships'. In the Institute's second prospectus, published in 1938, Benjamin was listed as a research associate, with his specialist topic given as 'aesthetics'. Under the title 'Aid to German European Scholars',

the first manuscript to be listed in the group 'Special Fields of Sociology', among a good two dozen manuscripts sponsored by the Institute, was 'The Social History of the City of Paris in the Nineteenth Century'.

Horkheimer left detailed examination of Benjamin's outline to Adorno. This examination was only one stage of a continuing discussion between the two which lasted until Benjamin's death. The discussion was carried on in letters, in the form of essays, and verbally (at a series of meetings sponsored by the Institute, the first of which took place in Paris at the beginning of 1936, and the last at about the end of 1937 or the beginning of 1938 in San Remo). All of Benjamin's longer studies in the second half of the 1930s were published in the *ZfS*, and were, to a greater or lesser extent, part of his work on the *Passagen*. 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' (1936) precisely located the moment of contemporary history which constituted Benjamin's point of departure for his historical reconstruction of the nineteenth century.<sup>122</sup> In 'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian' (1937),<sup>123</sup> Benjamin at last completed his long-delayed study of Fuchs, and took the opportunity to contrast his own conception of a historical-materialist historiography with the conception of cultural history which Fuchs had impressively represented, and which Benjamin criticized. 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire' (1939)<sup>124</sup> was Benjamin's second version of a section of the *Passagen-Werk* centred on Baudelaire (the first version, 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire', had been pronounced by Adorno to be 'too light'). The 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' appeared, not in the journal, but in a mimeographed volume published by the Institute in 1942, *In Memory of Walter Benjamin*.<sup>125</sup> The text contained reflections fundamental to the continuation of the work on Baudelaire, which he intended to send to the Institute for discussion purposes, and which his death turned into his legacy to the Institute. Through his articles in the *ZfS*, Benjamin became the point of crystallization in a pattern of relations in which he and Adorno, in a kind of tense solidarity with one another, faced Marcuse and Lowenthal, who were critics of ideology. It was a confrontation between a philosophy of history formed by experiences of modernity in aesthetics on the one hand, and a historical-materialist application of classical idealist conceptions of art, on the other.

If we examine Benjamin's extensive notes for the *Passagen-Werk*, which served him both as a quarry and as a store for current shorter studies, to discover his intentions in his research on the nineteenth century, we find a multitude of statements which are hard to reconcile with each other. For example:

Get hold of the world of childhood (of his generation and of his epoch in general).<sup>126</sup>

Bring nineteenth-century kitsch to the point at which it explodes.<sup>127</sup>

Discover a pattern that would mean waking up out of the nineteenth century. 128

Investigate the expressive character of the earliest industrial products, of the earliest industrial buildings, of the earliest machines, but also of the earliest department stores, advertisements, etc. 129

Grasp economic processes as clear basic phenomena which produce all the manifestations of life in the Parisian arcades (and hence in the nineteenth century). 130

Make clear the primevally tempting and threatening aspect of the beginnings of technology through nineteenth-century interior decoration. 131

Present the nineteenth century as the originary form of protohistory. 132

Show Baudelaire in the way he is embedded in the nineteenth century. 133

Contrast the historical image of the fate of art in the nineteenth century with a present age in which the last hour of art has already struck. 134

Link increased clarity with the application of the Marxist method. 135

These and other programmatic notes nevertheless have a common point of departure: to show how the historical image of the nineteenth century flares up as a spontaneous memory before the historical subject at moments of crisis; in this way, to rescue this section of the past from reification by tradition; and thus to bring energies to the present age that would encourage it to make technology into a nuptial bed for communication between humanity and the cosmos.

Two of Benjamin's central ideas formed the basis for this. The first was connected with method. From the exemplary experiences of dreaming and ecstasy, Benjamin was attempting to draw the principles of a method of perception that would go beyond the boundaries of what was usual in academic work: the principles of a sober expansion of consciousness. He found important insights here above all in Klages, Proust and the surrealists.

In 1920 Benjamin had written to Ludwig Klages to ask about the continuation of his article 'On Dream Consciousness', which had been published in 1914, and Klages had sent him a copy of it. In this series of articles, which was in fact never completed, Klages was not concerned with interpreting the contents of dreams, but rather with the

form of the dream, the characteristic difference between dream space and waking space, dream time and waking time. This analysis of form was to be valid not merely for dreams in the narrow sense but also generally for dream moods triggered by all sorts of stimuli:

as when we hear, in the quiet of the night, a car going by, and the sound slowly disappearing; looking at fireworks far away, or silent lightning; returning home after an absence of many years, perhaps of stormy life; or, by contrast, in places of unusual strangeness; . . . not infrequently on railway journeys, provided one has a compartment to oneself; exceptionally, in moments of complete exhaustion, despairing dejection, great pain, or simply after taking a narcotic. 136

Klages emphasized three aspects of the dream mood: first, perceptual passivity an abandonment to impressions only made possible by shedding, or bursting out of, customary forms of perception. Secondly, a sense of being far away, which can be connected even to things close at hand, since what is decisive is not remoteness itself, but the impression of distance. And, thirdly, the feeling of fleetingness the fleetingness, for example, of landscape images rushing past the train window, or of a car going past at night which has hardly approached us before it has already passed by, or the fleetingness of one's own life seen in the wilting leaf, in billowing smoke, in dissolving foam, in shooting stars, or in the face of images of changeless continuation such as trees hundreds of years old, pyramids thousands of years old, or primeval mountain ranges.

In his book on *The Cosmogonic Eros*, first published in 1922, Klages, inquiring into the essence of ecstasy, continued his discussion of the characteristics of what he called 'the contemplative state of consciousness', which was almost synonymous with 'dream mood'.

An observer who is inclined to make distinctions can treat even what is distant as if it were near at hand, and abandons the contemplated image in favour of a series of points that can be measured one by one, and therefore separately. Instead, the gaze of someone who is lost in contemplation, even of a nearby object, is freed from any ulterior purpose, and can thus be dominated by the *image* of the object. At the very least, this will mean being dominated by a form which is contained not within set limits but within a whole formed by the neighbouring images which frame it. It is not so much the distance from the object as the quality of its observation which decides whether it has the characteristic of being near at hand or far off; and no one can deny the reality of nearness or the vividness of distance. 137

Klages termed this distant quality in things looked at as archetypes their `aura' or `nimbus'. The distant quality he was referring to was that of the world soul, which could be seen above all in the temporal distance between us and the primeval world. The state of being contemplative `transport" us into "that which cannot be entered", into the motherworld of things which have passed, or . . . *brings back* the "spirits" of those who have long since passed away'. `The fate of the world is present in the enlightened moment; unto the depths of space and unto the depths of time, everything which has ever happened and is happening takes its light and its meaning from the image, no matter how swiftly it passes away.' 138

Ignoring these images would mean ignoring the world soul and encouraging the downfall of humanity. In what was perhaps his best-known work, an essay on `Humanity and the Earth' written in 1913 for a festschrift for the Freideutsche Jugend (Free German Youth) at their centenary celebrations on the Hoher Meissner, 139 Klages wrote:

The hatred of images which the Middle Ages nurtured inwardly as if it were a penance had to be transferred outwards as soon as it had achieved its aim: the abolition of the connection between Man and the soul of the earth. In the bloody blows which he has dealt to all of his fellow creatures, he is merely finishing off what he had previously inflicted on himself: sacrificing his interwovenness in the image-giving variety and inexhaustible wealth of life for the sake of the rootless disdainfulness of an intellectuality cut off from the world . . . We remarked that the peoples of antiquity would have had no interest in using experiments to spy on nature, or in making nature the slave of machines, vanquishing it through cunning by using its own powers against it. We may now add that they would even have abhorred this as *ἀσέβεια*, an abomination. Wood and spring, crag and bower were for them filled with sacred life. From the peaks of the high mountains wafted the awesomeness of the gods (that, and not any lack of `feeling for nature', is why they did not climb them!). Thunderstorms and hailstones broke in upon the game of battle, bearing threats or promises. When the Greeks crossed a river, they asked the river god to forgive them for Man's high-handedness, and offered libations; in ancient Germany, wilful damage to trees was atoned for in blood. A stranger to the planetary currents, the human being of today only sees childish superstition in all of this. He forgets that these interpretative phantasms were withering flowers on the tree of an inward life which concealed deeper knowledge than all of his science: knowledge of the world-creating interweaving power of all-uniting love. Only if this love were to grow within humanity once again would the wounds which the intellect has matricidally inflicted on it begin, perhaps, to heal. 140

In a review of a book on Bachofen 141 in 1926, Benjamin had expressed respect for the powerful prophecy of downfall offered by Klages, 'that great philosopher and anthropologist', in *The Cosmogonic Eros*. But he criticized his 'hopeless rejection of the existing "technical", "mechanized" state of the world',<sup>142</sup> and emphasized to Scholem the necessity for a thoroughgoing analysis of the theological kernel which he saw as being the source of such a rejection. Even in the 1930s, a full-scale debate with Klages and his image theory was seen by both Benjamin and Adorno as urgently needed, to clarify their own standpoint and the concept of the dialectical image.

Louis Aragon must have seemed to Benjamin to be the positive, modern counterpart to Klages's prophecies of downfall. In his book of 1926, *Le Paysan de Paris*, Aragon expressly demanded the creation of a modern mythology.<sup>143</sup> Benjamin mentioned, in a letter to Adorno of May 1935, that he had read the book at the start of his work on the *Passagen*, and that he had 'not been able to read more than two or three pages in bed each night, because the pounding of my heart became so strong that I had to put the book down'.<sup>144</sup> In the book's two main sections, 'Le Passage de l'Opéra' and 'The Sense of Nature in the Buttes-Chaumont', Aragon had written about a city-dweller who wanders about in the rather shabby shops, bars and other establishments adjoining the Passage de l'Opéra, which was threatened with demolition. Undistracted by any definite intentions, free of any aims or interests, he discovers the 'shores of the unknown, of eeriness', the 'doors to the infinite that are hard to shut', 'the face of the infinite'<sup>145</sup> as do three surrealist writers, who are feeling weary on a dismal, foggy spring evening, far from the familiar tourist haunts, in the Parc des Buttes-Chaumont, with its Suicides' Bridge leading across an artificial lake to a natural cliff-face. 'The unknown', 'the infinite', 'eeriness', 'mythology' these were astonishing words in texts whose most distinctive characteristic was their touching, lovingly detailed description of everyday life, which was normally seen as shabby and dull. But the texts tipped over again and again into glorifying misery and denouncing the intellect. Aragon's method was to preserve phenomena in the form of images, knowing they were illusory and that they would collapse in the face of reality, touting them in the manner of a crier at a fairground stall:

A fresh vice has just been born, one more frenzy has been given to mankind: *surrealism*, child of madness and gloom. Step up, step up! Here is where the kingdoms of the instantaneous begin!

The sleepers who have woken from a thousand and one nights, the miracle cures and ecstasies, how they will envy you, the modern hashish smokers, when you produce, without aid, the whole spectrum of their amazing pleasures, never completed till now, and possess yourselves of such visionary power over the world . . . that neither reason nor the instinct of self-preservation, despite their

nice clean hands, will be able to stop you from using it to excess . . . This vice called *surrealism* consists of the uncontrolled, passionate use of the drug *image* or rather of the uncontrolled provocation of the image for its own sake . . . Glorious devastation! The principle of utility will become alien to all those who practise this superior vice. For them, the spirit will ultimately cease to be applied. They will see its limits rolled back, they will share this intoxication with all those whom the world counts as dreamers, as dissatisfied. Young people will devote themselves to this serious and fruitless game with passionate abandon. It will distort their lives. 146

Benjamin was attempting to use references to the methods of expanded consciousness such as those offered by Klages and Aragon, which were anti-intellectual and unconcerned with historical and social reality, along with Proust's literature of *mémoire involontaire*, and his own experiences with drugs, to deal with urgent present-day problems. He saw the core of these and this was his other central idea, which he first formulated at length at the end of *One-Way Street* as follows: either technology would become, in the hands of the masses, a sober instrument of euphoric cosmic experience, or even more horrific catastrophes than the First World War would follow. It was precisely the effort to take up what was bad in technological innovation, Benjamin was convinced, which deepened one's insight both into prehistoric terrors, which had continued up till the present, and into the constructive tendencies in the recent past which offered a means of liquidating the forces of magic. Either technology would become the means of salvation, or there would be no salvation. Either it could be made to serve in the liquidation of the forces of magic, or there would be no liberation from those forces.

The crisis of the present day consisted, for Benjamin, in the destructive consequences of a 'defective reception of technology' which was characteristic of the nineteenth century. The nineteenth century's reception of technology ignored the fact that 'technology serves this society solely for the production of commodities'. Positivism saw 'in the development of technology . . . only the progress of science, not the retrogression of society . . . It also escaped the positivists among the theoreticians of Social Democracy that the development of technology made it more and more difficult for the proletariat to take possession of it an act that was seen to be more and more necessary.'<sup>147</sup> The image of technology among the bourgeoisie, and among the positivists who formed a majority of the Social Democrats, came from *Die Gartenlaube*.<sup>148</sup>

It may fairly be wondered whether the *Gemütlichkeit* in which the century's bourgeoisie rejoiced may not stem from a vague satisfaction at never having to experience at first hand the development

of the forces of production. That experience was really reserved for the following century. It is discovering that traffic speeds, like the capacity to duplicate both the spoken and the written word, have outstripped human needs. The energies that technology develops beyond their threshold are destructive. They serve primarily to foster the technology of warfare, and of the means used to prepare public opinion for war. 149

Under these conditions, the products of technology, even up to the present, appeared to someone viewing them in a dream mood, who regarded them archetypally, as mythical events:

In ancient Greece, people pointed out the sites of the entrances to the underworld. Our waking existence is also a landscape in which there are entrances into the underworld in hidden locations, a landscape full of inconspicuous places where dreams flow in. Every day, we pass by them unsuspectingly; but sleep has hardly come before we are already swiftly groping our way back to them and losing ourselves in their dark passageways. The labyrinth of buildings in towns, in broad daylight, is like consciousness. In the daytime, the arcades (these are the galleries which lead into the towns' past existence) flow out into the streets without being noticed. But at night, among the dark hulks of the buildings, the more compact darkness of the arcades emerges frighteningly, and the late passerby hurries past them, unless we have encouraged him to travel through a narrow alleyway.

But there is another system of galleries stretching through Paris, underground: the Métro, where in the evening the lights begin to glow in red, the lights that mark the way into the hell of names. CombatElyséeGeorges VEtienne MarcelSolférinoInvalidesVaugirard have thrown off the shameful chains of `Rue', of `Place', and here, in a darkness pierced by lightning, rent by whistle-shrieks, these names have become the misshapen gods of the sewers, the fées of the catacombs. This labyrinth harbours not one, but a dozen blind, charging bulls, into whose jaws not one Theban virgin a year, but thousands of anaemic office-girls and tired shop-assistants must throw themselves every morning. 150

This was a critique of capitalism with an allegorical twist. He made it clear that the demystification which had occurred under capitalist conditions did not reduce the dark horror surrounding everything human, but merely repressed it and deferred it. Myths were losing their open power to fetter mankind, but, wandering into the substructure of everyday life in decayed forms, they were still inexorably moulding people's behaviour and environment. The collapse of both humanity and the earth was made possible by a failure of man's relationship to

technology, which had produced a mythical form of everyday life. At this critical moment, it was possible to see those moments of the past (more exactly, of the nineteenth century) at which technology had still seemed to be able to break through the comfort and dull contentment of those with private wealth. At such moments, forms of art appeared which, instead of ignoring the (destructive) developments in technology that had formed the background to the nineteenth century, aimed to make the vast technical equipment of their time into the very nerves of humanity.

Benjamin had been able to draw important inspiration for his protohistory of the nineteenth century from Sigfried Giedion's book *Building in France, Building in Iron, Building in Reinforced Concrete*. Giedion had started his university studies in engineering, had gone on to study art history with Heinrich Wölfflin, taking his doctorate with him, and was for a considerable period General Secretary of the CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne), which he had helped to found. The leading members of this organization were Gropius, Le Corbusier and Alvar Aalto. Giedion was an enthusiastic supporter of the New Architecture, whose representatives embodied, as no other group in the Weimar Republic did, an emotional enthusiasm for simplicity, transparency and constructive rationality, which Benjamin shared. Giedion's book opened with the words:

The task of the historian appears to us today . . . to be: to single out from the vast complex of an age that is past those elements which will form a starting-point for the future.

The nineteenth century disguised all its new creations under a *historicizing* mask, no matter what field they were in in the field of architecture just as in the fields of industry or society. New opportunities for construction were created, but they were at the same time feared, and were stifled within stone façades without the slightest restraint . . . On the other hand, we cannot forget the *forward momentum* which suffused the nineteenth century . . . When the dust of the decades is swept off the newspapers, it can be seen that the questions that concern us today have been under discussion for over a century, and remain unresolved.

At the same time, it can also be seen . . . that the architecture which is called 'new' today is a legitimate part of a development running through the whole century . . . *The 'new' architecture has its source in the moment of the Industrial Revolution around 1830*, at the moment of transformation from craft to industrial production processes. We can hardly compare the daring of the progress we have made to that of the nineteenth century at all. The task of today's generation is: to transfer into residential form what the nineteenth century was only able to express in abstract constructions which are, to us, inwardly monotonous. 151

Benjamin had the idea of combining views of the nineteenth century such as this with the quality of magical eeriness in that century's products which was brought out by the surrealists and by authors such as Julien Green. From this combination, he drew out an image of the protohistory of the nineteenth century which indicated that the new creations and ways of life, above all those determined by the production of commodities, had not been crowned by the creation of a new form of society and given free development, but had only achieved a development that had been narrowed and misled by reified cultural concepts and was accompanied by phantasmagorias. 152

The fact that the daring creations of the nineteenth century presented themselves as phantasmagorias made the epoch a mythical one. To speak of the protohistory of the nineteenth century, therefore, meant not only to bring the Goethean concept of genotype 'out of its heathen context in nature and into the Jewish contexts of history'.<sup>153</sup> It also pointed to the dark side of the epoch, its demonic, opaque, unredeemed character. 'Protohistory of the nineteenth century' also suggested the secular enlightenment which could be drawn from its mythical elements, and from them alone for example, a bright, everyday sense of wonder, which was what made architectural structures that were flooded with light into what they were. 'In the dialectical image,' a note to the *Passagen-Werk* read, 'room is to be made for the "dream of a thing" regardless of the liquidation of the myth in the dialectical image.'<sup>154</sup>

In the dialectical image of the protohistory of a certain epoch, the present break in the continuum of history was related to a past one, and contemporary announcements of the arrival of something genuinely new were related to past ones. It was the relation between old and new created by such a deadlock that Benjamin was referring to when he mentioned 'dialectics at a standstill'. The expression did not refer to a deadlock in dialectics, but to a dialectics which only began to function in a state of standstill. It was the appearance of the 'now' in objects<sup>155</sup> which was dialectical for Benjamin not a transition or sudden transformation as in Adorno or Hegel, but an emergence from homogeneous time into fulfilled time, a bursting of the historical continuum, a bursting out of a progression that was rolling on with mythical relentlessness and lacking in decisive dimensions. Benjamin termed those images 'dialectical' which he considered to be recollections of the past, because they were neither timeless, nor moments of a continuous and homogeneous flow of events, but rather momentary patterns of relation between the present and the past.<sup>156</sup> A piece of forgotten or neglected past could achieve recognition in a present which expanded to receive it. What was past could be saved by a present which freed itself from its limitations.

Benjamin expected dialectical images, and a successful relation to technology, to be made possible by an alliance between a form of art whose aura had been destroyed and a public which destroyed the aura

of works of art through its reception of them. He had reported what was the key experience for the development of his theory of art in his 'Paris Diary', which appeared in 1930 in the *Literarische Welt*. The bookseller Adrienne Monnier, who was in close contact with important French avant-garde writers, had contradicted Benjamin's vehement old prejudice against photographs of paintings.

When I went on to call such a way of dealing with art miserable and irritating, she became obstinate. 'The great creations,' she said, 'cannot be seen as the works of individuals. They are collective objects, so powerful that appreciating them is almost necessarily connected with reducing their size. Mechanical methods of reproduction are basically techniques for reducing things in size. They help people to achieve that degree of command of the work without which they cannot appreciate it.' And so I exchanged a photo of the Wise Virgin of Strasbourg, which she had promised me at the beginning of our meeting, for a theory of reproduction which is perhaps of greater value to me. 157

In the 'Small History of Photography', which appeared in the *Literarische Welt* in 1931, Benjamin generalized this idea about the reduction of great works of art, the destruction of the aura of paintings and of architectural works, into the concept of the liberation of the object from its aura. In this forerunner to his essay about the work of art, he contrasted in a much clearer way the definition of the aura, which sounded full of yearning, with an optimistic observation of its unstoppable tendency to smash apart.

What is aura, actually? A strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close the object may be. While resting on a summer's noon, to trace a range of mountains on the horizon, or a branch that throws its shadow on the observer, until the moment or the hour become part of their appearance that is what it means to breathe the aura of those mountains, that branch. 158

When he then spoke of the contemporary passionate inclination to get hold of art objects as closely as possible through mass reproductions, he saw this as a dragging down of greatness into baseness, but as one which helped to disinfect the suffocating atmosphere of an aura which could only be sustained artificially. There was a daring assumption, or utopian vision, concealed here: that there was a close connection between the effect of size reduction in reproductive techniques and a kind of salutary alienation and plainness, between the vision of avant-garde artists and the vision of the masses.

In his essay 'Experience and Poverty', which was published at the end of 1933 in the journal *Die Welt im Wort*, edited in exile in Prague by Willy Haas, Benjamin wrote:

It is all the same whether Brecht remarks that communism is not the just distribution of wealth but of poverty, or whether the forerunner of modern architecture, Adolf Loos, declares: 'I only write for people who are in possession of a modern sensibility . . . I do not write for people who pine away in yearning for the Renaissance or the rococo.' Artists as complex as the painter Paul Klee, or as programmatic as Loos, both reject the traditional, celebratory, noble image of humanity, which is decorated with all the offerings of the past, in order to turn to their naked contemporary, who lies screaming like a new-born baby in the dirty nappies of this epoch. 159

How Benjamin pictured this 'naked contemporary' was shown both in his essay on 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' and in various notes for the *Passagen-Werk*. He described the relationship of the masses to reality, and to works of art based on reproducibility, as one in which elements of the dream form of perception appeared. On other occasions, he had claimed that those who were intoxicated by hashish had an enhanced appreciation for similarities, a characteristic which, in the essay on the work of art, he emphasized in relation to the masses. In his first essay on Baudelaire, he considered that traversing the city absent-mindedly, as if lost in one's own thoughts and worries, was a precondition for the successful presentation of large cities (for example in Dickens). If the masses did not provide such a picture of the big city, and even seemed unable to provide it, this nevertheless did not as yet disprove the hypothesis that 'images developed in the darkroom of the experienced moment' were resting unseen within the masses until they recalled them.<sup>160</sup> When Benjamin mentioned the dream consciousness of the collective, this implied an appreciation for the masses, among whom events were unnoticeably taking place of which only a fraction would become more or less conscious among artists, philosophers and theoreticians. When he spoke of the streets as being the dwelling-place of the collective, he was admitting that the masses were unconsciously practicing what he welcomed in the new architects as a fusion between street and dwelling.<sup>161</sup> When he held that popular taste was capable of changing suddenly from the most backward reactions, for example with regard to Picasso, to the most advanced, for example with Charlie Chaplin films,<sup>162</sup> he was thereby recognizing their respect for what was pathetic and clownish as opposed to what was stylish, classical, serious or elevated. It was possible to hold that the masses, characterized in such a way, had an as yet unconscious knowledge of the past,<sup>163</sup> one which was not concerned with continuity, but which

contained images of instinctive memory in which the decisive moments of the past were recorded.

What Benjamin hoped the masses would achieve was an exchange of a form of art which had an aura, i.e. which was distant and untouchable and which could to a certain extent be appreciated in an individual dream mood, for one whose aura had been destroyed, i.e. a form of art which was close at hand, which could be touched, and which could be appreciated as a diversion, as entertainment. It was an exchange of a 'Gartenlaube' 164 relationship to technology for a kind of dream consciousness which would take possession of technology for the sake of humaneness the technology of those avant-garde artists in whose buildings, pictures and stories humanity was preparing itself 'to survive culture, if it should be necessary'. 165

But was Benjamin not submitting himself unnecessarily to a crude alternative either plush or steel, either the interior strewn with traces of the past or transparency with no traces, either the 'baggage of a collector or antiquarian' or the 'new, positive concept of barbarism'? 166 Could essays such as 'Experience and Poverty' and 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' be reconciled with others such as 'The Image of Proust', 'Franz Kafka' or 'The Storyteller', to form a text which would show humanity how to shake off its back the treasures which had become burdensome to it and come to grips with them? Was starting again with a bare minimum really connected with a rejuvenating assimilation of the past? Was the freeing from tradition of what was to be reproduced really connected with being true to the things that cross our paths in life, with riding out the storm that blows towards us out of forgottenness? 167 Instead of speaking of 'the people', as Klages did, Benjamin spoke of 'the masses', of 'the crowd'; instead of speaking of the 'image', he spoke of the 'dialectical image'; instead of speaking of 'prehistory', he spoke of the 'protohistory of the nineteenth century'. Where the highest value of Klages was to feel a breath of wind from prehistoric times, for Benjamin it was to feel a breath of wind from a coming dawn. In a note for the *Passagen-Werk*, he wrote:

In every true work of art, there is a particular point at which someone who is able to put himself in that position can feel a cool wind blowing, as if from a coming dawn. From this it can be seen that art, which has often been thought to obscure any relation to progress, can in fact help to define progress *genuinely*. Progress does not lie in the continuity of the course of time, but in interferences with it, at home, or wherever something truly new makes itself felt for the first time with the soberness of the dawn. 168

But was there room, within the kind of social relations which Benjamin thought were necessary to produce a successful relationship to technology, for true works of art through which the wind of a coming dawn

could blow into the continuum of history? Could a plausible connection between poverty, art freed from the aura, and the assimilation of technology be imagined? Benjamin himself was aware of the problem of how to bring the theological-metaphysical, the historical-materialist, the mystical and the political poles of his thinking into a convincing relationship. On a more basic level, the problem concerned the correctness of, and connection between, three fundamental elaborations. First, the fact that even true works of art that had been familiarized by technology remained inaccessible to the masses was elaborated by Benjamin into a form of creative poverty. Secondly, he elaborated the programme of a 'politically functioning aesthetics' 169 into a reconciliation between working-class writing, aesthetic avant-gardism and the opening up of the continuum of history to the wind of a coming dawn. Thirdly, he elaborated the fascination of the masses with the new media into an indication of people's willingness to make use of technological equipment.

The course of events in Europe made the image of a 'bottleneck' through which humanity would have to pass, taking with it only the minimum of baggage, into a misjudgement of the situation which was increasingly out of place. In the end, the course of events made Benjamin's whole way of looking at problems, an approach which can be inferred by correlating his various central motifs, look obsolete.

Six chapters were planned in Benjamin's prospectus for the *Passagen-Werk*: 'Fourier or the Arcades'; 'Daguerre or the Dioramas'; 'Grandville or the World Exhibitions'; 'Louis-Philippe or the Interior'; 'Baudelaire or the Streets of Paris'; 'Haussmann or the Barricades'. The arcades, panoramas, world exhibitions and interiors were opposed, as decayed architectural residues of the dream-world of the collective, to the streets and barricades, as scenes of awakening into the open space of history and to a dream consciousness capable of producing dialectical images. But it was only the Baudelaire section which Benjamin was to elaborate further, at the Institute's insistence on having something that could be published in the *ZfS* in the foreseeable future. The first Baudelaire essay was written in the summer and autumn of 1938, while he was with Brecht in Svendborg, and the second in the spring of 1939 in Paris. The first essay, 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire' consisting of three parts, 'The Bohème', 'The Flâneur' and 'Modernism' was conceived as the central section of a book about Baudelaire, which for its part he thought of as a model in miniature of the *Passagen-Werk*. He saw the second essay, 'Some Motifs in Baudelaire', as a new version of the second part of his first essay. But in fact what happened was that 'in this discussion, which was originally conceived as a re-working of the *Flâneur* chapter, it turned out that precisely *flânerie* had to be excluded from consideration'. Only the motif of the crowd was preserved from the *Flâneur* part of the first essay, combined with important motifs from the essays on the work of art and on 'The Storyteller'. In the first essay on Baudelaire there was hardly anything of what had given the essay on

the work of art its special quality, namely the pathos of the new architecture, and in the second there was no trace of it left at all. What Benjamin had drawn from his observations of cinema-goers two years previously appeared in 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire' only as a retrospective caricature. The dandies, he had written, 'combined an extremely quick reaction with a relaxed, even slack demeanour and facial expression'.<sup>170</sup> Benjamin saw this behaviour reflected physiognomically in Baudelaire in the form of the grimace. As a poet, however, Baudelaire was a hero of modernity but in isolation from the crowd, which he let himself be intoxicated by, while a thousand blows from the crowd demanded the greatest alertness from his consciousness.

Baudelaire, the poet of modernity, a word he himself had coined in 1859, had articulated the problem of the modern poet more acutely than any before him: how is poetry possible in a technologized and capitalistic society? His poems and his writings on the theory of poetry gave the answer: modern poetry must be 'supple and resistant enough to adapt itself to the lyrical stirrings of the soul, the wave motions of dreaming, the shocks of consciousness'.<sup>171</sup> When Baudelaire enjoyed the special tone brought to modern life by industrialization, which he cursed, and by progress, which he cursed, and when he perceived not only the decay of humanity but also an as yet undiscovered, secret beauty in the dilapidated wilderness of the big city this was evidence of an attempt, in a time without dignity, to find a trace of genuine dignity.

In 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', nothing remained of the themes of 'cheerfulness in the new architecture' or 'passing on humanity to the masses'. The essay, considerably more disciplined and distinctive than the first, dealt mainly with the cost of modernity. Benjamin formulated the crucial question as 'how lyric poetry can have as its basis an experience [*Erfahrung*] for which the shock experience [*Erlebnis*] has become the norm'.<sup>172</sup> The 'figure of shock' was now seen all the more in inner connection with Baudelaire's 'contact with the metropolitan masses', which were now only characterized as reflexive, as the amorphous material for an approaching fascist mass-disciplinary process. Photography was no longer seen, as in the essay on the work of art, as a necessity out of which a virtue could be made as an opportunity but instead purely as an impoverishment: 'to the eyes that will never have their fill of a painting, photography is rather like food for the hungry or drink for the thirsty.' Where he had earlier welcomed presence of mind, Benjamin now only mentioned a loss: 'There is no day-dreaming surrender to faraway things in the protective eye. It may even cause one to feel something like pleasure in the degradation of such abandonment'.<sup>173</sup> The 'tiger's leap into the past' ended gloomily:

The luster of a crowd with a motion and a soul of its own, the glitter that had bedazzled the *flâneur*, had dimmed for him . . .

Having been betrayed by these last allies of his, Baudelaire battled the crowd with the impotent rage of someone fighting the rain or the wind. This is the nature of something lived through [*Erlebnis*] to which Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience [*Erfahrung*]. He indicated the price for which the sensation of the modern age may be had: the disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock. He paid dearly for consenting to this disintegration but it is the law of his poetry. 174

But even this gloomy bitterness, in which Benjamin seemed to have moved towards Adorno's position, still reflected his conviction that illumination was either exoteric or did not exist at all, that there must either be mass culture or no culture at all.

It was Horkheimer who had suggested or approved the omission of the introductory section of the essay on the work of art. Benjamin here referred expressly to Marx's analytical and prognostic methods, and stated that the goal of his own inquiry was to put forward theses on developing trends in art under current conditions of production. It was Horkheimer, too, who had suggested or approved the shortening of the introductory part of the essay on Eduard Fuchs, with its general reflections on the concept of historical materialism. Expressions such as 'fascism' or 'communism' were to be replaced by others such as 'totalitarian doctrines' and 'constructive forces within humanity'. The reason for these omissions was the same as in Horkheimer's reminder to Adorno, for a lecture at the London Institute of Sociology at the beginning of 1938, 'to speak extremely scientistically', 'not one word that can be interpreted politically', 'even avoid expressions like "materialist" . . . at all costs'.<sup>175</sup> The journal and the Institute must, as 'a scientific organ' or as a scientific institution, be protected from 'being dragged into any political discussion in the press'.<sup>176</sup> Horkheimer reserved any fundamental statements regarding the political or theoretical position of the Institute for himself, so as to be able to give them what seemed to him to be a form worthy of the Institute.

But what was it that Benjamin's ally, Adorno, objected to in his work? What did he himself have to offer that could be set against it? An answer to this can be found in what Benjamin called Adorno's 'long letters' on Benjamin's work following his essay on Kafka, and following the essays by Adorno which appeared in the *ZfS* in the second half of the 1930s. These formed a kind of dialogue with Benjamin's essays. Adorno's 'On Jazz' and 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening' were the critical riposte to Benjamin's essay on the work of art. Adorno's 'On Wagner' can be read as a counter-model to Benjamin's first Baudelaire essay; and the second version of the Baudelaire essay, which was published in the journal, is then added to the series as a fresh response to Adorno's essay.

Adorno's 'long letters'<sup>177</sup> illustrate the most important points clearly.

Adorno saw an agreement between him and Benjamin 'in central philosophical points'. These consisted, in his eyes, of the fact that both of them were carrying out a dialectical self-dissolution of myth by putting a dialectical construction on the relation between myth and history; and they were both doing this in the light of an 'inverse' theology, which saw earthly life from the point of view of those already redeemed, and which decoded the elements of a materially distorted life as symbols of hope.

Adorno's criticism of Benjamin rested basically on three complexes of factors: (1) In important matters, Benjamin was too archaic for him, or too involved in myth, or not dialectically transcendent enough, or not thoroughly dialectical enough. (2) With regard to the 'demystification of art' as a special case of the dialectical self-dissolution of myth, Adorno accused Benjamin of underestimating, on the one hand, the technological rationality of autonomous art and thereby the destruction of its own aura; and, on the other, of underestimating the immanent irrationality of everyday art and the 'reflexive' character of its audience, the masses, including the proletariat. (3) In addition, he considered it a fatal error that Benjamin could regard a series of facts as being unrelated to the philosophy of history, as being 'collective subjective phenomena' of some sort. Benjamin was thus, in Adorno's view, not able to account for the objective power of the commodity fetish, and was carrying out an un-Marxist form of psychologization which was dangerously close to that of C.G. Jung. This was preventing him from achieving the proper, thorough dialecticization of the commodity fetish, and from accounting adequately for the social mediation of the work of art.

When Benjamin thanked Adorno for his lively interest, and emphasized that Adorno had understood his intentions exactly, it was more than mere courtesy to someone whose support he depended on. Although Adorno did not grasp all sides of Benjamin, he did see more than Scholem or even Brecht or others, and it was he who went into Benjamin's ideas in the most interesting way, having assimilated much more of Benjamin than anyone else. It sounded imploring when Benjamin, in what he saw as his isolation, emphasized the deep agreements between their two points of view, before he got round to mentioning differences. The points on which he insisted on his differences, although he normally left discussions of matters of substance for personal meetings, are highly instructive. In general, they show that he made work on central problems more difficult for himself than Adorno did. This was true for the problem of mass art and its relation to autonomous art, and for the relation between art and society. It was also true for the relation between theology and historical materialism; and it was true for the question of the limits of the explanatory power or relevance of Marxist theory.

On the relation between his own essay on the work of art and Adorno's essays 'On Jazz' (1936) and 'On the Fetish Character in Music

and the Regression of Listening' (1938), Benjamin said that he had attempted to articulate the positive sides as clearly as Adorno had articulated the negative ones. Perhaps, he suggested, it was not a matter of theoretical divergences, but of differences in the objects under study: 'It is not necessarily the case that the acoustic and optical apperceptions of a revolutionary change are equally accessible. This may be connected with the fact that your essay's concluding prospect, of turning the act of listening around, is not entirely clear to someone for whom Mahler is not an experience illuminated down to the last detail.' 178 Here Benjamin was making a number of courteous suggestions. When Adorno, who was concerned with the thorough dialecticization and rescue precisely of what was most reified, declared jazz and mass art to be unrescuable, this seemed arbitrary, and sprang from a point of view which was negatively just as one-sided as Benjamin's positive view of film. At the end of his essay 'On the Fetish Character in Music', Adorno stated that regressive listening might, after all, 'suddenly turn round if art, at one with society, should ever leave the path of what is for ever the same', and went on, 'It is not popular music, but classical music which has produced a model of this possibility' and then mentioned the name Gustav Mahler. 179 This, too, seemed highly arbitrary, and sprang from a point of view which obviously only entertained expectations of autonomous art and not of mass art no matter how much Adorno demanded dialectics in the lowest as well as in the most elevated phenomena. 180

Benjamin expressed his view of the problem most insistently in his notes on the *Passagen-Werk*.

At no point in time, no matter how utopian, will it be possible to win the masses for a higher form of art. It will only be possible to win them for one which is closer to them. And the difficulty consists precisely in creating this form of art in such a way that it would be possible, with a clear conscience, to assert that it *was* a higher form of art. This can succeed with almost nothing of what the bourgeois avant-garde propagates . . . What is true of growing, living forms, by contrast, is that there is something in them which is warming, useful and ultimately cheering. Dialectically, they take up 'kitsch', thus bringing themselves nearer to the masses, and then nevertheless overcome it. It may only be film which is equal to this task today; at least, it is a task which lies close at hand for it. 181

This insight caused Benjamin to stop looking for the solution where it could not conceivably be found, namely in autonomous art. Adorno, on the other hand, saw precisely in the gap between the reflexive masses and autonomous art a challenge for the latter to preserve that gap for as long as the masses were reflexive and to do in art today what a

correct society would later do as routine. The problem for him was not how to bring art and the masses together, but how to make it plausible for autonomous art to be an arena in which society's crucial problems are recognized and in which it is possible to produce a model of salvation.

Adorno's interest in having a detailed discussion of the problem was shown by his plan for a volume of essays on 'Art for Mass Consumption'. This was to combine Benjamin's essay on the work of art and his own essay on jazz with a social-theoretical essay by Kracauer on the detective novel, and works by Bloch and others, on, for example, architecture and illustrated magazines, along with a main introductory essay by Horkheimer. It was to present 'the first concrete (not schematic, in the manner of the Russian theoreticians) application of theory to the *current* form of so-called "culture"'. 182 As with so many other plans, this one was never carried out. As in so many other cases, the awareness of the problem and the need to discuss it were greater here than the resulting publications might suggest.

Adorno's criticism of Benjamin's first essay on Baudelaire was directed, among other things, at the method of 'referring the pragmatic contents in Baudelaire immediately to related aspects of the social history of his time, preferably to those of an economic nature'. His own essays must therefore be seen as models of how he conceived the task of carrying out a 'materialist determination of cultural characteristics' 'by examining the general social and economic trends of the age'. 183

In the essay 'On Jazz', he went about the task as follows. In an analysis described as technical, he stressed various characteristics of jazz, particularly syncopationa form of syncopation in which the underlying time signature is maintained exactly. In syncopation there was an illusory break-out, a shaking-up of what was rigid, which involved coming in too early. Adorno saw this as revealing the social significance of jazz. He extended the significance of these characteristics: 'coming in too early' was seen in the psychoanalytic sense of premature orgasm caused by anxiety. The weak, staggering and merely illusory break-out by the mutilated individual was seen as a confirmation of the predominant force of the collective. Jazz was seen as giving an ostensibly individual touch to the quality of being a standardized commodity, as indicating a society which had to develop and inhibit its productive forces simultaneously. Jazz, the summary stated, was a rigid ritual revealing the subjection of the ego to the collective. Adorno concluded, with reference to another of the characteristics of jazz, that 'jazz is, at the same time, asserting the primeval significance of the relation between couplet and refrain, and bringing it into its own again: for the singer or dancer is hardly anything more than a human sacrificial victim, albeit a substitute one'. 184

In his work on Wagner, Adorno observed that a key to the interpretation of the social significance of Wagner's music as a betrayal of the

revolution to mere rebelliousness (in the Frommian sense of a revolt obedient to authority) could be found in the gesture of shrinking back, of linking revolution and regression. This conclusion was presented as the result of aesthetic and technical analysis in Adorno's book on Wagner 185 (of which only a few sections were published at the time under the title 'Fragments Concerning Wagner' in the *ZfS*). In Wagner's music, as opposed to jazz, Adorno saw precisely in its moments of degeneration something good as well, namely an abandonment of the ego which was more than mere masochism: aspects of a form of self-abandonment which pointed beyond reified existence. But in regarding the structural law governing Wagner's music as the concealment of the process of production by means of the outward appearance of the product, he saw this music, too, as having taken on a commodity character. Its commodity character involved more than mere deceptive wish-fulfilment on the part of the buyer; it also involved a concealment of the work which had produced the commodity.186

Adorno's method did not include a model of the mediation of cultural characteristics in the social and economic process as a whole. Instead, he placed everything that could be said globally about society as he saw it within a discussion of various aspects of the work of art. The technical analyses were extremely brief, since other interpretations based on content analysis, reception history, biography and social psychology imposed themselves on Adorno until the whole palette of his categories and motifs was full. And just as the analyses, on the negative side, soon ended in reification, alienation, the commodity character and the reflexive individual, on the positive side they soon led to the concept of intellect renouncing authority. In his analysis of works of art, Adorno was ready and willing to grant the characters of fetish and commodity to all and sundry, in the certainty of being able to testify that some of them autonomous ones, of course had thoroughly dialecticized their reification. In this way, in spite of having diagnosed a social curse which was all-embracing, he could present them as having escaped the curse.

The functions of theology and historical materialism, and the opportunities open to them, were just as controversial and unresolved as the social functions of, and opportunities open to, autonomous and mass art. Adorno wrote to Benjamin on the subject of his first essay on Baudelaire:

Your solidarity with the Institute, which no one can be more happy about than I am, has moved you to pay a tribute to Marxism which does not really flatter either Marxism or yourself. In God's name, there is only the one truth. And if your powers of thought take hold of this one truth in the form of categories which may seem to you, according to your conception of materialism, some-what apocryphal, you will nevertheless be able to make more of

that one truth with those categories than you do when you furnish yourself with mental equipment which your hand unceasingly resists at every touch. After all, there is more of this one truth in Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* than there is in Bukharin's *ABC* [N.J. Bukharin and E.A. Preobrazhensky, *The ABC of Communism*]. I think this thesis, stated by myself, is beyond any suspicion of laxity or eclecticism. The *Elective Affinities* and the book on the baroque are better Marxism than the tax on wine and the deduction of phantasmagoria from the behaviour of writers in literary supplements. You can have the confidence here that we are prepared to make your most extreme experiments in theory our own experiments. 187

This was a challenge which showed an astonishing change in the Institute's expectations from Benjamin. Adorno had at first advised against support for the *Passagen* project, in view of what seemed to be its metaphysical character. Then he had recommended support for it very warmly, on the grounds that it was free of metaphysics and quite new in the questions it posed and the methods it used. Finally, he had emphasized to Horkheimer that one of the most definite results of his discussions in Paris with Benjamin had been 'that for both of us, the necessity of avoiding any explicit use of theological categories became clear'.<sup>188</sup> But in his correspondence with Horkheimer Adorno had again and again insisted on the justification for theological motifs, and had attempted to demonstrate an implicit use of theological categories by Horkheimer himself in his essay 'On Theodor Haecker: the Christian and History' without meeting with any very energetic protest.<sup>189</sup> In 1938 Adorno who had in the meantime become a full-time associate at the Institute in the United States, and was in a position to give a reliable judgement on the limits of Horkheimer's tolerance as a materialist and Schopenhauerian perhaps wanted to renew the invitation to Benjamin (who was now supported financially by the Institute) to realize 'all the theological content and literalness in the most extreme theses' without regard to any 'outward correspondence' to Marxist theory (see above, p. 192). He obviously saw in Benjamin someone who could, as Schoenberg had done in music, turn his back on society and work on his own material which was implicitly theological and esoteric to produce a revolution: a revolution, paradoxically, in social theory.

Adorno saw himself as being capable of both more and less than Benjamin. He was more conscious in his mediation of Marxist theory and theological motifs, and less radical in his esoteric and theological thinking. But Benjamin defended himself against the role Adorno had destined for him. Referring to the last meeting he had with Adorno and Gretel Karplus (in San Remo) before the couple moved to the United States, Benjamin wrote:

If I refused on that occasion, for the sake of my own productive interests, to appropriate an esoteric development of my ideas, and to that extent to carry on as usual without regard to the interests of dialectical materialism or the Institute, it was in the end not just out of solidarity with the Institute or mere loyalty to dialectical materialism, but out of solidarity with the experiences which we have all been through in the last fifteen years. It is therefore a matter of my very own productive interests here as well. I won't deny that these interests may now and then violently contradict my original ones. There is an antagonism here which I would not wish to be without in a thousand years. Overcoming it is what constitutes the problem in the work, and the problem is one of how to construe it. 190

On the basis of his experience and his committed work as a left intellectual writer, Benjamin should in fact have had a closer relationship to Marxist theory than Adorno. But did he really show greater competence in practising what he wrote in his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' that historical materialism 'is easily a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight'?<sup>191</sup> In his critique of the first essay on Baudelaire, Adorno rightly demanded of Benjamin's view of Benjamin's own high standards that he should go over the passage on the commodity and the *flâneur* once more, and 'give it the greatest attention, confronting it in particular with Marx's chapter on commodity fetishism in volume 1' (of *Capital*). The journal 'rightly postulates that the competence of Marxism in this area is absolute', and he himself, in his essay on the fetish character in music, had had to reformulate the passage on the substitution of exchange value 'with endless trouble, together with Max, to replace the cheekier version of it in the first draft'.<sup>192</sup>

In the rest of the work, Benjamin relinquished his claim to Marxist competence. Although, in the second Baudelaire essay, the way in which he drew on his earlier essay, 'The Storyteller', might be seen as a return to trains of thought respected by Adorno, and to specifically Benjaminian categories, as a whole it was evident that the mediation between theology and Marxist theory was not really Benjamin's affair, and that it hindered rather than encouraged the originality of development of central motifs of his thinking. 'I had that passage in the fifth chapter of [your manuscript on] Wagner clearly in my mind', Benjamin wrote in his reply to Adorno's letter of 29 February 1940 (in which Adorno had praised the second Baudelaire essay highly and then made a few critical points).

But even if the aura is a matter of something 'human but forgotten', it may not necessarily be the same thing as what appears in

my work. Trees and bushes, whose images can be borrowed, are not made by human beings. There must therefore be something human in things which is *not* produced by work. But there I would prefer to pause.  
193

Where Adorno saw one of Benjamin's problems as having been solved by the use of a Marxist thought process, Benjamin saw an abridgement of a problem which in its unabridged form remained a puzzle.

In many ways, Adorno made it easier for himself than Benjamin did. He accused Benjamin of having archaic prejudices, but he himself was far too thoughtless in his use of dialectical transcendence. He handed out the labels 'mythical', 'fetishistic', 'reified' and 'alienated' extremely generously, and then, with the music of the Schoenberg circle as a model before him, 'dialecticized the object thoroughly', trusting to the power of the warming, illuminating consciousness. For Benjamin, by contrast, what he had written in his essay of 1912, 'A Dialogue on Contemporary Religiosity', remained decisive: it is to Romanticism that 'we owe the powerful insight into the dark side of naturalness: it is not basically good, it is strange, horrible, frightening, dreadfulmean . . . What Romanticism discovered was the appreciation of everything frightening, inconceivable and low which is woven into our lives.'<sup>194</sup> Although he was more sceptical than Adorno with regard to the power of consciousness and its progress, Benjamin was at the same time more cautious in his assessment of myth and its ability to be overcome by rationality.

Benjamin's concepts might seem eccentric: the concepts of a form of technology by means of which humanity could espouse the cosmos; of mass media which would school humanity to master a form of technology which had gone out of control; of a historical consciousness which could force the future to come bursting out of the past. But it was precisely in these areas that the crucial problems lay, and not in the rarefied atmosphere of progress in the 'benevolent rationality' of 'responsible' autonomous works of art, or in the reconciliation between nature and mind in avant-garde music's benevolent domination of nature. Adorno was glad that Benjamin, in his second essay on Baudelaire, had in a sense written 'the protohistory of the reflexive character', around which all his own considerations on materialist anthropology had revolved since he had come to America.<sup>195</sup> But he overlooked the fact that Benjamin could not accept this so lightly, since Benjamin did not believe, as he did, in the benevolent rationality of autonomous works of art. On the other hand, Benjamin noticed towards the end of the essay on the fetish character in music a suggestion of reserve with regard to the concept of progress which particularly appealed to him, and he observed: 'You justify this reserve only in passing, for the moment, and with regard to the history of the term "progress". I would rather take it by the roots and deal with it in its origins.'<sup>196</sup>

Despite various differences, Benjamin and Adorno agreed that

disenchantment was unavoidable and even good, and that it was important that it should not be obscured once again by any fresh curse. The opportunities for the present world lay solely in an increasing decay of traditional art. Anything that was incapable of being rescued from this decay and disenchantment was certainly beyond being rescued from what had counted in the past, or even still counted in the present, as being undisenchanted, eternally harmonious, or classically obligatory. 'I do see (in the way that music becomes comical)', Adorno wrote, 'in the "decay of sacred reconciliation", something definitely positive, and my essay certainly connects with your work on reproduction nowhere more insistently than here. If this has remained unclear in the text, I should consider it a severe fault.' 197

Critics of Ideology:

Herbert Marcuse and Leo Lowenthal on Art

While Benjamin and Adorno were busy in Europe discussing the correct view of the forms and functions of modern art and culture, the Horkheimer circle in New York was not being idle in the field of materialist aesthetics either. In 1937 Marcuse's essay on 'The Affirmative Character of Culture' and Lowenthal's article 'Knut Hamsun: the Pre-history of Authoritarian Ideology' appeared in the journal. 198 (Following on from his articles on Conrad Ferdinand Meyer, Dostoevsky and Ibsen, this was not only the last in Lowenthal's series of articles on the classics of bourgeois culture but also the last of his essays to appear in the *ZfS*.) Both texts seem entirely unaffected by the ideas of Benjamin and Adorno as published in their *ZfS* articles 'On the Social Position of Music' and 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. They were unaffected by the demand to concentrate on the work itself and its own methods of procedure and levels of significance; unaffected, too, by the fact that modernism had been developing in art since the middle of the nineteenth century one of the characteristics of modernism being a decline in the transfiguring function of art.

In his final contribution to the *ZfS*, which was stimulated by a disagreement between himself and Marcuse, who had a high regard for Hamsun, Lowenthal's methods were robustly those of class sociology and the critique of ideology. He distinguished between an older and a newer form of the bourgeois feeling for nature. The older one was active and full of trust in humanity's progressive domination over nature, and this sprang from an optimistic attitude in most sections of the liberal bourgeoisie, who had adapted themselves to material advancement. The new one was passive, full of blind devotion to a form of nature which appeared wild and unruly, and this sprang from a masochistic attitude among the petty bourgeoisie: faced with monopoly capitalism, the petty bourgeoisie had become confused, had resigned itself

to the situation and worshipped power. After these introductory comparisons, Lowenthal's analysis of Hamsun's novels began: 'Hamsun's works reveal this ideology'i.e. that of the petty bourgeoisie. It was an analysis which sounded strange, considering that Lowenthal was accusing Hamsun of lacking clarity in social theory and therefore of encouraging social irrationality. The analysis was methodologically questionable when Hamsun's novels were being denied the character of literature and being reduced to the level of statements often disguised in metaphors made by a proto-authoritarian ideologue, and when their social function was being drawn from the results of an interpretation based on mere content analysis.

After this, the reception of Hamsun's works could only be conceived of within the categories of acceptance or rejection of his post-liberal ideology instead of being seen as a continuing process through which various different levels of significance in a fundamentally polysemic work of art could come to light, or in which critics were able to express their own narrow-minded conceptions of art. Eduard Bernstein wrote of Hamsun's *Mysteries*, 'If the disjointedness of the dialogue, the disjointedness of the scenes, the disjointedness of the entire plot of the novel if one can speak of a plot at all are not a result of the author's indifference or nervousness, they are certainly capable of making the reader indifferent or nervous.'<sup>199</sup> For Lowenthal, who cited the 'clear position' of 'Eduard Bernstein, who at that time was still resolute',<sup>200</sup> this meant that Hamsun's petty-bourgeois, proto-authoritarian ideology was still being rejected here, although he had been lauded to the skies in the *Neue Zeit* since the end of the First World War. But what did Bernstein's view signify other than that he preferred novels with classical narrative forms and a social conscience to everything else, and that Hamsun was too modern for his taste? And what did it signify when later, in the *Neue Zeit*, 'empty moods' and 'mere nervous stimulation' stopped being criticized, and 'thrilling images of life and of the soul' were admired instead, if it had not first been established whether these later views referred to the same sort of book as the earlier ones? What was there to show that these were varying reactions to the same postliberal ideology in Hamsun, rather than being perceptions of different levels of significance within one and the same work of art? After reading Lowenthal's essay on Dostoevsky, Benjamin asked him:

Has this German reception been equal to the challenge of Dostoevsky's work? Is no other reception conceivable, from the work's point of view? . . . To me and I haven't opened Dostoevsky for a long time these questions are at the moment more open than they seem to be for you. To me, it is conceivable that precisely in those corners of a work into which your psychoanalytic point of view leads, catalysts could be found which could not be assimilated to the petty-bourgeois way of thinking. In brief:

it is conceivable that the reception of the writer does not necessarily come to an end with this one class, which is on the point of perishing. 201

The same objections applied to Lowenthal's interpretation of Hamsun's work.

Marcuse's procedure in his essay was just as disregarding of art itself and of its history as Lowenthal's. Horkheimer found Marcuse's essay 'particularly successful',<sup>202</sup> and he described it in the introduction to the journal's sixth volume as being exemplary of the Institute's work. The 'analysis of the affirmative concept of culture', which 'together with the article on positivism' (i.e. Horkheimer's 'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics'<sup>203</sup>) had developed 'from common discussions', showed in a positive way how metaphysical dreams could really be met on the theoretical level: by combining the critique of metaphysical categories with the practical application of the theory of history. 'This essay demonstrates this form of thinking at work, a form of thinking from which positivism threatens to distract us completely.'<sup>204</sup>

Marcuse took over the classical definition of culture by the educated classes as Goodness, Beauty and Truth, and defined affirmative culture as the culture of the bourgeois epoch in the West, for which Goodness, Beauty and Truth represented a higher spiritual and intellectual, or inward, world shared by all.<sup>205</sup> Marcuse repeated a topos from the criticism of religion which had been formulated at its sharpest by Marx in the introduction to his 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right': by providing a 'solemn complement' to an evil world, Goodness, Beauty and Truth contributed to the fact that such a world was being patiently suffered. But in some circumstances Goodness, Beauty and Truth, instead of producing satisfaction with existing conditions, could produce dissatisfaction with them and awaken a desire for existing conditions to be made more similar to the Good, the Beautiful and the True. This corresponded to the topos, also formulated at its sharpest by Marx, of transcending [*aufheben*] philosophy by realizing [*verwirklichen*] it.<sup>206</sup> These ideals were thus ambiguous: they could produce either satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and were capable of promoting either an acceptance of reality or an awareness of how different things might be.

In the final section of his essay, Marcuse took the apparent fascist transcendence of affirmative culture which in reality merely intensified its self-justifying components to a degree at which they became both heroic and contemptuous of mankind and contrasted this with a genuine form of transcendence in non-affirmative culture, in which Beauty would signify the experience of joy in reality. For Marcuse there was thus only one choice: either affirmative culture in its bourgeois-idealistic and fascist-heroic forms, or a genuine transcendence of culture in a form of reality in which there would be 'dancing on the volcano,

laughter in the midst of sadness, games with death'. Between these two alternatives, there was no place for conditions under which culture might become consciously critical. Affirmative culture in the form of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, and the ideas of Soul, Beauty and Personality was an extremely flimsy, almost intangible construction. Marcuse constantly equated it with 'great bourgeois art', which he characterized as an intensification of pain, sadness, hardship and loneliness to a degree at which they became metaphysical powers, and as a painting of celestial happiness with radiant colours from this world. 207 There was thus no place for anything in modern art, anything which offered dissonant objections to an antagonistic society. According to Marcuse, the alternative to fascist art and culture was therefore an attempt, bearing in mind the example of great classical bourgeois art, to realize in practice the ideals expressed in that art.

Marcuse's essay therefore provoked a protest from Adorno. On reading it, he wrote to Horkheimer:

As to the essay by Marcuse, you guessed my reaction correctly, as always. Much as I am glad that Marcuse of all people, who has more of a burden to bear than we do from the legacy of the academic 'history of ideas', has made energetic efforts in the essay, my reservations are just as great . . . It is characteristic that you should refer to the affirmative *concept* of culture, while what Marcuse offers for consideration is the affirmative *character* of culture, namely the *content* of culture, and above all art *in toto*. I think he would have got much further, and that it would have been more suited to him, if he had stayed with the *concept* of culture, its emergence and function, and an analysis of the way in which that function developed into so-called 'cultural criticism' in other words, if he had examined a precisely defined concept in the history of ideas in a materialist way. As it is, however, he falls into areas which should only be approached with the utmost caution, and indeed even then with the utmost rigour. His image of art seems to be essentially that of Weimar classicism; I should like to know how he proposes to account for *Les Liaisons dangereuses*, or Baudelaire, or even for Schoenberg or Kafka. It seems to me that art has a whole level the decisive one which he completely overlooks: namely, the level of *knowledge and discovery*, in the sense of what cannot be achieved by bourgeois science. 'Roses scattered through life' this sort of thing is really only good enough for the sixth form; and the dialectical counter-motif, that the art of an unpleasant reality provides a contrast with the ideal, is far too flimsy even to come near the decisive results of art. This corresponds to the tremendous naivety with which he accepts certain sensualist aspects of contemporary mass art as positive.

As soon as there were questions of concrete matters, such as the position of the Nazis on cultural ideology, the essay was excellent, and the correspondence between the decay and the fetishization of culture was well observed.

But it really is, as you write, 'too broad' and, precisely in this, too idealistic. This can also be seen, for example, in the fact that classicist *aesthetics* is assumed automatically, without the question even being raised of whether the way it was practiced by its greatest representatives I am thinking of Goethe, or Beethoven . . . corresponds to Herder's *Reflections [on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind]*, Kant's *Critique of Judgement* or Schiller's *Aesthetic Education*, and whether, precisely in art, the bourgeois rupture between theory and practice is not of enormous significance, i.e whether classicist aesthetics does not *deny* what actually happens in *Elective Affinities* or in the second part of *Faust*. The fact that Marcuse presumes that these are identical means that he succumbs to the idealist delusion; admittedly, it is then easy for him to demystify it. 208

Although the positions in the criticism of ideology taken up by Marcuse and Lowenthal appealed to Horkheimer very much the essays were written, after all, while the authors were in close contact with him no more articles by either of them on the topic of art or materialist aesthetics appeared in the *ZfS*. The subject became the monopoly of Benjamin and Adorno. A prospectus produced by the Institute in 1938 declared (in English):

The other branch of sociological studies has been devoted to various cultural spheres. The Institute works from the hypothesis that an analysis of an individual work of science or art, grounded upon a proper social theory, can frequently provide as deep an insight into the actual structure of society as many field studies conducted with an elaborate staff and resources. Our work in the sociology of art and literature has centered about those writings and artistic productions which are particularly characteristic for the spread of an authoritarian *Weltanschauung* in Europe.

When these sentences, which were as true of Lowenthal's as of Adorno's work, were written, there was still room at the Institute for both variants of the social-theoretical interpretation of works of art: one centred on aesthetic modernism and the other centred on the bourgeois concept of culture. But it was at this point that Benjamin and Adorno's position, which made aesthetic modernism into the basis in experience for ideas critical of society, finally took hold at the Institute of Social Research.

Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer:  
Unexploited Opportunities for Intensive Interdisciplinary Research

Otto Kirchheimer and Franz Neumann came to New York even before Adorno. In exile, both had already worked for the Institute in Europe. The personnel policy followed by the directors of the Institute, which was extraordinary in view of their programme for an interdisciplinary social theory, was evident in their behaviour towards these two figures. The Institute's directors made no effort to recruit the assistance of a specialist historian; nor did they offer full-time employment to Neumann or Kirchheimer, who were qualified academic specialists in law, government and politics.

Franz Neumann, as an émigré, had completed a second undergraduate degree at the London School of Economics under Harold Laski and Karl Mannheim, who had been 'suspended' from his academic post in Germany at the same time as Horkheimer. Neumann was commissioned by the Institute perhaps on Laski's recommendation, perhaps on Mannheim's to look after the interests of the Institute's library, the ownership of which had been transferred to the LSE in the hope that this would make it possible to get the library out of Germany.

Franz Neumann, to whom this mainly legal task had been delegated, could hardly suit Horkheimer's idea of having a homogeneous circle of research associates. Up to 1933 he had been a committed lawyer for the trade unions and the SPD, and only in exile had he become a full-time academic. His position was extremely close to that of Harold Laski, who was the principal theoretician of the reformist Labour Party.

Neumann began the curriculum vitae accompanying his 1923 doctoral dissertation in law with the words: 'I, Franz Leopold Neumann, was born on 23 May 1900 in Kattowitz. I am a Jew.'<sup>210</sup> He was born the son of a Jewish manual worker and shopkeeper in Kattowitz in Silesia [now Katowice in Poland], which at that time was part of Germany. He studied law, philosophy and economics in Berlin, Leipzig (where he fought on the barricades with the soldiers and workers in 1918), Rostock and Frankfurt (where he was one of the founders of the Socialist Student Group, along with Leo Lowenthal). During his legal training as an articled clerk in Frankfurt, he worked with the Social Democrat Hugo Sinzheimer, who was the founder of German employment law and one of the fathers of the Weimar constitution. Neumann, influenced mainly by Sinzheimer and by the Austrian Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, supported Social Democratic reformism, and published articles on topics in employment law. He taught at the Frankfurt Akademie der Arbeit (Labour Academy), and gave lectures at trade union education classes. In all of these activities he was immensely successful, an incorruptible, almost fanatical worker, an acutely logical thinker who was neither sentimental nor witty, a man determined to achieve social recognition so long as this could be accomplished without being untrue to himself.

In 1928 Neumann went to Berlin. Together with Ernst Fraenkel who

was, like himself, a student of Sinzheimer's, a Jew and a member of the SPD, and who later wrote an important work about Nazism, *The Dual State (Der Doppelstaat)* he opened a legal practice. Neumann became the lawyer for the building industry's trade union, and later for other unions, and appeared before the *Reichsarbeitsgericht* (National Employment Court) in Leipzig, the appeals court for employment litigation, in more than five hundred cases. He published articles on employment law, industrial law, press law, and cartel and monopoly legislation, most of which appeared in trade union newspapers, the SPD's academic journal *Die Gesellschaft (Society)* and other more or less left-wing papers. He lectured on employment law at the College of Politics, and took part in seminars given by Hermann Heller and Carl Schmitt. 211

Neumann was one of the most active members of the younger generation of trade union and SPD lawyers. Borne up by their trust in a strong political and social movement, and spurred on by the crisis in the Weimar Republic, which was becoming more and more obvious, these young lawyers threw the whole of their expertise into bringing the compromise between bourgeois and socialist positions contained in the Weimar constitution to bear against the restriction of socialist elements which was taking place. Neumann's position was that of a reformist and a legalist. The conclusion of his article on 'The Social Significance of Basic Rights in the Weimar Constitution', which appeared in the trade union magazine *Die Arbeit (Work)* in September 1930, read:

The central task of socialist constitutional law is to develop the positive social aspects of the second part of the Weimar constitution and to present them in concrete form . . . The central task of socialist jurisprudence is . . . to set the socialist interpretation of basic rights against the renaissance in bourgeois constitutional theory. The task of socialist politics is to realize these basic rights in practice. When Kirchheimer asks in his title, 'Weimar and what then?', verging on communist ways of thinking, the answer can only be: 'First try Weimar!' 212

In the summer of 1932, the leadership of the SPD appointed Neumann as official lawyer for the whole party. Ernst Fraenkel, in an address commemorating Neumann in 1955, recalled:

In that capacity, he fought with desperate courage as a constitutional lawyer against press restrictions, dispersals of meetings, arrests, sackings of tenured officials, and similar acts of despotism by the governments of Papen, Schleicher and Hitler. Although he was in danger politically and was under threat as a Jew, he remained at his post until 2 May 1933, when the SA occupied our law practice in the Metal Workers' Building in the Alte Jakobstrasse. Further activity in Germany had become pointless. He took his leave of me, who had been his partner in the practice and companion in shared hopes and efforts for over fourteen years, with the words, 'I've had enough of world history.' A brilliant career had been ruined, the struggle for socially acceptable employment law had been lost, the constitutional state had collapsed, and democracy was destroyed . . . Franz Neumann emigrated to England without a penny. 213

Probably thanks to intervention by Laski, the leading theoretician of the Labour Party, who at that time was still thinking in Marxist terms, Neumann was awarded a grant from the London School of Economics and financial support from Jewish organizations. He went to England as a failed reformist and legalist. In his first exile publication, an article on 'The Decay of German Democracy', which appeared in the *Political Quarterly* at the end of 1933, he diagnosed the situation: 'The system had been set up on the ground between socialism and capitalism, and could only survive so long as economic crisis did not intervene.' When the crisis came,

All the reactionary parties concentrated their efforts on a single goal: the destruction of parliamentary democracy as the constitutional platform for the emancipation of the workers. And they succeeded because the framework and practice of the constitution made it easy for them, and because the Social Democratic Party and the trade unions, the only defenders of the Weimar system, had been weakened. 214

The defeat of reformism was just as unavoidable as it was self-inflicted.

In England, Neumann at first tried to encourage the home opposition in Germany through articles under pseudonyms in Social Democratic publications. But he soon abandoned political activity, because he thought it was pointless in a vacuum. The lawyer of the labour movement and the legal theorist became an academic in the field of political and social science who was making an effort to grasp what had happened. He did not underestimate the role played by law and the constitution, but now saw it within the Marxist framework of the political and economic development of bourgeois society.

In 1936 Neumann completed his studies in political science in England with a PhD for his dissertation on *The Governance of the Rule of Law: An Investigation into the Relationship between the Political Theories, the Legal System and the Social Background in the Competitive Society*. The book, which owed much for its methodology to Karl Mannheim, Max Weber and Marx, and for its content to Harold Laski, essentially consisted of two large parts. In the first part, concerned with the history of ideas, Neumann examined political theories from Thomas Aquinas to Hegel from the point of view of how they viewed the relationship between the sovereignty of the state and the freedom of the individual. In the second part, he reconstructed the relationship between the economic, political and legal systems in England and Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This part of the dissertation was directed towards the question of what could be learned from this in estimating the role played by law, and the chances for greater or lesser reconciliation between state sovereignty and individual freedom. The results were, on the one hand, a functionalist concept of legality: in legal theory and legal practice, the decisive consideration was whether a theory or an interpretation fulfilled a 'progressive social function', given the prevailing economic and political conditions. On the other hand, Neumann saw the liberal constitutional state as releasing certain progressive elements which must be essential constituents of any state which took the freedom of the individual seriously:

The generality of the law, the independence of judges, and the doctrine of the separation of powers, have, therefore, functions transcending the needs of competitive capitalism, since they secure personal liberty and personal equality. The generality of the law and the independence of judges veil the power of one stratum of society; they render exchange processes calculable and create also personal freedom and security for the poor. All three functions are significant and not only, as is maintained by the critics of liberalism, that of rendering economic processes calculable. We repeat, all three functions are realized in the period of competitive capitalism, but it is of importance to discriminate between them. If one does not draw these distinctions, and sees in the generality of law, nothing but a requirement of capitalist economy, then of course, one must infer with Carl Schmitt that the general law, the independence of judges, and the separation of powers, must be abolished when capitalism dies. 215

It was a rather modest result. If the development from liberalism via monopoly capitalism to fascism were seen, as Neumann saw it, as a consistent and effective process of transmutation serving to maintain the domination of the private ownership of the means of production, then how could a re-establishment of the good old aspects of liberal constitutionality which had been appropriate under competitive capitalism be conceivable? How could legal theories and legal interpretations which could have been defended as socially progressive be imagined under such a presupposition? Neumann's book seemed to be saying: there could only be hope if something similar to the liberal constitutional state could be re-created, but with a ruling class which would recoil with horror from the fascist solution. Although he was now thinking in a Marxist fashion at the level of social-theoretical analysis, Neumann remained, like his teacher Laski, a political reformist who set all his hopes on an improvement in the politics of labour movement organizations once constitutional conditions had been re-established.

Neumann met Horkheimer at the beginning of 1936, before he had completed his studies in political science. On a trip to Europe Horkheimer visited the Institute's London office, and met Neumann, as the lawyer entrusted with the interests of the Institute's library. Neumann remembered Horkheimer from his Frankfurt period, but had himself never come to Horkheimer's notice before. From being merely the lawyer in charge of the library's concerns, Neumann became also a propagandist for the Institute in England after this meeting. He made efforts to distribute the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and, for example, organized an evening lecture on the topic of the *Studies on Authority and the Family*. Soon after his meeting with Horkheimer, Neumann wrote:

I am meeting Laski for tea tomorrow. I am fairly certain that I will have his full support for the I.f.S. and the Z.f.S. as well. Report follows. I was extremely pleased to meet you again after so many

years (or rather, to get to know you), and can only once more express my desire to see your essays collected and published in English soon, so that the ideological confusion around Marxism can be cleared up to some extent.

A few days later he wrote: `Laski said he is also happy to collaborate with the journal, in the form of either book reviews or articles. He promised the Institute all his support, in whatever form, provided it "remains Marxist".' 216 In the same year, the Institute enabled Neumann to go to the USA by giving him an employment contract, avoiding immigration restrictions. Laski introduced him to friends at various distinguished universities during a tour which they made. Among these friends was Felix Frankfurter, Professor at the Harvard Law School, who was a member of Roosevelt's Brains Trust and was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1939. Neumann's first impressions, which, looking back on the experience in 1952, he described as being decisive for him, indicated a point of view which was very distant from that of the Horkheimer circle.

Three impressions, I believe, have remained: the Roosevelt experiment, the character of the people there and the role played by the universities . . . Roosevelt's experiment showed a sceptical German that Wilsonianism, which had been preached ever since 1917, was not merely a product of propaganda, but was indeed reality. It showed that a militant democracy was able to solve precisely those problems which had destroyed the German republic.217

An opening for Neumann at an American university did not come up. Instead, he undertook primarily legal and administrative duties for the Institute. He had only just arrived in the USA when the Institute's directors sent him to Buenos Aires for six months to conduct a court case for Felix Weil. He wrote to Horkheimer from Buenos Aires in October 1936:

I had been hoping for three years to be able to work `normally' again, and as soon as the chance arrives I end up dealing with this business, which is dreadful for all concerned. I am looking forward very much to the lectures. But I have never in my life given lectures to students before, only to workers. I doubt very much whether the undergraduate will appeal to me as the object of my lectures as much as the German worker did.218

The reference was to the lectures on the totalitarian state which he was to give at the Extension Division of Columbia University in the winter of 1936-7, as part of the Institute lectures. The lectures did in fact take place, after he had succeeded in getting a judgement in the Buenos Aires case which could not have been more favourable for Felix Weil.

From then on, he gave regular lectures for the Institute, and they were a tremendous success with the students. In addition, he continued to be the Institute's legal adviser, although he was unsuccessful in the matter of the Institute's library. He assisted in a libel case, for example, and in a dispute with an Institute scholarship holder, Georg Rusche (see below, p. 233). He hardly produced any academic publications. Apart from a series of book reviews, only two articles by Neumann appeared in the *ZfS* (in other journals he published almost nothing at all between 1936 and 1942). The first article, published in 1937, 'The Change in the Function of Law in the Legal System in Bourgeois Society', 219 was more or less a condensed version of the second part of Neumann's English dissertation. The second article, which appeared in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, the short-lived successor to the *ZfS*, was on 'Types of Natural Law', a condensed version of the first part of his dissertation.<sup>220</sup> In addition, Neumann wrote a social history of the German worker from 1918 to 1933, as an introduction to the Institute's research publication on the working class, and busied himself with preparatory studies for various projects. He began work on *Behemoth*, which became the Institute's principal analysis of Nazism (see below, pp. 286-91), only in the summer of 1939.

The Institute had received 'a grant of 2000' for Neumann from the Emergency Committee in 1936 on the basis of an assurance that he would later become a full-time associate, and he was listed as such in the 1938 prospectus. However, as was the case with most of the others, the Institute did not enter into a formal employment contract with Neumann. The Institute's directors put more value on Neumann's usefulness as an academic diplomat, lawyer and practical adviser than on his long-term collaboration as a social theorist with qualifications in law and political science. In the summer of 1939 it was indicated to Neumann that Horkheimer and Pollock were seriously considering cuts in the Institute's 'exterior'. At the beginning of September he was informed that he would have to leave the Institute on 1 October 1940. After a short interval, Neumann wrote to Horkheimer:

This news has disturbed me very deeply, as I have identified myself with the work of the Institute, and with its theoretical basis, to such an extent that to dissolve my ties with it would be very difficult for me. My theoretical and political attitudes hold out little prospect of long-term employment at an American institution, particularly since the growing fascist tendencies here, as you rightly always stress yourself, reduce the prospects for people such as ourselves more seriously than ever.

I did not look for another position at an earlier stage, because both you yourself and Pollock frequently informed me, and others as well, that I was a permanent member of the Institute. I still recall a talk with Pollock in Woodland in the summer of last year,

when he informed me that my salary would be reduced. At that time, in a situation which was so critical for the Institute, he told me that solidarity was the most important thing in the Institute, and that a permanent member of it would never simply be dropped.

My prospects of finding a place at an American institution, however, are also made particularly difficult because during the three and a half years in which I have belonged to the Institute I have been principally concerned with administrative duties. This corresponded neither to your intentions nor to my inclinations. And you offered me the prospect of becoming a research assistant at the time of my appointment. I do not hold it against anyone that matters have turned out differently. But my production of academic publications has as a result been very slight. I have hardly anything from the last three and a half years to show to American institutions. As I have already mentioned to you, I shall attempt to find an amount from a third party which will be sufficient to finance my position at the Institute. I have already enquired of the Spelman Fund concerning the financing of my project on the theoretical basis of employment law, and I shall once again apply to Guggenheim for a grant to work on the renaissance of natural rights. Both of these topics have been selected with regard to the special interests of the organizations concerned. My preparations for a study of the theoretical and historical basis of fascism have made considerable progress in the last few months, and I hope I shall succeed in finding a publisher.

In addition, I have already taken steps to be appointed to a post at an American university. Difficult though it is for me, I shall exploit all of my connections in order to receive an appointment and thus relieve the Institute financially. Should circumstances make it necessary, I would, in accordance with Pollock's suggestion, spend part of the year either in Washington or at another university.

But, if all of my efforts should fail, I would be grateful to you if you would revise your decision, in consideration of the situation as I have presented it, and of my personal position. 221

A postponement was in fact conceded, but this came to an end in 1942. In the meantime, Neumann completed his *Behemoth*, which became his passport to an impressive career outside the Institute.

The policy the Institute's directors adopted towards Otto Kirchheimer was just as strange as their policy towards Neumann, although the two men were very different. Kirchheimer, in exile in Paris, entered the fluctuating circle of young academics who were supported by the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales through research contracts for various lengths of time. These contracts were partly to assist young scholars with their further education, and partly to enable independent academic work to be carried out.

'He was a brilliant young intellectual, but in the end not really interested in practical politics', the exact opposite of Franz Neumann this was the verdict of Otto Suhr's wife on Kirchheimer as she looked back on the later years of the Weimar Republic, when Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Ernst Fraenkel and other left-wing lawyers were frequent visitors to the Suhrs' house. 222 Otto Kirchheimer was born into a Jewish family in Heilbronn on 11 November 1905. From 1924 to 1928 he studied philosophy and history in Münster, and then law and social science in Cologne, Berlin and Bonn under Max Scheler, Carl Schmitt, Hermann Heller and Rudolf Smend, among others. 223 In 1928 he took his doctorate with Carl Schmitt, with a dissertation on *Constitutional Theory in Socialism and Bolshevism*. 224 It was a kind of radical left-wing answer to Schmitt's critique of Weimar parliamentary democracy. Kirchheimer saw in this a model of modern formal democracy. Because there was an almost exact balance between the existing forces, the classes which were in conflict with one another had finally reached silent agreement that 'the elections and their accidental majorities could decide who should take over the government, as long as this balance lasted.' Narrow limits were set to government power, so that 'those who think they have acquired control over the business of the state . . . find instead that they are in charge of a legal process.' 225

Kirchheimer was, like Neumann, a member of the SPD, but he belonged to the Young Socialist wing of it, whereas Neumann could be reckoned as more right of centre. Kirchheimer's dissertation made it clear that he despised the Social Democrats' respect for parliamentary democracy and the constitution, and admired the position of the Bolsheviks, which he characterized in terms of Schmitt's categories of sovereignty and the enemy. The Social Democrats, according to Kirchheimer, believed in 'dual progress', in the idea that the progress of the capitalist economy would correspond to progress in the education of humanity. But Lenin had replaced this doctrine with the doctrine of all-embracing, total struggle. The Social Democrats were fetishizing a state which amounted to less than a sovereign state with a definite enemy that is, merely a constitutional state. Bolshevik Russia, however, was more than a state: it proclaimed class as the sovereign power, it supported the immediately effective myth of world revolution instead of a rational utopia, it had a sovereign concept of dictatorship and a resolute concept of the enemy.

On completing his law studies, Kirchheimer became an articled clerk in the Prussian courts in Erfurt and Berlin. In addition, he gave courses in trade union colleges from 1930 onwards, and expressed his views in trenchant articles and books on constitutional law and on constitutional conditions in the Weimar Republic. For Neumann and his Social Democratic colleagues in Berlin, Ernst Fraenkel, Otto Kahn-Freund and Martin Draht, what mattered was to exhaust the possibilities offered by the Weimar constitution. But for Kirchheimer what mattered was to understand that the constitution was not an opportunity but a trap. The constitution obscured awareness of the advantages of constitutionally guaranteed bourgeois *property* over the constitutionally guaranteed *demands* of the working class; it weakened the workers' will to realize what they had demanded; and it encouraged a passive observation of events while the ruling classes regained their supremacy.

*Weimar and What Then?* (1930) 226 was an urgent warning to the Social Democrats: while they were sticking to the constitution and to parliamentarism, and concentrating all their strength on them, the ruling classes had long since ceased to let themselves be restricted by the constitution. They were taking advantage in particular of the flourishing of the bureaucracy produced by the ambivalence of the constitution and the temporary balance between class forces. Kirchheimer considered the hope that it would be possible to put a stop to the decline by means of constitutional reform by normalizing and legalizing deteriorated conditions to be completely mistaken. He had already asked in 1929 why most of the German bourgeoisie rejected the current constitutional position and were crying out for a bourgeois dictatorship, when every election result showed them yet again that the great majority of the population did not seriously want any change in the very conditions which favoured the bourgeoisie. Kirchheimer had answered that the bourgeoisie 'want a revolution because what they lack is a sense of ultimate security and reliability at the last, decisive instant'. What they wanted was 'an absolutely reliable concentration of, and control over, all the forces in the country, for the purposes of bourgeois politics'.<sup>227</sup>

In his *Limits of Expropriation* (1930),<sup>228</sup> Kirchheimer showed brilliantly how the basic rights guaranteed under the Weimar constitution had been undermined bit by bit by legal judgements and legal theory, and how the old bourgeois elements in the constitution were pushing the other elements aside. The principle of equality and the article on expropriation in the Weimar constitution, which many socialists had hoped to use to revolutionize the bourgeois state legally, had been made into a bulwark of private capitalism by the German Supreme Court. With a critical acuity comparable to that of Horkheimer in the aphorisms of *Dawn*, Kirchheimer analysed the anti-social renaissance of the bourgeois constitutional state against the background of a historical and sociological sketch of the way in which the working of legal institutions had changed.

It does not accord with the sense of the Weimar constitution for laws which are apparently a burden on an economically stronger class to be rejected in the name of justice as arbitrary. It is precisely this apparent injustice which fulfils the demand for justice that is contained within the social system of the Weimar constitution. It is precisely when equality is to be conceived of as a material value that it must be recognized that the principle of equality before the law will remain merely a right on paper until social equality creates conditions which will make it possible for the law genuinely to apply to all equally . . . A constitutional state can create certain external conditions, and put them at the disposal of individuals or of individual classes of the population, for better or worse. It can do nothing more than that. It can ensure, for example, that the son of a rich man, who has come into conflict with the police and the traffic regulations with his motor vehicle on three occasions, has his driving licence withdrawn, just the same as a chauffeur with four children. The fact that the one loses a form of amusement and the other his livelihood is irrelevant in the eyes of the law. The constitutional state stops there and leaves things imperfect, probably for

ever, at the point where social equality has to begin. To take the principle of equality before the law back into the vanished world of a bourgeois-constitutional order is to prohibit equality in the name of equality itself. 229

However, Kirchheimer did not avoid the desperate paradox here of insisting on the 'sense' or 'intention', of a constitution which he asserted, on the other hand, was only worth the class power which was available to back it up. But he did make the point that there had been a weakening of the strength of the working class lasting ten years, with a simultaneous strengthening of the ruling classes, which had in part been newly reconstituted.

After his final Civil Service examinations, Kirchheimer settled in Berlin in 1932 as a lawyer. He occasionally appeared at the seminars of Hermann Heller or Carl Schmitt, like other young Social Democratic lawyers. An extensive critique by Kirchheimer and his colleague Nathan Leites of Carl Schmitt's *Legality and Legitimacy* (*Legalität and Legitimität*) was published before the Nazis came to power. Kirchheimer made it clear here that he did not share Schmitt's conviction that a democracy could never function in a heterogeneous society and must therefore be rejected. Had he thus abandoned the contempt they had earlier shared for the nonsovereign constitutional state? Had it become clear to him that Schmitt had only conjured up Rousseau's ideal of radical democracy, and a rational utopia of parliamentary discussion, in order to confront them with a reality which made a mockery of them, and in order to reduce them and with them every form of democracy and rational way of solving political differences to the absurd? Kirchheimer's position had become blurred. The critique closed with the evasive remark that what mattered was to take account of 'the richness of possibilities for constitutional development, which arise not from the constitutional field itself but from other areas'. 'It would seem that constitutional theory will only be able to provide solutions to these problems in statements of a general nature for some considerable time to come, and even then only in close co-operation with almost all the other disciplines concerned with research in the social field.' 230

In the summer of 1933 Kirchheimer emigrated to Paris. He occupied himself mainly with studies on criminal law, supported by the London School of Economics to begin with. In 1935 he wrote a pamphlet on *State Structure and Law in the Third Reich*, 231 which was published under the pseudonym 'Dr Hermann Seitz' and smuggled into Germany camouflaged as no. 12 of a series entitled 'The Present-Day German State'. The editor of this series was Carl Schmitt, who in the wake of the victorious Nazis had progressed to become a Prussian State councillor, a member of the Academy of German Law, and National Group Leader of the National Group for University Teachers of the National Socialist League for the Protection of the Law. 232 The pamphlet provoked a disgusted reaction in the *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, which was also edited by Schmitt. This 'malicious piece of rabble-rousing', which was trying to undermine German efforts towards international understanding, was floundering helplessly in the dilemma of trying 'to use both communist-Marxist and liberal, bourgeois constitutional arguments against the National Socialist reconstruction of the legal system'. 233

The central topics of Kirchheimer's research financed by the Institute were criminal law and French constitutional law. He reviewed a number of French books for the *ZfS*. In 1937 he too began to make efforts to move to the USA. A letter from Horkheimer, intended, like the employment contract offered to Neumann in the previous year, to help Kirchheimer to come to the USA as an exception to the quota regulations, stated (in English):

Our Dr Neumann who has returned from Europe has reported us that you are prepared to join our staff in New York in the near future. We are glad to hear of your decision, and we hope we shall soon be able to welcome you here.

Dr Neumann has already told you that for the moment we are not in a position to employ you on a full-time basis, but that we shall consider your appointment to full-time work after the university summer vacation. We confirm, therefore, that we shall employ you as Research Assistant for at least one year on a part-time basis with a monthly salary of \$100.\_\_\_\_, starting from the moment of your arrival. 234

From the winter of 1937 until the summer of 1938, Kirchheimer was busy revising the 477-page manuscript of Georg Rusche's work on 'The Labour Market and Penal System' ('Arbeitsmarkt und Strafvollzug'). The manuscript was the product of a research project by Rusche which had been financed by the Institute since the beginning of the 1930s. Rusche had apparently come to the notice of Horkheimer and Pollock through an article he had written for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1930 on 'Prison Revolts or Social Policy?'<sup>235</sup> An article by Rusche on 'The Labour Market and Penal System' had appeared in the *ZfS* in 1933 as an interim report on his research.<sup>236</sup> Two US criminologists, whom the Institute had called on as assessors, had advised changes, particularly in the critical passages dealing with the United States penitentiary system. Rusche, who in the meantime had emigrated to Palestine, had promised to incorporate these changes speedily, but nothing more had been heard from him until the summer of 1937. The laborious revisions which Kirchheimer considered necessary led to a dispute over copyright, in which Neumann represented the Institute's interests.

In 1939 *Punishment and Social Structure* by Rusche and Kirchheimer was published the Institute's first book since *Studies on Authority and the Family*, and its very first publication in English. In his foreword, Horkheimer presented it as the 'beginning of a new American series' of Institute publications. The fact that the host country, the United States, was never mentioned at all in the chapters on the twentieth century, which according to the preface were all written along with the introduction by Kirchheimer, was clearly the result of drastic caution. In

other respects, Kirchheimer had presumably added legal and political matter sufficient to justify the new title, *Punishment and Social Structure*, which was more comprehensive than the original one. In its final form, particularly in the closing chapters, in which Kirchheimer supported his arguments to a great extent with statistical material, the book showed that punishment policies had no influence on the crime rate, and that neither a severe policy with the goal of deterrence nor a mild policy with the goal of character reform was capable of making people adapt to unbearable conditions. Instead and with its wealth of material and its historical method the book as a whole demonstrated the nature and extent of crime and the scope for prison policy depended on the social order, which was thoroughly hostile, and only capable of change in its economic and political forms. The book concluded:

So long as the social consciousness is not in a position to comprehend and act upon the necessary connection between a progressive penal program and progress in general, any project for penal reform can have but doubtful success, and failures will be attributed to the inherent wickedness of human nature rather than to the social system. The inevitable consequence is a return to the pessimistic doctrine that man's evil nature can be tamed only by depressing the prison standard below that of the lowest free classes. The futility of severe punishment and cruel treatment may be proven a thousand times, but so long as society is unable to solve its social problems, repression, the easy way out, will always be accepted. 237

The book was modest in its theoretical pretensions and totally avoided psychoanalytic considerations, so that it made hardly any impression on Horkheimer, whose drily expressed foreword testified to this. The thankless task had not offered Kirchheimer any chance whatever to develop his own talents. He remained a part-time associate of the Institute who was given tasks in economic statistics, or asked to compile a card index, for example, by Pollock. He also gave research assistance to Felix Weil, who sometimes contributed to the Institute's lectures in the Extension Division of Columbia University and who took part in the Institute's `internal' seminars. Horkheimer wrote to Neumann in August 1939 asking him to inform Kirchheimer, whose address he did not have (it was the vacation period), `that I will gladly support every measure which may lead to his remaining with us. During the time in which he has been here I have been able to form an excellent opinion of his academic quality.'<sup>238</sup> The results of such a contradictory attitude were similar to those which ensued with Neumann. Kirchheimer was at the Institute's disposal for very little money and without a firm employment contract, but received assurances of his esteem from Horkheimer and, at the same time, continual recommendations for job and grant applications, which remained unsuccessful for years.

Three articles by Kirchheimer were published in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (SPSS)* in 1940 and 1941. The journal, the continuation of the *ZfS* which appeared in English in the USA after a break of almost a year as a result of the outbreak of war, was seen by Horkheimer merely as a concession to the academic system which would have to be abandoned again as soon as possible. Articles like those by Kirchheimer, whose brilliance Horkheimer had not noticed in the Weimar period and which Kirchheimer was given no opportunity to demonstrate in the USA, confirmed Horkheimer's view of the journal, mainly because he did not see in them any application of the theory he was so urgently concerned with.

The article 'Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany', which appeared in the summer of 1940, emphasized that the transformation of the legal system from an independent organ of the state into an 'administrative bureaucracy' was the most significant change which had taken place in the system of criminal justice in Germany since 1933. 239 This bureaucracy's area of jurisdiction had been severely restricted, however, by the large increase in the number of administrative authorities which had their own powers of criminal punishment.

Kirchheimer's 'Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise' appeared in the second issue of the journal for 1941. Adorno in New York and then Horkheimer in Los Angeles had both tried to get the article into a publishable form. Kirchheimer thanked Horkheimer for this in October 1941 with the words, 'May I take this opportunity to thank you sincerely for the tremendous efforts which you put into reading through my article. The essential points are brought out much better by your revisions; I hope my future productions will also benefit from your attention.'<sup>240</sup> Liberalism, characterized by the use of money as a universal medium of exchange and by compromise between individual parliamentarians and between parliamentarians and the government, had been followed by 'mass democracy', characterized by the existence of central banks able to compete with governments, and by voluntary contracts between the leading groups, capital and labour, and their subsidiary organizations. In Kirchheimer's eyes, fascism, as the successor to these two stages, had imposed itself as a system which was marked by the fact that the absorption of individual rights into group rights, and the sanctioning of this by the state, had reached an extreme form. The monopoly of labour was thus acquired by the state, while industrial private monopolies were furnished with the powers of the state. 'Thus the process of cartelization has reached its logical conclusion in the final merger of private power and public organization.' However, the interests of the various partners in this compromise—the monopolies, the army, industry and agriculture, as well as the various levels of the party bureaucracy—could be reduced to a common denominator only by means of the fascist programme of territorial expansion.<sup>241</sup> Kirchheimer's article on political compromise appeared in the same issue of the journal

as Pollock's article on 'State Capitalism'. 242 Kirchheimer's article was only included because, according to Horkheimer, 'its material enriched' the issue and would not have fitted in with the following issue not because Horkheimer saw it as 'fundamental' to the issue on 'state capitalism', or as a study representing the Institute's position.

Kirchheimer's third essay, 'The Legal Order of National Socialism', appeared in the final issue of *SPSS* in 1942.243 It was the text of a lecture which he gave around Christmas 1941 as one of the Institute's lectures in the Extension Division of Columbia University. Its central idea that individuals were being held in check by social groupings and by state bureaucracy; that the authority of the group bureaucracy was growing with the number of executive duties being handed over to it by the government reached their climax with the observation that there was a form of technical rationality dominant everywhere which was only 'rational' for those in power.

Without research like Kirchheimer's, containing a wealth of material and centred on common ideas and concepts, the further development of social theory was not possible. Even Horkheimer could not imagine it without such research. Yet at the same time Horkheimer's desire and ability to co-operate with other qualified specialists in social theory, and to engage in a far-reaching integration of empirical and specialist research, were not sufficient. He was unable to resist the temptation to escape from this challenge through his contempt for systematic, as opposed to merely exemplary, analyses of concrete materials. Ultimately, it was his contempt which gained the upper hand. His relationship with Kirchheimer remained a provisional arrangement, courteous and aloof.

#### Adorno, Lazarsfeld and the Princeton Radio Research Project

In October 1937, Stefan Zweig asked Adorno to write a book about Schoenberg. Adorno had made a major contribution to an unexpectedly successful book on Alban Berg shortly before, and the new book was to appear with the same publishers. 'What do you think?' Adorno asked Horkheimer in a letter of 19 October. He had been considering writing a book on Schoenberg for years. He had written his contribution to the book on Berg between February and April 1936 in spare time snatched from his main tasks, the essay on jazz and the major part of his book on Husserl. It would probably be possible to finish the book on Schoenberg in two years of spare-time work, thanks to the detailed research on the subject he had already done.

I am certain at last that a book on Schoenberg, if I write it, will be extremely important in terms of its contents as well [i.e. in addition to the good publicity the Institute would gain from it]. As you know, I tend to see Schoenberg's achievements in the same

light as those of Freud and Karl Kraus, and, in the same sense and with the same qualifications, to see his cause as our own. To explicate this would be the main task of the book. 244

These words were written at a time when he was busy with a book on Wagner, a book on Husserl, and preparations for taking his PhD in Oxford.

The following day, 20 October, a telegram arrived from Horkheimer: 'Possibility your coming USA soon closer Stop If interest on your side part employment with new radio project Princeton University available two-year income 400 dollars monthly secured Stop Cable views in principle with earliest travel date Stop . . . Best Horkheimer.' At Horkheimer's invitation, Adorno had been to the United States for the first time a few months earlier, for a few weeks in June. He cabled his reply two days later: 'Happy and agree in principle also to Princeton work glad to come soonest Stop Difficulties 18-month tenancy agreement . . . and possible furniture removal from Germany grateful for cable with decision soonest Best Teddie.' Adorno clearly rated his prospects of finishing his PhD quickly as being fairly slight, and saw little point in acquiring such a qualification. By accepting the employment offer which Horkheimer had passed on to him, he was not being entirely untrue to his original intention only to move from England to the United States if offered either a full-time position at the Institute or a full-time university post. But his uncertainties about whether he might one day be completely cut off from his parents' financial provisions, and about whether there might be a war after all, gave matters urgency although he and Horkheimer were agreed that the Western democracies and Nazi Germany, all of them the stooges of capitalism, would never go so far as to make war on each other. Horkheimer encouraged Adorno:

The combination with the Lazarsfeld research project not only offers certain financial guarantees, but is also a way of putting you in touch with academic circles and other circles which are important for you. Of course, it goes without saying that we would much rather have you to ourselves, but on the other hand the adequate material basis for your life, which you rightly desire, will only be achievable if you are not dependent on the Institute alone. I definitely think the opportunities are there in America for you and Gretel to live a really upper-class life. 245

Lazarsfeld's offer of a job to Adorno was not merely a way of paying back a favour to the Institute, which he knew wanted to bring Adorno to the USA. He also wanted the author of the *ZfS* article on 'The Social Position of Music', whom he respected highly, to work with him as a colleague who would be rich in ideas. Once Adorno had agreed, Lazarsfeld could hardly wait for them to start work together.

Dear Dr Wiesengrund,

During these last few days I have discussed with my associates what we are expecting from your future work with us. Let me give you a brief idea so that we might start some correspondence about it even before you come to this country . . . I intend to make the musical section, so to speak, the hunting ground for the `European approach'. By that I mean two things: a more theoretical attitude toward the research problem, and a more pessimistic attitude toward an instrument of technical progress.

It is especially the first point to which I should like to draw your attention. Our project definitely deals with empirical research. But I am convinced, the same as you are, that fact-finding can be extremely improved by extensive preliminary theoretical thinking. Taking, for instance, the papers you wrote in the Institute's magazine, I might put the situation in the following terms: it is exactly this kind of thing which we shall expect from you, but it has to be driven two steps further:

- 1) Toward an empirical research problem;
- 2) Toward an actual execution of the field work.

Adorno, said Lazarsfeld, was to send on a list of the problems which seemed to him to be particularly important.

I purposely refrain from giving you any of the concrete problems and ideas which I, myself, have in the field of radio and music because I think it will be more advantageous for us to get your thinking quite fresh and uninfluenced by us. 246

Adorno, for his part, emphasized:

My theoretical attitude does not incorporate any aversion to empirical research. On the contrary. The concept of `experience', taken in a very precise sense, is moving closer and closer to the centre of my thinking . . . There is an interrelationship between theory and empirical research which we call the dialectical method . . . I am of the opinion that music undergoes certain qualitative changes on radio, which put the perception of it on a completely new basis.<sup>247</sup>

An analysis of the production must take first place. It was necessary `to make it clear, and to verify the fact, that *the technical qualities of musical phenomena on radio represent the key to their social significance*'. Once the `pictorial character of music broadcast by radio' and other possible characteristics had been grasped in a technical analysis of the production, `it may be possible to develop methods of analysing their

"correlates" in the listener', he wrote to Lazarsfeld in a six-page letter, full of ideas, with which he enclosed a sixteen-page draft of 'Questions and Theses', also brimming with ideas. In the fifteen points discussed in these 'Questions and Theses', he sketched out the starting-points for a 'dialectical theory of broadcasting' and a 'social theory of broadcasting', and criticized the existing form of radio as inhibiting the progressive tendencies it contained.

Somewhat taken aback, Lazarsfeld emphasized in his reply:

I agree with you also that such an approach needs a theoretical analysis first, and might have to start definitely by an analysis of music production. It is exactly as a stronghold of theoretical analysis preceding any research that I am looking forward to your coming. On the other hand, we shall have to understand that you have to end up finally with actual research among listeners, although in many cases we might have to stop with the formulation of the theoretical problem and discussions of techniques to answer them, simply for reasons of time. 248

The Adornos, who in the meantime had married, took a holiday in San Remo again, and met Benjamin, who was living there for three or four weeks free of charge in the guest-house belonging to his former wife. The Adornos left for New York on 16 February 1938 aboard the *Champlain*. On 26 February, Adorno and Lazarsfeld had their first discussions about the work that was to be done. Adorno was now head of the music section of the Princeton Radio Research Project, the precise title of which was 'The Essential Value of Radio to All Types of Listeners'.

The two directors in charge of the project were the psychologist Hadley Cantril, who had written a book on the psychology of radio with his well-known colleague, Gordon Allport, some years before, and Frank Stanton, then research director of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). The two of them had written the original draft for the project, for which Princeton University received in 1937 what was, by the standards of the day, a very considerable grant of \$67,000 over two years from the Rockefeller Foundation. Lazarsfeld had been enthusiastically recommended for the post of Head of Research (at what was, for him, an unbelievable salary of \$6000 a year) by Robert Lynd. In the letter in which he offered the post to Lazarsfeld, Cantril wrote, 'Our idea was to try to determine eventually the role of radio in the lives of different types of listeners, the value of radio to people psychologically, and the various reasons why they like it.'<sup>249</sup> Cantril and Stanton thought that a period of two years would be needed to develop a methodology, and that over a further two years, for which they hoped (correctly, as it turned out) to receive an extension of their grant, this methodology could be used to obtain 'final answers'.

Lazarsfeld had succeeded in arranging for the *de facto* management of the project to be in Newark at his own research institute. This tiny institute, whose entire budget was less than a third of that of the Radio Research Project, had thus acquired a huge contract. In Lazarsfeld's own memorandum to Cantril and Stanton he wrote, 'We consider ourselves essentially a service organization which does not have set goals, but which wishes to help in selecting and achieving them. Therefore, our research program has to be such that our results are adaptable to a variety of actual policies.' Critical undertones, even well-concealed ones, were entirely absent from the memorandum. When Lazarsfeld mentioned the distinction between commercial and non-commercial broadcasters, he emphasized the role of 'the educator', over and above the problem of the 'sales effect' whether people actually read what he recommended on the radio or whether they actually visited the museums he advertised. 'The educator hopes to affect the cultural and social life of his audience for a much longer period and in a much more general way than the commercial sponsor thinks of doing.' Radio was still a relatively new, and therefore controversial, medium. According to the memorandum, what was important was to use a whole variety of research techniques to address a variety of questions which came up again and again in discussions about it. These were questions such as: In what ways do listening to the news on the radio and reading the newspaper influence each other? Is radio contributing to the urbanization of rural areas? Will the new acoustic effects which radio has made possible influence the further development of music? The project was to concentrate on four main areas of radio programming: music, book-reading, news and politics. But Lazarsfeld soon gave a special place to the area of music. Radio ought to be seen against the general background of American culture and society, and Lazarsfeld thought the controversial results to be expected from such an analysis would be more acceptable if they were developed on the basis of music. 250

Adorno later recalled his first impressions of the Newark research centre, which was based in a disused brewery.

At Lazarsfeld's suggestion, I went from room to room and spoke with colleagues, heard words like 'likes and dislikes study', 'success or failure of a program', of which at first I could make very little. But this much I did understand: that it was concerned with the collection of data, which were supposed to benefit the planning departments in the field of the mass media, whether in industry itself or in cultural advisory boards and similar bodies. For the first time, I saw 'administrative research' before me. I don't now recall whether Lazarsfeld coined this phrase, or I myself in my astonishment at a practically oriented kind of science, so entirely unknown to me.251

These impressions were not entirely accurate. What was genuinely characteristic of Lazarsfeld was that his delight in technicalities in collaborative social-psychological research in which a multiplicity of methods could be used to find the answers to questions that had been reduced into checkable items made it easy for him to reconcile his own scholarly interests, despite their unconventionality, with the expectations both of his clients and of the academic system.

For his part, Lazarsfeld, after working with Adorno for a week, reported in a memo to the directors, Cantril and Stanton: 'He looks exactly as you would imagine a very absent-minded German professor, and he behaves so foreign that I feel like a member of the Mayflower Society. When you talk to him, however, he has an enormous amount of interesting ideas.'<sup>252</sup> This was well meant and tactically skilled. Some years later, when Lazarsfeld was to be appointed to a professorship at Columbia University, his friend Samuel Stouffer wrote to the appointments board:

In spite of the fact that he has lived in this country for seven years or more, he has a distinctly foreign appearance and speaks with a strong accent. This prejudices some people against him, and I think some are further prejudiced because they feel that there is occasional arrogance in his manner. Actually, Paul is one of the most modest of men, but he does have a rather heavy Germanic way of presenting a topic which tends to make some people feel that there is not as much in the topic as the difficulty in following him would suggest. I think such critics would be occasionally right, but I can testify from experience that there is plenty of pure gold in them thar hills.<sup>253</sup>

Lazarsfeld was thus doing what he could to integrate Adorno, as a European theoretician, into the American research system. Only slightly troubled by memories reminding him of his social-revolutionary beginnings in Vienna, Lazarsfeld himself was able to take the American system just as it was.

As an associate of the International Institute of Social Research, Adorno completed the work on Wagner which he had started in England, and wrote the article 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening'. As an associate of the Princeton Radio Research Project, he studied listeners' letters to broadcasting stations, conducted interviews ('I . . . still recall how pleased I was and how much I learned when I personally, for my own orientation, conducted a series of certainly very random and unsystematic interviews'),<sup>254</sup> and talked to people involved in radio ('his interviews with people in the radio industry had led to complaints of biased questions and distorted replies').<sup>255</sup> He also spoke to musicians ('who felt that they distributed culture

to American high school children'according to Lazarsfeld, Adorno told them 'what idiots they were'), 256 and wrote memos; for example, a memorandum about an evening performance of electronic musical instruments given by the League of Composers in May 1938, in which he developed the idea of uniting electronic musical instruments with radio, so that one would no longer 'transmit' by radio, but instead 'play the radio'. The 'abolition of the difference between natural and broadcast sound would meet my demand for the liquidation of reproduced sound'. But during the spring and summer of 1938 he was mainly occupied with writing a long memorandum<sup>160</sup> pages on 'Music in Radio'. Lazarsfeld wanted to circulate it to various experts, in reaction to the criticisms of Adorno that had been raised on many sides, in order to secure broad support for his work. Adorno's text, however, provoked Lazarsfeld into writing a long and critical letter.

Just because you express new and aggressive ideas you have to be especially careful not to be open yourself to justified attacks, and I am sorry to say that in many parts your memorandum is definitely below the standards of intellectual cleanliness, discipline and responsibility which have to be requested from anyone active in academic work. I hope you will take my frankness as an earnest effort to make your work as successful as it really could be.

My objections can be grouped around three statements:

- I. You don't exhaust the logical alternatives of your own statements and as a result much of what you say is either wrong or unfounded or biased.
- II. You are uninformed about empirical research work but you write about it in authoritative language, so that the reader is forced to doubt your authority in your own musical field.
- III. You attack other people as fetishist, neurotic and sloppy but you show yourself the same traits very clearly.

After discussing these objections on the basis of numerous examples from Adorno's memorandum, Lazarsfeld went on: 'It is as if you would give us with your right hand the gift of your ideas and would take them away with your left hand by the lack of discipline in your presentation.'

Lazarsfeld's criticisms touched on crucial weaknesses of Adorno's without being hurtful. Adorno, who was then thirty-five, only two years younger than Lazarsfeld, rejected the criticism. He defended himself justifiably on some points, and was not in any way opinionated, but nevertheless he was either unable or unwilling to take advantage of an important opportunity to learn, which virtually no one else offered him. 'I think you only need to look at one of my published articles, such as the study on jazz, to see that the facts you reproach me with are not the results of any inner disorganization but rather of practical

disorganization.' 257 In Adorno's eyes, his essay on jazz was quite an empirical study, having grown out of a manuscript which had also contained what he called 'verification theses'. The peculiar situation thus arose that Adorno accepted Lazarsfeld's demands, but basically saw himself as having already met them. He agreed with Lazarsfeld that he would draw up a typology of listeners which would make it possible to use questionnaires to assess the numerical distribution of the various types. But he then produced a description of the emotional type of listener, for example, which stated that crying was one of the most significant objects for the analysis of the emotional aspects of music. For Lazarsfeld this amounted to a refusal to engage in the concrete research on listeners which he had emphasized in his very first letters to Adorno.

The question of the value of empirical research was connected in a confused way with the question whether there should be reform or revolution. The problem of how to make good music appeal to as many people as possible appeared to Adorno, under existing social conditions and in the way that broadcasting was currently organized, to be meaningless. The texts he wrote for the music study made this unmistakably clear. In an 'interoffice memorandum' of January 1940, John Marshall, who was the Rockefeller Foundation official responsible for the Princeton Radio Research Project, wrote that Adorno seemed 'psychologically engaged at the moment by his ability to recognize deficiencies in the broadcasting of music to an extent that makes questionable his own drive to find ways of remedying them'. Productive work could be expected from Adorno 'only if he had the collaboration of someone representative of the present system, but tolerant enough of Adorno's position to see what was useful in it and interpret that for people certain to be intolerant'. 258 But Lazarsfeld's assurance that exactly this would take place, and a personal visit by Lazarsfeld and Adorno to Marshall in June 1940, were not able to persuade him to change his decision to bring the financing of the music study to an end. Results which would be of any use in helping to eliminate current shortcomings in radio music could not be expected in the foreseeable future. Adorno's association with the Princeton Radio Research Project finally came to an end, therefore, in the summer of 1940.

Lazarsfeld considered only one of the essays written by Adorno for the music study to be suitable for inclusion in the project's publications: 'The Radio Symphony'. It was published in 1941 in *Radio Research 1941*, edited by Lazarsfeld and Stanton. In the text, which was a continuation of his study of Benjamin's article 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', Adorno took the position that symphonies broadcast on radio only represented an image of the live performance, just as a film of a play was merely a picture of the live performance. For that reason, the radio industry's claim to be bringing serious music to the masses was fundamentally questionable.

All that is left of the symphony is a chamber symphony . . . The less listeners know about the undistorted original (especially those listeners whom radio pompously invites to take part in musical culture), and the more dependent they are on the sound from the radio, the more powerlessly they fall under its neutralizing effect, without being aware of it . . . The only people able to use radio sensibly are specialists, for whom the symphony, purified from all the solemnities and fuss of the concert hall, is enlarged, like looking at text through a magnifying glass. Armed with the score and a metronome, they would be able to follow the performance and expose its errors irresistibly. But this is not, of course, the purpose of the thing. 259

The other three essays were 'A Social Critique of Radio Music' (originally a lecture given for the staff of the Radio Project in 1939), which contained Adorno's basic ideas and was published in 1945 in the *Kenyon Review*; 'On Popular Music', published in 1941 in *SPSS*; and a study of the NBC Music Appreciation Hour, which remained unpublished, but was later included in part in a German essay on 'Appreciated Music'.<sup>260</sup> All of these essays included damning criticisms of American radio and the American social system. 'On Popular Music' was one of the clearest and most straightforward of Adorno's essays, and it was even praised in the *New York Herald Tribune*. Like the other essays, it was written together with Adorno's 'editorial assistant', George Simpson. Looking back, Adorno said that Simpson had brought about his 'first attempts to transform my distinctive efforts into American sociological language'.<sup>261</sup> Using topoi connected with the categories of 'the constant' and 'the new', taken from his discussions with Benjamin, Adorno achieved trenchant analyses of popular music (a concept which he tacitly used as a synonym for light music) and of the basic strategies behind its success.

The publisher wants a piece of music that is fundamentally the same as all the other current hits and simultaneously fundamentally different from them. Only if it is the same does it have a chance of being sold automatically, without requiring any effort on the part of the customer, and of presenting itself as a musical institution. And only if it is different can it be distinguished from other songs a requirement for being remembered and hence for being successful.

Standardization of song hits keeps the customers in line by doing their listening for them, as it were. Pseudo-individualization, for its part, keeps them in line by making them forget that what they listen to is already listened to for them, or 'pre-digested'.<sup>262</sup>

On the basis of an analysis of the objective side, the production, marketing and structure of popular music, Adorno developed a 'theory about the listener' in the second part of the essay. This contained a series of central 'theses' for example, that in popular music the recognition of the piece is the climax of understanding, whereas in 'good serious music' understanding transcends recognition and goes on to grasp something fundamentally new; or that

the strain and boredom associated with actual work leads to avoidance of effort in that leisure-time which offers the only chance for really new experience. As a substitute, they crave a stimulant. Popular music comes to offer it. Its stimulations are met with the inability to vest effort in the ever-identical . . . The moment of recognition is that of effortless sensation. The sudden attention attached to this moment burns itself out *instanter* and relegates the listener to a realm of inattention and distraction. On the one hand, the domain of production and plugging presupposes distraction and, on the other, produces it. 263

Ultimately he arrived at a distinction between two different social-psychological types of mass behaviour towards music in general and popular music in particular. The 'rhythmically obedient type', which Adorno believed was found mainly among younger people, held fast to the basic tempo in spite of any syncopations, and was thus expressing its pleasure in obedience. This view corresponded to that in his essay on jazz, where the jazz fan was seen as being masochistically subjected to an authoritarian collective. In contrast, the 'emotional type' used sentimental music to unload feelings, above all the feeling of unhappiness. Both types, according to Adorno, were reconciled to their social plight, although the first type was marching and the second weeping.

Taken as a whole, these essays of Adorno's represent a position which, in spite of its trenchant criticism of society, condemned the victims of the social structure it criticized; and it passed sentence on those victims without making any attempt to address them, whether immediately or at an early opportunity. There was no let-up in his negative interpretation of the ways in which these victims expressed themselves, and Adorno was thus exposing himself to Lazarsfeld's criticism that, by treating the explication of all the logical possibilities of a problem as superfluous, he was allowing himself to maintain his own prejudices. The fact that many people whistle distorted forms of tunes they are familiar with was, for Adorno, equivalent to children mistreating their pet dogs. The equally obvious possibility that this might be a matter of variation on a theme, or a disrespectful way of exploiting what was familiar for one's own purposes, he did not consider worth mentioning. Thus the idea of testing his suppositions empirically could simply not arise. Adorno's texts are full of similar cases.

What tempted Adorno into this self-glorifying indifference to pleasanter aspects of the human objects of his analysis was the notion, which regularly appeared at the conclusion of his trains of thought, of bursting things open from within, of sudden transformation, of disturbance. The theory about the listener in 'On Popular Music' closed with the sentence, 'To become transformed into an insect, man needs that energy which might possibly achieve his transformation into a man.' 264 But a position so distanced from the subjects it was concerned with was just as questionable as one which had no scruples in allowing its subjects to speak only through the filter of questionnaires or experimental situations prepared in advance and lacking any social-critical background.

### Balancing Acts and Indecision

While Lazarsfeld was attempting, at the Princeton Radio Research Project, to reconcile Adorno's ideas, as a European, to the kind of American empirical research contract research that Lazarsfeld himself represented at its best, empirical research had entirely ceased at the International Institute of Social Research itself. The various projects on the family, authority and unemployment, which had been drafted as continuations of *Studies on Authority and the Family*, had slowly ground to a halt. The collection and analysis of empirical materials on as large a scale as possible, which Horkheimer had announced in 1935 in the foreword to *Studies on Authority and the Family*, had failed to take place. There is no evidence to show that there was even any development of the plan, announced by Horkheimer in the foreword, for a continuation of collective research work. The 'fusion of constructive and empirical methods' seemed in practice to have been abandoned completely. 'Continuous collaboration between various specialists' had been left to improvisation, and had consequently been reduced to a matter of connecting various topics and points of view through frequent personal contacts and informal editorial meetings. Alice Maier, Horkheimer's secretary in New York for many years, recalled:

The building we worked in at 429 West 117th Street in New York had at one time been a private house. There were two rooms on each floor. On the ground floor there weren't any offices at all, just the kitchen and the room Mrs. Murdoch, who cleaned and looked after everything, lived in. On the first floor, Marcuse had the front room and Neumann the room at the back. On the second floor, Pollock was at the front and Lowenthal, with the editorial office for the journal, was at the back. Mr Horkheimer worked on the fourth floor in the front room, and the other secretaries and I were on the fourth floor as well, in the other room. There were three or four smaller rooms on the top floor. My husband

[Joseph Maier] was in one of them and Otto Kirchheimer was in another. 265

Fromm had always worked at home when he was not at his consulting room, and in 1938 and 1939 he spent long periods in Switzerland for health reasons. The two `communists', Wittfogel and Grossmann, did not have offices at the Institute either. Wittfogel had a study in the Butler Library at Columbia University, and had also more or less established himself at the Institute of Pacific Relations. Grossmann lived at home as a private scholar financed by the Institute of Social Research. His long, ponderous manuscripts did not meet the expectations of the Institute's directors at all, and, with a not particularly happy life, he had become a rather difficult character. Adorno worked part of the time in Newark and part of the time at home.

These were the physical conditions forming the background to the Institute's work. How had it come about that `continuous collaboration between various specialists' had become a phrase that could only be used with considerable reservations in connection with the Institute, and that the `fusion of constructive and empirical methods' was taking place to a lesser extent than before? What was behind it? Was it the result of doubts about the continuing significance of large-scale collective research? Was it the result of disorientation among people in exile? Was it merely a pause for reorientation?

Soon after the completion of *Studies on Authority and the Family*, which was to have been merely an interim report, a phase of doubt and indecision or of reorientation, both of the Institute's academic director and of the Institute dependent on him, seems to have begun. The point of view from which the Institute's collective research had started was the conviction that authority was in a process of decay, at least in the long term. In the second half of the 1930s, there could be no more doubt about the ability of Nazism to survive, and the undermining of the family and the increasing reduction in unemployment seemed to match perfectly well the requirement that the individual's character should conform to authoritarian social conditions. Under these conditions, the Institute's original point of view could not be maintained. At the same time, the Roosevelt period in the USA showed that, even in non-fascist states, authoritarian (or subservient) thinking and behaviour was not decaying, even in the long term, but rather increasing. Roosevelt himself had spoken of an `authoritarian experiment'. Thomas Mann, for example, in one of his lectures broadcast by the BBC for German listeners in November 1940, maintained:

Europe's destroyers, the violators of all the rights of the peoples, rightly see in Roosevelt their most powerful opponent . . . In this age of the masses, to which the idea of a leader [*Führer*] belongs, it was reserved for America to produce the happy phenomenon of

a modern mass leader who seeks what is good and intelligent, what is truly of the future, a man who seeks peace and freedom. 266

This was a view of Roosevelt which had long been common among German émigrés, and was usually accompanied by support or enthusiasm for him.267

Roosevelt's New Deal strengthened the trade unions and sometimes encouraged, sometimes restrained big business. It brought Jews and left-wingers into important political and administrative positions for the first time, and made the so-called Red Decade, the Rebel Thirties, possible. But neither its intentions nor its consequences included changes in the structure of the economy. The 1938 recession brought unemployment back up to ten million, and Roosevelt admitted in a public declaration that the only way out of the depression was to stimulate the arms industry. This made it unmistakably clear that developments in the USA represented the lesser evil compared with European conditions, but were in no way an alternative heralding a socialist democracy. The trade unions, which had been strengthened, were giant, hierarchical lobbying organizations. One of the measures characteristic of the New Deal was the creation out of thin air of institutions whose main task was administration. The image that was being offered was one of an ever-changing variety of caring organizations ready to intervenethe improvised harbingers of an authoritarian welfare state, with Roosevelt's `fireside chats', broadcast on the radio, providing soft background music.

It was not easy to assess this accurately against the dismal background of European fascism, which was marching from victory to victory. Towards the end of the 1930s, it was no longer possible for the Institute to carry out empirical research simultaneously in Europe and the USA, and it had to be restricted to America. To identify a complex of critical problems related to society which suited American conditions and at the same time fitted in with the Institute's policy of caution required time. Horkheimer was increasingly impatient in his criticism of the various scientific disciplines, and increasingly severe in his labelling of every theoretical and philosophical tendency which was not critical of society, and which was successful in the USA, as a form of recognition and acceptance of existing conditions. This may partly explain why empirical and collaborative research ceased at the Institute altogether, why from the mid-1930s onwards it was left to Lazarsfeld, who for Horkheimer and Adorno belonged to the positivists, to represent the research methods which had been used by the Institute up till then. It may explain, too, why it was only the journal which continuedand in German. At this level, and with a European orientation, it was possible for the time being to carry on working.

But there was an additional factor. As Horkheimer wrote to Madame Favez, who kept the Institute's Geneva office running, in October 1938,

We are moving house on 1 November. The suburb we are going to is called Scarsdale. It is a small house . . . in a wooded area, and I think I shall be able to work well there. So I'll be able to make a start at last on the book on dialectical philosophy. I will only be going into the Institute about once a week, on the day we have lectures. On the same day I will be giving a small seminar on Spinoza at the Institute. 268

At the back of Horkheimer's mind there were already more detailed plans for getting his book finished. The long-cherished plan to write the book with Adorno in the south of France had turned out not to be practicable in 1939 because of conditions in Europe, and he wanted to finish it in California. He had travelled to California with his wife in the summer of 1938, and wrote enthusiastically to Lowenthal from Santa Monica, near Hollywood: 'It's true that the landscape, and sometimes even the architecture, is beautiful and the climate is simply medicine. If we have a single cent to our names in fall 1939 and La France is not possible, we'll have to come here. You know it's cheaper here . . . It is stupid to live in the east unless it's absolutely necessary.'<sup>269</sup> Financial considerations spurred him on in his resolution finally to start serious work on what he saw as his major task and opportunity, the further development of theory in his book on dialectics.

The Institute was an impressive organization. In 1938 its permanent members, apart from Horkheimer and Pollock, were Fromm, Grossmann, Gumperz, Lowenthal, Marcuse, Neumann, Adorno and Wittfogel. The research associates varied from year to year, but Otto Kirchheimer and Fritz Karsen were there on a long-term basis, while there were six to eight shorter-term ones. There were also between four and six secretaries. Two young historians, Moses Finkelstein (later Finley) and Benjamin Nelson, worked as translators and editorial assistants. There were additional short-term and part-time posts connected with empirical research. To round off the picture of the Institute's expenditure: according to an estimate made by Pollock, it donated around \$200,000 in grants to support émigré academics, with individual grants to around 130 people, in the decade between 1933 and 1942.<sup>270</sup> This organization, as an 'exterior' regarded by the two directors of the Institute with mixed feelings, suddenly appeared to be endangering the dialectics project. Why?

The assets of the Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales, it was true, had shrunk in 1937 from 3.9 to 3.5 million Swiss francs, and the capital had to be drawn on for the first time.<sup>271</sup> Unpleasant though this was, it did not contradict the intentions of Weil's endowment, which stated that the money was not to be treated as capital, but should be gradually spent over an extended period. The recession year of 1938 did not bring any improvement, but rather a drastic deterioration, for which Pollock himself, by his own confession, was responsible. An entire wall of his office was reserved for Stock Exchange quotations, but he had an

unlucky touch in investments. The beginning of what might have been only a temporary reduction in the Institute's massive assets was not in itself sufficient grounds for letting the empirical research projects grind slowly to a halt and not even making a start on a new collaborative research project. Less ambitious empirical data collection than that which took place for the *Studies on Authority and the Family* might have sufficed for this.

There was a definite reason why the Institute's organization appeared to be a danger to the dialectics project, a reason why the project became more and more independent of the programme of using the Institute for collaborative research on social theory integrating empirical and specialist research. This was the Horkheimers' fear of not having sufficiently large finances at their disposal. It was this fear which had enabled Horkheimer to produce some of his severest criticisms of the bourgeoisie in his aphorisms in *Dawn*, and which had nevertheless driven him to make the peculiar contracts with the Society for Social Research which were mentioned above. In the summer of 1940, on his way to settle in Los Angeles, he wrote to Lowenthal, 'On the whole journey I keep seeing it coming up in front of my eyes: "Money is the best protection, money is the best protection, money is . . ."' 272 This fear, which Pollock, who usually saw the dark side of things, exacerbated, reminded him that in view of the increasingly insecure financial situation the book on dialectics had to be given first priority.

But fear was also an important motive for maintaining the work of the Institute at as impressive a level as possible. Under the umbrella of Columbia University, the Institute was an important protection; without it Horkheimer would have felt entirely like an individual cast into exile in a society in which, as he saw it, only powerful organizations offered any protection and individuals and their property were at the mercy of all the manipulated 'accidents' of the monopoly-capitalist era. And his need for achievement in the theoretical sphere was no less highly developed than his need for self-respect, which was flattered by his role as a managerial scholar and director of a scientific institution. This inner conflict produced a compromise in which the business of the Institute continued but without any particular direction. From the winter of 1938-9 onward, the Institute tried (very half-heartedly) to get official foundations and private citizens interested in its activities as a whole and in specific research projects (as briefly sketched out in the Institute's impressive-looking prospectus of 1938), in the hope of receiving grant money. (Horkheimer wrote to Benjamin, 'As you can imagine, this activity, in view of the special nature of our work, which is seen here even more than elsewhere as a luxury, at the very least, and in the medium of this language, is not easy for me.'273) Many of the staff were left confused and insecure by more or less secretive hints dropped about the Institute's impending financial collapse, and by obscure reductions in their salaries. Horkheimer was rushing to complete his book

on dialectics, but never actually getting round to it. And he regarded the Institute's commitments at Columbia University disparagingly and condescendingly, while at the same time wondering how to make it clear to Columbia that it was not showing the Institute the appreciation it deserved.

The Institute's disorientation in the late 1930s made the balancing acts it had always had to perform, for example in relation to its academic environment, even more difficult. The seminars were virtually discussion groups for the Institute's associates, and American students only rarely took part in them. If the Institute's staff kept to themselves the meetings announced in its prospectus, they felt all the more secure. These included, for example, Horkheimer's seminar on 'Select Problems in the History of Logic, with Reference to the Basic Concepts of the [*sic*] Social History' (1936-8), the seminar by Gumperz and Pollock on 'Theories of the Business Cycle' (1936-7), Weil's seminar on 'Standards of Living in National Socialist Germany', and Adorno's seminar on 'The Social Setting of Richard Wagner's Music' (1938). They also largely kept to themselves when 'Dr Max Horkheimer and members of the staff of the International Institute of Social Research' gave lectures, from 1936 onwards, in the Extension Division of Columbia University. Under various slightly differing titles, these lectures all dealt with authoritarian thinking and authoritarian institutions in Europe. In 1937-8, for example, Horkheimer gave a philosophical introduction, Marcuse spoke on the history of the ideas of domination and subjection, and later Lowenthal spoke on the problem of authority in literature, Neumann on authoritarian states, and Fromm on the structure of the modern character. For Horkheimer, at least, all this was an irritating distraction from the real work. He did not want to invest much time and energy in it, and was not particularly interested in what the students were interested in. On the other hand, it was, in the long run, not dignified enough for him merely to give badly attended lectures in the Extension Division on topics unrelated to examination subjects. And in 1939-40 he, Lowenthal and Adorno all felt it as an insult to the Institute when Neumann, who was much more successful as a university teacher, was appointed to a professorship at Columbia, and not Horkheimer. 274 This was symptomatic of the dilemma Horkheimer and his supporters saw themselves as facing: they wanted to remain at a distance from the academic system, but at the same time to be treated as if they were taking part in it in leading positions.

Another balancing act was involved in the effort not to betray the cause of the left, while simultaneously defending themselves against corresponding suspicions an effort to avoid what Adorno and Horkheimer were accusing other intellectuals of. When a possibility arose of bringing out a French-language publication of a collection of Horkheimer's essays with the Paris publishers Gallimard, Bernard Groethuysen, an acquaintance of Benjamin's who had lived in Paris for years, evinced

two kinds of anxiety in the eyes of Adorno and Horkheimer: 'First, fear that for his Marxist friends your book might be too academic. Secondly, fear that official university people might find it too Marxist.' 275 Horkheimer extended the idea:

The aversion to us from the official side can still be seen as resulting from the idea that there is some sort of power behind Marxist theory, although precisely this power is miserably withering away for the very reason that it has relinquished that theory. The aversion to everything 'academic' . . . is merely the result of that panicstricken fear of criticism which sees thinking as in itself suspicious . . . It was only a matter of time before the opposed powers, which resemble one another, joined forces again. Thinking is increasingly becoming the common enemy . . . indeed, we both saw the beginning of this process in Frankfurt. It has now become generalized and is uniting groups which had been opposed to one another.276

Horkheimer's strategy amounted to presenting their own position to 'Marxist friends' as a form of radical thought, while presenting it to 'official university people' as a form of faithfulness to the European tradition in the humanities and philosophy.

But precisely this appeal to the European intellectual tradition was inappropriate to the attempt to raise the Institute of Social Research above suspicion in a country in which social research was more or less identical with empirical research, and in which close collaboration with research clients was customary, and the continuous publication of research results expected. In a statement prepared in 1943 to defend the Institute against certain suspicions, not for the first time (although the text may never have been used for this purpose), Horkheimer said:

A further mistake, for which I feel partly responsible, but which may be explained by my background, is our having called ourselves an Institute instead of a Foundation or an Endowment. When we came to this country it had been our idea to devote the funds which we brought here to enable European scholars who had lost their position by the rise of dictatorship to continue their own work. When we became aware that a few of our American friends expected of an Institute of Social Sciences that it engage in studies on pertinent social problems, fieldwork and other empirical investigations, we tried to satisfy these demands as well as we could, but our heart was set on individual studies in the sense of *Geisteswissenschaften* and the philosophical analysis of culture.

Since we had not to rely [*sic*] on outside funds, we considered it as our duty and our privilege to cultivate the kinds of studies typical for older European humanities as they had lost their home

over there without being able to establish themselves in other countries. This goes for the contents, methods as well as for the organization of the work. This is also the reason why we continued for a long time publications in German and French language [*sic*] and even did not care to bring out a great deal of publications at all. 277

Over a period of years, the *ZfS*, in which full-page advertisements for *Studies on Authority and the Family* were still appearing in 1939, was the only public evidence of the Institute's work. Horkheimer defended its continued publication mainly in German in a paper distributed at a lunch given in January 1937 for the Social Science Faculty at Columbia. The discussion of fundamental theoretical problems which continued the tradition of German philosophy and sociology was, in the view of 'our friends abroad', better done in their German native tongue than in unsatisfactory English or French.

We believe that slight modifications of shadings of meanings are inevitable in every translation from one language into another, from German into English, and vice versa. Especially in philosophy, sociology, and history, the process of translating always bears in itself the danger of simplification and popularization. So far, we have avoided this pitfall. Today the *Zeitschrift* is the only completely independent organ in our field of science published in the German language.

Since Horkheimer had always supported plain and clear forms of expression, and in view of the linguistically unpolished work of almost all of the associates of the *ZfS* apart from Benjamin and Adorno, such linguistic sensitivity was not very convincing. Strategic considerations were also decisive. Publishing the journal in German Horkheimer, Lowenthal and Fromm were agreed on this would offer as little opportunity as possible to other people to 'interfere with' or 'control' it. 278 And a welcome side-effect of publication in German was that the Institute was contributing to intellectual resistance among the Germans. The Geneva office's secretary, Madame Favez, asked Horkheimer in 1938 if she could offer several volumes of the *ZfS* at a reduced price to a group of German students who had escaped to Basle and who wanted to study the work of the Institute of Social Research, which they had for a long time valued very highly. Horkheimer was overjoyed 'that our work, even today, is not altogether in vain', 279 and quoted a letter from a German professor who had emigrated to Norway, for whom, together with his friends in Germany, the journal was 'an oasis in the intellectual degradation and barrenness which now dominates philosophical and intellectual life in Germany'.

Although the fears and precautions of Horkheimer and his associates

often seemed exaggerated and absurd, they had, or at least acquired, genuine causes. At the end of the 1930s they were experiencing in exile a situation which in some respects recalled the last years of the Weimar Republic. In the late 1930s, when the New Deal came to a standstill, the end of the Red Decade also arrived. In reaction to the years of prominence in politics, administration and the media of left-wingers, or those denounced as such, an unmistakable anti-communism appeared, increasing in strength in the wake of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Even during the 1930s, there had been tolerance for left-wing positions among those who were established in America, but hardly ever for émigrés. Left-wing émigrés still felt at their safest under the wing of Columbia University. Columbia was one of the universities at which professors who were left-wing liberals, friendly towards the New Deal and friendly towards Roosevelt or at least one of these were relatively well represented. The conservative Republican president of Columbia, Nicholas Murray Butler, was proud of the fact that members of his staff were involved in the Roosevelt administration.

In this political climate, which had been growing more bitter in the late 1930s, the Institute suffered more from a vague kind of mistrust which had clearly been inspired by émigrés of other persuasions. Relations between the Institute and the New School for Social Research were particularly tense. 280 The New School had been founded after the First World War by a group of liberals, and had for a number of years been a centre for progressive academic intellectuals in the USA. Thorstein Veblen, for example, had taught there up to 1927. In the 1920s, under Alvin Johnson, it turned conservative and developed into an ordinary institution for adult education, dependent on financial grants. In the 1930s, with the 'University in Exile' affiliated to it as a genuine university, it became the numerically most important concentration of émigré academics in the USA. The Rockefeller Foundation had given its immediate agreement to Johnson's request for finance for one hundred professorships but the New School never came near to reaching the full number. Johnson founded the journal *Social Research* in 1934 as a publication outlet for his émigrés. The New School, with the anti-Marxist Adolph Löwe and the anti-Freudian Max Wertheimer, confronted Horkheimer's Institute with old acquaintances from the time in Frankfurt. Hans Speier, also an anti-Freudian, had written a condescending, patronizing review of *Studies on Authority and the Family* for *Social Research* in 1936. Emil Lederer, who was particularly favoured by Johnson, and up to his death in 1939 played a leading role among the émigrés at the New School, was an anti-Marxist, and even an opponent of the New Deal. Lederer sent a manuscript on 'Imperialism' by Wolfgang Hallgarten, who was considered to be a Marxist, back to France unopened. The personal friendship between Löwe and Horkheimer, Tillich's connection with both institutions, and the fact that a communist such as Hanns Eisler was able to teach at the New School, led to impenetrable strategic confusion.

But the directors of the Institute had to be prepared for the fact that suspicions that the Institute had Communist members of staff, was Marxist and was only a front organization were being spread not only by people at the New School but also by all sorts of other émigrés who wanted to discredit the Institute in the eyes of American grant organizations, or simply give vent to their irritation with it. On 30 July 1940, during the university vacation, two police officers visited the Institute. Only Lowenthal and one of the secretaries were present. Lowenthal reported to Horkheimer:

In the course of a long discussion, they took precise information about individual members of staff, how long they had been there and which of them were Americans, and noted both their home and vacation addresses. Headed writing paper, our pamphlet [the 1938 prospectus], the book by Rusche and Kirchheimer, the title and contents pages of the new journal [the *SPSS*, the English-language continuation of the *ZfS*], and what Social Studies consisted of, all made a deep impression on them. 281

The visit was allegedly part of a general inspection of foreign institutions, but Lowenthal found that no one else in academic circles had been affected.

It was hardly ever possible to nail down suspicions of Marxism as a reason for difficulties that were being made for the Institute. At the beginning of the 1940s, when the Institute was looking for research funds to support two projects, Neumann had a talk with Carl Joachim Friedrich, a well-known, extremely busy professor of politics, who had moved to the USA as early as 1921 and was teaching at Harvard University. Neumann reported to Horkheimer in August 1941:

I asked Friedrich for his views about our project on 'Cultural Aspects of National Socialism'. He answered that it would be an excellent project if it was carried out by 'competent, unbiased and undogmatic scholars'. When he made this statement, it was clear to me at once that Friedrich considered the Institute to be a purely Marxist affair, and consequently did not trust us to be able to carry out such a project in an unbiased manner. The only question, and I had to make the decision on the spur of the moment, was what tactics to apply. I could defend myself indignantly against the hidden accusation, or I could play with at least half-open cards. I decided on the latter course. I therefore asked him openly whether he meant by this that the Institute was purely Marxist and as a result of its dogmatic commitments could not guarantee that it would carry out the project objectively. His answer was 'yes'. I explained to him, in the first place, that there were differences between Marxists and Marxists, and secondly that it was not correct to say that the Institute was made up of Marxists. Some were

Marxists, others were not. In any case, none of them was either directly or indirectly affiliated to the Communist Party. A half-hour discussion developed from this, in which I explained to him the Institute's theoretical basis and the tasks which we believe we have to carry out. At the end of this I asked him whether he still held to his original suppositions. The answer was 'no'. 282

Minor successes in clarifying matters like this were not necessarily lasting, and were frustrated by the fact that Horkheimer's Institute was becoming relatively more left-wing without their own doing simply because it was withdrawing from older views at a slower pace than most of the other émigrés who were not already conservative. Horkheimer's statement on the first page of his essay on 'The Jews and Europe' was, in the context of the views then held by the émigré Germans, a daring one. He would hardly have risked being as unequivocal as this in English: 'No one can ask the émigrés to hold a mirror up to the world that has produced fascism in the very place in which they are being offered asylum. But those who do not wish to speak of capitalism should be silent about fascism.' 283

In articulating this sort of view, Horkheimer saw himself as someone who was using the Institute's independence to speak the truths which other émigrés, if they were not already blind to them anyway, did not dare to express. In fact the former religious socialists Paul Tillich and Eduard Heimann had in the meantime moved over to the view that there could be no question of fascism having a class character or of a crucial link between fascism and capitalism. 284 The editor of the *Neues Tagebuch*, Leopold Schwarzschild, a former left-winger, held that Hitler's support came more from the working class than from the bourgeoisie. Arthur Feiler of the New School of Social Research, who with his colleague Max Ascoli, an Italian émigré, published *Fascism for Whom?* in 1938, saw Nazism as the German form of Russian Bolshevism. And Franz Borkenau, a former communist and one-time Institute scholarship holder, wrote in his *The Totalitarian Enemy* in 1939, 'Nazism is Brown Bolshevism, just as Bolshevism could be described as "Red Fascism".' Emil Lederer's *State of the Masses*, published posthumously in 1940, began with the sentence 'Modern dictatorship is neither a last-ditch defence of capitalism . . . nor a revolt by the middle classes against their decline.' He regarded the totalitarian dictatorships as an 'abolition of history'. This was a romantic, apocalyptic view most effectively represented by Hermann Rauschning, who had been a leading Nazi and President of Danzig until 1936, when he broke with Hitler. Rauschning saw Nazism as a 'revolution of nihilism'. His book of this title, published in German in 1938 in Zurich and in English in New York a year later, became, together with his *Voice of Destruction*, published in 1940, the most successful and influential interpretation of Nazism by an émigré in the USA.

From the start, the émigrés who were drawn to the USA tended to be conservative, while the communist émigrés were concentrated more in Mexico. 285 The Jewish émigrés, who made up over 90 per cent of the German émigrés in the USA, were mostly political refugees only in the sense that they were the victims of Nazi policy, without having actually belonged to opposition parties. Many of those who had been driven towards the political left by rightists who were all more or less anti-Semitic were able, in the USA, to return to more right-wing positions which suited them better. Most of the later émigrés moved to the USA as well, many of them members of the Jewish upper classes who had continued their activities under Nazi rule for as long as possible. Proportionately, the number of anti-fascists among them was very small.

The impact of Horkheimer's 'The Jews and Europe' must be seen against this background. It was his first essay on the topic of fascism, and the first on fascism by anyone in the Horkheimer circle since the articles by Pollock and Marcuse in 1933 and 1934. In addition, it represented a general political statement which was unique in the Institute's Horkheimer period. Horkheimer had hesitated even longer than usual before publishing it. The text was finished at the end of 1938 but was not sent to the printer until the beginning of September 1939, shortly after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact and the German invasion of Poland which followed a week later. The essay was published in the final issue of the *ZfS*, the last German-language number of the Institute's journal. For the first time, Horkheimer did not publish one of his longer articles at the front of the issue. The text had been repeatedly subjected to particularly careful review by his closest colleagues. The passages about Russia, for example, had been softened several times, and a reference to legacy-hunters in relation to Russia was finally omitted completely. Despite this, Horkheimer could still count on falling between every available stool.

The nub of the article was that, since it took the view that fascism was the political form of monopoly capitalism, it seemed on the face of it to be loyal to the communist theory that fascism was merely the agent of big business. But in reality the article constantly moved beyond this theory in the direction of interpreting fascism as an authoritarian state which appeared not merely to be a consequence of capitalism, but could also be seen as existing wherever 'the domination of a minority, on the basis of actual possession of the material means of production' existed; wherever the concentration of economic power had gone over to organized violence as a means of overcoming social contradictions; and wherever it was possible for a bureaucracy to take decisions about life and death.286 (As early as 1938, when Wittfogel's 'Theory of Oriental Society' was published in the *ZfS*, the text of a lecture by Horkheimer on the Institute and its work had stated that its research on non-bourgeois forms of society had given particular attention to China. China 'has for many centuries had a bureaucratic social hierarchy which, in view of the

general development of Europe and above all of Germany and Russia, is constantly increasing in theoretical importance. It appears that the simple historical division into ancient slave economy, feudalism and capitalism, which has previously been made in the philosophy of history (this was a euphemism for Marxist theory) must be fundamentally elaborated on, through theoretically based research on China.) With optimistic-sounding words, as in his view that the ideas of nation and race had achieved their ultimate extension, and that the Germans did not really believe in them any more, Horkheimer seemed to be confirming the communist theory of fascism as the last struggle of capitalism before it went under. But in reality he was denying any hopes of this sort by using a theory derived from Fromm's social-psychological functionalism. This held that a fundamental anthropological change was taking place which, precisely in the absence of cultural illusions and in the absence of belief in any ideology, was leaving humanity submissive and obsequious towards its rulers.

Individuals will be subjected to a new form of selective breeding which will affect the foundations of social character. The transformation of the oppressed nineteenth-century unemployed worker into the obsequious member of a fascist organization recalls, in its historical significance, the transformation of the medieval craftsman into the Protestant citizen by the Reformation, or of the English village poor into modern industrial workers. 287

This view, going beyond the explicit expression 'long-term economic prospects' which Horkheimer used, also implicitly conceded a long-term social-psychological and political future to fascism.

