The Culture of National Security:

Norms and Identity in World Politics

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Preface

The revolutionary changes that have marked world politics in recent years offer scholars an extraordinary opportunity for reflection and critical self-appraisal[1] This is true, in particular, for scholars of international relations. One observer has likened the embarrassment that the end of the Cold War caused us as scholars of international relations and national security to the effects the sinking of the Titanic had on the profession of naval engineers. Although our analytical coordinates for gauging global politics have proven to be inadequate for an analysis of a world in rapid change, there has been remarkably little rethinking of our categories of analysis. Instead, in the first half of the 1990s North American scholarship on the theory of international relations was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of realism or liberalism offered a superior way for explaining the world. Considering the dramatic international developments occurring during these years, many of the academic debates looked arcane to the interested bystander. For it is hard to deny that existing theories of international relations have woefully fallen short in explaining an important revolution in world politics.

What the writer Peter Schneider said of the German Left is also apposite for the field of national security studies: it slept right through a revolution. While the balance between demand and supply effected significant changes among security specialists working in think-tanks and, more slowly, even inside government, remarkably little changed in the academy. In a recent review of the scholarship published between 1989 and 1994 in International Security, one of the premier journals in the field, Hugh Gusterson concludes that "old stories have been bent to new times rather than questioned or cast away."[2] He identifies only one article between 1989Ð94, published by a historian, which asks the obvious question--why and how virtually all of the established theories could have been so wrong.

Scholars have made some adjustments in their research. Various forms of realist theorizing, for example, have rediscovered nationalism and ethnicity and are doing so with a breath-taking lack of analytical discomfort. Ever since Kenneth Waltz published his seminal Theory of International Politics, this book had been invoked as a text that provided the field of national security studies with a firm base. However, Waltz was very clear that the internal characteristics of states were irrelevant to his theory. The analysis of nationalism and ethnicity thus is a sharp turn for those who previously had written on national security informed by this variant of realist theorizing. It is especially surprising that realists, with their natural focus on states, have not inquired more systematically into the effects of changes in state identity, for example from warfare state to welfare state in Western Europe, that have altered traditional conceptions and instruments of national security.

A second adjustment has been to look for new areas to apply realist theory. A spirited debate about the conditions of peace in Europe has led to an examination of those conditions in other regions of the world. Realist theory, for example, rediscovered in Asia the balance of power and the instabilities of multipolarity which so unexpectedly were missing in Europe in recent years. It was, however, odd that realist analysis continued to neglect domestic politics and transnational relations, the very factors that

had much to do with the unexpected end of the Cold War. A style of analysis that had proven to be inadequate in Europe was not refurbished but, implausibly, simply reapplied to Asia.

These adjustments in the core paradigm informing national security studies have left unimpressed a growing number of graduate students and younger scholars unpersuaded because, in part, their political and intellectual sensibilities are more firmly grounded in circumstances that differ from those experienced by their elders. The younger generation lived through the waning of the Cold War, not its exacerbation. It was exposed to new intellectual currents in the humanities and cultural studies. And as had been true before, this was an impatient cohort, eager to push ahead.

This volume represents and speaks to these intellectual currents. It reports the results of a project conducted under the auspices of the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research Council and funded by the Council through a grant from the MacArthur Foundation. The project was deliberately designed to expose the participants to different intellectual climates at different universities. Workshops held at Cornell University, the University of Minnesota, and Stanford University, attended by the project participants as well as graduate students and faculty members from the respective host institutions, elicited different reactions, depending on the local intellectual culture and the list of participants. The tenor of the discussions at the Cornell meeting, with a heavy representation of realists, was "why this effort?" At Minnesota, a stronghold of cultural and post-modern approaches, the reaction was "show us how!" And at Stanford, in the presence of sociologists and theorists of rational choice, both reactions were articulated at the same meeting. To say that the debates at these meetings were spirited would be misleading. The intellectual level of discussion was extraordinarily high and so was the emotional pitch of the participants. Differences in arguments mattered both substantively and personally.

"Identity" theory, in particular, is deeply contested because it raises for scholars of national security directly and unavoidably pressing moral issues. Even though all of the contributors to this volume show in their scholarship that they regard evidence to be of critical importance in adjudicating competing analytical and political claims, realists and rationalists, at times, tar their sociologically minded critics with the brush of being the vanguard of a new wave of intellectual fascism. The critics, less powerful and more polite, view these scholars at times as the vanguard of political and intellectual conservatism. Does truth speak to power? Does power exploit knowledge? For more than an hour the Stanford meeting erupted into an emotionally charged discussion of these issues, illustrating vividly, painfully and usefully for everyone around the table the magnitude of the intellectual, political, and moral stakes that are involved for all scholars, whether they choose to adhere to or depart from the conventional view of national security.

This project expresses an explicit commitment to engage realism on its own terms. Scholars tend to shy away from conversations that pose fundamental disagreements, preferring instead to live in the comfortable cocoon of the like-minded. Talking across deep intellectual divides is always difficult, often uncomfortable and occasionally hurtful. It is also a useful reminder of the pervasiveness of power in the world of scholarship, of the primacy of institutionally backed validity claims among competing analytical possibilities. Even when such confrontations do not lead to intellectual conversions, they help in sharpening key arguments and circumscribing general claims. Without the willingness of some distinguished scholars of national security to generously commit themselves and their time, this confrontation of perspectives could not have occurred.

In the view of these scholars this was, from the beginning, a fundamentally flawed enterprise. The critics argued that the issues raised in this book have been addressed by the extant literature in a promising way which is leading cumulatively to a theory of national security framed by neo-realist and realist writings. In their reading this volume offers no more than an intellectually incoherent mixture of postmodern interpretivism, nonfalsifiable claims, ex post facto description, and insignificant embellishments of what mainstream realism analyzes elegantly and with precision. I report these objections here and let the reader be the judge.

Science is a social process that develops, refines, and rejects ideas. It is not a football game in which players protect turf--intellectual and otherwise. Hence the inclusion in this volume of the self-critical chapter 12. Some colleagues supportive of this project have urged me quietly to drop this chapter. And, unsurprisingly, the vociferous critics of this bookÕs approach uniformly have applauded it as the most compelling piece in the entire collection. Both reactions are besides the point. The chapter points to some of the most noticeable weaknesses of this book and suggests some avenues for future improvement. This self-critical stance, not the waving of new flags or the dogged defense of received dogma, I take to be the task of an empirically oriented social science.

This project could not have been carried out without the generous support of the Committee on International Peace and Security of the Social Science Research Council. I would like to thank my fellow committee members for their vote of confidence in funding the project and for their useful counsel in its initial stages. I am also deeply indebted to the staffs at the Social Science Research Council and at Cornell University, the University of Minnesota and Stanford University for carrying the administrative burden involved in organizing the three workshops. And I would like to thank the many graduate students and faculty members at these three universities who were active participants and whose comments, criticisms and suggestions were indispensable for shaping my thinking on a broad range of issues. Without their intellectual energy and commitment all of us would have learned much less in the process, and the ultimate product would have been worse.

My special thanks go to the staff of Columbia University Press: to Kate Wittenberg for her strong interest in this project from the very outset; to two readers who gave detailed and searching suggestions that helped the authors to sharpen their arguments; to Jan McInroy for her extraordinarily careful work as copyeditor; to Alan Greenberg for putting together the index in record time; and to Leslie Bialler for much more than his humor and wit along the way.

Most importantly I would like to thank the project participants for their intellectual engagement and enthusiasm; for their ability to cooperate in friendship; for their willingness to disagree in civility; for their hard work; and for their toleration of an "old fogey" in their midst.

I dedicate this volume to all the graduate students at Cornell with whom I have worked over the years. I have learned an enormous amount from you. And without you I could not have conceived of this project. Contradicting current wisdom about the relation between research and teaching, it was our individual discussions and seminars as well as your research papers and dissertations that made me read in unfamiliar fields and thus lure me in new directions in both research and teaching.

Peter J. Katzenstein
May 19
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Note 1: See for example, the symposium on prediction in the social sciences introduced by Michael Hechter in the *American Journal of Sociology* 100, 6 (May 1995): 1520-1527. Back.

Note 2: Hugh Gusterson, "Reading International Security after the Cold War," paper prepared for the second workshop on Culture and the Production of Security/Insecurity, Kent State University, April 28-30, 1995, p. 6. Back.

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2. Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security

Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein

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The analytical perspective of this book departs in two ways from dominant assumptions in contemporary national security studies. First, we argue that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material. This contrasts with the assumption made by neorealists and many students of the domestic sources of national security policy. In their views, international and domestic environments are largely devoid of cultural and institutional elements and therefore are best captured by materialist imagery like the balance of power or bureaucratic politics. Second, we argue that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states--what we call state "identity." This contrasts with the prevailing assumption, made by neorealists and neoliberals alike, that the defining actor properties are intrinsic to states, that is, "essential" to actors (rather than socially contingent), and exogenous to the environment. Although we believe these arguments apply to both the domestic and the international environments in which national security policy is made, we shall illustrate them at this point only with reference to the latter.

There are at least three layers to the international cultural environments in which national security policies are made. Commonly recognized in existing scholarship is the layer of formal institutions or security regimes: nato, osce, weu, arms control regimes like the npt, cwc, salt treaties, and the like. Less widely acknowledged is the existence of a world political culture as a second layer. It includes elements like rules of sovereignty and international law, norms for the proper enactment of sovereign statehood, standardized social and political technologies (such as organization theory and models of economic policy) carried by professional and consultancy networks, and a transnational political discourse carried by such international social movements as Amnesty International and Greenpeace. Finally, international patterns of amity and enmity have important cultural dimensions. In terms of material power, Canada and Cuba stand in roughly comparable positions relative to the United States. But while one is a threat, the other is an ally, a result, we believe, of ideational factors operating at the international level. In each case realists will try to reduce cultural effects to epiphenomena of the distribution of power; we argue that these effects have greater autonomy.

Our second argument refers to the effects of cultural environments on the identity, as opposed to just the behavior, of states. The term *identity* here is intended as a useful label, not as a signal of commitment to some exotic (presumably Parisian) social theory. Indeed, this concept has become a staple of mainstream social science, whether or not the term itself is actually used. Frederick Frey has written an underappreciated article on the problem of actor designation, which calls attention to the problems and importance of specifying who the actors are in a system.[1] Kenneth Waltz was implicitly talking about

identity when he argued that anarchic structures tend to produce "like units."[2] Early on in the development of regime theory, Stephen Krasner [3] suggested that regimes could change state interests and, later, that an "institutional" approach would problematize "the very nature of the actors: their endowments, utilities--preferences, capacities, resources, and identity."[4] And Robert Keohane,[5] too, has called for a "sociological" approach to state interests, in which transformations of interests become an important effect to be investigated. None of these scholars, however, has systematically pursued these insights; we attempt to do so here.[6]

More specifically, our argument envisions at least three effects that external cultural environments may have on state identities and thus on national security interests and policies. First, they may affect states' prospects for survival as entities in the first place. Just as Waltz argued that competitive material environments will "select out" states that do not adopt efficient organizational forms, so Robert Jackson[7] and David Strang[8] have argued that recognition of juridical sovereignty by the society of states has enabled weak states to survive when they otherwise might not. Second, environments may change the modal character of statehood in the system over time. Today, in contrast to the late nineteenth century, it would be almost inconceivable for a country readily to vote to become a colony.[9] Relatedly, as late as the nineteenth century warfare was seen as a virtuous exercise of state power; today, while states are still organized to fight wars, changing international norms and domestic factors have "tamed" the aggressive impulses of many states, especially in the West, thus creating a disposition to see war as at best a necessary evil.[10] Finally, cultural environments may cause variation in the character of statehood within a given international system. The aftermath of World War II, for example, initiated a period of identity politics in both Germany and Japan, which generated "trading state" identities, as Thomas Berger shows in this volume. Similarly, unlike Britain, France maintained its commitment to the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (ems) partly because it is a founding member--that is, because of its identity interests.[11] In each case a choice theoretic approach that treated the properties of state actors as exogenously given would fail to capture important effects of the external cultural environment on state identities, interests, and policies.

We develop this analytical perspective in the rest of this essay. What emerges is not a "theory" of national security so much as an orienting framework that highlights a set of effects and mechanisms that have been neglected in mainstream security studies. As such, this framework tells us about as much about the substance of world politics as does a materialist view of the international system or a choice theoretic assumption of exogenous interests. It offers a partial perspective, but one important for orienting our thinking about more specific phenomena.

The next section of this essay sketches an intellectual map that conceptualizes international and domestic environments and their relationships to state identity. Subsequent sections locate prominent theoretical approaches in the field of national security on this map, in comparison to the approach of this book, pull together the book's main substantive arguments, and briefly discuss some methodological and metatheoretic issues. We conclude with some extensions of our analysis.

Analytical Context

The empirical essays in this volume focus on the ways in which norms, institutions, and other cultural

features of domestic and international environments affect state security interests and policies. In pursuing this idea we do not claim that theories that do not do so are unhelpful or wrongheaded. The relationship between different lines of argument will vary from complementarity to competition to subsumption. One cannot prejudge the relative utility of different arguments apart from the specification of the problems that motivate the research in the first place. It is in this spirit that this volume departs from realism and liberalism as the dominant approaches in security studies.

Figure 2.1 provides a map for positioning the arguments of these essays relative to those of realism and liberalism.[12] The map is analytically general; we use it here to categorize domestic and international theories of national security.



One axis of the map (the x-axis) focuses on the relative cultural and institutional density of the environments in which actors move.[13] States can be conceived of as interacting with environments that range from having limited cultural and institutional content on the one hand to being thickly structured by cultural and institutional elements on the other.

At the low end of this continuum are theories that depict the environment in materialist terms. The analogy would be to ecology in the physical sciences. In international relations this is the view held by neorealists, who conceive environments in terms of a distribution of material (military and economic) capabilities. Materialists need not ignore cultural factors altogether. But they treat them as epiphenomenal or at least secondary, as a "superstructure" determined in the last instance by the material "base." This is probably the dominant view of state environments in security studies. Indeed, this view is so pervasive that even its critics, such as neoliberal institutionalists, typically refer to structure in material terms and then treat norms, rules, and institutions as mere "process."

At the high end of the x-axis are theories depicting environments as containing extensive cultural elements. Such theories might refer to the states system as an "anarchy" in the strict sense, that is, as lacking a world state. But they insist that even anarchies can be highly "social." What ultimately determines the behavior of actors within these anarchies is shared expectations and understandings that give specific meaning to material forces.[14] When thinking about the relationship between theories located at opposing ends of this dimension, it is important to avoid two common misunderstandings. The

first is assuming that materialist theories are necessarily about conflict and cultural ones are about cooperation. Although neorealism tends to predict conflict, Daniel Deudney's work on nuclear weapons[15] suggests that material forces may also lead to cooperation.[16] And conversely, although neoliberals tend to focus on cooperation, cultural explanations of conflict are equally possible, as Samuel Huntington's work on the "clash of civilizations" illustrates.[17] In this respect the perspective of this volume, and of social constructivism more generally, is like that of game theory; it is analytically neutral with respect to conflict and cooperation. In contrast to the work of regime theorists, the value of the arguments here does not depend on the extent to which states cooperate in security affairs. We argue that any general theory of national security, realist or otherwise, needs to accommodate both cooperation and coercion.

A second common misunderstanding in comparing theories along the x-axis is smuggling in unacknowledged cultural factors that do most of the explanatory work within ostensibly materialist theories. Alexander Wendt,[18] for example, has argued that neorealist arguments about the role of the distribution of power in world politics in fact trade on an implicit characterization of the background of shared expectations, a culture of fear and enmity. Whether or not neorealists in fact adopt such an explanatory strategy, however, it is important to disentangle claims about the effects of "brute" or generic material forces from claims about their effects that presuppose specific contingent cultural contexts. Relatedly, categories like "revisionist" or "status quo" power, when deployed in a realist explanation, often refer to social identities. To establish the validity of a materialist argument, one has to show that the material base *as such* governs a cultural superstructure.

An important consequence of both these points is that the use by states of material power and coercion in their security affairs in no way speaks to the validity of theories along the x-axis. Power is ubiquitous in social life, whether in the "coercive" sense of punishing and constraining behavior as emphasized by neorealists or in the "productive" sense of producing subjects as emphasized by students of culture. The issue that separates the contributions to this volume from mainstream security studies is therefore not the extent to which power and coercion are thought to matter in international life. In general the authors are just as attentive to coercion and force as neorealists are. The issue, rather, is whether the manifold uses and forms of power can be explained by material factors alone, or whether ideational and cultural factors are necessary to account for them. In the latter case it makes little sense to separate power and culture as distinct phenomena or causes: material power and coercion often derive their causal power from culture. This volume does not concede the study of conflict and war to neorealism, as if the latter provided a confirmed theoretical "baseline," to which cultural arguments merely add a few secondary variables. The issue is what accounts for power, not whether power is present.

The second line of argument of this book is represented by the y-axis. It focuses upon the relationship between actors, such as states, and their environments. This relationship is two-sided. It includes the impact of actors on their environments and the impact of environments on actors.[19] Specifically, this volume wants to draw attention to the significance of the latter. However, this intention does not stem from a belief that the effects of actors on environments are unimportant. On the contrary. The contributors to this volume argue that agency and environment are mutually constitutive--in contrast with the primacy that the dominant realist and rationalist perspectives in international relations theory accord to the effects that actors have on environments. In this volume Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, for example, illustrate such a constitutive relationship in the case of the non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons. Similarly, Berger's analysis suggests that the transformation in Germany's and Japan's

collective identity affects the international environment.

In thinking about the effects of environments on actors it is useful to distinguish three kinds of effects, which correspond to progressively higher levels of "construction." First, environments might affect only the *behavior* of actors. Second, they might affect the contingent *properties* of actors (identities, interests, and capabilities).[20] Finally, environments might affect the *existence* of actors altogether. For example, in the case of individual human beings, the third effect concerns their bodies, the second whether these bodies become cashiers or corporate raiders, and the first whether or not the cashiers go on strike. Theories that call attention to lower-order construction effects may or may not stress higher ones. In this book we focus on the first and, especially, the second effects, usually taking the existence of states as given.

At the low end of this continuum are theories, such as rational choice and game theory, that depict the defining properties of actors as intrinsic and thus not generated by environments. Such theories may acknowledge a role for environmental structures in defining the opportunities and constraints facing actors, and thereby in conditioning the behavior of the latter via "price" effects,[21] but not in constructing actors themselves. Neoclassical economics, for instance, treats the preferences and capabilities of actors as exogenously given. Relatedly, Waltz[22] allows for what he calls "socialization" and "imitation" processes. But in so doing he envisions the shaping of the behavior of *pregiven* actors. He thus assumes that the processes determining the fundamental identity of states are exogenous to the states' environments, global or domestic.

At the high end of the continuum are theories that treat unit properties as endogenous to the environment and, at the limit, assume that units have no essential intrinsic properties at all, a possibility that we neglect here. That someone has the identity (and associated interests) of a "student," for example, has no meaning outside of a particular institutional environment that also defines related identities, like "professor" (with its associated interests). A similar argument can be made about the identity of some states as "sovereign," which presupposes a system of mutual recognition from other states with certain competencies. In both cases the properties of an actor, as well as its behaviors, depend upon a specific social context. The identities that states project, and the interests that they pursue, can therefore be seen as partly constructed by their environments.

Theoretical Perspectives

Figure 2.1 provides a way of thinking about the relationship of this book to dominant approaches in security studies. Each approach represents different views about what environments consist of, and about how such environments affect actors--here, states. In this section we briefly characterize approaches to security studies in terms of this figure, dividing the review into international/systemic and domestic theories.[23] We should note that the two dimensions of figure 2.1 are continua, but for ease of exposition we discuss approaches by reference to the *quadrant* in which they fall.

International Politics

Few approaches fall cleanly in the upper-left quadrant. This combination is difficult to sustain. If actor properties are constructed, a dense cultural and institutional environment is normally implicated. But, nevertheless, there probably are a few representatives of this quadrant. Strands of neo-Marxism,

especially world-systems theory, offer some examples. And Deudney's "security materialism" might also fall in this category.[24]

Since they insist on the determining effects of international structure, neorealists like Waltz[25] might also be located here. But it is not clear whether such a classification is accurate. Waltz claims to derive state interests from an ecological argument about how the logic of anarchy produces "like units." His argument, however, takes the self-interested and sovereign character of states as given, and in practice his neorealist "structuralism" ends up focusing on how structure conditions the behavior of given state actors.[26] This interpretation is reinforced by his reliance on analogies from microeconomics, a discipline that treats actors' properties as exogenously given. Analytically, then, in neorealism states have largely unproblematic--that is, unvarying and acontextual--identities and interests.[27] In this view, neorealism might therefore more accurately be located in the lower-left quadrant of the map.

In fact, most mainstream strategic and deterrence theory and policy research fall in this quadrant. Actor identities are taken for granted, and material capabilities are considered the defining characteristic of environments. Game theoretic models are then typically used to analyze how material structure provides incentives for particular kinds of behavior. This perspective focuses on how to contain or manage given conflicts, neglecting strategies for solving them by transforming underlying identities and interests. The analytical problem of conflict management and order is thereby reduced to the problem of balancing or achieving cooperation between exogenously given competitors.

Scholars in the lower-right quadrant retain a rationalist approach to actor construction but attach considerably more importance to norms, institutions, and other cultural factors than do neorealists. This neoliberal school argues that norms and institutions matter both at the domestic level, where regime type is found to have an important effect on some domains of foreign policy behavior,[28] and at the systemic level, where international regimes change the incentives for state action.[29] They have conceptualized the difference that norms make, for instance, in terms of their effects on the relative cost of specific forms of behavior--for example, through lowering transaction costs and reducing uncertainty about others' behavior. However, neoliberals have been relatively inattentive to varying constructions of actor identities on interests and policies. This contrasts with the keen interest of traditional realists in the effects of nationalism on state identity. Neoliberalism leaves that topic largely unexamined.[30]

In recent years theoretical disagreements between neorealists and neoliberals have constituted the core of mainstream international relations theory, which in turn has shaped security studies.[31] In terms of figure 2.1, these disagreements have occurred along the x-axis. While disputing the relative importance of material power versus norms and institutions, both approaches are committed to a rationalist view of the difference that structure makes. Structure merely affects behavior; it does not construct actor properties. Compared with earlier advances in international relations theory, this approach marks a substantial narrowing in analytical perspective. In the 1960s, for example, theorists of neofunctionalism and regional integration developed sophisticated approaches to investigating the effects of integration processes on actor properties.[32] These theories are precursors of current theoretical alternatives to neorealism and neoliberalism that can be found in the upper-right quadrant.[33] Since they differ greatly on important issues of research practice, such alternatives should not be lumped together as representing one intellectual position. They offer instead a range of analytical perspectives that differ from realist and

liberal variants of international relations theory.

The oldest stream of scholarship that might be positioned within this space, and to which subsequent traditions are partly indebted, is the Grotian tradition represented by Hedley Bull[34] and the English School.[35] From this perspective the international system is a "society" in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in public and customary international law. Scholars in this tradition have not focused explicitly on how norms construct states with specific identities and interests. But sociological imagery is strong in their work; it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms.

Perhaps the most fundamental institution in international society is sovereignty. It has become an important focus of a second body of scholarship, constructivism.[36] John Ruggie's important critique of Waltz[37] conceptualizes sovereignty as an institution that invests states with exclusive political authority in their territorial spaces, which he sees as crucial in the construction of state identity. By constituting states, and only states, with territorial rights, sovereignty determines what the basic political units of the system are. It thus defines also categories of "deviant" units, such as international trusteeships or safe zones, whose existence within the states system is thereby made problematic.[38] In addition to defining political identities, the institution of sovereignty also regulates state behavior through norms and practices of mutual recognition, nonintervention, and (state) self-determination--which in turn help reproduce state identities. These norms find expression in public international law, which communicates global agreements about how the society of states should operate. Such agreements matter. Sovereignty norms establish a largely "juridical statehood," for example, in Africa, which becomes a key political resource for these states within the interstate system.[39] And David Strang has shown that states externally recognized as sovereign show less movement between independent, dependent, and unrecognized statuses than do states not so recognized.[40]

Another body of scholarship, poststructural international relations theory, pursues a radical constructivist position. Beginning with the work of Richard Ashley,[41] poststructuralists have focused on how state identities are, down to their core, ongoing accomplishments of discursive practices. Crucial among these practices is foreign policy, which produces and reproduces the territorial boundaries that seem essential to the state.[42]

Neorealism's disregard of questions of identity formation, and classical realism's emphasis on the power-seeking interests of states as a function of human, rather than male, nature have given feminist critiques of realism a dual target. In the words of Ann Tickner, "in the name of universality, realists have constructed a worldview based on the experiences of certain men: it is therefore a worldview that offers us only a partial view of reality."[43] In both of its incarnations, realism seeks to articulate objective and timeless laws--the will to power and the tendency to balance power--that feminist critics argue reflect a deeply gendered view of reality. Relativizing that view, feminist theory insists, is a crucial first step in eventually transforming it.[44]

Like feminism, a fourth theoretical perspective that fits into the upper-right quadrant also is not

state-centric, and perhaps for that reason is not well known in international relations scholarship. This is the sociological research that John Meyer and his colleagues have done on the world polity.[45] This group has focused on the cultural and institutional foundations of *world* society as opposed to the society of *states*.[46] A parallel concern is quite natural to students of domestic affairs, who analyze the social embeddedness of states and markets as a crucial feature of national politics. And it resonates partly with theories of transnational relations that have informed international relations research during the last two decades.[47]

This body of empirical research has focused on a world political culture, carrying standardized models of statehood. The spread of democratic ideologies and market models provides obvious examples, along with the underlying consolidation of regional and even global ideologies of citizenship and human rights.[48] Even states' military procurement is partly scripted in models of statehood that diffuse widely in the world system, as Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman argue in their essay in this volume. Adoption of such evolving world models has shown a weakening relationship over time with specific characteristics of particular states, which indicates conventionalization and in some instances even institutionalization at the global level.

This sociological literature, now well developed empirically,[49] has tracked a rapidly intensifying world institutional and discursive order, carried by an expanding range of "epistemic" communities[50] as well as intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. This line of argument does not describe any formal change in sovereignty, however, nor does it foresee any movement toward a global protostate.[51] Rather, the jurisdiction and agendas of states are increasingly worked out within a transnational context. Without reference to this standardizing world political culture, it is difficult to account for the high stability of the states system, as well as the decreasing variability of political forms and the rapid spread of political and social technologies within it.[52]

At the same time, new forms of global homogeneity and order also generate new forms of heterogeneity and disorder. "The insistence on heterogeneity and variety in an increasingly globalized world is . . . integral to globalization theory."[53] World society carries standardized oppositional ideologies that are usually selective reifications of elements of dominant world ideology. Thus authoritarian ideologies and experiments with state socialism in Third World settings in the 1960s, and the spread of Third World demands for a New International Economic Order (nieo) in the 1970s, both drew upon Western principles of justice.[54] Indeed, during the Cold War socialist models achieved (counter)hegemonic status in many Third World states, despite the absence of the standard preconditions for socialism. With the end of the Cold War it is conceivable that some strains of Islamic fundamentalism may assume a similar oppositional role. For as J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson have argued, religion and societal ideologies may exercise stronger control functions over global society than do international law and industrialism.[55]

Domestic Politics

The differences in analytical perspective captured in figure 2.1 apply as much to theories of domestic politics as to those of international relations.[56] Thus, in their analyses of domestic politics, orthodox national security studies tend to adhere to the same materialist and rationalist perspective that

characterizes realism at the international level. This work has taken two main forms: scrutiny of individual decision makers, often observed at times of crisis, and of bureaucratic organizations involved in the process of policy formulation and implementation. The theory of the state implicit in the former is the rational-state-as-actor model; the theory of politics implicit in the latter is bureaucratic pluralism or bureaucratic routinization.

Critics of deterrence have questioned these implicit theories by invoking in a variety of ways the cultural content of the environment, thus moving rightward along the x-axis. The cognitive and motivational biases impairing rationality that have attracted attention are, in this view, rooted not only in the information-processing proclivities of individuals but also in the operational codes, understandings, and worldviews shared by decision makers and diffused throughout society.[57] Similarly, Elizabeth Kier and Alastair Johnston, in their respective essays in this volume, rely on studies of organizational and strategic cultures that criticize the lack of attention to cultural variables in the mainstream literatures on organizations and deterrence.[58]

To the extent that they focus on the effects of collective understandings (as embodied, for example, in ideologies and policy paradigms) rather than individual-level variables, these critics share much with recent writings in the fields of security studies, comparative political economy, and foreign policy analysis.[59] Although particular studies differ, they all pay attention to the institutionalization of ideas--in research institutes, schools of thought, laws, government bureaucracies--as a crucial determinant of policy. On this point the latter studies all belong to the "new institutionalism" in the analysis of domestic politics.

But the new institutionalism also has spurred debate about state identity, which moves one along the y-axis of figure 2.1, away from the origin. In the 1970s and 1980s, various forms of institutional analysis reemerged, providing powerful criticisms of the liberal and Marxist theories that regard the state as epiphenomenal.[60] Many realists were unmoved by these developments. If unitary state actors had to be disaggregated analytically, it was in terms of a plurality of bureaucratic and organizational actors. Other realists, however, embraced the return of an analytical perspective focusing on the state and looked for the enduring ideologies and world visions that motivate state action. Thus Stephen Krasner argued that American foreign policy was motivated by ideology rather than by the pursuit of a national interest more narrowly conceived.[61] But in the analysis of domestic politics, the state remained for these observers a largely unitary actor, as it was in the analysis of international politics.

Some students of domestic politics, on the other hand, viewed the state in its relation to society. In their view the identity of the state and of social actors--for example, interest groups or political parties--could be understood only as mutually constitutive.[62] Conceiving of the state in relational terms and investigating the domestic sources of foreign policy focuses attention on the degree to which the identities of actors are constructed by state-society relations. Ideologies of social partnership, for example, helped define for the rich, small European states after World War II a set of political strategies that combined economic flexibility with political stability.[63] Furthermore, the relatively generous welfare policies associated with these political strategies are representative of moral and humanitarian concerns that have prompted foreign aid policies not easily explained in terms of narrow conceptions of economic self-interest.[64] Put differently, shared conceptions of identity appear to have had an important

indirect effect on a number of policies.[65]

This brief review suggests a concluding observation about the pattern of theorizing in national security studies. In the case of international relations theorizing, one can discern a dominant arc of research. It starts in the lower-left quadrant with a materialist-rationalist neorealism, extends to the right along the x-axis in the form of neoliberal regime theory, which adds more cultural imagery, and moves into the upper-right quadrant with constructivist theories that seek to link cultural structures to actor identities. One can also map the analysis of the domestic sources of national security policy along this arc, although with less clarity. Different intellectual currents have challenged two analytical positions that lie close to the origin: the bureaucratic politics paradigm and the presumption of rational, individual decision makers.

This volume (located in the upper-right quadrant) seeks to establish the fruitfulness of a sociological perspective on national security. As one moves away from the origin, one captures the two theoretical departures of this project: the imagined cultural and institutional density of states' environments increases, and so does the extent to which states' properties are constructed by these environments.

Arguments

Most of the essays in this volume feature *norms, culture,* or *identities* in causal arguments about national security policy. (We will clarify conceptualizations of these terms in the appropriate subsections below.) The main lines of argument advanced herein can be captured by a simple schema:[66] Referring to the causal pathways summarized in figure 2.2, we outline five main types of arguments present in the substantive essays of this volume. (The numbers here correspond to the numbers labeling the pathways of the figure.)

1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states' environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure.



FIGURE 2.2 Lines of Argument

The five essays in part 1 of this volume--by Eyre and Suchman, Price and Tannenwald, Finnemore, Kier, and Johnston--focus primarily on the cultural and institutional content of the environments in which states act. These essays give analytical priority, respectively, to norms of military prowess, the limited use of nuclear and chemical weapons, humanitarian intervention, and the organizational and strategic cultures of the military that define interests or affect policy directly. The four essays in part 2--by Herman, Berger, Risse-Kappen, and Barnett--highlight the contested construction or reconstruction of actor identities within environments. These essays problematize the notions of a "Western" Soviet Union, of a Japanese merchant state and a Europeanized Germany, of a security community of liberal democracies in the North Atlantic community, and of the tension between pan-Arabism and Arab statehood. Identities shape actor interests or state policy.

