Propaganda and Intelligence in the Cold War

The NATO Information Service

Linda Risso

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This book offers the first account of the foundation, organisation and activities of the NATO Information Service (NATIS) during the Cold War.

NATIS was pivotal in bringing national delegations together to discuss their security, information and intelligence concerns and, when appropriate or possible, to devise a common response to the 'communist threat'. At the same time, NATIS liaised with bodies like the Atlantic Institute and the Bilderberg Group in an attempt to promote a coordinated western response. The NATO archive material also shows that NATIS carried out its own information and intelligence activities.

Examining the role of NATIS as a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques about how to develop and run propaganda programmes, this book presents a sophisticated understanding of the extent to which national information agencies collaborated. By focusing on the degree of cooperation on cultural and information activities, this analysis of NATIS also contributes to the history of NATO as a political alliance and reminds us that NATO was – and still is – primarily a political organisation.

This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, Cold War history, intelligence studies and international relations in general.

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**In memory of
Claudio Costatini and Vittorio Foa**

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Abbreviations

AAYPL	Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders
ACC	Atlantic Citizens Congress
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ACUS	Atlantic Council of the United States
AD 70	'Allied Defence in the Seventies' report
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Europe
ATA	Atlantic Treaty Association
AUC	Atlantic Union Committee
CCF	Congress for Cultural Freedom
CCMS	Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CCWU	Clandestine Committee of the Western Union
CEAS	Committee on European and American Studies
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICR	Committee on Information and Cultural Relations
COI	Central Office of Information
CONIO	Conference of National Information Officials
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DAU	Declaration of Atlantic Unity
DRDC	Defence Research Directors Committee
DPC	Defence Planning Committee
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EDIP	European Defence Improvement Programme (Eurogroup)
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
END	European Nuclear Disarmament
EPC	European Political Community

ERP	European Recovery Programme
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLP	Foreign Leader Program
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HION	History of International Organizations Network
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IOD	International Organizations Division (CIA)
IPC	International Press Centre, NATO
IPWG	Information Policy Working Group
IR	International Relations
IRD	Information Research Department
ISC	International Student Conference
IUS	International Union of Students
IVP	International Visitor Programme
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
MOC	Media Operation Centre, NATO
MODIO	Conference of Information Officials in Ministries of Defence
MSA	Mutual Security Agency
NA	NATO Archives
NAA	North Atlantic Assembly
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATIS	NATO Information Service
NAT-MDAP	North Atlantic Treaty and Mutual Defence Assistance Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATO-PA	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Parliamentary Assembly
NIDC	NATO Information and Documentation Centre
NIIS	NATO International Information Service
NIO	NATO Information Office
NMIC	NATO Mobile Information Centres
NPC	NATO Parliamentarians' Conference
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NRF	NATO Response Force
NRPC	NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
PCF	Parti Communiste Français
PCI	Partito Comunista Italiano

PDD	Public Diplomacy Division
PfP	Partnership for Peace
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SCAO	Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations
SCOM	Science Committee
SGPDN	Secrétariat Général Permanent de la Défense Nationale
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHAT	Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre
TNA	The National Archives, Kew
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNIC	Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council
USAF	United States Air Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
WAY	World Assembly of Youth
WEU	Western European Union
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth
WHO	World Health Organization
WPC	World Peace Council
YATA	Youth Atlantic Treaty Association

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Introduction

The body of scholarly works on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grows constantly as numerous new contributions are published every year. The end of the Cold War, and the debates surrounding the future of the alliance, have sparked a renewed interest among scholars eager to probe the alliance's military role, its contribution to the development of new security concepts and its value as a tool in the western response to terrorism. It has also prompted a significant adaptation in the way political scientists and international relations scholars have written about NATO.

From the 1950s, Karl Deutsch's concept of 'security community' was central in framing the analytical framework in which NATO was studied. By security community, Deutsch meant a region that had become integrated to the extent that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way'.[1] According to Deutsch, there are two types of security communities: the amalgamated security community, such as the United States, and the pluralistic security community, where the member governments retain their independence.[2] NATO clearly falls under this second heading and was therefore studied as such by political scientists. Since the end of the Cold War, Deutsch's concept has been adapted by constructivist scholars, principally Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, who redefined a security community to emphasise shared identities, values, meanings and reciprocal long-term interests.[3] It is an approach that chimes with the post-Cold War challenge to NATO of how a security community might extend beyond its own geographical area and seek to influence neighbouring countries to ensure political stability and good governance.

A similar shift is discernible in historical studies of the alliance. For many years, studies of the alliance's historical development tended to focus on its deterrence and defence functions and on how changing perceptions of the Soviet threat and military balance informed NATO's debate on Cold War military strategy and force planning. There was also a strong focus on the history of transatlantic relations and American defence policy. Less attention was given to how the alliance evolved into a forum of

political consultation and cooperation and how it reacted to new political and economic challenges. Recent contributions have tried to correct this trend. Andreas Wenger and Leopoldo Nuti, for example, have looked at the emergence of a common political culture at the core of NATO to explain its survival during the crises of the 1960s and 1970s.[4] Lawrence Kaplan, the doyen of NATO historians, has examined the alliance's role in keeping the Americans, and to a certain extent the British, committed to the continent, ensuring the participation of West Germany. More recently, Kaplan has illustrated how, throughout NATO's history, the alliance has faced and dealt with periodic crises, from Suez to Iraq.[5]

When looking at the history of the alliance, scholars tend inevitably to focus on situations of crisis rather than to look at the sustained degree of political cooperation, and Geir Lundestad has rightly spoken of a 'crisis perspective' that dominates the literature on European–American relations in general and NATO in particular.[6] Even the three-volume history of NATO edited by Gustav Schmidt, which has the merit of giving a sense of the complicated nature of the alliance and of its history, does not provide a satisfactory analysis of the interplay between the national and international dimensions and of how this reciprocal influence impacted on the alliance's security concept and political dimension in the long term.[7] The result is that no sustained historical study of the alliance as a multilateral political forum has yet been carried out.[8]

This absence is not unique to the history of NATO and partly reflects the difficulties inherent in researching and writing the history of international organisations, which pose intricate methodological questions. In recent years, historians and international relations experts have engaged in a lively debate about the methodological and epistemological problems posed by the institutional history of international organisations. This has led to quite a rich body of literature. Numerous scholars have tackled the issue by looking at the origins of international cooperation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In their respective studies of the United Nations, Mark Mazower, Paul Kennedy and Jussi Hanhimäki, for example, have looked at the history of the organisation, often going back to the League of Nations.[9] Yet they recognise the limitation of their approach, acknowledging that their work does not offer a full historical account and adopts a restricted focus on the origins, or on crucial passages. Most significantly, they do not put forward a normative framework that can be applied more broadly to the study of international organisations. This has been attempted by political scientists and IR specialists. Akira Iriye, for example, has focused on the narrative of an evolving 'global community'; Madeleine Herren's empirical approach recognises the entangled history of international organisations and the role of transcultural history, with a strong focus on key policy-makers rather than organisations themselves. Amy Staples has looked at the role of professional interest groups as driving forces for the newly created international

organisations after 1945 and Bob Reinalda has offered an encyclopedic overview of some key international organisations. Yet none of these works offers an overall methodological framework for the historical study of international organisations.[10]

This, however, is a rapidly developing area of study. The launching of the History of International Organizations Network (HION) in 2008 and that of the *Journal of International Organizations Studies* in 2010 are further signs of the increasing academic interest in the topic.[11] The United Nations itself has also engaged in refining methods and theoretical frameworks of study by actively contributing to cooperation among historians and practitioners and opening up its own archives.[12] Nevertheless, problems remain for the specifically *historical* study of international organisations.

Functionalist approaches and regime theory derived from political science and IR do not seem to be effective analytical tools for the historian, as they do not give sufficient weight to negotiation and to political compromise.[13] Organisational research in sociology and management studies is also of limited value for historical analysis. Sociological approaches tend to focus on the bureaucracies, national traditions, approaches to policy making and the influence of culture, which are indeed important elements to be considered but unfortunately restrict the focus on the institutional history of the organisations and do not include, for example, the role of ideas. The result is that the international organisations seem not to have a life of their own but to be the result of a multiplicity of external influences. Constructivist theories, on the other hand, do focus on the role of ideas which translate into the examination of new approaches to policy making and to the organisation's own assessment of its position in the world. Yet the risk here is to look at international organisations as fully independent and self-reliant international actors on the world stage, and thus ignore, or minimise, the role of national governments.

Similar problems have been faced by historians working on the history of the European integration process. Scholars have struggled to find an effective analytical framework, and the work of Wolfram Kaiser is known beyond the restricted circles of European integration scholars for his attempt to combine historical methodology and political science theory. However, Kaiser's focus on transnational networks answers only part of the problems faced by historians of international organisations and leaves open the question of how the networks' ideas influenced government policy and the institutional history of international organisations.[14] The official history of the European Commission recently published on behalf of the Commission itself has again the merit of gathering together some of the most important scholars in the field and of offering an overview of some key episodes and policy-makers, yet precisely because it is a co-authored volume in which each chapter focuses on the uniqueness of the

topic it discusses, the final result is a composite puzzle more than an encompassing narrative.[15]

Overall, there is still a sense of the need to go beyond the anachronistic focus on international organisations as diplomatic forums and to elaborate a more sophisticated methodological framework that takes into account the national and international dimensions and their reciprocal influence and places the institutional history of the international organisations within the appropriate geopolitical contexts in the long term. This is not an easy task. Historians need to take into account the institutional development of the organisation itself; the role of personalities; the changing geopolitical climate in which the organisations operate; the developing priorities of the member states, including their periodic changes of governments; and the presence of long- and short-term alliances between groups of member states to push forward certain goals within the organisation. Thus, the history of international organisations is potentially a never-ending one, with ramifications that go well beyond its institutional history and touch upon an endless series of influencing factors. There is also a problem of perspective, as historians need to adopt either an institution-centred or a member state-focused approach.

The history of NATO, as we will see in this book, is further complicated by the fact that different security concerns and diverging views of the role of the alliance dominated successive phases of life of the alliance and shaped its development. During the Cold War, there was never any doubt that the primary task of NATO was to achieve a common defence strategy able to defend Western Europe from an attack from the East. Yet different ideas about the nature of the communist threat and the ways in which the West should respond, as well as diverging legal traditions, political priorities and security concerns, meant a continuous shift of focus. A sustained history of NATO as a political and military alliance thus requires multi-national archival research to examine the position of the member states as well as to examine the organisation's papers to understand how the different viewpoints and interests found their place within the alliance's inter-governmental structure. It also demands the examination of the changing nature of East–West relations, the role of transatlantic elite networks and the impact of the shifting economic balance between the two sides of the Atlantic, including the fortunes of the emerging Common Market.[16] Thus, writing a comprehensive history of NATO, as of any other international organisation, is indeed problematic; it is a task that will require much preparatory work from several historians. This book is a contribution to that work. The reader should see the research findings discussed in the following chapters as a step towards a comprehensive history of the alliance pursued through a focus on the history of the Information Service and on a selection of its outputs. Precisely because of its well-defined focus, this book is able to follow the institutional development of the Service throughout the Cold War and to assess the changing weight of the information

work within the alliance due to a varying degree of solidity of the internal political consensus as well as of the alliance's developing security concept. The history of the NATO Information Service opens a new window into the history of the alliance, its changing defence strategy and the variable degree of internal political cooperation. It demonstrates the often underestimated influential role of smaller European states and the creation of coalitions – often short-lived coalitions, it should be said – within the alliance and how they shaped the organisation's political agenda.

The NATO Information Service and the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations

The NATO Information Service (NATIS), later called the Office of Information and Press and today the Public Diplomacy Division, was established in 1950. Its remit was to promote the alliance between its own members, initially by working exclusively in collaboration with the national information agencies and later by producing its own propaganda material and cultural programmes. Throughout the Cold War, the activities of NATIS were scrutinised by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) and ultimately by the North Atlantic Council, meeting routinely at the Permanent Representative level and intermittently meeting at ministerial or heads of state and government levels. Perhaps once a year, sometimes less frequently, these meetings would assess the work carried out by NATIS.

The primary aim of this book is to provide the first sustained study of the history of NATIS throughout the Cold War. Given its central role in coordinating pro-NATO and anti-communist propaganda campaigns, the history of NATIS contributes significantly to our understanding of Cold War cultural diplomacy. By examining the role of NATIS as a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques about how to develop and run propaganda programmes, we can gain a more sophisticated understanding of the extent to which national information agencies worked together and possibly learned from each other. This book examines in particular how the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations acted as discussion platform among countries with different legal traditions, policy concerns and security priorities. By focusing on the degree of cooperation on cultural and information activities, a history of NATIS also contributes to the history of NATO as a political alliance and reminds us that NATO was – and still is – primarily a political organisation.

It may be interesting to point out here that there was an asymmetry in the 'Cultural Cold War'. While NATO did indeed have its own information office, the Warsaw Pact did not have an agency of this kind.[17] Of course, the Warsaw Pact did not need similar propaganda machinery, as the job was already dealt with, and very effectively so, by the Cominform. The NATO allies were acutely aware of the advantage that the Cominform allowed the Warsaw Pact in terms of a consistent propaganda campaign

both in peacetime and, more worryingly, in wartime. According to the terms of reference of NATIS, in the event of conflict, the western national governments would resume full competences over all aspects of information policy directed towards their own public, and the result could have easily been a heterogeneous list of conflicting viewpoints within the alliance. The inconsistencies and incongruities in the western communication policy could be easily exploited by the communists to feed into conspiracy theories and to undermine the public's morale. Thus, as discussed in the following chapters, the history of NATIS is the history of a continuous struggle between the need to ensure consistency of all the members' information campaigns about the alliance in times of peace and in wartime, and the determination of all national governments not to delegate to the alliance any power over information policy, which was perceived as a crucial part of national sovereignty and security.

Through the examination of the content, style and format of a sample of the information material produced by NATIS up to 1991, this book investigates how the Service progressively targeted a larger set of audiences and took advantage of new media. After an initial phase in which it primarily addressed the so-called opinion formers, NATIS soon widened its scope and collaborated with a network of voluntary organisations in an attempt to address different sectors of society and to engage with the younger generations. The examination of these propaganda outputs demonstrates a shift away from straightforward anti-Soviet and military-based concepts towards a more articulated series of programmes that promoted the alliance as a political organisation that fostered cooperation among its members and helped them prepare for a wide range of threats, including pollution, nuclear waste disposal and new technologies. Through the analysis of the discussions that took place within the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations and of a selection of the propaganda material produced by NATIS, this book addresses the question of the value of institutional histories of propaganda agencies, by which is meant the reasons behind propaganda campaigns, and how they are put together and run.

Finally, the book examines the interplay between intelligence and propaganda, and, as mentioned above, particularly how the former feeds into the latter. As the NATIS papers show, the intelligence community was indeed interested in using the CICR as a forum through which they could learn what the other national governments were doing to prevent or to minimise the impact of the cultural initiatives promoted by the Cominform and by the national communist parties. In addition, participation in initiatives organised by, for example, the World Peace Conference allowed the intelligence services to observe life in the Soviet bloc from up close and gather further information that could later be used in the next propaganda programme. Thus, forums like the CICR allowed continuous contact with information and intelligence officers from other NATO member countries in a permanent – yet rather informal – setting.

This book is intended to contribute to the institutional history of NATO as a political organisation. The alliance's attempt to engage directly with public opinion without the mediation of national governments is an important part of the alliance's history. The study of the Information Service opens a window on the alliance's – meaning the Council's and later the Secretary General's – own assessment of its position in the Cold War, of its priorities and of its security concept. This book allows a preliminary investigation of the ongoing internal compromise between the members on anything ranging from weapon modernisation and estimates of the Warsaw Pact's military strength, to cultural exchanges programmes and publications. It challenges the view of NATO as a monolithic alliance in which episodes like the Suez Crisis, the French partial withdrawal of 1967 and the dual-track decision are exceptions. It is the contention of this book that they were in fact visible crises emerging from a continuous arm-wrestling process between the members that characterised the history of the alliance since its inception. Albeit through a restricted focus on information, this book draws attention towards internal frictions, shifting alliances and continuous negotiations. More generally, besides offering some preliminary methodological tools with which to investigate the institutional history of international organisations, this book contributes to the history of propaganda in the West during the Cold War.

Propaganda and information

Before proceeding any further, it may be helpful to clarify briefly the use of the terms 'information' and 'propaganda'. The two are used here as synonyms, although in the NATO archival documents – and in most of the literature on the topic – they are not used as such. According to the NATO documents, the communists were carrying out 'propaganda activities' against NATO and the West, whereas the alliance was 'informing' the public or – as was said at the time – 'enlightening public opinion'. However, closer inspection reveals that the methods and techniques used by the two sides were similar and that the lexical differences were primarily due to the negative connotations associated with the term 'propaganda'.

Propaganda, to quote Fabrice d'Almeida, is a *mot disgracié*, a 'word gone bad', owing to the association in people's mind with the two world wars, and particularly with the Nazi and Fascist regimes.[18] The word has acquired a sinister connotation, which we automatically link to the manipulation of people's will to suit the elites' needs so that they can pursue their own goals, which may not necessarily coincide with the interest of the people they govern.[19] According to this view, propaganda can only be a tool of totalitarian regimes because they can have full control of the media and of the messages allowed to circulate among the masses. Democracies, the refrain goes, cannot engage in propaganda because of their

very pluralist and democratic structure that allows freedom of speech and independent media, which relentlessly scrutinise what the government does and says. In any case, propaganda is always 'something someone else does'.[20] In fact, one could argue that claiming that liberal democracies cannot engage in propaganda is often itself part of the propaganda campaign. Studies in social psychology and communication have amply demonstrated that although the public is more aware of propaganda during wartime, information agencies relentlessly continue their activities through peacetime, too.[21] It was the combination of mass democracy and mass communications in the early twentieth century that led to the development of scientific approaches towards controlling social change through information management. It is now widely accepted that the Second World War created the circumstances for building a sizeable government apparatus to apply these hypotheses in practice.[22]

In times of crisis, democracies openly recognize the need to engage in 'counterpropaganda' to respond to the propaganda attack of the enemy, but the term is used only rarely, and with numerous caveats. Thus, since 1945 democratic governments have preferred using the term 'persuasion', made famous by Vance Packard.[23] In *The Hidden Persuaders*, Packard examined how advertisers used consumer motivational research and psychological techniques, including depth psychology and subliminal tactics, to manipulate people's expectations and induce desire for products. The techniques used by the advertising industry could, however, be easily applied to political messages that needed to be 'bought' by the public, hence the success of Packard's book went well beyond Madison Avenue. Recent research into the cross-fertilisation of propaganda and advertising has brought to light exciting new findings about the exchange of techniques, expertise and personnel over the past century.[24]

Over the past decade, 'communication' has replaced 'information'. The communication experts and spin doctors have taken the place once occupied by the propagandists, thus shifting the emphasis to the techniques and away from the message and its aims. Similarly, cultural diplomacy is often used to indicate a series of programmes promoted by national governments to engage with selected groups of individuals – the so-called opinion formers – in the knowledge that they will, in turn, communicate with the wider public, and will often do so more effectively because of their strong local credibility.[25] Since the publication of his well-known book *Soft Power*, Joseph Nye's encompassing term is now widely used in international affairs by analysts and statesmen alike. 'Soft power' focuses on the ability to attract and co-opt – rather than to coerce or to corrupt – as a means of persuasion. Despite claims to the contrary, all that Nye does is to offer a polished version of the concept of propaganda by focusing on the desired effects that it produces. While it is true, as Nye argues, that public diplomacy requires the building of long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies, the

aims, methods and expertise required are the same. Public diplomacy and propaganda are two sides of the same coin.[26]

Finally, the term 'psychological warfare' is also present in the NATIS archival documents. In mainstream discourse, psychological warfare is often understood as part of military operations in wartime, and as such it includes various actions aimed at undermining the enemy's morale. Hence, psychological warfare addresses the populations in hostile countries or in friendly allies in the hope of influencing their behaviour in such a way that their actions support the achievement of national objectives, thus facilitating military operations and promoting maximum cooperation among the civil population.[27] As mentioned above, NATIS's remit specifically forbade the Service from carrying out propaganda action in wartime, when all competences in the information and communication fields would be resumed by the national governments. It should, however, be pointed out that the documents of the NATO Information Service show that there was no agreement on the use of the term 'psychological warfare' among the experts at the time.[28]

It should be clear that the use of the word 'propaganda' in this book does not carry any moral connotation. Propaganda is not considered here as a specificity of totalitarian states or as a monolithic reality, but as an umbrella term that covers many forms of persuasive communication, media, techniques and target audiences.[29] Propaganda is distinguished from similar processes deploying information as their main tool – such as advertising – by the question of intent.[30] The focus lies here on the techniques used and the expertise required to carry it out so as to achieve the hoped results. Philip Taylor argued that propaganda is nothing else than a 'process of persuasion which utilises any available means (media) to persuade people (target audiences) to think or behave in a manner desired by the source in order to benefit the interests of that source'.[31] Defining propaganda as a process means focusing not only on propaganda products but also, and above all, on propaganda production and its producers. This means, in other words, going beyond the visible stage of propaganda and examining the way in which political ideas translate into propaganda products and how they are circulated among the public.

The institutional history of propaganda agencies is therefore central and the focus is on the knowledge and skills that – transversally to political regimes and national boundaries – are mobilised to build new propaganda initiatives.[32] Thus, this book examines how NATIS and the CICR set their own information priorities and periodically revised their outputs. It argues that historians must differentiate clearly between the *perceived* success of information programmes and their *actual* success among the public. As explained below, it is a contention of this book that the latter is beyond the grasp of historians, while the former can indeed be measured. A study of the information officers' priorities and concerns and of their own assessment of the impact of their initiatives allows for a more sophisticated

insight into the history of the Cultural Cold War and of the institutions that contributed to it.

The interplay between propaganda and intelligence

Intelligence and propaganda are closely connected. An effective propaganda campaign – particularly one designed to respond to an enemy's initiative, as in NATIS's response to communism – requires an understanding of the nature and methods of the opponent as well as an insight into the sensibilities and concerns of the target audience. In addition, propaganda operates through negative stereotypes, which require key information about the audience's prejudices and cultural constructs.[33] Thus, the close link between intelligence and propaganda was a trademark of the Cold War, as exemplified by the close connection between the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency and by the British Secret Service and Information Research Department. Most importantly, this was not a one-way process: the information work fed back into the intelligence field, albeit indirectly. Information agencies and their programmes opened opportunities to the intelligence services for observation and infiltration, which allowed them to gather further information about their opponent. Thus, intelligence and propaganda entered into a mutually beneficial relationship.

There is quite an extensive body of literature on the history of propaganda during the Cold War. The new approach to 'culture' – which is now defined more comprehensively as a combination of 'high' and 'popular' culture and which may also include scientific and technological development, and education – has deeply influenced historical writing and has replaced elitist notions that were predominant in Europe in the early decades of the Cold War.[34] The Cultural Cold War has attracted the attention of historians on both sides of the Atlantic and it is now widely accepted that the Cold War had as much to do with 'winning hearts and minds' as it did with the arms race. In addition, over the past decade the opening of archives in the United States and Britain in particular has led to new research into western information policies. This research has demonstrated that – contrary to the general perception at the time – it was the United States and not the Soviet Union that led the psychological warfare of the Cold War, in terms of both effort and resources invested. Historians have also recently gained a more advanced insight into the role and action of state–private network activities and into US and British covert information activities at both national and international levels.[35] Similar research is still needed in other Western European countries, where the declassification process appears more timid. Little is known about how international organisations engage in propaganda and, with the exception of a few interesting studies on how the Common Market approached information in its early years of life, historians have yet to tackle this important issue.[36]

The past few years, however, have also witnessed the publication of valuable contributions on the role of the western national secret services in the prevention of communist subversive activities and on intelligence collaboration among different western countries for this purpose.[37] The most interesting publications of this kind have often originated from the national governments' desire to know more about the activities of their own national intelligence services during the Cold War. Several Scandinavian governments have appointed historians and legal experts as members of special commissions in charge of shedding new light on the intelligence agencies' anti-communist actions. These initiatives have often originated from rumours and news stories about alleged wrongdoing or illegal activities by the secret services, such as unlawful surveillance of citizens. This kind of research benefits from political support and, most importantly, from the collaboration of the national information agencies, which allow exclusive access to their archives.[38]

In the case of NATO, little is known about how the organisation promoted a coordinated intelligence effort and prevention of subversive activities among its members, as the papers of the Special Committee (AC/46) are still classified. A little more is already known about how the alliance promoted a concerted propaganda action among its members.[39] Andrew Defty and Giles Scott-Smith have looked at the interplay between intelligence and propaganda. Defty was the first to offer a preliminary examination of the establishment of the NATO propaganda machinery and of the influence exerted over it by Britain's Foreign Office.[40] Yet Defty's work is based on the Information Research Department's documents and the private papers of Lord Ismay, and not on documents in the NATO Archives.[41] If Defty's book has contributed to the understanding of the Information Research Department's activity and its role in shaping the NATO propaganda machinery, it did not examine the history and structure of the NATO Information Service. Giles Scott-Smith has published extensively on the Cultural Cold War, with a strong focus on the attempt of western information agencies to promote the concept of the Atlantic community. More recently, Scott-Smith has produced an interesting study of Interdoc. Established in 1963 as a network that brought together intelligence officers, intellectuals and information experts, Interdoc hoped to be able to coordinate a more confident anti-communist action ranging from propaganda to covert action. Scott-Smith's latest work confirms the importance of understanding the links between intelligence and propaganda, and at the same time opens questions about whether and to what extent collaboration within NATO and other international organisations took place at the time.[42] Finally, research has also been recently published on the role of state networks, including the Bilderberg Group and the role of private foundations such as the Rockefeller, Ford and Mellon Foundations.[43]

A study of NATIS, moreover, is able to contribute to the recent historiographical twin concepts of 'Americanisation' and 'westernisation'. The

importance of the idea of an Atlantic community of values with shared cultural heritage and political ideas further strengthened by strong trade ties already existed during the Cold War and was amply used by national information agencies to promote NATO, as demonstrated by several scholars.[44] Both 'Americanisation' and 'westernisation' postulate a transatlantic community of values. Americanisation draws attention to the adoption by West Europeans of, in particular, an American lifestyle, cultural habits and production techniques. According to this view – and this is a simplification of a complex historiographical debate – Europeans absorbed American values and slowly became Americanised in what could be described mainly as a one-way process. A major part in this process was played by the mass media, above all Hollywood cinema, which created a receptive atmosphere favourable to the diffusion of American-style consumer patterns and cultural habits. Resistance was seen as backward-looking, and Americanisation was perceived as synonymous with 'modernisation'.[45] Other scholars have, however, pointed out that American-style political, social and cultural values were not simply imported and applied to the European context but were interpreted and adapted. Thus, American influence was selective and limited.[46] Thus, according to Holger Nehring, 'westernization' allegedly goes 'deeper than Americanization'.[47] While it recognises the strong cultural, political and economic influences coming to Europe from the United States, the westernisation concept stresses the degree of reciprocal influence and cooperation between Americans and Western Europeans whereby a new shared community of values emerged by means of cultural transfer. Far from being simply bystanders, the Europeans actively engaged with American ideas and values and adapted them to suit their own needs and culture, and were in turn able to export their own version of such values and cultural elements back to the United States in a mutual and continuous dialogue.[48] Two metaphors have been put forward to describe transatlantic relations – that of a two-lane highway along which people, ideas, values and goods travel in both directions, and that of a 'turn-around' table – both of which emphasise constant reciprocal influence and continuous dialogue.[49]

The study of the NATO Information Service contributes significantly to this debate as it looks at how Americans, Britons and Western Europeans worked together and influenced each other's propaganda activities. The Service acted as a forum for the exchange of ideas and methods and for the coordination of information policies among its members. The focus is here on the position and reaction of the Western Europeans to American influence. This book challenges the narrative whereby the US government used the alliance as an extension of its own foreign policy with little regard for the other members' security concerns. Research into NATIS therefore offers a privileged point of view from which to understand how anti-communist propaganda and intelligence developed in the West and to what degree a coordinated response was achieved. NATIS itself carried out

its own response to the anti-NATO communist campaigns and produced a wide range of material, including publications, conferences, travelling exhibitions, short films, newsreels and radio and television broadcasts. Thus, an examination of the history and action of NATIS leads to important new insights into the origins of Cold War propaganda and intelligence, and into the reciprocal influences among the alliance's members. In this sense, the history of NATIS suggests that the 'turn-around' table metaphor to discuss transatlantic relations in the intelligence and propaganda fields is indeed a fitting one.

A note on the sources

This book is primarily based on documents from the NATO Archives (NA). Although the archives were officially opened in 1999 and several key documents are now available online, they remain largely underexplored.[50] For this book, the documents of the NATO Information Service and of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations have proved crucial. They allow the examination of the history of the Service and of its changing priorities and information programmes. The CICR papers in particular open a window on the position of each member state and the member states' own action at the national level in the field of pro-NATO and anti-communist propaganda. The papers of ad hoc committees that contributed to the work and the Service's approach to information – like the Information Working Group (AC/253) and the Working Group on Problems connected with Psychological Warfare (AC/186) – are also examined. The *NATO Letter* (called *NATO Review* after 1971) has been particularly helpful in providing factual information, as it reported all the press communiqués and final resolutions published at the end of Ministerial Council meetings. The *Letter* also reported summaries of discussion and final resolutions of the annual meetings of the Atlantic Treaty Association and North Atlantic Assembly, two key voluntary organisations. Finally, publications like *The NATO Handbook* and *Facts and Figures*, as well as the NATO website itself, have offered additional information about the institutional history of the Service and examples of its propaganda outputs.

Research into the 1980s has been more problematic, owing to the lack of archival information. Here, a wider use of published sources has been made. I have also conducted interviews with key policy-makers. I have selected a broad range of interviewees who spanned the wider spectrum of NATO's information work, including Sir Brian Fall (Director of the Secretary General's Private Office), Dr Jamie Shea (current Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges), Nick Sherwen (NATIS, Publication Section) and François Le Blévennec (NATO Press Office). The advice of Anne-Marie Smith (Chief Archivist) has been crucial in unravelling the long list of acronyms and interconnected committees and ad hoc working groups.

It should be pointed out that the NATO Archives' declassification procedure is complex. All national delegations need to agree that a specific group of documents can be released to the public. Given that some of the documents may include information about national security, the discussion about declassification is never a simple and straightforward one, and declassification often proceeds slowly, although the archives aim to comply with the thirty-year rule.

There is, of course, a wider problem connected with writing the history of an institution using documents released by the institution itself. The declassified documents give a sanitised version of the institution's history and action at the source. Censoring or controlling the use of sources becomes redundant precisely because historians can only use pre-approved documents that the institutions themselves are happy to see in the public domain. This is a conundrum already discussed by historians of intelligence and security services. Richard Aldrich has spoken of a 'history supermarket' dilemma in which the censorship begins to shape the historical agenda through the act of declassification itself.[51] In the case of NATO propaganda and intelligence, the very fact that the documents of the CICR and NATIS are available whereas those of the Special Committee (on the prevention of subversive activities) are closed to consultation already gives a sense of how the alliance wants to portray itself.

As far as the examination of the Service's output is concerned, the NATO Archives and Library keep only scant record of the actual information material produced. National libraries often have a rich selection of the material produced, which they received through cultural and higher education institutes. I found many pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and academic publications sponsored by NATIS at the British Library in London. The Imperial War Museum in London keeps a large collection of Marshall Plan, SHAPE and NATO films and documentaries. Over the past years, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division has launched an internet TV channel and a website with a sample of the material produced by the Media Section. More recently, the public has been able to access news through a NATO Facebook page, YouTube videos and a series of Twitter accounts.[52]

Finally, the position of the British delegation has been primarily examined through the Information Research Department (IRD) papers available at the National Archives in Kew.[53] Since its dissolution in 1975, and even more since its papers were first made available to researchers in 1995, the history of the IRD has been at the centre of the attention of numerous historians, but the efforts of the IRD in shaping NATIS have not been yet studied, except by Andrew Defty, who has devoted part of one chapter to the subject.[54]

Organisation of this book

The book is divided into two parts. The first will examine the institutional history of NATIS and of the CICR; the second will analyse samples of

NATIS Cold War propaganda outputs. Chapters 1 and 2 will focus on the interplay between intelligence and propaganda and discuss how the foundation of the Cominform in September 1947 proved critical in enabling the Soviet bloc and communist parties across Western Europe to launch a cohesive propaganda assault against the West. In contrast, except those of Britain and the United States, early western intelligence and information agencies were fragmented, disorganised and poorly funded. American enthusiasm for exploiting the potential of international organisations as forums to improve the coordination and delivery of western propaganda met with opposition by Britain and even more so by the other European countries. Considerations about national security and entrenched intra-European animosities and suspicions ultimately undermined the United States' attempts to use organisations such as the Brussels Treaty Organisation and NATO to reinvigorate the West's anti-communist propaganda apparatus.