Ideas of this sort were bound to offend democrats who supported capitalism, Marxists who supported the Soviet Union, centralism and the planned economy, and in addition all the anti-fascists and émigrés who feared that growing isolationist tendencies in the USA would be strengthened by favourable prognoses about fascism. Olga Lang, Wittfogel's second wife, who had worked at the Institute from time to time, and whose *Chinese Family and Society* was published with the Institute's assistance in 1946, wrote to Horkheimer in April 1940:

I hope that lots of people will understand the article, particularly because its arguments are directed not only towards the Jews but also towards the whole group of émigrés who support capitalism and hope that liberalism will return . . . But I also hope that not everyone will understand it, and that the people at Columbia will be satisfied with the summary. 288

But Horkheimer also passed harsh judgements on various groups of people. He criticized 'exiled intellectuals' who seemed to have lost not only their civil rights but their minds as well. At the very moment at

which `social harmony and the possibility of progress in capitalist society have been shown to be the illusions which critics of the free market economy had always said they were, since in spite of technical progress the crisis, as predicted, has become permanent and the heirs to free enterprise are only able to maintain their position by abolishing civil liberty'at such a moment these people had thrown off, with a sigh of relief, `the "Jewish-Hegelian jargon" which at one time found its way from London into the German left' (this was an inspired circumlocution for Marxist theory), and they had returned `to neo-humanism, to the personality of Goethe, to the true Germany, and other such treasures of culture'. He criticized Jewish émigrés who had once considered, or even still considered, `a form of rationality which runs counter to the specific conditions of mere utility at each given stage . . . to be subversive and far-fetched', and he also criticized established American Jews who did not realize that `the idea of a home in horrifying conditions . . . must be a symbol of lies and mockery to every Jew who has experienced such a home in the course of the millennia.' According to Horkheimer, not only were the fascists themselves more advanced than the people he was criticizing, since they `had always seen the fragility' of the state the Jews longed to return to, but so too were `the German people, who are desperately showing off their belief in the Führer, but have already seen through him better than any of those who call Hitler a madman and Bismarck a genius'. 289

Horkheimer's advice to the Jews was: they should return to `abstract monotheism, to the rejection of belief in images, to a refusal to make what was finite into the Infinite'.<sup>290</sup> Lack of respect for a form of existence which had glorified itself into a god was `the religion of those who, in the Europe of the iron heel, have never ceased to devote their lives to preparations for a better world'.<sup>291</sup> Horkheimer was advising the Jews, therefore, to take a theological-materialist attitude. The prospect that beckoned was `the leap into freedom'.<sup>292</sup> The concept that planning was possible had become ambiguous as a result of the fascist elements in the planned economy and state dirigism. Thus the one concept which Horkheimer had always used to describe a better society had been stolen from him. Instead, he used the concept of freedom, which was nevertheless tainted in its turn by `liberalism', from his point of view.

At the end of the article, Horkheimer sneered:

The notion that the progressive forces have been defeated and that fascism can last for ever leaves intellectuals at a loss for ideas. They think that anything which works must have something good about it, and conclude that fascism consequently cannot work. But there are periods in which existing conditions, in the strength and efficiency which they possess, thereby become evil.

But what sort of ideas was Horkheimer himself *not* left `at a loss for'? In December 1938 he had written to Madame Favez,

The only consolation which one can still entertain for humanity is that this dreadful time of confusion, which may well last for some decades yet, will, like the decline of antiquity, sow the seeds of a new and purer culture. There are very few seeds, and every day more disappear. But ultimately this experience cannot simply continue without having some effect on people. Tyranny and slavery in antiquity produced the concepts of the infinite value of the individual soul, of mercy and of the brotherly community. And even totalitarian mass hysteria will give way to a more concrete vision of freedom than was previously the case . . . The fact that the night will not last for ever is a comfort even to those who perish in it. 293

The Institute assisted many people with affidavits references for the immigration authorities and also with finance to escape from the old world to the new one. Karl Korsch, for example, who came to New York in 1936 to join his wife, received \$100 a month from the Institute to begin with. Ludwig Marcuse, who had once been invited by the Institute to write an outline of a monograph on *Turnvater Jahn*,<sup>294</sup> which was subsequently rejected, received the offer of an affidavit from the Institute in the spring of 1938, without even having asked for it. When he arrived in New York on Easter Sunday 1939, 'a friend from the "Institute of Social Research", who had booked a room for me', was waiting on the pier.<sup>295</sup> Walter Benjamin had also frequently been pressed by Theodor and Gretel Adorno, from 1938 onwards, to come to the USA. He hesitated longer and was even more alarmed by the idea of emigrating to America than Ludwig Marcuse, who would have preferred to emigrate anywhere but the New World, which seemed to him not so much new as frightening. Benjamin's escape therefore became much more difficult; the fact that he died had nothing to do with any lack of assistance from the Institute. Horkheimer's parents moved to Switzerland in 1938, having lost the greater part of their property, but they were otherwise well provided for. Adorno's and Lowenthal's parents, who were already elderly, escaped via Cuba to the USA.

4

In the New World II:  
Productive Decay

'Running an Institute is by No Means Required by the Foundation's Statutes'

The crisis at the Institute continued. It was partly caused and certainly aggravated by the patriarchal and confidential way in which the directors of the Institute kept its resources at their own disposal. This made a mockery of the claim that the Institute represented a united community of Critical Theorists of society.

When the endowment capital began to shrink, from the late 1930s onwards, Horkheimer's main concern became to reserve a large enough part of the assets early enough to secure his own scholarly work on a long-term basis. Accordingly, Lowenthal in his capacity as one of the trustees of the 'foundations' among which the funds were distributed was one day asked to transfer \$50,000 to a fund with Horkheimer as its sole beneficiary. Lowenthal had reservations about this on formal grounds, and suggested instead repeating a bank transfer procedure which had been used before.

In Horkheimer's view, it was possible to meet the requirements of the Weil Foundation's statutes without actually having an institute. As an extreme measure, he imagined transforming the Institute 'into a foundation offering four or five private research contracts . . . Running an institute is by no means required by the Foundation's statutes. On the contrary, it is purely a matter of promoting social theory.'<sup>1</sup> Since Horkheimer ultimately saw Weil's Foundation as the material basis for promoting a theory of society of which he himself was the principal incarnation, the use of the Foundation for shared purposes on a united basis was impossible. The financial situation was never disclosed, even to the circle of the Institute's full-time associates, in a form that could be checked. The only ones who really had access to the information represented the 'interior': Horkheimer and Pollock. Lowenthal, however, was partly informed, in his capacity as a kind of general secretary.

Horkheimer's tactic and, where necessary, Lowenthal's as well was to treat regulations and figures relating to financial matters as a domain belonging to Pollock, who, they would claim, was conducting himself 'like a bourgeois businessman'. Pollock, for his part, used his whole personal manner, his partly pretended and partly genuine dimness and irrationality, to make anyone putting questions abandon the attempt, or else to make their enquiries run aground. He was officially in charge of determining the level of salaries, or rather of salary cuts. His measures here affected the members of the Institute on an individual basis, and they accepted their mutual isolation in these matters, only occasionally grumbling about suspected injustices. Salaries, according to Lowenthal in retrospect,

were set in discussions between Horkheimer and Pollock, and communicated to us. We sometimes had difficulties, but there were no negotiations. You have to picture the situation these people were lucky devils, after all . . . If Marcuse or I had said in 1938, 'I don't like it, I don't want \$350 a month, I want \$500, otherwise I'm leaving.' 'OK, go.' Where did we have to go to? 2

When there were complaints, they were usually made to Lowenthal, who kept Horkheimer informed about them (as he did about everything else as well) so that conciliatory measures could be undertaken. Together with the fixation which the individual members of staff had on Horkheimer, who encouraged these fixations by giving each of them individually the impression that he had a special relationship with him, and by giving inconsistent and sometimes even intentionally contradictory information to each of them, this was a classic example of the maxim 'divide and rule' being applied. Under conditions such as these, there was no way for a crisis to be resolved rationally on a common basis. Crises could only be resolved at an unnecessarily high psychological cost and, in the end, only according to the principle that some people must be asked to make sacrifices so that others, or rather others' ability to fulfil the theoretical task, could be saved. From 1939 onwards, there were time-bombs ticking in the Institute although in many other respects it was an oasis in the midst of exile.

The problems of exile, real or imagined financial difficulties, and the patriarchal conduct and indecisiveness of the Institute's directors, together with Horkheimer's need for security, produced an unpredictable jumble of insecurities from which none of the members of its staff was spared. In 1939 Horkheimer told Benjamin that 'in spite of our efforts, it is possible that the day may come in the not too distant future when we will have to inform you that, with the best will in the world, we are not in a position to renew your research contract.'<sup>3</sup> In the spring of 1939, Pollock told Fromm that from that October the Institute would no longer be able to pay his salary (\$330 per month). According to a letter from Fromm to Horkheimer, Pollock also gave Julian Gumperz a similar

warning. At the beginning of September 1939 Pollock informed Neumann that he would have to leave the Institute on 1 October 1940. In August 1940 Lowenthal advised Horkheimer, who was away on a journey lasting several weeks to look for a place suitable for him to work in on the west coast, to keep the Institute running in New York for another year. Horkheimer would at that point be able to see 'where we are heading', would be rid of Neumann, provided sufficient attention was given to getting rid of him, and would be able to put Marcuse under enough financial and moral pressure that he would leave to go to a college, if he was offered another \$1200 from autumn 1941 onwards. Lowenthal regularly reported to Horkheimer disrespectful remarks made about him by Neumann and Marcuse, who were friends, and Lowenthal's attitude to Marcuse could hardly be kept hidden for very long. Lowenthal hoped that Marcuse's book on Hegel and the origin of social theory, *Reason and Revolution*, which was published in the spring of 1941, would assist both the Institute and Marcuse in other words, that it would help Marcuse to separate himself from the Institute. Marcuse heard from Neumann that Horkheimer, before leaving for the west coast, had on the one hand said that Marcuse was to help him with his work on the dialectics book, and on the other had said that Marcuse should try to get some lecturing work and look for a university post. Horkheimer himself had told Marcuse that he wanted to write the book in collaboration with him. But Adorno's story was that Horkheimer wanted to write the book in collaboration with him, Adorno. Marcuse was the first to join Horkheimer on the west coast. He was informed, as soon as he arrived, that his salary was to be cut immediately. Even before work on the book had started, he returned to New York briefly to deal with negotiations with Columbia University for regular paid lecturing work for Institute members of staff (see below, p. 296). In a letter to him, Horkheimer wrote, 'The more I think about it, the more I become convinced I'll be able to put the three of us together and build a good team.'<sup>5</sup> At the same time, Adorno suggested that Horkheimer put Marcuse and Lowenthal at the disposal of Columbia University for one or two years as trainee assistants of some sort, in order to lighten the Institute's burden while ensuring Columbia's goodwill.

However, when it came to the question of who was to follow Horkheimer to the west coast when and under what conditions, Lowenthal and Adorno, in spite of their submissiveness, could not avoid a sense of having been well and truly betrayed either. After a discussion with Pollock in September 1941, Lowenthal was left in tears because Pollock had told him about the unfriendly plans for his future in such an unfriendly way, and Adorno was very disturbed that everything had been left hanging in the air for months. Pollock wrote to Horkheimer:

It is interesting to observe the way in which our members of staff are behaving. Marcuse is horribly frightened of ending up as another Günther Stern after five years, and for that reason wants to

maintain his connection with Columbia at any price. Teddie only has one interest in life, to become a minor gentleman of leisure on the west coast as soon as possible, and what happens to the rest of them is of no concern to him whatsoever. Neumann feels more or less secure, no matter which way the decision goes, but of course emphasizes the importance of the link with Columbia. The only person who is completely loyal is I am sorry to say Lowenthal. As you can imagine. Because he is convinced that, no matter what happens, we will not drop him. 6

The devotion of the staff to the Institute and to Horkheimer, with directors such as these, became constantly more desperate, as the prospects of an academic career were particularly poor during these years. Even for members of staff who were humiliated, the Institute remained attractive. It still appeared not only to be an authority offering protection and help, no matter how arbitrarily or provisionally it was able to provide money, opportunities for publication, recommendations, certificates, etc. but also to be the only bastion left for significant theoretical work. And the theoretical work continued, even though the atmosphere was peculiar and there was tremendous personal friction.

The effort to attract notice on the academic and scientific market through their publications so that, if necessary, it would be possible to manage without the Institute, grew in importance as a motivating force, and not only for Neumann. The important members of staff who were more or less obviously forced to leave the Institute published a number of significant works in 1941 and 1942 and in English. Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* and Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* appeared in 1941, and Neumann's *Behemoth* in the spring of 1942. It was not until 1944 that Horkheimer, by contrast, who had been relieved of the need to struggle for his existence, brought out the *Philosophical Fragments*, written in collaboration with Adorno. This was a difficult theoretical text which was published privately in mimeograph, and thus restricted to an extremely small readership. Adorno completed an extensive essay on the *Philosophy of Modern Music (Philosophie der neuen Musik)* in 1941, which he had written without planning to publish it, simply to clarify his own thoughts for internal Institute discussions. He had shown it to outsiders such as Thomas Mann and Dagobert D. Runes, the editor of the *Journal of Aesthetics*, who was prepared to publish it in English. But it principally became an important piece of preparatory work for the *Philosophical Fragments*, and went into the vast wealth of material which Adorno was later to exploit in the texts he published in Germany on his return. Kirchheimer received \$120 a month as a part-time member of staff at the Institute a minimal income, which thanks to my wife's job and some occasional supplementary earnings makes it possible to get through on an extremely modest basis'.<sup>7</sup> He did not manage to complete a work he had planned on 'Constitutional Theory in the Age of Monopoly Capitalism'.

In spite of some vacillations, the basic orientation of the Institute's directors was clear. His `dual role as a scholar and as director of the Institute of Social Research' 8 was too much for Horkheimer, who, as he had complained in his `Notes from Beach Bluff', did `everything with exactly the same degree of libido', and for whom `dictating a letter . . . involved the same amount of effort as writing a scholarly paper'. Alice Maier, his secretary in New York, recalled that `Mr Horkheimer thought very carefully about each and every word, and in two hours had sometimes not dictated a single word . . . Mr Horkheimer dictated to shorthand and then changed everything ten times.'9 From now on, Horkheimer's scholarly work was to take precedence. For this he would need only one or two principal assistants or collaborators. The institute was to be reduced in size to the extent that, although to outward appearances it would continue to exist, internally it would involve hardly any expense or energy.

In practice, this led to the following strategy, with the usual vacillations and contradictions. From 1939 onwards, the Institute's directors had been attempting to throw off ballast and, at the same time, to acquire new finance for research projects. On the one hand, they were preparing favourable conditions for Horkheimer's theoretical work by arranging for him to move to the west coast, where he would be able to live at a splendid remove from the academic system. On the other hand, they were simultaneously trying to maintain the impression that the Institute was continuing its normal existence. This tendency became stronger when in 1941 the opportunity presented itself of giving salaried full-scale lectures within the faculty at Columbia, instead of merely unpaid lectures in the Extension Division. The chance of a professorship was even held out. In the end, using research grants for special projects, they succeeded in keeping a rather scaled-down, self-financing rump of the Institute going. At the same time, Horkheimer and his colleagues were to be given superb access to the academic world, so that they might one day be able to continue their work on the theory as academics, without requiring finance from the Institute.

The outbreak of war and moving the journal's place of publication from Paris to New York meant that a whole year was missed out before the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* was continued as *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, but this left time for work on various books and on the drafts of various research projects.

#### Break with Erich Fromm

The first and most drastic break with one of the staff members was with Erich Fromm. There was a long run-up to this. As early as June 1934 (when Fromm was on his way from Chicago to his holiday resort at Sante Fé, and stopped off for a month in New York with Horkheimer), Horkheimer had written to Pollock that, although Fromm had some

productive ideas, he did not particularly like him, since he was trying to stay on good terms with too many people. This was an advance warning of the criticism which Horkheimer in his correspondence with Adorno later made of Sohn-Rethel: what was missing in Fromm was that he did not have a 'maliciously sharp eye for prevalent conditions'. Even while they were still in Frankfurt, Adorno had looked askance at the collaboration between Horkheimer and Fromm, whom he described as a 'professional Jew'.<sup>10</sup> Adorno's criticism of Fromm's article in 1935 in the *ZfS* on 'The Social Determinateness of Psychoanalytic Therapy'<sup>11</sup> was similar to Horkheimer's. In that article Fromm had criticized Freud on the grounds that, behind the 'tolerance' of the 'indifferent' and 'emotionally cold' analyst, there was a concealed respect for the social taboos of the bourgeoisie which had caused the patient's repressions in the first place. More or less unconsciously, the Freudian analyst was concealing an authoritarian, patricentric attitude. However, for the analytic situation to fulfil its purpose, more than mere 'neutrality' was required: what was necessary was unconditional approval of the patient's demand for happiness. 'Tact' and 'kindness' in the analyst, as Sandor Ferenczi had described them, were indispensable positive characteristics. Fromm emphasized Ferenczi's observation that analysis could only be brought to a successful conclusion when the patient had lost his fear of the analyst and had acquired a 'feeling of equality' with him. After reading the article, Adorno wrote to Horkheimer in March 1936 that Fromm had put him

in the paradoxical situation of defending Freud. The article is sentimental and wrong to begin with, being a mixture of social democracy and anarchism, and above all shows a severe lack of the concept of dialectics. He takes the easy way out with the concept of authority, without which, after all, neither Lenin's avant-garde nor dictatorship can be conceived of. I would strongly advise him to read Lenin. And what do the anti-popes opposed to Freud say? [Fromm had described Georg Groddock and Sandor Ferenczi as 'opposition' figures who were carrying Freudian psychoanalysis forward.] No, precisely when Freud is criticized from the left, as he is by us, things like the silly argument about a 'lack of kindness' cannot be permitted. This is exactly the trick used by bourgeois individualists against Marx. I must tell you that I see a real threat in this article to the line which the journal takes, and I would be grateful if you would pass on my objections to Fromm in whatever form seems appropriate to you. I only need to type them out.<sup>12</sup>

This remained the crucial point in Adorno's criticism of Fromm, and he repeated it in the mid-1940s in one of the aphorisms in *Minima Moralia*. He accused Freud with whom Fromm was in agreement hereof taking the general view that social goals were more important than

sexual goals or the individual's demand for happiness. But he refused to see Freud's attitude as representing a lack of kindness which could be relieved merely by supplying kindness. Rather, it was a repressive attitude, but it did not permit the illusion that it would be possible to improve conditions merely by kindness, or that it would be possible for kindness to relieve the drive to achieve satisfaction. Only someone wanting to moderate the demands of this drive, or prepared to conceal the extent of the privations forced on the individual by society, would come up with such an idea. 'If Freud was deficient in such human sympathy, he would in this at least be in the company of the critics of political economy, which is better than that of Tagore or Werfel.' 13 Adorno, true to his concept of 'bursting ideas open from within', conceived of a left-wing critique of Freud as follows:

A cathartic method with a standard other than successful adaptation and economic success would have to aim at bringing people to a consciousness of unhappiness both general and inseparable from it personal, and at depriving them of the illusory gratifications by which the abominable order keeps a second hold on life inside them, as if it did not already have them firmly enough in its power from outside. Only when sated with false pleasure, disgusted with the goods offered, dimly aware of the inadequacy of happiness even when it is that to say nothing of cases where it is bought by abandoning allegedly morbid resistance to its positive surrogate can men gain an idea of what experience might be. 14

Adorno, along with Pollock and Marcuse, was one of the three members of the Institute who had not been analysed, as opposed to Fromm, Lowenthal and Horkheimer, who had. His conception of a correct form of psychoanalysis was not, as Fromm thought, to let the patient experience something of what things ought to be like; nor, as Freud prescribed, to approach the patient as a tolerant representative of the reality principle. Instead, it was to confront the patient as someone who would take the reality principle to its extreme, who would bring the patient into a darkness in which the light of hope would begin to shine. Adorno did not ask himself whether what might be true at the level of aesthetic theory or the theory of class struggle would be applicable without further difficulty to individual therapy. The danger that 'kindness' would lead to naive conformism was at least as great as the danger that hard disillusionment of the patient would either reinforce the illness or make the patient cynical.

We can only guess what Horkheimer thought at the time, since he published Fromm's essay (checked in detail like all the others) as a 'leading' article in the journal and did not react with a single word to Adorno's criticisms, at least not in his letters. Horkheimer had once

written, 'Distrust all those who claim that help can only be given either to everyone at once or not at all. This is the lie which is lived by those who do not in fact want to help, and who talk themselves out of their duties in particular individual cases by means of grand theory. They are rationalizing their inhumanity.' 15 He had once described pity as an appropriate present-day form of morality alongside politics. 16 And he was a supporter of Schopenhauer, for whom to be healed of the illusions of Maya and to practice works of love were one and the same thing. 17 Could someone like this have any objections to kindness, provided that human beings' demand for happiness and their instinctual nature were also asserted, and provided that bourgeois and capitalist society were sharply criticized? Surely Fromm's ideas must have appealed to Horkheimer as a model of how the thought of Marx and Freud might be modified in the spirit of Schopenhauer and Buddhism.

In an aphorism in *Dawn*, and again in 1938 in his essay on 'Montaigne and the Function of Scepticism', Horkheimer had criticized psychoanalysis as being a tool of conformism which tended to expose, in a reproachful way, the aggressive tendencies of neurotics, nonconformists and those in opposition, and attempted to turn them into people who, in a horrifying world full of injustices, would be able to present themselves as natural and uninhibited, as if everything was all right. And in a letter to Benjamin in 1935 he had mentioned that a proper historical orientation was lacking in Freud's writings, and that they expressed 'despair at existing reality in terms of professorial unease'. 18 Freud's critique of existing reality was not vehement or aggressive enough for him. Adorno's criticism of Fromm, which disregarded the relation between psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic therapy, was an appeal to Horkheimer to treat categories such as kindness and pity in the way that Adorno himself treated theological motifs: to suspend them and only let them appear implicitly.

Horkheimer saw himself, together with Pollock (and Maidon), as being opposed by a hostile world in which all human relationships were falsified and friendships with honest intentions did not exist; and Adorno saw himself, in company with Horkheimer (and Gretel), as being in the same situation. But, although Horkheimer was the more powerful of the two, Adorno's mistrust was greater than Horkheimer's. Adorno's view of the world and his theoretical ideas mingled to produce a complex form of misanthropy:

If one is concerned to achieve what might be possible with human beings, it is extremely difficult to remain friendly towards real people. It is already the case that benevolence is virtually an index of malice . . . The maliciousness of benevolence may consist in the fact that kindness offers a pretext for approving of precisely that element in people by which they prove themselves to be not merely their own victims but virtually their own hangmen. 19

The motif of bursting ideas open from within, of coldly carrying coldness to its extreme, which Adorno passionately supported, showed Horkheimer how the Schopenhauerian and Buddhist elements in his thinking, which were coming more and more into the foreground in Fromm, might be 'suspended'.

From the middle of the 1930s onwards, Fromm, Karen Horney another émigré German psychoanalyst and the American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan, who tended towards behaviourism, formed a group of outsiders among the New York psychoanalysts. They were concerned with combining psychiatry and psychoanalysis with sociology and ethnology; and ethnologists such as Edward Sapir and Ruth Benedict joined them. 20 Horney's books on *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* and *New Ways in Psychoanalysis*, published in 1937 and 1939 (the latter including an acknowledgement to Horkheimer in the foreword), were written for a broad public and were extremely successful. In Adorno's eyes, Horney's work justified his critique of Fromm.<sup>21</sup> But in the *ZfS* her books, which concentrated on the role of culture and interpersonal relations, were praised by Ernst Schachtel, himself one of the neoanalysts. Of *New Ways*, he wrote:

The most significant sections of the book take a position opposed to Freud's biologicistic and instinctivist orientation (libido theory, Oedipus complex, death instinct, the basing of the psychology of women on anatomical differences) and opposed also to his mechanistic evolutionism (repetition compulsion, direct causation of mental dispositions by early childhood experiences) . . . By explaining character and human behaviour fundamentally on the basis of the concrete human relations in which a person has grown up and is living, and by dispensing once and for all with the assumption that there are fixed libido stages in human development, the book, which is written with great clarity, offers social psychology many promising signposts towards a better, more exact understanding of the psychological effects of social conditions.<sup>22</sup>

This took account of the critical motifs which were still echoing in Horney's books, but it overlooked the way in which psychoanalytic theory as a whole was being neutralized.

Karen Horney, born in 1885, was trained at the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute and was influenced principally by Karl Abraham and Hanns Sachs, who belonged to Freud's circle of friends. Prior to 1933 she had published a series of articles on the psychology of women in which, despite her loyalty to Freud, she was critical of his point of view and diverged from it. Freud had attempted to view female development and female characteristics as the psychological consequences of anatomical sexual differences. Horney, by contrast, emphasized the decisive role played by the patriarchal nature of the institutions, cultural norms,

upbringing, and society as a whole in which the women Freud had made biological and anthropological judgements about lived. Placing the importance of biological considerations and of early childhood experiences alongside the importance of social considerations and post-childhood experiences meant giving women the chance to wrest their self-images from the shackles of patriarchal definitions. 23

Fromm's assumption that instinctual structures were produced by the conditions of existence led him to demonstrate that the prevailing conditions of existence would continue indefinitely because they were embedded in instinctual structures. For Horney, an insight into the formative nature of social realities and norms became the springboard for a theory which released all forms of behaviour, perception and thinking from their embeddedness in instinctual structure and, in combination with the priority given to determination by social factors, left room for a redefinition and reshaping of the behaviour of women, for example. But her exposure of the premiss of biological determination as merely a piece of ideology developed into a conception in which the distorting effects of social conditions on instinctual structures were ignored, and in which better upbringing and better analytical therapy were supposed to provide a relatively simple solution to the difficulties of various cultures. According to Horney's bestselling books, the decisive contradictions in Western culture, which the neurotic experienced more intensely than a normal person and in coping with which needed support, were the contradictions between competition and brotherly love, between the stimulus of desires and the frustration of their satisfaction, and between the apparent freedom of the individual and the actual limitations on that freedom. These were contradictions which only brushed the surface of social conflicts and of the conflict between the individual and society, however.

Fromm's position ignored by Adorno was markedly more critical than Horney's and that of other 'revisionists'. He held fast to old complaints against bourgeois-capitalist society and to a conviction that it needed revolutionary change, and took the view that the well-adapted, normal person, who was never too sad or too angry, was often less healthy than the neurotic. What separated him from Adorno and from Horkheimer was his traditional, idealist formulation of the problem, and the way in which the scale of his criticism remained local. There are, Fromm stated in *Escape from Freedom*, human possibilities which have developed in the course of evolution and are attempting to achieve expression: creative and critical thought, the enjoyment of complex emotional and sensuous experiences, aspirations towards justice and truth. While Adorno and Horkheimer considered all forms of spontaneity to be suffering increasing destruction, and Horkheimer even more than Adorno predicted the downfall of the individual altogether, Fromm saw the rare, but still extant, spontaneity in Western culture as being the spiritual point of departure for the solution of the central problems.

But Adorno and Horkheimer's position was no less open to attack than Fromm's. To the extent that, in the 1940s, they considered 'biological materialism' to be the theoretical core of psychoanalysis which was to be maintained against the revisionists, <sup>24</sup> they were adopting a biological and anthropological basis for the criticism of societyan assumption that there was utopian potential in instinctual structurewhich was no less problematic than Fromm's belief in spontaneity. Although Adorno and Horkheimer's position was less conventional than Fromm's, it was at the same time less exposed, in that it said nothing about the way in which this utopian potential might be expressed. Their 'weakness in positive formulations' made Horkheimer, but not Adorno, uneasy in this respect.<sup>25</sup>

There was no attempt to work these positions out together, however, and thus no development which might have reinforced those aspects of Fromm's position which were critical of society against the conformist views of the neo-analysts. When a number of serious discussions developed at the end of 1939 between Fromm and Horkheimer, the breach had already taken place, and only the arrangements for the separation remained to be dealt with. Fromm had been offended by the way in which Pollock had declared to him, in the spring of 1939, that the Institute would not be able to pay his salary from that October. As he described it, Pollock had not asked him to do without his salary but rather had merely stated plainly that the Institute was not in a position to pay him any further salary after 1 October, nor would it do so. 'To my express observation that this implied dismissal, he answered, "Yes, if you choose to call it that!"<sup>26</sup> Fromm waived his tenured employment contract for a compensation settlement of \$20,000.

The Institute had thus parted with a member of staff who had for a considerable time been the most significant one for its theoretical work. After 1935, however, only one article by him had been published in the *ZfS*. An 'essay on principles', written in 1937, which Fromm wanted to revise on the basis of criticisms by Horkheimer which he had agreed were reasonable, was not published, or at least did not appear in the *ZfS*. Fromm's study on the working class never reached a stage at which Horkheimer considered it ready for publication. He was often either ill or taking a cure. He seemed to be closer to circles of psychoanalysts and sociologists that would have nothing to do with an antagonistic social theory than he was to the Horkheimer circle.<sup>27</sup> From the moment Adorno arrived in New York, Fromm had heavily criticized precisely those areas in which, in Horkheimer's eyes, he was more and more clearly being surpassed in theoretical productiveness during the second half of the 1930s. What Horkheimer had perhaps hoped for that Fromm would waive his tenured contract or his salary while remaining attached to the Institute or at least at its disposal did not come about. Fromm made enquiries about the research on the working class and he was sent a copy of it. As for Horkheimer, he sent a brief letter in October 1946,

when the death sentences following the Nuremberg trials were carried out. In memory of the fact that he and Fromm, hearing the news in New York of the events of 30 June 1934, had celebrated the downfall on that day of figures who had been symbolic in the Nazi Reich, he had mentally sent Fromm, on the previous Tuesday night, a toast to the death of Streicher and his comrades. 28

*Escape from Freedom* was published in 1941. It represented the psychological study of 'Man in the Authoritarian State' which had been listed as part of the research programme in the Institute's prospectus of 1938. Fromm had worked on the book between 1936 and 1940, and it was one of the few occasions on which the Institute's extensive programme of publications actually bore fruit. It was published outside the framework of the Institute, however, and did not contain a single indication of Fromm's earlier collaboration with the Institute of Social Research, except for a footnote in which an article by Horkheimer was mentioned. Instead, the text was headed by three epigraphs which together virtually paraded Fromm's humanistic credo.

Against the background of a historical sketch of the contradictory process by which the individual had been released from the ties of medieval society, the book combined the social-psychological functionalism found in Fromm's contribution to the *Studies on Authority and the Family* with the idea of escaping from what seemed to be a vicious circle. Fromm diagnosed three main methods of flight: authoritarianism, destructiveness and 'automaton conformity'. According to Fromm's own summary,

It has been the thesis of this book that freedom has a twofold meaning for modern man: that he has been freed from traditional authorities and has become an 'individual', but that at the same time he has become isolated, powerless, and an instrument of purposes outside himself, alienated from himself and others; furthermore, that this state undermines his self, weakens and frightens him, and makes him ready for submission to new kinds of bondage . . . Only if man masters society and subordinates the economic machine to the purposes of human happiness, and only if he actively participates in the social process, can he overcome what now drives him to despair his aloneness and his feeling of powerlessness . . . democracy . . . will triumph over the forces of nihilism only if it can imbue people with a faith that is the strongest the human mind is capable of, the faith in life and truth, and in freedom as the active and spontaneous realization of the individual self.29

But Fromm's support for spontaneity and a faith in life was not justified in any way by his rejection of the Freudian instinctual theory in favour of the conviction that the key problem of psychology was the

specific relationship between the individual and the world; nor was it justified by his substitution of the concept of character structure for that of instinctual drive; nor by the position he took on the 'culture and personality' debate on the relation between culture, society and personality. For example, the need to accumulate money or other material objects was no longer explained, as in orthodox psychoanalysis, as stemming from an unconscious desire to retain the faeces; it was explained instead by certain interpersonal experiences which had arisen in connection with the process of defecation. Such arguments alone did not offer grounds for optimism in a society in which interpersonal relations were distorted through and through. With regard to the diagnostic and analytical sections of the book, the spontaneity which Fromm supported was a *deus ex machina*. He simply appealed to the fact that certain qualities were 'inherent' in human beings, in the term used by Thomas Jefferson, whom he cited in one of his epigraphs, or that they had become inherent as a result of historical development. These qualities were: the 'tendency to grow, to develop and to realize potentialities which man has developed'. 30

Like Horney's books, Fromm's was directed at a wide audience, and was highly praised and successful both as a popular work and in the academic world. An approving review by Fromm's friend, Schachtel, even appeared in the Institute's journal in 1941. This was intended to placate Fromm, whom Horkheimer now saw as an opponent of the Institute threatening to unite to form a single front with Grossmann, Gumperz, Wittfogel and perhaps others who felt frustrated by the Institute.

### Projects

As early as 1938, the idea began to take hold at the Institute that efforts should be made to obtain funds from American foundations not merely for research projects by individual associates and protégés, but also for scientific research by the Institute itself. In 1939 the first efforts in this direction were made: for example, attempts to interest Christian and Jewish research foundations, and also private individuals, in a project developed by Adorno and Horkheimer on anti-Semitism. These efforts had no success. In April 1940, at a meeting of the Institute's advisory board (of which MacIver and Lynd, among others, were members), Horkheimer put up two projects for discussion, to find out which of them would have better prospects in the USA and what would be the best way of going about obtaining financial support for them. One of these was, again, the anti-Semitism project, which was intended to answer the question of how anti-Semitism had managed to achieve such extraordinary significance; the other was a project on 'modern German culture', which was to reconstruct the economic, social, political,

philosophical and literary development of Germany in the period from 1900 to 1933, and so answer the question of how Nazism came about. The advisers favoured the latter project, but the Institute continued its work on both. Horkheimer wrote to Neumann on 10 July 1940, the day before he was to travel to the west coast with his wife to look for a suitable place to settle down and finish his book on dialectics. In view of the fact that the American Jewish Committee had shelved the anti-Semitism project, as it only had resources for immediate observations and for campaigning, Horkheimer had asked Adorno to draft a research project on the anti-Jewish policies of Nazism and their effects at home and abroad. 'In contrast with our other projects,' he wrote, 'this one must be really carefully prepared . . . I think we should use this vacation, in which seemingly many things are under preparation, to do everything possible to achieve financial success in the autumn.' 31

In the following weeks, Adorno and Neumann in particular were involved in producing new versions of the two projects. The anti-Semitism project, in which Adorno and his wife were especially involved, was still given its original broad scope, although the emphasis was on the practical side, defending Jews against anti-Semitism. Horkheimer wrote to Lowenthal in August, from the west coast, suggesting that Adorno ought to be involved in the new project on Germany as well. 'He will be able to make sure it has "quality".'

Adorno's most important contributions to the new version of the German project were two sections on 'culture' and 'cultural crisis'. A few weeks later, Horkheimer drafted a letter to Robert M. Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago. Horkheimer suspected that Hutchins might be sympathetic to the theoretical goals of his circle, and he hoped to receive financial support for the Institute's project from him. The English draft stated:

We have made an attempt to theoretically understand the growth of Nazism not only in terms of the objective socio-economic forces that engendered it, but also in terms of men of the human, or rather inhuman climate that made it possible. This is not meant to be 'psychological'. I am not a social psychologist nor are the members of our Institute with whom I am preparing this project. It appears to me that, in our epoch, men are undergoing much deeper changes than could be expressed psychologically. It is as if the substance of man itself had changed with the fundamentals of our society . . . The religious emancipation of the middle classes, with all its appearance of 'progressiveness' reveals itself today as a force of dehumanization, however much it likes, or liked, to cloak itself as humanism. We witness a change that makes men into mere passive centers of reaction, into subjects of 'conditioned reflexes', because they have left no centers of spontaneity, no obligatory measure of behavior, nothing that transcends their most

immediate wants, needs and desires. And what is going on at present can be properly understood only against the background of the total development of what has reduced and mutilated man into what he appears to be today. You will find hints into this direction [*sic*] in the part on 'cultural crisis'.

The emphasis on the close connection between the neutralization of religion and culture and an anthropological transformation showed how close Adorno and Horkheimer were to Fromm, and how far they were from Neumann. In their view, the decisive elements (besides the mode of production) on which the constitution of contemporary society depended lay not in constitutional law or the organizations of the labour movement, but rather in religion and culture, and in transcending them correctly; and in the potential for rationality in the individual which depended on that transcendence. On the recommendation of one of the American advisers, the psychologically oriented political scientist Harold D. Lasswell, the project on Germany was ultimately given a specific title: 'Cultural Aspects of National Socialism'. The project was submitted to the Rockefeller Foundation at the beginning of 1941 with a request for financial support.

In the autumn of 1940 Horkheimer and Adorno decided that they wanted to pursue the topic of anti-Semitism whether or not it received financial support from outside research foundations. It was Adorno who had pushed for this. In his work on the drafts of the anti-Semitism project he had come across a work by the theologian Hermann Steinhausen. He wrote to Horkheimer:

Although he is perfectly respectable, he too has fallen victim to the superstitious view of the mysterious otherness of the Jews. I am beginning to feel, particularly under the influence of the latest news from Germany, that I cannot stop thinking about the fate of the Jews any more. It often seems to me that everything that we used to see from the point of view of the proletariat has been concentrated today with frightful force upon the Jews. No matter what happens to the project, I ask myself whether we should not say what we really want to say in connection with the Jews, who are now at the opposite pole to the concentration of power. 32

In one of the many ideas and suggestions he was constantly producing, Adorno thus put in a nutshell what was to motivate both him and Horkheimer later on when they were working together on the project: the idea of the Jews as the proletariat of the world-historical process of enlightenment, deprived of every vestige of power. The 'Research Project on Anti-Semitism' was published in the spring of 1941 in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*. It was to provide an example of the concept of 'critical social research' which Lazarsfeld, in his 'Remarks on

Administrative and Critical Communications Research', had advertised to an American public in the first article of the issue. The aim of the project was 'to show that anti-Semitism is one of the dangers inherent in all more recent culture'. Historical research on mass movements since the Crusades, and on representatives of modern humanism such as Voltaire and Kant, were to show how deeply rooted anti-Semitism was even in places where it had never been suspected. Experiments such as film presentations were to expose latent anti-Semitic tendencies and serve to construct a typology, so that a tool would be available which would make it possible to detect the strength and quality of anti-Semitic tendencies deep in the most subconscious levels. In this way it would be possible to start combating them early enough.

Adorno left out any ideas on the theory of anti-Semitism, with an eye on the American Jewish Committee and the interest expected from Jewish organizations in general in the practical usefulness of the project. But he sent a sample to Horkheimer in September 1940 daring ideas, as he put it himself, which aimed to explain anti-Semitism in terms of the philosophy of history. The sample consisted of two and a half typical Adorno pages, in which a broad, speculative declaration was attached to the minor observation that the 'girl from far away' in German folklore, who was viewed positively, was never Jewish, while on the other hand the image of the Jew in German folklore had traits which went beyond mere foreignness the traits of wandering, antiquity, scrounging:

At a very early stage of the history of humanity, the Jews either scorned the transition from nomadism to settled habitation and remained nomadic, or went through the change inadequately and superficially, in a kind of pseudomorphosis. The biblical story ought to be analysed in detail for this. It seems to me to be full of hints on it. The most important of these are the exodus from Egypt and the prelude to it, the promise of a land flowing with milk and honey, together with the brevity of the Jewish kingdom and its immanent weakness . . . The survival of nomadism among the Jews might provide not only an explanation for the nature of the Jew himself, but even more an explanation for anti-Semitism. The abandonment of nomadism was apparently one of the most difficult sacrifices demanded in human history. The Western concept of work, and all of the instinctual repression it involves, may coincide exactly with the development of settled habitation. The image of the Jews is one of a condition of humanity in which work is unknown, and all of the later attacks on the parasitic, miserly character of the Jews are mere rationalizations. The Jews are the ones who have not allowed themselves to be 'civilized' and subjected to the priority of work. This has not been forgiven them, and that is why they are a bone of contention in class society. They have not allowed themselves, one might say, to be driven

out of Paradise, or at least only reluctantly. In addition, the description that Moses gives of the land flowing with milk and honey is a description of Paradise. This holding firm to the most ancient image of happiness is the Jewish utopia. It does not matter whether the nomadic condition was in fact a happy one or not. In all probability, it was not. But the more the world of settled habitation a world of work produced repression, the more the earlier condition must have seemed to be a form of happiness which could not be permitted, the very idea of which must be banned. This ban is the origin of anti-Semitism, the expulsions of the Jews, and the attempt to complete or imitate the expulsion from Paradise.

Horkheimer decided in 1940 not to settle on the west coast yet, both because of the projects and because of the numerous people who had been mobilized to increase their chances of success. In Hollywood in August he had still been toying with the idea that when he went back in September, after a joint decision on how to proceed with the projects, 'the Ls, the Ms and the Hs could drive west together in two cars at the beginning of October'.<sup>33</sup> But because of rumours on campus at Columbia that the Institute was planning to move away, and in order to wait for conditions in which it would be possible to make a less spectacular departure, Horkheimer stayed in New York for another six months. When he finally left for the west in April 1941, he went on his own, with his wife, to make things look as inconspicuous and provisional as possible.

At the end of April, Lowenthal cabled him that the Rockefeller Foundation had rejected the project on 'Cultural Aspects of National Socialism'. The months of work on the two projects, the mobilization of all sorts of people, the continuation of 'normal' business at the Institute, and the postponement of the long-awaited start of work on the dialectics book all of this seemed to have been in vain. 'I think we did all we were able to,' Horkheimer wrote to Neumann from Los Angeles when he received Lowenthal's cable.

I can't see that we made any fatal mistakes. The memorandum seemed to me to be particularly impressive, mainly with its bibliography. It may be that the procedure, which resulted from an urgent recommendation by Tillich, was a diplomatic *faux pas*. The speed with which the rejection of the proposal followed the submission of the memorandum may point to this. Anyway, we definitely made every effort. My thanks go especially to you, as without you the project would never have taken the form it did, which is in fact the best one possible. From the time when you won Anderson over for us, up to the last memorandum and Earle's recognition, you were the one who bore the principal burden.<sup>34</sup>

Neumann in particular, however, did not consider the rejection to be final. When he and Pollock visited two associates of the Rockefeller Foundation to get more detailed information, it turned out that the idea had been not to support the Institute in independent research, but at the most to support work it might do as part of a project at another institution.

Neumann, whose future at the Institute depended on one of the projects succeeding, was in favour of applying to other research foundations, and immediately took in hand an application to the New York Foundation. For his part, Horkheimer feared the accusation that he had not really done all he could to exhaust every possibility. He feared, too, the prospect of ending the Institute's association with Columbia in an undistinguished way, and was in favour of pursuing further applications now more than ever, not admitting outwardly that their intention was to leave permanently. The intention to continue the policy of normalcy was strengthened by the fact that MacIver, the head of the Sociology Department, was holding out the prospect of associates of the Institute sharing in the departmental lectures, which raised hopes of at least one professorship for the Horkheimer circle. It all depended, Horkheimer wrote to Pollock, on being sure never to raise the slightest suspicion that there was a feeling of resentment. The officials of the foundations should never need to hesitate about contacting the Institute in the future. Colleagues such as Lasswell and MacIver should be given the impression that 'these people are making a serious effort to take part in American life and make a genuine contribution. The right opportunity for this will probably come up soon.'

35

This was the strategy which Horkheimer forced himself to adopt, and it was not easy to pursue it. In the middle of June 1941 an individual grant for Adorno was rejected, as were two individual grants for Marcuse and Neumann at the end of June. No wonder Horkheimer began to think there were people turning up at the decisive meetings of the grant boards, prompted by information from old opponents of the Institute from its Frankfurt days, pointing out the obscure character of the circle at the Institute: there was no evidence that they really did any social research there; no sign that they wanted to adapt themselves to the American way of life; no adjustment to local customs, according to which the director and all the members of an academic institution were dependent on a board of well-known businessmen not only in name but in fact. In Horkheimer's view, as he mentioned in a letter to Adorno following the rejection of the application, what lay behind all this, and what made the Institute's situation so hopeless even without rumours being spread by its old opponents, was:

the universal law of monopoly society. In this society, even academic research is controlled by agents who are woven into the

same elite as the economic authorities . . . Whatever does not totally submit to the monopoly, without reservation, is a `wild' enterprise and must be destroyed, even if it is necessary to make sacrifices to do so. The condemnation of a newcomer as immoral is correctly based on the prevailing conditions, because, when one form of human relations which was once viewed with contempt makes the transition to the form characteristic of a society, its features are the ones which set the standard. We rightly laugh about the ideologue who goes on talking . . . when the `protection' of other countries and control over Europe, or over industry and the state, are being discussed. The extent of these things does change their quality. Shouldn't science be satisfied with what the broadcasters and other custodians of the objective spirit are satisfied with? And here we are, trying to escape from this control, to remain independent and we even decide on the contents and extent of our production ourselves! It's indecent. Those who conform, on the other hand, are permitted to commit extravagances, even political ones . . . But integration would mean, in this case as in others, first of all: making concessions, many, many concessions, offering material guarantees that subjection is being entered into honestly, and is lasting and irrevocable. Integration means surrendering oneself without regard to the consequences. That is why our efforts are hopeless, even with other research foundations the variety among them is only a pretence, and we should beware of calling attention to ourselves elsewhere. 36

The situation became even more complicated for Horkheimer and his closest associates when MacIver announced that he would support the incorporation of the Institute into Columbia University. There was now not merely a problem of distinguishing the possibility of the Institute's being incorporated into the university from the possibility of its becoming involved in departmental lectures, without causing offence: the former was to be dealt with through delaying tactics, while the latter was to be encouraged. There was now a further issue over which the interests of Horkheimer, Pollock, Adorno and Lowenthal, on the one hand, and Marcuse and Neumann, on the other, might diverge. With closer incorporation of the Institute into the university, the chances of an academic career for Marcuse and Neumann would increase; in contrast, Horkheimer and those basing their hopes on having their material needs supplied by the Institute did not want to see its independence restricted in any way. This difference of view corresponded to an aversion to the idea of the `message in the bottle' among the former group, and a liking for it among the latter. `Message in the bottle' was an expression used mainly by Adorno for Critical Theory, which he saw as lacking an addressee and as being condemned to `hibernating' for the foreseeable future.

## Disputes on the Theory of National Socialism

The peculiar atmosphere at the Institute produced a strange assortment of views on the correct interpretation of Nazism, and a peculiar dispute about Pollock's conception of 'state capitalism'.

In 1933, in his article 'Remarks on the Economic Crisis', Pollock had given a very sketchy account of the events in Italy, Germany and the USA, describing them as a 'new stage of "state capitalist" intervention',<sup>37</sup> and he conceded that the prospects for a capitalist planned economy would be good. In 1938 Horkheimer, apparently under the influence of Wittfogel's ideas about oriental society, stated in a lecture about the Institute that 'The authoritarian state is nothing new, even in the bourgeois epoch, but rather a return, mediated by liberalism, to authoritarian forms which have their source in absolutism . . . Naturally, the power to dispose of the gigantic productive resources of the twentieth century requires a different authoritarian apparatus from that used in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.' In his essay on 'The Jews and Europe', originally written in the same year, he spoke of a new order being produced by the leaders of industry, the military and the Civil Service, and of the authoritarian rule of the administrative, judicial and political machine.<sup>38</sup> In general, the article offered a mixture of elements taken from two different views. On the one hand, Horkheimer held that the epoch of liberal capitalism must be conceived of as a process which made a spiral of lasting despotism possible by atomizing human beings and producing large-scale companies and gigantic organizations. On the other, he also held that fascism was a regime of gangsters ruling through violence and the distribution of plunder; since it had destroyed every illusion and every form of cultural deception, it was guaranteed that this regime would be swept away as soon as the alliance it represented ceased to function successfully against the masses. In 1940 Horkheimer took his ideas a step further in another article, which at first was called 'State Capitalism' but later had its title changed to 'The Authoritarian State'. He now expressly mentioned state capitalism as a phase succeeding monopoly capitalism. In this new phase, a new stage of organization was attained in which 'The bureaucracy has taken control of the economic mechanism which slipped away from the control of the bourgeoisie's pure profit principle'.<sup>39</sup>

Horkheimer saw 'integral statism or state socialism' as the 'most consistent form of authoritarian state, which has freed itself from any dependence on private capital'. This was his way of referring to the Soviet Union, which was never mentioned by name. The fascist countries, by contrast, presented only a 'mixed form', in which surplus value was produced and distributed under state control but continued to flow in large quantities, under its former title profit into the coffers of the industrial magnates and landowners. 'It is through their influence that

the organization is disturbed and distracted.' Horkheimer regarded reformism, Bolshevism and fascism all as forms of authoritarian state; if fascism was described as a mixed form, then for him there was simply state capitalism as such, existing in its fascist and reformist variants. Whereas Engels and the German Social Democrats had seen state capitalism as the gateway to socialism, Horkheimer saw it as a form of organization tending to develop into an integral form of statism which would be capable of lasting for a considerable time, and even of taking the place of socialism as the new order succeeding capitalism. Horkheimer thought state capitalism was not a regression but an 'intensification of forces', which would be able to 'exist without racism'. 40

Some surprisingly hopeful elements were included in this gloomy analysis, and they were more noticeable here than in Horkheimer's essay on 'The Jews and Europe'. He accused the mass organizations of the labour movement of promoting a concept of nationalization which hardly differed from that of socialization under state capitalism. Against this, he assured the 'isolated individual' that anyone who was neither appointed nor protected by any power nevertheless constituted a power, since everyone was isolated. Words were the only weapons of isolated individuals, but a 'powerless statement in a totalitarian state' was 'more threatening than the most awe-inspiring party rally under Wilhelm II'. Horkheimer's view that state capitalism sometimes seemed to be a parody of classless society corresponded to the philosophical motif of approaching the truth through its negation. So, too, with his statement: 'In order to conduct their affairs in solidarity with one another, people will have to change their natures much less than they have already been changed by Fascism.' Further, agreeing with Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', which were partly anticipated by the essay on Eduard Fuchs, Horkheimer wrote: '*the end of exploitation . . . is not a further acceleration of progress, but a qualitative leap out of the dimension of progress.*'<sup>41</sup> These were elements of hopefulness which seemed partly surprising as with the emphasis placed on the isolated individual and, in the context of the essay and of Horkheimer's other works, partly arbitrary. Theological and messianic motifs had up till then not been a concern of his. Nor was he himself comfortable with the aspects of hope that he had presented. In a letter to Adorno, he mentioned that 'we still have to elaborate these positive formulations for ourselves. The weakness of them affects the conclusion of the work on the authoritarian state as well.'<sup>42</sup>

Because of the politically explosive nature of the essay and its theoretical boldness, Horkheimer decided rather to hide than to publish it in 1942 in a mimeographed German-language memorial volume for Benjamin, which was only distributed to a selected readership. An even more carefully selected circle of persons received copies of the volume from which the essay on 'The Authoritarian State' had not been removed. Pollock's article on 'State Capitalism: its Possibilities and Limitations'

was thus given greater weight in the journal's special issue on state capitalism, which was to appear in the summer of 1941, originally with Horkheimer's essay as the lead. 43 Apart from the articles by Horkheimer and Pollock, the other items originally planned for inclusion in the issue on state capitalism were: Neumann, 'The Labour Movement under State Capitalism';44 Kirchheimer, 'The Constitutional Framework of State Capitalism'; Gurland, 'Economic Structural Change'; Otto Leichter, 'The Role of Bureaucracy in National Socialism'; and Felix Weil, 'Capital Formation under State Capitalism'.

Pollock's study was controversial from the start. It was not only Neumann who criticized it openly and directly, in his usual way but also, with more courtesy, all of those besides Pollock who belonged to the 'inner circle', namely Horkheimer, Lowenthal and Adorno. Horkheimer had already written to Pollock, after reading his outline for his 'state capitalism' article, 'It will be a difficult problem to avoid the error of taking sides with the "totalitarian answer"'.45 The following month, Adorno, to whom Pollock had given the first three dozen pages of the article, voiced his concerns about it to Horkheimer:

I can best sum up my views on this article by saying that it represents a reversal of Kafka. Kafka represented the bureaucratic hierarchy as a hell. In this article, hell is transformed into a bureaucratic hierarchy. In addition, it is all formulated so axiomatically and condescendingly, in the Husserlian sense, that it lacks all urgency, quite à part [*sic*] from the undialectical assumption that a non-antagonistic economy might be possible in an antagonistic society.46

The article could do nothing but damage, both to the reputation of the Institute itself and to Pollock's reputation. Adorno's own article on Spengler would not fit in with an issue presented at such a level. They need not discuss what could be expected from 'Neumann's article, inspired by Lynd, on the possibility of democratic state capitalism'. Adorno therefore suggested that Horkheimer should rewrite Pollock's article. Its themes had been taken from 'The Authoritarian State', but had been so simplified and made so undialectical that they had been transformed into their opposite. A rewritten version could possibly appear under both Horkheimer's and Pollock's names in the issue on state capitalism.

This Horkheimer did not want. He was pleased that after so many years his closest friend was at last to produce published evidence of his participation in the intellectual work of the Institute once again. Adorno stood by his criticisms: the pessimism of Pollock's basic idea seemed correct to him that is, the view that the chances of power being perpetuated in its immediate political form were greater than those of escaping from it. However, what was wrong in Pollock's article was its

`optimism, even its optimism on behalf of others: what is perpetuating itself seems to me not to be a relatively stable, and even in a certain sense rational, condition, but rather an unceasing series of catastropheschaos and horror for an unforeseeably long period, admittedly with the chance of escape, but this is dealt with too briefly in this Egyptian vision.' 47 At the same time, Horkheimer had repeated his earlier, rather similar worry after reading Pollock's manuscript. He praised the striking thesis that economic development was showing a tendency towards state capitalist development everywhere. This was an economically more effective and more up-to-date form compared with private capitalism, and it was possible for it to exist in a non-totalitarian form. But he insisted on `avoiding the misunderstanding that there is too much sympathy here with state capitalism'. `If I might formulate my general wishes here, they would be that the interconnectedness and ambiguity of the phenomena should be made more obvious . . . and that everything should be made to look less rigidly administrative.'48

A week after Pollock arrived on the west coast, where he revised the article with Horkheimer present, Horkheimer wrote to Neumann: `As time is getting very short, changes can only be made in details anyway, and I do not feel very happy about the fact that such an important topic should be dealt with in a work which from the very beginning was produced under such difficult circumstancespart-time. I am busy just now writing a kind of short preface, and would be most grateful if you could let me know your open vote concerning publication when you have seen both.'49

The manuscript by Pollock which Neumann received was clearly the same, except for some details, as the text which was later published. Although its title was `State Capitalism: its Possibilities and Limitations', state capitalism was presented in it as a system which not only was superior to the old capitalist companies but did not have any specific, inherent limitations at all. Pollock had always seen the decisive cause of capitalist crises as lying in the autonomy of the market, which, under pressure from the monopolies, was functioning less and less well as a self-control mechanism for the economy, and was producing anarchy and economic distortion to an ever greater extent. The fact that the autonomy of the market was abolished under state capitalism seemed in Pollock's eyes to remove the decisive cause of the crises. He drily stated the superiority of state capitalism over the old private capitalist companies, and towards the end of the article observed just as drily that one was faced with a choice between totalitarian and democratic state capitalism. But he had softened his praise for the latter, on Adorno's suggestion that this praise should be disguised in the form of questions and problems to be addressed by future research.

In his preface, which was also identical, except for details, with the text later published, Horkheimer attempted to set the correct tone from the outset without offending Pollock. Basing his argument on the

standard, which he took for granted, of a society formed 'according to human needs and potentialities', and avoiding the concept of state capitalism, he described the 'authoritarian society' as a reprehensible and paradoxical system. It was a system in which, under a 'totalitarian set-up, big industry' was 'in a position not only to impose its plan upon its former competitors, but to order the masses to work instead of having to deal with them as free parties to a contract'; in which 'planned waste of intelligence, happiness, and life succeeds the planless waste caused by the frictions and crises of the market system'; in which the 'irrational rationality' of the previous phase 'becomes madness with method'; and in which the contradictory effects of progress continue to develop until progress only functions destructively. 50 He disregarded Adorno's suggestion that it should at least be made clear that 'not only alienation, but also its opposite, may be able to develop under fascism after all'.51 He said nothing which could have been seen as a recognition of fascism, no matter how bitter or 'dialectical'. He described it merely in his conclusion as the 'die-hard competitor on an international scale' which the older world powers would now have to cope with. Finally, he presented Pollock's article as a warning against the illusion that fascism would soon collapse from its economic difficulties, and as a stimulus to think over the possibility that state capitalist measures might turn out to be more effective in a democratic framework than in a fascist one.

Neumann agreed with Horkheimer's preface, and only complained about the covering up of disagreements between the two directors of the Institute at the end of it, and about its positive evaluation of democracy in the United States (which was, however, acceptable in view of the political situation). He remained hard in his criticisms of Pollock's conception of state capitalism, criticisms he had already expressed to Pollock himself. These were directed principally at two points. First, state capitalism, as Pollock conceived of it, might represent the millennium and would thus condemn humanity to complete hopelessness. This was a strategic objection, which only became significant for the question of the accuracy of Pollock's analysis once it had been demonstrated that the conception was blind to contradictions within the social formations it analysed contradictions which endangered the system. Neumann's efforts in *Behemoth* to expose the concept of state capitalism as a contradiction in terms ran in the same direction, since they aimed to demonstrate that a crisis-free form of capitalism was inconceivable. Strangely, Neumann did not concern himself with the idea of a noncapitalist authoritarian social formation, an 'integral statism' perhaps because the idea of a third possibility beyond the alternative of capitalism and socialism in European conditions seemed too fanciful and out of touch with reality.

Neumann's second main objection to Pollock was that he neither had a theory of the transition from monopoly capitalism to state capitalism nor offered, on the basis of a substantial analysis of Germany, for

example, any evidence that Germany was state capitalist in any of its essential characteristics. In fact neither Engels nor Bukharin nor Lenin, when they used the term 'state capitalism', was referring to a nonsocialist system which could succeed capitalism. Bukharin had only mentioned such a possibility once, in his *Imperialism and World Economy*, first published in 1918. Dwight Macdonald quoted the passage in his essay on 'The End of Capitalism in Germany', published in 1941 in the *Partisan Review*, one of the most interesting forums in the United States for discussion on the interpretation of fascism:

Were the commodity character of production to disappear for instance through the organization of all world economy into one gigantic State trust, the impossibility of which we tried to prove in our chapter on ultra-imperialism we should have an entirely new economic form. This would be capitalism no more, for the production of commodities would have disappeared; still less would it be socialism, for the power of one class over the other would have remained (and even grown stronger). Such an economic structure would, most of all, resemble a slave-owning economy where the slave market is absent. 52

Nazi Germany's imperialist autarky policy made a transference of this idea to a single country or a single power system (although this was far from what Bukharin intended) seem quite plausible.

This was why the last part of Neumann's objection, behind which lay the whole weight of his book, was decisive: 'For a whole year I have been doing nothing but studying economic processes in Germany, and I have up till now not found a shred of evidence to show that Germany is in a situation remotely resembling state capitalism.'<sup>53</sup> Horkheimer replied:

As I have boundless confidence in your research on economic processes in Germany, I do believe your statement that Germany is not in a situation remotely resembling that of state capitalism. On the other hand, I cannot free myself from Engels's view that society is moving towards precisely that. I must therefore assume that the approach of such a period very probably still threatens us. And this seems to me to a great extent to prove the value of Pollock's construct in providing a basis for discussion of a topical problem, in spite of all its deficiencies.<sup>54</sup>

At this point the two were talking at cross purposes. Horkheimer was a theoretician of integral statism whose approach to Marxism was through the philosophy of history; Neumann was a theoretician of totalitarian monopoly capitalism whose approach to Marxism was a reformist one. What Neumann wrote in *Behemoth* at the conclusion of his critique of

the concept of state capitalism was a matter of existential significance for him: 'The present writer does not accept this profoundly pessimistic view. He believes that the antagonisms of capitalism are operating in Germany on a higher and, therefore, a more dangerous level, even if these antagonisms are covered up by a bureaucratic apparatus and by the ideology of the people's community.'<sup>55</sup> Neumann's existential commitment may explain the vehemence with which, in his letter to Horkheimer, he took the view that Pollock's article contradicted 'the theory of the Institute from beginning to end'; it contained 'a clear departure from Marxism'; it was 'in reality merely a new formulation of Mannheim's sociology, mainly of Mannheim's last book, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*'.<sup>56</sup> Horkheimer strongly rejected these criticisms.

Several weeks later, Neumann completed the manuscript of *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* one thousand typescript pages. He cut the introduction, dealing with the collapse of Weimar democracy, from 300 to 60 pages. 'I will have to cut a large part of the theoretical analyses in the rest, to make the book as concrete as possible,' he wrote to Horkheimer.<sup>57</sup> Horkheimer congratulated him:

Although, as far as the contents of it go, I only know what I remember from your lectures, from the Dieterle evening, and from various remarks you have made, I think I have a good idea of the significance of the work. Unless I am mistaken, I was one of the first to urge you to write a book of this sort. I admit I did not imagine how much energy you would put into it. This publication will document the fact that our theory is still the best guide through the maze of present-day social conditions. It will encourage many who thought the theory had met its end because of the intellectual decline understandable enough, certainly of many of our friends.<sup>58</sup>

Arkady Gurland had assisted with the economic part of the book, and Neumann quoted emphatically from Gurland's contribution to the issue of *SPSS* on state capitalism, 'Technological Trends and Economic Structure under Capitalism'.<sup>59</sup> Neumann's book had a virtually classic Marxist structure: it began with the political superstructure, so to speak ('Part One: The Political Pattern of National Socialism'); it continued with the economic base ('Part Two: Totalitarian Monopolistic Economy'); and it concluded with the presentation of class structure ('Part Three: The New Society'). The perspective of a Marxist analysis of society as a whole was combined throughout with a formal analysis in terms of constitutional law. Neumann called his examination of the structure and practice of National Socialism *Behemoth* with reference to Hobbes, whose *Behemoth; or, the Long Parliament* presented the English Civil War as a situation of anarchy, as a non-state, contrasting it unfavourably with *Leviathan*, the powerful state in which there were still remnants

of law and order. 60 In this way, the title pointed to one of the book's central theses: that 'National Socialism is or is tending to become a non-state'; that 'we are confronted with a form of society in which the ruling groups control the rest of the population directly, without the mediation of that rational though coercive apparatus hitherto known as the state.'<sup>61</sup>

The greatest beneficiaries of this development were large companies. The Nazi regime moved to advance their interests immediately it took power, with a policy favouring cartels at the expense of smaller and medium-sized companies. The mixture of private enterprise and 'command economy' which was characteristic of the system also constantly worked in favour of the leading groups of companies. The organizations for self-administration, etc., which were under company control showed a marked increase in power because of their growing involvement in the state control of the economy. A National Socialist economist, for example, wrote of the compulsory cartelization introduced in July 1933, 'The compulsory order, with the help of the state's sovereignty, gives the cartel [the Association of German Industry (Verband der Deutschen Industrie)] a power which it could not obtain on a voluntary basis.'<sup>62</sup> The war economy also led to a further strengthening of the position of the large companies, which were, for example, in charge of the very organizations which had been given the most important political and economic task of the time in Germany: the allocation of raw materials. From the evidence he gave, Neumann concluded:

If totalitarian political power had not abolished freedom of contract, the cartel system would have broken down. If the labor market were not controlled by authoritarian means, the monopolistic system would be endangered; if raw material, supply, price control, and rationalization agencies, credit and exchange-control offices were in the hands of forces hostile to monopolies, the profit system would break down. The system has become so fully monopolized that it must by nature be hypersensitive to cyclical changes, and such disturbances must be avoided. To achieve that, the monopoly of political power over money, credit, labor, and prices is necessary.

In short, democracy would endanger the fully monopolized system. It is the essence of totalitarianism to stabilize and fortify it. This, of course, is not the sole function of the system. The National Socialist party is solely concerned with establishing the thousand-year rule, but to achieve this goal, they cannot but protect the monopolistic system, which provides them with the economic basis for political expansion.<sup>63</sup>

The two other partners in league with the ruling class were the armed forces and the bureaucracy (the latter, in Neumann's view, was becoming increasingly less significant). The four groups were held together by

the fear that the collapse of the regime would be the end of them all. Contrasted with them were the 'ruled classes', whose situation Neumann examined using the working class as an example.

The working class had largely been robbed of its spontaneity by its bureaucratic organizations and by a standardized mass culture dictated by the private monopolies, and it was easy prey for the Nazis. After passing through a democratic phase, the masses could no longer simply be ignored, and the Nazis had been able to manipulate them effectively. The workers' organizations were smashed, freedom of movement was restricted or abolished, and terror and propaganda were used. At the same time, they raised German pride by nullifying the effects of the Treaty of Versailles, and provided organized leisure activities (*Kraft durch Freude* 'strength through joy', 64 etc.) and full employment, although wages were still low.

National Socialism is built on full employment. That is its sole gift to the masses, and its significance must not be underestimated. The business cycle has not been brought to an end, of course, nor has the economic system been freed from periods of contraction. But state control over credit, money, and the labor market prevents slumps from taking the form of large-scale unemployment. Even if production should sag after the war and the inherent contradictions of monopoly capitalism should make it impossible to direct the flow of capital back into consumers' goods, there will probably be no mass dismissals. Women will be sent back to the kitchen and invalids to their pensions . . . If necessary, the work will be distributed and labor time shortened, technical progress stopped or even reversed, wages lowered and prices raised. There are dozens of such devices available in an authoritarian regime . . .

Full employment is accompanied by an elaborate social-security program. The system developed by Weimar democracy has been streamlined and brought under authoritarian control. Unemployment assistance, health and accident insurance, invalidity and old-age pension—that is how National Socialism wins the passive toleration of the masses for the time being. Social security is its one propaganda slogan built on the truth, perhaps the one powerful weapon in its whole propagandistic machinery.<sup>65</sup>

Nothing in the material Neumann offered the reader left any doubt that Nazism would be successful in the long term in carrying out its function of integrating the masses into the 'new order'. And where it succeeded with the working class, it would certainly have no problem in succeeding with other 'ruled classes'.

Neumann's analysis of the relations between the party, the state, the armed forces and the economy made it clear that his differences of opinion with Pollock were basically quibbles about words. The development

which Neumann described clearly pointed in the same direction as that for which Pollock had chosen the unhappy term 'state capitalism':

The practitioners of violence tend to become businessmen, and the businessmen become practitioners of violence. Many leading industrialists become high SS leaders . . . Many terrorists have assumed powerful industrial positions . . . The ascendance of the practitioners of violence is thus inherent in the most intense monopolization that a modern society has ever witnessed . . . A small group of powerful industrial, financial, and agrarian monopolists [is] tending to coalesce with a group of party hierarchs into one single bloc disposing of the means of production and the means of violence. 66

Pollock might have said this in exactly the same way, with the words 'production' and 'violence' appearing in the reverse order.

Nine years later, when Neumann stated in his essay, 'Approaches to the Study of Political Power', that politics was becoming more independent of economic power in developed industrial society, it sounded as if he was explicitly agreeing with Pollock's rather blunt position, to which Horkheimer had given more sophistication. Under certain conditions, this independence could be extended into a 'supremacy of politics':

The Soviet Union presents a clear-cut marginal case where political power not only has made itself supreme but has become the fount of whatever economic power positions exist. Nazi Germany, on the other hand, exhibited a transitional case. It is undisputed that the Nazi party rose to power with the financial and political assistance of German big-business leaders who doubtless hoped to use the party for the promotion of their own interests. But the party, once having achieved power, emancipated itself from business control, and its political power became autonomous . . . It is quite safe to assume that, had there been no war or had the Nazis been victorious, the Soviet pattern would have prevailed.67

It was no misunderstanding when Neumann, on reading Horkheimer's preface to the issue on state capitalism, noted that its formulations were excellent and were often similar to those he had made in his own book. Both of them pointed out, in similar ways, the intertwining and ambiguity of the phenomena and the paradoxical character of the Nazi system. Both of them were looking for ways to express its irrational rationality, its state negation of the state, and the chaotic totality of the order it had created. Both in contrast to Pollock made clear what was monstrous about the system. The main difference between them was that Neumann insisted on the basically capitalist character of the Nazi system, and therefore thought the notion had been disproved that an unexpected

new social formation and a fundamental anthropological transformation had forced their way ahead of socialism, overtaking all the hopes which had been raised in the previous decades. Horkheimer, on the other hand, supported the theory of integral statism the term 'the administered society' was later used and 'a new, critical anthropology a theory of the Inhumane'. 68 When *Behemoth* was published, he wrote a letter to Neumann with critical notes on the book:

If there exists any real theoretical difference between us, it pertains to the optimism which you show not only with regard to the question of better administration but also to some of the deeper lying issues of society itself, such as the inherent and insoluble antagonisms of state capitalism and also to some anthropological issues, e.g. the one mentioned in your 'offense memorandum', namely the impossibility of a long-term existence of the 'split personality'. I suppose the optimistic idea of the break down [*sic*] of the 'split personality' as promoted by the mechanisms of National Socialism does not quite reflect what you really think. As a matter of fact the split of the ego which, as you know, is one of the main theses of the article on the End of Reason [Horkheimer's essay in the last issue of *SPSS*] has a long pre-history. What happens today is only the consummation of a trend which permeates the whole modern era. It has made itself felt not only within the old juxtaposition of theological and scientific truth, but much more drastically within the division of labor and leisure, of private morals and business principles, of private and public life, and in unnumerable [*sic*] other aspects of the existing order. What fascism does with respect to the personality is only to manipulate consciously and skillfully a break which itself is based on the most fundamental mechanisms of this society. 69

Sounding through these criticisms was Horkheimer's genuine opinion of Neumann's book: it was rich in material and better than anything else that had been published on the subject, but it failed on the theoretical level, since it did not deal with the decisive 'cultural-anthropological' problems.

Neumann had accused the theoreticians of state capitalism of not being able to give any evidence for the decay of the system they diagnosed, and for his own part he claimed that the contradictions of capitalism were working on a higher and therefore more dangerous level in Germany than elsewhere. He cited the familiar contradictions of Marxist, or critical, theory:

There exists a fundamental antagonism between the productivity of German industry, its capacity for promoting the welfare of the people and its actual achievements, and this antagonism is steadily deepening. For the past eight years huge industrial machinery in

continuous expansion has been set to work exclusively for destruction. The promises given by the regime to the masses are certainly sweet, but many of them have been broken and every essential point of the party programme has been sacrificed. This antagonism must be felt by the masses, which are not simply babes in the woods but have a long tradition behind them, a tradition that imbued them with a critical spirit and made them aware that the primary fact of modern civilization is this very antagonism between an economy that can produce in abundance for welfare but does so only for destruction. 70

This was an idea which was not exactly foreign to Horkheimer or Pollock. But the hopes based on it seemed to have been called into question in the meantime, and Neumann did not support them anywhere with analysis. The same was true of other contradictions he cited, such as the contradiction between the magical character of propaganda and the complete rationality and depersonalization of society; and his conjecture, referring to observers of events in Nazi Germany, that a stage had been reached at which 'leadership and community adoration are generally considered to be what they actually are: bunk'.<sup>71</sup> The functioning of this juxtaposition seemed to be something precisely characteristic of the system of Nazi rule.

The breach between 'possibility and actuality' was seen by all the members of the Horkheimer circle. But the question was whether the masses were so imbued with possibility that they would at some point cease to accept actuality. To this Neumann was only able to say, 'If we believe man to be essentially wicked, if egoism is the sole incentive of man, the prospects are rather black. But man is neither bad nor good, he will be molded by his cultural and political experience.'<sup>72</sup> However, it was precisely this cultural and political experience, in Neumann's own view, which had made the virtually unresisted seizure of power by the Nazis possible. Since then, the formative 'cultural and political experience' had been fascism.

Neumann's view of himself as an orthodox Marxist had enabled him to carry out a unique material analysis of Nazism which left no room for socialist hopes, but which assisted United States government officials in understanding how the Nazi system worked and in assessing the significance and responsibility of those involved in it.

A Branch of Private Scholars in Los Angeles and a Rump of the Institute in New York; Parting with Neumann and Marcuse

Even after Horkheimer arrived in Los Angeles in April 1941, it was some time before he started work on his first theoretical and philosophical book. He was now forty-six years old. In June, he and his wife

moved into a bungalow which he had had built and in which there was also room for Pollock. Pacific Palisades was a town formed by the bungalows and villas lying between Los Angeles and the sea, not far from Hollywood. Horkheimer's immediate neighbours were two of the most prosperous German emigrants, Thomas Mann and Lion Feuchtwanger.<sup>73</sup> A colony of German immigrants had formed in and around Hollywood. Most had come because of Hollywood actors, writers and musicians who were working in the film industry, or hoping to. By giving nominal contracts to a whole series of writers to Heinrich Mann,<sup>74</sup> for instance film companies such as MGM and Warner Brothers had made it possible for them to get visas and have a secure income, at least to begin with. For many of them, it was a case of 'expulsion into paradise'. Ludwig Marcuse recalled:

I was sitting here in the middle of the Weimar Republic: with Reinhardt and Jessner and Kortner and Deutsch; with Thomas Mann, Berthold Viertel and Bruno Frank . . . and every year more literature arrived, so that we were soon as complete as we had been in Sanary shortly before. You don't feel such a foreigner when you're surrounded by friends who are also foreigners. And even if some of them weren't friends, at least they weren't enemies. I hardly realized there were any Americans here. And I felt that a poor person isn't quite as poor in Los Angeles as in New York.<sup>75</sup>

In July, Brecht also arrived in Los Angeles via Moscow, Siberia and Manila. Feuchtwanger advised him to stay, as it was possible to live more cheaply in Los Angeles than in New York. And Brecht did stay, moving into a house which friends had rented for him. His experiences of the Hollywood film industry were as depressing for him as they were for many of the other émigrés. In the spring of 1942, Hanns Eisler came to Los Angeles from New York as well, also because of the film industry. Schoenberg had been living there since 1934, a composer without a public, but with a professorship at the University of California at Los Angeles where the students mostly studied music as a minor subject. Horkheimer, too, in spite of all his reserve and 'splendid isolation', now formed part of this colony of émigrés.<sup>76</sup>

The arrival of the Marcuse family in May and June and arranging accommodation for them, Pollock's arrival in July, and other matters such as preparing the articles for the *SPSS* issue on state capitalism, caused disruptions. Work on the dialectics project was restricted to preparatory studies, as before: planning and taking notes. For the time being, things went on in this way. Horkheimer wrote to Lowenthal in August:

In the last weeks, I'm afraid I've had a lot of distractions; the way things look at the moment, this should change again in the first half of September. On the whole, I am very happy I live only for

work. I never do anything else. And even external conditions, our own as well as those in general, are fading into the background in the face of specific questions to do with the drafts and notes . . . I don't want to talk about details in a letter yet, because it would then all still look too provisional and distorted for me, but I think I am on the right track. If there is any time for academic work at all in the next few years, the solution of moving west was definitely the right one. This thought makes me very happy. *Nota bene*: nature in southern California is more beautiful, and the climate better, than you could ever dream of. 77

Three days later, he congratulated Neumann on completing *Behemoth* words which, apart from showing that he was able to bestow praise and transmit a sense of mission, were also evidence of his efforts to maintain the goodwill of those whose financial claims the Institute's directors wanted to free themselves from. Again and again, the inner Horkheimer circle believed it saw a conspiracy forming between Fromm, Wittfogel, Grossmann and others who had been disappointed by the Institute's conspiracy which Neumann, Kirchheimer and Gurland would join if it was not possible for the Institute to break free from their financial claims without disputes arising. The completion of Neumann's manuscript was a favourable moment for a final settlement of his status in relation to the Institute. But Neumann was too hot a property for the Institute's directors. He was currently bearing the main burden of the Institute's academic work in New York, and was in charge of the efforts to find new openings with Columbia and with research foundations, as Horkheimer stated in a letter to Lowenthal in October 1941. If any of his efforts should, against their expectations, be successful, Neumann would doubtless become a kind of director of the New York branch of the Institute. For fear of disputes, the settlement of the Institute's relations with Neumann was put off once again.

In January 1942, however, the inner circle had finally given up all hope of getting any grants, and it was known that the Sociology Department at Columbia University was only interested in including Neumann's lecture course in its programme, from among the suggestions the Institute had put to it. Pollock demanded that Neumann should sign a declaration that he would have no more claims with respect to the Institute after 30 September 1942. Neumann turned to Horkheimer in protest having no idea, so little did he understand the way in which the Institute was run, that it was precisely Horkheimer himself who had already strongly pressed for this agreement to be pushed through in October 1941. Horkheimer advised him to sign the agreement:

I am well aware that in recent years, when the Institute was financially worse off and we were suffering from other worrying matters, some differences of opinion cropped up. I was always grateful to

you for the loyal way in which you reacted in such cases. Our departure to come here, which you never basically agreed with, made matters more acute. But putting aside those reservations which were well founded, you may believe me when I say that I had several points of view which would have stood the test of criticism. Which of us was right, only time will tell.

Pollock apparently believes that he owes it to himself and to the Institute to make it clear, at a moment at which you are more or less officially our representative on the faculty, that any payments made by the Institute in the coming year will be on a voluntary basis . . . From year to year, the question of financing your post from another source has been mentioned between us, but, truly, not because you were less important to the Institute than others, but because we have a greater responsibility towards the others. Again and again, we therefore made efforts to find new sources of income, and again and again, although none appeared, we stood by you. I believe that Pollock's request that the extension of any deadlines should not be a matter of obligation but should spring rather from respect for your achievements, from what connects us theoretically, and from an appreciation of the current difficulties in American surely be understood.

If Neumann were to resort to legal measures, Horkheimer added, it would not only damage the Institute but would also be less advantageous to himself than the lecture course and the rest of what the Institute had to offer him. 'I know that we can still achieve much more together than we can do working against each other . . . I can hardly imagine any company which you might join in the future which would have a more positive attitude to you than I can assure you we and not least I myself have.' 78

Neumann, who had no prospects of a university post in the short term from which he could have made a living, applied successfully some three months later for a post with the Board of Economic Warfare. In the late summer of 1941, William J. Donovan ('Wild Bill'), who was building up the Office of the Coordinator of Information which later developed into the Office of Strategic Services, had approached the Institute with regard to employing Neumann and Horkheimer in their capacities as the greatest experts on Nazi journals and magazines. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States declared war on Japan, and Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. The USA thus became a nation at war, and a contribution to the war effort was expected from academics and intellectuals; many vacancies for academically qualified personnel opened up in Washington. With his appointment as chief consultant at the Board of Economic Warfare, Neumann was the first associate of the Institute to relieve it of a financial burden and to take up an activity which could

be seen as a contribution by the Institute to the war effort. In July 1942 Horkheimer congratulated Neumann on being offered the post of chief economist of the Intelligence Division at the Office of the US Chief of Staff. 'I am all the more happy about it as it gives me the feeling that the knowledge, as we understood it [*sic*], can compete also in the practical field with what the New School has to offer.' 79

For the time being, Neumann's collaboration with the Institute continued. It was mainly through his efforts that the American Jewish Committee decided in the autumn of 1942 to support the anti-Semitism project. But when Neumann suggested that he might be able to continue to work within the Institute, either for \$1200 per year in the form of weekend consultations, or for \$2400 per year as a part-time associate working half of each week, Horkheimer had reservations. The project was not a secure basis for the future. It was uncertain whether there would be an extension or prolongation of it. He, Horkheimer, would be acting irresponsibly towards Neumann and the Institute if he were to encourage him to abandon what was the best solution from the financial point of view, namely a full-time job in Washington. From this point on, contact between Neumann and the Institute became rare, but never actually broke off: Neumann wrote to Horkheimer in March 1946, after a meeting with Pollock, saying he would prefer to return to the Institute to be able to do his own work again.

And how were things for Marcuse, who worked much more closely with Horkheimer than Neumann did, and who was personally much more submissive towards him? Marcuse, with his family, followed Horkheimer to the west coast in May 1941, and was the first to join him there. His arrival in Los Angeles prompted Horkheimer to write to Pollock that Marcuse's salary should be reduced from \$330 to \$280 a month as soon as possible. He had explained to Marcuse that he would receive \$300 in the following month; further developments would depend on the general situation and what he, Horkheimer, could arrange with Pollock.

Marcuse moved into a rented house in Santa Monica, near Pacific Palisades. Horkheimer advised him to buy a house, but Marcuse was deterred by the financial obligations involved and he had just been informed that his salary was to be cut and that his income for the future was uncertain. Marcuse had decided on a house in an area of Santa Monica in which many academics lived; Horkheimer found it excellently suited to the purposes of the Institute. He wrote to Pollock that Marcuse could set up 'a proper office there, put a library together and hold seminars. Grossmann could even live there . . . We'll have a nameplate put up: Institute of Social Research, Office Los Angeles even though it's in Santa Monica.' 80 It was also planned that, in addition to Marcuse, Adorno and Pollock, Lowenthal should also come to Los Angeles, and Kirchheimer as well if possible but the latter was to be an associate with only a minimal salary from the Institute and with no

definite claims on it, as before. Horkheimer's ideas for the future also involved making contacts with the Californian universities and preparing the way for academic careers there. But this all sounded very vague, and the affairs were always being described in different terms in his various letters and discussions.

Horkheimer and Marcuse did not start work together on the dialectics book straight away. Horkheimer had decided to devote the third issue of *SPSS* in 1941 to philosophy rather than public opinion, as it would be less risky in relation to current conditions, and for this he and Marcuse wanted to write linked articles about progress. 'I will make sure,' Horkheimer wrote to Adorno, 'that the decisive questions mentioned in Benjamin's theses 81 are kept for us later on. As I see it at the moment, Marcuse's article will deal mainly with the ideology of progress and its relation to the development of the individual, while mine will concentrate on technology and experimental psychology.'<sup>82</sup> Marcuse was therefore to deal with matters related to the history of ideas, following a division of labour which had in the meantime become customary between them. In the course of his discussions with Marcuse, however, Horkheimer's interest turned towards a theoretical analysis of the relation between the principles of reason and progress. He took on the task of writing an article on 'reason', while Marcuse was given the work on the topic of technology.

Both of them had considerable difficulties with their articles. The strategy of putting Marcuse under financial pressure, to make him look around for a job which would make it possible for him to work for the Institute without having more than nominal financial claims on it, was effective. Not only Horkheimer but Marcuse himself urged that he should go to New York so as to be at the disposal of MacIver, who had a particularly high opinion of him, and to bring the negotiations over departmental lectures by Institute associates to a successful conclusion. If he had any chances of an academic career at all, it would not be at the largely reactionary universities in California, but at Columbia, where he was the most respected member of the Institute after Neumann. Although the Institute of Social Research had never made any efforts to achieve serious co-operation with the professors at Columbia, and had remained a closed book to even the most well disposed of them, as a member of the Institute Marcuse was not approaching them merely as an individual. From his point of view, it only emphasized the urgent need for early success in the negotiations when Horkheimer wrote from Pacific Palisades to him, Pollock and Lowenthal in New York:

We must appear to these people [at Columbia] as what we are: individuals, each of whom is following his own theoretical ideas, but who admittedly have a mutual influence over one another and collaborate with one another, as may happen with the anti-Semitism question, for example. The concept of the Institute as we see it

corresponds in this country more to that of an endowment or foundation than that of an institute. As we encouraged this misunderstanding ourselves, partly out of courtesy and partly in our own interest, we should now see to it, if the various negotiations fail, that it is fully cleared up, to avoid any conflict of this sort recurring in the future. 83

The Columbia business dragged on. Marcuse only managed to work on his article sporadically, since he was expecting just a short stay in New York, was sometimes spending the nights on a sofa at the Institute, and was constantly under pressure from a vacillating Horkheimer either to return to the west coast or else to stay on in New York. At Pollock's request, he gave a lecture on 'State and Individual under National Socialism' in the Institute's lecture series at the Extension Division of Columbia University. After Marcuse's opening talk, Gurland lectured on 'Private Property under National Socialism', Neumann on 'The New Rulers in Germany', Kirchheimer on 'Law and Justice under National Socialism' and Pollock on 'Is National Socialism a New Social and Economic System?'

The plan to publish the lectures in book form as a contribution by the Institute to the war effort did not work out. Instead, the planned 'philosophical' issue of *SPSS* turned into one on National Socialism, containing revised versions of the three lectures by Marcuse, Kirchheimer and Pollock, along with Horkheimer's article on reason and one by Adorno on 'Veblen's Attack on Culture'. 'To direct my article more against National Socialism isn't difficult at all,' Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse. 'I am treating this precisely as the triumph of reason purified by scepticism.' A few days later he wrote again:

My train of thought is very simple. Reason appears to have been discredited by fascism. That is not correct. Fascism has merely cleared away completely the metaphysical categories which were associated with rationalism. Reason was always an organ of self-preservation, which is what, in the most brutal sense, fascism is based on. In fascism, however, the final rationalistic illusion appears: the ego organized for a lifetime, the synthetic unity of the person. The ego is shrinking. This tendency towards shrinkage is identical with the process of expropriating the middle classes. The logical conclusion is the decay of culture, as de Sade and Nietzsche predicted it. This is followed by a brief consideration of the chances of stopping the decay through terror, and an examination of the prospects for a change from individual self-preservation to universal solidarity.84

When Marcuse finally returned to Los Angeles in January 1942, hopes of being able to give lectures in the faculty at Columbia University and

of receiving grants for research projects seemed to have faded. The prospects of secure academic posts, even for naturalized foreigners, were smaller than ever as a result of the United States' entry into the war and the resulting changes in university life. But the Horkheimer Marcuse returned to was busy preparing a thirty-page manuscript out of a hundred-page `chaotic, indecipherable draft' 85 of his article on reason, in close collaboration with Adorno. Several months previously, Adorno's manuscript on `The Philosophy of Modern Music' had enthralled Horkheimer so much that he wrote, `If I ever felt enthusiasm for anything in my life, it was while reading this . . . This study will in the broadest sense form the basis for our common efforts.'86 His collaboration with Adorno on the article had already become so close that Horkheimer was planning to publish it under both their names, but in the end an English version of it was published in the *SPSS* under Horkheimer's name alone,87 with the more explicit German version appearing obscurely in the memorial volume for Benjamin.88 The article proved to be a kind of prospectus of the book on dialectics the two were to write.

Marcuse's article, `Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', followed the tried and tested pattern of the leading *ZfS* articles of the 1930s, and closed with the familiar idealist anarchism of the Marcusean utopia. He saw individual rationality as having been supplanted in the liberalistic age by `technological rationality', an expression also used by Kirchheimer and Neumann. The liberalistic age was a period of highly concentrated economic power and highly developed technologyan age characterized by the individual's adaptation to the machine, by efficiency, by equipment. It was not technical progress and rationalization which struck Marcuse as being disastrous, but rather `the special form . . . in which the technological process is organized'.89 What was corrupting technical progress was its fusion with the interests of a ruling class. A democratically controlled public bureaucracy, as opposed to a private one, would protect people from the misuse of technology and show that mechanization and standardization could be a means of liberating them from worries over material necessities. New forms of individuality would then become possible `natural' individuality.

Horkheimer's article on reason, by contrast, seemed far more unconventional, trenchant and radical, with its concept of the self-destruction of reason, of a merciless progress of self-transcending reason. Horkheimer himself saw the article as a kind of conclusion of the earlier studies which was at the same time leading on to a new set of questions of principle.90 To begin with, Marcuse was involved in working these out. `Adorno is working on mass culture, Marcuse is working on language, and I am working on the idea of enlightenment,' Horkheimer wrote to Kirchheimer in August 1942. `All three sections are, of course, closely interconnected.'91

The first results of these studies, it was planned, would be published in a yearbook, since the *SPSS* was to cease publication with the delayed appearance of the issue on Nazism. The entry of the United States into the war and financial considerations were only additional factors in this decision. The basic reason was that Horkheimer had become convinced that in its current form the journal constituted a concession, and no longer corresponded at all to what had been intended. For the duration of the war, according to an announcement in the last issue of the *SPSS*, a yearbook would be published. The plan was seriously followed up, and Kirchheimer and Neumann were pressured again and again to submit contributions on a topic suggested by Horkheimer, the racket theory of society (see below, pp. 318-19). At the same time, the carrying out of the project was obstructed by the fact that important members of the Institute were obliged to take on full-time posts in Washington which did not leave them sufficient time to hand in the planned articles early enough. The project was also hampered by the fact that restrictions were placed on them in publishing their research. An article by Marcuse on 'Operational Thinking and Social Domination', following on from his last contribution to the *SPSS*, was to have appeared in the yearbook. It represented an early stage of what later became *One-Dimensional Man*; but he was not able to complete it. The failure of the plan for a yearbook also meant that Marcuse was never named as a collaborator on the dialectics project.

In the autumn of 1942, the strategy of financial starvation applied by the directors of the Institute had succeeded to the extent that Marcuse felt compelled to find additional money somehow or other. Since Neumann saw definite opportunities both for him and for other Institute members in Washington in government jobs, and since Marcuse was afraid that because he was not employed on affairs connected with the war effort he might be conscripted, he travelled to Washington in the hope of finding a job that would enable him to earn his living in Santa Monica and at the same time carry on his collaboration with Horkheimer. But he had hardly arrived in the east when he was put to work on elaborating the anti-Semitism project in New York, the American Jewish Committee having in the meantime agreed in principle to support it.

On 10 November 1942 a telegram from Marcuse reached Horkheimer in Los Angeles: 'Office of War Information is offering me position in Washington Salary 4600 Shall learn particularly by Wednesday My attitude unchanged Cordially . . . Marcuse.' The next day, Marcuse sent off a letter explaining that the job would have to be carried out in Washington, since the work would involve studying microfilms of European newspapers, short-wave radio broadcasts and consular reports which were not available outside government premises. His task would be to suggest ways of presenting the enemy in the press, in films, in propaganda, and so on.

The appointment has been approved by all the chiefs, and although it has still to go through the routine of the Personnel Division and through the FBI, there seems unfortunately not the slightest doubt that it will go through . . . As I told you, I would not accept it. I think I can get away from it without suffering much harm or making a bad impression (unwillingness to contribute to the War Effort) by saying that I have first to complete my studies in L.A. which are just as pertinent to the War Effort. Since they want me to start work as soon as possible (even before the formalities are completed), this will end the negotiations.

Pollock had warned him against hasty decisions, however: the Institute's budget would only last two or three years more, and his, Marcuse's, future was at stake. 92

Even as he wrote his letter, Horkheimer's answer to the telegram was on its way. `You made this trip because you were convinced that, if you have no commitment, you will soon be unable to do your work with me here. Things being as they are, the position seems to be the only way to escape from what you dreaded.'93 The unhealthy financial situation of the Institute would not make it possible in times such as these to turn down the offer of a really acceptable job, particularly when it would provide an opportunity to acquire knowledge and abilities which might one day be of use to the Institute. Of course, Marcuse's decision to end his work in Los Angeles, or at least to interrupt it indefinitely, had disappointed him.

Philosophy is a very slow process and I don't see anybody apart from ourselves with the right tradition, experience and love which would justify the great practical risks involved in the sticking to [*sic*] such an undertaking during these days. When I returned from my trip, I had a particularly good feeling about the theoretical progress we could make in the near future, and this feeling was confirmed by what you had done in the meantime. In this new draft, I recognized our common spirit and I felt that we would now be able to gather results of our endeavours of the last year.

But when a really acceptable job was being offered to him, and he believed he could carry out what was involved, it would be irresponsible to turn it down.

A day may arise earlier than we think, when your presence there may be invaluable for myself. For all the objective and personal reasons I cannot say no when you ask me whether you should accept the position. What should I say if in two or three months your work would be interrupted under much more unpleasant circumstances!94

Marcuse, reconciling himself to his need for security, but insisting on his enthusiasm for the theory and demonstrating his respect for the Institute as a stronghold for further work on it, replied:

I know that, unfortunately, all `rational' argumentation speaks for my accepting the position in Washington. But it seems to me that you somewhat underrate my desire to continue the theoretical work we have been doing . . . In spite of my opposition to some of your conceptions, I have never and nowhere concealed my conviction that I know of no intellectual efforts today which are closer to the truth, and of no other place where one is still allowed and encouraged to think. It might be good to say this at this moment, and to tell you that I shall not forget what I learned with you . . . Only if you say that, on account of the Institute's financial situation, this relationship will anyway come to an end within a very short time, and that my position in Washington would make it possible to continue our common work after a relatively short interruption only then would the rational argumentation harmonize with my rather `irrational' desire to continue our theoretical studies. 95

With this, the matter was practically decided. The FBI had no objections. Marcuse first became senior analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence of the Office of War Information; later he went on to the more influential Office of Strategic Services, to which Neumann had already been transferred.

Less self-confident than Neumann, and considerably more submissive towards Horkheimer, Marcuse remained more closely attached to the Institute than his friend. In Marcuse, the Institute's directors had what Horkheimer had hoped for in vain from Neumann: someone who was no longer a financial burden to the Institute, but who continued `to feel as one of our group'.96

In 1943 six more or less full associates of the Institute were in full-or part-time government service, and were in this way visibly contributing to the war effort: Neumann as deputy chief of the Central European Section of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and consultant at the Board of Economic Warfare; Marcuse as senior analyst at the OSS; Kirchheimer and Gurland, also as members of staff at the OSS; Lowenthal as a consultant at the Office of War Information; and Pollock as consultant at the Department of Justice's Anti-Trust Division. The only ones who were spared were Horkheimer and Adorno, the two principal theoreticians.

Lowenthal had repeatedly been promised by Horkheimer that he would be able to transfer to the west coast and take part in their joint theoretical work; but he had to stay in New York. He was allowed to come to the west coast for a few weeks on just one occasion, to take

part in some work on the anti-Semitism project. Otherwise he had to hold the fort in New York in the rump of the Institute. This did not cost very much to run, but it was sufficient to continue the relationship with Columbia University and to demonstrate that the Institute continued officially to exist, while it avoided most of its earlier commitments.

#### Work on the Dialectics Project

'If I ever felt enthusiasm for anything in my life, it was while reading this,' Horkheimer had written to Adorno two months after moving into the bungalow at Pacific Palisades, on reading his manuscript 'The Philosophy of Modern Music'.<sup>97</sup> A feeling of happiness had come over him. The passive power with which Adorno experienced music would have to be directed 'against society itself'; his categories would have to be confronted with reality. Instead of being satisfied with giving a critical description of the riposte music offered to prevailing trends in cultural phenomena, one would have to deliver the riposte oneself.<sup>98</sup> Adorno agreed enthusiastically:

Both your criticisms and my own reflections seem to me to converge on a single point: whether we should really continue, as we intended, to focus our joint work on art, or whether in God's name we shouldn't finally start talking about society itself. While I was writing the piece on music, I, too, increasingly had the impression that it implied a farewell to art theory, for a considerable time at least . . . and I can already tell you that I not only agree with shifting the emphasis on to questions of society as such, but that precisely a knowledge of art makes such a 'transition' necessary.<sup>99</sup>

Adorno's text did in fact seem to focus all the important motifs of his thought together, but the plausibility of this was purchased at the price of an unmediated assimilation between musical and social processes. 'Admittedly, the treatment of the different spheres' (of base and superstructure) 'as identical does not always seem to me to be justified,' Horkheimer noted in the critical part of his remarks on Adorno's manuscript. 'The danger of the philosophy of identity, and thus of idealism, which was of course as clear to you as you were writing it as it was to me reading it, does not yet seem to me to have been wholly overcome.'<sup>100</sup> The focusing together of Adorno's motifs might have been expected to produce an examination of the role of music, particularly in association with the nature of the human subject, against the background of a critique of the domination of nature by society. The interaction between the relation of society to external nature and the relation of

subjects to their own internal nature might have been examined against this background. But what Adorno in fact did was to force all the motifs together into an interpretation of the music produced by Schoenberg and his closest students, seeing this interpretation as the only one which did justice to current objective possibilities of the musical material. This was rather an exaggeration of the thesis that the universal is contained within the particular.

Adorno's text centred on the technique of twelve-tone music. The philosophical interpretation of it was tied in to a conception of the development of the human species along the lines of Western civilization. This was a romantic-Marxist conception, which might be paraphrased as follows: to begin with, humanity was confronted with all-powerful nature. In the course of time, people learned how to become more powerful than nature, how to control nature. This meant that nature was seen less and less as something directed by superior, self-willed, unpredictable powers, and more and more as something which obeyed laws and which could be put to service through cunning exploitation of those laws. As if they were still under the spell of the old fear of a superior nature, people made it their highest goal to bring nature into submission. But they did not succeed in breaking its superior power; instead, nature, within them, remained superior. Nature had been dethroned, but they did not succeed in achieving fearless respect for it, even after they had intentionally brought it down: respect for something which had potentially produced a means of alleviating its own harshnesses in the form of humanity itself.

This concept was dovetailed only selectively with Adorno's view of the development of music, which was oriented towards Beethoven, Brahms and Schoenberg as turning-points. The connection was at its closest where Adorno became utopian:

Just as the goal of music reaches beyond the realm of intentions, the realm of meaning and subjectivity, so too does its origin. The origin of music is of the nature of gesture, and closely related to the nature of tears. It is the gesture of release. The tension of the facial muscles, the tension which both directs the face into action on the environment and seals it off from that environment, is released. Music and tears open the lips and set the arrested human being free . . . One who lets himself go in tears, or in a form of music no longer resembling him in any way, at the same time lets the stream of everything he himself is not, everything which had been dammed up behind the wall of the objective world, flow back through him. As one who weeps, or one who sings, he goes forth into alienated reality . . . The gesture of someone returning, not the expectancy of someone waiting, describes the expression of all music, even in a world which deserves to die. 101

Music here stood for the end of domination over nature, for a reconciliation between mind and nature which would prepare the way for a unification of internal and external nature.

In other passages, the connection was only ostensible. This was particularly so where the concept 'material' was equated with nature, and composers were presented more or less as being the organs responsible for the realm of sound within the totality of workers in society, contributing their part to society's domination over external nature.

Otherwise, the history of humanity conceived from the point of view of domination over nature was treated as a kind of long-term economic cycle, on which the briefer cycle of the development of Western music in recent centuries was finally overlaid. This closing cycle was then seen in terms of tradition and freedom, convention and spontaneity, objective order and subjective stance, demythologization and rationality. Adorno was thus once again taking up the problem posed in his earlier essays on music: how does the modern composer achieve definite forms? This question is only a special case of the more general one: how can humanity achieve definite order today, when all traditional measures and norms have begun to crumble? In such contexts, the concept 'material' signified 'secondary nature' for Adorno that is, traditions which had developed into fetters.

In a fascinating sketch of the transformation which had taken place in the function and form of musical performance since Beethoven, Adorno tried both to justify and to criticize the rationalization of music.

In Beethoven, and certainly in Brahms, the unity of the exploration of motifs and themes was achieved in a kind of balance between subjective dynamics and traditional tonal language. A subjective organization forces conventional language to speak once again, without intervening to alter it as language. The alteration of the language has been achieved along Romantic-Wagnerian lines at the cost of objectivity and definitiveness in the music itself. This alteration has dissolved the unity of motif and theme in *Lieder*, and substituted for it the leitmotiv and programme music. Schoenberg himself was the first to discover the principles of universal unity and economy in the new, subjective, emancipated Wagnerian material. His works are evidence of the fact that, the more consistently the nominalism in musical language inaugurated by Wagner is pursued, the more perfectly this language allows itself to be rationally controlled. 102

This rational control signified a destruction of conventions and the emancipation both of the material and of the subjectivity which was using that material for composition; and this was why Adorno welcomed it. But it also signified the unbridled domination of a subjectivity deeming itself to be autonomous over material which seemed in itself to be meaningless; and this was why he criticized it.

Twelve-tone technique is a system of domination over nature within music. It corresponds to a longing present from the beginnings of the bourgeois period: to 'grasp' whatever sounds appear and set them in order, dissolving the magical essence of music in human reason . . . Conscious disposition over the material provided by nature has two aspects: it is the emancipation of humanity from natural necessity within music, and the subjection of nature to human purposes . . . However, the oppressive moment of subjugating nature reverses itself and turns against the subjective autonomy and freedom in whose name domination over nature has been achieved. 103

For a moment, however, the utopia of a form of music emancipated from conventions and traditions, and open towards what was distinct from humanity, seemed to have become reality. 'Free atonality', 'free composition', the 'spontaneity of the critical ear'<sup>104</sup> had originally stood at the conclusion of the process of purifying music from convention. 'There is probably not a single rule in twelve-tone music which is not produced of necessity from composers' experience, from the progressive elucidation of the natural material of music. But the character of such experience was that of defence' (the text of *Philosophie der neuen Musik* adds 'by virtue of its subjective sensibility'):

that not a single tone should repeat itself, before the music had taken up all of the others; that not a single note should appear which does not have the function of a motif in the construction of the whole; that no harmony should be used which does not clearly justify itself at that point. The truth of all of these desiderata lies in their incessant confrontation with the concrete form of the music to which they are applied. They state what one must protect oneself from, but not how it is to be handled.<sup>105</sup>

Adorno gave the word 'material' a new sense in this context. Previously it had meant either mere nature, the blind domination of tonal matter; or the secondary nature found in conventional constraints; or disqualified material, which was in itself meaningless. Now it was used to indicate 'what could not be grasped', 'untamed sounds'.<sup>106</sup> It was with sounds of this sort that the composer of the 'emerging music' was concerned. He involved himself with them, and they yielded to him.<sup>107</sup>

'The steely apparatus of the twelve-tone technique', however, was directed against what 'was arising, at once more free and more necessary, from the decay of tonality'.<sup>108</sup> Adorno explained this development by saying that 'most composers had themselves been so thoroughly restrained' that it was necessary for them to forbid themselves the happiness of what could not be restrained; they were too weak to let themselves get involved with anything which was forbidden.<sup>109</sup> 'This is

why so many young musicians especially in America, where the experiences basic to twelve-tone music are lacking are prepared to write in the "twelve-tone system". It is also why there is such jubilation over finding a substitute for tonality, as if it were impossible to put up with freedom even aesthetically, so that a new form of submissiveness must surreptitiously be used to produce a replacement for it.' 110 Adorno drew his critical standards from the premature reconciliation between mind and nature which had taken place in atonal music, and he did not even attempt to explain its development in terms of social theory. He paid tribute to the real power of 'progress' by allowing the phase of atonal music, as a phase of expressionist statements, to transform itself 'necessarily' into one of objectivity. He justified twelve-tone technique as a 'narrow discipline through which all music must pass if it is not to fall victim to the curse of contingency'. 111 Now that free composition seemed to have been achieved, now that twelve-tone technique had been denounced as a system of musical domination over nature and as the symptom of a flight from freedom, he interpreted it as being the precondition for a genuinely free form of composition, since the objective spirit had 'progressed' towards it. This was a dialectical view of musical progress which raised the suspicion that it was furnishing the growth of one school in music with the solemnities of dialectical necessity.

On the other hand, Adorno's recognition of twelve-tone composition as a form of progress forced him to state more exactly what faithfulness to the ideal of free composition might mean under social conditions in which freedom was lacking. Of a work of art of this sort, he wrote, 'One moment it is insistent, and the next it is forgetful. It gives way, and yet becomes more rigid. It maintains itself, or sacrifices itself to outwit its fate.' 112 It was in these terms that he discussed the works of the late Schoenberg, the great moments of which were achieved both through twelve-tone technique and in opposition to it. 'Through it, because the music is enabled to behave as coldly and pitilessly as only befits it in this reality' (the text of *Philosophie der neuen Musik* has 'after the downfall' here). 'In opposition to the twelve-tone technique, because the mind which devised it always remains in sufficient command of itself to be able to fly straight through its architecture, its pillars, nuts, and bolts, and to light it all up as if he was prepared in the end to take the whole technical masterpiece and destroy it catastrophically.' 113 But what was it that enabled this mind to remain in command of itself?

The spontaneity of musical vision pushes aside whatever is prescribed, casts forth whatever has been learned, and lets only the force of the imagination have sway. This power to forget, this barbaric moment of hatred for art, allows the mediations of musical culture to be put in question at every instant through the immediacy of its reaction. It is this alone which balances the masterly command of technique and saves the tradition for it. 114

Adorno's view was therefore that it was the barbaric element which gave the mind (*Geist*) command over itself in opposing objectifications of its own activity which were alienated from it. In this way, the mind was able to appear armed in steel before a rigid society, while at the same time remaining open towards the ungrasped nature within itself. Indeed, each aspect required the other: just as its link with what could not be grasped was all that preserved the mind from being overpowered by its rigid objectifications, so too it could only remain true to what could not be grasped by maintaining its toughness within a rigid society. 115

There were echoes in this idea of, for example, Schoenberg's conception of the artist as a connoisseur of tradition following his own instincts; or of Thomas Mann's conception of art as being the outcome of a union between barbarism and intellectualism; and also of Bloch's and Benjamin's demand that the energies of barbarism and intoxication should be put at the service of the 'revolution'. But Adorno's was a problematic view in at least two respects. It was problematic to speak of something which could not be grasped without making it clear what was to be understood by this particularly when it was possible for concepts like 'barbarism' and 'nature', which occurred as synonyms, to be understood both in a positive and a negative sense. The negative sense was relatively clear, but the positive sense remained opaque. It was also problematic to put one's faith in a beneficial exacerbation of the rigidifying process in the same way that Benjamin's allegorizing philology gave its backing to construction through demolition if at the same time the only means of preserving the mind against insane self-glorification was held to be its connection with something that could not be grasped.

Ultimately, Adorno's challenging paradoxes appeared futile, in view of their repeated appeal to the existence of a cultured form of nature: the 'perceptive ear',<sup>116</sup> the 'attentive ear',<sup>117</sup> the 'experimenting ear',<sup>118</sup> the 'critical ear',<sup>119</sup> the 'modern ear',<sup>120</sup> and so on. With forms of cultivated nature such as these, was the vision of humanity going weeping and singing into the alienated world not a piece of pointless sentimentality?

If Adorno's interpretation of modern music as a form of domination over nature, and as a way of escaping an alienated form of domination over nature, were to be accepted, the immediate question would be whether such an interpretation would produce useful approaches to the criticism and correction of non-musical forms of domination over nature. More precisely: was it possible to do without any domination over nature or cultured dealings with nature altogether, in the spirit of the subject who could break free, weeping and singing? Could the instruments of domination over nature be made to 'glow' through 'barbaric', 'spontaneous' elements in the people controlling them? Were cultured dealings with a more or less cultured nature conceivable in which by analogy with atonality what was in principle untamed

could always be handled with a sense that the intrinsic qualities of objects and their usefulness could be reconciled? In Adorno's manuscript there was only space to pose an alternative between the loneliness of the rigidified subject and the self-dissolution of the subject in nature. It might be possible to see some significance in this for the field of music. But, in other fields, the question was whether there was any way of dealing with outward and inward nature, or any way for subjects to deal with one another, and whether such possibilities must not in any case be distinguished from dealings with the non-human elements of nature.

It was precisely in the most exposed section of Adorno's essay where he spoke of letting oneself go in tears and in music that Horkheimer saw the strongest evidence for the fact that his own trains of thought and Adorno's were mysteriously converging, even while the two men were separated. He took this passage as an occasion to throw in some ideas connected with anti-Semitism, quoting from a letter he had written to Adorno's brother-in-law, Egon Wissing:

Their laughable faithfulness to the One God makes the Jews in the view of the anti-Semites, not in reality simultaneously ungainly and dangerous. The killing of madmen is the key to the Jewish pogrom.

Of course, seeing a sense of monotheism as a piece of foolishness conceals a deep reverence for it; or, rather, a superstitious fear that it is one's own deeds which are wrong and corrupt. Madmen are not held spellbound by the goals and purposes people serve today, in the same way that proper people are. This makes them into sinister observers, who must be eliminated. The evil deed will be undone if the witnesses are killed.

Pain plays a special role here. The madman appears to be detached, to be standing outside, he lives in another world, removed from the constraints of the present. Pain calls us back into the present (think of the various ways of waking people from sleep!), and reduces people to defensive reactions, to seeing an escape from pain as being their one goal, it binds them to that purpose. The notion that heretics ought to recant was only the rationalization for torturing them. In a much deeper sense, they were to be made the equals of their tormentors: in the sense that they were to experience physically, in their own bodies, the supremacy of practical purposes. Again and again, it was to be shown that freedom is not possible.

An examination of anti-Semitism leads us back to mythology and ultimately to psychology. 121

Those who let themselves go in tears and in music, and madmen or Jews, who appeared to be detached, to be outsiders, were symbols of

release. Horkheimer's ideas paralleled Adorno's speculations on the persecution of the Jews as the representatives of a once-happy nomadism. For both of them, the Jews stood for an inability to achieve full assimilation into a social system characterized by radical self-preservation and totally purposive rationality. The Jews stood for a form of happiness free of the struggle for life, free of work, free of purposiveness. For both Horkheimer and Adorno, social theory, 'theological discussion' and the theory of anti-Semitism appeared to be closely connected. However, the one, a melancholy materialist, warned the other, a defender of an implicit use of theological categories, that in his fine and sometimes solemn style he was expressing a relation to the positive, to the theological, which was not mediated by a negation. This was not yet the correct formulation. Adorno's overcoming of psychologism in art through the theory that it was the work of art which had knowledge, and not the author, was being paid for 'with a piece of identity philosophy and optimism'. 'This leads immediately into the theological discussion which lies before us. Our work will to a great extent depend on our ability to find common formulations here.' 122

Soon after this, Adorno, waiting impatiently in New York for his move to the west coast, repeated the suggestion he had made a year before:

How would it be if the book . . . were to crystallize around anti-Semitism? This would bring with it the concretization and limitation which we have been looking for. It would also be possible for the topic to motivate most of the Institute's associates, whereas if we write something like a critique of the present judged by the category of the individual, my nightmare is that Marcuse would then prove that the category of the individual has contained both progressive and reactionary elements since the early days of the bourgeoisie. Then again, anti-Semitism is today really the central injustice, and our form of physiognomy must attend to the world where it shows its face at its most gruesome. Finally, the question of anti-Semitism is the one in which what we are writing would be most likely to find an effective context, without our having to lose anything by it. And I can imagine, even without any illusory optimism, that a work of this sort would come over to the outside world in a way that would help us. For my part, I would give up years to produce it without a moment's hesitation. 123

This suggestion met with Horkheimer's agreement at once. A few months before, Horkheimer had written to Laski, referring to the draft of an anti-Semitism project which had appeared in *SPSS*: 'Just as it is true that one can only understand anti-Semitism by examining our society, it seems to me it is becoming equally true that society itself can now only be understood through anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism demonstrates

from the example of the minority what is in fact in store for the majority as well: that people can be turned into administrative objects.' 124

In the few days before Adorno's letter, wearing the star of David had been decreed as compulsory for all Jews over the age of six in Germany, and emigration by Jewish citizens had been banned. On 22 June 1941 the German army invaded the Soviet Union. In the occupied territories, mass murders began at once. News about them could be found, for example, in the extensive 'Chronicles' section of *Contemporary Jewish Record*, published by the American Jewish Committee. But it was also possible to find information on the terrible events in Europe even in the main newspapers in the USA. 'Complete elimination of Jews from European life now appears to be fixed German policy,' wrote the *New York Times* on 28 October. The Jews, it reported, were being transported eastwards in goods trucks. The authorities abroad were also informed through ambassadors and diplomats about deportations and other evidence that the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe, prophesied by Hitler on 30 January 1939, was being seriously pursued. There were no changes in the United States' restrictive immigration policy.

Nazi anti-Semitism was constantly intensifying and being aggravated by unbelievable actions, which most people for a long time did not, in fact, believe. The Western democracies made no resolute protests or large-scale efforts to assist. The Soviet Union was an exception, but had been Hitler's ally until he attacked. Influenced by these facts, Horkheimer's interests turned finally from the theory of the absent revolution to the theory of an absent civilization.

In November 1941 all of the Institute's associates except Horkheimer were either still in New York or had returned there. Adorno's chance finally came. 'By the way, thanks to my illness,' he wrote in his last letter before leaving, 'the farewell party for me was held at the Institute without me even being there.' Referring to the departmental lectures and finance for research projects, he continued, 'If something goes wrong here now we will say imperturbably: that was the way you wanted it. Please excuse my audacity. I can't really contain myself for joy.' Later in the letter, showing the effervescence of his imagination, the phrase which later became the title of their joint book first appeared: 'I have just been reading Gorer's book on Sade, and a great many things occurred to me which I think we will be able to use. Essentially they relate to the dialectic of enlightenment, or the dialectic of culture and barbarism.' 125

This passage also made it clear once again under whose guiding star Adorno and Horkheimer's decision to work together was to become a reality. That guiding star was Benjamin, who had resisted any escape from an Old World whose culture was fused with barbarism into a New World without culture or tradition. When his escape over the Pyrenees seemed to have failed, Benjamin committed suicide on 26 September

1940 in the Spanish border town of Port Bou. In June 1941, Hannah Arendt, who had crossed the French-Spanish border at Port Bou some months after Benjamin, passed on to Adorno the manuscript of Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'. Benjamin had named Adorno as his literary executor. When Adorno sent Horkheimer a copy, he wrote in the covering letter that, although Benjamin himself, in a letter he had written to Gretel, 126 had rejected all thought of publishing it, the manuscript should be published anyway:

It contains Benjamin's final concepts. His death makes any reservations that publication may be premature null and void. There can be no doubt about the broad sweep it has as a whole. In addition: none of Benjamin's works shows him closer to our intentions than this. This relates above all to the conception of history as permanent catastrophe, the critique of progress and mastery of nature, and the place of culture.127

Horkheimer agreed without reservation.

I share your happiness that we have Benjamin's history theses. They will keep us busy for some time to come, and he will still be with us. The identity of barbarism and culture . . . was, by the way, the subject of one of my last conversations with him in a café near the Gare Montparnasse . . . The idea of class struggle as universal oppression, and exposing historiography as empathy with the rulers, are insights which we must view as theoretical axioms.128

As a homage to Benjamin, the Institute wanted to publish a mimeographed booklet containing the 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' and contributions by Horkheimer, Adorno and Brecht. It was then decided to do without Brecht after all. For tactical reasons, Horkheimer did not want to print Benjamin's theses at the front of the volume, as Adorno and Lowenthal suggested. 'The terminology, which we hardly dare change, is too undisguised.' This presumably referred both to the theses' Marxist terminology as well as to their theological terminology. The memorial volume published in the middle of 1942 ultimately included, in addition to Benjamin's theses (parts of which had already appeared in his essay on Eduard Fuchs), an article by Adorno written in 1939-40 on 'George and Hofmannsthal', and two articles by Horkheimer: 'The Authoritarian State' and 'Reason and Self-Preservation'.129 The two sentences signed by Horkheimer and Adorno which introduced the essays turned out to be misleading: 'We dedicate these articles to the memory of Walter Benjamin. The theses on the philosophy of history, which take pride of place, are Benjamin's final work.' Everyone to whom Horkheimer gave the volume thought that the articles on 'Reason and Self-Preservation' and on 'George and

Hofmannsthal' were the best things Benjamin had ever written better than the 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'. This may be seen as an indication of the extent to which both Horkheimer and Adorno had assimilated the theological basis for the critique of progress and of conservative positions which lay behind the categories of release, uselessness and self-abandonment.

At the end of November 1941 Adorno arrived in Los Angeles. With his wife, he moved into rented accommodation a few minutes' drive away from Horkheimer. There was room for his small library and for a magnificent grand piano. He had brought with him an almost complete version of his article for the last issue of the journal, 'Veblen's Attack on Culture'. This article, and the essay on 'Spengler Today' which had appeared in the previous issue, were variations on the theme of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. Spengler had become disreputable as an accomplice of the new barbarism, and Adorno tried to strip his work of its barbaric element, since this was a philosophical motif directed against culture. In Veblen, a 'technocratic Marxist' (as Dahrendorf called him), whose idea had been to contrast the engineer with the leisure class, Adorno attempted to protect from the 'pressures of dreamless adjustment and adaptation to reality' 130 those unarticulated elements of culture in which he saw the necessities of natural forces breaking through, an emancipation from the realm of ends and purposes. One example will suffice to show that Adorno's objections to Veblen's critique of culture involved nothing more than the fact that it demanded that the emancipation from tradition should be delayed. Veblen had 'noticed the temporal disparity between the castle and the railway station but not the law behind this disparity. The railway station assumes the aspect of the castle but this aspect is its truth. Only when the technological world is a direct servant of domination is it capable of shedding the disguise. Only in fascism does it equal itself.' 131 But to draw an analogy with the view Adorno took of Schoenberg's music what was to be understood, in the field of social theory, by putting the barbaric at the service of the true progress of culture? Adorno did not go into this.

Since all Adorno's criticisms were aimed at producing evidence of 'immanence', the goal of his critique could only be termed transcendence, or simply: release into the transcendent, into a realm free of intention, into what was new, unrestricted, open, non-identical. 'The whole of dialectical materialism' was centred on the 'potentiality of Novelty,' he wrote in the article on Spengler. 132 Adorno used the concept of the non-identical for the first time in a letter to the article's translator clarifying the meaning of his statement that freedom, considered absolutely, would fall victim to mere existence. He suggested adding the sentence: 'Freedom postulates the existence of something non-identical.' In the letter he explained that 'The non-identical element must not be nature alone, it also can be man.' 133

Adorno's essays always closed by surveying the prospects for salvation. Sometimes he saw the relation of immanence collapsing as a result of its own totalization and the complete destruction of its own basis in the non-identical which would result from such a totalization. Sometimes he saw it as failing through the impossibility of meeting its own demand for totality. What function was being assigned to thought in surveys of this sort? Were they not self-contradictory? Was it not the case that they were philosophical motifs so lacking in any connection with sociological analysis that they were simply speculative? The testing out of Adorno's ideas within a framework of research inquiries based on a mass of material seemed long overdue, both in relation to the article on the philosophy of music and in relation to the articles on the dialectic of culture and barbarism.

With Horkheimer, the situation was similar. His article on reason was a pot-pourri of fragments of thought in which two main motifs may be recognized. The first was sociological: the observation of a tendency towards eliminating all mediations between the individual and society. The second was connected with the philosophy of history: the observation of a tendency for thought to refine itself by excluding reason.

The elaboration of the sociological motif was carried out in the years that followed under the rubric of a theory of the racket phase of society (see pp. 318-19). This referred to a form of totalitarian monopoly capitalism, a society in which the insignificant individual could only survive as part of an association, a team; in which, to preserve himself, the individual had 'to knuckle down everywhere, work together as part of a team, be ready and able to do everything', be 'always watchful and ready, always aiming at some immediate practical goal'. 134

The elaboration of the motif connected with the philosophy of history was carried out under the rubric of a theory of the self-destruction of reason through instrumentalization. What Adorno denounced as the self-glorification of mind dominating nature, Horkheimer termed reason's self-refinement by excluding thought and morality. But what was this to mean? Was it Horkheimer's assumption that thoughtful, moral reason was thrusting thought and morality away from itself? Why should it? Clearly, Horkheimer was working with two distinct concepts of reason here. First, reason was equated with thought; this corresponded to the later concept of 'objective reason' in Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason*; then it was seen as an instrument serving self-preservation 'subjective reason', as it was termed in the *Eclipse*. Was instrumental reason therefore in conflict with thoughtful reason? Had instrumental reason thrown off what was humanistic and rational in reason, namely thoughtful, moral reason, as an 'animist residue'? But, if this were so, how was it possible to speak of the self-destruction of reason? How could it be maintained, as it was in 'Reason and Self-Preservation', that the self was slipping away beyond the reach of self-preservation, that rational civilization was perishing from the refinement of reason?

Where Adorno made what was unrestricted and non-identical the measure of his critique, Horkheimer referred to ideas which pointed beyond given realities, to contemplations which raised themselves above self-interest and expediency, to love as it was symbolized by Romeo and Juliet, to the image glimpsed between imagination and memory of an economically independent, responsible and thoughtful citizen. Was there not a residue of idealism at work here with Horkheimer as well, such as he had criticized in Adorno's article on the philosophy of music? Ultimately, the question arose: what was the connection between his observations in sociology and in the philosophy of history, assuming they were accurate? What was the relation between economic autonomy, which Horkheimer continued to refer to, and the self-destructive process occurring in reason?

These remained open questions, and that was how Horkheimer saw them as well. 'Most of the points mentioned in the new article will have to be dealt with in that book,' he wrote to Lowenthal in February 1942. Three months later, the preliminary studies had been given a clearer outline:

The first chapter (this, of course, is strictly confidential) will deal with the philosophical concept of enlightenment. Enlightenment here is identical with bourgeois thought, nay, thought in general, since there is no other thought properly speaking than in the cities. The main topics are enlightenment and mythology, enlightenment and domination, enlightenment and practice, the social roots of enlightenment, enlightenment and theology, facts and system, enlightenment and its relation to humanism and barbarism. The second chapter will contain the analysis of positivistic science and different phenomena of mass culture. This chapter could be closely related to your studies. There will be five chapters altogether, but the last three are still very indefinite. 135

The general programme guiding Horkheimer and Adorno, and also Marcuse, who was initially still involved in this early stage of work on the dialectics project, can be seen from the 'Memorandum on Parts of the Los Angeles Programme of Work which Cannot be Carried Out by the Philosophers', which was written in the middle of the year.

The plan of the work as a whole is concerned with a comprehensive critique of current ideology. Ideology is taken here to mean not only consciousness, but also the constitution of humanity in the current phase, thus anthropology in the sense in which the concept is used in 'Egoism and the Freedom Movement'. Particular emphasis is given to the connection between the practical, 'realistic' mind to which pragmatism has given its philosophical expression and fascism. It is not, however, a matter of a theory

which is to be tested. The liberating elements in enlightenment and pragmatism are to be brought out just as much as the repressive ones. The attack on the ruling ideology should take place in critical analysis both of the decisive intellectual spheres and of mass culture. The success of such analyses essentially depends on their orientation towards concrete insights into the latest economic developments. For the work as a whole aims to overcome political stagnation. 136

The philosophers did not expect their associates on the east coast to produce a comprehensive presentation of the current economic position and theory. 'The economic sections should concentrate instead on certain important particular questions related to class theory.' The particular questions they were concerned with were, for example: what has happened to the proletariat in the monopoly-fascist phase? What has happened to the capitalist class? Is the bureaucracy a class? What is the present status of academic and non-academic discussion of Marxist theory? How does the monopoly implement its control of mass culture?

The memorandum made it clear that Horkheimer was still convinced of the necessity of interdisciplinary collaboration; that he still considered economic analysis to be of central significance; and that 'his book' was to be a historical-materialist theory of the general tendencies of the era. However, it remained unclear in what sense 'interdisciplinary collaboration' was intended; what status economic analysis was to have; and what message was being conveyed by the fact that the work described itself as an 'ideological critique'. The expression contained a declaration of belief in the Marxist model of a critique of political economy, at the same time suggesting a critique of the illusions created by the capitalist mode of production and a presentation of the contradictory essence of that mode of production.

According to the programme indicated in his inaugural lecture, in the *ZfS* and in *Studies on Authority and the Family*, Horkheimer's concern had been to establish collaboration within a group of social theorists qualified in the various scientific disciplines and competent in philosophy to more or less the same degree. That had been his dream. In March 1942, a few weeks before he wrote the first pages of the book, he wrote to Felix Weil:

Actually, Fritz [Pollock] and yourself really ought to be here at the end of next month to start on the economic and political parts, and then for the next six months we ought to do nothing else night and day. Don't believe for a moment that we can shelve the questions of the economic significance of what is approaching, or questions of the forms of political resistance, simply because Fritz, Grossmann and Gurland can't agree or because every sort of hindrance is put in the way of free discussion of questions of that sort.

Since the others, who might take the burden from our shoulders, are absent, not even the lack of talent the lot of you use from time to time to rationalize your resignation is a respectable argument . . . My idea was that Fritz and you should in future spend at least four or five months here every year, working the larger part of the year in New York carrying out the theoretical programme. While you were here, you would take part in identifying and shaping the main parts of the work, and while over there you would elaborate the economic parts in detail, so that after a couple of years our interpretation of the current phase would be ready. It would be nonsense for me, even working together with Teddie, to try to give the work the precision and concreteness needed. It has to be filled to bursting point with historical and economic detail, or else it will look like speculation. 137

This was a vision of genuine interdisciplinary collaboration, including economic and political analysis and concrete, material theory. So far as Pollock and Weil were concerned, it was to remain a vision. They had both shown that they were unsuited to tasks of this sort. Neither the essay on economics for *Studies on Authority and the Family*, nor an issue of the journal on economics for the 1937 anniversary of the publication of Marx's *Capital*, nor any leading essays on economics for the *ZfS*, had been produced. And the problems of Pollock's and Weil's characters and lives offered no hope that the situation would change. When, after a long stay in Pacific Palisades, Pollock returned to the east coast in October 1942 to devote himself to the `exterior' some more, Horkheimer complained about how vital close collaboration between them for a couple of years was, and how uncertain the fate of two manuscripts Pollock had left behind would be if `we cannot discuss them thoroughly and integrate them into the theory of this time which I am trying to develop'.<sup>138</sup> But Horkheimer, torn between his need for powerful support and his need for `splendid isolation', raised no very great objections in the end to Pollock's arguments for breaking off his stay in Los Angeles and making an effort to find extra work with a government office in Washington. When he wrote back, Pollock, who wanted as always to see Horkheimer protected from all distractions from his great theoretical tasks, answered:

I am afraid that even if we should succeed in creating a material basis in Los Angeles, I could not stay there for the duration. If you are not in New York and or Washington, you lose all contacts with the centers of power (inadequate and feeble as these our contacts may be) and you land in utter isolation. I am not so sure whether it would not influence badly your work if you would not know that you have a comparatively good watchdog on the East coast [*sic*].<sup>139</sup>

And Horkheimer was in fact overwhelmingly impressed when Pollock, together with a group of others, was invited to dine with Eleanor Roosevelt in the White House. He wrote replying to Pollock's report on it:

I wish to tell you that the invitation by which you have been honored, was a real satisfaction for Maidon and for myself. You know, I don't overestimate successes particularly when there is only a very slight chance that they may have any tangible consequences. But in this case, I seriously think that we ought to be very grateful. It was a great experience and whatever will come out or not come out of it you have the right to be proud of it. I told you more than once how much I would give if I were offered the opportunity to listen in on conversations of historical importance. By the fact of your invitation a little bit of that wish has come true. 140

The loss of Pollock and Weil was harder for Horkheimer, since he connected interdisciplinary collaboration between theoreticians with the existence of a small, dedicated circle. Partly, perhaps, from bitterness that this dream could not be realized, and partly because his conception of it varied from time to time, he occasionally defended the opposite of what he had outlined in his letter to Weil.

Tillich, in a detailed analysis of Horkheimer's 'Reason and Self-Preservation' which was not intended for publication, had suggested an 'argumentative book, rich in material' for Horkheimer's future work. It was exactly that, Horkheimer replied, that their collaborative work ought *not* to produce. Admittedly, Tillich's suggestion was as friendly as could be, both with regard to the readers, who would thus be treated more 'democratically', and with regard to the public fate of the authors.

But even you yourself cannot suppose that such a publication would be able to distinguish itself from literary fireworks of that sort except by using exotic theses. But what are theses! Ours, as the principal passages in a successful publication, would in the best case only add a new shade of colour to the bouquet of rockets. I am well aware how infinitely well-meaning you are. But must there really be no thinking left which is not merely looking for success?

Horkheimer suggested what he had in mind instead by quoting from 'a brief discussion of conditions in Europe' that he had written:

The style of the theory will become simpler. But this is only because the style will expose simplicity, consciously making simplicity a reflection of the process of barbarization. The style will assimilate itself to the racketeers in the strength of its hatred, and

thus become their opposite. Its logic will become as summary as their justice, as crude as their lies, as unscrupulous as their agents and in this contradiction to barbarism it will become specific, exact and scrupulous . . . When philosophy omits the subordinate clause relativizing the mutilation of humanity, it will grant to horror the absoluteness which follows from that. The finest nuance of desire is sacred to philosophy. But in its lack of detailed description of the apparatus, the absence of syntactic links giving the why, when and wherefore of the disaster, there becomes eloquent in philosophy the night of despair in which one victim is the same as any other. Science reaches for statistics; but, for the understanding, one concentration camp is enough. 141

This sketched out a conception which followed on from the line taken by the 'gloomy' or 'black' writers of the bourgeois period whom Horkheimer admired. The conception also corresponded to one of Horkheimer's dreams. But it would exclude interdisciplinary collaboration and the realization of a theory, steeped in material evidence, of the general tendencies of society in that era; and it would have implied an open breach between narrow philosophical work and the work of an Institute of Social Research. Horkheimer recoiled from this. In practice, a third method of working was therefore arrived at which was partly based on assistance from experts and partly on the philosophers occasionally making themselves into experts. The two topics which were approached by this third method were the theory of rackets and the problem of anti-Semitism.

The theory of rackets was Horkheimer's answer, in the form of theses, to the questions posed in the 'Memorandum' on what had become of the working class and the capitalist class in the monopoly-fascist phase. The yearbook which was planned as a continuation of the journal was to contain essays on the theory of rackets by Kirchheimer, Neumann and Gurland, and one written jointly by Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse. 'The more concrete material we can gather,' Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse, 'the more our theoretical aspects will acquire substantial character. We should be able to present a manuscript on this subject at the beginning of the new year. It's very strange, but I have the feeling that the realization of this plan would be the first step toward giving [*sic*] a piece of Critical Theory which would not be purely philosophical.' 142

Adorno carried out assiduous preliminary work on the elaboration of the theory of rackets, which was seen as a politico-economic section of the dialectics project. Using a list of 'racket categories', he collected material from Greek cultural history, based mainly on Jacob Burckhardt's *Cultural History of Greece*, 143 and while Horkheimer was on a trip to New York he formulated the 'Reflections on Class Theory', based partly on discussions they had had. 'It is not the case that the laws of exchange

have produced the most recent form of power as the historically appropriate form for the reproduction of society as a whole at the present stage,' he stated, taking up the analysis by Horkheimer, Pollock and himself of the thesis defended in 'State Capitalism' that politics took precedence over the economy.

Rather, the old form of power at times withdrew into the economic apparatus in order, on gaining full control of it, to destroy it and thus ease its own existence. In the process of abolishing classes in this way, class domination comes into its own. The image of the most recent economic phase shows history as a history of monopolies. The image of obvious usurpation produced today by the peaceable leaders of capital and labour shows history as a history of group struggles, gangs and rackets. 144

Horkheimer himself later wrote, in collaboration with Adorno, a draft of a 'Sociology of Class Relations' similar in essentials to the 'Reflections'. He collected comments on this text from Kirchheimer, Marcuse and Neumann. Kirchheimer, for example, questioned whether the working class had been transformed into a 'pragmatic totality', whether the process of production had become the basis of society's legitimacy, and whether pre-capitalist societies could be considered as racket systems, systems of domination which lacked any really significant system of ideological justification.

Kirchheimer was the last of those who contributed to the Institute's war effort by taking up a full-time job in Washington. He was the only one who had an essay ready in 1943 'The Question of Sovereignty', in which he briefly mentioned the concept of the racket but did not manage to make its central significance plausible. Kirchheimer's article appeared in 1944 in the *Journal of Politics*. Parts of Horkheimer's essay were later incorporated into *Eclipse of Reason*.<sup>145</sup> The theory of the racket therefore remained an unfinished torso developed by Horkheimer and Adorno. The most important ideas from it were incorporated into the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, without Neumann or Kirchheimer or others having collaborated closely to check the extremely drastic, far-reaching assumptions involved against concrete economic, political and legal material. Nor had there been any concrete treatment of the topic featuring the wealth of evidence proposed.

Ultimately, the only promising point around which interdisciplinary collaboration might crystallize within the framework of the dialectics project was the focus on anti-Semitism. In the first months of work on the dialectics book, however, the focus on anti-Semitism was hardly noticeable; nor was there any mention of it in the 'Memorandum'. It seemed that Horkheimer and Adorno were still recoiling from the topic, or that they were leaving it to have its effect as a hidden central point in the work. But the considerations which did then lead to its becoming

the central topic of the research programme were surprising. When financial support for the Institute's anti-Semitism research project was guaranteed for at least one year by the American Jewish Committee (see pp. 355-6), Horkheimer informed the astonished Marcuse (who saw Horkheimer's participation in the project merely as an irresponsible distraction from his real work on the philosophy book) in spring 1943:

It is true that at least during the first months I will have to cut the work on our main philosophical problems down to one or two hours a day and often to nothing, but you will remember that in the beginning [*sic*] of our stay here you and I tried to find a topic which would fulfill the two requirements of first, encountering a somewhat broader interest than our ideas in their abstract form and second, offering an opportunity to develop some of those ideas in a more concrete material. I wanted to have an occasion for expressing our theoretical thoughts and at the same time presenting ourselves as experts in particular social problems. At that time you suggested democracy as a desirable topic but, for certain reasons, we dismissed that possibility. However, my wish not to stay too distant from pertinent questions was so strong that Teddie and I had already prepared a great deal of material and even written a part of the new memorandum on German Chauvinism which we had thought should have become a book. Instead of the book on Germany we shall now write on Anti-Semitism and instead of devoting half of our time we shall devote most of it to that purpose. I am very doubtful whether the Committee will like the part which we do in Los Angeles. But I know that our endeavours will not prove quite worthless to our common theoretical development. 146

This made it sound as if an external stimulus had been necessary for the concentration on the topic of anti-Semitism to take place the signing of a contract which must and indeed could be put to the best use. Above all, Horkheimer seemed to consider the dialectics project and the anti-Semitism project as two distinct items relating to one another in the way that an abstract theory relates to its application to a concrete topic, or in the way that Hegel's logic relates to the Hegelian philosophies of history, law or aesthetics. Was this not turning a distinction within the theoretical and empirical research process into a distinction which silently gave the theory the dignity of speculation and made it independent of the empiricism appropriate to science? And was empirical research not thus being denied its status as a dimension of reflected experience, and degraded into a means of illustrating the theory? Horkheimer and Adorno's willingness to devote themselves to the anti-Semitism project with an intensity similar to that for the dialectics project, and the fact that they had both several times emphasized the central

role of the problem of anti-Semitism precisely for the theory of their times, left open the question of how the relation between the dialectics and anti-Semitism projects, and the relation between philosophical work and interdisciplinary research, was to take shape. A further open question was whether their enthusiasm for the theory, and their contemptuous remarks about research in specific scientific disciplines, in fact represented more than mere evidence of personal values and moods; whether these did not have an influence on the way in which their scholarly work was carried out and on its results particularly when external influences were forcing them to take both dimensions seriously.

The `Memorandum' shows not only that work on the dialectics project was to have been based on interdisciplinary collaboration but that the emphasis in the opening chapters was originally to have been different from what was in fact produced. The liberating characteristics of enlightenment and pragmatism were to have been elaborated to the same extent as the repressive aspects. When the first chapter of the planned book was finished at the end of 1942, however, Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse:

During the last few days I have devoted every minute to those pages on mythology and enlightenment which will probably be concluded this week. I am afraid it is the most difficult text I ever wrote. Apart from that it sounds somewhat negativistic and I am now trying to overcome this. We should not appear as those who just deplore the effects of pragmatism. I am reluctant, however, to simply add a more positive paragraph with the melody: `But after all rationalism and pragmatism are not so bad.' The intransigent analysis as accomplished in this first chapter seems in itself to be a better assertion of the positive function of rational intelligence than anything one could say in order to play down the attack on traditional logics [*sic*] and the philosophies which are connected with it. 147

A similar fate was in store for myth, the subject which was treated as the opposite of enlightenment, although it was not mentioned in the `Memorandum'. Horkheimer and Adorno saw the idea of the transcendence of residues of inherited myth, the transcendence of utopian moments in myth, as playing an important role in defining the concept of thoughtful reason, the concept of a positive idea of enlightenment. Horkheimer had already observed to Marcuse during initial work on the essay on reason that `our intellectual ancestors' (i.e. Marx and Engels) were `not so foolish with their lasting interest in prehistory. You might look out some useful books on ethnology and mythology. All we have here is Bachofen, Reinach and Frazer, as well as Rohde and Lévy-Bruhl; Malinowski and Lowie's *Cultural Anthropology* are the up-to-date literature we have. We don't have Morgan's *Ancient Humanity*. 148

In his immediate background work for the book, Horkheimer studied the literature on ethnology and mythology dealing with the idea of work and related concepts. His aim, as a letter to Neumann of 18 June 1942 shows, was to contrast a reflected transcendence of the archaic elements contained in such concepts, up to the present day, with the 'refinement' of the central ideas which excluded their 'animist residue', as he had critically viewed the matter in 'The End of Reason'. It was not until Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason* that these concepts were given priority status. In their joint publication, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno placed the concept of determinate negation in the foreground as a form of negation which referred to the effects of unleashing enlightenment, not to the continuation of myths.

And the same happened again to the subject of the second chapter, mass culture. 'The section on the "culture industry" is even more fragmentary than the others,' Horkheimer and Adorno emphasized later on, in the introduction to the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. 'Extensive sections,' they noted in a sentence in the mimeographed edition of 1944, which was omitted from the published book, 'have long since been produced, and are only waiting for final editing. In these, the positive aspects of mass culture will be discussed.' (The positive aspects of mass culture, or the development of positive forms of mass culture, were the subject of *Composing for the Films*, which Adorno wrote with Hanns Eisler between 1942 and 1945. Eisler, teaching at the New School of Social Research, had received a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation to fund a project on film music.)

All of this showed a certain openness, an unfinished quality, which the decidedly sombre introduction made it difficult for the later reader of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* to imagine particularly since the introduction to the book publication in 1947 omitted an extended passage from the mimeographed edition sketching out the whole complex of research work from which the published 'Philosophical Fragments' had been selected, and citing 'the clarity of their inner connections and the integratedness of their language' as the criterion for their selection.

Horkheimer described his daily routine during the months of intensive work on the dialectics book in a letter to Tillich. This was written at a period when Marcuse was still working with him in Los Angeles, and when Pollock and Weil were there on one of their occasional visits.

My life runs quite a regular course. In the morning, I take a short walk with Pollock, after which I write notes and drafts for a fairly methodical study; in the afternoons I usually see Teddie to decide on the final text with him. Now and then I also discuss with Marcuse the parts he is responsible for. The evening belongs to Pollock, and sometimes also to Weil. In between, there are seminars and business to do with practical questions involving the Institute. For nearly two months now I have been able to say that we are working

on the real text . . . There is already an imposing series of preliminary notes, but the final formulation of them will still take years. This is due partly to the objective difficulties of the task of producing a formulation of dialectical philosophy which will take account of the experience of recent decades, and partly to our lack of routine, the cumbersomeness of thinking, and the lack of clarity on important points which we are still labouring under. 149

The upper-class ambience, reminiscent of Thomas Mann, which Horkheimer depicted here corresponded to the pretensions to classic quality which he connected with his work. In a letter to Pollock, he wrote:

There is no doubt that the studies which I am undertaking now and which are really the fulfillment of what we have dreamt to be our *raison d'être*, when we were young, cannot be achieved in one or two years. I am not struggling to make a book like Neumann did and all the others who, under the pressure of necessity and competition, turn out the more or less instructive literature of today. Husserl needed 10 years to write his *Logische Untersuchungen* and another 13 years to publish his *Introduction in pure Phenomenology* [*sic*], not to speak of more famous works on philosophy and related subjects, and if you take my poor forces, education and routine into consideration, you will appreciate what I am in for. 150

At other times, however, it troubled him that in spite of his hard work there was still nothing in print, nothing impressive to show for it. `Despite of [*sic*] the chapters and pages which are ready nobody who is not closely acquainted with the subject could see from these documents the theoretical progress I have made during this period. Think how Lix [Felix Weil] would react if he would be confronted with what we have done, he would be utterly disillusioned.' 151

But the first chapter was finished at the end of 1942. In the late summer of 1942, while Horkheimer was on a trip to New York, Adorno had already written, in addition to the `Reflections on Class Theory', a first draft of the chapter on mass culture. Apart from that, both of them had worked through an excursus by Horkheimer in the first chapter which dealt with the consequences of Kant's concept of enlightenment for practical philosophy. Adorno had also finished an excursus on the interpretation of Homer's *Odyssey*, about which Horkheimer wrote to Pollock:

We had decided that this work must be done because the *Odyssee* [*sic*] is the first document on the anthropology of man in the modern sense, that means, in the sense of a rational enlightened being.

What we learn from this study will also be of some value for the [anti-Semitism] project since the idea of ritual sacrifice which Odysseus tries to overcome will probably play a dominant role in the psychology of Anti-Semitism. 152

Finally, parts of a chapter on anthropology were ready in draft, and Horkheimer and Adorno were busy working on aphorisms which could be published as examples of trains of thought that would be incorporated into later chapters of the book. The chapter on anti-Semitism was thus the only one that was still not ready even in draft form from the material that later went to make up the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. But that chapter itself was not seen at first as forming part of the first publication of the results of the dialectics project, but instead as a theoretical study for the anti-Semitism project.