The essays differ in the details of their language and conceptualization, but they share a common idiom. They are cumulative in the challenge they pose to established analytical perspectives, and they illuminate how empirical analysis of cultural content and constructed identities can contribute to the study of national security. All essays specify one or more outcomes to be explained, compare alternative explanations, and stress the importance of agency and conflict in the construction of identity and the enactment of norms. All reach new and nontrivial conclusions regarding substantively important national security issues. The main lines of argument from the essays, in terms of the five main categories outlined above, appear below.[67]

1. Cultural or institutional elements of states' environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states. Many of the essays feature effects of norms. It has become more common to argue that, given constant interests, institutions change the transaction costs or information requirements for certain policies or that they change interests themselves. The essays in this volume build upon but broaden this insight, in ways that we will describe.

We should first mention that the essays employ the concept "norms" in a sociologically standard way. Norms are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity. (We will describe the concept "identity" momentarily.) Sometimes norms operate like rules defining (and thus "constituting") an identity--like the descriptors defining the basic characteristics of professorhood within a university, in relation to the other main identities found within that institution. These effects are "constitutive" because norms in these instances specify the actions that will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a

particular identity and to respond to it appropriately.[68] In other instances, norms are "regulative" in their effect. They operate as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity--like the standards defining what a properly conforming professor does in particular circumstances.

Thus norms either define ("constitute") identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviors for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identities will shape behavior in varying circumstances). Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.[69] With this conceptualization in mind, we proceed to arguments.

Price and Tannenwald show how models of "responsible" or "civilized" states are enacted and validated by upholding specific norms.[70] These norms constrain the use of some technologies for killing or incapacitating people in large numbers. Berger shows how Germany's and Japan's antimilitaristic norms have made it very difficult for their governments to adopt more-assertive national security policies since the end of the Cold War. Finnemore argues that nonwhite and non-Christian peoples can make claims for humanitarian military protection in the twentieth century in a way that was not conceivable in the nineteenth century. Humanitarian concerns have expanded and have shaped the interests and policies of states. Intervention now often occurs when geostrategic interests are absent or unclear, and when multilateral coalitions restrain the unilateral exercise of power.

Herman's analysis of Soviet foreign policy argues that the regime that emerged between the two superpowers during the era of detente articulated nascent norms--the avoidance of military force, the maintenance of strategic stability, and the legitimation of human rights--norms that shaped in demonstrable ways the definition of national interests advanced by liberal reformers within the ussr. Contesting definitions of security in the Soviet Union were tied to new interpretations of regime dynamics and U.S. debates by a significant sector of Soviet policy makers. These interpretive processes fostered a softening of the ussr's manichaean image of world order.[71]

The strength of the causal effects of norms varies. Norms fall on a continuum of strength, from mere discursive receptivity (as in the early years of American deterrence policy, discussed by Price and Tannenwald), through contested models (as revealed in Kier's contrasts of French, British, and German military doctrines in the interwar period), to reconstructed "common wisdom" (as in the eschewing of militarist policies in Japan and Germany that Berger discusses). Weak norms, as in the case of nuclear deterrence, and political ideologies, as in the case of the French military, have behavioral consequences neither as permissive as instrumental justifications nor as constraining as unthinking common sense.

Thus the presence of norms does not dictate compliance. Any new or emergent norm must compete with existing, perhaps countervailing, ones. This is a political process that implicates the relative power of international or domestic coalitions. But norms make new types of action possible, while neither guaranteeing action nor determining its results. Extending Finnemore's line of reasoning, one might argue that as norms become institutionalized, support for institutions may partly supplant adherence to norms as motivators of government behavior. It is plausible to argue, for instance, that the United States intervened in Somalia as much to make up for its own inaction in Bosnia and to show support for the un as to alleviate human suffering in Somalia. A dramatic expansion in the scope of un activities points in that direction.[72]

Other cultural effects. Some essays rather than invoking "norms" propose other "cultural" effects on the interests or national security policies of states. The use of the term *culture* in this volume also follows conventional sociological usage. While the authors who use the term vary in the details, they all invoke it as a broad label denoting collective models of nation-state authority or identity, represented in custom or law. As typically used (and as used here), *culture* refers both to a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate.[73] For example, in their discussions here of domestic cultures, both Berger and Kier invoke country-specific models of (and discourse about) national identity and political organization. These models are constructed and contested by politicians, leaders of political movements, groups and parties, propagandists, lawyers, clerics, and even academics. Kier's analysis focuses on the military's organizational culture, but she also examines the broader domestic political culture. The French army in the interwar period did not, as many claim, inherently prefer an offensive military doctrine. Instead, given the constraints established in the domestic political arena, the French army's organizational culture fostered the adoption of a defensive doctrine. Other military organizations would not have responded the same way. In short, what the civilians and the military understand to be in their interest depends on the cultural context in which they operate.[74]

Kier's analysis focuses on the organizational culture of the military, which is nested in a broader domestic political culture. Berger's essay concentrates more directly on this broader setting, in his words the "politico-military culture." Price and Tannenwald in their essay follow recent trends in the field of science and technology studies and military technology,[75] arguing that even technologies of mass destruction are socially constructed. They concentrate on how political actors, in international, transnational, and national communities of discourse, contest different categories of weapons and thus contribute to the emergence and evolution of norms.[76]

Similarly, Jeffrey Legro turns to the military's organizational culture to explain why during World War II submarine attacks on merchant ships and aerial bombings of nonmilitary targets escalated beyond all restrictions, while the use of chemical weapons did not.[77] Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman's essay provides an international example. In referring to models of military apparatuses and their world diffusion, they invoke what John Meyer has called a "more or less worldwide rationalistic culture," indicating "less a set of values and norms, and more a set of models defining the nature, purpose, resources, technologies, controls, and sovereignty of the proper nation state."[78] These models are politically constructed and contested within international organizations, transnational professions, the sciences and other "epistemic communities," social movement networks, and so forth.

2. Cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape state identity. Cultural and institutional structure may also constitute or shape the basic identities of states, that is, the features of state "actorhood" or national identity. For example, in essay 3 Eyre and Suchman show how many states enact standardized models of statehood. Specifically, they analyze how many such states procure a standardized weapons portfolio, one related more to domestic display and international prestige than to the actual security threats that the states face. Analogously, Third World states draw upon other models of proper organization from un agencies,[79] which helps to account for the extraordinary diffusion of social and political technologies within the world system. Similarly, the International Labor Organization (ilo) has been central in global

standardization of some elements and practices of welfare states.[80]

Ideas of more or less legitimate state identities develop in world society, as do technologies of statehood. With the recent "third wave" of democratization, even authoritarian regimes now use the rhetorical and constitutional trappings of democracy.[81] Norms of racial equality that emerged from domestic debates over race relations eventually diffused globally through transnational politics and politicized South African apartheid.[82] Analogously, ideas about citizenship, developed in domestic contexts, were implicated in the process of decolonization.[83] In this volume, Herman discusses how Soviet reformers sought ways to reconstruct the Soviet Union as a more "normal" country and how they articulated contrasting radical "global" and more conventional "national" political visions. And Berger shows how the aftermath of World War II occasioned a period of identity politics in both Germany and Japan, in which global models of legitimate state and national identities affected the domestic political process of reconstructing identity. The institution of multilateralism has had a particularly powerful effect on Germany.[84]

The concept of "identity" thus functions as a crucial link between environmental structures and interests. The term comes from social psychology, where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness ("selfhood") held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant "others." Thus the term (by convention) references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other.[85]

Appropriation of this idiom for the study of international relations may seem forced, since states obviously do not have immediately apparent equivalents to "selves." But nations do construct and project collective identities, and states operate as actors. A large literature on national identity and state sovereignty attests to this important aspect of international politics. We employ the language of "identity" to mark these variations. For the purposes of this project, more specifically, we employ "identity" as a label for the varying construction of nationhood and statehood. Thus we reference both (a) the nationally varying ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose ("nationhood" or nationalism, for short), and (b) country variation in state sovereignty, as it is enacted domestically and projected internationally ("statehood," for short).

This dimension of variation in statehood is less codified in the literature and requires a few words of further explication. We refer to two main forms of variation. First, the modal character of statehood varies over time *within* an international system, as well as varying *across* international systems. For instance, statehood in the contemporary West is arguably less militarist than statehood elsewhere and in earlier periods. Second, the kinds of statehood constructed within a given system also vary. For instance, the statehood of many African countries is more notably external and juridical than that found elsewhere.[86]

3. Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states. Identities both generate and shape interests. Some interests, such as mere survival and minimal physical well-being, exist outside of specific social identities; they are relatively generic. But many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This was certainly true during the Cold War. Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing--"who they are"--which in turn depends on their

social relationships. A case in point is the current ambiguity surrounding U.S. national interests after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire as a dominant "other" occasions instability in U.S. self-conception, and hence ambiguity in U.S. interests. The issue is considerably more pressing in Russia and several other successor states of the Soviet Union.

States can develop interests in enacting, sustaining, or developing a particular identity. For example, Price and Tannenwald (in essay 4) argue that a commitment to a "civilized" identity reinforced acceptance of norms defining chemical and nuclear weapons as illegitimate. And the wishes of American elites to present a pacific picture of the American nation facilitated the development of these norms.

Further, constancy in underlying identity helps to explain underlying regularities in national security interests and policy. Thus Johnston argues in essay 7 that China's strategic culture in the Maoist period was based on a zero-sum view of the world, a division between "self" and "other" that generated specific strategic commitments. Classical Chinese conceptions were reinforced by contacts with the European state system: nationalism and Marxism-Leninism provided themes of class war and anti-imperialist war that could be grafted onto traditional constructions. Historical variations in the structural conditions of the Chinese empire do not account well for the constancy in strategic culture: the relation between "anarchy" and realpolitik depicted by neorealism, Johnston suggests, is in this case spurious. Rather, it is China's strategic culture that drives its realpolitik.

Correspondingly, change in identity can precipitate substantial change in interests that shape national security policy. Redefinition of Soviet identity, and of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, Herman argues, precipitated a new picture of Soviet interests. And the security dilemma of the Cold War was rooted, as Risse-Kappen demonstrates, in definitions of self and other that elites constructed politically in the late 1940s. In the current period, as multilateralism is "internalized" as a constitutive part of some states' identities, these states develop an interest in participating in and promoting it. As Berger shows, German state elites have sought to lock in a reconstructed German identity--pacified, democratic, and internationalist--by linking this identity to regional and multilateral institutions and identities. These processes are directly analogous to those of "self-binding"[87] and "character planning" conspicuous in personal identity.

Second, state policy or activity may be a direct enactment or reflection of identity politics. Postwar domestic battles in Germany and Japan over proper security policy were part of a broader political conflict over identity. In Germany, but not in Japan, these were open contests over the reconstruction and retelling of national history. Berger argues that the new constructions of national identity have little resemblance to the militarist visions driving these states before World War II. One might argue that identity reconstruction is more consolidated in Germany than in Japan precisely because of Germany's greater "self-entanglement" in regional and world institutions.[88] In any case, Berger's study shows how identity politics and change in collective identities can precipitate substantial change in state interest and policy.

This argument has important implications for the post-Cold War era. The continuity in Germany's and Japan's security policy, Berger argues, must be attributed to their domestic politics of identity, rather than to discontinuity in the structure of the international system. Despite stark contrasts between China's hard realpolitik and Japan's and Germany's antimilitarist stance, analytically Berger's and Johnston's conclusions are isomorphic: China's strategic culture and Japan's and Germany's politico-military culture have stronger effects on national security policies than international structure does. Analogously, Kier

shows that during the interwar years domestic, not international, conflict over the identity of the French state provided the setting in which the organizational culture of the French military caused the adoption of a defensive doctrine.

We have exemplified "identity interests" and "identity politics" as useful constructs for the analysis of states' national security interests and policy. Barnett's contribution to this volume suggests another contribution of the identity idiom. In his discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations, Barnett refers to the identity "crisis" that began in Israel in the late 1980s. It was rooted not in the dramatic changes in the international system but in the debates spurred by Israeli occupation policies in the West Bank. Israel was deeply divided between those defending a traditional conception of geostrategic security, even at the risk of losing the emotional support of the American public, and those favoring strategic retrenchment while strengthening the notion of Israel as a Western-style democracy. The peace offensive of the Rabin government illustrates that identity can trump geostrategy as a determinant of national security policy.[89]

4. Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities. The preceding section focused on the effects of constructed and contested state identities on national security interests or policy. One can also analyze how states seek to enact or institutionalize their identities (potentially shifting or multiple ones) in interstate normative structures, including regimes and security communities.

Risse-Kappen discusses how the formation of nato both expressed the common identity of liberal democracies and reinforced an embryonic North Atlantic security community,[90] allowing for the development of new practices of collective defense, institutionalized over time in the nato security regime. Specifically, he shows that an important aspect of that security community was the norm of multilateral consultation that clashed at times with the American urge for unilateral action. He argues further that this security community is persisting despite the evaporation of a common enemy, for it has come to embody norms of consultation, among others, that reinforce an acquired collective identity.[91] Also, proponents of European integration, believing that integration requires agreement, actively championed human rights ideologies, promoting an ideology in order to deepen European identity.[92]

Barnett similarly argues that shifts in models of Arab collective identity--specifically, an ongoing competition between pan-Arabism and state-centric models--have driven the search for normative structures to implement this identity. From this analytical vantage point, arguments that invoke the balance of threat as an explanation of alliance formation remain incomplete in their specification of causation, as long as they neglect variable and contested state identities as the main factor that defines for decision makers what constitutes a threat in the first place.[93]

5. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure. The causal imagery captured in figure 2.2 represents a process. Cultural and institutional structures have no existence apart from the ongoing knowledgeable actions of actors.[94] This does not mean that such structures are reducible to such actions; it means that cultural and institutional structures cannot be divorced analytically from the processes by which they are continuously produced and reproduced and changed. Emanuel Adler,[95] for example, has analyzed how a particular political coalition of scientists close to the Kennedy administration helped establish the political practice of arms control for the United States, how

that practice was exported, and how it eventually became institutionalized internationally.

Since this volume concentrates on invoking cultural and institutional elements as causes of national security policy, this recursive feature is less stressed in the substantive essays. But all of the authors take pains to avoid reifying cultural and institutional structures. All stress the contested construction and contested interpretation of such structures. Power and agency thus matter greatly. And all at least sketch some of the patterns of agency and microstructure upon which their macroscopic arguments depend.

For instance, Risse-Kappen, Berger, Barnett, and Herman all develop the recursive argument that states enacting a particular identity have profound effects on the structure of the international system to which they belong. The forging of an identity as a Western security community, for example, contradicts the expectation of Europe's quick return to nineteenth-century balance of power politics.[96] It predicts instead the continuation of institutional forms of security cooperation in nato, the West European Union (weu), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), or some other multilateral forum. Germany's and Japan's identities as trading states have important consequences for the international security conditions in Europe and Asia.[97] The waxing and waning of pan-Arabism has had a profound effect on military alliances in the Middle East. And changes in Soviet identity and policy helped bring about the end of the Cold War.

In our insistence on documenting effects of norms and identities, we have unavoidably slighted important cognate topics. For instance, the essays do not offer detailed investigation of how cultural norms or constructed identities have effects. Ideas on this topic are scattered throughout the volume, but the topic itself does not receive concerted treatment.[98] And the essays do not present a sustained common argument about how one detects a norm or when a prescription is sufficiently endorsed, conventionalized, or institutionalized to be considered normative. Discussion of these topics is important in future research and would certainly complement and extend the work produced here. But the arguments and causal effects that this essay and this book emphasize are freestanding without this further development.

In sum, the arguments developed in the empirical essays address the major pathways depicted in figure 2.2. The essays show that "norms," "identities," and "culture" matter. They impute, furthermore, a higher cultural and institutional content to environments than do the more materialist views informing, for example, neorealist explanations. Furthermore, the insistence on socially constructed and contested actor identities militates against the rationalist imagery informing most neorealist and neoliberal theories, which take identity as unproblematic. These lines of argument thus open avenues for further research that dominant theories so far have unduly neglected.

Methodological and Metatheoretic Matters

Methodological Nonissues

The departures of this volume are theoretical rather than methodological. This book neither advances nor depends upon any special methodology or epistemology. The arguments it advances are descriptive, or explanatory, or both. All of the essays start by problematizing a politically important outcome; they then develop their own line of argument in contrast with others. Many employ comparison across time or space, in ways now standard in social science. When they attempt explanation, they engage in "normal science," with its usual desiderata in mind.

Many of the essays make descriptive claims that seek in the first instance to document phenomena that have been insufficiently noticed, let alone analyzed. For example, Price and Tannenwald chart the emergence of norms with regard to non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons; Berger delimits changes in Japanese and German identities after World War II. Both are complex descriptive tasks. Many of the essays then go on to make a variety of explanatory claims positing causal effects either of identities or of the cultural/institutional content of global or domestic environments. Authors thus problematize features of national or international security often overlooked by dominant analytical approaches. And they posit causal effects typically left unexplored.

When the essays make explanatory arguments, they assume no special causal imagery. For example, in most of them, norms are invoked as context effects, affecting the interests that inform policy choices. Some essays make occasional references to "constitutive processes" of identity formation, invoking a set of processes whereby the specific identities of the acting units in a system are built up or altered.[99] In these instances, the analytical problem concerns the shape of identities that inform interests rather than, directly, behavior--a characteristic blind spot in the rationalist vision. But reference to "constitutive" processes invokes a category of substantive arguments and is more a theoretical than a methodological departure. Similarly, when essays deal with issues of "meaning" (for instance, when discussing contested interpretations of or explanatory, oughgoing structuralists: they are interested in how *structures* of constructed meaning, embodied in norms or identities, affect what states do.

These essays have a decidedly empirical bent to them. The evidence employed runs the gamut of statistical and interview data, as well as documentary sources. The authors have sought substantial comparative and historical variation and subjected it to intensive and varied empirical probes.

The empirical work amassed here does suggest that security scholars have occasionally been too narrow in their consideration of both topics and causal factors. This project tries to contribute to widening the scientific "phenomenology" of the national security field in both senses. Herman's and Berger's essays suggest two examples. During the 1970s and 1980s realists and liberals debated at great length competing models of hegemonic stability or decline for the United States. With the exception of the broader sociological literature, no similar attention was lavished on developments in the Soviet Union.[100] Yet it was developments in Soviet, not American, politics and the effects of U.S.-Soviet regimes that brought about the current revolution in world politics.[101] Detailed analysis of the military balance of power between the two superpowers overlooked aspects of reality that turned out to be of great significance. Similarly, the growth of Japanese and German power during the same period was not just constrained by their status as client states in an anarchic international system. Military defeat, occupation, and the political experience under the Pax Americana affected norms of appropriate behavior and conceptions of identity that help shape the current security situation in Asia and Europe.

Problematizing what others take for granted or even reify, such as the construction of state identity and interests, does not in and of itself involve any specific methodological imperatives. For instance, despite the concern in these essays with cultural forces, and hence implicitly or explicitly with "meanings," they do not depend exceptionally upon any specialized separate "interpretive methodology." For example, Price and Tannenwald's essay is in part about the emergence of structures that carry meaning--specifically, norms. It identifies the ways in which nuclear and chemical weapons have been delegitimated, placing emergent proscriptions in the context of larger legitimating discourse defining standards of appropriate conduct for "civilized" states. The empirical work here amounts to a form of

"process tracing," whereby the development of the interpretive frames employed by actors is recounted in historical fashion. The "interpretations" at issue here are either explananda or causes in the world, rather than some specialized methodological approach or technique.

In stressing our methodological conventionalism we part company with those scholars who have pointed the way toward a sociological approach but who insist on the need for a special interpretive methodology--as do, for instance, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, in an oft-cited article.[102] We note that neither author, either in this article or in subsequent writings, has explicated what such a methodology would entail in practice or provided an empirical exemplar representing concretely the kind of work he has in mind. Ruggie's illuminating recent work on sovereignty[103] is not especially interpretivist in any specific methodological sense. And the ways in which Kratochwil's substantive work[104] is and is not interpretivist are themselves not very clear. Moreover, the research practices of scholars like Ruggie, Kratochwil, and others identified with constructivist or interpretive approaches converge substantially with those advocated by mainstream scholars. We are not claiming that these research practices are identical in details. But methodological differences in practice appear to be small--or at least are not clearly conceptualized, specified, and articulated in the literature.[105] We suggest that the literature is prone to conflate substantive and theoretical differences with methodological ones, as if a theoretical departure necessarily depends upon some methodological uniqueness. It need not, and does not do so in this volume.

This methodological conventionalism matters to us. From today's perspective, for example, the methodological differences dividing "traditionalists" like Stanley Hoffmann from "behavioralists" like Karl Deutsch in the 1960s assumed disproportionate importance. In their actual studies, both scholars subscribed to different variants of the analytical perspective of historical sociology as the most productive means for understanding security issues in the middle of the twentieth century. Disagreements on secondary issues of methods, for example, should not short-circuit the incipient sociological turn among some realist and liberal scholars that essay 13 reviews briefly.

Relations Between Lines of Theorizing

Stressing that our intended departures are theoretical rather than methodological does, however, raise a more substantial issue: what is the relationship of the "cultural," "institutional," and "constructivist" arguments of this volume to those of realism and liberalism? The short answer is that there is no one a priori relationship to be assumed or found. Sometimes this volume's arguments supplement extant arguments; sometimes they compete with them; in some instances the intent would be to subsume realist or liberal arguments within a broader perspective. Although this listing is not exhaustive, the point is simple: one cannot prejudge the relationship between lines of argument; various relations are possible, and they have to be established theoretically and empirically, rather than assumed.

This matter merits a bit more development. The discussion of the various possible relationships between differing lines of argument seems impaired by the highly reified "paradigm"-talk common to contemporary analyses of international relations. Scholarly communities are quick to reify differing arguments as distinct and competing paradigms. Then scholars are prone to assume, often without much thought or argument, that differing arguments are in immediate and direct competition. Or they will resort to an additive view of theorizing, suggesting that newly suggested lines of argument at best add variables to a previously established explanatory model. These images are procrustean and facile.

We see the different arguments of this volume as having differing relationships to the arguments of realism and liberalism. In some cases one finds instances of direct competition. In these instances, an author has taken up an explanandum already addressed (or readily addressable) by extant arguments and has offered an alternative (more sociological) explanation. Kier's essay provides an excellent example. Kier develops a cultural explanation of French military doctrine that contradicts existing functional explanations favored by realists. The evidence suggests the superiority of her explanation over conventional ones. Eyre and Suchman's essay provides a second example of intentionally direct competition. They set up two distinct models of weapons acquisition and attempt to adjudicate them empirically. In this case, the empirical results are not clear-cut; both models receive some support, and thus the relative strength of the different explanatory approache sometimes they compete with them; in some instances the intent wos is not settled unambiguously. Johnston's essay provides a more complex instance of direct competition, as he attempts to subsume a realist argument within a broader cultural one. In Johnston's account, the continuities in China's strategic culture, not the changes in the international balance of power, offer the most compelling argument for marked continuities in China's definition of and response to security "threats."

In some cases the arguments of this volume are meant to supplement or complement more conventional arguments in the security field, rather than to displace, modify, or subsume them. The most straightforward, and commonly acknowledged, instance is when new arguments offer description and explanation of phenomena unaddressed by existing argumentation. In effect, the differing lines of arguments address different empirical domains; in principle their contributions are complementary, since the contributions are subject to eventual bridging and thus integration. For instance, Finnemore investigates humanitarian interventions, a domain left largely unexplored by realist and liberal analysis. Similarly, the non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons that Price and Tannenwald examine is a topic mostly overlooked or treated schematically in conventional deterrence theory with its heavy reliance on realist and rationalist imagery.

More-complex forms of complementarity also occur. One can imagine what might be called "stage-complementarity," whereby one argument covers one phase of a process, while another argument takes up the next phase.[106] Thus this project's focus on the problem of interest definition leaves virtually unattended problems of strategic interaction, a complementary process. An integrated analytical perspective of politics should have room for both. For example, sometimes the authors of these essays limit themselves to providing the front end, as it were, to largely realist arguments--trying to specify further the character of the actors involved in interaction and/or qualifying the character of the interests being pursued. Barnett, for example, argues that threat perceptions in the Arab world offer no more than a partial explanation of alliance patterns in the Middle East. For threat perceptions depend, in turn, on collective identities. Stage-complementarity does not mean, however, that only cultural and institutional arguments operate at the front end of a causal chain. Herman's analysis, for example, links dramatic changes in Soviet foreign policy and the end of the Cold War to the "New Thinking" of parts of the Soviet elite. In this case a realist argument offers a plausible starting point of a more fully specified causal chain. Adverse shifts in the relative capabilities of the Soviet Union may have been a major factor in how the reformers could install themselves in power in the first place.[107]

Alternatively, arguments can be nested within one another and become complementary in this sense. There are two main forms of nesting: (1) one argument provides foundations for another, as when

microeconomics provides, at least in theory, foundations for macroeconomics; and (2) one argument provides conditions for another, as when Weberian institutionalism, in aspiration, describes and explains the conditions under which microeconomics obtains.[108] In this volume, the second form of nesting is more likely, since the sociological (institutionalist and constructivist) thrust of the book's argument departs from the convention that nation-state actors are somehow contextless or ultimately "real." Eventually, these arguments should attempt to do two things. First, they should specify the institutional "scope conditions" under which realist interactions and liberal coordinations unfold.[109] And, second, they should characterize features of the role as actors (and interests) that states adopt when they compete and coordinate politically. Such arguments depart from weaker versions of "historical" institutionalisms by positing that the processes of institutional contextualization and construction are ongoing, rather than relegated to past epochal moments (such as the putative effects of the creation of the Westfalian state system on state sovereignty, or the effect of the Great Depression on a Keynesian consensus).[110]

In brief, competition is not the only possible analytical relationship between different lines of argument; various forms of complementarity, both immediate and more distant, are possible. Often metatheoretical assumptions afford too limited a picture of competition anyway. We are rarely in a position where differing arguments take the form of two (non-nested) regression models, with the same explananda ("dependent variables"), sitting side by side in two panels--with agreed-upon sets of goodness-of-fit statistics offering ready adjudication between them. Neither realism nor liberalism thus can reasonably be depicted as representing a baseline model against which all comers must be measured. For instance, one cannot simply assume that alternative lines of argument are properly depicted as merely "adding possible new variables" to an extant framework. Such a picture makes no allowance for reinterpretation of concepts given new arguments, or for transformation of original arguments given new ones, or for some other form of integration. Limiting the discussion of relations between lines of argument to a few comments about relative "explained variance" is a superficial and misleading appropriation of statistical imagery.[111]

In a world full of anomalies, realism is neither sufficiently established nor sufficiently precise to be treated as a sacrosanct "paradigm" to which other lines of argumentation must defer. Similarly, power-and-interest-based arguments should not be rendered as foundational, with other arguments relegated merely to providing ancillary modules. Such imagery is unwarranted. The end of the Cold War has reminded us once more how naked the emperor of international relations theory is.[112] It will take more than a couple of tailors to provide the necessary clothes.

Extension and Conclusion

So far this essay has treated realism and liberalism as broad orienting frameworks for the analysis of international relations; it has offered sociological institutionalism as an additional frame that also generates specific arguments about national security issues. But we can also consider theories of national security as part of the explananda of an institutionalist perspective.

In making this move, we treat different lines of academic theorizing as highly articulated versions of world cultural models.[113] Consider realism. Because states remain the predominant legitimated "actors" in the current world system, theories of national-security-in-international-anarchy remain dominant, building around world-cultural reifications of state sovereignty and actorhood. Realism thus frames the

political discourse about national security. As more overt forms of international coordination have developed and become more prominent, an intellectual space has opened for the network, functional, and bargaining theories characteristic of neoliberalism.

As the world system changes, so does the way in which the domain of security is defined and conceptualized. For instance, as some types of state interaction have been reorganized into "regimes," the domain of security has been redefined in a correspondingly narrower fashion. International trade provides one example. As the multilateral coordination of trade conflicts has spread, trade has moved off the core agenda of national security scholars. Similarly, education systems were once core security concerns, because of their connection to military mobilization. Over time, the theories and practices of mass education have been reoriented around economic development and domestic social concerns. Discussion of education on the world scene is now about human capital, not military strength. This second example shows the movement of national security issues into taken-for-granted conventions and beliefs--that is, into culture, rather than into regimes. Eugenics and population control provide a third example. Previously conceived as national security concerns, these issues were redefined over time as environmental and public health matters.

In these particular instances, the conceptualization of security has become more narrowly defined, after what had once been core national security issues were reorganized into regimes or into the taken-for-granted culture of the world system (e.g., into scientific discourse). Issues previously classified as national security have been reclassified as economics (as with trade) or as culture (as with education), or sometimes as simply disorder (as perhaps with terrorism, genocide, or international crime). Left behind is a more concentrated conceptualization of national security, one defined along realist lines. That is, if changing state practices transform national security issues into international regimes or world conventions or doctrines, then they are no longer coded as security matters. In this way realism continues to define the domain of national security--if in a rather tautological fashion.

Issues can also move in the other direction, from culture or regimes into security. A number of regimes are quite unstable, and the bargaining that they organize can readily spill back into more "anarchic" types of interstate relations, thus expanding the domain of national security. A number of weak regimes, like that concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons, operate in this way. Environmental issues present a parallel example. Some could easily shift from world scientific culture or transnational regimes into the domain of interstate conflict or bargaining. Consider also the renewed contestation of issues surrounding population migration and the associated problems of immigration policy. These issues have reemerged as deeply politicized from relatively taken-for-granted conventions of nationalism and citizenship. While such issues are not yet loci of substantial interstate tension, they have attracted the attention of some security scholars and could induce expansion in the conceptualization of security affairs.

The domain of national security theorizing thus evolves as issues flow between the interactions of states in "anarchic" settings, political bargaining in regimes, and conventions or doctrines relatively taken for granted in world culture. Over time, the domain of pure "anarchic" security politics, the realists' home domain, has probably narrowed somewhat, with the partial and fitful expansion of multilateral regimes and world society. Simultaneously, this security domain has intensified, with instances of "anarchic" conflict receiving intense scrutiny and problematization by their main world-cultural theorists, namely realists.

The security domain has been partly transformed in two other ways, changes that are now affecting

security discourse. First, the state actors considered by security scholars have themselves been transformed by the reorganization of issues in the world system. Where military functions have attained more multilateral organization, most notably in Western Europe, state identity has been substantially pacified or tamed. Similarly, if less powerfully, as states are drawn more deeply into the world economy (with its attendant regimes, institutions, and associated doctrines of non-zero sum national development), state actorhood is partly reconstructed around less militarist lines. There is substantial regional variation in this process. It is a striking phenomenon in much of Latin America; in contrast, East Asia shows a picture of a more classic realist politics (and doctrines of common and benign economic development are, correspondingly, more weakly represented there). But it nevertheless remains notable that contemporary security discourse, even in Asia, no longer renders states inevitably as war machines locked into natural or routine Darwinian competition. "Lebensraum" is no longer assumed to be a desideratum of state identity.

Second, independent of the modal identity of states, it is clear that the security domain has become less exclusively an *interstate* realm: states' hegemony over security has partly eroded. States have undercut their own security by allowing (or promoting) a vast unregulated market in arms sales, feeding myriad civil wars and newly armed security-relevant "actors." Various mafias, narcotics cartels, crime syndicates, terrorist groups, and ethno-religious camps have proliferated and have attained regional and even global reach.

Thus while the interstate system, narrowly considered, is in some respects more pacified and ordered--some realists now consider it a "mature" anarchy[114]--the broader global system is not. Various dissipative forces could undermine or overwhelm existing forms of coordination or elements of world institutional and cultural structure. World crises could even give a new lease on life to traditional militarism in previously pacified states or regions. But that would not occur automatically or overnight. It would require highly visible and contested reconfigurations of state identities (even in countries like Japan or Germany, which have a substantial military apparatus). Conversely, it is notable that there has been a heightened reification of a world responsibility to respond to or manage collective threats. States more routinely organize interventions via multilateral regimes and justify such action in the name of a putatively existing or emerging world order, as Finnemore argues in her essay.

If one employs the above sociology of knowledge, it comes as no surprise that the analytical domain of "national security" has become less clearly defined and less canonically theorized. First, the realists' "anarchy" is now sufficiently embedded and penetrated that some core generalizations of realism--for example, the relationship between polarity and war--attenuate or break down. Second, the heightened reification of the "world" as an economy or society or physical environment expands the list of threats to security. Policy makers and scholars correspondingly call for a broadened conceptualization of the security field, or alternatively they demarcate entirely new fields outside traditional notions of national security (dealing, for example, with terrorism, genocide, or organized transnational crime).

The arguments of this book variously compete with, complement, and begin to contextualize those of realism and liberalism. We have represented realism's nation-state actor as a construction and reconstruction of evolving world and domestic social environments. And we see liberalism's functionalism as made possible in part by a broader evolving world society and culture. A developed institutionalist picture of the world system would describe the scope conditions under which realism and liberalism coexist. And it would also consider how realist and liberal theorizing is itself implicated in constructing and reconstructing the domain of international and national security.