By looking at the debates on the alliance's security concept and its defence strategy, the first part of the book will also examine the changes in the information policy adopted by NATO in terms of the content of the propaganda campaigns as well as the different audiences that were targeted at any one time. Passages like the publication of the Three Wise Men Report (1956), the Harmel Report (1967), the Ottawa Declaration (1974), and the dual-track decision (1979), will be identified here as key in shaping the information policy of the alliance. Chapter 4 in particular will look at how the rise of the peace movements and the emerging environmental movement prompted a complete overhaul of the information programmes and outputs, which up to this point had been primarily aimed at responding to the communist propaganda attacks against the alliance and western rearmament programmes. The Service's organisational changes of the 1970s and 1980s not only were a response to new audiences but also reflected the progressively clearer awareness of the need to engage with the press and the influence of key individuals. The appointment of Lord Carrington as Secretary General brought about a much more proactive engagement with the press and a more confident information policy overall, which was further developed by Manfred Wörner. The role of personalities – particularly those of the most effective Directors of Information and of the Secretary Generals – constitutes an important part of this book, as some key policy-makers had a strong impact on NATO's information policy and the alliance's relationship with the media.

The institutional history of the Service concludes here in 1991 with the reunification of Germany. The reader will find at the end of the book a very short Epilogue setting out the key institutional changes that have taken place since then.

The second part of the book will offer an analysis of a sample of propaganda outputs produced by NATIS during the Cold War. The activities of the Service can be broadly divided into three groups: publications, media

(films, documentaries and exhibitions) and public relations (visits to NATO Headquarters, scholarship and award programmes, academic exchanges, summer schools). Each of them is examined in a separate chapter. It was of course not possible to carry out a comprehensive examination of all outputs produced by each section throughout the Cold War, and a selection has been made so that only the most significant examples will be discussed here. The selection has not been arbitrary. In the case of the publications and movies, those with the widest circulation have been examined. The longevity of a publication or of a documentary was also a determining factor in its choice as an object of analysis. The *NATO Letter*, for example, was launched almost immediately after the creation of NATIS and is still published today under the title of *NATO Review*. The examination of its content, format and style offers a privileged point of observation from which to assess the Service's changing approach to information.

Each chapter in the second part of the book also opens the possibility of discussing wider issues with implications that reach beyond the scope of each information programme and involve the entirety of NATIS's output. Chapter 5, on publications, will discuss the problem of translation: how it was organised, who paid for it and how the lack of a central budget for translation affected the circulation of key publications, films and documentaries. By recalling the termination of the travelling exhibitions programme, Chapter 6, on the Media Section, will discuss the wider problem of adapting to new media and technologies. Chapter 7, on public relations, will examine the alliance's new engagement with science and the increasingly complex security concept developed by western governments from the late 1960s. It demonstrates how NATO's role expanded beyond military strength to include a response to environmental problems and political instability beyond the NATO area. The launching and work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society will therefore be examined in detail, as it had long-lasting repercussions on NATO's security concept.

When one is discussing the pro-NATO propaganda campaigns, the role of the so-called voluntary organisations cannot be forgotten, as they played a major role in influencing public opinion at the national level and in circulating NATIS's propaganda material. Even before the inception of NATO, private–state networks and pressure groups lobbied the national governments to promote various forms of Atlantic and European unity and to oppose the spread of communism in the western world. These organisations were often independent but they did benefit from governmental support and generous funding from private foundations. Again, it would have been impossible to examine here the role of all the voluntary organisations that promoted NATO and the Atlantic community concept during the Cold War. Each member state had at least one such group. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the United States, there were several organisations with strong transnational links. Thus, Chapter 8 will focus on the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), which was an umbrella

organisation that gathered together the most important pro-NATO groups in each member state and encouraged the formation of new ones where they did not yet exist. ATA's spin-off agencies, such as the Atlantic Institute in Paris and the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers in London, will also be examined in this chapter. The second pressure group is the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), which was an association of pro-NATO parliamentarians from all member states, separate from the alliance. Both ATA and the NAA were very active throughout the Cold War and are still alive and well today. In fact, the enlargement of NATO – in terms both of its membership and of its security concept – in the post-1989 era has seen ATA and the NAA take the initiative and expand their membership well beyond the NATO area, thus actively contributing to NATO's new Partnership for Peace programme.

In its Conclusion, the book will discuss how the complicated decision-making process relating to NATO's information work often caused problematic delays in the production of information material. It will also tackle the difficult question of how to measure the impact of the information policies promoted by the NATO Information Service during the Cold War, and it will distinguish between *perceived* and *actual* success. The problem of qualifying the success is at the core of any study on propaganda and is – according to this author – destined to be little more than an educated guess.

This book makes no claim to being the ultimate study of NATO's Cold War propaganda. To the contrary, it is better read as a beginning. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of how NATO perceived its position in the world, and what its priorities were in projecting itself to the public, historians must go back to the national archives and look at the debates at a national level. This will help understand what lay behind the official position of the national delegations within the CICR and of the national information experts in foreign affairs and defence who gathered every year at the NATO headquarters.[55] It is precisely because NATO's propaganda was the result of an ongoing compromise between the changing security and information priorities of its members that the national dimension needs to feed further into the analysis of the history of NATIS and of the Alliance itself.

Also, because of the book's well-defined focus on information policy, the history of the alliance is drawn upon only when it had a direct impact on the history of NATIS. So, for example, the withdrawal of the French from the integrated command structure and the relocation of the NATO headquarters to Brussels is examined here in relation to the direct impact that it had on NATIS's work, including the recruiting of new staff and the reorganising of the Library, as well as management of the public embarrassment of being expelled from France. The wider implications of de Gaulle's challenge and of his views about the position that France should occupy on the world stage will not, on the other hand, be discussed in depth. Similarly, the 1979 dual-track decision will be examined in this

book only in terms of how it contributed to the creation of vocal peace movements and required a radical change of focus across the entire information programmes aimed at youth. The reader will not find here, however, a detailed assessment of the strategic need for weapon modernisation, or a discussion of the alliance's estimate of the Warsaw Pact's military capability at the time.

In what follows, we will focus primarily on the British national delegation as a case study. The acknowledged expertise that the British had developed in the intelligence and propaganda fields, from the time of the First World War, left them in a unique position at the end of the Second. Their authority enabled them both to influence the newly founded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and to act as mediators between the Americans and the Europeans when the US call for a solid and coordinated response to communist propaganda campaigns met continental resistance. The role of the Information Research Department (IRD) in particular in shaping propaganda cooperation in the early years of the Cold War is crucial to my account. Its success, from its foundation in 1948, in persuading the CIA to adopt a more conciliatory and less confrontational tone in its propaganda programmes offers a privileged point from which to examine the concept of 'westernisation' and assess to what extent constant reciprocal influence between the two sides of the Atlantic took place. Similar studies of other national delegations and their own complex relationships with the United States and each other, however, will need to follow before we can gain a full picture of NATO's Cold War propaganda. If this book helps to stimulate such future research, it will have achieved one of its objectives.

Notes

1 Deutsch K.W., Burrell S.A. and Kann R.A., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 6.
2 The United States with Canada is a typical example of a pluralistic security community. The two countries are politically independent but they do not expect to have future military confrontations.
3 Adler E. and Barnett M. (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Adler and Barnett describe the typical evolution of a security community from nascent to ascendant, to mature. A nascent security community meets the basic expectations of peaceful change; a mature security community has some basic collective security mechanisms and supranational or transnational elements. Adler and Barnett further divide the mature security communities into 'tightly' and 'loosely coupled', depending on the level of their integration.
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5 Kaplan L.S., *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).

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9 Mazower M., *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Kennedy P., *The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations* (London: Penguin, 2007); Hanhimäki J., *The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

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11 For the History of International Organizations Network (HION), see its website on http://graduateinstitute.ch/unoacademia/Home/hion_en.html (last consulted on 12 October 2012); the *Journal of International Organizations Studies* is a peer-reviewed open-access academic journal available at: www.journal-iostudies.org (retrieved on 12 October 2012).

12 United Nations Intellectual History Project, www.unhistory.org (retrieved on 25 February 2013).

13 Special issue of *International Organization*, 36/2 (1982). See also Haack K. and Mathiason J., 'International organization studies: a new frontier for scholarship', *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 1/1 (2010), pp. 5–10; Mathiason J. and Haack K., 'How to study international organizations', *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 2/1 (2011), pp. 5–6.

14 See for example Kaiser W. and Varsori A. (eds), *European Union History: Themes and Debates* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Kaiser W., Leucht B. and Rasmussen M. (eds), *The History of the European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950–72* (London: Routledge, 2008).

15 Dumoulin M. and Bitsch M.T. (eds), *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007).

16 Laville H. and Wilford H. (eds), *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State–Private Network* (London: Routledge, 2006).

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19 Tchakhotine S., *Le viol des foules par la propagande politique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1952). In fact, the first to give a negative connotation to the word was Gustave Le Bon in *La psychologie des foules* (1895; English translation *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, 1896). See also Bernays E., *Propaganda*, first published in Brooklyn, NY, in 1928; Lasswell H.D., *Propaganda Technique in World War I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, first published in 1927).

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24 Di Jorio I. and Pouillard V. (eds), 'Publicité et propagande en Europe (années 1920–1960)', special issue of *Vingtième siècle. Revue d'histoire*, 101 (January–March 2009). See also Di Jorio I., 'La propaganda e i suoi saperi: per uno studio delle tecniche di comunicazione politica a partire da Vichy e Salò', *Quaderni di Farestoria*, 3 (2006), pp. 43–53.

25 In the post-Cold War era, on the other hand, a new horizontal structure in which people connect with each other in international networks aided by new technologies allows communication to happen in real time; governments are joined in their propaganda action by non-governmental organisations and non-state actors. Melissen J. (ed.), *New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

26 Nye J.S., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

27 Daugherty W.E. and Janowitz M. (eds), *A Psychological Warfare Casebook* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1958).

28 'Psychological warfare' was usually used in reference to addressing foreign audiences but occasionally it signified 'the application of propaganda and collateral psychological actions in support of military operations'. See, for example, Working Group on the Problems Connected with 'Psychological Warfare': Psychological Warfare and Psychological Defence, note by the United Kingdom delegation, 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)1. The appropriate explanation of what is meant each time will be included in the following chapters.

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30 Taylor P.M., *Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media since 1945* (London: Routledge, 1997).

31 Taylor P., 'What is propaganda?' Philip Taylor's website, Institute of Communication Studies, University of Leeds, UK. URL: ics-www.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&folder=715&paper=1144 (retrieved on 30 October 2012).

32 See insightful comments in Di Jorio and Pouillard in 'Le savon, le président et le dictateur. Publicité et propagande en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1960'. Introduction to *Publicité et propagande*, op. cit., pp. 3–8.

33 See, for example, Robin R., *The Making of the Cold War Enemy: Culture and Politics in the Industrial Complex* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), and Di Jorio I., 'Nel giardino imperiale. Inferiorizzazione e disumanizzazione dell'*altro* nella stampa fascista (1935–1939)', *Storia e Problemi Contemporanei* 28 (2001), pp. 51–70.

34 Rana Mitter and Patrick Major distinguish between 'Cultural Cold War', meant as the high and popular culture that developed during the Cold War, and 'Cold War culture', which refers to the general mentality associated with the ideological conflict. Mitter R. and Major P. (eds), *Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

35 Hixson W.L., *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997); Saunders F.S., *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999); Caute D., *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Rawnsley G.D., *Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 1999); Osgood K.A., *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006); Belmonte L.A., *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Cull N.J., *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

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Cold War History, 9/4 (2009), pp. 501–512; Risso L. ' "Enlightening public opinion": a study of NATO's information policies between 1949 and 1959 based on recently declassified documents', *Cold War History*, 7/1 (2007), pp. 45–74.

40 Defty A., *Britain, America, and Anti-communist Propaganda, 1945–53: The Information Research Department* (London: Routledge, 2004).

41 As will be explained in Chapter 1, the Information Research Department was an agency within the Foreign Office in charge with responding to anti-British communist propaganda. Its archives were opened to the public in 1995 and are available for consultation at the National Archives in Kew.

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53 FO 930, FO 953, FO 975, FO 1059 and the extensive FO 1110 series.

54 For the examination of the historiographical and journalistic debate surrounding the IRD, see Chapter 1.

55 Conference of National Information Officials (CONIO) and Conference of Information Officials in Ministries of Defence (MODIO).

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Part I

The history of NATIS

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1 The foundation of the NATO Information Service, 1949–1951

The early post-Second World War years saw numerous attempts to develop some form of propaganda and intelligence cooperation within the West. Not all attempts were equally successful, and in fact, with the exception of the Anglo-American intelligence cooperation, other forms of bilateral agreements either were limited to specific geographical areas and themes or were short-lived. As for information coordination within international organisations, the creation of the Western European Union in 1948 and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 opened the way to new forms of propaganda and intelligence coordination. Such organisations created new intergovernmental forums for the exchange of information, ideas and methods about what was perceived as the common enemy: communism in its national and international forms. Coordination was crucial to establishing a coherent and effective front to respond to the well-coordinated hostile attacks coming from the communist side. At the same time, the exchange of intelligence was an essential prerequisite to prepare for communist subversive activities. Yet as this chapter demonstrates, mutual suspicion, the fear that the new organisations might restrict national sovereignty and the fact that not all members had well-established national propaganda agencies meant that in the early Cold War years the exchange of information and intelligence and the degree of cooperation remained low and rather ineffective.[1]

Britain was the first western country to formulate a coordinated response to communist propaganda. The Labour government in power after the war believed that the effective projection of British power, the British way of life and Britain's achievements was the best policy for protecting British interests overseas.[2] A Cabinet paper published in January 1948, 'Future foreign publicity policy', launched a new propaganda policy, which was assisted by the creation of the Information Research Department (IRD). The new agency was part of the Foreign Office and was set up to promote the image and interests of Britain and to counter communist and anti-British propaganda attacks. The IRD benefited from the experience of the Political Warfare Executive and the Ministry for Information, both abolished soon after the end of the war, with responsibility for

overseas propaganda being transferred to the Foreign Office.[3] The rich body of literature on the history of the IRD shows that the initial task of the new agency was to respond to anti-British propaganda around the world, and particularly in those areas where the anti-colonialist movements were becoming louder at the end of the war. Soon, however, the IRD's scope enlarged to include straightforward anti-communist propaganda. The IRD targeted, increasingly more specifically, West European countries, where strong national communist parties could make substantial electoral gains. The IRD produced detailed reports on communist leaders, political parties and international organisations as well as on the political and economic environment in the Soviet bloc. The material was put together in the form of factual, objective and detailed reports later circulated through the embassies or through a network of personal contacts established during the war. The targets were the so-called opinion moulders: primarily journalists, writers and trade union leaders. It is clear that the IRD could gain such an insight into life in the Soviet bloc only thanks to its close links with the secret services.[4]

In the United States, the beginning of the Cold War convinced President Truman of the need to proceed by means of both overt and covert propaganda. The Smith–Mundt Act of January 1948 provided the Department of State with a strong legal and financial basis for an overt propaganda programme, which later included all means of modern communication, including publications, radio broadcasts, films, cultural exchange programmes and exhibitions.[5] At the same time, the Truman administration developed a covert psychological warfare programme modelled on the Office of Strategic Services established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt under the direction of the newly founded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This covert action had the additional advantage of opening new channels to address foreign public opinion.[6]

Building upon their tradition of intelligence sharing developed during the war, British and American officials continued to exchange information about their respective propaganda policies. Yet it was only with the foundation of the IRD in 1948 and of the CIA in 1947 that the two governments achieved systematic cooperation.[7] Close links with their American counterparts, and mistrust of their Western European partners, were defining features of post-war British anti-communist propaganda policy. In the 1950s, the launch of the Campaign for Truth in the United States and the foundation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) brought about closer cooperation between the British and Americans and marked the moment when the Americans seemed to take over the lead in the worldwide anti-communist fight.[8] It is clear from the IRD's archival documents that throughout the Cold War the US information staff was kept informed about most of the IRD's activities – while the opposite was not always the case. The IRD also agreed not to carry out propaganda activities on US soil; again, the Americans did not reciprocate the commitment.

Both countries developed their own anti-communist policies, but in a series of bilateral meetings British and American officials formally agreed to establish 'close and continuous liaison' in the field of anti-communist propaganda so as to be able to 'shoot at the same target from different angles'.[9] It has been argued that although Britain was more experienced and had started its anti-communist activity earlier than the United States, the lack of resources and weaker political support meant that the Americans caught up quickly and soon the British became the junior partners.[10] Perhaps not surprisingly, most of the historians who made such claims have based their work on American archival sources. The use of British documents, however, has allowed others to point out that despite their more limited means, the British continued to exert significant influence on the Americans and often were able to make use of the facilities and structures deployed by the Americans for their own use. Richard Aldrich, for example, has carried out an important reassessment of the development of British policy towards the Soviet Union in the early Cold War years based on American and British archival sources, thus producing an articulated and rich analysis of the interplay between American and British intelligence and information agencies.[11] Similarly, Andrew Defty has demonstrated the important role of the IRD after 1950s, particularly in adapting the United States' information policies to European audiences so as to make them more effective.[12]

Despite their endeavours, the Americans' attempts to create similar partnerships with the other Western European countries were to no avail. This was mainly due to the fact that in the immediate post-war period no continental European government had dedicated anti-communist propaganda agencies. The 'manipulation' of public opinion was seen as the preserve of totalitarian regimes and it was believed that such policies should not and could not be applied in peacetime by democratic governments. For these reasons, the continental West European governments quickly dismantled their war propaganda machinery after the end of the Second World War and it took a relatively long time to overcome the suspicion and to launch an effective information policy to respond to the propaganda attacks launched by the communists.[13]

The threat of communism, particularly in France, Italy and Belgium, meant that there was indeed great interest in collaborating closely with the United States, and more often than not the direct and indirect support of the American intelligence and information agencies was crucial in shaping the political development of such countries, as is testified by the CIA involvement in the Italian elections of 1948.[14] Yet actual bilateral cooperation on a permanent basis was problematic. The United States pushed for the creation of well-funded and well-organised propaganda machineries within the new international organisations that were established at the time. The Americans thought that through such organisations they could convince the continental Europeans of the need to create their own

national information agencies and to shape the development of their propaganda policies. Yet as we shall see, while the Europeans were keen to receive financial assistance and know-how from the Americans, they were reluctant to see the creation of a permanent body in which the other members would also be able to learn about the security and intelligence programmes of their neighbours.

Information cooperation within the Brussels Treaty Organisation

The foundation of the Cominform in September 1947 allowed the Soviet Union, its satellite states and national communist parties in Western Europe to carry out a coherent and energetic propaganda campaign against the West. This campaign benefited from the coordination of all information activities, generous funding and the possibility of exploiting the divisions between western powers, as well as widespread sentiments of pacifism and neutralism.[15] For these reasons, according to several western intelligence agencies it was imperative to promote a similarly coherent and unified response to anti-western Soviet propaganda. The creation of per-manent channels of consultation and the exchange of information about what each government was doing in the propaganda field were seen by many, and by the British and Americans in particular, as important first steps to achieving this goal.[16] Yet contrary to the American faith in coopera-tion with like-minded governments as a primary objective, British officials had little faith in the ability of their West European counterparts to provide an effective response on their own. At the time, the Labour government saw Britain as the leader of its West European junior partners. According to the 1948 Cabinet paper on Britain's 'Future foreign publicity policy':

> It is for us, as Europeans and as a Social Democratic Government, and not the Americans, to give the lead in spiritual, moral and political sphere to all the democratic elements in Western Europe which are anti-communist.... We must see that our friends in Europe and else-where are armed with the facts and the answers to Russian propa-ganda. If we do not provide this ammunition they will not get it from any other source.[17]

Because of the lack of appropriate information agencies and of adequate resources, the IRD argued, continental European countries needed guid-ance and advice from their more expert colleagues at the Foreign Office. This IRD's views coincided with the opinion of the foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, who supported the idea of Western Europe as a third force between the two emerging blocs, whereby 'What we have to offer in contrast to totalitarian communism and *laissez-faire* capitalism are the vital and progressive ideas of British Social Democracy and Western European

Civilisation.'[18] Led by Britain, the West European countries would produce a concerted and multilateral anti-Soviet response.[19] London was therefore in favour of closer cooperation particularly with France and the Benelux countries, but the level and form of such collaboration remained an object of controversy within the Foreign Office.

The early post-war meetings between the British, French and American foreign ministers offered an opportunity to discuss further the need for closer cooperation in the field of anti-communist propaganda. Ralph Murray, the first director of the IRD, warned colleagues about his over-arching concern of compromising the IRD's ongoing activities and making its existence known to the wider public.[20]

It was the signing of the Brussels Treaty in March 1948 that opened for the first time the way to practical collaboration within Western Europe in the fields of intelligence and information. The treaty created the Western Union and brought together Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It favoured political consultation among its members so as to foster economic, social and cultural cooperation among its members (article III).[21] In March 1948, the Foreign Office set up a Working Party on the 'spiritual' aspects of the new organisation to study cultural and information cooperation with other Brussels Treaty members. Despite his personal doubts, Ralph Murray supported the idea of exploring ways to 'make active use of the treaty' and argued that the Brussels Treaty could be exploited as a possible means to facilitate the distribution of IRD propaganda material throughout Western Europe. Thus, Murray proposed the creation of a joint information executive to be established by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty to facilitate the exchange of information, make recommendations to foster collaboration between the members and to offer training on anti-communist propaganda.[22]

The Working Party was more sceptical than Murray about the benefits that cooperation within the Brussels Treaty could bring to the Foreign Office. First of all, because of conflicting policies of the members in their respective colonial outposts, cooperation seemed unworkable. The Working Party recognised that cooperation with French and Belgian governments in Africa to counter nationalist movements in colonial territories had been established rather effectively in 1949. However, competing interests in the Middle East made similar collaboration in other areas virtually impossible. Second, an official policy of coordinating the propaganda effort of Western Union members could interfere with the efficiency of Britain's ongoing intelligence and information activities while offering little in return.[23] The Working Party's final report therefore opposed the creation of a joint propaganda committee within the Brussels Treaty and proposed instead more informal periodic discussions between information officials from the member countries.[24]

By opposing the creation of a permanent body issuing directives and recommendations, the Working Party hoped to avoid compromising the

secrecy surrounding the existence and activities of the IRD and to main-
tain the IRD's room for manoeuvre. The Working Party therefore advised
against informing the foreign ministers of the Brussels powers of the very
existence of the IRD.[25] Six months later, an internal IRD memo written in
preparation for the first meeting of the Brussels Treaty Council reiterated
some of these concerns, pointing out in particular that:

> [t]here is considerable risk that in the name of 'coordination' we
> should find our information and broadcasting being used by the other
> four Powers with no compensating advantage to ourselves and
> probable loss of efficiency due to the inevitable friction which would
> occur.[26]

In addition, the IRD officials spoke clearly of 'the danger that if we
attempt ambitious measures of coordination we may spend all our time
coordinating and very little actually doing any propaganda'.[27] Bevin was
also warned that collaboration with the French, for example, 'would mean
that the nature of our machinery and its work should have to be made
known to the departments of the French Government and we suspect that
those departments include communists' – something that would soon
become a much more serious concern.[28]

Contrary to the IRD's cautious approach, the United States pressed for
closer cooperation among the Brussels Treaty members and demanded
that Britain assume a leading role, which caused further frustration in
London.[29] In light of the pressure coming from Washington, Gladwyn
Jebb, who at the time acted as UK representative to the Brussels Treaty
Permanent Commission, advised Bevin that on the issue of intelligence
and information cooperation 'we should "show willing" especially in the
face of an American impression that we are "dragging our feet"'.[30]

The predicament was clear: on the one hand, the IRD feared that close
cooperation would interfere with its freedom of action; on the other hand,
it hoped to exploit its contacts with the West Europeans in order to find
new channels to spread its information work and collect more material on
international communism. For these reasons, although the IRD was inter-
ested in exploring ways to foster cooperation, it approached the creation
of a multilateral response to communist propaganda within the Brussels
Treaty Organisation with extreme caution. Bevin was advised to work
towards creating a loose consultation forum for 'the collection and colla-
tion of information and research into the true state of affairs in the USSR
and her satellites'. Building upon the recommendation of the Working
Party, the IRD envisaged a series of agreements for consultation at the offi-
cial level between those engaged in such research: 'each Power would thus
have the benefit of what contribution could be made to the essential stuff
of counter propaganda, while retaining full liberty of action to issue the
material by whatever means it considers proper'.[31]

Despite not having yet developed its own anti-communist propaganda policy, by the end of 1948 the French government had come to the conclusion that it was imperative to create a dedicated agency to coordinate the response to the communist propaganda attacks in the army as well as among the general public.[32] The French were as determined as the British to make sure that each government retained full control over anti-communist propaganda and that nothing more than exchange of information would take place.[33]

The coordination of information activities was discussed for the first time on 25 October 1948 by the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty. Bevin revealed the existence of a British organisation for countering Soviet propaganda in Britain, although he did not provide any specific detail about the organisation's scope, budget and terms of reference. It became soon clear that the Continental parties to the treaty were keen on receiving any information material dealing with the economic and social situation in the Soviet bloc that the British could provide so that their newly established anti-communist propaganda agencies could use it in their own propaganda programmes at minimal or no cost. Yet to the IRD's surprise, the Europeans showed little interest in knowing how such reports were put together and what their sources were. The Belgian Prime Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, simply mentioned that if the information material 'could be made available to him by the British Government it would save him the trouble and expenses of setting up a parallel Belgian organisation to do the same work as that which was being done in Great Britain'.[34] Thus, it was decided that the British government would make some of its propaganda material available to the other parties to the Brussels Treaty via its embassies, while other signatory countries agreed to contribute any item of information they were able to produce in the future. Most importantly for the IRD, the Council agreed that 'no attempt should be made to coordinate the propaganda of the five powers on an identical pattern' and that propaganda should 'be carried out by each country according to its own national needs and circumstances'. There was to be no consultation on information policies, and no coordination of large-scale propaganda activities on a permanent basis.[35]

Soon after the Consultative Council meeting, Ralph Murray visited the Brussels Treaty capitals to make the necessary arrangements for the distribution of the IRD's material and to explore further channels for the circulation of their reports.[36] The meeting with Dr Antonius Lovink, the General Secretary of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, was particularly helpful as it was agreed that the British material would be sent from Britain's embassy to the Dutch trade unions, which would then pass them on to colleagues in the French, Italian and West German trade unions.[37] The way was clear for the IRD to circulate its reports to the Brussels Treaty members through the British embassies, and the first report was sent on 8 December 1948.[38] In the first six months of 1949 alone, the IRD supplied twenty-eight papers on a variety of subjects to the other members.[39]

The exchange of propaganda material was conducted on a purely inter-governmental basis, established on an ad hoc basis through the embassies and personal contacts, a typical IRD working procedure. Cooperation was strictly defined as the circulation of information material and, significantly, did not entail consultation on propaganda policies or on any other form of information activity. Most importantly, given the persistent conflicting interests over colonies – particularly in the Middle East – the propaganda material exchanged among the members focused exclusively on how to respond to communist propaganda attacks in Europe; cooperation did not extend beyond the geographical region covered by the Brussels Treaty itself. In March 1949, British embassies in South-East Asia were informed that while information cooperation with the Americans remained tight, no such an agreement had been reached with the Brussels Treaty's members, and hence 'the exchange of information should in general be confined to the capitals'.[40]

In order not to compromise the secrecy surrounding the origin of the reports, the IRD developed a two-tier approach towards the Western Union powers. It divided the propaganda material that was to be distributed into two categories: Category A included reports based on classified information on Soviet policies and was sent directly to high-level Brussels Treaty civil servants and politicians; Category B material was based on less confidential information and was suitable for wider dissemination through embassies. Significantly, Brussels Treaty governments were not fully informed about the distribution of Category B material and they remained largely unaware of the extent of the IRD's activities in their countries and in the other parties to the Brussels Treaty.[41]

Thus, coordination with the Brussels Pact powers was mostly a one-way street and it remained therefore on a different level to that established with the United States. The IRD's analysis of the Western European countries' capability to manage an effective information campaign was correct; in 1949 no other European country had a machinery as well-oiled and reliable as Britain's. The fact that IRD provided twenty-eight papers to the other Brussels powers during the first six months, while receiving only two interesting reports from the French and nothing from the other Brussels Treaty partners, seemed to confirm the British analysis. This also meant, however, that, precisely because of the lack of effective counterparts, the IRD was unable to act as a leading force in Western Europe in the way that Bevin had foreseen.[42]

The foundation of the NATO Information Service

The disappointing results achieved in the field of information cooperation within the Brussels Treaty countries confirmed the British officials in their belief that close collaboration with other West Europeans was destined to absorb a large amount of the IRD's time and resources, offering little in

return. At the same time, precisely because the IRD was disappointed with the poor work carried out by its European counterparts, it recognised the urgency of doing more to stimulate its partners and to offer support. On the other hand, the IRD's officials recognised that, despite these problems, cooperation with the Brussels Treaty countries had indeed opened new channels for the circulation of the its reports, which was something the Foreign Office was always eager to find.

This was also the time when British officials grew concerned about the levels of Western European military capability in the event of a Soviet attack. A clear and permanent American commitment to the military defence of the Old Continent became increasingly important for the British government. In addition, the Soviet blockade of Berlin accelerated the demise of Bevin's Third Force concept.[43] In the eyes of the Foreign Office, it became plainly obvious that Western Europe needed American military and political support, and that a Third Way was both impracticable and undesirable.[44]

The end of Bevin's Third Force was marked by Britain's participation in the negotiations for the creation of an Atlantic defensive alliance. In April 1949, twelve nations signed the Washington Treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Again, the Americans and the British were eager to make sure that NATO offered more than purely military defence. In a letter of March 1949 to Ernest Bevin, Christopher Mayhew (now under-secretary at the Foreign Office) argued that:

> [h]aving closed the front door against Communist aggression, we must now see about the back door.… This is a task where we British, with our solid public opinion and exceptional political experience, seem to have special responsibility. We should, I think, take a strong lead in encouraging western democracies in combating Communist propaganda in their own countries … there is a definite need to continue giving moral encouragement and material assistance to weaker governments in the anti-Communist field.[45]

The launch of NATO required a rethinking of British and American propaganda policies. More room had to be given to the positive projection of western culture, democracy and the western way of life. This approach was already well established within the CIA, which since its inception had been engaging in cultural diplomacy and had formed close connections with the most influential western opinion formers.

The British government's shift in information policy came as a relief to the IRD, which had found the promotion of ideas linked to the 'Third Way' problematic. Now it could leave behind the thorny issue of promoting British social democracy as a viable and successful alternative to both totalitarian communism and uncontrolled capitalism, and promote the more general 'virtues, practices and values of Western democracy'.[46]

The new information policy did not change the Foreign Office's view that Britain, along with the United States, should continue to lead its junior European counterparts in a concerted anti-communist fight. The IRD officials were equally eager to ensure that the launch of the new organisation should enhance and not undermine Britain's leading role among the forces of anti-communism in Europe. Just before the signing of the treaty, Under-Secretary Christopher Mayhew wrote to Bevin to ensure that Britain would take the initiative in the propaganda field. He recommended that the British foreign minister open the discussion about the possibility of using the new organisation to coordinate the propaganda response to communism of its members.[47]

Immediately after the ratification of the NATO Treaty, Gladwyn Jebb submitted a proposal for the creation of an agency within NATO with the aim of promoting the exchange of ideas in the 'field of ideological defence'. Jebb's cautious draft was very clear in stating that each member government should retain the initiative and freedom of action and in warning that the new body should in no way hinder Britain's ongoing anti-communist offensive. Britain should not be forced into an 'undesirable co-ordination of propaganda policy with the other signatories' but it should nevertheless grasp the opportunity for 'stimulating the laggards and imparting the benefit of our experience and techniques'.[48] The same view was shared by Christopher Warner (Assistant Under-Secretary of State):

> We should keep our hands free to go on doing our own anti-communist publicity all over the world…. We and the Americans have, I think, the only effective anti-communist publicity machines and it would be a great pity and dangerous to do anything which would prevent us from continuing to use it inside North Atlantic Treaty countries or to allow our hands to be tied by any kind of contact only to work by agreement or under the detailed direction of a ten-power body.[49]

The position of the Foreign Office was therefore clear: Britain and the United States should take the lead and stimulate the action of their allies. At the same time, it should be ensured that the terms of references of the new agency should be restrictive, so as not to jeopardise the Foreign Office's and Central Intelligence Agency's ongoing campaigns. Finally, the new agency should only deal with the promotion of NATO among its members and not engage directly in anti-communist propaganda.[50]

These discussions about how to develop propaganda warfare in Europe should be placed within the wider propaganda effort being carried out by Britain beyond the Old Continent. At the time when the IRD was discussing cooperation with the NATO members, Britain was fighting in Malaya against communist insurrection, and the first signs of the Mau Mau rebellion were visible in Kenya. Freedom of action was therefore crucial for the

Foreign Office precisely because Western Europe was only one of the many theatres Britain was engaged in, and the Foreign Office feared that close cooperation might force its NATO representative to disclose details of the full scale of Britain's propaganda activities and thus restrict its freedom of action.[51]

The British criticism of a centralised agency must be placed in the wider context of the IRD's wider ongoing operations in the Western European countries. Since its inception, the IRD had provided the foreign governments with anti-communist information material in the hope of pushing them to adopt a more assertive anti-communist stand. The IRD's reports were also distributed directly to writers, journalists and academics and it was therefore often the case that the national governments were not aware of such actions.[52] This was still the case in 1952, when according to a detailed IRD survey only selected individuals in a few countries were aware of the degree of British information activities in their own countries. Most governments did not even know about the existence of a specific agency within the Foreign Office dealing with anti-communist propaganda. The Norwegian and Icelandic governments, for example, were unaware of large-scale operations run by the IRD in their territories. The IRD was therefore concerned that closer cooperation at the intergovernmental level, on the lines suggested by the Americans, might force the British delegation to reveal the existence of the IRD and the extent of its action in Western Europe.[53]

The attempt to fight the spread of communism worldwide led the IRD into tighter cooperation with the CIA, and particularly with its newly established International Organizations Division (IOD). Like the IRD, the IOD was a central collection point for information on the activities of national communist parties and front organisations, and provided covert assistance to an increasingly tight network of voluntary organisations. Thus, the IOD's mission was to fight communism, and particularly its international organisations. This mandate received a further boost in 1953 with the launch of the United States Information Agency (USIA), which expanded and reinforced the relationship with numerous left-wing and liberal organisations in an attempt to undermine support for the communist parties in Western Europe. It did so by initiating new policies such as cultural exchange programmes, travelling libraries and exhibitions, and the covert funding of numerous left-wing journals and intellectuals.[54] Thus, in the early 1950s cooperation between the IRD and like-minded American agencies, such as USIA and the IOD, grew stronger, while coordination with the other Western European countries struggled to take off.