From time to time, Horkheimer had considered publishing separately the chapter on mass culture, which had been conceived of as an independent piece so great was his urge finally to bring out the initial results of their great collaborative study. He even intended to employ a translator, whose continuous activity as an adviser would make it possible for him to write the chapter in English to begin with. This was another project which remained unrealized and which made it clear how much Horkheimer and Adorno dreamed of being able to present themselves to an American public. The revision of the chapter on mass culture dragged on, and Horkheimer's intentions were concentrated on publishing a mimeographed volume containing the available studies belonging to the dialectics book towards the end of the year. 'All these pieces together,' he wrote to Pollock in the middle of 1943, 'constitute a body of documents which in my opinion will make it possible to get quite a notion of the book as it is meant to live. I think that this fragments [*sic*] contain the principles of a philosophy to which we can stand [*sic*] and which is really original.' 153

Besides the revisions and additions to the fragments, work on theses relating to the psychology of anti-Semitism took up more and more time from the middle of 1943 onwards. Lowenthal collaborated on the first three theses later published in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. He spent several months in the summer of 1943 on the west coast; the visit went some way towards making up for the permanent removal to the west which Horkheimer again and again promised him. The theses on anti-Semitism were given their final form using the same method as that used for a large part of the fragments of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: Horkheimer and Adorno jointly dictated to Gretel Adorno.

Lowenthal had once written to Horkheimer that the intensity and quantity of Adorno's verbal and written production made him shudder. Pollock, who involved Adorno in planning the anti-Semitism project as a full-time assistant even though he was to continue to work on the dialectics project, told Horkheimer that what was considered a full-time

job by normal standards corresponded to a mere fraction of Adorno's working capacity. Adorno's productivity, and the fact that his wife was helping, almost in the capacity of a full-time secretary, with both the dialectics and anti-Semitism projects, caused Horkheimer finally to give in to Adorno's repeated requests for a salary rise, which had been going on for months. At the beginning of 1944 his salary was raised to \$400 per month.

In February 1944, Horkheimer, to his own great satisfaction, was to give lectures at Columbia University. Under the title 'Society and Reason', he planned to use the lectures to present the results of their collaborative work in a popular form; it was from these lectures that *Eclipse of Reason*, published in 1947, developed. Everything to be included in the mimeographed volume was to be ready by the beginning of the lectures. Since there was no prospect of publishing the results of the first year of work on the anti-Semitism project, and there were also hopes that the project would be continued in an expanded form, the theses on anti-Semitism were incorporated into the complex of studies included in the mimeographed dialectics volume. In contrast, pieces on dialectical logic, the concept Horkheimer had always seen as the central point of the book he planned, were among the parts left out. In May 1944 Horkheimer and Adorno were able to present the finished manuscript to Pollock on his fiftieth birthday. At the end of the year, the mimeographed volume, a stapled hectographed typescript in a pasteboard binding, appeared as a publication of the Institute of Social Research in an edition of 500 copies. Its confidently plain title was *Philosophical Fragments (Philosophische Fragmente)*.

Horkheimer's plan for an English edition, which he had been considering since work started on it, was not carried out. The *Philosophical Fragments*, with only a final thesis on anti-Semitism added, and with the anti-capitalist vocabulary softened at numerous points, were published three years later by the Amsterdam émigré publishers Querido as a proper book under the title *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (this had been the title of the first chapter in the mimeographed edition). The end of the 1944 introduction had read: 'If the good fortune of being able to work on problems of this sort without having the baneful pressure of immediate goals should continue, we hope to be able to finish the whole work in the not too distant future.' Horkheimer and Adorno left this sentence out of the book edition in 1947. They still continued to hope, even later when they returned to the German Federal Republic, that a continuation of the work would be possible. But the discussions in October 1946 in which they tried to clarify how enlightenment was to be rescued and how a concept of correct reason was to be developed showed that they were largely at a loss. 154 The omission of the passage in the introduction mentioned above, and the fact that a continuation of the study did not appear, made the book into something different from what its original form of publication had indicated: it became a

complete fragment providing a record of the essentials of what its authors had to say. In an advertisement for the mimeographed volume, Horkheimer and Adorno had emphasized that it consisted of fragments of a philosophical 'work in progress', the completion of which would take several years. But they insisted on the independent status of what they were presenting: in explaining their ideas, they had used the essay form in the tradition of Montaigne and Nietzsche, as it seemed appropriate to them for research studies 'which probe hitherto unexplored regions of thought'.

*Dialectic of Enlightenment:  
Philosophical Fragments*

From the point of view of Adorno's and Horkheimer's development as theoreticians, it is clear that for Adorno starting work on the dialectics book represented the moment at which he was able to begin writing a protohistory of idealism, of immanence, of the self-satisfied intellect and of domineering subjectivity, by contrast with Benjamin's project of writing a protohistory of the nineteenth century. Adorno's project involved examining the configurations of myth and modernism, nature and history, old and new, immutability and difference, decay and recovery, and proving that the ideas presented in his two monographs on the dialectic of musical progress, 'Fragments on Wagner' (*ZfS*, 1937) and the Schoenberg essay 'On the Philosophy of Modern Music' (1940-1), 155 were of relevance to social theory and the philosophy of history. For Horkheimer, on the other hand, it was a question of placing his critiques of positivism and bourgeois anthropology in a broader context, and pursuing the implications of his critique of the repression of religious problems and his acceptance of Benjamin's critique of merciless progress. Horkheimer had repeatedly stressed that irrationalism and metaphysics had correctly recognized the bankruptcy of rationalism, but had drawn the wrong conclusions from it. For him, the problem was how to sketch out the correct conclusions more clearly, and in closer relation to more recent events, than was possible with a programme that aimed to carry forward Marx's critique of political economy through a materialist transcendence of Hegelian dialectics.

'The discovery of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism': this was how the two writers described the aim of their joint study in its foreword.<sup>156</sup> Both had at one time been enthusiastic supporters of enlightenment. Horkheimer had endorsed the French Enlightenment as exposing social hypocrisy and injustice, while Adorno had endorsed the idea of clarifying and elucidating everything instinctual, obscure, insensate and subconscious. Both of them had endorsed Marx's clarification of the socio-economic preconditions for human emancipation. As late as 1941 the outline of the 'Research Project on Anti-Semitism' in *SPSS* had

stated: 'The levelling that results from abstract thinking is a prerequisite for the development of the world, in a truly human sense, for this type of thinking divests human relationships and things of their taboos and brings them into the realm of reason. Jews have therefore always stood in the front ranks of the struggle for democracy and freedom.' 157 The formulation 'dialectic of enlightenment' indicated that Horkheimer and Adorno did not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater, that they only wanted to demonstrate the ambiguity of the idea of enlightenment. But a passage from Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' seemed to have become the motto of their inquiry: 'The current amazement that the things we are experiencing are "still" possible in the twentieth century is *not* philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of knowledgeless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable.'158

Against the background of a generalization of Hegel's critique, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 159 of the unleashing of enlightenment, two oddly interwoven themes lay at the heart of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The most significant representatives of these two themes, Max Weber, the sociologist of modern rationality, on the one hand, and Ludwig Klages, the philosophical critic of the modern domination of nature, on the other, were not mentioned in the book. 160 The first of these two themes was the view of Western civilization as a process of rationalization, the ambivalence of which Weber had aptly described with the concept of disenchantment referring both to the breaking of a magical spell and to the escape from a curse. The second theme was the attribution of the state of the world at each stage of its development to a correspondingly harmonious or hostile relation between humanity and nature.

Horkheimer and Adorno believed that by interweaving these two themes they could give a better account of the disastrous consequences of a form of capitalism which had led to fascism than they could by continuing the Marxian critique of capitalism. The core of their conception of the problem was put in its most succinct form in one of the 'Notes and Drafts' at the end of the book, in the form of a story within a story under the title 'On the Critique of the Philosophy of History': 'A philosophical interpretation of world history would have to show how the rational domination of nature comes increasingly to win the day, in spite of all deviations and resistance, and integrates all human characteristics. Forms of economy, rule, and culture would also be derived from this position.'161

The first section, 'The Concept of Enlightenment', began like a thunderclap with the first central theme, the second being implicit in it: 'In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant.' Enlightenment as such, the argument ran, led to disaster. Disaster, for

the two writers, was, true to the Benjamin-Adorno tradition, synonymous with the domination of the mythical. 'Enlightenment reverts to mythology' was therefore another formulation of their thesis. 162 But they were equally concerned to show that myth was already enlightenment. The point of the thesis was that, in that case, enlightenment had not destroyed myth from outside; rather, myth had been the first step towards a failed emancipation from nature and had thus prepared the way for self-destructive enlightenment.

A complete formulation of the thesis would be: all civilization up to now has consisted of enlightenment trapped in mythic immanence and nipping in the bud every attempt to escape from mythic immanence.

Mythology itself set off the unending process of enlightenment in which ever and again, with the inevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic view succumbs to the destructive criticism that it is only a belief until even the very notions of spirit, of truth and, indeed, enlightenment itself, have become animistic magic. The principle of fatal necessity, which brings low the heroes of myth and derives as a logical consequence from the pronouncement of the oracle, does not merely, when refined to the stringency of formal logic, rule in every rationalistic system of Western philosophy, but itself dominates the series of systems which begins with the hierarchy of the gods and, in a permanent twilight of the idols, hands down an identical content: anger against insufficient righteousness. Just as the myths already realize enlightenment, so enlightenment with every step becomes more deeply engulfed in mythology. It receives all its matter from the myths, in order to destroy them; and even as a judge it comes under the mythic curse. 163

This was the world-historical interpretation which Horkheimer and Adorno gave to the concept of the irresistible movement of thought which Hegel had used the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to illustrate. In an unmistakable reference to the current political problems of their own time, they stated: 'Enlightenment is totalitarian.' And they defined the power characterizing this unstoppable movement as follows: 'Every attempt to break the natural thralldom, because nature is broken, enters all the more deeply into that natural enslavement.' 164 In the first chapter, however, they could not claim to have done more than outline their theses. The following chapters were therefore to provide the evidence for them.

Horkheimer and Adorno tried to give plausibility to the theses that myths already carry out enlightenment, and that enlightenment entangles itself further in myth with every step, not by criticizing or extending 'specialist axioms' (which they had treated as a dead end in their Introduction), nor by reinterpreting the data of Western history or humanity as a whole. Instead, they examined a few, mainly literary,

works according to the criteria of what they, Horkheimer and Adorno, held to be the decisive components of civilizing development. The procedure of interpreting works of art according to their significance for the philosophy of history, in the way that Lukács had done in his *Theory of the Novel*, 165 was used here to determine the way in which people's attitudes and behaviour towards their own nature, towards external nature, towards the body and towards one another had changed through the course of history. The works on which Horkheimer and Adorno concentrated related to decadence: the crumbling of myth in the *Odyssey* and the obsolescence of religion, metaphysics and morality in de Sade's *Histoire de Juliette, ou les Prospérités du Vice* and *Justine, ou les Malheurs de la Vertu*.

The first excursus, 'Odysseus, or Myth and Enlightenment', was, according to the Introduction, intended to provide evidence for the thesis that myth was already enlightenment; but that was not an exact description of what it contained. Most of it was concerned to demonstrate that enlightenment, even at that early stage, was already reverting to mythology. It was hardly possible to interpret the text of the *Odyssey* otherwise. The author allowed his heroes to take the myths seriously, but he himself already stood in an ironical, enlightened relation to them, and his central figure was moving towards a similar relation. Horkheimer called the *Odyssey* the first document on the anthropology of man as a rationally enlightened being in the modern sense; and the ingenuity with which Adorno managed to discover new aspects in this much-interpreted classical text was at its clearest in the way in which he used it to indicate the cost at which enlightenment was achieved.

Odysseus only managed to establish himself against the mythic powers through self-inflicted privation, by renouncing devotion, by hardening himself.

The nimble-witted survives only at the price of his own dream, which he wins only by demystifying himself as well as the powers without. He can never have everything; he has always to wait, to be patient, to do without; he may not taste the lotus or eat the cattle of the sun-god Hyperion, and when he steers between the rocks he must count on the loss of the men whom Scylla plucks from the boat. He just pulls through; struggle is his survival; and all the fame that he and the others win in the process serves merely to confirm that the title of hero is only gained at the price of the abasement and mortification of the instinct for complete, universal, and undivided happiness. 166

He sacrifices the living element in himself in order to save himself as a hardened self. The mythical powers have been outwitted; but the victims are then sacrificed to the identical self in a different form they are internalized as renunciation.

Following a line of interpretation opened up by Karl Kerényi and C.G. Jung, Adorno used the theory of sacrifice to try to show that myth was already enlightenment.

All human sacrifices, when systematically executed, deceive the god to whom they are made: they subject him to the primacy of human ends, and dissolve his power; and the deception of the god carries over smoothly into that practised by the disbelieving priests on the believers . . . By means of Odysseus, only the aspect of deception in sacrifice probably the quintessential reason for the fictitious character of myth is elevated to self-consciousness. The discovery that symbolic communication with the deity through sacrifice is not actual must be an age-old experience. The sacrificial representation that a fashionable irrationalism has so exalted, cannot be separated from the deification of the human sacrifice the deceit of a priestly rationalization of death by means of an apotheosis of the predestined victim. Something of this trickery, which elevates the frail individual to the status of a vehicle of divine substance, has always been apparent in the egowhich owes its existence to the sacrifice of the present moment to the future. 167

Adorno thus denied that either the victim or the myth had any genuine transcendence. Rituals carried out in a finite world confirmed to the victim that finite existence was full of sacrifices, instead of questioning and condemning such a world and demanding one that was free of sacrifices.

According to the Introduction, the second excursus, 'Juliette, or Enlightenment and Morality', was intended to demonstrate the reversion of enlightenment into mythology, using Kant, de Sade and Nietzsche as examples of those who relentlessly consummated the process of enlightenment in the areas of law and morality. To speak of a reversion of enlightenment into mythology was misleading to the extent that Horkheimer and Adorno were trying to prove the existence of a process of demythologization which had been going on since the age of myths, or indeed since pre-mythic times. This was a process which did not lead back to the old forms of myth compliant with nature, but instead led forward to a mythless compliance with nature, to a mythless mythic attitude.

Whereas all earlier changes, from pre-animism to magic, from the matriarchal to a patriarchal culture, from the polytheism of the slaveowners to the Catholic hierarchy, replaced the older mythologies with new though enlightened ones, and substituted the god of legions for the Great Mother, the adoration of the Lamb for that of the totem, the brilliance of enlightened

reason banished as mythological any form of devotion which claimed to be objective, and grounded in actuality. 168

What Horkheimer praised in de Sade and Nietzsche was that they did not conceal the fact that it was impossible for them, using reason, to produce a single basic argument against murder; that, instead of concealing it, they shouted it from the rooftops. In place of the mythic victim and ritual murder, there appeared banal, rationalized, thoughtless murder; in place of mythic pleasure and ritual devotion to nature, there appeared dull, rationalized pleasureleisure, holidays, fun. `The *chronique scandaleuse* of Justine and Juliette, with its production-line methods, and its foreshadowing in an eighteenth-century style of the nineteenth-century shockers and twentieth-century mass literature, is the Homeric epic with its last mythological covering removed: the history of thought as an organ of domination.' 169

But this was only one of the lines the presentation took. The point of the first chapter had been the self-destructiveness of enlightenment. What was that to mean if all enlightenment remained compliant with nature from the start, and if their formulation `the cyclical nature of the advance of history' 170 was intended seriously? Did talk of the self-destructiveness of enlightenment not presuppose that there had originally been real progress, a step beyond compliance with nature, which had then been lost for instance, by continuing to cling on to something which, under changed conditions, was no longer progressive? Or was history to be seen as a continual gambling away of chances, a continual missing of opportunities? In that case there would be, alongside manifest history, a kind of subterranean history, a history of possibilities which had been suppressed and excluded. This might even be seen as analogous to the increase in value achieved through exchange, although the whole meaning of history would then depend on whether such an exchange was one day cashed in or not.

Both ideas were to be found in Horkheimer and Adorno. There existed for them a `secret utopia in the concept of reason'. Those phases of history which did not fit into the idea of an irresistible process of demythologization could then be explained by saying that, in such cases, the anti-authoritarian tendency of enlightenment being acted out within manifest history was still in communication with `the utopia in the concept of reason', `though of course only in a subterranean form'. 171 Adorno and Horkheimer saw manifest forms of genuine, i.e. self-possessed, enlightenment in Jewish religion, in liberalism and in themselves. But how was the genesis of such forms to be explained? Even if explicit historical-materialist conditions were to be given under which communication with the secret utopia within the concept of reason, normally suppressed, could temporarily shape manifest history (as in the case of the bourgeois family in the liberal capitalist epoch), the question would still remain: how did the secret utopia come into existence at

all, and what was it that preserved it against the irresistible process of demythologization Horkheimer and Adorno were reconstructing?

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* did not deal with these questions. What a simple answer would have looked like is indicated, for example, by a letter that Horkheimer wrote when he was busy with revisions and additions to the fragments planned for the book. Replying to a memorandum from Pollock on a discussion in New York between himself, Paul Tillich and Adolph Löwe on Julien Benda's *La Trahison des Clercs*, Horkheimer wrote, 'We have to understand this development [the irresistible process of enlightenment] and we can understand it only if there is something in us which does not submit to it. Such an attitude is shown in each of your discussion remarks, particularly when you are in a somewhat desperate defensive, but in no word of the two other interlocutors.' 172 And when Adorno gave Lowenthal instructions in 1945 for the revisions and additions to Horkheimer's New York lectures on 'Society and Reason', from which the *Eclipse of Reason* developed, he saw one basic problem which it would not be possible to dismiss at too early a stage:

The text, particularly in the first chapter, describes the process of formalization and instrumentalization of reason as a necessary and irresistible one, in the sense in which Hegel dealt with enlightenment in the *Phenomenology*. But after that the book only contains a critique of this form of reason. The relationship between the critical point of view and the point of view being criticized has not been made theoretically clear. It often seems as though we were professing objective reason 'dogmatically' to a certain extent, having previously determined that subjective reason is ineluctable. In reality, two things must be made quite clear: first, that there is no positive 'solution' in the sense of providing a philosophy which could simply be contrasted to subjective reason; secondly, that the critique of subjective reason is only possible on a dialectical basis, i.e. by demonstrating the contradictions in its own course of development and transcending it through its own determinate negation. I am stating this here in very general terms, but precisely this process must be concretely worked out on at least one model if it is to be more than an unfulfilled promise. Broadly speaking, the final chapter will have to answer the questions put in the first explicitly, even if this only means making their unanswerability genuinely clear. Otherwise two philosophical standpoints irresistible, imperious, subjective reason, on the one hand, and the truth being contrasted with it, on the other will be immediately opposed to each other in a highly unsatisfactory theoretical fashion. 173

It was not as if Adorno and Horkheimer had found a solution to this problem in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and then somehow forgotten

it again. It had simply been possible to postpone it there, by presenting the first published fragments of a work in progress as preparing the way for a positive concept of enlightenment. 174 In addition, Horkheimer and Adorno, instead of distinguishing terminologically between objective and subjective reason, used the concept of enlightenment equivocally sometimes in a negative, sometimes in a positive sense, sometimes in the sense of subjective reason, sometimes in that of objective reason.

There were two concepts of enlightenment at work in the book. In the first, the goal of enlightenment had always been to establish humanity's dominance; this form of enlightenment had now reached its goal, and was bathing the perfectly enlightened earth in the glow of triumphant disaster. The goal of the other had been to soften the demand for dominance, and achieving this would mean dispensing with power. These two concepts of enlightenment seemed to have been forced together with violence in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, giving the impression initially that enlightenment was destroying itself but could also save itself. On a second reading, however, it was possible to recognize behind this the assertion not admitted to that the false enlightenment was *preventing* the victory of the true one, which alone could offer deliverance from the fateful consequences of the first. The prospectus for the mimeographed volume read, 'The general aim of this book could be defined as a defense of rationalism by revealing its inherent pernicious implications and by showing that certain critical elements which were formerly directed against the humanistic ideals of the enlightenment can be usefully incorporated into them'; and what the book praised in de Sade was 'the fact that he did not leave it to the Enlightenment's opponents to make it take fright at its own nature', thus making his work 'a spur to the salvation of the Enlightenment'.<sup>175</sup> This did not offer much hope that the false, failed enlightenment, the blindness of which had been proved, would recover itself; it only showed the insight the true enlightenment had into the errors of the false one. Horkheimer and Adorno wanted to preserve the moral that it was enlightenment itself which had caused the disaster, but they did not manage to relinquish the idea that there was something else still, namely domination which had thrown true enlightenment off its tracks, or was standing in its way. They wanted to blame the disaster on enlightenment, but again and again blamed it on a form of enlightenment qualified as bourgeois, as domination over nature, and so on. They wanted to explain the disaster by saying that enlightenment was, in its ultimate essentials, dominative, but again and again explained it by saying that enlightenment had strayed into domination, had become linked to it, and so on. When decoded, the formulation 'the self-destruction of enlightenment' was misleading as a moral. It did not signify what it promised. What it really said was rather: all enlightenment up till now was not genuine enlightenment, but the prevention of genuine enlightenment.

To be able to say more about these problems, it will be necessary to

deal with the other principal theme of the book, which to a certain extent lent the first its significance: the relationship between enlightenment, or those representative of it, and nature. 'The author's [*sic*] basic aim,' the prospectus read, 'is a critical analysis of civilization in today's phase of large scale industrial combines, manipulative control, technological advance and standardization. They look for the origins of the manifest crisis of modern culture in history and in the processes through which mankind established its rule over nature. The two foci of their investigations are mythology and rationalism.' There was a bold claim implied in this: that it was possible to show that the contemporary cultural crisis was a crisis of the fundamental principle of all human culture up till then, and that this fundamental principle was sovereignty over nature. The thesis lying behind this was that the decisive event in the history of human culture was not the development of the modern period and of capitalism, but rather humanity's transition to domination over nature. This turning-point led to the development of the characteristics making up the archaic legacy of contemporary culture. The uninterrupted continuation of this legacy was becoming threateningly apparent in the crisis of contemporary culture, and made it clear that a fresh turning-point was necessary.

Horkheimer and Adorno did not go into questions of the universal validity of their ideas on culture, or distinctions between Western and Asiatic modes of production or between occidental rationalization and Eastern meditative experience. They apparently assumed, without making this explicit, that the salvation of humanity would be achieved on the path of the 'history of thought as an organ of domination', on the path of 'the dominant spirit' 'from Homer to modern times', 176 or not at all.

A coherent reconstruction of the motif of domination over nature as it appears in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (with reference also to other writings of the same period) might be attempted in the following terms.

The primitive world was mere nature. Even human beings, in so far as they then existed, were natural, trapped within nature, ruled by instincts obscure to them. The first decisive step was taken when people began to think. Thinking meant interrupting the immediate texture of nature at a single point and raising a barrage, which would from then on divide inward nature from outward nature.

At the moment when human beings emerged from the primitive world, nature seemed to be a form of happiness whose attractive power was greater than that of the new happiness of individuation. The undertow from the primitive world could only be escaped by applying immense forces of resistance. The source of these forces was thought. Thought attempted to establish its position in the face of nature by weakening both inward and outward nature. It weakened inward nature by forcing it to restrict itself to immediate wish-fulfilment, renouncing many desires

altogether, humbling itself; it weakened outward nature by demystifying it or, more exactly, by starting to destroy the idea that nature contained immeasurable happiness in addition to its terrors an idea that had appeared simultaneously with humanity's emergence from the primitive world.

This set in motion a process which rejected and mutilated nature, in reaction to both the promise of happiness and the supremacy of nature. What it rejected and mutilated were both the capacity for devotion within humanity's inner nature and the temptations of outward nature; and also both the capacity for fear in humanity's inner nature and the terrors of outward nature. This diminution of desire and fear was intended to make it possible, with constant presence of mind, to wrest existence from nature, which was either viewed with indifference or seen as an enemy. What was frowned upon was fear:

At the turning points of Western civilization, from the transition to Olympian religion up to the Renaissance, Reformation, and bourgeois atheism, whenever new nations and classes more firmly repressed myth, the fear of uncomprehended, threatening nature, the consequence of its very materialization and objectification, were reduced to animistic superstition, and the subjugation of nature was made the absolute purpose of life within and without.

Desire was also frowned upon:

Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the self, the identical, purposive, and virile nature of man, was formed, and something of that recurs in every childhood. The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages; and the temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to maintain it . . . The dread of losing the self and of abrogating together with the self the barrier between oneself and other life, the fear of death and destruction, is intimately associated with a promise of happiness which threatened civilization in every moment. 177

The process of demystification, rationalization, enlightenment and civilization was not a process of realizing the happiness of which the primitive world, in hindsight, seemed to have consisted. Instead, the process was carried on as if all forms of happiness were reprehensible on the grounds that they might lead back to older, natural conditions. Nature in general seemed to present a threat, not merely the dangerous aspect of nature which often only became apparent if one deliberately sought it out. In this way, thought emphasized only those aspects of nature inimical to desire, not those permitting it. Humanity's emergence from the primitive world thus developed into a protracted struggle

against nature as such. Horkheimer and Adorno, for this reason, spoke of the continuance of mere nature, thus making this concept a collective term for the world as it was before genuinely rational thinking began, for a world in which thought dominated nature.

Many of the passages lamenting the world in which thought dominated nature were superb: the path of civilization

was that of obedience and labor, over which fulfillment shines forth perpetually but only as illusive appearance, as devitalized beauty. The mind of Odysseus, inimical both to his own death and to his own happiness, is aware of this. He knows only two possible ways to escape. One of them he prescribes for his men. He plugs their ears with wax, and they must row with all their strength. Whoever would survive must not hear the temptation of that which is unrepeatable, and he is able to survive only by being unable to hear it. Society has always made provision for that. The laborers must be fresh and concentrate as they look ahead, and must ignore whatever lies to one side. They must doggedly sublimate in additional effort the drive that impels to diversion. And so they become practical. The other possibility Odysseus, the seigneur who allows the others to labor for themselves, reserves to himself. He listens, but while bound impotently to the mast; the greater the temptation the more he has his bonds tightened just as later the burghers would deny themselves happiness all the more doggedly as it drew closer to them with the growth of their own power. What Odysseus hears is without consequence for him; he is able only to nod his head as a sign to be set free from his bonds; but it is too late; his men, who do not listen, know only the song's danger but nothing of its beauty, and leave him at the mast in order to save him and themselves. They reproduce the oppressor's life together with their own, and the oppressor is no longer able to escape his social role. The bonds with which he has irremediably tied himself to practice, also keep the Sirens away from practice: their temptation is neutralized and becomes a mere object of contemplation becomes art. The prisoner is present at a concert, an inactive eavesdropper like later concertgoers, and his spirited call for liberation fades like applause. Thus the enjoyment of art and manual labor break apart as the world of prehistory is left behind . . . The cultural material is in exact correlation to work done according to command: and both are grounded in the inescapable compulsion to social domination of nature. 178

But was it possible to have undiminished happiness without undiminished terror? Adorno had praised the 'rescuing of Sadism' in Horkheimer's 'Egoism and the Freedom Movement'. 179 In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, examples of a hidden plea for the sublimation of the

instincts were to be found. The idea of recollecting nature in humanity, which recurred at numerous points in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a prospective solution, pointed in this direction as well. Was the image of complete, undivided happiness not more vivid in the complaint against the spirit of domination over nature than in satisfaction with sublimated happiness? Was the idea of an ego which was simultaneously released from its bonds and able to preserve itself anything more than a demand for what was inconceivable, overlooking what was conceivable?

There remained the plausible idea of the progressive struggle of enlightenment against everything which remained of the primitive world and the ideas of happiness and indiscipline connected with it. This was the notion linking the first essay and the two excursuses with the two discussions and the 'Notes and Drafts' which followed them. Like the two excursuses, the remainder of the texts were also concerned with the domination of nature within humanity, and only sporadically and very abstractly with the domination of outward nature and with the connection between the relationship to outward nature and the relationship to inner nature.

The discussion of the culture industry came down to the following moral:

The escape from everyday drudgery which the whole culture industry promises may be compared to the daughter's abduction in the cartoon: the father is holding the ladder in the dark. The paradise offered by the culture industry is the same old drudgery. Both escape and elopement are predesigned to lead back to the starting point. Pleasure promotes the resignation which it ought to help to forget. 180

The culture industry was making even escape from a world determined by the principle of realistic self-denial into a part of that world. It was succeeding in passing off a dreamless art as the fulfilment of dreams, and smiling or jovial renunciation as a compensation for renunciation. From the point of view of the opening essays and the two excursuses, the culture industry meant the reduction of the promise of happiness offered by art, which had been neutralized into an object of contemplation, to the status of a 'medicinal bath' of 'fun'. 181

In his 1936 essay 'On Jazz' in the *ZfS*, Adorno, inspired by the concept of the sado-masochistic character, had attempted to present the core of the phenomenon of jazz as the subject's smiling ridicule of itself. This interpretation was now generalized into an interpretation of the culture industry as including both 'low' and 'high' art. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the culture industry proved to be a symptom of a premature climax in the world-historical process in which the subject, fixated on sovereignty over nature, was still putting a good face on the mockery it had made of itself.

The corollary of the theory of a sovereignty over nature which had fallen victim to nature was the 'anthropological theory of anti-Semitism' (Adorno's phrase). Horkheimer and Adorno saw anti-Semitism as a behavioural phenomenon confirming their analysis of failed civilization.

But the form of the social and individual spirit reflected in anti-Semitism the prehistorical and historical connections which it cannot escape remains obscured. If a malady which is so deep-rooted in civilization has no known justification, the individual would not rationalize it even if he were as well-intentioned as the victims themselves. All the rational, economic, and political explanations and counter-arguments however accurate they may be in part cannot provide a justification, because the rationality associated with domination is also based on suffering . . . Anti-Semitism is a deeply imprinted schema, a ritual of civilization; the pogroms are the true ritual murders. They demonstrate the impotence of sense, significance, and ultimately of truth which might hold them within bounds. The idle occupation of killing confirms the stubbornness of the life to which one has to conform, and to resign oneself.

It is the blindness and lack of purpose of anti-Semitism which lends a measure of truth to the explanation that it is an outlet. Anger is discharged on defenseless victims. And since the victims are interchangeable according to circumstances gypsies, Jews, Protestants, Catholics, and so on any one of them may take the place of the murderers, with the same blind lust for blood, should they be invested with the title of the norm. 182

Anti-Semitism represented the hatred of those who were 'civilized' for all those who reminded them of the failures of civilization. In what had originally been the final thesis on anti-Semitism, the sixth, it was even stated that disentangling rationality and power and liberating thought from domination 'would represent the step out of an anti-Semitic society' and make 'the Jewish question . . . the turning point of history' in a sense different from that intended by the Nazis. 183

Adorno and Horkheimer used the ideas of de Sade and Nietzsche, and of Freud and Fromm, on sadism, masochism and psychological mechanisms such as identification with power and the way in which reactions are produced, in brilliant analyses of the behavioural patterns which they considered 'anti-Semitic'. Their analyses were carried out in such a way that, if confirmed, they would additionally provide at least some support for the theory that the core of the failed enlightenment was a form of domination over nature which had itself fallen victim to nature.

They saw the process of enlightenment as a progressive destruction of everything that recalled the primitive world, everything non-civilized, whether it was recalled in happiness or in fear. In the same way, they

saw anti-Semitism as being at work wherever anger and cruelty were directed against weakness and fear or happiness and longing.

Woman, however, is marked out by her weakness; her weakness puts her in the minority, even where women are numerically superior to men. As with the oppressed aboriginal inhabitants in early national states, or the colonial natives whose organization and weapons are primitive compared with those of their conquerors, or the Jews among the 'Aryans', women's defenselessness is the legal title of their oppression . . . The signs of powerlessness, sudden uncoordinated movements, animal fear, confusion, awaken the thirst for blood. The justification for hatred for woman that represents her as intellectually and physically inferior, and bearing the brand of domination on her forehead, is equally that of hatred for Jews. Women and Jews can be seen not to have ruled for thousands of years. They live, although they could be exterminated; and their fear and weakness, the greater affinity to nature which perennial oppression produces in them, is the very element which gives them life. This enrages the strong, who must pay for their strength with an intense alienation from nature, and must always suppress their fear. They identify themselves with nature when they hear their victims utter over and over again the cry that they dare not themselves emit. 184

The same critical application of Nietzsche's dictum 'What is falling should be given a push' lay behind another passage:

In the bourgeois mode of production, the indelible mimetic heritage of all practical experience is consigned to oblivion. The pitiless prohibition of regression becomes mere fate; the denial is now so complete that it is no longer conscious. Those blinded by civilization experience their own tabooed mimetic features only in certain gestures and behavior patterns which they encounter in others and which strike them as isolated remnants, as embarrassing rudimentary elements that survive in the rationalized environment. What seems repellently alien is in fact all too familiar: the infectious gestures of direct contacts suppressed by civilization, for instance, touch, soothing, snuggling up, coaxing. We are put off by the old-fashioned nature of these impulses. They seem to translate long reified human relations back into individual power relations: in trying to influence the purchaser by flattery, the debtor by threats and the creditor by entreaty . . . However, undisciplined mimicry is the brand of the old form of domination, engraved in the living substance of the dominated and passed down by a process of unconscious imitation in infancy from generation to generation, from the down-at-heel Jew to the rich banker. This mimicry arouses

anger because, in the face of the new conditions of production, it displays the old fear which, in order to survive those conditions, must be forgotten. 185

Hatred for what had been lost under such domination was indissolubly linked with hatred for what recalled the anguish of domination:

Liberalism had allowed the Jews property, but no power to command. The rights of man were designed to promise happiness even to those without power. Because the cheated masses feel that this promise in general remains a lie as long as there are still classes, their anger is aroused. They feel mocked. They must suppress the very possibility and idea of that happiness, the more relevant it becomes. Wherever it seems to have been achieved despite its fundamental denial, they have to repeat the suppression of their own longing. Everything which gives occasion for such repetition, however unhappy it may be in itself—Ahasver or Mignon, alien things which are reminders of the promise of sex, or the proscribed animal which is reminiscent of promiscuity—draws upon itself that destructive lust of civilized men who could never fulfill the process of civilization. Those who spasmodically dominate nature see in a tormented nature a provocative image of powerless happiness. The thought of happiness without power is unbearable because it would then be true happiness. The illusory conspiracy of corrupt Jewish bankers financing Bolshevism is a sign of innate impotence, just as the good life is a sign of happiness. The image of the intellectual is in the same category: he appears to think a luxury which the others cannot afford and he does not manifest the sweat of toil and physical effort. Bankers and intellectuals, money and mind, the exponents of circulation, form the impossible ideal of those who have been maimed by domination, an image used by domination to perpetuate itself. 186

Horkheimer and Adorno apparently found attempts to explain why the Jews were not simply one minority among others unconvincing even their own attempts to do this at various points in the 'Elements of Anti-Semitism' section. They saw the peculiarity of the Jews compared with other minorities as consisting of the fact that fascism had declared them to be a hostile race. 'The Jews today are the group which calls down upon itself, both in theory and in practice, the will to destroy born of a false social order. They are branded as absolute evil by those who are absolutely evil, and are now in fact the chosen race.' 187 (It was indeed principally the hostility of its non-Jewish environment which had kept Judaism alive, and in the 1960s Isaac Deutscher remarked that it was macabre, but true, that the greatest contribution to the revival of Jewish identity had been made by Hitler.)

There was, however, one characteristic which distinguished the Jews from other minorities, precisely in relation to the process of civilization. As distinct from women, blacks, aboriginals, gypsies, and so on, the Jews contrasted with civilization not only downwards, towards undominated nature, but also upwards, towards the mind or spirit raising itself above nature. The God of Judaism had, indeed, not completely lost all the features of the nature-spirit in his transition from the henotheistic to the universal form.

The horror which stems from ancient pre-animist days is translated from nature into the notion of the absolute self which, as its creator and overlord, completely subjugates nature. In all the indescribable power and splendor which so alienates him from us, the absolute individual is still conceivable by virtue of the universalizing association with supreme, transcendental being. God as spirit is a principle at the opposite pole to nature; it not only represents the blind natural cycle like the mythical gods but can liberate us from this cycle. But the abstract and remote character of this spirit has also increased the horror of the incommensurable manifest in it; and the *I am*, which tolerates no opposition, exceeds in its inescapable force the more blind, but therefore more equivocal assumption of an anonymous fate.

Christianity absolutized the finite with the doctrine that Christ was incarnate spirit, and in practice rendered to Caesar what was Caesar's and to God what was God's; in contrast, the Jewish God remained wholly opposite to the finite. 'For Christian anti-Semites, truth is the stumbling-block, truth which resists evil without rationalizing it, and clings to the idea of undeserved salvation against all the rules of life and salvation which are supposed to ensure that blessed state.' 188 If Horkheimer and Adorno had chosen to go into the area of everyday life, they might have mentioned the role played by the rabbis, the deep respect for penetrating studies of sacred texts and religious, moral and ethical problems, the neglect of business matters and the essentials of daily life in favour of spiritual and religious matters a neglect which contended with the talent for capitalist activity. The general image of the Jews which Horkheimer and Adorno presented was one of subjects in whom unconformed nature and unconformed mind or spirit (*Geist*) were conjoined. In this way they represented, as no other minority did, the opposite of the failed civilization: a relation between mind and nature in which the mind was genuinely the opposite of nature and nature genuinely the opposite of mind.

Horkheimer and Adorno's view of themselves as hedonistic thinkers concentrating on the recovery and transcendence of instinct developed into a cautious identification with an interpretation of Judaism as a historical form of determinate negation. Work on the dialectics project

had, in fact, produced a consensus between them in the formulation of theological motifs. Among these motifs were: Horkheimer's advice to the Jews at the conclusion of his essay on 'The Jews and Europe' to recall their abstract monotheism, their rejection of the worship of images, their refusal to treat anything finite as infinite; the condition he had diagnosed in 'Egoism and the Freedom Movement' and in 'Reason and Self-Preservation' the disdain for instinct and thought, on the part both of the ruling classes and of society as a whole; and Adorno's speculations on the mythic immanence of capitalism and 'reactionary' art and philosophy and on the combination of construct and expression, consciousness and sensuality. In a fragmentary, sketchy form, all of this was now assembled into a philosophy of history and an assessment of the era which were implicitly based in theology.

Making the severest distortions a mirror of what had been distorted, the two writers put the most detailed formulation of their counter-position in the 'Elements of Anti-Semitism' section. The central theses here were the fifth, on anti-Semitism as an idiosyncrasy, and the sixth, on anti-Semitism as a false projection. In the sixth, they wrote:

Between the true object and the undisputed data of the senses, between within and without, there is a gulf which the subject must bridge at his own risk. In order to reflect the thing as it is, the subject must return to it more than he receives from it. The subject creates the world outside himself from the traces which it leaves in his senses: the unity of the thing in its manifold characteristics and states; and he therefore constitutes the 'I' retrospectively by learning to grant a synthetic unity not only to the external impressions, but to the internal impressions which gradually separate off from them. The real ego is the most recent constant product of projection. In a process which could only be completed historically with the developed powers of the human physiological constitution, it developed as a unified and at the same time eccentric function. Even as an independently objectified ego, it is only equivalent to the significance of the world of objects for it. The inner depth of the subject consists in nothing other than the delicacy and wealth of the external world of perceptions. If the links are broken, the ego calcifies. If it proceeds positivistically, merely recording given facts without giving anything in return, it shrinks to a point; and if it idealistically creates the world from its own groundless basis, it plays itself out in dull repetition. In both cases it gives up the spirit. Only in that mediation by which the meaningless sensation brings a thought to the full productivity of which it is capable, while on the other hand the thought abandons itself without reservation to the predominant impression, is that pathological loneliness which characterizes the whole of nature overcome. The possibility of reconciliation appears not in

certainty unaffected by thought, in the preconceptual unity of perception and object, but in their considered opposition. The distinction is made in the subject, which has the external world in its own consciousness and yet recognizes it as something other. Therefore reflection, the life of reason, takes place as conscious projection. 189

This was, at the same time, Horkheimer and Adorno's most detailed answer to the question of how the recollection of nature within humanity, which they mentioned again and again as the way out of the disaster, was to be conceived. Nature was as full of spirit and as alive as the vision and behaviour of humanity made it. But what people's vision and behaviour made nature into was not merely a collective hallucination: that was what nature in fact really was. Human beings experienced, in nature, what they themselves were for nature. It was only the proximity to nature produced from a distance by means of consciousness which was able to realize, in a transcended form, the lost happiness imagined in retrospect that is, 'authentically mimetic behaviour', 'organic adaptation to others'.<sup>190</sup> 'You encounter me, when you encounter me': this insight from the philosophy of religion, pointedly expressed by Martin Buber,<sup>191</sup> was turned by Horkheimer and Adorno into a materialist and anthropological one.

Although it did not go beyond hints, this was the image which Horkheimer and Adorno opposed to those historical events which, in their view, represented a series of struggles among more or less effectively organized rackets for the fruits of the reckless exploitation of nature.

When the mimeographed volume was published in 1944, the war was still going on, although the Allied victory was more or less certain. But the validity of the part of their 'work in progress' which Horkheimer and Adorno had so far produced did not, in their eyes, depend in the slightest on the actual existence of National Socialism. This assessment of the situation was very close to that of George Orwell, who wrote his anti-utopia *1984* at the end of the Second World War, during the years 1946-8. In *1984*, Oceania had London as its capital, and Orwell saw what was truly horrifying about totalitarianism as being not its cruelty, but rather the way in which it attacked the concept of objective truth.

Horkheimer himself had conceived the work on the dialectics book in ambitious terms. 'Our task in life is theoretical work,' he had written to Lowenthal in November 1941.

Now is the time for the experience and discussions of the last decade to bear fruit . . . The significance of our earlier work, indeed of our very existence, will first become clear retrospectively from what is now produced. In view of the horrors which are continuing outside and approaching within [i.e. in the USA], and

as we have no-one to look to in the broad vicinity, our responsibility is immensely large. 192

When Pollock reported to Horkheimer at the beginning of June 1943 that there were renewed suspicions about the Institute, Horkheimer set down for himself, in a long letter to his friend, an exhaustive account of whether he had done everything in his power to protect the Institute from such accusations. Among other things, he wrote:

When we became aware that a few of our American friends expected of an Institute of Social Sciences that it engage in studies on pertinent social problems, fieldwork and other empirical investigations, we tried to satisfy these demands as well as we could, but our heart was set on individual studies in the sense of Geisteswissenschaften [the humanities] and the philosophical analysis of culture . . . There may be many who don't share our philosophical standpoint and who contend that today is not the time for studies which seemed to be so utterly aloof. (My personal opinion is that it is just this kind of intellectual work which, exception made of everything necessary to win the war, this time needs more than anything else. The pragmatism and empiricism and the lack of genuine philosophy are some of the foremost reasons which are responsible for the crisis which civilization would have faced even if the war had not come.)193

Horkheimer ultimately held fast to this view of the significance of his own activity, although he sometimes despaired about how unimpressive the results of the work they were striving to do must seem to most people. 'The more the general political situation develops into what we have always expected,' he wrote to Marcuse in September 1943, 'the more I feel that what matters is our own philosophical work.'194

When Marcuse and Kirchheimer received the *Philosophical Fragments* through the post in December 1944, both independently of one another reacted with bafflement. All they could do was to send their thanks for it. Even later on, they had nothing more to say about the book. As it turned out, this was to be symptomatic of its reception for a considerable time to come.

Horkheimer's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment':  
*Eclipse of Reason*

In his manuscript 'Philosophy of Modern Music', Adorno had produced a model of the dialectic of enlightenment developed within the field of music; when a second part, on 'Stravinsky and the Restoration', was added to it in 1948, he described the finished book, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, in its preface, as an 'excursus on the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*'.

Similarly, Horkheimer, in the five public lectures on 'Society and Reason' which he gave at the invitation of the Department of Philosophy at Columbia University in February and March 1944, produced a Horkheimerian sketch of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. 'In January,' he had written to Pollock in November 1943, 'I may prepare the lecture together with Teddie. I intend to make it a more or less popular version of the philosophy of enlightenment as far as it has taken shape in the chapters of the book we have so far completed.'<sup>195</sup> However, the book version of the lectures, published in 1947, on which Adorno had been the main collaborator alongside Lowenthal and Gurland, listed only Horkheimer as its author. But in the preface it was stated:

These lectures were designed to present in epitome some aspects of a comprehensive philosophical theory developed by the writer during the last few years in association with Theodore [*sic*] W. Adorno. It would be difficult to say which of the ideas originated in his mind and which in my own; our philosophy is one. My friend Leo Lowenthal's indefatigable co-operation and his advice as a sociologist have been an invaluable contribution.<sup>196</sup>

The book's title, *Eclipse of Reason*, clearly took up the theme of Horkheimer's last contribution to the *SPSS*, 'The End of Reason', and also recalled the title of his early collection of aphorisms, *Dämmerung*.<sup>197</sup>

What was Horkheimerian about his sketch of the dialectic of enlightenment was the easy-to-follow presentation of his ideas. Equally Horkheimerian was its fresh version of the old two-front opposition to positivism and metaphysics, which was now explicitly extended to United States pragmatism and neo-Thomism as ever, with the greatest respect being given both to the metaphysical and to the positivist opponents. A final Horkheimerian aspect was the fact that Adorno's motif of bursting ideas open from within by exacerbating them hardly played any part in it, while what was good about the past was, by contrast, emphasized so strongly, and with such undialectical directness, that a demand for the revival of the good old days seemed to be all that remained as the principal conclusion of the book as a whole. It was precisely the demand for such a revival that Horkheimer criticized in the neo-Thomists as being not merely hopeless but even damaging, since such attempted revivals only accelerated the decay of what had actually survived of the good old days.

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* had implicitly worked with two concepts of enlightenment. These now reappeared in Horkheimer as subjective and objective reason. 'Historically, both the subjective and the objective aspect of reason have been present from the outset, and the predominance of the former over the latter was achieved in the course of a long process.'<sup>198</sup> In the view, for example, of the pragmatists, or Nietzsche, or Max Weber, or the 'average man', reason was not there

to allow judgements concerning goals to be made, but instead to be an instrument in the service of purposes decided upon in other ways. Horkheimer described the form of reason dominant in modern society as being simultaneously subjective and instrumental, since it served to find the correct means of achieving goals which were ultimately always concerned with the subject's self-preservation. He saw the form of reason which was objective and simultaneously autonomous as characterized by the fact that it recognized more comprehensive purposes than self-preservation and regarded itself as being competent to judge the rationality of such larger purposes.

Great philosophical systems, such as those of Plato and Aristotle, scholasticism, and German idealism were founded on an objective theory of reason. It aimed at evolving a comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims. The degree of reasonableness of a man's life could be determined according to its harmony with this totality. Its objective structure, and not just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for individual thoughts and actions. This concept of reason never precluded subjective reason, but regarded the latter as only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality from which criteria for all things and beings were derived. The emphasis was on ends rather than on means. The supreme endeavor of this kind of thinking was to reconcile the objective order of the 'reasonable,' as philosophy conceived it, with human existence, including self-interest and self-preservation. 199

This sort of evaluation of broad philosophical systems which were certain of the objective existence of meaning, both in the world and in human life, had not appeared in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Only a few flickers of genuine enlightenment, hovering above a history trapped in immanence, had appeared there as positive aspects: the Jewish religion, the ideals of the liberal bourgeoisie, the loyalty of critical theorists towards determinate negation. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, truth had been a criterion introduced surreptitiously to assess intellectual objectifications, and had never been discussed in more detail. In *Eclipse of Reason*, it was now traced back to what had still, for the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, embodied domination by nature: myth. Philosophy, religion, myth—these were all media through which the ideas that stood for reconciliation between human beings, and between humanity and nature, could be traced back to their prehistoric roots. It was the old taboos and myths smouldering beneath the surface of modern civilization which

still provide, in many cases, the warmth inherent in any delight, in any love of a thing for its own sake rather than for that of another

thing. The pleasure of keeping a garden goes back to ancient times when gardens belonged to the gods and were cultivated for them. The sense of beauty in both nature and art is connected, by a thousand delicate threads, to these old superstitions. If, by either flouting or flaunting the threads, modern man cuts them, the pleasure may continue for a while but its inner life is extinguished. We cannot credit our enjoyment of a flower or of the atmosphere of a room to an autonomous esthetic instinct. Man's esthetic responsiveness relates in its prehistory to various forms of idolatry; his belief in the goodness or sacredness of a thing precedes his enjoyment of its beauty. This applies no less to such concepts as freedom and humanity . . . Such ideas must preserve the negative element, as the negation of the ancient stage of injustice or inequality, and at the same time conserve the original absolute significance rooted in their dreadful origins. Otherwise they become not only indifferent but untrue. 200

But how was it to be decided which transformation of which elements of tradition should be viewed as the genuinely rational one? Would there not have to be a source independent of myth, superstition and religion? Must Horkheimer not have had such a source in mind when he spoke of 'independent thinkers'<sup>201</sup> who, unlike the well-meaning metaphysicians, did not expunge the last trace of significance from tradition through attempts to revive it artificially? But it was the dark prophets of the bourgeoisie Sade and Nietzsche, above all who in Horkheimer's view had spoken the truth about bourgeois culture. It seemed that there was nothing left to which the critique of ideology could make an appeal. How could 'independent thinking' make more of the 'last bit of meaningfulness' than, for example, the neo-Thomists, or other pseudo-rescuers denounced by Horkheimer as pragmatists of religion? What did it mean to speak of the 'last bit of meaningfulness' which 'such ideas' (truth, goodness, beauty) 'could have for independent thinkers tempted to oppose the powers that be'?<sup>202</sup>

Phrases like 'the dignity of man' either imply a dialectical advance in which the idea of divine right is preserved and transcended, or become hackneyed slogans that reveal their emptiness as soon as somebody inquires into their specific meaning. Their life depends, so to speak, on unconscious memories. If a group of enlightened people were about to fight even the greatest evil imaginable, subjective reason would make it almost impossible to point simply to the nature of the evil and to the nature of humanity, which make the fight imperative. Many would at once ask what the real motives are. It would have to be asserted that their reasons are realistic, that is to say, correspond to personal interests, even though, for

the mass of the people, these latter may be more difficult to grasp than the silent appeal of the situation itself. 203

This was the motif which appeared again and again in isolated passages in Horkheimer in the course of the year the motif of a kind of aesthetic existentialism. The desire of human beings for happiness was, for the materialist Horkheimer, a fact which needed no justification.<sup>204</sup> The finest nuance of desire was sacred to philosophy.<sup>205</sup> And now human nature and the silent appeal to the situation contained imperious demands which would be audible when subjective reason was silent. Horkheimer's view, more hinted at than stated here, was thus: independent thought would rescue the 'last trace of significance' not by attempting to revive something but by putting a halt to something destructive and distracting. Independent thought did not seek to renew worn-out ideals on the intellectual level, but instead attempted to link itself to their equivalents in human nature.

For Horkheimer, this was the concrete significance of the formula 'recollecting nature within humanity': an alliance between contemplation and instinct. At the last moment, thought felt its way back along the path through which objective reason had been overcome by subjective reason back along the path of subjectivization, formalization, instrumentalization, desubstantiation of nature and asserted itself, as an organ of nature, against the instruments of the self-glorifying intellect.

Distorted though the great ideals of civilization—justice, equality, freedom—may be, they are nature's protestations against her plight, the only formulated testimonies we possess. Toward them philosophy should take a dual attitude. (1) It should deny their claims to being regarded as the ultimate and infinite truth. Wherever a metaphysical system presents these testimonies as absolute or eternal principles, it exposes their historical relativity. Philosophy rejects the veneration of what is finite, not only of crude political or economic idols, such as the nation, the leader, success, or money, but also of ethical or esthetic values such as personality, happiness, beauty, or even liberty, so far as they pretend to be independent ultimates. (2) It should be admitted that the basic cultural ideas have truth values, and philosophy should measure them against the social background from which they emanate. It opposes the breach between ideas and reality. Philosophy confronts the existent, in its historical context, with the claim of its conceptual principles, in order to criticize the relation between the two and thus transcend them. Philosophy derives its positive character precisely from the interplay of these two negative procedures.<sup>206</sup>

This clearly demonstrated the paradoxical moral of Horkheimer's philosophy, the core of which had never changed, only its surface: a

critique of ideology which drew its standards from bourgeois ideals, and only sought to take them literally, was no longer possible in view of the self-destructiveness of reason and the prevalence of the myth of purposive rationality. Nevertheless, such a critique was also still possible if the bourgeois ideas, which had been desubstantiated to the extent of becoming mere slogans, were replenished from below by the protests of nature. The 'powerful machinery of organized research' 207 sanctioned by modern philosophy made such replenishment impossible. 'Spontaneous' research, guided by philosophical speculation, by contrast, could counter cultural decay by giving voice to the protests of nature.208

The central lecture, 'The Revolt of Nature', formed the pivot of the *Eclipse of Reason*. In the process in which meditation 'is superseded by pragmatic intelligence', 'nature has lost its awesomeness, its *qualitates occulatae*, but, completely deprived of the chance to speak through the minds of men even in the distorted language of these privileged groups [of speculative thinkers], nature seems to be taking its revenge.'209 Horkheimer saw civilization as having been attended from the beginning by opposition to, and revolts against, the repression of nature, in the form of social rebellions, individual crimes and psychological disturbances. Borrowing a term from Horkheimer's description of some middle-class writers, it can be said that he counted as social rebellions not only the 'bright' ones, i.e. revolutions, but also the 'dark' ones, the 'black' rebellions (rebellions in the sense of the terminology used in *Studies on Authority and the Family*). He described 'the cleverly staged race riots of our own day' as a 'Nazi rebellion of nature against civilization', in which forbidden instincts were given free rein in the service of repressive powers.210 (Freud, Benjamin and, more particularly, Ernst Jünger and Georges Bataille211 had described the First World War in similar terms as a raging manifestation of the currents resisting the profit principle of capitalist rationality.)

Closer to everyday life than in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, but basically reiterating its ideas, Horkheimer saw the real revenge of nature as lying in the fact that an inability to understand nature was in itself an incapacity for joy, happiness, self-esteem and the enjoyment of achievements.

The process of adjustment has now become deliberate and therefore total . . . The individual's self-preservation presupposes his adjustment to the requirements for the preservation of the system . . . The more devices we invent for dominating nature, the more must we serve them if we are to survive . . . The individual, purified of all remnants of mythologies, including the mythology of objective reason, reacts automatically, according to general patterns of adaptation . . . It is as if the innumerable laws, regulations, and directions with which we must comply were driving the car, not we . . . Our spontaneity has been replaced by a frame of mind which compels us to discard every emotion or idea that might

impair our alertness to the impersonal demands assailing us . . . The difference [compared to earlier periods in which conformity was also required] lies in the *tempo* of compliance, in the degree to which this attitude has permeated the whole being of the people and altered the nature of the freedom gained. 212

Horkheimer's hope was that 'The victory of civilization is too complete to be true. Therefore adjustment in our times involves an element of resentment and suppressed fury.'<sup>213</sup> What Marx and Lukács and, earlier, Horkheimer himself had expected from the proletariat that its misery was charged with revolutionary energies, that it was a lion crouched to pounce this was what Horkheimer now expected from all those in thrall to civilization, and above all from the insane, from criminals and from 'dark' rebels. To carry out, with 'confidence in man', a 'denunciation of what is currently called reason' this was what Horkheimer opposed to the fascist demagogues 'who seem to be flying in the face of civilization and sponsoring the revolt of nature'.<sup>214</sup>

The problematic nature of the notion of reviving bourgeois ideas from below led to the virtual omission in later texts of any mention of the alliance with the 'dark' form of rebellion. What remained was the complaint about the loss of objective reason and about the disdain for speculation and contemplation with a simultaneous appeal to 'objective truth'. This appeal of a metaphysical principle was from now on more consistent in Horkheimer than the appeal to the theological motifs of hope and salvation was in Adorno. There was a danger that this might have taken the sting out of the concern about the unleashing of enlightenment and out of the interest in analysing the experiences summed up in the concept of the instrumentalization of reason. 'If only you could soon start to work out all of the trains of thought which you were only able to hint at there,' Marcuse wrote to Horkheimer after reading the *Eclipse of Reason*.

Especially the one which disturbs me most of all: that the form of reason which suddenly changes into complete manipulation and domination still nevertheless remains a form of reason, so that the real horror of the system lies more in its rationality than in its irrationality. That is easily *said* but you must still provide the development for the actual reader no one else can or will do so.<sup>215</sup>

#### The anti-Semitism Project

Even for the United States, often thought of as an unconventional country, it was an independent and courageous initiative when in 1937 the Swede, Gunnar Myrdal, was commissioned to carry out an analysis

of the 'black problem' in the USA, and given every freedom and virtually unlimited resources to do so. The United States saw itself as the standard-bearer of democracy, and discrimination against blacks was the greatest blot on its reputation, apart from the virtual annihilation of the American Indians, which the world had more or less forgotten about, and the country's imperialist policy towards Latin America, which had nothing reprehensible in it in the eyes of the equally imperialist European powers. The idea for the project and the generous financial support it received were essentially the work of the then president of the board of directors of the Carnegie Corporation in New York, Frederick B. Keppel. In the 1940s Keppel was also the only member of the Board of Appeal, which passed final judgement on visa applications from 'enemy aliens', who opposed tighter immigration regulations after the German invasion of the Soviet Union. He thus succeeded in getting visas granted to many refugees who would otherwise have been refused them.

More or less simultaneously with Myrdal's completion of his work, the American Jewish Committee, the oldest and most influential of the four large Jewish defence agencies, took the decision to contribute towards the funding of the anti-Semitism project at the Institute of Social Research. This was an event almost as remarkable as what the Carnegie Corporation had done. Numerous studies had already been published, both on the question of race and on the problem of anti-Semitism; on the latter topic, for example, *Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Antisemitism* had appeared in 1942, with contributions from sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and so on, among them Talcott Parsons and Carl J. Friedrich.<sup>217</sup> But projects of this sort were not on a large enough scale to do justice to the social relevance of these problems in a way that matched the scale of the United States.

Five days after the so-called *Reichskristallnacht* ('Crystal Night') on 9-10 November 1938, when synagogues throughout Germany were set on fire and destroyed, and 30,000 Jews were arrested and deported to concentration camps, Roosevelt was asked at a press conference in the White House: 'Would you recommend a relaxation of our immigration restrictions so that the Jewish refugees could be received in this country?' 'That is not in contemplation,' the President replied. 'We have the quota system.'<sup>218</sup> The quota system allowed 27,230 immigrants from Germany and Austria per year. Small though it was, administrative restrictions meant that this figure was never reached by a long way, except in 1939 and 1940. A few days after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, procedures were tightened even more. From that point on, two United States guarantors were required for each immigrant: one to vouch for the immigrant's financial independence, and one to vouch for his or her moral integrity.

The European Jews were bound to have the impression that there was a coalition between the silent majority and the leading politicians,

who seemed to have agreed that the Jews should be left to their fate, and even that escaping should be made more difficult for them. Keeping the 'final solution' a secret did not succeed. But the news about it was usually not believed and it was believed as little abroad as it was by the Jews who were themselves affected by it. There were reservations in the Ministry of Information in England about spreading news of this sort: experience with the atrocity propaganda in the First World War showed that this kind of material would be dismissed as a concocted horror story. Another fear was that reports about the annihilation of the Jews in countries occupied by the Germans would lead to a revival of anti-Semitism at home.

Events in the part of the world ruled by the National Socialists, and reactions to them in Allied countries, focused the attention of some observers on the Anglo-Saxon version of the movement which was having such horrific consequences on the continent. These observers claimed to perceive a more or less concealed form of anti-Semitism which was combined with support for democracy. This confirmed the suspicion that anti-Semitism was much more widespread than generally supposed. 'Widespread awareness of the prevalence of anti-Semitic feeling, and unwillingness to admit sharing it' was how George Orwell summed up his experience of it in an article on 'Anti-Semitism in Britain', which appeared in April 1945 in the *Contemporary Jewish Record*, published by the American Jewish Committee:

This feeling that anti-Semitism is something sinful and disgraceful, something that a civilized person does not suffer from, is unfavorable to a scientific approach, and indeed many people will admit that they are frightened of probing too deeply into the subject. They are frightened, that is to say, of discovering not only that anti-Semitism is spreading, but that they themselves are infected by it. 219

The United States psychologist Allen L. Edwards spoke of 'unlabelled fascist attitudes' in an article of the same title published in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* in 1941. The article was one of a growing number of studies dealing with phenomena such as the fact that people who supported fascist principles and stereotypes protested against being described as fascists. Observations, for example, of the way in which students would withdraw their assent to statements as soon as those statements were labelled 'fascist' drew the attention of researchers to the problem of the concealed assessment of attitudes. Those affected often did not want to admit to the true nature of their attitudes, and were often genuinely horrified by it, or indeed not even clear about it.

After the United States had entered the war, Jewish organizations such as the American Jewish Committee (AJC) emphasized the involvement

of Jews in the war effort. The 'Chronicle' section of the *Contemporary Jewish Record* published page-long lists of the names and ranks of Jews taking part in the war in high positions and, as time went on, lists of those who had been killed in action. This was one of the defence measures taken against the prejudice which clearly existed, although it was hard to judge how widespread it was, that Jews were shirking military service while at the same time reaping the greatest benefits from the war.

'I have been extremely busy with the Anti-Semitism Project,' Neumann wrote from New York to Horkheimer in Los Angeles a few days after the United States was forced into the war.

The prospects are, of course, not very good at present. In the first place anti-Semitism had definitely receded into the background. In the second place many foundations will utilize their funds and abilities exclusively for war effort (Carnegie Corporation has already announced it). This view is, of course, shortsighted since there is not the slightest doubt that either during the war or certainly after it anti-Semitism will become much more powerful than even before because it will be fused with a definitely Fascist movement. Still, there are a good number of people who see that the breathing spell which the initial war period gives to the Jews, should be utilized . . . Anti-Semitism will grow and the Jews will soon wake up and see that the most passionate patriotic declarations will be of no avail. In consequence we must utilize the little money we might possibly get for pushing our anti-Semitism project and its work on it [*sic*] as rapidly as possible so as to be able to demonstrate in a few months our ability to tackle the whole problem. 220

It was mainly thanks to the stubbornness of Neumann's efforts that, when a new director was appointed at the AJC's Research Department in the summer of 1942, the Institute's anti-Semitism project suddenly had great prospects of receiving financial support. Horkheimer, deeply engrossed with Adorno at Pacific Palisades in work on their major theoretical book, was extremely sceptical, and wrote to Lowenthal in New York:

I think that I shall make up my mind and go to New York. There is one favor which I most seriously want to ask you, and I beg you not to forget it even for one minute of my stay there, even if I should waver myself: don't let me stay one day longer than absolutely necessary . . . Every day, nay, every hour which is left to me for our work must be devoted to it without any conformism. Our common life would be irresponsible if we should wast [*sic*] any of the hours in which I am able to work for other purpose [*sic*] than

those of the continuation of our mere existence. I don't consider the negotiations with the American Jewish Committee as such a sufficient reason for the interruption of my work. After our experiences with Graeber and all the prognoses in this matter, I am pretty certain that we will eventually be let down this time as we were before. Previous to the arrival of Neumann's letter, however, I had already the feeling that I could not avoid a trip during this fall or the coming winter. Since we could not afford to close the Institute altogether, I had to show up and to give vital proof to our different friends that I don't let the things go [*sic*], that I keep them well posted on my work, that the present lull in the activities of the Institute can be overcome at any moment when we deem it opportune. Since I shall not leave any doubt that my work will keep me in Los Angeles for the next two years (provided no force majeure [*sic*] intervenes) this should give us peace for the near future. Considering this situation, Neumann's letter determined not the trip but the date. If I have to go anyway, why not to go now [*sic*], particularly so since I am a terribly bad worker when I have such a trip before me. 221

Shortly after this, he did indeed travel to New York. His talks with representatives of the AJC confirmed Neumann's report, but Horkheimer remained sceptical, as the crucial meeting of the Committee would not be held for another two weeks, by which time 'the opposition', he believed, would 'succeed in blocking the way to an understanding'.<sup>222</sup> His impressions on a trip to the State Department in Washington made him equally sceptical. He and Neumann went to Washington to try to obtain some sort of letter of recommendation for a project on 'The Elimination of German Chauvinism', stating that the research had the importance of a recognized semi-official contribution to the war effort. They assumed that this would improve the prospects of its being supported financially by the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Corporation.

But it was still months before there was an absolutely final decision from the AJC. Horkheimer soon returned to Pacific Palisades, and negotiations were led, to begin with, mainly by Neumann. He and David Rosenblum, the new director of the Research Department of the AJC, planned to have Robert Lynd as an American co-director of the project. Lynd, like Thorstein Veblen before him and C. Wright Mills and David Riesman after him, represented a minority tendency in US sociology which was critical of society and which contributed decisively to the public success of sociology. Rosenblum responded to Neumann's reservation that Lynd might be rejected by the Committee because of his political views by saying, 'as long as a man was not a party Communist he was alright with him, the more so since in his view the problem of anti-Semitism could only be attacked by a man with left views who is willing to go to the roots of the problem.'<sup>223</sup> When Neumann named

Adorno, Marcuse, Lowenthal and Pollock as Institute associates who were to collaborate on the project, and mentioned Adorno's work with Lazarsfeld on the Princeton Radio Research Project, Rosenblum declared that 'the whole huge apparatus' of Lazarsfeld's study 'had achieved no results whatsoever'. This was evidence that there were indeed people in important positions who valued the Institute precisely on account of what Horkheimer and his closest associates were trying more to conceal than confidently to defend.

At a further meeting of the AJC, the project once again met with agreement. However, instead of getting the written confirmation they expected, the Institute's directors were asked to present a budget and a further, more detailed draft. Neumann and Marcuse once more enthusiastically lent a hand in preparing the new version of the draft, which was put together in extreme haste in the Institute's New York office, before they finally took up full-time jobs in Washington under solicitous pressure from Horkheimer and Pollock. Pollock was nominated as director of the project and acting director of the New York office of the Institute, at Horkheimer's wishes. 'Since you are an economist,' he wrote to his friend in November 1942, 'you can move the Institute towards a more empirical attitude promising more practical results without endangering the expression of our theoretical thought.' The two were agreed that the pattern of *Studies on Authority and the Family* should be followed, and that the theoretical core of the work should be supplemented by an impressive empirical supplement. But Horkheimer wanted, if possible, to drop the sub-project arranged by Neumann on anti-Semitism in the working class. He saw this as an unauthorized addition by Neumann to the draft of the project which had been published in *SPSS*. 'By the way,' he mentioned to Pollock, 'this idea of a survey on the whole labor movement, just to find some Anti-Semitic reactions, is, in my opinion, scientifically ridiculous.' 224

In January 1943, a final decision, on the basis of the budget and the new draft, had still not been reached, and the election of a new president of the AJC was due. At the end of the month, Joseph M. Proskauer was elected, and Pollock saw all hope fading. Proskauer was an ardent Republican, and belonged to the group of Jews who were opposed to publishing what was going on in Europe. It was therefore to be expected that he would prefer to be silent about anti-Semitism in the USA. The line taken by the AJC was generally moderate, supporting assimilation, and under Proskauer it involved opposing anti-Semitism in the USA by exposing it 'as a miserable anti-democratic and anti-American manifestation', as it was put in a statement by the AJC in October 1943.<sup>225</sup>

In the second half of February, Rosenblum telephoned to say that the Committee had now really finally decided in favour of the project. Pollock cabled Horkheimer on 2 March 1943: 'Reached complete agreement project. Rosenblum seems enthusiastic. Believes project will

develop into greater cooperation and much larger grant. Strongly advises New Yorker assistants start 15.3 and full staff 1.4.' 226

In talks between Pollock, Lowenthal and Rosenblum, the following points, among others, were agreed:

1 The two sides would participate in the project, which had a one-year time limit April 1943 to April 1944 to the amount of \$10,000 each.

2 European events would be taken into account.

3 Research in the narrower sense would concentrate on two main areas:

(a) 'The totalitarian type and its political functions'. This part was to be carried out in New York with Pollock as director, Robert MacIver (who took over from Lynd, who had too much other work) as co-director, and Leo Lowenthal, Paul Massing, Arkady Gurland and others as assistants.

(b) 'Psychological research'. This study was to be done on the west coast under Horkheimer's direction, with assistance from Adorno and others.

4 The film experiment, which in the draft published in the *SPSS* was central to the experimental section, was provisionally cancelled for financial reasons. It had originally been intended that it would serve as a model for new, covert methods of observing anti-Semitism.<sup>227</sup>

From now on, work on the west coast on the dialectics project and work on the east coast on the anti-Semitism project were intertwined, in such a way that it was no longer possible to say whether the *Philosophical Fragments* were the theoretical springboard for the anti-Semitism project or the anti-Semitism project was a gigantic, more or less distinct excursus on the *Philosophical Fragments*. The two projects were the climax of the collaboration between Horkheimer and Adorno. But the anti-Semitism project was, from the beginning, only partly their work, and it slipped more and more out of their hands. It is doubtful whether the anti-Semitism project would have been carried out without outside finance, and even whether there would have been a section on 'Elements of Anti-Semitism' in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, if there had not been the stimulus of the agreement with the AJC. Understandably, Horkheimer was both attracted to and daunted by the topic. In an intensive study of anti-Semitism and Judaism, it would be extremely difficult to maintain their self-image as a small group of theoreticians living in 'splendid isolation', as strangers standing above the cultures concerned, who saw their connection with Judaism as lying solely in their affinity with certain motifs of its thought. That self-image would have to give way to a more sober one: the admission that they belonged to a Jewish minority, whose Jewish identity had been forced upon it from outside, ignoring internal differences and disregarding its various

degrees of assimilation and willingness to assimilate. It was thus probably the ultimate success of negotiations for a research contract with the AJC which really made anti-Semitism become an explicit research topic. With time, their theoretical reflections on it came to form part of both the *Philosophical Fragments* and the anti-Semitism project. The philosophers in the group were contemptuous of the empirical parts of the anti-Semitism project, just as outsiders were enthusiastic about them.

When he was starting his work on the anti-Semitism project, Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse:

Since we have decided that here in Los Angeles the psychological part should be treated, I have studied the literature, under this respect [*sic*]. I don't have to tell you that I don't believe in psychology as a means to solve a problem of such seriousness. I did not change a bit my scepticism towards that discipline. Also, the term psychology as I use it in the project stands for anthropology and anthropology for the theory of man as he has developed under the conditions of antagonistic society. It is my intention to study the presence of the scheme of domination in the so-called psychological life, the instincts as well as the thoughts of men. The tendencies in people which make them susceptible to propaganda for terror, are themselves the result of terror, physical and spiritual, actual and potential oppression. If we could succeed in describing the patterns, according to which domination operates even in the remotest domains of the mind, we would have done a worthwhile job. But to achieve this one must study a great deal of the silly psychological literature and if you could see my notes, even those which I have sent to Pollock on the progress of our studies here you would probably think I have gone crazy myself. But I can assure you that I am not losing my mind over all these psychological and anthropological hypotheses which must be examined if one wants to arrive at a theory on the level of presentday knowledge. 228

Since Horkheimer and Adorno were sceptical about the importance to the AJC of explicit theory, the theoretical work on the anti-Semitism project was carried out partly in a grey area between the dialectics project and the anti-Semitism project and partly under the label 'Psychology of Anti-Semitism', so that they would be able to offer as much of their own material as possible under the protection of traditional terminology. Although Horkheimer and Adorno had declared the specialized disciplines to be unfruitful in the preface to the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, they did nevertheless deal with them, and kept themselves up to date on the most recent developments. These were represented above all by cultural anthropology, whose best-known figure, Margaret Mead, had been known to the Institute through Fromm since

the 1930s, and was later brought on to the advisory board by Horkheimer when the anti-Semitism project was extended. Horkheimer and Adorno expressly chose, as the starting-point of their study, a discussion of the hypotheses modern science had produced concerning the destructive tendencies lying at the root of anti-Semitism. However, the idea that this was a concession to the study's audience virtually displaced their sense that they were taking up the current state of research and carrying out a critical extension of it.

The second complex of studies carried out by the Los Angeles group on the psychology of destructive tendencies within civilized society consisted of a content analysis of the speeches and articles of the anti-Semitic agitators who had been appearing in large numbers in the south-western United States since the 1930s. It was intended that this should expose the decisive stimuli to which the destructive tendencies in the masses responded. This research was to be carried out principally by Adorno. When Lowenthal spent a few months in the summer of 1943 in Los Angeles he also assisted Adorno with it. The preliminary results of this second area of study were three analyses: one by Lowenthal on George Allison Phelps, one by Massing on Joseph E. McWilliams, and one by Adorno on Martin Luther Thomas. Horkheimer said of Adorno's analysis that it was 'not done in the strictly traditional American way', but that it was better 'to attempt things by such methods by which we can do them best rather than to put ourselves into a straight jacket [*sic*]'.<sup>229</sup> Adorno's suggestion that they 'send field workers to meetings and record exactly when there is applause and when not, and what the various degrees of enthusiasm are (probably proportional to the threats of violence)' was not acted on.<sup>230</sup> Nor was the project on which Adorno's content analysis of Martin Luther Thomas's radio broadcasts was based: the publication of a popular handbook, with sketches, which would help to expose the tricks used by fascist agitators and so disarm them and immunize the public against them. A feeling of strength was to be given, particularly to Jewish readers, by information of this sort. It was hoped that the booklet would produce a decline in what Horkheimer and Adorno, along with many Zionist Jews, saw as the most dangerous mechanism of anti-Semitism: the way in which the Jews, by appearing to be weak, confirmed the stereotype of the weak Jew and thus constantly attracted fresh aggression and violence.

A scholarly version of the planned popular handbook was later produced by Lowenthal and Gutermann's *Prophets of Deceit*.<sup>231</sup> A lecture given by Adorno on 'Anti-Semitism and Fascist Propaganda' presented a theoretical elaboration of the work on the three agitators. It was given at the Psychiatric Symposium on Anti-Semitism held in San Francisco in June 1944, arranged by Ernst Simmel, a psychoanalyst who had emigrated from Germany and had been practising in Los Angeles since 1934. Adorno's lecture was published in 1946 in *Anti-Semitism: A Social Disease*, edited by Ernst Simmel, along with the lectures given by other

participants including Horkheimer and Otto Fenichel, another psychoanalyst who had fled Germany in 1933. Fenichel's lecture, 'Elements of a Psychoanalytic Theory of Anti-Semitism', was on the same level as Horkheimer and Adorno's 'Elements of Anti-Semitism' and was in many ways closely related to it. Another, more comprehensive essay by Adorno on the same topic, 'Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda', was written later, and published in 1951 in the third volume of the journal *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences*, edited by another émigré psychoanalyst, Géza Róheim.

Experimental psychological research was the third complex of studies on which the Los Angeles group collaborated in the anti-Semitism project. In the research programme published in the *SPSS*, a film experiment had been proposed as an example of what was, for the directors of the Institute, a new approach to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism through 'a series of experimental situations which approximate as closely as possible the concrete conditions of present day life', in order 'to visualize the mechanism of anti-Semite reactions realistically'.<sup>232</sup> The idea, a favourite with Horkheimer, remained programmatic for the time being.

A less elaborate alternative arose from collaboration with R. Nevitt Sanford, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Daniel J. Levinson. Sanford had come to Horkheimer's notice in his reading of the psychological journals. Sanford was then Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of California in Berkeley, and a research associate at the Institute of Child Welfare there. He had published articles on the typology of criminals and on the formulation of scales according to which war optimism or national defence morale might be measured, at the same time allowing conclusions to be drawn regarding the psychosocial roots of the attitudes examined. Contact with Sanford was established through Else Frenkel-Brunswik, an acquaintance of Horkheimer's, who told him that Sanford was open to 'European ideas'. Frenkel-Brunswik, at that time a research associate, like Sanford himself, at the Institute of Child Welfare at Berkeley, had left Austria in 1938 as a refugee. She and her later husband, E. Brunswik, had been the first research assistants at Karl and Charlotte Bühler's Vienna Psychological Institute, where Paul Lazarsfeld, Marie Jahoda and Herta Herzog had also worked, and where young left-wingers, most of whom were also enthusiastic about Freudian psychoanalysis, had learnt how to go about sophisticated empirical research.

In May 1943 Horkheimer visited Sanford at Berkeley. 'Sanford's work, under my supervision,' he wrote to Pollock afterwards, 'would be the first scientific approach to the psychology, the types, the reaction of the American Antisemite. It is my conviction, that Jewish ignorance of the psychology of Antisemitism is not the only but certainly one of the very few main causes for the failure of the European defense against it.'<sup>233</sup>

The psychoanalytic orientation of Sanford, Frenkel-Brunswik and

Levinson, all three of whom had been psychoanalysed themselves; their corresponding concept of the personality, which incorporated modes of behaviour and conscious convictions, as well as more deep-seated, often unconscious, tendencies influencing behaviour and convictions; the distinction they made between overt and covert anti-Semitism; and their use of a combination of questionnaires, interviews and projective psychological tests all of this seemed to correspond well to the Institute's ideas. In December 1943, when it looked as if their budget limits would be exceeded both in New York and in Los Angeles, Horkheimer and Pollock had to decide whether to pay an additional request for \$500 from the Berkeley group. Horkheimer took the opportunity to emphasize to Pollock the group's significance for the future of the project and for the Institute's ambitions.

The team in Berkeley is certainly unique. The leader of the group is a gentle professor of psychology. The two assistants are exceptionally well-trained psychologists with a good knowledge of statistical and sociological methods. If at any time I go to San Francisco in order to organize with these friends an experimental series on a larger basis, we shall be able to publish a book on the analysis and the measurement of antisemitism. Such a book would be a new approach, not only with regard to our specific problem, but to the study of social phenomena in general. It would constitute what we propagated in our first pamphlets after our arrival in this country: the bringing together of certain European concepts with American methods. 234

For Horkheimer, Sanford became the Lazarsfeld of the Berkeley project.

In the course of its research, the Berkeley group began to call itself the Public Opinion Study Group, and it focused on constructing a scale according to which anti-Semitic opinions and attitudes could be measured, and on exposing the connections between anti-Semitism and personality structure. The group's starting-point was the view that anti-Semitism could be explained by an interplay between external and internal factors. They decided, purely as a matter of research strategy, to concentrate on the role played by personality structure. This had been less well researched than the external factors involved, and was in their view more difficult to analyse. They felt that they were particularly well qualified to undertake just such an analysis of anti-Semitism 'under the microscope'.

An interim report published by the Berkeley group in December 1943 stated:

The mass-production techniques give us information concerning the frequency of certain relationships (between anti-Semitism and group-membership or personality pattern or whatever) in society

at large, as well as subjects for additional clinical study; while the clinical, case-study methods serve to extend and deepen our understanding of the forces making for and against anti-Semitism in the individual, as well as to supply us with hypotheses for new questions to be used in questionnaires and other mass-production methods. 235

The 'mass-production techniques' involved questionnaires consisting mainly of anti-Semitic statements. The longest questionnaire form contained fifty-two statements, including: 'Jews seem to prefer the most luxurious, extravagant, and sensual way of living'; 'The Jews should make sincere efforts to rid themselves of their conspicuous and irritating faults if they really want to stop being persecuted'; 'In order to maintain a nice residential neighborhood it is best to prevent Jews from living in it'. For each statement, three levels of agreement or disagreement were possible for the respondent, and the various degrees of anti-Semitism or anti-anti-Semitism were to be established in this way. A few projective questions were built into the questionnaire, similar to those contained in earlier questionnaires prepared by the Institute open questions such as 'What great people, living or dead, do you admire most?', the answers to which were to allow provisional conclusions concerning the respondent's personality structure. The 'clinical, case-study methods' involved interviews lasting one to three hours, and the application of a variation on the Rorschach test developed by H.A. Murray. Murray's variant used pictures with people in them instead of ink blots, and was intended to direct the test subject's attention towards people and interpersonal relations. The sample, in this initial phase of the Berkeley part of the programme, consisted of seventy-seven women students, ten of whom took part in the clinical tests.

Horkheimer had great hopes of this part of the project, about which he was sometimes scornful, sometimes enthusiastic. He hoped to use it to provide the AJC with nothing less than 'the scientific proof of antisemitism being a symptom of deep hostility against democracy (the Berkeley investigation on a large scale with the results of which we could not only measure antisemitism, but arouse the Administration and all liberal forces of the country, particularly the educators of this nation)'. 236

In New York, where what was intended to be the main part of the research dealing with the economic and social causes of anti-Semitism was to be carried out, 237 the initial concerns were with European events and observations of the scene in the United States. To show the AJC quickly that valuable material was being collected, a survey of German émigrés was carried out, at Horkheimer's suggestion, with the aim of ascertaining their experiences of the German population's reaction to the anti-Semitic measures and actions undertaken by the Nazis. The New York office's tasks were mainly carried out by Massing and Gurland,

more or less under Pollock's direction, with the support of Lowenthal and, for a time, Kirchheimer.

When Horkheimer travelled to New York in February 1944 to give his five lectures on 'Society and Reason', none of the various parts of the project was even half finished. This was hardly surprising, since the drafts of the report on the project's first year included plans for research on the essence of contemporary anti-Semitism, on the lessons of recent European history, on the scene in the United States, and on developing measures to fight anti-Semitism, all of this in spite of the fact that the Institute, with a reduced staff, had not even begun to collaborate with outside scholars, apart from the Berkeley group.

A fresh phase of uncertainty began this time with regard to whether the hoped-for extension of the project would be realized. The uncertainty was all the greater because the AJC's academic expert, David Rosenblum, had in the meantime died. 'I am a little worried about the report for the A.J.C.,' Horkheimer (who had in the meantime returned to Los Angeles) wrote to Pollock, who was in charge of preparing the research report for the AJC in New York. 'If this piece is not done with some superiority and enthusiasm, the reader will again get the impression that our group is just a bunch of European scholars heavily laden [*sic*] with academic wisdom, trying to frighten the American public into buying the awkward and highly theoretical stuff as being particularly useful and expedient.'<sup>238</sup> To get Pollock, who often tended to be defeatist and insensitive, into the right mood for work on the report, Horkheimer indicated to him how important it was to put oneself in the position of the people the report was addressed to, in order to find the right tone.

The idea that one would have done much better in his place should be discarded as well as the usually erroneous opinion that the other person is utterly unaware of the dangers he has to face, reluctant to do something about them, unwilling and unable to learn from past experiences, in short, extremely unintelligent and malevolent. On the contrary, it is mostly true that he is well aware of the dangers and very eager to do something about them. The reasons for his acting like those who have perished and his repressing his fears are, particularly in the Jewish case, his secret insight into the fatality of the process, the overwhelming forces involved and the knowledge that in such a situation each counter-measure is double-edged. With regard to science, minorities are perfectly right when they are suspicious. Up to now, it has not served them so well, and such great authorities as Freud have repeatedly, implicitly and explicitly, stated its impotence to solve the pertinent problems of society.<sup>239</sup>

But, Horkheimer continued, the Institute had, for the first time, made a serious contribution to the great struggle against anti-Semitism:

by developing methods of gaining scientific evidence of the anti-democratic roots of anti-Semitism; by conceiving the idea of producing a booklet demystifying fascist agitation; by developing the method of 'participant interviews' the covert questioning of social groups, taking advantage of everyday situations, by members of those groups themselves who had been given training by experts. What Horkheimer was emphasizing here was not only the practical relevance of what the Institute had achieved for the struggle against anti-Semitism's challenge to democrats to show their solidarity, its strengthening of the self-confidence of democrats and Jews, its combination of research and enlightenment but also the Institute's competitiveness on the methodological and technical level. To Pollock's reservation that they were not experts in the examination of the effects of defence measures against anti-Semitism, as required by the AJC, Horkheimer replied that it would be possible to consult Lazarsfeld with regard to the usual methods of testing the effects of radio advertising and such things. But in other respects they were themselves 'the best experts in this field in America'.

We developed the measurement scale and we designed the experimental motion picture which, I think, is the only scientific instrument to test the exact amount of antisemitism at any time among a given group . . . If the Committee would either have helped my efforts to get the picture from one of the big studios, or spent the \$10,000 or \$15,000 for which it could have been produced half a year ago, it would now have in its possession a precise scientific instrument with which to test the increase or decrease of conscious and unconscious antisemitism with the accuracy to which we are used in natural sciences. 240

In May 1944 a two-day conference on the problems of research into anti-Semitism, organized by the AJC, took place in New York. Many scholars from the United States had been invited to take part, Horkheimer among them. The setting up of a scientific department at the AJC was considered. But the Institute's report on the first year of research, and the AJC's decision on whether to extend the project to a further stage, only came through in the summer. The four (typewritten) volumes entitled *Studies in Anti-Semitism: A Report to the American Jewish Committee* consisted of an almost 150-page report and numerous individual studies, among which the most impressive, certainly in the eyes of the sponsors and experts, was the study by Sanford and Levinson, 'A Scale for the Measurement of Anti-Semitism'. This had already been published in the *Journal of Psychology* by Gordon W. Allport, one of the most respected psychologists in the United States and a specialist in the psychology of the personality.

One of the high points of the report was the section on 'Economic Factors in Jewish Vulnerability'. Some, by no means new, ideas which had been mentioned in the SPSS draft of the project from 1941 were

developed further here. These concerned an analysis of the reality content of certain apparently contradictory anti-Semitic accusations.

The reasoning ran as follows: the Jews were particularly exposed owing to their role as money-lenders, merchants and traders, occupations which were more available to them than other people and in which, since they were forced to enjoy taking risks, they took more risks and were more successful in those they took than non-Jews. To the oppressed masses, they seemed to be the immediate cause of their misery and appeared to be displaying the expansionist and unsympathetic face of capitalism.

At the same time, for all their successful economic conquests, middle class Jews retained certain hallmarks of non-conformity that set them off from other members of that same middle class. From ghetto times on, while willing to use every means to gain individual achievement on the ladder of economic and social success, they continued to respect specific Jewish ethical and religious values such as learning, intellectual achievement, social betterment and the 'things of the spirit'; in consequence they never completely accepted stable patterns of economic activities or the standards of social behavior customary to their social setting.

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What Horkheimer had observed half a decade before in 'The Jews and Europe', yet in a gloating and reproving tone the falling behind of the individualist Jewish capitalists compared with an increasingly bureaucratized and monopolized economy now became a component of a desperate situation which provoked sympathy.

Thus, the Jews became the object of a two-pronged, contradictory attack. By the middle class they were attacked as symbols of all that was 'rotten' in declining old-fashioned capitalism: acquisitiveness, anti-social attitudes, cut-throat competition . . . At the same time, the Jews were attacked by protagonists of the new Fascism as embodying those values of liberalism which the 'movement' aimed to destroy . . . non-conformism, self-determination, and minority rights.<sup>242</sup>

Quite apart from the absence of any results from surveys, which must have disappointed the AJC, it was not surprising that the report remained broadly programmatic, and that its various parts were not very well integrated with one another: there was too great a disproportion between the time available for the research and the scale of the programme which had been planned. The omission of two particularly obvious topics was noticeable, however.

In the section on anti-Semitism in the USA, the methods of fascist agitators were mentioned, and examples of anti-Semitic statements by representatives of the upper classes, industrial workers and children,

derived from 'participant interviews', were presented. What was omitted was the question of the characteristics, causes and significance of the 'social anti-Semitism' typical in the United States: unofficial but unquestionably valid and unavoidable regulations such as the exclusion of Jews from certain clubs, hotels or student organizations; or the percentage of positions given to Jews at most of the important universities or in a series of professions. Elsewhere, in his lecture at the Psychiatric Symposium on Anti-Semitism in San Francisco, Horkheimer had claimed that social anti-Semitism was much worse in the USA than in Europe, leading one to suppose that, in spite of the obvious differences between the USA and the Third Reich, the difference between their psychological bases was dangerously small.

Horkheimer apparently did not dare to risk the consequences of openly stating this claim and the theoretical ideas he and Adorno had developed. If only a minority of the Germans had been anti-Semitic (as the report emphasized), if latent, smouldering anti-Semitism formed part of Western civilization, if the anti-Semitic minority in Germany had been able, within a few years, to push forward anti-Semitism to the stage of industrialized mass murder, must it not be feared that in the USA with its far more advanced capitalist structures, which had not been called into question by any socialist labour movement, with its much more all-encompassing and frustrating culture industry, with its more pronounced ethnocentrism and with its history marked by open violence far more extensive and severe anti-Semitic potential might already have become capable of suddenly turning into open, violent anti-Semitism, under far less critical political and economic conditions than in Germany? And how was the failure of the agitators on the west coast to be interpreted in view of these considerations? What was the status of anti-Semitism in comparison with discrimination against the blacks and the policy of wiping out the American Indians and confining them to reservations? What were the peculiarities of the variety of civilization found in the United States, largely 'freed' from European tradition? These were questions which must have been obvious in any discussion of the American scene, but which, perhaps partly out of courtesy for the host country and the interests of the Institute's sponsors, and partly because of the provisional nature of the report, were ignored.

The other obvious gap was the omission of the topic of 'Jewish psychology' that is, the problem of Jewish character traits which, no matter how explainable and excusable in terms of the role forced upon the Jews by persecution and the diaspora, were indeed observable in reality; and also the particular problem of the psychic mechanisms set in motion in Jews by the psychology of the anti-Semites.

At the very beginning of his work on the anti-Semitism project, Horkheimer had asked Pollock for a list of all psychological research dealing with the psychology of Jews and of anti-Semites. When a paper

by Massing took the view that totalitarian anti-Semitism had nothing to do with the Jews, while a paper by Gurland presented a series of distinguishing features of Jewish thought and behaviour which would have had catastrophic consequences if published, this reinforced Horkheimer's conviction that what was needed was research into the 'interaction of both Jewish psychology and Antisemitism with Capitalism as a whole'.<sup>243</sup> One aspect of this topic reappeared in Adorno when he took the view, on looking through the interviews for the project dealing with workers (see p. 367), that not all accusations against the Jews were deluded; rather, some of them had a basis in particular Jewish traits which were either genuine grounds for complaint or at least liable to provoke hostile reactions. He suggested that they produce, as a complement to the handbook of the techniques of fascist agitators, another handbook 'which lists these traits, explains them and contains suggestions how to overcome them'.<sup>244</sup>

But the topic never became part of the Institute's programme, perhaps partly out of consideration for the sensitivity of most Jews towards this topic, and partly to avoid exposing the Institute to the accusation that it was turning the problem of anti-Semitism into a Jewish problem. Another aspect of the 'psychology of the Jews', hinted at by Adorno in notes he wrote on the drafting of the report, also failed to become an item in the programme: the Jews' stereotyped perception of the situation confronting them, which made it more difficult for them to find an appropriate reaction, or prevented them from doing so altogether.

The usual practice of the Institute, self-censorship viewed as a matter of strategy, continued. Horkheimer and Adorno, for example, suggested replacing expressions such as 'Marxism', 'socialization' and 'means of production' with others such as 'socialism', 'nationalization' and 'industrial apparatus' in the copy of a paper which was to be presented to the AJC. This was already a softening of the suggestion made by the New York office to omit completely a paragraph intended to make it clear that fascist propaganda was not combating Marxist theory at all but merely a phantom it had dreamt up. 'And if they still have reservations even after these changes have been made,' Adorno wrote to the secretary in New York in connection with the suggestions which had been made, 'let them go ahead and cut: we don't want to bear the responsibility.'<sup>245</sup>

When the AJC finally decided to finance the continuation of the project to a further stage, and to set up a Scientific Department with Horkheimer as its director, Horkheimer went to New York at the end of October 1944 and remained there for several months. He established himself in the AJC's headquarters, with a view of the Empire State Building, and built up the Scientific Department there. Its task was 'to investigate the extent and the causes of antisemitism in the United States, to develop testing methods by which the effectiveness of current techniques of combatting antisemitism may be evaluated and to

integrate eventually its theoretical research with the practical program of the American Jewish Committee'. 246

The gap caused by Horkheimer's absence, and the continuation of the work of the Berkeley group, among others, were eased by a grant lasting from the spring of 1944 to May 1945 for a second project, with which the New York office became a centre for empirical research after all. An additional source of finance, the Jewish Labor Committee, was found for the topic 'labour and anti-Semitism', which on Horkheimer's initiative had been reduced in size to become part of the analysis of social groups. Gurland, who had a friend in the Jewish Labor Committee, had established contact with it in December 1943. Mr Sherman, the Jewish Labor Committee's field director, was very interested in the Institute's project, Gurland reported. Sherman was convinced that anti-Semitism was constantly on the increase among industrial workers, and it was only because of a lack of staff that a plan 'along the lines of our "workers' interviews" program' had not been carried out.247

Sherman's interest grew when Pollock told him during a meeting 'that we would not be interested in a purely statistical survey or a kind of super-poll, but only in a study using the quantitative and qualitative methods developed in our West Coast laboratory under Horkheimer's direction'. 'Sherman seemed to have been very much impressed by our insisting that the work of interviewing must be done by people who know the interviewees and whom the interviewees trust and not by field workers unknown to them. The functions of our two or three field workers would be to organize and instruct the interviewers on the strength of contacts made available by the Jewish Labor Committee and other Labor groups.'248

Research for the 'Project on Anti-Semitism and Labor' lasted from June to November 1944. It was carried out in various industrial centres of the United States (New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and San Francisco), and used the 'participant interview' technique mentioned by Pollock. Two hundred and seventy workers who had memorized a catalogue of fourteen open questions (for example, 'Do you remember having any particular experiences with Jewish people?', 'How do you distinguish a Jew from another person?', 'What do you think about the Detroit riots?', 'Do you go to church?') established their colleagues' attitudes to Jews and anti-Semitism in everyday situations, and recorded the results in notes made afterwards. The combination of the similarity of the questions memorized and the openness of everyday conversational situations was intended to allow both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the resulting material. 'This is a pioneer experiment in social research,' the instruction sheet for the interviewing workers read. 'We want to know what working people honestly are thinking about the whole "Jewish question" and why they feel that way. Polls will not tell us. Interviews won't either. Friendly conversations will.'

In this way, 566 sets of interview records were obtained. They were analysed for the most part on a qualitative basis. The various parts of the four-volume final report, almost 1500 typewritten pages long, *Anti-Semitism among American Labor*, 249 were written by Gurland, Massing, Lowenthal and Pollock, taking account of numerous suggestions and an extensive memorandum from Adorno. 'My feeling is that the Labour Project is only worth carrying out if we do not merely try to make it match the usual projects of this sort, but instead use its wealth of insights to bring out our own position, not allowing ourselves to be terrorized by the fear of theory others suffer from,' Adorno wrote to Horkheimer, indicating the great wealth of material which had been gathered, with which theoretical considerations could certainly be linked.<sup>250</sup> Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research and Herta Herzog assisted with the quantitative analysis in the usual way.

Against the expectations of the committee which had commissioned the study, its subject, as the introduction emphasized, was 'the nature, not the extent of antisemitism among the masses of American workers'. If the results were taken as representative, however, they confirmed what had prompted the Jewish Labor Committee to undertake the research: anti-Semitism was widely disseminated among workers, and a further increase in it was to be expected.

Of those interviewed, 30.8 per cent were classed as 'actively hostile to Jews', 38.5 per cent as rejecting them, but without assenting to consistent discrimination, and 30.5 per cent as 'friendly to Jews'. In a lecture on 'Prejudice and the Social Classes' given in March 1945 at Columbia University as part of an Institute lecture series on 'The Aftermath of National Socialism', Pollock summed up:

The image of the Jew seems to be essentially the same among the great majority of our sample. While they behave differently, their critique, resentment, hostility and hatred are directed at the phantom Jew. Most workers seem to see the Jew as a cheating storekeeper, a merciless landlord or rental agent, an unscrupulous pawn-broker, or an instalment salesman and insurance collector who will take away the collateral or let the insurance lapse at the first delinquency. To this is added the idea that the Jews own all business and that at least most Jews are in business. All this is so because the Jews are money-crazy, selfish, grabby, take advantage of others, cheat, chisel, lie, are ruthless, unscrupulous, and so on. Most workers plainly refuse to acknowledge the existence of a large group of Jewish workers. Either there are no Jewish workers, or they don't work, and merely pretend to be workers. In addition Jewish workers are accused of escaping hard work, passing the buck, catering to the bosses, doing everything for individual advancement, doing nothing for their fellow-workers. Finally they

are reproached with displaying superior attitudes, having bad manners, knowing everything better, being ambitious and arrogant. All the war-time accusations . . . have been found in our sample . . . The curious exception is that our interviewers met practically no worker who blamed the Jews for being mainly radicals and communists.

To reach an accurate assessment of results such as these and of possible counter-measures, it seemed to be necessary to distinguish between working-class anti-Semitism and middle-class anti-Semitism, as Adorno, in particular, emphasized in his suggestions for the report on the labour project. Might it not be the case that genuine experiences played a fundamentally larger part in the negative attitudes taken by workers towards Jews than was so for social classes higher up the scale? Must some account not be taken of the fact that workers, in their statements and behaviour, were less liable to put pseudo-democratic restrictions on themselves than members of the middle and upper classes? This might lead one to suppose that there was less covert anti-Semitism among the workers than in other classes, and that the anti-Semitic attitudes were less irrational among them and would be more easy to combat, through educational measures offering economic and political information, than was the case for the other classes.

Considerations such as these never extended beyond the hypothetical stage. Further work on the labour project later on consisted only of the Institute's directors commissioning Lazarsfeld to produce a publishable version of the report, while Adorno tried to round the undertaking off with a series of detailed memoranda. Adorno, Marcuse and others at the Institute agreed, however, that the version produced under Lazarsfeld's supervision did not meet the Institute's standards, because it emphasized the quantitative sections while neglecting the qualitative ones, and because of its inadequate integration of quantitative and qualitative analysis. As in the case of the study of the working class in Weimar Germany, therefore, the research was not published.

The Institute was only a vestige of what it had once been, and in taking on the labour project it had overextended itself. As Gurland, Massing, Pollock and Lowenthal were busy with the study on workers in the time left over from their part-time work in Washington, Horkheimer was, to begin with, left fairly helpless in his office in the AJC building in New York. He was dazed by the bustle there, trying laboriously to put together a staff, and desperately thinking out a programme of work which would satisfy both the expectation that there would be visible activity and short-term results and his own need for long-term theoretical work. He had arrived in New York at the end of October 1944, and hoped to be able to advance the project sufficiently by the end of the summer for Adorno and him to be able to devote

themselves mostly to continuing their major theoretical work afterwards. 'My health is not bad,' Horkheimer wrote to Adorno during the second month of his stay in New York,

but I now have to summon all my energies to stand the bustling days and nights during which I can't formulate a single rational thought . . . My plan . . . is as follows. I need a couple of assistants who can initiate research in the style customary here as quickly as possible: intensive testing of radio programmes which are directly or indirectly arranged by the Committee, testing the more drastic propaganda materials which are used by other organizations and which the Committee considers inappropriate. In addition, interviews in regional and social groups before and after the application of single or combined propaganda methods proposed by the Committee. Once this sort of research is operating, I am hoping that an atmosphere suitable for preparing our own long-term studies of principles will develop. Another reason for this project is the fact that all the Institute's staff here will be fully occupied with the study on workers till at least the end of January. There is therefore absolutely no point in starting any work in which the Institute is to be involved before that. Since Lewin's [the psychologist Kurt Lewin's] people are already developing feverish activity, I don't want to stand before the Committee now with empty hands. The position is complicated by the fact that there are simply no competent experts in testing on the market. My plan is therefore not an easy one to carry out. 251

Adorno gave Horkheimer tireless and enthusiastic encouragement through all of this. From the west coast, he sent him letters, memoranda and notes containing a wealth of ideas, suggestions and expressions of friendly sympathy. He could appreciate his situation well, he wrote to Horkheimer on reading his report,

particularly since my own experiences *du côté de chez* Lazarsfeld show certain analogies. The worst thing is that in that sort of enterprise you don't basically know what you're doing there or what is expected of you. This is to a certain extent the practical expression of the theoretical elimination of all meaning: the enterprise in which we are only able, ultimately, to see ourselves as a means towards the end of scientific discovery, even in connection with 'projects', is for these people more or less an end in itself, and basically we are no more capable of understanding them than they are of understanding us. 252

He suggested to Horkheimer people who might carry out the testing of radio programmes, and took the view: 'My feeling is that the Berkeley

research is gathering momentum well. But, like everything here, it needs a certain amount of time to get going. Don't let yourself feel too disappointed if nothing very concrete comes out in New York in the first few months; that is part of the system, and everything will crystallize soon enough.' He asked whether his long memorandum on the final version of the labour project had arrived, and thanked Horkheimer for sending the 'horrible' book by Horney, which described central doctrines of psychoanalysis, such as the theory of wish fulfilment, as 'working hypotheses'. He suggested resuming publication of the journal with Alcan in Paris, and publishing the *Philosophical Fragments* with him (in August 1944 the Allies had liberated France, and at the end of September British and United States troops reached the German border).

In February 1945 Adorno made the same gesture to Horkheimer which the two of them had made to Pollock the year before: on his fiftieth birthday, he presented him with a book dedicated to him which was full of his 'own' work *Minima Moralia* with the handwritten note: 'Fifty aphorisms for the fiftieth birthday of Max Horkheimer, Los Angeles New York, 14 February 1945'. These later formed the first part of *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, the second part of which Horkheimer was given as a Christmas present in 1945, with the dedication 'For Max: for the journey back'. The third part was written in 1946 and 1947.

At the end of October Horkheimer had hardly arrived in New York Adorno already had important news for him.

As you may remember, I mentioned a new idea to you which I was brooding over. It is a matter of identifying potential and actual anti-Semites purely by means of *indirect* indications, i.e. without any questions about Jews or about things which have obvious immediate connections with anti-Semitism, such as hostility towards blacks, political fascism, etc. The 'projective items' in the old Berkeley questionnaire already represented a start in this direction. I would like to go considerably beyond that, and produce a 'non-Jewish' questionnaire capable of giving statistically reliable information on anti-Semitism. I don't need to mention its advantages to you in detail. The problem is, of course, to find indirect indications which provide not merely necessary, but also sufficient, conditions for anti-Semitism, i.e. ones for which such a high correlation with present anti-Semitism exists that any possible differences can be disregarded. I picture the method as follows: in a *single* session, two questionnaires could be distributed in succession, first the non-Jewish one, and then one with questions relating to Jews, ethnocentrism, etc., but including other questions as well, so that even here the real point of the research is not immediately apparent. The responses of each participant on the two questionnaires would then be compared, and the indirect questions

in which the highest correlation with anti-Semitism or non-anti-Semitism appears would be gradually filtered out, so that a highly reliable indirect research tool would be produced. 253

The Berkeley group had been very interested, and said that they had already begun to work in this direction for themselves`always a good sign'.

Horkheimer was very enthusiastic, and eager to see the draft questionnaires soon and to form groups similar to the Berkeley group in New York and Chicago as soon as possible. These new groups were to work with the new questionnaires and the individual testing methods which had been tried out at Berkeley, and to carry out research parallel to the Berkeley group on a broad scale.

In the middle of December he received the bundle of papers with the title `F-scale' from Adorno, with documents from Berkeley on the new questionnaire. This was all initial material for the questionnaire. The questions suggested were partly still to be reformulated and put in a form which was comprehensible and psychologically suitable for those being questioned. Adorno himself had worked out eighty to a hundred questions, a number of which he had `distilled out of the "Elements of Anti-Semitism" by a kind of translation process'.<sup>254</sup> The extensive, unfinished material on the questionnaire discouraged Horkheimer. He was afraid, he wrote to Adorno, that

the questionnaire, which we wanted to keep short and quite simple, is becoming far too complex and sophisticated again to be able to be used in any sort of group. Developments here in the Committee largely depend on us being able to use a single questionnaire to carry out samples in socially significant groups in various cities. For the moment, this is one of our major projects, for which we will certainly be given respectable budgets.<sup>255</sup>

Adorno tried to calm his fears about the large number of questions. Only some of the questions would be included in the final questionnaire. Which of the questions were generally applicable, and which would only be used selectively for specific groups, still had to be tested. Otherwise, in `the indirect analysis itself, which had appeared as an entirely new idea, it would *not* be possible to make do with a very short questionnaire, as in the Labour Study'. There would not be sufficient material to provide the `statistically sound conclusions' which were the point of the exercise for them.

I am quite of your opinion, that precisely this research, as soon as it has been carried out on a larger scale in other places, must provide our `counterstroke' against Lewin's stuff. But that is only possible if the idea of `indirect measurement' really comes out so

convincingly and in such a well-substantiated way that it gains acceptance and is not, according to local custom, seen as 'hypothesis formation'. 256

In producing the final formulations of the questions, the Berkeley group took as its guide the kind of sentences appearing every day in radio broadcasts, newspapers and discussions. Looking back on his academic experiences in America, Adorno later wrote:

In Berkeley, we then developed the F-scale with a freedom which differed considerably from the idea of a pedantic science which has to justify each of its steps. The reason for this was probably what, over there, might have been termed the 'psychoanalytic background' of the four of us who were leading the project, particularly our familiarity with the method of free association. I emphasize this because a work like the *Authoritarian Personality* [the book in which the Berkeley group later published its findings], which has been accused of many things, but whose familiarity with American materials and American procedures has never been denied, was produced in a manner which does not correspond at all to the usual image of positivism in social science . . . We spent hours waiting for ideas to occur to us, not just for entire dimensions, 'variables' and syndromes, but also for individual items for the questionnaire. The less their relation to the main topic was visible, the prouder we were of them, while we expected for theoretical reasons to find correlations between ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism and reactionary views in the political and economic sphere. We then checked these items in constant 'pre-tests', using these both to restrict the questionnaire to a reasonable size, which was technically necessary, and to exclude those items which proved not to be sufficiently selective.257

From the beginning, Adorno put great emphasis in his elaboration of the F-scale on the ambivalent relation between conservatism and rebelliousness, bearing in mind Horkheimer's frequent reminders that 'the immediate value' of the Berkeley project for the Committee lay 'in evidence of a connection between anti-Semitism, fascism and the destructive character', in 'experimental proof of the threat that anti-Semitism poses to democratic civilization'.258 'To translate this question into "operative terms"', he wrote to Horkheimer,

I have placed the distinction between unconscious and rationalized or pre-conscious motivations in the foreground. My somewhat barbaric thesis is that 'destructive', rebellious impulses are actually unconscious ones, and that conservatism and conventionality are their rationalization. The best procedure seems to me to be to

think up pairs of questions, each referring to the same complex, but in its unconscious and rationalized forms respectively, e.g., on the one hand, something to do with the recognition of authoritarian powers such as the constitution or the family, and, on the other, something to do with 'self-help', etc. My prediction would be that each answer would contradict the other, i.e. that people who on the 'rational' level give conservative answers would give aggressive and destructive ones on the indirect level. I have asked Mrs B. [Else Frenkel-Brunswik] to separate all the questions into 'irrational' and 'rationalized' categories and to arrange them in pairs where possible. Of course, the pairs would not appear consecutively in the questionnaire. 259

Adorno insisted that there should be a distinction between 'conservative' and 'pseudo-conservative', as against the Berkeley people, who, according to him, tended simply to identify anti-Semites with conservatives 'especially Levinson, who has the black and white ideas of a progressive'.<sup>260</sup> But he was certainly pushing against an open door with the Berkeley staff here. By 'conservative' they did not mean people of the sort defended by Adorno, such as members of the ruling class in England, but conservatives in the American sense: those who supported unrestricted free competition even in monopoly-capitalist conditions, who ascribed the existence of poverty and failure to personal shortcomings, and who wanted a state which would only intervene to help those who were successful. The significance of Adorno's distinction between conservatism and pseudo-conservatism lay in the fact that he was attempting to give the political and economic concept of conservatism some psychological depth.

The category of rebelliousness, which belonged to the tradition of Institute studies, reappeared in Adorno's ideas in connection with the F-scale. Just as Fromm had distinguished in *Studies on Authority and the Family* between the rebel and the revolutionary, i.e. between the pseudo-revolutionary and the genuine revolutionary, so Adorno was distinguishing between the pseudo-conservative and the genuine conservative.

In general, it seemed that older Institute ideas, which had been central to the *Studies on Authority and the Family* and to the research on the working class in Weimar Germany, and which one might have expected to be taken over and developed further for the anti-Semitism project, only gradually regained their significance. It had already been the case in the research on the working class that questions were included in the questionnaires which, in relation to a sample with distinct party links, could be expected to produce answers reflecting the views of the party and current commentaries in the party newspapers rather than the personal opinions of those being questioned. At the same time, questions without any clear relation to the political sphere, and which

did not touch on any modes of behaviour clearly fixed by party affiliation, had also been included; these had therefore been expected to provide information on individual personality structure. In Fromm's introduction to the questionnaire section of the *Studies on Authority and the Family*, the primary methodological goal of the research was stated to have been 'to raise and formulate questions based on a psychological theory and to be pursued with experimental methods from which answers can be expected which will allow us to draw conclusions about the unconscious desires and thus about the instinctual structure of the person asked'. 261

The Institute's study on the working class in Weimar Germany proved in retrospect to have been an attempt to answer the question of how firmly the socialist views taken by the working class were anchored in instinctual structure, and how far the workers could be relied upon to stand by their left-wing views in crisis situations. The Berkeley group's research directed itself more and more clearly towards a moderated one might almost say, more modest variation on the same problem, namely the question of how firmly the democratic views of people in the United States were anchored in individual personality structure, and how far they could be relied on to stand by their democratic views in crisis situations.

The seductiveness of referring to social prejudices if propaganda effects could be achieved was shown by an enthusiastic communication from Adorno, which was received with equal enthusiasm by Horkheimer:

As to the groups, a large number, many more than originally planned, are being considered. Sanford thinks this is possible without any difficulties with regard to the budget. The plan relates among other things to . . . business organizations and the technical and bureaucratic class, which is the real key group for fascism. Sanford also suggested doing a study on criminals and prison officers, and I think it's a splendid idea. Research would be able here to transform itself *directly* into propaganda, i.e. if it could be reliably established that a particularly high percentage of criminals were extreme anti-Semites, the result would as such already be propaganda. I would also like to try to examine psychopaths in mental hospitals. 262

These plans were short-sighted, particularly when one thinks of Horkheimer's note on 'A Theory of Crime' in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* where the 'weaker, more delicate self' of criminals was discussed, 263 and when one thinks of the ambivalent role played by the 'self' in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a manifestation of both emancipation from nature and self-denying hardening against nature. In addition, if the evidence they hoped for were to be provided, it would be possible to dismiss anti-Semitism easily as something that was not a problem for

the average citizen, for the 'conforming anti-social person', but only for deviant anti-social people who were frowned upon anyway. (Only two special groups were later examined: prisoners and psychiatric patients. It was in fact shown that, in a sample of 110 prisoners in San Quentin, ethnocentrism and political and economic conservatism, although not especially anti-Semitism, were clearly more marked than in other groups, and unprejudiced subjects appeared less frequently than in other groups. But this conclusion was not particularly emphasized or exploited for propaganda purposes.)

On the other hand, in a critical commentary on an article by Frenkel-Brunswik on 'The Anti-Semitic Personality', based on a lecture given at the Psychiatric Symposium in San Francisco (see p. 358 above), Adorno emphasized:

It is an illusion to which we easily fall [*sic*] that society people because of their good manners are free of Antisemitism. This did not even hold good in Europe. It is even less true here. We have the strongest reason to believe that the upper class is violently antisemitic. I happened to find this corroboration during my last trip to the East Coast. 264

Taking these remarks on the top layer of society and on criminals and psychopaths together, it can be seen that they demonstrate a complex web of expectations in which it is remarkable how little the suppositions and hypotheses involved were drawn from any theory, and how much was expected from personal empirical research.

Of course, their inner sensitivity to problems was much greater than appeared in the later publications, and it was possible for them to see fundamental difficulties without being able to take account of them consistently when concrete results were to be achieved. Some of Adorno's reservations about Frenkel-Brunswik's article on the anti-Semitic personality showed this very clearly. He declared his scepticism with regard to Frenkel-Brunswik's diagnoses of both the anti-Semitic and the non-anti-Semitic personality. Psychoanalysis led one into condemning the object of the study whichever result appeared. 'Not only aggressiveness is bad but also kindness, as a symptom of compensated aggressiveness, etc. I should advise great attention to this danger since it might affect any publication in a way which might be politically contrary to our aims.' He showed the same scepticism towards her assessment of non-anti-Semites.

The description of the antisemitic and non-antisemitic girls appears to me somewhat stereotyped itself . . . Since the thinking in stereotypes is, according to our theory, one of the main characteristics of the fascist mentality, we should avoid everything that reminds of [*sic*] that way of thinking, even if the accents are the

opposite of the antisemitic ones. Incidentally, the ideal of 'achievement' which plays so vast a role in the psychological household of the non-antisemitic girls seems to me as indicative of dangerous conformism as any of the traits you pointed out with regard to the high Antisemites. In other words, I doubt whether the difference of opinion can be translated into ultimate differences of personality structures. This, however, is a heretic statement meant only for ourselves and decidedly off the record. 265

The Berkeley project was the only uninterrupted link between the first and second phases of the anti-Semitism project, and the only continuously maintained long-term study. In December 1944, when the rump of the Institute in New York was still busy analysing the study on workers and the outlines of the continuation of the anti-Semitism project were still quite unclear, Horkheimer wrote to Adorno: 'As far as the Institute is concerned, I would prefer to be commissioned by the Committee to extend the long manuscript of the first project the four-volume report on the first year of the project, *Studies in Anti-Semitism*' into a textbook on anti-Semitism the size of Myrdal's work on the blacks. A great many material and tactical problems would thereby be solved.'<sup>266</sup> This showed the need which was being felt to produce a publishable consensus concerning the overall structure of the various individual projects and thought processes. It was a need for a text which would correspond to Adorno's and Horkheimer's image of the Institute, which stressed theory, while at the same time providing evidence, through the text's educational and enlightening nature, of the Institute's solidarity with the war effort and with the problem of coping with the post-war challenges facing a country that was fighting fascism. But the real theoretical work would only be continued afterwards.

As we have very few staff, some things will unavoidably turn out not to be entirely to your taste, nor to mine. But in the end, the whole thing is not really our main job, and next summer at the latest the whole project period should be finished, if possible. We will have to get a move on if anything concrete (in every sense) is to come out of it.<sup>267</sup>

It was in the spring of 1945, when the study on workers was almost finished, that the final programme for the continuation of the anti-Semitism project was decided on. Suggestions for it had come from, among others, Adorno and members of the advisory board, of which Margaret Mead, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Robert K. Merton and Rudolph M. Loewenstein were members. Adorno came to New York briefly to help Horkheimer out with a matter of this importance.

The programme designated nine sub-projects as well as continuing questionnaires and tests:

*The Berkeley Project on the Nature and Extent of Anti-Semitism.* [Tasks:] (a) To establish the character structure of persons susceptible to anti-Semitism; (b) To construct an instrument for testing persons as to their susceptibility to anti-Semitism.

*A Study of Anti-Semitism among Children.* [Task:] To discover particular childhood experiences and age periods which are significant for the development of later anti-Semitism.

*A Survey of Psychiatric Cases involving Race Hatred.* [Task:] To discover psychodynamic mechanisms involved in anti-Semitic motivation in Jews and non-Jews (and similar mechanisms of anti-Negro and anti-White feelings with corresponding subjects).

*A Study of Anxiety and Social Aggression among War Veterans.* [Tasks:] To study anxiety and social aggression among different groups of war veterans; to study the effect on war veterans of educational material produced by the American Jewish Committee.

*An Analysis of Anti-Semitic Caricature.* [Task:] To determine which drives and emotions anti-Semitic caricatures try to satisfy.

*An Art Project to Develop a Sketch of a Fascist Agitator.* [Task:] To create the visual character of an anti-Semitic agitator, which can be used for newspapers, posters, motion pictures, etc.

*The Preparation of a Pamphlet on Anti-Semitic Propaganda.* [Task:] To produce a pamphlet which will effectively debunk the methods of anti-Semitic propaganda.

*A Definitive Treatise on Anti-Semitism.* [Task:] To produce a scientific standard work on anti-Semitism.

*An Experimental Motion Picture for Measurement of Race Prejudice.* [Tasks:] (a) To produce a new instrument for the testing of susceptibility to race propaganda; (b) To measure existing prejudice; (c) To gain insight into projection mechanisms.

*Experiments in Surveys and Testing.* [Task:] To test with established methods attitudes towards the Jews and towards educational material produced by the American Jewish Committee. 268

The personnel consisted of Horkheimer (Director), Marie Jahoda (Associate for the East Coast), T.W. Adorno (Associate for the West Coast), Genevieve Knupfer and Samuel H. Flowerman, as members of the professional staff of the AJC Scientific Department, and a dozen or

so additional assistants as well. Only one of them, Leo Lowenthal, was a close associate of the Institute, while another, Paul Massing, was loosely associated with it. Siegfried Kracauer, designated as an adviser for the experimental film, was an old friend of the Institute, but one who was viewed with scorn rather than seen as an ally.

The most important of the additional assistants was Bruno Bettelheim, who was then director of the Sonia Shankman Orthogenetic School for the education and treatment of children with severe emotional disturbances, and Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Chicago. He was designated as director of the study of anti-Semitic caricatures, and as co-director of the study on war veterans, together with Edward Shils, who in the years following became a partner of Talcott Parsons in the construction of structural-functional theory. Born in Vienna, and the same age as Adorno, Bettelheim was a psychologist. In the spring of 1938, immediately after the Germans had annexed Austria, he had been arrested and sent to Dachau and Buchenwald, then the largest concentration camps for political prisoners. In 1939 he was unexpectedly released, and emigrated to the United States. He wrote down his memoirs at once, and then began to analyse his experiences, after hesitating for several weeks, fearing that his indignation would rob the analysis of its objectivity. When the defeat of National Socialism began to approach, and misuse of his findings by the Gestapo was hardly to be expected any more, he finally decided to publish them as 'The Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations'. The article's explosive quality was the way it showed how the SS brought about a personality change in prisoners by torturing and humiliating them until they finally conformed to camp existence and identified with the SS itself even in the case of political prisoners. Looking back, Bettelheim wrote in his *Surviving*:

Unfortunately, for well over a year, this paper was rejected by one after another of the psychiatric and psychoanalytic journals to which I sent it, thinking that they were most likely to be willing to print it. The reasons for rejection varied. Some editors objected because I had not kept written records while in the camps, implicitly revealing that they had not believed a word of what I had written about conditions in the camps. Others refused it because the data were not verifiable, or because the findings could not be replicated. A few came right out and said that both what I claimed were facts and my conclusions were mostly improbable exaggerations. Some added probably correctly, as judged by my experience when I tried talking about these matters to professional people that the article would be too unacceptable to their audiences. 269

It was Gordon W. Allport who finally published the paper in October 1943 as the leading article in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social*

*Psychology*, of which he was the editor. It was reprinted in the journal *Politics* and appeared as a pamphlet, attracting international attention. 270 At the end of the war, General Eisenhower made it compulsory reading for every officer in the United States military government in Germany.

Some years later, Bettelheim published an article on 'The Victim's Image of the Anti-Semite', based on his experiences with Jewish prisoners in the concentration camps.<sup>271</sup> This tackled the explosive problem of the way in which the Jews reacted to the effective psychological mechanisms of the anti-Semites by developing reality-distorting psychological mechanisms of their own, and endangered themselves by stereotyping their opponents as simultaneously all-powerful and contemptible, since they did not see where their real chances lay.

Horkheimer and Adorno would have liked to bring Bettelheim to New York in order to collaborate with him more closely, not simply because good sociologists and psychologists prepared to work with them were rare during the initial period of the extended project, as a result of the war, but also because they had a genuinely high regard for him. But the only collaboration which came about was that on the Chicago study of war veterans.

Lowenthal and Massing, among the additional associates from the Institute, were designated as assistants on the 'Treatise on Anti-Semitism', the main editor of which was to be Horkheimer, with assistance from MacIver and Allport as co-editors. The 'Treatise' and the pamphlet on anti-Semitic propaganda were the two sub-projects allotted to the Institute.

The rump of the Institute therefore seemed to be well supplied with research tasks suited to it, and the associates who were to work on the rest of the sub-projects had been arranged for example, Nathan Ackerman, a psychiatrist close to the AJC, was to join Marie Jahoda in the study of psychiatric cases involving anti-Semitism. It looked as if Horkheimer and Adorno would be able to keep the whole project going largely on a managerial basis and by injecting ideas, and would soon be able to turn their main attention to continuing their joint theoretical work.

5

## Gradual Return

Ambitions for the anti-Semitism Project  
 Yearning for Philosophical Work  
 No Urge to Build a Community of Theorists  
 Visits to a Colony

When Allied troops entered German territory in April 1945 and the German surrender followed on in May, Horkheimer and Adorno were completely immersed in their vast anti-Semitism project. Both of them had in the meantime become American citizens. The project was entirely oriented towards the United States: it was financed by an organization concerned with improving the situation of Jews living in the United States, and it gave the Horkheimer circle the chance to make a name for itself in American social studies by combining 'European ideas' with American research methods.

Adorno was shocked to find that the collapse of Nazism which he had so long been hoping for hardly affected him at all. He admitted to Horkheimer that his 'libido' had in the meantime become more involved 'with our own concerns than with the course of world history, which those concerns are supposed to be resisting'. However, in spite of the dark prospects for the future, 'on which we have always been in agreement', he saw at least some grounds for rejoicing:

first, because any breathing space is an occasion for happiness in a world which seems to be staggering from one catastrophe to the next, and, secondly, simply because Hitler and Himmler were names for an extreme of horror which, although it is possible elsewhere, has not yet appeared there in reality. This time things have turned out better than you thought, and perhaps they will turn out better than either of us think.

1

For his part, Horkheimer had some months before taken the view that the distinction being drawn mainly by left-wing German émigrés between Nazi Germans and Germans in general was a symptom of the unrestricted transition 'from the class phase to the racket phase of society'.

The meaning of this slogan is simply that the people are all nothing but herds of cattle, whose nature is to follow any leader; or, to put it in a more modern way, who can be made to do anything one wants as a result of officials' familiarity with psychological methods . . . Who can hold the Germans responsible for the Nazis? We know perfectly well that they would have gone over to Stalin or General Motors with exactly the same enthusiasm! 2

Did this mean that Horkheimer and his circle did not believe in the possibility of a new Germany? That they rejected any attempt to influence developments there? Had the Institute's interest in Germany ceased when it failed to find sponsors for any of the various research projects on Germany it had drafted? Did 'the theory' which Horkheimer and Adorno were working on as a continuation of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and which they saw as a dialectical critique of society's general tendencies in the epoch, make the USA a more interesting country for them than Germany? Now that Nazism had been defeated, were they beginning to have the feeling that they would be no more at home in a Europe that had been purged of its Jews than they were in the USA?

These are difficult questions to answer. With the end of the war, and in view of the favourable way in which collaboration between the Institute and the American Jewish Committee had developed, the end of an interim period seemed to have arrived, and the question of renewing the old community of theorists seemed to take on new relevance. But it was not mentioned openly by any of those concerned.

During the war, the Institute had been glad to point to the fact that its staff members Neumann, Marcuse and Kirchheimer were in government service in evidence of the Institute's participation in the USA's war effort. The three were still in touch with the Institute at the end of the war. The Washington 'delegates' sent Horkheimer a telegram on his fiftieth birthday saying they regretted not being able to come to New York. All three would certainly have been delighted to become members of staff at the Institute again, as before. For Neumann and Marcuse, parting from it had been painful enough. The parting had been less noticeable in Kirchheimer's case because he had never achieved the same status on the staff as Marcuse and Neumann, and it had been possible to ask him to accept part-time employment. But the deterrent effect was obviously a lasting one. The three former associates could not know that in the spring of 1945 Felix Weil had pledged to endow the Institute with a further \$100,000. For their part, the directors of the Institute were careful not to take the initiative and ask any of the three to work with them again. The anti-Semitism project had a time-limit; the new endowment, according to Horkheimer, had been arranged with a view to allowing 'the Institute not to involve itself in future in largescale operations, so that it can concentrate on the crucial tasks'. As

Felix Weil had agreed, this would be possible at the present time only `if the few people the Institute consists of are given comparative security for a number of years', 3 and if the Institute's New York office was eventually closed completely, with every new financial claim on the Institute being unconditionally avoided.

In the mid-1940s the words `Horkheimer circle' referred to four people, each of whom had a special relationship with Horkheimer: Pollock, a faithful partner in the `interior' and co-director of the Institute; Adorno, a faithful partner in work on theory; Lowenthal, a faithful assistant for a variety of purposes; and Weil, a loyal patron. The process of separation and estrangement from the others became irreversible.

Fromm continued to be dismissed as a revisionist, although his writings went on appearing alongside those of Horkheimer and Adorno in volumes edited by third parties. Marcuse remained constantly in touch with Horkheimer but was held at a distance. Neumann was occasionally asked for legal advice. Kirchheimer was consulted sporadically. All three of them remained in government service years after the end of the war, and eventually, during the 1950s, they all managed to find posts at American universities. Grossmann was given a small pension by the Institute. Contact with Wittfogel became more and more sporadic during the 1940s, and formally ended in 1947 when the University of Washington at Seattle and Columbia University became the sponsors of his China History Project, in place of the Institute of Social Research and the Institute of Pacific Relations. When an attempt was made in 1951 to prove that the Institute of Pacific Relations had had communist members of staff who had contributed to the defeat of Chiang Kai-Shek and the victory of the Chinese communists, Wittfogel was called before the McCarthy Committee, a sub-committee of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. An apostate communist, he made a sorry spectacle of himself as he denounced a former associate of the Institute of Social Research, Moses Finkelstein, as a communist.

The Institute did still continue to take a lively interest in Germany, though for the one who counted most, Horkheimer, it was an interest tinged with serious reservations. But even those who were less cautious had their hands tied because of the circumstances. Germany had been destroyed and divided up into zones of occupation. Political activity was banned, and publications were censored. Free travel was not possible, and even entering the country without an official commission was not allowed. Even leaving the United States was not possible without difficulties. Civilians were not issued with passports to begin with. Travel to Europe could only be undertaken in government service. In addition, there was no way of predicting how the Allies were going to deal with Germany. The denazification directives issued by the Western Allies were symptomatic of their attitude. They were mainly concerned with security matters, and contained hardly any information on what criteria were to be used when appointing new German officials. Officials of

the military government often took the easiest way out in an effort to stabilize the situation: they left organizations that were still working untouched, and let civil servants who were efficient workers remain at their posts. Where personnel changes did take place, well-known National Socialists were often only replaced by less well-known ones or by fellow travellers. 'For example, the ones we had at the top of the list of "economic war criminals" were soon back in the decisive, responsible positions in the German economy,' Marcuse recalled, looking back on his period with the Office of Strategic Services. 4

The ban on political activity had disastrous effects. The anti-fascist committees which had been formed in many cities during the Allied invasion were crippled by growing limitations on the scope of their activities. The conditions for continued Nazi and conservative influence on non-political areas, above all on the economy and on a great part of the administration, were therefore automatically favourable. Apart from that, the Allies never had any intention, even in the long term, of encouraging political émigrés to return. Almost the reverse was true. The procedure used in releasing prisoners of war showed this. The British released anti-fascist prisoners last. Only a minority of influential occupation officials took a radically democratic line, and the significance of this minority shrank very quickly. After only two years, German managers who had had every confidence, from the very start of the United States invasion, that American capital would be thrown into the work of reconstruction were vindicated. And Adorno was proved essentially right in what he wrote to Horkheimer on 9 May 1945, immediately after hearing the news that Germany had surrendered:

As usually happens in our disagreements over practical matters, we have both been proved right. My bourgeois thesis that Hitler could not last has been proved correct, although with a delay so long as to render it ironical. In other words: the productive forces of the economically more developed countries have proved stronger than the heights of technology and terror achieved by the 'latecomer': in accordance with the general historical tendency, the war has been won by industry against the military. By corollary, however, your thesis on the historical power of fascism is also true, except that this power has changed places, just as Europe became bourgeois after the fall of Napoleon . . . the young, enterprising bankrupt has sold his business to a stronger company.5

Even apart from circumstances beyond their control, which left private citizens like Horkheimer and his remaining associates no choice other than to wait, there were hardly any factors in favour of a hasty return to Germany, in view of the Horkheimer circle's general diagnosis of the period. In March 1945 the Institute organized a lecture series in the Sociology Department at Columbia University on 'The Aftermath

of National Socialism: Cultural Aspects of the Collapse of National Socialism'. Horkheimer lectured on 'Totalitarianism and the Crisis of European Culture', Adorno on 'The Fate of the Arts', Pollock on 'Prejudice and the Social Classes' and Lowenthal on 'The Aftermath of Totalitarian Terror'. The lectures showed that the Institute's scholarly interest in Germany and Europe continued, but they also clearly suggested that the crucial problems of Germany and Europe were best studied from the USA. The central thesis of Adorno's lecture, for example, was that Hitler was only the executor of a tendency which appeared long before him, and which would certainly continue after him: the deculturing of the middle classes, the neutralization of culture in general and of the arts in particular, and their replacement by the culture industry. 'It is this lack of experience of the imagery of real art, partly substituted and parodied by the ready-made stereotypes of the amusement industry, which is at least one of the formative elements of that cynicism that has finally transformed the Germans, Beethoven's people, into Hitler's own people.' 6

If, as Adorno emphasized in his lecture, the best one could really do as an intellectual was to give expression to negativity, to call the catastrophe by its name would the United States not then have been a better object for a critic of the culture industry to study?

On the other hand, however, it was the standardization and artificial conservation of *European* culture that Adorno was warning against. Being able to overturn a form of alienation which had been taken to its limits depended on there still being a remnant not yet encompassed by it; this philosophical motif was decisive for Adorno here as well. Adorno saw more hope of improvement in the post-Hitler period in the country which had experienced the worst form of fascism than he did in the USA.

The same people who always had blamed intellectual cliques for modernism in the arts, remained themselves a clique whose folk ideas proved to be even more distant from the life of the people than the most esoteric products of expressionism and surrealism. Paradoxical as it sounds, the Germans were more willing to fight Hitler's battles than to listen to the plays and operas of his lackeys. When the war catastrophe put an end to the remnants of public German musical life, it merely executed a judgement that was silently spoken since the Hitler gang had established its dictatorship over culture. 7

Should Adorno not therefore have been making efforts, as soon as possible after the war in Germany had ended, to contribute towards the living continuation of European culture, at least in the field of music?

Adorno was in fact the first in the Horkheimer circle to argue that the journal should be restarted. In January 1945 he had met a publisher

called Guggenheimer who had a branch office in Switzerland. Guggenheimer's view was that as soon as the war was over there would be tremendous interest in German-language publications written by the opponents of Nazism. Adorno delighted with this idea proposed that Guggenheimer should publish his book on Wagner, as well as a German edition of his *Composing for the Films*, written in collaboration with Hanns Eisler, and that he should also bring out the continuation of the Institute's journal. Adorno asked for Horkheimer's authorization to offer the same publisher their *Philosophical Fragments*.

Nothing came of all this. Horkheimer was far more strongly inclined to 'wait and see', and it seemed to be symbolic of this attitude when he told Adorno that he had commissioned an American editor, along with a freelance associate of the Institute, Norbert Gutermann, to produce an English book manuscript from his 'Society and Reason' lectures in February and March at Columbia, and from various other lectures.

The other person who pushed for the journal to be restarted was Marcuse. The anti-fascist intelligence service, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), was dissolved in September 1945, its most important departments simply being attached to other ministries. The department in which Marcuse worked was attached to the State Department. But the State Department's Research and Intelligence Division was under powerful attack for its alleged communist tendencies, and fresh financial support for it had been blocked for the time being. If it were to be dissolved, Marcuse wrote to Horkheimer, he would not regret it.

What I have been writing and collecting 'in my free time' over the past few years has turned out to be the initial work on a new book . . . It centres of course on the problem of the 'absent revolution'. You will recall the drafts on the metamorphosis of language, on the function of 'scientific management' and on the structure of regimented experience which I wrote in Santa Monica. Those drafts have been expanded into one part of the book. How would all this fit in with your plans? Do you think there will be time for other studies after or alongside the anti-Semitism project? Are you planning to carry on with the journal? 8

What Marcuse was asking indirectly was whether, once his Secret Service work was finished, he could once again become an associate of the Institute and Horkheimer; whether he might not be able to carry on with the working arrangement which had been inopportunately broken off in 1942. Horkheimer's indirectly negative answer to this indirect question was that everything on the west coast was continuing on a regular basis, he and Adorno were devoting almost the whole day to the anti-Semitism project, and even Pollock and Felix Weil were being called in to help with it in part. This was as much as to say that for the meantime there was no room for theoretical work, and certainly not for

collaborative theoretical work on a large scale. So far as the journal was concerned, Horkheimer's information also showed little enthusiasm. Lowenthal was involved in negotiations on the renewal of publication. If the costs were bearable, it would probably soon appear in Holland. However, there was a difficulty, in that it was forbidden to export printed matter to Germany. In other words: we are doing what we can this was the polite front used to conceal the dilatory manner in which the matter was being dealt with.

For his part, Horkheimer was interested in finding out about the situation in Frankfurt. When he heard that Marcuse was to travel to London privately to visit his mother there was no telling when he would be able to arrange an official trip to Europe he was astonished at Marcuse's audacity in simply taking off for Europe all of a sudden. Horkheimer asked Marcuse to discover whether it would be worthwhile to make an investigative trip to Frankfurt and set up at least a listening post there in the foreseeable future. 9

Marcuse for his part could not fulfil this request. Instead, after returning from his trip to London and Paris, he argued even more urgently than before that the journal should be continued. In London he had met Karl Mannheim and Richard Lowenthal, among others, and in Paris he had met Raymond Aron and Jean Wahl and some of the young existentialists and surrealists.

All of them asked me why in heaven's name the Zeitschrift does not come out again. It was so they said the only and the last publication which discussed the real problems on a really `avant-gardistic' level. The general disorientation and isolation now is so great that the need for the reissue of the Zeitschrift is greater than ever before. Even if the Zeitschrift could not be officially introduced into Germany, the public outside Germany is large enough and important enough to justify its appearance.10

He thought the best thing would be for it to include English, French and German articles, as it did in the 1930s. He suggested a special issue on Germany, beginning with analyses of the various political, economic and cultural programmes and guidelines from the major German political parties which were in circulation in Germany at the time. He would be able to put the material at their disposal.

However, after a meeting with Horkheimer at which it was agreed that each of them would write a draft for the theoretical orientation of the journal, Marcuse was the only one who actually produced a text at the beginning of 1947. Consisting of nearly a dozen pages of typescript, it sketched out his ideas on a theory of the current position, based on the post-war situation.

Nearly two years later, Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse that he had decided to write a draft, together with Adorno, in the same style as Marcuse's `thesis'. There was already a mass of material to work from.

'The difficulty lies in the fact that we do not want to restrict ourselves to political aspects. It should at the same time become a kind of philosophical programme.' 11 This philosophical programme was never produced, and republication of the journal, discussion of which had virtually ceased in the meantime, was never achieved.

There were two fundamental reasons for the dilatory way in which the question of republishing the journal was handled: the fear of exposing themselves to attack, and the fear of not being able to fill their own journal with articles agreeing with the views of the Horkheimer circle. When the Institute's journal ceased publication, it was not so much for financial reasons; it was really because Horkheimer and Adorno were not satisfied with the contributions. Marcuse's February 1947 draft must have shocked Adorno, and Horkheimer even more. Admittedly, it was an internal paper, intended to clarify their own views. But it discussed political matters so directly that it must have seemed to Horkheimer and Adorno, reading it, that turning it into publishable ideas would be virtually impossible. The thesis with which Marcuse began his draft read:

Following the military defeat of Hitler's fascism (which was a premature and isolated form of capitalist reorganization), the world is dividing itself into two blocs, one neo-fascist and one Soviet . . . Those states in which the old ruling class has survived the war economically and politically will, in the foreseeable future, become fascist, while the others will enter the Soviet bloc.

Neo-fascist and Soviet societies are economic and class enemies, and war between them is probable. Both, however, are anti-revolutionary and inimical to socialism in the essential forms of their rule . . . Under these circumstances, there is only one way for revolutionary theory to progress: it must take a ruthless and unequivocal stand against both systems, and stand up uncompromisingly for orthodox Marxist doctrine in opposition to both. 12

This global political diagnosis corresponded to Horkheimer's and Adorno's views. The plea for a defence of 'orthodox Marxist doctrine', and the uninhibited use of the words 'socialism', 'communism' and 'capitalism', however, was certain to displease the authors of the *Philosophical Fragments* in two ways: first, because in their view an uncompromising profession of belief in orthodox Marxism was equivalent to masochism; secondly, because they were convinced that the principal elements of a critique of society had in the meantime come to differ from those of Marxist doctrine.

Horkheimer had long since begun to avoid even the expression 'critical theory of society'. Anyone who wanted to avoid difficulties had good reason to do so in a country in which spotting 'un-American' thinking was increasingly becoming an important weapon in the struggle

for power between American politicians. The House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) had been set up by the House of Representatives during the 1930s as a temporary committee to expose fascist and other subversive activities, but it had been used from the very beginning by its first chairman, Republican Congressman Martin Dies, as a weapon against the Roosevelt administration and the New Deal Democrats. In 1945 it was given the status of permanent committee. Truman, who became President after Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945, tried to take the wind out of the Republicans' sails by introducing a Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, and various other measures. In March 1947 he first developed the so-called Truman Doctrine when he presented US economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey as serving to hold back communism in its striving for world domination. Thanks to British and American aid, the monarchists had defeated the communists in the Greek civil war. What Truman was now raising to the status of a doctrine was a continuation of the Western democracies' policy following the Second World War: toleration and even support for authoritarian regimes as bastions against communism. The Salazar dictatorship in Portugal and the Franco dictatorship in Spain had never ceased to benefit from toleration and support of this sort.

The hawks in both parties hated the supporters of the New Deal and radicals inside the United States, whom they successfully slandered as being fifth columnists for the Soviet Union. Attempts were even made to show in retrospect that these people had not shown sufficient distrust for communists during the Roosevelt period. Supporters of the Fair Deal (Truman's label for his programme of extending the New Deal's social policy achievements) hated the Soviet Union, which was questioning the worldwide implementation of the principles of 'the world's greatest democracy' (as the liberal, Robert E. Cushman, put it in 1948). They showed their readiness to fight the enemy by discriminating against critics of 'the American way of life' in their own country, dismissing them as communists. These two forms of hatred fused into an everescalating witch-hunt, which, although it did not lead to arrests, torture and death, did achieve character assassination, unemployment and impoverishment, and a poisoning of the atmosphere of political and social life.

In 1947 two friends of Horkheimer and Adorno, Hanns Eisler and Bertolt Brecht, were caught up in it. Both were victims of a typical principle of the witch-hunt: guilt by association. Hanns Eisler was summoned to appear before the HCUA because he was the brother of Gerhart Eisler, who had been denounced by two apostate communists, Louis Budenz, former editor of *The Daily Worker* and the real leader of the American Communist Party, and by his own sister, Ruth Fischer. In an open session from 24 to 26 September in Washington, Hanns Eisler stated that he had never been a member of the Communist Party and saw himself as a composer and musician; he was loyal to his brother,

however. It was not until March 1948, thanks to statements of support from famous musicians and intellectuals, that he was allowed to leave the United States on condition that he would never return. Brecht, a close friend of Hanns Eisler, had been under observation by the FBI since his denunciation by a German émigré. He was one of nineteen authors, directors and actors summoned to Washington to the HCUA 'Hearings on the Communist Infiltration of the Motion Picture Industry'. Many of the Americans summoned to the hearings appealed to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution their right to freedom of speech and opinion and this often led to their being indicted for contempt of Congress. Others used their right to refuse to testify because of possible self-incrimination. During his interrogation on 30 October 1947 Brecht, like Eisler, replied instead to the notorious question 'Are you, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?' that he had never belonged to the Communist Party and that he saw himself as a poet. (In exactly the same way, Horkheimer and Adorno, whom Brecht was always sneering about, saw themselves as philosophers.) Brecht's hearing ended without an indictment, but parts of it were broadcast on the radio the same evening. The interrogation of 'unfriendly witnesses' was, after all, intended to slander the persons concerned as communists or communist sympathizers and then hand them over to public opinion. Although McCarthy's name came to symbolize the period, his only originality lay in using this strategy in a particularly unscrupulous and effective way, and in exploiting it to the hilt to further his own political career. The day after the hearing, Brecht flew to Switzerland. He was refused a visa to the American zone in Germany.

Horkheimer and Adorno, as naturalized American citizens, were under no threat of deportation or internment in the way that Eisler or Brecht were. But their cautiousness was enhanced by events such as these. Thomas Mann founded a committee to support Hanns Eisler. Adorno, by contrast, resigned from his co-authorship of *Composing for the Films*, which was first published in the United States in 1947, on the grounds that he had no reason to become a martyr for a cause which was not his own as he stated in 1969 in the afterword to his own German edition of the book and because he and Eisler had been friends only as musicians and had avoided discussing politics.