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Note 1: Frederick Frey, "The Problem of Actor Designation in Political Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 17, no. 2 (January 1985): 127-52. Back.

Note 2: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 74-77. Back.

Note 3: Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 362-64. Back.

Note 4: Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988): 72. Back.

Note 5: Robert O. Keohane, "International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics,* p. 183 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 6: We are thus following the general line of argument suggested by John Ruggie's and Friedrich Kratochwil's writings during the last decade. See John Gerard Ruggie, "International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends," in "International Responses to Technology," special issue of *International Organization* 29, no. 3 (Summer 1975): 557-84; John G. Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner, *International Regimes,* pp. 195-231; John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-85; John G. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John G. Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 3-47; John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 139-74; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "The Protagorean Quest: Community, Justice, and the 'Oughts' and 'Musts' of International Politics," *International Journal* 43 (Spring 1988): 205-40; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik Without Politics," *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): 63-80; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Norms Versus Numbers: Multilateralism and the Rationalist and Reflexivist Approaches to Institutions--A Unilateral Plea for Communicative Rationality," in Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters,* pp. 443-74; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Is the Ship of

Culture at Sea or Returning?" in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in International Relations Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, in press). Back.

Note 7: Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Back.

Note 8: David Strang, "Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts," *International Organization* 45, no. 2 (Spring 1991): 143-62. Back.

Note 9: Robert H. Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change,* pp. 111-38 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 10: On changing attitudes toward war, see John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and James Lee Ray, "The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War," *International Organization* 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 405-40. A distinguished military historian, John Keegan, concurs with the view that wars are not "natural" but "cultural." They are institutions of society that evolve. Keegan is "impressed by the evidence that mankind, wherever it has the option, is distancing itself from the institution of warfare. . . . War, it seems to me, after a lifetime of reading about the subject, mingling with men of war, visiting the sites of war and observing its effects, may well be ceasing to commend itself to human beings as a desirable or productive, let alone rational, means of reconciling their discontents" (John Keegan, *A History of Warfare [*New York: Knopf, 1993], p. 59). See also John Mueller, *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), pp. 111-23. Back.

Note 11: David Cameron, "British Exit, German Voice, French Loyalty: Defection, Domination, and Cooperation in the 1992-93 erm Crisis" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1993 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1993). Back.

Note 12: The map is Wendt's idea; the conceptualization of this version, however, was developed jointly with Jepperson, who has produced a related but different map of social theories; see Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis,* pp. 143-63 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). For further discussion of Wendt's own version, see Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press). Essays 1 and 13 in this volume provide some additional discussion of realist and liberal thought. In the interest of brevity we treat them here in a reified manner. Back.

Note 13: Throughout, we mean nothing special by *actors.* Typically, we are referring to governments or government elites. We treat *states* and *governments* largely as synonyms--sloppy practice for comparative politics, we realize, but this treatment is conventional in international relations. These shorthand references are not intended to anthropomorphize or reify actors. Back.

Note 14: It is important to note that while this more elaborated picture of structure is often associated with sociological analysis, it can be quite compatible with some versions of realism and rationalism. Paul Schroeder's critique of neorealism, for example, makes a move in this direction. See Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Paul W. Schroeder, "Neo-Realist Theory and International History: A Historian's View," *Security Studies* (in

press); Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundation of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," *The International History Review* 16, no. 4 (November 1994): 715-44. The same is true of game theoretic analyses that represent institutions as shared expectations or "common knowledge" that generates "focal points" in situations of strategic interaction; see David Kreps, "Corporate Culture and Economic Theory," in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy,* pp. 90-143 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy,* p. 17; Arthur T. Denzau and Douglass C. North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," *Kyklos* 47, no. 1 (1994): 3-31; and John Kurt Jacobson, "Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," *World Politics* 47, no. 2 (January 1995): 283-310. Similarly, Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane note that the interstate "anarchy" they address is contained within an "international society"; see their essay "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy,* p. 226 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). But this literature typically does not theorize this "society," suggesting at times that one does not need such theorization or that it is too difficult or unpromising to do so. Back.

Note 15: Daniel Deudney, "Dividing Realism: Structural Realism Versus Security Materialism on Nuclear Security and Proliferation," *Security Studies* 2, nos. 3-4 (Spring-Summer 1993): 7-37. Back.

Note 16: Put differently, realism does not equal materialism. Back.

Note 17: Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. Back.

Note 18: Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425. Back.

Note 19: Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 335-70. Back.

Note 20: The difference between these first two effects is partly captured by Robert Powell's useful distinction between "preferences over action" and "preferences over outcomes," though the actor properties in which we are interested go beyond preferences over outcomes to include identities and capabilities. See Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 313-44. Back.

Note 21: George Stigler and Gary Becker, "De Gustibus non est Disputandum," *American Economic Review* 67, no. 2 (March 1977): 76-90. Back.

Note 22: Waltz, *Theory of International Politics,* pp. 74-77. Back.

Note 23: We make no claim that figure 2.1 captures all significant differences among these traditions. And we are reasoning by illustration rather than canvassing the literature systematically. Back.

Note 24: Deudney, "Dividing Realism." Back.

Note 25: Waltz, *Theory of* . Back.

Note 26: Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It." Back.

Note 27: In his *Theory of International Politics,* pp. 74-77, Waltz does allow for "socialization" and "imitation" processes, but in so doing he envisions these primarily in terms of effects on behavior, thereby assuming that the processes determining the fundamental makeup or identity of states are exogenous to states' environments. Back.

Note 28: Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (December 1986): 1151-69. Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 29: Krasner, *International Regimes;* Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy.* We are neglecting here very substantial differences between international and domestic versions of the liberal argument. For an important statement of some of these differences, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Liberalism and International Relations Theory" (unpublished paper, Harvard University, 1993). Back.

Note 30: Uday A. Mehta examines liberalism from this perspective in "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," *Politics and Society* 18, no. 4 (1990): 427-54. This tendency is exemplified in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 31: Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 90-143; Joseph S. Nye Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics* 40, no. 2 (January 1988): 235-51; David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory"; Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, " 'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (January 1994): 209-34. Back.

Note 32: Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Karl W. Deutsch et al., *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967). Back.

Note 33: It is not entirely clear how to label these theories, given the confluence of different theoretical traditions that they represent. In "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 379-96, Robert Keohane called some of them "reflectivist," but we find this appellation to be far too subjectivist in connotation, as well as analytically vague. The perspective represented in this volume is thoroughly structuralist rather than subjectivist. From our perspective it makes more sense to refer to research of this type as institutionalist or constructivist (or both). See, for example, Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," and Wendt, *Social Theory of* . Back.

Note 34: Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1977). Back.

Note 35: Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Tony Evans and Peter Wilson, "Regime Theory and the English School of International Relations: A Comparison," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 3 (1992): 329-51; Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 1992); Barry Buzan, "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 327-52; Ole Waever, "International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 27, no. 1 (1992): 97-128. Back.

Note 36: For representative works, see Ruggie, "Multilateralism" and "Territoriality and Beyond." See also David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" *International Organization* 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 441-74; Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions;* Nicholas Onuf, *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and Their Progress," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations,* pp. 43-88 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 101-46; Peter Haas, ed., "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination," special issue of *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992); and Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It." Note that sovereignty is not the only form of identity in which constructivists are interested. Back.

Note 37: Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity." Back.

Note 38: Strang, "Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion." Back.

Note 39: Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 1-24; Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization." Back.

Note 40: Strang, "Anomaly and Commonplace in European Political Expansion." Back.

Note 41: Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 225-86; Richard K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space," *Alternatives* 12, no. 4 (1987): 403-34. Back.

Note 42: David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); R. B. J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Cynthia Weber, *Simulating Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 43: J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 30. Back.

Note 44: Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Spike Peterson, ed., *Gendered States: Feminist*

(Re)Vision of International Relations Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992). Back.

Note 45: John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen, ed., *Studies of the Modern World System,* pp. 109-37 (New York: Academic Press, 1980); George W. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society, and the Individual* (London: Sage, 1987); John W. Meyer, "Rationalized Environments," in W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, eds., *Institutional Environments and Organizations,* pp. 28-54 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1994); and John W. Meyer, "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State: A World Society Perspective," in George Steinmetz, ed., *New Approaches to the State in the Social Sciences* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). We should note that work in the tradition of Gramsci, such as Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), and Stephen Gill, *American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), also seeks to combine the analysis of structure, power, and ideas. Back.

Note 46: Buzan, "From International System to International Society." Back.

Note 47: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnationalism Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 48: See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) on democracy; Thomas J. Biersteker, "The Triumph of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics,* pp. 102-31 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) on market models; Francisco O. Ramirez and John W. Meyer, "The Institutionalization of Citizenship Principles and the National Incorporation of Women and Children, 1870-1990" (unpublished research proposal, Department of Sociology, Stanford University, 1992); John Boli, "Sovereignty from a World Polity Perspective" (unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, 1993). Back.

Note 49: Consult the citations to studies in Meyer, "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State." For a paper reviewing this research, see Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," *International Organization* (in press). Back.

Note 50: Haas, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination." Back.

Note 51: For an interesting argument that analyzes U.S. hegemony as a form of international governance from a moral perspective, see Lea Brilmayer, *American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 52: Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," and "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State." Back.

Note 53: Roland Robertson, "Globalization Theory and Civilization Analysis," *Comparative Civilizations Review* 17 (1987): 22. Back.

Note 54: Ronald Dore, "Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture," in Bull and Watson, *The Expansion of International Society,* pp. 407-24. Back.

Note 55: J. P. Nettl and Roland Robertson, *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies: The Formation of National Goals and Attitudes* (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), p. 153; Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992). Back.

Note 56: We are reviewing them here more briefly simply for reasons of economy. Back.

Note 57: Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (June 1969): 190-222; Alexander L. George, "Ideology and International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 1 (1987): 1-21; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Richard Herrmann, *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). Back.

Note 58: For a recent overview of the literature on organizational culture, see Frank R. Dobbin, "Cultural Models of Organization: The Social Construction of Rational Organizing Principles," in Diana Crane, ed., *Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspectives,* pp. 117-41 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Alastair Iain Johnston's *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) reviews the literature on strategic culture. See also his article "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 32-64. Back.

Note 59: Peter Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); Haas, "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination"; Judith Goldstein, *Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Charles A. Kupchan, *The Vulnerability of Empire* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 60: Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989); Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Back.

Note 61: Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). Back.

Note 62: Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Analogously, industrial sociology and social economics focus on the social context that envelops markets. "Industrial orders," writes Gary Herrigel, "have a relationship to agents within them that is analogous in some generic respects to the relation between a modern liberal constitution and its citizens" (Gary Herrigel, "Industry as a Form of Order: A Comparison of the Historical Development of the Machine Tool Industries in the United States and Germany," in J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., *Governing Capitalist Economies: Performance and Control of Economic Sectors,* p. 99 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1994]); Gary Herrigel, "Identities and Institutions: The Social Construction of

Trade Unions in Nineteenth-Century Germany and the United States," *Studies in American Political Development* 7 (Fall 1993): 371-94; Frank Dobbin, *Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and France in the Railway Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 63: Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Back.

Note 64: David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 65: Relatedly, a substantial number of empirical studies suggest that democracies do not fight wars with one another. See Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics"; Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace;* Randall Schweller, "Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?" *World Politics* 44, no. 2 (January 1992): 235-69; and several articles and subsequent correspondence in *International Security* 19, no. 2 (Fall 1994), and 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995). Back.

Note 66: Figure 2.2 labels broad categories of causal construction effects. It is thus *not* a total causal model of state security activity. Specifically, since some actor properties are intrinsic, "identity" is not the only cause of "interest." Figure 2.2 is *not* in itself a "theory." Back.

Note 67: We occasionally add arguments and examples drawn from other sources. Back.

Note 68: Francesca Cancian, *What Are Norms? A Study of Beliefs and Action in a Maya Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 137-38. Janice E. Thomson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," *International Journal of Group Tension* 23, no. 2 (1993): 67-83. Back.

Note 69: Norms may be "shared," or commonly held, across some distribution of actors in a system. Alternatively, however, norms may *not* be widely held by actors but may nevertheless be *collective* features of a system--either by being institutionalized (in procedures, formal rules, or law) or by being prominent in public discourse of a system. It is thus useful, following Emile Durkheim's fundamental discussion of types of social facts, to sustain a distinction between common (or shared or widely held) norms and collective ones, allowing for the possibility that some norms may be both common and collective. The now typical identification of norms as necessarily a "shared" social property is thus inappropriate. It builds subjectivist and aggregative imagery into the very conceptualization of norms. Instead, a distinction between collectively "prominent" or institutionalized norms and commonly "internalized" ones, with various "intersubjective" admixtures in between, is crucial for distinguishing between different types of norms and different types of normative effects. For a more extended discussion, see Ronald L. Jepperson and Ann Swidler, "What Properties of Culture Should We Measure?" *Poetics* 22 (1994): 359-71; Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," *The Review of Metaphysics* 25 (1971): 3-51; and Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics,* ch. 6. Back.

Note 70: See also Gerritt W. Gong, *The Standard of "Civilisation" in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1984). Back.

Note 71: Harald MŸller, "The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations,* p. 384 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1993). Back.

Note 72: Taking 1988 as a baseline figure, by 1994 the number of Security Council resolutions adopted had increased from fifteen to seventy-eight; the number of disputes in which the un was directly involved through preventive diplomacy or peacekeeping operations increased by a factor of three, as did the number of countries contributing military or police personnel. The un budget for peacekeeping operations increased fifteen-fold, to $3.6 billion. The un undertook election monitoring in twenty-one countries in 1994, as compared to none in 1988. And the number of sanctions imposed by the Security Council increased from one to seven. See Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Chief Chides Security Council on Military Missions," *New York Times,* January 6, 1995. Yet this expansion in un activities has generated political contradictions and conflicts of its own, as is illustrated, for example, in the growing strength of the voices, especially in the U.S. Congress, favoring a unilateral approach in the United States. See John G. Ruggie, "Peacekeeping and U.S. Interests," *The Washington Quarterly* 17, no. 4 (1994): 175-84. Back.

Note 73: For further discussion of conceptual issues, see Jepperson and Swidler, "What Properties of Culture Should We Measure?" Back.

Note 74: Two related research projects point in directions similar to that of Kier. See Jeffrey W. Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 108-42; Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); and Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 409-30. Avant's analysis of military doctrine relies on an institutional model that focuses on civil-military relations in Britain and the United States. Back.

Note 75: John Ellis, *The Social History of the Machine Gun* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975). Back.

Note 76: Their essay suggests that prohibitionary norms can be institutionalized either early or late; they can arise spontaneously in a diffuse manner in a national setting, or they can be created intentionally at the international level to become subsequently internalized in various states. Finally, norms can arise from dramatically different political sources: power politics in the case of nuclear weapons and moral opprobrium in the case of chemical weapons, also one of Robert W. McElroy's conclusions in *Morality and American Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). One preliminary finding that the analysis of Price and Tannenwald suggests is that historical contingency in the emergence of norms deserves close attention and may be more important as a starting point of social processes than rationalist perspectives tend to assume. Back.

Note 77: Legro, "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II"; Legro, . Back.

Note 78: Meyer, "The Changing Cultural Content of the Nation-State," p. 2. Back.

Note 79: Connie McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1989). Back.

Note 80: David Strang and Patricia Mei Yin Chang, "The International Labor Organization and the Welfare State: Institutional Effects on National Welfare Spending, 1960-80," *International Organization* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 235-62. Back.

Note 81: Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988). Back.

Note 82: Zimbabwe's support for sanctions against South Africa illustrated the significance of this symbol, that country's high vulnerability to and dependence upon its neighbor state notwithstanding. Zimbabwe's identity interests--the import of enshrining racial equality for the identity of the new regime--trumped more narrowly defined security interests. See Audie Klotz, *Protesting Prejudice: Apartheid and the Politics of Norms in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 83: Jackson, "The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization." Back.

Note 84: Ruggie, "Multilateralism," pp. 8-9. Back.

Note 85: More precisely, identities come in two basic forms--those that are intrinsic to an actor (at least relative to a given social structure) and those that are relationally defined within a social structure. Being democratic, for example, is an intrinsic feature of the U.S. state relative to the structure of the international system. Being sovereign is a relational identity that exists only by virtue of intersubjective relationships at the systemic level. Put in the language of game theory, intrinsic identities are constituted exogeneously to a game (though they might be reproduced or transformed through play of the game), whereas relational identities ("roles") are constituted by the game itself. In the latter case, part of what is "going on" in a game is the reproduction and/or transformation of identities. Back.

Note 86: Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist." Why does one identity prevail over another one? To put a very complicated matter much too briefly, identities will be affected by the social density of transactions and communications, as well as by the power-dependency relations between actors. The greater the social density and actor dependency, the more the actors' identity will be wrapped up in and affected by that relationship. Small states, for example, are more affected in their identity by their relationship with regional hegemons than with global superpowers. Since social densities are typically much greater in domestic than in international politics, domestic identities normally carry more weight than international ones. If we view this question as a social process, we should look for reciprocity, or "reflected appraisals," in identity formation. In such dynamics actors learn to see themselves in the roles that other actors, especially powerful ones, attribute to them. For example, if states treat ("appraise") each other in threatening ways, they will come to internalize ("reflect") identities as "enemies." If more powerful states treat less powerful ones as "clients," weaker states will internalize that identity. Back.

Note 87: Jon Elster, *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 88: Peter J. Katzenstein, "Taming of Power: German Unification, 1989-1990," in Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Lorriaux, eds., *Past as Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order,* pp. 59-82 (Boulder: Westview, 1993). Back.

Note 89: See also Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 90: Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Back.

Note 91: The United States and the European members of nato have been very careful not to risk the survival of nato despite their deep differences over the war in Yugoslavia. Although Risse-Kappen stresses the primacy of domestic politics, his analysis is compatible with recent analyses of the institution of multilateralism; see Ruggie, "Multilateralism," and Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 384-96. Back.

Note 92: Kathryn Sikkink, "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe," in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy,* pp. 139-70. Back.

Note 93: Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Stephen M. Walt, "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia," *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 275-316. Back.

Note 94: Giddens, *The Constitution of Society.*

Back.

Note 95: Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation." Back.

Note 96: John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56. Back.

Note 97: Katzenstein, "Taming of Power." Back.

Note 98: It is likely that greater attention to language will be important in specifying these effects. Language is neither an asset employed by given subjects nor an external constraint that is imposed on a subject. Rather it exemplifies the general social practices that form both social subjects and the objects to which they speak. There exists disparate work that engages this problem both inside and outside the field of ethnomethodology. See, for example, Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations," in Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, eds., *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, in press); Albert Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas Themselves and Policy Preferences: Behavioral, Institutional, and Discursive Formulations" (unpublished paper, Brown University, 1993); Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "Fairy Tales, Tragedies, and World Histories: Towards Interpretive Story Grammars as Possibilist World Models," *Behaviormetrika* 21 (1987): 1-28; and Deirdre Boden and Don H. Zimmermann, eds., *Talk and Social Structure: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Back.

Note 99: We neglect here to develop possible differences between constitutive and causal processes as conventionally understood. Most of the essays in this volume do not depend upon such further differentiation. See Wendt, *Social Theory,* for a discussion of this distinction and its implication. Back.

Note 100: Randall Collins, "The Future Decline of the Russian Empire," in *Weberian Sociological Theory,* pp. 186-212 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Randall Collins, "Prediction in Macrosociology: The Case of the Soviet Collapse," *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (May 1995): 1552-93. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Back.

Note 101: For a significant exception, see Valerie Bunce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern Bloc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liability," *International Organization* 39, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 1-46. Back.

Note 102: Friedrich V. Kratochwil and John G. Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 753-76. Back.

Note 103: Ruggie, "Multilateralism" and "Territoriality and Beyond." Back.

Note 104: Ray Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 215-48. Back.

Note 105: A recent book on methodology, for example, argues that "science . . . and interpretation are *not* fundamentally different endeavors aimed at divergent goals;" see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 37; also pp. 34, 36, 84 n. 8. Back.

Note 106: In the language of Robert Powell ("Anarchy in International Relations Theory"), this volume's analytical perspective complements neorealism's and neoliberalism's lack of a theory of "preferences over outcomes." Because problems of indeterminacy and incompleteness limit the claims that neorealism and neoliberalism can make concerning "preferences over actions," this volume's analytical perspective, at least potentially, might help us formulate stronger claims. We are indebted to Heiner Schulz for helping us sharpen our thinking on this point. Back.

Note 107: William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 91-129. Back.

Note 108: Arthur Stinchcombe, "Review of Max Weber's *Economy and Society,*" in Arthur Stinchcombe, *Stratification and Organization: Selected Papers,* pp. 282-89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Back.

Note 109: Bernard P. Cohen, *Developing Sociological Knowledge,* 2d ed. (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1989). Back.

Note 110: Michael R. Smith, *Power, Norms, and Inflation: A Skeptical Treatment* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1992), pp. 253-59. Back.

Note 111: One cannot assume that alternative arguments are limited in effect to mopping up "unexplained variance" left behind by an extant argument. Such a suggestion is not only blatantly tendentious, it also prescribes a logical fallacy, best illustrated by referring to multiple regression analysis once more. As is well known, one cannot take the residuals from one regression model and then assess the import of a second set of explanatory variables by regressing these residuals on the new variables. In regression, one must allow for the possible intercorrelation of independent variables. Neglecting to do so will result in a form of specification error. The extension of this analogy to issues of explanation in general is direct. Back.

Note 112: Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism.* Back.

Note 113: We attempt to develop an argument suggested by John Meyer. Back.

Note 114: Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear,* 2d ed. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 175-81. Back.

The Culture of National Security

1. Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security

Peter J. Katzenstein

> It is always risky to pronounce a verdict of death on ideas, even after an extended period of apparent lifelessness, but I predict that we have seen the last of the "sociologists" in political science. . . . What has happened is that others too have penetrated the characteristically sloppy logic and flabby prose to discover the deeper problems of circularity and vacuousness inherent in the approach.
>
> -- Brian Barry

This is a book written by scholars of international relations rummaging in the "graveyard" of sociological studies. Since research and teaching is an eminently social process, it is perhaps understandable that changing political circumstances and intellectual fashions reopen controversies that appeared to some to have been already settled. This process can lead, in the best of circumstances, to what we might call intellectual progress: the diminishing of sloppy logic, flabby prose, circularity in reasoning, and vacuousness of insight.

Put briefly, this book makes problematic the state interests that predominant explanations of national security often take for granted.[1] For example, in the absence of geostrategic or economic stakes, why do the interests of some powerful states in the 1990s, but not in the 1930s or the 1890s, make them intervene militarily to protect the lives and welfare of citizens other than their own? Why did the Soviet Union consider it to be in its interest to withdraw from Eastern Europe in the late stages of the Cold War, while it had rejected such suggestions many times before? Answers to such questions are nonobvious and important. State interests do not exist to be "discovered" by self-interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction. "Defining," not "defending," the national interest is what this book seeks to understand.[2] In the context of a bipolar, ideological struggle, the Cold War made relatively unproblematic some of the cultural factors affecting national security. Theories that abstracted from these factors offered important insights. Now, with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Issues dealing with norms, identities, and culture are becoming more salient. An institutional perspective permits us to investigate more closely the context, both domestic and international, in which states and other actors exercise power.

This book offers a sociological perspective on the politics of national security. It argues that security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors. This does not mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is unimportant for an analysis of national security. States and other political actors undoubtedly seek material power to defend their security. But what other

kinds of power and security do states seek and for which purposes? Do the meanings that states and other political actors attach to power and security help us explain their behavior? Answers to such questions, this book argues, raise issues of both theory and evidence.

Our point of departure is influenced greatly by the inability of all theories of international relations, both mainstream and critical, to help us explain fully what John Mueller aptly calls a quiet cataclysm:[3] the dramatic changes in world politics since the mid-1980s, which have profoundly affected the environment for the national security of states.[4] The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and its successor states, organized in the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the process of creating a new regional international system while at the same time attempting to effect transitions from authoritarian socialism to democratic capitalism. The international positions of the United States and Japan have changed greatly as international competitiveness and financial power shifted away from the United States in the 1980s and away from Japan in the 1990s. China is undergoing a fundamental transformation in its economic structure and in its links to the international system. And the European Union (eu) appears to have been perhaps an overambitious attempt to accelerate the pace of European integration in the face of German unification. In South Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and Western Europe, long-standing violent conflicts that only a few years ago appeared to be simply unsolvable are now finding negotiated settlements. And in Europe, Central Asia, the Islamic world, and Africa, new conflicts are breaking out.

The main analytical perspectives on international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism, share with all their critics their inability to foreshadow, let alone foresee, these momentous international changes.[5] Furthermore, with the end of the Cold War, international relations specialists, whatever their theoretical orientation, are uncertain about how to interpret the consequences of change.[6] Disagreement is widespread on what are the most important questions, let alone what might constitute plausible answers to these questions. Are we living in a unipolar, a bipolar, or a multipolar world? Is the world increasingly divided into zones of peace among prosperous states at the center and zones of war between poor states on the periphery? Is the risk of war rapidly increasing in Asia while it remains negligible in Western Europe or is the reverse closer to the mark? Is the main cause of war on the periphery the excessive strength or the deplorable weakness of states? Is ideological conflict between states in the international system diminishing or increasing?

Without thinking specifically about the Cold War and national security, some sociologists wrote in the 1970s and 1980s about large-scale processes of change in and possible transformation of the global system. They privileged factors that appear to be relevant to our understanding of some of the changes that we are now observing. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, argued that the dynamism inherent in the world capitalist economy would seek increasing integration of the socialist bloc.[7] And John Meyer articulated a model of global sociopolitical organization that embeds states.[8] This has opened up productive lines of research that undermine the plausibility of making a sharp distinction between international anarchy and world government as the only analytical alternatives for thinking about international relations. Taken together, Wallerstein's and Meyer's analyses recognize the importance of combining an analysis of power and wealth with issues of state sovereignty and cultural elements in the international society of states.

The uncertainties that mark international relations scholarship make this the right time to cast about for analytical perspectives that differ on key points from established theories, thus inviting us to take a fresh

look at the world we live in.[9] This volume concentrates on two underattended determinants of national security policy: the cultural-institutional context of policy on the one hand and the constructed identity of states, governments, and other political actors on the other. We explore these determinants from the theoretical perspective of sociological institutionalism,[10] with its focus on the character of the state's environment and on the contested nature of political identities. The primary purpose of this book is to establish these causal factors, and the theoretical orientations from which they derive, as relevant for the analysis of national security.

The empirical essays in this volume illustrate how social factors shape different aspects of national security policy, at times in ways that contradict the expectations derived from other theoretical orientations. This book does not offer a theory of national security.[11] To insist on such a theory now would be premature for an approach that is in the early stages of developing a theoretically coherent, empirically oriented research program. And it would be immodest in the midst of a wide-ranging discussion of economic and sociological approaches in the social sciences. Instead, this book seeks to redress the extreme imbalance between structural and rationalist styles of analysis and sociological perspectives on questions of national security.

The authors in this volume adhere to the sociological use of such concepts as norms, identity, and culture as summary labels to characterize the social factors that they are analyzing.[12] These factors result from social processes, purposeful political action, and differences in power capabilities.

The authors use the concept of *norm* to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having "constitutive effects" that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both.

For example, Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman in essay 3 argue that advanced weapon systems are one measure signifying that a state is modern. Governments thus spend their precious funds to buy such weapon systems even if they have only a marginal effect on national security. Analogously, large battleships at the beginning of the twentieth century and a secure second-strike capability at century's end confer world- or superpower status on states. Similarly, in essay 5, Martha Finnemore argues that global models of statehood have important effects on policies of military intervention. Relatedly, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald show in essay 4 that a taboo delegitimizing the use of chemical and nuclear weapons has, to different degrees, constrained the self-help behavior of states.

The essays refer to *identity* as a shorthand label for varying constructions of nation- and statehood. The process of construction typically is explicitly political and pits conflicting actors against each other. In invoking the concept of identity the authors depict varying national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose. And they refer as well to variations across countries in the statehood that is enacted domestically and projected internationally.

For example, Thomas Berger traces in essay 9 the transformation of Germany's and Japan's collective purpose from war to commerce. Thomas Risse-Kappen, in essay 10, argues that the collective identity of democratic states has been central to the creation of a transatlantic security community, marked by what

Karl Deutsch called "dependable expectations of peaceful change."[13] And Michael Barnett shows in essay 11 that changing and contested notions of Arab national identity help to define security threats and shape the dynamics of alliance formation.

Finally, the authors in this volume invoke the term *culture* as a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another.[14] Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald (in essay 4) and Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman (in essay 3), respectively, exemplify these two usages of the term. Furthermore, Elizabeth Kier (essay 6), Alastair Johnston (essay 7), and Thomas Berger (essay 9) invoke specific cultural arguments about France, China, Germany and Japan, and, at times, about some of the political and military organizations within these countries.

The definitions of these concepts share an emphasis on what is collective rather than subjective. Sociological approaches to the analysis of national security sometimes seem nebulous in their specification of the factors that affect the behavior of states or other political actors. We can easily conjure up the image of a column of 50,000 tanks stretching from Cleveland to Seattle that tells us something about the size of the Soviet military at the end of the Cold War. It is harder to fathom what force caused Governor Michael Dukakis, the Democratic candidate for president in 1988, to dress up in military fatigues and ride around on a tank--looking foolish in the process--to demonstrate his toughness on the issue of national defense. Collectively shared expectations of the American public about the military toughness of presidential candidates are what made the governor behave the way he did. Collective expectations can have strong causal effects. Such expectations deserve close scrutiny, this book argues, for a better understanding of national security policy.

This essay points to some analytical gaps left by the predominant perspectives. The next essay proposes an approach for filling those gaps. The empirical essays that follow seek to show that perspectives that neglect social factors foreclose important avenues for empirical research and theoretical insight that are relevant for explaining specific aspects of national security.

Why Traditional National Security Issues?

The end of the Cold War has put new national security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the two superpowers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars: ethnic conflicts leading to civil wars that expose civilian populations to large-scale state violence; an increasing relevance of economic competitiveness and, relatedly, of the "spin-on" of civilian high technology for possible military use; increasing numbers of migrants and refugees testing the political capacities of states; threats of environmental degradation affecting national well-being; and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion.

The 1970s and 1980s had already witnessed some evidence of this trend. It divided American realist academics and political practitioners on the one hand and reformers staffing the Brandt, Palme, and Brundtland Commissions and European peace researchers on the other.[15] In the case of Japan, whose power was increasing sharply in the 1980s, opinion also was divided.[16] Did Japan's strategy of "comprehensive security" represent merely a politically convenient ruse to counter American pressure for

greater defense expenditures? Or was it a genuine political innovation that reflected the political experiences of Japan since 1945?

In a prescient article published in the early 1980s Richard Ullman made a general case for broadening the concept of security.[17] Ullman viewed national security as more than a goal with different trade-off values in different situations. He insisted that national security is threatened by the consequences of events that quickly degrade the quality of life of state and nonstate actors alike, thus narrowing significantly the future range of political choice.[18] But at the height of the second Cold War in the early 1980s, security specialists did not consider seriously the arguments of European peace researchers. Japanese national security policy was not an important topic. And the political climate in the early 1980s was not favorable to Ullman's argument.

With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed.[19] In distinguishing between traditional, narrow definitions and recent, broad conceptions of security studies, Stephen Walt, Edward Kolodziej, and Barry Buzan, among others, have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security, as well as about the scope of analytical approaches and empirical domains appropriate to security studies.[20] The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military force by states.[21] This contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats that affect not only states but also groups and individuals, as well as other nonstate actors.[22]

Since different analytical perspectives suggest different definitions of national security, such disagreements are probably unavoidable.[23] Those interested in the state and in traditional issues of national security tend to favor established realist and liberal approaches developed during the last decades. A new generation of scholars built on these approaches in reinvigorating the field of security studies as an intellectually challenging field of academic scholarship during the 1980s. In contrast, those interested in unconventional, broader definitions of national security--such as economic competitiveness, human rights, or human welfare--as affecting not only states but also nonstate actors tend to favor alternative analytical perspectives.[24]

What scholars and policy makers consider to be national security issues is not fixed but varies over time. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, pronatalist policies were widely believed to strengthen national power and security. In the interwar period the focus on eugenics illustrated a partial shift from the quantity to the quality of population as an important measure of national power and security. And after 1945 there was a dramatic discontinuity as national elites no longer viewed population control policies as sources of national security but as sources of national well-being. To take a second example, in the case of plutonium, the very recent past has witnessed an analogous process of issue transformation. Once considered to be only a security issue, plutonium has now become an environmental issue as well.[25] The domain of national security issues thus is variable. In the nineteenth century, the concept covered economic and social dimensions of political life that, for a variety of reasons, were no longer considered relevant when national security acquired a narrower military definition in the first half of the twentieth century, especially during the Cold War. The intellectual move to broaden the concept thus returns the field of national security studies to its own past.