Like the IRD, the CIA was eager to make sure that NATO produced a coordinated and effective response to Soviet propaganda. Contrary to the views held in London, in the eyes of the American officials effective coordination of all western propaganda activities was a much more urgent consideration than the fear that such coordination might disrupt the

information campaigns already put in place by the other national governments. Between 1948 and 1949, the United States had grown increasingly frustrated by the resistance of its British and Western European allies to the forming of a Cominform-like alliance to fight communist infiltration and propaganda. For this reason, towards the end of 1949 the State Department explored the possibility of establishing other bilateral intelligence cooperation on the lines of the cooperation they had with the British so as to be able to offer the United States' allies direct assistance and advice on how best to respond to the anti-western communist campaigns.[55] A few months later, the State Department paper 'Capturing the initiative in the psychological field' officially proposed promoting 'tighter cooperation with the information services of other governments'.[56] While the State Department recognised the need for the West to speak with many voices and that it should tailor its intelligence and information policies to the different national contexts, it aimed to achieve a higher level of coordination within the West so as not to offer the Cominform propaganda machinery easy targets.

The United States reiterated its demands for better coordination of the propaganda policies of the NATO countries at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in August 1950. Aware of the European scepticism, the US delegation was careful to explain that '[n]o "Deminform" is intended but general propaganda increase is desirable'.[57] For this reason, the State Department pursued closer cooperation with the West European allies, particularly the French. Since the end of 1948, the American ambassador to Paris, Jefferson Caffery, had been putting pressure on the French government to institute tighter anti-communist information policies.[58] Following a recrudescence of the communist campaign against NATO and what was seen as an imperialist move by the United States in Europe, in February 1950 the US and French governments promoted the Franco-American Consultative Committee on North Atlantic Treaty and Mutual Defence Assistance Plan (NAT-MDAP). This was in fact an informal body that brought together information experts from both countries to discuss propaganda so as to help the French achieve a more effective response to communists' hostile attacks. It was, however, impossible for the Americans to establish any closer cooperation, as at that point the French did not have a dedicated information agency, and therefore the only thing the Americans could do was to maintain channels for the exchange of ideas and material.

Despite their determination, it was impossible for the Americans to establish with the continental European governments the same level of collaboration they had reached with the British, at least for the foreseeable future. This does not mean, however, that the Americans did not exert their influence in other ways. The presence of the United States Information Agency at the Hotel Astoria in Paris and its sections in Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille and Strasbourg, for example, coordinated various activities,

including the distribution of printed information material in various formats and assistance in the organisation of anti-communist initiatives throughout France.[59] The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) was carrying out a similar action with the specific aim of promoting Franco-American relations and fighting the widespread anti-American feeling fostered by the Communist Party.[60] Similarly, the American Federation of Labor offered financial support to the non-communist section of Force Ouvrière.[61] The CIA too, of course, was behind numerous other initiatives, including the launch and funding of several magazines, like *Preuves*, and of private–state networks, like the French branch of the Congress of Cultural Freedom.[62] In his history of the influence of the United States on post-war France, Irwin Wall argues that Force Ouvrière and the anti-communist Paix et Liberté accounted for the major part of the CIA's effort to promote mass non-communist organisations in France in the 1950s.[63]

In the United States' view, the maximum possible degree of cooperation among the NATO members in the fields of both intelligence and information had to be achieved as soon as possible. It saw the creation of an information agency within NATO as the best means of fostering a strong and coordinated anti-communist campaign in the West. As discussed above, the United Kingdom was instead eager to make sure that national governments retained the initiative in the fields of intelligence and propaganda. The Foreign Office was more in favour of an intergovernmental forum for the exchange of information but resisted the United States' attempt to create a powerful NATO agency that could be seen as a counter-Cominform. The IRD requested that the terms of reference should not 'hinder us in developing our offensive against Communism in our own way or as to open the door to committing us to undesirable coordination of propaganda policy with other signatories'.[64]

The NATO propaganda programme was discussed at the American and British Foreign Ministers' Conference in London in 1950. The US delegation suggested that the British and Americans offer direct assistance to the Western Europeans. Disappointed by their recent experience with the Brussels Treaty, the British resisted the call for closer cooperation.[65] At a bilateral meeting between Christopher Warner and Edward Barrett (the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs), it was agreed that the NATO information staff should not issue their own publicity but should instead coordinate information and stimulate the propaganda efforts of the NATO member governments. It was also recommended that all information action should be entrusted to British and American experts working directly under the chairman of the Council of Deputies. Warner also raised the issue of not duplicating what was already being carried out within the Brussels Treaty Organisation and its newly established informal circulation of reports.[66] The point of view of the Foreign Office, as envisaged by Christopher Mayhew and Gladwyn Jebb, seemed to be about to prevail. To the exasperation of the United

States, when asked for their opinion the West European governments sided with the British and recommended that each country remain free to tailor its propaganda activities to the national situation.[67]

This was a time when senior officials in the IRD started to grow increasingly concerned at what they saw as an excessive form of anti-communism from many of their colleagues in the IOD. The IRD believed that covert action required utmost discretion and feared that fervent political feelings were detrimental to the success of such operations.[68] Nevertheless, the coordination of information policy continued, as close contact with the IOD offered the IRD the double advantage of opening new outlets for propaganda material and exerting a moderating influence on the Americans. In this sense, a new consultation forum within NATO could allow more room for discussion by bringing in the points of view of other Western Europeans, who were notably wary of excessively overt and aggressive propaganda methods. For these reasons, the Foreign Office cautiously supported the creation of some form of loose information machinery within NATO.

In line with what was agreed by the United Kingdom and the United States in London at the beginning of August 1950, the NATO Council of Deputies approved the creation of the NATO International Information Service (NIIS), which was later renamed the NATO Information Service (NATIS). The new agency was to 'promote and coordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving the responsibility of national programmes to each country'.[69] The Canadian Theodore F.M. Newton was appointed Director of Information and was supposed to be joined shortly by 'high level international assistants accompanied by stenographers. The junior staff envisaged ... will comprise a junior press officer and four or five technicians for research work'.[70] All staff would be contributed by member governments on a fixed-term basis. Yet, as will be discussed later, most of these plans remained on paper, and voluntary contributions – in the form of both economic help and staff – did not pour in as quickly as expected by the United States and the United Kingdom. NATIS operated through the existing national information agencies, and according to its terms of reference:

> [n]either a general budget nor an operational budget exists for the furtherance of the service's activities, and accordingly within the existing prescribed budgetary and policy limitations, activities of the service must be restricted to certain facilitating operations performed in cooperation with established agencies and outlets.[71]

NATIS was strictly intergovernmental. The terms of reference of the new agency followed the agreement reached by Warner and Barrett the previous June with one important exception: NATIS could also assist the member governments in their response to communist propaganda but it

was made very clear that NATIS could not produce its own information material.[72]

The Foreign Office offered the new agency some office space at 13 Belgrave Square in London (today the site of the Ghanaian High Commission), little more than a mile away from the IRD's headquarters at Carlton House Terrace. The Press and Information office was located in the front room on the ground floor. From here, NATIS would launch NATO's communiqués, and senior officials would meet members of the press. It would also contain a small reference library. The ground floor was to be the only level open to the public and only accredited journalists would be invited. The rest of the building would be accessible only to NATIS staff and national information officials. Here, the examination of press and publication relating to NATO would be examined and meetings on national and NATO's information programmes would be held. This arrangement lasted until the 1952 reorganisation of the NATO Council, when NATIS headquarters were moved to Paris at the Palais de Chaillot.

The new NATO information machinery was a compromise between the American demand for a vigorous and fully coordinated western propaganda action, and the European countries' fear of excessive centralisation and information sharing. Like many compromises, it disappointed everybody. The State Department thought the new agency was too small, its budget virtually non-existent and its terms of reference too restrictive to allow NATIS to play a significant role in the anti-communist fight. The point that irritated the Americans the most was the demand that NATIS operate through the existing national information agencies. This seemed absurd, given that it was clear that many NATO members did not have such agencies in place.[73] Finally, according to the Americans it was imperative that NATO carry out an offensive propaganda campaign as they believed a simply defensive information policy would be ineffective in stemming the flow of hostile attacks coming from the Cominform front.[74]

The Foreign Office was equally disappointed, although for very different reasons. British officials feared that the creation of NATIS would overlap with what was already being done within the Western European Union and that it would compromise their own informal circulation of information material to their contacts. The creation of NATIS, they thought, meant an increase in the workload of the IRD and could potentially be an obstacle to their ongoing activities.[75]

The other Western Europeans were sceptical about the new agency too and were concerned that its foundation might translate into interference in their national affairs. According to most of them, each nation-state was unique and a common information policy within NATO was therefore destined to be unworkable and ineffective.

The lack of enthusiasm meant that the contributions that were supposed to be volunteered by the member governments were neither regular nor substantial. With the exception of the US delegation (which offered funds

and personnel) and the British and the French ones (which volunteered personnel), the other NATO members were reluctant to contribute.

Among the most important names are Geoffrey Parsons, former editor of the European edition of the *New York Herald Tribune*, and Jean Béliard, former attaché of the French embassy in Washington and later Assistant Press Chief at the Quai d'Orsay.[76] Under increasing pressure from the Anglo-Americans, in November 1950 the Italian and Dutch governments promised to send their own officials to join NATIS. Not surprisingly, therefore, only a few months after the creation of the Information Service Theodore Newton complained that he had 'no money to buy newspapers or to make telephone calls and that there was no provision for the payment of travelling expenses of himself and his assistants'.[77]

The IRD and NATIS

As soon as NATIS was set up, the IRD made contact with its new director. In December 1950, John Peck of the IRD offered Newton the support of the Foreign Office. He expressed the desirability of the two agencies working closely together in a common anti-communist campaign. He explained the need to avoid the saturation of the market and the over-arching concern of avoiding NATO being identified as an IRD channel. Finally, Peck suggested that, given the established British expertise, there was no need for NATIS to initiate the costly and lengthy collection of information about communist propaganda. It could rely instead on the material that the British delegation could provide. This proposition appealed to Newton precisely because NATIS did not have the resources to carry out such an operation by itself. Peck also provided Newton with examples of the IRD's output, including a copy of the fortnightly 'Trends in Communist propaganda'. According to Peck's report:

> Mr Newton is very anxious to cooperate with us to the full, to avoid getting in the way of anything we may do on our own, and in effect, to put his resources at our disposal, and I think he may be very valuable to us.[78]

The cooperation between NATIS and IRD was reinforced by the appointment of William Newton as the NATIS deputy director and head of the Research Section of the Information Service in 1951. He had previously worked for the BBC, where he had gained extensive experience in political and foreign language broadcasting and in the supervision of the production of information programmes.[79] William Newton and Theodore Newton were the only NATIS members to know of the existence of the IRD and of the true origins of the reports circulated by the British delegation.

It was the beginning of a very productive relationship. In the 1950s, the British delegation was the most prolific in producing reports on the

activities of the front organisations and of many national communist parties in the NATO area. In particular, the delegation submitted reports on the festivals and congresses organised by the International Union of Students and the World Peace Council, as well as reports on the political and economic situation of the Soviet Union and other communist countries. In 1953, Francis Brown of the UK delegation to NATO asserted that '[w]e remain the main purveyors of such factual information to NATO'.[80]

There is no doubt that the documents submitted by the UK delegation originated in the IRD. Drafts of the NATO reports are available in the IRD archives and they often include a copy printed on NATO headed paper. The style, sources and information contained in these reports are also easily recognisable and are similar in content and style to the information material passed by the IRD to British and international journalists. The reports were accurate and detailed, and based on information gathered by a long-established network of observers and informants that the IRD had cultivated since the end of the war.[81]

Secrecy remained key, and the IRD carefully instructed all those involved in the distribution procedure not to reveal the origin of the information reports that were passed on. The Foreign Office feared that the British delegates might be forced to inform their counterparts of the existence of the IRD and its covert activities in the other NATO members.[82] According to Denis Brown, the IRD man responsible for liaising with NATIS in the early 1950s, 'It is clear that we cannot authorise the British Representative … to describe, without more ado, all the activities of the IRD in NATO countries.'[83] Thus, the IRD issued precise guidelines to the British delegation:

> The UK representative is not to indicate the extent of H.M.G.'s activities in this field in any given foreign country.... He is not to volunteer the information that H.M.G. maintain a special agency to collect intelligence suitable for anti-communist propaganda.[84]

At first, the IRD sent its reports to NATIS via the British embassy in Paris. The embassy passed the unopened envelope on to the UK delegation at NATIS. This procedure often betrayed the origins of the material, as it could happen that the red slip attached to the pack in the IRD offices was not removed before reaching NATIS.[85] In order not to compromise the IRD's secrecy, in September 1952 a new procedure was introduced: the IRD material was to be sent directly to the UK delegation without passing through the embassy. All material was enclosed in a plain (not 'Foreign Office') envelope addressed to the North Atlantic Treaty Information Service without any compliments slip and without the red slip. According to Denis Brown:

> The fact that the envelope is received from the UK Delegation will be of sufficient indication that the material is ours for those members of

NATIS who know of the IRD's existence (i.e. so far as I know Mr Theodore Newton and Mr William Newton).[86]

Once secrecy about the existence of the IRD and the unattributability of its information material were ensured, the IRD supported close cooperation with NATIS. It even suggested that the new agency might offer the chance of:

talking about, for instance, the exchange of facilities on broadcasting; for influencing governments to release more factual information for use by NATIS, for influencing those governments who are not doing much at present to do more information work themselves.[87]

Closer collaboration in the broadcasting field received a further boost in 1951 with the appointment of Peter Pooley as Assistant Director of Information. Pooley was the founder and first editor of the BBC's *Radio Newsreel* and in 1940 had worked for the BBC Empire Service. At NATIS, Pooley overviewed the production of short films and documentaries and brought his expertise and valuable contacts with the BBC to the service of NATIS.[88] As will be discussed in the next chapter, a further important step in the IRD–NATIS collaboration was the appointment in 1968 of John Price as Director of Information. Price was himself an ex-IRD man and had worked as an information counsellor in Bonn. Price's first act as director-general was to visit London and to discuss current and future collaboration with the IRD. At Peck's suggestion, Price was welcomed directly at the IRD's offices to discuss with IRD officials ways to increase the flow of information from the IRD to NATIS. Price also requested to have copies of all material sent to him personally, including weekly press cuttings.[89] Thus, the appointment of Price established an even tighter and more direct link between the IRD and NATIS.

The reports distributed by the UK delegation included of course the periodic surveys that all national delegations were asked to submit. These allowed the Information Service to gain a detailed picture of how the member governments were responding to communist propaganda attacks and what they were doing to inform their own people about the need for NATO. More importantly, however, the UK delegation submitted detailed reports on the activities of the 'front' organisations and on their festivals and congresses. Such reports were remarkably detailed and included the number of national delegations and the names of their leaders, the events' organisers, the keynote speakers and the title of their presentations. After the events had taken place, the delegation often submitted additional reports with summaries about how the press had reported on the events and on any issue that might have arisen during the congresses and festivals. The initiatives promoted by the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade

Unions were the object of a particularly large number of reports sent in by the British delegation, and it is clear from the IRD archival material that these organisations were perceived by the Foreign Office as extremely dangerous.

The British delegation also submitted reports on the economic and political situation in the Soviet Union for circulation within the North Atlantic Council. These reports offered detailed information and data on the Soviet government's policies and their impact on the economic and political development of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern bloc as a whole. They were compiled to offer a precise picture of the economic and political situation behind the Iron Curtain so as to help the Council and the NATO countries gain a more advanced insight into the development of the Soviet economic and military potential. Copies of the reports circulated within the North Atlantic Council found their way to specialised working groups and committees, including the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy (AC/89 series) and the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy (AC/34). As Evanthis Hatzivassiliou has recently demonstrated, the reports allowed the NATO Council to monitor the Soviet Union's relations with the satellites and to project future developments of Soviet security strategy.[90] Through the circulation of the reports, the British delegation could therefore potentially influence the way in which the NATO Council and its national delegations perceived the Soviet Union and its satellite states, and therefore contribute to the formulation of NATO's defensive and strategic concept.

Conclusion

The launching of the Brussels Treaty and the creation of the NATO Information Service were important steps in the coordination of the Western response to Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda campaigns. By providing new forums for discussion and for the exchange of information and intelligence, both organisations allowed the West to produce a more coordinated action and to develop a common strategy to respond to the hostile communist attacks. Yet despite their potential and the American determination, these organisations failed to attract the necessary support in Western Europe. Although national bodies like the IRD saw the potential of the new intergovernmental information agencies, mutual suspicion and a reluctance to exchange security and intelligence information prevented them from taking full advantage of the situation. The West remained largely incapable of producing a common information and intelligence response to the Soviet attacks. The political and cultural divisions of the West left it exposed and fragile.

The obstacles encountered by the American and British information officials and the compromises they had to come to terms with are signs that, following its inception, NATO – and its information Service with

it – was more than a mere extension of the American will and that there was indeed an important degree of political dialogue, cooperation and mutual influence. As this chapter has discussed, the West European members shaped the political agenda and resisted the American calls for a strong, centralised propaganda machine within NATO. While they too were concerned about the strength of communism both in their own country and internationally, they clearly feared a powerful NATO information agency even more.

Study of the British papers offers a good example of the predicament national agencies found themselves in. Being one of the few well-organised and experienced agencies able to deal with propaganda in the early Cold War, the IRD looked for an opportunity to lead its junior European partners through the Western Union and NATO. Cooperation would also have the advantage of opening important new outlets for its propaganda material, something the IRD was always eager to find. However, any form of cooperation ran the risk of jeopardising the secrecy surrounding the very existence of the IRD. The possibility of being taken advantage of and of having its room for manoeuvre reduced by consultation with less experienced partners seemed a further great risk. For these reasons, the IRD approached propaganda cooperation within the Western Union with caution and resisted the American pressure to have a centralised and powerful propaganda machine within NATO. Only when it became clear that NATIS could not threaten the IRD's operations and that in fact it opened new ways for it to distribute its information material did the IRD fully come on board. As will be discussed in the next chapter, from 1953 the British delegation was – along with the Americans – one of the most prolific and produced key reports that had an important role in shaping the position of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations and consequently of NATIS itself. Through its delegation and the presence of British officials in key posts, the IRD was able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by NATIS without having its room for manoeuvre and its secrecy compromised in the slightest.

The kind of association with the Western Europeans that the Foreign Office had in mind was not based on cooperation among equal partners; it was rather a matter of the Anglo-Americans offering leadership and help to their junior counterparts. In their eyes, cooperation was a one-way street in which the Anglo-Americans supplied the West Europeans with copies of their information material and in which the countries involved were themselves the target of behind-the-scenes propaganda. The Foreign Office in particular envisaged a series of bilateral agreements rather than actual multilateral cooperation. Such agreements would facilitate the exchange of intelligence and propaganda information, which would offer the double advantage of protecting the secrecy surrounding the IRD and of allowing Britain to exploit the weakness of its counterparts by offering support and intelligence information. Given the expertise of the IRD, the

Foreign Office could decide what material should be collated and circulated, and therefore could influence the point of view and policies of its partners. Both the balance of power and the initiative would therefore remain in Britain's favour. To use the terminology of intelligence liaison cooperation studies, the bilateral agreements with the Western European governments saw Britain and the United States as primary partners if not dictatorial ones.[91]

Notes

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5 Cull N.J., *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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7 On the early exchanges between American and British officials, see W. Benton, Assistant Secretary of State to I. Kirkpatrick, 2 August 1946; I. Kirkpatrick to W. Benton, 7 November 1946, The National Archives (henceforth TNA), London, FO930/521 P998/963/907.
8 Cull, *The Cold War*.
9 Foreign Office circular to British missions, 12 May 1948, TNA, FO1110/6, PR229/1/G. This point will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter.
10 For example, see Richelson J.T. and Ball D., *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Wark W.K., 'Coming in from the cold: British propaganda and Red Army defectors, 1945–1952', *International History Review*, 9/1 (February 1987), pp. 48–72; Barnes T., 'Democratic deception: American covert operations in post-war Europe', in Charters D.A. and Tugwell M.A.J. (eds), *Deception Operations: Studies in the East–West Context* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990), pp. 297–323; Ranelagh J., 'Through the looking glass: a comparison of the United States and United Kingdom intelligence cultures', in Peake H.B. and Halpern S. (eds), *In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer* (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994), pp. 411–443.
11 Aldrich R.J., *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001).

12 Defty, *Britain, America*; Aldrich. Aldrich and Defty benefited from declassification of the IRD's archives that followed the 1993 White Paper on Open Government (the Waldegrave Initiative). Cmnd 2290, *White Paper on Open Government* (London: HMSO, July 1993).

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17 'Future foreign publicity policy', 4 January 1948, TNA, CAB 129/23.

18 Ibid.

19 Kent and Young, 'The "Western Union" concept'; Greenwood S., 'Ernest Bevin, France and the Western Union', *European History Quarterly*, 25/1 (1990), pp. 107–125.

20 'Exchange of views between France, United States of America and the United Kingdom on the coordination of their propaganda', minute by Ralph Murray, 15 October 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR860/G.

21 The 1948 Brussels Treaty created the Western Union (WU), which was also known as the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO). The name was changed to Western European Union (WEU) with the Amended Brussels Treaty of 1955. In order to avoid confusion, I use here only the WEU and BTO acronyms.

22 'Proposal for an Information Executive to be established by the Brussels Pact Consultative Council', R. Murray, 19 March 1948, TNA, FO953/145 P2604/1474/950.

23 'Third meeting of the Working Party on Spiritual Union', 24 March 1948, TNA, FO953/145 P26041474/950.

24 'Coordination of information activities of the Brussels Pact Powers', memo from C.F.A. Warner, 3 April 1948, TNA, FO953/145 P26041474/950.

25 Ibid.

26 'Item 5 of the agenda for the meeting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Pact Powers for October 25th, 1948', 21 October 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR984/G.

27 'Items 4, 5, 7 and 9c of the attached agenda of the Consultative Council meeting fixed for October 25th', Ralph Murray 18 October 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR914/G.

28 'Item 5 of the agenda for the meeting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Pact Powers for October 25th, 1948', 21 October 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR984/G.

29 Defty, *Britain, America*, ch. 3.

30 'On the exchange of views between France, United States of America and United Kingdom on the coordination of their propaganda', October 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR860/G.

31 'Item 5 of the agenda', TNA, FO1110/126 PR984/G.

32 Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*, ch. 5.

33 Record of a meeting of the Consultative Council held at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 a.m. and at 3.30 p.m. on 25 October 1948 [no author, no date], TNA, FO1110/126 PR985/G. Significantly, the French also expressed an interest in developing their own propaganda agency. 'Exchange of information regarding anti-communist publicity with the Brussels Powers', R Murray, 20 November 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR1162/860.

34 'Extract from: Record of a meeting of the Consultative Council held at the Quai d'Orsay at 10 am and at 3:30 pm on October 25th, 1948', no author, no date, TNA, FO1110/126 PR985/G.

35 'Record of a meeting', TNA, FO1110/126 PR985/G.

36 'Exchange of information regarding anticommunist publicity with the Brussels Powers', note by Ralph Murray, 30 November 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR1162/G.

37 'Note of conversation in Dr Lovink's room at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 25th', note by John Peck, 26 November 1948, TNA FO1110/126 PR1175/G.

38 Letter from Ralph Murray (Foreign Office) to Sir Oliver Harvey (British embassy in Paris), 8 December 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR1197/G.

39 'Progress report: Information Research Department, 1st January to 31st July 1949' [short version], 15 September 1949; and the attached Annex C 'List of papers sent to the Brussels Powers', Ralph Murray, 13 August 1949, TNA, FO1110/277 PR2891/G.

40 Foreign Office Circular, 4 March 1949, TNA FO1110/84, PR499/9/G.

41 'Exchange of information regarding anticommunist publicity with the Brussels Powers', note by Ralph Murray, 30 November 1948, TNA, FO1110/126 PR1162/G; Defty, *Britain, America*, pp. 112–118.

42 'Progress report', TNA, FO1110/277 PR2891/G; 'Record of a meeting', TNA, FO1110/126 PR985/G.

43 Lucas and Morris, 'A very British crusade', p. 101.

44 'A Third World Power or Western consolidation?', 9 May 1949, TNA, FO371/76384 PUSC(22)Final.

45 Letter from Christopher Mayhew to Ernest Bevin, 28 March 1949, TNA, FO1110/270 PR795/G.

46 Draft circular to Information Officers abroad, 24 August 1949, TNA, FO 953/481 P8128/129/850.

47 Memo by C.P. Mayhew to E. Bevin, 28 March 1949, TNA, FO1110/270 PR795; Mayhew C., *A War of Words: Cold War Witness* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 33.

48 'Anti-communist propaganda policy', memo by G. Jebb, 21 June 1949, TNA, FO 1110/192 PR1766/14/G.

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50 Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, pp. 429–430.

51 Short A., *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948–1960* (London: Muller, 1975); Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand*, ch. 22.

52 According to the IRD's progress report, for example, considerable publicity was achieved in Belgium and the Netherlands, while France remained a difficult territory to work, particularly as far as the national press was concerned. 'Progress report. Information Research Department, 1st January to 31st July 1949', TNA, FO1110/277 PR2891/G.

53 'Consideration by NATO Information Policy Working Group of suitable methods of countering communist propaganda', July–August 1952, TNA, FO1110/526 PR117/7; Mayhew C., *A War of Words: Cold War Witness*, ed. Smith L. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); see also Insall T., *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945–1951* (Oslo: Unipub, 2010).

54 Cull, *The Cold War*.

55 'Cooperation with the British and other Information Services', 30 December 1949, NARA, RG59, 741.5200/2-950; quoted in Defty, *Britain, America*, p. 120.

56 'US views on capturing initiative in psychological field', Washington, no date, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), 1950, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: US GPO), pp. 296–302.

57 US delegation minutes, First Session, preliminary conversations for the September Foreign Ministers' Meeting, Washington, DC, 29 August 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. 3, p. 1137.

58 Wall I.M., *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 67–70.

59 Captain René-Henri Wüst, 'La guerre psychologique de 1945 à 1952', 1952, Service historique de la défense: Archives du Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Vincennes, 1 K 609, as quoted in Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*, p. 188..

60 The Mutual Security Agency was established in October 1951 to assess the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan in Europe and to encourage increased use of counterpart funds to stimulate industrial production. The MSA was abolished by the Reorganization Plan (no. 7 of 1 August 1953) and its functions were transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration. Records of the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), 1949–1956, 469.3, part of the Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948–1961.

61 Kauffer R., 'Derrière Force Ouvrière: Brown, l'ami américain', *Historia*, 621 (1997).

62 Lucas S., *Freedom's War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Coleman P., *The Liberal Conspiracy: The Congress of Cultural Freedom and the Struggle for the Mind of Postwar Europe* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), chs 14 and 15; Grémion P., *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris, 1950–1975* (Paris: Fayard, 1995); Grémion P. (ed.), *Preuves, une revue européenne à Paris* (Paris: Julliard, 1989).

63 Wall, *The United States*, p. 150. Similar action was taken in other Western European countries, most notably in Italy, particularly in the months preceding the 1948 elections. Mistry, 'Re-thinking American intervention'; Mistry, 'The case for political warfare'.

64 Report to Secretary of State, 1949, TNA FO1110/270 PR795/G.

65 The US delegation at the tripartite preparatory meetings to the Secretary of State, 24 April 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. 3, pp. 856–857; 'The London Conferences: Anglo-American relations and Cold War strategy, January–June 1950', *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series 2, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1987), p. 48.

66 Notes on Barrett-Warner talks, first meeting, 20 May 1950, NARA 611.41/5–2650, RG 59; quoted in Defty, *Britain, America*, p. 121.

67 'Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State', 16 September 1950, *FRUS*, 1950, vol. III, pp. 308–309.

68 Peck to Watson, 7 February 1952, TNA, FO1110/516 PR89/49.

69 Summary record of the seventh meeting, held on 3 August 1950 at Lancaster House, 3 August 1950, NATO Archives (henceforward NA), DR(50)7; Summary record of the eighth meeting, held on 4 August 1950 at Lancaster House, 4 August 1950, NA, DR(50)8; 'Information service', 11 August 1950, NA, DD/17.

70 'The NATO Information Service', 20 November 1950, NA, DD/186.

71 Ibid.

72 'Terms of reference for the NATO Information Service', memo by the Director of Information, 20 November 1950, NA, DD/187.

73 Defty, *Britain, America*, p. 121.

74 Views of the Department of State concerning programmes and instrumentalities to further the objectives of NATO and MDAP, 23 February 1951, Office files of Assistant Secretary Edward Barrett, 1950–1951, Box 5, Lot 52D432, RG 59, NARA, quoted in Defty, *Britain, America*, p. 122.

75 Counter-propaganda by the NATO Information Service, J.H. Peck, 1 December 1950, TNA, FO1110/429 PR78/3/51; Minute by R. Murray, 19 December 1950, TNA, FO1110/429 PR78/3/51.

76 'The NATO Information Service', 20 November 1950, NA, DD/186.

77 Telegram from Sir Hoyer Millar, UK deputy to the North Atlantic Council, to Foreign Office, 29 November 1950, TNA, FO1110/429 PR78/3/51.

78 'NATO Information Services Counter Propaganda', minute by J.H. Peck, 15 December 1950, TNA FO1110/429 PR78/3/51.

79 Progress report to the deputies on the NATO Information Service, memo by Director of Information, 8 February 1951, NA, DD(51)38. In November 1962, William Newton was appointed chairman of the Working Group on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy and of the Working Group on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany.

80 Letter from F.D.W. Brown (UK delegation to NATO) to D.D. Brown (IRD, Foreign Office), 27 January 1953, TNA, FO1110/546 PR142/6/G. From 1960, the UK delegation also started to produce numerous reports on the situation in the Third Word, particularly in Africa; copies are available in the AC/52 series (Joint Working Group on Information Policy and Cultural Cooperation, 1953–1972), NATO Archives.

81 Taylor P.M., *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), ch. 1.

82 'Consideration by NATO Information Policy Working Group of suitable methods of countering communist propaganda', 1952, TNA, FO1110/526, PR 117/7.

83 'Consideration by NATO Information Policy Working Group of suitable methods of countering Communist propaganda', minute by D.D. Brown, 16 August 1952, TNA FO1110/526 PR117/7.

84 Letter from D.D. Brown to J.H.A. Watson in Washington, 19 September 1952, TNA, FO 1110/526, PR 117/7.

85 A copy of the red slip can still be found in the IRD papers at the National Archives: TNA, FO 1110/526, PR 117/21.

86 Letter from D.D. Brown to Mr Peck, 23 September 1952, TNA FO1110/526 PR117/21.

87 'Points Connected with NATO Information Policy', TNA FO1110/526 PR117/9G, no date.

88 See more details on the Media Section in Chapter 6.

89 From J.S. Champion to R. Thomas, 4 July 1968, TNA FCO95/386 IR5/2/9; 'Press cuttings for transmission to Mr J. Price, Director-General of NATO Information Services', by J.S. Champion, 10 July 1968, TNA, FCO95/386.
90 Hatzivassiliou E., 'NATO assessments of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11/2 (2009), pp. 89–116.
91 Richelson J.T., 'The calculus of intelligence cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 4/3 (1990), pp. 307–323.

2 The expansion of the NATO Information Service in the 1950s

The new NATO information machinery was a compromise between the American demands for vigorous and wide-ranging western propaganda activity, and the West European countries' fear that excessive centralisation and information sharing could infringe national sovereignty and undermine national security. Because of its limited powers, its small budget and the fact that only a few member countries were represented at senior personnel level, NATIS initially failed to attract political support. Yet as will be discussed in this chapter, the death of Stalin and the end of the war in Korea as well as the internal reform of NATO that took place in 1952 gave more importance to the information work carried out by NATIS.