A policy such as that drafted by Marcuse for the republication of the journal seemed to Horkheimer and Adorno not merely rash but also too traditional. In spite of their unorthodox content, Marcuse's remarks were in fact purely orthodox in their implications. He declared that the phenomenon of cultural identification necessitated a more extensive discussion of the problem of social 'glue' particularly in relation to the working class. He emphasized that the full burden of exploitation was falling more and more on fringe groups and foreigners, on 'outsiders' who were not incorporated into the working class, on the "unorganized", "unskilled workers", agricultural workers, transient

workers; minorities, colonial and semi-colonial groups; prisoners, etc.'. 13 He did make indirect statements that were fully in line with Horkheimer and Adorno's position for example, that the theory could not be linked to any anti-communist group but then he observed:

The Communist Parties are, and will remain, the sole anti-fascist power. Denunciation of them must be purely theoretical. Such denunciation is conscious of the fact that the realization of the theory is only possible through the Communist Parties, and requires the assistance of the Soviet Union. This awareness must be contained in each of its words. Further: in each of its words, the denunciation of neo-fascism and Social Democracy must outweigh denunciation of Communist policy. The bourgeois freedom of democracy is better than totalitarian regimentation, but it has literally been bought at the price of decades of prolonged exploitation and by the obstruction of socialist freedom. 14

Horkheimer and Adorno no longer held such views at all. In their eyes, a breathing-space in the course of historical development did not primarily mean prolonged exploitation and a delay in the arrival of socialism. Instead, it meant above all a chance for reflection and work on the theory. They were no longer able to see the theory, for the foreseeable future, as a progressive force; instead, they saw it at the very most as a force that could stimulate thought.

Marcuse criticized the two-phase theory which distinguished between socialism as the first stage and communism as the final stage, and put forward the view that a belief in the necessity of technical progress overlooked the fact that capitalism would always have the better technology and that the socialist countries' only chance of success lay in the experiment of abolishing class domination and making the leap into socialism. He then argued the case for a soviet republic, and welcomed anarchy, disintegration and catastrophe as the only means through which, in an act of revolutionary freedom, change would be achieved in the class structure of the productive apparatus and in human needs. Precisely this fusion of a motif corresponding to their own views a sudden improvement in human nature with the political concepts of the soviet republic and anarchy was bound to shock Horkheimer and Adorno. It made explicit a link which they wanted merely not to exclude. Against those who concluded from bad conditions that better ones were impossible, explicitly or implicitly referring to a pessimistic anthropology, Horkheimer and Adorno insisted that better conditions were possible. But they were not prepared either to designate or to recognize any political or social organization or grouping as embodying the possibility of improvement. They preferred to build on individuals.

It is hard to distinguish here between what stemmed from objective insight and what stemmed from a need to shift the discussion into areas

that were not immediately explosive. The need to expand and realize their range of ideas tended to camouflage the fact that a still central topic, which was particularly liable to produce shock and conflict, was being avoided. Not even *Minima Moralia* discussed this difficulty, although it contained a whole range of other reflections on their own weaknesses and apparently insoluble dilemmas. Marcuse visited Los Angeles in October 1947, but in the discussion of his draft apparently much was left unsaid. The 'orthodox Marxist' theoretician of the absent revolution and the authors of the *Philosophical Fragments* were no longer united even by a common concept of Critical Theory. The *Philosophical Fragments* left Marcuse at such a complete loss that, even after the published edition of it was sent to him in the summer of 1948, he did not feel that he was in any position to comment on it.

Marcuse's open defence of Marxist theory caused Horkheimer to become hesitant and cautious. And he reacted similarly to the behaviour of a pioneer of Critical Theory in Germany. From 19 to 21 September 1946 the proceedings of the Eighth Conference of German Sociologists the first to be held since the Weimar period took place in Frankfurt. In a letter to Horkheimer, Marcuse had described events in Germany since the end of the war as a 'ghost sonata', referring to Strindberg's play, and it was a ghost sonata which the sociologists performed at this conference. Leopold von Wiese, the doyen of German sociology during the Weimar period, had arranged a meeting at his home in Bad Godesberg in April 1946 at which the Gesellschaft für Soziologie (Sociology Association) was reconstituted, with himself as its president. The topic 'The Present Tasks of Sociology' had been agreed as the central theme for the conference. In his introductory address in Frankfurt, Wiese pilloried collective egoism and lust for power as being the great stupidities of the age. He saw the ideal future for sociology as lying in a 'secular Vatican': in a central structure in which the practice and theory of general administration were visibly united, there would stand, 'raised on a high stage, the granite tables of the general system of social processes, the details of which will from time to time be corrected'.<sup>15</sup> In Wiese's eyes, this vision would supersede outdated 'isms', among which he mentioned Marxism in particular. Wiese's programme, which today merely seems eccentric, was the sociotechnocratic counterpart to the most widely discussed programme circulating in Germany in 1945-6, Friedrich Meinecke's *The German Catastrophe*, the principal suggestion in which was that a Goethe Cultural Association should found local groups throughout the country.

There was only one person who sharply criticized Wiese's lecture, and he in fact intended to take his *Habilitation* degree with Wiese with a dissertation on 'Marxism and Sociology'. This was Heinz Maus, a non-émigré, who had studied with Horkheimer and Mannheim in 1932 and became an enthusiastic supporter of Horkheimer, sending him an article prepared as part of his dissertation on Schopenhauer in 1939. In

1939 the article was published under the title 'The Dream Hell of the Juste Milieu' 16 in a book commemorating the 150th anniversary of Schopenhauer's birth, and since that time Maus had been in correspondence with Horkheimer. In Frankfurt, Maus explicitly defended Marx's theory, which attempted to illuminate the process 'which we have wrongly come to call industrialization' (Horkheimer and his colleagues had in the meantime begun to commit this mistake as well); there was more class struggle today than ever. Then Maus referred to Horkheimer, who had written to him that one of the most urgent tasks of German sociology was a "sociology of terror", beginning with the transition to child education . . . and so on up to the transformation of the adult into a mere member of designated associations, without whose protection he is unemployed and without rights'.<sup>17</sup>

Horkheimer did not find out how closely Maus had linked his name with that of Marx and with class struggle. Maus simply reported to him how justified Horkheimer's fears concerning the Sociology Association conference had been. Maus's tireless efforts to have the works of the Horkheimer circle published in German he translated a whole series of them himself, including the *Eclipse of Reason* met with only limited success. He succeeded in publishing only two short extracts from *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Pollock's essay on state capitalism, and Horkheimer's 'Art and Mass Culture',<sup>18</sup> in *Umschau: Internationale Revue*, a journal published between 1946 and 1948 on which he worked as one of the editors. This lack of success was clearly due not so much to publishers' resistance to critical texts as to the strange division of labour between Maus, acting as an enthusiastic literary agent, and a hesitant Horkheimer. The publisher C.B. Mohr, who had brought out Adorno's *Kierkegaard* in 1933, accepted his *Philosophy of Modern Music* for publication in 1950 without even having seen the manuscript. Horkheimer, by contrast, mentioned in a letter to Adorno at the beginning of 1949: 'Rütten & Loening keep writing me letters offering to republish the Institute's publications series. I have not answered them yet, as I don't want to get involved in anything.'<sup>19</sup>

Horkheimer's own theoretical work was hardly progressing at all. Just as he had once mentioned his book on dialectics at every opportunity, he now constantly spoke of continuing his philosophical work now that he had finished the *Philosophical Fragments*. But its continuation never progressed beyond the stage of notes. After *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, he only produced occasional works during the 1940s, and these would barely have met even his own standards for leading articles in the journal. Among these occasional pieces were, for example, a lecture on the 'Sociological Background of the Psychoanalytic Approach', given at the Psychiatric Symposium on Anti-Semitism held in San Francisco in 1944; an obituary for Ernst Simmel, 'Ernst Simmel and Freudian Philosophy'; and an essay on 'Authoritarianism and the Family Today' (published in 1949 in the anthology *The Family: Its*

*Function and Destiny*) which concluded that the decay of the family was leading to the replacement of the father by the collective and to the production of totalitarian dispositions. 20 There was also an expanded version of a lecture on 'The Lessons of Fascism' which Horkheimer gave at an academic conference on 'Tensions That Cause Wars' organized by UNESCO in Paris in 1948.

Adorno had collaborated on most of these works. Adorno was also the one who on his own initiative continued their philosophical work in *Minima Moralia*. In the 'Dedication' to the book, which was first published in 1951 in Germany, he wrote:

The composition took place in a phase when, bowing to outward circumstances, we had to interrupt our work together. This book wishes to demonstrate gratitude and loyalty by refusing to acknowledge the interruption. It bears witness to a *dialogue intérieur*: there is not a motif in it that does not belong as much to Horkheimer as to him who found the time to formulate it.<sup>21</sup>

*Minima Moralia* represented a kind of aphoristic continuation of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, or its aphoristic section at least. There was no question of any change in his point of view, based on the expectation of a new Germany and on the revival of old hopes. Like Marcuse's February 1947 paper, *Minima Moralia* was written for Horkheimer as a contribution towards mutual comprehension of the current situation. It made it clear once again why Horkheimer and Adorno wanted to keep their distance from Marcuse, for objective and theoretical reasons apart from the financial ones. Marcuse spoke of liberation from exploitation and oppression, meaning the liberation of those who were exploited and oppressed. Adorno, when he spoke of emancipation, was thinking more of a form of emancipation suggested by his view of his own situation, an emancipation from fear, from violence, from the humiliation of conformism; he characterized a 'better condition' as one in which 'one can be different without fear'.<sup>22</sup> Marcuse was attempting to rescue orthodox Marxism by utopian methods; Adorno was attempting to justify the existence of the distanced, lonely critic of society. The 'existentialist' Marcuse was making himself into a spokesman of indignation about social injustice; Adorno, from a 'philosophy of life' standpoint, was making himself into an advocate for the non-conformist intellectual.

The variety of topics in the aphorisms showed that nothing was so small or extravagant, and nothing so large or difficult to comprehend, that an intellectual could and should not think about it. They led again and again into reflections about the radical modern intellectual (to use a formulation analogous to Adorno's reflections on 'radical modern music'). In the *Philosophy of Modern Music*, Adorno had said that the avant-garde composer always had to create his language for himself,

while at the same time tirelessly performing acrobatic stunts, namely recognizing the contingency and fragility of this language during the act of composition, in order to soften the pretensions of his self-created language and make them bearable. Adorno saw the paradoxical situation of the avant-garde thinker as being analogous to this. The fifth aphorism in *Minima Moralia* stated:

Sociability itself connives at injustice by pretending that in this chill world we can still talk to each other, and the casual, amiable remark contributes to perpetuating silence, in that the concessions made to the interlocutor debase him once more in the person of speaker . . . For the intellectual, inviolable isolation is now the only way of showing some measure of solidarity. All collaboration, all the human worth of social mixing and participation, merely masks a tacit acceptance of inhumanity.

However, as the 'Antithesis' in the sixth aphorism put it:

He who stands aloof runs the risk of believing himself better than others and misusing his critique of society as an ideology for his private interest . . . His own distance from business at large is a luxury which only that business confers. This is why the very movement of withdrawal bears features of what it negates. It is forced to develop a coldness indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois . . . Private existence, in striving to resemble one worthy of man, betrays the latter, since any resemblance is withdrawn from general realization, which yet more than ever before has need of independent thought.

Adorno saw the 'only responsible course' in this situation as being 'to deny oneself the ideological misuse of one's own existence, and for the rest to conduct oneself in private as modestly, unobtrusively and unpretentiously as is required, no longer by good upbringing, but by the shame of still having air to breathe, in hell'.<sup>23</sup> The responsible course lay, equally, in an attempt to find a method of presentation which would express one's own entanglement 'in this speed, crowding, density and still, on the other hand, contingency'.

*Minima Moralia*, Adorno's counterpart to Horkheimer's *Dawn*, confirmed that those who were left in the Horkheimer circle viewed themselves as a group of non-conformist intellectuals, as 'social non-conformists'<sup>24</sup> who were opposed to those who were 'conformingly anti-social' and who were addressing themselves to 'decent' (*anständig*) individuals (to use an expression Horkheimer and Adorno liked to employ in non-theoretical contexts). The renunciation on principle of any interdisciplinary analysis of society as a whole did not necessarily follow from this, since the significance of such an undertaking did not

depend on whether or not one felt oneself to be on the side of a revolutionary class.

The anti-Semitism project had at one time been seen as the saving of the Institute. This was before it turned into its central business, far beyond the ability of the rump of the Institute to cope with, and pushed everything else into the background, even for Horkheimer and Adorno. It now developed into an assortment of failures and successes which the two of them looked on with constantly changing feelings. Horkheimer had set the various sections of the project in motion by the middle of 1945 to the extent that he thought he could afford to return to Los Angeles and then only travel to New York occasionally, for brief visits. But he also hoped to be able to continue his philosophical work in Los Angeles together with Adorno, alongside work on the anti-Semitism project.

Yet Horkheimer's activities as an academic organizer met with increasing difficulties. In the autumn of 1945, Samuel Flowerman, a former psychologist and college lecturer who had previously been executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Committee in Newark, became a member of the AJC's Department of Scientific Research. After Horkheimer had left the directorship of the department in Flowerman's hands, conflicts over their areas of responsibility developed between them.

Horkheimer saw Marie Jahoda, who worked with Flowerman in New York, as an ally who, 'in the capacity of a liaison officer', would carefully maintain what he had tried to initiate as he put it in a letter to her. But Jahoda soon found herself being caught in conflicting loyalties. She told Horkheimer in a personal letter that she had a very high opinion of him as a philosopher, and knew of no one whose ideas on anti-Semitism were as fresh and penetrating as his; however, if she were to be asked in the near future, for example, by John Slawson, the AJC's vice-president, for her opinion of Horkheimer's film project, she would in honesty have to admit that 'the setting up of an actual large-scale experiment is not his sphere'. 25

This touched Horkheimer at two sensitive points: in his claim, as a theoretician, to be also a master of empirical research in an unconventional way; and in his claim, despite having passed the directorship of the Scientific Research Department to Flowerman, that he had not been reduced to the status of a chief research consultant, merely supplying ideas and suggestions, free of obligation, on the projects which were important to him. He reacted sharply:

Our difference in academic questions is as clear as the difference between Hegelian logic and 'an orderly working outfit' [in English in the German text] with its philosophical untidiness cleaned up. In the sphere of so-called 'research', such a contradiction might even be fruitful, in so far as you represent the research standpoint

with intelligence and integrity, while I, perhaps with no less intelligence and integrity, endeavour to give it meaning. But it is altogether impossible if you lecture me and at the same time take the situation one which has long since been lamented by those with more vision of the modern sociology assistant, who must restrict himself to his pseudo-exact paraphernalia if he does not want to be fired by his customers, and not merely eagerly assimilate it, but glorify it to yourself and to me as a piece of intellectual honesty, responsibility and incorruptibility. 26

A genuine resolution of the conflict between Los Angeles and New York, between an interest in large-scale, long-term and theory-oriented research and an interest in quick results and methodologically well-grounded research, was never achieved. Thanks to Lazarsfeld's mediation, Flowerman was later given responsibility for short-term research, with Horkheimer having responsibility for the long-term research. However, since the co-ordination of the long-term projects was also mainly carried on in New York, which Horkheimer only rarely visited, and since the publishers with whom the results of the completed projects later appeared were also in New York, the tense relationship between Horkheimer and Flowerman, and between Los Angeles and New York, continued to the end.

The anti-Semitism project dissolved into various sections, carried out for the most part separately and treated as monographs. The plan to produce a comprehensive work on anti-Semitism, which Horkheimer had hoped would be so fruitful for the Institute and which was to have linked the first and second phases of the project and the various sub-projects, was abandoned. The idea of a series of individual presentations took its place. Horkheimer's role as chief research consultant of the AJC came to an end in 1947. From then on, the concern was to publish the results and ensure that the role played by the Institute and its associates was given proper recognition.

In April 1948 Horkheimer boarded the *Queen Mary* for a one-month trip to Europe. He had been given a grant by the Rockefeller Foundation the very institution which, by his own standards, was investing the merest fraction of the surplus from the oldest and largest capitalist conglomerates in the USA in the corruption of intellectual activity and culture to take up a guest professorship at Frankfurt University. Officially, he was travelling as an American citizen, intending to contribute to the process of educating the Germans in democracy to 're-educating' the young in Germany and their teachers, a form of re-education which was no longer being carried out through censorship or bureaucracy but which nevertheless gave precedence, within Germany, to American citizens. Just as Horkheimer had gone to the USA in 1934 to test out the situation for himself, he now wanted to test out the situation in Europe, and in Frankfurt in particular. He wanted to

stake out property claims for the Institute, and also to make representations concerning his own private property in Germany and Switzerland (his parents had taken refuge from Nazism in Switzerland and had in the meantime died there). Marcuse had been trying for a considerable time, together with Neumann, to help Horkheimer to make a trip to Europe for official purposes, and Horkheimer wrote to Marcuse saying that he also wanted to see whether 'there are a few students and other intellectuals over there whom we could lastingly influence in our direction'. Finally, Horkheimer wanted to look for a place 'in which it would be possible to lead a bearable life on an extremely low income',<sup>27</sup> either in northern Italy or in the south of France, to concentrate on continuing his philosophical work.

The day he left for Europe, Horkheimer wrote to Adorno in Los Angeles, maintaining that Flowerman would do everything to rob the Institute of the fruits of its research, and that Adorno should try to prevent this and push the project forward. He concluded this section of his letter with a phrase characteristic of the two of them: 'If you will not succeed, I will know that there was no other chance and we will do more important things.'<sup>28</sup> For his own part, he was also travelling to Germany in the knowledge that the main task was to have left nothing undone in the effort to create ideal conditions for their philosophical work, to avoid the feeling that there was anything he had missed out. It was the old game: at the same time as he was holding out to himself the image of being able to work in isolation in a humble scholarly existence without an institute, without any contact with students, an audience or the system, he was trying to achieve as much institutional and establishment status and as much security, influence and recognition as possible.

Horkheimer wrote to the Adornos from Zurich in May that he had so far seen two countries, France and Switzerland. 'One can still imagine living in poverty here without having to rot away. Although nothing that happened here has passed without leaving its traces, and although the threat of fresh horrors is always present, our ideas about humaneness being able to etch itself into objectivity are surpassed by what we are immediately experiencing.'<sup>29</sup>

A few days later, he made his first visit to Frankfurt University. 'The rector, both deans, and others, all greeted me sweetly, slickly and with embarrassment, although honourably,' he reported to his wife. 'They are not yet sure whether to see me as a relatively influential visitor from America or as the brother of their victimsto think of whom means having a memory. They will have to plump for the latter.'<sup>30</sup>

This impression was probably accurate. In October 1946 the acting chairman of Frankfurt University's senate, Assistant Secretary Klingelhöfer, had, on behalf of the university, officially invited the Institute of Social Research to return to Frankfurt. A further invitation from the Mayor of Frankfurt, the Social Democrat Walter Kolb, had been enclosed with Klingelhöfer's letter. In his reply, Felix Weil enquired whether the Society for Social Research had been automatically re-entered in the

Register of Societies; whether ownership of the land on the site of the old Institute had been automatically restored to the Society; and whether the remnants of the Institute's library would be returned to it. These were things it was natural to expect, and Weil would have had every right to add more to the list. After all, everything which had been done, from the striking of the Society's name from the Register of Societies to the expatriation of Institute members, had all been illegal, and an automatic restoration of previous conditions, in so far as this lay in the power of the German administration and other institutions, would have been the normal thing to expect. But nothing of the sort had been done, even in the meantime. The university's invitation, in any case, could hardly have been intended sincerely. Klingelhöfer, who signed it, was the very person who in 1938 had signed the decree in which the Ministry of Culture ordered the Institute's books to be dispersed. The recommendation that the Institute should be asked to return had come from Professor Wilhelm Gerloff, mentioning the 'very considerable resources' which the Society for Social Research had at its disposal. In 1933 Gerloff, as rector, had signed the declaration dissociating the university from the Institute of Social Research.

It was Horkheimer himself, on his first visit to Frankfurt, who first pushed seriously for the Society for Social Research to be re-founded and for the Institute's rights to be renewed. He provided the stimulus for the formation of a committee to re-establish the Frankfurt Institute. While this did not exactly show arrogance, it must nevertheless have put to shame those who expressed outward regrets that more émigrés were not returning into the open arms they claimed Germany was holding out to them, but who at the same time needed to be pushed into making serious and acceptable offers to encourage them to return.

'They will have to plump for the latter' for his return as the brother of their victims, to think of whom meant having a memory Horkheimer had written to his wife in May 1948. Less than a month later, he wrote to her:

Denazification proceedings are going on at the moment against Rector Platzhoff. The chairman of the court has written to tell me that he had heard I was here, and asks me to come and see him and assist him with the matter. But I shall have to give serious consideration to the question whether I should appear as the only real prosecution witness and make an enemy of the university. There is honour but no advantage in such affairs. There is no shortage of people who were pigs just as much as Herr Platzhoff was, and who have long since been allowed to go back to educating German youth. 31

Horkheimer held lectures and seminars in Frankfurt, Munich, Stuttgart, Marburg and Darmstadt, and did not refuse a single request for him to lecture or take part in a meeting. His initial summing-up was:

If one works with absolute devotion, and does not allow oneself to be driven crazy by severe disappointments, it will probably be possible to show a few people in today's Germany what should be preserved through the night of history. The dangers are greater here than in other places on earth. But there is hardly anywhere else which is more important at the moment than Germany. If the last remnants of intellectual life were completely extinguished there, something would be lost to the world that ought to be preserved. And so far as practical matters are concerned, I see Germany as an area in which the most important decisions will be taken. If it is not possible, with the help of those elements with awareness or which are at least undecided, to break the frightful reaction which has already consolidated itself there, then the anti-Russian policy of the Western powers in Europe will be carried through with a massive chauvinistic and anti-Semitic energy. 32

In Paris, Horkheimer took part in a two-week UNESCO conference of eight sociologists (including Gordon Allport, Georges Gurvitch and Harry Sullivan) on 'Tensions Affecting International Understanding'. His contribution, a paper on 'The Lessons of Fascism', contained passages expressed with the laconic bitterness of his German writings of the 1920s and 1930s.

Even if the top criminals are put on trial, if they are condemned and in some cases executed, the majority of the Germans who sympathized with Nazism are better off today than those who distanced themselves from fascism. This is true to such an extent that one can justifiably say that the institutionalization of denazification has achieved the opposite of what was intended (just like the Weimar 'Law for the Protection of the Republic'). Anyone who had contacts with Nazis could have his denazification procedure speeded up, pay a fine of a few thousand worthless marks, and return to his previous post straight away. Only very few of those who had enough moral strength to risk their lives by opposing the Party are now holders of government or university posts.

What has the average European learnt for the future from postwar conditions in Germany? He is forced to the conclusion that in periods of totalitarianism it is not wise to stand at the top, but advisable and even advantageous to be among the sympathizers; that it may be risky to be actively involved in the worst atrocities, but is entirely safe to commit more minor crimes.

With more caution, and avoiding concepts like capitalism and communism, Horkheimer lamented, as an immediate danger, what Thomas Mann had again and again criticized during the war as being the basic folly of the epoch: the bourgeois world's ability to be seduced by a fear

of communism. 'The antagonism between East and West, which allowed yesterday's aggressor to grow strong and to attack, is today again a powerful temptation to statesmen to see things from this perspective alone and blind themselves to other threats to peace in the world.' 33

Horkheimer's description of this other danger gathered together the various themes of the new Critical Theory, the central idea of which was the direct attack on individuals by the collective, which no longer allowed them to achieve individuality. The defence of the individual against the collective, although it was aimed very much at capitalist countries, particularly in its critique of the culture industry, nevertheless fitted perfectly into the USA's self-image. According to this, American democracy meant actively developing the individual in opposition to the collectivism dominant in fascism and communism.

Those who did not wish to speak of capitalism should also be silent about fascism, Horkheimer had written in 1939 in 'The Jews and Europe'.<sup>34</sup> Now he no longer mentioned capitalism himself either. This was primarily for tactical reasons. If one criticized capitalism, one would have no chance of gaining the goodwill and support of the American authorities which permitted his activities as an American citizen in Germany, and which would possibly allow an Institute to be founded. (The fate of the journal *Der Ruf* (*The Call*), founded by Hans Werner Richter and Alfred Andersch, which was banned by the American military government in 1947 for its 'nihilistic' ideas about democracy, was only one among many examples showing how narrow were the limits of what the American authorities would permit or even support. William Faulkner's novels, describing the collapse of the old aristocratic families in the American South and the rise of unscrupulous upstarts, were banned in 1947 even during a preliminary selection in Washington of books to be exported to Germany because, as it was stated, they presented a wholly negative image of American society.) The book edition of the *Philosophical Fragments*, published by the émigré publishers Querido in Amsterdam in 1947 under the title *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, contained numerous small changes in comparison with the mimeographed edition of 1944. The word 'capitalism' was changed to 'existing conditions';<sup>35</sup> 'capital' was changed to 'economic system';<sup>36</sup> 'capitalist bloodsuckers' became 'knights of industry';<sup>37</sup> 'class society' became 'domination' or 'order';<sup>38</sup> 'ruling class' became 'rulers'.<sup>39</sup> A sentence such as 'That would be a classless society' was omitted.<sup>40</sup> This form of self-censorship was not new; it was an Institute tradition. But it was a progressive process. And the question was whether their thinking would not at some point either be driven in the wrong direction or be distracted from penetrating analysis of elements and perspectives which had originally been seen as central and were in reality still central. Constantly doing without staff in the fields of political science and economics made this danger more severe. The fact that parts of the chapter on the culture industry from *Dialectic of Enlightenment* were

published in *Umschau* in 1947 and 1948 was apparently the occasion for Adorno to write to Horkheimer, who was staying in Europe: 'I believe our stuff on the culture industry is noticeably making a particularly lasting impression, and I have given much thought to your desideratum that we should provide a really concise and binding social theory of the whole complex. My feeling is that today we are ready.' 41

On his return to the USA, Horkheimer considered ways of extending their 'German outpost' without abandoning their 'American outpost'. Marcuse thought that setting up a branch of their American organization in Frankfurt would allow them to establish a full professorship in Germany while retaining American citizenship.<sup>42</sup> Difficulties apparently arose here because in the meantime the American military government's re-education and reorientation programme had been largely abandoned. In June 1948 an important step towards the stabilization of West German capitalism was brought about by currency reform. In the autumn the first instalments of the Marshall Plan arrived in Germany. They were not of any decisive economic significance, but they were a further symbol of the way in which anti-communism was taking the place of anti-fascism and West Germany was being attached to the Western camp. Indeed, the export of American ideas, under the banner of economic and military co-operation, was furthermore a national concern in the USA, capable of attracting financial support. From now on, Horkheimer followed a strategy of expanding the German 'outpost' as a branch of the American Institute which would form a bridge between the USA and Germany, a country that needed American aid in every single field.

In the spring and summer of 1949, Horkheimer travelled to Frankfurt again, this time with Pollock. He drove to talks with the ministry in Wiesbaden together with Walter Kolb, the Social Democrat Mayor of Frankfurt. The outcome of the talks was that Horkheimer was reappointed to the chair of social philosophy. Over dinner in the Trade, Industry and Science Club,<sup>43</sup> Horkheimer and Pollock discussed with Kolb their plan to set up a branch of the New York Institute in Frankfurt. Having a branch of an American institute would make Frankfurt a centre of modern social research and forge links between the German social sciences and the most advanced research and technology in the field.

In 1946 the Institute had cut its links with Columbia University, at the very moment Columbia had wanted to intensify them at the end of the war. Problems with Horkheimer's health were given as the reason. As early as 1944, the rump of the Institute had handed over to the US Navy the building in 117th Street which had been put at its disposal in 1934 and moved into offices in a building on Morningside Drive. Cutting links with Columbia was intended to make it possible to maintain only an office in New York at minimum expense, while seeking in Los Angeles a connection with one of the Californian universities. (The

New York office nevertheless still operated as the Institute's headquarters, with contacts with Columbia University, whenever needed.) But it was never possible to establish more than loose relations with any university department in California. Instead, the Institute's directors succeeded in 1949 in getting renowned academics, mainly sociologists, to sign an appeal for the Institute of Social Research to be re-established at the University of Frankfurt, as a daughter body of the main Institute in New York. The appeal was published in the *American Sociological Review* in October 1949, the official journal of the American Sociological Society. It began to seem possible that previous conditions in Frankfurt—the combination of a professorship with an Institute attached to the university—might be restored without abandoning the American outpost.

Publication of the completed sections of the anti-Semitism project, under the general title *Studies in Prejudice*, was now imminent at last. This took on strategic significance for the current situation, in that the series was able to serve in Germany as evidence of the Institute's achievements and its strong position in the United States. Adorno and Horkheimer would have preferred the Institute to have been named on the title-page of the Berkeley research, thus presenting it as a collective work by the Institute (produced in co-operation with the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group). But they had to be satisfied with Adorno's name appearing at the top of the list of authors, while Horkheimer, as director of the Institute, contributed the foreword to the main volume of *Studies in Prejudice*. In addition, the idea of producing a German edition became especially important in the current situation, alongside the question of producing a simplified and condensed version of the whole series, or at least of the Berkeley research.

When the winter semester began in Germany, Horkheimer, who did not feel up to travelling, sent Adorno to Frankfurt to deputize for him. The first contact with Europe made an even greater impression on Adorno than it had on Horkheimer. He wrote from Paris:

Returning to Europe has taken hold of me with a force I cannot describe. And the beauty of Paris shines through the tatters of poverty more touchingly than ever before . . . What still exists here may be historically condemned, and it bears the traces of this clearly enough, but the *fact* that it still exists, the embodiment of temporal disparity, is part of the historical picture and allows a little hope that something humane is surviving in spite of everything. 44

When Adorno arrived in Frankfurt in November 1949, he was forty-six. His parents had fled to the United States by ship via Cuba, and only his mother was still alive, living alone in New York. Adorno came as Horkheimer's representative as someone who had not achieved a

professorship during his period of exile, who had not made himself independent, but who had put himself and his talents wholly at the service of Horkheimer and the Institute.

When Hans-Georg Gadamer, who had accepted a professorship in Heidelberg, suggested that Adorno might succeed him in the only chair of philosophy in Frankfurt, Adorno was touched by the prospect of directing the teaching of philosophy at Horkheimer's side. 'I congratulate you and ourselves on the success you have had on your very first appearance,' Horkheimer wrote to him when he heard of this.

I am convinced that things will continue to go well, too. If we can get this professorship, it will be the fulfilment of a dream which, a few years ago, we would have thought purely illusory. It would create the unique situation that two people as ill adjusted to reality as we are, and who for that very reason seem predestined to be powerless, should both be offered a sphere of influence of almost incalculable breadth. Because if we hold two professorships instead of one, quantity will really transform itself into quality; we will genuinely have a position of power. Not that I think, as the fools always suggest, that we could change the whole direction of movement; if neo-fascism is to appear, it will appear, and if the great flood comes, even we cannot form a dam against it. But the visibility the link between us will acquire in an arrangement like that will not lack significance for either of us as individuals. It will underline the importance of our theoretical work, and I am more certain than ever that, if conditions are favourable, we will be able to get this work done over there. After all, France is not far away, and we can spend a longer period there if we need to. 45

It was to be another seven years before Adorno having passed along a scale from 'Extraordinary' professor (1949) to 'ad hoc' professor (1950) and 'regular extraordinary' professor (1953) finally became a full professor in 1956.<sup>46</sup> This was the fault of the university and of the Ministry of Culture, which did not see him, in the way that it saw the Institute and its director, as being an embellishment of the university. But it was also Horkheimer's fault. To Horkheimer, Adorno was his deputy, and he was not prepared to risk too much for Adorno's career, even if it ultimately served his own purposes. Ultimately, it was Adorno's own fault too. He preferred to remain in Horkheimer's shadow and to obstruct his own career by volunteering to faculty members the argument that to have two similar professorships would not be a good idea (the idea of having both chairs held by émigrés was already horrifying to many colleagues), instead of avoiding any emphasis on his similarity to Horkheimer. He also suggested that Gadamer's successor should be a representative of a different tendency.

To assist the Institute's cause and the Horkheimer-Adorno symbiosis, Adorno also took some dubious steps, as he had once done for the cause of modern music in Nazi Germany. He usually had Horkheimer's support, but a cautious Horkheimer often put on the brakes at the last minute. For example, Adorno attempted to prevent publication of an article by Max Bense on 'Hegel and the Californian Left' 47 in *Merkur*. He wrote to Hans Paeschke, the editor of *Merkur*:

We are involved at the moment in negotiations on setting up a branch of our Institute in Frankfurt, and, little though Bense's criticism might affect the outcome of these negotiations, it might create a certain number of apparent difficulties . . . But I believe I have the more reason to appeal to your sympathy in that the article associates us with several theoreticians with whom we have the sharpest differences: we are working on a critical analysis of Lukács for the second volume of the 'Dialectics', and for objective reasons I have been completely at variance with my former friend Ernst Bloch for many years now. Publication of the Homer in *Sinn und Form* was carried out without our knowledge or approval. Under these circumstances, and since our books a fact Bense overlooks distance themselves from the Russians as clearly as could be, you will appreciate that I must repeat my request.<sup>48</sup>

He drafted a declaration of his and Horkheimer's joint responsibility for all philosophical, sociological and social psychology publications, even those signed by only one of them, and a declaration of their position on Russia.

Experience of journalism occasions us to declare formally that our philosophy, as a dialectical critique of the general social tendency of the age, stands in the sharpest possible contradiction to the policies and doctrine emerging from the Soviet Union . . . Fears that an unambiguous rejection of the policy followed by the Russian regime and its satellites might be to the advantage of international reaction have lost any justification in a situation in which the glorifiers of the state, for whom 'cosmopolitanism' is the worst term of abuse, have succeeded in making a shameful truth out of the petit-bourgeois cliché that fascism and communism are identical. We reject as strongly as possible any interpretation of our work as being an apology for Russia, and we believe that the potential for a better society is more faithfully preserved where the existing one is allowed to be analysed than where the idea of a better society has been corrupted in order to defend the bad one that exists. Any reprints of our works in the Eastern zone are published without our authorization.

Bense's article was published and proved to be harmless. Horkheimer hesitated to publish the declarations Adorno had drafted. The journal *Der Monat*, which Adorno had his eye on as a possible outlet for them, seemed as dubious to Horkheimer as *Merkur*, 'which simultaneously celebrates both logical empiricism and Heidegger'.<sup>49</sup> This showed that Horkheimer had a good nose for the situation. Although even insiders in journalism were not exactly certain about it, *Der Monat* had been founded in 1948 by the American Congress for the Freedom of Culture, a partner of the CIA, the anti-communist successor to the OSS. The Congress for Cultural Freedom, held in Berlin from 26 to 30 June 1950, was also financed by the CIA. 'A congress of free people in a free city' was the phrase used by Melvin Lasky, editor-in-chief of *Der Monat*, who devoted the next two issues of his journal exclusively to the congress. Adorno had so little sensitivity to the anti-communist 'freedom' jargon that he published articles in *Der Monat* just as he did elsewhere.

From the very beginning, Horkheimer and Adorno could not complain that there was any lack of media interest in them. The Hessische Rundfunk (Hessian Broadcasting) wanted to record a discussion between the two of them on the *Authoritarian Personality*. The publishers of *Frankfurter Hefte*, a determinedly left-wing Catholic journal edited by Eugen Kogon and Walter Dirks, asked about translation rights. *Merkur*, *Monat*, *Frankfurter Hefte*, *Neue Rundschau* and *Archiv für Philosophie* all willingly published their articles. But the prospects of a position of philosophical power at the university seemed to be diminishing. The setting up of the Institute was not making any obvious progress. They were both primarily Horkheimer, but Adorno to some extent as well still torn between opting for the United States and opting for Frankfurt.

Adorno now saw clearly some negative aspects which he had overlooked or suppressed in his initial enthusiasm. He recognized above all the illusory quality attaching not only to German democracy and German politics, but to everything in Germany, and not only Germany but the whole of Europe, since it was no longer politically independent. He sensed in Germany what he and Horkheimer had diagnosed since the end of the war: 'the conflict between two total tickets, from which there is no longer any escape'.<sup>50</sup> Expressing himself more vehemently than in his article 'A Resurrection of Culture in Germany?',<sup>51</sup> published in May 1950 in the *Frankfurter Hefte*, Adorno told Horkheimer that the students' intellectual passion, which was so attractive, also had a certain quality of substitute gratification, of Talmud school. The seductive intellectual climate disguised the fact that people were responding more to the novelty Horkheimer and Adorno were offering than to the real intentions lying behind it. Apart from security, 'which is so immensely important for our productiveness', Germany had little to offer. 'Thinking here has simply remained far behind ours, and has not been through

the critique of ontology. And what you once declared is true that over there [the USA] is a better place to analyse society than here in this colony.' 52

Because of the prospects for greater security, and to hurry on the building of the Institute, which was important whether it was eventually decided to make their place of residence Europe or America, Horkheimer finally went to Frankfurt as well in February 1950. It was a hesitant, reserved return home, although both Horkheimer and Adorno later travelled to the United States on several occasions in order to preserve their American citizenship. To act for strategic purposes and remain inwardly undecided was characteristic of Horkheimer; it was his way of reacting to the Jewish condition (an expression to be seen as analogous to Simone Weil's 'condition ouvrière'), a condition in which achieving a forever fragile sense of security demanded Machiavellian skill. At Frankfurt University, those who had remained some of whom had had successful careers under the Third Reich, some of whom had had difficulties in their careers without later being able to claim reparations and the émigrés, who were asserting their old rights in Frankfurt, confronted one another. They had little or no time for each other. Those representing the university acted calculatingly. Those who wanted to establish themselves afresh in Frankfurt also acted calculatingly. It was only realistic for Horkheimer to take the view that they should follow a policy of aloofness, to create the impression that they had a stronger position in the United States and that, because of their numerous commitments there, their activities in Frankfurt were a great concession. They must avoid anything that might give the impression that they were looking for professorships which they could not get in the USA.

Adorno saw Germany as a colony, in which intellectual life was something unreal, a substitute. But at least it was valued as a substitute, and not despised as something valueless, as it was in the United States. Horkheimer shared Adorno's assessment of the German situation. But if one was successful in that colony, if one counted for something, it might be possible to exercise some influence on a small scale. In the United States, intellectuals and thinkers, even in the best case, were virtually submerged. ('I long indescribably to be at home,' Horkheimer wrote to Adorno in 1957 during a visit to the USA. 'I have never felt our isolation as clearly as I do now . . . The AJC! By the way, they are creating a large research institute, and if we are ambitious we might manage to get in as junior assistants. I also saw Lazarsfeld. Mon Dieu! You are right all along the line.'<sup>53</sup> Yet mixed with their hopes for the German 'position', even independently of considerations of security, there was also a fear which turned out to be prophetic. Adorno saw the danger of Horkheimer's becoming a valued man, much in demand, who would no longer have any opportunity to take part in their joint philosophical work.

We would actually have enough time, in spite of teaching duties. But we both have inward problems. For you: that it will be difficult for you to keep the surging crowd at bay and save your time for us with an iron will and one is necessarily forced into the position of being an intellectual pastor, who has to say 'Halt!' to those disappointed . . . So far as I am concerned, I feel that the main difficulty is the incessant communicating; I sometimes feel like an overplayed gramophone record, as if I were overexerting myself in the wrong way; more than ever, I have the feeling that one can only attend to people's needs at a distance from them. Sils Maria is really a *topos noetikos*. And connected with this is the fact that I get the feeling here as well that what we write is infinitely more important than immediate reality, for the very simple reason that immediate reality is really condemned to be a preliminary affair and can hardly approach what is genuinely important to us . . . As you know, I do not think it is conducive to truth to live off one's capital.

54

### *Studies in Prejudice*

When Horkheimer arrived in Frankfurt in February 1950, the volumes of *Studies in Prejudice* representing the Institute's contribution were finally being published. The other volumes appeared soon afterwards.

*Studies in Prejudice* edited by Max Horkheimer and Samuel H. Flowerman, and sponsored by the American Jewish Committee was not presented as part of a general research project drafted by the Institute of Social Research, but rather as the initial results of the work of the AJC's Department of Scientific Research, headed successively by Horkheimer and Flowerman. *Studies in Prejudice* consisted of four studies on sections of the second phase of the project, and one study on a section of the first phase of the project. They were written by various authors: *The Authoritarian Personality*, by T.W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford; *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of Veterans*, by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz; *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation*, by Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda; *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator*, by Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Gutermann; and *Rehearsal for Destruction: A Study of Political Anti-Semitism in Imperial Germany*, by Paul W. Massing.

Further volumes were to follow, but these did not consist of the results of the further sections of the project planned in the maximal programme that had been presented by Horkheimer in spring 1945. Of the latter, the study 'Anti-Semitism among Children' by Else Frenkel-Brunswik, who had had Adorno's assistance to begin with, was the main

one that had reached an advanced stage of preparation. The remaining volumes consisted, instead, of studies of groups and communities. This was Flowerman's preference and matched a broad trend in American sociology.

The fact that 'Studies in Prejudice' was chosen as the series title rather than 'Studies in Anti-Semitism' stemmed from the caution of a Jewish organization intent on assimilation, and not from the notion that, after the industrialized and bureaucratized murder of millions of Jews and other minorities, the apparently harmless-sounding term 'prejudice' was so laden with horror that it could be used without any risk of euphemism. It *was* a euphemism, and it was being used for reasons of caution and in the hope that democrats would be more likely to respond to a call to fight prejudice and social discrimination in general than they would be to a call to fight anti-Semitism.

In their general foreword to the series, which was included in all five volumes, Horkheimer and Flowerman tried to come to terms with the dilemma characteristic of all long-term sociological research: the fact that a subject chosen for its topicality no longer seems topical by the time the results are published. A breathing-space in the world-historical persecution of the Jews was to be used to seek, with the support of scientific analysis, ways of preventing or weakening the next outbreak. In view of the ominous characteristics of Western civilization, a further outbreak was to be expected anywhere, even in the USA, where Jews were apparently less threatened than they had ever been. The emphasis on subjective, psychological aspects was to be explained by their interest in providing practical help. Fighting prejudice meant 're-education', and individuals and their psychology were the point of departure for this. This was deferring to a typically American credo.

The demand that the volumes should form an integrated whole put a burden above all on the two books that were to be devoted to analysing objective stimuli. The burden those books were not equal to. The most obvious and important elements—analyses of economic, political and social structures in the United States or in Western industrial nations—were left out of them.

Massing's book was a history of political anti-Semitism in the German Empire, written in the style of conventional historiography. The first three volumes had been based on empirical research on the American mentality. Massing's, by contrast, presented a period of German history in which the incapacity and unwillingness of the German bourgeoisie to create a state on the Western, liberal pattern led to conditions in which anti-Semitism became a political tool used to control social protest. The gap between the first three volumes and Massing's was too large.

The book by Lowenthal and Gutermann offered a psychoanalytically oriented content analysis of the radio speeches and pamphlets of the anti-Semitic, pro-fascist American agitators who had been appearing

mainly on the west coast of the United States since the late 1930s, without, however, ever having much success. Lowenthal and Gutermann's volume was rather like the handbook for demystifying fascist agitators which had been planned. But it was based purely on analysing texts, not on any research on the actual audience reaction. They had not even attended any agitators' meetings, as Adorno had suggested.

Instead of successfully making a virtue of necessity, the editors' refusal to sketch out a systematic maximal programme providing a background against which the volumes which had actually been published might appear as fragments actually made it more difficult to appreciate the works properly. This meant that the first volume tended more and more to become a substitute for the whole, dealing as it did with the most elaborate section of the project, and being the longest in the series, with wide-ranging introductory and concluding passages and a foreword by Horkheimer that staked large claims.

Horkheimer and his associates had no reason to be unhappy about this. The Berkeley study was the only section of the project which continued through both phases and represented the vital role played by the Institute. It was in connection with the Berkeley study that Horkheimer had in 1943 hoped that the Institute's dream of combining European ideas and American methods might be fulfilled. After reading the chapter on the anti-Semitism scale and the fascism scale in July 1947, Lazarsfeld wrote of the Berkeley study:

It is, I think, the first time that a solution has been found for combining the ideas of your group with the tradition of empirical research . . . the main concepts are very clearly presented and in such a form that they can be subjected to empirical tests. The tests, themselves, showed that your assumptions were correct. As a result, you win two important points at the same time: the study contributes real factual discoveries and at the same time shows the value of theoretical thinking for empirical research. 55

It was the Berkeley study that included most of Adorno and Horkheimer's theory. This was due partly to the chapter by Adorno on the qualitative analysis of the interviews, and partly to the fact that Adorno ensured that Sanford and Levinson 'in addition packed as many of our ideas as they could into their quantitative chapters' at the proof-reading stage.<sup>56</sup> It was also due partly to the extensive corrections which Adorno used at the last minute as a way of trying to ensure that the book had some coherence. The idea of having one book had only taken the place of the idea of a series of individual publications as the work progressed, and the book was made up of chapters which had been left to the individual contributors to write. (Even the chapter on the fascism scale (F-scale) was not written by four authors, as the list of contents suggested, but by Sanford alone. Else Frenkel-Brunswik, wanting to

ensure that her individual contribution to the interview section was given proper recognition, was not satisfied with the equal attribution to the four authors on the title-page, and insisted that each author should also be named in his or her 'own' chapter. Adorno would then have been deprived of the credit for the F-scale, which had been written up by Sanford. But Adorno regarded the F-scale, as he made clear to Horkheimer in memos written in July 1947, as his main contribution and as the 'core of the whole thing', which, in addition to the analytic schema for the interviews drafted by Frenkel-Brunswik, was 'the most effective instrument so far as the Americans are concerned'. A compromise was agreed on: each author signed his or her 'own' chapter, while all four signed the chapter on the F-scale.)

*The Authoritarian Personality* was the product of a project which had been started in a period in which the USA was at war with fascism and in alliance with the Soviet Union. While it was being written, and certainly by the time it was published, fascism had been conquered, the brief post-war phase of American hope that there would be a world-wide New Deal was over, and the USA's sense of having a democratic mission had hardened to become the anti-communist sense of mission of a jealous world power. This was all reflected not in the book but in its title. It was originally to have been called 'The Fascist Character'. In 1947 Adorno had mentioned to Horkheimer his fears that the Berkeley assistants would try to substitute an 'innocuous' title such as 'Character and Prejudice'.<sup>57</sup> In the following year, the title planned was 'The Potential Fascist'. The title under which the book finally appeared in January 1950 unmistakably reflected a compromise reached at a late stage, since the phrase 'studies in prejudice' was used only in Horkheimer's preface. The book itself discussed fascist, potentially fascist and prejudiced personalities, and the F-scale (fascism scale). But the camouflaging title, introduced to meet current conditions, provided a link with a terminology that had been developed by Fromm and used in the Institute's first collective publication, *Studies on Authority and the Family*, when fascism and anti-Semitism were not yet officially on the Institute's research programme.

The book's subject was accurately characterized by the two tasks allotted to the Berkeley project: (1) to expose the character structure of persons susceptible to anti-Semitism, and (2) to develop an instrument capable of measuring susceptibility to anti-Semitism. The title ought really to have been 'The Fascist Character and the Measurement of Fascist Trends'. The two went hand in hand: ascertaining and isolating the fascist character by means of questionnaires, interviews lasting several hours and projective tests; and acquiring a reliable instrument usable on a large scale to recognize and measure it. 'When you have finished reading the book,' Adorno observed with satisfaction on completing the proofreading, 'you know what an anti-Semite is.'<sup>58</sup> The results of the questionnaires, interviews and projective tests had shown,

for a restricted sample, that the anti-Semitic or fascist type existed and was in fact not infrequent. And the fascism scale was an instrument with which it would, if necessary, be possible to observe the spread and intensity of fascist trends even without mentioning ideological prejudices. At least, this was how Adorno and other participants saw it.

So far as measuring fascist trends was concerned, however, it might have been objected that the scales they had developed had not yet proved themselves in the decisive critical test: whether it was possible to apply them to different social groups, under differing political and economic conditions, and without continuous checking using interviews and projective tests.

Between January 1945 and June 1946, 2099 questionnaires had been filled in by various groups of people the majority being students and members of the middle classes. Three questionnaire forms were tested one after another, each time with a different group, the forms being called form 78, form 60 and form 45 or form 40, according to the total number of questions they contained. With each new questionnaire form, the idea was to achieve better results with fewer items. Each of the three forms consisted of three scales, the items of which were scattered through the questionnaire to preserve the impression that it was a general opinion survey. The scales were: the ethnocentrism scale (E-scale), containing anti-Semitic (A-S) items, as well as items relating to other minorities and items concerned with patriotism; a scale to measure political and economic conservatism (PEC-scale); and the fascism scale (F-scale), containing purely 'psychological' items.

The F-scale was never used on its own, but always within the framework of the questionnaire form as a whole. (For example, the last questionnaire contained, in form 45, ten ethnocentrism items and thirty fascism items; in form 40, five of the anti-Semitism items among the ten ethnocentrism items were omitted.) The F-scale was therefore never seriously tested. But what would a serious test have consisted of? Applying only the F-scale in mass questionnaires and assessing the fascist potential of various population groups on the basis alone? But would doing without the E-scale not have meant doing without highly significant information on the extent to which the anti-democratic potential had become manifest, the forms in which it manifested itself, and the groups against which these manifestations were mainly directed? 'The distinction between potential and manifest should not be exaggerated,' the authors maintained.

Given emotionally determined anti-democratic trends in the person, we should expect that *in general* they would be evoked by the A-S and E items, which were designed for just this purpose, as well as by the F scale and other indirect methods. The person who was high on F but not on A-S or E would be the exception, whose inhibitions upon the expression of prejudice against minorities would require special explanation. 59

The significance of the F-scale therefore lay above all in the fact that, within the framework of questionnaire methods that could be applied on a mass scale, it provided important information on how strongly ethnocentric attitudes were rooted in personality structure and on how much importance should be given to political and economic attitudes.

In the eyes of the Berkeley group, the F-scale, with its non-ideological, purely 'psychological' items, offered virtually direct access to personality structure. It was for precisely this reason that the group attached particular importance to some problematical aspects of the scales. With their two alterations and abbreviations of the F-scale, the Berkeley group excluded not only certain items which were so true or rationally plausible that both strongly prejudiced and strongly prejudice-free subjects agreed with them, but also certain items which were so drastically or aggressively formulated that both largely prejudice-free and strongly prejudiced subjects rejected them. But many similar items remained, for example statements in the final version of the F-scale such as 'A person who has bad manners, habits, and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people', 'The business man and the manufacturer are much more important to society than the artist and the professor', and 'Science has its place, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind.' 60 Strong rejection of such statements was automatically registered as positive, although their large element of truth would have suggested at the most weak rejection or at least rather weak agreement.

On the other hand, the stereotyped nature of most of the statements left no room for complex or ambiguous matters to be articulated. Someone agreeing with two statements which might together have served to present a complex set of facts was worse off in terms of points than someone who simply rejected them both because in isolation they were not quite correct. In addition, agreement with two such statements would be interpreted as an irrational contradictoriness showing a tendency to make sweeping judgements. On the other hand, someone who preferred to reject a statement for fear of being misunderstood or appearing provocative was, to an extent, rewarded.

However, critical objections of this sort did not affect the basic plausibility of the thinking lying behind the F-scale, in particular.

For example, when it was discovered that the anti-Semitic individual objects to Jews on the ground that they violate conventional moral values, one interpretation was that this individual had a particularly strong and rigid adherence to conventional values, and that this general disposition in his personality provided some of the motivational basis for anti-Semitism, and at the same time expressed itself in other ways, e.g., in a general tendency to look down on and to punish those who were believed to be violating conventional values. This interpretation was supported by results from the E and PEC scales, where it was shown that items

expressive of conventionalism were associated with more manifest forms of prejudice. Accordingly, therefore, *adherence to conventional values* came to be thought of as a *variable* in the personsomething which could be approached by means of scale items of the F type and shown to be related functionally to various manifestations of prejudice. 61

Statistical calculations showed a high correlation between results measuring ethnocentric prejudices and those measuring fascist psychological tendencies. In all, eighty people, who were either very high or very low on the various scales, were selected for the interviews and projective tests. These showed that such correlations did in fact rest on psychological processes of the same sort as those anticipated when the scales were being prepared, a procedure that had alternately involved producing questionnaires and carrying out interviews.

The variables according to which the scales had been developed therefore summarized the results of both the interviews and the projective tests. According to these results, the essential traits of the fascist character were: a rigid commitment to dominant values, mainly conventional middle-class values such as outwardly correct, unobtrusive behaviour and appearance, efficiency, cleanliness, success along with a pessimistic and contemptuous view of humanity, a readiness to believe that uncontrollable, dangerous events were taking place in the world and that sexual depravity could be detected everywhere; extremely hierarchical thoughts and feelings, with submissiveness towards idealized authorities in one's own group and contempt for outside groupings and everything deviant, discriminated against or weak; anti-introversion, i.e. defence against self-reflection, sensibility and fantasy, with a simultaneous tendency towards superstition and stereotyped misperception of reality.

The formula used, partly suggested by the evidence that had been gathered and partly governed by the interpretation and structuring of that evidence, could be described as a psychoanalytic one. It ran something like this: the fascist character was marked by a weak ego, an externalized superego and an ego-alienated id. The fascist's ego went about on the crutches of stereotype, personification and discriminatory prejudice; he identified himself with power, and appealed to democracy, morality and rationality only in order to destroy them; he satisfied his instincts while upholding moral condemnation of them and their suppression in out-groups and outsiders.

The clinical sections of the interviews, which included questions on family background, childhood, sexuality, social relations and school, completed the picture by providing insights into the socialization processes that had influenced the formation of psychic structures and social and political views. For example, parents whose relationships to one another consisted of domination and submission, with fixed roles and duties, who demanded uncritical obedience from their children, and

who hoped to achieve social advancement through conformist behaviour, made it more or less impossible for their children to develop any self-respect, to develop an ability to unload aggressive feelings on those who had caused them or to develop a capacity for close personal relationships. (The research on anti-Semitism among children, which was not completed, might have produced further conclusions on the significance of socialization processes of this sort for the development of fascist psychological structures and fascist ideologies. These might have corrected and supplemented the memories of those questioned.)

So far as clinical topics were concerned, the results of the qualitative analysis were poured into a quantitative mould by means of the detailed, psychoanalytically oriented interview schema and the equally psychoanalytically oriented catalogue of fifty-six categories, divided according to high and low variants, used to interpret the interview material. It was this effort to produce quantitative results that led to their missing the obvious point of intensive interviews complemented by projective tests: to present a series of case studies exemplifying the connection between personality structure and ideological views. Instead of offering case analyses, Else Frenkel-Brunswik presented 'patterns, abstracted from the study of groups'.<sup>62</sup> In the conclusion, these were combined into a 'composite picture' which contrasted the 'high scorer' and the 'low scorer' on the scales as ideal types. But what Adorno had expected from the analysis of the interviews, as a counterweight to the quantitative matter in the sections dealing with the measurement of ideological and psychological trends, was precisely a 'larger number of profile studies', namely 'detailed analyses of individual subjects on the basis of all the material collected concerning them: questionnaires, interviews, Murray tests and Rorschach tests'.<sup>63</sup> There would hardly have been a more convincing way of rounding off what was important here: proof that anti-Semitism did not appear in persons with otherwise irrelevant views and psychological structures; that it did not even appear in everyone who had been exposed to the same objective situation and the same external influences. Instead, it was part of a general attitude affecting not just Jews, and not even just minorities in general, but rather mankind as a whole, history, society and nature. This general attitude was rooted in a specific psychological structure. And it was ultimately this psychological structure which was bound to express itself in certain opinions and forms of behaviour, even if these seemed to affect only quite personal or neutral matters which was decisive for whether someone had a fascist character and was thus potentially anti-Semitic or not, and which made it possible to recognize this.

Adorno himself, however, did not offer any detailed analysis of a large number of individual cases in his own strictly qualitative studies either. Admittedly, he was concerned to put the relationship between ideology and personality structure at the centre of the research at last. 'What is the meaning of the subject's overt opinions and attitudes in the

areas covered by the A-S, E, and PEC scales when they are considered in the light of our psychological findings, particularly those deriving from the F scale and the clinical sections of the interviews?' he asked. He saw the ideological sections of the interviews as the starting-point for answering this question. But the method he used was 'a phenomenology based on theoretical formulations and illustrated by quotations from the interviews'. This made it possible

to exploit the richness and concreteness of 'live' interviews to a degree otherwise hardly attainable. What is lost for want of strict discipline in interpretation may be gained by flexibility and closeness to the phenomena. Rare or even unique statements may be elucidated by the discussion. Such statements, often of an extreme nature, may throw considerable light on potentialities which lie within supposedly 'normal' areas, just as illness helps us to understand health. At the same time, attention to the consistency of the interpretation of these statements with the over-all picture provides a safeguard against arbitrariness. A subjective or what might be called speculative element has a place in this method, just as it does in psychoanalysis, from which many of our categories have been drawn. If, in places, the analysis seems to jump to conclusions, the interpretations should be regarded as hypotheses for further research, and the continuous interaction of the various methods of the study should be recalled: some of the measured variables discussed in earlier chapters were based on speculations put forward in this part. 64

Adorno, who was attempting to exploit the richness and concreteness of the 'live' interviews through this phenomenological procedure, had not personally taken part in any of the interviews. The persons he was attempting to use, as if under a microscope, to elucidate the connection between ideology and personality structure were completely foreign to him, and so was the environment they lived in. As with the study on fascist agitators and other earlier empirical inquiries the Institute had undertaken, detachment from the 'object' of the research was maintained, and the division of labour was rigidly observed. This was not the procedure used by Myrdal, who again and again made long journeys through the United States for his research into the 'Negro problem' so as to gather 'on the spot' impressions of the persons and conditions he was reporting on. Adorno, to this extent highly conventional, was willing to manage without any more direct experience than was necessary here, despite his complaints over the loss of 'living experience'.

What Adorno's qualitative analyses did offer was a wealth of ideas drawn neither from the interview material nor from any theory. For someone familiar with Adorno's work and that of the Institute, it was clear that central themes of a social theory critical of enlightenment

thought formed the basis for these ideasthemes such as the individual's experience of powerlessness in the face of modern collectivist society, and the discontents of civilization. His contact with the interview material did not give Adorno's ideas any more solid a basis than that of Sartre's *Réflexions sur la Question juive*. Sartre remarked in passing that he had asked a hundred anti-Semites for the reasons for their anti-Semitism. His procedure had no methodological safeguards and did not involve any elaborate empirical research, but the insights it produced were sometimes deeper than those of the Berkeley group. Adorno had the irritating experience of finding that a European using 'European' methods could achieve as much as he had after several years' co-operation with a group using 'American' methods. A footnote to the final chapter of *The Authoritarian Personality* observed:

There is marked similarity between the syndrome which we have labeled the authoritarian personality and the 'portrait of the anti-Semite' by Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre's brilliant paper became available to us after all our data had been collected and analyzed. That his phenomenological 'portrait' should resemble so closely, both in general structure and in numerous details, the syndrome which slowly emerged from our empirical observations and quantitative analysis, seems to us remarkable. 65

However, Adorno had no need to be ashamed of his qualitative analyses particularly if they were viewed in connection with his (and Horkheimer's) other 'European ideas' on the topic, in the 'Elements of Anti-Semitism', for example, or in his 'Remarks on *The Authoritarian Personality*'. These 'remarks' had originally been conceived as part of the book, but Adorno did not manage to push their publication through. They dealt with the Berkeley project's position in relation to other theories and research.

Adorno saw himself faced with the following problem: he and Horkheimer regarded anti-Semitism as a manifestation of blind, distorted, rebellious nature, which accompanied an unsuccessful, imperfect civilization like a shadow and was even being used to maintain and sometimes restore the conditions for a rationalized exercise of power characterized by an antagonistic combination of democracy and capitalism. What they wanted to achieve with the anti-Semitism project, to the extent that they saw the project as a concern of their own, was to make an appeal both to those who benefited from imperfect democracy and to those who wanted genuine democracy but who, even in the age of big business, could only conceive of genuine democracy within the framework of the capitalist economic system. Both these groups should recognize that what was obstructing the perfection of democracy and contributing, with heavy losses, to the maintenance of imperfect democracy as Adorno and Horkheimer saw it was also endangering their

own positions and efforts. This was the significance of Horkheimer's hope that they would be able to produce 'experimental proof of the threat that anti-Semitism poses to democratic civilization' (see p. 373).

It was a desperate hope. What Sartre said about the Jews was true of democracy: it had 'fanatical enemies and lukewarm defenders'. 'At the very moment when he reaches the summits of legal society,' Sartre wrote in the third part of *Réflexions sur la Question juive*, dealing with the psychology of the Jew, 'another society amorphous, diffused, and omnipresent appears before him as if in brief flashes of lightning and refuses to take him in.'<sup>66</sup> And this other society was in fact almost omnipresent. It was part of what Adorno called the 'cultural climate'. The anti-Semite was only the spokesman for the ambiguity of a society whose official rational norms were being peddled for misuse as rationalizations in a climate of officially condoned prejudice and stereotyping.

In terms of ideology, the anti-Semite's conflict is between the current, culturally 'approved' stereotypes of prejudice and the officially prevailing standards of democracy and human equality. Viewed psychologically, the conflict is between certain foreconscious or repressed id tendencies on the one hand and the superego, or its more or less externalized, conventional substitute, on the other.<sup>67</sup>

Anti-Semitism, as part of the cultural climate, offered 'a kind of recognized red-light district of legitimized psychotic distortions'<sup>68</sup> to those who were threatened by madness in such conflicts, since they had had no opportunity to develop a strong ego in the course of their socialization. This was an interesting attempt to explain the 'normality' of certain collective delusions by pointing out their functionality within the existing culture. Delusions of this sort managed to remain normal because they were merely emphasizing the current cultural clichés of prejudice more clearly, in contrast to the officially dominant standards of democracy, although without abandoning those standards as rationalizations. Within the framework of his qualitative analyses, Adorno discussed the misuse of rationality to rationalize destructive tendencies as an example of a 'sham trial of rationalizations'.

Still another type of mock-defense can be observed in our interviews. It is the assertion that the Jews are so clever; that they are 'smarter' than the Gentiles, and that one has to admire them on this account. The mechanism at work here involves a double set of values which makes itself felt throughout contemporary culture. On the one hand, there are the 'ideals' of magnanimity, unselfishness, justice, and love to which one has to pay lip service. On the other hand, there are the standards of achievement, success, and status which one has to follow in one's actual life. This double set of values is applied to the Jews in reverse, as it were.

They are praised for their supposed or actual living up to the standards which the anti-Semite himself actually follows and simultaneously, they are condemned for their violation of the very same moral code of which he has successfully rid himself. The phraseology of conscience is used in order to take back the moral credit given to the chosen foe in order to appease one's own conscience. Even the praise apportioned to the Jews is used as supporting evidence for their pre-established guilt. 69

Under the heading 'usurper complex', Adorno gave a pointed example of the way in which the fascist character had a correct instinct for joining the ranks of the rebels against democratic civilization and identifying with stronger forces. People whose thoughts focused on power and violence saw Roosevelt's policies as a distinct form of dictatorship, but nevertheless failed to give him wholehearted support. Adorno tried to explain this by saying that the Roosevelt administration was never really strong enough in their view.

Pseudoconservatives have an underlying sense of 'legitimacy': legitimate rulers are those who are actually in command of the machinery of production not those who owe their ephemeral power to formal political processes. This last motif, which also plays a heavy role in the prehistory of German fascism, is to be taken the more seriously because it does not altogether contradict social reality. As long as democracy is really a formal system of political government which made, under Roosevelt, certain inroads into economic fields but never touched upon the economic fundamentals, it is true that the life of the people depends on the economic organization of the country and, in the last analysis, on those who control American industry, more than on the chosen representatives of the people. Pseudoconservatives sense an element of untruth in the idea of 'their' democratic government, and realize that they do not really determine their fate as social beings by going to the polls. Resentment of this state of affairs, however, is not directed against the dangerous contradiction between economic inequality and formal political equality but against the democratic form as such. Instead of trying to give to this form its adequate content, they want to do away with the form of democracy itself and to bring about the direct control of those whom they deem the most powerful anyway. 70

What Adorno stated here about pseudo-conservatives was also true of pseudo-democrats in general. They appealed to traditional American values and institutions, but strove consciously or unconsciously to assimilate these thoroughly to the views of the silent or 'moral' majority.

However, in the United States, where 'conservative' had always

described a position belonging to the middle-class, capitalist, democratic camp in contrast to Europe, which had once been ruled by aristocrats. The 'pseudos' were more likely to be found behind a conservative ideological front than behind a liberal or even pseudo-socialist one. Although Adorno usually used the terms 'pseudo-conservative', 'pseudo-liberal', 'pseudo-democratic' and even 'pseudo-socialist' as synonyms, he introduced the term 'pseudo-conservatism' specifically to be able to interpret the political and economic views of the interviewees adequately. The 'pseudo-conservatives' suffered from a failed identification with conventional values and institutions, and their conservatism and conventionalism merely represented a rationalizing cover for destructive, rebellious impulses. The 'genuine conservatives' had succeeded in making the identification, and this went hand in hand with a devotion to liberal, individualistic forms of capitalism and with serious democratic attitudes and behaviour.

But Adorno suspected that there were hardly any genuine conservatives left in the United States. In his view they were being driven into the liberal camp as a result of changing conditions, in which being conservative increasingly tended to mean stirring up hatred against the workers and against minorities. In the United States, the liberal camp comprised those who supported the concepts of social reform represented by the New Deal and approved of state intervention to assist weaker members of society. The majority of the interviewees with conservative political and economic views were accordingly seen as pseudo-conservative. This had consequences for the interpretation of a set of facts contradicting the Berkeley group's expectations. They had anticipated that ethnocentrism and political and economic conservatism would correlate to one another closely. For example, not only blacks and Jews but also workers were victims of discrimination and of hierarchical thinking and conditions. But the correlation between the E- and PEC-scales, that is between ethnocentrism and political and economic conservatism, was markedly lower than the correlation between the E- and F-scales, that is between ethnocentrism and fascist psychological tendencies. Conservative political and economic views were very widespread, but many of those who held such views did not have high scores on the E-scale.

This was not a particularly surprising result. In a country supposed to be a land of unlimited opportunities, socialism had never achieved anything like the importance it had in European countries. The attractiveness of capitalism was virtually untainted. To this extent, capitalism did not need ethnocentrism as an outlet for frustration and resentment. Was it not, therefore, merely the prejudices of left-wing academics, who wanted to discredit political and economic conservatism by demonstrating a correlation between ethnocentrism and fascist character structures, which were being disproved?

Adorno saw this differently. General ignorance and confusion in the

area of politics and economics, and a general tendency towards stereotyping and personalization, were only more pronounced among those who were on the whole prejudiced than they were among those who were on the whole free of prejudice but they were not absent even in the latter. He commented:

If a trend that differentiates statistically between high and low scorers on the 'highs' being higher on it appears very commonly in the interviews of all subjects, then we must conclude that it is a trend in culture itself. . . The evidence that they are potentially fascist is the fact that they 'go' statistically, psychologically, and in every other respect with high scale scores; if they also occur with considerable frequency in interviews of low scorers it must be because we are living in potentially fascist times. 71

In Adorno's view, political and economic conservatism was therefore a more significant indicator of fascist psychological tendencies than scores on the E- or F-scales. The conservatism of the interviewees was a defence of a genuine kind of conservatism found more often in Europe than in the United States, and Adorno therefore classified it more or less consistently as pseudo-conservatism. Since conservatives in the United States were seen as democrats and good Americans just as much as liberals were, and after 1945 even more so than liberals, Adorno's distinction concealed a very European left-wing critique of the American way of life, of American civilization. As a critic of monopoly capitalism and the culture industry, he was in fact forced to expect American civilization to produce a fresh rebellion against failed civilization that is, a fresh form of fascism.

The typology Adorno set up, which was the central text of the Berkeley study, produced similar results. The typology was supposed to make specific defence measures possible, and these were in fact the whole point of the anti-Semitism project. The group of variables designated 'fascist character' was to be given focus by producing an extrapolation from various types that was closer to everyday experience and that paid greater attention to psychodynamic patterns. This typology was supplemented by a typology of the various kinds of prejudice-free character. Adorno's main principle for dividing the types up was the extent to which people themselves were standardized and thought in stereotypes or else were 'real' individuals, capable of living experience, who opposed the standardization of human experience.

Adorno saw the potentially most dangerous type as being the 'manipulative' one more dangerous than 'superficial resentment', 'conventionalism', 'authoritarianism', 'psychopaths' and 'eccentrics'. This was an attempt to take recent experience into account and to bring out the central ideas of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Eclipse of Reason*, which were the peak of the Horkheimer circle's critique of positivism.

The technical aspects of life, and things *qua* 'tools' are fraught with libido. The emphasis is on 'doing things', with far-reaching indifference towards the content of what is going to be done. The pattern is found in numerous business people and also, in increasing numbers, among members of the rising managerial and technological class who maintain, in the process of production, a function between the old type of ownership and the workers' aristocracy. Many fascist-political anti-Semites in Germany showed this syndrome: Himmler may be symbolic of them. Their sober intelligence, together with their almost complete absence of any affections makes them perhaps the most merciless of all. Their organizational way of looking at things predisposes them to totalitarian solutions. Their goal is the construction of gas chambers rather than the pogrom. They do not even have to hate the Jews; they 'cope' with them by administrative measures without any personal contacts with the victims. 72

It was not anti-Semitic attitudes which were ultimately decisive, but attitudes and behaviour which lacked any reverence for living beings, for people, for the victims of discrimination. It was not anti-Semitism which was decisive, but the lack of any genuine anti-anti-Semitism. This lack made even those who never slipped into any form of anti-Semitism, even among trusted friends or in a familiar atmosphere, into 'anti-Semitoids' (Horkheimer's term).

The decline in anti-Semitism in the United States did not, therefore, give any comfort to the people at Berkeley or to Adorno all the less so since a substitute had long ago been found: anti-communism. On the one hand, Adorno was excessively timid; during his proofreading of the texts of the Berkeley study he went so far as to ask William R. Morris, who had written the chapter on prisoners in San Quentin, to delete offensive expressions used in quotations from prisoners. On the other hand, however, in interpreting the interview material he expressed his view without mincing his words:

During the last several years all the propaganda machinery of the country has been devoted to promoting anticommunist feeling in the sense of an irrational 'scare' and there are probably not many people, except followers of the 'party line', who have been able to resist the incessant ideological pressure. At the same time, during the past two or three years it may have become more 'conventional' to be overtly opposed to anti-Semitism, if the large number of magazine articles, books, and films with wide circulation can be regarded as symptomatic of a trend. The underlying character structure has little bearing on such fluctuations. If they could be ascertained, they would demonstrate the extreme importance of propaganda in political matters. Propaganda, when directed to the

antidemocratic potential in the people, determines to a large extent the choice of the social objects of psychological aggressiveness. 73

The authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* said nothing directly about how widespread the character structure lying behind anti-Semitism was, or what its future might hold; but in the foreword Horkheimer took the view that it was threatening to take the place of the individualistic, democratic character type. Since this character structure continued to exist, the Berkeley group came to the conclusion that the fact that the various aspects of personality formed a structural whole implied that any defence measures undertaken must be directed towards the structure of the prejudiced personality as a whole. 'The major emphasis should be placed, it seems, not upon discrimination against particular minority groups, but upon such phenomena as stereotypy, emotional coldness, identification with power, and general destructiveness.'74

What was to be done? Society must be changed, according to the Berkeley group (which wanted to commit the task to the community of sociologists, with psychologists having a say so that it could be ensured that the social reforms considered would really have an effect on the structure of prejudiced personalities). But was this not rather a non-committal statement, if modern man was seen as dwindling into a mere cluster of reactions directly controlled by an ever more flawlessly integrated society as Adorno saw it in his chapter on the significance of the Berkeley study, which was originally to have been published in *The Authoritarian Personality*? In Adorno's view, modern man was no longer even capable of 'spontaneous' anti-Semitism, as he put it,75 and no longer represented a suitable object of study for genuine psychology: the psychologist examining him must inevitably become a sociologist, since he was directly encountering society within the supposed individual.

The study therefore concluded in words unmistakably written by Adorno that what was needed was an instinctual and utopian version of the hope for a sudden change resulting from a redirection of energies.

It is the fact that the potentially fascist pattern is to so large an extent imposed upon people that carries with it some hope for the future. People are continuously molded from above because they must be molded if the over-all economic pattern is to be maintained, and the amount of energy that goes into this process bears a direct relation to the amount of potential, residing within the people, for moving in a different direction. It would be foolish to underestimate the fascist potential with which this volume has been mainly concerned, but it would be equally unwise to overlook the fact that the majority of our subjects do not exhibit the extreme ethno-centric pattern and the fact that there are various ways in which it may be avoided altogether. Although there is reason to

believe that the prejudiced are the better rewarded in our society as far as external values are concerned (it is when they take shortcuts to these rewards that they land in prison), we need not suppose that the tolerant have to wait and receive their rewards in heaven, as it were. Actually there is good reason to believe that the tolerant receive more gratification of basic needs. They are likely to pay for this satisfaction in conscious guilt feelings, since they frequently have to go against prevailing social standards, but the evidence is that they are, basically, happier than the prejudiced. Thus, we need not suppose that appeal to emotion belongs to those who strive in the direction of fascism, while democratic propaganda must limit itself to reason and restraint. If fear and destructiveness are the major emotional sources of fascism, *eros* belongs mainly to democracy. 76

The authors' identification with the cause of democracy was an attack on American democracy, crediting not it but its victims with having the strength for change.

This diagnosis of anti-democratic potential observed its indications neither in anti-Semitism nor, more generally, in prejudices against minorities, but in the general dissemination of stereotyped conservative political and economic attitudes; nor did it consider American democracy to be a basically healthy social order, which could be freed from embarrassing defects through appropriate propaganda, information and educational measures. Such a diagnosis could hardly appeal to the AJC, which was intent on assimilation. This was exactly what came out in a very detailed, competent and generally positive review of *Studies in Prejudice*, and of *The Authoritarian Personality* in particular, published in the AJC journal *Commentary*. The review was written by Nathan Glazer, a co-editor of *Commentary* and co-author of *The Lonely Crowd*, which was published in the same year as *The Authoritarian Personality*. *The Lonely Crowd*, subtitled 'A Study of the Changing American Character', explicitly used Fromm's concept of social character, and there were some similarities between its ideas and those of *The Authoritarian Personality* in the way it distinguished between tradition-guided, internally guided and externally guided character types. (Horkheimer had once written to Marcuse about David Riesman, who first came to prominence as the author of *The Lonely Crowd*. Horkheimer had happened to see an article by Riesman in a book Marcuse wanted him to send on to Washington. 'When I picked up the books which you wanted me to keep for you,' Horkheimer wrote, 'I found a manuscript by Mr Riesman on Anti-Semitism which I would like to keep if you permit it. Who is this Mr Riesman? His ideas coincide strangely with our own on the subject. He seems either to be a very intelligent man or to have studied successfully our publications.'77)

Glazer praised, among other things, the brilliance of Adorno's

qualitative analyses, but also used them to make strong criticisms of the way in which the authors took one particular social theory as having been proved correct, and regarded the extensive deviations from it as symptoms of a potentially fascist period.

Can it be demonstrated that `resentment of unions' or of `income limitations' are `potentially fascist persuasions'? Here one would not be convinced by the argument that they are correlated with other points of view that are undeniably fascist. For why may not these attitudes conceivably be the ones in a generally authoritarian personality that offer hope for action in behalf of democracy? If a person is resentful of unions he may be resentful of what he conceives of as an illegitimate infringement of his liberties; perhaps he is protecting his individuality, his sense of his own capacity to make his own way, perhaps he thinks he is resisting becoming part of a mass. Similarly, even in this book one can find evidence indicating that resentment of the limitation of one's income may not be a pre-fascist trait; for example, the non-authoritarians are more interested in sensual and material pleasures, less interested in status and power, than the authoritarians. And in fact, is not income sought for pleasure as well as status and power? 78

It could not have been put more plainly. Prejudice ought to be combated, but not in such a way as to call the American way of life into question.

Edward A. Shils went one step further in his essay `Authoritarianism, "Right" and "Left"', published in 1954 in *Studies in the Scope and Methods of `The Authoritarian Personality'*, edited by Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda. Shils had worked with Bettelheim for a time on the Chicago veterans project, and was one of those intellectuals, not uncommon at the time, who had previously been liberal but had become anti-communist conservatives in the atmosphere of the Cold War and McCarthyism. He accused the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* of a naïvety towards communism that represented an important variety of prejudice. Here he was not fundamentally wrong. Among the syndromes of those without prejudices, Adorno had in fact distinguished between `stubborn', `protesting', `impulsive', `naturally prejudice-free' and `genuinely liberal', conceding only to the last group an ideal balance between superego, ego and id. However, he did not have a category `pseudo-leftist' to correspond explicitly to the category `pseudo-conservative'. This category seemed to be easily subsumed under the headings of `stubborn' or `protesting' prejudice-free persons. But what, in that case, did the concept `prejudice-free' mean? For those who were genuinely pseudo-leftists, it was more than euphemistic. One might have pointed to the fact that the fascist character structure also lay behind pseudo-leftist personalities, and these could therefore be listed under

the syndromes of prejudice. This would in fact have been possible the word 'fascist' in the term 'fascist personality' was not intended in the political sense. But Adorno and the Berkeley people had not done this partly because they were inhibited about mentioning left-wing fascism, a form of pseudo-communism or pseudo-socialism grounded in a fascist character structure, but partly also for the simple reason that this was a type which was extremely rare in their sample and socially insignificant in the USA, where the Communist Party, the CPUSA, which had always been weak, had been banned as soon as the war ended. Shils's criticisms were therefore aimed at what was a side-issue in scientific terms. The fact that he gave it so much importance rested on purely political grounds, and is instructive in terms of the climate in which the response to *The Authoritarian Personality* took place. Critics tended to concentrate more or less exclusively on its methodological and technical aspects.

Among the other volumes of *Studies in Prejudice*, which were overshadowed by *The Authoritarian Personality*, the richest in ideas and the one which was closest in its subject-matter to *The Authoritarian Personality* was *Dynamics of Prejudice*. The impulse to do research on war veterans had been the consideration that they were a socially significant group which had particular difficulty in adapting itself to the peacetime economy. The conditions leading to the venting of aggressive feelings in the form of ethnic intolerance, particularly against Jews and blacks, ought therefore to be easy to observe among them. Interviews with 150 Chicago veterans classified as belonging to the lower class and the lower middle class, none of them officers, formed the empirical basis of the research. The interviews, lasting four to seven hours, were longer than those done in Berkeley. They were carried out if possible in the interviewee's home by six young social workers, all women, who had been trained in psychiatry. This was intended to create the atmosphere of a 'pleasant though intensive interview',<sup>79</sup> which would make it easy for the interviewee to speak openly about his experiences during the war and his current difficulties in adjusting. When the talk turned, first indirectly and then directly, to ethnic topics late in the interview, he would then be able to express his deep-seated attitudes.

The study of war veterans, also psychoanalytically oriented, differed from *The Authoritarian Personality* in two main points. First, the positive significance of prejudice for the prejudiced person was emphasized more strongly and treated with more sympathy. Secondly, society's established institutions, including the army, were treated as something positive which was taken for granted by those who had no sense of resentment, and rejected by those who neither had any control of themselves nor were capable of being controlled by others, and who relied on ethnic intolerance to give vent to their tensions. Bettelheim and Janowitz saw there being a continuum

from internalized to external control; from ego control, to superego control, to willingly accepted external control, to external control under grudging submission, and finally to controls which were so inadequate that they could only assert themselves occasionally and ineffectually. The last group in the continuum of tolerance to intolerance, that is, the intense anti-Semite, fell beyond this continuum of controls. 80

Without going into any general evaluation of American society, they simply stated: 'The data at hand indicate that while slow upward mobility is closely associated with tolerance, rapid mobility, either upward or downward, is positively related to interethnic hostility.' The authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* had reached almost the opposite conclusion: 'We are led to suspect, on the basis of results in numerous areas, that upward class mobility and identification with the *status quo* correlate positively with ethnocentrism, and that downward class mobility and identification go with anti-ethnocentrism.'<sup>81</sup>

Because of the non-committal nature of the research, it was hard to tell to what extent differences of this sort were the result of class differences within the respective samples, or whether Bettelheim, with a more intensive interview technique and with more direct access to his subjects than the Berkeley group, was able to discern deep-seated destructive tendencies on the basis of the subjects' relationship to established social institutions. But there was no overlooking the fact that the authors of the Chicago study did not share the Berkeley group's critical views of society, and that they regarded the ability to take part in the American way of life as a sign of a well-developed personality, while for the authors of the Berkeley study this was a sign of conforming to a society which was full of failures and injustices and therefore a breeding-ground for prejudice.

Nathan Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, the authors of *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder*, assisted by Alvin Gouldner and others, did not follow Horkheimer's plan to carry out a large-scale inquiry on the basis of information supplied by experts, in which numerous psychoanalysts were to be interviewed on cases of patients who were affected by anti-Semitism. They restricted themselves instead to twenty-seven cases suggested by psychoanalysts, who described their patients in detail during interviews. This information was partly supplemented by thirteen reports on cases dealt with by welfare offices. The limitations and distancing of the material gathered made it impossible for the book to provide significant confirmation, more precise definition, additions or corrections to *The Authoritarian Personality*, which contained a chapter on 'Psychological Ill Health in Relation to Potential Fascism: a Study of Psychiatric Clinic Patients' which was almost as long as Ackerman and Jahoda's book. Ackerman and Jahoda were so guarded in the analysis

of their material that one might have concluded, with only a few reservations, that what *The Authoritarian Personality* had shown on the basis of 121 patients in a psychiatric clinic was apparently in principle correct: that there were no obvious correspondences between prejudice and mental illness. The appearance of group prejudices was principally linked to certain general personality traits which did not correspond to psychiatric classifications, but were often more marked among those mentally ill. 82 Depression and feelings of inferiority and guilt appeared in mentally disturbed low-scorers only in more exaggerated forms than in 'normal' low-scorers; feelings of fear, particularly fear about one's physical well-being, took only more exaggerated forms among mentally disturbed high-scorers than among 'normal' high-scorers.

The expectations and hypotheses disproved by this evidence were pointedly expounded in the chapter on psychiatric patients in *The Authoritarian Personality*. One hypothesis had stated that the ethnocentrism of those with prejudiced personalities was based on irrational attitudes which were the product of neurotic conflicts. Prejudiced personalities would therefore occur with particularly high frequency among the mentally ill. The attitudes of those who were free of prejudice, by contrast, were produced in a rational manner consistent with reality. They were the 'normal' subjects. The contrary hypothesis stated that prejudiced individuals were 'normal', since they were well adapted to their culture and had assimilated the prejudices which formed a part of it. Those who were free of prejudice, who rebelled against their parents and against many of the dominant conventions, would be frequently found among the mentally ill. The results of the research showed that both adaptation and non-adaptation to poor conditions were achieved at a price. Ackerman and Jahoda also found some evidence to support the assumption, cautiously formulated in *The Authoritarian Personality*, that low-scorers tended to develop neuroses in mental illness, since their egos were more strongly developed, while high-scorers tended instead to develop psychoses, since their egos had remained underdeveloped because of strict upbringing.

The only volume of *Studies in Prejudice* which indirectly included social theory, and directly included criticism of society, was *The Authoritarian Personality*, which Adorno was directly involved in. It was therefore the only volume which provoked political criticism in addition to professional discussion of research methods. What, then, had been achieved with regard to the relation between subjective and objective factors in the theory of anti-Semitism and of prejudice?

An analysis of subjective aspects had, in fact, been carried out in its essentials by *The Authoritarian Personality* and two of the other volumes of *Studies in Prejudice*. In addition, social-psychologically oriented investigations of prejudice during the 1940s in the United States had developed into an extensive branch of research, and during work on the anti-Semitism project two analyses of the problem of anti-Semitism and

prejudice which were highly regarded by Adorno were published: Sartre's *Réflexions sur la Question juive* (1946) and Eugene Hartley's *Problems in Prejudice* (1946). But what was the state of the analysis of objective factors, at which some of Adorno's 1944 suggestions for the anti-Semitism project's maximal programme had been directed?

It was bad. Adorno had a tendency to see the form of psychological analysis which he practised as simultaneously representing the sociological analysis required, or at least a decisive part of it. This attitude was analogous to his characteristic view that the deeds of a great artist, working as a monad, coincided with the objective movement of the times a view he had taken since his earliest analyses of the New Music. Psychoanalytic individual psychology held to the orthodox theory of the unconscious and the repression of the instincts, and to the ideas of the ego, id and superego, and did not involve itself either in the question whether individual psychological states could be transferred to societies or in any revisionist sociologization of psychology. In Adorno's opinion, psychoanalytic individual psychology registered those objective forces at work within the individual which were the most formative ones and which at the same time the individual was not aware of. In his unpublished chapter on the significance of *The Authoritarian Personality*, he wrote:

To find out how objective economic laws operate, not so much through the individual's economic 'motivations' than through his unconscious make-up, would require extensive and carefully planned specific research. We venture to suggest, however, that the solution to the problem would provide us with the true scientific explanation of the nature of contemporary prejudice. Our study has at least provided considerable raw material and a number of hypotheses for such an undertaking. 83

Adorno's view was that the economic and social causes of anti-Semitism were demonstrated by the psyche of the anti-Semite; a consistent and thorough psychological study of the anti-Semite would lead to the 'cultural anthropology' of anti-Semitism. 84

But the same problem arose here as with the concept always defended by Adorno: the idea of an immanent critique which could not do without a dash of transcendence. In the same way, an analysis of objective factors through an in-depth analysis of subjective factors could not do without basic knowledge of the objective factors. Was the knowledge of objective factors which Horkheimer and Adorno had at their disposal indeed the knowledge of objective factors generally available up-to-date and specific enough to make the correct 'immanent critique' possible? Had Horkheimer and Adorno not regarded up-to-date and specific analysis of objective factors, right into the period of the anti-Semitism project, as a crucial desideratum? In view of the hopelessness

of taking on such a task with the number of assistants they were prepared to work with, they had clearly suppressed it increasingly over the course of the years, or learnt to skip over reminders of it with stylized descriptions of work already carried out. When they returned to Frankfurt, it was as the authors of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and of *Studies in Prejudice*, as philosophers of history and critics of culture, as social psychologists and experts in modern sociological research technique: as established academics who seemed willing to pass on their achievements, and as a team. Only Adorno, however, had any serious intention not to rest on his laurels.

6

## Critical Ornament of a Restoration Society

## Taking Part in Post-War Reconstruction Research on Political Awareness Among West Germans

When Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock settled in Frankfurt with their wives and began to expand the 'German outpost', they saw themselves as Jews, as left-wing intellectuals and as critical sociologists in an environment which had been more or less completely purged of people like themselves, and in which all the signs had long since been pointing clearly to the restoration of the old order. The unique symbiosis represented by German-Jewish culture had been irreversibly destroyed. Apart from Horkheimer and Adorno, none of the distinguished lecturers or professors from the heyday of Frankfurt University the last years of the Weimar Republic returned. Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock could count on being met with patience and good intentions precisely because they were, and remained, the exceptions.

In contrast to Wolfgang Abendroth, one of the few professors who openly admitted to being a socialist, 1 Horkheimer and Adorno sought support, not from the labour movement or from opposition groups, but from the ruling authorities themselves. As Horkheimer put it in a letter of thanks to the Prime Minister of the state of Hesse, Georg August Zinn, they were looking for 'friends in high places, the sort of friends often hoped for in vain by academics also pursuing the practical goals of genuine education'.<sup>2</sup>

Not long after taking up his old chair, Horkheimer was elected Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, an office he held from autumn 1950 to autumn 1951. In this capacity, he made a contribution to the reconstruction of Frankfurt University which made it clear that there had been a change of emphasis in his relationship to theology: he ensured that chairs for Protestant and Catholic theology were re-established, and later one for Judaic studies as well.

Horkheimer's skills in diplomacy and organization proved themselves once again. The Institute, which was supposed to have been long since

abandoned as a distraction from their real work, but which was again and again kept alive to serve as a widely recognized guarantee of their seriousness, absorbed a good deal of Horkheimer's and Adorno's energies.

To secure finance and official grants, Horkheimer was even prepared to emphasize the Institute's participation in post-war reconstruction. In a memorandum to potential sponsors, the Institute was extolled, not only as an institution offering a progressive course of study in sociology and linking the 'extension of the German tradition of social philosophy and the humanities' with the 'most advanced empirical research methods of modern American sociology', but also as a centre offering academic advice on the state's urgent problems. 3

Statements about the Institute's recent history and its research programme, intended as information for prospective sponsors, included the remarks:

Social research, in all its aspects, and particularly in the areas of research on the structure of society, on human relationships and modes of behaviour within the labour process, of opinion research and the practical application of sociological and psychological knowledge in the last few decades, has received a great boost. Owing to political events, Germany has not been able to participate in this to the extent that might have been desired. The part these disciplines can play today both in Germany's public life and in the rationalization of its economy can hardly be overestimated, if the experience of other industrial nations is anything to go by.

Social analyses will be able to throw light on many crucial political and social problems of the post-war period, such as the refugee problem. They can provide an important cognitive basis for the reconstruction of cities and industrial areas. Training in the methods of social research can help young people better to grasp the tensions within our own population, as well as those between nations, and thus allow them to make an independent contribution to overcoming them . . .

Last but not least, social research can open the way to a variety of new professions. The demand for scientists trained in the new methods is no less than that for engineers, chemists or doctors, and they are valued no less than those professions are. Not only government administration, and all the opinion-forming media such as the press, film and radio, but also businesses maintain numerous sociological research bodies. Social research can create the optimal social conditions in their factories, ascertain and calculate in advance what the public needs in their branch of business, and monitor and improve the effectiveness of their advertising. A similar course of development can be expected in Germany as well.4

In the summer of 1950, the *Frankfurter Neue Zeitung* published an article, written with Horkheimer's collaboration, on 'Sociology in the Struggle Against Prejudice: HICOG supports Frankfurt University Institute of Social Research'.<sup>5</sup> The article claimed that the tasks of social research were not restricted to the field of education and information, like the Institute's studies on prejudice, but rather made it possible, for example, to decide 'where and how a factory should be correctly set up for its workers to achieve the highest productivity'.

Was this a peculiarly daring form of deception? Was Horkheimer going particularly far in extolling the Institute's usefulness to a modernized rational renewal of capitalist conditions because he was hoping to smuggle through particularly dangerous contraband? Did he really intend to make the Institute into a body financed by the state and industry that would act as a corrective in the process of restoration? Was it a question of undertaking what was described later on, during the student movement, as the 'long march through the institutions'? Or were the Institute's directors deceiving themselves? Were they making the Institute into a tool for turning reconstruction into restoration? With its requirement that the principle of self-assertion and individual and collective egoism should be transcended, and its demand for more humane social conditions, was the Institute simply able to embellish itself better, with words that merely sounded less hollow than other people's ready-made gala speeches? Now that the Institute depended on financial sponsorship, was this becoming an excuse for them to proceed more cautiously than was necessary in their professorial and intellectual capacities in order to keep the Institute in existence, instead of offering their support to Critical Theorists?

There was apparently never any honest and open discussion of these questions. Who was there to have it with? What had returned to Frankfurt was less than a rump of the Institute: only Horkheimer, Adorno and Pollock. One of the old aims, casting off ballast, had thus been achieved. But the relationships between Horkheimer and Adorno, and Horkheimer and Pollock, were so routine and symbiotic that discussions never arose which called accustomed strategies into question, or which called into question ideas which had deteriorated into mere formulas about the significance and aims of their own activities.

The Institute was re-established without Horkheimer having realized that an Institute that was no longer financially independent would sooner or later have to take on research contracts. Nor did he see that it would be difficult for Critical Theorists, in a period of restoration, not to fall into moral dilemmas. No further money was to be expected from Felix Weil. His business had long since ceased to flourish, and, in addition, he had stayed behind in America. What alternative was there to the strategy pursued by Lazarsfeld, who was so despised by the Critical Theorists, of using research contracts, even unwelcome ones, to give the Institute an opportunity to carry out its own projects? At the same time, it would

not be possible for its own projects to kick up too much of a fuss, since this might result in contracts not being awarded.

During the new Institute's initial phase, one event was symptomatic. Peter von Haselberg, who had been a student of Adorno's before 1933, and who after 1950 was loosely attached to the Institute, arranged a meeting between Adorno and the production manager of the paint manufacturers Hoechst. Haselberg had managed to get the production manager interested in the Institute's work, but Adorno gave the man a lecture on the Institute's working methods and goals that convinced him that an Institute like this could be of no use to Hoechst whatsoever. Adorno thus demonstrated, as he had done with the Princeton Radio Research Project, his more or less constitutional incapacity for 'administrative social research'. But Haselberg did not give up. He went to Horkheimer. Horkheimer's view was: I don't agree with industrial sociology; are we supposed to support that now as well? At this period, in which he was on the one hand appearing as a Critical Theorist and on the other trying to make the Institute's work palatable to business and administrative circles, Horkheimer may have thought that during the setting up of the new Institute this was still a good form of camouflage but that, one day, there would be no need to take it seriously.

So far as the establishment of the Institute was concerned, Horkheimer's strategy was very successful. The spring 1950 memorandum on the Institute of Social Research contained a five-year budget in which \$50,000 was set aside for the costs of building and furnishing the new Institute, and \$109,800 annually for running costs. (The scale of annual salaries ran from \$1000 each for the porter and the secretaries to \$7000 for the principal, i.e. Horkheimer himself.) The Institute still had very provisional accommodation, partly in the ruins of the bombed-out old Institute building and partly in offices belonging to the senate of Frankfurt University. In 1950 the US High Commissioner, John McCloy, put DM 200,000 at the Institute's disposal, with a further DM 235,000 for rebuilding. This energetic support sprang from a belief among those responsible for American policy in Germany that sociology, particularly when represented by American citizens and with its emphasis on empirical research, was a factor promoting democracy. (The Institute of Social-Scientific Research (Institut für sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung) in Darmstadt, founded in 1949, was also financed by a grant from HICOG, but it only survived for a few years. The Rockefeller Foundation supported the establishment of a Dortmund Sociological Research Unit (Sozialforschungsstelle Dortmund) at the University of Münster. Political science was encouraged by the Americans even more than sociology.)

The city of Frankfurt, which wanted to use the site of the old Institute for an extension to the university, offered in exchange another site directly next to the university. It paid the Society of Social Research DM 100,000 to cover the difference in value, and had the ruins cleared from the new site. The university also contributed the remaining

DM 55,000 towards the rebuilding costs at Horkheimer's request. At the end of October 1950 the funds had all been collected. In addition to HICOG and the city of Frankfurt, funds were contributed by the Society of Social Research and by private donors. Building work had begun by November.

Horkheimer almost succeeded in crowning the re-establishment of the Institute of Social Research by having a UNESCO Institute of Sociology established in the same building. While it was still uncertain whether he would be able to achieve this, he requested permission from the city to add a fourth storey to the building. This was readily granted, in the hope that the city would then be able to boast a UNESCO Institute as well. The additional storey was built, but the UNESCO Institute was set up in Cologne, where it lasted from 1951 to 1958.

Thanks to the finance from HICOG, the Institute was able to begin its first large-scale research project by the summer of 1950: a study of West German political awareness, the results of which were later published in the volume *Gruppenexperiment*.<sup>6</sup> The goal of this opinion research project was to investigate the attitudes of the German population towards foreign countries, the occupying powers, the Third Reich and the question of joint responsibility for its crimes, democracy and Germany's place in the world. The project was an obvious choice, because opinion research was one of the American imports which had aroused keen interest in West Germany, and also because education for democracy was still a central element of American policy there. At the same time, the Institute was able to present *Studies in Prejudice*, published in 1949-50, as representative of its work. It saw itself as semi-American, and most of the finance for this first study came from HICOG.

True to the tradition of previous Institute research, Horkheimer and Adorno were not interested in superficial opinion polling. As in *The Authoritarian Personality*, they wanted to penetrate beyond the surface level of opinions and ultimately identify the fascist, anti-democratic potential in the population. But what could that mean in this case, and how were they to proceed? In the Berkeley section of the anti-Semitism project, an approach using character structure had been developed. Character structure could be revealed by indirect and projective methods. But this method was not possible when it was a matter of revealing attitudes to particular political topics. It was not possible to expose opinions about specific topics without actually talking about the topics themselves. What had to be achieved, therefore, was that the persons being examined should openly express their opinions on concrete topics of this sort.

It was an idea typical of Horkheimer that produced the research method finally used in the project. Even during the anti-Semitism project, the film project had been the section closest to his heart, since it was a research tool not too far removed from the conditions of everyday life and could therefore offer realistic insights into the mechanisms at work

among those taking part in the experiment. Horkheimer now suggested taking the situation in a railway compartment as a model of how one might carry out research into German opinion on political topics in a manner different from, and more realistic than, the usual methods of questioning. In railway compartments, discussions often took place in which strangers discussed even the most delicate topics with astonishing openness. At the time the model was an obvious one, since shared suffering or shared memories of suffering brought people into contact more quickly than usual.

It would have been natural for Horkheimer to have had a list made of the most important publications relating to public opinion research. He must have seen the article by Mark Abrams on the advantages and disadvantages of group interviews, published in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* in 1949. Abrams was director of the business-financed London Opinion Research Institute, and had used this still unconventional procedure to test advertising campaigns. Among the advantages of group interviewing, he mentioned that in group discussions of around two hours in length pre-conscious opinions of the informants which were not accessible to normal questioning methods came to light; that the group atmosphere led the informants to express views and feelings they would sense as intolerant and would therefore have suppressed in normal interviews; that matters expressed in a group discussion appeared in a recognizable context; that the juxtaposition of contradictory opinions that was characteristic of everyday life was reproduced in group discussion; that some members of the group tended to express 'public' views different from the 'private' ones given in their personal interviews, the former being more likely to provide evidence of their real behaviour; and that informants expressed themselves less cautiously and defensively in the company of those who were like-minded, or even members of the same club, than they would do in the normal interview situation. Abrams saw the problems as lying above all in analysing the data. The problem that groups could only with difficulty be formed according to the principles of the random sample or the quota sample did not seem to him a serious obstacle, so long as one was concerned not with accumulating diverse opinions but with the structure and dynamics of attitudes. Even Freud and his pupils had not been concerned with random samples of the general population when studying their patients, and they had nevertheless developed a general theory of the human psyche.

Whether or not Abrams's article played a part in Horkheimer and Adorno's conception of the project, it offered an original and novel concept which was very promising for researchers interested in qualitative analyses. Horkheimer was open to novelties of this sort, as always. The topic of group dynamics had been growing in significance since the 1940s, and he was familiar with it, at least through the researches of his fellow émigré Kurt Lewin, whom he had regarded as a competitor during the anti-Semitism research in New York. The method of participant

interviews used by the Institute in 1944 in its study of labour was an example of the way in which it was possible to steer discussions in everyday situations towards specific themes without it being noticed. From their impressions, experiences and ideas in this area, Horkheimer and Adorno derived the group discussion procedure as a newly modified, newly developed method of 'realistic opinion research' for the purposes of the Institute's own project. According to the first prospectus to be prepared by the newly founded Institute, in 1952, the group discussion procedure had been developed from 'questionnaire procedures, projective techniques and group interviews'. (The Institute's associates preferred the term 'group discussion' to that of 'group interview', which was more common in the English-speaking world, in order to make it clear that it was a question not of simultaneously interviewing a group of individuals but rather of establishing what opinions arose within the framework of a group discussion.)

The procedure, which the Frankfurt group was the first to use in Germany, developing it further during the 1950s and turning it into a recognized technique of social research, was in principle as follows. A group of people maybe ten participants gather at a place where people would normally tend to congregate anyway, to discuss certain topics for about two hours. To preserve anonymity, the participants can, if necessary, be given cards with assumed names on them. A 'basic stimulus' can provide the starting-point for the discussion. (In the Institute's group study, a fictional open letter from a sergeant of the Allied forces to his local newspaper after five years' service in the army of occupation was played back from tape. The 'basic stimulus' was put together in the same way as the questionnaire sheets used for *The Authoritarian Personality* it was based on the immediate experience of what was being said and on things which were common knowledge, but also on analytic categories such as ethnocentrism, guilt complex, authority complex.) The fieldworker, equipped with a tape recorder and accompanied by an assistant who was to note any reactions or occurrences not registered on the tape, was to function as a neutral chairman whose most important task was to ensure a discussion that was as free as possible and encouraged spontaneous statements. In the second part of the discussion the fieldworker could, depending on circumstances, introduce standardized arguments and counter-arguments relating to particular areas of the subject being discussed. Basic statistical information was to be provided by the completion of a short questionnaire.

During a test phase, the basic stimulus to be used was altered several times it was supposed to provide a psychological stimulus, but not overstimulation. Experiences were gathered on how mistakes in the formation of the groups could be avoided and on how those chairing the discussions should best proceed. Horkheimer and Adorno's associates, it should be remembered, had no experience. Diedrich Osmer, for example, the most dedicated among them, who was a head of

department at the Institute, had had a legal training up to the equivalent of a bachelor's degree, and worked in a piano shop in addition to his work at the Institute. Ludwig von Friedeburg, a psychology student in Freiburg, had stopped off one day to visit the Institute while passing through Frankfurt, and then carried out part of the practical course-work for his psychology diploma at the Institute in 1951. The project therefore at the same time represented real-life training in empirical social research for the new generation of sociologists. This was typical of the beginnings of social research in the first decade after the war.

The Institute's inquiries for a pilot study investigating significant aspects of German political awareness were carried out in the winter of 1950-1 in the municipal and rural districts of Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich and Augsburg. In side-rooms of small bars, in hostels, in refugee camps, in canteens at large factories, in bunkers, in clubhouses wherever groups of people were spontaneously gathering and talking to each other about 1800 people from every class of society met in groups of mostly eight to sixteen people to discuss the political topics mentioned in the Allied sergeant's 'open letter'. More than twenty research assistants took part in the research phase of the project, as well as press stenographers, who typed out transcripts of the tape recordings. The analytical phase had at its disposal 121 discussions with a total of 1635 participants, or, to be more exact, transcripts of the discussions amounting to 6392 typed pages containing the record of what had been said during the group meetings and what had been observed by the discussion chairmen and assistants.

In practice, it had soon become obvious that Horkheimer's enticing railway compartment model was misleading. With randomly associated groups, whose members neither knew one another nor had anything basically in common in terms of profession, interests, life-history, and so on, it was often not possible to create a free atmosphere for discussion. For the great majority of the 121 discussion groups, the Frankfurt group in a manner similar to what Abrams had suggested in his article used pre-structured and sociologically or ideologically more or less homogeneous groups. For example, they put together farmers from the same village, or members of a club who already knew each other, or else strangers who nevertheless shared the same profession, the same political convictions or the same life-history such as young teachers, Young Socialists, or refugees and an atmosphere for discussion soon appeared resembling what might have been expected from long-standing acquaintances.

Horkheimer's railway compartment model, which was mentioned in the published results of the research five years later as the concept which had inspired this research method, exemplified a problem which was also noticeable in the way the material was analysed. It was assumed in Horkheimer's model that individuals' dominant thoughts, what they had absorbed from public opinion and their attitudes to it would

all come to the fore in the easily penetrable atmosphere of the group. A central idea here was to put the mechanisms of self-censorship out of action, although by means different from those used in the Berkeley study. However, in the discussions held in the pre-structured groups which the research went over to, it became clear that the more it was possible to bring out dominant opinions through the group discussion, the more it proved necessary to analyse the group dynamics and individual character structures, which were by no means easily penetrable, if anything conclusive was to be said about the role played by public opinion in the individual participants' states of mind or about the real communicative situations for which the opinions expressed would be valid.

Four or five weeks after the group meetings, individual interviews were carried out with a quarter of those who had taken part in the discussions. These interviews were not properly prepared, and no account was taken of them in the analysis. A comparison between the results of the individual interviews and the opinions expressed in the group discussions was also difficult or impossible, both because the number of those who remained silent during the discussions was very large and because few of those who spoke gave their views on every topic. On average, those who were totally silent formed a majority of 61 per cent over those who spoke. In addition, the qualities of each group were not systematically recorded, so that analysis of the group dynamics of each group was not possible.

With the material available, it was therefore hardly possible to discover anything decisive about the dynamics of individual opinion under group conditions. Why were Horkheimer and Adorno not satisfied with regarding the research merely as a study of 'public opinion' on specific political topics among West Germans? Were there not good reasons for regarding the group discussion procedure as a way of producing a collective climate in miniature, as a simulation of the conditions in which public opinion was being formulated? Was it not more plausible to see the project's goal as being to reveal what had been described in *The Authoritarian Personality* as a 'cultural climate', to which individuals were either more or less susceptible or more or less immune to reveal what Sartre had described in his *Réflexions sur la Question juive* as that other, 'amorphous, diffused, and omnipresent' society; to reveal what Adorno described with the Hegelian term 'objective spirit'? At an advanced stage of the analysis, a draft written by Adorno for one of the assistants stated:

Our study is more concerned with intellectual supply than with intellectual demand. However, it is not interested in the institutional form of this, in 'mass communications', but rather in the more vague but omnipresent form in which it touches people in their social existence: in the intellectual atmosphere which they

breathe . . . The central interest of the study is therefore not directed towards subjective opinions at all, but rather to those elements of consciousness which are objectively predetermined and prescribed and disseminated socially; it is directed, precisely, towards the 'objective spirit', the 'German ideology'. 7

But Horkheimer and Adorno were not satisfied with this kind of goal. If the objective spirit conjured up by organizing group discussions was not to be connected with a materialist theory of society, an analysis of objective factors, then the least they could do was to provide it with a social-psychological basis in the 'living' individuals studied. To have presented an 'objective spirit' with its links to either of these aspects dissolved would, for them, have meant abandoning their claims to materialism; it would have meant that they were creating abstractions out of social structures and out of the individuals characterized by them.

Both the research and the analysis of it were therefore marred by a persistent lack of clarity. Although the principal purpose was to identify the objective spirit through group discussions, the attitudes of individual speakers formed the basis for both the quantitative and the qualitative analyses. These attitudes were considered to be not aspects of the group concerned but elements of the totality made up by the participants. In addition, although the function of the objective spirit for the individual state of mind was to be examined, attempts to develop a procedure capable of doing this never progressed beyond the initial stages. Moreover, since the goal of the proceedings was to prepare the ground for a theoretically significant and representative inquiry (it had also been planned that the Berkeley study should broaden out in this way), the group study took on a provisional and experimental character as well.

Despite scepticism among the assistants themselves, one thing was clear from the very beginning: the material they had acquired was of the greatest interest. It was concerned with matters which other social scientists preferred not to touch. The transcripts were processed using descriptive and interpretative categories just like the material that had been gathered in the inquiry on the working class in the second half of the 1930s, although no explicit connection was made between the two projects. In ten weeks of intense collective work, a 'scoring manual' to code the transcripts of the discussions was produced. In the quantitative analysis, the individuals, not the discussion groups, were treated as statistical units and collated under statistical groups independent of the discussion groups, such as twenty- to thirty-year-olds, primary school children, farmers, and so on. The results were depressing.

The quantitative analysis of attitudes to democracy was arranged around seven 'test topics': attitudes to democracy (Bonn and the type of state post-war Germany was), to guilt (shared responsibility for war atrocities and Nazism), to the Jews, to the West (the USA, occupation, Britain, France), to the East, to rearmament, to the Germans themselves.

The attitudes of those taking part in the discussions (or, more exactly, of those who spoke in them) were largely negative, not only towards the Soviet Union but also towards the Western powers. Approximately two-thirds of the speakers expressed ambivalent attitudes towards democracy. There were twice as many explicit opponents of democracy as there were those who had no reservations about it. At the same time, half of the speakers rejected any shared guilt for the atrocities of the Third Reich. Two statistical groups stood out in particular for their negative qualities: farmers and academics. The farmers all without exception denied any share in national guilt; the academics denied it virtually without exception. Of the farmers who expressed views about the Jews, more than three-quarters proved to be radically or considerably anti-Semitic. The academics, who participated in the discussions to a far greater extent than average on every other topic, were noticeably withdrawn on the topic of the Jews. Of those who did express an opinion, over 90 per cent were radically or considerably anti-Semitic.

The overall quantitative result, which made no claim to be generally representative of the West German population, and which was also restricted to those participants who spoke, was (for all topics excluding East Germany): 16 per cent positive, 40 per cent ambivalent and 44 per cent negative. On the topic of the East, rejection, classified as positive, was the overwhelming result. Despite an odd attempt to keep this evaluation of attitudes non-committal, and to leave undecided the question whether the attitudes being evaluated in this way were to be seen as attitudes to democracy or attitudes to the discussion topics, the interpretation which kept gaining acceptance, even in the text itself, was that the attitudes being examined were attitudes to democratic values. For supporters of a democratic system, it was therefore a result which gave little grounds for confidence.

Eighteen associates of the Institute contributed a total of eleven monographs to the qualitative analysis. Among these were a study by Adorno on guilt and defensiveness; a study on mistrust of democracy which tried to clarify the motives and reasons for the widespread 'depoliticization' that had taken place; and a study of a social-theoretical interpretation of the complex attitudes to rearmament. (The latter was a point which had been given particularly odd treatment in the quantitative analysis: acceptance of rearmament was always evaluated as a positive attitude, rejection always as a negative attitude, because Adorno and his assistants seemed to view the slogan 'Without us!', which was then still popular, as being linked to a rejection of the post-Hitler state. This took no account of the extremely various causes and motives involved, particularly among opponents of remilitarization. Among these was Gustav Heinemann, who resigned from his post as Federal Minister of the Interior on 11 October 1950 in protest at Adenauer's rearmament plans, and who founded the neutralist Emergency Society for the Peace of Europe 8 in November 1951.)

This was how the newly founded Institute of Social Research's first

project looked at the beginning of the 1950s: a fairly large-scale collective research project which followed the same line as that taken by the Institute's earlier inquiries on authority and prejudice. Other projects of the Institute's initial phase were overshadowed by it. Among these was the production of a version of *Studies in Prejudice* that took the German situation into account. This was soon scaled down to involve only the production of a German version of *The Authoritarian Personality*. But even this smaller-scale version, despite years of effort, never went beyond an abridged translation of *The Authoritarian Personality*, which Horkheimer was so dissatisfied with that it was left unpublished, only a few mimeographed copies being circulated. 9 Another project was negotiated by Leo Lowenthal, who had remained in the USA and had been director of the Research Department of the Voice of America since 1949. In collaboration with Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, the Institute examined the difference between the effectiveness of the German broadcasts of the Voice of America, the BBC World Service, and eastern European stations (Radio Moscow and East German stations). The radio research project—the first pure contract research in the history of the Institute of Social Research—was conducted by using experts to interview listeners. The results were poor. They did not make the Voice of America any the wiser. But to that extent they gave no trouble to the conscience of a Critical Theorist.

Viewed as a whole, all that had taken place at the Institute in the first eighteen months after its re-establishment, under circumstances which were provisional in every respect, was remarkable. When the new Institute building in the Senckenberg Park was officially opened on 14 November 1951, Horkheimer could be proud of what had been achieved.

#### Horkheimer Established Overnight

The official opening ceremony in the Institute's lecture hall was attended by representatives of the state and city authorities, of the US High Commission, of Frankfurt University and of other universities, as well as figures from the business and literary worlds and a student delegation. Among the speakers were the Hessian Minister of Education, Ludwig Metzger; the Mayor of Frankfurt, Walter Kolb; a representative of HICOG; Leopold von Wiese, the chairman of the German Sociology Association; and René König, director of the Sociology Department at the University of Cologne. Among the speakers representing the Institute were its director and also three young assistants, who closed the speechmaking with enthusiastic statements. Horkheimer had just been elected rector of Frankfurt University. He made a speech containing nothing that might cause offence, nothing that might confuse the representatives of state, city and academic institutions who were present.

These were politically explosive times, not unlike 1931, when Horkheimer had given his inaugural lecture as Professor of Social Philosophy and director of the Institute of Social Research. The Korean War had been going on since 1950. McCarthyism was reaching its peak in the United States. In March 1951 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was elected President of the United States in the following year, announced that the use of the atomic bomb was morally justified, since the United States had no intention of initiating a war. The West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, scenting in the Korean War a chance to enhance the status of the German Federal Republic, in 1950 proposed creating western European armed forces, including a German contingent. He was taking the first step towards rearmament. Anti-Communism was also on the march in `colonial' West Germany. On 19 September 1950 the Federal Government announced a ruling concerning `Anti-Democratic Political Activities by Public Employees'.<sup>10</sup> This described support for various organizations as being `incompatible with official duties', referring to thirteen organizations in particular, among them the Cultural League for the Democratic Renewal of Germany,<sup>11</sup> which avoided the ban by dissolving itself and founding a successor organization with the publisher Ernst Rowohlt at its head; and the Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime.<sup>12</sup> The leadership of the latter organization in Hesse had in 1948 encouraged the Mayor of Frankfurt, Walter Kolb, to carry out his intention to invite Horkheimer to the celebrations on the centenary of the opening of the German National Assembly in St Paul's Church in Frankfurt, the Paulskirche. Even people who openly admitted that they were not *anti-communists* were exposed to defamation and discrimination. The Catholic writer Reinhold Schneider, who supported holding a public debate on the rearmament question and serious attempts to reach an understanding with the East, published two articles in East Germany because of a lack of opportunities to publish ideas of this sort in the West. As a result, many West German journals, newspapers and broadcasting organizations refused to publish anything else by Schneider from then on.

Government and official bodies used the police to try to prevent political contacts between West and East Germans. West German police arrested 10,000 young West Germans who were returning from a Whitsun meeting in East Berlin and held them at the border for over twenty-four hours until they agreed to register their names and undergo a `health' examination. In May 1951 another 10,000 or so young West Germans, returning from a `Meeting on Germany' in East Berlin, were arrested by the police and held for two days at the border between West and East Germany at Herrenburg because they refused to let their names be registered. To stop people going to the `Third Youth and Student World Peace Festival' held in East Berlin on 5-9 August 1951, The German-German border, which at that time was still open, was closed by substantial numbers of West German police. In May

1952, twenty-one-year-old Philip Müller, a member of the Free German Youth, 13 was shot dead by West German police during a banned demonstration in Essen.

By contrast, Adenauer, who had been elected Chancellor by a majority of one vote (his own), had demanded in his inaugural speech that the distinction between 'two classes of people in Germany' those who were politically impeccable and those who were not should be abolished as soon as possible. The law relating to article 131 of the Basic Law, the West German constitution, which was passed in May 1951 with SPD approval, recognized the social security rights of those people, previously regarded as 'incriminated', who had belonged to the Civil Service at the end of the Third Reich. The law made it possible for those who were still incriminated to return to the Civil Service. 'Incriminated' persons were even given preferential consideration for vacant posts. Since university professors are also civil servants in Germany, a check had to be made against a list supplied by the Ministry of the Interior whenever an appointment to a professorial post was made, to see whether there was not a suitable candidate with a preferential claim to the post among these 'article 131' professors. The 'Loyalty Law' (*Treuepflichtgesetz*) of 1952 ensured in addition that members of the Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime were excluded from the Civil Service.

These examples illustrate the dominant political and cultural climate of the time. 'Things are getting gloomier and gloomier here,' Marcuse wrote to Horkheimer from the USA, a month before the Institute reopened. He had spent a few days in Frankfurt during a trip to Europe that summer, and had spoken to Horkheimer while he was there. 'But I think there will only be a relatively sort time-lag between the gloom here and gloom in Germany. At the moment the air over there is certainly still freer (although not fresher).'

This was the background against which Horkheimer gave his speech. He did not take the opportunity offered by his establishment position to overstep academic bounds in the slightest. Social science, he declared, could contribute towards abolishing the evils of prejudice and a priori restrictions, and could help to make the structure of the world correspond more closely to the true needs of its inhabitants. Without the kind of free thought, unconcerned with domination, which philosophy and sociology were concerned with, the door to a society which was more free and more worthy of humanity would never open, and the world would stagger from one catastrophe to the next, in spite of periods of reconstruction. Such talk of the importance of free thought for a freer world was indistinguishable from the dominant jargon of the time, which contrasted the values 'Freedom = West' and 'Dictatorship = East'. The future of humanity, Horkheimer stated, taking up another catch-word from current speechmaking and politics, depended on developing a modern version of humanism. Horkheimer referred even to Nazism in

conventional, mythologizing metaphors: 'devilish powers' had driven him and his associates from Frankfurt; a 'horror' had unfortunately taken place.

As to the goals and tasks of the Institute, he said that much of what he had mentioned in his inaugural lecture of 1931 was still valid, for example, the demand for collaboration between philosophers, sociologists, economists, and so on. 'The blinkers we might add today the blinkers must fall away, both those of individual disciplines and those of particular national or school traditions.' Earlier German sociology, which had tended to be rather more theoretical, and also the newest, most efficient empirical social science methods developed in the USA, would be given equal emphasis in the teaching programme at the Institute. This was an extension of his characterization of his own work as a combination of European ideas and American methods, a description that had long since degenerated into a mere formula, but also applied to the role of the Institute and its director as a bridge between the USA and Germany. Horkheimer proceeded now in exactly the same way as he had before. He had substituted the title *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* for Grünberg's *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*. In his inaugural lecture, he had substituted an apparently independent materialist transformation of German idealist philosophy for Grünberg's appeal to Marxist theory. And he had substituted a demand for interdisciplinary work and a combination of philosophy and the various scientific disciplines for Lukács's demand taking up a theme from Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg that the division of labour in bourgeois science should be transcended. So, too, he now used a general circumlocution which opened up an unimpeded vista compared with rigid and dogmatic left-wing theoretical positions while also sounding melodious and non-committal in establishment ears.

At the end of his speech, Horkheimer expressed the basic intention of Critical Theory in a way that transformed social change into a kind of ethical requirement for sociologists, like the Hippocratic Oath for doctors:

When I speak of the broader points of view that must be linked to individual studies, what I mean is that in every question that arises, indeed in the sociological attitude itself, there is always an implicit intention to transcend existing society. Without this intention, although it is hardly possible to describe it in detail, questions will neither be put in the correct way, nor will sociological thinking arise at all. One becomes a victim either of the abundance of evidence or of mere constructs. A certain critical attitude to what exists is, so to speak, part of the job for the social theorist, and it is precisely this critical element, which develops from the most positive thing there is from hope which makes sociologists unpopular. To educate students to endure this tension towards

what exists, which is part of the very essence of our discipline, to make them `social' in the true sense which also includes being able to endure standing alone this is perhaps the most important, and ultimate, goal of education as we see it. 15

In 1931 Horkheimer had spoken of large-scale research projects which were either under way or were soon to follow. Nothing of this sort was mentioned at the reopening ceremony. Horkheimer did not so much as hint at the initial results of the study on West German political awareness, although in this he would have appeared in no way isolated. For example, the US High Commissioner for Germany (HICOG) had in 1951 published the results of an opinion survey in German institutes, in which one of the questions asked was which groups had the greatest claim to assistance. `Public opinion' produced a hierarchy which was symptomatic of the times: war widows and orphans came first; second, those who had been bombed; third, those who had been expelled from the East; and, fourth, the resistance fighters of 20 July 1944, when there was an attempted assassination of Hitler. Only then came the Jews.

In 1931 Horkheimer had spoken of the new, challenging and important task of using a great empirical research apparatus to solve the problems of social philosophy. In contrast, he now praised some of his young associates, and continued, `We can only hope that fresh blood of this sort will very soon make us, the older ones, superfluous here and send us back to philosophy.'

The formula that European ideas and American methods should be merged remained an empty one. Horkheimer even in contrast with the period of the anti-Semitism project was apparently no longer able to imagine any Institute research that would both advance the theory and also arouse enough ambition in him to enable him to carry through a study that would be worthy of respect.

But what prospects did he see for his work in philosophy? Was he capable of drafting a project that would be able to give it inspiration? The answers to these questions can be seen in the speech he gave a week after the Institute's opening ceremony, on 20 November 1951, on taking office as rector of Frankfurt University. Among the guests of honour were the Bishop of Limburg and members of the diplomatic corps. `On the staff podium,' the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported the next day, `the hoods on the deans' gowns stood out colourfully. But the dark red with gold embroidery on the gown of the new rector, Professor Max Horkheimer, outshone them all.' The atmosphere at the handover ceremony for the rectorship was somewhat more formal than that at the Institute's opening. The wearing of gowns and insignia of office underlined how far removed the German universities were from any democratic customs. And embarrassing passages occurred more often in the speeches. The Mayor of Frankfurt, Leiske, deputizing for the Lord Mayor, addressed `your Magnificence', namely Horkheimer,

with the words: 'You have returned to your fatherland in an exemplary gesture of reconciliation, and have taken up your chair at this university again. Such loyalty demands loyalty in return. We all, therefore, feel that your election to the highest academic office at our Johann Wolfgang Goethe University has been the climax of our own duty to provide restitution and compensation.'

These were the circumstances in which Horkheimer, wearing the rector's chain of office, gave his speech 'On the Concept of Reason'. *Eclipse of Reason* had been a popularized version, enriched by Adorno's contributions, of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*; the rector's speech was an extract from *Eclipse of Reason* (which had been translated into German by Heinz Maus, but had not yet been published in Germany). One does not wish to take a speech given at a rectoral inauguration as a measure of what to expect of a person's academic work; but what followed in the years to come was merely a series of lectures, speeches and other occasional pieces produced by a man much in demand, and they were often based on drafts written by Adorno.

It was noticeable that Horkheimer's speech not only did not go beyond what had been said in *Eclipse of Reason* at any point, but did not even try to link what was said there with the situation in Germany. The speech might just as well have been given in New York or Los Angeles. The puzzled but precise report of it published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* showed how academic it had sounded in the end. The 'new calendar' in Germany did not have the datemark 'before liberationafter liberation', but 'before currency reformafter currency reform' (as Peter Rühmkorf put it). Germany was integrating itself into the West and was busy with reconstructiona process Horkheimer wanted very much to contribute to. There was much eagerness to suppress memories, and a great deal of reluctance and inadequacy in the financial restitution and compensation which Germany was forced by the victorious Western powers to provide to victims of the former regime. In a country like this, surely talk of a crisis in the concept of reason and a plea for reason to achieve self-reflection on the totality must have sounded completely abstract and out of touch. Surely such talk must have relieved conformists, and those who were 'politically incriminated', of the need to cover their ears to avoid hearing it. And was it capable of encouraging students in anything other than the strained intellectualism Adorno had mentioned in his article 'A Resurrection of Culture in Germany?', published in the *Frankfurter Hefte* in 1950?

But measuring Horkheimer and Adorno by the standards of their own tradition, by their own demands and by the standards and resoluteness of the critical-theoretical thinking of the Weimer Republic was one thing; seeing them in the context of the Federal Republic of the time, and particularly seeing them against its academic backdrop, was quite another. Even though what Horkheimer and Adorno said and published

during the 1950s was out of touch and non-committal, even though it was inoffensive, Critical Theory was still hibernating within it; it still bore traces of the fresh wind of left-wing social critique.

It was unusual for philosophy students to hear society or socially relevant matters mentioned. For example, at the first post-war conference of German philosophers, held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in 1947, the two dominant figures were Heidegger in his absence, since he had been banned from teaching till 1951 by the French occupation authorities on the grounds of his political incrimination; and Nicolai Hartmann, who gave the opening address. Ignoring every hope that there would be 'topical philosophizing', Hartmann spoke of the timeless 'categorical research' he had been carrying on for decades, undisturbed even by the Third Reich. But the sociologists did not offer anything particularly liberating either, although the discipline had suffered particularly severely from the Nazi purges, and one might have expected convinced democrats to move into the old chairs or take up new ones. When the rebuilt Institute of Social Research was opened, there were eight chairs of sociology in West Germany, some of them interdisciplinary ones linked to other subjects. 16 Only three of these were held by émigrés or anti-fascists. One of the two émigrés was Horkheimer. The other was René König, who had succeeded to Leopold von Wiese's chair in Cologne in 1949. König, who had lived and taught in exile in Switzerland during the Third Reich, was a conservative democrat politically, and academically he was the most resolute German pioneer of sociology, viewed as a consistently empirical, independent, non-philosophical discipline. In Berlin, Otto Stammer had received a professorship in sociology in the Faculty of Economics and Social Science at the Free University in 1951. Stammer had been a committed Social Democrat, journalist, teacher and electioneer, and after the Nazi takeover he had been banned from teaching or publishing. His academic career only started at the end of the Third Reich. He had studied under Hermann Heller,<sup>17</sup> and belonged, like Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, to a tradition of social scientists with links to the labour movement. The other five sociology professors had all had a more or less normal academic career under Nazism: Arnold Gehlen, Helmut Schelsky, Gerhard Mackenroth, Max Graf Solms and Werner Ziegenfuss.

The way in which appointments to the sociology chairs had been made was typical of the situation in the universities as a whole: the professors all came from the more conservative sections of society, just as they had done during the Weimar Republic. Even if someone like Heidegger, who had incriminated himself during the Nazi period, was not given a chair again, it did not tarnish his reputation, but on the contrary increased it in both academic and non-academic circles after the ban on him expired, Heidegger was still active as an academic teacher up to and after his retirement with emeritus status in 1958, and he had given sensational lectures even before 1951. Nor did his exclusion from

a chair affect the way in which his thinking was defended by those who did have chairs. No matter how Horkheimer and Adorno camouflaged themselves, they represented a ray of light for many students, even if only because what they were doing was unusual, and because what Horkheimer had said at the opening ceremony, thanking the architects of the newfunctionalInstitute building, was also true of them themselves: you could see from outside that it wasn't stuffy in there.

But what it was that they sensed there remained without a name. There was no Critical Theory, no Frankfurt School. The hopes expressed by Heinz Maus (who in the meantime had become Horkheimer's assistant) in a report he wrote for the *Frankfurter Rundschau* remained unfulfilled: 'Horkheimer's work . . . has mainly appeared in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*. It would be desirable for at least the essays "Egoism and the Freedom Movement", "The Latest Attack on Metaphysics" and "Traditional and Critical Theory" to be republished.' Nor did Horkheimer's or Adorno's teaching provide any substitute. After a lecture course on 'Theory and Criticism of Society since Saint-Simon' in the summer of 1950, Horkheimer only gave philosophical lectures on 'The Problems of Modern Philosophy', 'Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century', and so on and, from the summer of 1951 on, seminars on sociological research methods, with additional seminars on the basic concepts of sociology and social science training following soon after. Adorno, who for a long time was not nearly as popular among the students as Horkheimer, gave only philosophical courses for years after returning to independent teaching in the summer of 1950. To begin with, he gave a two-semester lecture course on aesthetics, and then lecture courses on 'Husserl and the Problems of Contemporary Epistemology', 'Bergson', 'The History of Political Philosophy' and 'The Problems of Idealism'. The joint seminars given by Horkheimer and Adorno, a pale shadow of the impressive collaborative teaching carried out during the heyday of Frankfurt University towards the end of the Weimar Republic, were also philosophical, and centred mainly on Kant and Hegel. The books by Horkheimer and Adorno that were available in German, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, *Philosophy of Modern Music* and *Minima Moralia* which, in the situation of the Federal Republic, were cut off from the tradition they stood in, and were not incorporated productively into the authors' current activities could hardly be seen as contributions to the revision and extension of a critical theory of society. In articles in newspapers and journals Adorno presented himself as a critic of music and culture with a sociological background.

In spite of all their successes, had they therefore cast aside what was best? Had Adorno's fear been proved true that he and Horkheimer had nothing much to hope for in Germany apart from security, since the climate of thought there was still on the wrong side of the critique of ontology, Germany's colonial status was unfavourable for the analysis of society, and there was too great a temptation for them to act as

intellectual guides? Were they both living purely off their earlier work, partly out of necessity, and partly in response to Germany's tremendous need to catch up on lost time, especially in the fields of social science and social psychology? And was their tendency to do this also encouraged by the sad fact that they were practically the only left-wing theoreticians from the Weimar period who had been able to re-establish themselves successfully? Was the Institute, in its new form, unsuited from the start to the task of carrying out what Horkheimer and Adorno had seen in the USA, up to the very end, as the decisive requirement: a topical and concrete analysis of objective factors? When Horkheimer, at the reopening of the Institute, said he hoped to be able to devote himself entirely to his philosophical work again, was it just the usual refrain from a man who complained about distractions from the philosophical work he longed to do (distractions he himself had caused), and who committed the Institute to carrying out unconnected empirical projects by conspicuously avoiding putting together a staff whose members had qualifications equal to his own community of theoreticians, to be precise? But how did things look in terms of practical research? In the very last year of his life, Adorno emphasized that, although people liked to accuse the critical sociologists of contenting themselves with paperwork, they did in fact feel a need for so-called fieldwork. What was he doing in practice? He was both years younger and the more productive of the two; was he giving the whole project a direction corresponding to the seriousness of his own standards? Was he at least trying?

#### Adorno's Vision of Critical Empirical Social Research Crisis at the Institute Marcuse's Dream

Horkheimer gave his speech at the reopening of the Institute on 14 November 1951 and his inaugural speech as rector of Frankfurt University on 20 November. On 14 December, Adorno gave the introductory lecture 'On the Current Status of Empirical Social Research' 18 at the First Conference on German Opinion Research, organized by the Frankfurt Institute for the Promotion of Civic Affairs 19 at Weinheim an der Bergstrasse. This division of labour proved symptomatic of the future division of roles between the two authors of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Apart from his teaching, which continued to be highly successful, Horkheimer ultimately took on a purely ceremonial role. Adorno, for his part, took on the role of sociologist, alongside his teaching, which was not very notable during the 1950s, his continued prominence outside academia as a critic and aesthete of music and a new prominence as a critic of culture and literature.

Adorno became a sociologist in two respects. On the one hand, he was active, as he had been during the anti-Semitism project, as a practitioner

of social research. He took part, sometimes intensively, in the Institute's empirical projects during the 1950s. Between the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1952 he also helped the Darmstadt Institute of Social Science Research, 20 which had got into difficulties, to publish the results of a broad-based community study in nine monographs. (The Darmstadt Institute had been founded by a HICOG official in 1949 to give young German social scientists an opportunity to learn social science research methods.)

On the other hand, he was also active as a theoretician of social science research. The emphasis here lay on the question of the relationship between empirical social research and sociological theorizing ultimately based on an outline of critical empirical social research. Throughout the two decades when Adorno lived in the Federal Republic, he produced a series of studies of this sort from his lecture on 'The Present State of Sociology',<sup>21</sup> given at a workshop on political sociology in February 1951 in Marburg, to an article written in collaboration with assistants at the Institute on 'empirical social research' for a *Dictionary of Social Science* published in 1954,<sup>22</sup> and a treatise on 'Social Theory and Empirical Research', written in the last year of his life, based on a broadcast lecture.

The Weinheim conference despite its general title 'Empirical Social Research', which Adorno, who helped to organize it, probably insisted on was mainly concerned with the methods and problems of opinion and market research. Over a hundred people took part. They came from commercial opinion research institutes, from universities and university institutes, from statistics offices, broadcasting organizations, HICOG and other organizations. The conference had been suggested by the HICOG Reactions Analysis Staff, the US High Commissioner's opinion research department. George Gallup, one of the pioneers of modern opinion research, who in 1936 had used a small but representative sample of 6000 voters to give an accurate prediction of the result of the American presidential election, thus making the sampling method famous virtually overnight, sent a telegram of greetings to the German pioneers who followed in his wake.

Leopold von Wiese, the seventy-five-year-old doyen of German sociology, had agreed to preside at the conference. His opening speech offered a taste of the abstract, unworldly reserve of pre-war German sociology in the face of empirical social research. There were some two dozen lectures on specialized social science methods, problems and organizational issues. Professor Leo P. Crespi from the US High Commissioner's opinion research department, whose questionnaire results were usually 'top secret', spoke emphasizing the significance of opinion research in getting social institutions to function in a genuinely democratic way. Professor P.L. Fegiz from the Milan DOXA Institute sketched out a vision of a European union in which questionnaires on the habits and tastes of European consumers would make mass

production of the products most in demand as cheap as possible. Before all this began, however, Adorno attempted in his introductory lecture to snatch empirical social research back from the 'research system' and rescue it to serve a theory of society which was resolutely critical of the humanistic tradition of German sociology.

In the period of idealism, Adorno argued, philosophical thought had been able to master all the factual material then known. After the collapse of idealistic systems, their central concepts had been torn from their theoretical context and material relations and made into tools of obscurantism in the hands of a humanistic social theory.

This remnant of German humanistic sociology urgently requires the use of empirical methods as a corrective measure. The true significance of empirical methods lies in the critical motivation they contain. Empirical social research must not allow this motivation to wither away, nor can it deceive itself in its investigation of social relations. Instead of starting by embellishing for itself a conciliatory picture of social reality with the help of ideological concepts and then contentedly accepting existing conditions, science must produce an awareness of the harshness of what exists . . . Sociology is not a humanities subject. The questions it must concern itself with are not essentially and primarily those of the consciousness, or even the subconscious, of the human beings of whom society consists. These questions relate primarily to the conflict between human beings and nature and to the objective forms of socialization, which cannot in any way originate in the mind, seen as a kind of inward state within human beings. Empirical research in Germany must rigorously, and without ornamentation, bring to light the objectivity of what is socially the case, far beyond the individual or even collective consciousness. 23

This was an elaboration of empirical research in the broad sense in contrast to speculations motivated by ideology. But at the same time it was also a critique of opinion research, to the extent that opinion research was not able to reveal the objectivity of what was socially the case. Adorno gave an example of what he meant:

If we are confronted with the statement, based on some alleged authorities in humanistic sociology, that the so-called rural population is resistant to technical and social innovations because of its essentially conservative spirit, we will not be satisfied with explanations of this sort . . . We will . . . for example, send interviewers familiar with farmers into the country and encourage them to persist with further questions when farmers tell them that they stay on their farms out of love for their homeland and loyalty to the customs of their fathers. We will confront their conservatism with

economic facts and investigate whether technical innovations were unprofitable in businesses below a certain size, whether these would require investment on such a scale that for a business of that type the technical rationalization offered would become unrational. 24

This example was based on the Darmstadt community study. As part of his collaboration on it, he had become familiar with the research material on several rural communities around Darmstadt, and had written an introduction to a monograph on *The Part-Time Farmer and his Family at the Intersection of Rural and Urban Life*.<sup>25</sup> It was characteristic of the Darmstadt studies that a mass of structural and objective institutional data as well as subjective and social-psychological data was collected. Adorno's example seemed to suggest that a possibly ideological theory must be tested using both subjective and objective forms of research. Asking supplementary questions in subjective research that was not content to accept superficial facts apparently confirming the ideological theory, and combining such information with facts derived from objective research, could produce a picture of social existence that went beyond the investigator's own awareness, which corresponded to the dominant form of awareness. Adorno was apparently concerned here with the concept developed by Fromm and Horkheimer in the early years of the Horkheimer period at the Institute of Social Research, in which the orthodox Marxist schema of superstructure and base was elaborated, under the influence of Freudian psychoanalysis, into an analysis of the relations between the economic process, the psyche and culture. It was only in this context, it seemed, that opinion research could have any meaning for Adorno.

But what was it supposed to mean when he added, at the end of his example, that of course not all empirical sociological inquiries could have a critical function?

I believe, admittedly, that even market analyses with precisely defined topics must also incorporate something of this informative, non-ideological spirit if they really want to achieve what they claim. This objective, relevant relationship to the provision of information, to the dissolution of blind, dogmatic and random theses, is what links me as a philosopher to empirical social research.<sup>26</sup>

What could market research offer other than data that could be used as a basis for more effective advertising, more successful packaging and better sales planning? Who was being informed during market research apart from the client? It was not enough to say, as Adorno did later during a discussion on norms in opinion research, that 'it is possible for research to be privately financed and nevertheless meet the very strictest scientific standards.'<sup>27</sup> Some of those taking part in the conference made heretical remarks in the general discussion after the lecture on

areas in which empirical social research might be applied—political and social opinion research, market research, factory questionnaires, audience research. Dietrich Goldschmidt of the Sociology Department at the University of Göttingen said, 'If an industrialist has an opinion survey carried out in his factory, one could of course claim that he wants a tool to manipulate his workers with. But if one keeps the real purpose of this sort of opinion research in mind, that is to get rid of bad conditions and improve human relations, then it is obvious that the company director should be subjected to questioning as well as the workers.' 28 E.P. Neumann from the Institute of Opinion Research in Allensbach took this idea a logical step further when he spoke enthusiastically about the results of the Gallup Institute's surveys, which were being published weekly in over a hundred newspapers, and said that members of parliament, the representatives of the people, should ultimately reap the benefits of opinion research.

What was it supposed to mean when Adorno emotionally emphasized that anyone wanting to treat people as if they were rational and human was contributing to the glorification of what was being done to them; that anyone objecting that empirical social research was too mechanical, too coarse and unintellectual was transferring these traits from the objects of sociology to sociology itself; and that the muchderided inhumanity of empirical methods was nevertheless more humane than the humanization of what was inhuman? Either the persons being investigated remained as objects, and even later on would be affected only as objects by the information gathered from the research and its application; in which case, the methods were 'not humane', and servitude was being perpetuated. Or, on the other hand, the persons being investigated might at least at some later point be given an opportunity to look at the results, as part of an educational process revealing connections that had been obscure to them themselves until then. Only in this case would Adorno's statement at the beginning of his lecture become more than mere empty words: 'We know that the people we concern ourselves with are still human beings, with the opportunity for free self-determination and spontaneity, even when they are involved in relations which are obscure even to themselves; and we know that it is this element of spontaneity and awareness that sets limits to the laws of numbers.'<sup>29</sup>

Adorno, playing off empirical social research against humanistic sociology and defending it against caricature and prejudice, thought he did not need to give any particular emphasis to the fact that he was not using ideology to help transform social science into a mere adjunct of business and public administration. But was he not making precisely this mistake in his attempt to rescue market research on behalf of critical sociology? Was he not blinding himself to the most important point at the empirical level, the point at which 'critical social research' differed from 'administrative social research'? Adorno cautiously used these

terms, which had been introduced by Lazarsfeld in the first issue of *SPSS* when the question of either perpetuating or breaking through the object status of the persons being examined did not even occur to him as a methodological topic?

Adorno clearly was making such mistakes. His effort to defend empirical social research as a duty towards the serious programme of critical social research concentrated exclusively on two points. He emphasized that empirical social research was more than a sophisticated questionnaire technique, that it had 'long since developed its own methods, not least under the influence of depth psychology, which it can use to resist superficiality': indirect questioning, tests, detailed in-depth interviews, group discussion procedures these were all methods which the Institute of Social Research had used with pride, and was still using.

He also emphasized, for example, the role of 'opinion leaders', stressed by Lazarsfeld, and the increasing awareness in the USA of the need for qualitative analyses, so as to be able to present the theory of society as a constitutive element of empirical social research. 'Precisely a theory of society for which the word change is not a mere platitude must incorporate the whole force of reluctant facticity if it is not to remain a powerless dream, whose powerlessness merely serves the powers that be.' 30

At the close of his lecture, Adorno had thus reached a position that represented a kind of Adornoesque variant of Horkheimer's old programme. Indeed, the lecture Adorno gave in Weinheim was more or less what one might have expected Horkheimer to say at the reopening of the Institute. Did this mean that Adorno was prepared to take over from Horkheimer, who had taken on a purely ceremonial role, and to ensure that the Institute from now on would, at least under someone else, carry out projects that would help to advance the materialist theory of society? Would he not have to have a sharper awareness of the need to extend 'critical social research' beyond methods designed to penetrate deep structures, and beyond the combination of theory and empirical research, including at least some long-term feedback of empirical research into information provided to those who were being questioned and analysed? Since this seems unrealistic, it was possible that the Critical Theorists were content to carry on 'critical social research' above the heads of those being questioned and analysed, even in the long term. But when their research results were available not just to the Critical Theorists themselves, but also to their clients or sponsors from business, public administration and academic institutions was the Critical Theorists' knowledge not ultimately liable to turn into a tool of domination instead of fermenting universal enlightenment? How was this to be avoided?