This book is self-conscious in bringing together two fields of study usually kept apart. Its theoretical

stance highlights the social determinants of national security policy, but it adopts a traditional, narrow definition of security studies. It does so despite the fact that the argument for a broadening of the field has substantial intellectual merit and is reflected in the changing agenda of United States foreign policy as well as in the curricula of many schools of foreign affairs.[26]

Why, then, does this book focus on traditional issues of national security? The main reason is a healthy respect for the sociology of knowledge. Intellectual challenges are often disregarded because they do not meet reigning paradigms on their preferred ground. It might have been easier to point to the limitations of existing theories of national security by investigating some of the "new" security issues. But in all likelihood that exercise would have been pointless. Such a challenge would be dismissed as skirting the hard task of addressing the tough political issues in traditional security studies. This book deals with what most scholars of national security would consider to be hard cases. It chooses political topics and empirical domains that favor well-established perspectives in the field of national security. If the style of analysis and the illustrative case material can establish plausibility here, it should be relatively easy to apply this book's analytical perspective to broader conceptions of security that are not restricted to military issues or to the state.

Existing Analytical Perspectives

Like other subfields in international relations, security studies is influenced by the major theoretical debates in international relations. Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as the two dominant paradigms agree on the central importance of international anarchy for the analysis of international politics. Even though neoliberalism to date has had little direct influence on national security studies, indirectly, through this shared assumption, it has helped consolidate the orienting Hobbesian framework that motivates most studies of national security.[27]

In addition, neorealism and neoliberalism share other areas of agreement on basic theoretical issues.[28] Neorealist and neoliberal perspectives focus on how structures affect the instrumental rationality of actors. Neorealists emphasize that the competitive pressure of an anarchic international system is a constant in history; it determines important types of state behavior such as balancing. In an interdependent world, neoliberals insist, international institutions provide an alternative structural context in which states can define their interests and coordinate conflicting policies. But the assumption of unified state actors and a focus on an anarchical, systemic context of states are common to both.

Kenneth Waltz's formulation of a neorealist theory has had a profound influence on the field of security studies.[29] Waltz's theory is explicitly structural. It argues that the international state system molds states and defines the possibilities for cooperation and conflict. According to Waltz, the international state system has three distinctive characteristics. It is decentralized; the most important actors--states--are unitary and functionally undifferentiated; and differences in the distribution of the capabilities of the most important states distinguish bipolar from multipolar state systems. Waltz is careful to specify only a restricted domain in security affairs as relevant for neorealist theory. But within that domain developments in international politics are driven by the balancing of differences in capabilities in the international system.[30]

Robert Keohane has been very influential in shaping the analytical perspective of neoliberal

institutionalism on questions of political economy and international relations.[31] According to Keohane, international politics after hegemony does not necessarily collapse into the unmitigated power politics that realists infer from conditions of international anarchy. Instead the international order that hegemons have created through institutions can continue to ameliorate the problem of international anarchy. These institutions facilitate monitoring, enhance political transparency, reduce uncertainty, and increase policy-relevant information. The institutional infrastructure of a post-hegemonic system thus can facilitate the coordination of conflicting policies by lowering the transaction costs associated with cooperation. Neoliberals insist that conflict inheres in the international system. But that condition is not immutable. Under some political conditions, international conflict can be ameliorated through collective management.[32]

Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share a similar, underlying analytical framework, susceptible to the same weakness. Kenneth Waltz privileges systemic effects on national policy and sidesteps the motivations that inform policy. He argues that "neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to the unit level explanations of traditional realism. . . . The range of expected outcomes is inferred from the assumed motivation of the units and the structure of the system in which they act."[33] Since causes operate at different levels and interact with one another, explanations operating at either level alone are bound to be misleading.[34] Robert Keohane concurs when he writes that "institutional theory takes states' conceptions of their interests as exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory. . . . Nor does realism predict interests. This weakness of systemic theory, of both types, denies us a clear test of their relative predictive power."[35] The consequences of this shortcoming for both neorealism and neoliberalism are in Keohane's view far-reaching. "Without a theory of interests, which requires analysis of domestic politics, no theory of international relations can be fully adequate. . . . Our weak current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the United States and European powers at the end of the Cold War. . . . More research will have to be undertaken at the level of the state, rather than the international system."[36]

Both neorealism and neoliberalism thus express a widely accepted, though problematic, social science paradigm suggesting a three-step analysis.[37] First, there is the specification of a set of constraints. Then comes the stipulation of a set of actors who are assumed to have certain kinds of interests. Finally, the behavior of the actors is observed, and that behavior is related to the constraining conditions in which these actors, with their assumed interests, find themselves. This perspective highlights the instrumental rationality of actors and focuses on decisions and choice.

Variants of realist and liberal perspectives do acknowledge the importance of social facts. However, in adopting economic styles of analysis, they often misunderstand concepts such as prestige and reputation, which they view as "force effects rather than as social attributions."[38]

Robert Gilpin is one of the most important and insightful realists. He has developed a compelling argument about war and change. While he appreciates the importance of sociological insights for understanding the context of rational behavior, his book argues in an economic mode.[39] Yet a core assumption of Gilpin's basic model embodies an unanalyzed concept of identity, the distinction between revisionist and status quo powers.[40] And Gilpin's analysis of the international system explicitly

incorporates recognition by others, or prestige. For Gilpin this is a functional equivalent to the concept of authority in domestic politics and has functional and moral grounding.[41] Gilpin asserts, but does not demonstrate, that "ultimately" prestige rests on military or economic power. But he writes that "prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency in international relations."[42]

Analogously, Robert Keohane is a leading neoliberal scholar favoring an economic mode of analysis. He writes that "much of my own work has deliberately adopted Realist assumptions of egoism, as well as rationality, in order to demonstrate that there are possibilities for cooperation even on Realist premises."[43] In thinking about egoism and empathy, Keohane poses the central question of "how people and organizations define self-interest."[44] The answer lies in the issue of identity, in variations in the degree of expansiveness and restrictiveness, with which people and organizations relate to one another. To what extent does the "self" incorporate relevant aspects of the "other" in its calculations of gains and losses? The answer to this question takes Keohane away from considerations of more or less myopic calculations of interest to "deeper" questions of values. Keohane concludes that "since the notion of self-interest is so elastic, we have to examine what this premise means, rather than simply taking it for granted."[45] Such relational thinking falls squarely in the sociological rather than the economic mode of analysis.[46]

Similarly, a theory of historical change popular among realists and rationalists mimics a sociological institutional perspective. Stephen Krasner, for example, gives an account of sovereignty that relies heavily on the concept of punctuated equilibrium and historical path-dependence.[47] In this view, the social determinants that this volume analyzes are acknowledged to exist, but they are banished to a remote past or to a distant future. The big bangs in history contrast sharply with the slight tremors of the present. The social determinants that are thus admitted to exist during epochal shifts, this book claims, exist throughout history, be it heroic or mundane.[48]

Finally, in a bold neorealist analysis of European politics after the Cold War, John Mearsheimer invokes the importance of social factors. Mearsheimer makes a case for a carefully managed process of nuclear proliferation to help stabilize an emerging war-prone, multipolar European system no longer held in check by the Soviet threat from the East and, possibly, the American night-watchman state from the West. Nuclear powers can reduce the dangers of proliferation by helping to "socialize emerging nuclear societies to understand the nature of the forces they are acquiring. Proliferation managed in this manner can help bolster peace."[49] Similarly, Kenneth Waltz has conceded in one of his more recent writings that "systems populated by units of different sorts in some ways perform differently, even though they share the same organizing principle. More needs to be said about the status and role of units in neorealist theory."[50]

This book relaxes the two core assumptions that mark, to different degrees, both neorealism and neoliberalism. First, what happens if, in contrast to neorealism, we conceive of the environment of states not just in terms of the physical capabilities of states? Neoliberalism has already effected this move with its focus on institutions. But its efficiency-oriented view of the role of institutions in political life is open to reinterpretation if we also relax a second assumption.[51] What happens if, contrasting with neoliberalism, we do not focus our attention solely on the effects that institutional constraints have on interests? This perspective neglects the crucial fact that institutions can constitute, to varying degrees, the

identities of actors and thus shape their interests. Relaxing core assumptions of the two central perspectives in international relations theory, this book argues, is useful for two reasons. It may help us discern new aspects of national security. Alternatively, it may help in accounting for anomalies in existing analyses of national security.

Cultural-Institutional Context and Political Identity

The end of the Cold War and the issues of international politics that are emerging as central make this a propitious time for rethinking established analytical approaches to national security. This book focuses on the effects that culture and identity have on national security. The prevailing theories deliberately slight these effects. For realists, culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. For rationalists, actors deploy culture and identity strategically, like any other resource, simply to further their own self-interests.

Neorealism, for example, insists that shifts in the balance of relative capabilities are the main determinants of international politics. Yet it is difficult to link the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union causally to dramatic changes in power capabilities.[52] It is undoubtedly true that the relative economic and military decline of the Soviet Union convinced the Soviet military of the need for fundamental reform. Realist insights thus are relevant to an interpretation of political developments since the 1980s.[53] But they are no more than partial.

For example, the process of German unification within multilateral frameworks illustrates well the shortcomings of realist analysis.[54] The Bush administration did not seek to exploit the weakness of the Soviet Union through an aggressive foreign policy. It remained instead committed to the institutional innovation of multilateralism that it had brought to Europe at the end of World War II.[55] The Soviet Union was willing to accept multilateral institutions to solve its national security problems. Germany eschewed neutralism in favor of continued membership in the Western Alliance and a deepening of the process of European integration. After a brief moment of uncertainty in December 1989 and January 1990, France, in contrast to Britain, decided in favor of European integration as the most appropriate way of dealing with the consequences of German unity. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, nato's Cooperation Council, reinforced subsequently by the Partnership for Peace, became a forum for the discussion of security issues between the West and all Central and Eastern European states as well as all successor states of the Soviet Union except Georgia. None of these choices was automatic. None is irreversible. But the logic of balancing in a world of relative capabilities did not dictate political action in the halls of government in 1989-1990. Realism does not offer a compelling explanation of the end of the Cold War.

While neoliberalism helps us understand the importance of institutions at the end of the Cold War, it is of less use in making intelligible the central features of international politics after the Cold War. During the Cold War, it may have been reasonable to take for granted state identities, at least on the central issues of national security along the central front that divided East from West.[56] Definitions of identity that distinguish between self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies. Furthermore, such definitions of identity are rarely captured adequately with the language of symbolic resources sought by self-interested actors. For most of the major states, identity has become a subject of considerable political controversy. How these controversies are resolved--for

example, in the United States, in the member states of the European Union, in Russia and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in China and in many parts of the Third World--will be of great consequence for international security in the years ahead. In sum, recent changes in world politics remind us that other approaches, here a perspective emphasizing social factors, are useful in sharpening our thinking on issues that neorealism and neoliberalism slight.

Social Determinant 1: Cultural-Institutional Context

In sharp contrast to the realist view of the international system as a Hobbesian state of nature, neoliberalism offers a theory of the cultural-institutional context of state action. It defines regimes as particular combinations of principles, norms, rules, and procedures.[57] Power shapes international regimes. Often these regimes emerge when a hegemonic state, such as the United States after 1945, attempts to mold the international order to suit its interests and purposes. But international regimes do not simply mirror power relationships. With the passing of time they acquire their own dynamic. Regimes reduce transaction costs and thus enhance the potential for coordinating conflicting state policies. Regimes present states with political constraints and opportunities that can substantially affect how governments calculate their interests.

While the analysis of economic regimes has become a focus of scholarly attention, American scholars have made relatively few attempts to apply this analytical perspective to issues of national security. In the original volume on international regimes, Robert Jervis, for example, was very tentative in his assessment of whether security regimes have existed since 1945.[58] And in a subsequent essay he reached cautious conclusions about the possibility of relatively high levels of cooperation between states confronting a security dilemma in international politics.[59] Other scholars have given greater weight to cultural-institutional factors in their analyses of security regimes and the security cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.[60] In the most recent synthetic and authoritative restatement of this line of research, Volker Rittberger has gone furthest in incorporating a prescriptive element as a defining characteristic of a regime.[61]

In an important article, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie have noted that these lines of argument subscribe to a view that is too behavioralist.[62] The dominant, neoliberal application of regime theory captures only what in a statistical sense is "normal" about norms. But norms reflect also the premises of action.[63] While above a certain threshold behavioral violations invalidate norms, occasional violations do not. Critics of neoliberal institutionalism have made this their central point. These critics insist that social change engenders a process of self-reflection and political actions that are shaped by collectively held norms.[64]

Although their criticism has not been answered to date, these observers have failed to produce the empirical research necessary to shake the rationalist and behavioral assumptions of neoliberal theory.[65] But this is beginning to change.[66] For example, in the area of arms control Emanuel Adler has relied on a sociological perspective to show how the arms control community in the United States institutionalized its influence in government and how it subsequently diffused and institutionalized its views in international agreements.[67] And several scholars have investigated with interesting results the effects of the culture of military organizations.[68]

Self-reflection does not occur in isolation; it is communicated to others. In the process of communication norms can emerge in a variety of ways: spontaneously evolving, as social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further specific interests; deliberately negotiated, as a mechanism for conflict management; or as a combination, mixing these three types. State interests and strategies thus are shaped by a never-ending political process that generates publicly understood standards for action.[69]

The behavioral compliance of actors with norms thus is only one part of the story, and that part must be linked to another aspect, the justifications proffered.[70] This line of reasoning is a departure from neoliberal theory, but it would be a great mistake to overemphasize this difference. The most widely accepted definition of what constitutes a regime refers specifically to implicit norms.[71] This definition thus grants scholars a wide measure of latitude in the type of evidence that they collect and in the methods of analysis that they rely on. Since a large amount of the scholarship on international regimes relies on qualitative case histories, the shift in analysis is not very great, so long as analysis adheres to the conventions of an empirically oriented social science.

Social Determinant 2: Collective Identity

International regimes are social institutions that mitigate conflict in a decentralized international society of states. But a rationalist theory of regimes factors out of its analysis the actor identities that often are consequential for the definition of actor interests. Cultural-institutional contexts do not merely constrain actors by changing the incentives that shape their behavior. They do not simply regulate behavior. They also help to constitute the very actors whose conduct they seek to regulate.

International and domestic environments shape state identities.[72] With the end of the Cold War, issues of collective identity have become centrally important, probably more so than the reduction in political uncertainties that inhibit agreements. For example, the shape and speed of the European integration process and the question of how that Europe will relate to the outside world is of critical political importance and has given rise to xenophobia and a new wave of nationalism. Analogous political developments are occurring in Eastern Europe, in the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in many Third World countries, and in the United States. And in Asia the intensification of efforts to create new forms of multilateralism designed to facilitate policy coordination is closely linked to contested definitions of Asian identity.

With few exceptions, neorealism also remains silent on the issue of identity--for two reasons. First, it stresses the ecological dynamics that self-selection and functional imperatives have for states. Second, neorealism seeks to distance itself from traditional realism, which did pay attention, implausibly, to human nature[73] and, plausibly, to issues of national identity. Since neorealists view states as undifferentiated and unitary actors, they sidestep consideration of issues concerning the character of the state and the construction of state identities.[74]

The international and domestic societies in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways. The state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reasons for the interests that motivate actors.[75] On this point the contrast between a sociological perspective on the one hand and neoliberalism and neorealism on the other is substantial. History is more

than a progressive search for efficient institutions that regulate property rights. And history cannot be reduced to a perpetual recurrence of sameness, conflict, and balancing. History is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity. In a broad historical perspective the eventual success of the national state in Western Europe should not blind us to the wide array of institutional experimentation, both domestic and international, that preceded it.[76] Influenced by a long history of universal empires, regional kingdoms, and subcontinental empires, Asian states also differ greatly from the conventional image of unified, rational states.[77] The historical evidence compels us to relinquish the notion of states with unproblematic identities.

The identities of states emerge from their interactions with different social environments, both domestic and international. Despite differences in theoretical formulation, the analysis of nationalism offers an important example. Ernest Gellner stresses the importance of the instrumental logic of nationalism; Benedict Anderson emphasizes that national identities are socially constructed; and Ernst Haas combines both perspectives in his discussion of nationalism as an instrumental social construction.[78] All insist that the national identities of states are crucial for understanding politics and that they cannot be stipulated deductively. They must be investigated empirically in concrete historical settings.

The international society of states also shapes varying state identities by virtue of recognizing their legitimacy and admitting them to international organizations whose membership is often restricted only to states.[79] Governments crave the diplomatic recognition by members of the international society of states because it bestows upon them the legitimacy they may need to secure their existence. In Africa and elsewhere, for example, sovereignty constitutes and legitimates states that are extremely weak in terms of material power.[80] Statehood thus depends partly on position in the international society of states.

The analysis of transnational relations and of world systems offers analytical perspectives that also elucidate the relations between states and their social environments.[81] Often the social environments that affect state identity link international and domestic environments in a way that defies the reification of distinct domestic and international spheres of politics. After 1945, for example, the institutionalization of the welfare state created a system of "embedded liberalism" based on the compromise between advocates of domestic welfare capitalism and proponents of a liberal international order.[82] In her research on European guestworkers Yasemin Soysal has demonstrated one of the consequences of embedded liberalism for changing notions of citizenship in Western Europe.[83] In contrast to past practice, European nation-states have become responsible for the welfare of all persons, not just citizens, living within their borders. Traditionally defined on the basis of nationality, individual rights in Western Europe are now codified into notions of universal personhood rather than nationality. This is a novel and important change in the matrix of factors affecting the international relations of Europe.

This book analyzes the effect of political identities. It views states as social actors. It analyzes political identities in specific historical contexts. And it traces the effects that changing identities have on political interests and thus on national security policies.

Neorealist and neoliberal theories adhere to relatively sparse views of the international system. Neorealism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without affecting conceptions of state interest. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities and views ideas and beliefs as intervening variables between

assumed interests and behavioral outcomes.[84] In this view states operate in environments that create constraints and opportunities.

These analytical perspectives overlook the degree to which social environments and actors penetrate one another. The domestic and international environments of states have effects; they are the arenas in which actors contest norms and through political and social processes construct and reconstruct identities. The cultural-institutional context and the degree to which identities are constructed both vary. In some situations neorealist and neoliberal assumptions may be warranted. But these perspectives often overlook important political effects that condition international politics and thus affect issues of national security.

This book makes two analytical moves simultaneously. It stipulates a more social view of the environment in which states and other political actors operate. And it insists that political identities are to significant degrees constructed within that environment. It thus departs from materialist notions and the rationalist view of identities as exogenously given. That is, this book seeks to incorporate into the analysis of national security both the cultural-institutional context of the political environment and the political construction of identity. The empirical studies illustrate how both factors help to shape the definition of interests and thus have demonstrable effects on national security policies.

Why Bother?

Neorealism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of national security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook. Furthermore, neorealism holds forth the promise of a tight, deductive theory as the ultimate prize of theorizing about national security. Kenneth Waltz himself, however, has been very circumspect in his theoretical claims. He argues that his theory, formulated at the level of the international system, seeks to explain only the recurrence of the balancing behavior of states in history.

Neorealism is too general and underspecified to tell us anything about the direction of balancing, let alone about the content of the national security policies of states. Therefore, particular studies of national security, typically, adapt some features of Waltz's theory and, in addition, import more or less loosely clustered groups of variables from other fields (such as organization theory, comparative politics, or political psychology) and graft them onto the orienting framework that neorealism provides. The theoretical contribution of these studies lies in the formulation and testing of, at best, loosely linked hypotheses. The politically substantive and most interesting scholarship in the field is historical in nature and offers little hope of moving to a deductive style of "theory" anytime soon.

This book puts at center stage analytical concepts that the existing literature on national security acknowledges only obliquely. Some studies seek to explain aspects of national security with reference to social facts. But they tend to do so in a manner that subordinates the causal force of social facts to a materialist or rationalist view of the world. In this view, for example, identities and norms either are derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for instrumental reasons. Based on the assumption that rationality is a natural rather than a constructed concept, these books view ideologies largely in the service of rational calculations.

The "myths of empires," for example, that Jack Snyder analyzes in accounting for the conditions under which great powers overexpand result from different patterns of domestic politics. While Snyder acknowledges that international factors also play a role, he argues that specific domestic coalitions

develop aggressive strategic perspectives that serve particular political interests. Elites manipulate mass publics through propaganda. In this view imperial ideologies are rationalizations for parochial interests, products that entrepreneurs sell in political markets. As Snyder writes, his theory of domestic politics roots its analysis "securely in a rational-choice framework. . . . It is more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it is to say that they are shaped by them."[85] Snyder acknowledges in passing that the "blowback" of propaganda, the blurring of the line between "fact and fiction . . . sincere beliefs and tactical argument,"[86] entraps political leaders not only in their own confusions but in the political context that they helped create. But since this aside cuts against Snyder's rationalist interpretation of ideology, it remains one underdeveloped page in a long theoretical essay. Sociologists and cultural historians are likely to demur by insisting that "blowback is big."

Stephen Walt's theory of balance of threat shows a similar theoretical inclination.[87] As is true of Snyder's work, Walt's threat theory is not a minor modification of neorealism but a substantial departure from it. While Walt continues to subscribe to realism as an orienting framework, his emphasis on threat perception moves away from the systemic level and shifts analysis from material capabilities to ideational factors.[88] Walt views ideology as a variable that competes with others for explanatory power.[89] But balance-of-threat theorizing poses an obvious question about the importance of ideology in the threat perceptions of states. If one views ideology as a system of meaning that affects the definition of threat, then Walt's conclusions may warrant further investigation, for the cost calculations that states make when they weigh ideological solidarity against security concerns are not exogenous to their ideological affinities.[90]

James March and Johan Olsen, among others, have elaborated this view in an often neglected chapter of their much-cited book. Ideologies, norms, and identities do not simply serve instrumental purposes. March and Olsen argue that obligatory action contrasts with consequential action. Behavior is shaped not only by goals, alternatives, and rules of maximization or satisficing central to rationalist models of politics. Behavior is shaped also by roles and norms that define standards of appropriateness. Improvisation and strategic behavior are embedded in a social environment that constitutes the identity of the actors and their interests and that shapes the norms that also help to define their interests. "Political processes are as much concerned with managing interpretations and creating visions as they are with clarifying decisions. . . . We are led to a perspective that challenges the first premise of many theories of politics, the premise that life is organized around choice. Rather, we might observe that life is not only, or primarily, choice but also interpretation."[91] Applied to questions of national security, the work of Elizabeth Kier on strategic culture offers a compelling application of that general perspective.[92] In a landmark study, Barry Posen, for example, developed sophisticated arguments that link the preference of military organizations for offensive doctrines to the functional needs of military organizations--specifically their wish to control resources, to be autonomous from civilian interference, and to enhance the social prestige of military officers.[93] Kier has reexamined existing explanations of the choice of offensive and defensive military doctrines by military leaders, investigated fully the historical evidence, carefully evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of alternative explanations, and come to an unambiguous conclusion: military organizations do not have an inherent preference for offensive doctrines. One cannot deduce the interests of the military from either the functional needs of the military or the international balance of power. Instead, the political preferences for offensive or

defensive doctrines of different branches of the military reflect organizational interests. And these must be understood within the context of specific organizational cultures, which are themselves nested in broader political-military cultures distinctive of the politics of different states.

A perspective that emphasizes obligatory action does not have to deny consequential action and the importance of the instrumental political use of norms and identities. For example, moral entrepreneurs who manipulate ideas, John Mueller and Ethan Nadelmann argue in different projects, have had important effects on how elites and mass publics view the institution of war and a variety of state policies combatting acts such as piracy, slavery, counterfeiting of national currencies, hijacking of aircraft, trafficking in women and children for purposes of prostitution, and trading in drugs.[94] As these examples make clear, empirical research on national security needs to evaluate the competing claims of both obligatory and consequentialist perspectives.

This book makes its main analytical move at the level of an orienting framework that privileges social factors. Contrasting analytical claims are best articulated in the form of specific hypotheses that are applied in particular empirical domains. This is the strategy that the empirical essays in this volume follow. It is on the ground of evidence that we have the best chance of intellectually engaging contrasting analytical perspectives that differ on questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology.

For particular research questions in specific situations it may be sensible to conceive of states as actors with unproblematic identities that balance and bandwagon or conduct their political business in institutions that lower transaction costs. But for many research questions and in many situations we must capture additional factors to explain problematic aspects of national security policies.

The effort to test sociological, culture-based explanations against economic, interest-based explanations centers on identifying and describing problems overlooked by existing scholarship and specifying the social factors, here state identity and the cultural-institutional context, that shape conceptions of actor interest and behavior. Some essays in this book view the context of states and governments as more permeated by social facts than is typical of most scholarship on national security. Other essays focus on the problematic nature of the identity of states and governments. While the individual essays privilege one or the other aspect in their empirical research, the book as a whole makes both moves simultaneously. In this view the crucial question is not to establish whether interests prevail over identities and norms or whether identities and norms prevail over interests. What matters is how identities and norms influence the ways in which actors define their interests in the first place.

Essay 2 explicates more fully the theoretical approach, with its dual focus on cultural-institutional context and identity. It compares that approach to others in the analysis of international and domestic politics; it makes some basic conceptual distinctions; finally, drawing on the individual case studies as well as other literature, it reviews the effects of culture and identity on interests and national security policy.

Part 1 focuses on the cultural-institutional context in which states and governments define their interests and act. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman analyze in essay 3 the effects that norms of military prowess have on some of the weapons procurement policies of states. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, in essay 4, analyze the historical evolution in norms of the non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons. In essay 5 Martha Finnemore examines the effects of changing norms on patterns of military intervention. She shows how shifts in understandings about the reasons to intervene and the means of intervening have

changed the modalities of national security policies. In essay 6 Elizabeth Kier analyzes the effects of the organizational culture of the French military on the evolution of offensive and defensive military doctrine. Finally, in essay 7 Alastair Johnston argues that China's national security policy in the Maoist period resulted from a "hard" strategic culture of parabellum, a quintessentially constructed worldview, rather than from the condition of international anarchy. What unites these essays and sets them apart from related inquiries is their detailed attention to the effects of the cultural-institutional context on national security policies.

Part 2 analyzes how constructed, collective identities of political actors, such as states or governments, affect their interests and policies. In essay 8 Robert Herman traces the political process by which cosmopolitan reformers in the Soviet Union articulated and put into practice newly invented or rediscovered notions of a "Western" Soviet Union, thus helping to end the Cold War. Thomas Berger, in essay 9, deals with Germany and Japan as two instances in which collective identities have been deeply transformed by the effects of World War II in a political process marked by political contestation and historical contingency. In essay 10, Thomas Risse-Kappen examines the changing identities that help define changing security communities among liberal democracies in the North Atlantic area. And Michael Barnett, in essay 11, examines the effects of contested and changing identities on security policy, both in an Arab nation increasingly divided and between the United States and Israel.

The essays in parts 1 and 2 span domestic and international levels of analysis as well as national, regional, and global political contexts. They engage the present as well as the past. They deal with Western and non-Western states operating at different levels of development. But this diversity in empirical application conceals a unity of theoretical purpose. All these essays specify a political outcome or set of outcomes that is central to students of national security. And all of them either derive a plausible set of expectations from existing theories that do not address their question or offer a plausible explanation derived from existing analytical perspectives that they test against a preferred culture- or identity-based explanation.

The two essays in part 3 conclude the volume. In essay 12, Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro deal with the origins and consequences of norms and identities. Their analysis connects this book back to a set of intellectual concerns that distinguish a number of current approaches. In the interest of mapping directions for future work, they seek also to impose greater specification of variables and causal patterns. And they point to gaps and oversights in this book's approach and findings. Finally, essay 13 considers some recent realist and liberal writings that are trying to grapple with the issues of culture and identity raised in this book; it summarizes the approach, hypotheses, and main findings of the empirical essays and explores further some of the issues raised in them; it points to a broader research agenda for national security studies; and it concludes with a discussion of the implications of this book's perspective for the role of the United States in a changing world.

This book argues that we should not take for granted what needs to be explained: the sources and content of national security interests that states and governments pursue. A focus on political identity and the cultural-institutional context, this book claims, offers a promising avenue for elucidating the changing contours of national security policy.

For their careful readings and critical comments of previous drafts I would like to thank the members of the project; the participants at the Social Science Research Council/MacArthur

Workshops at the University of Minnesota and Stanford University in 1994; and Emanuel Adler, Thomas Christensen, James Goldgeier, Peter Haas, Gunther Hellmann, Ronald Jepperson, Mary F. Katzenstein, Robert Keohane, Jonathan Kirshner, Atul Kohli, Charles Kupchan, John Odell, Judith Reppy, Shibley Telhami, Stephen Walt, Alexander Wendt, and two anonymous readers for Columbia University Press.

Note 1: Although, properly speaking, I am referring to state security, I am adhering to the conventional usage in the field of national security studies. Back.

Note 2: See Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). Back.

Note 3: John Mueller, *Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins, 1995). Back.

Note 4: This project thus resembles others that seek to reevaluate or refine international relations theory in light of recent events. See Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations* Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Robert O. Keohane and Helen Milner, eds., *Internationalization and Domestic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Miles Kahler, ed., *Liberalization and Foreign Policy* (forthcoming); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 5: Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); Michael J. Hogan, ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Back.

Note 6: Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1993); Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Meredith Woo-Cumings and Michael Lorriaux, eds., *Past As Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order* (Boulder: Westview, 1993); Mike Bowker and Robin Brown, eds., *From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Hans Henrik Holm and Georg S¿rensen, eds., *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview, 1995). Back.

Note 7: Immanuel Wallerstein, "Socialist States: Mercantilist Strategies and Revolutionary Objectives," in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy*, pp. 86-96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Immanuel Wallerstein, "Marx, Marxism-Leninism, and Socialist Experiences in the Modern World System," in Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World System*, pp. 84-97 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Back.

Note 8: John W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," in Albert Bergesen,

ed., *Studies of the Modern World System*, pp. 109-37 (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Back.

Note 9: This is a major difference between the inspiration motivating this book and Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, eds., *Reconstructing Realpolitik* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). Back.

Note 10: Recent volumes that articulate a similar perspective include Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Back.

Note 11: I argue below that this is no particular liability for the approach chosen for the book; no such theory exists in the field of national security studies. Back.

Note 12: One of the main difficulties in making the sociological approach of this book attractive for scholars of national security lies in the intuitive equation of the concept of norm with morality. The book focuses primarily on the analysis of regulatory norms (defining standards of appropriate behavior) and constitutive norms (defining actor identities). It touches less directly on evaluative norms (stressing questions of morality) or practical norms (focusing on commonly accepted notions of "best solutions"). See also various essays in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1993). Back.

Note 13: Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5. Back.

Note 14: This distinction between the cognitive and evaluative effects of norms is also made by scholars working from within a cognitive paradigm. See, for example, Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy," in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System*, p. 235 (Boulder: Westview, 1980). Back.

Note 15: Raimo Varynen, "Towards a Comprehensive Definition of Security: Pitfalls and Problems" (paper presented at the thirty-first annual convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., April 10-14, 1990), pp. 1-2; John P. Lovell, "From Defense Policy to National Security Policy: The Tortuous Adjustment for American Military Professionals," *Air University Review* 32, no. 4 (May-June 1981): 42-54; J. A. Tapia-Valdes, "A Typology of National Security Policies," *Yale Journal of World Public Order* 9, no. 1 (Fall 1982): 10-39; Bruce Andrews, "Surplus Security and National Security: State Policy As Domestic Social Action" (paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., February 22-26, 1978). Back.

Note 16: "Comprehensive Security: Japanese and U.S. Perspectives: A Conference Report of the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy" (Stanford University, November 1981); J. W. M. Chapman, R. Drifte, and I. T. M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, Dependence* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World* (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1993). Back.

Note 17: Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," *International Security* 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983): 129-53. Back.

Note 18: Ibid., pp. 130-35. Back.

Note 19: Two surveys of the field of security studies from 1987 and 1992 illustrate this point very clearly. See Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 5-27; and Lynn Eden, " 'New Approaches to the Study of Conflict and Peace in a Changing World': Report on a Conference Held January 16-17, 1992, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University" Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1992. Back.