The invasion of South Korea had an immediate impact on NATO's strategic thinking. The alliance became aware of the need to urgently address two fundamental issues: the effectiveness of NATO's military structures and the strengths of NATO forces. Recognising that the existing NATO structure of planning groups would not be adequate in a war against the Eastern bloc, in September 1950 the North Atlantic Council approved the creation of an integrated military force under centralised command. A few months later, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was nominated NATO's first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). By April 1951, the new headquarters of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) were ready.[1] Shortly afterwards, the alliance improved created the post of Secretary General and established a permanent session of the North Atlantic Council (NAC).[2]

These structural changes, together with the accession of Greece and Turkey, needed to be reflected in a new Strategic Concept. From September 1950, the alliance moved away from the so-called peripheral strategy, whereby in the event of an attack from the Soviet bloc NATO would retreat west of the Rhine–IJssel line, regroup and respond to the attack.[3] The new 'forward strategy' – championed by Dirk Stikker, the Dutch Foreign Minister – was based on the assumption that it was crucial to resist Soviet military invasion as far to the east as possible so as to minimise casualties and destruction.[4] The second Strategic Concept did

not differ fundamentally from the first; it was the Strategic Guidance (MC 14/1) that changed. This comprehensive document stated that NATO's strategic aim was to 'ensure the defence of the NATO area and to destroy the will and capability of the Soviet Union and her satellites to wage war'. NATO would initially be conducting an air offensive and would follow it with simultaneous ground and sea operations using 'all types of weapons'. The defence line was also moved eastwards. The Elbe line saw the inclusion of the northern provinces of the Netherlands and the entire territory of West Germany. The 'forward strategy' stressed even further the need for West Germany's military contribution to the defence of Europe and of its own soil.[5] The rearmament of West Germany, the end of its Occupation Statute and ultimately its political rehabilitation were thorny issues, difficult to sell to the West European public. In whatever way the rearmament of Germany took place, either within NATO as suggested by the Americans in the form of the Spofford Plan or as part of a European framework like the European Defence Community, the topic was highly controversial. The NATO members themselves were divided on the issue. Several scholars have already demonstrated the extent to which the Americans underestimated the level of resistance among the West Europeans, particularly the French, and how this led to tensions within the alliance.[6]

In addition to the need for rearmament and the contribution of West Germany to European defence, there were two other important issues that NATIS had to focus on at the time: the widespread anti-Americanism and the equally rife neutralist feelings, particularly in continental Europe. This will be discussed in the next chapter; suffice it to say now that NATO information experts knew that NATO was seen by sectors of the public as a cause of tension in East–West relations and that many disagreed with the policies of rearmament that NATO entailed. The NATO and national information officials were also very much aware of the fact that such topics were adeptly exploited by the national communist parties and by their international organisations. It was therefore imperative to respond effectively to such claims and to make the defensive and peaceful nature of the alliance known to the public.

While NATO's structural changes had moved forward, the strength of NATO forces remained a problem. At its meeting in Lisbon in February 1952, the NAC set very ambitious force goals that proved to be financially unrealistic and politically problematic.[7] As a consequence, in the following years NATO strategy was plagued by the persistent gap between the Lisbon targets and the actual resources of its members. The United States, under the leadership of NATO's former SACEUR and now US president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, looked for ways to gain greater military effectiveness without an increase in a military budget that had almost reached its peak. Because nuclear weapons offered the proverbial 'more bang for the buck', the Eisenhower administration shifted the emphasis of American defence

policy away from conventional weapons. The 'New Look' policy reflected the United States' need to balance its Cold War military commitments with the nation's financial resources. It emphasized reliance on strategic nuclear weapons to deter potential threats from the East.[8]

However, it was problematic to integrate nuclear weapons into NATO's strategy. Such integration was a matter not only of technical and practical obstacles to be overcome but also of sensitive political problems to be ironed out between the members. Some Allies advocated massive retaliation using nuclear weapons and stressed the advantage of helping to reduce national force requirements and, therefore, defence expenditures. Others were more cautious and sceptical about the use of atomic weapons in general. The Americans were keen to push ahead, as their military commitments in Europe and beyond were overstretching their resources. In his characteristically uncompromising style, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recommended the 'use of atomic weapons as conventional weapons … whenever and wherever it would be of advantage to do so'.[9]

To the disappointment of the United States, the new SACEUR, Matthew B. Ridgway, produced a controversial report in which he warned that the integration of atomic weapons into NATO's strategy would in fact imply an increase rather than a decrease in force levels because of the high casualty rates.[10] Soon after issuing his report, Ridgway was replaced as SACEUR by General Alfred Gruenther, who was asked to look into the matter again. Gruenther gained some time by establishing a 'New Approach Group' at SHAPE to examine this question. In the meantime, the United States, together with a number of European members, called for the complete integration of nuclear policy into NATO strategy. The 'New Approach Group' produced MC 48, the first document to explicitly discuss the use of nuclear weapons and the concept of massive retaliation. Documents published in the following years (MC 14/2 and MC 48/2) reflected the alliance's increasing concern about the Soviet political and economic activities outside the NATO area.[11]

The importance of out-of-area events became even more relevant in the context of the Suez Crisis and the crushing of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet Union in 1956. A political directive issued by the Atlantic Council to NATO's military authorities in December 1956 stressed that 'although NATO defence planning is limited to the defence of the Treaty area, it is necessary to take account of the dangers which may arise for NATO because of developments outside that area'.[12] As will be discussed later, out-of-area events had a strong impact on the security concept of the alliance and on its internal political cohesion, leading to a rethinking of NATO's information work and consideration of whether NATIS and the national information agencies should address part of their propaganda efforts beyond NATO territory and engage in psychological warfare.

The first steps towards pro-NATO propaganda

The new NATO strategy was based on the ability to make use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons to respond to a Soviet attack from the outset. This strategy would therefore lead to rapid and massive nuclear escalation. The political impact of the new strategy documents was not negligible. Convincing the national governments and the public of the need to include West Germany while agreeing to a defensive strategy based on massive retaliation and the use of nuclear weapons was not an easy task. The national information agencies and NATIS had to coordinate their efforts and put forward adequate propaganda programmes to help the public and national governments digest such controversial ideas. These concerns were noted by the Secretary General, Lord Ismay, who recognised the 'widespread feeling that it will become increasingly difficult to sustain popular support for defence expenditures as now planned unless governments can explain more clearly why the money is needed'.[13]

Soon after the foundation of NATIS, the Council of Deputies set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conflict of Ideas to study ways in which the Information Service could assist the governments in their anti-communist propaganda effort. Despite the sense of urgency, the Working Group recommended that that the terms of reference should not be changed and that NATIS should not be directly involved in any propaganda campaign. It also stressed that all members should not direct their information activity beyond the Iron Curtain or towards any non-NATO countries.[14]

In its first report, the Working Group issued guidelines on how to ensure a coherent NATO information campaign aimed at achieving two complementary goals: the justification of the very existence of NATO as a defensive military organisation (according to article 5 of the Treaty of Washington), and the role of NATO in fostering closer economic and political cooperation among its members (article 2). Three themes should be at the core of any information programme in support of NATO. The first need was to explain to the public the nature, aims and structure of NATO and point out that the organisation was primarily defensive and built around the need to foster political cooperation among its members. Second, all information material should stress the superior resources of the North Atlantic countries as compared to those of any possible aggressor. Third, NATIS and the national governments should explain that only through cooperation within NATO could the West achieve effective military defence.[15] The report also suggested additional topics that NATIS and the member governments should emphasise more clearly. The approval of the 'forward strategy' meant the participation of West Germany in the military defence of Europe, and this was a particularly hot potato that NATIS had to handle with care. It was important to explain to the public that the involvement of West Germany in the defence of

Europe and its rearmament were part of the wider process of political and economic consolidation of Western Europe, including the beginning of the European integration process. As preliminary discussions about the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Defence Community were taking place, NATO should be presented as part of a wider political process towards closer political cooperation within the West.[16] Finally, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conflict of Ideas wanted to strengthen collaboration between NATIS and the national governments, and suggested increasing the flow of information from the capitals to NATIS. The Service would therefore become a central point of collection of all information relating to pro-NATO propaganda in the member countries and from which all national information officials could draw ideas about what other countries were doing and ask assistance in coordinating their response.[17]

Based on the documents produced by the Working Group, the Council of Deputies published a resolution on the 'importance of information activities' which demanded that all member governments collaborate more closely with NATIS and that they increase their commitment to the common information effort.[18] Thus, in May 1951 the Council of Deputies approved a resolution that confirmed the 'desirability of adopting affective measures designed to turn the present defensive position of NAT countries in the counter-propaganda field into active initiatives likely to make a strong impression on public opinion'.[19] Yet despite such a firmly phrased resolution, the Deputies had no means of forcing the national governments to work more closely with NATIS and with one another, and to spend more resources on the promotion of NATO among their own publics. In fact, despite all their efforts the hands of the Deputies, as well as of NATIS itself, were tied and the Deputies had to recognise that 'the national information services of each member country of the Atlantic Treaty are alone competent to make the fullest use, in the light of local conditions, of the data which the specialised NATO service is responsible for collecting'.[20]

Given the circumstances, it is therefore not surprising that the central role in shaping NATO's information policy and in fostering cooperation among the national propaganda agencies was played by the annual Conference of National Information Officials (CONIO) that was launched in 1951 rather than by NATIS itself. CONIO gathered together NATIS officials as well as experts from all NATO countries and representatives from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).[21] The conference met once a year for two or three days to review the action carried out by NATIS as well as to monitor the activities of the communist parties in the light of specialised reports submitted by the national delegations. Upon its conclusion, the conference issued guidelines to NATIS and to the national delegations in the hope of achieving greater coordination. Not surprisingly, the British and American delegations were by far the

largest and often included high-ranking officials. At the first conference, for example, most national delegations comprised one or two experts, while the United Kingdom sent six officials, including Christopher Warner of the IRD and Sir Robert Fraser, Director-General of the Central Office of Information. There were also nine Americans, among whom was Edward Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.[22] It is interesting to note that although the main task of the conference and of its delegations was to discuss ways to improve propaganda activities at the national level, information officials in CONIO – as well as delegates in the CICR – were always based in Foreign Ministries.

The very fact that in the early stages of the Information Service's life CONIO assumed such an important role confirms the fact that suspicion about a central information agency within NATO was rife and that NATIS struggled to take off. The central role of CONIO gave strength to the national dimension and underlined the intergovernmental nature of NATO information work. CONIO was, in many ways, competing with NATIS and often overruled its suggestions. As a result, NATIS was sidelined and unable to run its own activities independently. CONIO also established a permanent channel of cooperation between NATO and SHAPE. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Eisenhower was very much aware of the importance of adequate information work to support the military effort.[23] Thus, as soon as he was appointed Commander, Eisenhower created an Office of Public Information within SHAPE. By 1951, the office included thirty-two people and was still expanding. In NATO's early years, the support of SHAPE was of crucial importance, as it provided expertise and support through its media library and press clippings service.[24]

Although it appreciated the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conflict of Ideas and of the Conference of National Information Officials, the US State Department had hoped for a more aggressive and active NATO Information Service. In its opinion, NATIS was far too small and understaffed. The absence of a proper budget and the fact that its personnel were appointed and paid for by the member governments placed great limits on the Information Service's operational capacity. The United States believed it was pure nonsense to force the Information Service to work through national security agencies when it was well known that several countries did not have agencies of this kind or, if they did, that those agencies did not have sufficient expertise and funding. However, each time the American Deputy reiterated demands for a better-funded and enlarged Information Service, those demands met fierce resistance from the European members and frustration grew on all sides.[25] The only step forward was the decision of the Deputies that the member governments should each nominate one official, usually based at the Foreign Ministry of the member governments, who would be responsible for acting as a liaison officer between NATIS and the national governments and to ensure the

flow of information and the distribution of propaganda material between NATO and the capitals.[26] Albeit a step in the right direction, this decision was hardly satisfying to the American calls for a stronger Service, and the United States continued its demands for better funding of and more power to the Information Service. The Americans were determined to spur the Europeans towards a more vigorous information action.

In November 1951, a memorandum by the chairman of the Council of Deputies and US Permanent Representative, Charles M. Spofford, outlined a 'Proposed Advisory Committee on NATO Information'. In February 1952, the British delegation also submitted a memorandum headed 'Reorganisation of NAT Information Work'.[27] Examination of the two memoranda shows the persistent discrepancy between the two countries' views about propaganda. Both proposals suggested the establishment of some 'advisory' or 'policy' body to guide NATIS. Both appreciated the need to safeguard national differences and to avoid unnecessary duplications of what was already being done more effectively at the national level. Both reports also recognised the importance of fostering NATO information policies. The essential difference between the two proposals was the composition of the new body: while the United States was thinking of a committee whose membership was non-governmental, the British proposed a group composed of staff appointed by national governments. Several delegations – particularly the Belgians, Canadians and Danes – considered the American proposal too ambitious and maintained that the new committee's role should be limited to offering policy guidance to the members and to NATIS. It was argued that the appointment of a non-governmental staff could potentially undermine the control of the national governments over NATIS propaganda.[28] The Greeks and the Italians demanded a more confident action in the information field and were less critical of the American proposal. Yet they eventually sided with the British as they too feared that NATIS might become too powerful and end up talking to their public over the government's head.[29]

Following the approval of the British memorandum, and thanks to the support of the new Secretary General, Lord Ismay, in June 1952 the Information Policy Working Group (IPWG) was created under the chairmanship of Sergio Fenoaltea, Ismay's Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs.[30] Building upon the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conflict of Ideas, the IPWG was supposed to advise the Council of Deputies about the best methods and techniques to make the western public more aware of NATO's defensive nature and of the provisions of article 2. The IPWG was supposed to assist the national information services, to promote cooperation and to establish and to maintain new contacts among members. The second important function of the IPWG was to consider ongoing information projects put forward by NATIS and to advise the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and the Council of Deputies about their effectiveness and potential impact. In its

first meeting, for example, the IPWG discussed issues such as a NATO postage stamp, a NATO logo, a photographic competition, exhibitions and visits of journalists to the NATO HQs, and collaboration with non-governmental NATO associations. The proposals were immediately approved by the Council of Deputies and became a central part of NATO's propaganda campaign throughout the Cold War, as will be discussed in the second part of this book.[31]

The establishment of this new working group provided for central and coordinated direction of NATO information programmes by a body responsible to NATO as well as to the national governments. Yet the IPWG's room for action remained extremely limited and the new Working Group was in fact nothing more than a forum for consultation and exchange of views on problems concerning national anti-communist propaganda.[32]

Despite its restrictive terms of reference, the IPWG quietly ventured onto a new territory: monitoring anti-NATO communist activities. The effective response to anti-NATO communist propaganda required an insight into the communist propaganda machinery, including the themes and techniques used in the different countries. For these reasons, the IPWG started to collect reports from the national delegations about the activities of the national communist parties. This activity soon expanded into reports on anti-American activities and in general on any propaganda campaign run by the communist parties or by their international organisations. The reports were then circulated to the other delegations in the hope that common trends as well as weaknesses could be identified and exploited by the member states and by NATIS itself.[33]

The collaboration between NATIS and the IPWG defined the double nature of NATO's information work. On the one hand, NATIS was in charge of promoting NATO among its members and of devising an articulated series of programmes to tell the public of the member countries that NATO was a peaceful and defensive organisation and that its very existence fostered better political, cultural and economic relations within the West. Although the national information agencies remained the primary actors in this campaigns, and despite the fact that its means remained limited, from 1952 NATIS started to play a more independent role, producing its own information material and working more actively with the national information agencies.

On the other hand, the IPWG monitored anti-NATO – and anti-western – propaganda activities carried out by the communists and kept NATIS and the national delegations informed. Such monitoring action could be achieved only thanks to cooperation with the national intelligence agencies, which made some of their findings available to NATO through their own national representatives. The IPWG did not have its own observers, and all information reports came from national sources. Unfortunately, research into this side of the IPWG's activities is hindered by the fact that

in order to make the discussions as frank and informal as possible, meetings were followed by informal sessions without records because 'the Working Group wishes to stress the need for keeping this side of NATO activities secret'.[34] Yet it is interesting to see that the number of reports circulated rapidly increased and that there was growing demand for more. Initially, most reports came from United States and the United Kingdom, but later the West Germans and French also produced reports.

Finally, the IPWG oversaw all information programmes initiated by NATIS. The Working Group assessed the cost-effectiveness and feasibility of the information programmes suggested by NATIS and passed its views on to the Council of Deputies, which would then approve or reject the proposal and award funding for proposals that were approved.

Given the interest aroused by the first reports on communist activities circulated by some national delegations, the Council of Deputies was asked to formalise this procedure and to create similar working groups to monitor systematically the activity of national communist parties and of international organisations, and to promote the exchange of such information among the NATO members.[35] Thus, the Council established the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities and the Social and Cultural Working Group as preliminary forums where national delegations could discuss ways and means of forestalling subversive activities and of responding to hostile communist propaganda attacks.[36] In both cases, although the Council agreed that close cooperation and exchange of information between the member governments were of great value, it was again adamant that such cooperation ought to be developed gradually and that the main aim of such groups was to foster reciprocal trust. In other words, no independent NATO action in the field of intelligence sharing should be carried out at this level. The Working Groups could make recommendations to the Council and to the national delegations, and:

> such recommendations would be made with a full appreciation of the fact that rules and regulations governing the control of subversive persons and movements vary considerably from one country to another. It would therefore remain a matter for each national government to decide to what extent it might be prepared to accept such recommendations.[37]

In the early stages of NATIS's life, the Information Staff itself was regarded with considerable suspicion by the member governments, which seemed 'afraid that NATO might be setting loose an international propaganda machine which would speak to people over the heads of the governments or behind their backs'.[38] It was this suspicion that led some delegations to propose the creation of regional information agencies, whose competences would be limited to certain geographical areas, thus precluding the

creation of a central know-it-all authority. The proposal, however, was rejected by the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities because it deemed such fragmentation to be an obstacle to the establishment of a consistent information policy.[39]

It should not be forgotten, however, that despite the delegations' attempts to water down the centralisation of NATO information policy, the reorganisation of the NATO Council that had taken place at the Lisbon Conference of February 1952 had in fact introduced the whole organisation to a new level of centralisation, which of course also involved the Information Service. This meant that at the time of the discussions of the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities, a more centralised NATO structure was, in fact, already in existence and the problem was therefore to persuade the national governments of the advantages of transferring competences to an agency of this kind rather than reforming the system itself – a predicament NATO officials were all too aware of:

> It should be realised that national traditions and the concept of sovereignty will continue to impose limitations on the degree of centralisation which it is possible, or even desirable, to achieve, in particular in the field of information and propaganda where problems and requirements differ greatly from country to country.[40]

In February 1952, CONIO ran the first survey of information activities and facilities available to member governments within their own borders based on written reports submitted by the national delegations. The survey not only revealed that the counter-propaganda capabilities of the member states varied greatly, but also confirmed the persistent reciprocal distrust regarding the exchange of security information. Ironically, the survey also highlighted the governments' demand for closer cooperation among the members.[41]

The history of NATIS continued therefore to be affected by the problem of combining respect for national sovereignty and security concerns with the need to achieve a greater degree of coherence of NATO's information policies. Although the member governments were aware of the urgent need to respond to communist criticism, they were determined to protect their independence and were reluctant to share security information with other members – a conundrum that that would characterise the history of NATIS until the end of the Cold War.

The Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR)

Following the 1952 restructuring of NATO, the Information Service was moved to Paris, on the fifth floor of the Palais de Chaillot. NATIS's

relocation meant an increase in the workload of its staff. In addition to the usual press clippings service, the reference and photographic libraries, the information room for accredited journalists and the usual ongoing information programmes run by the Service, the transfer to Paris meant that a substantial part of the time was now spent on attending meetings and preparing material for deliberation by officials and committees. The relocation to Paris also allowed the information staff to cooperate closely with new international information agencies present in the Paris area, such as the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, UNESCO and, above all, SHAPE. The latter was an important partner and the NATO Information Service held periodic meetings with the staff of the Information Division at SHAPE. A representative from SHAPE also attended the NATO Conference of National Information Officials. In the early years of life of NATIS, SHAPE offered both guidance and assistance concerning NATO's information work. The two bodies needed to keep each other informed and often issued joint press releases, particularly during ministerial conferences. NATO information staff could also access the superior photographic resources housed by SHAPE and use them in their campaigns.[42]

In the light of this new pressure on the information staff, in the summer of 1953 the NATO Information Service was restructured and divided into three sections: Press Relations (under the chairmanship of George Parsons Jr), the Editorial Section (under Oliver de Sayve) and the Media Section (under Peter Pooley). The Service was placed under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, although its terms of reference were not revised.[43]

This was also the time when the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities and the Social and Cultural Working Group merged to become the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR).[44] The appellation 'committee' underlined the permanent nature of the new body, whose terms of reference encompassed those of the working groups it had absorbed, including examining 'the current and long term problems of encouraging public understanding of and support for the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in all fields covered by the Treaty' and making 'appropriate recommendations to the Council for action by member governments, either individually or collectively or by the Secretariat'.[45] The chairman of the CICR was appointed by the North Atlantic Council, and the Director of Information acted as its deputy.

Throughout the Cold War, the relationship between NATIS and the CICR was synergistic. In time, NATIS's action expanded and the Service developed and coordinated multinational and national information programmes and was responsible to the NATO Secretary General for their implementation. The activities of NATIS were closely monitored by the CICR, which reviewed NATIS's output and practices and sent its

recommendations for approval to the North Atlantic Council. Being a committee, the CICR was established by the North Atlantic Council for the purposes of reaching consensus-based decisions and for preparing the ground for the Council's own work or decisions. The CICR was, and still is, responsible to the North Atlantic Council. As will be discussed later in this book, during the Cold War other committees and ad hoc working groups operated within and alongside NATIS. These committees revised specific programmes run by NATIS in the light of new developments in the East–West tensions and studied the possibility of expanding the action of NATIS in fields such as psychological warfare, and of addressing audiences beyond the NATO area. In order to gain an advanced understanding of the history of NATIS, it is therefore essential to reconstruct this network of working groups and committees and to understand how they interacted with each other. Among the most interesting ones – as has been mentioned – was the Conference of National Information Officials, which met once a year to review the activities of the various member states in the field of pro-NATO and anti-communist propaganda and to promote tighter cooperation between the member states, the CICR and NATIS.

NATIS consisted of members of the International Staff, while the CICR included representatives from each national delegation, usually appointed on a fix-term basis. The preparation, organisation and follow-up of the CICR's meetings were undertaken by the International Staff acting in a secretarial and support capacity. In reviewing the action, procedures and output of NATIS, the CICR made recommendations regarding improvements and cost-effectiveness. The representatives of the national delegations also presented reports on the activities of their national governments in the field of pro-NATO and anti-communist propaganda and worked towards tighter coordination among the member states so as to ensure a more coherent and consistent action. It should not be forgotten that by 1954 all NATO members had developed some form of information machinery at the national level. None of them could compare in expertise and level of funding with the American and British efforts; nevertheless, they had developed the necessary basis to allow for tighter cooperation with the other NATO partners.[46] For this reason, while the study of the NATO archival papers is central to understanding the history of NATIS, an insight into how the national delegations produced their reports and how they viewed their own role within NATIS is crucial for grasping the reciprocal influences between the national and NATO levels. However, research is often hampered by the lack of historical documents, which are often unclassified.

Because of the low priority accorded to the NATO information work in most member countries, the officials sent to work for the CICR tended to be non-specialised junior civil servants and usually the most recently arrived staff seconded to national delegations from national diplomatic

services. There were, however, a few exceptions, notably in the American delegation, which always included 'information professionals' among its staff, who often belonged to the United States Information Agency staff. As a general rule, however, few CICR staff had professional competence or experience in the information and communication fields. Very often, they were young officers at the beginning of their career paths. They had little experience and no desire to upset their superiors. For these reasons, they kept a low profile and limited themselves to repeating what their ambassador to NATO – on whose reports their career progression depended – desired them to say. They showed little or no initiative and were hardly proactive and creative, which had an impact on the work of NATIS as a whole. In the words of one NATIS official, 'Since conducting information policies implies a certain amount of risk-taking – at least greater risk than doing nothing – it was not ideal to subordinate decisions on such programmes to a risk-averse authority.'[47]

The primary task of the CICR and NATIS was to promote NATO among the public of its member states. Ignorance about NATO, its aims and nature was rife indeed and caused great concern to NATO officials as well as to the national governments. Since the death for Stalin and the end of the war in Korea, it had become increasingly difficult to pass any budget that devoted a substantial portion of national resources to defence and rearmament. Ignorance of and opposition to NATO seemed to increase in the mid-1950s. A more coordinated and effective propaganda effort was therefore more important than ever. Pro-NATO information activities underlined the defensive nature of the alliance and focused on the provision of article 2, which aimed at fostering political, economic and cultural ties among its members. In this sense, a lot of work went into the promotion of the idea of an Atlantic community, which was supported by the work of the voluntary organisations and particularly by the North Atlantic Assembly and the Atlantic Treaty Association, as will be discussed in Chapter 8. In order to promote NATO effectively it was also essential to move beyond a simple and straightforward pro-NATO message by responding to the hostile propaganda attacks launched by the communists. It was equally important to explain to the public the oppressive nature of the communist system and the need to prepare against the Kremlin's military expansionism.

Technically, counter-propaganda lay beyond the terms of reference of NATIS. Yet in 1954 both NATIS and the CICR effectively moved into the field of counter-propaganda. Precisely because an effective campaign of this kind required an advanced understanding of the composition, actions and products of the Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda machinery, the CICR built upon the work previously carried out by the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities and started to collect and to collate a vast amount of information on national communist parties and international organisations. This was done through the creation of various

specialised groups, like the Working Group on Trends in Soviet Policy and the Working Group on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany. These working groups included members of the international staff as well as experts appointed by the national delegations. Soon the CICR gained an increasingly more advanced insight into Soviet-inspired anti-NATO propaganda, and so did the national representatives on the Committee and NATIS itself.[48] The CICR circulated detailed reports along with examples of communist propaganda material and guidelines about the most effective responses that NATIS and the NATO members could put forward. On the basis of such information, NATIS produced pro-NATO and anti-communist propaganda material.

The foundation of the CICR therefore marked a step forward towards closer cooperation in the information field. In fact, while the national information agencies remained free to operate according to national policies and priorities, the CICR provided a permanent forum in which to discuss any propaganda-related issue, including the exchange of information about the communist parties and international organisations, and of ideas about how to respond to their provocations. The CICR also promoted joint propaganda initiatives from the member states. The propaganda material had the double aim, first, of promoting NATO and the concept of an Atlantic community among its members, and second, of responding to communist criticism. The balance between these two aspects of NATO information policy shifted through time as it adjusted to the minor yet significant changes in East–West relations. However, throughout the Cold War, and despite the American demand to produce material to be used beyond the Iron Curtain, the NATO propaganda machinery was directed only at its own members and possibly to some of their colonial outposts. The monitoring action carried out by the CICR should not be confused with actual intelligence sharing, which took place somewhere else and the CICR gathered information for propaganda purposes only.

The NATO Special Committee (AC/46)

The prevention of communist subversive activities lay in the hands of another, very different, committee. In December 1952, the NATO Atlantic Council launched the NATO Special Committee (AC/46 series) to coordinate the intelligence services of its members. The Special Committee, which is still active today, is the alliance's multilateral intelligence-sharing mechanism. It includes the heads of the intelligence security services of the NATO countries and it is used as a way of sharing any sensitive information among the members that is deemed of relevance to the alliance as a whole rather than to one member state.

Research into the activities and history of AC/46 is notably problematic, as the documents are not declassified. At the national level, too, it is not

possible to gain access to the documents relating to the position of the national experts on the Committee. What is known at the moment is that in May 1952 the newly reorganized North Atlantic Treaty Council considered the establishment of a new security committee to deal with counter-intelligence activities and to respond to communist security threats. It was feared that in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, militant members of the national communist parties would side with the aggressor and act as 'fifth columnists', undermining the internal front with sabotage and espionage activities:

> In the event of war, the rear areas might well play a decisive role. The geography of several NATO countries is such that a highly organised communist network, carefully kept in reserve, could well establish strong points of resistance and disseminate slogans which could only lead to confusion or defeatism, particularly in the event of a reverse in the early stages.[49]

Although such speculations could never be proved, it is true that, at the time, western communist parties remained conveniently vague on the issue of what they would do if there was a war with the Soviet Union. In 1951, for example, two key members of the Italian Communist Party, Aldo Cucchi and Valdo Magnani, were expelled from the Party for declaring that in the event of a Soviet attack they would defend their country.[50]

The possibility of a new intelligence-sharing committee was first discussed by the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities. In response to the British request to move towards a better understanding of the Soviet-inspired propaganda action, the Danish delegation submitted a memorandum proposing the extension of cooperation in the security field within NATO. According to the document, 'It is of vital importance both from a national and from an all-NATO point of view to safeguard the security of the defense effort of each NATO country against espionage, sabotage, or other subversive activities.'[51] In addition to the collection, analysis and distribution of information on communist activities, the Danish document proposed the 'study of measures to combat disruptive forces which may be uncovered within NATO, including measures against communist infiltration and of steps to safeguard essential utilities, such as transport and communications'.[52] A few weeks later, the Greek delegation added to the mounting pressure by stressing that:

> [t]he highly organized and wide-spread network of Communist Parties within our countries, buttressed by the powerful administration of the Soviet State, enables our adversaries to transfer their pressure at will from the frontiers to the very heart of our lands.[53]

Building upon the Danish proposal, the Greek memorandum supported the establishment of a NATO agency to coordinate the work of national security agencies in their effort to keep track of individuals suspected of subversive activities. The Belgian representative supported the Danish and Greek proposals and asked for the creation of a 'Special Committee on Information' as a clearing house for intelligence information received from specialised national agencies. The new committee gathered together delegates from the military and civilian intelligence services of the member states to serve as political advisers in the fields of counter-intelligence and anti-communist campaigns. According to the Belgian memorandum, the new Committee would assume the role previously performed by a committee of the same name operating within the Brussels Treaty Organisation.[54] The document probably referred to the Clandestine Committee of the Western Union (CCWU), which was established immediately after the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948 and was composed of senior intelligence officers. According to Daniel Ganser, the Special Committee and the Clandestine Planning Committee based at SHAPE led to the creation of an alliance-wide non-orthodox form of warfare against the communist parties, also known as Stay-Behind operations or Gladio.[55]

In its final document, the Working Group recommended that the new committee should be called the 'NATO Special Information Committee', as it felt that this non-committal name avoided any reference to the special task of the Committee. The draft terms of reference stated that the Committee was 'to serve as a forum for the exchange of information between member governments on experiences in their efforts to counteract subversive activities and to discuss and exchange information on ways and means of counteracting and uncovering such activities'. It was expected that the Committee would meet twice-yearly or whenever business required special sessions to be held. The Committee was to report to the Council on the progress of its work. It was to make recommendations about steps in furtherance of its objectives, either to the Council or via national delegations reporting directly to their respective governments.[56] Jonkheer van Vredenburch, Deputy Secretary General, supported the proposal and recommended that NATO activities in this field should be essentially practical. The new committee should arrange for the exchange of factual information and it 'should be organised as to increase the effectiveness of national services without interference with the operation of those services'.[57] The Council discussed and approved the matter in December 1952. Following a British suggestion, the Council decided that the Committee's name should be changed to 'Special Committee', thus dropping the term 'information', which was deemed misleading.[58]

These documents are classified and no other information about the Special Committee is currently available. What we do know is that the Special Committee met regularly throughout the Cold War and became

an even more important part of NATO strategic thinking after 9/11, assuming new competences. The Special Committee advised the North Atlantic Council on security, espionage, terrorist threats and acts of sabotage that might in any way threaten or destabilise the alliance or any of its members.[59]

French and Italian attempts to promote psychological warfare

By the mid-1950s, the fear of a communist takeover that had dominated French politics in the immediate post-war years had subsided. Yet the government was aware of the need to respond effectively to the wide-ranging and well-organised propaganda campaigns carried out by the French communists and by their ancillary organisations. The wave of strikes that had hit France in the years of the Marshall Plan caused the government further headaches as they risked jeopardising the reconstruction effort. The public and the media were increasingly polarised. In addition, the continuous changes of government in the Fourth Republic led to political instability and a sense of insecurity as the coalition parties had radically different ideas about almost everything, and anti-communism was often one of the very few points all moderate parties could agree on.