And in what kind of state was the theory of society if it was possible for Adorno to speak, without any critical qualification, of the triumphs of the empirically verified natural sciences, and to describe the universal

acceptance of new medicines as being taken for granted in society? Was the theory really able to deal with essential research questions? Was it advanced and concrete enough to be able to articulate the various data? Were the projects being carried out by the Institute of Social Research, at least, really being guided at least in part by its theory of society?

For the meantime, these questions remained open. The re-established Institute of Social Research had hardly begun its work when it lost its real members of staff. Horkheimer's election as rector of Frankfurt University, and his re-election a year later, meant that he had scarcely any time for the Institute alongside his teaching and rectoral duties. Adorno, who himself was under an additional workload as a result of his collaboration on the Darmstadt community studies, although he had a lower teaching load than Horkheimer, took over much of Horkheimer's work and devoted himself to the Institute intensively. But in 1952 the three years he was allowed, as a naturalized American citizen, to spend continuously in his country of birth ran out. If he did not either travel to a third country or return to live in the United States for a time, he would lose his United States citizenship. Horkheimer, as rector of Frankfurt University, had managed to have an 'individual law' passed allowing him to remain in his country of birth continuously for five years. For Adorno, as an ordinary citizen, no such exception was made.

At a moment at which it still looked as if all three of them Horkheimer, Pollock and Adorno would have to return to the USA at around the same time, the Institute's directors signed a contract with Friedrich Hacker to carry out one or more research projects, so as to ensure that they would have a source of income. Hacker was a psychiatrist born in Vienna who had emigrated to the USA and became well known during the 1970s with his standard work on aggression. He had opened a psychiatric clinic in Beverly Hills, and hoped to gain an academic reputation and advertising for his clinic through collaboration with the leading members of the Institute of Social Research.

'I am travelling with an infinitely heavy heart,' Adorno wrote to Horkheimer from his first stop, Paris, in October 1952. 'Ceterum censeo that we belong on this side of the pond.' And he concluded: 'Max: the Unconditional. There is nothing else!' <sup>31</sup> The next day, he and his wife boarded ship in Le Havre for New York, where he met Lowenthal and Marcuse. Then he travelled on to Los Angeles.

It was now a matter of satisfying Hacker, who was counting on both Horkheimer and Adorno coming (and who knew nothing of the real reasons for their signing the contract or for the Institute's peculiar way of fulfilling it), of getting Hacker to pay the full fee, and if necessary holding the fort there without Horkheimer ever arriving, until Adorno could return to Germany without losing his American citizenship. 'The devilish thing is,' he wrote on arriving in Los Angeles, 'that I don't know when I will get my passport back certainly not for six months, and my feeling is it will be at least a year.'<sup>32</sup> He felt his work for the

Hacker Foundation was a sacrifice and thought Hacker himself was a pest, and his trip to the USA was painful evidence to him of the fact that their return to Germany was not yet absolutely final. On reaching his destination, he immediately repeated his `ceterum censeo': `My basic view is that we should concentrate our efforts over there the danger of breaking down here, in every sense, is very serious, and the thought doesn't leave me for a moment . . . And if one is faced with a choice between a paranoid fantasy about paranoid reality and the stupidity of healthy common sense, paranoia is still more productive.' Four months later, he wrote even more urgently:

In view of the fact . . . that we can hardly hope any more to be the subjects of that praxis that would be capable of turning away the evil, everything depends on preserving a continuity that will give us hope that not everything that has gathered itself in us will be lost. But in every respect this is only possible when it is possible for us, both literally and figuratively, to speak . . . Great though our luck was in being allowed to survive, the conditions which produced that luck have passed away, and we cannot let ourselves turn them into fetishes. The old rule that the returning exile should have a look round to see what he can achieve seems to me to hold more wisdom than today's institutionalized demand for the opposite, supported by the petty-bourgeoisie, who misuse their wounded dignity as an excuse for the most wretched conformism.

`Even every kirsch in the Schlagbaum,' Adorno continued in his peculiar joking, but emotional, way, `has more in common with our philosophy than Riesman's collected works.'<sup>33</sup> And then, with his emotions going into overdrive:

I do not know how much I can speak for both of us in what is literally a matter of life and death, although I think I can, but I would rather run the risk of being beaten to death over there than `build up' something anywhere else, or even withdraw into private life, although developments . . . would hardly give one a chance to have any private life.

And then, plain and serious:

But if we follow our impulses we will be able to arrange things, when you have the rectorship business behind you, so that we have time left to think and to live, and the two are the same. I am basically convinced, though it sounds paradoxical, that we will find more peace and quiet in Frankfurt, with all its duties and all its entwinement in life, than in a form of existence which only contains the negative aspect of loneliness: isolation.<sup>34</sup>

Adorno agreed with Hacker that he would carry out a study of the social-psychological function of astrology. For Adorno, this represented an extension of *Studies in Prejudice* falling in an area between Lowenthal and Guterman's analysis of speeches and articles by sub-fascist demagogues and the Berkeley study on *The Authoritarian Personality*. Adorno had already mentioned astrology in his 'Theses against Occultism' in *Minima Moralia*, 35 and his old suggestion that stereotyped and anti-democratic thinking could be investigated through the products of the culture industry and the mass media was applied at least in part to this complex of phenomena which tended to strengthen the fascist disposition. In addition, Adorno had planned the project in such a way that he would be able to carry it out himself if necessary, as he was not sure whether Horkheimer would join him in the United States in the foreseeable future.

Conditions were clearly disagreeable for both Adorno and Hacker and reached such a crisis in May 1953 that Adorno received a letter signed by the whole executive committee of the Hacker Clinic demanding that he relinquish half his salary and work half-time so as to be free of the administrative duties and community relations which were obviously such a burden to him upon which he resigned. But even under these conditions Adorno succeeded in carrying through a one-man research project: a purely qualitative content analysis of three months of material taken from the astrology column of the *Los Angeles Times*, a right-wing Republican newspaper. Adorno worked on this project during a stay in the USA that lasted nearly a year, and the results were published in Germany in 1957 in the *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* under the title 'The Stars Down to Earth: the *Los Angeles Times* Astrology Column Study in Secondary Superstition'.<sup>36</sup>

Adorno did not personally speak either to the readers of the astrology column or to its writers. He did not mention any objective data. 'Pure' interpretation of the astrology column became a classic case in which the whole range of Adorno and Horkheimer's ideas could be applied. The 'column is directed towards readers who are dependent, or who feel dependent. It presupposes ego weakness and real social powerlessness.' 'The horoscope . . . conceals, feeds and exploits . . . universal and alienated dependency.'<sup>37</sup>

Adorno himself conceived the study as a model of the procedures of qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis of the texts alone in isolation, however, proved to be fatal. Association with the stars was interpreted in the study as a virtually unrecognizable and therefore tolerated mask for a taboo relation with an omnipotent father figure, and this was not the only aspect in which Adorno's method resembled the monotony and prejudgement of depth-psychological analysis. The 'micrological' procedure, and his claim that he had immersed himself in the material unreservedly, remained idle boasts. The interpretation was so broad that it stifled the narrow base of the evidence, which to some extent

offered too little resistance. What was lacking was an embedding of Adorno's talent for qualitative analysis into a working environment like that characteristic of the Berkeley study.

While Adorno was earning his living in Los Angeles with the astrology project, Horkheimer was getting into greater and greater difficulties with the Institute in Frankfurt. Helmuth Plessner was travelling from Göttingen to Frankfurt two or three days a week to stand in for Adorno in part. Plessner, three years older than Horkheimer, had lost his job as a teacher of philosophy in Cologne in 1933 because he was Jewish, and he emigrated to the Netherlands in 1934. In 1939 he became the first professor of sociology at a Dutch state university, with an endowed chair at the University of Groningen. He survived the German invasion in the underground, and finally, at the age of sixty, was appointed to a new chair for sociology and philosophy at Göttingen. With his book on *The Stages of Organic Life and Man*, 38 published in 1928, Plessner had become, alongside Scheler, one of the founders of modern philosophical anthropology. Unlike Scheler, he carried out his analyses from the point of view of social history. In 1952 the Sociology Department at the University of Göttingen, under Plessner's direction, had started an empirical and statistical study on the position of German university teachers, the results of which were published in three volumes in 1957-8. But Plessner saw himself above all as a social philosopher and sociologist of culture, and emphasized the significance of philosophy for sociology. Helmut Schelsky later called him a 'German-hater'. He thus had much in common with Horkheimer and Adorno. Yet the two of them regarded him with considerable reserve, and continued to do so as they did any third parties who were close to them.

Since Adorno was absent, and Horkheimer hardly had any time either for the Institute with his job as rector and his unrelenting teaching duties, Plessner's part-time help was not even sufficient to get done what was absolutely necessary. In Horkheimer's view, the Institute of Social Research needed above all to get out publications, but these should certainly uphold to some extent the standards set in the Institute's glorious past. The two most important projects they might be able to publish, the German version of *Studies in Prejudice* and the group study on West German political awareness, were nowhere near ready for publication, and no one was giving consistent attention to them.

Faced with all these problems, Horkheimer was once again torn between plans for a quick retreat with no loss of face and a slow retreat trailing glory. To bring the group study on West German political awareness to a conclusion at last, he organized a seminar for the end of April 1953 at which papers on the results of the project would be presented to an audience consisting mainly of civil servants from Hesse and Frankfurt. The papers could then, Horkheimer thought, be published as a book without too much academic responsibility for them being involved, with the complete text being sent as a mimeograph to selected

individuals and institutions. But he was so dissatisfied with the papers that he abandoned the plan for a book and instead revived the plan to restart the journal, where the inadequacy of research reports could be balanced out by the high quality of other contributions.

As before, the journal was to comprise no more than three issues per year. Each issue was to consist of four parts, as Horkheimer told Adorno:

(1) Articles, either by us (reworking material from the earlier journal if necessary), or representative articles by friends of the Institute, to whom I will send written requests, e.g. Allport, Cantril, Klineberg, Georges Friedmann (or any others you can get for us).

(2) Texts. Here I am mainly thinking of passages from the literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which have been translated into German either inadequately or not at all. One needn't restrict these to crucial information, on the contrary . . .

(3) Extracts from empirical studies at the Institute. Here we might think of studies from the practical training courses, the radio study, the expert survey, the student project, and finally parts of the group study, if it is not possible in the end to bring that out as a small book.

(4) Reviews.

He added, 'If we can't do the journal, I'm afraid we will fail to deal with the publication problem, and on the other hand the journal would mean reorganizing the Institute's work in a way that would be very desirable from our point of view. If only you already had the problem in hand!' 39 Adorno reacted enthusiastically. He guaranteed that 'there will be no lack of material, even without reprinting older texts, although that could be very nice too.' In any case, the first issue must 'really be representative of us'.40

Horkheimer also finally found what seemed to be a promising solution to the personnel problem. He had first told Adorno of a short-term withdrawal plan in January 1953. Plessner and two of the young assistants at the Institute, Diederich Osmer and Egon Becker, were to form a triumvirate to direct the Institute if Horkheimer and Adorno were to withdraw. The withdrawal plan caused an old argument to flare up again. This time, however, the argument was not between Horkheimer and Lowenthal and Pollock, but between Horkheimer and Adorno. Adorno's reservations, that they would be throwing away an important element of security if they gave up the Institute, and in addition that a letter to him from Plessner on the group study had shown that Plessner saw the whole thing as a burden, made Horkheimer move to a more cautious plan. 'The idea has now occurred to me that we could entrust the Institute to the Sociology Association as such, i.e. so to speak commit it to von Wiese's honorary presidency. For a suitable honorarium von Wiese could look after our people until you return. If that was possible, I could act as a kind of chief consultant and we could decide

later whether you would want to do the same or take over the active directorship.' 41 Adorno had reservations about this suggestion and about von Wiese as well, but wrote to Horkheimer:

However: I do not have a better suggestion, simply due to a lack of available people. My advice is therefore: muddle through and do not make any organizational changes until I get back. What we do then we will have to see; if you become chief consultant then, it would be a good idea for me to take over the active directorship, at least for a time. It is becoming more and more clear to me that the Institute, together with the university, is our main asset in the ever more difficult struggle with reality, and the moment we no longer have the executive power in our hands, all sides will at once conspire against us. We must accept disadvantages and even delays in the Institute's work for the next few months; I think I can promise you that I will be able to put things in order quickly, without troubling you.<sup>42</sup>

Before this letter reached Horkheimer, he had shown Frankfurt University senate his cardiogram to demonstrate what stress he was under, and received permission to open negotiations with von Wiese. But he spoke to Plessner again beforehand. In the end, he and Plessner agreed that Plessner would temporarily take over the Institute as deputy director, substituting for Adorno, during the following semester. Once he had gathered momentum again, Horkheimer offered von Wiese DM 1000 if he would give a class on general sociology at the Institute once a fortnight during the summer semester, as well as a lecture. 'All this will show that the Institute is the centre of sociology teaching in Germany.'<sup>43</sup>

At moments like this, Horkheimer's ambition to achieve social recognition even at the cost of abandoning nonconformist research, teaching and action and his confidence in his ability to reach the top and produce extraordinary achievements once again won out. One typical consequence of this attitude was the following series of events. Alexander Mitscherlich, one of the few staunch supporters of Freud in the early post-Nazi period, had attracted the enmity of his colleagues, and accusations of fraud and treachery, through his activities as an observer and expert witness during the Nuremberg Trials and as co-editor of a collection of documents, *Science without Humanity*.<sup>44</sup> According to Horkheimer, he was being treated 'everywhere, in the faculties and even in the research community, as the new Gumbel'.<sup>45</sup> (The statistician and mathematician Emil Julius Gumbel had attracted the enmity of colleagues, students and broad sections of the public during the 1920s by producing documents on political murders and the criminal prosecution of politically motivated offences, and exposing the right wing and the way it was being given preferential treatment.) When Mitscherlich

officially asked to join the Institute at the beginning of 1953, however, Horkheimer and Adorno did not want him. Collaboration with a psychoanalyst would have fitted in with their tradition and with the Institute's claims to be interdisciplinary and to be particularly competent in social psychology, which were renewed at its reopening. But apart from his old reluctance to give regular employment to more or less established academics who would in principle have to be treated as equals, Horkheimer was also discouraged by the fear that letting Mitscherlich join the Institute would `probably trigger the open attacks which we have so far avoided. The vindictiveness of the Nationalists' (*die Rachsucht der Völkischen*, i.e. of supporters of Nazism) `is truly Old Testament, unto the third and fourth generation.' 46 But if the directors of the Institute were not prepared to protect someone in a case like that, was the protective institution therefore not merely an end in itself? Horkheimer's additional argument, that Mitscherlich had given a lecture at the Institute some time previously which `was a very diligent analytical explication of our Fifth Thesis on Anti-Semitism', but that he had not actually heard Mitscherlich produce anything original, seemed to be merely a rationalization after this. Thanks to an unsuccessful attempt by the Institute's two directors to dispatch Mitscherlich to Hacker in Los Angeles to act as a substitute for Adorno, the problem of his application was solved by the dilatory way it was dealt with.

The agreement with Plessner hardly lessened the Institute's problems, however. At the same time as the old plan to restart the journal was revived, Horkheimer took another step which seemed about to make a miracle come true: he asked Herbert Marcuse if he would come to Frankfurt.

Contact between Horkheimer and Marcuse had never been broken off. Marcuse's devotion to Horkheimer, who in his opinion still represented the only chance of doing theoretical work, had continued. This made it easy for Horkheimer to treat Marcuse in such a way as to keep his former assistant's hopes up and make him a well-disposed extension of the Institute.

In the spring of 1950, when it was still not clear who would be Gadamer's successor in the one chair of philosophy at Frankfurt University, apart from Horkheimer's chair of social philosophy, and when the most serious candidate, Karl Löwith, had decided to go to Heidelberg instead, Horkheimer had, he wrote to Marcuse, `naturally . . . pressed strongly for you yourself to be appointed to Gadamer's chair'. The difficulties of installing Adorno in the chair were greater, since he was too closely identified with Horkheimer as co-author of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. `Probably,' Horkheimer continued, `neither is possible, and we will get a second-class or third-class existentialist's reference to supporters of Heidegger. `What would your attitude to such an appointment be?'47 Marcuse answered positively`if only because of the

prospect of being able to work together again. But I would be very wrong in my judgement of the world spirit if I thought it would allow Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse all to join one and the same university.' 48 But he then heard from Horkheimer: 'In the meantime I have succeeded (faculty secret!) in getting Teddie on to the list.'49 However, if Adorno got the chair, and finance could be found for 'the big project' the study of West German political awareness there were good prospects of pushing through a second chair of social philosophy. This would, of course (Horkheimer certainly did not say so explicitly), be for Marcuse. However, Gadamer's successor in 1953 was not Adorno but Gerhard Krüger, who had been Professor in Tübingen since 1946 and was the same age as Adorno. Krüger's main interests lay in Plato and Kant, and as well as books on these classics he had also edited a selection of Leibniz's writings for the publishers Kröner.

When his wife died in the spring of 1951, Marcuse asked what Horkheimer's plans were, and received an evasive and confusing reply. His plans were that 'we want to get back to proper work'. 'Whether it will be here or over there, the next few months will tell. But it would also be good if you could write about your own plans. Would you prefer a professorship in Germany to the Columbia Institute, or would it be possible to combine the two in the end? How do you see general developments here and over there? Do you think the economic and political conditions for a reclusive, modest existence are present over there, in case we decide to break things off here?'50 Marcuse's own statements helped to keep the whole business hanging in the balance, in the sphere of resigned, although fervent, wishes. He took the view that proper philosophical work was more important to him than a professorship. A visit to Horkheimer in Frankfurt in August 1951 had strengthened this attitude. His few days in Frankfurt had shown him once again 'that more comes out of a half-hour discussion between us than from weeks of isolated or professional effort.'

I would like to spend the remaining years of my life in such a way that I can dedicate them to our proper work without having any real material worries. This can best be done where you are provided that you have time for such work. The question of the location depends on us and on the world spirit . . . If you are willing to spit in the face of the world spirit, I am happy to help you but the spitting must be worth it. In the meantime, I will certainly work to be able to come over next summer for a longer spell. I hope to have ready the manuscript of the book on Freud [*Eros and Civilization*, published in 1955] and to be able to go through it with you. I am working on it intensively: the apparently unpolitical framework is intended to enable as much as possible to be said as clearly as possible.51

Six months later, the two of them met in New York, and after this Marcuse introduced first-name terms between them: 'Dear Max (if I may)' (although he kept the form *Sie*, the formal 'you', which was also still the practice between Horkheimer and Adorno). In the summer of 1952 Marcuse visited Europe for a longer spell. At the end of July he wrote to Horkheimer from Sils Maria to thank him for spending time on the Freud manuscript.

Then, in the spring of 1953, Horkheimer asked Marcuse whether he was ready to come to Frankfurt, as if it was really serious. Marcuse was more decided than ever about giving up his job in the State Department altogether. After a year with a fellowship at the Russian Institute at Columbia University, he did not have much enthusiasm for a similar offer from the Russian Research Center at Harvard, since this would mean 'spending another year working on Russian matters, and I'm sick and tired of it.'<sup>52</sup> He agreed in principle to come. 'I am more grateful than I can say for your fundamental willingness to come,' Horkheimer wrote to him.

The main reason is that the Institute simply cannot go on without help. Pollock will be leaving in the summer, and Teddie, whose return I am fighting for, will still have to stay over there for at least a few months. But even when he is here we will still need another one of our own people.

The most important thing is that we want to produce a journal again, which will be the core of the Institute's activity. Once it is in place, a certain course will be set which the assistants here will still be able to follow when we have all left. You will enjoy having these assistants very much, but they are still far too young to do anything independently.<sup>53</sup>

Marcuse's dream in the early years after the war working with Horkheimer again and restarting the journal seemed suddenly about to come true. It was a dream of engaging in free, articulate thinking under the protective hand of Horkheimer as a managerial scholar the dream which had also linked Benjamin, Fromm, Neumann, Kirchheimer, Lowenthal and Adorno to Horkheimer and which had come true for a few of them, at least for a time.

The chance to continue the collaboration remained a dream this time as well. The fact that it did not come true, even in the least, was not the fault of the world spirit. It was because, at the very moment when Horkheimer and Marcuse seemed to be ready to take it seriously, the old pattern of relationships from the time of Marcuse's separation from Horkheimer reappeared. On the one hand, Horkheimer and the Institute did not want to make any financial commitments to Marcuse, although they had helped him by providing credit during his wife's long illness; Marcuse, now fifty-five years old, did not want to go to Germany

just on the offchance; Adorno showed unconcealed jealousy. An attempt to finance Marcuse's travel costs and collaboration with the Institute of Social Research through a research project failed. Marcuse's draft of an interdisciplinary project on 'Studies in Philosophical and Cultural Anthropology', to be carried out in Germany and the USA with the Institute of Social Research as its institutional base, had no success with the Rockefeller Foundation.

The affair dragged on, and it lost its urgency for Horkheimer, since Adorno's return began to be foreseeable. After the letter from the executive committee of the Hacker Clinic, Adorno had given notice for 31 July 1953. In the middle of July he and his wife received passports valid for two years. On 6 August he had the astrology study finished. On 19 August he and his wife sailed from New York to Cherbourg. Adorno felt a threefold relief: first, the Hacker project was behind him; secondly, he was able to return to Horkheimer and Frankfurt; and, thirdly, he was leaving the USA, where things were getting too hot for him. McCarthyism was still flourishing, although not as spectacularly as in previous years. In the spring, an inspection of the libraries of the 'America Houses' had started, and these held copies of *Studies in Prejudice*. 'And if you read it maliciously you can see anything in it, although the liberal, in every sense anti-totalitarian, spirit of the series must be obvious to anyone unprejudiced.'<sup>54</sup> In the following month, Adorno read through the contributions for the volume *Studies in the Scope and Methods of 'The Authoritarian Personality'*, put together by Marie Jahoda and Richard Christie, which was to be published in September, and his pleasure at this achievement soon turned to horror. 'The contribution by Mr Shils<sup>55</sup> is probably the crassest thing we have seen yet,' he wrote to Horkheimer. A few days later he wrote: 'I have a definite feeling that I would like to be out of here before the book edited by darling Mitzi is published.'<sup>56</sup>

Adorno never travelled to the USA again. When their passports expired in 1955, he and his wife became German citizens.

So Marcuse did not come to Frankfurt. Whatever he may have thought, his devotion to Horkheimer and his dream of working with him and collaborating on the journal remained. 'You will have heard . . . in the meantime,' he wrote to Horkheimer a good year later in one of his letters,

that I have accepted an offer from Brandeis University: a full professorship in the Department of Political Science. This at least gives me the financial basis needed to make final decisions because I am of course not thinking of spending the rest of my professional life there. But I can now wait to see how things develop with you. As soon as you write: I can get out of there any time.

Please write soon to say when we can meet in the summer. As you know, I want to discuss other matters with you as well . . .

Teddy has written to me about the journal. The manuscript of the Freud book is now finished now I have to work through it. Is there enough time if we decide over there which parts should go into the journal? That would be best for me. 57

Stabilization at the Institute  
Its First Publications After the Return to Frankfurt:  
*Sociologica, Group Experiment*

The elections for the second Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament, took place in September 1953, the month after Adorno's return to the Federal Republic. The currency reform, and the policy of a 'social market economy' drafted as early as the 1930s by the neoliberals of the 'Freiburg School' centring on Walter Eucken, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow and Alfred Müller-Armack, and unwaveringly practised by Konrad Adenauer's Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard since 1948 had given an unfair advantage to the owners of capital. But the stabilization of prices, the decline of unemployment and the constant increase in mass purchasing power made the renewed capitalist order attractive to others as well. Even those who had not yet received any of the blessings of the 'social market economy' hoped that they too would one day profit from it. While the percentage of votes cast for all the other parties decreased in 1953, there was a big increase in the share of votes cast for the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). The CDU/CSU, with 45.2 per cent, had a strong majority over the SPD, with 28.8 per cent, although it was not an absolute one. The trend continued. Four years later, the year Ludwig Erhard's book *Affluence for Everyone* was published, the CDU/CSU took 50.2 per cent of the votes in the election for the third Bundestag.

While Adorno was still in the USA, the Minister for Culture in the state of Hesse received a letter from the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy applying, on Adorno's behalf, to have a chair established for a tenured 'extraordinary' professor. 'The faculty is making this application in consideration of the fact that such a chair can be established purely for reasons of restitution and compensation, while the chair can lapse should Professor Adorno leave this university, so that plans . . . to establish other chairs will not be affected.'<sup>59</sup> At the end of September, the minister appointed Adorno to the 'Extraordinary Chair of Philosophy and Sociology' in Frankfurt University's Faculty of Philosophy. The chair became known as the 'Compensation Chair' (*Wiedergutmachungslehrstuhl*), even in official usage a term that lent itself to defamation.

Restitution and compensation to the victims of the Nazi regime had been forced on the Federal Republic by the Western Allies, who had linked their revocation of the Occupation Statute, and the granting of

sovereignty to the new state, to the Federal Government's assurances that restitution and compensation would be provided. Individual public figures like Kurt Schumacher, Carlo Schmid and Theodor Heuss supported restitution. 60 But it was never popular. This was shown by questionnaires, and also by the behaviour of many politicians. Only 106 of the 208 members of the governing coalition in the Bundestag voted for the restitution agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1953. Even into the mid-1950s, 'Aryanizers' (those who had bought Jewish property) and members of the governing coalition in the federal and state parliaments were still up in arms against the reimbursement law enacted by the American military government in 1947, which declared that ascertainable property which had changed hands while its owners were under pressure of persecution was to be returned to its former owners in exchange for the selling price. (Aryanizers who had been forced to sell their property back to its owners, and who persisted in pursuing their claims, were themselves compensated at public expense in 1969 as 'victims of restitution'.61)

Adorno's hope that he would be able to obtain a professorship on the basis of an application by the Faculty of Philosophy for him to be appointed full professor, made purely on the grounds of his objective qualifications and unconnected with any restitution requirements, was not fulfilled. In February 1956 he felt compelled to remind the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of his legal claim to a full professorship. At a commission meeting in May 1956 at which the 'restitution case' of Adorno was discussed, along with his claim to a full professorship on the basis of the Third Amendment of the Law on Compensation for National Socialist Injustice, some of those taking part expressed reservations. Hellmut Ritter, Professor of Oriental Studies, mentioned rigging. All anyone needed to make a career in Frankfurt, he said, was to have Mr Horkheimer's protection and to be a Jew. Ritter later apologized to Horkheimer in writing, and to Adorno as well at the insistence of the dean, who was outraged. But these were neither the first nor the last remarks of this sort that Ritter made, nor was he the only member of staff at the university to make such remarks.

Adorno's happiness was therefore not unqualified when he was appointed full professor on 1 July 1957, with a chair in philosophy and sociology. He had never had an offer of a chair from any other university, which would have strengthened his position at Frankfurt. Nor did he ever receive such an offer later on. Once again, Adorno suffered the old Jewish experience of being simultaneously privileged and nevertheless stigmatized and vulnerable. (He was privileged in comparison with countless other émigrés and victims of Nazi persecution who had to wait for restitution and compensation for longer than he did, or had to undergo humiliating formalities before finally receiving insultingly small sums, or nothing at all.) 'As a cabinet minister, he will be a Jewish cabinet minister, at once an "Excellency" and an untouchable,' Sartre

had written of this experience in his *Réflexions sur la Question juive*.<sup>62</sup> As before, Adorno therefore felt dependent on Horkheimer's protection and advice.

In May 1956 Horkheimer requested early retirement with emeritus status on the grounds of repeated expressions of 'Jew-hatred' by a fellow member of staff. The dean pressed him 'not to leave us at this moment', and formally asked the Minister of Culture to give Horkheimer special status, according to which his teaching duties would be halved until his sixty-fifth birthday, while his salary would continue to be paid in full. Horkheimer had been dean for one year and rector for two, and he had carried out the administration not only for his own chair but for that of Professor Krüger as well for three years, in addition to directing the Department of Philosophy; he had been appointed professor in 1954 by the University of Chicago, and as a result of persecution under National Socialism he had lost ten years of his own study and research. A ministerial decree of 6 December 1956 did in fact award Horkheimer a series of sabbatical semesters up to his retirement. He only made use of this privilege once, however, as he did not want to do without his lecturing fees, which were discontinued during sabbaticals.

'I am, of course, thinking hard about the Institute's research programme, and I hope to be able to make reasonable suggestions to you when we are back together again at last,' Adorno had written to Horkheimer from Los Angeles in June 1953. But, even after he returned, there was nothing to be seen of any long-term conceptual plan for their research projects on the basis of a definite theory of society. Their claim to have such a plan, however, was not abandoned or deferred on the grounds that it was impossible to carry it out during a period of restoration and after the loss of the Institute's financial independence. Instead, an improved variation of the strategy of muddling through, recommended by Adorno for the period when Horkheimer was rector and he was in the USA, emerged.

The publications produced in 1955 symbolize what became of Critical Theory, the Horkheimer circle and the Institute of Social Research during the 1950s. The first three volumes of the series 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' ('Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie') were published: *Sociologica*, a collection of essays presented to Max Horkheimer on his sixtieth birthday; *Group Experiment*,<sup>63</sup> the report on the research into West German political awareness; and *Working Atmosphere*,<sup>64</sup> a report on research on workers at the industrial corporation Mannesmann. In addition, Adorno published *Prisms*, a collection of essays in sociology and cultural criticism;<sup>65</sup> Marcuse published *Eros and Civilization*;<sup>66</sup> and two volumes of *Writings* by Walter Benjamin,<sup>67</sup> edited by Theodor and Gretel Adorno and Friedrich Podszus, appeared.

Horkheimer did not feature in any of these publications as an author. But he emerged all the more clearly as a figure who was held in respect. *Sociologica*, the first publication of the re-established Institute of Social

Research, was, as its dedication stated, produced in honour of 'a man to whom the Institute owes what is decisive: intellectual leadership, tireless initiative and a mastery of objective conditions, which alone have made it possible for the Institute to survive'.<sup>68</sup> The dedication unmistakably Adorno's work closed with the hope that Horkheimer would find leisure 'to bring out all the philosophy and theory that is pressing to be formulated in his mind. The research which he himself has called to life has largely created the material preconditions for this. We know that he has the strength to draw all the conclusions from his work, which are genuinely needed in today's world, without wavering.' Adorno's hope that he would one day be able to continue the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* with Horkheimer, and advance the materialist theory of society, was still so firm that he was able to announce it in print.

The book almost exclusively contained articles originally planned for inclusion in either the first double issue or the first volume of the new journal. Horkheimer was forever making new efforts to involve his friend Friedrich Pollock in their theoretical work (successfully, in the case of the credit given to Pollock as a collaborator on the group study and with the publication of his book on *Automation: Materials to Evaluate its Economic and Social Consequences* as volume 5 of the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology'<sup>69</sup>). So, too, Adorno was constantly making efforts to involve Horkheimer in their work. Adorno's essay on 'The Relation between Sociology and Psychology', which opened *Sociologica*, was dedicated to Horkheimer and had originally been intended as a joint contribution by Adorno and Horkheimer to the first issue of the journal. Horkheimer's collaboration did not, however, extend beyond a few notes and suggested changes. In addition, Adorno had produced a 'censored version', as he put it, of 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', the German version of 'The End of Reason', which even in the late 1940s Horkheimer had not wanted to see published in Germany without alterations.<sup>70</sup> Adorno had arranged with Walter Dirks whom he had known since the 1920s and who was a co-editor of the left-wing Catholic journal *Frankfurter Hefte*, and who co-edited the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' for a time to produce a survey of recent publications on the subject of the worker. The new journal was therefore planned almost as an unbroken continuation of the old one.

Horkheimer and Adorno only abandoned the plan to publish the journal at the end of 1954. The preface to *Sociologica* stated that the research materials collected by the Institute could not be dealt with in short journal articles, but this could hardly have been the decisive reason for cancelling the journal. Even while the contributions for the first double issue were being put together, it had already been decided that the collaborative study on West German political awareness and the study on the working atmosphere at Mannesmann were to be published independently in book form. Nor could poor quality in the contributions received have been a determining factor. Horkheimer was exceptionally

pleased by *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse's book on Freud, from which an article on 'Freedom and the Theory of Instinct' ('Trieblehre und Freiheit'), a shortened version of the last chapter, had been extracted. Horkheimer wanted the complete German translation to appear as an Institute publication at all costs. Adorno had a high opinion of Walter Dirks's report on research into 'The Consequences of Denazification' ('Die Folgen der Entnazifizierung'). In his first ideas on a new journal, Horkheimer himself had suggested authors such as Georges Friedmann or Hadley Cantril as writers of 'representative articles by friends of the Institute'. Bruno Bettelheim was respected by both of the Institute's directors.

But there was no one to represent their own theory. The one contributor to *Sociologica* who would most have been able to meet such expectations, Walter Benjamin, was dead. Franz Neumann was also dead. On leaving the State Department, Neumann had become a visiting professor at Columbia University in 1948, and full Professor of Public Law and Government in 1950. He had been influential as an adviser and guest lecturer during the early years of the Federal Republic, and took part in setting up the Free University of Berlin. He died in a car accident in Switzerland on 2 September 1954. The planned publication of a collection of his essays in the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' failed to materialize 'only' because disagreements arose over its preface between Adorno and Marcuse. Adorno's view was that a Neumann volume which had a preface by Marcuse instead of Adorno himself would have no relation to the Institute. Apart from Marcuse, the only other sympathetic theoretician was Otto Kirchheimer, who had contributed an article on 'Political Justice' ('Politische Justiz'), the subject of his principal book, which was published later. Relations with Kirchheimer, which were not particularly close anyway, had probably become even more distant after Adorno met Kirchheimer shortly after his arrival in Frankfurt in 1949, and learned that Kirchheimer had visited his former teacher, Carl Schmitt professor of law who had been prepared to do anything to get access to the ruling power, which had then left him out in the cold. In 1936 Schmitt had opened an academic conference by saying, 'We need to liberate the German spirit from all Jewish falsifications, falsifications of the concept of spirit which have made it possible for Jewish emigrants to label the great struggle of Gauleiter Julius Streicher as something unspiritual.'<sup>71</sup> In contrast to Marcuse, whose visit to Heidegger in 1947 was not repeated,<sup>72</sup> Kirchheimer visited Schmitt on several occasions. There was continuing reserve at the Institute towards Marcuse on account of his Heideggerian past, and there was bound to be reserve towards Kirchheimer, with his continuing respect for Schmitt, who, like Heidegger, never stated that his view of Nazism had changed in any way.

The decisive factor in the abandonment of the plan to restart the journal, which Horkheimer had hoped would mark the 'beginning of

reasonable work', was therefore probably the fear above all on the part of Horkheimer himself that it would not be possible in the long term to get enough contributions to bring out their own position properly. He wrote to Adorno from the USA in August 1954:

Comparison with the old journal should not be too unfavourable for the new one. I am not just thinking of the articles, but also of the review section. The difficulty is that earlier on we all basically put all our energies into the journal in the same spirit. Apart from ourselves, there are only Dirks and Dahrendorf now. Of course, we would have to publish something in it together ourselves in the end, but firstly when I get back I will need some prolonged rest, and secondly it wasn't articles we had in mind, but a more extensive publication. In any case, we cannot let the journal cast a shadow over the light the Institute is still able to give off. 73

One of the two associates of the Institute whom Horkheimer was counting on, Walter Dirks, left for Cologne in 1956 to become head of the Cultural Department at the broadcasting company Westdeutscher Rundfunk. The other, the twenty-five-year-old Ralf Dahrendorf, had, to Adorno's considerable surprise, just handed in his notice when Horkheimer's letter arrived. Adorno reported to Horkheimer that Dahrendorf had accepted a superb job offer from the University of Saarbrücken, and had emphasized that his decision was irrevocable by saying that he felt he did not belong with Horkheimer and Adorno in the theoretical field. For Dahrendorf, they thought too 'historically', while he wanted to work along the lines of formal sociology and the sociology of knowledge. Adorno wrote, 'He is probably the strongest evidence for our thesis that, in the strict sense, there will be nothing to follow us.'74

There may have been something else as well that made Horkheimer shrink from carrying through the plan for the journal: fear of no longer being productive enough, even with Adorno's collaboration, and a feeling that he would no longer be able to show enough incisiveness in social philosophy the field that had always been closest to his heart in exposing social conflicts and in attacking intellectual collaboration that played down their significance. It was as if he was practising on himself his own response to Adorno's suggestion that they should publish translations of Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* and then texts by the Abbé Meslier in an Institute series: 'The Abbé Meslier will hardly be suitable. There would only be sense in it if we published him as a whole, or at least with the decisive passages; but in what these say about society and politics they are even more ruthless than de Sade.'75 It is hard to say which was greater in Horkheimer: his fear of producing an up-to-date account of the self-destruction of the Enlightenment, while not being able to replace it

with a positive concept of enlightenment; or his fear of the offensive effect of an analysis critical of society that was not melancholy and calm, but ruthless. In any case, the outcome was an attitude that was reactionary in more and more respects for example, in the 1950s he rejected the Algerian struggle for liberation, and in the 1960s he rejected criticism of the American war in Vietnam.

The group study of West German political awareness finally appeared as only the second volume of the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology', under the cautious and, in view of its important subject, misleading title *Group Experiment*. In August 1954 Adorno wrote to Horkheimer, then in the USA in connection with his chair at Chicago University, 'After correspondence with Fred I have completely rewritten the introduction to the group study, by the way, and I think it is now quite good. The only controversial issue in the study is whether we want to include transcripts, which I very much advocate, while Fred is against it, but we can still decide on this later.'<sup>76</sup> Adorno was not able to push through the inclusion of a series of complete transcripts in the book. Even so, it was still 550 pages long. Adorno wrote in his preface to the qualitative section:

Actually our intention was to reproduce here, word for word, some typical transcripts. Only considerations of space prevented this. The real persuasiveness of the qualitative findings, their conclusiveness, can only be communicated by knowledge of the primary material, at least until the methods of analysing these findings develop far beyond their present stage. The appearance of arbitrariness associated with the interpretation of individual pieces of evidence is only dissolved by the living experience of entire, coherent discussions.<sup>77</sup>

This corresponded to the ideas Adorno had already defended during the Berkeley project, when he asked for a series of 'profiles', in other words, detailed analyses of individuals in the experiment on the basis of all the material collected about them.

Adorno's wishes were not met either in *The Authoritarian Personality* or in *Group Experiment*. However, although the book's title, and its repeated references to the pioneering quality of its research and the inadequacies that went with this, signalled a certain modesty and an insight into their own deficiencies, a proud claim was made:

Empirical social research is faced with a kind of paradox. The more exact its methods are, the more those methods run the risk of substituting an object defined in 'operational terms' for the object really being investigated. In other words, the problem itself is restricted to what can be discovered by the questionnaire procedure, and what is relevant to society is neglected . . . On the

other hand, the history of sociology shows sufficient evidence of the opposite danger, that of arbitrariness and of unexamined dogmatic assertion. We can hardly demand that science should exclude modern methods of 'fact finding' from its research. At the same time, however, the joy of discovery in the new method should not disguise the fact that, in its demand for objects which are particularly significant for knowledge of society, the method is open to attack precisely at the point it prides itself on, that of objectivity, of knowledge of the true object . . . Empirical social research is faced with the task of using the methods it has developed to overcome the deeper causes of its own inadequacies and sharpen social research into a tool of genuinely social knowledge . . . It is a matter of uniting scientific objectivity with significant insight into what is essential, which is constantly striving to elude exact measurement.

The undertaking by the Institute of Social Research described in the following report is an experimental contribution to this effort . . . It has long since become routine to apply depth psychology in interviews, and to use projective tests, detailed case studies and other techniques to correct and supplement the usual questionnaire methods. The group technique used by our Institute, to be described here, differs from all of these undertakings principally in that it is not satisfied with adding corrections at a later stage, but already begins at an early stage, while opinions are being ascertained *in statu nascendi*. 78

The problems created by this type of opinion research have been discussed above (p. 439). The book publication of the research contained a supplement with quantitative analysis of two of the eleven monographs, a study by Volker von Hagen on 'Integration Phenomena in Discussion Groups' and one by Adorno on 'Guilt and Defensiveness'.<sup>79</sup> Adorno's study followed in the steps of his qualitative analyses of the interview material in *The Authoritarian Personality*. Social phenomena were to be clarified using Freudian categories, through an interpretation of the material which met the accusation that it was merely arbitrary by closely following extensive quotations, which confidently professed its distinctness from orthodox social research, and which concluded by producing a typology.

Adorno's analysis was based mainly on twenty-five transcripts, among them the twenty containing the largest number of statements dealing with the fields of shared responsibility for Nazism and the war, shared responsibility for the concentration camps and war crimes, and attitudes to Jews and displaced persons. Restricting the analysis to twenty-five transcripts seemed to be a sensible way of saving work, since the quantitative analysis and samples had shown that the types of reaction evident in these twenty-five transcripts appeared again and again throughout

the discussion materials with a rigidity and monotony that were characteristic of the whole field of political ideology.

In the introduction to his study on 'Guilt and Atonement' Adorno wrote:

The idea of repressed guilt should not be taken in too narrowly psychological a sense: defence mechanisms only operate to the extent that injustices one has committed are consciously seen as injustices. Hardly any of those who took part in the experiment and found themselves on the defensive were prepared to say, 'It was right that they should be killed.' Instead, it was usually a matter of making one's own excessive identification with the collective to which one belongs consistent with knowledge of the crimes. One denies or minimizes such knowledge in order not to lose the possibility of identifying with the collective that psychologically enables countless people to overcome an unbearable sense of their own powerlessness. One can conclude from this that those who found themselves on the defensive, even where they only supported rudiments of the Nazi ideology, did not agree with any repetition of what had happened. Defensiveness itself is a sign of the shock they experienced, and therefore offers hopeful prospects. 80

In the rest of the study, however, these hopeful prospects had the ground cut from under them by Adorno's hypothesis that the 'anthropological conditions' for manipulative mass psychology continued to exist, as did a susceptibility to totalitarian systems, caused by the technological and economic tendencies that were developing in society as a whole. Hopeful signs were also undermined by his statement about the 'virtuosity that moral defensiveness develops, which may correspond to the extent of unconscious guilt one has to suppress'.<sup>81</sup>

The 'anthropological' reaction to the conditions of post-liberal society a reaction which continued after the war, and which Horkheimer, Fromm and Adorno had sought during the 1930s and 1940s to subsume under the concepts of the sado-masochistic or authoritarian character, the liquidation or powerlessness of the individual, the fear of freedom, the racket phase of society, and so on was termed by Adorno 'collective narcissism'. This idea was disseminated widely later on through the much-quoted statement in Adorno's 1959 lecture, 'What does "Reappraisal of the Past" Mean?': 'I regard the survival of Nazism *within* democracy as potentially more threatening than the survival of fascist tendencies *against* democracy.'<sup>82</sup>

Various defence mechanisms lay at the heart of Adorno's study. Among these were: an attempt to calculate and quantify guilt; the assertion that in a world divided into nations and power blocs, victors and vanquished, an unbiased judgement of guilt and innocence was not

possible; the demand for mitigating circumstances to be taken into account for a people used to slavishly obeying authority, a people never suited to democracy, a people suffering from the 'German neurosis', as those taking part in the discussions liked to call it. One of the most provocative defences was what Adorno succinctly termed 'turning truth into ideology':

We know the role that cliché, rigid and therefore false generalization, plays in totalitarian thinking. Anti-Semitism, which transfers a number of negative stereotypes to a whole group with no regard to the persons concerned, would be unthinkable without the method of false generalization. Even today, the collective singular used for foreign peoples—the Russian, the American, the Frenchman, a usage which entered everyday speech from the army—is evidence of this. The collapse of fascism and its system of false generalization has opened many people's eyes to this practice so far as it concerns them themselves. It seems to be a law of present-day social psychology that what one has practised oneself is always what makes one most resentful. The unconscious motives for this, closely related to the projection mechanism, need not be discussed here; suffice it to say that, as soon as one has condemned false generalization, it is easy to distance oneself from National Socialism, and that once this has been accomplished without much cost it is easy to put oneself in the right and to make yesterday's persecutor today's victim. 83

Along with truth, morality too was turned into ideology. One argument used against restitution and compensation was: in view of the gravity of the crimes, restitution was not possible anyway. In defence of racist measures, it was argued that they were at least honest, and had also helped the Jews to create Israel.

It was not so much the decision not to print a series of complete transcripts that affected the persuasiveness of Adorno's study and the value of the analysis as a whole as a methodological model. In the quantitative section, no analysis of the correlation between specific attitudes was given, and in the study of 'Guilt and Atonement' there was no attribution of quotations or interpretations to particular individuals. Certainly, it was the objective spirit that Adorno was concerned with. But if one went into statements by particular individuals as deeply as he did, and then classified these individuals under one ideological syndrome or another, one could not simply ignore the question of which combinations of the elements of the objective spirit that the interpreter was examining occurred in particular individuals, or the question of the frequency with which these elements occurred. It was also unsatisfactory that the quantitative and qualitative analyses had not been dovetailed even so far as to make their typologies correspond ('negative',

`ambivalent' and `positively minded' in the quantitative part, `prejudiced', `ambivalent' and `willing to achieve reconciliation' in the qualitative part). There were several ways of responding to the accusation that the group study exaggerated the significance of anti-democratic attitudes. For example, statements of assent or partial assent on the topics of democracy, guilt, the Jews and relations with the Western Allies were largely made towards the beginning of the discussions, when uncertainty about the reactions of the discussion's chairman (who was at first seen as having an official capacity) and about the views of the other participants caused more consideration to be given to the democratic credo. The inclusion of these statements in calculations and interpretations therefore produced a positive distortion of the results. Ultimately, however, this also pointed to the unsolved central problem: how to assess opinions with respect to their function for each speaker, their function for the class or group each speaker belonged to, and their function within real communicative situations.

The substitution of personal, living experience for the methodical gathering and organization of material by different people made the wealth of the material not only clearer but at the same time more obscure. A vast academic machinery, although justified by its pioneering aims, obtruded like a forbidding barrier between the potential audience and a study which could fairly be described as the first, and in the 1950s the most penetrating, analysis of the post-Hitler German inability to mourn.

The group study on West German political awareness soon brought the Institute criticism from the right wing. This appeared in a prominent place, the *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*. The author was the respected psychologist Peter R. Hofstätter, who was himself mentioned in *Group Experiment*. Hofstätter was born in Vienna in 1913, and had been influenced by the psychologists Karl and Charlotte Bühler and the philosophers Robert Reininger and Moritz Schlick. From 1937 to 1943 he had been an army psychologist, first in the Austrian and then in the German army. He had taken his *Habilitation* and been promoted into the senior Civil Service. After the war he taught psychology at the University of Graz and later in the USA. Since 1956 he had been Professor of Psychology at the College of Social Science in Wilhelmshaven.

His criticism was very condescending, and as a witty leitmotif it used the assertion that the group experiment was just a variation on the theme *in vino veritas*, namely *in ira veritas* (a play on the alleged overstimulation of the participants by the `basic stimulus'). According to Hofstätter, this was just as questionable as using proverbs, which had repeatedly been suggested to him when he was an army psychologist as an alternative to his own method, which had been ridiculed as being `out of touch with life'. Hofstätter's criticisms, which were quite well aimed on several important points, ignored the work's overall

methodological intentions. He picked up the expression 'positivist-atomistic' (used to describe the usual procedure of seeing public opinion as the sum of individual opinions) from the sections on the limitations of orthodox research methods and on contemporary self-criticism by orthodox researchers of their own methods. 'Positivist-atomistic', Hofstätter observed ironically, was a negative evaluation that must surely, by the authors' standards, be interpreted as an indicator of fascist thinking.

Using the figures given in *Group Experiment*, but classifying those who were silent as not having negative attitudes and ignoring the high percentage of ambivalent cases, Hofstätter concluded that on average only 15 per cent of the participants could count as authoritarian and undemocratic by the group study's own standards. 'I do not know,' he continued, 'whether, on the basis of these results in Germany, we have any more reason to speak of "the legacy of fascist ideology" or the expression of a "continuing anthropological disposition" than any other Western country' as if there were no difference between a country in which a potential also present elsewhere had run amok in terror and murder for twelve years, and other countries in which it had largely remained a mere potential. After underestimating the danger from the right in this way and announcing that conditions were normal, he then finally turned the tables and, 'in passing', remarked that he was afraid 'a form of thought dedicated to the objective spirit lies in danger of succumbing to totalitarian despotism itself'.<sup>84</sup> He described the 'qualitative analysis, over 150 pages long', as 'nothing but an accusation, or a demand for genuine mental remorse', and countered that 'there is simply no individual feeling which could satisfactorily correspond to constantly looking at the annihilation of a million people'. For this reason, 'the indignation of the sociological analyst' seemed 'misplaced or pointless'. Hofstätter thought the solution to the problem of guilt, and a true sense of the limitations of the group experiment, lay in the response of a group of Bavarian dignitaries who had dismissed the moral side of the question as being a matter for the confessional. But this ultimately led to the same effect of exoneration as the thesis of collective guilt. Either everyone must be guilty and then no one was guilty, and everything was simply fate and the destiny of Being; or else each person must come to terms with it him- or herself and then no one had the right to condemn others, and everything must be left to the healing powers of private life.

What Hofstätter was practising was a tried and tested procedure which is popular to this day: playing down the dangers from the right, presenting the 'exposers' of such dangers as totalitarian moralists and idealists themselves, and declaring genuine reflection on this to be a private affair.

Presumably because of the poorly disguised polemical nature of Hofstätter's criticisms, Adorno was given an opportunity to reply in the same issue. In his conclusion, he stated clearly what the core of

the dispute was: 'The method is declared to be useless so that the existence of the phenomenon that emerges can be denied.'<sup>85</sup> He exposed Hofstätter's discussion of 'exposures' and 'accusations' as an appeal to collective narcissism: the condemnation of mechanisms and of an ideology that had been beaten into people was represented as a condemnation of individuals, so as to stir them up against it.

Hofstätter thinks 'it hardly possible that a single individual could take upon himself the horror of Auschwitz'. It is the victims of Auschwitz who had to take its horror on themselves, not those who, to their own disgrace and that of their nation, prefer not to believe in it. The 'question of guilt' was 'laden with despair' for the victims, not for the survivors, and it is no small achievement to have blurred this distinction with the existential category of despair, which is not for nothing a popular one. But in the house of the hangman one should not mention the noose; one might be suspected of harbouring resentment.<sup>86</sup>

The controversy between Hofstätter and Adorno publicly crystallized, for the first time in the Federal Republic, something which later went down in the history of sociology as the 'positivist dispute': the use of disputes over the methodology and philosophy of science as an arena for controversies over social theory and social policy.

Among a number of interesting projects which were considered during the 1950s but which never came to fruition, and which kept faith with the Institute's traditions within the conditions of a restoration society, was the plan to publish a series of German translations of American works of sociology. A memorandum by Adorno written in August 1954 stated:

The post-war period has brought with it, in Germany, a remarkable revival of interest in the social sciences . . . The impact on German sociology of the techniques of social research, developed and refined in the US to so large an extent, has already been considerable . . . Most people, however, students and laymen alike, are not aware of the contributions of American sociologists to social thought and social theory, nor do they realize that, in the US as everywhere, social theory and social research are closely interdependent and influence each other in their progress. The present plan is designed to close this gap . . . by presenting to a German public the works of independent thinkers who, while being inspired by the spirit of empiricism and pragmatism, tried to grasp with a bold sweep the totality of the society in which they live.

A preliminary list included six volumes: William Sumner, *Folkways*; Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*; an abridged version of Robert and Helen Lynd's *Middletown* and *Middletown in Transition*;

a selection of works by John Dewey not yet translated into German; Adorno et al., *Studies in Prejudice*; and Robert Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*. 87

This was a project which would have been able to use American sociology to help reinforce theoretical and materialist social research that was oriented towards society as a whole. At the same time, it would have begun to fill an enormous gap in West German post-war sociology: namely the lack of any systematic response to new trends in the social sciences. But the resistance to producing the series seems to have been considerable, and there was little interest in it. Even today, Veblen's is the only one of the works listed to have been translated into German.

Farewell to Independence:

Research in Mannesmann Factories Withdrawal of Adorno from Empirical Research

At the time when it was still planned to restart the journal, and while the finishing touches were being added to the group study on West German political awareness, something happened which seemed like the first serious lapse on the part of the Institute of Social Research: it accepted a contract from the Mannesmann corporation. During the 1940s the Institute's directors had alleged more or less bluntly that there was corruption among other émigrés resulting from their lack of material and psychological independence, and declared that research foundations had a highly developed capacity to distinguish between conformist and nonconformist academics. When they sought grants themselves, they were lucky: they were sponsored by the American Jewish Committee. Conservative though it was, it was easy to find a common denominator between the Institute's views and the American Jewish Committee's current interests, without suffering any loss of identity. When a well-meaning friend of the Institute tried to negotiate a contract for it with the chemical company Hoechst in 1950, Horkheimer had declined indignantly. In 1954 when Pollock, who continued to be the Institute's administrative officer up to the mid-1950s, had once again portrayed the Institute as facing imminent closure Horkheimer accepted a similar offer. This had come about through his acquaintance with Helmut Becker, later director of the Max Planck Institute for Educational Research in Berlin, who at the time was a lawyer and adviser to various organizations and institutions.

Mannesmann was not just any company. It had been a founding member of the Anti-Bolshevik League and had financed the Nazi Party. During the Second World War it had taken over factories in occupied countries. After 1945 it was one of the industrial conglomerates which were decartelized. The decartelization of German heavy industry, whose concentration in a few hands the Allies saw as being a decisive precondition for Germany's vast potential for waging war, was one of the most important provisions of the Potsdam Protocol. The American military

government, however, had ensured from the start that decartelization offered an alternative to socialization. Under pressure from the USA, the British Labour government, which had nationalized its own coal and steel industry, banned the parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia from carrying out socialization measures demanded not only by the SPD and KPD but also by the workers' wing of the CDU. Wherever the works council laws passed by individual states gave works councils a say in business matters, the military governments suspended either the laws as a whole or the relevant sections of them. In addition, representatives of the former companies were entrusted with carrying out the decartelization, since this meant that the normal course of business would be disturbed as little as possible.

So it was with Mannesmann as well. Wilhelm Zangen, 'Leader of the War Economy' (*Wehrwirtschaftsführer*), who had been classed as incriminated after the war and sentenced to a prison term, became chairman of the board of directors in one of his own former Mannesmann factories at the beginning of 1949, against the protests of the works council, and the trustee administration also put him in charge of liquidating the old Mannesmann company. He immediately began to put the old corporation back together. By 1960 the 'reconstruction' of Mannesmann Ltd was complete. 88 When Horkheimer took on the Mannesmann contract, there was a legal dispute going on between the works councils and the board of directors of the Mannesmann holding company to decide whether or not the holding company, which already comprised a number of the companies separated by the Allies, was affected by the Workers' Participation Law. The Workers' Participation Law gave equal representation on the board of directors to representatives of the workers and to representatives of the owners of the company's capital, and meant that a workers' representative would become an executive director.

Although the Institute's associates had no experience whatever with industrial sociology, Horkheimer accepted the contract under conditions that put it under extreme time pressure. He himself hardly gave it any attention. The fact that it succeeded at all was due to a lucky chance. When the most self-sacrificing research assistant of the early years, Diederich Osmer, suffered a breakdown from the strain of working under the overload of material gathered from the questionnaires and group discussions, Ludwig von Friedeburg made his appearance. At the beginning of the 1950s he had done his practical training at the Institute and had then worked as a research assistant with Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann at the Institute of Opinion Research in Allensbach. He now returned to the Institute of Social Research in order to be able to take up a Rockefeller stipendium that had been offered to him on condition that he held a research assistantship at an academic institution. Friedeburg, thirty-one years old, had experience with questionnaires, and even with questionnaires in industrial sociology, and when

Horkheimer offered him the directorship of the Institute's Empirical Research Department, he quickly accepted. His first task was to bring the Mannesmann study to a successful conclusion.

The executive board of Mannesmann wanted an answer to the questions 'What does our company's workforce think and what does it want, and why does it think and want this?' They wanted information on the social atmosphere in their workplaces and on the factors that were decisive in producing this atmosphere. According to a lecture given at a company conference by Hermann Winkhaus, a member of the executive board at Mannesmann Ltd at the beginning of 1955, what really mattered to management was information about the deeper reasons the roots and causes in ideas and feelings that lay behind the formation of opinion, because it was only on this basis that the research results would be able to be used effectively in solving company problems. It was precisely in this respect that the Institute of Social Research, with its experience, the technique of group discussion it had developed and its programmatic claim to be able to penetrate beneath surface opinions seemed to be a promising choice. 89

The Institute drafted a research plan involving employees but not management; dealing with employees' subjective opinions and behaviour but not with objective conditions; and examining specific conditions in the factories themselves but not relationships extending beyond the factory. As in earlier studies, the interview and group discussion methods were combined.

In July 1954 a pilot study was carried out in two Mannesmann factories. The first version of the questionnaire, based on extensive discussions with management and with workers' representatives, was tested, as well as the basic stimulus that was to be used in the group discussions. The original version of the basic stimulus was changed by Adorno after objections from Horkheimer. Adorno tried to calm Horkheimer's fears when sending him the second version he had produced:

This kind of discussion between Tom, Dick and Harry is perfectly normal and routine, and so are the positions that are taken in it; there is no danger at all of the blame for harsh statements about the employers being put on *us*. In addition, care will be taken that the report expressly states that these positions and statements directly take up themes from the articles by Tom, Dick and Harry in the company news-sheet.90

In July and August, the main research was carried out in Mannesmann's five main factories, four of which were run with worker participation. In individual oral interviews lasting an average of fifty minutes and following a questionnaire sheet, fifteen experienced interviewers from the German Institute for Population Surveys (Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen) in Frankfurt interviewed 1176 workers.

Selected randomly from the company's workforce of almost 35,000, they were each told of the interview shortly beforehand by their bosses, foremen or works representatives, and asked to come to the interview room, which was a separate room within the factory. In addition, fifty-five group discussions with a total of 539 participants were conducted by assistants of the Institute of Social Research, usually inside the factories. All the points which the preliminary research had shown to be significant in producing satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a factory were included in the newly revised version of the basic stimulus to be used for the main research. Among the points omitted was an important passage which might have been able to provide a specific historical perspective: 'Just think back to 1945,' the text read. 'What were things like? It was us, the workers, who rebuilt everything. The bosses had their hands tied. A lot of them were being held in camps or were banned for other reasons. The workers got things going on their own. And that proves we're capable of participating in management that proves it's good for the economy when workers have a say and can give their advice. That's why we want workers' participation now.'

'The fieldwork for the Mannesmann study has been completed,' Adorno wrote to Horkheimer, who was in Chicago, in the middle of August. 'Went splendidly, much of the discussions already transcribed, highly interesting material. I think we'll be able to make a really good impression with this study.' 91

In January 1955 the Institute of Social Research gave the Mannesmann holding company in Düsseldorf the draft report, followed in June by the main report, 410 pages long. Several months later, a synopsis of the results was published as the third volume of the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology', consisting of parts of the main report two introductory sections on 'The Problem' and 'Factors in the Atmosphere in the Workplace', together with a 'Summary'.

The answers to the direct question which out of eight enumerated factors workers regarded as generally the most important ones for them produced a ranking in which pay, job security and recognition of one's work were clearly in the lead, with good relations with one's immediate boss and safety at work coming a long way behind.

By contrast, the effect of single factors on attitudes to the factory and on the associated atmosphere in the workplace which was being analysed was assessed indirectly, since those being questioned were not considered capable of directly specifying the decisive factors in their relation to the factory on the basis of their own insights. Positive or negative answers to specific questions of detail, each representing a particular area of conditions in the factory such as 'Is there another job that you would rather do?' in the section related to the quality of the workplace were taken as a measure of the satisfaction or dissatisfaction felt with respect to each area. Five questions of detail were used to assess five areas, which 'judging by previous experience were

among the most important'. Using this procedure, it was ascertained that the strongest correlation occurring was that between believing or not believing that one's job was secure and having a positive or negative attitude to the factory. The conclusion drawn was that being satisfied that one's job was secure was the most important single factor in forming an attitude to the factory. Following close behind were satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one's treatment by one's immediate boss and with working conditions. Views on pay and promotion opportunities, by contrast, were much less significant.

If one accepted this procedure and the results it produced which largely corresponded to those of other industrial surveys the paradoxical result was that, in answers to direct questions about the things generally most important for an employee and about the most important complaints made to management, pay took first place. But, in the indirect ranking of the most important factors for the atmosphere in the workplace, pay only came in fourth place. The study neither provided nor suggested any explanation for this contradiction between workers' thinking and their behaviour, the existence of which was emphasized by other findings as well.

Additional information from the study on individual areas of the relationship to the factory included, for example, the fact that nearly three-quarters of those questioned considered themselves adequately informed about events in the factory. Three-quarters also considered the behaviour of their immediate boss correct; for most of those questioned, bosses further up the ladder belonged to a different world. The Institute's assistants concluded from the group discussions that workers 'do not reject their bosses as such, but they do reject bad bosses. Criticism therefore at the same time offers an image of a good boss in outline: he should above all be impartial, he should acknowledge good work, maintain good manners, and try to keep up a certain amount of personal contact.' 92 Complaints repeatedly expressed during the group discussions about being rushed, about overtime and Sunday working, about the supremacy of production requirements, of targets, of machinery, cumulated together into the expression of a desire to be treated as a human being and not just as a worker.

In spite of or because of these desires, which were as modest as they were unrealistic, the idea of the works council and of worker participation, paltry remnants of hopes that had been raised in the early post-war period, did not have any consciously dominant role for those questioned. The inadequacy of the works council in the economic field and its limited influence in general on the one hand, and its remoteness from the daily working environment on the other, meant that, although it was seen by a relative majority of those questioned as best representing their interests, this majority only represented a third in absolute terms, with those who saw the shop steward or foreman as their best representatives coming in close behind.

So far as worker participation was concerned, the study showed that the majority of those questioned had no clear picture either of the legal requirements or of how they were implemented. The answers expressed expectations and hopes connected with participation, and were associated with matters relating to each worker's own job, or own factory or company, at most. Only a tenth of those questioned linked participation with the economy as a whole or with the executive level. When they were asked directly which areas employees should have a say in, 59 per cent mentioned pay, 36 per cent mentioned social questions, and 26 per cent mentioned questions connected with the work itself. Profit-sharing, business and investment were only mentioned by 9 per cent, 5 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. The report stated cautiously, but without drawing any conclusions about the analysis and assessment of the influence of the inquiry's methods on its results, that

This should not lead one to conclude that employees are prepared to do without participation in the more 'remote' sphere because they think the sphere 'closer' to them is more important. The discussions show, rather, that employees support the demand for equal participation in the remote sphere as soon as trained workers' representatives explain to them that it is those bodies which have the greatest authority to issue directives, and that the most urgent demands can only be met by having equal participation in these top-level bodies. 93

The more detailed sections of the main report, and the separate volume of tables, showed a somewhat different picture from the one in the published book. Of the 1176 people questioned, 59 were salaried office workers and 110 were foremen, who generally had more positive attitudes to the company than the manual workers, thus significantly exaggerating the 'positive' results according to which some three-quarters of those questioned had a positive or very positive attitude to the company. Thus 70 per cent of salaried employees, 60 per cent of foremen, but only 45 per cent of workers thought they were adequately paid for their work.

The main report also gave other details, such as the fact that in the iron- and steel-producing works and processing factories workers who had been there for less than three years, those expelled from the East German provinces, and those aged between twenty and forty, had particularly reserved attitudes towards the company. Information of this sort was useful to management, but there was no way the workers themselves could ever have taken advantage of it, even if they had known about it.

Analysis of the group discussions was also given much more weight in the main report than in the summary. Although the report contained neither a quantitative analysis nor a particularly intensive qualitative

one, the analysis in the main report gave more depth to the description of the attitudes of those questioned.

Various factors probably persuaded Mannesmann, or encouraged them to believe, that better management training and so on would be enough to improve further an already good working atmosphere and so promote industrial peace and increasing productivity, which in turn would give employees an increased sense of job security. Among the factors in the report encouraging such a view were the details of workers' attitudes it provided; the way it repeatedly emphasized that the study was restricted to subjective reactions, and did not give any consideration to objective facts; and the overall results, the most striking characteristics of which included: overall satisfaction with the situation as it was; no evidence of any particular interest in the works council, which many saw as being too remote; almost no interest at all in having workers' representatives on distant boards of directors and executive boards; and wishes which, so far as the company was concerned, concentrated mainly on matters that were obvious and personal.

There was no doubt that the study was seen by Mannesmann in exactly this way. The Mannesmann executive Hermann Winkhaus stated, in the lecture mentioned above:

The contract we placed has somewhat puzzled people, both inside and outside Mannesmann, as to the motives behind it. Quite wrongly! The directors of the company have always seen caring for its employees as being part of their task, alongside coping with technological and business challenges. It was, and still is, not a question of having any romantic social ideas, but of how best to fulfil all the functions which the company, as an economic and social organization within the community, must perform. This includes responsibility for company employees, taking care to see that they successfully integrate themselves into the structure of the company's working world, and in a wide variety of ways ensuring their job security.

We are faced in our factories today with young people from a generation uniquely marked by the experiences and demands of the war and the post-war period. We are faced with refugees from the eastern provinces who have often lost not only their homeland and their property but also their chosen profession. In every way, we are faced with people who are no longer certain of having a definite place in society and who therefore expect their factory to give them not merely bread and work, but also a way of belonging to the community . . .

At no time has more depended on there being social peace within the factory and on employees enjoying their work and feeling a sense of belonging to the company. At no time has the problem of good leadership and the carrying out of planned research

into the basis for it been more pressing than it is today . . . All of these considerations led us to undertake a study of the atmosphere in the workplace in various factories belonging to our company, using the most modern scientific opinion research methods. Our workforce were to tell us themselves what they think and what they expect from the factory they work in. The results will enable us to find out how to promote social peace, create closer collaboration between management and employees, and achieve satisfactory results for the company, thus meeting its varied responsibilities within the community.

This was the inevitable, solemn, polished way of thinking and speech-making characteristic of a senior manager and employers' representative. This way of appropriating the research was just as much to be expected as were protests from the trade unions against a study which provided evidence that there was no great interest among workers for worker participation. The Institute's directors tried to take the sting out of reactions of this sort through a small press campaign. Horkheimer, who published an article on 'People in Large Factories: Opinion Research in Industry' in the *Deutsche Zeitung and Wirtschaftszeitung* on 19 February 1955, and Walter Dirks, who published an item on 'What Does the Worker Want? Pay, Security and a "Good Atmosphere"' in the *Neue Ruhrzeitung* on 5 March, both used the same arguments. It was a matter of science and truth; research results based on scientific quality and accuracy were in the interest of everyone equally; the fact that workers showed greater interest in participation in their immediate vicinity than in participation at the highest levels of a company only showed that, for most people, charity begins at home; humanizing factory conditions would be good for everyone involved.

Horkheimer's four-page newspaper article stated:

Even if one may have reservations about the theoretical value of research of this sort, information about the company, down to the smallest group of workers, will have to be encouraged in this country to the same extent that it has advanced in other countries, particularly the United States. What encourages a company owner to provide the opportunity for such research is of no importance: he may see human factors as creating the conditions for, or restricting, a desired increase in productivity and profitability, or else he may see them as ends in themselves; he may see the problem as one of 'leadership', or else as one of 'partnership'. Workers themselves have just as much interest in the development of scientific methods as management does. In spite of their understandable mistrust, they need to have clear information about their own working life and how to improve the factors affecting it. The factory matters to them. Where things are more or less right, a bond with the company forms.

Sentences like that, symptomatic of the tenor of the whole article, were telling enough. Workers were represented as people able to improve their own working life on the basis of the study, as if their chances of using it and acting on it had the slightest similarity to management's; as if the study had not explicitly concerned itself only with observing subjective reactions, not with discovering objective relations; as if it offered any evidence of the opinions and behaviour of management, including management representatives, to correspond to its evidence of workers' opinions and behaviour; as if workers had been provided with a suitable version of the main report, which in fact had only been given to the executive board of Mannesmann and, at the most, to a few trade union experts; as if an uninterpreted presentation of data crying out for interpretation in terms of history, politics and social psychology, could contribute to workers' emancipation; as if research carried out in the interests of the workers would not have been drafted and executed in a totally different way from that done for the board of Mannesmann. When Horkheimer claimed in his article that the Mannesmann study had investigated one of the blank spaces on the sociological map of Germany, that the workforce, virtually unknown, and the 'consciousness of the working masses' as it had changed since the period before and after the First World War, had been discovered for the first time, one might almost think one was listening to an industrialist showing a sympathetic interest in the semi-exotic world of his employees.

When Adorno wrote that the Mannesmann study would make a genuinely good impression, he was probably thinking of the way in which it combined quantitative analysis in the interview results with largely qualitative analysis in the transcripts of the group discussion—that is, the way in which it succeeded in combining representativeness with an analysis based on depth psychology, and quantitative with qualitative evaluation. This combination had been lacking in the group study on West German political awareness, but had been characteristic of *The Authoritarian Personality* and the study of the working class in Weimar Germany conducted by Fromm.

What emerged from the study, however, was something different: a quantitative analysis of the interviews, complemented by superficial analysis of the group discussion material. The third volume of 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' was therefore a study which differed from all previous publications by the Institute of Social Research: it was an impressively professional, and purely quantitative, questionnaire analysis. Its professionalism was due to the Institute's new associate, Ludwig von Friedeburg, who probably suited Horkheimer precisely because he seemed to him to be a pure empiricist who had nothing to do with Critical Theory.

Critical Theory was only evident in the introductory section, entitled 'The Problem', which obviously had Adorno's mark on it. He showed clear awareness of the serious limitations the study suffered from. The introduction stated that there was no analysis of the key figures

responsible for atmosphere in the workplace or their opinion the factory managers and section chiefs. Further: the quality of behavioural modes such as those that constituted the atmosphere in a company was only conceivable in terms of a living relation to the quality of the stimulus to which reactions were occurring. An idea that hinted at the missing social and historical dimension was buried in a subordinate clause: notions of being represented by qualified people which had appeared in connection with the topic of workers' participation, and the element of apathy, both developed in many ways 'where fundamentally democratic conditions are not present'.<sup>94</sup> In a peculiar apology for the conformism of the contract work that had been carried out, it was also stated that the study had skirted the problem of the relationship between increasing productivity and the humanization of relations within the company, and the problem of how far workers were in principle interested in improving the atmosphere of their workplace, and how far they instead perceived in this the risk of being simply manipulated to increase production since the way in which such questions were posed would have affected the results connected with the atmosphere of the workplace. Under the guise of the Adornoesque slogan, 'The more rigorously sociology, as free from illusions as it can possibly be, states what is the case even when this contradicts what those concerned wish to hear the better it serves its purpose for humanity',<sup>95</sup> there was a confusing approximation to the views of Schelsky and his slogan about sociology being a 'search for reality', an anti-ideological investigation of social facts. This was confusing and dangerous because it failed to establish any right to pose fundamental questions or offer insights into the wider significance of interpretation and theory to those who had neither power nor privilege.

Several years later, in his *Habilitation* thesis of 1963, published as volume 13 of 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology', Ludwig von Friedeburg himself emphasized the necessity of assessing the atmosphere in the workplace 'on the basis of central, objective facts about the factory, the conditions of work there, and the structure of authority in it'. It was necessary, he held, to see the atmosphere in the workplace as being a product of the conflict between the subjective expectations of the employees, which were produced socially, and the subjectively mediated objective conditions of the factory, and not merely to register the various elements of the atmosphere in the workplace, but to explain them on the basis of the social process as a whole. This point of view also made it possible to clear up the contradiction, which had remained merely an observation in the Mannesmann study, between the fact that workers generally saw higher pay as the most important objective and the fact that conditions in the immediate vicinity of the individual workplace took priority in forming their attitudes to the factory. 'In both cases, the conflict of interest between management and employees is manifested in forms which at the same time conceal that conflict.'<sup>96</sup>

In both cases, there was a distortion of the fundamental contradiction between the interests of management and those of the employees. An analysis of the atmosphere in the workplace that restricted itself to the subjective reactions of employees admittedly an important indicator, but only one among several and that was cautious about interpreting them, must willy-nilly contribute towards covering up the fundamental conflict of interest and merely concentrating on its symptoms.

Although the Mannesmann study was hardly designed to give workers an insight into their situation, it in no way reflected a business ideology, such as a point of view focused on producing social harmony within the factory. What resulted when sociologists supported business ideology was evident, for example, in the work of Otto Neuloh and his associates. Neuloh, who belonged to Adorno's generation, had worked as an academic consultant on careers advice for the government Employment Office from 1927 to 1945, had been co-founder in 1946 of the Dortmund Social Research Unit of the University of Münster, and had been academic administrator and head of the Department of Industrial Sociology there since 1947. In *Factory Regulations Governing Industrial Relations in Germany and the Social Forms They Take, Including Worker Participation* (1956) and *The New Style of Factory* (1960),<sup>97</sup> Neuloh and his associates published the results, based on business ideology, of a project that was described by Ralf Dahrendorf in his monograph on industrial and factory sociology as one of the 'four great analyses of worker participation and, more generally, of the position of the worker in modern (steel) industry'. Neuloh and his associates saw the factory as a 'convivium' and separated 'life processes' there from 'work processes'. They wanted those working in the factory to be seen by sociologists primarily as people engaged in collaboration more or less in the same sense as the informal groups whose important social role had been discovered by the American sociologist Elton Mayo. Mayo had been looking for ways of increasing workers' productivity in the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne works, and his 'informal groups' had been a focus of interest for factory sociologists ever since.

Another of the four principal studies in industrial sociology of the period was the factory questionnaire carried out in 1952-3 by a research team consisting of Theo Pirker, Siegfried Braun, Burkart Lutz and Fro Hammelrath, for the trade unions' Institute of Economic Science (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Institut). Their results were published in 1955 as *Workers, Management, and Worker Participation*.<sup>98</sup> A counterpart to the Mannesmann research which was superior in many respects was that carried out in 1953-4 by Heinrich Popitz, Hans Paul Bahrdt, Ernst August Jüres and Hanno Kesting on technological and social influences on industrial work in the iron and steel industry. Their results were published in 1957 in the two volumes *Technology and Industrial Work* and *The Worker's Image of Society*.<sup>99</sup> The four authors, associates of the Dortmund Social Research Unit founded by Neuloh, belonged,

like Friedeburg, to the younger generation of sociologists. The study was directed by Popitz, whose philosophy dissertation, *Alienated Man: Critique of Contemporary Issues and Philosophy of History in the Young Marx*, 100 was part of the first post-war wave of German Marx interpretation triggered off by a rediscovery of the 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*.

Their study was financed by the Rockefeller Foundation, and the second part of it dealt with the worker's image of his own work, technological progress, economic and political problems, worker participation and society as a whole, based on interviews with 600 workers in an iron and steel works in the Ruhr. What was unique about this study was, in the first place, that the authors were far closer to the 'objects' of their research than had been the case in the Mannesmann study. The four authors themselves were among the team of interviewers, and they got to know each workplace in detail and spent nine months in the hostel for single people that belonged to the works. Six other interviewers also familiarized themselves with the workplaces of the workers they were to interview. The interviews consisted of discussions lasting at least two hours, and often considerably longer. The pattern of questions had been assembled on the basis of numerous conversations at the workplace, in the hostel, in private homes and in bars. Most of the interviews took place in the works, usually in rooms set aside for the purpose.

Methods like these would have fitted in well with the programmatic claims of the Institute of Social Research. The Mannesmann study stated in its 'Remarks on Methods' that, through their immediate contact with those questioned, the interviewers acquired a series of general impressions that went beyond the answers themselves. It was difficult to record these impressions and eliminate the subjective interviewer factor at the same time. With an unmistakably Adornoesque idea, it was stated that 'The interviewer's full subjective capacity to react is here made into a "research tool" best adapted to the object, which is imponderable in its dynamics and complexity.'<sup>101</sup> It was a poor match for this when the interviewing the actual fieldwork was carried out by fifteen experienced interviewers from the German Institute of Opinion Research (Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen or DIVO) who only added at the end of the questionnaire sheet their general impressions on the degree of co-operation shown by the person being questioned, on the quality of the contact, the person's sincerity, how attached he was to the factory, and how much trade union activity he engaged in. From the research report, it was not possible to judge the extent to which the results had benefited from the 'full subjective capacity to react' of the 'assistants' of the Institute of Social Research who had been entrusted with carrying out the group discussions. In addition, it was decided to do without any qualitative analysis of the group discussion materials.

In its contents, too, *The Worker's Image of Society* was far more natural than the Mannesmann study in its use of language, in its reporting of quotations, and in the way in which it went into detail on contentious topics. The Popitz study gave extensive attention to the topic of the struggle between capital and labour, which had been explicitly excluded from the Institute of Social Research study for no convincing reason. No matter how much one wanted to concentrate on the atmosphere in each specific workplace, that atmosphere always at the same time represented a particular form of the clash of interests between labour and capital which was produced by the special situation in each factory. The naturalness and impartiality of the Popitz study, however, was unmistakably the result of the authors' certainty that they were above any suspicion of having socialist or even remotely left-wing attitudes. In the introductory chapter to the Mannesmann study, and in Horkheimer's newspaper article, cautious references were made to broader topics: only stubborn dogmatism could deny that 'since the present catastrophic phase began, i.e. forty years ago, much has changed in the nature of the workforce and in its position and function within society as a whole'; unquestionably, 'many of the old ideas of the labour movement' had been 'deprived of their meaning as a result of their degradation by Russian despotism into instruments of power'; but 'an empirical study such as ours' could 'under no circumstances presume' to discern 'whether this has affected their real content, the concept itself'.<sup>102</sup> By contrast, Popitz and his associates, openly rejecting socialist class theory in the presentation of their results, were prepared to call a spade a spade:

The employer is not only an opponent over the question of worker participation, but also in general an adversary to the worker. The majority of people conceive of the relationship between the employer and the employee as a polar one, not as an all-inclusive system. With an adversary like this, one may be able to reach a compromise through mutual concessions; it is more likely that one will have to wring things out of him to achieve anything at all. But a great many workers have abandoned even this hope. They take the view that the polarity between 'the top' and 'the bottom' is irrevocable.<sup>103</sup>

The resignation of so many workers in the face of what seemed to be an overpowering opponent appeared, in the Popitz study, as a kind of hangover or depression.

Behind the many proverbial expressions used e.g. 'Money makes the world go round' there is in fact an ideological tradition. Wealth, possession of a commanding position and knowledge are still, in the way in which they are reciprocally determined and indivisible, the marks of the power of capitalism in the eyes of

many workers. One can still sense today that it has been hammered into generations of workers that the adversary's strength lies in this trinity of forces, and that a tremendous effort will be necessary to conquer such a foe. 104

Since immediate familiarity with workers, instead of becoming easier, had become more difficult for the employer than before, it was possible for the old doctrine to survive, and he was still being described as a 'capitalist'. 'There is a certain irony in the fact that the image of the employer, exaggerated for educational purposes and made into a warning contrast, has an intimidating effect on today's sceptical worker.' 105

The Mannesmann study was peculiar in that, in the introduction, it held open the possibility that class theory would have lasting validity, while in the text itself mention of the various forms in which class theory had survived, or of other ideas that had taken its place, was virtually omitted. By contrast, the Popitz study's unconditional rejection of class theory formed the basis for a detailed consideration of workers' ideas and arguments, of the stereotypes they used and of the relevance of these for social 'theory'. The study, which opened with four long quotations from reports by four workers about their worklife recordings, as it were concluded, after extensive qualitative analyses, by presenting a great many pithy quotations in a differentiated typology of the images of society found among the workers who had been questioned, rather, a typology of the workers on the basis of their images of society. This was an impressive, and in the West Germany of the 1950s unique, empirically based phenomenology of the various ways in which workers reacted to the conditions of their existence as workers, to the 'condition ouvrière'. 106

One of the consequences of the Mannesmann study was that the Rationalization Commission for German Industry (Rationalisierungs-Kuratorium der Deutschen Wirtschaft) provided the Institute of Social Research with finance for research assistantships in industrial sociology. It was already doing this for the Cologne Research Institute of Sociology and Administrative Studies, under the direction of René König, and the Department of Sociology at the University of Hamburg, under the direction of Helmut Schelsky. This made Adorno very uneasy. He saw the danger of becoming committed 'to industrial research of a kind . . . we have certain reservations about' which could lead to 'competition with Schelsky and König on their own level'. 107 But in the Institute's next prospectus, published in 1958, it was proudly stated unmistakably in Horkheimer's words that the study carried out in Mannesmann Ltd in connection with the atmosphere in the workplace, and two further research projects, on the reasons for fluctuations in the mining industry and on workers' ideas about old age, 'served the practical purposes of German industry and government administration'. It was also stated that the Institute of Social Research, in which students were

familiarized with the methods of social research in a manner probably unmatched by any other German university, had been the first to introduce an examination for a diploma qualification. Giving a pragmatic note to the old Horkheimer programme of interdisciplinary work and thought concerned with society as a whole a note which had already come to the fore in the speech Horkheimer gave at the Institute's reopening ceremony the text went on:

Sociologists with a diploma qualification are not narrow specialists, but people capable of linking solid knowledge of specialist areas with an insight into present-day social questions and into the interrelationship of the whole. They meet a need felt by an ever-increasing number of official bodies, by industrial groups such as boards of directors and trade unions, and also by institutions such as radio and the press. The high standards required in this examination are intended to make it possible to select students who are genuinely capable.

It was possible to distinguish between two kinds of research at the Institute. On the one hand, there were projects which were mere contract work, intended to ensure its financial survival, such as radio research, research on the atmosphere in the workplace, and other contract work carried out for Mannesmann including research into fluctuations in coalmining. On the other hand, there were projects relating to the Institute's own topics of interest. Examples of these during the 1950s were the research on West German political awareness, research studies on the university and society, and also, to a certain extent, the further elaboration of the group discussion procedure. Further examples, during the 1960s, were the development of an A-scale, or authoritarianism scale, corresponding to the F-scale (fascism scale), and research on political awareness and political education in the Federal Republic. To extend this second group of research topics, which were also partly financed from outside for example by the German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) Adorno toyed with the idea of a long-term series of research projects on 'German ideology'. (In 1964 this became the subtitle of his *Jargon of Authenticity*, a kind of qualitative content analysis of elevated German speech. 108) But for Horkheimer this distinction obviously became less and less relevant, at least from the time of the Mannesmann study onwards. His goal was, rather, to build up a respected Institute, with the vague image of a glorious past, which attracted socially useful sociologists with humanist convictions who had good prospects of getting jobs in the fields of industry and administration.

Development along these lines must have been a relief to Horkheimer, who had a strong need for the goodwill of influential personalities. He had applied for the chair in Chicago because he saw it as a way of

keeping his American citizenship. In the mid-1950s he moved heaven and earth to have another 'individual law' passed in order to get back his American citizenship, which he had been deprived of after all. He also wanted to be granted the privilege of lifelong dual citizenship of the United States and Germany. In Germany he got people like the Hessian Prime Minister, Georg-August Zinn, and the Federal President, Theodor Heuss, involved in his campaign. Demands like these were bound to dampen his efforts to make advances in materialist and critical social theory. Horkheimer was still living ambiguously, and he was still contemptuous of the society of his time, although more secretly than in earlier years. What he was doing above all, as a teacher and speechmaker, instigator and co-ordinator, was to advertise liberal-bourgeois cultural traditions which it was important to rescue and pass on into the administered world, no matter how faint and weak the traces of these traditions were becoming. 109

But Adorno was not serious about the plans he had in mind for a critical empiricism either. Having gone into his work with so much momentum and with the idea of a critical, empirical form of social research before him, he was never involved in any decisive way in the projects at the Institute of Social Research after the group study on West German political awareness. He only processed the research reports and wrote introductions or forewords to them and he did this without the benefit of any audience, since *Gruppenexperiment* and *Betriebsklima* were, for a decade, the only publications of Institute research to appear in the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' series. A posthumously published manuscript, 'Teamwork in Social Research', dating from 1957, allows us to draw some conclusions about the reasons for Adorno's limited involvement in the Institute's work. His lack of involvement was partly due to the paralysing attitude taken by Horkheimer, who still had the last word in Institute affairs up to the 1960s, and from whom Adorno was unable to free himself; and it was also partly due to Adorno's own other interests, which were in no way subordinate to his sociological ones.

'Teamwork in Social Research' was a radicalization of the self-criticism of empirical social research about which Adorno had stated, in *Group Experiment*, that he would be able to give it further productive development. He now saw criticism and empiricism as dividing into two components that were irreconcilable in practice. 'Whoever knows the practical side of social research from his own work will have been forced to observe that, in the areas of research being discussed, teamwork cannot be replaced by the work of an individual scholar of the old style. "One-man studies" are always dubious, and mostly amateurish.'<sup>110</sup> Simply carrying out interviews to gather a representative sample, for example, could not be managed by a single individual alone. And anyone wanting to be taken seriously by his or her peers, anyone wanting to obtain research contracts, could not avoid applying the controls

only possible through teamwork which were generally held to balance out subjective distortions in the scoring or classification of data under particular categories.

But the price which must be paid for this kind of 'streamlining' of the social sciences is very high . . . What is sacrificed to the process of elimination is not merely individual arbitrariness, but also all forms of objective insight that are granted to the reflecting individual. These vanish in the process of abstraction that leads several individuals to formulate a common awareness that has had all their specific differences cut away from it. Perhaps the most worrying experience of social researchers, and the one which ultimately led to the self-critical explosion of recent years, is the fact that a study with a broad perspective, containing ideas on the essential interrelationships and putting penetrating questions, is stripped of all that is best in it in the course of its progress from draft to execution, particularly during the bottleneck of the preliminary tests. Undertakings full of substance and vigour lose all their force in this way, not through any fault, ill-will, or narrow-mindedness of any of the individuals involved, but as the result of the objective constraints operating in the machinery itself. 111

In teamwork, everyone must be able to carry on where others had left off. Objective order must prevail if each researcher was to be able to orient him- or herself. If research directors tried at the end to restore to the study the personal element they had introduced into it at the beginning, but which had during the course of the research fallen victim to the institutionalized form of the research process Adorno was obviously here referring to his own experiences as a presenter of research results and as a writer of programmatic introductions they would find that its relation to the data had been irrecoverably lost. Their ideas would remain vague and could only hope to be tolerated at best as hypotheses, to be tested in future inquiries that usually never took place.

The lack of people capable of doing the 'write-up' for studies, often remarked upon, cannot be explained by any lack of literary talent. A report of this sort is not a matter of mere literary practice, but demands complete comprehension of the research. The explanation lies, rather, in the aporia that a final report of this sort has to provide a kind of coherent significance, while the immanent significance of the method it is all based on is precisely the negation of coherent significance, a dissolution into mere facticity. Theory is therefore merely given lip-service, since the tendency immanent within the research does not have the acquisition of theory from facts as its goal at all. 112

The only implicit conclusion to be drawn from Adorno's assessment of his experiences in empirical social research was: to do in future what one could do alone, but without at the same time exposing oneself to accusations of being amateurish or merely pottering about—namely to work on theory. But what sort of theory? And how was the theory to protect itself from declining into mere speculation? Two years later, Adorno started work on his *Negative Dialectics*, which can be said to have taken the place of his project to continue the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in collaboration with Horkheimer. After nearly two decades in which he had been unwillingly harnessed to empirical social research projects, and had taken part in them with growing, but never unqualified enthusiasm, Adorno had now returned to the standpoint he had taken during his work on the Princeton Radio Research Project; important matters could not be approached empirically.

But had there not been a Berkeley project? Was Adorno not still proud of the combination of psychoanalytic theory and social research methods, of Freud and quantification, which had been achieved there? Had his collaboration with the Berkeley Public Opinion Study Group been nothing more than 'streamlining teamwork'? Had decisive experiments in critical empiricism not failed to take place precisely from a fear of diverging too far from the established research system, and through an incapacity to form an 'intellectual community between people associating with one another' in the name of a 'cause that objectively motivates them', as Adorno put it? Adorno's critique referred to the established research system, but not to the project of producing a critical, empirical form of social research. His critique made it easier for him to concentrate on philosophical theory, but enabled him to insist to the last on the need for field research to be carried out in critical sociology, although he was not able to define with any exactness what this might involve.

Marcuse's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment':  
*Eros and Civilization*

When publishers or potential sponsors were not showing enough interest in the Institute's publications projects, or when enough suitable translators were not available; when the Institute's directors had come to terms with the institutionalized research system; when just running the system they were integrated into was using up the greater part of their energies, were they still at least keeping alive what was left of the intellectual community, so far as they were able—a community between persons linked by a cause objectively motivating them, which Adorno saw as the only alternative to 'teamwork' and to the 'one-man study'? Even if Marcuse had failed to move to Frankfurt because of Adorno's jealousy, Horkheimer's reluctance to enter into long-term financial

commitments and Marcuse's own understandable need to have financial security, was there at least some kind of community at arm's length between Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse as representatives of Critical Theory? The story of the German publication of Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (the working titles had been 'Beyond the Reality Principle: A Philosophy of Psychoanalysis' and 'Philosophy of Psychoanalysis: Towards Civilization without Repression') showed a different picture.

The Freud book had grown out of a series of lectures Marcuse had given in 1950-1 at the Washington School of Psychiatry. In November 1951 Marcuse wrote to Horkheimer, whom he had recently visited in Frankfurt in August: 'You asked me for the plan of the Freud book. As I am venturing into an area that is very risky, both privately and objectively, I have decided to write down everything that occurs to me first, and then rewrite it. So I have no plan apart from the ideas I mentioned to you in Frankfurt.'<sup>113</sup> Horkheimer saw the manuscript in its earliest stages, and Marcuse kept him informed of its progress. In the late summer of 1954 Horkheimer met Marcuse while visiting the USA in connection with his Chicago professorship. 'By the way, Herbert's work seems to me to be quite decent,' he wrote to Adorno. 'Although the psychological approach does not really appeal to us, there are so many splendid things in the book that we should accept it completely. Apart from publishing a series of extracts in the journal, a complete translation is definitely one of the most important things the planned "Series of German Translations" could produce.'<sup>114</sup> A few days later, in the face of predictable difficulties in securing finance for the translation series, he wrote, 'My view is that we should publish Herbert's book as an Institute publication, whether in English or in German. This will be no obstacle to prior publication of some parts of it in the journal.'<sup>115</sup> After Horkheimer's return to Frankfurt, Marcuse wrote to him, 'It would be wonderful if the German edition could appear as an Institute text it belongs to the Institute and its director.'<sup>116</sup>

In the volume *Sociologica*, dedicated to Horkheimer on his sixtieth birthday, Marcuse's abridged translation of the final chapter appeared in second place, immediately after Adorno's contribution. Even before the English edition came out, however, dark clouds were hanging over the plan to publish the German edition. Adorno wrote to Horkheimer in August 1955:

In *Dissent* there is a long article by Herbert against the psychoanalytic revisionists, which basically contains the ideas we hold on the matter, although we are not mentioned in so much as a single word, which I find very strange. I am decisively against one-sided solidarity, and in connection with his book, of which this article forms a chapter, I should very much like to advocate that we do *absolutely nothing*.<sup>117</sup>

A year later, the plan to publish the German edition of Marcuse's Freud book as an Institute text had definitely fallen through. A letter from Adorno to Marcuse in the summer of 1957 stated:

It's true that I felt uneasy with a certain directness and `immediacy' (in the tainted sense we now give to the concept of mediation) in your English Freud text, although this did not affect the basic positions taken. It was precisely for this reason that I wanted you to produce the German version. It is simply a question of the difference between the levels of language. You only need to formulate your ideas in German to notice the sort of thing that was disturbing me and you'll change them in such a way that all of us will be able to stand behind them fully . . . There can be no question of any aversion to publishing the book whatsoever on my part. On the contrary, it was my view from the very start that it was natural for it to come out in our series, and I have not changed my view in the slightest. 118

But Marcuse was not Benjamin, nor was he in Benjamin's situation. Perhaps a version changed to meet Adorno's requirements might have been an improvement in some ways just as Benjamin's article on Baudelaire for the *ZfS* had been. But would it have been an improvement in terms of Marcuse's requirements? The German edition of Marcuse's Freud book appeared in 1957 with the publishers Ernst Klett under the title *Eros und Kultur*. (In later editions the title was changed to *Triebstruktur und Gesellschaft (Instinctual Structure and Society)*.) The relationship between Marcuse and the directors of the Institute became even more fragile.

In retrospect, the Freud book can be seen as Marcuse's major theoretical work. Moreover, in comparison with the 1955 publications listed earlier in this chapter, and even with what was published in the years before and after, it has the best claim to be seen as a continuation of Critical Theory. In *Reason and Revolution* (1941) Marcuse had attempted systematically to snatch Hegel from the hands of reaction and fascism and demonstrate that Marx's social theory was the heir to the critical tendencies in Hegel's philosophy. In 1946 he had suggested producing a special issue of the planned new journal containing a systematic assessment of the political, economic and cultural ideas and programmes of the significant parties in post-war Germany. In 1947 he was the only one to draft programmatic theses around which to orient the new journal. Later on, the product of his fellowships at the Russian Institute at Columbia University and the Russian Research Center at Harvard was *Soviet Marxism* (1958), a systematic critique of Soviet Marxist ideology which took Marx's theory as its yardstick. In *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) he attempted a systematic critique of the ideology of advanced industrial society. In *Eros and Civilization*, similarly,

he used the dynamics of instinct to provide Critical Theory with a basis of a sort.

*Eros and Civilization* was Marcuse's 'Dialectic of Enlightenment'. While Horkheimer and Adorno's book remained a fragment that claimed merely to have laid the groundwork for a positive concept of enlightenment, in Marcuse's book the first part, 'Under the Rule of the Reality Principle', was followed by a second, 'Beyond the Reality Principle'. Marcuse attempted to refute Freud's widely accepted thesis that civilization was inconceivable without renunciation or repression of instinct and without recognition of the reality principle. Using the metapsychological part of Freud's own theory, he tried to show that a culture without repression is indeed conceivable, and that it can exploit the objective conditions created by the previous, repressive culture. He accused the neo-Freudians, and Fromm in particular, of cutting off society's roots in the dynamics of instinct by transferring their attention from the unconscious to the conscious, from biological to cultural factors. They treated society as the institutionally established cultural milieu confronting the individual, and had no conceptual basis at their disposal that went beyond the ruling system. In contrast, he himself claimed that, thanks to Freud's metapsychology, he had identified the concept of levels of instinct as an independent critical yardstick by which it was possible to measure society and how it shapes the individual.

Marcuse's analysis of the 'dialectic of civilization' was as follows. The whole course of previous culture was marked by the fact that acquiring the necessities of life was organized not according to the goal of satisfying the needs of individuals in the best possible manner, but in such a way that 'the gradual conquest of scarcity was inextricably bound up with and shaped by the interest of domination'. In addition to basic repression, the "modifications" of the instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization', 119 there was also 'surplus repression'. The progress of culture, marked by surplus repression and indeed, in view of the growth in the extent of domination over nature, by a relative increase in this surplus repression, weakened the erotic components of instinctual energy and strengthened the destructive ones.

Strengthened defense against aggression is necessary; but in order to be effective the defense against enlarged aggression would have to strengthen the sex instincts, for only a strong Eros can effectively 'bind' the destructive instincts. And this is precisely what the *developed civilization is incapable of doing* because it depends for its very existence on extended and intensified regimentation and control.120

With this diagnosis, the idea of an unavoidable 'biological' conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, between sexuality and culture, was replaced in Marcuse's opinion by

the idea of the unifying and gratifying power of Eros, chained and worn out in a sick civilization. This idea would imply that the *free* Eros does not preclude lasting civilized societal relationships that it repels only the supra-repressive organization of societal relationships under a principle which is the negation of the pleasure principle. 121

The second part of his book contained chapters on 'Phantasy and Utopia', 'The Images of Orpheus and Narcissus' as an alternative to Prometheus, 'The Aesthetic Dimension' and 'The Transformation of Sexuality into Eros'. Marcuse was thus offering, on a small scale, a counterpart to Bloch's *Principle of Hope* (the first volume of which, consisting of 'Brief Daydreams', 'The Anticipating Awareness' and 'Ideals in the Mirror', had been published in 1954; the second volume, 'Outline of a Better World', came out in 1955 and the third, 'Ideals of the Fulfilled Moment', in 1959).<sup>122</sup> Marcuse's final chapter, 'Eros and Thanatos', attempted to snatch the topic of death from the opponent and view even death which had taught humanity that every pleasure is short and led mankind into resignation even before society forced it into it as something capable of being changed. Philosophy should respond to death with a 'Great Refusal' the striking formula Marcuse borrowed from A.N. Whitehead, who had used it in an attempt to define the principal characteristic of art with an insistence on the claims of humanity and nature to complete fulfilment.<sup>123</sup>

Under conditions of a truly human existence, the difference between succumbing to disease at the age of ten, thirty, fifty or seventy, and dying a 'natural' death after a fulfilled life, may well be a difference worth fighting for with all instinctual energy. Not those who die, but those who die before they must and want to die, those who die in agony and pain, are the great indictment against civilization . . . It takes all the institutions and values of a repressive order to pacify the bad conscience of this guilt.<sup>124</sup>

(Here Marcuse came full circle, returning to the circumstances that had formed the starting-point for his Freud book. The dedication page reads: 'Written in memory of Sophie Marcuse, 1901-1951.' Marcuse had begun work on the book in 1951, the year in which his first wife died of cancer, after almost a year and a half of living face to face with death.)

Marcuse, who in his early articles had used Heidegger's existential ontology in a Marxist fashion and had spoken of the 'total revolution' and of 'realizing the whole human being', drafted a cultural-revolutionary introduction to Freudian and Marxist thought in *Eros and Civilization*. The book's title stood for an appeal to eros as the great antagonist to an unnecessarily repressive civilization and as the guarantor, never losing sight of its goal, of a civilization free from repression. (Marcuse usually

mentioned this without getting involved in any discussion of whether he meant that, once surplus repression had been abolished, and on the basis of the previous achievements of civilization, the character of basic repression would change in such a way that there would no longer be repression of any kind at all.)

The fact that the reality principle has to be re-established continually in the development of man indicates that its triumph over the pleasure principle is never complete and never secure . . . What civilization masters and represses the claim of the pleasure principle continues to exist in civilization itself. The unconscious retains the objectives of the defeated pleasure principle . . . *The return of the repressed* makes up the tabooed and subterranean history of civilization . . . And the past continues to claim the future: it generates the wish that the paradise be re-created on the basis of the achievements of civilization. 125

The continuum of a constantly subterranean history of pleasure, and the memory of earlier happiness in each individual's childhood as well as in the childhood of the human species, guaranteed, Marcuse reasoned, not only that the demand for happiness was indestructible but that it was a demand for total happiness.

How the process of repression had come into being; whether the distinction between basic repression and surplus repression was to imply that a civilizing process free from surplus repression might have been possible; whether the achievements of a civilization marked by domination and surplus repression should not be examined critically and fundamentally revised; whether what had been condemned to suffer a subterranean, tabooed history might not have fallen victim to distortions that could not simply be thrown off one day like tiresome fetters pressing questions like these were either not put by Marcuse at all or were simply answered with phylogenetic speculations taken over from Freud or answered with catchwords, for example in the reference to the need for a 'rational reorganization of a huge industrial apparatus', and the transformation of sexuality into eros and the replacement of 'alienated labour' with 'libidinal' labour' that would then be possible. 126

Was Marcuse's work not finally bringing to light the very sources Horkheimer and Adorno's studies had also been feeding on? In *Philosophy of Modern Music*, Adorno had seen the 'gesture of someone returning' as being 'the expression of all music, even in a world which deserves to die'. 127 Horkheimer and Adorno, in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, had seen the mind's recognition of itself as unreconciled nature as being the way to emerge from the dialectic of enlightenment. In *Eclipse of Reason*, Horkheimer had seen the old forms of life still smouldering beneath the surface of modern civilization as being the source of the capacity to love something for its own sake. Horkheimer

and Adorno wrote an obituary for Ernst Simmel that defended Freud's 'biological materialism', as did Adorno's article on 'Revised Psychoanalysis'.<sup>128</sup> Was all of this not summed up by Marcuse's premiss that instinctual structure, or, more precisely, the 'good' instinctual structure, eros, contained within itself a form of reason? Was Marcuse not thus postulating bluntly what had been Horkheimer and Adorno's own premisses, which they themselves had stated only indirectly, bashfully, aphoristically? Their view was that there was a positive side to nature running from myth up to the Enlightenment and the age of reason that was ultimately based on a spontaneous and to that extent natural sense of what was right, good and true. Horkheimer and Adorno repeatedly emphasized that only self-reflective thinking could give voice to repressed nature; that giving support to nature was only possible by releasing its apparent opposite, independent thought. Was it possible, then, to envisage the contribution of thought as being other than the realization or articulation of something that the 'good' version of nature had provided? Were Horkheimer and Adorno, through their caution, not merely avoiding an open confrontation with the dilemma that faced them? On the one hand, there was a need for a yardstick that was independent of a possibly deceptive sense of what was right and wrong, in order to distinguish between the 'good' and 'bad' versions of nature. On the other, there was an equal need for a yardstick that was independent of a form of rationality that was also possibly deceptive, in order to permit rational judgement by someone who had a clear vision of the dialectic of enlightenment and of the fusion of basic repression and surplus repression within civilization.

With their cautious attitude towards questions concerning the basis for Critical Theory, and the emphasis they gave to the role of determinate negation and to merely expressing what was the case, Horkheimer and Adorno had pleaded for the main emphasis to be put on a materialist theory of society. But if work on the materialist theory of society was not progressing, should the problem of the foundations of Critical Theory not inevitably move to the fore, and did Marcuse's book not deserve to be discussed from this point of view?

It ought to have been so. Horkheimer had complained about the lack of theoretical economic analysis in the second half of the 1930s, particularly with regard to the dialectics project. As late as 1954, when Adorno revived his old plan to publish a collection of articles consisting of Institute studies on mass culture, he complained in a letter to Lowenthal that 'There is, of course, something decisive missing, namely a theoretical economic analysis of the basis of the culture industry.'<sup>129</sup> Just as the need for this had been emphasized again and again, and then suppressed during practical work, the need for a discussion of the foundations of Critical Theory had now suddenly become urgent and was suppressed even more firmly than the need for theoretical economic analysis had been.

During the last few months before Adorno moved to the west coast of America, he and Horkheimer had exchanged ideas in their letters which went into the problem of foundations more openly than any other passages in their correspondence or manuscripts. Their situation at the time prompted this: they were about to start work together almost immediately on finishing their magnum opus. In the conditions this created, there did not seem to be a single problem so great that it could not finally be solved in the course of their collaboration if a solution was possible at all.

Adorno once again advocated to a sceptical Horkheimer the fundamental significance of theological motifs. But it was a matter of 'still thinking the secret'. He went on:

I have a weak, infinitely weak, feeling that it is still possible to think the secret, but I am honestly not yet in a position today to formulate the way in which it might be possible. The premiss that theology is shrinking and will soon become invisible is one motif, while another is the conviction that, from the most central point of view, there is no difference between theology's relation to the negative and its relation to the positive. (Marcuse's book, which thrives on this distinction, has only encouraged me here.) But above all I think that everything we experience as true not blindly, but as a conceptual impulse and what presents itself to us as the *index sui et falsi*, only conveys this light as a reflection of that other light. 130

The book by Marcuse mentioned here was *Reason and Revolution*, in which it was stated, for example, that Marx's 'categories are negative and at the same time positive: they present a negative state of affairs in the light of its positive solution, revealing the true situation in existing society as the prelude to its passing into a new form.'<sup>131</sup> The final aphorism in Adorno's *Minima Moralia* read: 'The only philosophy which can be responsibly practiced in face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption . . . consummate negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror-image of its opposite.'<sup>132</sup> Was this not the same as what Marcuse was writing? The differences between them appeared in the sentences that followed in each case. In Marcuse's view, the elements of the new society were inherent within existing society and were preparing to transform it into a free society. For Adorno, however, perceiving the world from the point of view of redemption as being displaced and alienated, a perception anticipating the 'messianic light', was on the one hand the simplest and most obvious thing of all, while on the other hand it was an utter impossibility. This was because, for Adorno, any such perception must be situated at some point beyond the scope of

existence, while at the same time every possible insight was marked by the very distortion it sought to escape. Marcuse took the view that there was a positive essence inherent within negative phenomena, and saw the subterranean history of that positive essence as being the authentic and ultimately victorious side of history. Adorno, by contrast, did not accept that a subterranean history of this sort could offer any guarantee. Only at the moment of consummate negativity would it be possible for both the negative and the positive, and the victorious light of a redemption that would cancel at once the distinction between them, to reveal themselves simultaneously. Only from the moment in which redemption occurred, and therefore in retrospect like a life flashing past one at the moment of death would it be possible to distinguish correctly between the negative and the positive. It was precisely Adorno's insistence on the aporia of the immanent critique of false conditions that led him into a kind of theology in parentheses. It was like a bill of exchange whose character as such was emphasized, while one nevertheless counted on its being redeemed.

Adorno told Horkheimer in the same letter that when he attempted to articulate his views on this problem it sounded strange and naïve, and he could only express himself falteringly. No wonder he did not go into these questions in his written work, on principle, preferring to give hints about the ultimate justifications for Critical Theory in metaphorical form, and therefore in formulations that sounded provisional and non-committal.

Horkheimer, giving Schopenhauer a Marxist twist, had based his own view on the assumption that human beings have a natural need for happiness, natural sympathies and natural solidarity with other finite beings, and that these characteristics would win through as soon as humanity was freed from manipulation and the struggle for survival. This involved an assumption that there was a form of reason emanating from humanity's natural qualities.

But there was another motif that appeared in the correspondence between Horkheimer and Adorno in September 1941. Although they both mentioned it only briefly, the way they discussed it showed that the idea developed later on by Jürgen Habermas that reason is situated in language, and that Critical Theory might seek its ultimate foundations there hung in the air for a moment without being picked up.

While working on his article on reason in 1941 (see p. 296 above), Horkheimer had asked Adorno for his opinion of the thesis of the 'Carnap people' concerning the identity of reason and language. According to Horkheimer, this view had pervaded the whole history of bourgeois philosophy. In the seventeenth century the French had not called reason *raison* at all, but rather *discours*. But the intention behind the Carnap thesis had basically involved denying the existence of objective truth.

I ask myself whether we are not obliged to take this thesis out of the philosophers' hands. Language intends, quite independently of the psychological intentions of the speaker, the universality that has been ascribed to reason alone. Interpreting this universality necessarily leads to the idea of a correct society. When it serves the status quo, language must therefore find that it consistently contradicts itself, and this is evident from individual linguistic structures themselves. I should like to hear your reaction to this idea, although I have only hinted at it rather formally and vaguely here. Because in this form I don't really trust it myself. There would always be a contradiction between serving the dominant praxis and necessarily intending the correct generality. Don't imagine that I haven't got many more specific things to say about it, but the formal thesis itself is very attractive, in spite of its positivity. `Critique of language' would thus be a subjective genitive. But I am not entirely happy with this path, even though it leads from Mauthner to Karl Kraus.

By serving existing injustice, language fell victim to two contradictions. First, the process of becoming functionalized and schematized had led language into contradiction with its capacity to express a wealth of significance.

Karl Kraus . . . made schematization look much too harmless by attempting on every occasion to revoke it as an error. But we have already reached a stage at which confronting the bourgeois ideal alone is no longer sufficient. In contrast with the critique of language, the critique of political economy was not satisfied with mere confrontation; it produced an antithesis. But even the critique of political economy is questionable for the same reason. It, too, is secretly still oriented towards the concepts of power, order, planning and administration which appear plainly in Kraus.

And there was a second contradiction to which language fell victim within existing society:

To speak to someone basically means recognizing him as a possible member of the future association of free human beings. Speech establishes a shared relation towards truth, and is therefore the innermost affirmation of another existence, indeed of all forms of existence, according to their capacities. When speech denies any possibilities, it necessarily contradicts itself. The speech of the concentration camp guard is actually a terrible illogicality, no matter what its content is; unless, of course, it condemns the speaker's own duties. 133

Horkheimer himself at once considered the objection that the concept of generality used in the second case could at best only be described as being just as bourgeois as any other ideal. There was no concealing the fact that it was derived from Kant, and it could not offer any guidance. And then, at a loss, he added, 'That may be so, but then all that will be left is experience, not its expression.' In that case, logic would really be reason in its purest form. He asked for Adorno's view on this second point, and Adorno gave his emphatic agreement.

I totally agree with the thesis about the antagonistic nature of every language that has yet existed . . . If humanity is still not yet mature [*mündig*], then it means that, in the most literal sense, it has not yet been able to speak; Kraus's illusion was that it had lost the ability to speak. Your new variation on the philosophy of language is also very closely connected with our critique of psychology. In psychology, the utopia of a beneficent generality, however inadequately represented by logic, goes by the board, while the bad generality, i.e. simple commonness, emerges in it all the more decisively. I should like to give my passionate support to the new trend in the philosophy of language, together, of course, with its dialectical antithesis. In fact I am so convinced by it that I can hardly understand your hesitation. It should not be called critique of language, but something like 'language and truth' or 'reason and language'.

Giving added urgency to this piece of advice on Horkheimer's clash with the positivists by referring to his own experience, he added:

I have never experienced anything so intensely as the relationship to truth that lies, in a very specific way, in direct speech. It has always been difficult for me, and basically still is, to realize that a person who is speaking can be a villain, or can be lying. My sense of language's claim to truth is so strong that it vanquishes all psychology and tends to give me a degree of credulousness towards the person speaking which forms a glaring contradiction to my experience, and is usually only overcome when I see something written by the person concerned and recognize precisely that he *cannot* speak. My almost insuperable aversion to telling lies is connected only with this awareness, not with any moral taboos . . . When you ask me for my views on this question, I can only say that what are perhaps the most inward impulses I have so inward that I am almost helplessly at their mercy are based on the very level you describe. 134

Despite this enthusiastic confirmation of Horkheimer's idea, nothing they wrote ever reflected it.<sup>135</sup> In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and other

works, there is only the idea that language has been robbed of its meaning and that people today do not genuinely speak, that all communication is false, only distancing one from objects and persons. But although this idea was central to the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and to Adorno's work, it was not intended to be a strict negation of a claim to truth and reason that had its roots in language. Language's claim to truth and reason was not the central point from which Critical Theory fed. The correspondence does not give any hints on whether Horkheimer and Adorno consciously rejected the idea of a 'critique of language' (seen as a subjective genitive) while they were working together on the dialectics book or, if so, why. They may have rejected it because to argue on the basis of a demand, based in language, for truth and for an association of free human beings seemed to Horkheimer to be too idealistic. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* only shows that Adorno's strategy of presenting a hidden theology won through, and that his way of dealing with the problem of how to justify Critical Theory stiffened into a formula in which Hegel's concept of determinate negation merged with Horkheimer's formulation of the substance of Jewish monotheism, given prominence at the end of 'The Jews and Europe'.<sup>136</sup> When Horkheimer, in the *Eclipse of Reason* and in his inaugural lecture as rector, subsequently contrasted the dominant 'subjective reason' with 'objective reason', but without himself clearly laying any claim to possess objective reason, he was avoiding the problem. At the same time, however, he was taking the opportunity to make resolute criticisms of the dominant 'subjective reason'.

With *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse had been trying to fill a gap. The criticisms Adorno made, without getting himself involved in any discussion of the position Marcuse had taken, ultimately amounted to advising him to proceed in the same way as Adorno and Horkheimer themselves: to maintain his cover and not present the central focus of his thought as a tangible, certain foundation.

Adorno's criticisms were incomprehensible to Marcuse. Marcuse had always defended with Aristotelian vehemence what Horkheimer and Adorno had in one form or another expressed with restraint and as indirectly as possible. He had always seen what was true and correct as having a fundamental existential quality. And so things remained. Even for a community of theoreticians living at a distance from one another, their mutual reservations were too deep, and their willingness to discuss them too slight.

7

## Critical Theory in Contention

Adorno as an Independent Interdisciplinary Researcher Towards a *Musique Informelle* and Corresponding Approaches in Other Fields

With his *Philosophy of Modern Music*, Adorno founded a tradition in the aesthetics of music that was oriented towards the philosophy of history. Most of the books he published during the first decade of the Federal Republic dealt with music: *Philosophy of Modern Music* (1949), *In Search of Wagner* (1952), *Dissonances* (1956) and *Tone Figures* (1959).<sup>1</sup> Second editions of *Philosophy of Modern Music* and *Dissonances* came out in 1958. His 'Theses on Musical Education' first presented as a lecture in Darmstadt in 1952, upset the supporters of the 'Young Music', who as early as the 1950s were already invoking a revived 'new national community'.<sup>2</sup> As a veteran defender and supreme connoisseur of the Schoenberg school, Adorno became an important participant in discussions held at the Darmstadt International Vacation Courses on New Music,<sup>3</sup> where the musical avant-garde met. He saved the Darmstadt community study from foundering, took part in empirical research at the Institute of Social Research right into the 1950s, and kept the idea of critical social research alive through his numerous lectures and articles. His radio talk on 'Poetry and Society', broadcast by RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) in Berlin in 1951, inaugurated an approach to interpreting literary works on the basis of social theory that was new in the Federal Republic, where immanent or ontologically based interpretations dominated. In *Minima Moralia*, he presented an example of aphoristic, 'impure' philosophy which was unique in the 1950s. By contrast, in 1956 he published the study of Husserl he had begun when he was living in England, *Against Epistemology: A Metacritique Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies*<sup>4</sup> a work that met the strictest academic standards. With *Prisms: Society and the Critique of Culture*,<sup>5</sup> published in 1955, he offered the clearest evidence yet of the variety and individuality of his thinking risking his reputation among his colleagues in philosophy and sociology, as Georg Simmel had also done in his time. Adorno's musical compositions, mostly written before 1945

and consisting largely of song cycles with piano accompaniment, were performed more and more often from the 1950s onward. He only published a few of his literary pieces, and even then in obscure journals or under a pseudonym. Most of what he wrote consisted of articles and lectures that were published in journals for the general public such as the *Frankfurter Hefte*, *Neue Rundschau* or *Merkur* and in books aimed at the general public, rather than in specialist books and journals. Many of his published articles started out as radio talks.

In broad terms, this was the image Adorno would have offered to someone who was aware of the whole spectrum of his activities during the 1950s. But nobody saw it. Only some facets were noticed, although even these offered enduring rays of hope during the suffocating years of Adenauer's chancellorship. Peter Brückner, born in 1922, was one of the left-wing intellectuals who later became important in the student movement. He described his memories of the mid-1950s as follows:

Towards the end of my time at university, I discover some writings by Adorno and Horkheimer, I can't remember where or how many more; the name 'Mitscherlich' sticks in my mind as well. By the middle of the 1950s I can hardly ever put down Adorno's *Minima Moralia* for very long, and then his writings on the sociology of music the 'Frankfurt School' becomes *the* experience of my whole education. But, like my interest in psychoanalysis, this remains more or less a private matter. 6

Oskar Negt, born in 1934, who later took his doctorate with Adorno and helped to carry on the work of the Frankfurt School, had been unhappy studying law, and moved from Göttingen to Frankfurt in the winter of 1955-6 to study philosophy. Full of curiosity, he went to Adorno's lectures. 'He talked about aesthetics in the old, dilapidated biology lecture hall. It all sounded strange, hermetically sealed, and it provoked my resistance because exchanging one desert of abstractions for another was not exactly what I had wanted.' It was thanks to Horkheimer that Negt did not pack his bags again and make off for Munich, where what was being offered in philosophy seemed to him to be more wide-ranging and open-minded:

[Horkheimer] made his lectures attractive to his listeners, inspiring their confidence straight away, taking up the slightest trace of an idea and twisting it and turning it till it became comprehensible. In the theory of philosophy as well, Horkheimer proved to be an entrepreneur, organizing things carefully and knowing exactly how to use sympathy and fascination to grab people's interest. There are considerable advantages in having talents like these. Adorno, on the other hand, frightened people off; he refused to treat his listeners as a medium, and, although persistency and mediation of

the object were a central topic in his dialectical thought, he refused to build bridges for teaching purposes, to be a philosopher of the market-place . . . Horkheimer was the entrepreneur, Bloch was the political prophet and storyteller; Adorno was a respectable watchmaker. 7

And Jürgen Habermas, born in 1929, coming to Frankfurt from Bonn as a philosopher with a doctoral thesis behind him, and familiar with the contemporary philosophical scene, took the view in retrospect that it would have been impossible at the time to have had any sense of a coherent doctrine, a 'Critical Theory'. 'Adorno wrote essays on the critique of culture and gave seminars on Hegel. He presented a certain Marxist background and that was it.' But then: 'When I first met Adorno, and saw how breathtakingly he suddenly started to talk about commodity fetishism, how he applied the concept to cultural and everyday phenomena, it was a shock at first. But then I thought: try to behave *as if* Marx and Freud (about whom Adorno spoke in the same orthodox way) were *contemporaries*.'<sup>8</sup> The editor of the literary supplement of the weekly *Die Zeit*, which was politically right-wing at the time and had published Carl Schmitt and others, added an editorial note to a review of Adorno's *Prisms*, without the reviewer's knowledge, to the effect that the Frankfurt sociologist 'Wiesengrund-Adorno' was a 'propagandist for the "classless society"'.<sup>9</sup> This showed how irritatedly anti-communists could react even to someone who in articles such as his 'Nannied Music',<sup>10</sup> published in 1953 in the anti-communist journal *Monat*, had unambiguously expressed his criticisms of the 'Eastern stewards of culture' and of the 'dictatorships' that were in power 'on the other side of the border'.

What was it that made a book by Adorno something that for one person was educative and illuminating and could hardly be put down, for someone else gave an off-putting impression of being hermetically sealed, for a third offered the exciting prospect of being able to treat Marx and Freud as contemporaries, and for others still smacked of drawing-room communism and class struggle? It was the same quality that had characterized all of Adorno's work since the later 1920s: his way of combining bitterness and romanticism; his way of combining a social interpretation of works of art with an interpretation of society that took as its yardstick the promise of happiness that works of art themselves contained; his way of combining the happiness produced by an ability to articulate suffering with the suffering produced by a sadomasochistic denial of the demand for happiness; his way of combining catastrophe theory and the scent of freedom, esotericism and vehemence.

This discussion concerns itself . . . exclusively with music. How is a total world to be structured in which mere questions of counterpoint give rise to unresolvable conflicts? How disordered is life

today at its very roots if its shuddering and rigidity are reflected even in a field no longer affected by empirical necessity, a field in which human beings hope to find a sanctuary from the presence of horrifying norms. 11

Adorno used this notion, in the foreword to *Philosophy of Modern Music*, written in Los Angeles in the summer of 1948, to disarm in advance those criticisms of his book that seemed to him to be the most obvious and important ones: first, that after everything that had happened in Europe, and everything that was still threatening to happen, it was cynical to spend time and intellectual energy on puzzling out the esoteric questions of modern compositional technique; secondly, that it was a mere provocation when the book's abstruse arguments about art often claimed to have immediate relevance to a reality which was not interested in them in the slightest. Nothing could describe more precisely what attracted some people to Adorno and repelled others: his thought was such that nothing existed for it which was not either evidence of, or decisive for, the fate of humanity. The aphorism from 1944, 'Do not knock', in *Minima Moralia* (the book about which Adorno's anti-Semitic colleague had said in his letter of apology that, like many of Adorno's publications, he did not 'like it or really consider it a strictly academic achievement'), stated:

Technology is making gestures precise and brutal, and with them men. It expels from movements all hesitation, deliberation, civility . . . Thus the ability is lost, for example, to close a door quietly and discreetly, yet firmly. Those of cars and refrigerators have to be slammed, others have the tendency to snap shut by themselves, imposing on those entering the bad manners of not looking behind them, not shielding the interior of the house which receives them . . . What does it mean for the subject that there are no more casement windows to open, but only sliding frames to shove, no gentle latches but turnable handles, no forecourt, no doorstep before the street, no wall around the garden? And which driver is not tempted, merely by the power of his engine, to wipe out the vermin of the street, pedestrians, children and cyclists? The movements machines demand of their users already have the violent, hard-hitting, unrelenting jerkiness of Fascist maltreatment. 12

Adorno saw the whole of the catastrophe, and all human hope too, as being concentrated together in each of the items he discussed. His philosophizing could therefore appear to some to be pompous and destructive, leaving no free space for anything that was harmless. To others, however, his thought did not disappoint their expectation that philosophy should have a certain awesomeness: instead of trying to soothe away the sense of astonishment from which philosophy sprang,

it tried to increase it; and it consorted with the most daring elements in contemporary art in order to extend them even further in thoughtful reflection.

In an 'Open Letter to Max Horkheimer', published in *Die Zeit* on Horkheimer's seventieth birthday, Adorno wrote:

With regard to my upbringing and early development, I was an artist, a musician, although I was possessed by an urge to render account for art and for the possibility of art today, an urge within which there was a certain objective aspect also trying to articulate itself a suspicion that naïvely aesthetic behaviour was inadequate in view of the trends evident in society.

The conditions Adorno met with when he returned to Germany were more than favourable for his activities as a theoretician of music. During the late 1940s, West Germany started to become the focus of the musical avant-garde. Events like the Darmstadt International Vacation Courses on New Music, late-night programmes on the decentralized federal public broadcasting system, the Donaueschingen Music Festival, and the Musica Viva concerts in Munich, made the Federal Republic into a mecca for new music. The origins of this development were closely connected to the rapid success of the Viennese School. René Leibowitz took part in the Darmstadt courses for the first time in 1948. He had studied under Anton Webern, and during the German occupation of Paris had managed to get the Viennese School established there by organizing illegal performances, by distributing scores and through his own compositions. His performances of works by Schoenberg and Webern, and his courses on twelve-tone music, were given an enthusiastic reception in Germany after the war. When Adorno's *Philosophy of Modern Music* came out in 1949, it supplied an impressive philosophy to underpin a movement that was already well established. Adorno took part in the Darmstadt courses every summer after his return to Germany, either as a course director or as a participant in the discussions.

But he did not now become the intellectual pioneer of a musical movement that had assimilated both the twelve-tone technique and the criticisms made of it in *Philosophy of Modern Music*; nor did he in any sense become the leader of a movement that had entered a realm of freedom after passing through the hard school of dodecaphony. On the contrary. After Schoenberg, it was Webern's turn to be idolized. After twelve-tone music, serial music now became the shibboleth of the musical avant-garde. Not just the pitch of a note but also its length, volume, tone, rhythm, all the elements of composition elements for which the term 'parameter', borrowed from physics, became established were now subjected to the serial principle. The aspect that had distinguished the 'revolutionary' Schoenberg from the 'reactionary' Stravinsky, according to Adorno's *Philosophy of Modern Music* the 'idea of rational

total organization of the total musical material' 13 was systematically radicalized. The other side of Adorno's apparently paradoxical definition was ignored: that the only rational objectivity that was still possible for the modern work of art was only possible, in any significant sense, as a product of subjectivity.

*Dissonances: Music in the Administered World*,<sup>14</sup> a collection of essays published in 1956, was Adorno's most incisive work of the 1950s. In addition to two earlier essays, it also contained two from the 1950s: 'Critique of the Musician' and 'The Ageing of the New Music'.<sup>15</sup> These two articles criticized complementary phenomena: the expulsion of the subject and of every form of expression, both by the 'community' experience of those who glorified the 'Young Music', on the one hand, and by the 'serial engineers' on the other. Adorno was thus identifying a phenomenon in the realm of music that corresponded to the phenomenon he perceived in philosophy and sociology: ontology and positivism, ideological speculation and positivist empiricism, complemented one another and represented variants of an objectivism that was busily kicking what was already down: the subject, the individual.

But if serial music which was regarded not only in West Germany but also internationally as music's most advanced form was a 'flight into system', was it not bound to become popular with audiences sooner or later? The facts proved otherwise, and Adorno was faced with the same problem he had had in his judgement of Stravinsky's music, which had been based on a critique of ideology. The broadcasting companies noted considerable demand for the new music during the 1950s. But it was broadcast in late-night programmes whose audiences consisted of a small number of specialists and fans. 'A message in a bottle, addressed to no one' was how the music was described at the time, not without a certain self-satisfaction and pride.<sup>16</sup> Serial composers seemed to see *Philosophy of Modern Music* as confirming the view that they were practising an art 'that remained truly loyal to its own standards, paying no attention to its influence'. Was *Philosophy of Modern Music* being turned into a justification for the ivory tower as a welcome contrast to the functionalization of art that had taken place under Nazism?

Adorno thought art had lost its way and changed into ideology. However, 'as long as art still trembles like the voice of humanity',<sup>17</sup> he was confronted with the problem of how to distinguish between art that accepted inhumanity, on the one hand, and inhuman art that was nevertheless implacably opposed to inhumanity, on the other. The answer he gave was provided by a central topos of his thought: all salvation was to come from an exacerbation of the rigidifying process, but at the same time all salvation depended on there still being a residue of subjectivity and spontaneity left (see p. 307). But how was this residue, this mite of subjectivity in the work of art, to be recognized? By the fact that it contained a non-mechanical, living element this was Adorno's tautological response.

Adorno tried to give a more or less transcendental justification for this demand for a living element, seeing it as a kind of condition of possibility for music. But this also failed to provide an answer to the question of what criteria were to be used to distinguish between an attitude of 'that's the way it is' that was accepting of given conditions, and one that was implacably opposed to them. In his criticism of Stravinsky, he tried to substantiate his position:

As an art that occurs within time, music is tied by its very medium to the forms demanded by successiveness. It is, therefore, like time, irreversible. Simply by commencing, it has already committed itself to continue, to become something new, to develop itself further. What may be called transcendence in music is the way in which, at each moment, it has become something something different from what it is. The way in which it points beyond itself is not a metaphysical law that has been forced upon it, but an essential quality, which it cannot avoid . . . It does not relinquish its anti-mythological essence even when, in a state of objective despair, it makes that despair into its own concern. Music does not guarantee the existence of the Other; but, to the same extent, sound cannot evade the fact that it has promised that existence. Freedom itself is an immanent necessity for music. That is its dialectical essence. Stravinsky has denied music's commitment to freedom, perhaps due to the superior might of objective despair from the grandest of motives, then, a motive that would constrain music to fall silent. If this were so, what he writes would in fact be stifled music. But it cannot bear the concept that there could be someone without hope and the more densely his music disposes itself, the less it can do so. 18

In Darmstadt in 1957, two of the most resolute supporters of serial music, Karlheinz Stockhausen and Pierre Boulez, marked the beginning of a new phase in contemporary music: Stockhausen with his new *Piece for Piano XI*, and Boulez with a lecture entitled 'Alea' ('dice'). The new phase was called aleatoric music. Aleatorics signified involving chance elements in both composition and interpretation: for example, certain parts of a composition could be interchangeable, or parts which the composer had only recorded in sketch form could be open to free interpretation in performance. Aleatorics involved elements of Dadaism and Zen Buddhism, introduced mainly by John Cage and Mauricio Kagel. In 1958 Cage launched a decisive assault on serial orthodoxy with the performance of his *Imaginary Landscapes No. 4* for twelve radios, played like normal musical instruments in four-four time, creating an 'ordered chaos'.<sup>19</sup>

Adorno interpreted this development as being a self-critique of anti-subjectivist serial music. He was all the more disposed to see it in this

way because 'The Ageing of the New Music' had been understood wrongly by some as a critique of musical structure and musical rationality. He therefore welcomed the new trend as one that advanced musical construction in the direction of self-reflection, and he made himself into its pioneer thinker. In a radio broadcast in 1960 entitled 'Vienna', he took the view that 'Uncompromising insistence on objectively structured form draws the subject into that form, while the neo-classicists' non-committal form usurped its validity by violently driving the subject out.' In the broadcast, he welcomed contemporary music as liberating the Second Viennese School from its remaining stale, petty-bourgeois elements, and as being an advanced form of liberation. Ever the willing dialectician, he admitted his sympathy for a will to self-assertion that made use of organizational skills. 'In the administered world, what is different can only survive the winter, can only find its voice, by using administrative methods. There is something hypocritical about expressions of distaste for so-called cliques in a culture in which the universal law is particularism.' He welcomed the fact that the most advanced music had at last freed itself from the taboos of fashion.

For the first time, music has voluntarily drawn into itself what has otherwise only been achieved objectively, over the heads of the works themselves: the historical value of aesthetic truth which is not, as historicism would have it, embedded in time, but which time itself inhabits . . . It is therefore foolish to sneer at the speed of developments, which seem to be running at a gallop compared with those of the first half of the century, or at the hectic speed with which the latest tendencies change the slogans upon which they thirst to immolate themselves. High art seems to be relinquishing part of its fetishistic claim to be of lasting value. At the same time, it is using its own speed to criticize itself. The development of the new music into a system the establishment of the twelve-tone technique established an arbitrary basis for it, one that did not exclusively obey objective law, but which had this law forced on it from outside. The poison is taken from this arbitrary basis when the system ceases to profess its own validity seriously; when it decays, and consents to that decay. In practice, it is becoming what that other great system in modern art, cubism, was: not an essence in itself, but a straitjacket for the liberated consciousness. Composers who absorb randomness into the law crave to break the law's spell again and again. 20

In the summer of 1961, Adorno attempted in his lecture at Kranichstein to point the most recent music in the direction it should take: it should move 'vers une musique informelle', towards the 'musical style of freedom', towards resuming the project of developing free atonal music at a post-serial stage. Eduard Steuermann, who had been Adorno's

piano teacher in Vienna and was one of the great interpreters of the Schoenberg school, and Ernst Krenek, who had taken part in discussions with Adorno since the 1920s and was one of the most significant modern composers, although he did not form a school, were both amazed. 'You are the young man again, identifying yourself with all the recent trends, and I am the old man now a conservative,' Steuermann wrote to Adorno on his sixtieth birthday. 21 Krenek wrote, more tetchily:

The philosopher of music . . . is listened to with bated breath, and when his leaps and bounds land him in avant-garde territory he is welcomed as an ally in contrast to the composer, who, if he should land there, finds himself suspected of 'clinging more or less by force to whatever happens to be the latest thing, so as not to be thrown on the scrap heap'.<sup>22</sup>

They both underestimated Adorno's unchanged devotion to Schoenberg, Berg and Webern, and the way he still took his bearings from them, making specific references to them again and again. Nevertheless, Adorno's relationship to the most recent developments in avant-garde music was astonishing. He pleaded for a 'resumption of the process Schoenberg retarded, while apparently advancing it, with his brilliant innovation' (i.e. twelve-tone technique), and for once again 'taking a stand for the idea of unrevised, uncompromising freedom'.<sup>23</sup> This was not possible simply as a recapitulation of the style of 1910, however. 'One cannot go on composing undauntedly in the style of the most daring works of that era, Schoenberg's most productive one.' Why should one, when the music was free, and when what had followed that style had only abolished freedom again?

Remnants of the past, such as the chromatic elements of free atonality, are no more tolerable now than they were then, when the immanent demands of the material had not been fully perceived . . . It was Stockhausen who observed that the whole rhythmic and metrical structure, both of atonal music and of Schoenberg's twelve-tone music, had in a sense remained tonal. This should never be forgotten now; the inconsistency should not be tolerated.<sup>24</sup>

Although Adorno during the 1950s had regarded serial technique as a system that went hand in hand with the expulsion of musical meaning and 'composedness', in the 1960s he saw it as an advance in the development of musical productivity, control over the material and the ability to distinguish between what was correct and what was false in short, a welcome process of enlightenment.

In Kranichstein, I produced a composition I happened to have, the intention of which was to unify all the parameters while avoiding

musical determinacy, and asked, 'Where are the antecedent and consequent phrases here?' That was not correct. Contemporary music cannot be pinned down, even to categories as apparently general as theme and continuation, as if they were unalterable. It is nowhere laid down that it must, a priori, contain traditional elements of this sort, or even fields of tension and resolution, continuation, development, contrast, confirmation. All the less so in that reminiscences of these in the new material often produce serious inconsistencies, correcting what is itself a mainspring of development. 25

But was one not simply left with a collection of tones which could be manipulated, perhaps even using traditional forms, or whose sounds, purified of all human touches, could have metaphysical powers attributed to them as composers inspired by Zen, for example, did? And did this not correspond precisely to what Adorno had long since diagnosed as a weakening of the individual in society, which composers were also affected by? 'In the midst of the anthropology of the present age, to demand non-revisionist music is to expect too much,' Adorno himself stated. He mentioned the 'prohibitive difficulties' of contemporary art again and again. Yet it was precisely in music that he saw chances at the present time for a third path to succeed.

He gave a clear example of what he had in mind returning, however, to Schoenberg once again. In *Erwartung* (*Expectation*) and the works most closely related to it, Schoenberg had apparently regarded the treatment of motifs and themes as 'something external to the spontaneous flow of the music itself, as a form of manipulation', just as serial determinism had been regarded as a form of manipulation since the second half of the 1950s.

Hence the a thematic fibre running through the monodrama. This fibre does not simply abandon itself to chance, but preserves the spirit of motif and theme treatment positively within itself. The treatment of motif and theme is thus altered: it is broadened. The new concept that appears . . . includes every kind of music that produces a connection between partial, relatively independent, complexes such that their character and relationship to one another appear compellingly, without similarities or variations in motif being generally detectable. At the same time, such similarities and variations are not rigorously disallowed, and are occasionally suggested in the discreetest possible way. The impulses and relations occurring in music of this sort do not presuppose any preordained or overriding order, not even a principle such as the thematic principle, but instead produce connectedness from within themselves. To that extent, they are the descendants of themes, although themes are only treated in a rudimentary way in them, if at all, and are never repeated at intervals. 26

The example is an illuminating one. Phrases like 'the spontaneous flow of the music' or 'the impulses and relations . . . produce connectedness from within themselves' abandoned theoretical pretensions and used unconcealed metaphor as an aid to understanding. In addition, the example shows an attempt to articulate what could be learned from a piece of music such as this to help solve current problems of composition: stored experience and a concrete sense of the problem made practical solutions possible. The path that led to such solutions could only be described in retrospect, and even then only in a very unspecific way.

But Adorno wanted more: he wanted to define the path to the 'musical style of freedom'. The formulation he arrived at in response to the experience he had had at Kranichstein, mentioned above, was: 'equivalents' of the older musicological categories were to be 'developed using the new material as a standard, in order to do, in transparent terms, what those categories in the older material did irrationally, so that they soon became inadequate'.<sup>27</sup> In defining these equivalents, however, Adorno never got beyond the observation that they could only be identified by the 'composing ear' which was able to learn from the material the tendencies that were inherent in it. His theoretical efforts thus concluded, as in *Philosophy of Modern Music*, in an appeal to the existence of an element of cultured nature. This appeal to the 'composing ear' was also a variation by Adorno on the time-honoured topos of the sculptor who chisels free the figure that had lain concealed within the stone.

In 'Vers une musique informelle', his most important work on musical theory after *Philosophy of Modern Music*, Adorno let loose on the reader the whole fireworks of his repertoire of motifs. The fatal dialectic between rigidified mind [*Geist*] and repressed nature must be replaced by a dialectic, freed from domination, between illuminating mind and fulfilling nature. The rigidified mind was a disconnected piece of nature, and could only exist for as long as it contained a germ of nature within itself; thus it also contained, for as long as it existed, a potential for improvement. Repressed nature was blind; it contained a longing for light and could only ignite that light by means of the mind. The whole Romantic problematic of Adorno's motifs was thus included in this analysis, embedded in musical aesthetics, of contemporary music and of the prospects for it. He also brought in from the philosophy of history the dialectic of the demythologization and liquidation of the subject, as well as the theological dialectic of infernal and celestial music, dark music and free music; and, in addition, the problem of how one was to know when the ear, which had so often been mistaken in the past, was hearing spontaneously and in this spontaneity was able to perceive which direction the material, of itself, wished to take. It was a problem of whether the bonds between unknown nature in the composer and unknown nature in the material were to be accepted as the ultimate basis, or whether an ever-fallible agreement between subjects over the

gentlest form of manipulation was to have the last word. In the latter case, the question would arise of what could motivate these subjects to reach agreement and become concerned about gentleness.

Burdened philosophizing, 'daring thought' of this sort, was obviously necessary to formulate a theoretical plea for 'adventurous composing' 28 and to give fresh attention to received wisdoms, to which no one else at the time was giving comparable emphasis.

### *Notes to Literature*

In West German painting and literature, there was nothing comparable to the Darmstadt school, no group that crystallized the international avant-garde. The Munich group 'ZEN 49', started by Willi Baumeister, Fritz Winter and Rupprecht Geiger, only reflected the German need to catch up in the area of abstract painting. The supporters of concrete poetry, who mostly published their 'texts' in the journal *material*, only represented one very limited aspect of literature, even in terms of their own interests. Advanced literary works were rare in the Federal Republic, and remained the preserve of controversial loners. Wolfgang Koeppen's novels *Tauben im Gras* (1951), *Das Treibhaus* (1953) and *Der Tod in Rom* (1954) were indebted to Faulkner, Joyce and Dos Passos in terms of technique, form and language, and at the same time represented reactions both to the trauma of Nazism and to post-war reconstruction in the Federal Republic and the mentality that went with it with its characteristic suppression of unpleasant memories. Koeppen's books, as he stated himself, were filled with 'fear and little hope'. But they were given an immediately political interpretation. 'You can only handle the book with fire tongs,' was *Welt am Sonntag's* comment on *Treibhaus*. Koeppen had gone into hibernation after 1933, living abroad most of the time, as Adorno had also done for several years, but he had not emigrated. In the mid-1930s he had even published two novels, the second of which, *Die Mauer schwankt*, was brought out by the Jewish publishers Bruno Cassirer, a firm which was wound up by its owner in 1935. During the war, having neither money nor friends in the USA, Koeppen had taken refuge in the film industry. In the Federal Republic he stood alone. He did not belong to any circle; he did not form a school of any sort.

The case of Hans Henny Jahnn was similar. In the 1920s he had published plays that met with vehement criticism,<sup>29</sup> as well as one unique expressionist novel, *Perrudja*. When 1933 came, his books were banned at once. He went into exile in Denmark, living on the island of Bornholm. In 1949 and 1950 he published *Das Holzschiff*<sup>30</sup> and the two-volume *Niederschrift des Gustav Anias Horn nachdem er 49 Jahre alt geworden war*, which formed the prelude and main part of a melancholy and discursive trilogy of novels, *Fluss ohne Ufer*. In 1956 a slim novel,

*Die Nacht aus Blei*, appeared. During the 1950s, Jahnn, who was also an organ-builder, hormone researcher and editor of early music, as well as a critic of cruelty to animals and extinction of species, devoted most of his energies to the struggle against the atomic bomb. He too was a loner fighting a lost cause in the context of the Federal Republic's 'Restauratorium'.<sup>31</sup> Adorno and Jahnn might have met at the Darmstadt discussions in 1950 on 'The Image of Man in Our Time'; perhaps they did. If they did, then in spite of their closeness in terms of the radicality of their criticisms of civilization and their preference for the interrelation between instinct and mind and for humanity to reconsider the way in which it forms a part of creation Jahnn's complete lack of refinement and refusal to make concessions to public opinion and social etiquette would at best have shocked Adorno. Jahnn was one of the loners on whom *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Minima Moralia* had counted, but Horkheimer and Adorno were in reality rather alarmed by people like this.<sup>32</sup>

It was not, therefore, merely because his attention and energy did have limits, and because in art at least he wanted to be guided by his own personal preferences, that Adorno was satisfied during the 1950s with cautiously ensuring recognition for his own interpretation of works of art in terms of the philosophy of history and society, as distinct from the other dominant trends in literary theory and criticism in West Germany. He used the modern classics, and some forerunners of modernism, to exemplify his interpretations.