Note 20: Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 211-39; Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (December 1992): 421-38; Edward A. Kolodziej, "What Is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War," *Arms Control* 13, no. 1 (April 1992): 1-31; Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* (London: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983); Barry Buzan, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition of Security and the Institutional Consequences of Accepting It," *Working Papers* 4/1990 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1990); Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991): 431-51; Lester R. Brown, *Redefining National Security*, Worldwatch Papers no. 14 (Washington, D.C.: Worldwide Institute, 1977); Joseph J. Romm, *Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse," *Alternatives* 17, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 95-134; Theodore C. Sorenson, "Rethinking National Security," *Foreign Affairs* 69, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 1-18; Martin Shaw, "There Is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies," *Review of International Studies* 19 (1993): 159-75; Ole Waever et al., *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Wilhelm Agrell, "The Problems of Defining and Dealing with the Civilian Aspects of Security" (unpublished paper, Research Policy Institute, University of Lund, Sweden, December 1986); Deborah A. Stone, *Policy Paradox and Political Reason* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1988), pp. 69-86; Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing Security: Discursive Practices, Material Changes, and Policy Consequences" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1992 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 3-6, 1992); Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, eds., *World Security: Challenges for a New Century* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994); Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); Peter Digeser, "The Concept of Security" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994); James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, "Introduction: The Changing Definition of Security," in Emil Kirchner, Christoph Bluth, and James Sperling, eds., *The Future of European Security*, pp. 1-22 (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub., 1995). Back.

Note 21: Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 212. Back.

Note 22: Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies?" pp. 422-23; Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security," pp. 432-33. Back.

Note 23: Proponents on either side of the debate agree that much would be lost, and little gained, if broader security studies were compressed into the well-developed, narrower focus of strategic studies; Walt, "Renaissance of Security Studies," p. 213; Buzan, "The Case for a Comprehensive Definition," pp.

12-13. Back.

Note 24: Why these are the lines of division is not entirely clear. It is possible that nonstate actors and issues that touch less directly on the balance of material capabilities lend themselves perhaps more easily to the sociological perspectives that this book proffers. Back.

Note 25: I would like to thank John Meyer for drawing my attention to this analytical point and these examples. Back.

Note 26: Andrew Rosenthal, "U.S. to Unveil Drug Plan with Wide Military Role," *New York Times*, March 9, 1990, p. A5; Elaine Sciolino, "Bush Wants Intelligence Agencies to Reconsider Focus on Military," *New York Times*, December 22, 1991, p. 6; Ken Brown, "Cold War Over, Foreign Affairs Schools Refocus," *New York Times*, November 17, 1993, p. B7. Back.

Note 27: Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), p. 6, for example, writes that the "causal impact of international institutions on state policy is not as strong as that of states on international institutions." But in contrast to realist thought, this version of liberalism focuses on deception rather than violence as the most important consequence of international anarchy. Back.

Note 28: Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 313-44; Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, " 'Less Filling, Tastes Great': The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (January 1994): 209-34; Michael ZŸrn, "We Can Do Much Better! Aber muss es auf amerikanisch sein? Zum Vergleich der Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehungen' in den USA und in Deutschland," *Zeitschrift fŸr Internationale Beziehungen* 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 98-109. Grouping different theoretical formulations under these two broad headings is a simplification. Each theory has a major and a minor variant. Neorealists have sought to systematize the insights of traditional realists. And neoliberals distinguish themselves from traditional liberals. Although not unimportant, these differences pale compared with the combined impact that the two main variants, neorealism and neoliberalism, have had on international relations scholarship since the early 1980s. Hence I discuss them here. The first part of the concluding essay examines briefly some attempts of reformulating realist and liberal perspectives to address the issues that this book raises. For some important differences between realism and liberalism, see also Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, pp. 1-20, and the discussion in Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 1-17. Back.

Note 29: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Back.

Note 30: This book's approach differs from Waltz's along all three dimensions. First, the international society of states is distinguished by both organizational decentralization and elements of a shared culture. Second, states are not unitary and functionally differentiated. Third, the distribution of capabilities and the number of poles may be less important than some of the effects of the society of states. An additional important difference lies in the fact that the recurrent balancing behavior of states that interests Waltz is of little concern to any of the authors writing in this volume. Some of them are interested in the direction of the balance, others in a variety of aspects of national security policy. A set of essays in two special

issues of *Security Studies* (5, nos. 2 and 3 [Winter 1995/96 and Spring 1996]) takes stock of realist and neorealist theory. Back.

Note 31: Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). Back.

Note 32: Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Oran Young, *International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 33: Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars*, pp. 41-42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Back.

Note 34: Ibid., p. 42. Back.

Note 35: Robert O. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, p. 285 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 36: Ibid., pp. 294-95. Back.

Note 37: James G. March, "Decision-Making Perspective: Decisions in Organizations and Theories of Choice," in Andrew H. Van De Ven and William F. Joyce, eds., *Perspectives on Organization Design and Behavior*, pp. 205-44 (New York: Wiley, 1981). Back.

Note 38: Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, "Realism and Rhetoric in International Relations," in Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, eds., *Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations* (East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, in press), p. 21 of manuscript. Back.

Note 39: Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. xii-xiii. Back.

Note 40: Ibid., pp. 10-11. Randall Schweller's interesting paper on neorealism illustrates the same point; see Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," *Security Studies* 5, no. 3 (Spring 1996) (in press). "Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the avoidance of relative-gains losses, are the prime movers of neorealist theory" (ibid., p. 36 of manuscript). Back.

Note 41: Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 14, 28, 30. Back.

Note 42: Ibid., pp. 30-31. Back.

Note 43: Robert O. Keohane, "Empathy and International Relations," in Jane J. Mansbridge, ed., *Beyond Self-Interest*, p. 227 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Back.

Note 44: Ibid., p. 228. Back.

Note 45: Ibid., p. 236. Back.

Note 46: Keohane writes further: "A complete analysis of regimes would have to show how international regimes could change as a result not of shifts in the allegedly objective interests of states, or in the power distributions and institutional conditions facing governments, but of changes in how people think about their interests, including the possibility that they may be interested in the welfare of others, both from empathy and from principle" (ibid.). In the early 1980s Keohane suggested that a different, sociological line of argument about regimes would be possible, whereby norms would be "internalized" by actors as part of their utility functions; see Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, p. 154 n. 27 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). But his subsequent work has continued to draw almost exclusively on economic imagery and has followed a rationalist path. See also Robert O. Keohane, "International Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint," in Rebecca Grant and Kathleen Newland, eds., *Gender and International Relations*, pp. 41-50 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). This paper clearly recognizes feminism's sociological orientation toward the articulation of an "institutional vision of international relations" (p. 44) and calls for an "alliance between two complementary critiques of neorealism," neoliberal institutionalism and feminism (p. 47). Back.

Note 47: Stephen D. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (1988): 64-94. Back.

Note 48: I am indebted to John Meyer for drawing my attention to this point. Back.

Note 49: John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 38. Back.

Note 50: Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," *Journal of International Affairs* 44, no. 1 (1990): 37. See also Henry Nau, "Identity and International Politics: An Alternative to Neorealism" (unpublished paper, George Washington University, April 1994). Back.

Note 51: One should note here that neoliberalism and institutional economics have been notably unsuccessful in measuring transaction costs, an opaque concept at best that is central to an understanding of how institutions work. Back.

Note 52: John Mueller, "The Impact of Ideas on Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, pp. 48-62 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 249-77; see also Robert Herman's essay in this volume. Back.

Note 53: William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 91-129. Back.

Note 54: Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 244-46; Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 185-214. Back.

Note 55: John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John Gerard Ruggie,

ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, pp. 3-47 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 56: This is a simplifying assumption, not an empirical claim. State identities are always politically reproduced and contested. Furthermore, context makes a difference. The Cold War may have had a large effect on state identities in Europe. But this does not mean that it necessarily did so, for example, in the Third World. Back.

Note 57: Krasner, *International Regimes;* Volker Rittberger, ed., *International Regimes in East-West Politics* (New York: Pinter, 1990); Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1993). Back.

Note 58: Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Krasner, *International Regimes*, pp. 173-94. Back.

Note 59: Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," in Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, pp. 58-79. Although these are two widely cited papers, it should be noted that Jervis was not writing from an unambiguous, neoliberal perspective. His analysis neglects cultural-institutional factors and rests largely on changes in the payoffs of different policies as well as on institutional features that increase transparency and warning time. Back.

Note 60: Harald MŸller, "The Internalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments: The Case of Security Regimes," in Rittberger, *Regime Theory and International Relations*, pp. 361-88; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 371-402. Alexander George, *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 61: Volker Rittberger, "Research on International Regimes in Germany: The Adaptive Internalization of an American Social Science Concept," in Rittberger, *Regime Theory and International Relations*, pp. 10-11. Back.

Note 62: Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State," *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 753-75. Other critics have questioned the lack of precision in definition, the analytical usefulness, and the empirical application of the regime concept; see Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 491-517; Martin J. Rochester, "The Rise and Fall of International Organization as a Field of Study," *International Organization* 40, no. 4 (Autumn 1986): 777-813. Back.

Note 63: This leads to an important set of analytical distinctions that could be further clarified, relying on Goldstein and Keohane's taxonomy of three types of beliefs; see Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, pp. 8-11 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). "World views" and "principled beliefs" are publicly held and have behavioral implications; they are "intersubjective." "Causal beliefs" can be held privately and do not necessarily make claims on behavior; they are "cognitive." Back.

Note 64: Hayward R. Alker, Jr., "The Presumption of Anarchy in World Politics" (unpublished manuscript, Cambridge, Mass., 1986); Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International*

Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 225-86; Richard K. Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy Problematique," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 7, no. 2 (1988): 227-62; Richard K. Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War" (unpublished manuscript, Tempe, Ariz., 1988); Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 65: Keohane, *International Institution and State Power*, pp. 158-79; Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," pp. 5-6, 26-27. Back.

Note 66: As the research in this volume and many of the volume's references illustrate, the charge of a lack of empirical research has by now lost much of its bite. Cornell graduate students alone are finishing a series of dissertations and books that provide a wealth of empirical research challenging exclusive reliance on rationalist and behavioralist styles of analysis. See Robert Herman, "Ideas, Identity, and the Redefinition of Interests: The Political and Intellectual Origins of the Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1995); Elizabeth L. Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Audie J. Klotz, *Protesting Prejudice: Apartheid and the Politics of Norms in International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Gil Merom, "Blood and Conscience: Recasting the Boundaries of National Security" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1994); Richard Price, *A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo* (forthcoming); Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization* 49, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 73-104; Christian Reus-Smit, "The Moral Purpose of the State: Social Identity, Legitimate Action, and the Construction of International Institutions" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1995); Nina Tannenwald, "Dogs That Don't Bark: The United States, the Role of Norms, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1995); Michael Marks, "The Formation of European Policy in Post-Franco Spain: Ideas, Interests, and the International Transmission of Knowledge" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1993); and Dan Thomas, "Between Reason and Power: International Norms and Political Change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1975-1989" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1995). Back.

Note 67: Emanuel Adler, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security: A Thirty-Year Retrospective and a New Set of Anticipations," *Daedalus* 120, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 1-20; Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992): 101-46. Back.

Note 68: Jeffrey W. Legro, *Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint During World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Kier, *Imagining War;* Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 69: Harald MŸller, "Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln," Zeitschrift *fŸr Internationale Beziehungen* 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 15-44; James Johnson, "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action," *Political Theory* 19, no. 2 (May 1991): 181-201; Oran Young, *International Cooperation: Building Regimes for National Resources and the Environment* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Young, *International Governance.*

Back.

Note 70: David Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 71: Krasner, *International Regimes*, p. 2. Issues of definition and conceptualization are considered at length in several essays in Rittberger, *Regime Theory and International Relations.*

Back.

Note 72: Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 335-70; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 384-96; Iver B. Neumann, "Identity and Security," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 2 (1992): 221-26. Back.

Note 73: J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 30. Back.

Note 74: Relatedly, state theory applied to the analysis of domestic politics or the domestic sources of foreign policy has typically focused on the variability in the autonomy and the capacity of states, not on their identity. See Bruce Andrews, "Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor," *World Politics* 27, no. 4 (July 1975): 521-40; Peter J. Katzenstein, "International Relations and Domestic Structures: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States," *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 1-45; Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223-46; Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Peter B. Evans, *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 75: Andrews, "Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor," p. 536. Back.

Note 76: Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, A.D. 990-1990 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). Back.

Note 77: Suzanne H. Rudolph, "Presidential Address: State Formation in Asia--Prolegomena to a Comparative Study," *Journal of Asian Studies* 46, no. 4 (November 1987): 731-46. Back.

Note 78: Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983); Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism: An Instrumental Social Construction," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 505-45. Back.

Note 79: John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-85; John Gerard Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time, and Method," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, pp. 21-36 (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, Lexington Books, 1989); Raymond Duvall and Alexander Wendt, "Institutions and International Order," in Czempiel and Rosenau, *Global Changes and*

Theoretical Challenges, pp. 51-74. Back.

Note 80: Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics* 35, no. 1 (October 1982): 1-24; Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Meyer, "The World Polity"; George M. Thomas and John W. Meyer, "Regime Changes and State Power in an Intensifying World State-System," in Bergesen, *Studies of the Modern World System*, pp. 139-58. Back.

Note 81: Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980). Back.

Note 82: Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity"; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). Back.

Note 83: Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Back.

Note 84: Goldstein and Keohane, "Ideas and Foreign Policy," p. 5.# *Peter J.* Back.

Note 85: Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 17, 30. Back.

Note 86: Ibid., p. 41. Back.

Note 87: Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). Back.

Note 88: Walt is very explicit in arguing that balancing in inter-Arab relations is atypical. While states typically "seek to counter threats by adding the power of another state to their own . . . in the Arab world the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites" (ibid., p. 149). Back.

Note 89: In a second book, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), Walt extends this analytical move from international threat perceptions to domestic threat perceptions. He argues that revolutions affect threat perceptions through miscalculation, hostility, perception of offensive power, and uncertainty--that is, through four different psychological mechanisms. Back.

Note 90: For a critical discussion of Walt's use of correlational metaphors and ways of drawing conclusions, see Albert Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas Themselves and Policy Preferences: Behavioral, Institutional, and Discursive Formulations" (unpublished paper, Brown University, 1993), pp. 10-11, and Stephen Haggard, "Structuralism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Relations Theory," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations*, pp. 420-22 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). For a more positive reading, see Gunther Hellmann, "FŸr eine problemorientierte Grundlagenforschung: Kritik und Perspektiven der

Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehungen' in Deutschland" *Zeitschrift fŸr Internationale Beziehungen* 1, no. 1 (June 1994): 82-83. Taken on Walt's terms, his analysis of ideology also fails to convince at times. He appears to be bent on arguing the case against the importance of ideology, especially for the superpowers, either by imposing excessively rigid definitional criteria or by coding decisions of cases that are not compelling. For example, as noted in Douglas J. MacDonald's review in *Journal of Politics* 51, no. 3 (August 1989): 795-98, Walt's restrictive definitional criteria of left-wing ideological adherence (p. 186) preclude coding the support of "united front" movements by the Soviet Union as alliances based on ideological considerations. And the ideologically close relations between the United States and Israel are simply argued away by referring to Israel as a "welfare-state theocracy" that has little ideological affinity with the United States (p. 200). Maybe so. But as Michael Barnett argues in this book, U.S.-Israeli relations became much more problematic in the late 1980s when some segments of the American public began to doubt that Israel was still behaving like an essentially like-minded parliamentary democracy. Back.

Note 91: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 51; March, "Decision-Making Perspective." Back.

Note 92: Kier, *Imagining War.* Back.

Note 93: Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decison Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). I neglect Snyder's work here, since Kier replicates Posen's research on interwar Europe. Back.

Note 94: Mueller, *Quiet Cataclysm;* Ethan A. Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization* 44, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 479-526. Back.

The Culture of National Security

3. Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach

Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman

> Namibia became the world's newest nation today as Africa's last colony celebrated the end of 75 years of South African rule. . . . South African soldiers lowered their country's banner for the final time just after midnight and Namibian troops hoisted the new blue, red and green flag of Namibia to a bugle fanfare. . . . Soldiers of the new Namibian army . . . marched briskly through the stadium to the beat of drums as officers bearing swords barked commands. About 25,000 spectators roared approval.
>
> -- Associated Press, March 21, 1991

> We cannot be an independent nation without an army of some sort.
>
> -- Sylvanus Olympio
> president of Togo, 1960-1966

In recent years, significant Third World militarization[1] has become a hallmark of the contemporary international order. Between 1973 and 1989 the total real military expenditures (in 1982 constant dollars) of developing countries increased from $95.3 billion to an estimated $220 billion, while arms imports grew an astounding 1,755 percent. Observing this trend and commenting on militarization in both the developed and the developing world, Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales conclude that "ours is the age of militarization. . . . There is no doubt that the military formation is a major part of contemporary society."[2] Although these trends have slowed somewhat in the past few years, they have not abated entirely.[3] And despite the relative slowing of proliferation, the overall magnitude of this arms buildup is in itself noteworthy. But it is the qualitative nature of these new arsenals rather than their growth rate that sets the current trend apart from its historical precursors. Since at least 1957 the global military buildup has been marked by a remarkable proliferation of "advanced" high-technology weaponry in the "developing" world. Today, twenty Third World countries possess or are developing ballistic missiles; at least a dozen are armed with more than a thousand main battle tanks; more than seventy have deployed advanced-capability supersonic fighter aircraft (at present there are approximately twenty thousand military aircraft in the developing world); and a similar number have fielded sophisticated offensive and defensive missile systems. Perhaps better known is the growing concern with weapons of mass destruction. Discussion about the causes and consequences of proliferation of these weapons in the developing world has reached a height not seen since the early atomic age. Regardless of

the weapon system examined, however, the concern is the same: well-equipped "state of the art" militaries are no longer restricted to a few industrialized "core" powers; military development and economic development, it seems, have become decoupled.[4]

The primary aim of this essay is to develop and evaluate arguments concerning the spread of advanced conventional weaponry. In particular, the object here is to formulate a more theoretical and empirically tractable analysis of the role of "status" and "norms" in weapons proliferation. Traditionally, "status" or "norm" arguments about weapons proliferation are seldom systematically theorized and, when they are employed, are generally used in an ad hoc manner. Such factors are seen as playing only a residual role in the proliferation of weaponry; typically, "status" is the explanation given for a specific weapons acquisition when the acquisition can be attributed to no other factor. What is more important than the debate over the relative importance of such factors, however, is that "status" and "norm" arguments are seldom formulated in empirically testable ways, and seldom is evidence systematically developed for the role of status and norms in weapons proliferation. Our aim is to address this weakness and thereby to increase our ability to examine patterns of weapons proliferation through the development of a body of ideas that can support a less ad hoc approach.

We begin by reformulating existing arguments about the role of norms and status in weapons proliferation, using a sociological perspective known as institutional theory.[5] Through institutional theory, both weapons proliferation and the broader process of the worldwide spread of professional, technically oriented military organizations are interpreted as social (and not merely functional or military) phenomena. Weapons proliferation is shaped by the same forces that shape the development of other elements of the modern nation-state.[6] In contrast to this sociological approach, the existing literature has exhibited a tendency to treat militaries as unique organizations, to see them as fundamental--indeed, foundational--agents of the state, to take their existence for granted, and to explain their growth and development primarily through reference to technical and security concerns.[7] Such arguments see military strength as the bedrock on which nation-states are built. While these arguments have substantial merit, particularly in explaining the emergence of nation-states and militaries before this century, we shall develop here an alternative perspective, suggesting that modern militaries emerge as part of the more general, world-level *cultural* processes that have given rise to the modern nation-state.

In brief, we shall argue that militaries no longer build modern nations, but rather, the world political and social system builds modern nation-states, which in turn build modern militaries and procure modern weaponry. While the sociological vocabulary employed in this essay may strike some as a bit jargon-laden, the Namibian example should make the process analyzed herein quite clear. Namibia was brought into being by the modern world political and cultural system: drawing on taken-for-granted cultural models of appropriate political organization, United Nations efforts and the recognition of states throughout the world have constituted Namibia as a "state." As a symbol of its statehood, the incipient Namibian state created a flag and an army of more than a thousand soldiers. That the army was (and remains) essentially militarily insignificant when compared with those of its possible foes (e.g., South Africa or various armed factions in Angola) is irrelevant to its clearly significant symbolic role.[8]

Standard Explanations for the Proliferation of Weaponry

Three broad arguments are commonly made in efforts to understand the proliferation of the tools of

military endeavor. We will label these the superpower manipulation, national security, and factional interest arguments. Each stresses that weapons acquisition and military force structures are the result of rational calculation by actors in the pursuit of their own self-interest. All three of these explanations rest on a single paradigmatic image of human behavior. Described by James G. March as "consequential action" and by Jon Elster as rational choice, this approach sees behavior as guided by the determination of goals (or preferences), the assessment of alternatives available for action, and the mapping of alternatives to goals.[9] Alternatives are selected according to a decision rule--for example, maximize (or satisfice) goal attainment. Superpower manipulation or geopolitical arguments emphasize choice at the level of the major international powers; national security explanations, at the level of the individual nation-state; and factional interest approaches, at the level of subnational interests. Each argument will be briefly reviewed below; each argument leads to a set of at least partially unique empirical predictions concerning influences on the process of weapons proliferation. The particular hypotheses that we will investigate will be summarized after we discuss the three conventional approaches and the institutional theory alternative.

Superpower Manipulation

The proliferation of conventional weaponry and, more broadly, the militarization of the world system may be argued to be primarily the consequence of major power decisions and geopolitical concerns. Regional conflicts are seen as the playing out of superpower conflicts in alternative venues; weapons proliferation is driven not by (local) national needs or internal politics but by the global strategies of the U.S. and the ussr.[10] Superpower or geopolitical theorists differ among themselves with regard to the nature and origins of underlying superpower antagonisms. Thus, some attribute the structure of the international military order to fundamental geostrategic conflicts, while others focus on factional processes within the superpowers themselves and still others highlight action-reaction conflict spirals. For the purposes of this investigation, however, these debates are not central; whatever their view of the dynamics that drive superpower policies, all geopolitical approaches concur in their emphasis on the active--indeed overwhelming--role of the superpowers in the militarization of the Third World.

National Security

Underlying most existing research on proliferation is the general assumption that strategic, operational, and tactical analysis governs force structure and weapons procurement decisions. Individual nations design a force structure to meet these needs. Decisions are made on the basis of rationally developed performance criteria and threat assessments, and nations are presumed to select a mix of weaponry that balances military benefits with purchase costs. Described by Graham T. Allison and Frederic Morris as the "prevailing simplification" in the weapons proliferation literature, the approach emphasizes that "weapons are the result of national strategic choice; government leaders select specific weapons and total force posture on the basis of precise calculations about national objectives, perceived threats, and strategic doctrine within the constraints of technology and budget." While the exact degree of precision in these calculations may be variable, the central argument is nonetheless clear: weapons procurement is driven by security needs.

Factional Interest

Contrasting with theories that focus on the value of weaponry to nations as a whole, factional or political

theories view procurement as a reflection of competing internal interests. Thus the acquisition of a particular weapon is the product of a "procurement coalition" shaped by the self-interests of coalition participants. The military clearly is the primary group, with the most direct interest in weapons purchases.[11] Thomas Ohlson has suggested that military governments "by embracing doctrines which exaggerate the role of force and military preparedness and equate national development with an expansion of national power, are likely to allocate larger sums to the armed forces than civilian-dominated governments."[12] These three perspectives have generated a rich tradition of research in an effort to understand the dynamics underlying this worldwide trend in the post-World War II period.[13] This tradition has produced a theoretically elaborate and frequently fruitful collection of explanatory schema and numerous empirical studies, yet the dominant paradigms seem to have left the research community with a sense that something is missing. For example, Charles H. Anderton has noted:

> Much of the empirical arms race modeling literature represents an unsuccessful attempt to find fundamental "lawlike" arms race relationships. . . . The result has been an extremely large and growing literature . . . employing the most sophisticated empirical techniques, which has left us rather dry in terms of knowing more about arms races than we would otherwise know.[14]

Despite the dominance of the three perspectives within the arms trade literature, country- and region-level empirical examinations frequently find that these approaches perform poorly as predictors of actual weapons proliferation patterns. Confronting theory with data, observers frequently note the "widespread propensity to procure highly sophisticated, expensive weapon systems and technologies, despite well-known absorption handicaps, and to reject equally serviceable but cheaper and perhaps less sophisticated options that are readily available."[15] Explanations offered for this phenomenon tend to emphasize the inadequately rational nature of Third World military decision making rather than the potential inadequacies of the rational explanation. Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth, for example, note the "superficial Third World knowledge of particular military systems" and also argue that "developing nations lack the analytical staffs necessary to assess the true military value of weapon technologies or to determine how the new weapon can best be employed" and that "less developed countries are often unaware of significant military technologies that are and will be available to them at reasonable cost."[16]

Robert O'Connell argues that this situation is the "product of a fundamental misunderstanding of the intimate relationship between humans and their armaments."[17] Such a misunderstanding is almost inevitable given the tendency in the arms control literature to treat weapons merely as the tools of rationally developed policy; weapons are seen as technology "pure and simple" without independent meaning or significance. Dana Eyre, Mark Suchman, and Victoria Alexander have noted that students of arms control "must acknowledge what has become virtually a truism in other areas of sociology: that technology is never just technology, that every machine has a socially constructed meaning and a socially oriented objective and that the incidence and significance of technological developments can never be fully understood or predicted independently of their social context."[18] In this essay we investigate this "intimate relationship between humans and their arms" by identifying and examining factors that affect the adoption of a variety of individual weapon systems (e.g., supersonic aircraft, armored personnel carriers, or apcs) by nation-states in the Cold War period.

An Alternative Perspective: Obligatory Action and an Institutional Theory of Weapons Proliferation

We emphasize the argument that the spread of high-technology weaponry throughout the world is the result of more than rational policy or national security concerns. Reduced (for purposes of explication) to the simplest but strongest possible statement, weapons spread not because of a match between their technical capabilities and national security needs but because of the highly symbolic, normative nature of militaries and their weaponry. Weapons have proliferated because of the socially constructed meanings that have become associated with them. Highly technological militaries symbolize modernity, efficacy, and independence. Thus the spread of weapons is a process both driven and shaped by institutionalized normative structures linking militaries and their advanced weapons with sovereign status as a nation, with modernization, and with social legitimacy.[19] This argument, which can be labeled an "institutionalist" approach to arms transfers, emphasizes the role of world-level cultural models that "press all countries toward common objectives, forms, and practices"[20] and that therefore result in a notable degree of isomorphism in structures and practices among nation-states.

Consequential action (which lies at the core of traditional explanations for weapons proliferation) is not the only useful theory of human behavior. While a mythos of rationality may permeate much of Western culture, and the examination of international relations in particular, arguments emphasizing different mechanisms are common within sociology.[21] Central to social phenomenology, traditional role theory, and recent institutional approaches in sociology is an alternative perspective that James G. March terms "obligatory action."[22]

Obligatory action may be contrasted with consequential action. Behavior is explained not in terms of goals, alternatives, and decision rules such as maximization or satisficing (the vocabulary of consequential action) but through an emphasis on roles, norms, accounts (i.e., stories and explanations justifying particular actions) and definitions of appropriate action. Although the vocabulary of the obligatory action perspective may not be a central feature of modern American pop psychological discourse, social scientists should not ignore the value of the perspective. Viewed through the lens of obligatory action, the identity of an actor is profoundly social, and an actor's behavior is *explained by* the culturally constructed definition of the situation and of appropriate action within the situation. Through the perspective of obligatory action, the behavior of nation-states, and people, can be seen as similar to the behavior of actors in a play, or players in a game. Their identity is constituted by the social system (for example, the identity of pitcher, or that of wife, is given meaning by the complex of behavioral rules associated with the role), and their behavior is guided by the "script" or the "playbook." Such arguments do not deny that individual actors are thoughtful or strategic; there is room for improvisation and creativity (neither people nor nation-states are mindless followers), but individual behavior is fundamentally shaped by the social structure surrounding the behavior. Indeed, actors themselves are constituted by the social system. Actors (be they organizations, persons, or nation-states) do not have social standing, or the ability to act within a social system, separate from the rules that both construct them and charter their actions. Within such a perspective the key question for understanding behavior is no longer "What are an actor's goals, alternatives, and decision rule?" but "How are roles, accounts, and rituals written, spread, and learned?"

Whatever the explanatory model chosen (consequential or obligatory), it is important not to reify the

model. The concrete action of real people (and states) can be *explained* by alternative models, but the action itself is neither "consequential" nor "obligatory," "rational" nor "irrational"; rather, these ideas are the lenses that the analyst uses to understand action. Indeed, the ultimate purpose of constructing analytically distinct arguments is to enable us to combine these "nuts and bolts" in ways that are useful for the explanation of particular features of social life.

Within organizational theory and political sociology, "obligatory action" arguments are frequently labeled "institutionalist." Such arguments share three central assumptions: First, institutional theory sees society as more than a network of exchange relations and power-balancing efforts. Instead, institutionalists emphasize that the social world is a cultural system, structured by an evolving set of categorical prescriptions and proscriptions that define and delimit appropriate action. Second, institutional theory argues that since these cultural categories are practically taken for granted as lawful, actors rarely subject conforming behaviors to cost-benefit analysis--or do so only ritualistically.[23] In keeping with this outlook, institutionalists explain social life not by postulating goals and interests but by examining the mechanisms through which societal structures and activities take on a rule-like or ritual status in the minds of participants. Thus, most institutional arguments focus on the ways in which apparently autonomous action reflects "higher-order constraints imposed by socially constructed realities."[24] Finally, institutional theory stresses that these normative "definitions of appropriateness" are not static but develop and change over time. Although cultural rules sometimes remain relatively static, this stability is the product of a dynamic process. Cultural definitions do not merely "originate" and then "spread"; rather, they should be thought of as in a constant process of evolution, perhaps akin to the process of speciation in the biological world.

Applied to international relations, these three features of institutional theory imply that nation-states are not autonomous, independent actors in pursuit of national interests within an anarchy, as realist theories assume. Most important, institutional theory emphasizes the central role of the larger world system in constituting the state as "carrier of collective value and purpose."[25] Indeed, it is this increasingly integrated global system of socially constructed rules that creates and legitimates nation-states as sovereign actors both in domestic affairs and on the international stage. It should be noted that institutional theories bear some similarity to perspectives in political science emphasizing the importance of regimes.[26] Both schools share conceptions of an international cultural or social system, and both emphasize a view of the world as more than an unstructured anarchy. But whereas systemic perspectives view global society as "order-providing"--that is, as a set of enforced constraints on behavior--institutionalist perspectives view the world system as "constitutive"--that is, as a set of fundamental definitions of legitimate actors and appropriate actions. To grossly oversimplify, within the systemic perspective, nations go to war in violation of international norms; within the institutional perspective, nations go to war because that is one of the actions their "charter" as a nation-state allows/instructs them to do. John Keegan, Donald Snow, and Martin Van Crevald offer sociologically informed historical analyses of the impact of social structure on warfare that are sympathetic to this approach.[27]

Empirical examinations at the world-system level have generally emphasized the "remarkable degree of ideological and organizational convergence throughout the world,"[28] and most have concentrated on the three substantive areas: welfare systems, educational systems, and conceptions of citizenship.[29] This

substantial body of empirical work has focused primarily on establishing the fruitfulness of the institutional perspective and on demonstrating the presence of isomorphism within the world system. Thomas and Lauderdale's examination of the worldwide spread of national welfare programs provides a useful example of work in this tradition.[30] Arguing against the assumption that nation-states adopt and expand welfare programs in response to functional needs (e.g., the argument that states have an unemployment insurance system because they have lots of unemployed workers who are hungry or politically active), the authors posit that "incorporation . . . into the world system reconstitutes the state as the carrier of collective value and purpose, . . . chartered with the responsibility for 'national welfare.' " Under such circumstances, welfare policies are not predicted by indicators of need; they are instead predicted by the extent of incorporation into the world polity. The basic pattern of the Thomas and Lauderdale study is typical of other institutional efforts, as are the empirical findings. Indicators of incorporation into the world system are found to predict the degree of adherence to international cultural norms chartering state action (here, the existence and extensiveness of social security programs). In contrast, indices of functional need for state action (for example, the percentage of elderly citizens in the population) fail to predict either the existence or the extent of governmental response. On the basis of these findings, Thomas and Lauderdale conclude that national policies establishing formal welfare programs are "best viewed as rituals of external legitimacy."[31]

As noted above, the institutional approach to the problem of proliferation developed herein will emphasize the role of the symbolic, normative aspects of militaries and weaponry. Frequently, students of arms control recognize the potential significance of the processes described by institutional approaches, although generally employing words like status and prestige. Jones and Hildreth acknowledge that the drive to acquire high-technology weaponry may be a combination of inadequately rational decision-making systems and "a political compulsion to deploy systems as modern or sophisticated as a neighbor has."[32] Ohlson argues that "the armed forces, equipped with as modern weapons as possible, came to be regarded by many governments in the Third World as a symbol of unity and independence and as tangible evidence that the government intended to defend its sovereignty. The actual utility of these weapons . . . was often of secondary importance."[33] Examining the structure of European navies, Catherine M. Kelleher, Alden F. Mullins, and Richard C. Eichenberg found that the number of sea control vessels remained remarkably stable across all European states during the period 1960 to 1970. "The effects of constrained resources seem minimal. . . . Destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and (for a few states) carriers all seem to constitute an element of national prestige." Examining the force structures of individual countries, they argued that "in terms of traditional indicators, it seemed logical to predict the Netherlands and Italy would be prime candidates for our 'rational middle power'; yet their present naval profiles show few of the choices we hypothesized for [the model]. . . . It may well be the least powerful middle powers which are most attached to their symbols of 'equality.'"[34] While these findings are not conclusive (indeed, Kelleher, Mullins, and Eichenberg's study is one example of the use of prestige arguments when nothing else seems to fit), they clearly suggest that force structure is influenced by more than domestic politics and rational calculation of strategic need.