Thus, despite a relatively late start, by 1951 the French government had established several offices in charge of anti-communist propaganda within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which included a Press Service and a Directorate of Cultural Relations, and within the Ministry of National Defence. There was also an Information Section of the Prime Minister's Office, which was in charge of coordinating all the information activities across the various ministries. The prime minister also had at his disposal a Documentation and Publication Department, which issued official information material. This heterogeneous structure was in itself a problem, and the lack of coordination and the degree of duplication meant that French information policy was fragmented and ineffective.[60]

Always keen to increase the anti-communist efforts of his government, in February 1951 the then prime minister, René Pleven, created the 'Comité interministériel de coordination de l'information et de la propagande OTAN' to ensure a smoother flow of information between the various offices in charge with pro-NATO propaganda and NATIS.[61] It may be interesting to note here that the degree of American influence on the French effort towards propaganda that was mentioned in the previous chapter continued and became stronger in the early 1950s. This involvement is demonstrated by the fact that William Tyler, attaché to the US embassy in Paris, was invited to the very first meeting of the new committee.[62] William Tyler was one of the Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) in charge of implementing the Foreign Leader Program in France. Having been born and brought up in France, Tyler had in-depth personal knowledge of

the country and had close links with the CIA. Tyler attended several meetings and offered advice and guidance, including refining the core propaganda themes the new information agencies were to focus on so that their effort could be better targeted and made more effective.[63]

Among the new propaganda agencies launched by the French government in the early 1950s, the Secrétariat Général Permanent de la Défense Nationale (SGPDN) was the most vocal about the need to contribute to the creation of an effective NATO information agency. In order to do so, it argued, it was crucial to achieve first a higher level of coordination between the existing French information agencies, so as to be able to present a common front within NATO as well as to the Americans during Franco-American bilateral contacts. According to the SGPDN, France could not postpone such discussion any longer: '[E]ither we are ready to accept as a *fait accompli* a fundamentally Anglo-Saxon propaganda machine within NATO or we accept that we should play our part in the inter-allied negotiations.'[64] In order to do so, the SGPDN recommended tackling the excessive departmentalisation of information. A commission gathering together the representatives of the various information offices was set up to discuss the French position on NATO information policy. Unfortunately, it did not find time to meet before the first London Conference of National Information Officials in April 1951. This meant that the French delegation did not have a clear mandate and therefore its impact on the talks was negligible.[65] The only notable contribution of the French delegation was the report presented by Jean-Paul David, member of the National Assembly and president of the anti-communist organisation Paix et Liberté. David reported on the activities of his movement and stressed the need for tighter transnational cooperation to fight effectively against communist propaganda campaigns. David was a strong advocate of the need to unleash an alliance-wide psychological war against the communists. As one of the co-founders of Paix et Liberté, which had been launched to respond to the campaigns of the World Peace Congress, David was an experienced propagandist and could rely on a tight network of contacts in the French press, the arts and the political world.[66]

Given the interest aroused by his report at London conference, Jean-Paul David prepared a pamphlet entitled *A Psychological Defence of the Free World* (1953) in which he called for closer collaboration between the NATO Information Service and the national information agencies.[67] Eager to gather information on every form of psychological action carried out by the NATO countries in support of their propaganda effort, in May 1953 the French government appointed Jean-Paul David as its special envoy to the governments of the other countries of the alliance. David visited all NATO capitals and discussed issues connected with anti-communist propaganda and psychological warfare. He presented his findings in a memorandum to the NATO Council of Ministers, pointing out that precisely because conditions varied greatly from country to country, 'a body such as

NATO must provide closer co-ordination of action undertaken by individual countries to enlightened public opinion on the various aspects of the defence effort'. The proposal called for a more effective propaganda action in the NATO area and was based on two core ideas: first, the creation of 'national cells' to ensure coordination of all propaganda activities dealing with the promotion of NATO at the national level; and second, to give more powers to the Secretary General to ensure more effective coordination among the national delegations.[68]

The French proposal was indeed very ambitious. Not only did it entail reforming NATIS and giving it more powers, but also it foresaw allocating more funds to information activities from the central budget and from the national delegations. Not surprisingly, many delegations were reluctant to approve the French proposal, and the Council opted for much vaguer recommendations. Rather than conferring more powers in the field of NATO information policy on Secretary General, for example, the Council proposed that he should 'facilitate the efforts of the national governments to associate all strata of public opinion with the policies and the programmes of NATO and promote more extensive co-operation among these governments in information activities directed to this end'.[69] Yet how these goals should be achieved and, most importantly, to what extent the Secretary General could force the national delegations to work together was left open. In other words, the Council of Ministers rejected the French call for a revision of the structure and competences of the NATO Information Service.

The Americans were particularly sceptical about the French document and stressed that setting up a 'national cell' in the United States would entail the reorganisation of the American information machine on a scale that was neither possible nor desirable. The appointment of a high-ranking NATO official able to devote his full time to the coordination problems between NATIS and national agencies seemed more than sufficient. In addition to the organisation problems, the United States was also clearly irritated by the French lack of appreciation of the complex American information machinery and level of expertise. Most importantly, the Americans, as well as the British, feared that a centralised propaganda machinery on the French model would interfere with national information policies and, in particular, would be an obstacle to the propaganda actions already being carried out abroad by such agencies.[70] The French proposal was in fact more invasive than the one the Americans had put forward a couple of years earlier, and the creation of national cells would have impinged upon ongoing propaganda activities carried out by the CIA in Europe. If the Americans were to favour a strong, powerful NATO propaganda action, they wanted to be in the driving seat, and the French proposal did not cater for this.

Trying to dispel widespread criticism of their proposal, the French delegation submitted a second document that clarified that 'national cells'

were not to be imposed on every country but only on those where informa-
tion agencies had just been established and whose structures had to be
finalised and expertise strengthened. In this way, they argued, there would
be no obvious duplications between offices dealing with information in
different ministries within the same country and between national agen-
cies and NATO. Thus, the French indirectly implied that Britain and the
United States would not be affected by the proposal as they already had
well-established national information agencies.[71] This time the French
ideas received the support of the Greeks, Belgians and Italians. The
British, Americans, Danes and Canadians persisted in their opposition, as
they claimed that the introduction of national cells, even if only in a few
countries, would be a precedent and would open the way for NATIS to
interfere in the internal affairs of the member countries. The Director of
Information, Robert Alan Farquharson, was also critical of the French sug-
gestions, and the proposal was buried by the CICR, which aimed to achieve
uniformity of goals and aims in preference to a centralised structure.[72]

   The outcome was a big disappointment to the French, who had hoped to
move towards centralisation but also towards outright psychological warfare.
Nevertheless, this is an important episode in the history of the alliance's
information work, as this was the first attempt by a continental European
country to disseminate its own model of anti-communism and propaganda
and to offer an alternative to the Anglo-Saxon approach. According to Paul
and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, the fragmented French information appar-
atus, divided into several agencies within different ministries, created a
structural problem that translated into the lack of a clear vision and deter-
mination and eventually led to the French proposal's failure.[73]

   Yet not all the French efforts were to no avail. David's proposal did lead
to a recognition that NATO had to enlarge the scope of its information
activities and to coordinate the national efforts more closely. As a result, in
the following months the CICR discussed the need to do more to
'enlighten public opinion' and to enlarge the scope of NATO propaganda
activities.[74] David's campaign also led to closer collaboration between the
French and the Italians. Both countries were acutely aware of the need to
move towards counter-propaganda and to promote closer cooperation in
the prevention of subversive activities. They both had strong communist
parties that were highly organised and politically active. In addition, the
Parti Communiste Français (PCF) and the Partito Comunista Italiano
(PCI) were strengthened by a tight network of collateral organisations,
and their party newspapers reached millions of people. The parties and
their trade unions organised general strikes that often paralysed the entire
country and jeopardised its political stability. Like the French government,
the Italian government too hoped that NATO could lead the propaganda
and intelligence effort of the West. The then prime minister, Alcide
De Gasperi, had asked for NATO to offer guidance in the fields of
counter-propaganda and psychological warfare at the NATO Council

Meeting in Ottawa in September 1951 and had reiterated the request in Rome and Lisbon.[75] Yet, as discussed above, these requests were frustrated by the reluctance of other members to have a centralised office within NATO to handle such delicate issues.

In the early 1950s, David made frequent visits to Italy and assisted with the creation of the Italian section of Paix et Liberté under the chairmanship of the Liberal MP Edgardo Sogno. The Paix et Liberté network opened new links between the two countries outside the official channels of communication. As is often the case with this kind of non-governmental organisation, research into its activities is remarkably difficult as very few archival documents are currently available and key information is often part of the private archives of the key leading figures. In addition, it is difficult to distinguish personal points of view from governmental ones. In Italy, some information has been made public as part of the work carried out by the Commissione Stragi.[76] According to the documents released by the Commission, the French and Italian authorities coordinated their action to promote psychological warfare through the Paix et Liberté network. For example, Italian officials were forewarned that Georges Bidault would relaunch the issue of psychological warfare at a NATO Council Meeting and that the French would again suggest the creation of national cells on the example of the Paix et Liberté network. The Italian Foreign Minister, Giuseppe Pella, was asked to support Bidault in the Atlantic Council, which he duly did. The documents released by the Commissione Stragi suggest that the links between the various branches of Paix et Liberté went beyond the coordination of common initiatives in the propaganda field. In a letter to the Foreign Minister, Aldo Moro, Sogno mentioned that in July 1953 he was given a new task of an 'exceptional and reserved' nature regarding the 'psychological defence of our democratic institutions'. Sogno maintained that the operation was closely linked to the proposal put forward by De Gasperi and Pella to the Atlantic Council about counter-propaganda. Most importantly, according to Sogno in October 1954 this 'agency' developed into a committee in charge with the defence of the democratic institutions. The committee was responsible directly to the prime minister and worked closely with the Ministries of the Interior, Defence and Foreign Affairs, and it benefited from strong support by the industrial lobby of the north of Italy and by the American embassy.[77] Unfortunately, further research on this point is impossible due to the lack of declassified documents.

The Soviet 'peace offensive'

At the end of 1952, the NATO Information Service was given a budget coming directly from the NATO Civil Budget Committee. Albeit quite modest, these funds made NATIS less dependent on the volatile national contributions and enabled it to plan its activities with more confidence.[78] Yet the information budget remained very small in comparison with the

increasing number of activities carried out by NATIS. In 1952, NATO launched various initiatives, which included a wider range of publications, the preparation of material to be distributed to the national news agencies, the publication of the second edition of the *NATO Handbook* and the adoption of the NATO symbol and flag.

The lack of appropriate funding was painfully recognised at the time by NATO officials themselves, and in his opening statement to the NATO Information Policy Conference, Lord Ismay complained that during a meeting with the United Aircraft Company he had learned that in a single advertising campaign it spent twice as much as NATIS's annual budget.[79] According to the calculations carried out at the time, the NATO information budget represented 0.0002 per cent of total defence expenditure. The situation was about to get even worse.

In 1954, NATIS experienced a substantial dip in its resources. NATIS's budgetary crisis was due to the fact that in March the United States discontinued its voluntary contribution of half a million dollars per year to the Information Service.[80] Despite the allocation of a permanent budget from the Civil Committee, national delegations were allowed to continue their voluntary contributions, which could take the form of direct economic support or of technical assistance, the volunteering of personnel and so forth. Between 1949 and 1952, the Information Service had been assisted by the resources of the United States Information Service, which in the early days enjoyed the financial backing of the counterpart funds available to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and, after 1948, to the Office of Policy Coordination under the Marshall Plan. The US funds had been vital for the foundation and early development of the NATO propaganda machinery. With the winding up of the Marshall Plan, however, there was a drop in the direct support made available to NATIS. Thus, although the information budget for 1955 showed an increase as compared with the budget voted in 1954, the overall amount of funds actually available to the Information Service fell dramatically. As explained in the second part of this book, special projects, like the travelling exhibitions, were the first to suffer and more attention was given to publications and the HQs visiting programme, which were thought to offer better value for money.[81]

Notwithstanding the interruption of its voluntary contributions, the United States remained convinced of the importance of information activities on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and even if the new legislation prevented it from making direct contributions to overseas activities, it did continue to support NATIS's activities indirectly. One of the most successful ways it did so was by assisting with the production and circulation of documentaries and newsreels, whose production costs were far higher than NATIS could afford. In 1954, Theodore Streibert, head of USIA, informed NATIS that his organisation was willing to carry out a programme involving considerable expenditure for the preparation of a series of fourteen films depicting the NATO countries.[82]

The budgetary problems came at the worst possible time for NATIS. The review of the NATO Information Service's output was made all the more urgent by the admission of West Germany into NATO in May 1955, which added 50 million people to the 385 million in the existing member states. The overwhelmingly neutralist German public opinion needed to be told about the need to have a strong NATO and, at the same time, large sections of the West European public had to be reassured that a rearmed and sovereign Germany was not a threat precisely because of its NATO membership.

The death of Stalin and the consequent climate of détente had made the education of the public all the more urgent. As historical research has already widely demonstrated, Stalin's successors replaced the frontal opposition to the United States and NATO with a more articulated strategy directed at weakening the unity of the Atlantic alliance. In the post-Stalin era, cultural influence became an even more important instrument in the Soviet foreign policy and propaganda machine. The Soviet Union boosted its activity in Europe while at the same time turning its attention to the Third World, supporting the anti-colonial movements.[83] The Soviet call for peaceful coexistence resonated strongly with large sections of the public, well beyond the restricted sphere of communist militants. NATO officials feared that the new Soviet approach would 'encourage tendencies in the West which might undermine NATO, cause a degeneration of western military effort, and create a climate inhibiting the possible use of nuclear weapons by the West'.[84] This required the urgent review of all NATO propaganda material, which was bound to be costly and time-consuming. Moreover, given its intergovernmental structure, the CICR was not structurally able to respond quickly to the change of focus required by the developing history of the Cold War, and the need to find a suitable compromise between the different views and priorities of the national delegations often meant that CICR lost months in an attempt to find a common position to pass on to NATIS.

The change in the Soviet approach did not bring a relaxation of western propaganda and possibly led to an increase. Western information services believed the new Soviet approach to be even more dangerous than its previous outright opposition. Stalin's successors presented the Soviet Union as an entirely peaceful country engaged in diplomatic dialogue to solve pending problems such as the division of Germany and the Austrian peace treaty. This approach had a strong appeal to large proportions of the public, who called for the peaceful coexistence of the two blocs. The Soviet 'peace offensive' was seen in the West as an instrument to divide the allies as well as the political parties within each government, particularly at a delicate moment such as the ratification of the European Defence Community Treaty.[85] Thus, the NATO officials perceived the Soviet policy as extremely dangerous. They believed that the new Soviet approach would 'encourage tendencies in the West which might undermine NATO, to cause a degeneration of western military effort, and to create a climate inhibiting the possible use of nuclear weapons by the West'.[86]

The appointment of Paul-Henri Spaak as Secretary General in 1957 gave a boost to NATIS. Spaak believed that precisely because it blurred the line between communists and non-communists, the new Soviet strategy risked drawing uncommitted states into closer relations with the Soviet Union and creating a rift among NATO's members. Spaak therefore saw the Soviet 'peace offensive' as extremely dangerous and pushed for a more confident propaganda offensive. Unlike his predecessor, Lord Ismay, Spaak had no military experience and his appointment represented a shift away from the alliance's strictly military purpose. It is worth noting that when confirming Spaak's appointment in December 1956, the North Atlantic Council also expanded the role of the Secretary General. Largely as a result of the Suez Crisis, which had strained intra-alliance relations, the Council issued a resolution 'to empower the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration'.[87] Spaak, who was a keen anti-communist and had already realised the full potential of joint propaganda initiatives, took full advantage of the new role and pushed for a more confident counter-propaganda effort within NATO by supporting NATIS but also by strengthening collaboration with the network of pro-NATO voluntary organisations.

According to the new Secretary General, fear of a communist takeover of Western Europe had subsided and the public was more sceptical about the need for the alliance and high defence spending. NATO officials and national governments needed to put forward a more positive image of the alliance that their people could identify with.[88] US President Eisenhower agreed and argued at around the same time, '[We] need something dramatic to rally the peoples of the world around some idea, some hope of a better future.'[89] In other words, to minimise the impact of Moscow's 'peace offensive' on the Western European public, NATIS needed to abandon strictly military-based themes and to invest more on NATO's economic and social integration aspects. It was also necessary to enlarge the scope of NATO information policies so as to include all opinion leaders such as artists and intellectuals, upon whom the Soviet Union exerted a strong influence, and to increase the production and distribution of materials in all forms (press, radio, television, films, etc.).[90] The promotion of NATO's non-military aspects was about to receive a boost with the publication of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO.

The Three Wise Men Report

Set up by the Council on 5 May 1956 to 'advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community'.[91] The Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation comprised three foreign

ministers: Halvard Lange (Norway), Gaetano Martino (Italy) and Lester B. Pearson (Canada). The Committee of Three, also known as the Three Wise Men, circulated a questionnaire to NATO's members to establish a basis for the discussion of political, economic and cultural cooperation as well as questions concerning information. On the basis of these consultations, the committee produced a report which was approved by the Council in December 1956. The report was adopted in the midst of the Suez Crisis, when internal consultation on security matters affecting the alliance was particularly problematic and risked jeopardising the alliance's solidarity. The report put forward several recommendations concerning the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes, economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, cultural cooperation and cooperation in the information field. It was the first time since the signing of the Washington Treaty that NATO had officially recognised the need to strengthen its political role. Preparing the ground for the Harmel Report of 1967, the Three Wise Men Report broadened the political framework within which the alliance operated. It recognised formally the need to ensure peaceful relations between the members through political dialogue, and the importance of presenting a common political will to the outside word.

The report asked for more cooperation and consultation in political and economic matters, which led to the creation of the Committee of Political Advisers and Committee of Economic Advisers. As far as NATIS was concerned, chapter V of the report ('Cooperation in the information field') is of great importance. It recommended closer and more coordinated action and asked for more funds to be made available to the Information Service, particularly for translation purposes.[92] The Three Wise Men advised (in point 87) that:

> the journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organisations supporting NATO and the Information Service should also be encouraged.

As will be demonstrated in the second part of this book, these recommendations were duly followed and the visiting programmes as well as cultural exchanges involving university students and young political leaders were expanded in the late 1950s. Most importantly, the Three Wise Men recommended that although NATO's information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion within NATO, 'an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organisation is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted' (point 82). This marked a radical departure from the original terms of reference of NATIS, whose mandate

was clearly restricted to the NATO area. This paragraph added fuel to the long-standing American demands for a vigorous propaganda action beyond the Iron Curtain.

Since the signing of the NATO Treaty, the American government had demanded that NATO's information effort be directed beyond the Iron Curtain in order to destabilise the Soviet bloc. Other members – and Britain in particular – thought it more urgent to focus on the West European countries, and particularly on those that were threatened by strong communist parties, namely France and Italy.[93] However, the publication of the Three Wise Men Report and the increasing importance of the decolonisation movements, particularly in South-East Asia and Africa, required a renewed and redirected propaganda effort to undermine the appeal of communism in those areas. Thus, the British and other European members started to come round to the idea of directing part of the alliance's propaganda efforts beyond the NATO area. Thus, the Cold War itself became a much more global affair and the focus started to shift away from Europe. Both blocs turned their attention to the Third World, and their propaganda efforts followed suit.[94]

Yet despite the recommendations of the Three Wise Men, NATIS had limited room for manoeuvre and according to its terms of reference the Service could not engage in propaganda outside NATO territory. However, NATIS stretched the terms of reference as much as it could and issued invitations to visit NATO Headquarters to journalists of non-NATO countries, starting with the Commonwealth, and distributed information material through the NATO countries' embassies. Private non-governmental organisations, such as trade unions and youth organisations, were identified as favourable outlets for NATO informative material too.[95]

The approval of the 1956 report meant that NATIS had to adapt the themes and approach of all its information material. In movies, newsreels and publications, NATO began to be described more convincingly as an Atlantic community, and although information on military defence was still provided in the background, more emphasis was placed on economic and political cooperation. The Conference of National Information Officials suggested replacing the strictly military-based themes widely used in the early 1950s with a new focus on the economic and social integration promoted by NATO and to place the alliance within the wider context of European integration, a view shared by the CICR.[96]

The scope of NATO information policies should be widened in terms both of the themes used and of the targeted audiences. It was vital to target 'opinion makers' without losing sight of the wider public, particularly the younger generations, who were becoming increasingly sceptical about the need for NATO. The NATIS experts suggested therefore that the overall language used in all information material become more positive and constructive. NATO's information material should move away from strictly defined military themes (article 5) and portray NATO

as a means to foster economic and cultural ties among its members (article 2).[97]

The new NATIS material should explain that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty brought peace in Europe and stopped Soviet expansion. Most importantly, the Conference of National Information Officials advised NATIS to make clear that Western expenditure on defence did not undermine the economic recovery of Western Europe by diverting funds towards rearmament, a point harshly made by the communists. The new propaganda material should illustrate the dramatic economic progress in countries like Italy and West Germany and show the high standard of living enjoyed throughout the alliance.[98] NATIS should also 'stress the need for Western unity, regardless of the Communist threat' and 'emphasise the positive aspects of the alliance which functions in practical matters – infrastructure, common production, alignment of policies, etc.'.[99]

In order to respond effectively to Moscow's 'peace offensive', NATIS gradually abandoned strictly military-based themes and focused on the economic and social integration aspects of the organisation. It targeted all opinion leaders such as artists and intellectuals, upon whom the Soviet Union exerted a strong influence, and increased the production and distribution of materials in all forms (press, radio, television, films, etc.).[100] At the same time, the NATO Council asked for a more confident response to the communist propaganda attacks. NATIS circulated information to help the western press publicise, for example, the discrepancies between the Soviet call for a relaxation of the East–West tensions with the persisting hostile and aggressive tone of the Soviet domestic press. Each country collected all relevant material, which would be collated in a weekly publication called *Contradictions in Soviet Propaganda* prepared by the US information services. An analysis of the CICR papers reveals that the American and the British were, once again, by far the most active contributors; more than two-thirds of the content of the new publication came from these two delegations.[101] The Soviet 'peace offensive' had clearly reinforced the British and American counter-propaganda effort within NATIS, and archival evidence shows that in the post-Stalin era the two countries' delegations submitted an increasingly higher number of reports suitable for propaganda purposes and demanded a more assertive action from NATIS. Other delegations also recognised the need to shift emphasis away from purely confrontational propaganda material and aim for a more conciliatory tone.[102]

Initially, NATIS resisted the CICR's attempts to divert the attention away from NATO military capability and argued that 'NATO should not appear apologetic in insisting on the maintenance of its defensive strength in face of current and possible long-term threats'.[103] Geoffrey Parsons, Director of Information, argued that it was the aim of his department to keep the people focused on the military defence mission

of the alliance. On the other hand, the national delegations believed that in order to increase public support for the organisation and minimise the impact of communist criticism, the attention paid to NATO's peacetime objectives should outweigh its display of military capability.[104] According to the CICR:

> To keep referring to NATO in purely military terms has long been, and still is, standard communist terminology ('military bloc'), for well-considered propaganda reasons. It helps Soviet purposes to use a terminology consistent with depicting NATO in purely military terms, as an aggressive military organisation, based on the threat of armed force.... Historically speaking, it was necessary when NATO was first developed to emphasise the military potentialities of the alliance in order to reassure a somewhat demoralised western public opinion. It is now necessary to emphasise that this military potentiality is based on a political alliance which is of the first importance, without being aggressive. The need for such a shift of emphasis is in part a measure of the success of NATO, but it is also necessary to consider the effects of Soviet 'peace' propaganda techniques, and the dangerous complacency and ignorance of some elements of western public opinion.[105]

Finally, as a response to the Three Wise Men Report, a new Special Fund was put in place to assist the production of NATO's information material and to support its large-scale distribution in preparation for the 1959 celebration of the tenth anniversary of the alliance. All national delegations were invited to put forward a project and apply to the Special Fund to cover half of the costs. The remaining part would be covered by the applicant country.[106] The Special Fund was part of NATO's civil budget and was in addition to the funds covering the work of NATIS; after the tenth anniversary, the Special Fund continued to exist to support pro-NATO organisations, national programmes and cultural exchange programmes.

Conclusion

The launch of the Information Service offered a platform for the national information experts to exchange ideas and discuss joint solutions to common problems. In principle, all members agreed on the need to reach a common position on the key issues concerning the West so as to be able to present a common front to their public and to the international communist front on issues such as German rearmament, the Austria Peace Treaty and the use of nuclear weapons. Yet the different levels of expertise, mutual distrust and diverging security concerns meant that progress was extremely slow, and an evident rift between the Anglo-Saxon approach

and the continental European members started to appear. The fear that a centralised NATO propaganda machinery might undermine the national governments meant that the CICR remained intergovernmental and that NATIS's actions were scrutinised by the national governments, which through their delegates on the CICR had a direct say concerning what the Service would produce and controlled its budget in the Council.

The Soviet peace offensive did strike a chord among the public as well as provoking different reactions among the national governments, and jeopardised further the political cohesion of the alliance, which was additionally tested by the Suez and Hungarian crises. All this posed new challenges for NATIS, which struggled to promote the idea that the main aim of NATO was to foster political and economic cooperation among its members. A detailed study of NATIS documents in the 1950s reveals the increasing importance of out-of-area events, which had an increasingly important role in shaping the alliance's security concept. Yet while it was not a problem to discuss events like the occupation of the Suez Canal, it was difficult to tackle the issue of whether the alliance should foster support outside its member countries and engage in psychological warfare and propaganda.

This chapter has demonstrated that NATO did offer a platform for all its members to have a say in NATO's Strategic Concept and on how the alliance should present itself to the public. It was much more than a machine for carrying out instructions coming from Washington and indeed there was reciprocal influence between the delegations and a continuous search for compromises.

Notes

1 Other structural changes took place in the same period. The North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group was replaced in 1952 by Allied Command Atlantic (headed by Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, SACLANT). This left only the Canada–US Regional Planning Group out of the original five. The same year, the Channel Committee was established to deal with the English Channel and adjoining coastal waters.

2 For the evolution of NATO's military command structure during the 1950s and the political disputes that had to be overcome, see Pedlow G.P., 'The politics of NATO command, 1950–1962', in Duke S.W. and Krieger W. (eds), *U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 15–42.

3 The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area (DC 6/1), 6 January 1950.

4 The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area (MC 3/5 Final) was approved by the NATO Council on 3 December 1952.

5 Van der Harst J., *The Atlantic Priority: Dutch Defence Policy at the Time of the European Defence Community* (Florence: European Press Academic Publishing, 2003), pp. 27–28.

6 There is an extensive historiographical debate on the German rearmament problem and the European Defence Community (EDC) in particular. Among

the most recent contributions are van der Harst, *The Atlantic Priority*; Ruane K., *The Rise and Fall of the European Defence Community: Anglo-American Relations and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000); Risso L., *Divided We Stand: The French and Italian Political Parties and the Rearmament of West Germany, 1949–1955* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007); Ballini P.L. (ed.), *La Comunità Europea di Difesa* (Rome: Rubettino, 2009).

 7 According to the Force Goals, by 1954 NATO should have been able to count on a total of ninety-six divisions after ninety days from the beginning of the hostilities, with almost half of them to be ready at the very start.

 8 Basic National Security Policy, 30 October 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), *1952–1954*, vol. 2, *National Security Affairs*, pp. 585–586, 593; Rosenberg D.A., 'The origins of overkill: nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945–1960', *International Security*, 7/4 (1983), pp. 3–71.

 9 Statement by the Secretary of State to the North Atlantic Council Closed Ministerial Session, Paris, 23 April 1954, *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. 5: *Western European Security*, pp. 511–512.

10 Kaplan L.S., *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1988), p. 60.

11 The 'Most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the next five years' (MC 48) was approved by the Military Committee on 22 November 1954 and by the NAC on 17 December 1954. It provided strategic guidance pending the review of MC 14/1 and contained concepts and assumptions that were later included in NATO's third strategic concept, most notably the concept of massive retaliation, which is normally associated with MC 14/2. Trachtenberg M., *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), ch. 5. Building upon MC 48 and after considerable discussion, the 'Overall strategic concept for the defence of the NATO area' (MC 14/2) was issued in May 1957. It was accompanied by 'Measures to implement the strategic concept' (MC 48/2). MC 14/2 advocated massive retaliation as the key element of NATO's defensive strategy. In order to cater for all the members' concerns, the use of conventional weapons to deal with lesser forms of aggression 'without necessarily having recourse to nuclear weapons' was maintained. Despite this flexibility, it was nonetheless stated that NATO did not accept the concept of limited war with the Soviet Union, and MC 14/2 maintained that 'if the Soviets were involved in a hostile local action and sought to broaden the scope of such an incident or prolong it, the situation would call for the utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO's disposal, since in no case is there a concept of limited war with the Soviets'. Quoted in Heuser B., *NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1997), p. 40. See also Dockrill S., 'Cooperation and suspicion: The United States' alliance diplomacy for the security of Western Europe, 1953–1954', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 5/1 (1994), pp. 138–182; David F., 'The doctrine of massive retaliation and the impossible nuclear defense of the Atlantic Alliance: from Directive MC 48 to MC 70', in Hanhimäki J., Soutou G.-H. and Germond B. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 32–44.

12 Directive to the NATO military authorities from the North Atlantic Council, 7 December 1956, NATO Archives (henceforward NA), CM(56)138.

13 'NATO defence planning', note by the Secretary General, 8 December 1955, NA, CM(55)113 (Revised).

14 Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 14 February 1951, 16 February 1951, NA, DR(51)10.
15 'The conflict of ideas', report by the Ad Hoc Working Group, 23 February 1951, NA, DD(51)54.
16 Ibid.
17 Memorandum of guidance for the proposed meeting of national information officials, draft by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Conflict of Ideas, 3 March 1951, NA, DD(51)63.
18 'Importance of information activities: resolution', 9 March 1951, NA, DD(51)62 (Final).
19 Summary record, DR(51)39, quoted in DD(52)80 (Revise).
20 Memorandum of guidance for the proposed meeting of NATO and national information officials, 10 March 1951, NA, DD(51)63 (Final).
21 Revised agenda for NATO International Information Meeting, 12–14 April 1951, at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1, 11 April 1951, NA, AC/1-D/2.
22 NATO International Information Meeting: List of Delegates, 16 April 1951, NA, AC/1-D/11.
23 Osgood K.A., *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008).
24 Summary record of the First NATO International Information Meeting, held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 12–14 April 1951, 10 May 1951, NA, AC/1-R/1.
25 For the American position, see Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 14 February 1951, 16 February 1951, NA, DR(51)10; Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 26 February 1951, 27 February 1951, NA, DR(51)13. For the opposition of the European members, see Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 12 December 1951, 20 December 1951, NA, DR(51)88.
26 Summary record of the 34th meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 19 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 27 November 1950 at 3 p.m., 29 November 1950, NA, DR/34.
27 'Proposed Advisory Committee on NATO Information', memo by the chairman, 8 November 1951, NA, DD(51)277; 'Reorganisation of the NATO information work', memo by the UK deputy, 6 February 1952, NA, DD(52)44.
28 Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 19 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 12 December 1951, 20 December 1951, NA, DR(51)88 Final.
29 'Suggestions on aims of NATO information policy', memo by the Greek delegation, 21 August 1952, NA, AC/24-D/4; memo by the Italian delegation, 8 September 1952, NA, AC/24-D/6; 'Counter-propaganda', note by the UK delegation, 24 September 1952, NA, AC/24-D/8.
30 'Creation of the Information Policy Working Group', 2 July 1952, NA, AC/24-D/1.
31 Working Group on Information Policy, summary record of a meeting held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 2 September 1952 at 3 p.m., 9 September 1952, NA, AC/24-R/2.
32 Information Policy Working Group, terms of reference, 9 May 1952, NA, CM(52)17; 'The Information Field and Advisory (Policy) Committee', memo by the Director of Information, 1 April 1953, NA, DD(52)80 (Revise).
33 See, for example, Working Group on Information Policy, summary record of a meeting held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 2 September 1952 at 3 p.m., 9 September 1952, NA, AC/24-R/2.

34 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115.

35 'Reorganisation of NATO information work', memo by the UK Deputy, 6 February 1952, NA, DD(52)44.

36 Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities, 27 November 1952, NA, CM(52)110; 'Cooperation against subversive activities', note by the Deputy Secretary General, 6 September 1952, CM(52)72; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 24 July 1952, 28 July 1952, CR(52)17; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 10 September 1952, CR(52)20; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 18 September 1952, CR(52)21.

37 Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities, report by the chairman, 27 November 1952, NA, CM(52)110.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.; NATO Conference on Information Policy, 'Development of information since 1950', report by the Director of Information, 24 January 1955, NA, AC/87-D/6.

40 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115.

41 'Information policy', progress report by the Assistant Secretary of the General Group for Political Affairs, chairman of the Working Group, 23 March 1953, NA, CM(53)26.

42 NATO Information Conference, February 1953, report by the Director of Information on the work and functions of the NATO Information Service, 3 February 1953, NA, AC/24-D/28.

43 'Reorganisation of the Information Division', memo by the Secretary General, 15 June 1953, NA, ISM(53)30. Parsons and de Sayve were the two Deputy Directors of Information.

44 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 1 July 1953, 2 July 1953, NA, CR(53)33.

45 CICR, note by the chairman, 26 August 1953, NA, CM(53)118.

46 A detailed list of such progress is available in CICR, 'The structure and functions of national information services', note by the Secretariat, 24 February 1954, NA, AC/52-D/38. Among recent works on such developments are Villatoux P. and Villatoux M.-C., *La République et son armée face au 'péril subversif'. Guerre et action psychologiques, 1945–1960* (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005); Delmas J. and Kessler J. (eds), *Renseignement et propagande pendant la guerre froide, 1947–1953* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1999); Alexander M.S. (ed.), 'Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War', special issue of *Intelligence and National Security*, 13/1 (1998).

47 Nick Sherwen, interview with the author, 8 December 2009.

48 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115.

49 'Counterpropaganda and action against subversive activities', memo by the Greek delegation, 13 June 1952, NA, CM(52)32. Similar observations are available in a report circulated through the delegations in April 1950, 'Reorganisation of the NAT information work', memo by the UK Deputy, 6 February 1952, NA, DD(52)44.

50 Magnani V. and Cucchi A., *Dichiarazioni e documenti* (Bologna: Tipografia Luigi Parma, 1951). In her autobiographical book, Magnani's wife recalls the

ostracism her family fell prey to after the expulsion of her husband from the PCI; Magnani F., *Una famiglia italiana* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991).

51 'Cooperation between the NATO countries in the security field', memo by the Danish Permanent Representative, 22 May 1952, NA, CM(52)21; memo by the UK Deputy, 6 February 1952, NA, DD(52)44.