'Poetry and Society' ('Lyrik und Gesellschaft'), given as a lecture and also published in various versions between 1951 and 1958, was, in a way, a version of 'On the Social Position of Music'<sup>33</sup> one that was more serene, and which entered into literary controversy rather more cautiously. (Apart from 'On Popular Music', the latter was the only essay from the *ZfS* which Adorno did not republish in West Germany.) Adorno was presenting again his earlier ideas, inspired by Hegel's and Lukács's historicization of aesthetics, which were new to the West Germany of the 1950s. His view was that interpreting a poem in social terms meant reading it as a 'sundial of the philosophy of history'; as a manifestation of 'the whole of a society, as a unity containing contradictions, within the work of art'; as an expression of the 'historical relationship . . . between the individual and society within the medium of the subjective . . . mind'.<sup>34</sup> Adorno's way of expressing the familiar maxims of artists and philosophers of art once again reappeared: filled with the experience of social reality, poetry must be written with the dream of feeling one's way 'towards the sound . . . in which sufferings and dreams unite', while bearing witness to the fact that 'peace cannot be achieved without the dream shattering'.<sup>35</sup> Poetry must be written while immersing oneself in individuality in order to become free of the limitations of self and share in language as the medium of the collective undercurrent, of benevolent generality, of undistorted humanity.<sup>36</sup>

Using as examples Eduard Mörike's 'Auf einer Wanderung' and Stefan George's 'Im windes-weben' from the poem cycle *Der siebte Ring*, Adorno demonstrated what it meant to identify the historical moment that a poem recorded by interpreting it in terms of society. He saw in Mörike the beginning of a phase in which lyric poetry only continued to be possible as a tenuous, fragile appeal to the dream of immediacy in life within a society which was more and more clearly destroying that dream. Lyric poetry had reacted to increased difficulties in invoking the dream by engaging in a process of purifying and sharpening the means it had at its disposal to preserve it.

The poems of the hypochondriac parish priest of Cleversulzbach, who is usually seen as a naïve artist, are virtuoso pieces which none of the masters of art for art's sake ever succeeded in outdoing. The hollowness and ideological quality of the sublime style are as familiar to him as the low style of the Biedermeier period, with its petty-bourgeois dullness, blind to the totality of the period in which most of his poetry was written. The sublime style drives his intellect to create once again images that suggest neither the drawing-room nor the alehouse, neither vociferation nor slobbering. The last echoes of sublimity in style are dying away in him, surviving only as memories; it is stranded on a narrow ridge, but linked to all the signs of an immediate life, which promised endorsement at the very moment they themselves had already been condemned by the trend of history. Both aspects greet the poet, on a ramble, only as they fade away. He already has a share in the paradox of lyric poetry in the approaching industrial age. 37

At around the same time as Adorno was offering his interpretation of Mörike's almost free-verse poem 'Auf einer Wanderung', Emil Staiger published an interpretation of Mörike's 'Auf eine Lampe', a kind of poetic still life in iambic trimeter. Staiger was the most impressive of the literary critics who after 1945 published studies that became standard works of what was called 'work-immanent' interpretation. Under the Nazis, this approach had offered critics like Max Kommerell a way of avoiding ideological demands, and after 1945 it became a way of avoiding genuinely fresh thinking that enjoyed wide popularity. Wolfgang Kayser wrote the standard textbook for this approach with his introduction to the study of literature, *The Linguistic Work of Art*, published in 1948.<sup>38</sup> In his *Basic Concepts of Poetics*, first published in 1946,<sup>39</sup> Staiger drafted a 'fundamental poetics' following Heidegger's phenomenology of the purely ideal essences of lyric, epic and drama. These he regarded on the one hand as literary-critical terms for general human possibilities and, on the other, as fields for the manifold possibilities of poetic composition. Staiger thought the task of interpretation was to provide evidence, from a poem that addresses us with peculiar beauty,

to show that its appeal to us is justified that is to prove 'how everything accords within the whole and how the whole accords with the details'.<sup>40</sup> This was to be done by using philology, biography and intellectual and general history all the various achievements of so-called positivist literary studies. The classicist lines by Mörike he selected suggested to Staiger the image of a poet standing on the threshold between two ages, at the end of Romanticism and the beginning of an epoch whose dullness was painful to him.

Only he, the poet, perceives it [the art object, i.e. the lamp] in its unobtrusive beauty. He has entered from outside. He comes from the world of everyday life, which has brought him, like everyone else, down to earth. Who can resist the spirit of the times? But the nobler faculties of his mind are not yet extinguished. Presently they are touched by the work of art, and, as he remains there, the fair world that has passed away raises itself once more, and seems once again to be present 'wrapped up in the allure of strangeness', we might say, using an expression from the poem 'Göttliche Reminiszenz'. For the poet himself has long since lost his familiarity with such things. Beauty, however, still pleases him, just as his verses please us. We may now understand pleasure [*Anmut*] better, in its literal sense, on the basis of Mörike's contemporary situation. He is not the master of the house in which the lamp is hanging. There seems to be no master at all there any more. But he still feels he belongs there; he dares, or at least half dares, to see himself as an initiate. It is perhaps precisely this that produces the mixture of pain and beauty that gives the poem its magic.<sup>41</sup>

Two more or less equally talented critics thus viewed Mörike's poetry in the same way on certain essential, concrete points. Adorno, for his part, was anticipating an accusation that a fear of falling into crass sociology had made him sublimate the relationship between poetry and society to such an extent that the relationship had vanished altogether. Staiger expressly stated his unwillingness to allow his immediate feeling for the individual, historical quality of poems to be restricted by any fundamental poetics. The one critic was recoiling from a sociology of literature, while the other was not afraid to relate poetry directly to contemporary history. Where, then, did their differences lie?

Staiger's interpretation was self-contained. The mood dominant in it was one in which great minds touched upon their greatness and accepted given conditions, a mood of wonder at the fact that 'human life is open towards human life, even across gulfs in time and space',<sup>42</sup> the Nietzschean pathos of communicating from peak to peak. Adorno's interpretation was filled with the restlessness of the search for the methods lying behind artistic expression. For Adorno, Mörike was his contemporary in what he sought to achieve, a pioneer in the way he

sought to achieve it and an example of how it could no longer be done. Taking Mörike as his example, Staiger, as an artist and theoretician of art, was trying to achieve a better understanding of the transformed methods, under transformed social conditions, that would give artistic expression better success than it had had in Mörike. Adorno's interpretation was not really much more of a social one, since it was dominated by the idea from the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that greater precision in the methods of artistic expression had been both forcibly introduced and made possible by an ambivalent form of social progress. But this did give Adorno's literary-theoretical works a degree of social relevance, an interest in topical events and a momentum of commitment to the project of modernism in art as an anticipation of a free society that was lacking in most other publications on literary theory during the 1950s.

It was lacking, for example, in Hugo Friedrich's book, *The Structure of Modern Poetry*, published in 1956, which sold 60,000 copies during the 1950s alone. Friedrich was Professor of Romance Philology at Freiburg im Breisgau, and was the same age as Adorno. In his book, he attempted to demonstrate the structural unity of modern poetry using relevant examples ranging from Baudelaire and T.S. Eliot to Saint-John Perse. 'I myself,' he admitted in his foreword, 'am no avant-gardist. I am happier with Goethe than with T.S. Eliot. But that is not the question. What interests me is how to recognize the symptoms of daring and toughness in modernism.'<sup>43</sup> Taking his standards of judgement from older literature, to be more precise, from the forms of older literature which the dominant taste considered to be exemplary, he hoped to describe the elements of abnormality that were found in modern poetry. He saw these as expressions of revulsion against a society that centred on material progress, revulsion against the scientific demystification of the world. The only explanation Friedrich could see for the fact that this revulsion manifested itself in the 'abnormal' way he described was that, with outstanding representatives of modernism, such as Mallarmé, it was 'a form modern only in the tension it possesses of that dissatisfaction with the world which has always tended to arise in superior minds'. For the rest, he held that 'a stylistic and structural compulsion characteristic of the era' was operating.<sup>44</sup> With its attempt at neutrality, this was the view of someone unable to see modern poetry as an expression of the experiences besetting him, unable to see it as the sundial of the philosophy of history, who saw it instead as an exotic phenomenon alongside which the established tradition remained undiminished in its validity.

The position was different with another figure, who himself was a poet: Gottfried Benn. Benn was a passionate defender of modern poetry, of the artistry and autonomy of the poem, and his contempt for the centre, the loss of which had been effectively deplored by conservative theoreticians of art like Hans Sedlmayr, was undisguised. 'The poet's word does not defend any ideas, any thoughts or any ideals: it is existence

in itself, expression, mien, breath'this was Benn's credo. In a letter to Peter Rühmkorf in 1964 (responding to his contribution to Adorno's festschrift), Adorno took the view that 'Politically, Benn has committed atrocities, but in a higher political sense he still has more in common with us than many others.'<sup>45</sup> 'In a higher political sense' presumably meant 'in relation to the politics of art'.

In 1933 Benn welcomed the totalitarian state as being the type of state that corresponded to the autonomous poem, and in a speech broadcast on 24 April 1933 he stated, moreover, that 'everything that has made the West famous, which has marked out its development, which is at work within it even today, was created let us be perfectly clear about it in slave-owning states . . . History is rich in examples of the pharaonic exercise of power being linked with culture; and the song of this revolves like the starry vault.'<sup>46</sup> In 1948-9 Benn achieved a comeback with two volumes of poetry, *Statische Gedichte* and *Trunkene Flut*. His dazzling lectures and essays on the theory of literature, and above all his lecture on 'The Problems of Poetry' at the University of Marburg in 1951, were willingly accepted by many young people and seen as stimulating and novel. In October 1951 Benn was awarded the Georg Büchner prize in Darmstadt, only a year after he had made it perfectly clear, through the publication of his *Early Prose and Speeches*, that he still considered a slave-owning state to be the appropriate basis for his poetry.

'Western man, in our age, vanquishes the demonic using form,' he wrote in the 'Address on Stefan George' contained in the *Early Prose and Speeches*. 'If, instead of form, we were always to say breeding, or order, or discipline, or norm, or necessity for arrangement all of those terms that have become so familiar to us because the movement of history is attempting to shape itself through them then we are on George's territory.'<sup>47</sup> In the first edition of 1934, the text read 'has shaped' ('geprägt hat') instead of 'is attempting to shape' ('zu prägen versucht'). This was how little Benn felt it necessary to alter his essay when editing it for republication, not as a historical document, but as an earlier piece that had not lost its relevance. So little had he changed that he even had fresh hopes that what he had immediately welcomed enthusiastically in 1933 would return. The spirit of the new age, which in 1934 he saw coming to life 'as a *single* command, in the art of George and in the marching columns of the brown-shirted battalions', he still saw in 1950 as 'a *single* command, in the art of George'. All that he left out was 'and in the marching columns of the brown-shirted battalions', since, at the time of republication, their marching had in fact ceased.

Adorno's commitment to modernism in the arts was so deep that he saw Benn as less of an enemy than those who rejected modern art altogether and gave conservative or reactionary significance to the established forms. In view of the renewed fascination with Benn and Ernst Jünger that arose during the early years of the Federal Republic, the

problem which had once occupied Benjamin was still a topical one: the fact that there was a variant of modernism in the arts which had a certain affinity with fascism. But this problem was apparently not a particularly urgent one for Adorno. What took precedence for him was the fact that the works and opinions of the avant-garde were able to cause unrest and make art a form of provocation, independently of trends and causes. Avant-garde art was presumably no more important to him than a free society; but his passion for the new music, and a critical glance at social reality, made the progress of art seem the more obvious choice in his view. If art first gave authentic expression to the latest occasions for despair that were occurring in reality he may finally have thought then that reality could not long persist.

Adorno did not undertake any immanent critique of progressive modernism in the field of literature and literary theory corresponding to the *Philosophy of Modern Music*, nor did he attempt to distinguish between progress and reaction in that field. It was a student of Emil Staiger's Peter Szondi, influenced by Hegel's *Aesthetics*, Lukács's essay on 'The Sociology of Modern Drama' and Adorno's *Philosophy of Modern Music*, who demonstrated in his *Theory of Modern Drama* (1956) however without a theological and messianic point of view an analysis of the dialectic of form and content in individual works was able to show that the treatment of technical problems within works represented at the same time a reaction to social problems.<sup>48</sup> In sample analyses of plays from Ibsen to Arthur Miller, Szondi, then twenty-five years old, showed how the contradiction between dramatic form and epic subject-matter and between a frame based on dialogic communication and the growing problem of the isolation of individuals ultimately led to a new principle of form in drama. The changed subject-matter of the present day this was the lesson of Szondi's dialectical and phenomenological analysis guided dramatists towards a new world of forms, quite independently of their judgement of the contemporary period, if they confronted it at all.

At the beginning of the 1960s, Adorno became a defender of contemporary modernist positions in literature as well as in music. In the spring of 1958, on returning from a trip to Vienna, he wrote to Horkheimer, 'My most significant artistic impression was of a literally magnificent production of Beckett's *Endgame*. This is really a significant text which you *absolutely* must read if only because some of its intentions are closely connected with ours. And it's correspondingly uncomfortable, so much so that there was booing.'<sup>49</sup> Samuel Beckett's *Endgame* and Hans G. Helms's *FA: M'AHNIESGWOW* stimulated Adorno into recognizing a development in literature that went beyond Proust, Kafka and Joyce. In Adorno's opinion, Beckett's *Endgame* was to Kafka's novels, and Helms's *FA: M'AHNIESGWOW* was to Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*, what serial music was to Schoenberg, free atonality and twelve-tone technique.<sup>50</sup>

Just as the serial composers had absolutized the serial principle, so Beckett and Helms had absolutized their predecessors' principle and were attempting to achieve a degree of necessity that was freed from the individual and that could encompass every aspect of the work. Beckett belonged to Adorno's generation, and had entered James Joyce's circle of friends in Paris at the age of twenty-two. In 1942, as a member of a resistance group in France, he narrowly escaped being arrested by the Gestapo, and lived as a farm worker in an isolated mountain village in the south of France until the country was liberated. In 1953, after nearly twenty-five years of literary activity, he made his breakthrough with *Waiting for Godot*. For him, the play was a side-product of his real work, which at that point was his trilogy of novels. The first two volumes of this, *Molloy* and *Malone Dies*, were written in 1948, with *The Unnamable* following in 1949. *The Unnamable* closed with the words: 'in the silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on.'<sup>51</sup> Beckett did go on with plays and texts in which, although the discursive meaning of the words is never entirely destroyed, the connection between ever more barren groups of words was achieved more and more by using phonetic arrangement, leitmotifs, repetitions, analogies and echoes, and, in the plays, through gestures and pantomime.

*Endgame*, written in the mid-1950s, is a more bitter version of *Waiting for Godot*: circling the abyss, but still a game. The categories of drama, treated parodically, and the principles of musical form give a minimum of structure to the contents. There is still a soliloquy in *Endgame*, for example; but it is nothing more than a series of halting, empty-sounding allusions. Instead of the curtain rising, Hamm takes a handkerchief off his face. This produces a play which is merciless towards everything that is no longer possible after the 'end', and which nevertheless takes what is no longer possible and presents it on stage. Productions in which Beckett was involved turned into continuations of his work on the play, with countless minor alterations being included, all pointing in one direction. 'Something peculiar has happened,' Michael Haerdter wrote in his report on the rehearsals for the Berlin production of *Endgame* in 1967. 'In the last three weeks Beckett has given *Endgame* a tight stage presentation, simplifying it, repeating leitmotifs, and making it rhythmic. It will not be an absurd spectacle giving people the creeps. Instead, it will be something that goes beyond stage conventions, whose crystalline perfection will affect people personally.'<sup>52</sup> There could hardly be better confirmation of what Adorno had written in 1961 in his analysis of the play:

The course of the dialogues . . . sounds as if the law of their progression was not the logic of statement and response, not even the psychological linkage of statement and response, but rather a form of listening to the end similar to that of music, a form of listening which has emancipated itself from prescribed types of discourse.

The play listens after each sentence to hear what can possibly come next. 53

In some scenes, Beckett counterbalanced the musical arrangement of the repetitions and analogies by using apparent spontaneity. As with Alban Berg, who composed according to the twelve-tone technique, but in such a way that there was considerable room for tonal elements, so in Beckett's plays there were many insertions within the crystalline structure which had obvious, sharp significance even though in the context of the play this was disguised by cynicism, weariness or speaking in broken phrases. In *Endgame*, for example, there were passages like this:

HAMM: (*letting go his toque*). What's he doing?

*Clov raises the lid of Nagg's bin, stoops, looks into it. Pause.*

CLOV: He's crying.

*He closes the lid, straightens up.*

HAMM: Then he's living. (*Pause.*)<sup>54</sup>

In Adorno's view, Helms's text was even more advanced than Beckett's. Joyce had essentially counted on associative links provided by psychology or depth psychology. Helms was counting on associative links provided by philology. But this meant counting on erudition. Oddly, Adorno equated what he himself described as a kind of parody of the *poeta doctus* with a trend towards a predominance of associative connections that were created from the material of language itself. In contrast to Beckett and thus more radically, avant-gardistically than him Helms, according to Adorno, was trying in this way to break out of the interior monologue, which would therefore no longer represent the law of the literary work but instead become its material. By making chance itself a parameter, the fallibility of subjective consciousness was being openly admitted.

Necessity, within the field that is constituted subjectively, is tending to be split off from the subjective consciousness and contrasted to it. Structure no longer sees itself as an achievement of spontaneous subjectivity without which, admittedly, it would hardly be conceivable but prefers, rather, to be read out of the material, which has in any case always been mediated by the subjective consciousness.<sup>55</sup>

What would it mean if the power of the poet was considered to be at its greatest when he abandoned himself to linguistic accident? Adorno's most detailed demonstration of this used examples not from Helms or from Beckett, but from Hölderlin. (Two studies he had planned to write for a fourth volume of *Notes to Literature* one on Beckett's

*The Unnamable*, and one on Paul Celan's *Sprachgitter* which might have achieved this on the basis of contemporary literature, were never produced.) For Adorno's philosophy of literature, the later Hölderlin turned out to be what Schoenberg was to music.

In contrast to music, non-conceptual synthesis in literature rebounds against the medium: it becomes a constitutive dissociation. The traditional logic of synthesis is therefore only gently suspended by Hölderlin. Benjamin managed to describe this using the concept of series . . . Although, as Staiger rightly emphasized, Hölderlin's method, steeled by contact with Greek, is not devoid of boldly formed hypotactic constructions, parataxes are noticeable as elaborate disturbances that deviate from the logical hierarchy of subordinating syntax. Hölderlin is irresistibly drawn to forms of this sort. The transformation of language into a concatenation, the elements of which combine in a manner different from that of judgement, is a musical one. 56

The technique of concatenation, achieved through strict outward form, and modelled on Pindar and other Greek poets, was a convincing example of how extreme linguistic discipline could lead to the liberation of something one apparently only needed to submit oneself to. Destroying language and submitting oneself to it thus appeared to be one and the same thing. But `language' was being used in two different senses here. What was to be destroyed was everyday, communicative, reified language. The language one was to submit oneself to was a different one.

Hölderlin's language, free of intention, whose `bare rock . . . is already emerging everywhere into the light' (Walter Benjamin, *Deutsche Menschen*), is an ideal: the language of revelation . . . It is his distance from language that is significantly modern in him. The Hölderlin of ideals inaugurates the process which leads to Beckett's meaningless protocol sentences [*Protokollsätze*].57

It was misleading to speak of Beckett's meaningless protocol sentences. Adorno was treating Helms and Beckett as equivalent to the composers of serial music, but was paying the penalty for this by not stating precisely what it meant to elevate to canonical status whatever was no longer possible. `That is no longer possible' was an ambiguous formula with Adorno. It usually meant that a traditional method had been blocked by obstructions: one could no longer compose in harmony, use cadenzas, introduce a seventh as a chord that provided an exceptional intensification. One could no longer seriously present soliloquies on the stage; it was no longer possible to get away with using an omniscient narrator. But `that is no longer possible' also meant, on the

other hand, that conventions, prejudices and impediments ceased to exist: one was free to use dissonance, to narrate stories using multiple points of view, to express bitterness without fear of censorship, to scorn reconciliation. But was this latter aspect being applied to Helms and Beckett in equal measure? It was clear here that more meaningfulness was not equivalent to a greater lack of reconciliation, that the meaning of the sentences or groups of words still had a decisive role to play. Adorno jumped too quickly to the conclusion that a loss of quality and content must sometimes be accepted as the price of progress in mastering the material. It was also clear here how questionable it was to talk of 'making language speak' as a standard. What was language? It surely meant something different to Adorno from what it meant to Heidegger. For Adorno, language was not something that came over the subjective consciousness, but rather something which only existed to the extent that subjective consciousnesses were free. But one must then distinguish between crystalline forms, which exacerbated the bitterness, and forms which were mere impoverishments.

As if in haste, Adorno developed for literature as well the idea of a form of art that promised to achieve what seemed unattainable: the objectification of what was irrepressibly subjective, 58 an anticipation of a way of socializing the individual that would remain free of compulsion. There was no question of there being any pessimism in Adorno's interpretations. He used Hölderlin to defend utopia against Heidegger. He read Beckett's dark writings as representing the construction of a point of indifference at which the distinction between hell, where there is no longer any possibility of change, and the messianic condition, in which everything is already in its correct place, disappeared. In the dissolution of the interior monologue, of objectless inwardness, carried out in literature by Rimbaud, by the surrealists and, finally and most radically of all, by Beckett, and in a stream of language that went bouncing back and forth, Adorno saw an approach to the ultimate reconciliation of the individual with the beneficent generality, a free society. What offended people about Adorno was the emphasis he gave to avant-garde literature as a means of giving trenchant expression to an unbearable and unnecessary form of reality instead of rejecting such literature, or holding it at arm's length, or treating it as merely a fresh variation on the theme of the eternal human crisis. Equally, his partisanship for modern art, and his defence of its utopianism, made him an outsider in the academic world. The remainder of those seriously interested in modern art were usually artists themselves, or correspondents of non-university newspapers and journals. Even compared with them, Adorno seemed considerably more aggressive, definitive and disturbing. The interpretation of Beckett's *Waiting for Godot* by Günther Anders, included in his *The Antiquatedness of Man*, but first published in the *Neue Schweizer Rundschau* in 1954, was a remarkable exception.<sup>59</sup> Otherwise, even the best analyses of Beckett that were published in German took the same

tone as Gerda Zeltner-Neukomm's *The Gamble of the Contemporary French Novel*, published a year before Adorno's analysis of *Endgame*:

Our initial description of Beckett's interior monologue no longer restricted by any objective correlations being purely lyrical and subjective, requires qualification. This subjective voice, with its searching and probing towards a distant and perhaps non-existent goal, is so elementary that it becomes utterly generalized: it is the voice of human desolation as such. Interior monologue in the contemporary French novel is not returning to individualism; it is going deeper, acquiring general validity and an archetypal quality.

She saw Beckett as representing one particular modern attempt to burst the bounds of the work from within, namely through the 'self-transcendence of the word . . . for the sake of silence, in which real and thus unnamable Being might commence'.<sup>60</sup> Up to the messianic conclusion of Adorno's interpretation, there were many similarities here but nevertheless the two analyses were in general as distinct in tone as their two supreme concepts: the concept of Being and the concept of the free society.

#### Towards a Philosophy Unafraid of Lacking Foundations

As a (specialist) philosopher Adorno remained in the background for a very long time. This was partly because philosophy was not the field of activity in which an institute could improve its reputation, partly because of the limited audience for the subject, but mainly because most of Adorno's specifically philosophical activity consisted for a long period in lecturing and giving seminars. In addition, Adorno wanted to be a specialist philosopher even less than he wanted to be a specialist sociologist. Apart from the new edition of his book on Kierkegaard (1962) and the essay collection *Three Studies on Hegel* (1963), he only published one book of philosophy in the narrower sense before *Negative Dialectics* appeared in 1966: *Against Epistemology: a Metacritique Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies* (1956).<sup>61</sup> The book took up a few of the complex issues dealt with in the long manuscript of his Oxford thesis on Husserl and reworked them. It also included a long introduction going to the heart of the problem in the same way as his introduction to the *Philosophy of Modern Music*.

Adorno's approach in philosophy was similar to that of his writings on sociology, music and literature. He was concerned to produce a philosophy that would increase the rationality of the perceiving subject and make the subject sensitive to the structure of objects a philosophy for which to increase rationality meant to be receptive to the rationality of objects. Literature, in contrast to music, was uniquely restricted by

the fact that it could not be allowed to erode the discursive element of language to the extent that it ceased to be language and became mere sound. The boundaries of philosophy were even narrower, since it could never cease to be conceptual knowledge. Adorno's criticism of Bloch, and of Benjamin as well for a considerable time, was that there was a certain irresponsibility in their philosophical or metaphysical improvisation. Adorno therefore saw the climax of philosophy, up to the present time, as lying in Hegel; and Hegel's friend Hölderlin represented the climax of literature for him. In philosophy, there had been nothing after Hegel that Adorno could see as the philosophical equivalent of Schoenberg, Kafka or Beckett.

There was, however, one figure whose significance in philosophy, in Adorno's view, approached that of Schoenberg in music: Edmund Husserl. As early as his inaugural lecture in 1931, Adorno had seen Husserl as the only modern philosopher who had seriously attempted to break out of the tradition; however, he had failed. Adorno held to this assessment, even after Horkheimer, Lowenthal and Marcuse rejected publication in the *ZfS* of an article on Husserl that he had based on his long thesis manuscript. Horkheimer criticized the article not only because it lacked any obvious relevance to social theory and materialist philosophy, but also because Husserl could not be regarded as an idealist, and Adorno had not convincingly provided an immanent critique of idealism. In contrast, as Adorno wrote in 1940 in his article on 'Husserl and the Problem of Idealism', published in the *Journal of Philosophy*:

It appears to me that Husserl's philosophy was precisely an attempt to destroy idealism from within, an attempt with the means of consciousness to break through the wall of transcendental analysis, while at the same time trying to carry such an analysis as far as possible . . . he rebels against idealist thinking while attempting to break through the walls of idealism with purely idealist instruments, namely, by an exclusive analysis of the structure of thought and of consciousness. 62

Even in the 1960s, Adorno still considered Husserl to have an outstanding place in modern philosophy. In his article 'Why Philosophy?', written in 1962, he wrote,

Thinking that turns towards objects openly, consistently, and on the basis of progressive knowledge, is liberated in relation to those objects in such a way that it cannot allow organized science to prescribe rules for it. It turns the epitome of the experience accumulated within it towards the objects, tears through the social veils that conceal them, and perceives them afresh. If philosophy could rid itself of the fear spread by the terrorism of dominant tendencies the ontological fear of thinking anything impure; the

scientific fear of thinking anything not 'based on' the corpus of scientific evidence already recognized as valid then it might even be in a position to perceive what this fear has forbidden it, what uncorrupted consciousness actually aims for. What philosophical phenomenology once dreamt of, like someone dreaming that he has woken up, its 'To the things themselves!' ('*Zu den Sachen*'), could be achieved instead by a philosophy that does not hope to obtain such 'things' by the magical stroke of 'contemplating general essences', but instead simultaneously takes account of their subjective and objective mediations, and does not allow itself to become dependent on the latent primacy of the method being used which for the various schools of phenomenology always produced mere fetishes, self-made concepts, instead of the longed-for 'things themselves'. 63

Adorno wrote his studies on Husserl during the 1930s from his conviction that a 'genuine change in philosophical consciousness' could only be achieved 'through the strictest dialectical communication with the most recent attempts to solve the problems of philosophy and philosophical terminology'.<sup>64</sup> He justified taking Husserl as his startingpoint rather than Scheler or Heidegger, who had increasingly overshadowed Husserl for the academic audience during the 1920s, by claiming that the ontologies drafted by Husserl's successors were building on phenomenology. They did not develop it further, but merely used it as a foundation, without troubling themselves about its fragility.

In Adorno's opinion, Husserl had not succeeded in breaking out of idealism, out of the philosophy of consciousness which saw consciousness as being capable of grasping the totality of the world. Husserl had, however, to a certain extent opened idealism to attack by taking it to self-destructive extremes. Lukács had demonstrated the antinomies of bourgeois thought in his essay on 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat',<sup>65</sup> and used them to arrive at the embodiment of the proletariat's self-knowledge in Marxist theory; similarly, Adorno wanted to present the phenomenological antinomies that plainly appeared in the plethora of paradoxical constructs and conceptual links in Husserl, and use them to arrive at materialist dialectics, as he understood it, as the solution to them.

He borrowed from Husserl two supremely important themes which were close to his own heart as well: the idea of the objectivity of truth, logical judgement, etc.; and the idea that true knowledge, logical judgement, etc., are enacted in thought by the subject. Husserl stood for the attempt to save objectivity from being dissolved altogether in psychologism, but also for the principle that attention should be turned towards the subjective acts within which what was objective appeared. Husserl created a systematic method to achieve subjective acts of this sort: the 'phenomenological reduction'. This signified excluding everything that

went beyond what was originally given in the pre-philosophical 'natural attitude' to the world, above all belief in the existence in themselves (*Ansichsein*) of objects. What remained after the phenomenological reduction was what was authentically experienced, what was genuinely objective, 'phenomena', the 'things themselves'. These were held to belong to an intermediate realm of awareness-of-things which belonged neither to the immanent sphere of consciousness nor to the transcendent outer world.

This intermediate realm of awareness-of-things, with its 'immanent transcendence', was criticized by Adorno as being a combination of two abstractions: an abstraction from everything factual, in the concept of originally given phenomena, and an abstraction from the activity of thinking, corporeal individuals, in the concept of consciousness. Husserl had dissociated these abstractions from the things they were abstracted from. What resulted was the reification of abstraction. Consciousness was taking something as given because it had forgotten the part it played in creating it itself. The space in which consciousness and objects apparently coincided was that of reduced consciousness itself.

The same points of attack were crucial for Adorno in the critique of logical positivism: the dissociation of logic from the existing world 'the logic of toy money' was his label for this and the dissociation of knowledge from thinking individual where the label he used was subjectless, i.e. non-human, experience. He concentrated on Husserl partly because he felt the critique of logical positivism was being competently dealt with by Horkheimer, and partly because the topics involved took up a great deal of space in Husserl and he thus offered a more rewarding starting-point for a transformation of philosophical consciousness. For Adorno, the great forerunner of Husserl precisely in the exposure of contradictions was Kant, who, as Adorno stated in his 'Introduction to Epistemology' lecture course in the winter semester of 1957-8, had attempted to rescue objectivity by passing it through subjectivity, to turn transcendence inward into the transcendental, and to put what was beyond experience on a level with the conditions that are constitutive for knowledge.

If Hegel, with his cosmological and dialectical philosophy, was the climax of idealism, Husserl's phenomenology represented the most consistent, most reductive form of his philosophy, in a way an absurd parody of it. As Adorno had already trenchantly stated in his inaugural lecture in 1931, 'Husserl has purified idealism of every trace of speculative excess and advanced it to the highest measure of reality it can achieve.'<sup>66</sup> Husserl had deprived philosophy of every form of 'philosophical decoration'. In this 'late-bourgeois, fatalistic'<sup>67</sup> variation on idealism, it seemed to Adorno that breaking out of the tradition lay within reach. His critique of Husserl, he wrote to Horkheimer in 1937, was not concerned to substitute the primacy of being for the primacy of consciousness, but

to show, on the one hand, that the search for an absolute first concept, even that of being, necessarily has idealist consequences, i.e. ultimately leads back to consciousness; and, on the other hand, that a philosophy which in fact draws this idealist consequence necessarily gets involved in such contradictions that the problematic shows itself to be clearly false. That is the content of the assertion that the 'problem' of being and consciousness, although not solved, is finished with. 68

The trenchant demonstration of the aporias in Husserl's phenomenology cleared the way for the only solution then still conceivable: a dialectic of subject and object in which dialectics was no longer, as in Hegel, hypostatized into an absolute dialectics of the mind. It was fruitful to speak of a materialist dialectics so far as this emphasized a source that was able to act as a corrective to idealist dialectics. Strictly speaking, however, Adorno was not concerned with materialist dialectics, but as one might say, to make the analogy with his musical intentions clear with a dialectic in which the subject was open towards the object: a free dialectics, therefore, a *dialectique informelle*. This was the only path still open, in Adorno's view, since Husserl's philosophy proved that, if the mediatedness of subject and object was not recognized, then, instead of the 'things themselves' and the living fulfilment of subjects, only the projections of a self-absolutizing consciousness would appear. For the same reason, Husserl's drafts for an ontology were untenable projections of a subject that was absolutizing itself, and was thus alienated both from itself and from the world.

When Adorno was finally able to publish his studies on Husserl, two decades after they had been written, there had been no fundamental change in the philosophical scene in (West) Germany since the 1920s and early 1930s. After the war, the scene was dominated by Heidegger and a new variation of 'material phenomenology', French existentialism, with Sartre as its best-known representative. A further variant of existential philosophy was provided by Jaspers. Plessner, Gehlen and Schelsky were powerful representatives of the philosophical anthropology that was influential in sociology at the time. By contrast, neopositivism and critical philosophy, the worst affected by expulsions from Germany under fascism, still had to regain ground. Critical philosophy was able to do so thanks to the return from exile of Horkheimer and Adorno. None of the neopositivists who had fled ever returned to Germany. Up to the 1960s, neopositivism which had a monopoly position in the USA, Scandinavia and Holland influenced the philosophical scene in German-speaking countries only indirectly. Adorno was therefore not mistaken in seeing his studies of the phenomenological antinomies, and his draft of a *dialectique informelle* which took them as a starting-point, as still being up to date. In his introduction, he merely emphasized once again what the four studies in the book had in common, and stated this

in a memorable formula: a critique of the philosophy of origins, of *prima philosophia*. This was what all philosophy to date, including epistemology, had been.

As a concept, what is primary and immediate is always mediated, and therefore not primary. No immediacy, and no factuality, in which philosophical thought hopes to escape mediation through itself, will be granted to intellectual reflection except through thought. This was both registered and transfigured by the pre-Socratic metaphysics of existence in the Parmenides fragment stating that thought and being are the same. Pre-Socratic metaphysics thus of course also denied its own Eleatic doctrine that being was an absolute . . . Since that time, all ontology has been idealist. At first it was idealist without realizing it, then it was idealist for its own sake, and ultimately it has become idealist against the desperate will of theoretical reflection, which seeks to break out of the mind's self-established limits as an in-itself, into the in-itself.

Husserl wanted

to re-establish the *prima philosophia* by reflection on the mind, purified of every trace of mere existence. The metaphysical notion that marked the beginning of the age appears once again at its close, sublimated and made wiser in the extreme, but therefore all the more inescapable and consistent, bald, naked: to develop a doctrine of being in conditions of nominalism, conditions in which concepts refer back to the thinking subject. 69

The ontological philosophies simply ignored this contradiction and behaved as if traditional philosophy, *prima philosophia*, could continue as if this was possible again after Husserl. The neopositivists abandoned the claim to those engaged in philosophy and saw themselves as analysts of science. Neither tendency could contribute towards what Adorno saw as still possible for an unfree philosophy to achieve at best, towards taking demythologization a step further, exposing conventions in, and restrictions on, genuine philosophical experience that were still being overlooked.

The *Studies on Hegel* filled the gap suggested by what Adorno stated in his Husserl studies about the climax of idealism: they explained his view that, in spite of all of Hegel's conservative traits, he had placed at philosophy's disposal the means with which one could manoeuvre in freedom, with which a philosophy became possible that was no longer plagued by a fear of lacking foundations and a need for a secure standpoint, a philosophy that no longer claimed autonomy. As in his inaugural lecture, Adorno did not consider the Marxist concept of

transcending philosophy through praxis to be relevant; instead, he sought a new philosophy. The Marxist critique of ideology, in his hands, became an instrument with which to criticize the elevation of abstractions into autonomous beings and to show that all unfree philosophies, every philosophy not open to the experience of 'reality', converged in philosophical idealism, *prima philosophia*.

But what sort of 'progressive insight' was this, according to which thought was supposed to turn towards objects with openness? Philosophy after Husserl had, in Adorno's view, not made any progress. In addition, he emphasized agreeing here with the introduction to the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that free thought must refuse to allow organized knowledge to prescribe rules for it. The relationship of all this to the various scientific disciplines remained enigmatic. Adorno stressed their importance to philosophy, but rejected their cognitive methods so uncompromisingly that it seemed impossible for him to recognize the results of such restricted forms of knowledge or to do any further work on them.

Examining Adorno's own work with a view to how much can be learned from it about a form of thought that turns towards objects openly, consistently and in tune with progressive knowledge, and perceives them afresh; and, ignoring the question of how open it was possible for thought to be in a society that was not open, one can see a number of models being presented. One of these was a re-evaluation of Bach, 'Bach Defended Against his Devotees',<sup>70</sup> treating him as a man of the early modern period who was able to respond freely to earlier music. Another was a re-evaluation of Heine, 'The Wound Heine',<sup>71</sup> where 'wound' referred to Heine's poems, whose ease of manner concealed the fact that they were transmitting the experience of alienation. Another again was his discussion of the threat to democracy from fascist tendencies: in 'What does "Reappraisal of the Past" Mean?' he wrote, 'I regard the survival of Nazism *within* democracy as potentially more threatening than the survival of fascist tendencies *against* democracy.'<sup>72</sup> These were all examples of an essayistic way of looking at things afresh, based not on systematic acquisition of knowledge and assimilation of current scientific research but on intuitive, chance reading and his own experience and associations. The fact that the first volume of *Notes to Literature* opened with an essay on 'The Essay as Form' was a confession of his own attitude to knowledge in general, and the essay could just as well have opened a volume of his essays on the aesthetics of music, or on philosophy, sociology or contemporary issues. The essay was, for him, the very form of free thought.

It does justice to the consciousness of non-identity, without needing to say so, radically un-radical in refraining from any reduction to a principle, in accentuating the fragmentary, the partial rather than the total . . . The slightly yielding quality of the essayist's

thought forces him to greater intensity than discursive thought can offer; for the essay, unlike discursive thought, does not proceed blindly, automatically, but at every moment it must reflect on itself . . . It constructs the interwovenness of concepts in such a way that they can be imagined as themselves interwoven in the object . . . By transgressing the orthodoxy of thought, something becomes visible in the object which it is orthodoxy's secret purpose to keep invisible. 73

But how was this to be reconciled with the view that the philosophical critic of prevailing conditions must grasp the false whole, the evil totality, the prevailing conditions that were denounced by Adorno again and again as a system? How was it to be reconciled with the view that social theory must continue to form part of the critical alternative to an academic system based on the principle of the division of labour? Adorno's vision of free thought in essay form analogy with the composer's self-abandonment to the material of music, or the writer's self-abandonment to language was perhaps a utopia, one which stood the test of time in Adorno's work to a surprising extent, although with clear limitations. It was a utopia, however, which was to be translated into an empirical form of knowledge that would be able to exploit the successful discoveries of organized science in all their breadth and at the same time provide science with fresh horizons to produce more specific, and at the same time more cautious, discoveries and applications. By defending and practising the essay form, Adorno seemed to be avoiding this problem. But more and more depended on successfully overcoming it: for example, whether the content of Critical Theory could continue to be a match for philosophical anthropology, and whether Critical Theory could use historical research, and research on society as a whole, to avoid the danger of ossifying into an attractive-sounding counter-programme that merely rejected everything else.

Jürgen Habermas Social Theorist at the Institute at Last, Valued by Adorno But Seen by Horkheimer as Too Left-Wing

Ralf Dahrendorf, in whom Adorno had placed great hopes, left the Institute in 1954. The following year, Ludwig von Friedeburg joined it a young, professional empirical researcher with an open-minded attitude towards the critique of society. 'We'll get Friedeburg a *Habilitation* for dealing with empirical matters in sociology,' Adorno told Horkheimer. 'If another sociologist is to get a *Habilitation*, he absolutely must be able to teach theoretical sociology.'<sup>74</sup> A year later, Jürgen Habermas became Adorno's research assistant and an associate of the Institute of Social Research. He was a social philosopher whose interests lay exactly in an area that had only been dealt with sketchily in Adorno's

essays and in Horkheimer's lectures and speeches: the theory of the contemporary age, the pathology of modernity.

Thus there arose a remarkable combination of factors which resembled what had happened in 1932-3, when Marcuse joined the Institute. Habermas had been schooled in his view of the crisis of the present age through reading Heidegger and other conservative cultural critics, and his approach had become more incisive when he encountered the writings of the Young Hegelians, especially the young Marx, and ultimately when he read Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* and Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. However, even a year before he joined the Institute, he had written a review for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* describing Gehlen and Schelsky's textbook of modern sociology <sup>75</sup> as exemplar<sup>y</sup> a book written by the very two people Adorno saw as Critical Theory's principal opponents. Arnold Gehlen first achieved world recognition with his main work, *Man*, in 1940.<sup>76</sup> This gave an anthropological justification to the glorification of discipline and order, so that his collaboration with Nazism seemed to be as little a matter of chance as Heidegger's. Adorno regarded Helmut Schelsky as particularly dangerous because he showed his fascist tendencies less openly than others did. In his preface to *Sociology of Sexuality*, however, Schelsky explicitly supported the programme of the counter-Enlightenment.<sup>77</sup>

Born in Düsseldorf in 1929, Jürgen Habermas grew up in Gummersbach, where his father was director of the Chamber of Commerce. The German surrender in May 1945 was an experience of liberation for him. He greedily read not only the long-banned Western and German literature that was being published by Rowohlt, but also pamphlets by Marx and Engels published in East Berlin and distributed by his local communist bookshop. He was hoping for an intellectual and moral renewal in Germany, and was disappointed to see how little renewal was noticeable during the elections to the first Bundestag, and how soon the question of rearmament returned to the agenda.

On the one hand, Habermas came from a politically conformist middleclass family and was therefore sceptical towards the SPD, not to mention the communists. On the other hand, however, he was also a product of post-war 're-education', and took its ideals so seriously that he was no less sceptical towards the right-wing parties which he thought had made no radical break with the disasters of the past than he was towards the SPD. Initially, he could not see any political force with which he would be able to identify himself. From 1949 to 1954 he studied philosophy, history, psychology, German literature and economics, in Göttingen, Zurich and Bonn. His most important teachers in philosophy were Erich Rothacker, a theorist of the human sciences who followed Dilthey, and Oskar Becker, a student of Husserl's belonging to Heidegger's generation, who distinguished himself in the fields of mathematics and logic. Apart from one, Theodor Litt, all the professors who were of significance to him during the course of his studies had been either convinced Nazis

or at least conformists, carrying on their work as usual during the Nazi regime.

Habermas's writing career was already under way by the early 1950s. His articles discussed books and topics related to philosophy and sociology, and were mostly published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the Düsseldorf *Handelsblatt* (the main organ of German business), the *Frankfurter Hefte* and *Merkur* newspapers and journals that were all aimed more or less at the general public. Among his early articles was one that attracted particular attention and made left-wing intellectuals sit up and take notice: appearing in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* in 1953, it was a critical commentary on Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics*, first published the same year. 78 Habermas stated later, in an interview with Detlef Horster and Willem van Reijen:

Until Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* was published, my political and philosophical confessions, if you like, were two completely different things. They were two universes that barely touched on another. Then I saw that Heidegger, whose philosophy I used to live in, had given this lecture in 1935 and was publishing it now this was what really shook me without a word of explanation. So I wrote one of my first articles in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* about it. I was naïve, and I thought, how can one of our greatest philosophers do something like that? 79

The critical article was written with the bitterness of someone who did not conceal his indebtedness to the person he was now condemning.

It is not our task here to demonstrate the stability of Heidegger's fundamental categories, from *Being and Time* to the *Letter on Humanism*. By contrast, the variable quality of the appeal being made in them is obvious. Thus the talk today is of caring, remembrance, guardianship, grace, love, listening, yielding, where in 1935 acts of violence were demanded, while eight years before that Heidegger praised the quasi-religious decision of the private, isolated existence as a finite autonomy within the nothingness of a world without gods. The appeal itself has changed its tone at least twice, according to the political situation, but the philosophical motifs of a call to authenticity and a polemic against decay have remained stable. 80

In his book, Heidegger had mentioned, without comment, the 'inner truth and greatness of this movement' the Nazi movement as an 'encounter between technology, with its planetary destiny, and modern man'. This opened Habermas's eyes to the fact that what was objectionable in Heidegger was not just the speech he gave in 1935 as rector, but his philosophy itself: a glorification of Nazism emerged from its objective structure. Habermas accused Heidegger of using the history of Being to sanction the elimination of the idea of the equality of all before God, the idea of individual freedom, and the idea of providing a practical and rationalist corrective to technological progress.

In his other early works, Habermas proved to be a kind of democratically oriented critic of culture (*Kulturkritiker*). He was familiar with the

conservative culture criticism (*Kulturkritik*) of Hans Freyer and Arnold Gehlen. He had written a dissertation on *The Absolute and History: The Duality in Schelling's Thought*, 81 and was thus also aware of the critique of alienation that had been produced by conservative and Romantic thinkers during the decades around 1800. But Karl Löwith's book *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, 82 written in exile in Japan, also drew his attention to the Young Hegelians and the young Marx. In 1953 he discovered Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* in the library of the Philosophy Department at Bonn University, and read it with fascination. He also discovered Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, in which the key experience for him was the way in which the authors used Marx's thought to analyse the present-day situation. For Habermas, however, Marx's thought was significant for the present day not as a critique of capitalism but rather as a theory of reification, which he looked at from the standpoint of philosophical anthropology.

Habermas's first long essay, 'The Dialectic of Rationalization: on Pauperism in Production and Consumption', published in *Merkur* in 1954, already contained two motifs which remained central to his work. The first of these was the topic of the peculiar character of social rationalization as a practical and rationalist corrective to technological progress a theme already mentioned in his critique of Heidegger:

Have the sciences dealing with man not just proved that technological and economic organization in large industrial concerns has to be restricted in order to leave scope for natural, social faculties to develop? The proposal for social rationalization is initially a restrictive one: to bracket out one area from the progressive advance of organization in order to leave scope for what develops autonomously and not automatically. The proposal is not in any way directed towards organizing *these* faculties as well.<sup>83</sup>

Secondly, Habermas conceived of alienated production and alienated consumption jointly under the heading of compensation. The French sociologist Georges Friedmann had taken the view, approvingly, that having a share in 'affluence' and in the 'perfection' of the products of technologically advanced production offered workers a substitute, in the sphere of consumption, for the satisfaction they had lost in the sphere of production as a result of technological progress. Habermas applied the findings of Friedmann and other sociologists critically and took them as evidence that alienated labour was being compensated for by alienated consumption.

He presented as astonishing what sociologists usually accepted as being a matter of course: that traditional needs, linked to specific cultures, were being remoulded into a reservoir of demand that could be tapped by virtually any stimulus to consumption. He saw the advertising industry as offering only half the explanation for this astonishing state of affairs. The other half of the explanation was provided by the pauperism of consumption, which was a consequence of the pauperism of industrialized labour. Using the language of conservative culture criticism, he observed:

Industrialized labour, further and further removed from the object being manufactured, is destroying manual skill, the 'intelligence of

the hand', and allowing familiarity with raw materials to shrink to a statistically demonstrable minimum. Similarly, it is increasingly distancing mass consumption from the goods being consumed. The 'goodness' of these products, their quality, is perceived less and less, since one is able to linger in contact with the things themselves only more and more tenuously and briefly, and one's perception of their essence grows more vague, their proximity more unreal . . . Those who are no longer familiar with things, who do not experience them because they no longer handle them independently and can no longer linger with them, do not know where things belong. 84

What alienated labour left workers for their leisure time could be 'tickled, but not made to bear fruit', as Habermas put it, in a phrase worthy of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. The compensatory nature of consumption produced an insatiable demand for ever new forms of compensation.

Habermas was in agreement both with conservative culture critics and with those at Frankfurt in his critique of compensatory consumption and in suggesting that the explanation for the disastrous development towards a state of all-embracing alienation lay in the removal of all the channels through which the availability of products had been limited by an element of wonder. Where he followed conservative thinking closely was in seeing the solution to the problem he had diagnosed as lying in a new style, a new cultural will, in the 'crystallization of a new attitude'. But what he understood by these concepts differed from what conservative theorists were concerned with. What Habermas wanted was to remove the alienated character of labour, so far as it was possible, so that consumers could become participants in culture. What Gehlen, Freyer and Schelsky wanted was to stabilize the behaviour patterns of the masses within industrial society if possible without making concessions in return, simply by habituating succeeding generations to an objectified, depersonalized mode of labour and production.

However, the goal the young Habermas set for developments in the field of production, which he described using Schelsky's concept 'retrograde processes', was a modest one. What he demanded for workers was that they should be given 'purposeful tasks with limited responsibility, demanding full initiative'.<sup>85</sup> His goal was not the critique of a society in which practically all products took the form of commodities produced by a commodity known as labour-power, namely capitalist society. But it was easy for someone primarily trained in conservative thought to miss the possibility of a critical approach it was easy even for a reader of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. When preparing the mimeographed text of that book for publication by Querido, Horkheimer and Adorno had, after all, concentrated on eliminating every formulation that explicitly mentioned capitalism, monopolism and class society. They continued this practice in works that were later republished in the Federal Republic, taking into account, moreover, the apparent West German economic miracle. At this later stage, however, they tried to remove not only all the passages referring to the imminent collapse of capitalism, but also those in which any radical rejection of the prevailing form of society was explicitly referred to. A sentence like 'Antagonistic society, which must be negated and exposed right down to the innermost cells of its hostility to happiness, can only be

presented by practising an ascetic form of composition' was removed by Adorno from his essay 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening' when it was republished in his collection of essays, *Dissonances*. 86

But if anyone had examined the works by Adorno and Horkheimer that were available in the Federal Republic during the 1950s and looked at them not only from the point of view of the systematic theory of society, but also through either an initiate's or an adversary's eyes, they would have found that there was more involved than culture criticism, and that Adorno and Horkheimer's studies were riddled with elements of a theory of society that it would have been quite possible to use as a starting-point. If someone had taken these elements and gathered them together, a picture something like the following would have emerged.

Contemporary society was an 'administered society' and an 'exchange society'. In the economy, as in other areas of society, individual autonomy was being increasingly restricted. Free competition between giant companies was being constantly reduced. The organic composition of capital was still increasing that is, the proportion of objectified labour was increasing in comparison with that of living labour.<sup>87</sup> At the same time, there was an increase in the organic composition of individuals themselves that is, the process that had begun by transforming labour-power into commodities was continuing as a growing reduction in the living proportion of subjects themselves in their dealings with things and people, both inside and outside the production process. Individuals were being increasingly robbed of their autonomy, through their growing loss of economic independence, through increasing dependence on economic, social and state organizations, and through the culture industry and the administrative bodies responsible for culture, which were neutralizing culture and turning it into an instrument with which to expropriate people's independent experience. Individuals, uncertain how to deal either with their own discontent or with whatever had not yet been transformed into commodities and administered, tended to identify themselves with what kept them alive, to which there seemed to be no alternative: an administered capitalism.

Adorno and Horkheimer chose to do without even an outline of a coherent presentation of social theory, and they vacillated between the view, on the one hand, that a theory of society had yet to be produced, and a conviction, on the other, that its essentials had already been stated by Marx and by themselves. This made it easier for elements of unclarity to remain, and these unclaritys reinforced the impression among readers during the 1950s that the culture criticism Adorno and Horkheimer were engaged in had at best been given only a provisional basis in social theory. If the principle of the exchange of commodities was the decisive, fateful factor, why were the autonomy of the individual and man's relation to nature not better attended to in the USSR and other East European countries than they were? If domination over nature was the decisive, fateful factor and the roots of the evil were the same in both West and East European industrial societies show was it possible for Adorno to welcome further development of the forces of production, and to see the distorting influence as arising first from the principle of the exchange of

commodities? If the social system was equally responsible, in both West and East European industrial societies, for the catastrophic continuation of man's domination over nature, and for perpetuating the domination of man by man, then what was the East European equivalent of the principle of the exchange of commodities; and how were domination over nature, and the principle of the exchange of commodities and its East European equivalent, related to one another? When Adorno referred, in every possible context, to the domination of the general over the specific, of the reified over life, and of the abstract over the qualitative, did this not indicate a hidden assumption that a mysterious structural principle existed that characterized every possible level of advanced industrial society although he never made it clear how this structural principle operated, or from where?

What was bound to appeal to Adorno in Habermas was his talent for writing (Adorno had repeatedly lamented the lack of this talent among research assistants at the Institute); that he had come to the fore through a resolute critique of Heidegger (Adorno's own harsh criticisms of Heidegger first appeared in the 1960s); that he had the same critical attitude to many things as Adorno himself (not surprisingly, since Heidegger's and Adorno's thinking had a series of motifs in common, such as their critique of positivism and idealism, their critique of the general trend of Western thought as a whole, their critique of the idea of an autonomous philosophy, of the hypostatizing of the instinct for self-preservation and the priority of the subject). But Adorno and Horkheimer should not have been surprised that a young intellectual like Habermas was not more critical of scholars such as Gehlen and Schelsky, despite what he could learn from them or from Freyer. Those who were aware of many of their colleagues' fascist past or the close relation between their thinking and fascism, or who understood the connection in terms of the critique of ideology, remained silent. Horkheimer and Adorno, too, remained silent in public, only attempting to block the influence of such people in the academic field for example, by giving their advice in 1958 at the request of a professor at Heidelberg who wanted to prevent Gehlen from being appointed to a professorship at that prestigious university or by involving themselves in the elections for the executive committee of the German Sociological Association, in which Schelsky was playing an increasingly important part. According to René König, in his autobiography *Living in Contradiction*, Schelsky was the driving force behind the return of proven Nazis to posts as university teachers, while at the same time presenting himself as an advocate of the young, empirical, 'anti-ideological' sociologists. 88 Adorno's allusion to Hofstätter's pro-fascist past, in his reply to the latter's criticism of *Group Experiment* criticism in which Hofstätter had supported the idea of repression was a rare example during the 1950s of an open reference to something that was being universally repressed. The courses given in Marburg by Wolfgang Abendroth, on

publications of the most important scholars in the humanities and law in the Third Reich, were another example.  
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When Habermas came to Frankfurt, nothing in his image of the Frankfurt theoreticians changed very much. Even as an associate of the Institute of Social Research, he had no sense of there being any Critical Theory that claimed to be systematic. Indeed, Horkheimer himself, who had once made such a claim, wanted to preserve in the Federal Republic the Institute's aura of a glorious past while keeping the actual work on which that aura was based in the dark since in his view it would make an irresponsibly inflammatory impression in the era of the cold war and the formation of opposing blocs. 'Horkheimer was terribly afraid of us opening the chest in the Institute's basement that contained a complete series of the journal,' Habermas recalled. 'For me there was no Critical Theory, no consistent theory. Adorno wrote essays on culture criticism and gave seminars on Hegel. He presented a certain Marxist background and that was it.'<sup>90</sup>

The events organized by Horkheimer and Mitscherlich to celebrate Freud's centenary in the summer of 1956 revealed to Habermas that Freud, about whom he had heard practically nothing during his studies in psychology, was not only a significant theoretician and founder of the highly influential system of psychoanalysis, but also someone who, like Marx, could be used to analyse present-day conditions. Habermas reacted to what was the essential impetus behind Critical Theory—the utopian perspective of a radical critique of dominant conditions—with unconcealed astonishment and almost helpless sympathy. He was openly confronted with this perspective for the first time in Marcuse's lecture on 'The Idea of Progress in the Light of Psychoanalysis', which closed the series of Freud lectures. But he was not yet aware how close an associate of the Horkheimer circle Marcuse had been during the 1930s and early 1940s, or how closely related Marcuse's view of redemption and release was to Adorno's. At the end of his report on the completion of the Freud lectures, Habermas wrote:

We have isolated Marcuse's analysis of the times [in the preceding report of his lecture] he himself presents it in a quasi-redemptive framework. This is given its most striking description in the hypothesis of a primordial father, who organizes and distributes the necessities of life for the primordial horde not on an egalitarian basis, but hierarchically. He symbolizes an arbitrary deterioration from libidinous culture, or the possibility of it, to a culture based on domination, which, Marcuse concludes, is capable of having a historical end, just as it had a historical beginning. The dialectic of progress has today made a non-repressive culture objectively possible, one which 'can be made a reality tomorrow or the day after, if humanity would finally choose it'. This almost millenarian testimony may serve better than long-winded discussion to suggest

the excitement, but also the doubts, raised among his listeners by this wondrous transformation of the early-Marxist philosophy of history into the terminology of Freudian theory. The structure stands or falls, as we see it, with the concept of non-repressive sublimation. The objections to this are many, and Marcuse himself knows them best. Nevertheless, showing the courage to release utopian energies again with the uninhibitedness of the eighteenth century in times like ours makes a peculiarly strong impression. If anything, he will have given rise to at least one reflection, even among the toughest of those in the audience: an awareness of the extent to which we all unconsciously share the conventional resignation that reinforces existing conditions in our thoughts, without testing the 'conception' lying behind those conditions, the objective possibility that they can undergo historical development. 91

There could be no clearer evidence than this statement, not only of how alien the tradition of utopianism and social criticism in German thought had become as a result of the Nazi regime, but also of how alien it had remained during the restoration and cold war period to those who had grown up after 1933.

Not long after he became an associate at the Institute, Habermas, in close collaboration with Adorno, wrote a long introduction to the report on the first part of the Institute research project on 'University and Society', which had started in 1952. A shortened version of the introduction was published in *Merkur* under the title 'The Chronic Sufferings of University Reform'.<sup>92</sup> There seemed to be a chance that a representative of the younger generation would, on the one hand, be able to carry certain Adornoesque motifs forward, and on the other hand be able to set them in a new philosophical context. Adorno's influence was evident above all in the way Habermas synchronized scientific and academic developments with social developments, in his use of concepts drawn from the theory of capitalism and not merely from the theory of alienation, and the way in which he contrasted the utopian ideal that arises within historical contexts with the reality that contradicts it.

What, after all, was the real situation in the universities at the turn of the eighteenth century, what was the real fate even of the universities' philosophical defenders? At the end of the century of Enlightenment, Kant was reprimanded and had his writings banned for offending against religious dogma; Fichte lost his professorship during the controversy over atheism; Hegel wrote his most daring works either before he joined the university or after he had left it during the confusion of the Napoleonic wars . . . Nevertheless, it was this phase of bourgeois development which was privileged to create the idea of the university. It was possible for this phase to achieve at least a reflection of what the university can and ought

to be, partly through self-government for the academic body, the liberalness of its members, and the freedom of students to form associations; and partly through setting down as inalienable rights the principle of academic freedom, the principle that one should be free to learn what one chooses and the principle of self-education. 93

The critique of the sciences, a typically Habermasian theme, pervaded the whole introduction. The stimulus for this may have come from Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness*, or from Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Horkheimer's essays, 'Traditional and Critical Theory' and 'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics', were not known to Habermas at the time) or even from Heidegger but the tone of his critique of the sciences was quite different from theirs. He did not take the view that 'theory' or 'thinking' would lead to true knowledge in more or less stark contrast to 'bourgeois' science, or science that had 'forgotten Being'. Instead, he looked to the sciences themselves to recover their links with living, purposive practice. The impetus for this would come from a 'conservative' view of what science had once been: something in which, until the Middle Ages, 'directions for right living' had been inherent in every statement.

If the signs are not deceptive, the problem of the university in today's society stems from the fact that society now sees the mind as being there only to serve it. As if wanting to compensate the mind for having been domesticated in this way, however, society showers it with prizes . . . For the sake of achieving some form of neutral practicability, science has been alienated from living practice into becoming pure theory, and is continuing to alienate itself. It distorts its own critical sources by entrusting its results to bodies alien to science which can make arbitrary use of them . . . Finally, we must note that the failures from which university reform has suffered from the very beginning, without ever basically being able to overcome them, owe their persistence to a society which is making its remotest outposts 'scientific' while at the same time neutralizing science to such an extent that it has ceased to be a catalyst of life.94

In this study Habermas could only answer the question of how to achieve a recovery of the living, purposive relation to practice in the sciences themselves by using an Adornoesque motif: radicalizing specialization to the point of self-reflection. Every specialized science must reflect on its fundamental principles and at the same time on its relation to social reality. Such self-reflection must reveal 'the hidden practical roots of pure theory' and grasp the fact that 'a theory reconciled to practice must not let itself be satisfied with practicability'.95

This first text written by Habermas as an associate of the Institute was very much his own work, so far as its central theme was concerned, and showed the determination with which he could go his own way, guided by a powerful systematizing and academic interest. For Habermas, categories such as 'bourgeois science' never existed, and the established sciences merely showed useful or less useful aspects. The extent to which the text was his own, and the extent of his determination to go his own way, were shown by the central role he gave to the critique of the social neutralization and self-neutralization of science. This was a problem that was largely foreign to Adorno, for whom the neutralization of culture in the sense of art and speculative thought was the decisive catastrophe.

The productiveness of this constellation of themes for Habermas was shown by the next two large-scale studies he wrote or co-authored: *Students and Politics* and *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*.<sup>96</sup> Thanks to an unprejudiced, if not naïve, approach to the sciences, these studies seemed to be seriously concerned with the programme of a materialist theory of society inspired towards radically democratic thinking by the utopian and messianic ideas of Critical Theory.

*Students and Politics*, a 'sociological inquiry into the political awareness of Frankfurt students', was part of the series of studies carried out by the Institute on the topic of the university and society. It was to take its place in the tradition of great empirical research projects carried out by the Institute of Social Research. With its extrapolation of a typology of deep-seated political attitudes in order to assess the democratic potential among students, it continued the work done in *Group Experiment*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, *Studies on Authority and the Family* and the study on the working class in Weimar Germany. At the same time, *Students and Politics* continued Habermas's own interest in democracy, marked by the democratic 're-education' that took place after the war. This was democracy, however, in a sense explicitly radicalized into an 'idea of democracy' by Habermas's proximity to Adorno and his encounter with Marcuse.

*Students and Politics* was the result of an empirical research project mainly involving Jürgen Habermas, Christoph Oehler and Friedrich Wetz. It started with the interview guidelines. These came from Wetz, who also carried out the majority of the interviews. The restructuring of the material using the categories 'political disposition', 'political tendency', 'image of society', and ultimately constructing a typology emerged during the processing of the interview material. Finally, the introduction was written and a complementary study, requested by Horkheimer and carried out by Friedeburg, was added.

The random sample used in the questionnaire consisted of 171 out of over 7000 students matriculated at the University of Frankfurt in the summer semester of 1957. The interviews took place during the run-up

to the elections for the third Bundestag in September 1957, in which the CDU/CSU won an absolute majority. The interviews took place in the Institute building, lasting on average two and a half hours, and were based on interview guidelines and usually free questions, so that to some extent they had the quality of conversation. The interviewees were told that the research was concerned with 'study problems'. The questions about involvement in politics were positioned as unobtrusively as possible, so as to prevent the interviewees from being tempted to pretend they were interested in politics in order to make a good impression. The transcripts of the interviews, in which the interviewees' statements were recorded as literally as possible, formed the material for analysis. Apart from a short part of the main section and the appendix, the text of the book was written by Habermas.

The wide-ranging, axiomatic quality of the introduction, its combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis (with the latter predominating) and the assurance with which it defended a phenomenological methodology were reminiscent of Adorno. The systematic treatment given to studies in political science and constitutional law by 'bourgeois' scholars, and the replacement of depth-psychological and social-psychological interpretations of the interviewees' responses with an exposition of their 'images of society' (following in the steps of the research on workers done by Heinrich Popitz and his colleagues) this was all new. What was also new was that the concept of democracy which in *The Authoritarian Personality*, and even more so in *Group Experiment*, had been a concession to research clients and the prevailing situation, concealing radically anti-capitalist, utopian-revolutionary criteria was invested with radical content by Habermas and overtly made into an explicit standard of measurement.

The introduction, 'On the Concept of Political Participation', 97 sketched out the development of democracy up to the situation at the time of the questionnaire, providing a background to the problem of student participation in politics. Basing his position mainly on the work of a few conservative and authoritarian critics hostile to modern mass democracy Ernst Forsthoff, Carl Schmitt, Werner Weber and Rüdiger Altmann Habermas drew a stylized picture of the 'development of the liberal constitutional state as a collective means of providing for existence'. For a minority, democracy had at one time been more or less a reality, to the extent that that minority had had access to means of material existence that could only be restricted by universal laws enacted by representatives of that minority. But this was in fact rather a negative aspect of democracy: a community using politics to reserve to itself economic interests that were regarded as private. It was negative in comparison with the concept of democracy in antiquity: for the Athenians, the community's public affairs were more important than regulating the necessities of life. It was also negative in comparison with the radical sense of democracy, that a people should have sovereignty even over the

basis of its material existence. It was characteristic of the situation in the twentieth century that the state should be forced by the concentration of capital on the one hand and the organization of independent labour on the other into intervening to a growing extent in social and private affairs. But this did not necessarily imply that the influence of capital and labour would result in the communal public regulation of production, or in communal regulation of the distribution and use of products. Instead, an administrative state was developing, in which associations and groups beyond public control were able to have immediate influence on parliament as the organ representing the people. The fatal result was as Habermas put it, with a piquancy derived from Marx the production of 'unpolitical citizens within what is actually a political society'. 98

With the decline of open class antagonisms, the contradiction has taken on a new form: it now appears in the form of a depoliticization of the masses that is simultaneous with an increase in the politicization of society itself. The old disproportion between legally guaranteed equality and actual inequality in the distribution of opportunities to influence politics increases in proportion to the extent that the separation between state and society disappears and social power becomes immediately political. But the same process also has the effect that the process itself becomes less urgent, less clear in people's minds. Even though it is political in terms of its content, a society that is no longer in fact separate from the state, in spite of continuing to be separated from it by the proprieties of a liberal constitution, functionalizes its citizens increasingly to serve various public purposes, but privatizes them in their consciousness.99

According to this analysis, the contemporary period was at a cross-roads between manipulative politicization and genuine politicization, between an authoritarian welfare state and substantive democracy. According to the widespread interpretation of the Federal Republic's Basic Law, citizens were assured personal protection and personal freedom through an extensive catalogue of fundamental, liberal rights but legally the people had no means to express its will definitively on any specific issue. The only opportunity to participate in politics at the federal level was in the elections to the Bundestag. But the Bundestag had lost power to the executive, to the bureaucracy, and to political parties influenced by various lobbying organizations and groups with vested interests. The ineffectiveness of the elections was therefore obvious, and they had been degraded by the techniques of electoral campaigning into a mere touting for customers.

Habermas cited opinions from Joseph A. Schumpeter, Morris Janowitz, Harold D. Lasswell, David Riesman and Helmut Schelsky

equating democracy with the conditions prevalent in those countries considered to be democratic. According to such opinion, a certain measure of political apathy was healthy (as Janowitz put it), and the existence of a behavioural type consisting of non-political citizens who gave their assent to the system was seen as needing to be positively acknowledged in the long term, since this formed the very basis of the system (as Schelsky put it in his book, *The Sceptical Generation*).<sup>100</sup> By contrast, Habermas appealed to the 'idea of democracy' explicitly acknowledging his debt to 'Critical Theory'. Quoting from an aphorism in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, he stated that Critical Theory's freedom consisted of the fact that 'it accepts bourgeois ideals, either those that are still promulgated by the representatives of the bourgeoisie, although in distorted forms, or those that can still be recognized as giving objective significance to technical and cultural institutions, despite having been manipulated in every way.'<sup>101</sup> The idea of democracy that legitimate state power is mediated by the free and express consensus of all citizens lay at the roots of the bourgeois constitutional state. It continued to give objective significance to existing institutions in Germany; and the goal must be to communicate a sense of the validity of the idea of democracy, even if that sense of validity was merely being created by manipulative methods.

Habermas thus succeeded in producing a sophisticated concept of political participation. Participation could only go beyond being a mere value in itself if democracy was seen as a historical process aimed at creating a society of responsible citizens and transforming social power into rational authority. Political participation therefore ran parallel to contributing to the creation of conditions in which all citizens did in fact participate, and in which the general regulation of the reproduction of social existence excluded economic inequality as a source of unequal opportunities to participate in politics.

This was the standard by which students' participation in politics was to be measured. It was a very strict one; the introduction stated that the only opportunity for participation in politics currently lay in 'extra-parliamentary actions' by members of mass organizations who could put state organizations under pressure from the streets and by functional élites within the administrative apparatuses of industry, the state and lobbying organizations. But students, as a rule, did not belong to any mass organizations, and they would not belong to functional élites either for some time to come, if at all.

The scale of the frustration felt at the time, even with extra-parliamentary actions that had the support of mass organizations, was becoming clear once again during the period in which *Students and Politics* was being written. The first large-scale wave of protest began when the German government publicly declared its willingness to provide the West German armed forces with atomic weapons. Responding to a statement by the Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, that 'tactical atomic

weapons are basically nothing more than the further development of artillery', eighteen of the most distinguished German atomic scientists, in the Göttingen Manifesto of April 1957, gave a public warning about the dangers of nuclear weapons. After the decision of the NATO conference in Paris in December 1957 to equip European member states with atomic weapons installations, town councillors and professors protested, and mass meetings of workers, shop stewards and trade union organizations passed resolutions demanding strikes, and even a general strike. On 25 March 1958 the majority in the Bundestag, after four days of debate, agreed to allow West German armed forces to be equipped with atomic weapons within the NATO framework, thus belatedly approving what was already a *fait accompli*. Several thousand manufacturing workers at Henschel in Kassel went on strike. Fifty-two per cent of the adult population of West Germany and West Berlin were in favour of a strike to prevent the army from acquiring atomic weapons. In the middle of April, 150,000 people took part in a demonstration in Hamburg. On 20 May there were demonstrations by 20,000 university teachers and students, in Frankfurt and elsewhere, against arming West German forces with atomic weapons. A month later, the Frankfurt student newspaper, *diskus*, published an article by Habermas which was a counter-statement to an article published simultaneously by the Frankfurt professor and CDU Member of the Bundestag, Franz Böhm. Böhm was a neo-liberal who had written the foreword to *Group Experiment*, and was chairman of the board of the Institute of Social Research's Research Foundation. He described the protests as an attempt to create panic, a one-sided attempt to collaborate with dictators and oppressors opposing the West, class rabble-rousing against the CDU, and a 'brutalization of political discussion and an undermining of the Basic Law', preparing the way for a new form of Nazism. These were all clichés from the arsenal of authoritarian thinking, which required, as the writer of a letter to the paper later pointed out, that 'we should live in a democracy as if we were under a dictatorship'. The protests, Habermas's article countered, were directed against 'the statesmen ruling in our name'. Habermas defended demands for a plebiscite on the grounds that they were a reaction to the fact that the Federal Republic was not a 'representative democracy in the classical sense'.

The campaign, mainly organized by the SPD and the trade unions, concentrated everything on the demand for a referendum. But the referendum was prohibited by the Constitutional Court on 30 July 1958 to the particular relief of a group of reformists in the SPD grouped around Herbert Wehner, Carlo Schmid, Fritz Erler and Willy Brandt. Reacting to the results of the general election in 1957, this group wanted to transform the SPD into a people's party, and in their view this demanded an image of demonstrative military commitment. After the overwhelming CDU victory in elections to the regional parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia in July 1958 had shown that support for the

campaign against atomic weapons was not bringing in votes, the forces in the SPD and DGB 102 which were determined to let the campaign grind to a halt gained the upper hand. And this did in fact seal its fate. Protests continued, however. In January 1959, for example, a Student Congress against Atomic Weapons was held in West Berlin, with a council whose members included professors, and also writers such as Günther Anders and Hans Henny Jahnn. But it was no longer a real movement. Even Habermas's hopes for extra-parliamentary action by mass organizations now seemed exaggerated, an underestimation of the forces in favour of restraint that were at work within that type of organization. His expectations of action by sympathetic CDU professors within parliament seemed like an ironic attack on a democracy that used every available means to discourage political participation.

The strictness of the standards that were applied in the research on students was nevertheless useful. In contrast to the usual opinion polls, this was an attempt to establish the extent of the stable democratic potential within a population which formed a significant field of recruitment for future élites. The interpretation of the research material was carried out in three stages: establishing the subject's willingness to take part in politics at all (political disposition [*Habitus*]); establishing the subject's attitude to the democratic system (political tendency); and establishing the presence and character of ideological motifs (view of society). The method used was that of 'descriptive typology', as it was termed in the remarks on research technique. The classification of answers to individual questions, or to complexes of questions on individual themes treated as units, provided the basis for this typology. The questions, in turn, were 'drawn hypothetically from a prior understanding of the objective situation and from subjective reactions expected on the basis of socio-psychological mechanisms'. Greater exactness, in the usual sense, would be incommensurate to the phenomenon, in the authors' view, and would lead to gross inaccuracies.

With regard to political disposition, the main types found were: unpolitical, irrationally distanced, rationally distanced, naïve citizens, thoughtful citizens, and committed. The types of political tendency found were: genuine democrats, formal democrats, authoritarians, and those who were indifferent. The views of society typified were: those of the declining academic middle class, of inward values, of the intellectual élite, of social equality, and of the middle class in general. The point was now that, so far as political disposition and political tendency were ideologically stabilized by a corresponding view of society, it would be possible to draw conclusions about the implied political potential that extended beyond the status quo. If one assumed that a deep-seated democratic tendency was present when the political disposition of a committed person or of a thoughtful citizen coincided with a genuinely democratic tendency and a social-equality view of society, only 4 per cent of all those questioned were stable democrats. Out of the 52 subjects

questioned who had been classed as 'genuine democrats' in terms of their political tendency, only six remained under these criteria. By contrast, 6 per cent of the sample were stubborn authoritarians, those whose political dispositions of commitment or thoughtful citizenship were combined with an authoritarian political tendency and an élitist view of society<sup>11</sup> of the 37 who had been classed as 'authoritarian' in terms of political tendency. When the criteria were relaxed, the proportions did not become more favourable. A 'definitely democratic potential' of 9 per cent contrasted with a 'definitely authoritarian potential' of 16 per cent. In the centre, equal proportions tended towards the authoritarian side and towards the democratic side. Those of the students questioned who showed authoritarian potential came more often from homes with an academic tradition, and those who showed democratic potential came more often from homes without any academic tradition. Among the former, top professional positions were the goal both in terms of objective career prospects and in terms of subjective ambitions, while among the latter more modest positions were aimed at. The conclusion was therefore: 'According to these findings, the group which is weaker in any case the one which is fundamentally and definitely committed to defending democracy in a crisis, using appropriate means will additionally be hindered by the fact that, to a greater extent than the group with authoritarian potential, it will later on remain restricted to the modest room for manoeuvre afforded by the role of a mere citizen.' 103

The small size of the sample, 171 subjects, meant that the percentage figures given in the tables sometimes concealed absurdly small real numbers. But when quantitative data were being presented it was impossible to avoid giving the impression that they were representative, and in the spring of 1959 Friedeburg therefore undertook a supplementary study. The research work was carried out by fifty-nine sociology students, who interviewed 550 students using a standardized questionnaire. The supplementary study confirmed that the political tendency aspect of the main study was representative. This did not necessarily imply confirmation that the main study's results with regard to the distribution of deep-seated political potential were representative. However, the social-equality view of society held by those classed as staunch democrats had nothing to do with socialist convictions or a sober view of power relations. It meant instead that social differences were being seen as something external, attributed to snobbishness on the one hand and feelings of inferiority on the other. At the same time, it was denied that academics had a right to any privileges. The overall outcome was therefore clearly not too negative.

After the radical liquidation of unorthodox and critical thought and behaviour that had taken place, the liquidated traditions were not yet once again 'on offer'; one question that remained, therefore, was whether there might not be a potential for discontent and protest that was

incapable of being assessed by investigating political awareness. The 1950s were, after all, the years of rock and roll and teddy boys, showing that, since the time of the research for *Group Experiment*, new phenomena had appeared. While it might not be possible to account for these using the categories of political activity and political knowledge, those involved with such phenomena might perhaps have given greater democracy an enthusiastic welcome and sensed it as a liberation.

Objections from Horkheimer delayed publication of the study. He criticized the introduction vehemently. 'It presents theses similar in content to those in the article in the *Philosophische Rundschau*,' he told Adorno in the late summer of 1958, referring to Habermas's 1957 article 'On the Philosophical Debate over Marx and Marxism', 104 which he had seen as grounds for urgently recommending Habermas's removal from the Institute. Habermas's plea for the replacement of autonomous philosophy by a practical philosophy of history whose aim would be to transform the philosophy of history into critical and practical activity was, in Horkheimer's view, playing into the hands of dictatorship and the destruction of the last remnants of civilization.

The word 'revolution', probably under your influence, has been replaced by 'the development of formal democracy into material democracy, of liberal democracy into social democracy'; but, so far as the imagination of the average reader is concerned, it will hardly be possible to realize the 'potential' that is supposed to become politically effective in this process by democratic means. How is a people which is 'being held in the shackles of bourgeois society by a liberal constitution' to change into the so-called political society for which, according to H., it is 'more than ripe', other than by violence? It is simply not possible to have admissions of this sort in the research report of an Institute that exists on the public funds of this shackling society. 105

Horkheimer also vehemently criticized the 'dilettante, often irresponsible treatment of the empirical material' and the 'biased evaluation' of it. In his view, the study's overall approach meant that injustice was done to those, for example, who 'express a desire for bearable conditions and an aversion to restricting themselves to their own speciality' and thereby really offered models 'for the outlook of the individual in countries where nothing very positive is to be expected from political changes'. 106 In the course of the 1950s, Horkheimer had become a convinced defender of the CDU slogan 'No experiments!', and his view was that the Institute could not gain any respect with a publication of this sort. Adorno argued, in favour of it, that he himself had invested a great deal of work in it; that the foreword made it clear enough 'that we do not identify ourselves with the introduction'; that Habermas's introduction was a '*tour de force*'; that, in spite of all the reservations 'that we

have about the conformism of social democracy', the introduction was closer to the true problematics of the political sphere of the day than anything else he knew of; that the limitations on the study's representativeness were emphatically stated, and research carried out in Frankfurt was a guarantee rather than there would be too much sympathy in the results than that they would be too negative; that those involved had taken objections and suggestions into account as well as they could; that they had attempted in the study as best they could to achieve 'what we always asked of them: linking the theoretical motifs they received from us, no matter how provisionally and inadequately, with the empirical material'. 107 But Horkheimer stuck to his position.

*Students and Politics* was not published in the series 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology', and not even by the same publisher, the Europäischer Verlagsanstalt. Habermas's introduction thus suffered the same fate as Benjamin's introductory section to 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction'. Significant publications were reserved for 'the responsible figures'. If the latter never got round to writing them so much the better. Then nothing could go wrong. Horkheimer wrote to Adorno at the end of August 1959, 'If a book of ours is published in which questions of this sort 'the goals of political maturity for the electorate and social as opposed to authoritarian democracy' are seriously considered, it very much carries an obligation. It is a serious matter of theory. I cannot see why the staff of the Institute should want to enter the arena with a political text simply because a research report is being published.' In 1961 *Students and Politics* came out with the publishers Luchterhand in the series 'Sociological Texts', of which Heinz Maus was a co-founder. It contained no mention of the Institute of Social Research, except in the remarks on research methods in the appendix. The Institute of Social Research, whose identity Horkheimer saw as being threatened by Habermas, remained virtually anonymous in the book, and thus denied itself in the very publication that was to become the most successful empirical study the re-established Institute ever produced.

In the meantime, Habermas had started work on an analysis of changes in the structure and function of the bourgeois public sphere, which he would have liked to use as his *Habilitation* thesis in Frankfurt. Adorno, who was proud of him, would also have liked to accept the thesis proposal. But Horkheimer, like the king in the fairy-tale who does not want to give away his daughter in marriage, imposed the condition that Habermas must first of all do a study of Richter. This would have taken him three years. Habermas gave in his notice and Horkheimer had achieved what he wanted: to get rid of someone who in his opinion had incited the Institute's staff into a kind of class struggle in a teacup, and about whom he had remarked, 'He probably has a good, or even brilliant, career as a writer in front of him, but he would only cause the Institute immense damage.' 108 The alternative for Habermas was to go to Wolfgang

Abendroth, Professor of Political Science at Marburg, whom he later described as a 'partisan professor in a nation of fellow travellers'. Abendroth's roots lay in the labour movement. He had at one time studied with Hugo Sinzheimer in Frankfurt, and had been gaoled by the Nazis for resistance activities before being sent to Punishment Battalion 999, from which he defected to the Greek partisans. In the post-war period, he became perhaps the only openly and staunchly socialist professor at any university in the Federal Republic. Abendroth agreed at once to supervise a *Habilitation* thesis for Habermas, who had attracted his notice in 1953 with his unusual political critique of Heidegger.

Now financially independent of the Institute thanks to a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation), Habermas completed his book on *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Matters that had only been sketched out in the theoretical introduction to *Students and Politics* were presented here at length, including consideration of the philosophies of the public sphere that had developed at the height of the bourgeois period. The study thus showed an associate of the Institute attempting for the first time to present the 'theoretical conception of society as a whole that would have room for the concept of public opinion' that had been proposed in the introduction to *Group Experiment*. It was also an attempt to give substantial theoretical content to Horkheimer and Adorno's formulas about the 'administered world' and about the way in which ever weaker individuals were being delivered into the hands of organizations. The practical interest that determined the study's point of view could not be overlooked. Is it possible to democratize industrial societies that are based on the welfare state? That is one way of phrasing the question that lay at the heart of the study, which was subtitled 'An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society'.

The book was historically systematic and interdisciplinary, and its very structure was significant. The central chapter on 'The Bourgeois Public Sphere: Idea and Ideology' was preceded by chapters on 'Social Structures of the Public Sphere' and 'Political Functions of the Public Sphere', and followed by chapters on 'The Social-Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere' and 'The Transformation of the Public Sphere's Political Function'. The idea fundamental to the presentation of recent university history in the introduction to *University and Society* reappeared here as a structural principle: one particular phase of bourgeois development provided the modern age with the idea of having reasoned public debate over matters of general interest but social conditions then made it more and more difficult to put this idea into practice.

The phase of bourgeois development in which the model of Greek public discussion handed down by humanistic tradition again became the dominant idea was the phase in which the bourgeoisies sustained

by its own economic importance and schooled through the precursor of the literary public sphere or through contact with the aristocracy in institutions for social intercourse confronted the state with the demand that nothing should be allowed to affect bourgeois society that had not been subjected to public political debate by bourgeois private citizens. To achieve the complete emancipation of private property from the state, whose functioning had come to depend more and more on contributions from property owners, the latter forced the area of the reproduction of life that they dominated to be seen as a matter that could only be influenced by public decisions made by those concerned. What served the interests of the private ownership of capitalist property proved at the same time to be an institution in which there was an inherent tendency for domination to be loosened by a non-violent method of determining what was practically necessary in the general interest.

On the basis of the continuing domination of one class over another, the dominant class nevertheless developed political institutions which credibly embodied as their objective meaning the idea of their own abolition: *veritas non auctoritas facit legem*, the idea of the dissolution of domination into that easy-going constraint that prevailed on no other ground than the compelling insight of public opinion.

If ideologies are not only manifestations of the socially necessary consciousness in its essential falsity, if there is an aspect to them that can lay a claim to truth inasmuch as it transcends the status quo in utopian fashion, even if only for purposes of justification, then ideology exists at all only from this period on. 110

Marx had held fast `to the idea of the bourgeois public sphere, to confront it as in a mirror with the social conditions for the possibility of its utterly unbourgeois realization'.<sup>111</sup> The direction was given by the development which in fact took place. Its principal characteristics were that a growing proportion of non-bourgeois social strata, namely those lacking property and education, found their way into the politics of the public sphere and began to exercise an influence on its institutions, on the press, political parties and parliament, and were able to use journalism, a weapon forged by the bourgeoisie, against it. For the future, a democratic public sphere was emerging which would make the direction and administration of the reproduction of society a matter of public concern to all. A `political society' would then have socialized the means of production.

From the dialectic immanent in the bourgeois public sphere Marx derived the socialist consequences of a counter-model in which the classical relationship between the public sphere and the private

was peculiarly reversed. In this counter-model, criticism and control by the public were extended to that portion of the private sphere of civil society which had been granted to private persons by virtue of their power of control over the means of production to the domain of socially necessary labor. According to this new model, autonomy was no longer based on private property; it could in principle no longer be grounded in the private sphere but had to have its foundation in the public sphere itself. Private autonomy was a derivative of the original autonomy which alone constituted the public of a society's citizens in the exercise of the functions of the socialistically expanded public sphere . . . The identity of *bourgeois* and *homme*, of property-owning private persons and human beings, was replaced by that of *citoyen* and *homme*; the freedom of the private person was a function of the role of human beings as citizens of society. No longer was the role of the citizen of a state the function of a human being's freedom as property-owning private person, for the public sphere no longer linked a society of property-owning private persons with the state. Rather, the autonomous public, through the planned shaping of a state that became absorbed into society, secured for itself (as composed of private persons) a sphere of personal freedom, leisure, and freedom of movement. In this sphere, the informal and personal interaction of human beings with one another would have been emancipated for the first time from the constraints of social labor (ever a 'realm of necessity') and become really 'private'. 112

The 'dialectic of the public sphere', however, in reality turned out to be different from the one that Marx maintained merely showed the world what it was that it was fighting for. The public sphere had extended itself, but had thereby also become a battlefield for competing interests which only diverged further and further from the ideal of using debate as a non-violent method of determining what was practically necessary for the general interest. Whenever the public sphere extended itself and included non-bourgeois social strata, the theorists of the bourgeoisie either disparaged the broader public as a mass which was dominated by momentary passions and incapable of identifying what was rational and true; or they redefined the public sphere as consisting of an experienced and responsible élite. Above all, however, the broader public sphere was deprived of power and had its function altered as much as possible, making it all the more, or confirming it as, what it was accused of being: immature, vacillating and impatient. The non-bourgeois strata that penetrated the public sphere and presented their collective interests as demands before the state were made to appear as usurpers preventing the continuation of public debate aimed at discerning what was rational and true.

Habermas got into difficulties in his presentation of this problem.

How close had the bourgeoisie come, within the framework of the liberal bourgeois public sphere, to determining what was practically necessary in the general interest? Was it not merely its own general interest that it had determined on the basis of 'a certain rationality and even effectiveness' in public discussion? 113 Was it not necessary to relativize the liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere in such contexts, in view of the 'plebeian public sphere as a variant that in a sense was suppressed', mentioned in the preface to the book and explicitly excluded from consideration in it? 114 Was maintaining the idea of the bourgeois public sphere, and concentrating his thinking on the confrontation between idea and reality in the bourgeois public sphere, not leading to a misjudgement of the element that was disturbing it and seemed to be undermining it? It was as if Habermas was recoiling from involvement with what Kirchheimer had demonstrated most incisively in the final years before the Nazi takeover: an analysis of the constitution and constitutional reality that would show that the forms of a functioning democracy had up till then been possible only on the basis of the unchallenged supremacy of a single social class. But this recoil from taking as a direct theme the democratic system's dependence on the patterns of the distribution of power within society went hand in hand with the absence of any stimulus in the history of ideas that might have encouraged him to take up such a topic. Not merely Kirchheimer's trenchant studies from the late 1920s and early 1930s but also all the discussion by social-democratic and trade-union-oriented legal and constitutional experts, both among themselves and with their authoritarian counterparts, formed part of a tradition of social-democratic thought that had been either destroyed or protractedly interrupted by Nazism and remained suppressed until late into the 1960s. In the Federal Republic, this tradition was only maintained by Wolfgang Abendroth, an outsider among the university professors. Habermas and even more so others of his generation knew only more recent work by Kirchheimer, Neumann or Fraenkel. The only work critical of democracy that Habermas mentioned from the final years of the Weimar Republic was Carl Schmitt's *Dictatorship*. 115 But Schmitt's anti-democratic critique of democracy, after all that had happened and everything Schmitt had had a part in, was more likely to lead to sidestepping the problem of the impossibility of undistorted democracy in an antagonistic society.

As a kind of substitute for the topic of concrete constitutional development as a product of class struggle, Habermas introduced the idea that both the classical liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere and the socialist counter-model shared a single problematic assumption: that there existed a 'natural order' of social reproduction, and that general agreement concerning this 'natural order' would make possible a structuring of society that was strictly in the general interest and in which conflicts of interest and the necessity for bureaucratic decision-making could be reduced to a minimum and regulated without much

controversy. Theories of elite rule within democracy would then replace the awareness of class conflict with a model of a relativized form of the bourgeois public sphere. According to these theories, representatives chosen by the masses would seek agreement by the masses to compromises reached through non-public negotiations, in order to achieve re-election.

A further problematic assumption was shared by both the liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere and its socialist counter-model: the assumption that the public can easily control the state apparatus. This assumption was closely related to the first. For if there was a 'natural order' in the reproduction of life, an elaborate apparatus would not be necessary to guarantee it. In reality, however, an ever more powerful administrative state was developing, and no attempt at supervision by a reasoning public seemed to be able to make any impression on it.

What was happening was not an expansion of the authority of the bourgeois public sphere, or of the circle of persons within it, into those that would be appropriate to a socialist public sphere, but instead a mutual restriction of state and society that undermined the old basis for the existence of a critical public sphere, without providing a new one. What followed was a flourishing of publicity on the part of state, economic and political organizations and institutions seeking, and usually getting, support from a public that consisted of economically dependent consumers who were no longer accustomed to public debate and who viewed their own opinions as private ones.

Habermas's extended presentation of the decay of the bourgeois public sphere concluded with a glimmer of hope. The vastly increased level of productive forces had made available, on the one hand, a quantity of social wealth and, on the other hand, a potential for destruction which were so great that structural conflicts of interest over them ought, in his view, to lose their edge. Against this background, what needed to be done was to discover whether there were organizations containing functioning internal critical public spheres which would be able to supervise other organizations in which such critical public spheres were absent. According to Habermas, 'whether the exercise of domination and power persists as a negative constant, as it were, of history or whether, as a historical category itself, it is open to substantive change' would depend on the increase or decrease in the extent of this supervision of bureaucratic decision-making by critical publicity released through public spheres within organizations themselves. 116 (The variation on this hope for the 1980s was: it depended on whether subcultures that were critical of growth were able to form autonomous public spheres through grassroots organizations, and on whether they were able to practise a considered combination of power and self-restriction, whether the state and the economy, using power and money as their methods of control, could be made more sensitive to the results of radical democratic opinion-formation directed towards specific purposes and relevant

to the life-world, and whether the emphasis could be shifted towards controls effected on the basis of solidarity. 117)

*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* was a disillusioning book for those who believed in democracy, and was seen in this way by outstanding members of Habermas's generation and at the same time praised by them in the highest terms by Renate Mayntz in the *American Journal of Sociology*, for example; by Ralf Dahrendorf in the *Frankfurter Hefte*; and by Kurt Sontheimer in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The only consolation that the reviewers could offer, both to themselves and to their readers, was the observation that the author had set himself an extremely high standard one that was too utopian, in Dahrendorf's view. But no matter what one's view of this standard, nothing changed the decisive diagnosis. One might, like Dahrendorf, emphasize that domination was never unlimited, and that the existence of 'countervailing powers' was decisive. But there emerged no other diagnosis than that the dominant conditions in the post-war European democracies were far from what they claimed to be and far from what was desirable.

So far as Habermas's specific proposals were concerned, his own experience with an attempt to create a critical public within an organization was not encouraging. The critical thinking conveyed to students by Adorno and Horkheimer, and by other associates of the Institute such as Oskar Negt and Jürgen Habermas, had made a vital contribution both in Frankfurt and in a few other cities such as Marburg, Berlin, Göttingen and Münster to the development of an intellectual left within the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), the league of German socialist students. The Frankfurt students, in particular, regarded working with the SDS not as a springboard to a party career in the SPD, but as a focus for committed socialist theoretical work and for political activity based on that. The dissatisfaction of the SPD party executive with the party's student organization grew in proportion to the increase in the influence of these left intellectuals within the SDS. At the Extraordinary Party Conference of the SPD in Bad Godesberg in 1959, a fundamental policy programme, cleansed of every last hint of Marxism and lacking in any attempt to take account of what had happened since 1933 or in the post-war period, was passed with only sixteen votes against. In February 1960 the party executive decided that 'the SPD will support other student associations in addition to the SDS, provided they accept the SPD's Godesberg Programme.'<sup>118</sup> Three months later, there followed the founding in Bonn of the Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (SHB), the Social Democratic University League, by an assortment of social-democratic student groupings. In October 1961 Abendroth and others, including Habermas, founded a society called the Association of Socialist Sponsors of the Friends, Sponsors and Former Members of the SDS (Sozialistische Förderer-Gesellschaft der Freunde, Förderer und ehemaligen Mitglieder des SDS). One month later, the

SPD's party executive declared: 'Membership of the society "Association of Socialist Sponsors of the Friends, Sponsors and Former Members of the SDS" is incompatible with membership of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, just as it is incompatible for anyone to be both a member of the SDS and a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.' It was a strange declaration, which officially expelled the SDS by behaving as if others had already implemented a decision that membership of the SPD and membership of the SDS were incompatible, and as if incompatibility between membership of the SPD and membership of the Sponsors' Association was merely a consequence of that. The party executive gave no reason for its decision. Since the left-wing intellectuals who had come to dominate the SDS had certainly been willing to reach an understanding with the party executive, and had, for example, declared that they were opposed to blind anticommunism but also supported maintaining a critical distance towards communism in Germany, the only explanation for the behaviour of the SPD party executive was that it was irritated about various other matters. Among these were: the SDS's uncompromising insistence on continuing extra-parliamentary action against the acquiring of atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr (the West German armed forces); actions such as an exhibition in which documentation relating to Nazi lawyers who had taken up official positions again in the Federal Republic was presented this was attacked both by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, which stereotyped it as a communist-inspired action, and by the SPD party executive, which distanced itself from it in a press release; and a reprint in the SDS paper *Standpunkt* of a critique by Abendroth of the draft of the Godesberg Programme. What the party executive was therefore expelling was, precisely, a critical public sphere within the organization, initiated by left-wing intellectuals. The party's grass roots tolerated the executive's high-handedness in the matter. The expulsion of the SDS stood. Intellectuals were the only ones to criticize the decision. If they were members of the SPD and their criticism took the form of membership of the SDS Sponsors' Association, they were also expelled from the party as were Abendroth and Ossip K. Flechtheim, for example. The SDS continued to exist as a kind of extra-parliamentary critical public without any roots in mass organizations, and therefore condemned to impotence, according to *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. Indeed, nothing was heard of the SDS for a considerable time. For its part, the SPD, represented by Herbert Wehner, entered into secret talks in 1962 with representatives of the CDU and CSU about a Grand Coalition government. The FDP (the Freie Demokratische Partei) had insisted on Franz Josef Strauss's resignation from the government after the *Spiegel* affair (see p. 597 below), as a condition for its continued membership of the governing coalition. The SPD would have been prepared to have Strauss as a minister, but refused to accept Adenauer as Chancellor for the full legislative period or to agree to

introduce a first-past-the-post electoral system, as in Britain, as a means of excluding the FDP from the Bundestag. Critical intellectuals may have been unbearable to the SPD, but they were all the more so for the trade unions not to mention parties like the CDU and CSU, in which there seemed to be not even a demand for internal party discussion, and whose youth organizations were never more than a starting-point for party careers.

Horkheimer, then, who had been living next door to Pollock in Montagnola above Lake Lugano in Switzerland since 1958, and who had received the freedom of the City of Frankfurt in 1960, prevented Habermas from taking his *Habilitation* in Frankfurt. Habermas's study of *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* was published in Darmstadt by Luchterhand instead of in Frankfurt. This, too, contained no mention of the Institute of Social Research. It was even more successful than *Students and Politics*.

In 1961 Habermas became a *Privatdozent* in Marburg. His inaugural lecture was on 'The Classical Doctrine of Politics in Relation to Social Philosophy'.<sup>119</sup> It was no accident that it later formed the opening chapter of his collection of essays, *Theory and Practice*. Prompted by Hannah Arendt's 1958 study *The Human Condition*,<sup>120</sup> Habermas took the Aristotelian distinction between τέχνη and πράξις as a focus for a progressively more precise formulation of his social theory and his clarification of the status of Critical Theory.

On the initiative of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Löwith, both students of Heidegger, Habermas was appointed to a chair as Extraordinary Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg even before completing his *Habilitation*, an unusual procedure at the time. In Heidelberg he gave an inaugural lecture in 1962 on 'Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution', in which he held that Hegel had traced the Revolution to the heart of the World Spirit in order to acknowledge its achievements while at the same time denying that they were owed to the revolutionaries and to an alliance between philosophers and revolutionaries.

In 1962 Friedeburg left the Institute as well. He had more or less independently kept the day-to-day business of research going, while Adorno tended to seek Horkheimer's advice and agreement, even over trivialities. Friedeburg had taken his *Habilitation* in Frankfurt in 1960, the first student of Horkheimer and Adorno to do so, with a thesis on *The Sociology of the Atmosphere in the Workplace*.<sup>121</sup> He would have liked to combine continued work at the Institute with a professorship at Giessen. But the offer from Giessen was an unfavourable one, and the simultaneous offer he received from Berlin was highly favourable. He therefore went to Berlin. The Institute had thus lost both Habermas, the promising theoretician of society, and Friedeburg, the professional empiricist.

It was around this time that Horkheimer and Adorno raised a monument to their own sense of resignation over the theory of society.

*Sociologica II*, containing speeches and lectures by Horkheimer and Adorno, was published in the same year as Habermas's *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*. It was to be their only joint publication of studies that had been completed after their return to Germany. The laconic prefatory note attempted to preclude disappointment. The texts it contained 'neither develop a single consistent theoretical idea, nor do they report coherent research activities'. A more detailed explanation of this was given in the sections of Horkheimer's draft of the preface that were not printed. The fact that the authors were presenting 'individual observations instead of a theory of society of the sort conceived by *Dialectic of Enlightenment*' was perhaps not merely the result of their biographical circumstances or their own weakness, but lay in the nature of the thing itself, the condition of society. 'Consistent theory presupposes, in the consistency and discreteness of its object, the potential effectuation of those impulses which, by transcending prevailing conditions, animate theoretical conceptions as a matter distinct from mere facts.' The fact that a 'rational social whole' was nowhere in sight reduced the scope for conclusive theory. Horkheimer concluded his draft for the preface with the resigned flourish: 'The objective situation, which is unfavourable to a discrete theory, was also the reason why the authors have devoted more of their energy to their academic duties than they would ever have considered possible. That energy has gone into lectures, speeches, talks and seminars.'<sup>122</sup> The challenge that preceded this statement that one should not withdraw into vague positivism, that one should never surrender the idea that is 'indistinguishable from an interest in achieving rational human conditions' became blurred in this context into a dull expression of defiance. What was surprising about the draft was the fact that Horkheimer was discussing the possibility or impossibility not of a dialectical theory of society but of a consistent, discrete one.

Adorno's version of the preface was equally surprising. A few months before, he had remarked during the 'positivist dispute' at the German Sociological Society's Tübingen meeting: 'Sociology's abandonment of a critical theory of society is resignatory: one no longer dares to conceive of the whole since one must despair of changing it.'<sup>123</sup> This was an ambiguous statement, though: since it was spoken by a representative of the Critical Theory, one was forced to interpret it as referring to the defenders of a sociology that was content to be positivist. Reading Adorno's draft for the preface of *Sociologica II*, however, one had the impression that the Critical Theorist himself had abandoned any attempt at a critical theory of society. The point of Adorno's programme for a theory of society always seemed to have been: to think through the evil whole for the sake of its suppressed differences, to grasp the antagonistic system for the sake of the variety it had distorted. Now, however, his view was:

The tendency towards concentration which has reduced to a sham the market mechanism of supply and demand; imperialist expansion, which has prolonged the life of the market economy by pushing it beyond the area in which its own laws operate; interventionism and the planned sectors of the economy, which have penetrated the area in which the laws of the market operate all of this, in spite of the total socialization [*Vergesellschaftung*] of society, has made the attempt to view society as a harmonious system more than questionable. The increasing irrationality of society itself, manifested by today's threatened catastrophes and the obvious potential for society to destroy itself, is irreconcilable with rational theory. Theory can now hardly continue to take society at a word that society itself no longer speaks. 124

Horkheimer's note of defiance was given the following form by Adorno:

What the authors have in mind is a manner of thinking about society and experiencing society which does not promulgate conclusive theory or repeat it in the form of dogma, no more than it merely observes what is apparently the case and thus involuntarily shows its colours. Its relationship to theory would be comparable with that of the eater to his bread: theory is consumed by thought; thought lives on theory; and theory vanishes into thought.

There was no longer any room here either for 'conclusive theory' or for Critical Theory. Adorno characterized his own position as a critical way of thinking which incorporated theoretical elements. In his effort to justify the fact that he and Horkheimer were presenting in contrast to their longstanding intention to formulate a theory of society merely a 'collection of marginalia to an absent, or at least not explicit, theory of society', Adorno had unexpectedly arrived at an idealization of the 'marginalia' they were presenting into the actual goal of their collaboration. But could a denial of Critical Theory, justified by the irrationality of the social system, really be an adequate articulation of what they were both trying to achieve? What troubled Adorno about Horkheimer's draft was its assumption that a lack of interest in rational human conditions would affect the possibility of a theory of society.

One might simply respond that, in a social situation so jinxed that it is drifting towards disaster without there being any apparent alternative, the greatest possible interest literally the immediate interest of everyone would lie in finding an adequate explanation for this in a theory. To the same extent that humanity has become concretistic, it is waiting for a saving word.

In addition:

It is only the other side of the same coin that, with the current way of the world, situations may arise today or tomorrow which, while they are very likely to be catastrophic, at the same time restore the possibility of practical action which is today obstructed. As long as the world remains antagonistic and itself perpetuates contradictions, the possibility of changing it will be a legacy. 125

But it could similarly be objected to Adorno's version that the impossibility of viewing a now more irrational society as 'a consistent system', and of 'taking it at a word it no longer speaks itself', did not provide sufficient grounds for concluding that a dialectical theory of society was impossible. It was clearly their uncertainty about their own position as regards the much-vaunted theory of society that made Horkheimer and Adorno omit everything that went beyond the dry sentences that opened the preface.

### The Positivist Dispute

In spite of Horkheimer's hostility and Adorno's weakness, there was no open breach with Habermas. His reputation quickly grew, and before he returned to Frankfurt, with Adorno's support, to take up Horkheimer's chair in philosophy and sociology he kept up a kind of long-distance collaboration with Adorno.

Other associates of the Institute of Social Research, such as Alfred Schmidt and Oskar Negt, published important work in the broad area of the humanities in the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' series: Alfred Schmidt's *The Concept of Nature in Marx's Theory* was published in 1962, and Oskar Negt's *Structural Relationship Between Comte's and Hegel's Theories of Society* appeared in 1964.<sup>126</sup> Habermas, however, showing early signs of developing his own variation of Critical Theory, intervened in the 'positivist dispute'. The controversy that later went down in the history of the social sciences under this name had its roots in the 1950s. For Adorno, it was only a continuation of what had begun during the 1930s as a dispute between the Vienna Circle and the Horkheimer circle, with meetings for discussion between the Frankfurt and the Viennese groups taking place in Frankfurt, Paris and New York. In the best known of Horkheimer's essays it had been described as a conflict between 'traditional and critical theory'. When Habermas gave a lecture in January 1962 at the Berlin University Conference under the title 'Critical and Conservative Tasks of Sociology',<sup>127</sup> he was describing what the dispute was about more openly than Adorno.

A year later, Habermas published a series of earlier essays under the title *Theory and Practice*, hoping they would be seen as historic advances

towards a systematic study of the relationship between theory and practice in the social sciences. 128 In the same year he published 'Analytic Theory of Science and Dialectics: a Supplement to the Controversy between Popper and Adorno' in *Zeugnisse*, a volume produced in the same format as the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' to celebrate Adorno's sixtieth birthday. 129 The article placed him more or less officially on Adorno's side.

In 1961 Ralf Dahrendorf, commenting on the discussion of the presentations given by Karl Popper and Theodor Adorno on the logic of the social sciences at an internal workshop held in Tübingen by the German Sociological Society, wrote:

It is no secret that manifold differences not only in research orientation but also in theoretical position and, beyond this, differences in basic moral and political attitudes, divide the present generation of university teachers of sociology in Germany. After several discussions in recent years, it seemed as if a discussion of the logical-scientific foundations of sociology could be an appropriate way in which to make the existing differences emerge more clearly and thereby render them fruitful for research. The Tübingen working session did not however confirm this assumption. Although both symposiasts did not hesitate, in their expositions, to adopt unequivocally a definite position, the discussion generally lacked the intensity that would have been appropriate to the actual differences in views. In addition, most of the contributions to the discussion adhered so strictly to the narrow confines of the topic that the underlying moral and political positions were not expressed very clearly. 130

Their 'differences in views' involved nothing less than mutual accusations of having totalitarian tendencies. Even before the Tübingen workshop, this had once again become clear at the Fourteenth German Sociology Conference in Berlin in 1959. In consecutive papers, Horkheimer had spoken on 'Sociology and Philosophy' and König on 'Changes in the Position of the Sociological Intelligentsia'. Horkheimer had emphasized that, if sociology failed to concern itself with the fate of the whole, if it failed to fulfil its task of allowing 'society to reflect on itself' in the light of its purpose the 'correct form of human co-existence' then it would fail 'in the struggle against the totalitarian world, which threatens the European world both from without and from within'. 131 König was bound to see this as a reference to himself, since he rejected precisely what Horkheimer was demanding, on the grounds that it was no longer appropriate to a 'pure', specialist sociology. He got his own back in his lecture. He claimed that it was precisely those sociology experts who had found a place in factories and offices, and 'who looked after the actual functioning of the machinery', who would be able to be critical

`in the one place it is really worth targeting i.e. not in the vague sphere of literary discussion, but in the reality in which all decisions that hold any promise for the future are taken', and he observed:

The concept of criticism being used here needs to be examined, however. It cannot be merely a matter of `denouncing' one aspect or another of the capitalist economic system, for example, or of measuring a given reality against a vague concept. Sorel has already shown that this method of utopian attack itself ultimately leads to absolute violence and terror when it is put into practice; for to quote Geiger again `today's rebel is tomorrow's possible dictator'. There is also a crypto-totalitarian critique of totalitarianism, which appears most strongly in the cultural criticism inspired by Marx. By contrast, the critique of power, as Geiger sees it, develops along entirely different lines, namely through the empirical social sciences, which measure the ideological pretensions of dictators against reality and thus work towards genuine `enlightenment'. 132

It was in the playing off of reality not only against the ideologies of dictators but also and much more energetically against the `ideologies' of utopians and rebels, that the `pure' sociologist König found himself in agreement with the technocratic commentator on the times, Schelsky, and with the neo-liberal theoretician of science, Popper. Even Schelsky, who with a `realistic sociological [*realsoziologisch*] eye' had welcomed a withdrawal from the public and political sphere into one's own family and career as a `highly satisfactory tracing back of what is abstract and programmatic in social thought to the experience and objectivity of each personal existence',<sup>133</sup> had managed, at least in one passage, to accuse the Frankfurt theoreticians of having virtually totalitarian tendencies. `This dogmatically anti-authoritarian family ideology,' he wrote in his *Current Changes in the German Family*, published in 1953, `thus consciously or unconsciously takes the part of bureaucratic power against the intimacy of the family and the natural authority of the person within it.'<sup>134</sup>

At the Tübingen workshop, Popper and Adorno courteously talked past one another, satisfied merely to present shorthand recapitulations of their positions on the philosophy of science. Popper had been influenced by neo-Kantianism and gestalt psychology, and had published his principal work, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, in Vienna in 1934, at the age of thirty-two. He had seen himself as an opponent of logical positivism from the very beginning. He had contrasted its combination of empiricism and modern logic with the method of critical testing of possible theoretical solutions for problems, showing a clearer grasp of the real problems of research. The critical approach (*Kritizismus*) and fallibilism the use of critical discussion to arrive at solutions to problems that were reliable but never regarded as final characterized the

critical method which in Popper's view had been practised by the modern sciences ever since Galileo, and which could also be transferred to history and politics.

In the paper he gave at Tübingen, Popper again warned sociologists against 'scientism', meaning a transferral into the social sciences of 'a misunderstanding of the methods of the natural sciences', of the 'myth of the inductive character of the methods of the natural sciences'. What ought to be transferred in this way was, instead, his own critical philosophy of science. In concrete terms, this meant taking economics as a specific model, since it was the discipline which had long enjoyed a greater degree of formal perfection than the other social sciences and provided particularly powerful abstractions from social reality. Popper saw economics as practising the 'method of *objective* understanding, or situational logic'.<sup>135</sup> In this, theoretical reconstructions of actions '*objectively appropriate to the situation*' were elaborated. Such theoretical reconstructions were rational, accessible to empirical criticism, and capable of being improved. But, for the purposes of situational analysis, the wishes, motivations, memories, etc., of an individual needed to be transformed into objective goals and an objective form in which they were furnished with this or that theory, or this or that piece of information. Understanding implied finding the situational logic of a given action that would enable the scientist to say, 'If I had had the same goals, theory and information, I would have acted in exactly the same way.' It was thus not a question of investigating the way in which subjective desires and objective restrictions, subjective ideas and objective conditions, were interrelated in social actions, but rather a process of translating subjective factors into factors that were accessible in the same way as the occurrences investigated by the natural sciences. How such a process of translation was possible within the framework of Popper's critical philosophy of science remained obscure, however.

With his emphasis on the primacy of theory and the purely corrective function of empirical investigation, Popper seemed to be closer to Critical Theory than genuine positivists. But the historical fact of the advancement of knowledge in the natural sciences from Galileo to Einstein formed for him, too, the point of departure and the critical standard for all philosophical reflection. He, too, equated the empirical and analytic methods of the natural sciences based on the twin pillars of experimentation, or testing, and theory or systematic deduction with scientific rationality as such. But he took more account of the reality of progress in the natural sciences by admitting the possibility of hypotheses for which no experimental tests were currently available.

Without attempting to compare their two positions systematically or to develop his own position through an immanent critique of Popper's, Adorno listed the points that made it clear that Popper's philosophy of science also implied a rejection of Critical Theory as unscientific. Popper's philosophy of science denied that individual observations with any value

could be made merely on the basis of a constant relation to what could never be more than a provisional concept of the social totality. It denied that any non-deductive theory could be an adequate way of understanding contradictory, antagonistic societies. It denied that the experience of individuals could be more correct than results established through the official system of organized science. It denied the insight that sociological evaluation could not be neutralized by introspective knowledge, but was on the contrary constitutive of knowledge in some way. 'The experience of the contradictory character of societal reality is not an arbitrary starting point but rather the motive which first constitutes the possibility of sociology as such,' Adorno argued at the conclusion of his second contribution, and continued:

Sociology's abandonment of a critical theory of society is resignatory: one no longer dares to conceive of the whole since one must despair of changing it. But if sociology then desired to commit itself to the apprehension of facts and figures in the service of that which exists, then such progress under conditions of unfreedom would increasingly detract from the detailed insights through which sociology thinks it triumphs over theory and condemn them completely to irrelevance. 136

Both Popper and Adorno claimed to experience the contradictory character of society; but they experienced and reacted to this in different ways. In the discussion, Adorno admitted that he saw himself as being forced back to the position of left-wing Hegelianism in the face of social reality.<sup>137</sup> Human nature and the shape of reality made a liar of anyone who behaved 'as if one could change the world tomorrow'. At this, Popper accused him of suffering from the "pessimism" that must necessarily spring from the disappointment arising from the foundering of overextended utopian or revolutionary hopes.<sup>138</sup> By contrast, someone like Popper himself, who believed he knew nothing and wished for less, was able to be an optimist. It was at this late point in the discussion that the classic confrontation was reached. Popper represented the view that one must do what was possible, and claimed to share with Adorno the ideal of a more rational society but he upheld this ideal as something impossible which one must hope for in order to be able to achieve what was possible. He accused his opponent of presenting what was impossible as theoretically possible: if Adorno was not an optimistic revolutionary stirring up revolt, then he was a desperate anti-reformist spreading dissatisfaction with prevailing conditions and with what was genuinely possible, and therefore instigating a form of resignation to fate that could have incalculable consequences.

Habermas's approach was quite different from Adorno's. He was able to proceed differently because, as now at least became clear, his ideas were fundamentally different from those of Adorno and the other

major theoreticians of the Horkheimer circle. Habermas could to some extent put into practice an immanent critical approach to Popper which Adorno had attempted only half-heartedly. As a theoretician of the critical public sphere and of praxis in the sense of political ethical activity, he could in principle treat Popper and his critique of positivism in the same way that Marx treated liberalism, by mirroring the received idea of the bourgeois public sphere against the social conditions that would be required for its un-bourgeois realization. Habermas took Popper's idea that scientific objectivity was grounded in critical, rational discussion, and contrasted it with the necessity for a 'comprehensive rationality' of free dialogue between communicating persons, which would be the condition of possibility for such an idea to be realized if the model of the advancement of knowledge in the natural sciences were abandoned. 139

Logical empiricism, or neopositivism, had projected an ideal of what science ought to be on to scientific practice, without bothering to produce any real scientific discoveries. In accordance with the view, dominant until well into the 1960s, that the development of science was fundamentally determined from within science itself, this approach treated science as being in principle an ahistorical, asocial 'third world' (as Popper termed it) of objective knowledge, the inner structure and development of which were subject only to logic. Popper broadened this outlook and brought the problem of scientific progress into the foreground, although this was restricted to the 'context of refutation' the epistemological and logical examination of theoretical hypotheses and the experimental testing of them, based on the principle of falsification, with the aim of achieving a closer approximation to the truth. He excluded the 'context of discovery', the external influence of psychological and socio-economic factors, which he alleged to be irrelevant to the logic of scientific discovery. During his years in Heidelberg, Habermas had studied the American pragmatists at the suggestion of his friend Karl-Otto Apel, and had learned to value their work as a democratic, American variant of the philosophy of praxis. Habermas made the following move. He took Popper's philosophy of science as a first stage of self-criticism by positivism; he radicalized this first stage by means of a pragmatic perspective that brought the model of discovery in the natural sciences into an even more general context than Popper did; then he himself drafted a pragmatic perspective for Popper's idea of critical, rational discussion. He provided a pragmatic justification for Popper's logic of scientific discovery in order to make room for the logic and the pragmatic foundation of the dialectical type of research, and ultimately to provide cultural restraints for the technical rationalism that had been absolutized both by logical empiricism and by Popper's critical rationalism.

In the analysis in the philosophy of science of ways of testing theories empirically, the so-called 'basis-problem' had arisen the problem that

elementary sense-data could not be seen as something intuitive and immediately evident, as logical empiricism claimed. Popper had proposed applying his criterion of the testability of theories to 'basic statements', as a possible solution to this problem. Whether a basic statement was adequately motivated by experience could be decided by a provisional and constantly retractable consensus of all the observers taking part in attempts to falsify specific theories. But the necessity for consensus pointed to an orientation towards socially standardized forms of expected behaviour. The character of the experimental conditions and the character of the hypothetical laws (conditional prognoses as to observable behaviour) suggested, according to Habermas, a particular pragmatistic interpretation of the process of discovery analysed by Popper, namely interpreting it as forming part of the sphere of activity of labour within society.

The so-called basis-problem simply does not appear if we regard the research process as part of a comprehensive process of socially institutionalized actions, through which social groups sustain their naturally precarious life. For the basic statement no longer draws empirical validity solely from the motives of an individual observation, but also from the previous integration of individual perceptions into the realm of convictions which are unproblematic, and have proved themselves on a broad basis. This occurs under experimental conditions which, as such, imitate the control of the results of action which is naturally built into systems of societal labour. If, however, the empirical validity of experimentally tested law-like hypotheses is derived in this manner from the context of the work process, then strictly empirical scientific knowledge must tolerate being interpreted through the same life-reference to labour as a type of action and as the concrete domination of nature. 140

At the basis of labour as a type of action, however, lay an interest in making objective processes accessible, according to Habermas. The empirical-analytical type of research must also, therefore, be oriented towards an interest of this sort. This technical interest, in Habermas's opinion, was what defined the normative power of the type of science that was equated, both by neopositivism and by critical rationalism, with scientific rationality, and presented by them as being in principle value-free. The dispute concerning value-freedom in the sciences was thus resolved by Habermas using anthropological arguments: the empirical-analytic sciences formed an element of social reproduction, and their specific function for social reproduction was virtually a condition of their possibility. What Habermas was producing was therefore a kind of transcendental-pragmatic foundation for the positivist type of science, or to be precise of those sciences for which a positivist philosophy of science provided a largely accurate account.

But what were the advantages of this for Habermas's defence of the possibility of a scientific approach to practical activity, of the relevance of knowledge to rational praxis, of rational consensus concerning goals and purposes, of practical control over historical processes?

First, the empirical-analytic sciences' claim to have a monopoly of scientific rationality and objectivity was deprived of the argument that they were value-free. They, too, had an objective life-reference, which had simply ceased to be noticed by scientists and philosophers of science because it was the most obvious thing in the world. The fact that this forgetfulness was so marked in the case of the technical cognitive interest could be explained by the consequences of capitalist modernization.

In so far as exchange relations also affect the work process and make the mode of production dependent upon the market, the life-references constitutive in the world of a social group which are the concrete relations of human beings to things and of human beings with one another, are torn asunder. . . On the one hand, just as in the exchange values the actually invested labour and the possible enjoyment of the consumer disappears so, on the other hand, the manifoldness of the social life-references and of the knowledge-guiding interests is obfuscated in the objects which remain when the veneer of subjectivized value qualities is stripped from them. It is all the more easy for the excluding domination of that particular interest to prevail unconsciously which, complementing the process of utilization, incorporates the natural and the social world into the labour process and transforms them into productive forces. 141

Theory and technology only united to form natural science during the early phase of capitalism.

The empirical-analytic sciences could no longer, on the basis of their claim to have a monopoly of value-freedom and scientific objectivity, explain away difficulties in their application to the field of society by asserting that there was no scientific alternative, and that finding solutions to the problems arising was merely a matter of time. A gap, at least, had therefore been created, into which a different type of social science might be introduced. This new type of science was spared some central difficulties of empirical-analytic social science. For example, it need not be at a loss if there was no way of isolating meansend relationships and using them as a model for the explanation of human behaviour. On the contrary, means might prove to be value-laden, and ends might prove to be ambiguous and only comprehensible within a larger social context. If this were so, this different type of social science could not be dismissed on the grounds that it was not value-free. Instead, an attempt might be made to ground the dialectical type of social science in an alternative, 'transcendentally posited frame of reference'.

This frame of reference was not characterized nearly as precisely as was the field of technical control over objectified processes. In his definition, Habermas's aim was to achieve a conception of the process of formation of the human species into which the transcendental-pragmatic or epistemo-anthropological foundations of the sciences would fit. In his reply to an essay by Hans Albert, a student of Popper's, Habermas gathered together what he had learned from a wide range of sources into an original and comprehensive description of the social process as a whole, and one that had topical relevance. His sources included Rothacker on 'lifestyle', Gehlen on 'sphere of action', Gadamer on 'dialogue' as forming the basis of communicatively constituted human existence, Husserl on the relation between the life-world and science, Adorno and Horkheimer on Critical Theory, Schelsky, Ritter and others on the role of the sciences in a civilization distorted by science, Hannah Arendt on the relationship between theory, technology and praxis, and Freud on psychoanalysis as therapy through self-reflection. In the final part of his reply to Albert, Habermas wrote:

Within sociology as a strict behavioural science, questions relating to the self-understanding of social groups cannot be formulated. Yet they are not meaningless on that count, nor are they beyond binding discussion. They arise objectively from the fact that the reproduction of social life not only poses technically soluble questions; instead, it includes more than the processes of adaptation along the lines of the purposive-rational use of means. Socialized individuals are only sustained through group identity, which contrasts with animal societies which must be constantly built up, destroyed and formed anew. They can only secure their existence through processes of adaptation to their natural environment, and through re-adaptation to the system of social labour in so far as they mediate their metabolism with nature by means of an extremely precarious equilibrium of individuals amongst themselves . . . Everyone repeats such experiences of impending loss of identity and the silting up of verbal communication in the crises of his life-history. Yet they are no more real than the collective experiences in the history of the species, which the total societal subjects have made for themselves in their confrontation with nature. Questions concerning this realm of experience, because they cannot be answered by technically utilizable information, are not capable of explanation by empirical-analytical research. Nevertheless, since its beginnings in the eighteenth century, sociology tried to discuss these very questions. In so doing, it cannot do without historically-orientated interpretations; nor, apparently, can it evade a form of communication under the spell of which alone these problems pose themselves. I refer to the dialectical network of a communicative context in which individuals develop their fragile identity

between the dangers of reification and formlessness. . . In the evaluation of consciousness, the problem of identity presents itself as a problem of survival and, at the same time, of reflection. From here dialectical philosophy once developed. 142

Behind all this, there lay a kind of anthropological variant of Habermas's conception of the reduction and rationalization of domination resulting from the development of a public sphere in politics an original version of utopia, consisting of a restoration, mediated by science, of the 'comprehensive rationality which, in the natural hermeneutics of everyday language, is still, as it were, naturally at work'. What Habermas meant by the natural hermeneutics of everyday language was that everyday language is a medium that makes self-reflection possible: everyday utterances can, when necessary, be explained using everyday language. As speaking subjects, Habermas claimed, 'we always find ourselves in a communication which is intended to lead to agreement', and thus to 'comprehensive rationality'. 143

In the summer of 1965, Habermas gave his inaugural lecture as Horkheimer's successor on 'Knowledge and Human Interests'. The lecture showed that he was finally taking the offensive in the clash with positivism (this concept was still being used by both Habermas and Adorno not out of any ignorance of change and progress in the scientific camp, which treated the currently dominant form of scientific research as an absolute, but rather in order to retain a generic concept that took account of central elements ultimately common to various positions). After a generation, Habermas remarked with self-assurance consciously placing himself in the tradition of the Frankfurt School that he was once again taking up the topic of the distinction between theory in the traditional sense, and theory in the sense of critique, that had been 'the object of one of Max Horkheimer's most important studies'. The inaugural lecture gave a sketch of a 'critical philosophy of science' 144 which exposed the bid by the positivist theory of science to occupy the various categories of science, and used a series of theses not only to attempt to halt this process in its tracks but also to make its own counter-bid.

The division of the sciences that has always been usual in the USA distinguishes between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities. In his 1963 study of the idea and structure of the German university and of university reform, *Loneliness and Freedom*, Schelsky had sketched out a corresponding division into three parts for both German and all modern European scientific development and its academic framework. 145 In the period after Humboldt's reforms, a natural science [*naturwissenschaftliche*] faculty had typically developed from the faculty of philosophy, which thus became a 'humanities' [*geisteswissenschaftliche*] faculty for the non-natural science disciplines excepting medicine, law and theology, which, not being 'character-forming' branches of

knowledge (*nicht-bildende Formen der Wissenschaft*), developed their own faculties anyway. Economics, sociology, political science, and so on, had then developed out of the humanities faculty, or crystallized alongside it, to form the complex of the social sciences. There had thus developed, as in the USA, a triad consisting of the natural sciences, the humanities and the social sciences. However, in contrast to the USA, this account concealed a history of decline in the idea that science could provide education in the sense of character formation (*Bildung*), an idea that had been characteristic of German Idealism and Humboldt's university reforms. Originally, mathematics and the natural sciences had also counted as character-forming sciences, since, in Alexander von Humboldt's view, they were still related to a natural whole that was impelled and animated by inner forces. 146 Dilthey had impressively revived the idea of education as character formation in the humanities, but the notion was already ailing under the influence of historicism, with its tendency to turn history and tradition into museum-pieces. When the social sciences crystallized in their turn as a new complex, it was never claimed that they were character-forming. If any claim to practical relevance was made for them, it was in connection with administrative affairs.

Hans Freyer, in his 1930 publication *Sociology as a Science of Reality*, an attempt to provide the system of sociology with a philosophical foundation, was the only writer to have granted sociology a special role in which the idea of education as character formation seemed to be preserved. Sociology's role was to provide a 'scientific self-recognition of social reality', the 'self-recognition of an event in the consciousness of human beings, who existentially belong to that event'. It was precisely a philosophical foundation and a logical analysis which would help sociology to catch up with its real task: 'to understand, to interpret, to be effective in life'.<sup>147</sup> Freyer saw a Kantian questioning of the conditions of possibility of natural science, history and sociology as being a precondition for this, although the answer need not necessarily turn out to be a Kantian one.

The answer Freyer himself gave was that he saw a 'conscious will to knowledge', a 'marked epistemic attitude', as being the precondition for the scientific character of forms of knowledge. He distinguished between three forms of epistemic attitude, corresponding to three differently structured types of objects and three forms of relation to life in these objects.

[Man] wants to live on the earth, he wants to cultivate it, i.e. to include it among human creations. The epistemic attitude of the natural sciences is unimaginable without this quite primary fact of the will the technological will, taken in the broadest sense. What elements constitute the complex processes of nature, which laws govern them, and which types of material systems exist whose

inclusion in the natural process will create a particular situation B from a given situation A these questions represent the hidden rudder of discovery in the natural sciences and give rise to all of the concepts they develop. This epistemic attitude does not imply the intervention of heterogeneous motives of utility, but lies within the object of knowledge itself and in the living relation between a person and the object. Modern Western science has certainly implemented in a particularly radical and unscrupulous way this ethos of violent or treacherous examination of nature in order to dominate it step by step. But, on the other hand, this historical form of thought in the natural sciences, which is familiar to us and which we of course take for granted, is based on a generally valid epistemic attitude that is required by the matter itself. 148

An epistemic attitude of understanding, of inward reception, corresponded to significant mental constructs. An epistemic attitude of self-recognition of an existential reality, of self-recognition with the intention of shaping society, corresponded to occurring history that is, to significant events to which human beings themselves existentially belonged.

(The obscurity into which Freyer's laying of the foundations for sociology fell after 1945 the book was only reprinted for the first time in 1964 can largely be explained by the fact that, like Heidegger, he had at first seen the Nazi movement as offering a potential existential renewal, and that, in spite of his reservations about it, he never showed that he had distanced himself from fascism, even after 1945. But since the same set of circumstances did not, in Heidegger's case, cause *Being and Time* to be forgotten, another factor may have been at work. Freyer, full of self-confidence and not without good reason contrasted 'German' or 'European' sociology with 'American sociology' in his book, and poured scorn on an approach to sociology whose motto seemed to be 'Let's be like the Americans!' There was no place for an attitude of this sort in the post-war Federal Republic.)

Habermas knew Freyer's work, and stimuli from both the critical and the conservative sides were able to cross-fertilize in his thinking on the problem of the foundation of a critical sociology. When he took up the concept of a critical philosophy of science again, he was in touch with the latest developments in the field, and his sketch which he broadened over the following years in *On the Logic of the Social Sciences* and in *Knowledge and Human Interests* contained more reality and was more attractive than that of his predecessors.

It was possible, Habermas contended, to show that three categories of research process involved a specific relation between logical and methodological rules, on the one hand, and epistemological interests on the other. In the empirical-analytical sciences, the logical structure of the permitted systems of proof, and the type of test conditions applied, suggest that reality is grasped on the basis of a guiding interest in

achieving technical control over objectified processes. In the historical hermeneutic sciences, the methodological framework of understanding meaning and interpreting texts, and the application of tradition to one's own situation that was inseparable from these, suggest that reality is grasped on the basis of a guiding interest in preserving and extending the intersubjectivity of possible agreement directed towards action. For the critically oriented sciences, the methodological framework, consisting of objectifying procedures or nomological knowledge and of a method of comprehension, suggests that reality is grasped on the basis of a guiding interest in the dissolution of apparently objective, but in principle alterable, relationships of dependency. The transcendental framework and the conditions of possible objectivity were determined in the first case by an epistemic interest in technology, in the second by an epistemic interest in practical affairs, and in the third by an epistemic interest in emancipation. The positivist approach to science distorts our view of these transcendental epistemic interests. The natural sciences might then be misunderstood as pure theory that was not designed to achieve power over nature, but merely to make objective discoveries. The humanities might fall into the positivism of historicism. The social sciences might rigidify into social technology.

According to Habermas (departing here from Kant), these transcendental conditions for the scientific relation to the world had arisen under empirical conditions. The basis for these lay in the 'natural history of the human species', 149 which sustained its existence through work and language, and was shaped by relations of power. As linguistic beings, Habermas argued, human beings had been raised above nature. The structure of language was an anticipation of emancipation. As linguistic beings, it was possible for us to recognize a priori an interest in autonomy and responsibility. 'Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus.' Language embodied a form of 'reason' which simultaneously 'means the will to reason'. In an emancipated society, domination would be dismantled, social relations between individuals would consist of a 'non-authoritarian and universally practised dialogue', and nature would be at the technological disposal of mankind.150

Habermas's sketch, programmatic as ever, seemed to indicate a way of rescuing the sciences from positivism. With regard to the natural sciences, Habermas could take his cue here from Peirce and Popper; with regard to the humanities, from Dilthey and Gadamer; and with regard to the social sciences, from Critical Theory or Western Marxism. These particular ways of interpreting science seemed to be given greater depth through the transcendental-pragmatic deduction. Speaking of empirical and analytic science, historical and hermeneutic science, and critical science rather than simply natural sciences, humanities and social sciences and the distinction between nomological knowledge and processes of reflection in the field of social science that could be

produced by nomological knowledge, seemed to protect Habermas's philosophy of science from assigning methods and fields of study superficially and from becoming fixated on chance forms of academic organization. The concepts of historical and hermeneutic science and of critical science seemed to provide exactly the basis that was needed to be able to imagine a rationalization in the sphere of ultimate goals and practical political action. Compared with a `positivistically bisected rationalism', this outline of a critical philosophy of science seemed to justify a complete form of rationalism that included a specific rationalization of the social-cultural framework. The assumption that there was an idea of reason contained within language as an existential condition of the human species seemed to produce a standard for the criticism of society that was independent of historical traditions. This was the conclusion to which Habermas had been leading in borrowing Heidegger's and Gadamer's concepts of human existence as speech and a solidarity that unified every speaker of a language.

But how convincing was Habermas's sketch? Doubts were immediately raised about some of his assumptions. 151 Was it really possible, using the philosophy of science for reflecting on the varieties of modern science (in forms undistorted by positivist misunderstandings), to discover transcendental frameworks for the reproduction of the human species that would provide eternally valid criteria for the correct way of dealing with external nature, internal nature and the social environment? Had there not been such a radical change since the sixteenth century in the fields of natural science, technology and labour that it was implausible to assume that one and the same epistemic interest might form the universal transcendental framework for a relationship with external nature? Had the seventeenth century not seen the beginning of the victorious progress of a particular form of technology, and a particular way of relating to external nature, with which a qualitatively different variant had coexisted? This variant had been different not because it was hidden behind a cultural mask, but because nature was seen in it as a technologically exploitable causal network, and at the same time as a process requiring to be understood and in which the investigators themselves were involved. Could the labour process that had developed under capitalist conditions be seen as the paradigmatic model for the material reproduction of society? Did it really represent labour as such, freed of all cultural masks, without qualification or was it only a distorted form of labour?

Why did Habermas reject the idea that he might be wanting to `introduce something approaching a new "method" alongside the already well-established methods of social-scientific research'?<sup>152</sup> If critical social science was concerned with the fact that information concerning law-like interrelations produced a process of reflection in the consciousness of those affected, then the well-established methods of social science research would have to be changed in some areas and

supplemented in others. If the basing of knowledge in the social sciences on an emancipatory interest in acquiring understanding was to provide the form of objectivity specific to this type of science, then the methods of data collection must, so far as possible, aim to set in motion processes of self-reflection as Horkheimer and Adorno had thought at the beginning of the anti-Semitism project, although they did not raise the idea to the level of a methodological principle or maintain it consistently. 153 During the later phase of a research project at least, the critical social scientist would have to face his 'experimental subjects' at least if they were among those who by his own standards were suffering from naturally occurring social constraints as what they themselves might possibly be, as what he had anticipated them as. It was not sufficient simply to restrict oneself to a demand for a change in social scientists' self-perception and otherwise simply hope that a restored critical public sphere would one day reincorporate the results of scientific research within the horizon of the social life-world.

Light was thrown on another problem by the differences appearing between Horkheimer and Adorno on the one hand, and Habermas on the other, with regard to their fundamental themes, their views of a rational society and the good life. Much of what Habermas wrote represented a more precise definition and systematization of ideas drawn from Adorno and Horkheimer. Even in these cases, however, there was a difference in tone which was not merely the result of differing attitudes to the academic system or to the Western democracies. Horkheimer had already put his finger on the difference in their fundamental themes in his letter of September 1958 on Habermas's essay on 'The Discussion about Marx and Marxism' ('Zur Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus'):

There is a phenomenon called nature, and the principle ascribed to the 'young Marx' that it must be possible to confront every object 'critically within the framework of the revolutionary theory of Historical Materialism including nature' is either meaningless or simply the converse of the extravagant concept of freedom which ultimately excludes nature from reconciliation, as a mere object of domination, as an aspect of metabolism, or, as H. describes it in connection with productive labour, as an aspect 'of the exchange of humanity with nature'. According to H., only domination among human beings, and not the predatory violence towards all creation that is reproduced in individuals, is to count as 'untruth'. 154

It did in fact remain characteristic of Habermas that he thought the demand for a form of enlightenment that was in command of itself could be fulfilled if the blind constraints of nature were no longer extended into the domination of man by man, and if, instead, human beings, as beings capable of speech, associated with one another free

from domination, while at the same time disposing over nature even more successfully than ever. In an article published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on Adorno's sixtieth birthday, 'A Philosophizing Intellectual', Habermas criticized the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* for the fact that, in its darkest passages, it conceded the counter-Enlightenment position that civilization was not possible without repression. 155 The topos of surrendering self to an amorphous nature emerged in Horkheimer and Adorno in a Schopenhauerian form in Horkheimer and a sexual-utopian, anarchist form in Adorno. In partial agreement with Popper, Habermas observed in both Horkheimer and Adorno a pessimism deriving from an exaggerated notion of reconciliation with nature. By making language the basis of a utopian potential, Habermas declared talk of the 'oppression' of external nature, with which of course we cannot speak, to be an inaccurate paraphrase of a normal, unavoidable state of affairs; and he declared the idea of emancipation, of the dissolution of social relations of domination through unconstrained communication, to be a normative potential that was anchored in the structure of language. The problem of the dialectic between the effects of internal and external nature, which had again and again led the authors of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* into ambiguity and contradiction, fell by the wayside in Habermas's suggestion that the idea of reconciliation with nature could be replaced by the idea of emancipation.

In his inaugural lecture in Frankfurt, Habermas spoke of the seductive aspect of nature that was present in each individual in the form of libido and which demanded a utopian fulfilment. Individual demands of this type were taken up by the social system and incorporated into the social definition of the good life. But were inner and outer nature not two aspects of one and the same nature? Was it possible in the long term for the intellect to have a divided relationship to them? Could libido be included in the definition of the good life without a libidinous relationship to external nature also being incorporated in the definition? Could a purely instrumental relationship to external nature be sustained without having an effect on behaviour towards everything that was imbued with nature, including mankind? Was the concept of language competence as forming a dividing line between instrumental and communicative behaviour not already a dubious one in relation to the animal world? Was the necessity for further differentiation here not immediately clear? Admitting only an alternative between communication with nature, or control over nature in terms of modern natural science and technology, and then declaring the latter to be the only possible choice, while at the same time maintaining the notion of emancipation, might well result in that notion being rejected as an exaggeration as well.

There was another figure who seemed to be much closer to Horkheimer and Adorno in his central themes than Habermas: Ernst Bloch, whose reputation in West Germany grew during the 1960s and who drew spectacular crowds when he gave a lecture at Frankfurt University

in January 1965 on 'Positivism, Idealism and Materialism'. 156 But the relationship between Adorno and Bloch was marked more by contempt than by any sense that they were allies. Bloch saw Adorno as a renegade pupil. Adorno rejected Bloch because of what he saw as his undisciplined, 'blustering' style of philosophizing. He also found unacceptable Bloch's elevation of hope to the status of a principle, and his concept of reconciliation with nature that included the idea of a *natura naturans*, unreflected nature, with subjective status. What may also have divided them was that Bloch had all his life distanced himself from the academic system and from current disputes in philosophy and the philosophy of science and, unconcerned with controversies like the positivist dispute or the critique of Heidegger, stood out in the academic and intellectual landscape as a monolithic block, a 'Marxist Schelling', as Habermas once described him. In addition, Adorno was certainly still afraid of contact with the 'communist' Bloch. Bloch had been a Stalinist, and had supported the Moscow show trials as being measures necessary for the defence of the world's only socialist country, which was under threat.

Ultimately, there was therefore no one closer to Adorno in theoretical and political disputes than Habermas.

### The Conservatism Dispute

Adorno's *Jargon of Authenticity* was published in 1964, and became one of his most successful works of the 1960s: its title quickly became a catchphrase. *Negative Dialectics*, the first part of which provided a more philosophical debate with Heidegger and ontology, followed in 1966. During this period, when Adorno was concentrating his energies on Heidegger, Habermas continued the dispute with the positivist philosophy of science all the more intensively. He also confronted, more intensively than Adorno, Schelsky and Gehlen, the outstanding representatives of a consciously anti-democratic version of positivism which saw itself as lying in the tradition not of the Enlightenment but of the counter-Enlightenment.

Schelsky, Gehlen and Freyer were conservative critics of culture. In so far as they were positivists, their position represented an instrumentalist, scornful attitude towards modern culture and industrial culture as such. As early as when he was writing his introduction to the first part of the Institute of Social Research project on *University and Society*, Habermas, mentioning Schelsky's open advocacy of the counter-Enlightenment in his book on the *Sociology of Sexuality*, had summed up the position of the young conservatives. Positivism, which had already lost its pioneering quality and become conservative, he said,

virtually marks a generation gap in Germany between 'old' and 'young' conservatives, according to whether they approach the present period critically, even while looking back to the distant past or to what they project on to the past, or whether they consciously take the side of prevailing conditions, work exclusively with instruments for measuring and quantifying, and claim to be sceptical and down-to-earth. These conservative positivists allow themselves to be guided by the 'realism' on which conservative thought has always prided itself. In a period such as ours, in which power is ever-present, there is a certain plausibility in the 'sense of power' particularly when the influence of the German Historical School has made it more incisive being kindled by prevailing conditions and therefore gladly abandoning the normative concepts of forms of power that are both past and transfigured. 157

Since the 1950s the young conservatives, alongside the 'pure sociologist' René König (whose 1958 dictionary of sociology<sup>158</sup> had sold 100,000 copies by 1960), had been extremely successful competitors to the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research. This was true not only with regard to academic politics but also in the publishing field and in their impact on the non-academic world. Schelsky's *Sociology of Sexuality*, which came out in 1955 as the second volume of the paperback series 'Rowohlts deutsche Enzyklopädie', had already sold its hundred thousandth copy in 1957. (Schelsky himself was a member of the international advisory board for the series, which was a high-quality work aimed at the general public. The first works by Adorno to be published in the series did not come out until 1968 and 1969: the *Introduction to the Sociology of Music* and *Nerve Centres of Modern Music*.)<sup>159</sup> A work published in the same series in 1957, *The Soul in the Technological Age*, by Schelsky's friend and former teacher, Arnold Gehlen, had sold 40,000 copies by 1960.<sup>160</sup> There was no sense in which the sociological studies of the Institute of Social Research, published in small editions by the Europäische Verlags-Anstalt, could keep pace with this. *Sociological Excursus* came out in 1956 as the fourth volume of the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology', and was presented as a new-style introduction to sociology using a series of 'thought models' on individual concepts and areas.<sup>161</sup> Its first edition of 3000 copies did not sell out for more than five years. Books by Adorno too had no noticeable success in sales terms until well into the 1960s. It was not until the end of 1963, after *Prisms* had come out in a popular paperback edition of 25,000 copies (the first of his books to do so) that Adorno was able to celebrate, as he wrote to Kracauer: now that *Interventions*, published together with *Nine Critical Models* in a first edition of 10,000 as the tenth volume of the 'Edition Suhrkamp',<sup>162</sup> had sold 18,000 copies, he thought anything was possible.

The writings of Schelsky in particular, the youngest and least

compromised of the three conservative critics, were aimed at a wider public. Free of methodological and epistemological concerns, specialist limitations and mathematical-statistical dryness, Schelsky's work represented a kind of popular positivism. Schelsky presented himself as a representative of down-to-earth humanity, as an advocate of an anti-ideological need for reality and fresh orientation in post-war German society, as an ally in the fight against the excessive demands being made of his contemporaries by high-flown ideals and would-be educators' demands for awareness and self-reflectiveness.