Despite apparent compatibility and the potential fruitfulness of an institutional approach to the study of the arms trade, existing examinations have tended to leave these nascent institutional arguments underdeveloped. For their part, institutional theorists have also have tended to skip the military in their empirical investigations of the world system. Yet the application of institutional arguments to the study of world militaries should be uniquely fitting for at least two reasons. First, militarization, from an

institutionalist perspective, may be seen not as a unique and especially problematic occurrence (except for the possible consequences) but as merely one additional facet of the larger, global system-wide trend toward isomorphism among nation-states that is the central empirical finding within institutional arguments. Second, failure to examine militaries from an institutionalist perspective is especially odd given the traditional, unique link between armed force and national sovereignty and the institutionalist concern for the construction of the nation-state as an actor. Michael Howard argues that, within the international system, "the military capability of a state is assumed to be [a] major element in its effectiveness as an actor in the international system."[35] This argument suggests that, far from being an aberrant event, the militarization of the Third World is inextricably linked with the extension of the nation-state system and the development of national sovereignty. Thus it can be argued that the developing world is militarized, not because of particular events or forces within or between developing world nation-states but because the developing world is made up of nation-states and one of the defining characteristics of the nation-state is the possession of a modern military.

From an institutional perspective, once a social object (say, a flag or a supersonic aircraft) is established as central to normative definitions of statehood (that is, once "being a nation" means, among other things, "having a flag" and "having a high-tech military"), the critical variable in the determination of acquisition of these objects is not the nation-state's functional requirement for the object but the degree of connection of the nation-state to the world system. In order to understand the "unprecedented proliferation of national flags in the post-World War II period," one does not look at the nation-state's functional need for a flag, or at the behavior of flag manufacturers. To understand flag proliferation, one must understand the cultural system that gives flags their unique meaning for nation-states. A nation-state "acquires" a flag because it is embedded in a normative system that gives the flag meaning. Thus, an institutional argument suggests that the proliferation of conventional weapons is profoundly shaped by an essentially "ritualistic" (in the sense of ritual as encapsulating meaning, not in the more common usage of habitual action devoid of meaning) belief in militaries and modern weaponry as distinguishing emblems of the modern nation-state. It follows that, if procurement results from immersion in such a normative system, then the pace of procurement should vary with the extent of the immersion.[36]

Institutional arguments are able to make comprehensible many otherwise problematic aspects of militaries and weapons proliferation. It is quite common for developing nations to maintain only a single "squadron" of four or five advanced aircraft--too few to offer any substantial strategic or tactical benefits in any but the rarest of circumstances, but enough to constitute a reasonable air show. Similarly, the symbolic nature of weaponry is almost certainly a significant part of the failure of the F-20 export fighter program, which was intended to provide a low-cost, high-reliability jet fighter designed specifically to meet the needs of newly industrialized countries. Despite having the "right stuff," it lacked the legitimating imprimature of usaf ownership and perished as unsalable. Institutional arguments must be better specified if a fuller understanding of the process is to be gained. Indeed, both Ann Swidler and Connie McNeely have noted that few investigations using institutional arguments have focused on the specification of the mechanisms by which isomorphism is produced; instead, they have focused primarily on establishing the fruitfulness of the institutionalist perspective and the existence of isomorphism within the world system.[37] Although this investigation, which is designed to use institutional theory in a new empirical realm rather than to expand institutional theory, is marked by this limitation, we would now like to explore four directions in which institutional arguments can be developed: greater attention to the structure of the world system; systematic variation in the process of early and late adoption of an object;

variation in the degree to which an object is given social meaning (or degree of institutionalization); and variation in the nature of an actor's identity. Although not all of these arguments will be empirically evaluated here, the effort is useful in the interest of giving a full picture of an institutional approach to proliferation.

Structure of the World System

Within the diffusion literature attention is paid both to the nature and degree of connectedness of the potential adopter and to the organization of the social system.[38] Institutional theory relying on empirical investigations have tended to assume an undifferentiated (or simply differentiated, e.g., core-periphery) world system, featuring only variations in the degree of connection of an individual state to the polity. However, Swidler usefully suggests that different "models of stateness may well be promulgated within subcommunities, based on language or colonial heritage, political divisions, etc."[39] This concern suggests an argument that the proliferation of high-technology weaponry should follow existing channels of international influence and communication. Variations in these channels should predict variations in patterns of weapons proliferation. For example, postcolonial relationships (e.g., the British Commonwealth) or regionally based alliance or cooperation organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States) may foster the development of variant models of stateness.

Few sociological investigations have systematically examined variations in the structure of the world cultural system. Anthony Giddens notes that current conceptions of the "world system" may exaggerate the level of integration of the system. The current world system may, he argues, be better characterized as being made up of a "global information system," a "nation-state system," a "world capitalist economy," and a "world military order." "The world system exists," Giddens notes, but this "does not imply a single dominating dynamic in its development."[40] We see much value in this approach, and we would point out two major advantages. First, such a differentiated characterization allows for the formulation of arguments about the relationship between these systems, focusing, for example, on the degree to which conformity in one "sector" or "system" (e.g., education or the "global information system," using a measure of conformity such as that developed by McNeely)[41] predicts conformity in another sector (e.g., the "world military order"). Similarly, it should be possible, following the pattern of earlier institutional theories, to construct an indicator of connection to the world military system, using, for example, the number of military attachés sent abroad or the number of military-related treaties signed. It would then be possible to examine which indicator of connection was a better predictor of institutional conformity; significant improvement with the use of the indicator of connection to the world military system would suggest support for Giddens's arguments. Second, Giddens's framework implicitly challenges us to assess empirically the uniqueness of the dynamics of the world military system, rather than assuming that it must be dominated by either cultural processes or functional considerations.

Early/Late Adopters

Within the literature on institutional arguments at the organizational level, empirical research has "yielded the frequently replicated finding that early adoption (that is, adoption of an innovation soon after its introduction, before a large portion of the population at risk has adopted it) of organizational innovations is strongly predicted by technical or political attributes of adopters but that later diffusion is more poorly predicted by technical or political measures."[42] Pamela Tolbert and Lynne Zucker find that

when civil service reforms are not required by the state, early adoption of civil service by cities is related to internal organizational requirements, with city characteristics predicting adoption, while late adoption is argued to be related to institutional definitions of legitimate structural form; empirically, they find that city characteristics no longer predict adoption.[43] The argument may be restated more positively as: early adoption of an innovation will be predicted by "technical characteristics" of the adopter (reflecting the suitability of the innovation as a solution to a problem), while later adoption (after the "institutionalization" of the innovation) will no longer be predicted by technical characteristics and should be predicted by variables reflecting the degree to which the adopter is connected to the social system within which the innovation is institutionalized.

Degree of Institutionalization

If objects, such as flags, become, in Selznick's phrase, "infused with value," or institutionalized, it is reasonable to assume that different objects may vary in the degree to which they do so. A social object can vary in the degree to which it has been given meaning and has become part of, or linked to, a particular "taken for granted" image of social reality. The value given a particular object can vary across social systems. The most obvious example of this process is the value accorded small bits of ribbon. Within the military, these "bits of ribbon" are highly significant and full of meaning. In another social system, they may be mere insignificant and meaningless bits of ribbon. Within the modern world system, where sovereignty, modernity, and independence are the essence of our ideas about the nation-state, some weapons might reasonably be seen as highly institutionalized (or symbolically significant, e.g., supersonic aircraft), while others are less so (e.g., trucks, small arms). A given weapon's symbolic significance is dependent on the degree to which it is linked to cultural ideas and images of the nation-state; highly technological, visible, unique weapons are more effective at symbolizing independence than are mundane, unremarkable weapons. Thus, just as weapons can be thought to vary in technical capacity (e.g., "throw weight"--the capacity of a missile in terms of a weight/distance measure), so also can they be seen as varying in terms of institutional integration or "symbolic throw weight." Weapons that vary in this dimension should follow distinct patterns of diffusion; the diffusion of highly institutionalized weaponry should be influenced by linkage to the larger world system and by processes similar to those that shape the diffusion of other, highly institutionalized elements of the world system. The diffusion of weapons of a minimal degree of institutionalization (labeled by *The Economist* as "the tools of everyday slaughter") should be influenced primarily by consequential factors, including both strategic requirements and situational constraints.

One significant empirical task for institutional theory is to establish a means of systematically assessing the degree of symbolic significance for social objects. Establishing such a metric is difficult; for our purposes, however, variation in symbolic significance among weapons is relatively clear. Some weapons are commonly seen as highly loaded with meaning. Howard, looking at naval power at the beginning of the twentieth century, notes that "the Battleship was indeed a symbol of national pride and power of a unique kind; one even more appropriate to the industrial age than armies. It embodied at once the technological achievement of that nation as a whole, its world-wide reach and, with its huge guns, immense destructive power. It was a status symbol of universal validity, one which no nation conscious of its destiny could afford to do without."[44] In the post-World War II era, navies have not lost their symbolic significance; the evocative phrase "showing the flag" has not lost meaning, although the vehicles may have changed. Aircraft carriers may have taken pride of place in navies, their symbolic value equaling or exceeding that of battleships of old. Argentine reluctance to employ the aircraft carrier

Veintecinco de Mayo in the Falklands war, for instance, suggests that the symbolic significance of the carrier exceeded its military utility. Aircraft have similarly significant roles; the rise of the symbolic significance of aircraft is captured in the contemporaneous labeling of the era from 1950 to 1970 as "the jet age." Although the 1990s are infrequently labeled as the jet age, the symbolic significance of aircraft has not been entirely eliminated. For example, the Slovenian Air Force held an air show in the spring of 1994, despite having fewer than five aircraft.[45]

Actor Identity

So far, world system-level empirical investigations employing institutional theory have tended to assume a single, undifferentiated identity for all nation-states: that of sovereign equals. It is reasonable to suspect, however, that there are variations in this basic identity. Clearly, a "superpower" is more than a mere nation-state; it is, within the military realm, a nation-state that--at a minimum--has nuclear weapons. Some nations (e.g., India) have at times seemed actively to aspire to this differentiated status. Similarly, some states seem to aspire to a more local, but still differentiated, status as a "regional power"--for example, Nigeria or Argentina. Discussions of the spread of chemical and biological weapons have frequently featured the label "pariah state." While no state is likely to aspire, or even publicly acknowledge, such a label, labeling theory [46] offers potentially useful insights into the mechanisms through which such socially undesirable labels can shape behavior. Finally, it is reasonable to speculate that "microstates" (e.g., Kiribati, Nauru, St. Kitts, and Nevis) may very well view their identity as something other than a full nation-state.

Thus, some variation in the identity and behavior of nation-states may stem from variations on the basic concept of the nation-state in the world-level cultural model. But while world-level cultural concepts of the nation-state have a profound impact on the formation of specific states, identity as a nation-state is not constituted solely by world-level cultural processes. "Domestic" cultural definitions of nationhood and statehood interact with world-level cultural concepts of the nation-state to form the specific identity of individual nation-states and, in turn, to shape their behavior. Together, these two processes may account for substantial variation in the identity and behavior of individual nation-states. Clearly, the dynamics of identity formation for the nation-state require greater theoretical and empirical work. This discussion is adequate, however, to highlight the point that variations in national identity may shape variations in patterns of weapons acquisition.[47]

Hypotheses

Before turning to a summary of the hypotheses to be investigated, we should point out that there are strong reasons to anticipate robust period effects in the proliferation of conventional weaponry.[48] Most qualitative literature on weapons proliferation suggests that the post-World War II era may be marked by three major periods: The immediate postwar and early Cold War period extended through approximately 1968. This period was marked by the relatively restrained aid policies of both superpowers. Weapons transfers were mostly outdated World War II-era equipment; the United States was still transferring World War II-era propeller-driven fighter aircraft to developing countries in the early 1960s. Beginning in the early 1960s and intensifying in the 1970s, the Soviet Union transferred large amounts of relatively "high-tech" equipment to independent and newly independent countries. The United States followed at a lag, and at a relatively reduced rate (with the obvious exception of transfers to a few key states, such as

South Vietnam and Israel). This second period continued through the mid-1970s, when the burgeoning oil revenues fostered the development of an increasingly open arms "supermarket." In the third period, arms of increasing sophistication were available to any nation that had the cash, and to many that had only marginal credit. Marked by "let's make a deal" fervor, these black- and gray-market transfers pushed a large volume of weaponry into even the newest and least industrialized states.

The following hypotheses are suggested by the four arguments (superpower, national security, factional interest, institutional theory) reviewed above:

H1.	Levels of conventional weaponry will be strongly shaped by patterns of alliance with the United States and the Soviet Union and will be less significantly shaped by local security considerations.
H2.	Levels of conventional weaponry will be influenced primarily by the level of strategic military threat directly faced by a nation-state.
H2a.	To the degree that national security arguments implicitly discount the role of "status" or "normative" processes or reduce them to residual effects (as described above), they also suggest that indicators of connection to the world system should not be consistently or powerfully related to weapons inventories.
H3.	Military regimes will feature a higher level of conventional weaponry than will civilian regimes.
H4.	Variation in levels of conventional weaponry will be predicted by variation in the level of connection of a nation-state to the global system. In developing this hypothesis, using the observation made above about variation in level of institutionalization for different weapon systems, we can add:
H4a.	Inventory levels of noninstitutionalized weaponry (i.e., that with low symbolic significance, such as propeller aircraft or armored personnel carriers) will be influenced primarily by processes described by national security arguments.
H4b.	Inventory levels of highly institutionalized weaponry (i.e., that with high symbolic significance, such as supersonic aircraft) will be influenced primarily by processes described by institutional arguments.[49]

Research Design, Data, and Methods of Analysis

Before proceeding to the details of the data and methods, we will comment briefly on the research design of the empirical investigation. Each of the arguments laid out above makes some claim to the accurate portrayal of some aspect of the growth of Third World militaries. A substantial number of empirical investigations have been conducted, including (1) examinations of broad patterns of international arms

transfers, (2) studies of overall military expenditures at the country level, (3) efforts at understanding the growth of overall military capability, through the use of aggregate indicators of military capability, and (4) examinations of arms merchant behavior.[50] However, the dominant forms of empirical investigation have been the country- or region-focused case study and the econometrically flavored examination of levels of military spending. Each has a weakness. Country studies make the recognition of world-level processes difficult, while existing quantitative work, with its focus on single indicators of military expenditure or capability, is, although sophisticated, perhaps too coarse-grained in its choice of dependent variables. Both sorts of analysis run the risk of obscuring potentially important aspects of the actual mechanics of proliferation. Relatively lacking thus far have been efforts to unpack the proliferation process and to conduct large-scale quantitative investigations of the spread of military organizational forms and individual weapon systems throughout the world. The preliminary work reported here is intended to fill this gap. In its more fine-grained view of the proliferation process, it will offer a view of the arms trade that has not been developed in existing studies. By its examination of the proliferation of individual weapon types, this investigation is designed to sharpen our understanding of the processes that drive the proliferation of weaponry in the developing world.

Measures and Indicators--Dependent Variables

Below, we will report results from the examination of a series of ordinary least squares cross-sectional regression models that evaluate the hypotheses discussed above. We have conducted a cross-sectional regression analysis of weapons inventories during the period from 1970 to 1990 (with 1970, 1980, and 1990 as target time points), using country-level weapons inventories (i.e., counts of weapons of various types possessed by a country) as dependent variables. Inventories of world militaries are drawn from a variety of published sources. The most significant are the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *The Military Balance*; the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's *Arms Trade Registers* (covering 1950 to 1973) and *Arms Transfers to the Third World* (covering 1971 to 1985), and *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*.[51] The data set used in the analyses reported for 1970, 1980, and 1990 (tables 3.1 and 3.2) for the developing world includes inventories for the states that became independent during the burst of decolonization following the independence of Ghana in 1957 through the mid-1980s. Not included are "microstates," those states with populations of fewer than about 750,000.[52] The analysis reported in table 3.3 covers all non-micro nation-states for which data were available in 1980. For both analyses, individual weapon systems inventories are aggregated into three basic categories: propeller-driven aircraft, supersonic aircraft, and armored personnel carriers. Propeller-driven aircraft include all ground-attack and transportation/utility aircraft in the military inventory, though most in this category are transportation aircraft. Supersonic aircraft include all aircraft in the military inventory identified as having supersonic capability, regardless of role. Armored personnel carriers include all armored vehicles, whether tracked or wheeled, designed for troop transportation. No differentiation is made between vehicles designed to be fought from and vehicles designed solely for transportation. Although these categories are somewhat crude and do not capture wide variations in the performance of weapon systems, they should adequately capture important similarities in the symbolic value of the weapon systems.

Measures and Indicators--Independent Variables

The independent variables used in this analysis are drawn primarily from the Data Bank on Political and Socioeconomic Development available from the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. This

data bank provides more than three thousand economic, social, political, and cultural measures for 126 countries for the period 1950 to 1992. The majority of the data are drawn from United Nations or World Bank statistical sources.

Some of the common empirical indicators of connection used in institutional investigations are the nation-state's number of diplomatic representatives abroad and its number of memberships in *international governmental organizations* (e.g., United Nations, International Postal Union). The standard practice of most institutional theory empirical investigations is to use the number of international governmental organization (igo) memberships as the indicator of connectedness to the world system. Strong theoretical and empirical justification exists for the routine use of this variable as an indicator of the degree of connection of a country to the world polity, with more memberships indicating a higher degree of connection.[53] Measuring the relative political power of the military within a regime is a difficult task. While a number of somewhat successful efforts have been recorded, they have seldom been done both on a worldwide scale and over a significant period of time. Therefore, as a indicator of *type of regime* (Regime) we shall use the presence of a military officer as president, prime minister, or head of state. This is coded as a dummy variable and is admittedly a very rough indicator of military power within a government. We undertook a similar effort to examine the impact of authoritarian regimes as a part of the preliminary research effort, but the results paralleled those obtained by using the military regime indicator, and therefore we used the simpler military regime coding inR the final analyses.

Gross national product per capita (gnppc), as measured in constant 1980 dollars, is used as an indicator of national development.

Obviously, constructing broadly applicable indicators of military threat is a difficult task. Perceived threat is shaped by a wide variety of factors that are unique to each potential conflict situation. Nonetheless, some widely applicable indicators can be identified; these fall into two broad classes, one based on strategic situation or potential threat and the other based on actual conflict experience. The *number of bordering countries* (Border) serves as a rough indicator of the potential for friction, while the fraction of a country's history spent at war, measured as the *number of years at war as a fraction of years of independence* (Years at War), captures a country's military experience. This indicator (drawn from Kidron and Smith)[54] and others include both international/cross-border wars and internal conflicts.[55]

Geopolitical alignment (Alignment) was used as an indicator of tie to the superpowers. Following Kidron and Smith, the general orientation of countries was assessed as pro-West, nonaligned, or pro-East.[56] This represents an assessment of a country's political allegiance and an effort to identify the state's main policy direction. It considers, but is not limited to, formal alliance or friendship pacts. In our preliminary efforts for this study, we used two dichotomous variables, one for alignment with the West, the other for alignment with the East, with "nonaligned" being the reference category. The dummy variable for West was not significant in any of the equations, and removing it from the equations did not alter the parameter estimates or substantive conclusions in any significant way. This does not, of course, mean that the West did not transfer arms to its allies; it means only that Western allies did not receive significantly more or fewer arms, overall, than did nonaligned nations. The West dummy variable is therefore not included in the final analyses. The Alignment variable is coded 0 for nonaligned or aligned with the West or 1 for aligned with the East/Soviet Union. For the examination of the world inventories of supersonic aircraft in 1980, an additional dichotomous variable was included to indicate membership

in the *industrial core* (Core), either East or West, with 0 coded as outside of the core and 1 as a core member.

As appropriate, each variable is also identified by a suffix indicating the year the variable was measured (e.g., igo82 indicates that the variable measures the number of international governmental organizations that a country belonged to in 1982). All dependent variables are measured in the year of the equation. Selection of appropriate lag times for independent variables is always a significant issue; however, for these analyses, variations in lag affected the relative significance of variables only modestly; for this investigation, a standard one-year lag was selected for purposes of simplicity. The exceptions to this are the igo variables, which were available only for the years 1966, 1977, and 1982. This introduces an exceptionally long lag for the igo variable in the 1990 equations, which should be expected therefore to attenuate the impact of the igo variable on 1990 inventories.

Results

The three tables included in this essay present the results of a series of regression analyses. Table 3.1 covers analyses of weapons inventories of the newly independent states in 1980, Table 3.2 examines analyses of weapons inventories of the newly independent states in 1990, and Table 3.3 presents results of a regression analysis for inventories of supersonic aircraft for the entire world (again, minus microstates of under 750,000 population) for 1980. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the results for regressions of all of the independent variables on the three weapon systems categories: supersonic aircraft, propeller-driven aircraft, and armored personnel carriers. The tables show the number of cases and the R2 for each of the individual equations. The coefficients reported below each R2 are the standardized regression coefficients for each independent variable, along with their approximate significance levels.

TABLE 3.1

Regression Results, Newly Independent States, Year =1980

Dependent Variable	Supersonic	Propeller Aircraft	Personnel Carriers
n =	57	57	57
R^2 =	.360	.360	.304
Years of War	.323**	.465**	.322**
Border	-.141	.325	-.145
IGO77	.390***	.079	.244**
CNPPC79	.101	.034	.130
Regime	.120	-.120	.210
Alignment	.355**	-.308**	.276*

Table shows standardized coefficient, with p values identified as follows:
*** = less than .01
** = less than .05
* = less than .1

Before turning to the tables, however, we must discuss the results of the 1970 equations. For all three of the equations the R2 was exceptionally small and the equations were not significant. There were thirty-eight states in the 1970 analysis, and their inventory levels were relatively small. Few nation-states

in the sample were more than ten years old, and most still featured militaries that resembled those left by the colonial powers. Because these units were designed primarily for colonial police missions, the military legacy left by the colonial powers was dominated by dismounted infantry formations and relatively low levels of equipment. In the case of Britain, this was a de facto policy; in the case of France, a formal policy was implemented to keep postcolonial militaries relatively small and internally oriented, with France sharing the external defense burden. Equipment deliveries from all sources to the newly independent states were relatively modest, and few, if any, states had developed any military industrial capacity at all.

Turning to the 1980 and 1990 equations, we find a very different pattern. All six equations are significant at or below the .01 level. The first finding that should be noted concerns the R for the equations. Overall, the models fit the data reasonably well, with the 1990 equations seeming to fit slightly better on average. In both sets of equations, the Years at War variable is consistently significant and positive. In most of the equations it also has the largest standardized coefficient. The second threat indicator, Border, is not significant in any of the equations. Regime is also not significant in any equation. igo is significant in five of the six equations in the 1980 and 1990 analyses; the only equation in which it is not significant is the 1980 propeller aircraft equation. Gross national product per capita (gnppc) is not significant in any equation in the 1980 analysis but is significant in the supersonic aircraft and armored personnel carrier equations in the 1990 analysis. Finally, the Alignment variable is significant and positive in four of the six equations, significant and negative in the propeller aircraft 1980 equation, and not significant and negative in the 1990 propeller aircraft equation. In the 1980 world equation (table 3.3) we see a very similar pattern, with the Years at War, igo, gnppc, and Alignment variables positive and significant.

Comparing the findings with the hypotheses, we see first that the national security argument is strongly supported by the consistent positive effect of Years at War. In conjunction with the lack of significant effects by the Border variable, this result strongly suggests that countries should pay attention to their histories of conflict, and not to more abstract indicators of potential conflict, when making weapons acquisition decisions. In contrast with "hard" national security arguments, however, which tend to employ cultural arguments as ad hoc explanations for idiosyncratic cases, the second notable finding is the consistent relationship between international governmental organization membership (igo) and the number of weapons possessed by a country. This finding provides substantively significant support for institutionalist arguments. Indeed, it appears that international organizational membership is significantly related not merely to those weapons that were seen as highly symbolically significant (supersonic aircraft) but also to positivweapons that were seen as of lesser symbolic significance (armored personnel carriers). This finding can be interpreted as supporting a "strong" institutionalist argument. That is, at least for newly independent states, possession of any of the trappings of a modern military may be of symbolic significance.[57] It should be noted that the significance of the Years at War variable does not directly challenge institutionalist arguments, which do not deny the significance of functional factors. Rather, institutional arguments point out that functional requirements are responded to in socially structured ways: modern militaries are seen as the appropriate response to war (rather than other possible responses, including target hardening, civilian- or reserve-based defense, or prayer) because of the highly institutionalized linkage between the nation-state and the military.

TABLE 3.2

Regression Results, Newly Independent States, Year =1990

Dependent Variable	Supersonic	Propeller Aircraft	Personnel Carriers
n =	57	57	57
R^2 =	.461	.362	.435
Years of War	.406***	.465**	.390***
Border	-.042	.064	.036
IGO82	.210*	.331**	.200*
GNPPC89	.288**	.059	.533***
Regime	.133	.050	.178
Alignment	.426***	-.060	.212*

Table shows standardized coefficient, with p values identified as follows:
*** = less than .01
** = less than .05
* = less than .1

The second major issue raised by these results concerns the assessment of the symbolic significance of various weapons. For our purposes, an a priori assumption was made: jets, supersonic aircraft, main battle tanks, and (for later analysis) large naval vessels were assumed to be weapons of high symbolic significance. The results discussed above, and conversations with foreign military trainers, have suggested that many elements of the modern military system may have substantial symbolic significance. Devising a means for systematically assessing the symbolic significance of weaponry remains an important task. The level of technological sophistication involved in a weapon system is clearly one variable that contributes to symbolic value. But the visibility of a weapon may also have much to do with its symbolic value. We are currently proceeding with a study on demonstration effects by examining the proliferation of Exocet missiles after the Falkland Islands war. The results of this preliminary empirical work make it clear that development of a theoretically justified assessment of symbolic significance is a central research task.

The lack of significance of the Regime variable is interesting but not inexplicable. Military regimes may indeed spend more on military budgets and not buy more military hardware. Budgets may very well go to salaries and personal comfort rather than to organizational capability. While we cannot discount the possibility that military power within the nation-state may more profoundly shape procurement patterns--although the effect may be masked by the admittedly crude measure of military power--we can with some safety assume that this effect is not the primary motor driving weapons proliferation.

The Alignment variable shows that a strong connection to the Soviet Union has a substantial impact on force structure: the average state connected to the Soviet Union in 1980 had approximately twelve more supersonic aircraft and one hundred more armored personnel carriers than the average nonaligned/West-aligned state. In 1990 the effect was similar: aligned states had approximately twenty-five more supersonic aircraft and ninety more armored personnel carriers than the reference group. The negative effect of alignment in the propeller equation is interesting. The average Soviet-aligned state has about six fewer propeller aircraft than the reference group. This result may reflect a propensity on the part of the Soviet Union to transfer helicopters rather than propeller aircraft: in equations (not reported in the tables) for helicopter inventories, the alignment variable is positive and

significant, with the average aligned state having five to six more helicopters. Again, it should be noted that the absence of an effect for alignment with the West does not mean lack of Western transfers; it suggests instead a lack of differentiation in Western transfers.

TABLE 3.3

Regression Results, World, Year =1980

Dependent Variable	LSSAC80
n=	138
R^2 =	.502
Log Years of War	.330***
Border	.147
IGO77	.256***
GNPPC79	.264***
Regime	.067
Alignment	.247***
Core	.207*

Table shows standardized coefficient,
with p values identified as follows:
*** = less than .01
** = less than .05
* = less than .1

The pattern of significance for the gnppc variable is interesting. Although insignificant in the 1980 emerging-nation equations, it is significant and positive in two of the three 1990 emerging-nation equations and in the 1980 world equations as well. This outcome may reflect the dynamics of an aggressive marketing effort by major suppliers in the middle period of the arms supermarket. During this rather frenzied time, suppliers may very well have hung out signs that said, in effect, "Credit is no object. Your good name (as a country) is your credit." Certainly this effect was seen in bank loan patterns, as the credit-refinancing crunch of the late 1980s demonstrated. The 1990 equations may reflect the impact of this tightening credit, with propeller aircraft (which have much broader utility and generally much cheaper prices) the only exception.

Before closing, we should review the significance of the 1980 world equation. The world equation includes 138 nation-states, all the countries of the world except for the microstates. The Core variable has a significant effect, and core nations have more supersonic aircraft than noncore nations, but the effects of other variables in the equation are similar to their effects in the developing-world equations. This outcome suggests that the effect captured by the igo variable is relatively robust and is not unique to the developing world or to the formation of new militaries in newly independent states.

In this essay we have tried to do two things. First, we have summarized a theoretical approach capable of moving beyond the ad hoc nature of existing arguments about the role of status and norms in weapons proliferation. Institutional theory provides a vocabulary and a research tradition comparable in sophistication and structure to existing theoretical approaches to weapons proliferation. Second, we have conducted a preliminary empirical investigation employing these arguments. We have argued that the acquisition of modern weaponry, like the acquisition of a flag, is at least in part a product of world-level

cultural definitions of the modern nation-state. The results reviewed above provide some modest, tentative support for our arguments. The theoretical structure of institutional theory, the empirical research informed by it in other substantive areas, and the initial empirical results presented here suggest that institutional theory offers significant insights into the process of weapons proliferation.

In the remainder of this essay we would like to look beyond our initial results and discuss directions for further work. We suggest that this effort be approached not as a process of adjudication, pitting theory against theory in some intellectual version of a World Wrestling Federation loser-leaves-town-winner-takes-all grudge match, but as a process of dialogue, framing more-sophisticated and -nuanced arguments in order to capture important variations in social processes. Weapons proliferation is a complex phenomenon that is unlikely to be explained fully by any single theoretical vocabulary. Theoretical rivalry serves understanding only if it later builds to theoretical synthesis. We have elsewhere laid out suggestions for this process.[58] Here we wish to focus our attention on the development of institutional theory and empirical analysis.

As a first step, we note that the arguments we have laid out have not specified the mechanisms of influence upon which institutional processes are dependent. How is it that world-level cultural models shape the acquisition behaviors of particular nation-states? Full explication of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this essay; it is, however, possible at least to suggest some mechanisms that may serve to carry cultural expectations into the nation-state.

Institutional theory has attended to this issue. When examining the growth and development of the nation-state, institutional theory has primarily emphasized the role of international organizations as "teachers of norms."[59] For example, McNeely notes that international organizations such as the un serve to convey a wide variety of expectations to member states, and Finnemore also traces the powerful role played by unesco in the establishment of national science policy boards.[60] But this organizational- or regime-based mechanism is clearly absent in the world military system. With the exception of nato and the Warsaw Pact, the world military system has no formal international organization or regime with a significant standardizing effect. Thus, while the International Organization for Lappish Culture and Reindeer Husbandry may have the effect of standardizing the forms and practices of reindeer husbandry, no similar organization exists to account for similarity of form and practice in modern military organizations.

Institutional theory, however, when examining the role of cultural processes at the organizational level, has emphasized an additional set of cultural carriers. At this level the role of professional processes in both the emergence and the spread of organizational forms is significant. For example, Meyer and others examine the role of professional processes in educational organizations, Scott looks at these processes in mental health organizations, and DiMaggio examines the construction and spread of the modern American art museum.[61]

While the exact role of professional processes in the emergence and spread of organizational forms varies in each case, all share a common set of elements, including the development of a unique professional identity, the development of a theorized body of knowledge, the development of professional organizations, increases in the density of intraorganizational contacts between professionals, increases in the flow of organization, and the emergence of a collective definition of the field.[62] Students of military sociology and civil-military relations will recognize that this is the story of the development

of the professional officer corps in the early modern era. But while the story of the emergence of the professional officer within the nation-state is familiar, the story of the development of transnational connections within the military profession is less well known.