52 'Cooperation between the NATO countries in the security field', memo by the Danish Permanent Representative, 22 May 1952, NA, CM(52)21.

53 'Counterpropaganda and action against subversive activities', memorandum by the Greek delegation', 13 June 1952, NA, CM(52)32.

54 'NATO reorganisation: setting up of a special committee on information', memo by the Belgian Permanent Representative, 16 June 1952, NA, CM(52)34.

55 Ganser D., *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

56 Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities, report by the chairman, 27 November 1952, NA, CM(52)110.

57 'Cooperation against subversive activities', note by the Deputy Secretary General, 6 September 1952, NA, CM(52)72.

58 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 3 December 1952 at 10.15 a.m, item II: 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counter-propaganda', 4 December 1952, NA, CR(52)31.

59 Lefebvre S., 'The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 16 (2003), pp. 527–542.

60 CICR, 'The structure and functions of national information services', note by the Secretariat, 24 February 1954, NA, AC/52-D/38. The extensive literature on French anti-communist information activities includes the following: Buton P. and Gervereau L., *Le couteau entre les dents: soixante-dix ans d'affiches communistes et anticommunistes (1917–1987)* (Paris: Chêne, 1989); Becker J.J. and Berstein S., 'L'anticommunisme en France', *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'Histoire*, 15 (July–September 1987), pp. 17–27; Delmas and Kessler (eds), *Renseignement et propagande*; Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*.

61 Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*, pp. 195–196; Irwin W., *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 443.

62 Irwin W., *The United States*, p. 443.

63 Tyler W.R., interview with Charles Stuart Kennedy, 17 November 1987, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Washington, DC. Available at: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCID+mfdip2004tyl02) (retrieved on 23 February 2013); Scott-Smith G., 'The US State Department's foreign leader program in France during the early Cold War', *Revue Française d'Études Américaines*, 1/2006 (no. 107), pp. 47–60.

64 'Note à l'attention du Président du Conseil concernant la réunion des chefs de service d'information NATO du 12 avril prochain à Londres', [no date], Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, 5 Q 21, as quoted in Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*, pp. 196–197 (my translation).

65 Summary record of the First NATO International Information Meeting, held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 12–14 April 1951, 10 May 1951, NA, AC/1-R/1.

66 Duhamel E., 'Jean-Paul David et le mouvement "Paix et Liberté": un anticommunisme radical', in Delmas and Kessler, *Renseignement et propagande*, pp. 195–216; Sommer R., 'Paix et Liberté: la Quatrième République contre le PC', *L'Histoire*, 40 (1981), pp. 26–35.

67 Summary record of the First NATO International Information Meeting, held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 12–14 April 1951, 10 May 1951, NA, AC/1-R/1.

68 'The problem of enlightening public opinion', memo by the French delegation, 12 December 1953, NA, CM(53)171.

69 'The problem of enlightening public opinion', report by the chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 15 December 1953, NA, CM(53)173.

70 CICR, 'Problems involved in keeping the public informed', memo by the French delegation, 21 May 1954, NA, AC/52-D/50.

71 Ibid.

72 CICR, 'Problems of enlightening public opinion', report by the Director of Information, 9 April 1954, NA, AC/52-D/44.

73 Villatoux and Villatoux, *La République et son armée*, pp. 195–204. See also Raflik J., 'La France et la genèse institutionnelle de l'Alliance atlantique, 1948–1952', *Relations Internationales*, no. 134 (Summer 2008), pp. 55–68.

74 CICR, 'Problems of enlightening public opinion', draft report to the Council by the chairman, 16 June 1954, NA, AC/52/WP/5; 'Problems of enlightening public opinion', report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations', 21 June 1954, NA, CM(54)52.

75 Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Direzione Generale degli Affari Politici, Appunto dell'11.12.1953, Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Fondo Cassaforte, busta n. 8.

76 The 'Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi', also known as the 'Commissione Stragi', was operative between 1988 and 2001. The Commission investigated the role of the secret services and paramilitary organisations in the terrorist attacks that ravaged the country in the 1970s. As part of its investigation, it published numerous documents touching upon the links between the Italian branch of Paix et Liberté and its French counterparts as well as NATO.

77 Lettera di Edgardo Sogno al Ministro degli Esteri Aldo Moro del 12 agosto 1969, Archivio storico Camera dei Deputati, quoted in *The Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi*. Available at: www.parlamento.it/parlam/bicam/terror/home.htm (retrieved on 12 Febraury 2013). According to Sogno, this assignment was built on an ongoing action launched in 1948 by the then Foreign Minster, Count Sforza, and linked to the promotion of the Marshall Plan.

78 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115; 'Information Policy Working Group: Position of NATO Information Officials to Member Country Capitals', note by the secretary, 22 September 1952, NA, AC/24-D/11.

79 NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1; NATO Conference on Information Policy, 'Development of Information since 1950', report by the Director of Information, 24 January 1955, NA, AC/87-D/6.

80 NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.

81 NATO Conference on Information Policy, 'Development of information since 1950', report by the Director of Information, 24 January 1955, NA, AC/87-D/6. Aubourg V., 'Creating the texture of the Atlantic community: the NATO Information Service, private Atlantic networks and the Atlantic community in the 1950's', in Aubourg V., Bossuat G. and Scott-Smith G. (eds), *European*

Community, Atlantic Community (Paris: Soleb, 2008), pp. 390–415. For an examination of how the provisions of the Marshall Plan were used to finance the information activities of various CIA-led programmes, see Scott-Smith G., *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 70–71.

82 Summary record of the thirty-fourth meeting of the Council, held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 17 November 1954, 19 November 1954, NA, CR(54)43.

83 Among the best examinations of these changes are Zubok V. and Pleshakov C., *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gould-Davies N., 'The logic of Soviet cultural diplomacy', *Diplomatic History*, 27/2 (April 2003), pp. 193–214.

84 'Trends and implications of Soviet policy', report by International Staff, 3 December 1956, NA, CM(56)133; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on 27 February 1954, 5 March 1954, NA, CR(54)6.

85 The first signs of disintegration were already visible in the French National Assembly, where the Socialists and the Radicals refused to take part in the EDC ratification debate until new diplomatic relations with Moscow had been established.

86 'Trends and implications of Soviet policy', report by International Staff, 3 December 1956, NA, CM(56)133. See also Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 27 February 1954, 5 March 1954, NA, CR(54)6.

87 Resolution on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Differences between Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 11–14 December 1956. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D7466651-139FAA09/natolive/official_texts_17482.htm (retrieved on 12 November 2012).

88 'Countering Soviet propaganda themes', 26 April 1960, NA, PO/60/502.

89 136th meeting of the NSC, 11 March 1953, *FRUS*, 1952–1954, vol. 8, p. 1122; Osgood, *Total Cold War*.

90 Report to the Secretary General from the Temporary Cultural Consultant on strengthening cultural cooperation among NATO countries, 21 July 1954, NA, AC/52-D/53; summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 5 October 1955, 7 October 1955, CR(55)40.

91 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 5 May 1956 at 3 p.m., 17 November 1956, NA, CR(56)23. The document was approved by the Council on 13 December 1956. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm (last accessed 12 November 2012).

92 Official text available on the NATO website: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-96747985-4802FC23/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm (accessed on 16 April 2012).

93 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115; Information Policy Working Group, 'Draft report on NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counter-propaganda', 14 November 1952, AC/24-D/17. The position of the US delegation was based on NSC-68 (April 1950).

94 Westad O.A., *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

95 CICR, 'Extension of NATO information activities to non-member countries', note by the Acting Director of Information, 8 February 1957, NA, AC/52-WP/32; CICR, 'Proposed 1959 NATO information activities', note by the Director of Information, 10 November 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)60.

 96 'Implementation of the recommendation made by the Committee of Three', note by the Deputy Secretary General, 10 January 1957, NA, CM(57)3.
 97 The implementation of article 2 was first discussed at the Ottawa (1951) and Lisbon (1952) meetings, but although all members agreed on the urgency of informing their public about NATO's pacific aims, disagreement on the methods and lack of funding forced the Council to postpone any decision.
 98 Conference of National Information Officials, 1 March 1960, NA, RDC/60/44; 'Information programme for 1956', report by the chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 20 February 1956, NA, CM(56)18.
 99 'Information programme for 1956', report by the chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 20 February 1956, NA, CM(56)18.
100 'Strengthening cultural co-operation among NATO countries', report to the Secretary General from the Temporary Cultural Consultant, 21 July 1954, NA, AC/52-D/53; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 5 October 1955, 7 October 1955, NA, CR(55)40. The promotion of NATO's non-military aspects received a boost with the publication of the Three Wise Men Report.
101 CICR, 'Proposed system for distribution and collection of material relating to contradictions in Soviet propaganda', note by US delegation, 20 June 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)20/1.
102 NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.
103 CICR, 'Information programme for 1956', 9 February 1956, NA, AC/52-WP/14.
104 Similar disagreements emerge from various documents dated between 1952 and 1955; as an example, see NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.
105 'Information programme for 1956', report by the chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 20 February 1956, NA, CM(56)18.
106 CICR, 'Special information fund for the tenth anniversary', 5 November 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)56.

3   The NATO Information Service in the 1960s

The 1950s laid the basis for the work of NATIS throughout the Cold War, and, despite a few internal reforms, that basis remained unchanged until 1989. The first half of the 1960s was a phase of consolidation both of the methods and working practices of the Information Service and of the message that NATO wanted to put across. The second half of the 1960s brought about important changes in terms of both the content of NATO's information material and the way in which the material was put together. In fact, the relocation of NATO headquarters to Brussels, the appointment of John Price as Director of Information and the publication of the Harmel Report, 'Future tasks of the alliance', marked a watershed in the history of the NATO Information Service.

How to promote NATO among the western public

A detailed examination of the most successful information programmes run by NATIS during the Cold War will be the focus of the second part of this book. It may, however, be interesting to mention here some key ideas, methods and programmes that were launched between the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s to give a sense of how NATIS organised its work and of how the different priorities and ideas came together. In the early 1950s, NATIS's propaganda material focused primarily on the need to explain to the public what NATO was and on making sure that the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy and the military might of the Eastern bloc were clear in people's minds. In this period, NATIS concentrated on military issues and on the provision of article 5, which portrayed NATO as a defensive military alliance. After the death of Stalin and the new policy of 'peaceful coexistence' put forward by Moscow, NATIS reviewed the content and tone of its information material. 'Peaceful coexistence' was striking a chord among the Western public and it was imperative to reiterate the need to continue with a policy of rearmament and military defence. At the same time, it was important to show that NATO was more than a military alliance and that it also aimed to foster political, economic and cultural ties between its members as proclaimed by article 2.

Promoting NATO meant working in close collaboration with the national governments and devising strategies to improve the way the alliance was perceived by the public. There was indeed widespread ignorance among the public about the nature and purpose of NATO, which potentially made them easy prey for communist propaganda. The public's lack of knowledge of NATO was glaring. In 1955, several years after the beginning of NATO's information activities, the Secretary General, Lord Ismay, remarked, 'The percentage of people knowing nothing about NATO and its aims had been reduced from 90 to 85%, but this meant that there was much to be done before the proportion was to be brought down to 50%.'[1] The following year, the CICR had to admit that '[d]espite five years of effort on the part of the Information Division, national information services and voluntary bodies, knowledge about the structure and aims of NATO remains abysmally small, even in intelligent circles'.[2]

Because only a small proportion of the public knew what NATO was, and few had an interest in the alliance's structure and aims, it was feared that communist propaganda could find fertile terrain and undermine the defence effort of the whole organisation. For example, because it was true – as the communists claimed at the time – that the rearmament effort and the creation of NATO was absorbing a substantial amount of national resources that could have been otherwise employed to pay for reconstruction and modernisation projects, it was imperative to explain the reasons behind such politically sensitive decisions in order to maintain public support. Lord Ismay himself was all too aware of the need to foster information policies, because 'men and women cannot be expected to make exertions and sacrifices indefinitely, unless they know the reasons for them'.[3] Hence, the CICR and NATIS initiated a campaign to spread the:

> fundamental concepts of constructive peace, solidarity and understanding between nations which are part of the aims of the NATO countries [using] to the fullest the motion pictures, photographs, books, pamphlets, speeches and all other means at our command to disseminate and to repeat, over and over again, the truth about our purpose and our efforts to protect our liberties and our freedom, and to preserve peace.[4]

According to the CICR, the first step was to address the so-called opinion formers: journalists, parliamentarians, academics and intellectuals. Thus, NATIS organised official visits to NATO Headquarters and tours of the NATO countries. On such occasions, brochures describing the work of the alliance were distributed to the participants, who would also attend conferences and meet NATO officials. The number of the visits and the size of the groups grew dramatically over a period of a few years, from 8 small groups in 1954 to 132 groups (comprising 4,574 persons) in 1957; and

8,000 people visited the HQ in 1958.[5] With time, invitations became open to a wider range of professions (educationalists, students, members of youth organisations, military men, civil servants, industrialists and businessmen, editors and trade unionists).

Although initially NATIS devoted a lot of its attention to the opinion moulders, some of its activities were also directed to other audiences, with the consequent production of targeted information material. Great attention was paid to the younger generations, particularly university students. The CICR and NATIS fully supported cultural exchange programmes, like the Fulbright scholarship scheme, and pressed the Council to launch some of its own. The NATO fellowship project and the Atlantic scholarship programme were launched with the clear purpose of enhancing the image of NATO as a peaceful organisation committed to cultural exchange and research. Similar initiatives included the Oxford summer schools and the establishment of Atlantic chairs in various European and North American universities. Suitable documentation was forwarded to lecturers in modern history and in foreign affairs, and NATIS started the publication of specialised material for schools students. Other initiatives included the organisation of essay prizes for high school and university students, the issue of NATO stamps and the publication of posters. Youth movements and schools acquired increasing importance for the CICR: in 1956, it supported a study conference on the role of the school in the Atlantic community, which was organised by the Atlantic Treaty Association and a conference for representatives of youth organisations of NATO countries, when it was decided to create the position of Youth Specialist within the CICR.[6]

In order to involve as large a portion of the public as possible, NATIS and the national governments collaborated in the preparation of travelling exhibitions. These were small displays usually located in a van and a tent where the public could see pictures of NATO Headquarters, read figures about the progress of rearmament and be reminded of the continuous danger of Soviet aggression. The success of these exhibitions was enhanced by the fact that they consisted of pictures and posters with simple messages and figures, and that they often included a large amount of information about the country where the exhibition was taking place. Another advantage was the fact that the wide use of pictures and drawings minimised the need for translation, which was costly and time-consuming. An examination of the material used for these exhibitions, some of which is available at the NATO archives, reveals that the organisers skilfully placed posters promoting NATO alongside posters portraying the successes of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Recovery Programme (ERP). This juxtaposition was intentional and was designed to show that NATO was part of a wider plan to foster economic relations between its members.[7] NATIS made full use of all media, but particularly of short movies and newsreels.

Their content was tailored to the different audiences and ranged from short films dealing with purely military issues for the troops to longer documentaries on the alliance's members. The short movies had a large non-commercial distribution and were broadcast on national TV networks too.

In 1963, NATIS supported the launch of the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers at Franklin House in London. The Centre was the pet project of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA), an umbrella organisation gathering together several pro-NATO voluntary organisations. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, ATA's main aim was to promote transatlantic studies and the concept of 'Atlantic community' in the national curricula. The Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers was 'to collate and diffuse, for the use of education authorities and teachers, materials and suggestions for the teaching and study of recent history, geography and current international affairs' and 'to organise periodically international study conferences and to assist in the preparation of national and international courses and seminars on such subjects and to encourage educational exchanges'.[8] The governing body of the Centre was the Atlantic Treaty Education Committee created in 1956, which consisted of one representative from each NATO country and a representative of the European Teachers' Association. John Eppstein, the former Secretary General of ATA, was appointed as the Centre's first director.

According to the CICR, in Western Europe more than in the United States, the public was hostile to anything savouring of propaganda and was therefore more willing to accept information about NATO activities if they were given in regular newspapers and newsreels, using local sources and authors, rather than in feature films and publications specially made for the purpose, as the latter were seen as government propaganda and therefore counter-productive in the long run. Thus, the CICR advised that it was preferable that the national governments should not be directly associated with manifestations in favour of the alliance. In general, Western Europe believed in the importance of concentrating less on the quantity of the propaganda and more on a subtle and carefully targeted campaign. UK officials had expressed similar concerns as early as 1950.[9] This viewpoint was shared by other NATO members, including France and Italy, where the communist parties were all too keen to denounce any propaganda attempt led by their governments.

For these reasons, collaboration with 'voluntary organisations' – such as trade unions, cultural organisations, private foundations, academic groups – became a cornerstone of the activity of NATIS and the CICR. Voluntary organisations as well as state–private networks were groups that had no formal connection with NATO apart from its anti-communist stance and the promotion of cultural and economic exchange.[10] The support of such organisations was vital in those cases in which it was preferable that the national governments and NATO itself should not be directly associated with manifestations in favour of the alliance. Perceived as spontaneous

demonstrations of support, their impact on the public was stronger and more long-lasting. Voluntary organisations were a common tool of the Cultural Cold War strategy and, as Frances Stonor Saunders has demonstrated, the CIA in particular excelled in the use of state–private networks to achieve the 'mobilization of culture'.[11] The fact that groups of individuals were apparently making the free choice of backing NATO – or any of the CIA's activities – could only work if the sponsoring agency's support remained covered, often hidden to the voluntary organisation's members themselves too. During the preparations of the tenth anniversary celebrations, the Civilian Budget Committee established a Special Fund for this purpose: NATO would contribute to the activities of the voluntary organisations by covering up to 50 per cent of the costs of any initiative proposed approved by the CICR.[12] The CICR and NATIS followed closely the activities of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of the North Atlantic Assembly, as well as assisting indirectly the individuals involved in the foundation of the Atlantic Institute in 1957. They also collaborated with the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.[13]

Collaboration with the voluntary organisations also offered the benefit of helping with the distribution of propaganda material. Soon, NATIS and the CICR came to privilege this channel to circulate pro-NATO material rather than using the formal distribution networks via their Foreign Ministries, as NATIS and the CICR had no control of – in fact, they did not even have a sense of – how and whether the material was further distributed to the public. In 1958, the CICR set up a special working group to assess to what extent the national governments used the NATO propaganda material.

The result of the survey came as a shock, as it revealed that in numerous countries there was no network for redistribution and that often a large part of NATIS's propaganda material remained in a corner of some forgotten office. In addition, the survey found out that while by and large the national information officials appreciated such publications, they pointed out that they were repetitive and too specialist. A survey of the thirteen key weekly, daily and fortnightly publications all dealing with Soviet propaganda shows that it is difficult to disagree with such criticism. Thus, the national officials of CONIO and the CICR suggested reducing the number of publications and devoting more resources to translation, which would increase the circulation in countries that were not Anglophone or Francophone and to make more effective use of the pro-NATO organisations for the circulation of propaganda material.[14]

From propaganda to psychological warfare

In 1960, the West German delegation relaunched the idea of allowing NATO to engage in psychological warfare in war and peacetime. As

mentioned in the previous chapter, a similar proposal had been put forward by the French delegation through Jean-Paul David in the early 1950s but had been abandoned because of the Anglo-American view that an expansion of the alliance's competences in the field of propaganda might be an obstacle to their ongoing action at home and abroad. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet propaganda policy based on peaceful coexistence and on a targeted campaign of denigration against NATO, and West Germany in particular, had undermined support for collective defence and political cooperation, and it fuelled distrust among the members, and particularly against West Germany. It therefore seemed necessary, and indeed urgent, the West German delegation claimed, to reopen the discussion on psychological warfare. Tellingly, the Germans decided to introduce the topic at a meeting of the NATO defence ministers in February 1960 rather than in the Council to make sure that the proposal was seen as a strategic and defence, rather than political, issue.[15] Mindful of the opposition encountered by the French a few years earlier, the Germans were determined to move the discussion on to new ground. Capitalising on the heightened tensions surrounding Berlin, Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss stressed that 'in this psychological war [an] attack against one NATO ally is also an attack on them all and against NATO as a whole'. The German proposal impressed a sense of urgency on to the Council and the national delegations, warning that:

> [t]he enemy aim is to paralyse the psychological defence readiness of the NATO nations, to weaken their common defence efforts, to undermine the mutual confidence of the NATO countries and people to dissolve NATO from within.… Psychology as a means to achieve this end has been given priority over other means. This development is still continuing, and increased activity must be expected in this field.[16]

According to the German proposal, the communists mainly used 'slander and defamation' against the FRG and NATO itself. As Strauss explained:

> This psychological warfare carried out by the Soviet bloc had military implications in that its aim was to weaken the western nations' will to defend themselves so that a military effort would no longer be required for the achievement of the Soviet aim of world domination.… Intensification of psychological operations intended systematically to defame the Federal Republic and its leaders, to isolate this country morally and politically and finally to separate it from the alliance.… It affected the political cohesion of the alliance in peacetime but could also lead to the demoralisation in case of war. It was inconsistent to build up well equipped and balanced forces without at the same time establishing the moral solidarity that was based on the

concepts of liberty and the democratic social order. On this basis, psychological warfare had not only a defensive but also an offensive value.[17]

Communist propaganda portrayed West Germany as a warmonger, a hotbed of Nazism, militarism, revanchism and anti-Semitism. On the other hand, the communists targeted West German public opinion by accusing NATO of behaving like a colonial and economic imperialist organisation that used and abused the weak international position of the Federal Republic to shape its domestic politics. The NATO military bases and training camps were a clear sign of such exploitation and would jeopardise the Republic's security, they argued, by becoming the first target of an attack in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union. In this way, the communists hoped to 'create in Germany a nationalist wave of hostility to NATO and the West, on which the Soviet leaders count strongly in their struggle to break up NATO'.[18]

What made the German proposal different from the one put forward by the French seven years earlier was the fact that it did not ask for a revision of terms of references of the Information Service but instead called for an overhaul of the alliance's security strategy. The proposal claimed that the propaganda attacks against West Germany should be seen as the equivalent of an armed attack and the West Germans were therefore calling on the alliance to intervene immediately. According to the German proposal, psychological warfare should become an integral part of the military defence system of the West both in peacetime and in time of war. For this reason, it called upon articles 2 and 4 of the treaty and not only on article 5, and for the same reason it was presented to the defence ministers in the first instance, and not by the information officials.

The Germans proposed the establishment of a permanent international planning team on psychological warfare with the Standing Group in order to agree principles and guidance for NATO defence strategy in psychological warfare. Although the proposal made a clear distinction between the use of psychological warfare in peace and its use in wartime, it stressed that both should be seen by NATO and by the member states as complementary and as crucial defensive weapons that the Alliance had not yet been able to master to its advantage.[19] In this context, therefore, the term 'psychological warfare' was used in the sense of offensive propaganda action against the opponent and not as information policies aimed at foreign audiences to facilitate the achievement of national goals. It entailed a proactive – not reactive – stand to undermine the morale of the enemy.

The trigger to this proposal was Khrushchev's renewed attempt to force an ultimatum on the status of West Berlin. John Foster Dulles's announcement that the United States might deal with GDR officials as representatives of the Soviet Union over the situation of Berlin, and the US

recognition of East Germany, undermined the Hallstein Doctrine (of non-recognition of the GDR) and alarmed Bonn.[20] West Germany's concerns were further fuelled by the Khrushchev–Eisenhower discussions at Camp David in September 1959 and the Paris summit of May 1960. There was a great risk that if it clung to the Hallstein Doctrine, West Germany would remain isolated and unable to influence the discussion. Thus, the German proposal for a new NATO body to deal with psychological warfare should be seen both as an attempt to engage with the FRG's allies and as a means of preventing the communist bloc from holding the initiative during what seemed to be a prolonged period of tense negotiations.[21]

The German report gained the approval of the Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, and the Council set up a Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare (AC/186). The Working Group was operative in 1960 and 1961; it gathered together experts sent from the national delegations and it was chaired by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Robin W.J. Hooper. Because of diverging views about its scope, no terms of reference were agreed, which was not a promising start.[22] The Danes, French, Germans, Greek, Turks, British and Americans sent their experts, and the Working Group met for the first time on 13 and 14 October 1960.[23] In addition to reviewing reports on how the member governments were dealing with psychological warfare at the national level, the Working Group had two main tasks. The first was to define what 'psychological warfare' actually was and how it differed from defence psychology. Second, it was necessary to decide how to make sure that NATO's action in these fields became more effective and wide-ranging without interfering with what was being done at the national level.[24]

Despite considerable disagreement between the British and the West Germans, the Working Group agreed to use the term 'psychological warfare' to mean all propaganda activities, including any collateral psychological actions such as threats, warnings, exhortations, agitation, disruption, persuasion, reassurances and 'certain physical devices in support of military operations'. Psychological warfare was therefore to be used only in military operations and was to be directed at national and international targets. On the other hand, according to the Working Group, 'defence psychology' indicated everyday psychological situations confronting military personnel both in training and operation and would include any measure put in place to sustain the troops' morale in peace and war. Finally, 'counter-propaganda' would be part of all ongoing information activities of NATO and of the national governments both in peace and in wartime conditions, and it would be directed at national and international targets, be they friendly, hostile or uncommitted.[25] Given that psychological warfare in wartime and psychological defence in peacetime remained internal matters to be dealt with by each national government, it was agreed that the Working Group would discuss only issues relating to

counter-propaganda and psychological defence in peacetime affecting the common interests of the NATO members as a whole.[26]

In its first progress report, the Working Group recognised the need to 'improve the methods and techniques currently employed both to combat the communist psychological offensive and the active conduct of our own operations.... It is desirable that there should be a greater measure of cooperation and coordination'.[27] The existing machinery within NATO was considered inadequate for dealing with psychological warfare. Yet the British and Canadians were adamant that no new agency should be set up at the NATO level. In their view, improving the exchange of information among the national delegations about communist parties' activities and the governments' responses was sufficient to achieve a more effective response.[28] The Germans were not at all convinced and demanded more confident action. The first report concluded that:

> there would be need for a permanent committee to be charged with the responsibilities in the field of 'psychological action' and that a senior official with the appropriate qualifications would be needed on the International Staff to ensure the effective working of this body and to coordinate the activities involved.[29]

The experts could not agree, however, on whether the new agency should be based on a new and reformed Committee on Information and Cultural Relations or whether instead the Council should create a new permanent Committee on Psychological Action composed of experts in the field. As usual, the suspicion of most national delegations with regard to 'more machinery' and to giving more power to NATO hampered progress and did not allow NATO to achieve a consistent and coherent counter-propaganda framework. In the end, it was unhelpfully agreed that 'more should and could be done to improve consultation and the exchange and analysis of information' about the nature, objectives, targets and methods of the communist psychological offensive, but no actual coordination measure were in put in place.[30]

The outcome of the first round of consultations was of course a disappointment. The Germans had hoped to launch a new Committee on Psychological Action, yet it was difficult to argue the case for the creation of yet another body to deal with propaganda. By 1960, NATO was in fact already engaged in psychological action and several bodies were indeed involved. The CICR and NATIS, and the annual Conference of National Information Officials, contributed to a NATO-wide response to the hostile propaganda attacks coming from the communist side by collecting information and exchanging ideas about how national information agencies responded. In addition, following the Three Wise Men Report the new Committee of Political Advisers was launched with the purpose of assisting the Permanent Representatives and the Council, and of

facilitating the exchange of views on political questions of concern to the alliance. Thus, its weekly agenda contained items like 'The Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia'; 'The Middle East'; and 'Other areas', which allowed the experts to monitor the expansion of communism around the world as well as the activities of communist 'front' organisations, and to prepare the appropriate background reports for the ministerial meetings. The Committee of Political Advisers was also involved in the preliminary exchanges of views relating to replies to all Soviet notes concerning NATO and the defence of the West.[31]

The Political Affairs Division too carried out a number of duties and operations that were directly relevant to NATO's propaganda and psychological actions. These included the distribution of information material and intelligence reports produced by the national delegations. From 1960s onwards, the Political Affairs Division set up a series of ad hoc regional working groups, for example to study communism's penetration in various areas of the world. Most of these documents consisted of factual compilations or analytical studies of Soviet policy, of economic and political developments in the Soviet bloc and of the activities of the communist international organisations. The senior officials of the Political Division also chaired numerous specialised working groups of experts which drafted reports for the Council on Soviet policy. All of these had a bearing on psychological action.

Finally, the Special Committee, which developed from the Working Group on Cooperation against Subversive Activities, facilitated the exchange of information on the activities of national communist parties and on Soviet-bloc espionage activities and plans in the field of sabotage. While the Special Committee's work did not fall directly under the heading of 'psychological action', its reports provided additional crucial information.

Yet even if a lot of information was indeed gathered and redistributed at a hectic pace, the lack of coordination and of an alliance-wide policy concerning what to do about such reports undermined the effectiveness of NATO's propaganda. According to their terms of references, the actions of the CICR, NATIS and CONIO in the field of psychological warfare were to be limited to the exchange of information. They were intended not to counter communist propaganda but merely to promote NATO and the idea of an Atlantic community. In 1959 and 1960, the *NATO Letter* carried at least an article per issue on some aspect of 'Sovietology' written by an expert in the field and NATIS produced a pamphlet entitled 'Vigilance: the price of liberty' on the dangers of peaceful coexistence. Yet there was no coordinated response to Soviet propaganda – whether anti-NATO or of any other nature – on a day-to-day basis. The Committee of Political Advisers and the Political Affairs Division contributed to the information work of the alliance but did not take any decision on information policy. Thus, the German delegation's members did have a point when they claimed that

such a system was prone to unnecessary duplications and lack of coordination. In a last attempt to convince their partners, in November 1960 Dr Gebhardt von Walther, the Permanent Representative of the FRG, expressed doubts that the low-ranking officials sent to work at the CICR would ever be in a position to make a significant contribution to NATO's psychological warfare action, but to no avail.[32]

The German proposal received the support of the Turks and Belgians but other delegations – and particularly the British and the Americans – opposed the creation of yet another body within NATO, arguing that propaganda action, in all its forms, should remain a prerogative of the national governments. Eventually the Dutch, Italians, Canadians, Norwegians and Danes rallied to Britain's side and opted for the streamlining of the existing apparatus.[33]

Interestingly, the French offered only lukewarm support. This seems counter-intuitive, as only a few years earlier the French delegation had protested against the same British opposition to their plan for a more centralised NATO propaganda action. However, by 1960 de Gaulle's approach to foreign policy had shifted away from close political cooperation within NATO. The creation of a new body along the lines proposed by the Germans did not fit with the developing Gaullist approach to foreign policy. The Americans too should have been supportive of the proposal, at least in principle. One explanation for their opposition is that, as on previous occasions, they were resistant to the creation of a new centralised agency that they could not control. Giles Scott-Smith has pointed out that back in Washington the Mansfield Sprague Commission, set up to review all American propaganda activities abroad, was about to submit its report. This meant that the US government was not in a position to make a clear commitment at this point.[34] The need to wait for the results of the Mansfield Sprague Commission certainly played a role, but the Americans were clearly uneasy about the German proposal and did not offer any form of indirect support. According to László Borhi, the inability of the Americans to intervene in the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 had left a deep mark on the Eisenhower administration and discredited the 'rollback policy' enshrined in National Council Report 68 (NSC-68). This could explain the US reluctance to support a proposal that might result in the promotion of social unrest in the East, which NATO and the United States would have been unable to support.[35]

While the German proposal had the merit of focusing the discussion on the opportunity of moving forward towards a more confident propaganda action, it eventually led to the already established view that these activities could be best dealt with outside the official NATO channels. It was indeed unlikely that the launch of yet another committee would have changed much unless a radical rethinking of the whole of NATO's actions in the area of psychological warfare had been put in place, and there was clearly not enough political support for such a move.[36] Thus, yet again the British and

American view in favour of 'less machinery, better coordination' prevailed. What was proposed was in fact a revision of the terms of reference of the CICR, which appeared to be the quickest and most effective solution.[37]

The failure of the German proposal had two main consequences. The first was the inclusion of external specialists in various aspect of communication and propaganda policies in NATO discussions in the form of a series of ad hoc working groups, which sprouted more and more often during the 1960s.[38] They were usually short-lived, lasting no more than eighteen months, and with limited competences, but they did contribute to the exchange of information and cooperation on an ad hoc basis.

On the other hand, the German government looked for an outlet of its ideas elsewhere. In 1962, the International Information and Documentation Centre, or Interdoc, was founded in The Hague. The aim was to respond to the propaganda attacks coming from the Eastern bloc; moving beyond simple responses to communist criticism, Interdoc actively carried out a pro-western propaganda campaign based on common western values and ideals. Interdoc was a transnational enterprise with close links with national groups based in several NATO countries around a Dutch–German core. As Giles Scott-Smith has demonstrated, the relationship between Interdoc and NATO was never an official one, and certainly the creation of Interdoc did not come about solely as a result of the discussions held within the Alliance at the time. Yet the Interdoc network provided West Germany with an outlet for its concern about what it perceived as the Eastern bloc's edge in the propaganda war.[39]

The idea of moving towards a centralised agency to handle psychological warfare as well as intelligence information sharing that was suggested by the West German defence minister in 1960 transcended NATO's political role and radically challenged the identity of the alliance. It aimed to tighten collaboration in the propaganda and intelligence fields as well as to redefine the overall political scope of the alliance. If successful, the German proposal would have meant that national governments would have transferred competences in intelligence and information sharing to NATO in the name of efficiency and coherence. The national governments would have lost the ability to address their own public in times both of peace and of war. It is therefore not surprising that the German plans met resistance from other delegations and were eventually abandoned.