Schelsky's counter-Enlightenment position gave him, like Freyer and Gehlen, a shrewd approach to the dialectic of enlightenment. What Marcuse later attacked as repressive desublimation was exposed no less acutely by Schelsky in his *Sociology of Sexuality*.

There has often been controversy as to whether our age really shows a high degree of eroticization or not. Those who claim that it does can appeal to the ubiquity of erotic images in modern advertising and propaganda, to the most candid possible display of sexual stimuli in magazines, cinemas, hit songs, advertisements, television and so on. The question whether this represents eroticization as such seems to me to be irrelevant in comparison with the realization that these erotic images and clichés, delivered with the constant pressure of modern mass communication media, relieve the functioning of the individual's own sexual fantasy to the extent of virtual atrophy, and thus inhibit it. 163

His critique of what might be called stereotyping through education, or the expropriation of consciousness through consciousness-raising, was even more perspicacious:

Psychotherapy and psychological care, deliberate sex education and organized marriage guidance, birth control and child guidance clinics, group teaching and human relations, the entire apparatus of modern mental welfare technology or of 'social engineering', are taking the place of the dwindling services of institutions and conventions in shaping the world of human instinct . . . This process may be described as the conventionalization of the mind through the popularization of psychology. To a far greater extent, and to a far greater depth, than a deliberate and organized attempt to achieve psychological influence could effect, the psychological interpretation and self-interpretation of modern man has taken over precisely the role of that force in the life of society which ritualizes and provides symbols, which distances and classifies, and which creates norms and standards. The withdrawal of this force from the old institutions is the origin both of such interpretation and self-interpretation and of the object of its study. But one must

also note that the scientific value of psychology is today almost negligible in comparison with its significance as a function of society, and that psychologists have thus, in a very deep sense, become the officials and agents of society. 164

This penetrating critique was ambivalent. In the first place, the whole book consisted of an attack on educators and intellectuals, who had plunged people into unrest by disturbing the apparent naturalness of traditional patterns of behaviour, and had thus caused trouble for the scientists who were required to smooth over the effects of the popularization of scientific discoveries. Paradoxically, this counter-Enlightenment enemy of the popularization of 'what are actually highly scientifically specialized discoveries' was making an appeal to a wide public with a paperback that, again paradoxically, was supposed to serve as evidence for the fact that 'In many areas of science, we are in the process of rediscovering the functional significance of tradition.'<sup>165</sup> Thus readers, who were not really supposed to find out anything about the subject of Schelsky's book, were supposed to be inspired to return to an unthinking recognition of tradition by conscious and artificial scientific attempts to restore traditions that had natural validity.

On the other hand, there was a certain sense of satisfaction expressed in Schelsky's analysis. Things had turned out for the best. In the end, the decay of tradition had only shown that the ideas of the Enlightenment, and enlightenment as such, had demanded too much of the masses and had only prepared the way for a new order.

Nowhere has more been expected of humanity in relation to its instincts than in the suggestion that one ought to be immediately both a person and an individuality. We therefore find the portrayal of what is, once again, very extensive conventionalization and social standardization in sexual matters quite easily reconciled with the conviction that this fact alone offers a new opportunity for intellect, culture and morality to achieve a freshly compelling quality with regard to human sexuality.

His satisfaction over the fact that sexual emancipation had turned out to be merely a repressive form of desublimation was, however, limited.

Sexuality's extensive dependence on society, the detail of its expression, and the social standardization and conventionalization of the forms of sexual behaviour, undoubtedly do not represent the heights of the personality that mark the relationship of each person to his own instincts in the manner of an impulse, an inner task. This is the origin of the critical tone of every report on this sociological level of behaviour.<sup>166</sup>

Schelsky had indicated clearly enough in the course of his analyses where, in his view, the heights of the personality lay: wherever people took pleasure in repressing their search for pleasure, thus providing a model of normality:

Social institutions, rituals and systems of normsthose helpful relief measures that produce lifestyleexclude those who are abnormal. If such people conform, it is at the cost of their search for sexual pleasure, so that they must exist within the norm as vitally hollow beings. The unsuccessful attempt to conform . . . leads to social isolation. . . In this situation, people cannot achieve a position from which to manage their instincts and their lives, and instead lose their position and lose themselves: the instinctual mechanisms within them become autonomous. Characters such as these then become the models for the psychology of instinct which views everything that is normativein comparison with instinctmerely as a form of repression, censorship, or discipline, etc., i.e. as a `de-naturing phenomenon', a view which therefore passes over the most fundamental categories of the sociological level of behaviour, the enhanced form of life that consists of `second nature'. 167

Achieving the heights of the personality was only possible for an élite, whichaccording to Schelsky, citing Gehlen's 1952 essay `On the Birth of Freedom out of Alienation'entered into institutions with open eyes, viewing them as those `great orders and fates that preserve us and consume us, and will long outlast us', 168 and at least allowed themselves to be burned up and consumed by their own creations rather than by raw nature, like the animals. But a reflection of this greatness could also be passed on to the masses, whose sexualizationhowever manipulated and standardizedand whose fascination with spending money on consumer goods, etc., Schelsky was unable to tolerate, since these seemed in the long run too dangerous and costly, and not normal enough. Institutions should protect people from an immediate, conscious confrontation with their instincts, but not from the struggle for survival. Precisely for those who lacked sufficient greatness to allow themselves to be consumed by institutions, with open eyes, freely and even with pleasure, in order to achieve a possible higher form of freedomprecisely for people like this, it was particularly important that they should be given a taste of the severities of life again. According to Schelsky, Gehlen and Freyer, modern alienation had failed to alienate people enough from their search for pleasure and from their need for immediate freedom precisely to the extent that it provided them with a surfeit of other satisfactions, albeit compensatory ones, which allowed them to forget the severities of life.

Just as left-wingers are always eagerly on the lookout for tendencies

showing that their expectations correspond to the trend of history, or at least to one aspect of it, so too are right-wingers. The young conservatives thought there was a chance that 'the technical organizational tasks associated with preserving the system that ensures life, welfare and comfort' 169 would be able to dissolve not only the Enlightenment thinkers' sentiments about improving the world but also those 'traits of egoism and materialist enjoyment of life' that had been pushed too far. In what was already an advanced phase of a transitional period the crisis-ridden crossing of the cultural threshold of industrialism conditions seemed to be heralded that would provide German conservatism in particular, discredited by the 'conservative revolution' and by its partial collaboration with Nazism, with a solution that was in keeping with the times: a 'stabilization of industrial society', 170 'cultural crystallization', 171 and the perfection of what Ernst Jünger, the first theorist of technocratic conservatism, had prior to 1933 already termed 'organic construction'.

'Man is freeing himself from the constraints of nature, in order to submit himself to the constraints of his own production,' Schelsky had stated in his lecture 'Man in Scientific Civilization' (1961), a programmatic announcement of the replacement of politics by technical constraints that was widely discussed at the time. The reconstruction of the world and of human beings through their own scientific and technological production would lead to the apparently paradoxical position that the means that made the process possible would also determine its ends, since human thought was no longer capable of anticipating the scientific and technological self-creation of humanity that was taking place. Gehlen's view, in a lecture on 'Cultural Crystallization' almost simultaneous with Schelsky's, was that it should not be disturbing that the sciences were no longer able to produce a consistent world-picture, 'because all the sciences are in fact consistently related, not in people's heads the last place a synthesis could be achieved but in the reality of society as a whole'. Integrated reality, and the scientific processing of reality, which could be achieved neither intellectually, nor morally, nor emotionally, but only in the 'superstructure of the social context', were welcomed by Schelsky and Gehlen as a kind of mega-institution of the industrial, technological and scientific age. If scientific and technological progress, and an increasing sense of efficiency, were to revolutionize democracy more and more, then the compensation of democratic participation might one day, perhaps, be made superfluous through comprehensive welfare arrangements, and the 'carrot of leisure and comfort' might once again be replaced by a challenge from the 'stick of alienation'. 172 In the service of a social structure that had been freed from pity, stylized attitudes and forms of behaviour might then once again become both possible and necessary. These would require 'self-improvement' from their representatives and their ideologues, while the 'massed millions of consumers', who had only 'mutual recognition of their mere humanity' and had 'made themselves a cosy place within

nature, which had now become mechanical', would at least be startled out of their cosiness and mere humanity. 173

(When in the late 1960s the protest movement of students, school pupils and apprentices, on the one hand, and underground movements on the other, began to shift the prevailing orientation away from the values of work, order and consumption towards post-material values, and Willy Brandt, the Chancellor of the socialist-liberal coalition, made his appeal to 'dare more democracy',<sup>174</sup> this seemed to undermine the expectations that Schelsky, above all, had had of industrial society and its constraints. Gehlen's traditional conservative view, by contrast, seemed to have been proved right that the industrial age merely accelerated the decay of proper institutions, and nothing more could be done than to preserve what remained of proper systems of leadership and guidance. A decade later, the situation once again looked completely different, and a younger man, who was continuing Schelsky's work with modern methods, came to fame: Niklas Luhmann. Luhmann belonged to Habermas's generation and had initially been a civil servant. At the beginning of the 1960s he met Talcott Parsons, the founder of structural functionalism, during a vacation course at Harvard University. In the mid-1960s Schelsky made Luhmann head of department at the University of Münster's research centre in Dortmund; in 1968 he became Professor of Sociology at the new University of Bielefeld, which was largely Schelsky's creation. Luhmann extended what had remained merely programmatic in the ideas of Gehlen and Schelsky, producing a systems theory of society. According to this theory, a form of control of complex social systems that was neither intellectually, morally nor emotionally integrated and lay beyond individual minds was not a disaster or a dreadful plight that needed to be changed, but instead an appropriate way of overcoming the problems of highly developed industrial societies. Luhmann was a model embodiment of a contemporary form of conservative positivism, or positivist conservatism, and his debates with Habermas were an uninterrupted continuation of those of the 1960s.)

Theoretical discussions with those taking this conservative position were more difficult than those with the positivists, who saw themselves as following the tradition of the Enlightenment. A debate between Gehlen and Adorno broadcast on the radio in 1965 turned at its close into a confrontation between two classic standpoints. The dialogue sounded at this point as if the Grand Inquisitor from Ivan Karamazov's story in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* was talking to a Jesus who was no longer silent:

. . . Mr Adorno, you see the problem of emancipation here once again, of course. Do you really believe that the burden of fundamental problems, of extensive reflection, of errors in

GEHLEN: life that have profound and continuing effects, all of which

we have gone through because we were trying to swim free of them do you really believe one ought to expect everyone to go through this? I should be very interested to know your views on this.

I can give you a simple answer: Yes! I have a particular conception of objective happiness and objective despair, and I would say that, for as long as people have problems taken away from them, for as long as they are not expected to take on full responsibility and full self-determination, their welfare and happiness in this world will merely be an illusion.

ADORNO: And it will be an illusion that will one day burst. And when it bursts, it will have dreadful consequences.

We have reached the exact point at which you say 'yes' and I say 'no', or vice versa where I would say that everything we know and can state about mankind from the beginning up till now would indicate that your standpoint is an anthropological and utopian one, although generous, or even grandiose

GEHLEN: . . .

It's not so frightfully utopian at all, but I would rather simply say this to start with: . . . the difficulties because of which, in your theory, people seek out relief . . . the distress that drives people to seek out such forms of relief, derive precisely from the strain that is put upon them by institutions, namely by the organization of the world in forms that are alien to them and omnipotent over them . . . And it seems to me to be virtually a fundamental phenomenon of anthropology that people seek refuge in precisely the power that is causing them the injuries they suffer. Depth psychology even has a term for this: it is called 'identification with the

ADORNO: attacker' . . .

Mr Adorno, we have reached the end of our discussion and are running out of time. We can't extend the discussion any further . . . But I would like to make another counter-accusation. Although I have the feeling that we are united in certain profound premisses, it's my impression that it is dangerous and that you have the tendency to make people dissatisfied with the little that still remains to them

GEHLEN: out of the whole catastrophic situation. 175

The debate thus seemed to end in stalemate. Or was this deceptive? Was Gehlen not the loser? It was precisely the defender of the attitude 'Out into hostile life!' who was presenting himself here in a protective role. It was precisely Gehlen, who called himself an 'empirical philosopher', who was not prepared to leave matters to experimental testing. However: in his view, revolutions had occurred again and again, and institutions had become severely decayed in 'late culture' without 'the

multitude of the people' ever having been able to prove their capacity for self-determination on these occasions.

Or was Adorno the loser, after all? It was precisely Adorno, who believed in people's capacity for self-determination, who did not believe that they would simply grasp their freedom to do so, but thought instead that it would have to be given to them. However: he predicted dreadful consequences if it was not given to them. This remark remained a gloomy one, thought suggested chaos and collapse rather than revolution and liberation. It was, after all, a stalemate that concluded the discussion.

Once again it was Habermas, who had learnt a great deal from Gehlen, who gave more attention to him as an opponent and who extended his own position and attempted to make it plausible in the course of his debate with him.

Habermas liked the way that Gehlen, in his book on *Man (Der Mensch)*, had linked research results involving themes from Scheler, Plessner and the American pragmatist and social theorist George Mead, in order to produce a systematic anthropology that showed how people could independently transform the unsatisfactory conditions of their lives and create the opportunities to eke out an existence, and how they could build up a system of behaviour patterns that fed on surplus energy and had largely been freed from instinctual drives. It was a system that allowed people genuinely to lead their lives instead of merely existing. Habermas also liked the way that Gehlen, in *Primeval Man and Late Culture*, 176 had reconstructed the origins of institutions: the means created to satisfy primary needs to the extent that they had proved their value and made the fulfilment of primary needs seem natural became in turn the objects of secondary needs. As the fulfilment of these needs in turn began to seem natural, and instead of being a means to an end became an end in itself, the inhibition and modification of primary needs became possible even to the extent of abandoning them altogether. The climax of institutionalization was thus achieved: the creation of existent but simultaneously transcendent essences, crystallization points for a 'secular transcendence' that could become a motive for action.

What was missing from this account was the aspect the young Marx had described as an alienation of essential human powers and as a consolidation of our own products into an objective force over us that escapes our control. What was excluded from it was the question of what alternative lifestyles might be possible for humanity on the basis of the resources it possessed, resources that could be identified from the historical record. The fact that human beings could be characterized by reduction of instinct, surplus energy and cosmopolitanism was, for Gehlen, synonymous with being predestined for chaos, from which only substitute instincts could preserve them. These quasi-instincts were institutions, and proper institutions, in Gehlen's view, must therefore have a rigidity and unquestionable naturalness that would make

them the functional equivalents of animal instincts. But to sum up Habermas's critique this systematic assemblage of anthropological findings and theories did not imply either that human beings were by nature uncontrollable monsters, or that institutions must necessarily have the pitilessness of substitute instincts. For that reason, and because thoroughly plausible explanations for the crisis phenomena of the present period were available, it was not reasonable for Gehlen to attribute these crisis phenomena to the decay of institutions. So far as specifically modern crisis phenomena existed, it had neither been established that it would be possible to control them using rigid archaic institutions although this might perhaps have been justified at one time; nor had it been established that other ways of life, even at earlier periods, might not have been both effective and at the same time more satisfactory. Nor, finally, had it been established that there was no such thing as a learning process in the sphere of human lifestyles, to which crises must belong, since it was precisely crises that would produce progress.

To introduce such considerations was basically only to take Gehlen literally. The idea that human beings were characterized by reduction of instinct, surplus energy and cosmopolitanism immediately fell victim to a *reductio ad absurdum* if the consequence was to be merely the deduction that substitute instincts were necessary. The critical position with regard to a pessimistic form of anthropology, Habermas emphasized in his analysis of Schelsky in 'Educational "Optimism" before the Tribunal of Pessimistic Anthropology', does not consist of an optimistic counter-anthropology, but of the complete abandonment of anthropological doctrines of immutability in the philosophy of history. History was the primary sphere in which it was possible to observe what human beings could make of themselves. It had transpired in this sphere that, at least locally and temporarily, institutions could be stripped of their objective force to some extent through revolts against them, and that efficiency in acquiring the necessities of life could be combined with an increase in independent activity and with solidarity in social intercourse. What history also showed was that these 'oases' that brought an open lifestyle closer were incapable of resisting attack for very long from social groups with quasi-instinctive leadership systems. Opportunities to prove oneself then arose and not only then, but within every society routinely, every day any amount of opportunities: opportunities to defend those who were weaker against those who were stronger. But this would genuinely require courage and self-discipline. But 'heroic beings' only felt strong when they were on the side of those acting quasi-instinctively. History and everyday life tended to prove that rigidly institutionalized societies were dangerous to societies that had loose institutions, rather than that the decay of institutions as such was perilous to the continued existence of the human race.

Against this background, however, the impression given was merely one of an appeal to strength when Habermas objected to Gehlen's

proposal of the paradox of an intentional reduction in humanity by stating that 'Being human is the fearlessness ultimately left to us once we have had the insight that only the perilous means of an ever-so-fragile communication can resist the dangers of a universal fragility.' 178

### Critique of Heidegger

The least responsive of their opponents in the Federal Republic was Heidegger, on whose seventieth birthday in 1959 an article by Habermas appeared in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* under the title 'The Great Influence: a Chronicler's Note on Martin Heidegger's Seventieth Birthday'. In his first critical article on Heidegger in 1953, Habermas had still described *Being and Time* as being the most significant event in philosophy since Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In 1959 he wrote, more moderately, that Heidegger had had at least within the academic world the greatest influence of any philosopher since Hegel. *Being and Time* might be recognized, in the first place, as merely one more futile attempt to provide philosophy with a foundation within itself, and the contents of the work could be described as an ontological certification of concepts that had been commonplaces in cultural criticism from Spengler to Alfred Weber. Heidegger, disappointed by the vulgarization under the Third Reich of the élitism he favoured, had disassociated himself from social praxis, from science, and even from philosophy, and had retreated into the role of mythical thinker. Nothing remained in his work that could inspire any thinking concerned with the reintegration precisely through the analysis of science and technology and of a society shaped by having science and technology as its principal productive forces of the rationality that had been bisected by positivism.

Perhaps Heidegger's thought may be characterized indirectly by what it does not achieve: it understands itself just as little in relationship to social practice as it does in relation to the interpretation of the results of the sciences. As to the latter, it demonstrates the metaphysical limitations of their foundations and abandons them, along with 'technology' in general, to the 'mistake' . . . For the shepherds dwell outside the wasteland of the devastated earth. 179

This was Habermas's last word on Heidegger for a long time. Alongside a positivism which saw itself as lying in the tradition of the Enlightenment, and alongside conservative positivism, the ontology embodied most effectively by Heidegger presented the image of a conservative apositivism.

Later on, Habermas gave even more detailed attention to Gadamer

than he had to Heidegger. Gadamer regarded himself both as a student of Heidegger's and as a trained classical philologist, and he was concerned in his principal work, *Truth and Method* (1960), 180 with relativizing the sciences in terms of the sphere of experience of philosophy and art. What appealed to Habermas in Gadamer was that he was a philosophical practitioner of hermeneutics, who had, as it were, urbanized the Heideggerian province.<sup>181</sup> He was a philosopher of the humanities who had unintentionally contributed to a transformed, more liberal conception of modern science.

For Adorno, by contrast unlike Habermas, he had an ambivalent relationship to science. Heidegger remained a challenge. When Marcuse travelled to Europe for the first time after the war, Horkheimer had asked him to bring him two books: Kogon's *SS State*, and Heidegger's *On the Essence of Truth*.<sup>182</sup> Marcuse brought not only these but also other books by Heidegger that Horkheimer had not requested, and he spoke to Heidegger at length during his visit. When Adorno was in Frankfurt again in 1949, he had tried to encourage Horkheimer to write a review for the journal *Der Monat* of Heidegger's *Holzwege*, which had just been published.<sup>183</sup> He had been giving much thought to Heidegger, and had written to Horkheimer, enclosing some of his notes, that Heidegger was 'in favour of false trails [*Holzwege*], in a way that's not very different from our own'.<sup>184</sup> Adorno had wanted to leave the review to Horkheimer, as he was working on Heidegger and Lukács anyway; but nothing in fact came of it.

It was his sympathy for 'false trails' that enabled Adorno to go on taking Heidegger seriously to the very end. Like Habermas, Adorno criticized Heidegger's genteel aversion to science, which merely served to confirm its omnipotence. He criticized Heidegger's aversion to the world of motorways and modern technology, and his way of offering 'comfort for the heart' that relieved him of any need to criticize reality. Adorno, like Habermas, emphasized the way in which Heidegger perpetuated the fatal syndrome that had been typical of the Nazi period: a glorifying of the simple, natural life, combined with ruthless acceleration both of the process of concentrating economic power and of technological development.

Unlike Habermas, however, Adorno still had some sympathy for a mode of thought which, independent of the academic system, and regardless of the shackles of scientific method, was attempting to push forward to the matters that were most important. He saw this impulse, no matter how distorted, as still surviving in the later, ontological Heidegger, just as Horkheimer had observed it in his essays of the 1930s.

Surviving in the ontological need is some remembrance of this greatest virtue [i.e. the presumption of wanting to see to the heart of things], which critical philosophy did not so much forget as zealously eliminate in honor of the science it sought to establish

a remembrance of the will not to let thoughts be robbed of that for the sake of which men think them. 185

As ever, Adorno's relationship to science was ambivalent. When he criticized science, it often remained unclear whether he really meant (a) the positivist conception of science, (b) the sciences in their existing form (whether or not this form was adequately grasped by positivist scientific theory) or (c) the individual scientific disciplines with their division of labour. On the other hand, this attitude reflected a defence of speculation, of essayistic, independent thinking which, while emphasizing conceptual discipline, was at the very least no further removed from Heidegger's 'recollection of Being' than it was from the various methods of scientific research. In contrast to Habermas, much of Adorno's philosophical writing neither took advantage of the results of any particular piece of scientific research, nor included any reflections on the philosophy of science. Philosophical thought became an independent instrument of discovery.

In contrast to Habermas, Adorno was attempting an immanent critique of Heidegger's philosophy of being. He hoped to provide a justification for a conclusive concrete philosophy through an immanent critique of the spurious concreteness of the ontology that was dominant in Germany. Karl Heinz Haag, a student of his who was now his research assistant, had trenchantly demonstrated in his work the way in which Heidegger made a virtue of necessity: since he was unable to conceive of Being in its traditional meaning, as a result of nominalist criticism, he defined it as the 'not-ness' of entities as that which was pure mediation, transitive being, unique in its sudden change into the entity of 'existing' Being. The thinking of Being was a thinking of Being in the sense of the objective genitive only to the extent that it was a thinking of Being in the sense of the subjective genitive. Thinking was the thinking of that which it thought. Both entities and thinking were presented as a destiny of Being an undefined, transitive, pure Being. Being, which precisely in its purity is the exact opposite of pure immediacy, namely something that is mediated through and through and only meaningful in mediations, was assumed to be immediacy *per se*. 186

In Heidegger's conception of Being, in which mediation was as it were stretched out into a non-objective objectivity, a transitive transcendent, Adorno saw an ontological distortion of the dialectical fact that *Dasein*, the subject as a constituent, already presupposes the facticity that it constitutes. In his view, Heidegger had attempted to express dialectical structures in an undialectical way, and to do justice to the suspended character of philosophy which consists neither of *vérités de raison* nor of *vérités de fait*.

Heidegger has . . . literally transformed that specific trait of philosophy perhaps because it is on the point of extinction

into a specialty, an objectivity of quasi-superior rank: a philosophy that knows it is judging neither facts nor concepts the way other things are judged, a philosophy that is not even sure what it is dealing with, would seek a positive content just the same, beyond facts, concepts, and judgements. The suspended character of thought is thus raised to the very inexpressibility which the thought seeks to express. The nonobjective is enhanced into the outlined object of its own essence and thereby violated. Under the weight of tradition, which Heidegger wants to shake off, the inexpressible becomes explicit and compact in the word 'Being', while the protest against reification becomes reified, divorced from thinking, and irrational. By treating the inexpressible side of philosophy as his immediate theme, Heidegger dams up philosophy all the way back to a revocation of consciousness. By way of punishment, the well he wants to excavate dries up. It is a buried well, in his conception, oozing a scantier trickle than ever came from the insights of the allegedly destroyed philosophy that inclines indirectly to the inexpressible. 187

By means of an immanent critique of the ontology dominant in Germany a continuation of his critique of Husserl published in the 1950s Adorno attempted to point philosophy beyond the self-reflection of the sciences towards authentic concretion: to an expression of the inexpressible that would not abandon thought. Adorno's analysis of Heidegger can be summed up as follows: behind his ontology there stood, objectively, his interest in a thinking qualitatively different from science, from the philosophy of science and from logic, one that went to what was essential, that broke free of immanent consciousness. Ignoring not only the sciences but the whole of the Western tradition since Plato caused Heidegger to remain too caught up in traditional metaphysics, from which only self-reflection could bring release. Concrete philosophy, according to Adorno, would be 'complete, unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflection'. To what extent he really succeeded in going beyond Heidegger in this respect must be judged from Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, published in 1966, which he began with a critique of Heidegger that claimed to be an immanent one.

The attempt to produce an immanent critique did not lessen his awareness of the danger from opposing positions. Habermas had accused the bisected rationalism of the positivists, who saw themselves as lying in the tradition of the Enlightenment, of encouraging a technological civilization which threatened to split consciousness and split humanity into two classes: social engineers and inmates of closed institutions.<sup>188</sup> For technocratic conservatives, this was a more or less openly admitted programme. With these conservatives as opposed to what the technocratic conservative Armin Mohler termed 'gardening conservatism', or what Erhard Eppler called 'value conservatism' it was

not possible to start from an immanent critique. Their merit was that, in their hate and contempt for democracy and socialism, they were sometimes able to describe the distortions these suffered more accurately and trenchantly than the left. In *Jargon of Authenticity* Adorno finally reduced the part played by Heidegger, which continued to be a fatal one, to the formula: 'irrationality in the midst of the rational is the working atmosphere of authenticity'.<sup>189</sup> This corresponded to the position of the technocratic conservatives: an artificial naturalness was to be built into technological civilization as a control mechanism.

In view of the extent to which figures as suspect as Heidegger and Gehlen were respectable and influential in the Federal Republic, it might be surprising to find that they were so dissatisfied. There had been an effective West German restoration in the Adenauer period, a smooth transition to the Erhard period with its motto 'the fully formed society' (*die formierte Gesellschaft*),<sup>190</sup> and a smooth transition again to the period of the Grand Coalition. Could Heidegger and Gehlen not reconcile themselves to the dreariness and impersonality of industrial society? It was partly this, perhaps. But the principal explanation lay in what Kirchheimer described as the lack of 'a sense of ultimate security and reliability at the last, decisive instant'.<sup>191</sup> In 1952, towards the end of the period in which the economy was still state-controlled, the neo-liberal Minister of Economic Affairs, Ludwig Erhard, the 'father of the economic miracle', had emphasized that 'the welfare state introduced for social reasons under special social circumstances must be dismantled as quickly as possible'.<sup>192</sup> This view continued to form part of his programme. In the 1960s it was heard again from Erhard's adviser, Rüdiger Altmann (who had invented the motto 'fully formed society')-for example, in an article in the *Handelsblatt*, as follows: what mattered was to get 'this society to accept the toughness of its economic and technological struggle for achievement, that there will be no social paradise, that all programmes which attempt to subordinate the economy to any social order are illusions'.<sup>193</sup> In the election year of 1965, Hans Werner Richter published his *Plea for a New Government, or, No Alternative*.<sup>194</sup> Rolf Hochhuth's article there on 'Class Struggle' was featured prominently in the weekly *Spiegel* prior to publication. Erhard was presented in it as the protagonist of a class struggle initiated from above. Erhard's reaction to it as Chancellor was: 'There is a certain type of intellectualism that becomes idiotic. To me, this isn't a writer any more, but a self-important pip-squeak yapping away like a stupid little dog.'<sup>195</sup>

8

Critical Theory in a Period of Upheaval

Adorno's Continuation of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*:  
*Negative Dialectics*

In December 1966 Adorno wrote to Horkheimer in Montagnola:

You'll have received the *Negative Dialectics*, that fat child, in the meantime, and of course I'm extremely excited to hear your reaction though I wouldn't want to pressure you into reading it faster than you or I would normally read this sort of thing. I hope you won't see it as a reversion to philosophy. It was intended, rather, as an attempt to extend (to put it mildly) the traditional concept of the philosophical problematic from within itself . . . The only controversial aspect of it might be whether it was necessary to go into the so-called specialized philosophical field to do this; but this is just my passion for immanent criticism it is not merely a passion and may be justified to some extent in the book. 1

There could hardly be a clearer indication than this of how much Adorno would have liked to sum up the contemporary period through a direct intervention in it and of how irremediably incapable he was of giving this impulse direct expression. The letter was written at a critical phase in the history of the Federal Republic. In response to the first recession that disturbed the course of the economic miracle, the governing coalition between the CDU/CSU and FDP had collapsed in the autumn of 1966. The right-wing extremist party, the NPD, founded two years before, had been elected to the state parliaments of Hesse and Bavaria with 7.9 and 7.4 per cent of the vote respectively. In this situation, the SPD joined a Grand Coalition with the CDU and CSU at the end of November 1966. In contrast to the FDP, the SPD accepted that Franz Josef Strauss should be given a ministerial post despite having been incriminated by the *Spiegel* affair and other scandals.<sup>2</sup> The SPD also

accepted Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor. Kiesinger had been a member of the Nazi Party and a liaison officer between Ribbentrop's ministry and the broadcasting companies of occupied countries which were used for Nazi propaganda. Willy Brandt, one of the initiators of the changes in the SPD that took place at its Godesberg conference, became Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor. As Habermas wrote in the Frankfurt student magazine *diskus*, 'We have reason to fear the new government . . . What is known of its plans so far suggests not so much that the safety of democracy will be ensured during a state of emergency as that a state of emergency will be imposed on democracy.' 3

Marx wrote his critique of the SPD's Gotha Programme in 1875. Adorno had for some time planned to write a critique of the Godesberg Programme, and to get it published in the *Kursbuch* edited by Hans Magnus Enzensberger, who was enthusiastic about the idea. A fear of providing grist to the mill of 'those undermining democracy, which has been seriously shaken', made Adorno shy away before the plan could be carried through, however. Horkheimer encouraged these doubts. So Adorno was able to devote himself with a clear conscience to integrating his aesthetic ideas and thus continued to give indirect expression to his political impulses while remaining in a state of political uncertainty.

He had been working on *Negative Dialectics* since 1959. 'At the moment I am up to my ears in a very ambitious philosophical project, the weightiest since *Against Epistemology*,' he wrote to the composer Ernst Krenek in October 1963. Work on the book was fitted into the following daily routine. After piano practice in the early morning, he spent the morning and afternoon at the Institute of Social Research in the director's corner room, which was neither quiet nor romantic, since it overlooked the Senckenberg-Anlage, one of Frankfurt's main traffic routes. For years on end, Adorno gave his seminars and lectures in philosophy and sociology on Tuesdays and Thursdays among them original sociological events such as a laughter seminar and a quarrel seminar, using students' everyday experiences as a starting-point; he also regularly gave a philosophy seminar for advanced students ('Philosophisches Hauptseminar') jointly with Horkheimer. He spent the evenings at home at a rented house five minutes from the Institute, whose only notable feature was a grand piano and did his reading and so on. For his writing, Adorno constantly made notes in a little notebook he carried with him at all times. He then dictated from the notes. The pages were typed with double-spacing and wide margins on all sides often in incomplete sentences. He then revised the typed pages, sometimes until none of the typed material was left and everything had been replaced with handwriting. This process was repeated sometimes up to four times. 4

At the end of 1965, Adorno for the first time since 1953 requested a sabbatical year to be able to finish those of his drafts that 'mean the most to me: a long book on the fundamentals of dialectics, and one on

aesthetics', 'while I am still in full possession of my powers'.<sup>5</sup> A visit to a new production of Brecht's *Threepenny Opera*, which he now found incredibly dull and old-fashioned,<sup>6</sup> increased his doubts about whether works created for the present moment were really capable of lasting. His long books on the fundamentals of dialectics and aesthetics also sprang from an attempt to resolve the paradox observed, for example, in his *Philosophy of Modern Music* that the only works that counted today were those that no longer constituted works. Adorno was attempting to resolve this paradox in the spirit of his music teacher, Alban Berg, and to create great forms, works in fact, whose contents rebelled against the work.

Like the *Philosophy of Modern Music* and *Against Epistemology*, the first result of these efforts *Negative Dialectics* consisted of a series of essays combined with a long introduction. As well as the long introductory essay, the book contained three sections, 'Relation to Ontology', 'Negative Dialectics: Concept and Categories' and 'Models', the first two based on lectures given at the Collège de France in Paris, and the last taking up themes from drafts and texts written in the 1930s.

Why was it a philosophy, and not a theory, of society? However much Adorno might wish to emphasize the 'primacy of substantive thought'<sup>7</sup> and promise a concretization of philosophy that would be more than spurious why substantive philosophy and not a material theory of society? The introduction began:

Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. The summary judgement that it had merely interpreted the world, that resignation in the face of reality had crippled it in itself, becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change the world miscarried . . . Perhaps it was an inadequate interpretation which promised that it would be put into practice.<sup>8</sup>

Again, in the opening pages of the second section, in a passage about the 'Relation to Left-Wing Hegelianism' the philosophy of those students of Hegel who were mocked by Marx and Engels as German ideologues, fighting incorrect ideas on the philosophical level and attempting merely to replace illusions by critical ideas it was stated:

The liquidation of theory by dogmatization and thought taboos contributed to the bad practice; the recovery of theory's independence lies in the interest of practice itself. The interrelation of both moments is not settled once for all but fluctuates historically . . . The remaining theoretical inadequacies in Hegel and Marx became part of historical practice and can thus be newly reflected upon in theory, instead of thought bowing irrationally to the primacy of practice.<sup>9</sup>

As in his inaugural lecture of 1931 on 'The Actuality of Philosophy', however, Adorno also emphasized in *Negative Dialectics* that philosophy could no longer hope to grasp the totality. But if philosophy, in its inability to grasp the totality, had no advantage over social theory what reason was there for engaging in left-Hegelian philosophy instead of unsystematic social theory? Why write a philosophical work that was to be followed by further long work, the *Aesthetic Theory*, unfinished in Adorno's lifetime and published posthumously, and which was itself to have been followed by a book on moral philosophy a trilogy in all, which, as Adorno saw it, was to 'represent the quintessence of my thought'?<sup>10</sup> Would an unsystematic social theory not undoubtedly have been more significant and more productive?

The answer to the question 'why substantive philosophy and not a material theory of society?' is probably that there was an analogy in Adorno with what Kracauer had once described in connection with Bloch as a 'running amok to God'. Instead of working on a more adequate interpretation of the world on the level of social theory, impatience caused Adorno's thoughts to revolve around the idea of gaining access to what had not yet fallen under the spell of the false totality. According to the preface, negative dialectics

attempts by means of logical consistency to substitute for the unity principle, and for the paramountcy of the supraordinated concept, the idea of what would be outside the sway of such unity. To use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity this is what the author felt to be his task ever since he came to trust his own mental impulses; now he did not wish to put it off any longer.<sup>11</sup>

What would, at the level of social theory, have required the description or at least the drafting of a way of changing the defective whole could to a certain extent simply be freely conjured up at the level of 'philosophical theory'.<sup>12</sup> In addition, what seemed impossible to achieve at the level of interdisciplinary collaboration seemed to be possible at the level of philosophical theory, through a kind of solo research that had been initiated into interdisciplinary methods.

'Negative dialectics' was a new term for Adorno's old programme of philosophical escape, for the concept of 'intermittent dialectics' that had been emphasized as early as in his book on Kierkegaard. In 'intermittent dialectics', the objections of intersubjective truth were opposed to the mythical omnipotence of the spontaneous subject. Negative dialectics was the logic of the decay of the self-satisfied spirit and the organ for what in the Kierkegaard book he had already termed the 'transcendence of longing'.<sup>13</sup> Its task was to put an end to the idea of unity and to the function of self-correction.

But how was it possible, in the administered world Adorno himself

had diagnosed, to 'open up', under the spell of the idea of unity, what was particular, unique and non-identical? And if the 'right state of things' was free of dialectics, 14 what was to prevent the non-identical that had been released, over which the idea of unity and dialectics no longer had any power, from falling back into what was amorphous, isolated and blindly natural? What was it that 'reconciled' what was different, and made possible an interrelation and a universality that were free of compulsion? If dialectics was a form of discovery that used concepts to open up what was unconceptualized without reducing it to those concepts, 15 how was it possible to conceive an advance towards a generality free of compulsion, towards Hölderlin's 'What differs is good'? 16

Dialectics, developed by Hegel within the framework of the idealist system and used by him as the principle of substantive philosophizing, held concealed the experience of the resistance of the object to the subject, the resistance of the non-identical to the identical. This made possible, and in Adorno's eyes even required, a dialectics freed from the philosophy of identity, one that was anti-systematic. 'Dialectics is the consistent sense of non-identity' and 'Contradiction is non-identity under the aspect of identity; the dialectical primacy of the principle of contradiction makes the thought of unity the measure of heterogeneity.' 17

The motive for dialectics did not lie merely in what offered a certain resistance from below, however. The concepts that allegedly lay at the origin of philosophy, its highest principles, were driving forces behind dialectics as well. It was precisely in their claim to totality that they failed. But if they were not first principles in the absolute sense, then they were not first principles at all. Instead, they wereas 'higher', more active, more dynamic principles all the more subordinate. The train of thought that supported the whole of Adorno's argument ran as follows:

Carried through, the critique of identity is a groping for the preponderance of the object. Identitarian thinking is subjectivistic even when it denies being so. To revise that kind of thinking, to debit identity with untruth, does not bring subject and object into a balance, nor does it raise the concept of function to an exclusively dominant role in cognition; even when we merely limit the subject, we put an end to its power. Its own absoluteness is the measure by which the least surplus of nonidentity feels to the subject like an absolute threat. A minimum will do to spoil it as a whole, because it pretends to be the whole.

Subjectivity changes its quality in a context which it is unable to evolve on its own. Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject enters into the object altogether differently from the way the object enters into the subject. An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from

the outset an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject.

That the I is an entity is implicit even in the sense of the logical 'I think, which should be able to accompany all my conceptions', because the sequence of time is a condition of its possibility and there is no sequence of time save in temporality. The pronoun 'my' points to a subject as an object among objects, and again, without this 'my' there would be no 'I think'. 18

At the back of this there lay a simple insight: the world might also be able to exist without human beings, but human beings cannot exist without the world. Negative dialectics meant: be mindful of the Other. It did not round off into a system, did not represent a progress from one category to another, as in Hegel. Instead, it admonished one again and again, in every case, to 'release the non-identical'<sup>19</sup> from which 'identitarian' thought, the self-satisfied spirit, could never tear itself away and which it could only distort, with unforeseeable consequences. Hypostatizations would never succeed in the long term, and the only reasonable solution must therefore be to recognize and accept the object, the Other, the alien: this was the conclusion of *Negative Dialectics*.

If a man . . . would like to dynamize all entity into pure actuality, he tends to be hostile to otherness, to the alien thing that has lent its name to alienation, and not in vain. He tends to that nonidentity which would be the deliverance, not of consciousness alone, but of reconciled mankind . . . We cannot eliminate from the dialectics of the extant what is experienced in consciousness as an alien thing: negatively, coercion and heteronomy, but also the marred figure of what we should love, and what the spell, the endogamy of consciousness, does not permit us to love. Eichendorff's phrase 'the strange and beautiful' arose out of Romanticism, which was experienced as world-weariness, as a suffering from alienation. The reconciled condition would not be the philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien. Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains what is distant and different, beyond the heterogeneous and beyond that which is one's own.<sup>20</sup>

However, until this should come to pass, a predominance of the object, in the negative sense, was to be expected. As ever with Adorno, the central concepts were bipolar. Predominance of the object in the positive sense meant openness on the part of a differentiated subject towards an object perceived in qualitative differentiation.<sup>21</sup> Predominance of the object in the negative sense meant domination over powerless individuals

by social forces that had become autonomous society's condition when it lacked an overall subject.

Wherever there was a predominance of the object in the positive sense, there would also be 'a surplus of subject'.<sup>22</sup> The object must be conceived without the subject. But one could only speak of a precedence of the object in an emphatic sense where there was a subject that had the freedom of differentiated perception, where a differentiatedly perceiving subject concerned itself with the object as a matter neither of concession nor of necessity, neither obsequiously nor deceitfully. Instead, the subject must 'yield to the object' and make itself an organ capable of blending the 'faculty of mimetic reaction' with conceptual discipline.<sup>23</sup> Adorno had claimed that Mahler possessed an incomparable capacity to 'objectify what was limitlessly subjective'.<sup>24</sup> Since the time of his music reviewing during the 1920s, he had seen the objectification of what was limitlessly subjective as the task both of art and equally of society. The objectification of the object within a differentiatedly perceiving subject this was the comprehensive form that this task had taken on over the years, and for which *Negative Dialectics* was now presenting the most advanced solution.

The general sections of the book offered what Habermas called an 'exercise in waiting' within the confines of a critique of reason that turned identitarian thought's own weapons against it, but did not dare attempt an escape from it. The introduction, which explained the concept of philosophical experience, and Part Two, which dealt with the idea of a negative dialectics and its relationship to certain categories, revolved incessantly around the philosophical motif of a reflected enlightenment a positive concept of enlightenment of the sort that *Dialectic of Enlightenment* had hoped to prepare the ground for. These two parts of the book continued this process of preparation.

The 'models' presented in the third part of the book were intended to show whether the demand for a reflected enlightenment, the demand to transcend 'the concept by way of the concept', to 'reach the nonconceptual' through the concept, for 'full, unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflection'<sup>25</sup> had really been met. The models were also intended to show whether it was possible to distinguish plausibly in this way between the disfigured shape of what ought to be loved that which merited the predominance of the object in the positive sense and heteronomy, the domination of functional interrelations in society that people had ceased to recognize that which embodied the predominance of the object in the negative sense.

The concept of a model, of exemplary thought,<sup>26</sup> represented an effort to grasp the system of the false totality in an anti-systematic way, putting limits to this system in specific cases, limits characterized by their degree of disfigurement and resistance of 'the other' and an effort, at the same time, to release the 'coherence of the non-identical' within the other.<sup>27</sup> The first model contained speculations in moral philosophy

concerning the concept of freedom, in the form of a metacritique of practical reason. The second presented speculations in the philosophy of history concerning the concepts of world spirit and the history of nature, in the form of an excursus on Hegel. The third, 'Meditations on Metaphysics', dealt with concepts such as death, life, happiness, immortality, resurrection, transcendence and hope the ultimate questions. Adorno offered no explanation of why he had chosen these particular concepts although it was surprising that his approach was not based on what was ephemeral, coarse or minute, in the way that his explanations of the idea of a negative dialectics might have led one to expect. It was also surprising that none of these models was aimed at the phenomenon that always springs to mind at once in connection with the concept of the non-identical, or of the predominance of the object: external nature, dominated by man. On the one hand, it was understandable for Adorno to want to steer clear of this topic. He had repeatedly confessed self-critically that he had no understanding of the natural sciences and was therefore not in a position to counteract the regrettable alienation of philosophy from natural science. On the other hand, it was quite possible to speculate on relations to external nature from points of view quite different from that of the connection between natural science and natural philosophy. It would even have been possible to do this as Adorno himself showed with other topics without making extensive reference to research in the individual scientific disciplines in the areas of economics, history of technology and cultural history. In view of Adorno's interests, it was not surprising for him to have a blind spot of this sort, but it was a sensitive weak point in the context of a theory that saw the decisive catastrophe of world history as lying in the domination of external and internal nature by the self-satisfied spirit, and in which the concept of true understanding and of the right conditions for the world was so closely related to the Romantic philosophy of nature.

The first model, the discussion of the question whether the will the subject was free or not, was particularly impressive. The individual scientific disciplines, forced to side with determinism as a result of their search for scientific laws, left the question of free will to philosophy, which answered it in terms of pre-scientific, apologetic ideas. As a result, philosophy confirmed the criminality of subjects whom the sciences presented as determined.

If the thesis of free will burdens the dependent individuals with the social injustice they can do nothing about, if it ceaselessly humiliates them with desiderata they cannot fulfil, the thesis of unfreedom, on the other hand, amounts to a metaphysically extended rule of the status quo. This thesis proclaims itself immutable, and if the individual is not prepared to cower anyway, it invites him to cower because that is all he can do . . . To deny free

will outright means to reduce men unreservedly to the normal commodity form of their labour in full-fledged capitalism. Equally wrong is aprioristic determinism, the doctrine of free will which in the middle of the commodity society would abstract from that society. The individual himself forms a moment of the commodity society: the pure spontaneity that is attributed to him is the spontaneity which society expropriates. All that the subject needs to do to be lost is to pose an inescapable alternative: the will is free, or it is unfree. 28

Adorno contrasted this with the formulation of a dialectics of freedom and lack of freedom, in order to provide a critical standard by which to assess the freedom or lack of freedom of socialized individuals.

The subjects are free, after the Kantian model, in so far as they are aware of and identical with themselves; and then again, they are unfree in such identity in so far as they are subjected to, and will perpetuate, its compulsion. They are unfree as diffuse, non-identical nature; and yet, as that nature they are free because their overpowering impulse the subject's nonidentity with itself is nothing else will also rid them of identity's coercive character. 29

In an antagonistic world, the coercive nature of identity and the destructive nature of impulses predominated both expressions of a lack of freedom. Genuine freedom would mean following one's impulses, and thus becoming more than identical with oneself, i.e. reconciled with others. Adorno presented a weak version of utopia, in which 'everyone's fearless, active participation in a whole' would 'no longer institutionalize the parts played, but would allow them to have consequences in reality'. 30 This was the image he contrasted with a way of constituting society in which the notion of the freedom of the will made the incrimination of powerless members of society legitimate; and which he also contrasted with a philosophical tradition that linked freedom and responsibility with one another in a spirit of repression.

The central thread in Adorno's argument was a critique of Kant, the great philosopher of freedom. Adorno put the concepts of freedom and lack of freedom, which had become fixated on individuals seen in isolation, back in their social and historical context. He maintained an awareness of the experiences of his own time, foremost among them the impression left by the deepest debasement yet suffered, the most annihilative experience of the powerlessness of the individual, the Nazi concentration camps. In this way he arrived at conclusions which were unconventional not only in the field of philosophy in the Federal Republic, but also in the general climate of thought being expressed in Germany, and which displayed a kind of humane realism.

It is not in their nauseating parody, sexual repression, that moral questions are succinctly posed; it is in lines such as: No man should be tortured; there should be no concentration camps while all of this continues in Asia and Africa and is repressed merely because, as ever, the humanity of civilization is inhumane toward the people it shamelessly brands as uncivilized.

But if a moral philosopher were to seize upon these lines and to exult at having caught the critics of morality at last caught them quoting the same values that are happily proclaimed by the philosophy of morals his cogent conclusion would be false. The lines are true as an impulse, as a reaction to the news that torture is going on somewhere. They must not be rationalized; as an abstract principle they would fall promptly into the bad infinities of derivation and validity . . .

The impulsive naked physical fear, and the sense of solidarity with what Brecht called 'tormentable bodies' is immanent in moral conduct and would be denied in attempts at ruthless rationalization. What is most urgent would become contemplative again, mocking its own urgency . . . What has not been severed [from theory and practice] lives solely in the extremes, in a spontaneously stirring impatience with argumentation, in the unwillingness to let the horror go on, and in the theoretical discernment, unterrorized by commands, that shows us why the horror goes on anyway, ad infinitum. This contradiction alone is the stage of morality today, considering the real impotence of all individuals. 31

The conclusion drawn from this represented a justification for spontaneous resistance and spontaneous revolutionary activity. It would have been more morally correct than the Nuremberg trials, according to the example Adorno gave, for the ranks who were responsible for torture, together with those who gave them their orders and including the big industrialists who were their patrons, all to have been shot straight away in a revolution against the fascists. The conviction that lay behind this was that the truth would be more likely to be found in critical situations that released strong impulses, in an epoch in which the manipulative character type had proved to be the most dangerous one, since such characters finished off their victims using administrative methods, and their sober intelligence and almost complete lack of emotion rendered them merciless (see above, pp. 421-2). Adorno was well aware of how easily views such as these might be misunderstood, of how close they were to existential philosophy, and of the way rebelliousness had been exploited by fascism. In passages like these he became a philosopher of daring, presenting his fundamental intuitions in a suitable context.

If one dared to accord its true substance to the Kantian X of the intelligible character, the substance that will stand up against the

total indeterminacy of the aporetic concept, it would probably be the historically most advanced, pointlike, flaring, swiftly extinguished consciousness inhabited by the impulse to do right. It is the concrete, intermittent anticipation of the possibility, neither alien to mankind nor identical with it. 32

This was the best formulation Adorno achieved of what could be called humane realism.

Adorno's speculations in moral philosophy in relation to the concept of freedom were concerned with the relation between internal and external nature, the body and one's fellow creatures, each in specific social and historical situations. They were speculations which in fact turned out to represent an attempt to approach, through concepts, what lay beyond concepts without reducing it to concepts. More precisely, it was an attempt to recognize what had been destroyed by abstraction, the 'impulse before the ego', the 'somatic' impulse, the 'addendum',<sup>33</sup> without throwing overboard identity, identifying thinking, and the universality embodied by social coexistence. Just as Adorno's philosophy of modern music had defended the view that the barbaric could give the spirit power over itself against the objectifications of its own activity that had become alien to it; just as the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* had defended a recollection of nature within the subject, and Horkheimer's critique of subjective, instrumental reason had defended an alliance between contemplation and instinct so *Negative Dialectics* defended the view that the 'dawning sense of freedom' could feed on 'the memory of the archaic impulse not yet steered by any solid I'.<sup>34</sup> There is 'a flash of light between the poles of something long past, something grown all but unrecognizable, and that which some day might come to be'.<sup>35</sup> But the line that connected the 'impulse before the ego' with anticipations of what lay beyond the ego and would represent genuine individuality remained obscure as the faith that gentle strength would predominate over unconstrained self-preservation in the somatic impulse, in instinct, in what was wild.

The two other models also contained varying developments of some of Adorno's earlier ideas. These ranged, in the 'Meditations on Metaphysics', from the dictum that after Auschwitz all culture is garbage,<sup>36</sup> to a materialist recovery of theological motifs in ideas such as the materialist longing for the resurrection of the body, or the utopia of a world from which not only existing suffering had been removed, but to which things irrevocably past and gone had also been returned. The latter motif, on which Benjamin and Horkheimer had corresponded during the 1930s, was the background for a humane, realistic idea that Adorno felt had been well expressed by Strindberg's 'Only he who hates evil can love what is good'. Benjamin and Marcuse had also given it insistent expression Benjamin in his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History': 'hatred and [the] spirit of sacrifice . . . are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren';<sup>37</sup>

and Marcuse in *Eros and Civilization*: 'To forget is also to forgive what should not be forgiven if justice and freedom are to prevail.' 38

The 'Meditations on Metaphysics' were free of any sense of tranquillity. They opened with the aphorism 'After Auschwitz'. The tone was not one of 'in spite of everything', but rather:

The point of no return has been reached in the process which irresistibly forced metaphysics to join what it was once conceived against. Not since the youthful Hegel has philosophy unless selling out for authorized cerebration been able to repress how very much it slipped into material questions of existence. Children sense some of this in the fascination that issues from the flayer's zone, from carcasses, from the repulsively sweet odour of putrefaction, and from the opprobrious terms used for that zone. The unconscious power of that realm may be as great as that of infantile sexuality . . . An unconscious knowledge whispers to the child what is repressed by civilized education; this is what matters, says the whispering voice. And the wretched physical existence strikes a spark in the supreme interest that is scarcely less repressed; it kindles a 'What is that?' and 'Where is it going?' The man who managed to recall what used to strike him in the words 'dung hill' and 'pig sty' might be closer to absolute knowledge than Hegel's chapter in which readers are promised such knowledge only to have it withheld with a superior mien.<sup>39</sup>

But there was a certain tone of 'in spite of everything' when the other extreme of metaphysical experience was also recalled:

What is a metaphysical experience? If we disdain projecting it upon allegedly primal religious experiences, we are most likely to visualize it as Proust did, in the happiness, for instance, that is promised by village names like Applebachsville, Wind Gap, or Lords Valley. One thinks that going there would bring the fulfillment, as if there were such a thing. Being really there makes the promise recede like a rainbow. And yet one is not disappointed; the feeling now is one of being too close, rather, and not seeing it for that reason. . .

To the child it is self-evident that what delights him in his favorite village is found only there, there alone and nowhere else. He is mistaken; but his mistake creates the model of experience, of a concept that will end up as the concept of the thing itself, not as a poor projection from things.<sup>40</sup>

What was common to both experiences was a transgression, laden with sensuousness and materiality, beyond what was sensuous and material.

Passages such as these offered, in outline, an image of what might be correct within a life that had become entangled in false life in a way that a theory of society could hardly do. Life after Auschwitz for Adorno, this topic became an argument for the fact that it was still possible to philosophize about essential matters from one's own experience.

*Negative Dialectics* presented the peculiar image of someone concerned with concrete philosophizing who was writing as his main work in philosophy a book in which concrete philosophy formed a mere appendix to the presentation and justification of his own methodology. Taken as a whole, *Negative Dialectics* as the title suggested, since it did not refer to the contents of the book was a kind of counterpart, in the theory of philosophy, both to the philosophy of science and to traditional epistemology. At the same time, this compromise distanced the book from ontology, which was inimical to both science and theory. But the book was not persuasive in its view that to include scientific research would threaten or even make impossible those insights that were gathered from speculation. The concept of negative dialectics merely kept alive an insistence on undefined experience in the face of the various philosophies of science, and indicated the direction this insistence should take by means of a negative concept: 'the non-identical' the meaning of which hovered between the two poles 'secret' and 'it should be individuality'. Interdisciplinary work on the theory of society, in the spirit of a negative dialectics, could only be fruitful. Only impatience and personal inclination could explain the exclusion of scientific research, and the use of the history of philosophy to circumvent social theory although the latter was only partly true in Adorno's case.

#### The Critical Theorists and the Student Movement

In the same year as Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, the German translation of Marcuse's essay on 'Repressive Tolerance' was published (together with essays by two of his friends, the American leftists Robert P. Wolff and Barrington Moore) in a volume entitled *Critique of Pure Tolerance* that had appeared in English the previous year, 1965. 41 It was a 'high-profile' essay, as Marcuse himself wrote to Horkheimer while he was working on it at the beginning of 1965.

In *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*, Marcuse had attempted to provide what had been missing in the work of the other older Critical Theorists: putting analyses of late capitalist society into a systematic context. He had succeeded in this in a striking, effective way in the style that was characteristic of him and which distinguished his tone from that of the other Frankfurt theoreticians. With plain romanticism, he described the everyday experience of a sensitive theoretician:

To the denial of freedom, even of the possibility of freedom, corresponds the granting of liberties where they strengthen the repression. The degree to which the population is allowed to break the peace wherever there still is peace and silence, to be ugly and to uglify things, to ooze familiarity, to offend against good form is frightening. It is frightening because it expresses the lawful and even organized effort to reject the Other in his own right, to prevent autonomy even in a small, reserved sphere of existence. In the overdeveloped countries, an ever-larger part of the population becomes one huge captive audience captured not by a totalitarian regime but by the liberties of the citizens whose media of amusement and elevation compel the Other to partake of their sounds, sights, and smells . . . Massive socialization begins at home and arrests the development of consciousness and conscience. 42

In terms of its content, what Marcuse had to say in the book represented Frankfurt social theory and appeared to suggest that the old collaboration and distribution of roles had continued uninterrupted. As in the conclusions of Adorno's books, the diagnosis that was summed up in the book's title was contrasted with references to the opportunity for qualitative change, which was now in a disastrous condition. In accordance with ideas he had developed in *Eros and Society*, Marcuse saw this opportunity as being one for a 'redefinition of needs'.<sup>43</sup> As early as the final pages of *One-Dimensional Man*, playing with the concept of an educational dictatorship, he had stated that a liberation of fantasy presupposed the repression of much that was now free and perpetuated a repressive society. Before closing the book with the quotation from Benjamin, 'It is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us', Marcuse a citizen of the United States, which in Vietnam was supporting the struggle of a dictatorship against the liberation struggle of a people; which continued to repress blacks at home; and which had made only the barest attempt to tame capitalism with welfare state measures took a further step towards a theory of marginal groups:

However, underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. When they get together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to ask for the most primitive civil rights, they know

they face dogs, stones, and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period. 44

What had emerged only timidly in *One-Dimensional Man*, the turn towards a theory of practical commitment, was given passionate expression in the essay on tolerance. In 1948 Marcuse had severely criticized Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* in accordance with Frankfurt theory, seeing 'the ideology of free competition, of free initiative and equal opportunity for all' as being at work behind the 'nihilistic language of existentialism'. With his essay on tolerance, however, Marcuse took sides with Sartre, who in 1961 had written an introduction to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* expressing unreserved solidarity with it and describing the book as 'the Communist Manifesto of the anticolonial revolution'.<sup>45</sup> The German versions of Fanon's book and Marcuse's 'Repressive Tolerance' were both published in 1966a literary symbol of what had begun to take place in West Germany among intellectuals and students.

Marcuse dedicated his 'high-profile' essay on 'Repressive Tolerance' to his students at Brandeis University. This was more than a mere gesture of gratitude to bright participants in his seminars. It was an expression of solidarity with students who had become politically active. In their struggles for civil rights, many in the American South had been attempting since the early 1960s to force the abolition of racial segregation in restaurants, shops and public transport, using sit-in and go-in tactics. Students and not only black students had been the victims of violence from whites during these campaigns. In Berkeley, the Free Speech Movement grew up, and students had fought for the right to collect money on the university campus to support civil rights organizations and other causes. In December 1964, 800 students had been arrested during a sit-in strike the largest mass arrest in United States history. Students were also protesting against the war in Vietnam and fighting against being drafted by burning their draft cards.

'No gentleness can efface the marks of violence; only violence itself can destroy them. The native cures himself of colonial neurosis by thrusting out the settler through force of arms,' Sartre wrote in the foreword to Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*,<sup>46</sup> arguing against those of the French left who expected guerrilla soldiers to behave chivalrously and thus demonstrate their humanity. Although he did not adhere to Fanon's view that the oppressed must see the feet of the oppressor in order to become human, Marcuse's conclusions were the same:

In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by

the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms of violence are inhuman and evil but since when is history made in accordance with ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it. 47

Marcuse combined the radicalism of a critique of imperialism with the radicalism of a critique of advanced industrial society. Even at the centres of this society, actual violence dominated, and society as a whole was in the most extreme danger. His conclusions seemed to be valid both for those oppressed by the United States as a world power and for those thrust into subjugation by the United States as an advanced industrial society; both for those who took up the struggle against the repressive system out of solidarity with minorities or peoples deprived of their rights and subjected to oppression, and for those who did so simply out of opposition to the system. Marcuse's essay on tolerance concluded:

I believe that there is a 'natural right' of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate. Law and order are always and everywhere the law and order which protect the established hierarchy; it is nonsensical to invoke the absolute authority of this law and this order against those who suffer from it and struggle against it not for personal advantages and revenge, but for their share of humanity. There is no other judge over them than the constituted authorities, the police, and their own conscience. If they use violence, they do not start a new chain of violence but try to break an established one. Since they will be punished, they know the risk, and when they are willing to take it, no third person, and least of all the educator and intellectual, has the right to preach them abstention. 48

If statements such as these seemed to need interpretation above all when read in a West German context other statements that he made, formulating the demand that ran through the whole essay for a kind of left-wing educational dictatorship in advanced industrial societies, seemed bizarre and self-contradictory:

The small and powerless minorities which struggle against the false consciousness and its beneficiaries must be helped: their continued existence is more important than the preservation of abused rights and liberties which grant constitutional powers to those who oppress these minorities. It should be evident by now that the exercise of civil rights by those who don't have them pre-

supposes the withdrawal of civil rights from those who prevent their exercise. 49

But who, apart from the ruling authorities and institutions, was able either to withdraw or to enforce civil rights? In a society in which, as Marcuse assumed, unilateral restrictions of tolerance had always been in force in the background, every demand for biased tolerance could only strengthen the attitudes of those in power, with their merely apparent impartiality. In situations like this, only one demand seemed useful: the demand that everyone should be able to exercise their civil rights. If, for example, conflict were to arise between the right to freedom of opinion and information, on the one hand, and the capitalist structure of the mass media, on the other, then one could demand democratization of the mass media and campaign for that demand. It could not be correct to demand the replacement of the 'hidden censorship' that permeated the media by an open form of 'pre-censorship'. Behind such ideas in Marcuse there seemed to lie a mistaken transferral of the concept of a natural right to resistance into the field of consciousness, upbringing and education. It might be that only violence could heal those who had been colonized of their colonial neurosis, or that only violence could protect one from violence in many situations, but one could not fight right-wing manipulation with left-wing manipulation. However, perhaps Marcuse only meant what was obvious: that freedom must be defended against those who claimed it at others' expense, and that the fight to gain liberties that were being withheld must entail a restriction of liberties that were being enjoyed at others' expense. But why should he use pernicious concepts like pre-censorship or counter-censorship, when what was at stake was not anything pernicious, but simply more democracy and more freedom? Why should he speak of violence in general terms, when non-violent forms of civil disobedience were also implied in the termforms of passive resistance, occupying squares or buildings, and other non-injurious actions? It may have been common among lawyers, politicians and wide sections of the public to describe these actions as violent, in so far as they did not accept the goals they were being used to pursue. But in a philosopher of the opposition in the highly industrialized societies of the West, was it not bound to give rise to misunderstandings? Was it surprising that Adorno, who had not read 'Repressive Tolerance' but had heard at third or fourth hand of statements made by Marcuse in confidence, should tell Horkheimer that they must take the earliest opportunity to have a serious word with Marcuse? Marcuse, Adorno wrote, seemed to be taking up a quite ruthless position, not even shrinking from the idea that all dissent should be banned, and thus saying things that were horrifying to Horkheimer and himself.<sup>50</sup> Was Horkheimer not bound to feel that his policy of stalling Marcuse had been justified? Marcuse had repeatedly expressed a desire to teach in Frankfurt, and as late as 1965

had taken the opportunity provided by an offer from the Philosophy Faculty at the Free University of Berlin to tell Horkheimer it would be absurd for him to return to Germany and not come to Frankfurt.

In the same year as the German translation of his 'high-profile' essay on tolerance was published, Marcuse took a 'high-profile' part in an event organized by the West German student opposition. On 22 May 1966 he gave the main address at the conference organized at Frankfurt University by the SDS (the league of German Socialist Students) on 'Vietnam Analysis of a Model'. More than 2000 students and several professors and trade-unionists took part in the conference. Among the speakers and chairmen of study groups were Jürgen Habermas and Oskar Negt. The conference ended with the largest demonstration against the Vietnam War that had yet taken place in West Germany. In addition to the factually informative part of his lecture, Marcuse offered a quintessence of his interpretation of the present age.

Picking up from the question posed by *One-Dimensional Man* of whether the Third World offered reason to hope for an alternative to the repressive technological rationality of both the Western and the Soviet industrialization processes, he asked:

Is a non-capitalist form of industrialization possible in these countries, a form of industrialization that avoids the repressive, exploitative industrialization of early capitalism, which constructs its technological apparatus *à la mesure de l'homme* and not in such a way that it has power over people from the start and that they need to submit to it? Can one speak of this, too, as being a historical advantage possessed by the 'latecomers'?

Only slightly softening the pessimistic answer he had given in *One-Dimensional Man*, the answer he offered was:

What stands in the way of this great chance for a non-capitalist form of industrialization is, unfortunately, the fact that most of these developing countries depend, for better or worse, on the developed industrial countries either of the West or of the East for their original accumulation of capital. At any rate, I believe that, objectively, the militant liberation movements in the developing countries today represent the strongest potential force for radical transformation. 51

For that type of government to be developed in the Third World, there was no prospect of any practicable alternative to the technology Marcuse observed in the industrial societies of both East and West. Nevertheless, Marcuse thought his conviction of the strength of negation, of the great refusal, of the demand for life in freedom, was all the more strikingly confirmed.

What does Vietnam mean? . . . Vietnam means all national liberation movements in the sphere of over-developed industrial society; liberation movements that call into question and threaten the rationality, the institutions, and the morality of this over-developed industrial society. Vietnam has become a symbol of the future of economic and political repression, a symbol of the future of the domination of man over man. What would the victory of the national liberation movement in Vietnam mean? Such a victory would mean, and in my view this is its decisive aspect, that a fundamental rebellion by the people can succeed against the most powerful technical apparatus of repression ever created. 52

He assured the students of his instinctive and intellectual solidarity with them. To work within Western societies for a liberation of consciousness was not a revolutionary action, but it was a movement in the face of which those in power were already becoming nervous. Morality and ethics were not merely parts of the superstructure, were not mere ideology. What was happening in Vietnam `must be protested against, even if we believe it is hopeless, simply in order to be able to survive as human beings, and perhaps to make possible an existence worthy of a human being for others'.<sup>53</sup> In his first appearance in front of West German students, he thus explicitly stated what had guided him in his judgement of the student opposition and in his assessment of their actions: not considerations of theoretical justification, strategic shrewdness or avoidance of risk, but his respect for an existential need for humane behaviour. Three years later, when the police evicted students from the Institute of Social Research (see below, p. 633), Marcuse again explained his basic attitude to the student opposition to Adorno: `We know (and they know) that the situation is not a revolutionary one, not even a pre-revolutionary one. But this situation is so horrible, so suffocating and humiliating, that rebellion against it forces you into a biological, physiological reaction: you can no longer bear it, you're suffocating and you have to get air . . . it is the air that we (or at least I) also want to breathe one day.'<sup>54</sup>

A year after the Frankfurt Vietnam conference, in July 1967, Marcuse entered the scene in Berlin as a celebrated mentor of the New Left. His arrival was announced by *Der Spiegel* in an article headed by the final sentences of his article on tolerance, and in which Knut Nevermann, former chairman of the Students' Union<sup>55</sup> of the Free University of Berlin, was quoted as saying, `Marcuse means a great deal to us. He is part of the background for what we are doing.' Shortly before, on 2 June, the student Benno Ohnesorg had been shot dead. Ohnesorg had been taking part in a demonstration against the Shah of Persia in front of the Berlin Opera. After the Shah had disappeared inside the opera house, the police dispersed the demonstrators. In an operation called `Foxhunt', Ohnesorg was shot dead by a plain-clothes policeman in the

courtyard of a building. The Mayor of Berlin expressed his gratitude to the police. Further demonstrations were banned. The Springer press, which almost exclusively dominated the Berlin newspaper market, mocked the students. Police noted down the registration numbers of cars that had black ribbons attached to them. The tyres of cars with black ribbons were slashed.

The events of 2 June 1967 were the climax of a development that had been emerging since 1965, and which turned the Free University into West Germany's Berkeley. On 7 May 1965, the twentieth anniversary of the German surrender, and therefore of liberation from Nazi rule, the Students' Union at the Free University in Berlin had invited the journalist Erich Kuby, among others, to a panel discussion to be chaired by Ludwig von Friedeburg, who had been Professor of Sociology at the university since 1962. The university's rector who a few weeks later, together with the president of the West German Rectors' Conference, personally took part in celebrations for the 150th anniversary of the German student fraternities, 56 held in Berlin's Deutschlandhalle banned the panel discussion on the grounds that some years ago Kuby had once slandered the Free University. Student political organizations and the Students' Union saw the ban on Kuby not as a legal measure but as a political decision, felt that their democratic rights were being infringed and made the clash public. The banning of the 7 May event which was held as planned at the Technical University instead marked the start of a series of incidents during which the university authorities progressively restricted the students' room for political manoeuvre, while on the other hand the students became increasingly mobilized politically.

In the following year, two faculties at the Free University had used the Academic Council's recommendations for course reorganization as an opportunity to introduce a restriction on the length of time students could be registered for a degree. This meant an obligatory limitation on the period of study, or, as the students described it, compulsory removal from the university's register. Since catastrophic study conditions and inadequately organized teaching were the main reasons for high dropout rates and long-drawn-out periods of study in the first place, this was a provocation. The students reacted to the first signs of repressive university reforms on 22 June 1966 by staging the first large-scale sit-in at a German university, with around 3000 participants. The first signs of repressive university reforms were all the more provocative because the only comprehensive plans for universities in a democratically constituted industrial society had been produced by students, but no notice had been taken of them. The danger that the Berlin students were the first to fight against openly lay in the fact that the professors had reached an agreement with their `customers', the companies that employed those educated by the universities, who were pressing for rationalization measures to increase efficiency; and this amounted to combining the professorial university system with features of bureaucratic large companies.

The students hoped to prevent this by establishing participation rights for students and for the non-professorial teaching staff.

When the situation reached crisis point as a result of the events of 2 June 1967, the only solidarity the Berlin students received was from outside the university, apart from a small number of their own professors. Indignation over Benno Ohnesorg's death spread to every university in the Federal Republic. Student protests flared up in every university city in the country, and students became a factor in West German domestic politics. University reform and social reform became firmly established as demands of equal significance among the powerful student minority that was setting the tone. Indignation over the shooting of Ohnesorg was the stimulus that released what had been building up in the younger generation for a long time: a complex form of discontent over the twenty-year-long postponement of social reforms in favour of economic prosperity, a postponement that the installation of the Grand Coalition at the end of 1966 seemed to have made indefinitely long.

In the weeks that followed 2 June, the relationship between the Critical Theorists and the student protest movement was to be exemplary. On the day of Benno Ohnesorg's funeral, 9 June, the Students' Union of the Free University organized a conference in Hanover virtually in exile on 'University and Democracy: Conditions and Organization of Opposition'. It was the first nationwide mass meeting of the left in the universities, and the Students' Union had also invited 'professors who have recently shown their support for us' to take part in it. Habermas was among them.

In his speech, Habermas tried to define the students' political role and to clarify the difficulties arising from an attempt not merely to interpret the world but also to change it. As the principal author of *Students and Politics* and the author of *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, as a critical philosopher of science and a long-term partner in discussions with the SDS, especially on ideas for democratic reform of the universities, he was marked out like no one else among the non-student population to undertake such attempts at self-comprehension and clarification. The central elements of his theoretical ideas formed the basis for his analysis and for the conclusions he drew from it. He saw two elements as being linked in the student opposition: a demand to recover the educational potential of the sciences a demand to recover society's practical potential for emancipation; and a demand for the maintenance or restitution of the dimension of self-reflection in the university a demand for the restitution of the dimension of praxis in society. Marcuse and Negt, opposing the frequent accusation that the protest movement was retreating into illusory activities, had argued for solidarity with the liberation movements of the Third World on the grounds that this was the only way that an awareness of submerged historical strengths and revolutionary perspectives could penetrate the desiccated political scene in highly developed industrial societies.

Habermas, more cautiously, saw such solidarity as restoring an element of the political public sphere: 'The student protests, I contend, have a compensatory function, since the control mechanisms that are built into democracy are either not working at all here, or not working properly.' As an example, he cited Vietnam: 'I well remember the fact that it was the campaign by students, in this case those in Berlin, against false definitions of a war that is a struggle for social liberation, that first made a breach in the official world-picture of our nation and let information from the other side gradually trickle in.' He reinforced the demand for official encouragement of the critical discussion of political problems within the universities by referring to his conviction that 'the self-reflection of science, which is the means of scientific progress, is allied to the rational discussion of practical questions and political decisions by the fact that they share a common form of criticism.' 57

Habermas then turned to the subjective dangers that threatened the student movement, or which it would have to be aware of. These lay in the fact that the gap between theory and praxis had become unusually large; and the students' role was characterized by tensions, on the one hand, between political commitment and preparing for a career and, on the other hand, between the positivist academic system, which could no longer offer guidance for action, and their need for practical general guidance. He described the difficult, but correct, path as being like walking a tightrope between indifference, excessive conformism and political apathy, or irrational guidelines for action, on the one hand this was the mass of the students and activism, uncontrolled permanent preparation for revolution and theoretical oversimplification, on the other hand this was a group of students so small as to be hardly worth mentioning. He congratulated the student leaders who were on the platform with him for showing exemplary rational assimilation of the conflicts and dangers he described, and in his conclusion he once more warned against the masochism of turning the latent power of institutions into manifest power by challenging it. The student opposition was restricted to 'demonstrative power' that served to 'force our arguments, which we think are the better ones, to people's attention'.58

The strongest and most fundamental challenge to Habermas came from Rudi Dutschke. Dutschke, a sociology student at the Free University, had been a conscientious objector to military service when he was an active member of the Protestant Church in East Germany. As a result, he had not been able to study in the East, and fled to West Berlin just before the Berlin Wall went up. In 1964 he had been involved in the 'Subversive Action' group, in which literary figures influenced by Critical Theory had joined with students interested in analysis based on economic history, to form cells in various West German cities and become politically active through direct action. At the beginning of 1965, together with other Berlin members of 'Subversive Action', he switched to the SDS in order to set up an activist faction within it and

give the SDS as a whole a new anti-authoritarian and activist character. A stirring public speaker with radical democratic ideas, Dutschke was presented by the media as 'red Rudi' and as the epitome of the rebellious student leader. In Hanover, Dutschke declared that Habermas's orthodox Marxist view that it was not sufficient for the idea to penetrate through to reality, reality must also penetrate through to the idea as long since out of date. Dutschke radicalized Marcuse's view that technological progress created new needs once the reality principle which enforced privation had been superseded, to produce what he called a new voluntarism. He put the emphasis on the will, instead of on an emancipatory tendency concealed within socio-economic development. He accused Habermas of representing a concept-free objectivism that destroyed the subject it was supposed to be emancipating. In addition, he demanded the creation of nationwide action centres as an anti-authoritarian remedy for bureaucratic tendencies within the Students' Union, the SDS and other established student organizations. These action centres were to 'extend politicization in the universities and cities using information and direct action, whether against the state-of-emergency legislation, the NPD, Vietnam, or soon hopefully Latin America as well'.

In a tense political situation, in which the first death had just occurred, Habermas now saw there was a serious danger that the person who was precisely the most influential and rhetorically gifted of the student leaders might lose his footing on the narrow tightrope of rational conflict resolution. Habermas had already gone to his car to leave the meeting, but he turned back to repeat in harsher terms the warning against a masochistic challenge to institutionalized power that he had already given twice in a more restrained manner. He described the voluntaristic ideology Dutschke had presented as 'left-wing fascism'. He introduced this interpretation in the form of a question thrown out to those present Dutschke had already left and it was not discussed further, since the conference was already breaking up. A harshly formulated accusation was therefore left to stand, and its very harshness condemned Habermas himself in the eyes of the most active students. In a situation in which those wanting to denigrate the student opposition liked to use the term 'fascist' anyway, the professor who was probably the students' most committed and thoughtful ally acquired a reputation for having given the enemy useful ammunition. In a later interview Habermas said, 'It was about the middle of 1967 that the leadership of the SDS stopped being able to speak to me unreservedly.' 59

A month after the Hanover conference, on 7 July, Adorno came to Berlin to give a lecture, which had been arranged before 2 June. It was on 'The Classicism of Goethe's *Iphigenia*', and was to be held in the main lecture hall at the Free University, at the invitation of the German Department and the Department of General and Comparative Literature. Following the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg, Adorno had prefaced

his lecture on aesthetics on 6 June with a declaration on the events in Berlin, in which he declared his sympathy for Ohnesorg, 'whose fate, no matter what has been reported, is quite out of proportion to his participation in political demonstrations'. He had demanded that 'the inquiry in Berlin should be conducted by bodies beyond any suspicion of having organizational links with those who did the shooting and wielded the rubber truncheons, bodies which cannot possibly have any vested interest in the results of the inquiry.' This was virtually the only 'intervention' of this sort that he engaged in during his whole career as a professor. He had not been prepared to give testimony concerning leaflets distributed by Commune I. Commune I, described by the media as the 'horror commune', had been expelled from the SDS in May 1967 for behaviour liable to be damaging to the organization. According to the Berlin Public Prosecutor, the leaflets concerned had incited arson. In fact, the leaflets used a fire that had taken place in a Brussels department store in which 300 people had died as an opportunity to produce a tasteless satirical critique of consumer society's indifference to the war in Vietnam. Nor had Adorno been prepared to accede to the SDS's request to cancel the *Iphigenia* lecture in Berlin and hold a political discussion instead. A leaflet distributed by the SDS in front of the main lecture hall, anticipating the tone of the offshoot of the protest movement that later moved into terrorism, and anticipating, too, an accusation against the Critical Theorists that was later raised from various different quarters, stated:

The arson trial against Fritz Teufel documents the irrationalism of the judicial process that has been unleashed, and it can end with a student victory only if a network of testimony undermines even the most remotely rational arguments the court can produce. Professor Adorno was an ideal figure to produce such testimony, as he has peddled concepts such as 'the commodity character of society', 'reification' and 'culture industry', a repertoire with which his listeners are invited to share in sophisticated despair. But requests from colleagues and students were fruitless, Prof. Adorno could not condescend to interpret the commune's leaflet as a satirical expression of despair. He refused to help. This attitude is truly classicist in its modesty, since Adorno's theorems of immutability are the very precondition for the frivolities the Commune instigates.

Adorno was introduced at the start of the lecture by Peter Szondi, one of the professors who was on the side of the student opposition. Szondi had known Adorno for a considerable time, and described himself emphatically as a student of Adorno's, although he could never have studied under him. He stated that he had presented fourteen pages of testimony on the previous day to the court in the arson trial against the students Rainer Langhans and Fritz Teufel. Szondi thus made it

possible for Adorno to give his lecture more or less without interruption. At the end of the lecture, a student attempted to present Adorno with a red inflatable rubber teddy bear (Adorno was called 'Teddy' among his friends), but another student knocked it out of her hand. Adorno condemned this as an 'act of barbarism'.

Two days later he met with members of the SDS for a private discussion. He had made it a condition of the meeting that it should not be recorded on tape. What he said during the meeting would have made him a celebrated mentor of the protest movement if it had been stated in public; he was already one of its uncelebrated mentors. To be a mentor of the student opposition did not necessarily imply complete identification with what the student opposition stated, demanded or did it was in any case by no means a unified opposition; nor did it necessarily imply active commitment to the cause of the student protest movement, or even enthusiastic recognition from the students.

In contrast to Habermas, Adorno had no particular interest in concrete ideas for university reform or a revival of political participation, and his hopes were pinned more on the preservation and exploitation of what scope remained for speculative philosophy and avant-garde art. He therefore vacillated between sympathy for the student protest movement and aversion to it. He was busy with work on his aesthetics book now that *Negative Dialectics* was finished, and what he hoped, as he had written to Horkheimer back in February, was that they could 'only get some peace' to bring their 'work to a close and finish our lives without fear or pressure'.<sup>60</sup> A high-profile role in the protest movement was incompatible with this, and his whole style of behaviour and thinking would hardly have fitted him for it. In a *Spiegel* interview two years later, he spoke openly of what he saw as his capacities and strengths: 'I attempt to express what I discover and what I think. But I cannot arrange this to suit what others can make of it or what may eventually become of it.'<sup>61</sup> This did not exactly correspond to the concept of a Critical Theory capable of reflecting on its social function that had been developed by Habermas and, earlier, by Horkheimer. To some it was bound to sound irresponsibly anarchistic; to others it would smack of the ivory tower. It was evidence of how close Adorno was to the position of an artist whose concern was his own autonomy, in spite of the complete impossibility of autonomy. It was only slightly arrogant, and largely a disarming kind of self-justification, when Adorno stated in the same interview:

If I were to give practical advice in the way that Herbert Marcuse has to a certain extent done, it would be at the cost of my own productivity. One can say much against the division of labour, but, as is well known, even Marx, who vehemently attacked it in his youth, later declared that without the division of labour nothing would work.

As we have mentioned, Marcuse entered the Berlin scene in July 1967 as a celebrated mentor of the New Left. When he arrived, he wanted to have a discussion with Adorno over the serious differences that had arisen between him, on the one side, and Horkheimer and Adorno on the other, concerning their assessment of the USA, the Vietnam War and the student movement. It had not been possible to resolve these differences through correspondence when Marcuse was living in California, Horkheimer in Switzerland and Adorno in Frankfurt. But Adorno had flown back to Frankfurt just before Marcuse arrived in Berlin. On 12 July the four-day event organized by the SDS which centred on Marcuse began. In the main lecture hall, filled to bursting, he gave lectures on 'The End of Utopia' and 'The Problem of Violence in the Opposition', and took part in panel discussions on 'Morals and Politics in Transitional Society' and 'Vietnam: the Third World and Opposition in the Capital Cities'.

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To have one of the grand old men of Critical Theory, a figure who in the meantime had become a famous émigré, completely taking their side with revolutionary and humanist emotionalism, did the opposition students good, only a few weeks after the accusation of left-wing fascism had been left hanging in the air. Expectations were all the greater in that most of those present, apart from the theorists of the SDS, only knew Marcuse's works superficially at best. But it was precisely the most active students who hoped that Marcuse would give answers to urgent questions that they themselves were not able to provide for the students they had mobilized. In an interview published in *Der Spiegel* immediately before the Marcuse event, Dutschke had declared that the most important task facing Critical Theory, particularly in the present extremely slow and complex period of transition, was to describe a concrete utopia.

But Marcuse, too, disappointed the students. He told them unequivocally that they were not the subject of radical historical change. He denied that they were an oppressed minority, and denied further that they were a directly revolutionary force. He made it clear that hopes could only be pinned on a variety of splintered forces. In contrast to Habermas, Marcuse saw the connection between student opposition in the capital cities and the liberation struggles of the Third World, which was so important to the students' view of themselves, as not merely a matter of breaking through false definitions and correcting biased reporting, but something much more fundamental. However, his view of this connection was bound to disappoint the students, who thought their own opposition to the authoritarian powers that were entrenching themselves in their own country formed part of a world-political convulsion of the highly industrialized countries brought about by the Third World liberation struggle. In his first lecture, Marcuse developed his idea of a 'new anthropology' and described the characteristic quality of a free, socialist society as its 'aesthetic and erotic dimension'. He went on:

I observe a tendency towards these new demands at both poles of existing society, namely in the most highly developed part and also in those parts of the Third World engaged in the struggle for liberation . . . It is not necessary, for example, to impose a demand for peace on the Vietnamese involved in the struggle for liberation, since they have it already . . . And, on the other hand, in highly developed society, there are those groups/ minority groups which can afford the new demands, or which, even if they can't afford them, simply have them anyway since they would otherwise physically suffocate. Here we come back to the beatnik and hippie movement. What we have here is certainly an interesting phenomenon: a refusal to share in the blessings of the 'affluent society'. This is also one of the qualitative changes in demands that are taking place. 63

It was no wonder that one of the first comments on the discussion from the floor was: 'The question that should really be concerning us and to which we have not yet had an answer from you is what material and intellectual forces are required for radical change.'<sup>64</sup> Instead of addressing this, Marcuse admitted his helplessness in the face of the vicious circle that, in order for the new demands to develop, the mechanisms that reproduced the old demands would first have to be abolished; while, on the other hand, in order to abolish those mechanisms, the demand for them to be abolished would first have to be created. The only solution he could envisage, as he had already mentioned in the essay on tolerance and again almost to excess in an interview, 'Professors as State Regents?', published in *Der Spiegel* several weeks after the Berlin event,<sup>65</sup> was an educational dictatorship. This could hardly appeal to the overwhelmingly anti-authoritarian student opposition. In his second lecture, 'The Problem of Violence in the Opposition', he described the pursuit of confrontation for confrontation's sake as irresponsible, emphasized the necessity for an elaboration of Critical Theory, and designated the liberation of consciousness a liberation that would require both discussion and demonstration, the 'involvement of the whole person' as the priority for the opposition. In terms of the points relevant to his audience's expectations, therefore, there was practically no difference any more between what Marcuse was saying and what Habermas had said in Hanover. The emotionalism with which Marcuse spoke about the Third World liberation struggle proved to be an evasion of the question of what was to be done in the West. But there was no discussion of the points Marcuse openly declared his helplessness about nor could there have been at such a large-scale meeting.

After Marcuse's appearance in Berlin, Knut Nevermann said, 'Marcuse should have shown us a positive utopia.' In fact, so far as the expectations of the student opposition and particularly those of its leaders were

concerned, Marcuse's remarks fell far short, in terms of concreteness and appeal, of what Dutschke had said in the *Spiegel* interview published immediately before the Berlin lectures. Dutschke had talked about a democracy of students' councils, about action centres, about passive forms of resistance to the Springer press and the plan for a counter-university, as examples of direct action and the 'Great Refusal' that he, too, propounded.

It seemed inevitable that an unhappy relationship between the student opposition and the Critical Theorists would develop, despite the variety of the positions the theorists took and the various ways they reacted. Adorno's reaction was that of an academic teacher rather remote from political matters who had, in his writings, ensured that critical thought was passed on to the extra-parliamentary opposition that was gradually awakening in the very lap of restoration in the Federal Republic. He held back in public on his judgement of the effects of his intellectual work, neither openly identifying himself with them nor distancing himself from them. Habermas, as an academic teacher and writer with definite interests in the philosophy of politics, reflected on the connections between science, university and society, and identified himself with the protest movement. Occasionally, however, he tried to clarify the goals and methods, opportunities and dangers for this movement with an acuity that objectively had the effect of distancing him from it. Marcuse had a range of memorable and enticing concepts ('Great Refusal', 'natural right to opposition', 'new sensibility') which were anchored not so much in theory as in a vision of an instinctual basis for socialism, and in a revolutionary humanist fervour which was joined with open prejudice in favour of all sorts of opposition groups, provided that, if violence seemed necessary, they did not use more than was necessary.

Horkheimer tended to identify the student movement with anti-Americanism and pro-totalitarianism, and rejected it along with the Vietnamese liberation struggle. But, ironically, respect for him grew as the student movement became progressively radicalized, since some of his early writings turned out to be a goldmine for quotations that suited the current mood. Of course, this gave him no satisfaction at all. At the beginning of the 1960s he had agreed only to an Italian edition of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, in which it had been possible to make some slight changes. He refused permission for republication in German, which the publishers Fischer had already planned for 1961 with a large print run. Adorno had attempted to explain Horkheimer's hesitation to Marcuse:

The situation is simply this, that on the one hand, because of certain high-profile statements in it particularly those connected with institutionalized religion we are apprehensive of what to expect if the thing were seen by so many people; while on the other hand

we would like to preserve the text intact and not water it down with this or that qualification. 66

Just as annoyance over pirated editions of *History and Class Consciousness* had caused Lukács to republish it, however, Horkheimer too was provoked by irritation with pirated editions into reprinting his *ZfS* articles, after the German translation of *Eclipse of Reason* had come out in 1967. He did this for purposes of documentation, and prefaced the articles with a foreword reminding 'present-day youth' that 'To protect, preserve, and, where possible, extend the limited and ephemeral freedom of the individual in the face of the growing threat to it is far more urgent a task than to issue abstract denunciations of it or to endanger it by actions that have no hope of success.'<sup>67</sup> But he left unpublished the texts from which some of the student slogans were taken: the *ZfS* article 'The Jews and Europe', which contained the sentence 'Those who do not wish to speak of capitalism should be silent about fascism',<sup>68</sup> and the collection of aphorisms *Dawn and Decline*, which included the statement: 'The career of the revolutionary does not advance through banquets and honorary titles, interesting research and professorial salaries, but through misery, disgrace, ingratitude, and imprisonment towards an uncertainty which only an almost superhuman faith can penetrate. Merely talented people therefore hardly ever take it up.'<sup>69</sup>

The radicalization of the student protest movement and its development into the driving force of the extra-parliamentary opposition continued, since the reasons it had arisen also continued to exist: the absence of democratic reform in the universities; the continuing erosion of the parliamentary system under the Grand Coalition, which among other things had decided to introduce legislation for a state of emergency and was toying with the idea of a simple majority electoral system, or a requirement that a party should win at least 10 per cent of the total vote before being allotted any seats; the Federal Republic's moral and financial support for the war in Vietnam; the manipulation of public opinion blatantly being carried out by the Springer corporation and in the press situation in Berlin; the general orientation towards the model of a 'fully formed society'. After the protests had spread throughout the universities in the Federal Republic, general political activity began to take precedence over purely university politics during the winter of 1967-8 and the spring of 1968. To student activists, the universities appeared more and more to be both a base and a theatre for general political conflict.

In February 1968 the SDS at Berlin's Technical University organized an International Conference on Vietnam, followed by a demonstration. The event aimed to adopt Willi Münzenberg's policy of using conferences to appeal to feelings of solidarity, and was intended as a departure from earlier student conferences that had involved theoretical analysis and discussion, like that with Marcuse in Frankfurt in 1966.

It took place under a gigantic flag of the Vietnamese National Liberation Front with the words of Che Guevara, who had been killed a few months earlier in the guerrilla struggle in Bolivia, emblazoned on it: 'The duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.' In April the assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke who was critically injured by three shots from a revolver wielded by a twenty-three-year-old labourer called Josef Bachmann was at once seen by the students as a consequence of the bloodthirsty mood stirred up against students by the Springer press. They reacted by blockading Springer. Some 60,000 young people throughout the Federal Republic attempted to prevent the delivery of Springer newspapers over Easter. There were street battles such as had not been seen in western Germany since the late Weimar Republic. In Munich a photographer and a student were fatally injured.

Then came May '68. In Paris, it was the month of nights behind the barricades in the Latin Quarter, the month of the general strike called by the trade unions and left-wing parties for 13 May. In a discussion with Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a rebel sociology student who had risen to fame overnight, Sartre appealed to the students not to flinch from the attempt to bring fantasy to power and expand the realm of possibility. In West Germany, May was marked by the struggle against the introduction of legislation to enable a state of emergency to be declared. Almost 100,000 people demonstrated in Bonn on 11 May. On 20 May a wave of occupations of institutes and universities began in Berlin and spread. On 27 May the SDS, together with the umbrella group Emergency for Democracy (which had the support of the powerful trade union, IG Metall) and the Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament (which had grown out of the Easter March movement), called for a political general strike in factories and universities. In Frankfurt, after the rector had responded to a student strike call by closing the university, the university's main building was occupied on 27 May by 2000 students led by Frankfurt's counterpart to Dutschke, Hans-Jürgen Krahl, who was a doctoral student of Adorno's and well versed in theory. In place of its official name, 'Johann Wolfgang Goethe University', Frankfurt University was renamed 'Karl Marx University'. In the occupied university, the programme of a 'political university', developed shortly before, began to be turned into reality and presented as a model of what a critical university ought to be. Habermas's research assistants Negt, Offe, Oevermann and Wellmer took part, giving seminars on 'History and Violence', 'The Political Theory of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition', 'The Non-Political University' and 'The Politicization of Science'. After three days a group of students had in the meantime opened the files in the rector's office the building was cleared of students by the police, who then occupied it in turn. A conference of students and school pupils on the conditions and organization of the opposition, a

year after the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg and the Hanover conference, was held in Frankfurt over Whitsun. A protest march from the conference to the police-occupied university passed off without incident.

During these weeks, when political conflicts had pushed university politics into the background for the rebellious students and they were confronted with their powerlessness and failure on all sides Springer newspapers were delivered, purchased and read after Easter just as they had always been, the state-of-emergency legislation was passed by the Bundestag on 30 May, horror about the Vietnam War remained a matter for the opposition minority Critical Theorists twice made statements in Frankfurt on the student movement: Adorno was the first, and Habermas the second.

On 8 April 1968 Adorno, as departing chairman of the German Sociological Association, had given the opening lecture at the Sixteenth German Sociology Conference, which was being held in Frankfurt. The central theme of the conference, the theme to which Adorno's lecture was also devoted, was 'Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?' The choice of topic related to the 150th anniversary of Karl Marx's birth, but it also indicated a kind of reverence for the student movement. German sociologists had been surprised by the movement and, apart from Habermas, had had little to say about it up till then. They were now meeting in what was, after all, the most important centre of student opposition outside Berlin, an opposition that had ensured that structural questions connected with an industrially highly developed capitalist society had once more entered the spectrum of public debate.

In his most recent sociological study, 'Notes on Social Conflict Today', written in collaboration with Ursula Jaerisch, one of his students, and published in 1968 in a festschrift for Wolfgang Abendroth's sixtieth birthday, Adorno had developed the hypothesis that class conflict had become latent, and was being displaced towards the margins of society an idea that might have produced promising new directions for the New Left's theoretical analyses. In his opening lecture at the sociology conference, 'Late Capitalism or Industrial Society?', however, Adorno did not take the idea up, despite its immense promise for an analysis of the current situation. Instead, he voiced the resignation of a conjecture that had been omitted from the introduction to *Sociologica II* that contemporary society might be beyond the reach of any consistent theory. The image he repeated here was that of a society lying under a universal curse. It was an image that contained a sprinkling of orthodox Marxist elements, which he now made more explicit than he had earlier. The curse that society bore was blamed partly on state interventionism, which was seen as representing an indirect confirmation of the theory of the inevitable collapse of capitalism. This image of society was dispelled at only one point in the lecture, when, after observing that the individual was undergoing a process of collapse, Adorno stated:

It is only in the recent past that traces of a counter-tendency have begun to appear, among a whole variety of groups of young people: resistance to blind conformism, freedom to choose one's goals rationally, disgust at the existence of a world of cheating, and an idea, an awareness, of the possibility of change. Whether society's growing urge to destroy itself will nevertheless triumph against this counter-tendency remains to be seen. 70

He then continued the train of thought this passage had merely interrupted, as if the remark had simply not been made. He was thus showing his basic sympathy for the protest movement, and at the same time indicating that he did not regard this sympathy as having any implications for his thinking. The sociology conference closed with nothing of significance having been said about how to interpret the protest movement and the condition of Western societies on the same day as the assassination attempt on Dutschke prompted the students to blockade Springer.

Whit Saturday, 1 June, was the first day of the Frankfurt conference of students and school pupils. During the evening, in a tense political situation, Habermas again spoke to opposition students who had assembled in the student refectory, which was outside the area of the university occupied by the police. According to the programme, his subject was to be how much scope for action was available for protest and opposition. Once again, what he said was a combination of insistent analysis and critique of the protest movement. Once again, when he was involved in internal criticism, the criticisms he came up with were incisive. After a year of experience with a nationwide protest movement, and a semester as a visiting professor in the USA during the winter of 1967-8, Habermas confirmed that the student opposition had opened up a serious new perspective on how to achieve radical change in deep-seated social structures. As in Hanover, he observed that the immediate goal of the protest movement was the politicization of the public sphere: in returning to public discussion questions that might have immense practical consequences, and in reversing the process of depoliticization that had made technocratic pretensions possible. What was new was that Habermas now recognized that provocationist techniques of limited rule-breaking were a legitimate and necessary means of forcing through discussion in areas where it was being refused. New, above all, was that he now had an idea of how to explain the students' and school pupils' protest movement, and that he no longer immediately classified and rejected neo-anarchist views and direct action as a form of fascism.

His explanation was the product of a combination of the theory of conflict displacement in late capitalist society with Marcuse's thesis of a new sensibility, a thesis that had been intended partly as diagnosis and partly as utopia. Also included in the mixture were the results of

American empirical research on the influence of class affiliation and forms of socialization on young people's attitudes and behaviour. His most extensive presentation of the new interpretation had appeared in a lecture at the end of 1967 to the New York Goethe Institute.

This generation has probably grown up with more psychological understanding, and with a more liberal upbringing and more permissive attitudes, than any that has preceded it . . . If we take, in addition, the fact that this generation is the first to have grown up under economic conditions of greater ease, and has therefore been under less psychological pressure from the labour market than its predecessors, then a hypothetical connection arises which may allow us to explain the peculiar sensibility of the young activists. They have been sensitized to the costs, in terms of individual life-history, of a society marked by competition for status and achievement, and by the bureaucratization of every area of existence. These costs appear to them to be disproportionately high in relation to the potential technological advantages involved . . . It may well be that the decay of parental authority and the spread of permissive methods in education have made experiences possible for children growing up, and required them to find their bearings, in ways that on the one hand must inevitably come into conflict with the standards of an ideology of achievement, but on the other hand converge with the technological potential available, which society has not yet released, for leisure and freedom, satisfaction and pacification. 71

However, Habermas once again made severe criticisms. These were based on his fears about the protest march to the police-occupied university that was planned for the following day, and also on his worries about the protest movement. It was a close partner for him in its critique of the exclusion of practical questions from a public sphere that had become depoliticized, yet at the same time it was so threatened and so dangerous as it walked the precarious tightrope of revolt in a non-revolutionary period. His criticism was severe in describing the new demonstration techniques as ritualized forms of blackmail and adolescent defiance against inattentive but relatively lenient parents. It was also severe in that Habermas exacerbated his accusation that some of the leading figures were confusing the occupation of a university with an actual takeover of power, by adding that this sort of thing would satisfy the medical criteria for mental delusion. It was severe, finally, in accusing the students of being guided by 'truisms' and using these to break off difficult and unresolved debates in the field of Marxist social theory and replace them with simplified certainties with the convictions, for example, that the problems of using capital, even under state-controlled capitalism, were insurmountable; that socio-economic class conflict could be intensified into political conflict; and that there was a

causal connection between economic stability in the developed capitalist countries and the catastrophic economic situation in Third World countries. Habermas held that it was these convictions that were producing the strategies he was criticizing as disastrous.

These were amazing accusations. They were amazing first of all because the convictions Habermas listed applied more to the `traditionalists' among the SDS membership, while it was precisely the `anti-authoritarian' members such as Dutschke who was influenced more by Marcuse or Krahl, whose intellectual roots were in Adorno and Habermas's Critical Theory, who were the defenders of the new protest methods. It was also amazing that Habermas was taking orthodox Marxist views of the conditions necessary for revolution, summing these up as consisting of open rebellion by the exploited masses on whose co-operation the social system depended and then using the fact that these conditions had not been met to conclude that a revolutionary situation had not arisen, and therefore that all actions were inadmissible that were intended as a violent means of capturing positions of power, rather than merely using symbolic blackmail to draw attention forcibly to their arguments. But no matter how debatable it was whether Habermas was accurate or not in his description of the convictions that determined the activities of the most active students; no matter whether the strategies they were using were really the consequences of such convictions; and no matter whether the conditions necessary for a revolutionary situation that he mentioned were too narrow or not he was right in asserting that the SDS saw its scope for action as lying in a situation that needed to be revolutionized. The SDS's analysis more and more indicated a view of itself, and an assessment of the situation, according to which the protest movement must be kept going, no matter how long, until it finally opened out into a revolution that would be borne forward by the workers as well.

This indicates the ultimately crucial difference between Habermas and the most active students. For the latter, a violent coup against the affluent society was not unthinkable, and the politicization of the public sphere was to serve the purposes of radical anti-authoritarian, anti-capitalist change. For Habermas, the revolutionizing of highly developed industrial societies was only conceivable in the following scenario: a surfeit of achievable affluence would one day make even a working population that had become integrated into the system irritated by bureaucratized forms of work and existence. Those in power, in order to continue to receive the labour required from a population no longer prepared to make unnecessary sacrifices, would therefore have to consent to the repoliticization of a public sphere that had dried up. A newly political public would then reach an agreement over the goals of social action. The function of the protest movement, in Habermas's eyes, could only be to use pressure from below, or from outside, to strengthen or revive democracy within organizations such as political parties, trade

unions and other bodies, and to strengthen or revive the functioning of the mass media as organs of criticism. In an extremely mediated fashion, this would serve to democratize complex societies and de-bureaucratize power. The breakthrough constituted by the tactics of diffusion and direct action had been clearly demonstrated in Berlin by Dutschke and others belonging to the Subversive Action group in 1964-5; from then on, Dutschke represented this breakthrough in the West German student movement, and it was maintained as an element that contributed decisively to the movement's dynamics. It was welcomed by Marcuse, the theoretician of the new sensibility and an instinctual basis for socialism, and was bound to meet with a certain amount of sympathy and understanding from Adorno, the theoretician of the non-identical and the somatic impulse. But for Habermas, the theoretician of comprehensive rationalization and the liberation of inward nature through communication, it produced a fear of the irrational, a fear of expression and action that would insist on their rights, if necessary, without conceptualization or discussion.

No understanding between Critical Theorists and critical students was ever reached, either on the theoretical level or on the subject of university organization. The students expected the left-wing professors to stake their whole existences on a revolution the students believed was close at hand. The book, *The Left's Answer to Jürgen Habermas*, 72 published the same year, opened with the theses Habermas had presented at the Whitsun conference in Frankfurt, followed by contributions by various members of the SDS and left-wing university staff. It did not succeed in starting a theoretical debate, although in its introduction, Oskar Negt, who was Habermas's research assistant and at the same time a representative of the New Left who was closely linked to the SDS, saw the book's significance as lying in a 'publicly conducted controversy within the New Left'. His arguments for this were well founded, and he did not shy away from resolute criticism of Habermas. The introduction of a departmental council in the Department of Sociology within the Philosophy Faculty, with equal representation on it for students, professors and other staff, did not succeed in Frankfurt because of mutual distrust between the students and professors and because of the demands of the group that was setting the tone in the SDS, which went beyond this and aimed at a direct politicization of science.

In the winter semester of 1968-9, the situation became even more acute. First, the students in the Department of Education went on strike to protest against the first signs of a technocratic university reform that affected them, and organized alternative courses. Students of sociology, Slavic languages, Romance languages and German joined them at once. A leaflet distributed by the Action Group for Sociology read:

There will be a general meeting of all sociology students at 7 p.m. on 5 December in Lecture Hall VI to recommence the debate

with the professors about the immediate reorganization of the sociology course. The following points will be discussed: (1) the possibility of introducing a constitution that will ensure that students have joint control over the content of research and teaching strategies; (2) the possibility of a provisional suspension of teaching in the Sociology Department, as it has been carried out up to date, and the joint organization of research and teaching collectives that will dismantle the authoritarian teaching situation and draft a new teaching and research strategy. Participation in these joint working groups must be recognized as a normal course of study.

The leaflet went on, 'We haven't the slightest interest in being left-wing court jesters for an authoritarian state who are critical in theory but conformist in practice. We take Horkheimer's saying seriously' and here the leaflet closed with the passage from *Dawn and Decline* quoted above (p. 625). Adorno passed the leaflet on to Horkheimer with a note saying, 'This is how far we've come.'

Three days after the fruitless discussion with the sociology professors, students occupied the Sociology Department in Myliusstrasse, renaming it the 'Spartacus Department'. Every evening they elected the next day's strike committee, which was responsible for arranging rooms for the various working groups, co-ordinating the cross-faculty working groups and producing leaflets and news-sheets pinned to walls. In some dozen or so working groups, students of sociology, philosophy, law, mathematics and education conducted debates on 'Marxist legal theory', 'epistemology, philosophy of science and positivism', 'organization and emancipation', and so on. It was an 'active strike' an extension of what had first started in Berkeley under the name 'counter-university', had been taken up in Berlin in the winter semester of 1967-8 under the title 'critical university' and had made its appearance in Frankfurt in the spring of 1968 as the 'political university'. The wave of occupations that took place in response to the state-of-emergency laws thus proved to have been a threshold beyond which there now occurred what was, by German standards, an almost miraculous juxtaposition of more or less normal teaching and research in one part of the university, and self-organized studies in the other part.

This might well have provided a new strategy to achieve democratic university reform: the use of the pre-emptive self-organization of courses and the extension of the form and content of studies as a means of exerting pressure for the implementation of an up-to-date conception of reform. But the 'active strike' experiment was dominated by two kinds of vested interest, neither of whose supporters were prepared or able to join in a dual strategy that would include a pragmatic strategy of reform. On the one hand were those students who, borrowing the guerrilla strategy of 'liberated areas', wanted to set up bases at the universities that would offer a 'collective opportunity to discover and develop long-

term social-revolutionary strategies for the cities'. 73 On the other hand were those students whomore modestly and vaguelywanted their studies to be better integrated with their own experiences and interests, which had been politicized through the protest movement, and who wanted their studies to have new content and new forms determined to a greater extent by themselves.

To begin with, Habermas and Friedeburg (who had returned from Berlin to Frankfurt in 1966 and was a director of both the Sociology Department and the Institute of Social Research there) frequented the `Spartacus Department' almost as usual. Then they started to use the Philosophy Department more and more. One day, the university rector, Walter Rüegg, called Habermas. The Medical Council, the owners of the building in which the Department was housed, had threatened to cancel its tenancy agreement, and Rüegg had arranged for the building to be cleared by the police in the early hours of the following morning. When Habermas asked whether this information was to be treated as an order that could not be contradicted, he answered, `Yes.' At four or five o'clock the next morning, when the police were about to clear the building on the basis of a reported breaking and entering, they found it empty.

A month later, farce ensued. On 31 January 1969 Adorno saw several dozen students from the window of his corner office at the Institute walking round the corner at speed and disappearing into the Institute building. He at once concluded that they intended to occupy it. The students had gone to the Sociology Department, now under `modified reoccupation', and found it shut, so they had been looking for a room in which to hold a discussion at the Institute, without any further aims whatsoever. After Friedeburg had in vain requested the seventy-six students to leave the building, he and Adorno (who, together with the statistician Rudolf Gunzert, formed the Institute's board) summoned the police. The police arrested and removed all seventy-six, but released all of them except Krahl the same day. Krahl was charged with breaking and entering. Some months later, an unedifying trial ensued.

Marcuse was referring to this clearing of the Institute when he wrote to Adorno in April 1969:

Briefly: I believe that, if I accept the Institute's invitation without speaking to the students as well, I will be identifying myself with a position (or will be identified with one) that I do not share politically . . . We cannot ignore the fact that these students have been influenced by us (and not least by you) . . . We know (and they know) that the situation is not a revolutionary one, not even a pre-revolutionary one. But this situation is so horrible, so suffocating and humiliating, that rebellion against it forces you into a biological, physiological reaction: you can no longer bear it, you're suffocating and you have to get air. And this fresh air is not that

of 'left-wing fascism' (contradictio in adjecto!), it is the air that we (or at least I) also want to breathe one day, and which is certainly not the air of the establishment . . . For me, the choice is: to come to Frankfurt and also speak to the students, or not to come at all. If you think the latter is better it's 'perfectly alright with me' [English in the original], maybe we can meet somewhere in Switzerland in the summer and clear all this up. Even better if Max and Habermas could be with us as well. But clarification between us is necessary. 74

Two months later Marcuse told Adorno:

You write of the 'Institute's interests' and add the emphatic reminder 'our old Institute, Herbert'. No, Teddy. It is not our old Institute that the students forced their way into. You know as well as I do how fundamental the difference is between the work the Institute did in the 1930s and the work it is doing in today's Germany. The qualitative difference is not derived from the development of the theory: the 'grants' you mention so incidentally are they really so incidental? You know that we agree in our rejection of any immediate politicization of the theory. But our (old) theory has an inner political content, an inner political dynamic, which today, more than in the past, presses for a concrete political position. That doesn't mean: giving 'practical advice', as you accuse me in your *Spiegel* interview of suggesting. I have never done that. Like you, I find it irresponsible to advise people, from my desk, to take action people who, fully aware of what they're doing, are prepared to have their heads smashed in for the cause. But that means, in my view: in order to remain our 'old Institute', we have to write and act differently today from the way we did in the 1930s . . .

You write, introducing your concept of 'coldness', that we would even have put up with the murder of the Jews at the time, without moving over into praxis, 'simply because it was barred to us'. Yes, and today, precisely, it is not barred to us. The difference in the situation is that between fascism and bourgeois democracy. The latter gives us freedoms and rights. But to the extent to which bourgeois democracy (because of its immanent antinomy) blocks qualitative change, even through the parliamentary democratic system itself, the extra-parliamentary opposition becomes the only form of 'contestation': 'civil disobedience', direct action. And the forms of such action, too, no longer follow the traditional schema. There is much about these forms that I condemn just as much as you do, but I am reconciled to this and defend them against their opponents precisely because the defence and preservation of the status quo, and its cost in human life, is much more dreadful. This

is probably where the deepest divergence between us lies. To talk about having 'the Chinese on the Rhine', so long as the Americans are still stationed on it, is simply impossible for me. 75

Although Marcuse may have been right about the clearing of the Institute and in his fundamental views, the situation in West Germany, and most of all in Frankfurt, could not be comprehended using methods like these. A demand for the instrumentalization or even destruction of science had become dominant in the SDS, and the shifting of the potential for protest into a semi-political subculture and pseudo-political communist splinter groups was in full swing. This was a result of the extensive failure of the protest movement's political actions and the efforts and frustrations involved in the attempt to change things in the universities directly. When Adorno's philosophy lecture 'An Introduction to Dialectical Thinking' was disrupted in April 1969, it was rebellious women members of the SDS who were responsible. They had formed a Women's Council in 1968, and were among the pioneers of the women's movement. One Dr Hans Meis aired both his own views and popular sentiment in a letter to Adorno after he had read about the event in *Die Welt*:

That I'd like to have seen, the 'brave' professor taking to his heels! Those 'students' have given you the punishment you and the left-wing professors deserve! Carry on just as you have been doing, so the dialectical reversal can succeed sooner and more thoroughly! Prof. Horkheimer is already in Lugano . . . You'll be able to find somewhere there to escape to as well when the turnabout comes; it will be starting fairly soon. Even that dozy lot in the present government will wake up eventually. I don't agree with the cheeky cynic who said he wanted a new Hitler to give the left-wing professors and students a 'free ticket to the oven'. But hundreds of thousands want an end to the nonsense of this poisoning of youth that you and your colleagues are carrying on.

But the reaction only came later. To begin with, something surprising took place: a period of reform, which was partly an effect of the protest movement, but which also partly accelerated its disintegration, and diverted young people's commitments into traditional channels, on the one hand, and subcultural resistance on the other. In March 1969 Gustav Heinemann was elected Federal President. Earlier on in his career, he had resigned from office as Home Secretary in protest against Adenauer's plans for rearmament, and had been a co-founder of the All-German People's Party (the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei, GVP), which at the time had been the only party that stood for German neutrality. When he took office in July, Heinemann called for greater democracy. After the elections for the sixth Bundestag in September, a socialist-liberal

coalition was formed, although the CDU remained the strongest single party and the NPD still got 4.3 per cent of the vote. The head of government, Willy Brandt, like Gustav Heinemann, promised greater democracy and gave his motto as 'No need to fear experiments!' When the period of reforms began almost as surprisingly as the protest movement had a few years before Adorno was no longer alive. He died of a heart attack on 6 August during a holiday in Switzerland. (A few months later, in February 1970, Hans-Jürgen Krahl, the most significant theoretician of the SDS, died in a car accident. By this time the SDS had practically ceased to exist, and it was formally dissolved soon after.) It was peculiar how the passing of the protest movement thus coincided with the passing of the person who, like hardly anyone else, had created the long-term intellectual basis for a demand that ultimately became irrepressible for an escape route out of the 'Restoration'.

#### Habermas on Course Towards a Communication Theory of Society Adorno's Legacy: Aesthetic Theory

'I am not the least bit ashamed to state in public that I am working on a long study in aesthetics,' Adorno told *Der Spiegel* in an interview shortly after his philosophy lecture had been disrupted. *Aesthetic Theory*, which remained unfinished, was the second in a trilogy of works that were intended to represent what in his view was the contribution he could offer. It became his legacy one that to begin with attracted little attention in a period in which the after-effects of the preceding iconoclasm were still being felt. Far more successful and effective were two works by Habermas published in 1968: *Knowledge and Human Interests* and *Technology and Science as Ideology*. *Knowledge and Human Interests* had been written between 1964 and 1968, and was designed as a prolegomenon, to be followed by a two-volume analysis of the development of analytical philosophy. Habermas hoped by this means to find an approach to a new, non-idealistic theory of society. *Knowledge and Human Interests* reconstructed the intellectual prelude to recent positivism, and sought to justify critical social theory epistemologically. During the winter semester of 1968-9 Habermas used the book as the basis for a philosophy seminar on 'Problems of Materialist Epistemology' in which the students attempted to practise participation in shaping topics and the formulation of questions, and they criticized the book on the grounds that it was trapped in questions that were immanent to science. *Technology and Science* suggested a method of analysing the coherence of the society in which positivism first arose and took on an ideological function. From this, the book drew conclusions about how to clarify the conditions that would be necessary to revolutionize late-capitalist societies. It was from this work that the students immediately

drew the slogan about technology and science being the primary productive force.

*Knowledge and Human Interests* was a continuation of the essays in *Theory and Practice* which focused on defining the status of criticism, or Marxist theory, as a form of knowledge that lay between philosophy and science. It was a continuation, too, of Habermas's contributions to the positivist dispute, and also of his inaugural lecture on 'Knowledge and Human Interests'. The book was an introduction, via the history of the problem, to a critical philosophy of science that in contrast to scientific philosophies of science would be concerned with developing a comprehensive theory of all the various differentiated forms of knowledge, throughout the whole range of the sciences, that were available in industrial societies. What was new in contrast to his earlier work was, above all, a more vivid and detailed presentation of processes in the particular objective sphere with which the critically oriented sciences were concerned. Habermas used the example of psychoanalysis to illustrate this more precisely.

At the level of its self-reflection, the methodology of the natural sciences takes cognizance of a specific connection between language and instrumental action, comprehends it as an objective structure, and defines its transcendental role. The same holds for the methodology of the cultural sciences with regard to the connection between language and interaction. Metapsychology deals with just as fundamental a connection: the connection between *language deformation* and *behavioural pathology*. In so doing, it presupposes a theory of ordinary language having two tasks: first, to account for the intersubjective validity of symbols and the linguistic mediation of interactions on the basis of reciprocal recognition; second, to render comprehensible socialization that is, initiation into the grammar of language games as a process of individuation. Since, according to this theory, the structure of language determines likewise both language and conduct, motives of action are also comprehended as linguistically interpreted needs. Thus motivations are not impulses that operate from behind subjectivity but subjectively guiding, symbolically mediated, and reciprocally interrelated intentions.

It is the task of metapsychology to demonstrate this normal case as the limiting case of a motivational structure that depends simultaneously on publicly communicated and repressed and privatized need interpretations. Split-off symbols and defended-against motives unfold their force over the heads of subjects, compelling substitute-gratifications and symbolizations . . .

The split-off symbol has not simply lost all connection with public language. But this grammatical connection has as it were gone underground. It derives its force from confusing the logic of the

public usage of language by means of semantically false identifications. At the level of the public text, the suppressed symbol is objectively understandable through rules *resulting* from contingent circumstances of the individual's life history, but not connected with it according to intersubjectively *recognized* rules. That is why the symptomatic concealment of meaning and corresponding disturbance of interaction cannot at first be understood either by others or by the subject himself. They can only become understandable at the level of an intersubjectivity that must be created between the subject as ego and the subject as id. This occurs as physician and patient together reflectively break through the barrier to communication . . . bringing about the disappearance of the deformation of private language as well as the symptomatic substitute-gratification of repressed motives of action, which have now become accessible to conscious control. 76

This language-game interpretation of the psychoanalytic theory of the development and cure of symptoms as a process of de-symbolization and re-symbolization had been inspired by Alfred Lorenzer, one of Habermas's colleagues at Frankfurt. By analogy, Habermas was also attempting to derive from Freud a theory of the development and dissolution of institutions and ideologies.

Freud comprehends institutions as a power that has exchanged acute external force for the permanent internal compulsion of distorted and self-limiting communication. Correspondingly he understands cultural tradition as the collective unconscious, censored in varying measure and turned outwards, where motives that have been split off from communication are driven incessantly about and are directed by the excluded symbols into channels of substitute gratification. These motives, rather than external danger and immediate sanction, are now the forces that hold sway over consciousness by legitimating power. These are the same forces from which ideologically imprisoned consciousness can free itself through self-reflection when a new potential for the mastery of nature makes old legitimations lack credibility.77

The goal that resulted from this for Freud was that of 'providing a rational basis for the precepts of civilization', an idea that Habermas reformulated as 'an organization of social relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination'.78

This was the point at which the argument connected with Habermas's diagnosis that the current system of rule depended on the exclusion of practical questions from a depoliticized public sphere, and that the protest

movement, with its insistence on participating in public discussion about how to conduct a desirable life, had hit the system's weak point.

The new ideology [i.e. technocratic consciousness] damages . . . an interest that is linked to one of the two fundamental conditions of our cultural existence: the interest in language or, more precisely, in the form of socialization and individualization that takes place through colloquial communication. This interest extends to the preservation of an intersubjectivity of understanding, and to the production of a form of communication that is free of domination. The technocratic consciousness allows this practical interest to disappear in favour of an interest in extending our technological capacities. 79

This justification for a critical theory of society in terms of an anthropology of knowledge involved a number of problems, however. Among these was the tension between the assumption that there existed a unified generic subject, on the one hand, and the foundation provided by the structures of intersubjectivity for a practical and emancipatory interest in knowledge, on the other. There was also the problem of the dissimilarity between technological and practical interest in knowledge, whose fundamental value for the reproduction of the human species was obvious, and an emancipatory interest in knowledge where there was apparently more at stake than reproduction and self-preservation, namely the possibility of humane existence in freedom and dignity. If an `interest of reason in human adulthood, in the autonomy of action and in the liberation from dogmatism'80 was one of the foundations for the reproduction of the *human* species, must it not also have some influence on the technological and practical interest in knowledge?

Habermas's reaction to these and other problems was to substitute the project of a critical theory of society based on communication theory, in place of his attempt at justifying and approaching the critical theory of society through the anthropology of knowledge. Taking people's speaking and acting with one another as his starting-point, he attempted to show that the anticipation of undistorted communication was the condition of possibility for communicative action that is, action aiming to achieve understanding. His friend, the philosopher Karl-Otto Apel, provided Habermas with vital suggestions pointing in this direction. The idealizations identified within the framework of a universal pragmatics as conditions of possibility for linguistic communication were to be seen as norms that allowed for a justification of criticism that was no longer bound to historical traditions. Critical theory would then be able to confront vital idealizations with the real life-process of society. Some years later, the point of view for a critical theory of society capable of finding its justification in universal pragmatic terms was given the following vivid formulation in *Legitimation Crisis*:

How would the members of a social system, at a given stage in the development of productive forces, have collectively and bindingly interpreted their needs (and which norms would they have accepted as justified) if they could and would have decided on organization of social intercourse through discursive will-formation, with adequate knowledge of the limiting conditions and functional imperatives of their society?  
81

*Technology and Science as 'Ideology'* was a continuation of the discussion of the decay of the bond between technology and the social life-world that had been present in Habermas's first analyses of the pathology of the modern world, of distortive enlightenment, analyses in which Habermas, as a student of Rothacker<sup>82</sup> and to a certain extent of Heidegger as well, had gathered together a complex variety of motifs. Habermas attempted to define, in a more precise fashion than Max Weber and Herbert Marcuse before him, the phenomenon according to which the rational form of science and technology—the rationality embodied in systems of purposive action—was expanding to become the historical totality of a life-form. Weber had interpreted this as a process of 'rationalization' paralleling the process of 'demystification' of traditions; Marcuse had attempted to define it as a fusion of technology and power.

Technology as power—the foremost characteristic of this was that power, by seeming to have taken on the shape of scientific rationality and technological necessity, appeared unassailable. Marxist theory had once regarded the force that would burst the fetters of the outmoded relations of production as lying in the productive forces themselves; but science and technology, which had become the primary productive force, appeared in the meantime to have become the mainstays of the dominant relations of production. The old observation of Critical Theory—that the capitalist form of society was continuing to function, no matter what the cost, and that most members of society therefore felt they had closer links with the existing system than with the possibility of a better society—had taken the discouraging form, in Marcuse, of the diagnosis that scientific and technological progress not merely justified the dominant relations of production as functionally necessary but also aimed to achieve power itself.

In contrast to Weber and Marcuse, Habermas thought the transformation of the rationality of science and technology into the historical totality was not an unstoppable, self-justifying process, but instead was a process that was exacerbating the problems. To provide a background, he sketched a history of social evolution, the main theme of which was the problem that the distribution of wealth and power was unequal but nevertheless legitimate. In traditional societies, this problem was solved through political power being accompanied by world-pictures which gave, even to those who had to suppress more of their needs than

was necessary, a sense that they were participating in a form of life that aimed to provide the greatest possible measure of satisfactory, benign coexistence. Under capitalism, the economy, technology and science were to a great extent released from being tied into the framework of political power that had been supported by traditional world-pictures. The ideology of free and fair exchange, demystified but still based on ideas of benign coexistence, became the crucial legitimation for the social system. In Habermas's eyes, two tendencies were decisive for advanced capitalism: the growth of interventionist activity by the state in order to shore up a social system which tended to correspond less and less to the ideology of free and fair exchange, and which was plagued with crises; and the development of science and technology to become the primary productive force. Following the undermining of traditional forms of legitimation, the ground was now also being swept away from under bourgeois ideologies as well, while the extent and complexity of the `subsystems of purposive activity' were increasing. The interventionist state now sought to satisfy its need for legitimation through a `substitute programme' by sustaining a system that offered social security and upward mobility in proportion to achievement. In order to be able to ensure this, and thus assure the loyalty of the masses to the capitalist form of society, considerable scope was required for manipulation through state intervention, extending deep into social and private life. This, in its turn, increased the state's need for legitimation all the more.

The problem that arose was: how to make plausible, to citizens of a democracy, the avoidance of any public discussion of practical goals and the fact that the actions of those in power were being guided solely by a search for answers to technological and administrative questions. It was an advantage to those in power that the vast increase in the extent and complexity of economy, technology and science made it easier to create the impression that laws immanent to these spheres were producing a sheer force of events that politics must simply obey, in order to continue to provide its substitute programme. Just as the exclusion of questions of practical and educational relevance from the sciences was no problem at all for scientific philosophies of science, the technocratic illusion became, for the depoliticized mass of the population, a justification for their depoliticization and for their exclusion from decision-making processes that had important consequences for society as a whole.

*Technology and Science as `Ideology'* this was a way of saying that technocratic consciousness was less ideological than previous ideologies and at the same time, therefore, more harmful. It was no longer possible to trace it back to any fundamental motif of just interaction, of interaction that was free from relations of domination.

What is reflected in the technocratic consciousness is not the dislocation of a moral connection, but the ousting of `morality' as a

category of existential relations as such. The positivist sense of community puts out of action the referential system of colloquial interaction in which the forms of power and ideology that arise under conditions of distorted communication can be exposed through a reflexive process. The depoliticization of the mass of the population, which finds its legitimation in a technocratic consciousness, is at the same time a self-objectification of humanity in categories that are those of purposive action and of adaptive behaviour in equal measure: the reified models of the sciences find their way into the sociocultural life-world, and acquire objective power over the view humanity has of itself. The ideological core of this consciousness lies in the elimination of the distinction between practice and technology, a mirror image but not the definition of the new pattern of relations that has arisen between an institutional framework that has been deprived of power, on the one hand, and a system of purposive action that has taken on a life of its own, on the other. 83

In *Technology and Science as 'Ideology'*, Habermas abruptly contrasted this analysis, which in no respect failed to match the gloomy diagnoses of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *One-Dimensional Man* and the notion of the 'administered world', with an alternative one:

Rationalization at the level of the institutional framework can only take place through the medium of linguistically mediated interaction itself, namely by releasing the barriers to communication. Public and unimpeded communication, free from relations of domination, concerning the appropriateness and desirability of principles and standards that can serve as guides to action, in the light of the sociocultural repercussions of subsystems of purposive action that are continuing to develop communication of this sort at every level of the political and repoliticized processes of forming a consensus is the only medium in which something approaching 'rationalization' is possible. 84

The student movement, as a force for protest pressing for the politicization of a public sphere that had become desiccated, did not yet in any sense indicate a process whereby state-regulated capitalism produced an exacerbation of problems it could not solve.

Even in his debate with Niklas Luhmann, Habermas only asserted that the new mode of legitimation would derive from the protective mechanism represented by an alternative to ideologies of bourgeois or even pre-bourgeois origin that had lost their credibility, an alternative that was increasingly imposing itself in complex societies.

The alternative that is emerging is a democratization of all decision-making processes that are of consequence to society as a whole.

For the first time in world history, these decision-making processes would replace legitimation in its sense of spurious justification, and would allow standards of action legitimately claiming validity to be taken seriously and have their claims either proved or dismissed by means of discourse. 85

It was only in *Legitimation Crisis*, published in 1973, that Habermas began to think he had discovered more than merely a weak point in state-regulated capitalism here.

The structural dissimilarity between areas of administrative action and areas of cultural tradition constitutes, then, a systematic limit to attempts to compensate for legitimation deficits through conscious manipulation. Of course, a crisis argument can be constructed from this only in connection with the broader point that the expansion of state activity produces the side effect of a disproportionate increase in the need for legitimation. I consider a disproportionate increase probable, not only because the expansion of administratively processed matters makes necessary mass loyalty for new functions of state activity, but because the boundaries of the political system *vis-à-vis* the cultural system shift as a result of this expansion. In this situation, cultural affairs that were taken for granted, and that were previously boundary conditions for the political system, fall into the administrative planning area. Thus, traditions withheld from the public problematic, and all the more from practical discourses, are thematized.

But as soon as cultural traditions were applied strategically they lost their power, which could only be preserved through a critical assimilation of the tradition, to the extent that its claims to validity could be proved through discourse.

At every level, administrative planning produces unintended unsettling and publicizing effects. These effects weaken the justification potential of traditions that have been flushed out of their nature-like course of development. Once their unquestionable character has been destroyed, the stabilization of validity claims can succeed only through discourse. The stirring up of cultural affairs that are taken for granted thus furthers the politicization of areas of life previously assigned to the private sphere. But this development signifies danger for the civil privatism that is secured informally through the structures of the public realm. Efforts at participation and the plethora of alternative models especially in cultural spheres such as school and university, press, church, theatre, publishing, etc. are indicators of this danger, as is the increasing number of citizens' initiatives. 86

A policy of maintaining the latency of the class structure seemed bound to undermine itself, since increasing state intervention in the sociocultural sphere clearly had the effect of destroying cultural traditions and diminishing meaningfulness, and these effects could not be offset indefinitely through social compensations and the provision of consumable values. Habermas's analysis of late capitalism thus led to a more precise restatement of an old theme of Critical Theory, that total socialization of society (*Vergesellschaftung der Gesellschaft*) would stifle its own base. On the basis of his distinction between technology and praxis, out of which his later distinction between system and life-world was to develop, Habermas attempted to link a more pointed version of the older Critical Theory's critique of society with a crisis theory that relieved Critical Theory of some of its tendency to produce discouragement.

Habermas had sharply criticized the protest movement, because of the significance his own interpretation attributed to it. The direction in which he now restated more precisely his distinction between technology and praxis, however, and linked it to current social tendencies, had been indicated to him before the protest movement arose. What he took from the protest movement and its continuations in various forms local grassroots groups, the alternative movement, the women's movement, citizens' initiatives of every sort was that there were good grounds for assuming that a peculiar form of rationalization in the dimension of praxis existed, and that what mattered was to strengthen this peculiar form of rationalization through collaboration between the critical theory of society and protest against technocratic reforms.

Adorno was defiant in his interview with *Der Spiegel* in May 1969, when he declared himself in favour of the ivory tower and of work on an aesthetics, as if it would genuinely have been impossible for the events of the previous years to have made any impression on his work whatsoever. But had there really not been any change or redefinition in his concept of an informal music, and an informal literature, sociology and philosophy, as a result of the protest movement? Were there elements in Adorno that were less systematic, but perhaps also less regimented, than in Habermas, elements capable of assimilating current experiences inspired by the urge to give an account of art, and of the possibility of art, today' 87 in a period in which cultural revolution and the transcendence and abolition of art were on the agenda even in the culture industry?

*Negative Dialectics* began with the words 'Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.' Similarly, *Aesthetic Theory* stated that 'The moment it is forbidden, the moment it is decreed that it should cease to exist, art regains, in the midst of the administered world, that right to existence whose denial itself resembles an administrative act.' 88 The iconoclasm that sprang up during the student movement drew on Western associations with the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' and on the Dadaist and Surrealist

traditions, as well as Marcuse's critique of the 'affirmative character of culture' in his *ZfS* article of 1937 and Benjamin's 1936 essay on the work of art. Iconoclasm of this sort alarmed Adorno, since he regarded it as a parody of the transcendence of art and as an abolition of art which was trapped in the illusion that decisive changes were immediately possible and which destroyed the chances for a radicalizing transformation of art. Adorno never understood why since 1967 there had been criticism of the edition of Benjamin's works that he had brought out during the 1950s, and why he had been accused of suppressing the materialist Benjamin, the Benjamin who defended the decisive role of art in the class struggle. The 'Marxist' Benjamin had always appeared to Adorno to be something un-Benjaminian that could only be explained by Brecht's influence, an anti-art trait that did not suit Benjamin.

In Adorno's early contribution to the *ZfS*, there had been a sentimental sense of uninterrupted enlightenment: music that was enlightened and had, in its own sphere, achieved complete domination over nature was to be a provocation for unenlightened society. In the *Philosophy of Modern Music* he had pinned his hopes on the invigorating barbaric element in the dodecaphonic Schoenberg, who had returned to a sense of order. In 'The Ageing of the New Music' 89 he had been sceptical towards post-war developments in serial music. In *Vers une musique informelle* he had made a plea for a new, post-serial departure in music. *Aesthetic Theory*, after all this, now became a *summa* which defended the project of modern art as no other theory of art in the postwar period had a period in which the heroic phase of modern art seemed to have irrevocably faded into the past. But what was this to mean? Did Adorno, at the end of the 1960s, see any progress beyond the Schoenberg school, beyond Joyce, beyond Picasso, any realization of a genuinely free art that had been made possible by an even more radical liberation from tradition? What prospects did Adorno open up for a contemporary artist? How did Adorno himself come to terms with the jumble of possible standards by which to judge works of art that he had by now introduced: quality; degree of technical advancement; idiosyncrasy in contrast to everything traditional; richness in meaning, i.e. in what was written, composed, painted; content in terms of the philosophy of history; truth content; opposition that had been given form; degree of freedom? Had the protest movement caused Adorno, no matter how little he cared to admit it, to change his view of the general condition of late capitalist society and, in turn, to change his view of the opportunities and dangers facing art, which corresponded to the general condition of society in a manner that was difficult to comprehend? Would it have been possible for *Aesthetic Theory* to act as a corrective against rash cultural-revolutionary endeavours in the protest movement and to strengthen the critique of the neutralization of culture that the protest movement contained?

The answers Adorno gave to questions like these demonstrated his

enthusiasm for modern art in general and his puzzlement with the most recent modern art, his understanding of frustrating phases in art's development and also his fixation on a route of progress in art that led precisely to frustrating results. By analogy with a central theme of his more narrowly philosophical work that an abstract element must never be allowed to become completely separate from the element from which it had been abstracted he explained the secret of convincing modern works of art by the fact that they never totally emancipated themselves from the things they were abolishing.

The pre-artistic level of art is at the same time a reminiscence of its anticultural trait, its suspicion of its own antithesis to the empirical world that leaves the empirical world undisturbed. Significant works of art nevertheless strive to incorporate this level, one that is inimical to art, within themselves. Where it is lacking, out of a fear of being infantile where the spiritual chamber musician lacks the last trace of the café fiddler, or an illusion-free drama has nothing of the magic of the stage art has capitulated. The curtain rises full of promise even over Beckett's *Endgame*; plays and production methods that leave the curtain out are trying to deny their very natures using a clumsy trick. In fact, the moment the curtain rises is one in which an apparition is expected. If Beckett's plays, in the grey that remains after the setting of the sun or after the end of the world, hope to exorcise the bright colours of the circus, they nevertheless remain true to the circus to the extent that they occur on stage, and we know how much their antiheroes were inspired by clowns and slapstick films. Despite all their austerity, the plays in no way try to do without costumes and scenery . . . and in general, it is questionable whether even the most abstract paintings, in their materials and visual organization, do not still contain remnants of representationalism that disable them. 90

What Adorno saw as the explanation for Beckett's greatness was, in his view, at the same time characteristic of previous climaxes of art, the late works of pre-modern artists.

Without a reminiscence of contradiction and non-identity, harmony would be aesthetically irrelevant . . . If one were to see the anti-harmonic gestures of Michelangelo, of the later Rembrandt, or of Beethoven's final period, as deriving from the dynamics of the concept of harmony itself and ultimately from its insufficiency instead of deriving from a subjectively passionate development, it would hardly be an inappropriate generalization of matters that diverge too widely in terms of the philosophy of history. Dissonance is the truth about harmony. If harmony is taken in

the strictest sense, it proves to be unattainable in terms of its own criteria. The desiderata for it can only be satisfied if this unattainability comes to appear as part of its essence as in the so-called late style of significant artists. 91

There were thus two closely related elements which, in Adorno's view, were characteristic of great modern art: a growing fragility in those illusions that were still maintained, and the consequent opening afforded to what had once been excluded. Where these two elements were genuinely combined, modern art had a bitter beauty and an aggressive melancholy.

What the aesthetic hedonism that has survived the catastrophes condemns as a perversion in the postulation of a sombre element for example in the way that the Surrealists raised black humour to programmatic status is the fact that the most sombre elements of art are expected to excite a kind of pleasure. But this signifies nothing more than that art, and a correct sense of its felicity, are only found in a capacity to stand firm. This felicity radiates from within into the work's perceptible appearance. Just as the spirit of harmonious works communicates itself to even the most obdurate phenomenon, so the sombre element, since Baudelaire, has become attractive, even sensuously, as an antithesis to the deceptions of culture's sensuous façade. There is more pleasure in dissonance than in consonance: and this repays hedonism in due measure. What is incisive is dynamically sharpened, differentiated from itself and from the monotony of affirmativeness, and becomes an attraction. This attraction, no less than a disgust with optimistic nonsense, leads the new art into a no-man's-land that represents the inhabitable earth. This aspect of the modern was realized for the first time in Schoenberg's *Pierrot lunaire*, in which a crystalline, imaginary essence combines with a totality of dissonance. Negation is able to transform itself into pleasure, not into what is positive. 92

However, Beckett and Celan, the only contemporary artists whom Adorno acknowledged without reservation, with their indulgent inclusion of the rudiments of the older forms they were negating, and with the density of their texts that was increased by the inclusion of what had formerly been suppressed, were in terms of Adorno's own standards in the philosophy of history not, as artists, contemporaries of Adorno himself but of Schoenberg, Picasso and Joyce, contemporaries of heroic modernism. Adorno's real contemporaries were presented as more advanced and poorer, and he had nothing more to say about them than that they lacked the richness of the Beckettian atom, or that art really did seem to have come to an end in them, although they must persistently continue it.

What is qualitatively new about the most recent developments in art may be that, as a result of its allergy towards harmonizations, it is even attempting to eliminate them as having already been negated. Truly a negation of the negation, this leads to the fatal flaw in any such procedure: a self-satisfied transition to a new positivity, the lack of tension observed in so many of the paintings and musical pieces of the decades following the war. False positivity is the technological location of the loss of meaning. What was perceived during the heroic periods of modern art as being its meaning maintained the elements of order as determined; liquidating them results, in effect, in a frictionless, empty identity.

And:

This development may well lead to an exacerbation of the sensual taboo, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish how much this taboo is based on the law of form and how much it is simply due to failures of competence . . . Ultimately, the sensual taboo even extends to encompass the opposite of what is pleasing, because, even at the greatest distance, a sense of its specific negation is shared. To achieve this form of reaction, dissonance forces its way too close to its corollary, reconciliation; it rejects an apparent humaneness that is the ideology of inhumanity, and prefers to take sides with reified consciousness. Dissonance cools to become indifferent matter; although it is a new form of immediacy, with no trace of a memory of that from which it grew, it is deaf and without quality. 93

But if the continuing removal of all remnants of the past from the material of art, which had been welcomed by Adorno in *Vers une musique informelle*, had not brought about any increase in the freedom of art towards its object, in its strength to break through the 'mimetic taboo', in its capacity to assimilate what was outlawed and forbidden why, then, did he nevertheless maintain that only by taking this line would it be possible to follow the precept that one must be absolutely modern, that one must seek out the new?

The fact that (works of art) seem to be growing more indifferent cannot be explained merely by a decrease in their social effectiveness. There is some evidence that the works lose their coefficient of friction, an element essential to them, when they turn towards their own pure immanence: that they are also becoming more indifferent in themselves. The fact that radically abstract paintings can be hung in official reception rooms without causing offence does not, however, justify any restoration of a representationalism that is pleasant a priori, even if Che Guevara is selected for the purposes of reconciliation with the object. 94

But was representationality really merely complacent, a priori? Had it not often enough been uncomfortable too? Had abstract painting not become the dominant trend in painting in West Germany precisely for political reasons, because modern representationality might easily have caused discomfort? Were the differences between various forms of representational painting merely the result of differences in the objects being represented? The casual way in which Adorno dismissed every kind of representational painting as conformist restoration can only be explained as an effect of the undertow of a mentality that expected sudden change: as an expectation that sudden change would result from a mimesis of gloom, in an all too literal sense. But Adorno himself remarked, 'It cannot generally be distinguished whether someone who abandons all forms of expression is a medium of reified consciousness or represents a speechless, expressionless expression that denounces that reification.'<sup>95</sup> But what was it that made the difference in any particular case? Precisely the difference between this and a perfect mimesis of reification that was Adorno's reason for regarding Beckett and Celan so highly. His evaluation of these two figures might have shown him that art does not progress according to the formula 'You can't do that any more' but instead according to the formula 'You can't do it like that any more'. If the discussion of progress in art was not to be reduced in advance to a demand for art to become mute, cold and indifferent, and ultimately self-eradicating, then the possibility of progress must be seen in a broader sense, more hesitantly, with more openness to the qualities of everything in art that was capable of holding its own under current conditions.

In addition to the undertow of a mentality that expected sudden change, another element reinforcing the persistence with which Adorno defended a concept of progress in modern art that was based on cleansing it of everything that was either traditional or alien to art, with no regard for either quality or content, was his peculiar concept of nature and of reconciliation with nature.

In fact, as a result of the spiritualization that it has undergone during the past two centuries, and which has emancipated it, art has not alienated itself from nature as reified consciousness would have it but has instead approximated itself to natural beauty in accordance with its own form . . . Art attempts, using human means, to make what is not human speak. The pure expression of works of art, freed from reifying disturbances, as well as from so-called natural materials, converges with nature, just as, in the most authentic creations of Anton Webern, the pure sound to which these works reduce themselves, by force of their subjective sensibility, transforms itself into natural sound. Admittedly, it is the sound of a nature that has become eloquent; it is the language of nature, not merely the reflection of a part of it. The subjective

transformation of art as a non-conceptual language is, in a state of rationality, the only shape in which something approaching the language of creation is reflected with the paradox that the reflection is distorted. Art attempts to imitate an expression that would not involve any intrusion from human intention. Human intention is merely its vehicle. The more perfect the work of art, the more intentions drop away from it. Mediatly, nature is the truth content of art, but immediately it produces its opposite. If the language of nature is silent, art strives to bring what is silent to speak. Failure to achieve this is exposed by an insuperable contradiction between this idea, which demands desperate effort, and the idea towards which that effort is directed, which is one of utter involuntariness. 96

The critique of man's domination over nature, and the critique of the administered society, were linked together in *Aesthetic Theory* in more detail than in earlier works to form a critique of a society which, through its reified structures, was refusing nature the socially mediated achievement of serenity it was longing for. It was the linking of these two themes that gave Adorno's philosophy of aesthetics like his philosophy of society, his philosophy of history and his epistemology its pathos. It was from this linkage that Adorno's claim was derived that he was engaged in, or supporting, enlightened enlightenment. The moral of Adorno's philosophy of art, and of the continuation of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that he was carrying out in *Aesthetic Theory*, was: works of art were all protohistories of subjectivity that were striving in an enlightened way to accomplish enlightenment.