Our study of this process is in the early stages, but it is sufficiently well developed to outline these linkages. There are at least two key sets of linkages between military professionals that cross national boundaries. The first is the exchange of liaison officers and observers and the development of exchange officers in military schools. While this process has been carried out between developed nations at a relatively modest pace for at least a hundred years, the international exchange of officers has picked up substantially in the post-World War II era. For example, the United States Army's Command and General Staff College usually has students from some fifty to sixty nations attending its courses in any given year. Attendance at military schools in the developed world is very common for military officers from the developing world; indeed, even during the Cold War some Third World officers had the no doubt stimulating and unusual experience of attending both American and Soviet, or American and Chinese, military courses.

The second major set of linkages is the development of an international defense literature. While some of this material is the product of official defense establishments (for example, some U.S. Army professional journals have Spanish editions), the largest part of it is of commercial origin. *Jane's Defense Weekly*, *Aviation Week* and *Space Technology*, and *Flight* are but a few examples of this substantial body of literature. Thus, to a degree that may be unexpected by those who assume that security considerations restrict the flow of defense information across borders, the military profession is marked internationally by many of the same features that other professions exhibit. It seems therefore that many of the same carriers responsible for the transmission of cultural definitions of appropriate behavior in other organizational sectors are also present within the military sector.

Empirical investigation of these arguments needs to proceed along several lines. Along with the development of more-sophisticated quantitative indicators of critical concepts, quantitative work needs to be done employing more-sophisticated techniques, such as event history analysis and sequence analysis.[63] Case study methods also promise insight into the processes described by institutional theory. In particular, case studies offer the ability to assess the degree and nature of connection between states and the larger world culture. The utility of the case study is not unlimited, however. Case studies of individual weapons acquisition processes by individual countries fall victim to the problem noted above: myopic focus on individual cases means that world-level processes are seen only as distant blurs, if at all.

In summary, we have reviewed thinking about the role of status and norms in the proliferation of weaponry. Using institutional theory, we have reformulated these arguments in a way that allows for quantitative empirical evaluation, and, briefly, we have suggested some mechanisms through which cultural models may be transmitted. The results of this effort offer substantial insight into the role of normative processes in weapons proliferation. Norms, we suggest, do not directly cause the acquisition of a particular weapon. Nation-states do not buy particular weapons exclusively to enhance their prestige. Rather, the creation of a military and the acquisition of the basic "tools of the trade" both confer and confirm the central cultural construct of "statehood" wihin the modern world system. The more a nation interacts with this larger cultural environment, the more it tends to assert and authenticate its sovereign status with the ultimate symbol of nationhood, a military.

Although many people have helped us in the course of this work, Victoria Alexander deserves special recognition for substantial effort during the formative period of this essay.

Note 1: See Andrew L. Ross, "Dimensions of Militarization in the Third World," *Armed Forces and Society* 13 (1987): 561-78, and Robert L. West, "Problems of Third World National Security Expenditures" (paper presented at the United States Institute of Peace Conference on Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War World), for discussions of the term *militarization* and the scope and scale of modern militarization. Ross points out that frequent use of the term masks fundamental disagreements concerning its meaning. *Militarization* is used in this introductory paragraph to refer to a steady growth in the military potential of states. By using it in this sense, we follow the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Back.

Note 2: Peter Wallensteen, Johan Galtung, and Carlos Portales, *Global Militarization* (Boulder: Westview, 1985), p. xi. Back.

Note 3: Consider, for example, the growth of navies in Southeast Asia and the increasing attention given to submarines by many navies throughout the world. Back.

Note 4: Although the empirical focus of this essay is on "horizontal" proliferation (that is, the spread of weaponry of a given level of technological sophistication across countries), "vertical" proliferation (the development of weapons of increasing levels of technical sophistication) is of equal concern to the authors. The primary aim here is to develop and test general theories useful for understanding the dynamics of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. The choice to evaluate these theories empirically by examining horizontal proliferation in the "Two-Thirds World" is driven by analytical and methodological issues, not by theoretical claims concerning the uniqueness of the Two-Thirds World or by political concerns about the unique evils of horizontal proliferation. The research reported here focuses primarily on the determinants of conventional weapons proliferation in the states that won independence in the burst of decolonialization following the independence of Ghana in 1957. These ex-colonies began life as newly independent states with, for the most part, only modest military inheritances from their colonial governors. Their militaries were consequently relatively unformed. These states also lacked extensive military production capabilities, which required them to acquire weapons from beyond their borders, thus making the estimate of inventory levels somewhat easier. Together, these circumstances allow for the relatively complete tracing of their weapons acquisition histories. Back.

Note 5: For a discussion of institutional theory and contemporary uses of the term *institution* within sociology, see Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, pp. 143-63 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and W. Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1995). For the foundational work in institutional theory, see John W. Meyer, John Boli, and George M. Thomas, "Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account," in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., *Institutional Structure* : Constituting State, Society, and the Individual (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987); John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 2 (1977): 340-63. Back.

Note 6: Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 2-3,

and others have proposed distinguishing "national states" ("states governing multiple contiguous regions and their cities by means of a centralized, differentiated, and autonomous, structure") from "nation-states" ("state[s] whose people share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity"). This terminology usefully highlights the distinction between ethnic-cultural coherence and political autonomy. The phrase has not yet gained wide currency, however, and in the present discussion the distinction, while useful, is not of central theoretical importance for the processes examined. We therefore use the more common approach of employing *nation-state* to refer broadly to any sovereign entity that possesses territorial integrity and political independence and that enjoys international recognition as the collective representative of a discrete population. Back.

Note 7: Ibid.; Michael Mann, *States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988). Back.

Note 8: The current Namibian military is approximately eight thousand strong and is in the process of acquiring several small patrol craft. These figures compare with Angolan military forces of approximately forty-five thousand (along with twenty thousand internal security police) and approximately forty thousand unita (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces. In 1994, South Africa had armed forces of approximately sixty-seven thousand. The Namibian example, and our assertion of its problematic military utility, is, we realize, suggestive, not conclusive. We include it merely to remind readers of the central symbolic role played by militaries throughout the history of the nation-state, a role that persists even when actual military utility is exceptionally open to question. Back.

Note 9: James G. March, "Decision-Making Perspective: Decisions in Organizations and Theories of Choice," in Andrew H. Van De Ven and William F. Joyce, eds., *Perspectives on Organization Design and Behavior* , pp. 205-44 (New York: Wiley, 1981); Jon Elster, *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Back.

Note 10: For examples of superpower or geopolitical arguments, see Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), or Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," *Daedalus* 104 (1975): 99-129. Back.

Note 11: Arguments about the role that procurement coalitions play in acquisition are most fully developed in examinations of American defense procurement; cf. Gordon Adams, *The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982), for examinations of "iron triangles." Although some similar work has been done on developing-world procurement processes (e.g., Nichole Ball, *Security and Economy in the Third World* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988]; Stephanie G. Neuman, *Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States* [Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984]), it has concentrated on the defense planning and procurement processes of a few large states and does not provide the quantitatively oriented researcher with readily available cross-national and longitudinal indicators of procurement coalition power. Thus, despite the desirability of better-theorized arguments concerning Third World procurement coalitions, quantitative work is limited by the relatively crude indicators available. Back.

Note 12: Thomas Ohlson, ed., *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. xi. Back.

Note 13: Summarized in Edward J. Laurance, *The International Arms Trade* (New York: Macmillan, 1992); A. F. Mullins, *Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, *Arms Transfers in the Modern World* (New York: Praeger, 1979); Robert E. Harkavy, *The Arms Trade and International Systems* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975). Back.

Note 14: Charles H. Anderton, "Arms Race Modeling: Problems and Prospects," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (1989): 349. Back.

Note 15: Rodney W. Jones and Steven Hildreth, *Emerging Powers: Defense and Security in the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 65. Back.

Note 16: Ibid., pp. 5, 60-61. Back.

Note 17: Robert O'Connell, "Putting Weapons in Perspective," *Armed Forces and Society* 9 (1983): 441. Back.

Note 18: Dana P. Eyre, Mark C. Suchman, and Victoria D. Alexander, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation" (paper presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association). Back.

Note 19: We seek to develop arguments that provide a framework for systematically examining the impact of "normative" or "cultural" processes in the world military system. While we work within a well-established body of sociological thought (cited above), the application of these arguments to the examination of areas traditionally ceded to realist theory is new. We do this not in an effort toward an expansive sociological theoretical hegemony but in the spirit of Jon Elster's exposition of the process of "explanation by mechanism" (*Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*). Elster argues that the first step in social science is the development of a "toolbox" of causal mechanisms, a set of "cogs and wheels" that can be assembled to provide explanations of specific events and facts. We seek not to replace other tools but to develop an alternative set of tools. Back.

Note 20: Connie McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States: The Role of International Organizations" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1989), p. 3. Back.

Note 21: For a discussion of the mythos of rationality in Western culture, see March, "Decision-Making Perspective," and Meyer and Rowen, "Institutionalized Organizations." Back.

Note 22: March, "Decision-Making Perspective." Back.

Note 23: James G. March, "Ambiguity and Accounting: The Elusive Link Between Information and Decision Making," in *Decisions and Organizations* , pp. 384-408 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1988); Martha S. Feldman and James G. March, "Information in Organizations as Signal and Symbol," *Administrative Sciences Quarterly* 26 (1981): 171-86. Back.

Note 24: Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism." Back.

Note 25: George M. Thomas and Pat Lauderdale, "State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context," *Sociological Forum* 3 (1988): 383-99. Back.

Note 26: Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press 1977); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). Back.

Note 27: John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993); Donald M. Snow, *Distant Thunder* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); and Martin Van Crevald, *The Transformation of War* (New York: Free Press, 1991). Back.

Note 28: McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States;" p. 2. Back.

Note 29: For welfare, see Thomas and Lauderdale, "State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context"; for education, see Francisco O. Ramirez and John Boli, "Global Patterns of Educational Institutionalization" in Thomas et al., *Institutional Structure* , pp. 150-72. For citzenship, see Francisco O. Ramirez and Yasemin Soysal, "Women's Acquisition of the Franchise: An Event History Analysis" (paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association). Back.

Note 30: Thomas and Lauderdale, "State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context." Back.

Note 31: Ibid., p. 393. Back.

Note 32: Jones and Hildreth, *Emerging Powers*, p. 5. Back.

Note 33: Ohlson, *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security*, p. 49. Back.

Note 34: Catherine M. Kelleher, Alden F. Mullins, Jr., and Richard C. Eichenberg, "The Structure of European Navies 1960--1977," in Oliver Veldman, ed., *The Future of West European Navies*, pp. 173-238 (The Hague: Den Helde, 1980). Back.

Note 35: Michael Howard, "War and the Nation-State," *Daedalus* 108 (1979): 101. Back.

Note 36: Some may object to the comparison of weapons and flags, arguing that flags are purely symbolic and weapons primarily or exclusively functional. We do not disagree with the observation that weapons have functional value. Guns, in fact, can be used to kill people. We do, however, disagree with the assumption that some social objects (e.g., flags) are purely symbolic and also with the a priori assumption that because some social objects (e.g., weapons) have a functional value, functional considerations must necessarily dominate the proliferation of those objects. First, it should be remembered that the actual utility of symbolically significant weaponry, such as a supersonic aircraft, is more open to question than weapons salespeople might acknowledge. This is particularly true in many developing-world strategic and tactical circumstances. Jet fighters, for example, are difficult to maintain and to employ effectively. Second, the a priori assessment of the relative functional value of military weaponry is often dependent on a complex set of assumptions that are themselves as much cultural theories of war as hard-earned, firsthand lessons of war. As a final complicating factor, the socially constructed nature of a "threat" should also be kept in mind. The nature and magnitude of a threat are shaped by perceptual processes and cultural assumptions, as well as military considerations. Thus, the degree to which a given weapon is seen as "functional" is dependent on threats and assessments of utility, both of which are socially constructed. The symbolic and the functional values of social objects cannot be simply separated or assessed. Carl Von Clausewitz, speaking of what he termed the "physical" and

"moral" factors in war, noted: "One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade" (*On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], p. 184). Again, we do not dispute the functionality of weapons. We merely point out that the assessment of "functionality" is more problematic than may be generally acknowledged and that one should begin the study of weapons proliferation with a question, rather than an assumption that one of these two tightly intertwined aspects necessarily dominates. Back.

Note 37: Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51 (1987): 273-86; McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States." Back.

Note 38: Claude S. Fischer and Glenn R. Carroll, "Telephone and Automobile Diffusion in the United States, 1902-1937," *American Journal of Sociology* 93 (1988): 1153-78; J. S. Coleman, E. Katz, and H. Menzel, Medical Innovation (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966); Lawrence A. Brown, *Innovation Diffusion: A New Perspective* (New York: Methuen, 1981). Back.

Note 39: Swidler, "Culture in Action." Back.

Note 40: Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 276. Back.

Note 41: McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States." Back.

Note 42: Paul DiMaggio, "Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory," in Lynne G. Zucker, ed., *Institutional Patterns and Organizations: Culture and Environment* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), p. 6. Back.

Note 43: Pamela Tolbert and Lynne G. Zucker, "Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935," *Administrative Sciences Quarterly* 28 (1983): 22-39. Back.

Note 44: Howard, "War and the Nation-State," p. 104. Back.

Note 45: Others who have employed similar arguments acknowledging the symbolic significance of weaponry but examining distinct historical epochs include William H. McNeill (*The Pursuit of Power* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982]), who looked at the spread of chariots in the ancient world, and Richard A. Fletcher (*Moorish Spain* [London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1992]), who examined the military structures of Moorish Spain. Back.

Note 46: Walter R. Gove, *The Labeling of Deviance*, 2d ed. (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1980). Back.

Note 47: This argument suggests the following hypothesis: elements of the nation-state that are more tightly tied to the local culture will exhibit more variation than elements of the state that are more loosely connected to the local culture and more tightly tied to the world-level cultural model. This argument neatly accounts for patterns of uniform isomorphism in world militaries as observed informally by the first author. Armies throughout the world exhibit substantial variation in the color, design, and symbols used on their uniforms. Navies, in contrast, seem to exhibit substantial uniform isomorphism. Most world navies have uniforms that vary little from the British Royal Navy scheme. Back.

Note 48: Laurance, *The International Arms Trade.Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons.* Back.

Note 49: Here we insert a brief confession of academic unworthiness, in order to reinforce the point we made earlier. The argument that objects that vary in their degree of symbolic significance should exhibit different patterns of diffusion within the world system is a reasonable extension of institutional theory. Developing means of assessing the symbolic significance remains an important task, one that we have not yet tackled. We proceed with this preliminary investigation based on the assumption that "high-tech" weaponry is emblematic of modern militaries and modern states. We believe that this assumption (and our current instantiation of it) is a reasonable starting point for empirical analysis. Moving beyond this assumption, through a theoretically informed, empirical assessment of symbolic significance, is an important future task. We also note, following the comments of one reviewer, that the ability to produce weaponry may also be symbolically significant. We agree and suggest that the arguments we have made would apply, mutatis mutandis. Back.

Note 50: Empirical investigations of the subject (summarized in Mullins, Born Arming; and Laurance, *The International Arms Trade*) have been conducted, including: (1) examinations of broad patterns of international arms transfers (e.g., Michael Klare, The American Arms Supermarket [Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984]), (2) studies of overall military expenditures at the country level (e.g., Robert E. Looney, *Third World Military Expenditure and Arms Production* [London: Macmillan, 1988]), (3) efforts at understanding the growth of overall military capability, through the use of aggregate indicators of military capability (e.g., Mullins, *Born Arming*). Back.

Note 51: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's, 1993); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade Registers* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975); and *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-1985* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987). Back.

Note 52: We have chosen this population of states, and not included the microstates, for research design reasons. It can be argued that both acquisition of weaponry and igo membership are prompted by a third variable, relative importance in world politics. Larger or "leader" states do more of both. This argument has some merit; but in restricting our primary population to developing-world states, we do not include those "core" states that are most important in world politics. While it still may be possible to argue that there is variation in importance in world politics within the population, the argument becomes less compelling. For similar reasons, not including microstates eliminates those states for which any but the most minor involvement in world politics would be a significant strain. Further empirical examination of this argument awaits a more sophisticated research effort. Back.

Note 53: For example, see Thomas and Lauderdale, "State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context." Back.

Note 54: See Michael Kidron and Dan Smith, *The War Atlas : Armed Conflict--Armed Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). Back.

Note 55: While one might wish for a more individually tailored indicator of perceived threat, the conceptual and practical details involved in creating such an indicator are significant. Nonetheless, we stand by the use of the Years at War variable as a reasonable indicator of threat. Countries with a high

level of involvement in warfare probably perceive greater threats than countries with long histories of peace. Back.

Note 56: Kidron and Smith, *The War Atlas* . Back.

Note 57: Our logic in making this assertion is as follows: Previous institutionalist empirical investigations (as noted above) have consistently found that igo membership predicts adherence to world cultural models of statehood. The statement "the more a nation-state is connected to the larger world system, the more it follows the established cultural model of statehood" is strongly supported by empirical evidence (cf. Thomas et al., *Institutional Structure*). We have extended institutional theory through our arguments that social practices may vary in degree of institutionalization and that these variations should affect patterns of diffusion. In order to conduct a preliminary empirical evaluation of this extension, we have made an analytically necessary assumption: that supersonic aircraft have more symbolic significance than armored personnel carriers and propeller aircraft. As is often the case, the results were mixed. In 1980, igo77 was significant in the equations for supersonic aircraft and personnel carriers but not in the equation of propeller aircraft. igo82 was significant in all of the equations for 1990. These results can be interpreted as (a) disconfirming our extension of institutional theory, (b) disconfirming institutional arguments in general, or (c) disconfirming our analytic assumption but being generally in accord with institutional theory. We have chosen (c) because the overall pattern of our results strongly resembles patterns of results in other institutionalist investigations and because we realize that our initial analytic assumption is just that, an initial assumption. It is grounded in a plausible argument, but it remains an auxiliary assumption rather than a theoretically justified, empirically assessed position. Mechanization, it is equally plausible to argue, may be symbolically equivalent (for armies) to high-performance aircraft (for air forces). Back.

Note 58: Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," *Sociological Forum* 7 (1992): 137-61. Back.

Note 59: Martha Finnemore, "Restraining State Violence: The International Red Cross as a Teacher of Humanitarian Norms" (paper prepared for delivery at the 1992 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association). Back.

Note 60: McNeely, "Cultural Isomorphism Among Nation-States"; Martha Finnemore, "Science, the State, and International Society (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1991). Back.

Note 61: See, for example, John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, with the assistance of Brian Rowan and Terrence E. Deal, Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1983), for examinations of the role of professional processes in educational organizations; W. Richard Scott, "The Organization of Medical Care Services: Toward an Integrated Theoretical Model," Medical Care Review 59 (1993): 271-302, for a discussion of the role of these processes in mental health organizations; and Paul DiMaggio, "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940," in Powell and DiMaggio, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, pp. 267-92, for a discussion of the growth of art museums. Back.

Note 62: DiMaggio, "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project." Back.

Note 63: For event history analysis, see Nancy Brandon Tuma and Michael T. Hannan, *Social Dynamics: Models and Methods* (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984); for sequence analysis, see Andrew

Abbott and Alexandra Hrycak, "Measuring Resemblance in Sequence Data: An Optimal Matching Analysis of Musicians' Careers," *American Journal of Sociology* 96, no. 1 (1990): 144-85.

The Culture of National Security

4. Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos

Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald

The concept of deterrence has been central to traditional international security studies. Deterrence has been invoked as the primary explanation for two central phenomena of twentieth-century international relations--the non-use of nuclear weapons and the non-use of chemical weapons. Yet, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that the conventional notion of deterrence--based on a rationalist account--does not by itself adequately account for the practice of non-use of these weapons. Instead, a significant normative element must be taken into account in explaining why these weapons have remained unused. Moreover, closer examination also reveals that rationalist explanations for the development of these norms themselves are indeterminate at best or mistaken at worst.

This essay offers an alternative view on deterrence and the non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons, one that highlights the socially constructed nature of deterrence and deterrent weapons. We argue that in order to fully account for why these weapons have remained unused, we must problematize, not assume, their status as deterrent weapons. The patterns of non-use of these weapons cannot be fully understood without taking into account the development of prohibitionary norms that shaped these weapons as unacceptable "weapons of mass destruction." Moreover, we argue that constructivist accounts are needed to redress gaps or mistakes in existing explanations for the origins and development of these norms.

The discussion presented here consists of four parts. It begins with a critique of the traditional conception of deterrence--a realist explanation that assumes that states are unified rational actors acting on the basis of exogenously given self-interest. We argue that the explanatory power of this conception in accounting for "non-use" is severely limited by its ultimate indeterminacy: it is impossible to know "what deters" or why a practice of non-use has arisen without investigating the normative context in which actor identities and interests are defined. Thus it is not that realist deterrence theory is entirely wrong so much as it is uninterested in the kinds of questions necessary for a full understanding of the phenomenon of the non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons. Positing deterrence as an unproblematic variable elides the question of how certain weapons have been defined as deterrent weapons whereas other weapons have not.

We then suggest social constructivist approaches that problematize the issue of non-use, the nature of the technology and weapons involved, and the notion of actor self-interest upon which traditional deterrence theory is based. The genealogical approach to the chemical weapons (cw) taboo and the social construction of nuclear deterrence both argue that in order to understand the anomalous status and patterns of non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, it is necessary to understand how particular social and cultural meanings become attached to certain kinds of weapons, how these normative understandings

arise historically through actor practices and interpretations thereof, and how they shape actors' conceptions of their interests and identities.

The second and third sections of the essay then suggest how these two constructivist perspectives, respectively, illuminate the two empirical cases--chemical and nuclear. These cases provide a useful comparison, since their domains of analysis are somewhat different. The cw taboo originated largely at the systemic level, while the nuclear taboo arose domestically, principally (although not entirely) in the United States and was then diffused transnationally. These sections highlight how the different conceptual puzzles opened up by these approaches result in a more complete account of the origins and roles of norms in international relations. They briefly sketch the historical development of the respective non-use norms, describe how they enter into an account of the non-use of these weapons, and then suggest several ways these norms have affected the substance of international politics. If anarchy and self-help are "what states make of it," then these non-use norms have constrained self-help by delegitimating certain kinds of military technologies.[1] More broadly, if the "structure" of the international system is understood to include both material and ideational elements, then these norms have come to play a significant role in structuring a certain kind of hierarchical world order in the post-Cold War era.[2]

The final section of the essay evaluates some of the similarities and differences in the two cases with respect to the origins and role of prohibitionary norms in international politics. It summarizes a constructivist perspective on norms, clarifying the relationship between our argument and alternative explanations, as well as how these norms matter and where they came from. It seeks to demonstrate why explanations involving norms are not simply a matter of accounting for "residual variance."

The Social Construction of Deterrence

Explaining Non-use

Deterrence theory, which draws on realist assumptions of unitary state actors and exogenously given interests, focuses its analytical attention on the use of retaliatory threats of force to deter attack.[3] Deterrence is defined as dissuading an adversary from doing something it otherwise would want to do (and which is perceived as threatening) through threats of unacceptable costs. The analytical power of rational deterrence theory derives from a set of simplifying assumptions about how states seek to maximize their utility. Most deterrence theorists stress a strong material cost-benefit logic to deterrence and a strong rationalism.[4]

The logic of deterrence has been invoked as a primary explanation of the non-use of both nuclear and chemical weapons. As the argument goes, the non-use of these weapons is due substantially to fear of retaliation in kind. They are self-evidently so horrifying and/or destructive that actors acting on the basis of rational self-interest would naturally be deterred from employing them, for fear of the overwhelming devastation that nuclear or chemical retaliation would bring. This parsimonious account provides the dominant explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons by the superpowers during the Cold War and is often cited as the most important immediate factor in explaining the non-use of cw.[5]

Yet, explanations from deterrence are insufficient by themselves to explain the non-use of either chemical or nuclear weapons. For example, they cannot account for significant cases of the non-use of

either weapon when there was no threat of retaliation in kind. For cw, the Spanish Civil War, the Korean War, the French in Indochina and Algeria, the Vietnam War, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are prominent cases. Even during the violence of World War II, cw were not employed in situations where they offered a clear military advantage. To cite but one example, the U.S. did not employ gas warfare against the Japanese, even though there was no threat of retaliation and cw would have been enormously effective against Japanese forces entrenched in the tunnels and caves of the Pacific Islands.

Likewise, a deterrence explanation cannot account for why nuclear weapons were not used by the United States during the first ten years of the nuclear era, when the U.S. possessed a virtual monopoly on nuclear weapons and fear of retaliation was not a dominant concern. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States faced crises in Berlin, Korea, Quemoy and Matsu, and Dien Bien Phu. Yet, despite a perceived weakness in U.S conventional military capabilities and a military strategy that relied increasingly upon nuclear weapons, U.S. leaders did not use nuclear weapons during these crises. Later, in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, U.S. officials effectively ruled out use of nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear Iraq, even though a small nuclear weapon could have been militarily effective on the desert battlefield.[6]

Several additional factors suggest why a traditional deterrence explanation is inadequate and raise the issue of the role of normative taboos in shaping the practice of non-use of these weapons. Here the deficiencies in the scholarship on the chemical and nuclear cases diverge somewhat: the literature on cw recognizes that a deterrent explanation alone is inadequate but does not fully explore the mutually constitutive operation of the normative status of cw and its successful definition as a deterrent weapon. In contrast, the nuclear literature by and large finds the deterrence explanation satisfactory. In both cases, however, the acceptance of "deterrence" as more or less unproblematic leads to a slighting of the role of other factors--in particular, normative ones--in shaping the patterns of non-use.

For cw, World War II offers the most studied and spectacular case of non-use, and it is widely recognized in the literature that the avoidance of chemical warfare cannot be attributed solely to deterrence.[7] Indeed, there is a virtual consensus in this literature that attributes this non-event to three major factors:

> The two sides warned each other not to use chemical weapons at the risk of strong retaliatory action in kind; a general feeling of abhorrence on the part of governments for the use of cb weapons, reinforced by the pressure of public opinion and the constraining influence of the Geneva Protocol; and actual unpreparedness within the military forces for the use of these weapons.[8]

It is of signal importance to note that while some authors have privileged individual factors over others for different stages and aspects of the story, none of the major studies has dismissed the prohibitionary norm as irrelevant in the overall explanatory equation.[9] Thus while it has been argued that legal and moral restraints were not central in immediately affecting decisions to avoid using cw,[10] the same authors recognize that the unpreparedness of the military establishments cannot be taken as an unproblematic variable but has to be explained itself. It is here that normative and legal opposition to cw takes pride of place in explaining why cw were not used in World War II, as these restraints were crucial in preventing the assimilation of cw as a standard weapon of war.[11]

On this basis alone, the normative opposition to cw cannot be dismissed as peripheral in preventing the use of cw in World War II. An even stronger case can be made, however, for the impact of the taboo in preventing the use of cw. Just as the literature recognizes that the variable of military preparedness itself has to be explained, it is argued here that the variable of deterrence--the status of cw as a deterrent weapon--also has to be problematized. Why would the fear of retaliatory cw attacks be any more robust a restraint than the fear of other horribly destructive methods of warfare such as incendiary bombing raids or submarine attacks on civilian shipping? If we are to avoid merely begging the question of why a special dread of retaliation operated with respect to cw, we need to understand how the discursive practices of statesmen served to set cw apart as a symbolic threshold of acute political importance and defined cw as a weapon *that might not be used*.

In sum, the odium attached to cw is indispensable in accounting for their non-use. In the absence of a normative discourse that ostracized and politicized the use of cw as unacceptable, illegal, and reprehensible, a strong counterfactual case could be made for the possibility or even the probability that these weapons eventually would have been assimilated into military arsenals and their use would have proceeded as an uncontroversial and unpoliticized standard practice of warfare.

The nuclear case, in contrast, is in some ways a "harder" case for challenging traditional deterrence theory than that of chemical weapons because it is widely felt that the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons *does* render them qualitatively different from other weapons (and therefore makes them "natural" deterrent weapons). Also, in contrast to the chemical case, the U.S. military establishment has been fully prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, while a special dread of nuclear weapons may be easier to understand, the opprobrium attached to them--as with cw--does not follow purely "rationally" or logically from the nature of the technology. Use of the atomic bomb by the U.S. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (which caused less destruction than the firestorms in Tokyo a few months earlier) was widely supported in the United States, and moral arguments were invoked as justification.[12] It was only later, when the development of thermonuclear weapons appeared to clearly violate any previously existing conceptions of proportionate weapons, that a normative stigma against nuclear use emerged. But why did the nuclear taboo then come to apply equally to *all* nuclear weapons, small and large, tactical as well as strategic, irrespective of utility considerations? Why did subsequent efforts to pursue such things as "peaceful nuclear explosions" fail, despite the latter's peaceful and practical applications? Or, to take another angle, why have nuclear weapons, supposedly fearsome deterrent weapons, not deterred some conventional attacks by nonnuclear states against nuclear states or allies of nuclear states?[13] a name="121">A rational deterrence explanation for nuclear non-use, while capturing some broad outlines of the Cold War nuclear experience, also glosses dangerously over the historical record. In doing so it tends to lend an impression of inevitability to the nuclear non-use tradition that is far from warranted. As military historians remind us, the enormous destructive capability of weapons and the prospect of retaliation cannot be assumed to give rise automatically to rational self-interested avoidance-of-use behavior on the part of actors; such assumptions have failed more often than not in the past. The parsimonious explanation for nuclear non-use obscures the variety of reasons that the bomb did not get used on different occasions, not all of which are "normative," to be sure, but not all of which qualify as "deterrent" either. These include concerns about lack of military effectiveness of bombs, shortage of bombs, disagreement over policy options, public and allied opinion, moral concerns, and, especially, contingency. However, as we discuss further in the fourth section of this essay, clear distinctions between "normative" and "nonnormative"

concerns may in actuality be difficult to make. In sum, the overall "pattern of caution" with regard to nuclear use in the postwar era does not mean that in each individual case of nuclear crisis, decision makers were cautious.[14] In fact, the picture over time of nuclear non-use by the United States suggests a significant role for a normative element in undergirding emerging perceptions of nuclear weapons as lacking in military utility. U.S. restraint with regard to nuclear use was in part a matter of chance, in part a matter of deterrence, but was also shaped in part by emerging American perceptions of nuclear weapons as "disproportionate" (a profoundly normative concern), a view that increasingly clashed with U.S. leaders' perceptions of America's moral identity. Even a "realist" such as John Lewis Gaddis concludes at the end of his examination of nuclear non-use during the early postwar period that moral considerations may have played a significant role.[15]

Explaining the Taboos

Both the nuclear and the cw taboos are norms that matter in international politics. The odium attached to the use of these weapons is indispensable in explaining their non-use. In addition, these taboos are phenomena that themselves cannot be reduced to the assumptions of deterrence theory. The problem with deterrence theory is not that its logic has never operated in the case of chemical and nuclear weapons but that it does not address the question of how a particular weapon comes to be defined in deterrent terms whereas other weapons do not or that of how actor "interests" with respect to use or non-use come to be defined. How is it that a prohibitive fear of cw has operated over and above the fear of other powerful means of destruction, some of which are accorded the legitimacy of "conventional" weapons despite their capability to wreak more havoc than cw can? Similarly, how have nuclear weapons been defined alternatively as moral or immoral weapons, and how have perceptions of them been shaped such that all uses of nuclear weapons are unacceptable? How did American decision makers come to define their interests with regard to nuclear use? How have both chemical and nuclear weapons been ostracized apart from other weapons as an unacceptable practice of warfare? What do these prohibitions mean for the practice of international politics?

Just as rationalist explanations for the non-use of nuclear and chemical weapons are not fully satisfactory, neither do rationalist explanations for the norms themselves suffice to accommodate some of the peculiarities involved in the origins and operations of these taboos. The argument is often made that cw have not been used, and a norm of non-use has developed, because cw are perceived as being of marginal military utility. While there is a long controversy over the question of utility of cw (because of complications such as wind conditions, logistical burdens, and so forth), this controversy has never been definitively resolved--there has never been unanimous agreement that the use of cw would not be advantageous in certain circumstances. In short, the argument that the cw taboo arose from the lack of utility of cw is not empirically sustainable, as cw have been favorably assessed by military establishments on many occasions.[16]

A second kind of argument also draws upon the intrinsic characteristics of cw to explain their anomalous status. Michael Mandelbaum has offered an account of the stigma against cw in the course of a comparison between the status of nuclear weapons and that of cw. But while he purports to provide an argument based on cultural and institutional restraints, in the end his case rests on the implausible argument that the opposition to cw is a genetic aversion rooted in human chromosomes.[17] His argument fails because, like arguments that ascribe the norm to the lack of utility of cw, it is premised on the

assumption that there must be a rational reason for the taboo that can be deduced from the essential features of these weapons.