The result was that throughout the Cold War the alliance was in no position to deal with psychological warfare in peacetime. In case of conflict too, psychological warfare would remain a national prerogative. This marked a striking difference with the Eastern bloc. The Warsaw Pact never developed agencies like NATIS and the Special Committee to facilitate the exchange of intelligence and information. Yet because of the very nature of the satellite system there was no need to do so. The Cominform ensured that the communist international organisations and the national communist parties put forward a consistent message and coherent propaganda campaigns.

The central role of the KGB, the Soviet Security Service, in the network of national intelligence agencies meant that there was already an established structure to collect intelligence information and to devise common psychological warfare actions in peacetime as well as in case of conflict. Thus, as far as propaganda and intelligence are concerned, the Eastern bloc would indeed have been in a much stronger position to coordinate intelligence and counter-intelligence operations on a large scale.

Stemming the communist tide

The monitoring of the communist parties and of the international communist organisations in Western Europe absorbed a large part of NATIS's and the CICR's energies. An effective pro-NATO propaganda campaign required an advanced understanding of the functioning of the Soviet and Soviet-inspired propaganda machinery on both sides of the Iron Curtain based on the collection of a vast amount of intelligence. In the words of the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Sergio Fenoaltea, 'any effort at countering Soviet propaganda must be based on an extensive, up-to-date knowledge about communist activities throughout the world'.[40] Given the magnitude of the task, it was imperative to join forces with all the national secret services. As was discussed in the previous chapter, this process started with the decision of the Information Policy Working Group to collect reports from the national delegations on the activities of the communist parties and on their anti-communist and anti-American campaigns. The launch of the CICR formalised this procedure, and national delegations regularly submitted reports on the propaganda and political activities of their communist parties and of the branches of the international communist organisations on their soil. Some delegations – namely the Americans and British – also circulated reports on the activities of such organisations beyond the Iron Curtain and in the Third World. These reports can be seen as examples of the link between intelligence and propaganda as they were based on information collected by the national intelligence agencies with the aim of allowing the national and international propaganda agencies of the West to gain a more sophisticated insight into the methods, themes and practices of the communist propaganda machinery so as to be able to respond effectively.

The CICR had a double function: it advised the Council of Ministers about the best means to achieve an effective propaganda campaign and it facilitated the exchange of information among its members about the activities of communist parties throughout Europe so as to allow the delegations to exchange ideas about how best to respond to such hostile attacks. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the CICR focused more and more on the Soviet anti-NATO propaganda. Through the creation of various specialised groups – for example, the Working Group on Trends in Soviet Policy (1952) – and the collection of information provided by the

national delegations, the CICR put together a detailed portrayal of the activities of the national communist parties and the communist international organisations. The UK delegation was the first to provide information of this kind: in 1954, it submitted a detailed memorandum on communist propaganda against NATO. As was discussed in the previous chapters, a study of the IRD papers in the National Archives at Kew reveals that such reports originated from the IRD itself. According to the British memorandum, communist anti-NATO propaganda was based upon four main themes:

1   NATO is an American creation, and is American-dominated;
2   NATO infringes national sovereignty;
3   NATO is aggressive;
4   NATO is a cause of international tension, it gives rise to an arms race and it lowers standards of living.[41]

The British report also pointed out that since the invasion of South Korea and the subsequent rearmament of the NATO members there had been a sharp increase in communist propaganda attacks against the alliance, notably through the communist international organisations.

NATIS and the CICR responded to the Soviet criticism with equal determination. Part of their counter-propaganda activities was consistent with the overall western information approach and was based on the need to expose the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime and to emphasise that NATO and its members were the sole guardians of freedom and democracy against the Soviet threat. For this reason, NATIS launched a campaign to demonstrate NATO's peaceful nature and focused on NATO's promotion of political and economic cooperation among its members. The Information Service's activity needed to demonstrate that:

> [o]wing to its aggressive policy, the USSR must shoulder the entire responsibility for the present armament race, precluding the use for other purposes of the immense productive capabilities of the great democracies in the West. A halt in the armaments drive would immediately release productive resources for the benefit of all countries including those now occupied by Russia.[42]

The collection, analysis and circulation of intelligence information regarding the tactics and activities of the communist parties in the member countries was a crucial preliminary step towards the creation of an effective network within Western Europe that could enable its members to react to Soviet-inspired propaganda and anticipate sabotage and infiltration. At the same time, however, the exchange of information was unhelpful if not backed up by close contact between 'security authorities of the various NATO members for the purpose of keeping track of

individuals suspected of subversive activity and by appropriate legislation'.[43] Yet it was problematic to decide what action should be taken since most of the time the communist parties expressed their criticism within the limits granted by the democratic constitutions of their country, and any action would undermine their right to free speech. In this field, the hands of NATO – as well as of the national governments – were tied.

There was, however, another field that allowed more room for action. The foundation of the Cominform in 1947 produced a new transnational opposition in the form of international organisations and movements or – as the western intelligence and propaganda agencies called them – 'front' organisations. Since the 1920s, the Soviet Union had understood that organisations that were believed to be independent could be more useful to the cause of international communism than ones that were openly pro-communist. Precisely because their programmes were ones that non-communists could sympathise with (peaceful coexistence, disarmament, economic and cultural exchange), they attracted wider support. The great asset of such organisations was their spurious international appeal to communists and non-communists and their ability to demonstrate that they enjoyed support that transcended the limits of any political party as well as national boundaries. Consequently, the Soviet Union invested massively in these organisations. In 1951, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union spent $2.5 billion a year on its network of international organisations.[44]

Aware of the appeal that such organisations had for the western public, NATO monitored their activities closely. The CICR was particularly concerned about the fact that the communist international organisations held conferences and activities on both sides of the Iron Curtain. If these were held in democratic countries, the communist organisations' initiatives could persuade non-communists of their promoters' democratic legitimacy. In addition, a conference held in a western country was more likely to be publicised by non-communist information agencies than one that was held in a communist state. The staging of a conference in the West also absolved its organisers from all the difficult visa and security problems to which they were exposed when they invited foreign delegates behind the Iron Curtain. For these reasons, there were strong arguments for forcing the network of communist international organisations to hold their conferences behind the Iron Curtain 'where they properly belong'. The CICR believed that:

> [t]he best means of achieving this end will vary from country to country. In many countries the outright refusal of entry to foreigners (including, if necessary, citizens of other NATO countries) who wish to attend such conferences is likely to be the easiest and most quickly justifiable course of action. In other cases, however, other forms of administrative action (for example refusal of the authorisation to hold such conferences, delay in the issue of visas, etc…) may be found

more appropriate. The matter is plainly one which individual govern-
ments are best fitted to decide.

[…]

The Committee [on Information and Cultural Relations] therefore
submit that the Council should recommend member governments to
take all actions that is open to them to make it impossible for the
international communist 'front' organisations to hold their confer-
ences in NATO countries.[45]

A further reason to push the conferences to the East was that 'such confer-
ences may also afford free nations valuable opportunities for observation
and contact'.[46] By infiltrating the western delegations allowed to take part
in the international conferences held in the East, the western intelligence
agencies would gain new chances to observe the Soviet-led propaganda
machinery.

Pushing the communist international organisations to the East pre-
sented some risks, too. Official meetings held behind the Iron Curtain
inevitably contributed to the prestige of the regimes that hosted them and
indirectly legitimised them politically. For this reason, the American dele-
gation suggested differentiating 'between those countries whose govern-
ments maintain a measure of independence from and those which are
completely under Soviet domination.'[47] On this basis, international meet-
ings held in Poland or Yugoslavia were less objectionable than meetings in
Hungary or Bulgaria. A special geographical problem arose in connection
with international conferences held in Poland. Delegates proceeding to
Poland by train via East Germany required GDR visas. It was believed that
if the volume of such cases increased, 'this might have an undesirable
effect upon our policy of preventing any increase in the international
stature of the GDR'.[48] Aware of this issue, the 'front' organisations organ-
ised an increasing number of events in Poland, and in the summer of 1958
two major international conferences were held in Warsaw.

Among the numerous communist international organisations, the
youth organisations were a source of particular concern not only because
of the impressive number of their members but also because of their
relentless activity. In the early 1950s, the World Federation of Democratic
Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS), two organ-
isations completely controlled by the Soviets, organised numerous youth
festivals that gathered together hundreds of thousands of young people
from all over the world.[49] The West responded with the foundation of
similar movements, like the World Assembly of Youth (WAY) and the
International Student Conference (ISC), but their lack of funding pre-
vented such organisations from achieving results comparable to those of
their communist counterparts.

In line with the NATO recommendations, the western governments
tried to minimise the success of such events in different ways: passports

and visas were refused, special trains bound for demonstrations and conferences that needed cross other nations' territories were refused transit permits, and organisations were outlawed overnight. In West Germany, the Council of Ministers banned the Freie Deutsche Jugend, a pro-Soviet organisation, and in Italy the authorities withdrew the passport of Enrico Berlinguer – who at the time was the WFDY president – a few days before the Berlin Youth Festival.[50]

Because of their strong appeal to the non-communist public, the conferences organised by the World Peace Council (WPC) were obstructed with equal, if not stronger, determination. Between 1949 and 1953, the WPC organised several international meetings promoting a peaceful solution for the German question through diplomatic agreements between the Four Powers. The western governments tried to obstruct the WPC's events. The Odense conference, for example, was initially supposed to take place in Paris but the French authorities forbade it at the last minute. Although a new location was chosen, the difficulties did not cease and the East German, Austrian and Polish delegations could not take part in it because the Danish government refused them visas. Again, the second WPC Congress was supposed to take place in Genoa but the Italian authorities did not grant visas. The Council then tried to hold it in Sheffield but the British government refused entry to the most prominent foreign communist spokesmen. Eventually the meeting took place in Warsaw.[51] In the case of the Vienna conference, the Italian government provisionally suspended all passports for Austria.[52] In extreme cases, the WPC leaders were arrested for a short period of time, sufficient to prevent their participation in international meetings. Such arrests were later blamed on mistaken identity or errors by the officers carrying out the arrests. In 1954, Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialists and the president of the World Peace Council, was arrested on his way to the International Conference of the Countries Involved in the European Defence Community in Paris. The arrest was motivated by an ordinance against him of 1941, which had not been repealed. Nenni was released a few days later, after the end of the conference.[53]

At this stage, it is difficult to assess the impact of the CICR and of the member countries' actions in hampering communist demonstrations and initiatives. However, as has been shown, the CICR documents demonstrate the correlation between the recommendations of the CICR and the actual measures adopted by the national governments. It is possible that the governments would have implemented similar policies even if they had not been discussed in and recommended by the CICR, but it is clear that the CICR offered a forum for the discussion of the western anti-communist initiatives and allowed room for the coordination of their strategies aimed at minimising the impact of the communist international meetings on the western public.

It is, however, worth pointing out that notwithstanding this array of measures employed to disrupt the demonstrations and conferences of the

front organisations, the communist initiatives remained successful, particularly in terms of the number of people attending. The Berlin Youth Festival in 1951, for example, welcomed nearly one and a half million participants, with delegations coming from all over Europe and South-East Asia. Of course, the fact that the western press under-reported them – or, if they had taken place in the East, completely ignored them – drastically reduced their impact on the western public.

The study of the CICR's papers is particularly interesting because it opens a window on the sensitive implications of initiating propaganda activities and controlling political movements in democratic countries. Denying visas to persons wishing to participate in conferences sponsored by communist 'front' organisation did not infringe the constitutions: in the absence of international agreements on the free movements of people, each government retained the right to deny visas to foreign citizens, albeit citizens of friendly nations. On the other hand, the suggestion that the members should refuse permission to hold demonstrations and conferences has more problematic implications since it entailed a violation of the freedom of speech. During the Cold War, the key ideological terms in western propaganda were *democracy* and *freedom*. However, such terms were interpreted in different ways according to the different contexts: the West opposed the Soviet Union because it denied basic democratic rights to its own citizens, and especially to those of Eastern Europe. At the same time, it could become necessary to override freedom of speech in the West if a particular form of opposition (i.e. communist) threatened the social order. There was – and still is – a discrepancy between the language and ideals of democracy and its practices. In other words, western governments and NATO officials alike thought that even liberal democracies might need to suspend temporarily basic democratic rights such as freedom of speech, otherwise they would find themselves in a paradoxical situation 'which enables an enemy to take advantage of the freedoms enjoyed in the democratic countries while the latter refrain from taking action in answer to such tactics'.[54]

The second half of the 1960s: a period of turmoil

In the second half of the 1960s, the relocation of the NATO headquarters to Brussels, the evolution of NATO's strategic concept and the publication of the Harmel Report opened a new phase in the history of the alliance. As will be discussed in the following pages, the publication of the Harmel Report in particular radically changed the way in the alliance perceived its place in the world and its role in western society.

Changes in technology and military defence strategy called for a rethinking of NATO's defence strategy. When NATO adopted the third strategic concept (MC 14/2 and MC 48/2) in 1955, the territory of the United States was not directly threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons, as

the Soviet Union did not have the necessary delivery system and sufficient range to reach the United States. However, the deployment of Soviet long-range bombers and the launch of Sputnik in October 1957 dealt a blow to the United States' sense of isolation and invulnerability. If a rocket could put a satellite in space, it could also drop bombs on American soil. Soviet boasts about the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile system led to the so-called missile gap and the perception that the United States – and NATO with it – was losing its competitive advantage in nuclear deterrence. The Western European governments feared that no American president would launch a nuclear attack to defend the Old Continent if this meant that the United States itself could come under direct attack as a result. Tensions over Berlin between 1958 and 1962 reinforced such doubts and made a clarification of NATO's security concept more urgent.

The key question was how the West should respond to Soviet threats that were geographically and strategically limited in scope. Atomic weapons might not be the appropriate response to a limited Soviet provocation, such as blocking access to West Berlin. The new US president, John F. Kennedy, was particularly concerned about the issue of limited warfare and the prospect that a nuclear war could be unleashed by accident or miscalculation, and proceeded with a reappraisal of US defence strategy. In 1961, the National Security Council issued a new policy directive (National Security Action Memorandum 40) stating that NATO should prepare for lesser threats than an all-out war.[55] In the meantime, international tensions became more acute following the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis the following year. The United States advocated 'a strong non-nuclear response posture for NATO' and the need to devise a strategy of 'flexible response'.[56]

According to the special report on NATO defence policy of April 1962, the alliance could moderate its policy of massive retaliation by submitting the use of nuclear weapons to wider alliance-wide consultation whereby all members would indirectly have a say in the use of the American nuclear deterrent.[57] This was of course a controversial proposal that was sternly opposed by the Pentagon and caused resistance among several member countries. While the discussions were under way, the US government was shaken by the assassination of Kennedy and was increasingly concerned by the American military involvement in Vietnam. Thus, all negotiations on the revised Strategic Concept for NATO came to a halt and opened the way for protracted internal negotiations, which showed the lack of political cohesion among the members, particularly France.

Under the leadership of de Gaulle, France was increasingly sceptical about what it saw as excessive control by the Americans and the British of the alliance's defence strategy. In February 1966, all French armed forces were removed from NATO's integrated military command, and all non-French NATO troops were asked to leave France. The reasons behind de

Gaulle's decision to withdraw France from NATO's integrated allied command in 1966 have already been examined in detail by several historians.[58] It is, however, worth mentioning here that the French withdrawal meant the removal from French territory of NATO Headquarters, which was relocated to Brussels, and of other Allied bodies like the Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and other facilities and bases that were not under French authority. In addition, France stopped participating in any negotiations concerning the revised Strategic Concept of the alliance, as it was decided to give responsibility for all defence matters to the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) rather than to the North Atlantic Council.[59] In December 1966, NATO also launched the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which increased the role of West Germany in nuclear consultation and decision making, thereby further reshaping the dynamics within the alliance and ensuring German support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations.[60]

NATO's Fourth Strategic Concept was eventually issued, and approved in December 1968. The two key features of the new NATO defence strategy were flexibility and escalation. According to the new document, 'the deterrent concept of the Alliance is based on a flexibility that will prevent the potential aggressor from predicting with confidence NATO's specific response to aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack'.[61]

Although the French decision of March 1966 did not come as a surprise, it did pose serious organisational and political problems for NATO. In September 1966, the fourteen allies on the DPC agreed that SHAPE should leave Voluceau-Rocquencourt near Versailles and build new headquarters on a 2-square-kilometre army summer training camp in Chièvres-Casteau, north of Mons in Belgium, to which SHAPE moved in March 1967. NATO too had to look urgently for new headquarters. Rome was briefly put forward as an option, and so were London and various locations in the Netherlands. For different reasons, which had mainly to do with lack of housing for the NATO staff, all such options had to be shelved. Eventually, in October 1966, the decision was taken to move to Brussels. The Belgian government proposed a two-stage solution: a temporary arrangement to be prepared very rapidly in Haren on the disused airfield between Zaventem Airport and the centre of town, and permanent headquarters to be built at Heysel, which had housed the Brussels World Fair in 1958 (Expo '58) within five years. However, NATO Headquarters is still located near Zaventem. In 1999, the NATO heads of state and government agreed to construct a new headquarters opposite the present site, and construction is currently under way.[62]

At the time when NATO was discussing its strategic objectives, in December 1966 it commissioned a report to examine the possibility of

a dual approach to security, to combine the political and military dimensions of the alliance. The results were published in 'The future tasks of the alliance', also known as the Harmel Report, in December 1967. The Harmel Report reiterated that a balance of military power between the two blocs was a prerequisite for the creation of a climate of stability in East–West relations and that it was an essential precondition to allow the West to achieve progress in international negotiations with the Soviet bloc on issues such as the division of Germany and the position of Berlin. The Harmel Report advocated strong defence along with new diplomatic relations with the East and called on the NATO members to use the alliance in the interests of détente. NATO's dual approach of maintaining credible collective defence based on the principles of MC 14/3, while at the same time pursuing a policy of seeking détente through dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, was to provide the foundation for NATO policy for the next twenty years.[63]

As far as NATO's information activities were concerned, the Harmel Report stated that public support for the alliance's defence efforts was vital to the accomplishment of the tasks ahead. It was crucial to explain to the public the rationale underlying NATO strategy and the alliance's efforts to preserve the military and defence balance between East and West. Public support for the defence effort was an essential in the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy. Without it, according to the Harmel Report, the deterrent value of the NATO would be seriously undermined. Military and nuclear capabilities would mean little if there was no political will to use them. The approval of the report therefore brought about a review of the NATO information effort, which had to focus more clearly on fostering support among the wider public and on explaining the need for military strength as well as for political cohesion at a time when neither seemed to have been achieved at a satisfactory degree.

A new approach to NATO's information work

The publication of the Harmel Report put forward a new vision of the alliance's own perception of its role in the Cold War. Not surprisingly, therefore, the end of the 1960s brought a dramatic increase in the workload of NATIS, which had to relocate and at the same had to produce new information material in which the French withdrawal and the disagreements within the alliance were downplayed. The French withdrawal in particular needed to be explained in the new information material, which had to be produced immediately to answer to the new wave of public interest in the alliance. At the heart of the Gaullist challenge to NATO was the questioning of NATO's political legitimacy, transatlantic relations and the role of Western Europe in the Cold War. On the other hand, however, the relocation of the headquarters was also a tremendous opportunity as it

attracted the attention of the media and created a greater than usual interest in NATO. Thus, the French withdrawal and the relocation of NATO opened new opportunities as well as challenges for the Information Service at a time when NATIS was preparing for the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty.

The relocation of NATO Headquarters was a logistical nightmare as well as a political embarrassment for the alliance. One of the major issues was the widespread lack of enthusiasm among the International Staff. At the time, less than half of the staff members responded positively to the relocation proposal. The French members of staff who worked for NATO were reluctant to move abroad. For others, the best thing about being posted to NATO was being able to live in Paris. In comparison, Brussels seemed less appealing. Others had problems with the proposed new salary, as the Belgian scales were lower than the French ones.[64] Despite the efforts of the central administration to appease them, a large proportion of the existing staff decided to leave NATO. According to François Le Blévennec, of around 600 people working for the organisation at the time, only about half agreed to move to Brussels.[65] Reluctantly, Jean de Madre, the editor of the *NATO Letter*, agreed to move to Brussels for one year to help with the transition, but in December 1968 he left NATO and returned to Paris.[66]

The situation was of course compounded by the already huge organisational problems associated with the relocation of the headquarters, as the alliance had to proceed quickly with massive recruitment of a large proportion of its clerical and maintenance staff. Finding the right people was not always possible and many compromises were made. To make things worse, all C grades (support staff) were of course locals and needed to obtain security clearance from the Belgian government, which created an additional bureaucratic nightmare. The need to find the right people for the right job often meant that bright young officials were promoted to a higher grade and given more responsibility faster than would have otherwise happened.[67] The radio and television studios were in fact eventually completed thanks to the work carried out by the Information Service's own technical staff, with little outside assistance. According to John Price, the move to Brussels hit the Information Service harder than any other section: 'The staff continued to work in nearly intolerable and occasionally perilous conditions, since constructions were being built above their heads. The Radio and TV area and briefing rooms were unusable for four months.'[68]

The relocation coincided with the death of Valentine Selsey, head of TV/Films/Radio, while both assistant editors of the *NATO Letter*, the NATO librarian, the head of the Distribution Unit and a number of secretaries did not relocate and were not replaced until early 1968, which created a considerable staff shortage. This was also the time when the Director of Information, Raban Graf Adelmann, resigned. NATIS was

therefore in no position to react swiftly to the new demands imposed by the relocation and by the publication of the Harmel Report.[69]

The Secretary General appointed a new Director of Information, John L.W. Price, in November 1967. Before joining NATIS, Price had worked for the Information Research Department in London, where he had gained extensive experience in the field of anti-communist propaganda. Price was a very effective and energetic Director of Information. His first decision was to visit all the NATO capitals and to look for new ways to improve coordination between NATIS and the national information agencies, something that – despite all the talk about better cooperation – his predecessors had never done.[70] Contrary to the IRD's normal practice, when he visited London, Price was welcomed directly in the IRD offices to discuss ways to increase the flow of information from the IRD to NATIS. On this occasion, he also requested to have copies of all material sent to him personally, including the IRD's weekly press cuttings.[71]

The first few months of 1968 were of course absorbed by the distribution and publicity of the Harmel Report, which informed all briefings given to visitors and of special articles in the *NATO Letter*. At the same time, NATIS launched two new publications, *Speakers' Notes* and *NATO Latest*. The former was designed to meet the needs for basic factual information of those who lectured about NATO, such as members of the Atlantic Treaty Association. *NATO Latest* was an updated information sheet sent by express mail directly to all Atlantic Treaty Association members and to key contacts who needed to be kept informed on NATO's latest developments. Both documents contained factual and accurate information and were distributed on the assumption that their content would not be quoted directly and that the information could not be traced back to the NATO Information Service by the end receivers.

Despite being very helpful, these measures were contingent and did not go to the core question of how to implement the core message of the Harmel Report and how to achieve a rethinking of NATO's information work. Price was convinced of the urgency of producing better results as soon as possible:

> The basic task of the Alliance is, of course, to deter any possible aggression and I believe that we have not hitherto paid enough attention to the whole question of the role of public opinion and its effects on the deterrent value of the alliance's military forces in a time of crisis.... To the larger masses of unqualified opinion … the word NATO means nothing.... It is no good having the best equipped and trained military forces in the world if a large section of the civilian population could, when the time comes, show itself – perhaps by open demonstration – as resolutely opposed to the use of these forces in any circumstances.[72]

Price was convinced of the need to streamline NATIS's work and to focus on fewer, more cost-effective programmes that could reach the wider public. He invested in films and documentaries and was sceptical of other programmes such as the mobile exhibitions and the summer schools. Accordingly, Price took two important decisions. First, he worked actively to improve contact and exchange of information between NATIS and the national governments. He did so by visiting the national capitals himself to establish closer personal relations with information officers in the foreign ministries and by relaunching CONIO, which had not met since the early 1960s for no apparent reason other than the lack of interest from the national governments and the chaos that followed the relocation of the headquarters. Second, Price ordered a complete review of all NATIS information activities and of the role of the CICR. For this purpose, he launched the Information Working Group, which was operative from 1969 to 1973 and which carried out a detailed examination of NATIS's output and suggested changes and cuts to make the Information Service more cost-effective.

In 1968, the Council approved Price's suggestion to make the annual Conference of National Information Officials responsible for the development of information policy and for drawing up guidelines for its implementation.[73] The Council would base its decisions on policy recommendations from CONIO and not only from the CICR, as it had done up to this point. Following the pattern established in the 1950s, CONIO met once a year for a few days with a mandate to evaluate and make recommendations concerning the NATO Information Service's output and how to improve coordination with what was being done at the national level. By making CONIO – which was a more distant body that met less frequently than the CICR – responsible for formulating the NATIS's mandate, the Council indirectly gave the NATO Information Service greater independence in implementing its programmes. The Service gained some protection from the micro-management usually enforced by the CICR, which was in a position to scrutinise every little change and trend. Interestingly, one of the first and clearest recommendations issued by CONIO was to ensure that the CICR kept within its limits and did not hamper the work of NATIS. This arrangement whereby the Council based its information policy decisions on suggestions by CONIO survived until the end of the Cold War. Yet while CONIO made suggestions about information policy, it did not have any decision power in the matter, and the final say rested with the Council. Thus, this arrangement maintained the Council's overall authority for information policy while it protected information programmes from excessively heavy-handed interference by the CICR and the national governments. A final point worth mentioning is that while the CICR traditionally consisted of junior information officials, CONIO gathered together much more senior colleagues, including members of the United States Information Agency and the Information Research Department.

CONIO met in October 1968, a few weeks after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring as well as the increasingly widespread student movements prompted CONIO to recognise the need to win the hearts and minds of the younger generations who were too young to remember why NATO had been founded and who seemed increasingly tempted 'to come to the easy conclusion that all military blocs are wrong'.[74] From this moment, therefore, each year the Conference of National Information Officials put forward numerous proposals to reach the younger generations, including for the first time high school students, and to persuade them of the need to have NATO. Projects included the relaunch of the visits to NATO Headquarters, a programme that was open to university students, and the production of new publications and films targeting the younger generations.[75]

At the same time, CONIO recognised that in order to implement the recommendation of the 1956 Three Wise Men Report and the more recent Harmel Report, NATIS needed more resources allocated from the central budget and more assistance from the member governments. CONIO also agreed that the NATO information programme 'should emphasise both pillars of the alliance policy i.e. defence and detente as defined in the Harmel Report and a special effort should be made to emphasise that these are not contradictory but complementary'.[76]

Most of the recommendations put forward by CONIO remained on paper, however. The suggestion to establish regional offices in member countries and in the headquarters of the various international organisations, something SHAPE had already achieved successfully, was not implemented because of the opposition of many members, who feared that regional officers might become involved in internal political controversies. Similarly, no increase in the information budget was agreed, despite the fact that in addition to the recommendation of CONIO two influential voluntary organisations, the North Atlantic Assembly and the Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, had passed resolutions calling for an increase in the size of the NATO information budget. For this reason, Price complained that:

> I appreciate very well that national authorities inevitably have their own priorities when it comes to information work and NATO can never hope to be top of the list. On the other hand, if I may speak frankly, I have the impression that for many national authorities NATO is a subject which scarcely figures at all, even at the bottom of the list of priorities.[77]

Price had good reason to complain, particularly because he compared the NATIS budget to the Common Market Information Service, which was three times as big despite the fact that the European Economic Community comprised only six countries and five languages (while NATO had

fifteen countries and eleven languages to deal with). Most importantly, Price was the first Director of Information to discuss the level of the information budget in relation to the size of the problem, rather than the level of the previous year's budget.

Price was also convinced of the need to streamline the work of NATIS and he was keen to respond constructively to a proposal coming from the US delegation, which had asked for a review of the output of the NATO Information Service with special reference to the nature, scope and aims of the *NATO Letter*.[78] Price used the opportunity to propose the creation of an open-ended working group to review all activities carried out by NATIS. The new Information Working Group (AC/273) comprised members of the CICR and of NATIS as well as national experts. It was charged with carrying out a thorough examination of the activities of the Information Service, including evaluating its effectiveness, suggesting a new set of priorities and recommending measures to ensure more effective coordination between NATIS and the national information agencies.[79]

The Working Group carried out a survey of all material produced by the Information Service, including its links with the voluntary organisations and its aims and working methods. It recommended that NATIS should focus on fewer programmes and should focus on those initiatives that were deemed to be most cost-effective. For example, it suggested withdrawing the mobile exhibitions, which were too costly and organisationally complicated, and investing in the production of short films. The initial costs of producing NATO films were high, but once they had been covered, the films had the advantage of reaching a wider audience at a relatively low cost.[80]

Following the recommendations of the Information Working Group, Price proceeded to a substantial reshaping of the activities of the NATO Information Service. He agreed significant cuts, including to the *NATO Letter*, which was scaled back from a monthly to a bimonthly publication and acquired a new focus on the day-to-day work of NATO, including an 'open forum' with discussion in which the authors could speak in a personal capacity about the activity of NATO and the challenges it faced. In the name of cost-effectiveness, films and documentaries became a central part of NATIS's communication effort, as they could reach a wider audience and be used in cinemas, in NATO travelling exhibitions and visits to NATO Headquarters. The new Media Operation Service produced new material, most of which was targeted to those belonging to the younger generations, who did not have any experience of the war and did not recall the years when East–West tensions were at their peak, and therefore remained doubtful about the need for NATO. The 1970s saw the production of numerous new films, some of which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. Equally important was Price's work towards better coordination with the network of voluntary organisations in support of NATO. For this reason, Price asked for an increase in the Special Fund, as explained in Chapter 8.[81]

Conclusion

Historians have spoken of the 1960s as a time of repeated crises. The Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the tensions caused by the Vietnam War, the assassination of President Kennedy, de Gaulle's veto of the British application to join the Common Market and his decision to withdraw France from the alliance's integrated command structure had a direct impact on the political cohesion of the alliance. The alliance appeared fragile and its political consensus seemed to be declining rapidly. Yet it emerged from this protracted period of crisis stronger and more rounded. Historians such as Andreas Wenger, Leopoldo Nuti and Frédéric Bozo see the crisis of the late 1960s and the challenges posed by de Gaulle as a time of catharsis for the alliance. NATO was able to absorb the shock caused by de Gaulle's decision to pull out and gained stronger political cohesion and a more coherent vision of its own place in the Cold War. The Harmel Report provided a new degree of flexibility and consultation, while NATO's flexible response strategy was a political compromise that shows the members' determination to work together. The Johnson administration also abandoned its hegemonic leadership style of the 1950s and engaged with the alliance and West European concerns about the American guarantee of the defence of Europe. Thus, the Defence Planning Group and the launch of the Nuclear Planning Group tightened consultation on defence strategy and strengthened the alliance's political dimension.[82] Equally interesting is the fact that the strategic planning of the Warsaw Pact and that of NATO were influenced more by political than by military factors and that the politics and methods surrounding strategic planning were often more important than its substance. Thus, the two alliances evolved on their own more than by interaction with one another.[83]

The publication of the Harmel Report and the appointment of John Price marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Information Service. The alliance's political dimension had acquired importance and was more well-defined, which in many ways made its promotion among the western public much easier to handle. A sharper focus on the younger generations and on the peaceful goals that the alliance wanted to achieve opened new possibilities for NATO propaganda. The review of NATIS's programmes put forward by Price led to fewer, yet more cost-effective, information programmes and to the embracing of new media. NATIS was therefore in a better position to face the new challenges that the 1970s were about to pose.

Notes

1 Opening statement by the Secretary General, NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.
2 CICR, 'Information programme for 1956', 9 February 1956, NA, AC/52-WP/14; NATO Conference on Information Policy, 8 February 1955, AC/87-R/1;

'Survey by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1 May 1955 to 30 November 1955', 6 December 1955, CM(55)122.

3 Summary record of a meeting of the Council of Deputies held at 13 Belgrave Square, London SW1 on 26 February 1951, 27 February 1951, NA, DR(51)13.

4 CICR, note by the chairman, 26 August 1953, NA, CM(53)118. The same point is reiterated in NATO Information Conference. Note by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 9 February 1953, NA, CM(53)6.

5 CICR, 'Proposed NATO information activities in 1954', note by the Director of Information, 29 September 1953, NA, AC/52-D/17; CICR, Report on visiting groups to NATO in 1957, 12 March 1958, AC/52-D(58)11; CICR, 'Proposed 1959 NATO information activities', note by the Director of Information, 10 November 1958, AC/52-D(58)60.

6 CICR, 'Conference for representatives of youth organisations of NATO countries', note by the Director of Information, 16 August 1956, NA, AC/52-D/183; CICR, 'Study conference on the role of the school in the Atlantic Community', note by the Director of Information, 10 September 1956, NA, AC/52-D/185.

7 Pictures are available in various folders of the AC series; they are often without date and location.

8 CICR, 'Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers', note by the Secretary, 4 December 1963, NA, AC/52-WP(63)43.

9 *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*), 1950, vol. 3, pp. 1642 and 1647–1478.

10 Lucas S.W., *Freedom's War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Scott-Smith G. and Krabbendam H. (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003).