The language [of works of art] is, in relation to significative language, something older, but it has not been fully realized: as if art works, having adapted themselves to the subject in their structuring, were performing a repetition of the way in which this structuring arises, or is wrested out. They possess expression not where they communicate the subject, but where they tremble before the protohistory of subjectivity, which is one of inspiration (*Beseelung*) . . . This describes the affinity which the work of art has with the subject. This affinity is a lasting one precisely because that protohistory survives within the subject. Throughout history, it is constantly recommencing. Only the subject can serve as an instrument of expression no matter how mediate it is, though it imagines itself to be immediate. Where what is expressed still resembles the subject; where the stimuli are subjective, they are simultaneously apersonal, influencing the integration of the ego but not subsumed into it. The expression of works of art is the non-subjective element of the subject, not so much its own expression (*Ausdruck*), but rather the impression (*Abdruck*) it makes. There is nothing as expressive as the eyes of animals apes which

objectively seem to lament the fact that they are not human. When stimuli are transposed into works of art, and by dint of the works' integrative capacity are assimilated into them, they remain, within the aesthetic continuum, tokens of an extra-aesthetic nature. Although, as their after-images, they are no longer physically present. This ambivalence is registered in every genuinely aesthetic experience, and is incomparably expressed in Kant's description of the sense of the sublime as being something that trembles within itself between nature and freedom. 97

But this concept of art could only encompass its deep structure. If it were made an immediate criterion of progress in art, the potential for new forms of artistic reaction would be unilaterally reduced to a dialectical 'progress' of society, the manifestations of which would be unpredictable.

In Adorno himself, two factors repeatedly came into serious conflict: on the one hand, his conviction that the development of modern art contained a logic that could be formulated in categories such as intellectualism, thorough articulation, etc.; and, on the other, general considerations on art as such, in which art was seen as not necessarily progressive, but rather as reacting to subterranean historical stimuli, and as revolving around a goal it could never reach.

Ultimately, works of art are enigmatic not in their composition, but in their truth content. The ever-recurring question with which any work of art releases one who has passed through it 'What does it all mean?' becomes a 'But is it true?', a question that seeks the absolute. Every work of art reacts to this question by relinquishing discursive responses. The taboo on the answer is the last information released by discursive thought. In a form of mimetic resistance to this taboo, art tries to give the answer, but since it must remain impartial, it fails to do so; and it therefore becomes as enigmatic as the horrors of the primitive world, which have not disappeared, but merely transformed themselves. All art remains a seismogram of these horrors . . . The external shape in which this enigmatic quality can be conceived is the question of whether or not meaning itself exists. For there is no work of art that lacks a context, even if this varies to the extent of turning into its opposite. Through the objectivity of its structure, however, the context lays claim to the objectivity of meaning as such. Not only can this claim not be justified, it is even contradicted by experience. The enigmatic quality gazes forth from each work of art in a different fashion, but as if the answer, like that of the sphinx, were always the same even if only in being different, rather than in the unity that the enigma, perhaps deceptively, promises. Whether this promise is deceptive or not: that is the enigma. 98

As distinct from philosophy, art contained a hidden promise of happiness. It achieved what negative-dialectical philosophy was striving for: that 'something objective can be revealed by subjective effort'.<sup>99</sup> But it could achieve this only at the cost of illusoriness. That was why every philosophy of art must at the same time be a critique of it. This was also true with regard to radical works of modern art, which preserved illusion willy-nilly by making breakdown their constitutive principle. But if works of art did not also provide a pre-conceptual fulfilment of what negative-dialectical philosophy was attempting to achieve through concepts, they at least stiffened its motivation by forcing it to reflect 'on the question of how they, being figures of what is existent, and incapable of summoning the non-existent into existence, could themselves become an overwhelming image of what is non-existent unless the non-existent were indeed also present in itself'.<sup>100</sup>

There could be no question of Adorno having merely translated theory into an aesthetic form. If art was the refuge of the mimetic, 'the theory' was the guarantee of conceptual knowledge. The head of human emancipation is philosophy, its heart the proletariat Marx asserted. He also said: the realization of philosophy and the transcendence of the proletariat are only possible through each other.<sup>101</sup> Philosophy and art, too, could become superfluous only jointly, if at all, in a liberated society. For the rest, they were partners, standing back to back as symbols of a union of mimesis and reason, of an enlightened enlightenment, both in threatened positions, both concerned with shaking up rigidified forms of perception and behaviour, both aiming to sustain or reawaken a sense of wonder.

In his 1962 essay on commitment, Adorno had taken the view that 'The obstruction of genuine politics here and now, the ossification of relations, which nowhere show any tendency towards softening, force the spirit to go where it has no need to coarsen itself', that is to works of art, whose task it was 'silently to record what is barred from politics'. It was this that he had seen as the social and political justification for the emphasis he had put on the autonomy of the work of art. And this was still how he saw it at the end of the 1960s. He had no confidence in cultural-revolutionary aspirations which wanted to transcend and abolish art without even knowing anything about it. Therefore he could not identify a single goal of the protest movement that would have permitted him to play the role of someone attempting to correct its deviations from that goal. Where Habermas saw room for a model of democratization based on the domination-free communication that took place among scholars, Adorno could not see any room for the expression of the non-identical. Where Habermas, as a critical philosopher of science, had hopes of a democratic reform of the universities, Adorno saw no hope of modern art becoming the stimulus for an enlightened enlightenment. At a period in which science and technology had become the primary productive force, Habermas, with his interests in

science and university reform, seemed to be the more realistic of the two. However, precisely because of the significance of science and technology, the chances of change in this area were all the smaller.

There was a desperate hope in the way Adorno counted on the shattering power of a form of art that was constantly, as a result of its aporetic state, being driven further forward and increasingly weakened, and which was being taken less and less seriously in society. But there was no less desperation in Habermas's hope for an alliance between new forms arising in the political public sphere and the guiding, self-reflective power of science in particular, which was being used by society more and more selectively, and more and more insistently, as a productive force and as an ideology, and whose educative and reflective disciplines or variants were being marginalized into an 'autonomous' and irrelevant role similar to that to which art had long since been assigned. The shift in paradigms from the philosophy of the subject and the utopia of a reconciliation between mind and nature, to the theory of communicative action and the utopia of exhausting the normative content of action that was based on consensus promised a new perspective on society and history, one that would for the first time make possible a systematic perception of progress in the approach to the creation of a human race that could achieve consensus about its essential goals without fear of domination if such a human race was possible. Adorno's approach was not taken up into the new paradigm, nor was it supposed to have been, since Habermas considered it essentially mistaken. Some of the significance Adorno attributed to art later found its way into Habermas's assumption that a rationalization of the life-world was taking place as a result of the potential of science and philosophy for interpreting both the world and themselves, as a result of the potential for enlightenment provided by strictly universalist concepts of law and morality, and as a result of the radical experiences of modernism in aesthetics. The fact that not only art, but all three dimensions, embodied such a promise was a plausible idea. What was not plausible, however, was the exclusion of a further dimension which played an important part for Adorno: the beauty of nature. Another question was also disregarded, one which had not yet been reduced to insignificance by being raised and emphasized by a restricted paradigm: the question of the relationship between the domination of external nature and internal, corporeal nature and the connection between the domination of nature and social conditions. This was a problem which had yet to be examined with a degree of concreteness and a degree of saturation in the subject-matter that Adorno and Horkheimer had never attempted.

Adorno's death was a caesura. Fromm was still alive but the estrangement between him and the other members of the Horkheimer circle had never ceased. During the 1950s he and Marcuse had once again sharply criticized one another. Marcuse had accused Fromm of

adopting a guru-like position. Lowenthal was still alive but during the 1950s Horkheimer and Adorno had broken with him as a result of his attempts to claim pension rights from the Institute. Up till 1956, Lowenthal had lived in the Institute's old New York office, which was kept going until the end of the 1960s by Horkheimer's former secretary in New York, Alice Maier, since Horkheimer wanted to maintain a base in the USA. In 1956 Lowenthal became a professor at the prestigious university at Berkeley. Horkheimer was still alive but as someone who had distanced himself from his past, and for whom talk of a longing for what was utterly different, which fascinated theologians, was linked with a denial of every chance of achieving social conditions in which human beings could simultaneously live in freedom, equality and solidarity. Marcuse was still alive, and Horkheimer's remark that Marcuse's fame was based on ideas 'that are coarser and simpler than those of Adorno and myself' 102 contained in addition to a nasty dig at someone who had once been loyal to him and who was no longer satisfied with mere complaints about the administered world a recognition that there was considerable intellectual common ground between them. But Marcuse was not the focus of an institutionally based school of thought. Adorno's death was thus the end of a form of Critical Theory, no matter how disunified it had been, which had uniquely centred on the Institute of Social Research, as its outward form, and on an urge for discovery that had its roots in anti-bourgeois sentiment and in a sense of having a mission to criticize society. The fact that the younger members of the Institute all left Frankfurt within two or three years only underlined the significance of the break that Adorno's death represented. Friedeburg became Minister of Culture in the state of Hesse in 1969, and took up the struggle for educational reform at the administrative level. Negt became Professor of Sociology in Hanover in 1970. In 1971 Habermas accepted an appointment as director of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Living Conditions in the Scientific and Technological World at Starnberg, near Munich, hoping to be able to put into practice there the concept of interdisciplinary work on theory which he saw no chance of developing in the Institute of Social Research, although he had been offered a co-directorship of it. He wrote to Horkheimer in 1971:

I do not need to tell you how much the scene has changed since Adorno's death. I have two reasons for going to Starnberg. On the one hand, there are very generous research opportunities for me there. I can fill fifteen research posts, and can freely choose what projects to undertake within fairly broad financial limits. Here in Frankfurt, by contrast, there has never been any realistic chance of joining the Institute of Social Research with the assistants with whom I should like to work. The other reason is that the future sociology faculty is to be burdened with the task of carrying out the basic training of teachers, lawyers and economists. If I were

to remain here, I would have to give all my energies to this admittedly urgent task. 103

The only one to remain was Alfred Schmidt, in a sense the specialist in materialist philosophy of the younger generation (who later became administrator of the Horkheimer estate, together with Joseph Maier, a student and associate of Horkheimer's from the New York period).

And the Institute of Social Research? Even during Adorno's lifetime, the decision had been taken to concentrate on trade union research as the main focus of its future work. The course that was to be followed had therefore already been laid down, and the work was carried out after 1969 with almost entirely new staff. In 1971 the twenty-second volume of the 'Frankfurt Contributions to Sociology' series edited by Adorno and Friedeburg was published: Michaela von Freyhold's *Authoritarianism and Political Apathy: Analysis of a Scale for Establishing Behaviour Forms Linked to Authority*.<sup>104</sup> The series was then discontinued. After 1974 only the results of trade union research and Institute studies on industrial labour were published. On the one hand, there were no more theoreticians; on the other, there were no more research contracts. Aside from regular grants from the city and the state, the Institute finances itself from national research funds linked to specific projects.<sup>105</sup>

## Afterword

At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Critical Theory more or less ceased to serve as a guide for the protest movements. Some groups turned to orthodox forms of Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism-Stalinism-Maoism, others turned away from theory altogether. Otherwise, a period of reformism seemed to have started. The younger representatives of Critical Theory scattered in all directions, and continued to exercise an influence from more established positions. But as early as 1972 the first signs of the end of the Federal Republic's spring were already evident. At the beginning of 1972 the Social Democratic Chancellor, Willy Brandt, together with the prime ministers of the Federal German states, passed a ban on radical teachers and civil servants. 1 The ban was intended to prevent 'extremist' representatives of a critical generation of students from engaging in a 'long march through the institutions', but it soon led to practices of screening and exclusion from Civil Service professions that went out of control. The term 'Frankfurt School' continued to be a familiar concept in Germany, and was used as a handy label from the years of student revolt onwards by those who liked to attribute dissatisfaction, protest, efforts towards radical reform and terrorist activity to incitement by the intellectual seducers of youth. In 1977 the murders occurred of the Chief Federal Prosecutor, Siegfried Buback, and his driver; of Jürgen Ponto, the chairman of the board of the Dresdner Bank; and of the bodyguards of the kidnapped president of the federations representing German industry, Hans-Martin Schleyer, who was himself killed on 16 October.2 In the same month, the Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Hans Filbinger, and the chairman of the CDU in the state of Hesse, Alfred Dregger the former in a speech given at the celebrations for the 500th anniversary of the University of Tübingen, and the latter in a Bavarian television programme that was broadcast throughout Germany by the television station ARD both declared the Frankfurt School to be one of the causes of the terrorism. Terrorism, and the demand for an intellectual and political analysis of its roots, became an excuse for the defamation of its so-called sympathizers and of those who criticized society and talked about socialism.

Conservative academics, and those who had turned conservative, felt that the day of reckoning had come for left-wing intellectuals in general, and for the Frankfurt School in particular.

Günther Rohrmoser was a social philosopher employed by Filbinger, who, as a judge at a naval court martial during the last days of the Second World War, had pronounced a scandalous death sentence which he defended during the 1970s by saying that what was the law then could not be injustice today. Since the publication in 1970 of his book *The Poverty of Critical Theory*,<sup>3</sup> Rohrmoser has promulgated, in constantly varying forms, the view that Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer were the terrorists' intellectual foster-parents, who were using cultural revolution to destroy the traditions of the Christian West. Academics such as Ernst Topitsch and Kurt Sontheimer, who saw themselves as educators and liberal democrats, followed in Rohrmoser's footsteps. In 1972 Topitsch, a critical rationalist who was Professor of Philosophy in Graz, had stated that behind the slogans of 'rational discussion' and 'dialogue free of domination' there was being established at the universities 'a distinct terrorism of political convictions such as has never existed before, even under Nazi tyranny'.<sup>4</sup> Sontheimer, who came to prominence during the 1960s with his study of *Anti-Democratic Thought in the Weimar Republic*,<sup>5</sup> declared during the 1970s that left-wing revolutionary theories were the breeding-ground for terrorism,<sup>6</sup> and considered the Federal Republic to be threatened by left-wing ideas in precisely the same way that the Weimar Republic had been threatened by anti-democratic right-wing ideas. In 1978 Henning Günther, a student of Rohrmoser's who was now Professor of Education at Cologne, published with others a crude pamphlet that presented itself as an academic analysis, under the title *The Violence of Negation: Critical Theory and its Consequences*.<sup>7</sup> The book gave voice to a view that was being widely taken among professors and politicians. As in the first phase of restoration in the Federal Republic, in this second phase too the measures taken to combat unconstitutional forms of opposition were imperceptibly extended to include measures against the legal opposition as well. Conservative anti-democrats denigrated every effort at reform as a deviation from the 'fundamental free democratic order', and were often supported in this by 'liberals' who supported a 'militant democracy' and a strong state, such as Werner Maihofer, then Minister of the Interior.

In a climate like this, when the award of the Theodor W. Adorno Prize to Habermas by the Christian Democrat Mayor of Frankfurt, Walter Wallmann, already looked like an attempt to counteract the 'declaration of civil hostilities', Claus Offe and Albrecht Wellmer, and above all Jürgen Habermas and Oskar Negt, the most prominent of the younger Critical Theorists, held fast to Critical Theory. Since the terms 'Frankfurt School' and 'Critical Theory' had never corresponded to any uniform phenomenon, there was also no question of a decline, as long as essential elements of everything that could be regarded as forming

part of Critical Theory were being further developed in forms relevant to the current period. The inseparability of concepts such as Frankfurt School, Critical Theory and neo-Marxism indicates that, from the 1930s onwards, theoretically productive left-wing ideas in German-speaking countries had focused on Horkheimer, Adorno and the Institute of Social Research while other individual figures such as Ernst Bloch, Günther Anders or Ulrich Sonnemann must be seen in relation to this focus. The best way of defining the Frankfurt School is surely to use the term to refer to the period of the older Critical Theory, for which the Institute of Social Research, headed by Horkheimer and Adorno, is a kind of institutional symbol. The concept of Critical Theory, in contrast, should be taken in a broader sense distinct from the focus of Horkheimer, Adorno and the Institute of Social Research to refer to a form of thought that is committed to the abolition of domination and that stands in a Marxist tradition open to a wide variety of associations. The expressions of this thought range from Adorno's anti-systematic, essayistic style of thought to Horkheimer's project of an interdisciplinary social theory.

These two poles have been impressively and originally represented, since the 1970s, by Habermas and Negt. At the Max Planck Institute for Research on Living Conditions in the Scientific and Technological World, in Starnberg, near Munich the University of Munich refused him an honorary professorship Habermas attempted to take up seriously once again the programme of an interdisciplinary social theory. When he returned to Frankfurt ten years later to become Professor of Philosophy, he regarded this project as having failed. However, his *Theory of Communicative Action* had been published.<sup>8</sup> It was intended to provide the normative basis and the fundamental conceptual framework for the programme, sketched out at the close of the two volumes, for an updated critical theory of society: a programme of interdisciplinary research into the selective pattern of capitalist modernization that had led to the collision between the imperatives of the economic and political system, on the one hand, and the original communicative structures of the lifeworld, on the other. In collaboration with the writer and film director Alexander Kluge, Negt attempted to make Adorno's micrological analysis and sceptical epistemology of the non-identical of the oppressed and unrecorded bear fruit in terms of a theory of the organization and the philosophy of history of the 'proletarian' resistance to capitalist industrialization. Negt and Kluge's *The Public Sphere and Experience*, dedicated to Adorno and published in 1972, ranged from the analysis of the bourgeois public sphere as a distorting, expropriative form of the organization of social experience, to the concept of the proletarian public sphere as a 'collective production process, the object of which is coherent human sensuality'.<sup>9</sup> In *History and Originality* (1981), Negt was concerned with an analysis of the opposite pole to capital, the history of living labour-power.<sup>10</sup> His analysis of the history of individual

working capacity was at the same an attempt to `create a counterweight to the microphysics of power' that had been developed by Foucault. 11

The only way a book about the history of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory can close is therefore simply to break off. More about the second generation of Critical Theorists can be found in Willem van Reijen's *Philosophy as Critique*.<sup>12</sup> A comprehensive sketch of the reception of the Frankfurt School is provided by Jürgen Habermas's `Three Theses on the Reception of the Frankfurt School', a lecture given at a symposium at the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in December 1984.<sup>13</sup> Although Critical Theory was always highly receptive and willing to integrate outside influences; although the stimuli it provided, and still provides, were so varied during the many forms and phases it passed through; and although many of the boundaries have now become blurred between the theory and the surrounding scene in the social sciences and in philosophy, which have in turn taken on far greater variety nevertheless, Critical Theory still has a recognizable face, for which `philosophers' like Habermas and Negt, in their undogmatic but resolute ways and with all their differences, are models.

## Notes

Notes in square brackets are those of the translator.

## Notes to Introduction

1 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, 'Drei Thesen zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Frankfurter Schule', in *Die Frankfurter Schule und die Folgen*, ed. Axel Honneth and Albrecht Wellmer (Berlin, 1986), pp. 8-12; and Willem van Reijen, *Philosophie als Kritik. Einführung in die Kritische Theorie* (Königstein, 1984).

2 Max Horkheimer, *Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung*, Frankfurter Universitätsreden, 37 (Frankfurt am Main, 1931).

3 [Ludwig Klages (1872-1956), German psychologist and philosopher, a leader of the Vitalist movement (1895-1915), which argued that the laws of physics and chemistry cannot, on their own, provide a full explanation of life.]

4 'Dialektik der Rationalisierung', Jürgen Habermas in an interview with Axel Honneth, Eberhardt Knödler-Bunte and Arno Widmann, *Ästhetik und Kommunikation*, 45/46 (October 1981), p. 128.

5 [The German term *verwaltete Welt* is explained in English by Adorno himself in *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 2 (1957), p. 82: 'what we called *verwaltete Welt*, a world caught by administration'.]

6 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (Amsterdam, 1947); *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London, 1973).

7 Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialektik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1966); *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E.B. Ashton (London, 1973); and *Ästhetische Theorie*, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main, 1970); *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. C. Lenhardt (London, 1986).

8 Michel Foucault, 'Um welchen Preis sagt die Vernunft die Wahrheit? Ein Gespräch', *Spuren*, 1 (1983), p. 24.

9 Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophische Terminologie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), vol. 1, p. 87.

10 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York, 1965), pp. 79-80.

11 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 245-94; in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), pp. 188-243.

- 12 Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen, 1927); *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, 1973).
- 13 Karl Marx, 'Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte' (1844); 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', trans. Gregor Benton, in *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 279-400.
- 14 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 356-78.
- 15 See Adorno to Kracauer, 12 January 1933.
- 16 Habermas, interview, *Ästhetik und Kommunikation*, p. 128.
- 17 The description used by Karl Dietrich Bracher in his *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Königstein, 1978).
- 18 Helmut Dubiel, *Wissenschaftsorganisation und politische Erfahrung. Studien zur frühen Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1978); Rainer Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation. Gespräche über Franz L. Neumann* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985); Leo Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie. Ein auto-biographisches Gespräch mit Helmut Dubiel* (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), trans. as 'I Never Wanted to Play Along: Interviews with Helmut Dubiel', in Martin Jay (ed.), *An Unmastered Past: The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 15-159; Ulrike Migdal, *Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts für Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1981); Alfons Söllner, *Geschichte und Herrschaft. Studien zur materialistischen Sozialwissenschaft 1929-1942* (Frankfurt am Main, 1979).
- 19 Erich Fromm, *Arbeiter und Angestellte am Vorabend des Dritten Reiches. Eine sozialpsychologische Untersuchung*, ed. Wolfgang Bonss (Stuttgart, 1980), translated as *The Working Class in Weimar Germany: A Psychological and Sociological Study*, trans. Barbara Weinberger, ed. Wolfgang Bonss (Leamington Spa, 1984). Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (1974- ). Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften in achtzehn Bänden*, ed. Alfred Schmidt and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main, 1985- ).

## Notes to Chapter 1

- 1 Robert Wilbrandt, *Ihr glücklichen Augen. Lebenserinnerungen* (Stuttgart, 1947), p. 337.
- 2 Felix Weil, *Sozialisierung. Versuch einer begrifflichen Grundlegung nebst einer Kritik der Sozialisierungspläne* (Jena, 1922), p. 85.
- 3 Robert Wilbrandt, 'Sind die Sozialisten sozialistisch genug?', *Sozialismus und Kultur*, 3 (Berlin, 1919), pp. 11, 25-6.
- 4 'Programm der Sozialisierungskommission vom 11. Dezember 1918', in E. Schraepler (ed.), *Ursachen und Folgen. Vom Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung* (Berlin, 1958), vol. 3, pp. 33-4.
- 5 Weil, *Sozialisierung*.
- 6 [The title for a German university lecturer who has passed his *Habilitation*, the degree qualifying one to give lectures, but who has not yet been appointed to a professorial chair.]
- 7 Weil, *Sozialisierung*, p. 83.
- 8 On Hermann Weil, see Ulrike Migdal, *Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts für Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1981); and Robert

Hellmuth Eisenbach, 'Millionär, Agitator und Doktorand. Die Tübinger Studentenzeit des Felix Weil (1919)', in *Bausteine zur Tübinger Universitätsgeschichte*, 3 (Tübingen, 1987).

9 According to Weil himself, in his unfinished 'Memoirs' (*Erinnerungen*), frequently cited by Eisenbach.

10 [Clara Zetkin (1857-1933), editor of the SPD women's journal *Die Gleichheit* (*Equality*) from 1891 to 1916, member of the Communist Party (KPD) from 1919, Member of the Reichstag, 1920-33. Paul Frölich (1884-1953), founding member of the KPD, from which he was expelled in 1928, Member of the Reichstag, 1928-30. He edited the works of Rosa Luxemburg. In 1932 he joined the Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (SAP), and led it in exile from 1934 onwards. On returning to Germany in 1950 he rejoined the SPD, which he had left in 1908.]

11 Hede Massing, *Die grosse Täuschung. Geschichte einer Sowjetagentin* (Freiburg, 1967), p. 69. On the 'Marxist Study Week', see Michael Buckmiller, 'Die "Marxistische Arbeitswoche" 1923', in *Grand Hotel Abgrund. Eine Photobiographie der kritischen Theorie*, ed. Willem van Reijen and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Hamburg, 1988), pp. 141-79.

12 Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971); Karl Korsch, *Marxism and Philosophy*, trans. Fred Halliday (New York, 1971).

13 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction', trans. Gregor Benton, in Karl Marx, *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 250.

14 Migdal, *Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts*, p. 35.

15 [The academic qualification required to give lectures and advance to a professorship in the German university system.]

16 Buckmiller, 'Die "Marxistische Arbeitswoche" 1923', p. 156.

17 [*Die Bedeutung des Arbeiterinnenschutzes.*]

18 Peter von Haselberg's suggestion.

19 [The government body in each German state which is responsible for educational institutions and is in direct administrative control of the universities.]

20 Weil to the Minister of Science, Art and Education, 1 November 1929. Konrad Haenisch was the first Social Democratic Minister of Culture in Prussia. In his brief period of office he propagated radical reforms.

21 *Denkschrift über die Begründung eines Instituts für Sozialforschung*, enclosure with letter from Felix Weil to Kuratorium of Frankfurt University, 22 September 1922.

22 Carl Heinrich Becker, *Gedanken zur Hochschulreform* (Leipzig, 1919), p. 9.

23 *Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie*, 1 (1921), pp. 16-17; Ludolph Brauer, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, Adolf Mayer and Johannes Lemcke (eds), *Forschungsinstitute. Ihre Geschichte, Organisation, und Ziele* (Hamburg, 1930), vol. 2, pp. 290-1.

24 Ernst Herhaus, 'Institute für Sozialforschung', transcript of the tape recording of a report by Pollock in 1965, in Ernst Herhaus, *Notizen während der Abschaffung des Denkens* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp. 41 and 48.

25 Günther Nenning, 'Biographie', *Indexband zum Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung* (Graz, 1973), p. 43.

26 Carl Grünberg, *Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des gutsherrlich-*



*bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien* (Leipzig, 1894); 'Sozialismus und Kommunismus' and 'Anarchismus', in *Wörterbuch der Volkswirtschaft*, ed. Ludwig Elster (Jena, 1898), 2 vols, vol. 2, pp. 527-76; vol. 1, pp. 66-71. [Grünberg also wrote the article on Social Democracy, vol. 2, pp. 509-27.]

27 Rosa Meyer-Leviné, *Im inneren Kreis. Erinnerungen einer Kommunistin in Deutschland 1920-1933*, ed. Hermann Weber (London, 1977), p. 101. Rosa Meyer-Leviné was the wife of Eugen Leviné, who had been shot by firing squad on 5 July 1919 for his part in the second, communist, German soviet republic. She later married Ernst Meyer, leader of the KPD in 1921-2 and 1926-7.

28 Grünberg was making a virtue of necessity here, since the reference to the Institute as a teaching institute had been struck from its draft charter at the request of the faculty.

29 Carl Grünberg, *Festrede, gehalten zur Einweihung des Instituts für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt am Main am 22. Juni 1924*, *Frankfurter Universitätsreden*, 20 (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), pp. 8-9.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 12; Christian Eckert, 'Des Forschungsinstitut für Sozialwissenschaften in Köln', in Brauer et al. (eds), *Forschungsinstitute*, vol. 2, p. 291.

32 (*Archive on the History of Socialism and the Labour Movement*) Leipzig, 1911-30; repr. Graz, Austria, 1966-73.

33 Friedrich Pollock, 'Das Institut für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt a.M.', in Brauer et al. (eds), *Forschungsinstitute*, vol. 2, p. 352.

34 Cf. Migdal, *Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts*, pp. 94-5.

35 [A German youth movement founded in 1895 which, using ideas derived from late nineteenth-century cultural criticism, hoped to overcome urban civilization by developing a specific lifestyle for young people in which hiking, camping, folksong and folk dancing were important. During the First World War, some parts of the movement enthusiastically supported the war and enlistment. In 1933 the organization was banned by the Nazis.]

36 Henryk Grossmann, *Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems* (Leipzig, 1929); Friedrich Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion 1917-1927* (Leipzig, 1929); Karl Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931).

37 Kurt Mandelbaum, *Die Erörterung innerhalb der deutschen Sozialdemokratie über das Problem des Imperialismus 1895-1914*; Hilde Weiss, *Abbé und Ford. Kapitalistische Utopien*.

38 Paul Massing, *Die Agrarverhältnisse Frankreichs im 19. Jahrhundert und das Agrarprogramm der französischen sozialistischen Parteien*.

39 Julian Gumperz, *Zur Theorie der kapitalistischen Agrarkrise. Ein Beitrag zur Erklärung der Strukturwandlungen in der amerikanischen Landwirtschaft*.

40 Leo Lowenthal, *Soziologie der deutschen Novelle im 19. Jahrhundert*.

41 [Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), a member of the SPD from 1872 onwards and Member of the Reichstag, 1902-28, had become friendly with Engels while in exile in London; August Bebel (1840-1913) was a founding member and leader of the SPD, and Member of the Reichstag from 1867 until his death.] Franz Schiller, 'Das Marx-Engels Institut in Moskau', *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 15 (1930), p. 417.

42 *Marx-Engels Archiv*, vol. 1, p. 462.



43 Note by Carl Grünberg in D. Rjasanoff [David Borisovich Ryazanov], 'Neueste Mitteilungen über den literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels', *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 11 (1924), p. 400.

44 Cf. Migdal, *Die Frühgeschichte des Frankfurter Instituts*, pp. 100-1.

45 Dean Gerloff to the Kuratorium 4 June 1926, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 104-5.

46 Lecture Guide (*Vorlesungsverzeichnis*) (Frankfurt University, 1972-3), p. 5; Paul Tillich, 'Autobiographische Betrachtungen', in *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 12 (Stuttgart, 1971), p. 69.

47 Felix Weil to the Minister of Science, Art and Education, 1 November 1929.

48 Fritz Schmidt to Ministerial Director Richter, 25 July 1930, cited by Paul Kluge, *Die Stiftungsuniversität Frankfurt am Main* (Frankfurt am Main, 1973), p. 504.

49 On his own appointment, Grünberg had been contractually assured of the directorship of the Institute up to this date, the end of his seventy-first year.

50 Adolph Löwe was Tönnies's successor from 1926 to 1931 as Professor of Economic Theory and Sociology in Kiel, and director of the Research Department of the Institute for World Economics. An active Social Democrat and religious socialist, he had been a friend of Horkheimer since their childhood together in Stuttgart.

51 Horkheimer to Weil, 10 March 1942; Leo Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past: The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal* (Berkeley, 1987), p. 53; Faculty of Philosophy to the Minister of Science, Art and Education, 26 June 1930 (Horkheimer personnel file in the archive of the former Faculty of Philosophy, J.W. Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main).

52 Max Horkheimer, *Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung*, *Frankfurter Universitätsreden*, 37 (Frankfurt am Main, 1931); repr. in Horkheimer, *Sozialphilosophische Studien*, ed. Werner Brede (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), pp. 41-2.

53 Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 14 (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), pp. 373-4; [cf. the translation by Angela Richards in 'The Future of an Illusion', Freud, *Civilization, Society, and Religion: Group Psychology, Civilization and its Discontents, and Other Works*, Pelican Freud Library, 12 (Harmondsworth, 1985), p. 233.]

54 In Ignaz Jastrow (ed.), *Die Reform der staatswissenschaftlichen Studien* (Munich, 1920), pp. 92-3.

55 *Institut für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt am Main*, a prospectus probably published in 1931.

56 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 8 December 1963. In 1919, as a consultant for German affairs in the Political Department of the Foreign Office, Riezler had been a staunch supporter of military intervention against the Soviet Republic in Munich; from 1919 he was co-editor of the monthly *Die Deutsche Nation*; from 1928, executive chairman of the senate of the University of Frankfurt am Main and Honorary Professor of Philosophy. In 1930 he was one of the most vehement opponents of Frankfurt's Goethe Prize being awarded to Freud. He had tried unsuccessfully to bring his friend Heidegger to the University of Frankfurt.

57 'Das Schlimme erwarten und doch das Gute versuchen. Ein Gespräch mit Professor Dr. Max Horkheimer', in Gerhard Rein (ed.), *Dienstagsgespräche mit Zeitgenossen* (Stuttgart, 1976), p. 151.

58 Cited in Helmut Gumnior and Rudolf Ringguth, *Max Horkheimer* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1973), p. 16.

59 [Arthur Schopenhauer, 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life', in *Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays*, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford, 1974), vol. 2, pp. 311-497.]

60 Max Horkheimer, *Aus der Pubertät. Novellen und Tagebuchblätter* (Munich, 1974), pp. 196-7.

61 [Ernst Toller (1893-1939), politician and writer. As an Independent Social Democrat (USPD), he was a member of the Munich Soviet Government in 1918. After its collapse, he was sentenced to five years in prison; he emigrated to the USA in 1933.]

62 Hans Cornelius, in *Frankfurter Universitätsreden*, 20 (Frankfurt am Main, 1924), pp. 4 and 11.

63 Horkheimer to Maidon, i.e. Rose Riekher, 30 November 1921.

64 [Max Horkheimer, *Gestaltveränderungen in der farbenblinden Zone des blinden Flecks im Auge. Zur Antinomie der teleologischen Urteilskraft.*]

65 Wiesengrund to Lowenthal, 16 July 1924; in Leo Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), pp. 248-9.

66 Max Horkheimer, *Kants 'Kritik der Urteilskraft' als Bindeglied zwischen theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie* (Stuttgart, 1925), pp. 62-3.

67 'Heinrich Regius', i.e. Max Horkheimer, *Dämmerung. Notizen in Deutschland* (Zurich, 1934); in Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Alfred Schmidt and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Frankfurt am Main, 1985- ), vol. 2, pp. 309-452. Trans. Michael Shaw, in Max Horkheimer, *Dawn and Decline: Notes 1926-1931 and 1950-1969* (New York, 1978), pp. 15-112. [The English translation omits 28 of the book's 136 aphorisms, as well as its epigraph (six lines of verse by Lenau), while including only extracts from its prefatory note dated February 1933.]

68 *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie*; 'Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?'; and *Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung*.

69 Horkheimer, *Dämmerung*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 425 [new translation; cf. *Dawn and Decline*, p. 98].

70 *Ibid.*, pp. 380, 356, 351 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 67, 47, 43].

71 *Ibid.*, pp. 319, 356-7, 426 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 21, 47, 99].

72 *Ibid.*, p. 344 [*Dawn and Decline*, p. 37].

73 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 373-8: 'Die Ohnmacht der deutschen Arbeiterklasse' ['The Powerlessness of the German Working Class'; *Dawn and Decline*, pp. 61-5].

74 *Ibid.*, pp. 377, 378, 348 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 64, 65, 41].

75 *Ibid.*, pp. 416-17, 383, 392, 343 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 92, 69, 75, 37].

76 *Ibid.*, pp. 371, 377, 378 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 58, 64, 65].

77 Max Horkheimer, 'Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?' *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 15 (1930), pp. 33-56.

78 Horkheimer, *Dämmerung*, p. 419 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 93-4].

79 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, 1973), pp. 32-3; Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme* (Paris, 1970), p. 22 ('L'homme n'est rien d'autre que ce qu'il

se fait'); Max Horkheimer, 'Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?', pp. 40, 45.

80 Karl Korsch, 'Marxismus und Philosophie', *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 11 (1924), p. 55.

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81 *Die Grenzen der Wissenschaft bei Max Weber.*

82 *Das jüdische Gesetz. Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Diasporajudentums.*

83 Ernst Simon, *Erinnerungen an Erich Fromm*, Stadtarchiv, Frankfurt am Main. [Ernst Akiba Simon (1899- s ), a teacher, philosopher of religion and associate of Martin Buber, co-edited the *Jüdisches Wochenblatt* with Fromm, and later became Professor of Pedagogy in Jerusalem; Lowenthal describes him as having been 'very influential in Jewish circles in Frankfurt' (Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*, p. 22).]

84 Interview in *Die Zeit*, 21 March 1980, p. 52.

85 Erich Fromm, *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Rainer Funk (Stuttgart, 1980-1), vol. 6, p. 9.

86 [Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-87), Professor of Roman Law at Zurich, developed a Romantic interpretation of the mythology and symbols of antiquity, and was held to have discovered the existence of matriarchy in the ancient world. Wilhelm Reich (1897-1957), the Freudian psychologist, later developed the theory of the 'orgone'. Siegfried Bernfeld (1892-1953), a student of Freud's, was a socialist and anti-authoritarian educationist; see Bernfeld, *Antiautoritäre Erziehung und Psychoanalyse. Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Lutz von Werder and Reinhart Wolff, 3 vols (Frankfurt am Main, 1969-70).]

87 Erich Fromm, 'Die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf Soziologie und Religionswissenschaft', *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 3 (1928-9), p. 269.

88 Max Horkheimer, *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930), p. 270; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Holy Family*, trans. R. Dixon (Moscow, 1956).

89 [Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72), materialist philosopher and critic of Hegel, was the author of *The Essence of Christianity* (1841), which transformed 'Hegel's idealism into a radical humanism' and explained 'religion as man's alienation of his own powers or essence and his subsequent domination by his own creations' (David Fernbach, 'Introduction', in Karl Marx, *The Revolutions of 1848* (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 11). Bruno Bauer (1809-92), a Young Hegelian philosopher and colleague of Marx, was later criticized for Idealism by Marx and Engels in *The Holy Family*.]

90 Heinrich Meng, *Leben als Begegnung* (Stuttgart, 1971), p. 78.

91 Jürgen Habermas, Silvia Bovenschen et al., *Gespräche mit Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), p. 15.

92 Erich Fromm, 'Die Entwicklung des Christudogmas. Eine psychoanalytische Studie zur sozialpsychologischen Funktion der Religion', *Imago*, 16 (1930), pp. 305-73; repr. in *Das Christudogma und andere Essays* (Munich, 1965), p. 83.

93 Horkheimer, 'Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?', pp. 54 and 56.

94 Fromm, *Das Christudogma*, pp. 91, 65, 15.

95 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

96 Karl Kautsky, *Der Ursprung des Christentums. Eine historische Untersuchung* (Stuttgart, 1908); cited in Fromm, *Das Christudogma*, p. 44. [Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), an associate of Marx and Engels during his exile in London (1885-90), and a theoretician of Social Democracy and the Second International, helped to formulate the SPD's reformist Erfurt programme (1891). After 1917 he opposed violent revolution and left-wing dictatorship, and was briefly a member of the Independent Social

Democrats (USPD). He rejoined the SPD in 1922, and worked on its Heidelberg programme (1925). Kautsky's book appeared in English as *Foundations of Christianity: A Study in Christian Origins*, trans. Jacob W. Hartmann (London, 1925).]

97 Fromm, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 1, pp. 34, 36.

98 Friedrich Pollock, *Sombarts 'Widerlegung' des Sozialismus*, Beihefte zum Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, 3, ed. Carl Grünberg (Leipzig, 1926), pp. 53-4.

99 [Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), the author of *The Decline of the West (Untergang des Abendlandes)* (1918-22, English trans. 1926-8), held that the future for the West was a period of inevitable and irreversible decline. His ideas were similar to some Nazi doctrines, but he was criticized by the Nazis, and lived in isolation from 1933 until his death. Johann Plenge (1874-1919) was Professor of Sociology in Münster up to 1933. Othmar Spann (1878-1950), an Austrian professor of economics, who was removed from his post in 1938, developed a doctrine of universalism in economics and social theory, and his theories, which were opposed to liberalism, pluralism and Marxism, were influential in Austrian conservatism and among the Austrian fascists.]

100 [On 'phenomenological intuition', see Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction* (The Hague, 1982), pp. 104-5.]

101 Friedrich Pollock, 'Zur Marxschen Geldtheorie,' *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, 13 (1928), p. 203.

102 [Max Adler (1873-1937), an Austro-Marxist, was Professor of Sociology in Vienna. He attempted a synthesis of Kant and Marx, and proposed a strictly socialist form of culture and life.]

103 Friedrich Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche in der Sowjetunion 1917-1927* (Leipzig, 1929), pp. 382, 288, 291.

104 Ibid., p. 2 and note 4.

105 *Rede Trozki auf dem 9. Kongress der KPR*, April 1920, cited in *ibid.*, pp. 57-8.

106 Ibid., pp. 365, 366.

107 Horkheimer, *Dämmerung*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 361, 389 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 51, 72].

108 Pollock, *Die planwirtschaftlichen Versuche*, pp. 316, 278, note 116, and p. 323.

109 [Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), a politician and medical doctor, was an Austro-Marxist born in Vienna. Having been editor of the German Social Democratic paper *Vorwärts (Forwards)*, he left the SPD to join the Independent Social Democrats (USPD) during the First World War, and was editor of their paper, *Freiheit (Freedom)*. He later rejoined the SPD, and was a Member of the Reichstag from 1924 to 1933 and Finance Minister in 1923 and 1928-9.]

110 Rudolf Hilferding, 'Die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie in der Republik', in *Protokoll der Verhandlungen des sozialdemokratischen Parteitag 1927 in Kiel* (Berlin, 1927), p. 168.

111 This was a side-swipe at Henryk Grossmann and his theory of the collapse of capitalism, based on exegesis of the three volumes of Marx's *Capital*.

112 [Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), Professor of Biology in Jena, was a passionate defender of Darwinism.]

- 113 Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*, p. 43.
- 114 Leo Lowenthal, 'Das Dämonische. Entwurf einer negativen Religions-philosophie', in *Gabe Herrn Rabbiner Dr. Nobel zum 50. Geburtstag* (1921).
- 115 Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*, p. 49.
- 116 *Die Sozialphilosophie Franz von Baaders. Beispiel und Problem einer religiösen Philosophie.*
- 117 Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie* (Munich and Leipzig, 1918), p. 410.
- 118 'Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre' and 'Die Philosophie des Helvétius'.
- 119 Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie*, p. 67; cf. *An Unmastered Past*, p. 54.
- 120 Kracauer to Lowenthal, 4 December 1921 [translated in part in Leo Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*, p. 203].
- 121 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Henkel, Krug und frühe Erfahrung', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main, 1970-86), vol. 11, pp. 556-7.
- 122 [Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was Professor of Philosophy in Berlin and later in Strasbourg; see Rudolph H. Weingartner, *Experience and Culture: The Philosophy of Georg Simmel*, Middletown, Conn., 1960.]
- 123 Siegfried Kracauer, *Soziologie als Wissenschaft. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung* (Dresden, 1921); in Kracauer, *Schriften*, ed. Karsten Witte (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 13-14.
- 124 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 125 Kracauer to Lowenthal, 4 December 1921; cited in Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie*, p. 245.
- 126 Kracauer, 'Die Wartenden', *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 12 March 1922; repr. in *Das Ornament der Masse. Essays* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 117.
- 127 *Die Transzendenz des Dinglichen und Noematischen in Husserls Phänomenologie.*
- 128 Adorno to Lowenthal, 16 July 1924; cited in Lowenthal, *Mitmachen wollte ich nie*, p. 247.
- 129 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 11.
- 130 Adorno, in *Neue Blätter für Kunst und Literatur*, 6 (1921-2), pp. 88-9. [For the translation of *durchseelt* with 'animated' here, see Adorno, 'Spengler Today', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 322.]
- 131 *Neue Blätter für Kunst und Literatur*, 1 (1922-3), 18 September 1922, p. 11.
- 132 *Zeitschrift für Musik*, 11 August 1923, pp. 315-16.
- 133 *Ibid.*, p. 316.
- 134 [*Die Musik*, 20 (1928), p. 607.]
- 135 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Gedichte von Reinhold Zickel', *Akzente*, 3 (1958), pp. 275-6.
- 136 Adorno to Krenek, 7 October 1934.
- 137 Theodor W. Adorno, *Berg. Der Meister des kleinen Übergangs* (Vienna, 1968), pp. 24, 44-5.
- 138 *Ibid.*, p. 49.
- 139 Adorno to Kracauer, 8 March 1925 and 10 April 1925.

140 [A well-known encyclopaedia.]

141 Cited by Willi Reich, *Arnold Schoenberg oder Der konservative Revolutionär* (Munich, 1974), p. 17.

142 *Das Andere. Ein Blatt zür Einführung abendländischer Kultur in Österreich: Geschrieben von Adolf Loos.*

143 Arnold Schoenberg, *Harmonielehre*, 7th edn (Vienna, 1966), p. 497.

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- 144 Arnold Schoenberg, 'Franz Liszts Werk und Wesen' (1911), in *Stil und Gedanke. Aufsätze zur Musik*, ed. Ivan Vojtech (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), p. 171.
- 145 Schoenberg, 'Komposition mit 12 Tönen', in *ibid.*, p. 75.
- 146 Adorno, *Berg*, p. 45.
- 147 Adorno to Kracauer, 17 June 1925.
- 148 Kracauer to Bloch, 27 May 1926, cited in Ernst Bloch, *Briefe 1903-1975*, ed. Karola Bloch et al. (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 274-5.
- 149 [A *modern dráma fejlődésének története (History of the Development of Modern Drama)* (Budapest, 1911).]
- 150 Éva Fekete and Éva Karádi (eds), *Georg Lukács. Sein Leben in Bildern, Selbstzeugnissen und Dokumenten* (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 33.
- 151 Georg Lukács, *Entwicklungsgeschichte des modernen Dramas*, ed. Frank Benseler (Darmstadt, 1981), p. 359.
- 152 Georg Lukács, 'Von der Armut am Geiste' and *Soul and Form*, trans. Anna Bostock (London, 1974).
- 153 Ferenc Fehér, 'Am Scheideweg des romantischen Antikapitalismus', in Agnes Heller et al., *Die Seele und das Leben* (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 301.
- 154 Cited in Fekete and Karádi (eds), *Georg Lukács*, p. 62.
- 155 Georg Lukács, 'Der Bolschewismus als moralisches Problem', *Brecht-Jahrbuch* (1979), p. 18.
- 156 Georg Lukács, *Werke* (Neuwied/Berlin, 1968), vol. 2, p. 81.
- 157 Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 186, 237, 193, 172.
- 158 Kracauer to Bloch, 29 June 1926, in Bloch, *Briefe*, vol. 2, p. 283.
- 159 Theodor W. Adorno, *Der Begriff des Unbewussten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre*, first published in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1.
- 160 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 91, 222, 320.
- 161 Cornelius to College of the Faculty of Philosophy, 8 January 1928; Theodor Adorno file of the Faculty of Philosophy.
- 162 Walter Benjamin, 'Die Schulreform, eine Kulturbewegung' (1912), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt am Main, 1974-85), vol. 2, p. 891.
- 163 Benjamin to Strauss, 21 November 1912, cited in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 839.
- 164 Walter Benjamin, 'Dialog über die Religiösität der Gegenwart', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 28-9. [Nietzsche's phrase, occurs in the passage, 'Do I exhort you to love of your neighbour [*Nächstenliebe*]? I exhort you rather to flight from your neighbour and to love of the most distant [*Fernsten-Liebe*]', Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and to No-One*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1961), p. 87.]
- 165 Gershom Scholem, *Walter Benjamin: The Story of a Friendship* (London, 1982), pp. 53-4.
- 166 Walter Benjamin, 'Das Leben der Studenten', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 82.
- 167 Walter Benjamin, 'Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie', in *ibid.*, pp. 160, 164.

168 Scholem, *Walter Benjamin*, p. 77.

169 Walter Benjamin, *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik* (Frankfurt am Main 1973 paperback edn), pp. 15, 63, 113.

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170 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 168.

171 Benjamin, 'Drei Lebensläufe', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 6, p. 218.

172 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 138, 169, 186.

173 Ibid., pp. 184, 186, 147, 181.

174 [Benjamin distinguishes carefully between classical tragedy (*Tragödie*) and the German baroque *Trauerspiel* (tragedy), and the English translation keeps the German term in the text, although not in its title.]

175 Walter Benjamin, *Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. John Osborne (London, 1977), pp. 35, 41 (cf. p. 35), 46.

176 Ibid., p. 37.

177 Walter Benjamin, 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man', in *One-Way Street, and Other Writings*, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London, 1979), p. 114.

178 Benjamin, *Origin of German Tragic Drama*, pp. 45, 138, 139, 140.

179 Ibid., pp. 166, 176.

180 Ibid., p. 176.

181 Benjamin, *Der Begriff der Kunstkritik*, p. 81.

182 Benjamin, *Origin of German Tragic Drama*, p. 182.

183 Walter Benjamin to Gershom Scholem, 22 December 1924; in Benjamin, *Briefe*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), p. 366.

184 Benjamin to Rang, 9 December 1923; *Briefe*, p. 322.

185 Benjamin to Scholem, 13 June 1924; *Briefe*, p. 350.

186 Benjamin to Scholem, 30 October and 23 April 1928, 15 March 1929; *Briefe*, pp. 483, 470, 491.

187 Cf. Rolf Tiedemann, 'Einleitung', in *Passagen-Werk, Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 21.

188 Benjamin to Adorno, 31 May 1935; *Briefe*, p. 663.

189 Benjamin to Scholem, 20 January 1930; *Briefe*, p. 506.

190 Adorno to Benjamin, 10 November 1938; *Briefe*, p. 783.

191 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Zur Zwölftechnik', repr. in Adorno and Ernst Krenek, *Briefwechsel*, ed. Wolfgang Rogge (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 168.

192 [Cf. *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. Stanley Sadie (London, 1980), vol. 18: 'Through-composed (Ger. *durchkomponiert*). A term generally applied to settings of songs in which the music for each stanza is different, not repeated from one stanza to the next as it is in strophic songs. The resulting musical form is thus not necessarily determined by the verse form of the poem, and a continuity can be achieved in which the music responds minutely to the flux of ideas, images and situations in the verse. The recurrence of thematic motifs is of course not precluded.' Cf. also *The New Oxford Companion to Music*, ed. Denis Arnold (Oxford, 1983), vol. 2: 'Through-composed . . . Any composition which does not rely on repeating sections for its formal design may be described as through-composed. However, the term is most usually applied to a song in which the music for each stanza is different.']

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violent anarchism. He was a member of the soviet republican government in Munich in 1919, and was assassinated by members of the *Freikorps*.]

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- 196 Adorno to Kracauer, 25 July 1930.
- 197 Adorno, *Kierkegaard* (1974 edn), p. 234.
- 198 Adorno to Kracauer, 6 August 1930.
- 199 Paul Tillich, 'Gutachten über die Arbeit von Dr. Wiesengrund: *Die Konstruktion des Aesthetischen [sic] bei Kierkegaard*', in the Theodor Adorno file (1924-68), Philosophy Faculty of the University of Frankfurt am Main.
- 200 Max Horkheimer, 'Bemerkungen in Sachen der Habilitation Dr. Wiesengrund', February 1931, in *ibid.*
- 201 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Die Aktualität der Philosophie', in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 342.
- 202 Benjamin to Scholem, 19 February 1925; *Briefe*, p. 372.
- 203 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 334 and 342.
- 204 Benjamin to Scholem, 15 January 1933, in *Walter Benjamin/Gershom Scholem, Briefwechsel 1933-1940*, ed. Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), p. 36.
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- 206 See Hermann Mörchen, *Adorno und Heidegger* (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 13.
- 207 Adorno, *Kierkegaard*, p. 111.
- 208 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 356.
- 209 Herbert Marcuse, *Der deutsche Künstlerroman*, in *Schriften*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), pp. 16 and 333.
- 210 Cf. Barry Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation: An Intellectual Biography* (London, 1982), p. 55.
- 211 *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*.
- 212 *Jahreshefte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften 1957-58* (Heidelberg, 1959), p. 20, cited in Winfried Franzen, *Martin Heidegger* (Stuttgart, 1976), p. 25.
- 213 *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*.
- 214 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, vol. 1 (1913).
- 215 Martin Heidegger, 'My Way to Phenomenology', in *On Time and Being* (New York, 1972), p. 77.
- 216 Karl Löwith, 'Curriculum vitae' (1959), in Löwith, *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Klaus Stichweh and Marc B. de Launay, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1981), p. 451.
- 217 Cited in Paul Hühnerfeld, *In Sachen Heidegger. Versuch über ein deutsches Genie* (Hamburg, 1959), p. 51; see also Franzen, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 26.
- 218 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford, 1973), pp. 21, 32, 34.
- 219 *Ibid.*, pp. 33 and 68.

220 Ibid., p. 222.

221 Ibid., pp. 233, 232, 307.

222 Ibid., p. 435.

223 [*The "they" is an existentiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*], Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 167 (Macquarrie and Robinson's italics). An `existentiale' is defined as one of

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*Dasein's* `characters of Being', as opposed to `categories', which are `characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein' (p. 70).]

224 Martin Heidegger, `Was ist Metaphysik?', in Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), p. 22. [The passage referred to here is from the introduction added by Heidegger in 1949, not translated with `What is Metaphysics?' in Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, ed. and trans. David Farrell Krell (London, 1978), pp. 94-112.]

225 Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, p. 112. Page references which follow are to this English edition.

226 Ibid., pp. 112, 101, 103.

227 Ibid., pp. 107-8, 112.

228 Ibid., pp. 107, 108.

229 `Davoser Disputation', in Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4th edn (Frankfurt am Main, 1973). [The Davos discussion was first included in this edition and is not contained in the English translation, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington, 1962).]

230 Marcuse, *Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 358 and 385.

231 Herbert Marcuse, `Philosophie des Scheiterns. Karl Jaspers' Werk', *Unterhaltungsblatt der Vossischen Zeitung*, 14 December 1933.

232 Herbert Marcuse, `Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus' (Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism'), published in the *Philosophische Hefte* of his friend, the Husserlian Maximilian Beck (special issue on Heidegger's *Being and Time*, 1928), pp. 45-68; in Marcuse, *Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 364-5.

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234 Herbert Marcuse, `Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des historischen Materialismus', *Die Gesellschaft*, 9 (1932), pp. 136-74; in *Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 509.

235 Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie*, p. 3.

236 Marcuse, *Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 536.

237 Ibid., p. 486.

238 Cf. Katz, *Herbert Marcuse and the Art of Liberation*, p. 84.

239 Cited from the reprint of the editorial introduction which appeared in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 25 January 1929.

240 Niccolò Machiavelli, *Florentine Histories*, trans. Laura F. Banfield and Harvey C. Mansfield (Princeton, 1988), p. 123 (Book 3, chapter 13).

241 Max Horkheimer, *Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie* (Stuttgart, 1930).

242 Max Horkheimer, `Zur Relativität des Charakters', *Dämmerung*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 449. [This aphorism is omitted from the English translation, *Dawn and Decline*.]

243 Max Horkheimer and Friedrich Pollock, *Materialien für Neuformulierung von Grundsätzen* (New York, August 1935) (MHA: XXIV 97).

244 Julius Deutsch, *Faschismus in Europa* (1928); Hermann Heller, *Europa und der Faschismus* (Berlin, 1929).

245 Horkheimer to Senior President (*Oberpräsident*) of the Province of Hessen-Nassau and State Commissar of the University of Frankfurt am Main, in Kassel, 4 December 1930.

246 Lowenthal, *An Unmastered Past*, p. 54.

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- 247 [The *George-Kreis* was a group of writers, painters and critics which flourished during the 1890s, its central figure being the poet Stefan George (1868-1933). Their aim was to revive German literary language. Many well-known writers belonged to it and contributed to its journal, *Blätter für die Kunst* (1892-1919). Among its members, besides Kommerell and Kantorowicz, were Hugo von Hofmannsthal and the philosopher Ludwig Klages.]
- 248 Karl Korn, *Lange Lehrzeit. Ein deutsches Leben* (Munich, 1979), pp. 115-16.
- 249 [Discussing Lessing's *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* (a critical edition by L.F. Helbig was published in Berne, 1980).]
- 250 Joseph Dünner, *Zu Protokoll gegeben. Mein Leben als Deutscher und Jude* (Munich, 1971), pp. 65-6.
- 251 Kommerell to Heusler, 10 July 1932, in Max Kommerell, *Briefe und Aufzeichnungen 1919-1944*, ed. Inge Jens (Olten, 1967), pp. 26-7.
- 252 Korn, *Lange Lehrzeit*, p. 134.
- 253 Apart from Wittfogel's book, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931), which was published as volume 3 of the 'Schriften des Instituts für Sozialforschung'.
- 254 'Die Umschichtung des Proletariats und die kapitalistischen Zwischenschichten vor der Krise'.
- 255 Siegfried Kracauer, *Die Angestellten. Aus dem neuesten Deutschland* (Frankfurt am Main, 1930).
- 256 Kracauer, *Schriften*, vol. 1, pp. 285-6.
- 257 Ibid., p. 298.
- 258 Horkheimer, *Dämmerung*, p. 412 [*Dawn and Decline*, pp. 88-9].
- 259 Ibid., p. 439 [from the aphorism 'Menschliche Beziehungen', which is omitted from the English translation].
- 260 Ibid., p. 333 [*Dawn and Decline*, p. 29].
- 261 Theodor Geiger, 'Zur Kritik der arbeiter-psychologischen Forschung', repr. in Geiger, *Arbeiten zur Soziologie* (Berlin, 1962).
- 262 Horkheimer to Pollock, 12 August 1934.
- 263 Karl August Wittfogel, cited in Mathias Greffrath, *Die Zerstörung einer Zukunft. Gespräche mit emigrierten Sozialwissenschaftlern* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1979), p. 316.
- 264 Max Horkheimer, 'Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 1; 'Remarks on Science and the Crisis', in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), p. 4.
- 265 Friedrich Pollock, 'Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus und die Aussichten einer planwirtschaftlichen Neuordnung', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 19; Erich Fromm, 'Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie', *ibid.*, p. 47; Theodor W. Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', *ibid.*, p. 123.
- 266 Pollock, 'Die gegenwärtige Lage des Kapitalismus', pp. 21, 20, 16, 27, 17.
- 267 Friedrich Pollock, 'Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftskrise', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 349.
- 268 Erich Fromm, 'Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 275, 276.

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- 270 Horkheimer, 'Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise', pp. 4, 7, 6.
- 271 Max Horkheimer, 'Geschichte und Psychologie', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 136, 131-2, 133, 131.
- 272 Horkheimer, 'Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise', p. 2.
- 273 Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', pp. 106, 109-10, 104.
- 274 Ibid., p. 106.
- 275 Ibid., p. 116.
- 276 Leo Lowenthal, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Literatur', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 93, 97, 98, 99.
- 277 [In Karl Marx, *Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregory Benton (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 424-8.]
- 278 [Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, trans. C. Dutt, W. Lough and C.P. Magill (London, 1965).]
- 279 Fromm, 'Über Methode und Aufgabe', p. 52; 'Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie', p. 276.
- 280 'Goethe als Repräsentant des bürgerlichen Zeitalters', *Neue Rundschau* (April 1932), repr. in Thomas Mann, *Schriften und Reden zur Literatur, Kunst und Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), vol. 2, pp. 88-9.
- 281 Franz Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie in der Manufakturperiode* (Paris, 1934), p. iii.
- 282 Franz Borkenau, 'Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen Weltbildes', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 312, 313.
- 283 Borkenau, *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild*, p. 21.
- 284 Borkenau, 'Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen Weltbildes', pp. 323, 355.
- 285 Fromm, 'Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie', p. 267.
- 286 Max Horkheimer, 'Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 44.

## Notes to Chapter 2

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- 3 Adorno to Horkheimer, Oxford, 2 November 1934.
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- 6 Karl Dietrich Erdmann, *Deutschland unter der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus, 1933-1939* (Munich, 1980), p. 171.
- 7 Cited in Schivelbusch, *Intellektuellendämmerung*, p. 88.

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9 Cf. Schivelbusch, *Intellektuellendämmerung*, pp. 95-6.

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- 14 In *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 410.
- 15 Henryk Grossmann, *Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems* (Leipzig, 1929).
- 16 Walter Benjamin, 'Zum gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen Schriftstellers', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 54-78.
- 17 Benjamin to Scholem, 29 June 1933; in *Walter Benjamin/Gershom Scholem, Briefwechsel*, ed. Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main, 1980), p. 83.
- 18 'Materialism and Metaphysics', in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), p. 24; 'Materialismus und Metaphysik', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 14.
- 19 Cf. Marcuse and Horkheimer to Bloch, 6 May 1936, in Ernst Bloch, *Briefe 1903-1975*, ed. Karola Bloch et al. (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 674-5.
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- 21 Max Horkheimer, 'Zum Rationalismustreit in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 50-1.
- 22 Andries Sternheim, 'Neue Literatur über Arbeitslosigkeit und Familie', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 413.
- 23 Erich Fromm, 'Über Methode und Aufgabe einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 36, footnote 1; p. 35.
- 24 Erich Fromm, 'Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechts-theorie', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 196-227.
- 25 See p. 115 above.
- 26 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 6 July 1934; Fromm to Horkheimer, 15 July 1934.
- 27 *Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung* (Paris, 1936), p. 317.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 364.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 449 and 445.
- 30 Herbert Marcuse, 'Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 174-5; translated as 'The Struggle against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State' in *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, Mass., 1968), pp. 3-42.
- 31 Erich Fromm, 'Die Sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie', p. 226.
- 32 Kurt Mandelbaum and Gerhard Meyer, 'Zur Theorie der Planwirtschaft', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), introduction by Horkheimer, p. 230.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 261.
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1968), p. 52.

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2 *Studien über Autorität und Familie. Forschungsberichte aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung* (Paris, 1936).

3 Leo Lowenthal, 'Die Auffassung Dostojewskis im Vorkriegsdeutschland', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 343-82.

4 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 6 July 1934.

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6 Horkheimer to Adorno, 15 March 1935.

7 *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 35, 39.

8 Erich Fromm, 'Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), p. 274.

9 Erich Fromm, 'Die sozialpsychologische Bedeutung der Mutterrechtstheorie', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), p. 222.

10 *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 117, 131, 100.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 101.

12 *Ibid.*, pp. 107, 133.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 113.

14 Wilhelm Reich, *Charakteranalyse. Technik und Grundlage für studierende und praktizierende Analytiker* (Vienna, 1933); *Character Analysis*, trans. Theodore P. Wolfe, 3rd edn (New York, 1949).

15 *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 117, 122.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 67-9, 72-3, 75.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 75.

19 *Ibid.*, p. xii.

20 Fromm to Horkheimer, 17 July 1935.

21 Horkheimer to Adorno, 25 October 1934.

22 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 November 1934. Horkheimer had mentioned 'starving friends' whose claims on assistance from the Institute took precedence over Adorno's.

23 Wiesengrund to the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Lommatzsch, 5 April 1933.

24 Lommatzsch, dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, to Wiesengrund, 19 July 1933.

25 Herbert Müntzel, *Die Fahne der Verfolgten. Ein Zyklus für Männerchor nach dem gleichnamigen Gedichtband von Baldur von Schirach.*

26 *Die Musik* (June 1934), p. 712.

27 'Die phänomenologischen Antinomien. Prolegomena zur dialektischen Logik'. Cf. Adorno to Kracauer, 5 July 1935.

28 Horkheimer to Adorno, 16 November 1934.

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29 [Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), Italian economist and sociologist. His theory of the 'circulation of élites' was an influence on fascist ideology.]

30 Adorno to Horkheimer, 25 February 1935.

31 Adorno to Horkheimer, 24 November 1934, 25 February 1935, 25 June 1936.

32 Horkheimer to Adorno, 2 January 1935.

33 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Über Jazz', *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 235-59.

34 Adorno to Horkheimer, 13 May 1935.

35 Adorno to Horkheimer, 8 June 1935.

36 Erich Fromm, 'Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit der psychoanalytischen Therapie', *ZfS*, 4 (1935), pp. 365-97.

37 Adorno to Horkheimer, 21 March 1936.

38 Adorno to Horkheimer, 28 January 1938.

39 Adorno to Horkheimer, 21 March, 26 October and 28 November 1936.

40 Horkheimer to Adorno, 8 December 1936.

41 Horkheimer to Pollock, 4 June 1934.

42 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, *Soziologische Theorie der Erkenntnis* (first published Frankfurt am Main, 1985).

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45 Walter Benjamin, 'Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 346-81.

46 Adorno to Horkheimer, 23 April 1937.

47 Horkheimer to Adorno, 13 October 1937.

48 Benjamin to Adorno, 7 February 1936, cited in Walter Benjamin, *Das Passagen-Werk, Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5 (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), p. 1152.

49 Horkheimer to Adorno, 23 October 1936.

50 [Victor Adler (1852-1918) was an Austrian socialist, leader of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and founder of the *Arbeiterzeitung*. For Rudolf Hilferding, see p. 667, note 110 above. Otto Bauer (1882-1938), was an Austrian socialist politician, editor of the *Arbeiterzeitung*, and leading spokesman for Austro-Marxism.]

51 [Alfred Adler (1870-1937), the psychologist, who broke with the Freudian school in 1911 to found a school of psychology which viewed the quest for money, power and recognition as the principal psychological motive force.]

52 Cf. Knoll et al., 'Der österreichische Beitrag zur Soziologie von der Jahrhundertwende bis 1938', in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, special issue, 23, pp. 90-1.

53 Paul Lazarsfeld, 'Eine Episode in der Geschichte der empirischen Sozialforschung', in Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and Paul Lazarsfeld (eds), *Soziologieautobiographisch* (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 155.

54 Paul Lazarsfeld, *Jugend und Beruf* (Jena, 1931), p. 63.

55 Marie Jahoda, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Hans Zeisel, *Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Ein soziographischer Versuch über die Wirkungen lang-andauernder Arbeitslosigkeit. Mit einem Anhang zur Geschichte der Soziographie* (Leipzig, 1933; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 28.

56 Horkheimer to Lazarsfeld, 16 May 1935; Lazarsfeld to Horkheimer, 27 May 1935.

57 Fromm to Horkheimer, 10 January 1936.

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58 *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 119-39 [in English].

59 Andries Sternheim, 'Neue Literatur über Arbeitslosigkeit und Familie', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), pp. 413-20.

60 Fromm to Horkheimer, 10 January 1936.

61 Ibid.

62 *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, pp. 235, 237, 236.

63 Ibid., p. 235.

64 Cf. *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 53 and 40.

65 Erich Fromm, *The Working Class in Weimar Germany: A Psychological and Sociological Study*, trans. Barbara Weinberger, ed. Wolfgang Bonss (Leamington Spa, 1984), p. 42.

66 Ibid., pp. 208 and 210.

67 Ibid., pp. 208-9.

68 Ibid., pp. 228-30.

69 Ibid., p. 229.

70 Ibid., p. 43.

71 Ibid., p. 61.

72 Karl August Wittfogel, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas* (Leipzig, 1931).

73 Karl August Wittfogel, 'Die Theorie der orientalischen Gesellschaft', *ZfS*, 7 (1938), pp. 91, 120, 102.

74 Cf. *ZfS*, 4 (1935), p. 65.

75 International Institute of Social Research, *International Institute of Social Research: A Report on its History, Aims and Activities 1933-1938* (New York, 1938), p. 5.

76 Cf. Wolfgang Bonss, *Die Einübung des Tatsachenblicks. Zur Struktur und Veränderung empirischer Sozialforschung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), esp. p. 182; and Bonss and Schindler, 'Kritische Theorie als interdisziplinärer Materialismus', in Wolfgang Bonss and Axel Honneth (eds), *Sozialforschung als Kritik. Zum sozialwissenschaftlichen Potential der Kritischen Theorie* (Frankfurt am Main, 1982), p. 57.

77 Karl Korsch, 'Briefe an Paul Partos, Paul Mattick und Bert Brecht', ed. Michael Buckmiller and Götz Langkau, in *Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung*, 2 (1974), p. 188.

78 *Marx-Engels Werke*, vol. 32, p. 547 [Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, p. xlv].

79 'Bemerkungen über Wissenschaft und Krise', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 1-7; in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), pp. 3-9.

80 Max Horkheimer, 'Zum Problem der Wahrheit', *ZfS*, 4 (1935), pp. 321-64; 'On the Problem of Truth', in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 432-3.

81 Max Horkheimer, 'Zum Rationalismusstreit', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), p. 49.

82 Max Horkheimer, 'Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung (Zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters)', *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 164-5.

83 Ibid., pp. 168, 170-1.

84 Ibid., pp. 167, 171, 170.

85 Ibid., p. 172.

86 Ibid., pp. 165, 172.

87 Ibid., pp. 229-30.

88 Max Horkheimer, 'Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis', *ZfS*, 7 (1938), pp. 1-54.

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89 Max Horkheimer, 'Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 4-53, and 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 245-94; in Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, pp. 132-87 and 188-243.

90 Horkheimer to Grossmann, 27 November 1936.

91 Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, p. 151; 'Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), p. 21. The Vienna circle work cited by Horkheimer was: Hans Hahn, 'Logik, Mathematik und Naturerkennen', in *Einheitswissenschaft*, ed. Otto Neurath et al., vol. 2 (Vienna, 1933), p. 9.

92 Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, p. 140; *ZfS*, 6 (1937), p. 11.

93 *Erste Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre*.

94 Horkheimer, *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 46-7; cf. *Critical Theory*, p. 181.

95 *Ibid.*, p. 31; cf. *Critical Theory*, p. 163.

96 Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, 'Philosophie und kritische Theorie', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 625-44. [Horkheimer's 'Postscript' to this article appears in Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, pp. 244-52.]

97 Horkheimer, 'Traditionelle und kritische Theorie', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), p. 261; *Critical Theory*, pp. 206-7.

98 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, 'Offener Brief an Max Horkheimer', in *Die Zeit*, 12 February 1965.

99 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Marginalien zu Mahler', 23, 8 June 1936.

100 Cf. pp. 92-3 above, and also, for example, Adorno to Kracauer, 14 March 1933, and Adorno to Horkheimer, 4 September 1941.

101 [Translated by Gregor Benton in Karl Marx, *Early Writings* (Harmonds-worth, 1975), p. 247.]

102 Ernst Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Zurich, 1935; expanded edn, Frankfurt am Main, 1962), p. 12.

103 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk, Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 1023.

104 Walter Benjamin, *Understanding Brecht*, trans. Anna Bostock (London, 1973), p. 120.

105 Walter Benjamin, 'Surrealism: the Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia', trans. Edmund Jephcott, in *One-Way Street, and Other Writings* (London, 1979), p. 237.

106 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 1014.

107 Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit*, p. 121.

108 Adorno to Horkheimer, 22 September 1937.

109 For details of the dishwasher story, see Ernst Bloch, *Briefe 1903-1975*, ed. Karola Bloch et al. (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 443-4. [Bloch wrote to Adorno thanking the Institute for a grant of \$100 it had made to him some time previously, but claiming he had been forced to take a job as a dishwasher, and had been sacked for being too slow. He was now working an eight-hour day packing and carrying parcels, and had had to break off work on his book in the middle of a page. None of this was true, but the Institute at once granted him the \$50 per month for six months.]

110 [Siegfried Kracauer, *Jacques Offenbach und das Paris seiner Zeit* (Amsterdam, 1937).]

111 Cf. Rolf Tiedemann, in Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk, Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 1097; and Gershom Scholem, in *Walter Benjamin/Gershom Scholem, Briefwechsel 1933-1940*, ed. Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am

Main, 1980), p. 301, note 1.

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112 Walter Benjamin, 'Zum gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen Schriftstellers', *ZfS*, 3 (1934), pp. 54-78; K.A. Stempflinger (i.e. Walter Benjamin), 'Der eingetunkte Zauberstab' (review of Max Kommerell, *Jean Paul* [Frankfurt am Main, 1933]), *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 29 March 1934, Reichsausgabe, p. 10.

113 Theodor Wiesengrund-Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 103-24.

114 Walter Benjamin, *One-Way Street, and Other Writings*, trans. Edmund Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter (London, 1979), p. 62.

115 In Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (Glasgow, 1973), pp. 219-53.

116 Adorno to Benjamin, 6 November 1934, cited in Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 1106.

117 Karplus to Benjamin, 28 May 1935, cited in *ibid.*, p. 1115.

118 Benjamin to Adorno, 31 May 1935, in *ibid.*, pp. 1117-18, and in Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), p. 664.

119 Adorno to Horkheimer, Oxford, 8 June 1935.

120 Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth, 1976), pp. 163-77.

121 Horkheimer to Benjamin, New York, 18 September 1935.

122 Walter Benjamin, 'L'oeuvre d'art à l'époque de sa reproduction mécanisée', *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 40-68, in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, pp. 219-53; Benjamin to Horkheimer, Paris, 16 October 1935, in Benjamin, *Briefe*, p. 690.

123 Walter Benjamin, 'Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der Historiker', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 346-81, in Benjamin, *One-Way Street, and Other Writings*, pp. 349-86.

124 Walter Benjamin, 'Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), pp. 50-91, in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, pp. 157-202.

125 Walter Benjamin, 'Über den Begriff der Geschichte', in *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis*, ed. Institute of Social Research (Los Angeles, 1942), pp. 1-6; in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, pp. 255-66.

126 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 490.

127 *Ibid.*, p. 500.

128 *Ibid.*, pp. 571, 580.

129 *Ibid.*, p. 574.

130 *Loc. cit.*

131 *Ibid.*, p. 496.

132 *Ibid.*, p. 579.

133 *Ibid.*, p. 405.

134 Benjamin to Horkheimer, 16 October 1935, in Benjamin, *Briefe*, p. 690.

135 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 578.

136 Ludwig Klages, 'Vom Traumbewusstsein', in *Sämtliche Werke* (Bonn, 1974), vol. 3, p. 162.

137 Ludwig Klages, *Vom kosmogonischen Eros*, 2nd edn (Jena, 1926), pp. 128-9.

138 Ibid., pp. 142-3, 126.

139 [The Freideutsche Jugend was an association of students forming part of the contemporary youth movement, which in October 1913 organized the first Free German Youth Congress (*Freideutsche Jugendtag*) on the Hoher Meissner, a plateau in the Hessian mountains. Wyneken, Benjamin's

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teacher, for some time attempted unsuccessfully to achieve recognition as the leader of the Freideutsche Jugend. At its meeting on the Hoher Meissner, the group's programme, the so-called 'Meissnerformel', was promulgated, promoting the idea of young people building their lives on the basis of self-determination, autonomy, inner truth and inner freedom. Alcohol and nicotine were banned at their meetings. The association was dissolved in 1919.

140 Ludwig Klages, 'Mensch und Erde', in *Mensch und Erde. Zehn Abhandlungen* (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 22-3.

141 [Johann Jakob Bachofen (1815-87), Professor of Roman Law at Zurich. He developed a Romantic interpretation of the mythology and symbols of antiquity, and was held to have discovered the existence of matriarchy in the ancient world.]

142 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), p. 44.

143 Louis Aragon, *Le Paysan de Paris* (Paris, 1970), p. 145.

144 Benjamin to Adorno, Paris, 31 May 1935, in Benjamin, *Briefe*, p. 663.

145 Aragon, *Le Paysan de Paris*, pp. 19-20, 20, 144.

146 Ibid., pp. 82-4.

147 Walter Benjamin, 'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian', in Benjamin, *One-Way Street, and Other Writings*, pp. 357-8.

148 [A nineteenth-century German magazine that published sentimental writing.]

149 Ibid., p. 358.

150 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk, Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 5, p. 136.

151 Sigfried Giedion, *Bauen in Frankreich, Bauen in Eisen, Bauen in Eisenbeton* (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 1-2.

152 Walter Benjamin, second summary, 1939, in *Passagen-Werk*, p. 1256.

153 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 577.

154 Ibid., p. 1174.

155 Ibid., p. 1034.

156 Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 576, 578.

157 Walter Benjamin, 'Pariser Tagebuch', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), p. 582.

158 Walter Benjamin, 'A Small History of Photography', trans. Kingsley Shorter, in Benjamin, *One-Way Street, and Other Writings*, p. 250.

159 Walter Benjamin, 'Erfahrung und Armut', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), p. 216.

160 Cf. the notes on Proust and Baudelaire accompanying 'Zum Bilde Prousts', in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 63.

161 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, pp. 467, 533, 534.

162 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 459.

163 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 572.

164 [See note 148 above]

165 Benjamin, 'Erfahrung und Armut', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, p. 219.

166 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 961, 215.

167 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 438; vol. 4, p. 579; vol. 2, p. 436.

168 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, p. 593.

169 Bernd Witte, *Walter Benjamin* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1985).

170 Walter Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, trans. Harry Zohn (London, 1973), p. 96.

171 Baudelaire, in the dedication to the *Spleen de Paris*, cited by Benjamin,

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- Charles Baudelaire, p. 67; Benjamin, 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire', in *Illuminations*, p. 167.
- 172 Benjamin, *Charles Baudelaire*, p. 110; Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 164.
- 173 Benjamin *Illuminations*, pp. 167, 189, 193.
- 174 Ibid., pp. 195-6.
- 175 Horkheimer to Adorno, 24 December 1937.
- 176 Horkheimer to Benjamin, 18 March 1936; cited in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 997.
- 177 17 December 1934, on Benjamin's Kafka essay; 2 August 1935, on his first prospectus for the *Passagen*; 18 March 1936, on the essay on the work of art; 10 November 1938 and 1 February 1939, on the first Baudelaire essay; 29 February 1940, on the second Baudelaire essay. The letters are collected in Theodor W. Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main, 1970).
- 178 Benjamin to Adorno, 9 December 1938; Benjamin, *Briefe*, pp. 797-8.
- 179 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens', *ZfS*, 7 (1938), pp. 321-56; cited, with minor alterations, from the translation 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression in Listening', in Arato and Gebhart (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, p. 298.
- 180 Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 129.
- 181 Benjamin, *Passagen-Werk*, pp. 499-500.
- 182 Adorno to Horkheimer, 23 November 1936.
- 183 Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, pp. 138 and 139.
- 184 'Hektor Rottweiler' (pseud. of T.W. Adorno), 'Über Jazz', in *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 256, 254.
- 185 Theodor W. Adorno, *In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1981). Cf. Adorno to Horkheimer, 19 October 1937.
- 186 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Fragmente über Wagner', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), pp. 46, 17, 21, 22.
- 187 Adorno to Benjamin, 10 November 1938, in Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, pp. 141-2.
- 188 Adorno to Horkheimer, 21 January 1937.
- 189 Max Horkheimer, 'Zu Theodor Haecker: Der Christ und die Geschichte', *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 372-83; cf. Adorno to Horkheimer, 25 January 1937.
- 190 Benjamin to Adorno, 9 December 1938, in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 1103.
- 191 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 255.
- 192 Adorno to Benjamin, 1 February 1939, in Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 154.
- 193 Benjamin to Adorno, 7 May 1940, in Benjamin, *Briefe*, p. 849.
- 194 Walter Benjamin, 'Dialog über die Religiösität der Gegenwart', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 22, 24.
- 195 Adorno to Benjamin, 29 February 1940, in Adorno, *Über Walter Benjamin*, p. 158.
- 196 Benjamin to Adorno, 9 February 1938, in *Briefe*, p. 798.

197 Adorno to Benjamin, 1 February 1939; the `text' Adorno refers to is his essay on the fetish character in music.

198 Herbert Marcuse, `Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 54-94; Leo Lowenthal, `Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der

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autoritären Ideologie', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 295-345, translated as 'Knut Hamsun', in Arato and Gebhart (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, pp. 319-45.

199 Knut Hamsun, *Mysteries*, trans. A.G. Chater (New York, 1927); Eduard Bernstein, *Die Neue Zeit*, 2 (1893-4), p. 376, cited by Lowenthal in 'Knut Hamsun. Zur Vorgeschichte der autoritären Ideologie', p. 340. [On Bernstein, see p. 663, note 41 above.]

200 Ibid., p. 340.

201 Benjamin to Lowenthal, 1 July 1934, in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, pp. 978-9.

202 Horkheimer to Adorno, 22 February 1937.

203 Max Horkheimer, 'Der neueste Angriff auf die Metaphysik', in *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 4-53, in Horkheimer, *Critical Theory*, pp. 132-87.

204 Max Horkheimer, in *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 1-2.

205 Marcuse, 'Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur', p. 56.

206 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction', trans. Gregor Benton, in Karl Marx, *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth, 1975), pp. 244, 250.

207 Marcuse, 'Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur', pp. 90, 91, 63.

208 Adorno to Horkheimer, 12 May 1937.

209 Only one article by a specialist historian was published in the journal: 'Sociological Remarks on Greek Poetry', *ZfS*, 6 (1937), pp. 382-99, by Maurice Bowra, a non-Marxist, who had been recommended by Adorno.

210 Cited by Alfons Söllner, in Rainer Erd (ed.) *Reform und Resignation. Gespräche über Franz L. Neumann* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), p. 30; for the following materials, see in particular Söllner's introduction to Franz Neumann, *Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie: Aufsätze 1930-1954*, ed. Alfons Söllner (Frankfurt am Main, 1978).

211 [Hermann Heller (1891-1933) was a sociologist and Professor of Constitutional Law in Berlin, 1928-32 and Frankfurt, 1932-3; he died in exile in Madrid. Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), political theorist and Professor of Politics in Berlin, joined the Nazi Party in 1933 after it took power.]

212 Franz Neumann, 'Die soziale Bedeutung der Grundrechte in der Weimarer Verfassung', in *Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie*, p. 74.

213 Ernst Fraenkel, *Reformismus und Pluralismus. Materialien zu einer ungeschriebenen politischen Autobiographie*, ed. Falk Esche and Frank Grube (Hamburg, 1973), p. 175. On 2 May 1933 the SA stormed trade union buildings, after the trade unions had demonstrated their submission to the Nazis in a degrading way on 1 May, declared a public holiday by the Hitler government.

214 Neumann, *Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie*, pp. 109-10.

215 Franz Neumann, *The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society*, ed. Matthias Ruete (Leamington Spa, 1986), pp. 285, 257.

216 Neumann to Horkheimer, 15 and 19 January 1936.

217 Neumann, *Wirtschaft, Staat, Demokratie*, p. 415.

218 Neumann to Horkheimer, 5 October 1936.

219 Franz Neumann, 'Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft', *ZfS*, 6 (1937),

pp. 542-96.

220 Franz Neumann, 'Types of Natural Law', *Studies in Philosophy and Social*

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*Science*, 8 (1940), pp. 338-61. The publication of the English dissertation, which was one of the projects mentioned in the prospectus of the International Institute of Social Research in 1938, did not come about. It was not until 1980 that Alfons Söllner first published Neumann's dissertation, translated into German.

221 Neumann to Horkheimer, 24 September 1939.

222 Cited by Alfons Söllner in Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation*, p. 42.

223 [Max Scheler (1874-1928) was in the early 1920s the principal figure next to Husserl in the phenomenological movement, before the advent of Martin Heidegger. Rudolf Smend (1851-1930) was Professor of Theology in Basle and Göttingen.]

224 *Zur Staatstheorie des Sozialismus und Bolschewismus*.

225 'Zur Staatslehre des Sozialismus und Bolschewismus', an excerpt from *Zur Staatstheorie des Sozialismus und Bolschewismus*, in Otto Kirchheimer, *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus* (Frankfurt am Main, 1976), pp. 35 and 37.

226 Otto Kirchheimer, *Weimar und was dann? Entstehung und Gegenwart der Weimarer Verfassung* (Berlin, 1930).

227 'Verfassungswirklichkeit und politische Zukunft der Arbeiterklasse', in Kirchheimer, *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus*, p. 75.

228 Otto Kirchheimer, *Die Grenzen der Enteignung. Ein Beitrag zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Enteignungsinstituts und zur Auslegung des Art. 153 der Weimarer Verfassung* (Berlin, 1930).

229 Otto Kirchheimer, 'Die Grenzen der Enteignung', in *Funktionen des Staats und der Verfassung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), pp. 257-8.

230 Otto Kirchheimer and Nathan Leites, 'Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts *Legalität und Legitimität*', in Kirchheimer, *Von der Weimarer Republik zum Faschismus*, p. 151.

231 *Staatsgefüge und Recht des Dritten Reiches*.

232 *Reichsgruppenwörter der Reichsgruppe Hochschullehrer des National-sozialistischen Rechtswahrerbundes*.

233 *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung*, 15 September 1935, p. 1004.

234 Horkheimer to Kirchheimer, 16 February 1937.

235 'Zuchthausrevolten oder Sozialpolitik'.

236 Georg Rusche, 'Arbeitsmarkt und Strafvollzug', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), pp. 63-78.

237 Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Structure* (New York, 1939), p. 207.

238 Horkheimer to Neumann, 10 August 1939.

239 Otto Kirchheimer, 'Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany', *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (SPSS)*, 8 (1940), p. 462.

240 Kirchheimer to Horkheimer, 15 October 1941.

241 Otto Kirchheimer, 'Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 280, 276, 288.

242 Frederick [sic] Pollock, 'State Capitalism', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 200-25.

243 Otto Kirchheimer, 'The Legal Order of National Socialism', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 456-75.

244 Adorno to Horkheimer, 19 October 1937.

245 Horkheimer to Adorno, 24 December 1937.

246 Lazarsfeld to Adorno, 29 November 1937.

247 Adorno to Lazarsfeld, 24 January 1938.

248 Lazarsfeld to Adorno, 3 February 1938.

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- 249 Cited in Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 'An Episode in the History of Social Research: a Memoir', in *Perspectives in American History*, 2 (1968), p. 305.
- 250 Cf. David E. Morrison, 'Kultur and Culture: the Case of Theodor W. Adorno and Paul F. Lazarsfeld', in *Social Research*, 45 (1978), pp. 339-40, 342.
- 251 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America', trans. Donald Fleming, in *Perspectives in American History*, 2 (1968), pp. 342-3.
- 252 Lazarsfeld, 'An Episode in the History of Social Research', p. 301.
- 253 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 301.
- 254 Adorno, 'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America', p. 343.
- 255 Lazarsfeld, 'An Episode in the History of Social Research', p. 323.
- 256 Morrison, 'Kultur and Culture', p. 348.
- 257 Adorno to Lazarsfeld, 6 September 1938.
- 258 Cited in Morrison, 'Kultur and Culture', pp. 347 and 348.
- 259 Theodor W. Adorno, 'The Radio Symphony: an Experiment in Theory', in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton (eds), *Radio Research 1941* (New York, 1941), pp. 110-39; in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 15, pp. 378-9.
- 260 Theodor W. Adorno, 'A Social Critique of Radio Music', *Kenyon Review*, 8 (1945), pp. 208-17; 'On Popular Music', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 17-48; 'Die gewürdigte Musik', in Adorno, *Der getreue Korrepetitor. Lehrschriften zur musikalischen Praxis* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), repr. in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970-86), vol. 15.
- 261 Adorno, 'Scientific Experiences of a European Scholar in America', p. 351.
- 262 Adorno, 'On Popular Music', pp. 27-8, 25.
- 263 *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 38-9.
- 264 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
- 265 Alice Maier, in Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation*, p. 99.
- 266 Thomas Mann, *Politische Schriften und Reden*, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main, 1949), p. 189.
- 267 Joachim Radkau offers convincing evidence of this in his work on *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA. Ihr Einfluss auf die amerikanische Europapolitik 1933-1945* (Düsseldorf, 1971), which is in every sense extensive.
- 268 Horkheimer to Favez, 13 October 1938.
- 269 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 21 June 1938.
- 270 Friedrich Pollock, *Memorandum for P.T. on Certain Questions regarding the Institute of Social Research* (1943), in the Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 258.
- 271 Friedrich Pollock, *Rapport Annuel sur le Bilan et le Compte de Recettes et Dépenses de 1937, présenté à la 6ème Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 9 avril 1938*, Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 277. 7.
- 272 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 25 July 1940.

273 Horkheimer to Benjamin, 17 December 1938.

274 The appointment only came into effect after the war, however.

275 Adorno to Horkheimer, Oxford, 12 October 1936.

276 Horkheimer to Adorno, 22 October 1936.

277 *Statement of Prof. Dr Max Horkheimer, Research Director of the Institute of Social Research, on June 9, 1943. Re: Certain Charges made against*

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*the Institute of Social Research (Columbia University)*, Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 63.

278 Fromm to Horkheimer, 19 December 1935.

279 Horkheimer to Favez, 13 October 1938.

280 On the following, see in particular the section on the 'University in Exile' at the New School for Social Research, in Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*.

281 Lowenthal to Horkheimer, 4 August 1940.

282 Neumann to Horkheimer, New York, 13 August 1941.

283 Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), p. 115.

284 On this and the following, see Radkau, *Die deutsche Emigration in den USA*, pp. 232, 234 and 241-2.

285 On this too, see *ibid.*, p. 287 and *passim*.

286 Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', pp. 121, 122, 128.

287 *Ibid.*, p. 118. The 'new form of selective breeding' lay in the creation of totalitarian domination by one particular interest group over the whole population.

288 Lang to Horkheimer, 15 April 1940.

289 Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', pp. 115, 130, 131, 135.

290 *Ibid.*, p. 136.

291 *The Iron Heel* is the title of a novel by Jack London, published in 1908, in which a member of a socialist society which had achieved victory after centuries of struggle presents documents recalling the beginnings of the preceding, centuries-long domination of the Iron Heel, i.e. of capitalism prepared to use naked and total violence. The novel earned Jack London the accusation from his socialist friends of being defeatist and discouraging.

292 Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', p. 135.

293 Horkheimer to Favez, 6 December 1938.

294 [Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778-1852), founder of the German gymnastics movement.]

295 Ludwig Marcuse, *Mein zwanzigstes Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1975), p. 253.

#### Notes to Chapter 4

1 Horkheimer to Adorno, 14 September 1941.

2 Leo Lowenthal, in Rainer Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation. Gespräche über Franz L. Neumann* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), p. 98.

3 Horkheimer to Benjamin, 23 February 1939.

4 Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York, 1941).

5 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 14 October 1941, referring to himself, Adorno and Marcuse.

6 Pollock to Horkheimer, 1 October 1941. 'Günther Stern' was Günther Anders (1902-), a novelist and critic, and son of the psychologist William Stern.

7 Kirchheimer to Horkheimer, 16 July 1942.

8 Horkheimer, 'Report to the Trustees of the Kurt Gerlach Memorial Foundation'.

9 Cited in Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation*, p. 100.

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10 Cf. Peter von Haselberg, 'Wiesengrund-Adorno', in Heinz Ludwig Arnold (ed.), *Theodor W. Adorno*, special issue of *Text + Kritik* (Munich, 1977), p. 12.

11 Erich Fromm, 'Die gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit der psychoanalytischen Therapie', *ZfS*, 4 (1935), pp. 365-97.

12 Adorno to Horkheimer, 21 March 1936.

13 Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London, 1974), p. 60. [Note by Adorno's translator: 'Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), Bengali poet and philosopher of mystical populist inclinations. Franz Werfel (1890-1945), an Austrian writer of religious-humanitarian pathos'.]

14 Ibid., p. 62.

15 Max Horkheimer, *Dämmerung* (Zurich, 1934), in *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985- ), vol. 2, p. 341 [*Dawn and Decline*, trans. Michael Shaw (New York, 1978), p. 35].

16 Max Horkheimer, 'Materialismus und Moral', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 183.

17 Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, vol. I, p. 441.

18 Horkheimer, *Dämmerung*, p. 444; Max Horkheimer, 'Montaigne und die Funktion der Skepsis', *ZfS*, 7 (1938), p. 19; Horkheimer to Benjamin, 28 January 1935.

19 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 June 1941.

20 It was thanks to these contacts that Fromm was able to arrange a contribution by Margaret Mead for the *ZfS*, which was welcome evidence for the Horkheimer circle of the Institute's collaboration with well-known United States scholars.

21 See also Theodor W. Adorno, 'Die revidierte Psychoanalyse', in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970-86), vol. 8.

22 *ZfS*, 8 (1939), p. 246.

23 Cf. M. Mitscherlich, 'Freuds erste Rebellin', in *Emma*, 12 (1978), pp. 34-5.

24 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, 'Ernst Simmel und die Freudsche Philosophie', in Bernhard Görlich, Alfred Lorenzer and Alfred Schmidt (eds), *Der Stachel Freud* (Frankfurt am Main, 1980).

25 Cf. Horkheimer to Adorno, 21 June 1941.

26 Fromm to Horkheimer, 16 November 1939.

27 Cf. Rainer Funk, *Erich Fromm* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1983), pp. 99-100.

28 Horkheimer to Fromm, 18 October 1946. [On 30 June 1934, 'by Hitler's orders, the SA leaders, Röhm, Ernst, Heines and many of the most prominent Nazis of the "old Guard" were put to death without trial in Munich and the neighbourhood, whilst Göring conducted an even more extensive massacre in Prussia.' E.J. Passant, *A Short History of Germany 1815-1945* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 195.]

29 Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (London, 1942), pp. 233, 238.

30 Ibid., p. 246.

31 Horkheimer to Neumann, 10 July 1940.

32 Adorno to Horkheimer, 5 August 1940.

33 Referrings to the Lowenthals, the Marcuses and the Horkheimers; Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 10 August 1940.

34 Horkheimer to Neumann, West Los Angeles, 30 April 1941.

35 Horkheimer to Pollock, 30 May 1941.

36 Horkheimer to Adorno, 26 June 1941.

37 Friedrich Pollock, 'Bemerkungen zur Wirtschaftskrise', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 347.

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38 Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), pp. 121, 128.

39 Max Horkheimer, 'The Authoritarian State', in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (Oxford, 1978), p. 110.

40 Ibid., pp. 101, 102 [translation revised].

41 Ibid., p. 97, pp. 112-13 [translation revised], pp. 114, 116, 107.

42 Horkheimer to Adorno, 21 June 1941.

43 Friedrich Pollock, 'State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 200-25; repr. in Arato and Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, pp. 71-94. From the second English-language issue of the journal onwards, which had been a special issue on mass communication, each issue was to have a special theme. For autumn 1941, an issue on bureaucracy was planned, for spring 1942 an issue on methodology, and for the summer one on public opinion.

44 'Arbeiterbewegung im Staatskapitalismus'.

45 Horkheimer to Pollock, 30 May 1941.

46 Adorno to Horkheimer, 8 June 1941.

47 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 July 1941.

48 Horkheimer to Pollock, Pacific Palisades, 1 July 1941.

49 Horkheimer to Neumann, 20 July 1941.

50 Max Horkheimer, *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 196-7.

51 Adorno to Horkheimer, 18 August 1941.

52 Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy, with an introduction by V.I. Lenin* (London, 1930; repr. 1972), cited in Dwight MacDonal, 'The End of Capitalism in Germany', *Partisan Review*, 7 (1940), p. 210.

53 Neumann to Horkheimer, 23 July 1941.

54 Horkheimer to Neumann, 2 August 1941.

55 Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944* (New York, 1963), p. 227.

56 Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction: Studies in Modern Social Structure*, trans. Edward Shils (London, 1940).

57 Neumann to Horkheimer, 28 August 1941.

58 Horkheimer to Neumann, 30 August 1941.

59 Cf. Erd (ed.), *Reform und Resignation*, p. 113.

60 [Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth, or an Epitome of the Civil Wars of England, from 1640 to 1660* (London, 1679); *Behemoth; or the Long Parliament*, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies (London, 1889; 2nd edn, London, 1969).]

61 Neumann, *Behemoth*, pp. xii and 470.

62 Claire Russell, 'Die Praxis des Zwangskartellierungs', *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 97 (1937),

p. 500, cited in Neumann, *Behemoth*, p. 266. [Claire Russell is listed in the journal as a member of staff (1937) at the Institut für Weltwirtschaft in Kiel.]

63 Neumann, *Behemoth*, p. 354.

64 [See *ibid.*, p. 429, 474. 'Strength Through Joy' was a Nazi leisure organization.]

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 431-2.

66 *Ibid.*, pp. 633-4.

67 Franz L. Neumann, 'Approaches to the Study of Political Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, 65 (1950), p. 176.

68 Horkheimer, draft of a letter to Laski, March 1941.

69 Horkheimer to Neumann, 2 June 1942.

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70 Neumann, *Behemoth*, pp. 463-4.

71 Ibid., p. 471.

72 Ibid., pp. 472, 473.

73 [Thomas Mann (1875-1955), the novelist; Lion Feuchtwanger (1884-1958), German novelist, author of *Jew Süß*.]

74 [Heinrich Mann (1871-1950), novelist and essayist, brother of Thomas Mann.]

75 Ludwig Marcuse, *Mein zwanzigstes Jahrhundert* (Zurich, 1975), p. 267. [Ludwig Marcuse (1894-1971), literary critic and philosopher, Professor of Philosophy in Los Angeles, 1946-72; Max Reinhardt (1873-1943), the Austrian-born theatre director, who opened the Komödie on the Kurfürstendamm in Berlin in 1924 and ran it until 1933; Leopold Jessner (1878-1945), director of the Berlin State Theatre, 1919-30; Fritz Kortner (1892-1970), Austrian-born author and director; Ernst Deutsch (1890-1969), a German actor; Berthold Viertel (1885-1953), Austrian director and writer, an associate of Karl Kraus on the journal *Die Fackel*; Bruno Frank (1884-1945), German poet, novelist and playwright. Sanary-sur-Mer is near Toulon, in France.]

76 [Hanns Eisler (1898-1962), the composer, studied with Schoenberg, and taught music in Berlin at the Marxist Workers' School (Marxistische Arbeiterschule) from 1928, also collaborating with Brecht. He lived in exile in the USA from 1933 to 1948. From 1950 on, he taught composition at the Academy of Arts and University School of Music (Hochschule für Musik) in East Berlin.] On the seminar which took place in the summer of 1942, which on several occasions brought members of the Horkheimer circle and the Brecht circle together, see the minutes of the discussions and the editorial preface in Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 12, pp. 559-86.

77 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 27 August 1941.

78 Horkheimer to Neumann, 1 February 1942.

79 Horkheimer to Neumann, 8 July 1942.

80 Horkheimer to Pollock, 22 June 1941.

81 Walter Benjamin's 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (Glasgow, 1973), pp. 255-66.

82 Horkheimer to Adorno, 4 August 1941.

83 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 17 October 1941; cf. p. 252.

84 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 26 November and 6 December 1941.

85 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 11 February 1942.

86 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 August 1941.

87 Max Horkheimer, 'The End of Reason', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 366-88; repr. in Arato and Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, pp. 26-48.

88 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (eds), *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis*, mimeograph (New York, 1942).

89 Herbert Marcuse, 'Some Social Implications of Modern Technology', in *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 430.

90 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 6 December 1941.

91 Horkheimer to Kirchheimer, 16 August 1942.

92 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 11 November 1942.

93 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 10 November 1942.

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94 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 10 November 1942.

95 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 15 November 1942.

96 Cf. Horkheimer to Neumann, 2 June 1942.

97 Adorno's 'Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik', basically unchanged but with some sections on politics shortened and some on music added, was published in 1949 under the title 'Schönberg und der Fortschritt' ('Schoenberg and Progress'), as the first part of *Philosophie der neuen Musik (Philosophy of Modern Music)*.

98 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 August 1941.

99 Adorno to Horkheimer, 4 September 1941.

100 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 August 1941.

101 'Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik' ('The Philosophy of Modern Music'), typescript, p. 88; identical with the text of Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 122; cf. *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloomster (New York, 1973), pp. 128-9.

102 Ibid., typescript, p. 25; *Philosophie der neuen Musik*, pp. 58-9; cf. *Philosophy of Modern Music*, pp. 57-8.

103 Ibid., typescript, pp. 32-3; *Philosophie*, pp. 65-6; cf. *Philosophy*, pp. 64-6.

104 Ibid., typescript, p. 74; *Philosophie*, p. 110; *Philosophy*, pp. 107, 115.

105 Ibid., typescript, p. 35; *Philosophie*, p. 68; cf. *Philosophy*, pp. 68-9.

106 Ibid., typescript, pp. 65, 66; *Philosophie*, pp. 102, 103; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 106.

107 Ibid., typescript, pp. 65, 66; *Philosophie*, pp. 103, 102.

108 Ibid., *Philosophie*, p. 100; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 103.

109 Ibid., typescript, pp. 65-6; *Philosophie*, p. 102; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 106.

110 Ibid., typescript, pp. 35-6; *Philosophie*, pp. 68-9; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 69.

111 Ibid., typescript, p. 74; *Philosophie*, p. 111; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 115.

112 Ibid., typescript, p. 90; *Philosophie*, p. 125; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 132.

113 Ibid., typescript, p. 36; *Philosophie*, p. 39; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 69.

114 Ibid., typescript, p. 83; *Philosophie*, p. 117; cf. *Philosophy*, p. 123.

115 Ibid., typescript, p. 79; *Philosophie*, p. 114.

116 Ibid., typescript, p. 6; *Philosophie*, p. 40; *Philosophy*, p. 69.

117 Ibid., typescript, p. 35; *Philosophie*, p. 68.

118 Ibid., typescript, p. 43; *Philosophie*, p. 80.

119 Ibid., typescript, p. 74; *Philosophie*, p. 110; *Philosophy*, p. 115.

120 Ibid., typescript, p. 75; *Philosophie*, p. 111; *Philosophy*, p. 116.

121 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 August 1941; see also Horkheimer, 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', in Horkheimer

and Adorno (eds), *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis*, pp. 54-5.

122 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 August 1941.

123 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 October 1941.

124 Horkheimer to Laski, 10 March 1941. [Horkheimer's English corrected here. The original reads: `As true as it is that one can understand Anti-semitism only from our society, as true it appears to me to become that by now society itself can be properly understood only through Anti-semitism. It demonstrates on the example of the minority which is, as a matter of fact, in store for the majority as well: that change into administrative objects.']

125 Adorno to Horkheimer, New York, 10 November 1941. See also Geoffrey Gorer, *The Revolutionary Ideas of the Marquis de Sade* (London, 1932).

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126 Walter Benjamin had written to Gretel Adorno in April 1940 that 'It would throw wide the doors to enthusiastic misunderstanding.'

127 Adorno to Horkheimer, New York, 12 June 1941.

128 Horkheimer to Adorno, Pacific Palisades, 21 June 1941.

129 'Autoritärer Staat'; 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung'.

130 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Veblen's Attack on Culture', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 404.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 402.

132 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Spengler Today', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 319.

133 Adorno to David, New York, 3 July 1941.

134 Horkheimer, 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', in Horkheimer and Adorno (eds), *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis*, p. 40; cf. 'The End of Reason', in Arato and Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, p. 37.

135 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, Pacific Palisades, 23 May 1942.

136 Max Horkheimer and (?) Theodor W. Adorno, *Memorandum über Teile des Los Angeles Arbeitsprogramms, die von den Philosophen nicht durchgeführt werden können* (1942), Max Horkheimer Archive, VI 32. 1 ff.

137 Horkheimer to Weil, Pacific Palisades, 10 March 1942.

138 Horkheimer to Pollock, Pacific Palisades, 12 October 1942.

139 Pollock to Horkheimer, 5 November 1942.

140 Horkheimer to Pollock, 10 February 1943.

141 Horkheimer to Tillich, 12 August 1942.

142 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 17 August 1942.

143 [Jacob Burckhardt (the Younger), *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, ed. Jakob Oeri, 4 vols (Berlin, 1898-1902).]

144 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Reflexionen zur Klassentheorie', published post-humously in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 381.

145 Cf. Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 12, pp. 75-6.

146 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 3 April 1943.

147 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 19 December 1942.

148 Horkheimer to Marcuse, Pacific Palisades, 14 October 1941. [Among the books referred to are: Johann J. Bachofen, *Das Mutterrecht. Eine Untersuchung über die Gynaiokratie der alten Welt nach ihrer religiösen und rechtlichen Natur* (Stuttgart, 1861)cf. *Myth, Religion, and Mother Right: Selected Writings of J.J. Bachofen*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London, 1967); J.G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative Religion*, 3rd edn, 12 vols (London, 1907-15); Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mentalité primitive* (Paris, 1922)cf. *Primitive Mentality*, trans. Lilian A. Clare (London, 1923); Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (New York, 1934); Bronislaw Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology* (London, 1926); Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes, et Religions*, 5 vols (Paris, 1905-25)cf. *Cults, Myths, and Religions*, trans. Elizabeth Frost (London, 1912); Erwin Rohde, *Psyche. Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1890)cf. *Psyche*, trans.

W.B. Hillis (London, 1925; New York, 1966).]

149 Horkheimer to Tillich, 12 August 1942.

150 Horkheimer to Pollock, 27 November 1942.

151 Horkheimer to Pollock, 11 April 1943.

152 Horkheimer to Pollock, 20 March 1943.

153 Horkheimer to Pollock, 17 June 1943.

154 See the minutes of the discussions in Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 12, pp. 594-605.

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- 155 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Fragmente über Wagner', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), pp. 1-49, and 'Zur Philosophie der neuen Musik'.
- 156 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (Amsterdam, 1947); *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (London, 1979), p. xi.
- 157 *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 139.
- 158 Benjamin, 'Theses on the Philosophy of History', in *Illuminations*, p. 259.
- 159 [S.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford, 1977), pp. 328-55.]
- 160 [Klages is cited on p. 49, footnote 6, of the English edition of *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.]
- 161 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 223.
- 162 *Ibid.*, pp. 3, xvi.
- 163 *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12; cf. p. 6.
- 164 *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 13.
- 165 Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature*, trans. Anna Bostock (London, 1971).
- 166 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 57.
- 167 *Ibid.*, pp. 50-1.
- 168 *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- 169 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 170 *Ibid.*, p. 35.
- 171 *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 93.
- 172 [Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris, 1927), trans. Richard Aldington as *The Great Betrayal* (London, 1928); the American title was *The Treason of the Intellectuals*.] Horkheimer to Pollock, Pacific Palisades, 7 May 1943.
- 173 Adorno to Lowenthal, 3 June 1945.
- 174 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. xvi.
- 175 *Ibid.*, p. 117.
- 176 *Ibid.*, pp. 117 and 31.
- 177 *Ibid.*, pp. 31-3.
- 178 *Ibid.*, pp. 33-4.
- 179 Max Horkheimer, 'Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung (Zur Anthropologie des bürgerlichen Zeitalters)', in *ZfS*, 5 (1936), pp. 161-234.
- 180 Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 142.
- 181 *Ibid.*, p. 167.

182 Ibid., pp. 170-1.

183 Ibid., pp. 199-200.

184 Ibid., pp. 110, 112.

185 Ibid., pp. 181-2 [translation corrected].

186 Ibid., p. 172 [translation corrected].

187 Ibid., p. 168.

188 Ibid., pp. 176-7, 179.

189 Ibid., pp. 188-9.

190 Ibid., p. 180.

191 Martin Buber, 'Der Glaube des Judentums' (1933), repr. in Kurt Wilhelm (ed.), *Jüdischer Glaube. Ein Auswahl aus Zwei Jahrtausenden* (Bremen, 1961), p. 513.

192 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 29 November 1941.

193 Horkheimer to Pollock, 9 June 1943.

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194 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 11 September 1943.

195 Horkheimer to Pollock, 19 November 1943.

196 Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York, 1947), p. vii. The book first appeared in English, and not until 1967 was it published in German, with minor changes, as *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*.

197 [i.e. 'Twilight'; the title of the English translation is *Dawn and Decline*.]

198 Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 6.

199 Ibid., p. 4.

200 Ibid., p. 35.

201 Ibid., pp. 61, 81.

202 Ibid., p. 61.

203 Ibid., p. 32.

204 'Materialismus und Metaphysik', *ZfS*, 2 (1933), p. 31, in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), p. 45.

205 Horkheimer to Tillich, 12 August 1942; see above, p. 318.

206 Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, p. 182.

207 Ibid., p. 49.

208 Ibid., p. 100.

209 Ibid., p. 103.

210 Ibid., pp. 94, 122.

211 [Ernst Jünger (1895-), German novelist and essayist; Georges Bataille (1872-1922), French dramatist.]

212 Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason*, pp. 95-100.

213 Ibid., p. 100.

214 Ibid., pp. 187, 119.

215 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 18 July 1947.

216 The others were the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League and the Jewish Labor Committee.

217 Isacque Graeber, Stuart Henderson Britt et al. (eds), *Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Antisemitism* (New York, 1942).

218 Arthur D. Morse, *While Six Millions Died* (London, 1968), p. 149.

219 George Orwell, 'Anti-Semitism in Britain', *Contemporary Jewish Record*, 8 (1945).

220 Neumann to Horkheimer, 20 December 1941.

221 Horkheimer to Lowenthal, 27 August 1942. Isacque Graeber, co-editor of *Jews in a Gentile World*, had been

employed by the Institute in 1941 to procure research funds.

222 Horkheimer to Adorno, 17 September 1942.

223 Neumann to Horkheimer, 17 October 1942.

224 Horkheimer to Pollock, 9 November 1942.

225 See *Contemporary Jewish Record*, 6 (December 1943), p. 657.

226 Pollock to Horkheimer, 2 March 1943.

227 Pollock, 'Memorandum no. 18', 24 February 1943, an item in the Horkheimer-Pollock correspondence.

228 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 17 July 1943.

229 Horkheimer to Pollock, 26 October 1943.

230 Adorno to Horkheimer, 3 February 1944.

231 Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Gutermann, *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator* (New York, 1949).

232 *SPSS*, 9 (1941), p. 142.

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233 Horkheimer to Pollock, 19 May 1943.

234 Horkheimer to Pollock, 17 December 1943.

235 *Approach and Techniques of the Berkeley Group* (December 1943), p. 4 (Max Horkheimer Archive, VI 34. 37-43).

236 Horkheimer to Pollock, 25 March 1944.

237 See 'Speech of Dr H. of April 16th 43', published in Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 12, p. 168.

238 Horkheimer to Pollock, 25 March 1944.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Institute of Social Research, *Studies in Anti-Semitism: A Report on the Cooperative Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism for the Year Ending March 15, 1944*, hectographed research report (August 1944), p. 29.

242 Ibid., pp. 30-1.

243 Horkheimer to Pollock, 19 May 1943.

244 Adorno to Horkheimer, 'Memorandum re: Manual for Distribution among Jews', 30 October 1944.

245 Adorno to Mendelssohn, 18 December 1943.

246 American Jewish Committee, *Progress Report of the Scientific Department* (22 June 1945) (Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 66).

247 Report by Gurland cited by Pollock, 'Memorandum re: Jewish Labor Committee', 23 December 1943, part of the Horkheimer-Pollock correspondence.

248 Pollock, in *ibid.*

249 *Anti-Semitism among Labor: Report on a Research Project Conducted by the Institute of Social Research (Columbia University) in 1944-1945*, hectographed research report (1945) (Max Horkheimer Archive).

250 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 December 1944.

251 Horkheimer to Adorno, 9 December 1944.

252 Adorno to Horkheimer, 14 December 1944.

253 Adorno to Horkheimer, 26 October 1944.

254 Adorno to Horkheimer, 9 November 1944.

255 Horkheimer to Adorno, 19 December 1944.

256 Adorno to Horkheimer, 30 December 1944.

257 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Wissenschaftliche Erfahrungen in Amerika', in Adorno, *Stichworte* (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), pp. 136-7.

258 Horkheimer to Adorno, 9 December 1944.

259 Adorno to Horkheimer, 18 December 1944.

260 Ibid.

261 *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (Paris, 1936), p. 237.

262 Adorno to Horkheimer, 26 October 1944.

263 Cf. Adorno and Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 226.

264 Theodor W. Adorno, *Notes by Dr Adorno on Mrs Frenkel-Brunswik's Article on the Antisemitic Personality* (enclosure with the letter from Adorno to Horkheimer of 25 August 1944).

265 Ibid., pp. 1 and 7.

266 Horkheimer to Adorno, 19 December 1944.

267 Ibid.

268 American Jewish Committee, *Progress Report of the Scientific Department*, 'List of Scientific Projects', 22 June 1945 (Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 66).

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269 Bruno Bettelheim, *Surviving, and Other Essays* (New York, 1979), p. 15.

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271 Bruno Bettelheim, 'The Victim's Image of the Anti-Semite: the Danger of Stereotyping the Adversary', in *Commentary*, 5 (1948), pp. 173-9.

#### Notes to Chapter 5

1 Adorno to Horkheimer, 9 May 1945.

2 Horkheimer to Adorno, 24 November 1944.

3 Horkheimer to Adorno, 6 April 1945.

4 Jürgen Habermas et al. (eds), *Gespräche mit Herbert Marcuse* (Frankfurt am Main, 1978), p. 21. Cf. Ulrich Borsdorf and Lutz Niethammer (eds), *Zwischen Befreiung und Besatzung. Analysen des US-Geheimdienstes über Positionen und Strukturen deutscher Politik 1945* (Wuppertal, 1976), pp. 175-6.

5 Adorno to Horkheimer, 9 May 1945.

6 Theodor W. Adorno, *What National Socialism Has Done to the Arts* (1945) (Max Horkheimer Archive, XIII 33), p. 10 [English in original].

7 Ibid., p. 18.

8 Marcuse to Horkheimer, Washington, DC, 6 April 1946.

9 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 30 August 1946.

10 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 18 October 1946 [English in original].

11 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 29 December 1948.

12 Herbert Marcuse, *Paper of February 1947* (Max Horkheimer Archive, VI 27a. 245-67), pp. 1-2.

13 Ibid., pp. 10, 8.

14 Ibid., pp. 14-15.

15 *Verhandlungen des 8. Deutschen Soziologentages* (1946), p. 35.

16 'Die Traumhölle des Justemilieu'.

17 *Verhandlungen des 8. Deutschen Soziologentages*, p. 44.

18 [This originally appeared in English in *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 290-304; repr. in Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York, 1986), pp. 273-90.]

19 Horkheimer to Adorno, 3 January 1950.

20 Max Horkheimer, 'Authority and the Family Today', in Ruth Nanda Anshen (ed.), *The Family: Its Function and Destiny* (New York, 1949).

21 Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London, 1974), p. 18.

22 Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia. Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben* (Frankfurt am Main, 1951), p. 131.

23 Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (London, 1974), pp. 25-8.

24 Adorno, *Minima Moralia* (Frankfurt am Main, 1951), p. 121.

25 Jahoda to Horkheimer, New York, 21 November 1945.

26 Horkheimer to Jahoda, 28 November 1945.

27 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 28 February 1948.

28 Horkheimer to Adorno, 25 April 1948 [English in original].

29 Horkheimer to Adorno, 21 May 1948.

30 Horkheimer to Maidon Horkheimer, 21 May 1948.

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31 Horkheimer to Maidon Horkheimer, Carlton Hotel, Frankfurt, 20 June 1948.

32 Horkheimer to Jahoda, Paris, 5 July 1948.

33 Cited from the German translation, 'Lehren aus dem Faschismus', in Max Horkheimer, *Gesellschaft im Übergang. Aufsätze, Reden und Vorträge 1942-1970*, ed. Werner Brede (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), pp. 56, 57.

34 [Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), p. 115.]

35 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophische Fragmente*, mimeographed volume (New York, 1944); *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (Amsterdam, 1947). 'Das Bestehende': mimeo edition, p. 209/Amsterdam edition, p. 200.

36 *Ibid.*, pp. 214/205.

37 'Kapitalistische Aussauger'; 'Industrieritter'; *ibid.*, pp. 216/207.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. 209/201; pp. 213/205.

39 *Ibid.*, pp. 213/205.

40 *Ibid.*, pp. 208/200.

41 Adorno to Horkheimer, 1 July 1948.

42 [In Germany, a full professor must normally be a German national.]

43 Klub für Handel, Industrie und Wissenschaft.

44 Adorno to Horkheimer, 28 October 1949.

45 Horkheimer to Adorno, 9 November 1949.

46 *Ausserordentlicher Professor; ausserplanmässiger Professor; planmässiger ausserordentlicher Professor; ordentlicher Professor.*

47 'Hegel und die kalifornische Linke'.

48 Adorno to Paeschke, 12 December 1949. [Adorno's remark on 'the Homer' refers to the first excursus in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*; *Sinn und Form* was an East German literary journal.]

49 Horkheimer to Adorno, 6 December 1949.

50 Adorno to Horkheimer, 9 May 1945.

51 'Auferstehung der Kultur in Deutschland?'

52 Adorno to Horkheimer, 27 December 1949.

53 Horkheimer to Adorno, 28 January 1957.

54 Adorno to Horkheimer, 27 December 1949. [Sils Maria is a spa and skiing resort in the Engadine in Switzerland, where Nietzsche spent his summers from 1881 to 1888. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1974), p. 371. Adorno discusses Sils Maria and its Nietzschean connections in Theodor W. Adorno, 'Aus Sils Maria', *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1970-86), vol. 10, part 2, pp. 326-9.]

55 Lazarsfeld to Horkheimer, New York, 19 July 1947 [English in original].

56 Adorno to Horkheimer, 10 June 1949.

57 Theodor W. Adorno, *Memorandum on the Berkeley Situation*, 21 July 1947.

58 Adorno to Horkheimer, 2 July 1949.

59 Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950), p. 224.

60 Ibid., p. 255.

61 Ibid., pp. 225-8.

62 Ibid., p. 473.

63 Adorno to Horkheimer, 23 May 1945.

64 Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, pp. 603-4.

65 Ibid., p. 971, footnote 1. 'Portrait of the Anti-Semite' was the English title of the first part of Jean-Paul Sartre, *Réflexions sur la Question juive*, published in *Partisan Review*, 13 (1946), pp. 163-78.

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66 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York, 1965), pp. 79-80.

67 Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 629.

68 Ibid., p. 617.

69 Ibid., p. 634.

70 Ibid., pp. 686-7.

71 Ibid., p. 656.

72 Ibid., pp. 767-8.

73 Ibid., p. 726.

74 Ibid., p. 973.

75 Theodor W. Adorno, *Remarks on 'The Authoritarian Personality'* (1948) (Max Horkheimer Archive, VI 1d), p. 28.

76 Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 976.

77 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 3 April 1943 [English in original].

78 Nathan Glazer, 'The Authoritarian Personality in Profile', *Commentary* (June 1950), p. 580.

79 Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York, 1950), p. 10.

80 Ibid., p. 138.

81 Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality*, p. 204.

82 Ibid., pp. 964-7.

83 Adorno, *Remarks on 'The Authoritarian Personality'*, p. 15.

84 Ibid., p. 26.

#### Notes to Chapter 6

1 [Wolfgang Abendroth (1906-85), Professor of Politics at Marburg from 1951 on. He founded a 'Marburg School' of social science based on Marxism, and was active in the Extra-parliamentary Opposition during the 1960s and the peace movement during the 1970s.]

2 Horkheimer to Zinn, 8 March 1955.

3 *Memorandum über das Institut für Sozialforschung an der Universität Frankfurt/M.* (November 1950) (Max Horkheimer Archive, IX 70).

4 Draft (for letters to sponsors), June 1951 (Max Horkheimer Archive IX, 75); almost identical papers by the Institute's director are quoted in the application by the municipal authorities of Frankfurt am Main to the Town Council for approval of a grant to the Institute of Social Research.

5 'Soziologie im Kampf gegen das Vorurteil. HICOG fördert Institut für Sozialforschung an Frankfurter Universität'. The acronym HICOG referred to the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany.

6 *Gruppenexperiment. Ein Studienbericht*, ed. Friedrich Pollock (Frankfurt am Main, 1955).

7 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Entwurf für Osmer', no date.

8 Notgemeinschaft für den Frieden Europas.

9 *Autorität und Vorurteil*, 2 vols.

10 'Politische Betätigung von Angehörigen des öffentlichen Dienstes gegen die demokratische Grundordnung'.

11 Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands.

12 Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Nazi-Regimes.

13 [The East German Communist youth organization.]

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14 Marcuse to Horkheimer, New York, 18 October 1951.

15 Institut für Sozialforschung an der J.W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, *Ein Bericht über die Feier seiner Wiedereröffnung, seine Geschichte und seine Arbeiten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1952) (Max Horkheimer Archive), p. 12.

16 Here, and in what follows, my information is based mainly on the report by M. Rainer Lepsius, 'Die Entwicklung der Soziologie nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg' (The Development of Sociology after the Second World War), *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, special issue, 21: *Deutsche Soziologie nach 1945: Entwicklungstendenzen und Praxisbezug*, ed. Günther Lüschen, pp. 25-70.

17 [See p. 683, note 211, above.]

18 'Zur gegenwärtigen Stellung der empirischen Sozialforschung in Deutschland'.

19 Frankfurter Institut zur Förderung öffentlicher Angelegenheiten.

20 Darmstädter Institut für sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung.

21 'Die gegenwärtige Situation der Soziologie'.

22 Theodor W. Adorno, J. Decamps, L. Herberger, H. Maus, S. Osmer, I. Rauter and H. Sittenfeld, 'Sozialforschung, empirische', in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften*, ed. Erwin von Beckerath et al., vol. 9 (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 419-35.

23 Theodor W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), pp. 481-2.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 482.

25 *Nebenerwerbslandwirt und seine Familie im Schnittpunkt ländlicher und städtischer Lebensform.*

26 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 482.

27 Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten, *Empirische Sozialforschung. Meinungs- und Marktforschung, Methoden und Probleme* (Frankfurt am Main, 1952), p. 227.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 83.

29 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 479.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 492-3.

31 Adorno to Horkheimer, Paris, 20 October 1952.

32 Adorno to Horkheimer, Los Angeles, 12 November 1952.

33 The Schlagbaum was a bar close to Frankfurt University. [Adorno refers to the sociologist David Riesman, author of *The Lonely Crowd*; see p. 424 above.]

34 Adorno to Horkheimer, 12 March 1953.

35 Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London, 1974), pp. 238-44.

36 [*Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 2 (1957), pp. 19-88; repr. in *Telos*, 19 (Spring 1974), pp. 13-90.] Condensed versions were published in German under the title 'Aberglaube aus zweiter Hand' in 1959 in the journal *Psyche* and in 1962 in Adorno and Horkheimer's *Sociologica II. Reden und Vorträge von Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962).

37 In Adorno and Horkheimer, *Sociologia II*, p. 150 [cf. *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien*, 2 (1957), p. 36] and p. 163.

38 [Helmuth Plessner, *Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie* (Berlin, 1928).]

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39 Horkheimer to Adorno, 17 April 1953.

40 Adorno to Horkheimer, 25 April and 3 June 1953.

41 Horkheimer to Adorno, 19 January 1953.

42 Adorno to Horkheimer, 24 January 1953.

43 Horkheimer to Adorno, 13 March 1953.

44 [Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke (eds), *Wissenschaft ohne Menschlichkeit. Medizinische und eugenische Irrwege unter Diktatur, Bürokratie und Krieg* (Heidelberg, 1949).]

45 Horkheimer to Adorno, 16 February 1953.

46 Horkheimer to Adorno, 16 February 1953.

47 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 17 March 1950.

48 Marcuse to Horkheimer, Washington, DC, 4 June 1950.

49 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 3 July 1950.

50 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 26 March 1951.

51 Marcuse to Horkheimer, New York, 18 October 1951.

52 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 9 February 1953.

53 Horkheimer to Marcuse, 28 April 1953.

54 Adorno to Horkheimer, 10 May 1953.

55 See p. 425 above.

56 Adorno to Horkheimer, 24 June 1953.

57 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 3 June 1954.

58 [Ludwig Erhard, *Wohlstand für Alle*, ed. Wolfram Lange (Düsseldorf, 1957); trans. Edith T. Roberts and John B. Wood under the title *Prosperity through Competition* (London, 1958).]

59 Dean Patzer to the Hessian Minister, Frankfurt am Main, 1 August 1953.

60 [Kurt Schumacher (1895-1952), Member of the Reichstag, 1930-3), imprisoned in various concentration camps, 1933-45, chairman of the SPD, 1946-52; Carlo Schmid (1896-1972), SPD politician, Member of the Bundestag, 1949-72, vice-president of the Bundestag, 1949-66 and 1969-72; Theodor Heuss (1884-1963), writer and politician, Member of the Reichstag, 1930-3, co-founder of the liberal FDP in 1946, first President of the Federal Republic, 1949-59. All three made decisive contributions to the shaping of the West German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*).]

61 Cf. Dörte von Westernhagen, 'Wiedergutmachung?', *Die Zeit*, 5 October 1984, p. 34.

62 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York, 1965), p. 80.

63 *Gruppenexperiment. Ein Studienbericht*, ed. Pollock.

64 *Betriebsklima. Eine industriesoziologische Untersuchung aus dem Ruhrgebiet* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955).

65 Theodor W. Adorno, *Prismen. Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 1955); *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, Mass., 1981).

66 Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud* (Boston, 1955).

67 Walter Benjamin, *Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955).

68 *Sociologica I. Aufsätze, Max Horkheimer zum sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet* (Frankfurt am Main, 1955).

69 Friedrich Pollock, *Automation. Materialien zur Beurteilung der ökonomischen und sozialen Folgen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1956).

70 Max Horkheimer, 'Vernunft und Selbsterhaltung', in Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno (eds), *Walter Benjamin zum Gedächtnis*, mimeograph

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(New York, 1942); 'The End of Reason', *SPSS*, 9 (1941), pp. 366-88, repr. in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 26-48.

71 Cited in Jürgen Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (London, 1983), p. 41.

72 Cf. 'Flaschenpost? Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse und Nachkriegsdeutschland', in *Pflasterstrand*, 17 May 1985.

73 Horkheimer to Adorno, 14 August 1954.

74 Adorno to Horkheimer, 17 August 1954.

75 Horkheimer to Adorno, 22 January 1957.

76 Adorno to Horkheimer, 17 August 1954.

77 *Gruppenexperiment*, ed. Pollock, p. 275.

78 *Ibid.*, pp. 30-1.

79 'Integrationsphänomene in Diskussionsgruppen' and 'Schuld und Abwehr'.

80 *Gruppenexperiment*, ed. Pollock, p. 281.

81 *Ibid.*, p. 310.

82 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit?', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 10, part 2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), pp. 555-72.

83 *Gruppenexperiment*, ed. Pollock, pp. 339-40.

84 *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 1 (1957), pp. 101-2.

85 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9/2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1975), p. 393.

86 *Ibid.*, pp. 392-3.

87 [William G. Sumner, *Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals* (Boston, 1907); Thorstein B. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions* (New York, 1899); Robert Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown: A Study in Contemporary American Culture* (New York, 1929); Robert Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflict* (New York, 1937); Theodor W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York, 1950); and Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Ill., 1951).]

88 Cf. Eberhard Schmidt, *Die verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952*, 8th edn (Frankfurt am Main, 1981).

89 Cf. Hermann Winkhaus, 'Betriebsklima und Mitbestimmung', *Arbeit und Sozialpolitik*, 9 (April 1955).

90 Adorno to Horkheimer, 30 June 1954.

91 Adorno to Horkheimer, Frankfurt am Main, 17 August 1954.

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93 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

94 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

95 *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

96 Ludwig von Friedeburg, *Soziologie des Betriebsklimas. Studien zur Deutung empirischer Untersuchungen in industriellen Grossbetrieben* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), pp. 18, 51.

97 Otto Neuloh, *Die deutsche Betriebsverfassung und ihre Sozialformen bis zur Mitbestimmung* (Tübingen, 1956) and *Der neue Betriebsstil. Untersuchungen über Wirklichkeit und Wirkungen der Mitbestimmung* (Tübingen, 1960).

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98 Theo Pirker et al., *Arbeiter, Management, Mitbestimmung. Eine industriesoziologische Untersuchung der Struktur, der Organisation und des Verhaltens der Arbeiterbelegschaften in Werken der deutschen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie, für die das Mitbestimmungsgesetz gilt* (Stuttgart, 1955).

99 Heinrich Popitz et al., *Technik und Industriearbeit. Soziologische Untersuchungen in der Hüttenindustrie* (Tübingen, 1957) and *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters. Soziologische Untersuchungen in der Hüttenindustrie* (Tübingen, 1957).

100 *Der entfremdete Mensch. Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Marx.*

101 *Betriebsklima*, p. 103.

102 *Betriebsklima*, pp. 15-16.

103 Popitz et al., *Das Gesellschaftsbild des Arbeiters*, p. 153.

104 *Ibid.*, p. 154.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 156.

106 Cf. Oskar Negt, *Soziologische Phantasie und exemplarisches Lernen. Zur Theorie der Arbeiterbildung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968; expanded edn 1971), p. 45.

107 Adorno to Horkheimer, 3 September 1955.

108 [The subtitle 'Zur deutschen Ideologie', recalling Marx's *German Ideology*, is omitted from the English translation, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London, 1973).]

109 On this point, and on Horkheimer in general in the post-war period, see Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, 'Kritische Theorie in der Nachkriegsgesellschaft', in Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main, 1985), p. 457.

110 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Teamwork in der Sozialforschung', in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, pp. 494-5.

111 *Ibid.*, pp. 496-7.

112 *Ibid.*, pp. 409-10.

113 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 26 November 1951.

114 Horkheimer to Adorno, 1 September 1954.

115 Horkheimer to Adorno, 10 September 1954.

116 Marcuse to Horkheimer, 11 December 1954.

117 Adorno to Horkheimer, Frankfurt am Main, 30 August 1955.

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119 Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pp. 36, 35.

120 *Ibid.*, pp. 80-1.

121 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

122 Ernst Bloch, *The Principle of Hope*, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight (Oxford, 1986), 3 vols.

123 Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, p. 166.

124 Ibid., pp. 235-6.

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126 Ibid., pp. 216-17, 220.

127 Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 122; cf. *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloomster (New York, 1973), p. 129.

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132 Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott, p. 247.

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135 On this topic, cf. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, 'Wahrheit, Macht und Sprache', in Alfred Schmidt and Norbert Altwicker (eds), *Max Horkheimer heute: Werk und Wirkung* (Frankfurt am Main, 1986), pp. 349-70.

136 Max Horkheimer, 'Die Juden und Europa', *ZfS*, 8 (1939), pp. 115-37.

#### Notes to Chapter 7

1 Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (Tübingen, 1949), translated as *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Bloomster (London, 1973); *Versuch über Wagner* (Berlin, 1952), translated as *In Search of Wagner*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1981); *Dissonanzen. Musik in der verwalteten Welt* (Göttingen, 1956); *Klangfiguren. Musikalische Schriften I* (Berlin, 1959).

2 *Volksgemeinschaft*, a Nazi term.

3 *Darmstädter Internationale Ferienkursen für Neue Musik*.

4 [Trans. Willis Domingo (Oxford, 1982).]

5 [Trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London, 1967).]

6 Peter Brückner, 'Die 50er Jahrelebensgeschichte: ein Zwischenland', in Götz Eisenberg and Hans-Jürgen Linke (eds), *Fuffziger Jahre* (Giessen, 1980), p. 30.

7 Oskar Negt, 'Heute wäre er 75 geworden: Adorno als Lehrer', in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 11 September 1978.

8 'Dialektik der Rationalisierung', Jürgen Habermas in an interview with Axel Honneth, Eberhardt Knödler-Bunte and Arno Widmann, in *Ästhetik und Kommunikation*, 45/46 (October 1981), p. 128.

9 Marianne Regensburger to Adorno, 11 May 1955.

10 ['Die gegängelte Musik'; cf. *Die gegängelte Musik. Bemerkungen über die Musikpolitik der Ostblockstaaten* (Frankfurt am Main, 1954).]

11 Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, p. xvii.

12 Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London, 1974), p. 40.

13 Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, p. 53.

14 Adorno, *Dissonanzen: Musik in der verwalteten Welt*.

15 'Kritik des Musikanten' and 'Das Altern der Neuen Musik'.

16 Hans Vogt, *Neue Musik seit 1945* (Stuttgart, 1972), p. 23.

17 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Strawinsky', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main, 1970-)

86), vol. 16, p. 386.

18 Ibid., pp. 386-7.

19 H.K. Jungheinrich's term.

20 Adorno, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 16, pp. 451, 453.

21 In Max Horkheimer (ed.), *Zeugnisse. Theodor W. Adorno zum 60. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963), p. 360.

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22 Ibid., p. 361.

23 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 16, p. 498.

24 Ibid., p. 499.

25 Ibid., p. 504.

26 Ibid., pp. 515-16.

27 Ibid., p. 504.

28 Adorno on 'Mahler', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 16, p. 329.

29 Alfred Kerr described Jahn's tragedy *Medea* in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of 5 May 1926: 'This horror story about a young German takes Hoffmannsthal's *Electra* line darkly and orgiastically towards the ultimate bestiality.'

30 [Published in English as *The Ship*, trans. Catherine Hutter (London, 1970).]

31 Rühmkorf's term.

32 During the second half of the 1960s, a student of Adorno's from the pre-Nazi period, Wilhelm Emrich, lent his support to Jahn, who had died in 1959. Emrich defended him with great resolution, using Adornoesque arguments.

33 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Zur gesellschaftlichen Lage der Musik', *ZfS*, 1 (1932), pp. 103-24, 356-78.

34 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 11, pp. 60, 51, 55.

35 Ibid., pp. 58, 54.

36 Ibid., pp. 56, 58.

37 Ibid., p. 63.

38 [Wolfgang Kayser, *Das sprachliche Kunstwerk. Eine Einführung in die Literaturwissenschaft* (Berne, 1948).]

39 [Emil Staiger, *Grundbegriffe der Poetik* (Zurich, 1946).]

40 Emil Staiger, *Die Kunst der Interpretation. Studien zur deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, 3rd edn (Zurich, 1961), p. 15. [On Staiger, cf. P. Salm, *Three Modes of Criticism: The Literary Theories of Scherer, Walzel, and Staiger* (Cleveland, 1968).]

41 Staiger, *Kunst der Interpretation*, p. 27.

42 Ibid., p. 30.

43 Hugo Friedrich, *Die Struktur der modernen Lyrik von Baudelaire bis zur Gegenwart* (Hamburg, 1956), p. 8.

44 Ibid., pp. 86, 108.

45 In Peter Rühmkorf, *Die Jahre, die Ihr kennt: Anfänge und Erinnerungen* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1972), p. 153.

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50 Theodor W. Adorno, 'Versuch, das *Endspiel* zu verstehen', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 11, p. 303; 'Voraussetzungen. Aus Anlass einer Lesung von Hans G. Helms', in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 11, p. 440.

51 [Samuel Beckett, *Molloy*; *Malone Dies*; *The Unnamable* (London, 1959), p. 418.]

52 Michael Haerdter, 'Samuel Beckett inszeniert das "Endspiel": Bericht von den Proben der Berliner Inszenierung', in Clancy Sigal et al., *Materialien zu Becketts 'Endspiel'* (Frankfurt am Main, 1968), p. 85.

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53 Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 11, p. 308.

54 Samuel Beckett, *Endgame* (London, 1958), pp. 41-2.

55 Adorno, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 11, pp. 440-1.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 471.

57 *Ibid.*, p. 478 [*Protokollsatz* is a technical term in Vienna Circle logical empiricism.]

58 'Mahler', in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 16, p. 329.

59 Günther Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen. Über die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution* (Munich, 1956).

60 Gerda Zeltner-Neukomm, *Das Wagnis des französischen Gegenwartsromans. Die neue Welterfahrung in der Literatur* (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1960), pp. 150, 152.

61 Theodor W. Adorno, *Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1962), *Drei Studien zu Hegel* (Frankfurt am Main, 1963) and *Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Studien über Husserl und die phänomenologische Antinomien* (Stuttgart, 1956) [trans. Willis Domingo (Oxford, 1982)].

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85 *Ibid.*, p. 721.

86 [The published English translation of the text follows the revised text of *Dissonanzen*. The original text of 'Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens', *ZfS*, 7 (1938), p. 325, is: 'Schlug ehemals Askese den ästhetischen Anspruch auf Lust reaktionär nieder, so ist sie heute zum Siegel der progressiven Kunst geworden. Die antagonistische Gesellschaft, die verneint und bis in die innersten Zellen ihrer Glücksfeindschaft freigelegt werden muss, ist darstellbar allein in kompositorischer Askese. Kunst verzeichnet . . .' The revised text, *Dissonanzen. Musik in der verwalteten Welt* (Göttingen, 1956), p. 13, reads: 'Schlug ehemals Askese den ästhetischen Anspruch reaktionär nieder, so ist sie heute zum Siegel der avancierten Kunst geworden: freilich nicht durch eine archaisierende Kargheit der Mittel, in der Mangel und Armut verklärt werden, sondern durch strikten Ausschluss all des kulinarisch Wohlgefälligen, das unmittelbar, für sich konsumiert werden will, als wäre nicht in der Kunst das Sinnliche Träger eines Geistigen, das im Ganzen erst sich darstellt anstatt in isolierten Stoffmomenten. Kunst verzeichnet . . .' The latter passage is translated in 'On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening', in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (eds), *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader* (Oxford, 1978), p. 274: 'If asceticism once struck down the claims of the esthetic in a reactionary way, it has today become the sign of an advanced art: not, to be sure, by an archaizing parsimony of means in which deficiency and poverty are manifested, but by the strict exclusion of all culinary delights which seek to be consumed immediately for their own sake, as if in art the sensory were not the bearer of something intellectual which only shows itself in the whole rather than in isolated topical moments. Art records . . .']

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4 These details were provided by Rolf Tiedemann, a former student and research assistant of Adorno's, and later the editor of his writings and trustee of his estate. Tiedemann is also a Benjamin expert and author of *Studien zur Philosophie Walter Benjamins*, published in 1965 in the 'Frankfurter Beiträge zur Soziologie' series.

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99 Ibid., p. 173.

100 Ibid., p. 129.

101 [ 'A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction', trans. Gregor Benton, in Karl Marx, *Early Writings* (Harmondsworth, 1975), p. 257: 'The *emancipation of the German* is the *emancipation of man*.

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The *head* of this emancipation is *philosophy*, its *heart* the *proletariat*. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence [*Aufhebung*] of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization [*Verwirklichung*] of philosophy.'

102 *Der Spiegel*, 30 June 1969, p. 109.

103 Habermas to Horkheimer, 22 April 1971.

104 Michaela von Freyhold, *Autoritarismus und politische Apathie. Analyse einer Skala zur Ermittlung autoritätsgebundener Verhaltensweisen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1971).

105 See *Leviathan*, 4 (1981), special issue entitled 'Institut für Sozialforschung: Gesellschaftliche Arbeit und Rationalisierung. Neuere Studien aus dem Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt/M'.

#### Notes to Afterword

1 [The 'extremist directive', or *Radikalenerlass*. Since schoolteachers are civil servants in Germany, the ban on 'extremists' in the Civil Service meant that students with radical views were banned from entering the teaching profession as well. Cf. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany* (Oxford, 1989), vol. 2: *Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988*, p. 250.]

2 [Schleyer was president of the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA), the Federation of German Employers' Associations, and of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, the Federation of German Industry.]

3 Günther Rohrmoser, *Das Elend der kritischen Theorie* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970).

4 Ernst Topitsch, 'Die Neue Linke Anspruch und Realität', in Willy Hochkeppel (ed.), *Die Rolle der Neuen Linken in der Kulturindustrie* (Munich, 1972), p. 34.

5 Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik. Die politischen Ideen des deutschen Nationalismus zwischen 1918 und 1933* (1960; Munich, 1978).

6 Kurt Sontheimer, *Das Elend unserer Intellektuellen. Linke Theorie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Hamburg, 1976).

7 H. Günther, C. Willeke and R. Willeke, *Die Gewalt der Verneinung. Die Kritische Theorie und ihre Folgen* (Stuttgart, 1978).

8 Jürgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (Frankfurt am Main, 1981); *The Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, Mass., 1984-9).

9 [Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Öffentlichkeit und Erfahrung. Zur Organisationsanalyse von bürgerlichen und proletarischen Öffentlichkeit* (Frankfurt am Main, 1972), p. 486.]

10 [Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Geschichte und Eigensinn* (Frankfurt am Main, 1981).]

11 Alexander Kluge, in 'Die Geschichte der lebendigen Arbeitskraft. Diskussion mit Oskar Negt und Alexander Kluge', *Ästhetik und Kommunikation* (June 1982), p. 102.

12 Willem van Reijen, *Philosophie als Kritik. Einführung in die kritische Theorie* (Königstein, 1984).

13 [Jürgen Habermas, 'Drei Thesen zur Wirkungsgeschichte der Frankfurter Schule', in Axel Honneth and Albrecht Wellmer (eds), *Die Frankfurter Schule und die Folgen. Referate eines Symposiums der Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung vom 10.-15. Dezember 1984 in Ludwigsburg* (Berlin, 1986) pp. 8-12.]

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## Abbreviations

## MHA

Max Horkheimer Archive

## SPSS

*Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*

## ZfS

*Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*

## Bibliography of Archives and References Consulted

## I Archives:

Prospectuses of the Institute of Social Research in brochures, memoranda, reports, letters

## Files

## Correspondence

Research reports of the Institute of Social Research

II Publications of the Institute, of the Institute's most important associates, and of the major representatives of the Frankfurt School

## III Secondary sources

## IV Works on the context and works forming part of the context

## I

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*Prospectuses of the Institute of Social Research in Brochures, Memoranda, Reports, Letters (A Selection, Primarily of Longer or More Significant Texts, in Chronological Order)**Denkschrift über die Begründung eines Instituts für Sozialforschung*. 5 pp. Enclosure with letter from Felix Weil to Kuratorium der Universität Frankfurt a.M., 22 September 1922 (MHA: IX 50a. 2; extract printed in the following pamphlet).

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## II

Publications of the Institute, of the Institute's most Important Associates, and of the Major Representatives of the Frankfurt School

### *Publications of the Institute of Social Research*

Series:

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1 Henryk Grossmann. *Das Akkumulations- und Zusammenbruchsgesetz des kapitalistischen Systems*. Leipzig: Hirschfeld, 1929.

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4 Franz Borkenau. *Der Übergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Manufakturperiode*. Paris: Alcan, 1934.

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3 *Betriebsklima. Eine industriesoziologische Untersuchung aus dem Ruhrgebiet*, ed. Ludwig von Friedeburg. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlags-Anstalt, 1955.

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7 Georges Friedmann. *Grenzen der Arbeitsteilung*, trans. Burkart Lutz. Frankfurt: Europäische Verlags-Anstalt, 1959. [French original: *Le Travail en Miettes*.]

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