Likewise, it is often pointed out that while the United States did contemplate using nuclear weapons on several occasions, it never faced a situation in which its vital interests were at stake. The intended point is that the real "hard test" case for a constraining norm never materialized. This may be true, but it misses what is interesting here, which is precisely that historically, *despite* the fact that nuclear weapons are indeed qualitatively different, U.S. leaders on various occasions contemplated their use in cases of less than overwhelming national interest. This situation provides telling contrast with today's widely shared assumption that nuclear use could be morally contemplated only in the direst of circumstances (if at all). The historical comparison reminds us that the revolutionary nature of the weapons was not evident to all.

Further, the particular domestic sources of the nuclear taboo--a democratic United States--were crucial in shaping interpretations of these weapons as unusable. While a rationalist account may tell some of the nuclear story, ignoring questions about identity and thus taking interests as given leaves rational deterrence theory fundamentally unable to explain the criteria for "deterrence"--that is, what goes into leaders' calculations of "unacceptable costs." For similar reasons, rationalist regime theory, because it neglects identity, may offer an inadequate account of norms. With its ahistorical approach, rationalist regime theory has little to say about the origins and evolution of norms and practices that cannot be conceived as simply the rational calculation of the national interest.[18]

Actually, both the nuclear and the cw taboos resist the parsimonious explanations offered by rationalist approaches. It is precisely the widely recognized anomaly that taboos may embody an "irrational" attitude toward technology--a norm that defies the realist dictum that only useless weapons are banned--that makes the origins and persistence of these norms such an intriguing puzzle.

For these reasons, it is clear that an account of the chemical and nuclear taboos requires an investigation into the meanings and social practices that have constituted these norms. As James Johnson argues, moral decision making must be understood as "essentially historical in character, an attempt to find continuity between present and past, and not an ahistorical activity of the rational mind."[19] That is, the nature of the question plays to the strengths of constructivist approaches to norms. Such approaches are provided by the genealogical method, on the one hand, and a "social construction of deterrence" approach, on the other. The differences in the two approaches lie in the primary analytical focus: the genealogical approach focuses on understanding how norms are constituted through social and discursive practices and how these discourses normalize or delegitimate forms of behavior; the social construction of deterrence perspective emphasizes the relationship between norms, identities, and interests and provides a causal explanation of how the norm affects outcomes. As will be made clear, these two approaches offer complementary methods of analyzing norms.

The genealogical method, a mode of analysis articulated by Friedrich Nietzsche and popularized more recently by Michel Foucault, is particularly appropriate for shedding light on the case of the cw taboo, for several reasons.[20] Not only is it a method specifically concerned with the origins and operations of moral discourses, but it also emphasizes the role that contingency and chance play in the constitution of moral institutions. As will be discussed below, such fortuitous factors played a major role in the origins and development of the prohibition against the use of cw. In addition, the genealogy is a constructivist approach and is thus well suited to the contention of this essay that the cw taboo is a political

construction that cannot be adequately explained solely by virtue of the intrinsic qualities of cw.

Besides remedying the deficiencies of rationalist approaches by historicizing moral institutions, this study of the cw taboo draws upon the genealogical method through its analytic focus on moral discourses. Discourses produce and legitimate certain behaviors and conditions of life as "normal" and, conversely, construct categories that themselves make a cluster of practices and understandings seem inconceivable or illegitimate.

Prohibitionary norms in this sense do not merely restrain behavior but are implicated in the productive process of constituting identities as well: actors have images of themselves as agents who do or don't do certain sorts of things. Unlike some approaches, which seek to distance the study of norms from power, then, the genealogy in this way implicates norms in hierarchical relations of domination and resistance. Drawing upon these insights of the genealogy illuminates aspects of the origins, functions, and development of the cw taboo that have gone underanalyzed in the literature. All of this results in a better appreciation of the sources and robustness of this remarkable success in banning a weapon of war.

A social constructivist perspective on deterrence also problematizes the social and historical construction of deterrence, but that approach takes as its analytical focus the interaction between norms and the constitution of identities and interests of the actors involved. It holds that in order to determine "what deters," the identity and interests of actors have to be investigated. A social constructivist approach is explicitly interested in the relationships among norms, interests, and outcomes but conceives of norms very differently from the way a rationalist account does. In a rationalist view, norms constrain exogenously given self-interest and behavior or lead to recalculations of self-interest. In the constructivist view--developed primarily in the sociological literature--norms shape conceptualizations of interests through the social construction of identities.[21] Actors conform to norms in order to validate social identities, and it is in the process of validating identities that interests are constituted. Thus both the creation, and reproduction, of norms and their salience for actors are inseparable from the social constitution of actors' identities.

Both of these approaches open up sets of questions different from those that are typically posed by the dominant approaches in international relations scholarship, and it is this problematic that is required for an adequate account of these weapons taboos and their influence on outcomes. What set nuclear and chemical weapons as categories apart from other methods of warfare in the first place? How were nuclear and chemical weapons defined and delegitimated as a special category of "nonconventional" weapons, and what features of these weapons were regarded as critical in regarding them as unacceptable weapons? How did actors come to define their interests with regard to these weapons, and how were their identities validated in the construction and strengthening of these norms? Have the meanings of the taboos changed over time, and what are the implications of such discursive transformations for the robustness of the taboos? In the following two sections, we suggest how the genealogical and social constructivist perspectives illuminate the two cases by showing that deterrence and non-use cannot be adequately explained on a purely rationalist basis, but rather require attention to the elements of identity, contingency, and the socially constructed nature of weapons taboos.

The Chemical Weapons Taboo

In this short space it is not possible to address at each point every alternative explanation for each issue and event relevant to the development of the cw taboo and the non-use of cw. Instead, the account that

follows is designed to illustrate the contributions of a genealogical analysis by filling in neglected gaps in the cw story and redressing key errors. First, and in opposition to essentialist explanations and arguments from utility, the contingency involved in the political construction of the cw taboo is examined to underline the difficulties of a straightforward rationalist accounting of its origins and development. Second, the development of the contested features of the moral discourse are traced in an effort to gauge the robustness of the norm. Third, it is argued that a better understanding of the meaning and significance of violations of the cw taboo is gained when it is recognized that this taboo is implicated in the hierarchical operation of ordering war and international relations according to a discourse that characterizes nations as "civilized" and "uncivilized."

Contingency

Rather than being viewed as simply the inevitable result of the objective qualities of chemical weapons, as is often supposed, the cw taboo is better understood as a political construction that owes much to a series of fortuitous events. International law first proscribed chemical warfare at the Hague Conference of 1899, which banned the use of asphyxiating shells even though no such weapon had yet been developed. This prohibition was accepted by delegates to the conference largely because it was not believed to have much significance. In fact, however, the Hague Declaration subsequently proved to be of no small importance. As will be seen below, later prohibitions against cw--culminating in the Geneva Protocol of 1925--were made possible on the basis of the understanding that these bans represented not the creation of a new norm but only the reaffirmation of the norm embodied in the Hague Declaration. In the absence of the Hague Declaration, it is unlikely that agreement would have been reached on interwar efforts to proscribe cw.[22]

If such an understanding made agreement on a renewed cw prohibition possible, efforts to proscribe cw might not even have been on the international agenda at all except for an interwar hysteria over cw generated by the overzealous propaganda efforts of the chemical industry lobby and the gas warfare lobby. Especially in the U.S. and Britain, a massive campaign made "totally irresponsible . . . exaggerations of new weapons developments" in order to secure chemical tariffs and the survival of chemical warfare departments.[23] The fearful scenarios of future danger that these lobbies constructed around the issue of cw were so effective because they encountered no opposition until it was too late: the same dialogue of dread was being inscripted by the opponents of gas warfare.[24] Hence, the image of cw that was constructed was far out of proportion to the actual danger they represented at the time, as many have noted.[25] Indeed, of all the recent technological innovations in offensive warfare, cw are the one weapon that is most susceptible to defensive measures, a fact that makes the image of cw as a special threat all the more intriguing.

This depiction of cw eventually backfired on those seeking to promote cw preparedness, for it led to renewed efforts to prohibit cw. The first major effort was at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922. At this gathering, U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes pushed through an absolute prohibition on any first use of cw, despite the unanimous recommendations of a subcommittee of experts that cw be treated the same as any other weapon. According to the subcommittee, "the only limitation practicable is wholly to prohibit the use of gases against cities and other large bodies of noncombatants in the same manner as high explosives may be limited."[26] While Hughes was prepared to accept the same kinds of limitations on cw as on other weapons if his resolution had encountered stiff

opposition,[27] his proposal for an absolute ban was accepted as Article V of the Washington Treaty.

Its acceptance was made possible by the belief of the delegates at the conference that such a prohibition was neither nothing new nor anything terribly important. On the one hand, they saw it as merely reaffirming previous bans--the Hague Declaration, whose violation during World War I left little confidence in such treaties, and Article 171 of the Versailles Treaty, which itself cited the previous outlawing of cw as its basis and in any case was essentially an anti-German provision of a dictated peace. Furthermore, it was believed that such a treaty was not very important, since it would not prevent preparations for chemical warfare. Even though the Washington Treaty never came into effect,[28] the clause banning cw lived on in the sense that it served directly as the basis and even the rationale for the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which in turn has operated as the focal point of the cw norm for almost seventy years.[29]

In genealogical fashion, an institutional tradition prohibiting cw came to be invoked as its own justification, in such a way as to obscure the fortuitous ancestry of the taboo. The cw taboo was reborn from the ashes of World War I not simply as a technologically determined and self-interested reaction to a prohibitively costly new means of warfare but also as a political construction whose institutionalization has in turn helped to politically legitimate the definition of cw as a practice beyond the pale of civilized nations.

Defining Features

An important aspect of the cw taboo that is brought out by the genealogical tracing of discourses concerns the features of the taboo that have been regarded as essential in defining cw as unacceptable. When the Germans initiated the use of lethal chlorine gas from cylinders in the trenches of World War I, they defended this use of cw by arguing that it was no more cruel than shattering soldiers to bits with guns and howitzers. In taking this position, the Germans directly challenged the presumption of the cw prohibition that cw were an especially inhumane method of warfare. This contestation of the very core of the cw prohibition became even more prominent in the U.S. Senate during the ratification hearings for the Geneva Protocol. Typical of such a position was the contention of Senator David Reed that the cw ban would prevent the U.S.

> from using gas against the next savage race with which we find ourselves in war, and would compel us to blow them up, or stab them with bayonets, or riddle them and sprinkle them with shrapnel, or puncture them with machine-gun bullets, instead of blinding them for an hour or so until we could disarm them. That is the "humanity" that is attempted to be worked out by the Geneva Protocol.[30]

Because the humanitarian core of the cw taboo has over time become increasingly unacceptable to question, such sentiments strike most contemporary observers as rather unsettling. To bring this out more starkly, the above developments can be compared to attitudes toward cw during the most recent use of cw, the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. Iraq did not even admit to the use of cw until the last year of the war. Even then, Iraq's leaders stated that they supported the general rule prohibiting the use of cw; Iraq justified the use of cw as the "right to defend itself and protect its territorial integrity and its homeland."[31] One need not attribute too much credence to Iraq's claims to abide by the cw norm to notice that something significant had not occurred: a reopening of what has over time become the

humanitarian core of the cw norm. Similar to the Italians in their war against Ethiopia in 1935-1936, the Iraqis made no attempt to legitimate their use of cw on the basis of the alleged humanitarian qualities of cw.

This closure of direct challenges to the humanitarian definition of cw as a particularly odious means of warfare is indicative of a gradual strengthening of the taboo over time. Indeed, while it may seem that the opposition of many Arab nations to the Chemical Weapons Convention[32] represents a fundamental challenge to the anti-cw norm, it will be argued below that this contestation in fact positively depends on cw's being ostracized as a terror weapon of last resort, though now in its more recent incarnation as a "weapon of mass destruction."

Domination and Resistance: Weapons of Mass Destruction

A significant manifestation of the cw prohibition has been its operation in the hierarchical ordering of relations of domination in the international system. This feature of the taboo is most evident in the characterization of cw as weapons of the weak and the taboo's role in the disciplining discourse of civilized conduct of international society.

The Hague Declaration established a discriminatory regime insofar as its language stipulated that the ban against asphyxiating shells was "only binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of war between two or more of them." Furthermore, the declaration stated that "it shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power." Those contracting powers were the nations that would count as the members of an emerging society of civilized states. That is, one of the qualifications for gaining the status of a civilized nation was to participate in the regulation of warfare that began among the European society of states in the mid-nineteenth century.[33] As such, the origins of the cw taboo were implicated in exclusionary practices that distinguished between civilized and uncivilized areas of the globe.

The symbolic connection of cw with standards of civilized conduct has made it more difficult for advanced nations to employ these weapons against each other as just another unremarkable, unpoliticized, and standard means of warfare. At the same time, however, it has also played a part in undermining the taboo in "uncivilized" areas. The invocation of the disciplining discourse of civilization operated during the two most significant violations of the cw taboo since World War I: their use against Ethiopia by Italy in 1935-1936 and during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.

The use of cw against Ethiopia led some to expect--and fear--that their employment would be a matter of course during World War II.[34] For others, however, the assessment was different: war among the industrialized nations of Europe was a different matter than conflicts involving less technologically advanced areas, such as the colonies.[35] The surprising lack of gas warfare during World War II can thus be understood as part of a process by which the conduct of war among "civilized" nations was demarcated from that involving "uncivilized" nations. As one author has put it, a standard view of world affairs after Versailles was that the arenas of European war and colonial war might well have been separable.[36] And the use of cw might have been less unacceptable in one arena than in the other.

This phenomenon of differentiation in the acceptability of forms of warfare has received recent articulation by a number of authors, most forcefully perhaps by John Mueller. For Mueller, major

war--war among developed states--has been subject to a gradual obsolescence that has not occurred in other areas of the globe.[37] The occasional ruptures of the cw taboo reflect the understanding that modern warfare between industrialized powers is a qualitatively different situation than war involving an "uncivilized" country.[38] Such was the argument of the Italians, who contended that the "Ethiopians have repeatedly shown she is not worthy of the rank of a civilized nation."[39]

This disciplining discourse of identity has not issued solely from the developed world, however. In a July 1988 statement defending the use of cw, Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz ventured to argue: "There are different views on this matter from different angles. You are living on a civilized continent. You are living on a peaceful continent."[40] cw were indeed a symbol of unacceptable violence--at least among "civilized" countries.

A related manifestation of the disciplining aspect of the cw discourse has been the characterization of cw as weapons of the weak. To be sure, the designation of cw as the "poor man's atomic bomb" has condescending overtones, but recently this characterization has been turned on its head. The link between chemical and nuclear weapons established by the terminology of cw as the poor man's atomic bomb has been appropriated by some nations in the developing world--the Arab nations in particular--by situating it within a broader discourse of "weapons of mass destruction."

For the industrialized world, the category of weapons of mass destruction has served as the touchstone for efforts to curb the proliferation of advanced weapon systems in the Third World. The Arab world, however, has appropriated this discourse in a manner that has made explicit the double standard in the antiproliferation designs of the industrialized world: while the Third World is prevented from acquiring deterrents such as nuclear or chemical weapons, the Western powers are permitted to retain their weapons of mass destruction--conventional and otherwise--as legitimate tools of diplomacy.[41] Israel's undeclared nuclear arsenal is a particular concern in this strategy of linkage, and it is on these grounds of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction that the opposition of some nations to the Chemical Weapons Convention is centered.

This appropriation of the mass destruction discourse is a remarkable example of the kind of interpretive reversal that Nietzsche and Foucault had in mind in their writings on moral discourses. As Foucault wrote, "The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them."[42]

The important point to note for the purposes of this essay is the effects of this usurpation on the illegitimacy of cw. First, it is to be noted that framing unacceptable weapons in terms of the "weapons of mass destruction" discourse invites the question of why other enormously destructive "conventional" weapons are not included in this category. On that level, the overall thrust of the weapons discourse has been to try to expand the definition of unacceptable weapons rather than to restrict or abolish it.[43]

Second, while the linkage to nuclear weapons conceivably could serve to justify the possession of cw as a deterrent, the linkage to nuclear weapons has not legitimated the actual use of cw. If anything, the taboo against using nuclear weapons is in all likelihood stronger and more universal than the taboo against using cw. Thus the effect of linking cw to nuclear weapons has been to further remove cw from the arsenal of standard and acceptable means of warfare.

The argument here is that this shift in the site of contestation of the norm--from earlier debates over the alleged humanitarian benefits of chemical weapons to contemporary efforts to extend the nonproliferation regime of weapons of mass destruction--is indicative of the consolidation of the taboo over time. Not only is the resistance to the transformation of the norm from use to possession restricted to a small group of nations, but the main thrust of this resistance has not been to challenge the unacceptability of using cw so much as it has been to question the legitimacy of possessing other weapons of mass destruction, including the definition of what counts as such a weapon.

The Non-use of Nuclear Weapons

The analysis of the nuclear case offered here focuses initially on the non-use of nuclear weapons by the United States but then broadens its scope to examine, as in the chemical case, the global implications of the norm for non-use and its world-ordering impact. The "social construction of deterrence" perspective problematizes nuclear "deterrence" and seeks to determine on what grounds the United States was deterred. Why did President Truman agonize after World War II over the possibility of nuclear use again against a nonnuclear adversary while President Eisenhower actively considered nuclear use against allies of a nuclear-armed adversary, for example? Why were only a few nuclear weapons considered enough to deter in the early years while in later years "deterrence" was defined as requiring a much higher level of damage? What goes into the definition of "unacceptable costs"?

These kinds of questions highlight the relevance of a constructivist account that investigates how U.S. interests and identity were defined with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear use. The account that follows emphasizes several features of the origins and operation of the nuclear non-use norm and its impact on outcomes. First is the nature of the initial precedent set by nuclear use on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which provides a point of contrast for later developments. Second is the role of both practice and contingency in the development of the non-use norm and the nonlinear process by which it developed. Third is the way normative concerns that were linked with American identity reinforced emerging perceptions of lack of military utility of nuclear weapons on the part of American decision makers. Fourth, and finally, is the role the non-use norm has come to play in the selective delegitimation of nuclear weapons.

Parts of the constructivist account of nuclear non-use are complementary to a rationalist account (when fear of retaliation genuinely holds), and parts offer an alternative to the deterrence argument (when fear of retaliation is not prominent and other factors, including moral repugnance and the perceived illegitimacy of nuclear weapons, play a significant role). In all cases, however, a constructivist account is necessary to get at "what deters" and how/why deterrence "works."

The Initial Precedent: Hiroshima and Nagasaki--from Seamless Web to Utter Discontinuity

The first point to emphasize is the precedent that World War II created of a seamless web between nuclear and conventional bombing and between "tactical" and "strategic" bombing. It was only later that thresholds were created between the two. As historians have noted, the atomic attacks on Japan represented a continuation of--not a rupture with--wartime bombing strategy.[44] While the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were carried out with new and revolutionary weapons, they simply culminated an effort by American strategic air power to decimate almost every important city in Japan through

firebombing. Nuclear weapons provided a more effective means of carrying out a strategy that was already widely and vigorously pursued through conventional bombing, and "it was not thought that any irreversible threshold had been crossed."[45] In fact, conventional bombing *intensified* after the nuclear attacks, and the heaviest conventional bombing of the war followed Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[46] General Leslie Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, wanted to drop as many nuclear bombs on Japan as were ready.[47] Plans were discussed for dropping a third atomic bomb in late August if Japan did not surrender; after news of the scale of the destruction at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Truman was reluctant to do so, but he began to think he might have to. Recent research reveals that General George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, briefly explored the tactical use of atomic bombs in connection with plans for the possible invasion of Japan at the end of the war.[48]

These facts emphasize the continuity of atomic weapons with existing military strategy and plans. George Quester highlights this continuity, noting that the kind of thinking we tend to associate largely with nuclear weapons existed *before* 1945 with regard to strategic (conventional) bombing: "Modern terms such as 'deterrence,' 'tacit agreement' or 'balance of terror' show up often in the literature, coupled with descriptions of war scenarios every bit as awesome as a nuclear holocaust."[49] Thus the label of "weapons of mass destruction" cannot be said to be simply a straightforward designation of objective features.

Contingency, Iteration, and Principled Belief

While the notion that nuclear weapons ought to remain unused after Hiroshima and Nagasaki dates from the immediate postwar period,[50] its realization in practice and its transformation from a notion of prudence and, for some, moral belief into a collective, normative understanding was a matter of a gradual historical process. During the early period of the Cold War, little consensus existed on the nature of nuclear weapons, their military or political uses, how they should be controlled or managed, or whether they should, or would, be used again. But as the United States became increasingly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, especially after the development of thermonuclear weapons and advanced delivery capabilities by both sides in the mid-1950s, the perception that strategic nuclear weapons could have no meaningful uses increased. However, the development of tactical nuclear weapons combined with the increased prospect of retaliation gave rise to a temporary interest in limited nuclear wars and the possible creation of various kinds of "thresholds."

It was thus only gradually during the postwar period that nuclear weapons acquired their status as unacceptable weapons and that the no-first-use taboo emerged and the utter discontinuity between nuclear weapons of all kinds and conventional weapons was established. But this development was neither linear nor inevitable; rather, it owes much to the combined workings of contingency and the iterated practice of non-use over time, as well as to self-conscious efforts on the part of some to foster a normative stigma. For example, President Truman, though he had been the one who actually dropped the bomb, expressed great horror at the possibility of having to do so again. His administration spent considerable energy pursuing the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic weapons at the un, and Truman established the precedent of civilian control over nuclear weapons, thus signaling their special status.[51] The Eisenhower administration, however, subsequently attempted to reverse earlier efforts at setting nuclear weapons apart as something "different." It is useful to speculate on the counterfactual

situation--that had Eisenhower preceded Truman as president, postwar nuclear history might have looked quite different.

The Impact of the Norm

While conventional deterrence theory takes interests as given, from the constructivist perspective the issue is how normative considerations, identities, and interests regarding nuclear use mutually shaped each other and hence influenced outcomes. The Korean War provides a good example of how an emerging "taboo" against initiating use of nuclear weapons influenced American leaders. In the 1950s, the emerging non-use norm entered decision making instrumentally in the form of a "cost" (public opinion against the first use of nuclear weapons), which top decision makers initially sought to appease, while disagreeing with it themselves. When President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles came into office, tactical nuclear weapons had recently become available, and they actively sought to make these weapons "usable," i.e., to make them like any other weapon. Their attempts reveal the normative stigma against nuclear weapons that was already beginning to emerge. Policy discussions during the spring of 1953 on how to end the Korean War suggest that Eisenhower and Dulles were more preoccupied by the constraint on nuclear use imposed by negative public opinion than by any more material concern.[52]

Over time, a central element of the definition of nuclear weapons was that they were disproportionately lethal, and this aspect came to clash with U.S. leaders' perceptions of the United States as a moral country that took seriously the traditional laws of armed conflict, such as proportion in the use of force and the avoidance of killing noncombatants. During the crisis over Quemoy and Matsu in 1958, several State Department officials who thought Dulles was too enthusiastic about seeking out opportunities for use of tactical nuclear weapons produced some estimates showing how many civilians would be killed on the islands by a U.S. tactical nuclear attack on Chinese forces. There is some reason to believe that this dampened Dulles's ardor for the nuclear option; in any case, the issue was disproportionate destruction of civilians--a normative concern--not fear of retaliation.[53]

In contrast to the chemical case, in which chemical weapons were not well integrated into the military establishment, nuclear weapons have been the central element of U.S. military plans since the late 1940s.[54] This information raises the question of the location of the nuclear non-use norm. As it emerged, it was held primarily by the top civilian leadership and by the public, but not by the military as an institution. However, even the U.S. military and nato have over time moved away from the "early first use" plans of the early Cold War years toward what many have argued is a de facto no-first-use position. Normative development tends to proceed neither linearly nor necessarily coherently: norms can (and often do) develop even in the face of seemingly contradictory behavior.[55] As the non-use norm continues to strengthen, one would expect to see it increasingly reflected in operational plans that downgrade the role of nuclear weapons.[56]

Though the U.S. was the only country ever to have used nuclear weapons in warfare, American leaders later came to define nuclear use as contrary to Americans' perception of themselves. As one high-level official reportedly said of the nuclear option during the 1991 Persian Gulf war, "We just don't do things like that."[57] This unwillingness to consider nuclear options in the war against Iraq, where no fear of retaliation existed, provides telling contrast to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A non-use norm has ruled out

any serious consideration of nuclear use in places where small nuclear weapons might have been useful--to bomb bridges or dams in the Vietnam War, for example, or in the Gulf war for use on massed Iraqi troops--wars that were otherwise highly destructive.[58] The drive to create "smart" bombs and other high-tech options so that leaders will not have to resort to nuclear weapons is indicative of the special status of nuclear weapons. Whereas nuclear weapons were once relied upon in order to avoid spending money on conventional forces, the nuclear non-use norm now propels the building of high-tech conventional arsenals that are more politically "usable."

But with the convergence in destructive power of small nuclear weapons and advanced conventional weapons, the traditional threshold between nuclear and conventional technology may become increasingly blurred. Fuel-air explosives provide a case in point. During the Gulf war, coalition military leaders first worried about Iraq's possible use of fuel-air explosives and then used such weapons themselves at the end of the war against Iraqi forces. Military officials described the weapons as capable of delivering a devastating blast similar to a small nuclear explosion over an area several miles wide.[59] Unlike chemical and biological weapons, fuel-air explosives are blast-effect weapons and there is no ready defense against them. Official and private statements on why the United States would not need to resort to nuclear weapons in the Gulf war generally echoed the theme that the coalition could create equivalent damage with conventional forces without the moral "downside" of using nuclear weapons. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons per se was not a prominent feature of the reasoning.[60]

The strength of the nuclear taboo and the odium attached to nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction render unusable all nuclear weapons, even though certain kinds or uses of nuclear weapons could, from the perspective of just war theory, conceivably be justified. The feature of nuclear weapons at the core of the taboo--their disproportionate nature--may change with advancing technology. As scattered proponents of tactical nuclear use during the Gulf war argued, in some circumstances the use of very small, accurate "micronukes" with low yields could minimize disproportionate destruction and avoid the killing of noncombatants.[61] The capability must be juxtaposed against the coalition's destruction of the Iraqi electric and water infrastructure during the Gulf war, which caused vast numbers of civilian deaths from infectious diseases and the lack of food, water, and medical care.[62] Such an attack erodes the moral claims against the killing of noncombatants, which are the traditional basis for objection to nuclear weapons. Thus the nuclear taboo may have "permissive effects"--permitting other weapons and practices that, while avoiding the stigma of nuclear means, accomplish equivalent ends of destructiveness.

The Non-use Norm and World Order

As suggested in the discussion of the cw taboo, both the chemical and the nuclear prohibitionary norms have become instruments for structuring certain kinds of status hierarchies in the international system, thus becoming, in effect, "world order" norms. This development is particularly interesting in the nuclear case because of the patently asymmetrical application of varying nuclear prohibitionary norms to different categories of states and because of the remarkably widespread--if ultimately fragile--acceptance of the legitimacy of this asymmetry.

In the post-Cold War era, nuclear proliferation has replaced superpower conflict as the major potential threat to the tradition of non-use. The links between non-use and nonproliferation are best understood in

terms of the differing--and sometimes tenuous--degrees of legitimacy that the international community appears to attach to different aspects of nuclear weapons--use, acquisition, possession, and deterrence--and the ambivalence toward such weapons that this attitude ultimately reflects.[63] These various nuclear taboos apply unequally to states--only the great powers may legitimately possess nuclear weapons, for example--and provide mechanisms for the international community to differentiate the status and legitimacy of the various states. Compliance with the appropriate nuclear norms reinforces the identity of states and their status as legitimate members of the international community and/or as a certain kind of state (responsible, civilized, etc.).

The non-use norm, for example, provides the basis for justifying asymmetrical rights and statuses between nuclear and nonnuclear powers. On one hand, the non-use norm has the effect of legitimating and stabilizing the practice of deterrence between the superpowers. Stable nuclear deterrence could not be taken for granted at the end of the 1950s; up to 1962, U.S.-Soviet relations were unstable because there was as yet no expected process by which they were conducted and there were few shared norms. After 1962, deterrence was stabilized by a host of arms control agreements that embodied a variety of shared understandings about nuclear weapons and were based implicitly on the expectation that nuclear weapons should not be used.[64] These made the process predictable and legitimated the concept and practice of deterrence as the appropriate form of superpower political competition.

On the other hand, nuclear deterrence is a practice reserved for the superpowers, and the non-use norm at the same time serves to justify the illegitimacy of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the majority of the world. This relationship between non-use of nuclear weapons and "nonacquisition" is explicitly embodied in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in various commitments by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers who are parties to the treaty.[65]

Norms, Constructivism, and Explanation

In the final section, we briefly compare and contrast the two cases, with the aims of drawing out some generalizations and also clarifying more specifically a constructivist conception of the role of norms. Specifically, we summarize and assess the contribution of our cases with respect to three questions: (1) What are alternative explanations of non-use? (2) How do these norms matter (what were their effects)? (3) Where did these norms come from (why is rationalism insufficient)? Consideration of these questions helps to illuminate the basic constructivist argument about norms and how they work, in particular why and how it is not merely a matter of explaining "residual variance."

The Two Cases Compared

The chemical and nuclear cases present a number of interesting similarities and differences with respect to the origins and role of norms. While both are highly specific norms, the nuclear non-use norm was initially *uninstitutionalized* (in fact, "use" is what was institutionalized), while the anti-cw norm was *institutionalized* from its earliest origins.[66] In the nuclear case, the de facto norm arose first, and only later did it begin to become institutionalized in bilateral and multilateral security and arms control agreements. Unlike the case of the chemical taboo, there is as yet no specifically *legal* prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons.[67] This process contrasts with that depicted by the dominant approach to norms in the international relations literature (i.e., rationalist regime theory), which tends to focus on

how norms are created in the process of negotiating institutions (a process that may be more characteristic of political economy than of security issues). In contrast, the anti-cw norm is not only *institutionalized*, but the fact that it was institutionalized before the development of modern chemical weapons is perhaps the single most outstanding feature that explains how cw have been so successfully ostracized. Finally, the nuclear non-use norm is probably stronger and more widespread than the chemical taboo, despite the fact that it is largely a de facto norm.

These cases also raise the issue of the relationship between national and international norms. The nuclear case focuses on how a norm arose in a *national context* (that of the United States) and then was subsequently diffused more broadly, while the chemical case involves a norm that was created at the *international level* and then diffused into national policies.[68] Both of these analyses could, in theory, be broadened to look at the rise of these non-use norms globally (though this is not to claim that they are universal), the various processes by which this rise occurred, and the way these norms now shape actors' perceptions of their identities and interests. We have suggested how they both constitute part of a larger explanation concerning the rise of international society and efforts to regulate the destructiveness of warfare among "civilized" states. It was because of such concerns that cw (especially) and, later, nuclear arms control and disarmament were placed on the international agenda in the first place.

The single most important effect of these taboos, however, is that the delegitimation of these weapons constrains the practice of self-help in the international state system. Military technologies that might be useful under some circumstances are successfully proscribed. This phenomenon belies the realist view--captured in the sayings "war is hell" and "in time of war law is silent"--that everything is permitted in warfare. Rather, the existence of prohibitionary norms reveals that war is rarely absolute; instead, it displays features of a social institution.[69] National leaders are forced to seek or develop alternative technologies for use in war or defense--or else risk being classified as acting outside the bounds of "civilized" international society. "Society," not anarchy, is the source of constraining and permissive effects.

In sum, these stories suggest that the path of normative development can be highly varied. They suggest that prohibitionary norms can be institutionalized early or late, that they can arise from different sources--from power politics, moral opprobrium, and/or domestic politics--and that they can arise either in a national context and be diffused more broadly or at the international level. They also suggest that norms may arise more or less spontaneously or as the result of intentional efforts. Finally, they point to the important role of historical contingency in normative development, highlighting the often nonlinear, contingent, and contradictory features of this process.

Alternative Explanations

Why were the weapons not used? We have argued that the development of prohibitionary norms was a necessary condition for the limited use of nuclear and chemical weapons. Without these taboos, the patterns of use would likely have looked quite different. In short, there would have been more use. In order to explicate more precisely the nature of this claim, we show below how it relates to possible alternative explanations.

Several alternative explanations could be put forth. The most skeptical is the occasionally cited argument that nuclear and chemical weapons were not very useful and hence states did not use them. In this view--a classic realist argument--norms are simply frosting on the cake. They merely prohibit what states