11 Saunders F.S., *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999). See also comments in Lucas S.L., 'Revealing the parameters of opinion: an interview with Frances Stonor Saunders', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18/2 (2003), pp. 15–40.

12 CICR, 'Special information fund for the tenth anniversary', 5 November 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)56. See more details in Chapter 8.

13 'NATO relations with international trade union organisations', 13 September 1952, NA, CM(52)76 and CR (52)21; *Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO* (Paris: NATO, 1956); Aubourg V., 'Organizing Atlanticism: the Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952–1963', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18/2 (June 2003), pp. 92–105.

14 Interim report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 8 July 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)34(Final).

15 Meeting of Defence Ministers, summary record of a meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris on 10 February 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 15 February 1960, NA, CR(60)4; Statement by the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany at the meeting of defence ministers on April 1960, NA, RDC/60/208. Given the political nature of the question, the discussion was postponed to the next session of the Council.

16 'NATO-wide co-operation and co-ordination in the field of psychological warfare', proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 March 1960, NA, CM(60)22.

17 Statement by the Minister of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany at the meeting of defence ministers on April 1960, NA, RDC/60/208.

18 'NATO-wide co-operation and co-ordination in the field of psychological warfare', proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 March 1960, NA, CM(60)22. The West German Communist Party was banned in 1956, although many of its members continued to work clandestinely; Major P., *The Death of the*

KPD: Communism and Anti-communism in West Germany, 1945–1956 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

19 'NATO-wide co-operation and co-ordination in the field of psychological warfare', proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany, 9 March 1960, NA, CM(60)22.

20 Record of Secretary of State Dulles' Press Conference, 26 November 1958, *FRUS*, 1958–60, vol. 8, p. 125.

21 Scott-Smith G., 'Not a NATO responsibility? Psychological warfare, the Berlin crisis, and the formation of Interdoc', in Wenger A., Locher A. and Nuenlist C. (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 32–49.

22 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris on 21 September 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 27 September 1960. NA, CR(60)35.

23 Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, first meeting of the Working Group, 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-N(60)1. The American and British delegations included high-profile figures like D.C. Hobson, head of the Information Research Department, and Clinton Knox, First Secretary Office of Political Affairs. Other members were represented by low-ranking officials, often newly appointed to NATO.

24 See reports in the AC/186 series (Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 1960–1961).

25 Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'Psychological warfare and psychological defence', note by the UK delegation, 10 October 1960. NA, AC/186-WP(60)1; Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'Psychological defence', note by the German delegation, 2 November 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)4; Ad Hoc Working Group on the Defence Aspects of Psychology, summary record of a meeting held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 2 and 3 November 1959, 18 November 1959, NA, AC/137 (DP)R/1.

26 It was also decided that the term to be used in documents open to the public would be 'psychological action'. See 'Psychological action', note by the chairman of the Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 10 November 1960, NA, CM(60)94.

27 Progress report to the Council by the Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, note by the chairman of the Working Group, 18 October 1960, NA, CM(60)88.

28 Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'Psychological warfare and psychological defence', note by the UK delegation, 10 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)1; Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'Comments on the German memo of 12 September 1960', note by the Canadian delegation, 25 October 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)3.

29 Progress report to the Council by the Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, note by the chairman of the Working Group, 18 October 1960, NA, CM(60)88.

30 'Psychological action', note by the chairman of the Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 10 November 1960, NA, CM(60)94.

31 The Committee of Political Advisers was also involved in producing reports about communism and anti-communism and therefore indirectly dealt with issues of propaganda and counter-propaganda. Meeting of defence ministers, summary record of a meeting held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris on 23 January 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 'Annex A: Terms of reference for the Committee of

Political Advisers', 27 January 1957, NA, CR(57)4. For examples of the reports produced by the committee, see 'The recent Soviet political offensive', note by the chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers, 13 June 1957, NA, CM(57)93; and 'The situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany', report by the Committee of Political Advisers, 18 November 1960, NA, CM(60)101.

32 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris on 30 November 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 6 December 1960, NA, CR(60)45. The same point was reiterated vigorously in Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'Psychological action', note by the German delegation, 7 March 1961, NA, AC/186-WP(61)1.

33 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the permanent headquarters, Paris on 30 November 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 6 December 1960, NA, CR(60)45.

34 Scott-Smith, G. 'Not a NATO responsibility?', p. 38.

35 Borhi L., 'Rollback, liberation, containment or inaction? U.S. policy and Eastern Europe in the 1950s', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1/3 (1999), pp. 67–110.

36 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Permanent Headquarters, Paris on 30 November 1960 at 10.15 a.m., 6 December 1960, NA, CR(60)45.

37 Working Group on the Problems Connected with Psychological Warfare, 'The role of the Information Committee in the field of psychological action', note by the UK delegation, 13 December 1960, NA, AC/186-WP(60)11.

38 In the summer of 1961, for example, three ad hoc working groups came into being (Radio Broadcasting to Sub-Saharan Africa, AC/201-A; Youth and Education Matters, AC/201-B; and Berlin, AC/201-C).

39 Scott-Smith, 'Not a NATO responsibility?'; Scott-Smith G., 'Confronting peaceful co-existence: psychological warfare and the role of Interdoc, 1963–72', *Cold War History*, 7/1 (2007), pp. 19–43; Scott-Smith G., *Western Anti-communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

40 'NATO functions in the field of propaganda and counterpropaganda', report by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, 29 November 1952, NA, CM(52)115.

41 NATO Conference on Information, 'Analysis of Communist propaganda against NATO', memo by the UK delegation, 22 December 1954, NA, AC/87-D/4.

42 'Counterpropaganda and action against subversive activities', memo by the Greek delegation, 13 June 1952, NA, CM(52)32.

43 Ibid.

44 Kotek J., 'Youth organizations as a battlefield in the Cold War', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18/2 (2003), p. 181.

45 'Conferences held by communist "front" organizations', reports and recommendations by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 19 January 1954, NA, CM(54)6. Similar measures were discussed by British and American officials a few months earlier: 'UK report on activities in countering anti-NATO propaganda', memo for Mr Brown, 22 January 1953, TNA, FO 1110/546 PR 142/4.

46 'International conferences held in communist countries', note by the US delegation, 11 July 1958, NA, CM(58)105.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Evidence of the Soviet control over these organisations is the fact that in 1958

Alexander Shepelin was appointed head of the KGB while still a vice-president of the IUS.

50 Kotek, 'Youth organizations', p. 173. Among the 'front' organisations monitored by the CICR were the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Union of Students, the International Resistance Federation, the International Organization of Journalists and the Committee for the Promotion of International Trade.

51 NATO Information Conference, February 1953, 'United Kingdom activities in countering anti-NATO propaganda', 30 January 1953, NA, AC/24-D/26-1.

52 For the reaction of the Italian Communist Party, see 'Il Governo annulla i passaporti per l'Austria nel tentativo di sabotare il Congresso di Vienna', *L'Unità*, 5 December 1952. The Italian delegation exhorted the other NATO governments to adopt similar measures in the future. Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 15 December 1952, 12 December 1952, NA, CR(52)37.

53 'Pietro Nenni: "J'ai été réveillé ce matin à la fameuse heure du laitier"', *L'Humanité*, 22 March 1954.

54 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on 24 July 1952, 28 July 1952, CR(52)17.

55 Policy directive, 'NATO and the Atlantic nations', 20 April 1961, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63*, vol. 13: *Western Europe and Canada*, p. 285.

56 Address by Secretary of Defense McNamara at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Paris, on 14 December 1962, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63*, vol. 8: *National Security Policy*, pp. 440, 445–446. McNamara spoke again about the need for NATO to implement a 'flexible response' at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Athens, 5 May 1962, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63*, vol. 8: *National Security Policy*, pp. 278 and 280–281.

57 'Annual political appraisal', special report by the Secretary General on NATO defence policy, 17 April 1962, NA, CM(62)48.

58 There is a rich body of research on this point; among the most interesting recent contributions are Locher A., *Crisis? What Crisis? The Debate on the Future of NATO, 1963–66* (London: Routledge, 2008); Soutou G.-H., 'La décision française de quitter le commandement intégré de l'OTAN', in Harder H.-J. (ed.), *Von Truman bis Harmel. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Spannungsfeld von NATO und europäischer Integration* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 185–208; Nuenlist C., Locher A. and Martin G. (eds), *Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspective on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Bozo F., *Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001); Bozo F., 'Détente versus alliance: France, the United States and the politics of the Harmel Report', *Contemporary European History*, special issue entitled 'Changing Perspectives on European Security and NATO's Search for a New Role: From the 1960s to the Present', 7/3 (November 1998), pp. 343–360; Vaïsse M., *La Grandeur. Politique étrangère du Général de Gaulle, 1958–1969* (Paris: Fayard, 1998); Ellison J., *The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–68* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

59 In simple words, the DPC was the NAC meeting without France; its composition and role remained otherwise unchanged.

60 Nuti L., 'Negotiating with the enemy and having problems with the allies: the

impact of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on transatlantic relations', in Hanhimäki J., Soutou G.-H. and Germond B. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 89–102; Brands H., 'Rethinking non-proliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee and U.S. National Security Policy', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8/2 (Spring 2006), pp. 83–113.

61 'Overall strategic concept for the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area', MC 14/3. The companion document, 'Measures to implement the strategic concept for the defence of the NATO area' (MC 48/3), was issued in final form on 8 December 1969. Both MC 14/3 and MC 48/3 were so inherently flexible, in substance and interpretation, that they remained valid until the end of the Cold War. Stromseth J.E., *The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1988); Haftendorn H., *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility, 1966–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

62 'New NATO Headquarters'. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49287.htm (retrieved on 15 November 2012).

63 Bozo, 'Détente versus alliance'.

64 Le Blévennec F., 'The big move', *NATO Review* (Summer 2007), Web version. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/history.html (last consulted on 28 April 2010). It was to remedy this problem and to encourage clerical staff to move that the secretarial allowance was introduced.

65 François Le Blévennec, interview with the author, 12 February 2010.

66 Price J., 'Editor's departure', *NATO Letter*, 16/12 (December 1968). De Madre was replaced by Gerard van Rossum.

67 François Le Blévennec, for example, was promoted from B2, where he was in charge of the circulation of classified documents for meetings and conferences, to B3 in the Press Office as head of the Press Clippings Service. François Le Blévennec, interview with the author, 12 February 2010.

68 CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, 1 July–31 December 1970', report by the Director of Information, 18 March 1971, NA, AC/52-D(71)1.

69 CICR, meeting held on 30 November 1967, action sheet, 5 December 1967, NA, AC/52-R(67)11.

70 CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, January 1968–June 1968', note by the Director of Information, 5 September 1968, NA, AC/52-D(68)2. Price left NATIS on 19 May 1972: AC/52-R(72)2.

71 Telegram from J.S. Champion to R. Thomas, 4 July 1968, TNA FCO95/386 IR5/2/9; 'Press cuttings for transmission to Mr J. Price, Director General of NATO Information Services', by J.S. Champion, 10 July 1968, TNA, FCO95/386.

72 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 3 June 1971, NA, CM(71)44.

73 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 17 June 1970 at 10.15 a.m. and 3.30 p.m., 10 July 1970, NA, CM(70)32.

74 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 4 November 1968, NA, CM(68)60.

75 See, for example, CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, July 1968 to December 1968', note by the Director of Information, 3 March 1969, NA, AC/52-D(69)1.

76 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 4 November 1968, NA, CM(68)60.

77 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 3 June 1971, NA, CM(71)44.

78 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 2 October 1969, NA, CM(69)42.

79 Information Working Group, 'Terms of reference of the Information Working Group', note by the secretary, 14 November 1969, NA, AC/273-D(69)1; Information Working Group, 'Procedure for the evaluation of NATO Information Service output', note by the Director of Information, 17 December 1969, NA, AC/273-D(69)2.
80 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1; 'The NATO Information Service: survey output, 1970', NA, AC/273-D(71)1; 'The NATO Information Service: survey output, 1971', NA, AC/273-D(72)1.
81 CICR, 'Proposed 1969 information activities', note by the Director of Information, 5 November 1968, NA, AC/52-D(68)3; Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at Reykjavik on 24 and 25 June 1968, 9 August 1968, NA, CR(68)30.
82 Nuti L., 'Negotiating with the enemy'; Wenger A., 'Crisis and opportunity: NATO's transformation and the multilateralization of détente', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 6/1 (2004), pp. 22–74; Wenger, Locher and Nuenlist (eds), *Transforming NATO*, particularly the chapters by Suri J., 'The normative resilience of NATO: a community of shared values amid public discord', pp. 15–30, Mahan E., 'Through the looking glass: the Berlin Crisis and Franco-American perceptions of NATO, 1961–63', pp. 89–106, and Locher A., 'A crisis foretold: NATO and France, 1963–66', pp. 107–127; Bozo, 'Détente versus alliance'; Wenger A., 'The politics of military planning: evolution of NATO strategy', in Mastny V., Holtsmark S.G. and Wenger A. (eds), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 165–192.
83 Mastny *et al.* (eds), *War Plans and Alliances*, particularly the chapters Mastny V. 'Imagining war in Europe: Soviet strategic planning', pp. 15–45, Wenger A., 'The politics of military planning: evolution of NATO strategy', pp. 165–192, and Heuser B., 'Alliance of democracies and nuclear deterrence', pp. 193–217.

4   The crisis of détente

Information policy in an age of multilateral talks

The departure of France from the alliance's integrated military command and the relocation of NATO Headquarters to Brussels demanded a renewed information effort to explain the impact that such changes had on the alliance and to justify the need for NATO. At the same time, the increased attention of the media on the internal problems of the alliance and on the move to Brussels attracted public interest and opened new opportunities for NATIS. As was discussed in the previous chapter, this was also the time when the publication of the Harmel Report gave new food for thought to anyone involved in NATO information policy and redirected the focus more clearly towards the alliance's political dimension and the younger generations. Yet at a time when the Harmel Report promoted the political role of the alliance, the invasion of Czechoslovakia once more made military defence vital. At the national level, many governments witnessed widespread protests by students and workers. In the 1970s, the appeal of NATO – and of all things military, for that matter – among the younger generations was at its lowest point and by the early 1980s well-organised and vocal peace movements involved large sectors of the public.

The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed a shift in the military balance between the two blocs. The United States lost its claim to nuclear superiority against the Soviet Union, which undermined the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee to its European allies and opened up questions about western security and the role that the European members should play in the defence of the alliance's territory. The 1973 enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the overall economic growth of Western Europe created imbalance between the two sides of the Atlantic as the United States lost its hegemonic role in the economy. Congress attempted to draw down American military forces in Europe by proposing a withdrawal of American forces commensurate with the allies' failure to rectify the American balance of payments.[1] The fear of an imminent American disengagement from Europe pushed the Europeans to work more closely together to show their commitment to the alliance. The European Defence Improvement Programme (EDIP) – often referred to as

Eurogroup – was launched in 1970. It is a good example how the West European members worked together to improve the alliance's military capability, including an additional collective contribution to NATO common infrastructure, to integrated communications systems and aircraft survival measures.[2] The European dimension of NATO was becoming a more structured and important part of the alliance, and something that NATIS stressed widely in all its information material.

These changes were all the more important at a time when the West embarked on a new series of diplomatic talks about arms control and the status of Berlin. Multilateral political dialogue took place on all fronts and involved new political actors like the European Council and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

While in the 1960s NATO's security agenda was primarily shaped from within and led to the strengthening of its own political functions and institutional structure, in the 1970s the picture was much more complex and dynamic, and exogenous factors became increasingly important. Diverging conceptions of détente started to merge. Western Europe was keen to play an active political role through its new foreign policy cooperation strategy. Yet while the Europeans perceived the CSCE process as an opportunity to encourage the Soviet Union to engage with an expanded concept of security that included human rights, the United States pursued bilateral superpower relations, with little interest in the CSCE. The breakdown of Bretton Woods and the increasing trade bickering between the EEC and the United States underlined deficits of governance of the West and caused further rifts within the alliance. The oil crisis precipitated the predicament and led to clashes caused by diverging policies in the Middle East. Leopoldo Nuti has spoken of a 'crisis of détente' to explain the political and cultural turmoil of the late 1970s. The 'crisis of détente' concept defines the decoupling of détente as political strategy and defence as military strategy at both governmental and societal levels.[3]

These changes of course had a strong impact on the work of NATIS, which had to adapt to the climate of détente and revise its information policies so as to reflect the new image that NATO wanted to convey to the public. NATIS was aware of the need to recapture disillusioned youth and to re-establish trust in international diplomacy, while at the same time having to explain the need to maintain high levels of military expenditure and to modernise the alliance's nuclear arsenal. As this chapter demonstrates, the last decades of the Cold War posed new challenges to all those involved in pro-NATO information work, challenges that were thoroughly discussed and conceptualised but not necessarily effectively answered.

The 'multiple approach' to information work

The early 1970s were marked by international negotiations on arms reduction and an overhaul of the role of the alliance. In May 1970 in Rome,

NATO issued a declaration on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction and in December the NATO ministerial meeting renewed the offer to hold exploratory talks. The ministerial meeting also saw the publication of the 'Allied Defence in the Seventies' report (AD 70), which carried out a comprehensive study of the defence challenges the alliance would face in the 1970s.[4] Building upon the 'Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance' of 1967, the AD 70 report reaffirmed the twin concepts of defence and détente as the cornerstones of NATO's approach to security in the 1970s. The report recommended that NATO's military strength should not be reduced unilaterally and reiterated that the alliance's strategic nuclear capability remained a key element in the security of the West. The AD 70 report also underlined that in terms of conventional forces there was an imbalance between the military capability of NATO and that of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the experts pressed for the modernisation of NATO's conventional forces. Most importantly for NATIS, the AD 70 report stated that 'public support is a fundamental condition of the entire defence effort of NATO, Ministers drew attention to the vital need to foster understanding of its aims and policies among the peoples of every country of the alliance'.[5]

As was discussed in the previous chapter, since the appointment of John Price as Director of Information, NATIS had already experienced considerable changes. A thorough review of all NATIS output had led to substantial transformation of its working methods and of the content of its information material. Crucially, a more cost-effective approach was introduced in order to cope with the lack of increase in the budget. Price had also relaunched the annual Conference of National Information Officers (CONIO) to work along with the CICR and NATIS and to establish a permanent channel of communication with the national information agencies.

Following the example of CONIO, in 1971 the Council launched a parallel body: the Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence (MODIO). It gathered together senior information officials in the national defence ministries and members of NATIS, and was chaired by the Director of Information. It is interesting to note that MODIO, which was closely linked to the national defence ministries, had a direct role in informing national publics and in explaining national and multinational defence policies to them. On the other hand, delegates to CONIO – and certainly national representatives on the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations – belonged to Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with mandates that specifically forbade them from addressing their own national audiences, an anomaly that was seldom recognised and never addressed.[6]

The launch of MODIO reflected a growing recognition of the need to ensure a clearer public understanding of the relationship between the military and civilian aspects of the alliance at a time of intense diplomatic negotiation with the Soviets about armament reduction. In other words,

according to NATO information officers the public had to be told about the need to maintain a militarily strong alliance and even to approve higher defence spending while at the same time engaging in arms reduction negotiations. MODIO's main task was to help NATIS explain to the public the reasons behind NATO's continued commitment to military defence and to promote a coherent and effective NATO-wide information campaign. These efforts were particularly important immediately prior to and during the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations so as to boost public support and to respond to the calls for unilateral disarmament.[7]

It was also recognised that an important aspect of the military cohesion of the alliance lay in the extent to which there was a strong consensus among military personnel about NATO's political aims. MODIO reiterated the need to explain to the public the alliance's role as a defender of peace and a promoter of tighter political and economic cooperation among its members; it also pointed out that a time of sensitive international negotiations, NATIS should explain why conventional forces were still needed in a nuclear age and why costs had to be shared. At the same time, MODIO stressed that military personnel also had to be kept informed about the political significance of the talks that were taking place at the time and be reminded that deterrence and military defence were part of a wider diplomatic context. For this to happen, the first MODIO conference agreed to strengthen cooperation between the NATO Information Service and the Ministries of Defence and to improve coordination with the information services at SHAPE and SACLANT.[8]

MODIO also advised closer cooperation between NATIS and the national information agencies, military and civilian alike, towards the production of information material. For this reason, it organised a series of meetings between military film makers and those in charge with promoting military films on television and within the armed forces as well as meetings of editors of armed forces publications to give more emphasis to joint defence problems in these publications.[9]

According to NATO officers, all information material should explain that the position of the alliance and of its member countries during the negotiations would be weakened if NATO reduced its forces unilaterally. Particularly at a time of steady growth in Soviet military power, the alliance had to maintain comparable levels of conventional and nuclear strength for defence as well as for deterrence purposes.[10] Thus, public support continued to be an essential factor in the credibility of NATO's deterrent strategy. John Price was aware of the intensity of public criticism and apathy about NATO, and vigorously demanded more funds and better coordination. According to Price:

> The general overall impression is that in the last four years there has been a steady growth of opposition to all things military and an

increasing reluctance to support adequate defence expenditure.…
The basic task of the alliance is, of course, to deter any possible aggres-
sion and I believe that we have not hitherto paid enough attention to
the whole question of the role of public opinion and its effects on the
deterrent value of the alliance's military forces in a time of crisis.…
To the larger masses of unqualified opinion … the word NATO means
nothing.… It is no good having the best equipped and trained
military forces in the world if a large section of the civilian population
could, when the time comes, show itself – perhaps by open demonstra-
tion – as resolutely opposed to the use of these forces in any
circumstances.[11]

In Price's view, it was clearly a matter of achieving better coordination
between NATIS and the national agency as well as of having more
resources to support the information effort, a point also made by the
North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) and the Atlantic Treaty Association
(ATA). In 1970, both organisations passed resolutions calling for a greater
information effort by NATIS and by the national agencies, and also for an
increase in the size of what they called a 'ridiculously modest' information
budget.[12]

   In 1972, Claus G.M. Koren was appointed Director of Information and
he continued to pursue energetic change on the same lines as John Price.
Koren was a highly experienced information officer and, perhaps more
than his predecessor, he was keen to focus more openly on the military
side of the alliance.[13] Koren also shared Price's concerns about the need
to avoid duplication between the work carried out by NATIS and what was
done at the national level. He made the most of the meagre information
budget and focused on fewer but more effective programmes. Most impor-
tantly, Koren supported a revision of the CICR terms of references
whereby the Director of Information became the chairman of the CICR
unless the Council decided otherwise. Up to this point the chairman of
the committee had been appointed by the Council; the change was
intended to tighten relations between the two bodies by improving the
exchange of information between NATIS and the CICR.

   Claus Koren also introduced the 'multiple approach' strategy. Under
this new concept, maximum flexibility was to be retained by both NATIS
and the national information agencies, yet a new degree of cooperation
would be achieved through a more clearly codified relationship between
the two sides. According to the multiple approach concept, the member
countries should look to NATIS as a source of official and factual informa-
tion about the position of the alliance regarding international talks and
receive assistance about how to present such information to national audi-
ences. In addition, NATIS would offer the national information agencies
tailored support for their information activities to suit their national pref-
erences and interests. This concept was designed to provide the flexibility

and versatility required to meet the needs of the individual member countries, and great emphasis was placed on the 'sensibilities and concerns' of the national audiences.[14]

The unwritten understanding underpinning the multiple approach concept was that in its implementation, individual nations would not consume an unfair proportion of the common-funded information resources available to NATIS or produce material that could undermine the position of or embarrass the other NATO allies or the alliance as a whole. The multiple approach also accommodated the fact that some member countries preferred to work closely with NATIS while others cherished their independence. In other words, some national governments continued to think that they were in the best possible position to judge their own domestic public information needs and to respond to them. Other members maintained their preference for the bulk of the work relating to NATO information to be handled by NATIS, either because of their lack of expertise or lack of funding, or – in many cases – because of a combination of both.[15]

As part of the multiple approach concept, Koren built upon Price's idea of creating regional offices. The only one existing at the time was in Iceland, where NATIS had maintained its own office since the mid-1960s.[16] Opposition within the CICR against established regional officers had been rife since the foundation of NATIS and it continued unabated throughout the 1970s. National governments feared that the presence of NATIS officials in their capitals could undermine the information activities carried out by their national agencies and that NATIS would end up talking to the public over the heads of national officials. Yet from the early 1970s the CICR agreed on the need for a more coordinated information effort during a period of intense diplomatic talks with the East, and this opened up the possibility for more ad hoc collaborations between the national authorities, NATIS and the voluntary organisations. It should be stressed that these collaborations were not permanent and were based around specific projects under the aegis of the new multiple approach. Because of the absence of a permanent structure and because of the short-lived nature of most of the projects, little opposition arose within the CICR.[17]

Interestingly, at a time when the West was engaged in talks about armaments reduction, MODIO suggested that selected joint military exercises should be publicised widely, as they could provide opportunities to explain the framework of NATO defence. As Koren pointed out, 'one of the problems confronting the NATO information operation is to deepen public understanding of how NATO builds security.... Joint defence is only fully acceptable as long as it is realised how it enhances the security of individual nations'.[18] For this reason, joint military exercises as well as cooperation in the field of weapon modernisation and defence technology were given additional attention in many NATIS publications, particularly in the newly relaunched *NATO Review*. The new material was also included

in the brochures distributed during visits to NATO headquarters as well as passed on to the voluntary organisations.[19]

It was of course more difficult to find a common platform on which to work together during military crises. Despite the talks between CICR, MODIO and CONIO, cooperation in the information field in case of conflict lay beyond their terms of reference. As in the past, the impasse was due to the demand of national governments to keep full control over the flow of information about military action on their territories. Thus, a common NATO information policy in time of war continued to be highly controversial and was therefore never included in any military and emergency plans.[20] In case of conflict, information regarding military strategy and the conduct of the war remained the responsibility of NATO's Supreme Commanders. All other information activities would be carried out by the national information agencies under the strict supervision of their own governments. This would of course open the possibility of conflicting messages being circulated within the alliance, thus opening the possibility of confusing the public and allowing the 'enemy' to exploit the inconsistencies of the western information campaigns. In the event of a conflict with the Warsaw Pact, the western alliance would have therefore been at a severe disadvantage from the information point of view.

A new front: the peace movements

Throughout the Cold War, NATIS focused primarily on information policies designed to promote the alliance and particularly to explain to the public that the aim of NATO was to build up common defence as well as to foster political cooperation among its members. As was discussed in previous chapters, initially the criticism coming from the communist side was the main concern of the NATO information officers. All initiatives were designed to respond to the communist claims that the alliance was keeping Europe divided, that it was making a war with the East more probable and that it was draining national resources in the name of common defence and rearmament. NATO was also portrayed by the communists as a tool of American imperialism, and NATO military bases were portrayed as tangible signs of West European governments' inability to protect national sovereignty, let alone national interests.

In the early Cold War years, national and international communism was the main focus of NATIS's activity, but neutralists and pacifists were also important targets. During the ratification process in 1949, numerous political parties expressed concern that NATO would drag their countries into a conflict between the two superpowers. The costs of rearmament linked to NATO membership were also a concern to sectors of the public well beyond the communist sphere. Historical research has demonstrated the extent to which Moscow capitalised on the polarisation of public opinion about rearmament in the early Cold War period and played a leading role

behind the scenes. Yet once the Washington Treaty was ratified and Europe entered the logic of a divided continent, calls for pacifism and anti-militarism became a communist prerogative. In the 1950s and for most of the 1960s, communist parties in Western Europe and their front organisations remained isolated.[21]

The student and worker movements of the late 1960s brought about a new wave of protests against the establishment, the older generation of politicians and the logic of the Cold War as a whole. This opened up the political discourse by bringing new ideas to the table, including the beginning of a new environmental consciousness. By the 1970s, the peace movements had gained considerable momentum and became important political actors. Unlike what had been the case in the previous decade, in the 1970s the peace movements were independent and separated from communism. In fact, they criticised the communist regimes as much as the western governments for their lack of commitment to peace and international dialogue and for the economic, political and environmental consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.[22]

The protest movements of the late 1970s have complex sociological cultural and religious motivations, models of participation and modes of perception, which have already been examined effectively elsewhere.[23] Generally speaking, while in the 1950s and 1960s the peace movements had maintained a safe distance from the communist groups, in the late 1970s, and particularly in the 1980s, this was no longer the case. The peace movements tried to reach across the Iron Curtain and bring about a wider movement that would bring together the people of all Europe and feed into the international talks between the two blocs, in what has been called 'détente from below'. This new phenomenon found its most important institutional expression in the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement, an association of individuals and groups on both sides of the Curtain for a 'nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal'.[24] By the early 1980s, pacifism and neutralism were on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic, and the younger generations had become an increasingly important target of major information policies within and outside NATO. The anti-nuclear weapons movement was vocal and well organised. In October 1983, nearly 3 million people across Western Europe protested against nuclear missile deployments and demanded an end to the arms race.[25]

The peace movements were galvanised by NATO's decision in December 1979 to respond to a Soviet upgrading of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe with its own nuclear modernisation. The so-called NATO dual-track decision envisaged the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. These plans awoke fears of a nuclear war in Europe and reopened the question of national sovereignty being infringed by the alliance, and therefore indirectly by the United States. The dual-track decision also opened up a wide-ranging debate on rearmament, weapon modernisation,

nuclear weapons, the nature of transatlantic relations and the geopolitical role of Western Europe.

The strategic considerations that led to this proposal and the political and social reactions surrounding NATO's dual-track decision have already been at the centre of a substantial body of historical research.[26] NATIS and the national governments saw the peace movements as a sign of the deficit of credibility of the NATO deterrent. In fact, even if modernisation of the alliance nuclear arsenal was indeed achieved, it was unlikely that the public would ever support its use, which would in practice nullify the deterrent's potential. The Soviets would know that nuclear weapons could hardly be used in any actual military operation. The protest movements that developed as a consequence of NATO's dual-track decision have often been examined within the paradigms of the Cold War and therefore there has been a tendency to focus primarily on the role of ideologies. More recent works, however, have underlined the need to take a more holistic approach that includes important sociological, cultural and religious elements and to place the protest movements within larger shifts in international relations and domestic politics in response to the breakdown of détente.[27]

The emergence of the peace movements in the wake of the dual-track decision raised fundamental questions among political leaders and the public about security within NATO. According to Leopoldo Nuti, although the post-war era was characterised by discussions on different notions of security and new structures, this did not ultimately change the tendency to frame security policies through the prism of national interests.[28] Yet the experience of the oil price shock and the increasing discussions about environmental risks linked to pollution and nuclear energy did not stop at national boundaries and forced policy-makers and the public to rethink traditional notions of security and particularly of 'national security'.[29] As Eckart Conze has demonstrated, different ideas of 'security' and of 'military security' coexist within a society at any one time and lead to different interpretations of the present and of the future.[30] In this sense, the discussions about the neutron bomb in 1977 and the double-track decision only a couple of years later were about more than the straightforward nuclear arms race and should be linked back to the international debate about implementing a broader concept of security, which was directly linked to the international experiences of crisis in the 1970s.[31]

This was a complex environment for NATIS to work in as it was necessary to engage proactively with the peace movements, to understand their concerns and their priorities and to find new channels of communication with them. Public speeches and communiqués stressing the commitment to peace and political cooperation as well as the Ottawa Declaration of Atlantic Relations did little to appease these sentiments.

Signed in 1974, the Ottawa Declaration reaffirmed the dedication of all member countries of the alliance to the aims and ideals of the Washington

Treaty on its twenty-fifth anniversary. The timing was opportune, as the West was entering the preparatory phase of new summit talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear arms limitation. In the Declaration, the allies pledged to maintain 'close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust'. The Declaration added an important new aspect to the alliance's security strategy: the recognition that NATO's interest in the nuclear age went beyond the area covered by the treaty itself. This was the first official statement on the importance of out-of-area events for NATO's security concept, which opened the debate about how NATO should respond to challenges arising outside the European theatre. Yet the impact on the western public and on political leaders in the East was lost, as the document was signed after more than a year of squabbling between the United States and its European counterparts on the wording of just one paragraph.[32]

The Ottawa Declaration made no direct reference to public opinion and information policy, although the need to ensure public support was very clear in the minds of all policy-makers at the time. NATIS was aware of the erosion of public support for the alliance, which seemed particularly relevant at a time when important negotiations with the East were under way. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) seemed to make NATO redundant, and in fact an increasingly loud portion of the public saw NATO and any discussion about military and technological modernisation as a way to disrupt the talks.

Now more than ever, NATIS was torn between different goals that had to be achieved at the same time. The communist threat – in the shape of the Warsaw Pact and of the national communist parties and their international organisations – remained of course an important part of NATO's information work. In a period of international talks about arms reduction and about the need for new and more advanced military technology, however, it was crucial to reaffirm the need for NATO and for an integrated military defence system that could respond to a Soviet attack.

If the core message had hardly changed since the 1950s, the methods and the sensibilities of the audiences were radically different. NATIS had to explain that western deterrence strategy should be geared to approaching technological parity with the Warsaw Pact so as to be able to engage effectively in diplomatic talks for arms reduction. Until the reduction of all atomic weapons was agreed, the West could not show itself weak. New military technologies, however, posed questions about military strategy as well as about ethical implications linked to their use and were at the centre of a lively public debate that went beyond communist circles as strictly defined. NATIS and the national information agencies were aware that public opinion felt lost as politicians and experts alike seemed unable to provide clear political responses to the security as well as ethical dilemmas surrounding nuclear weapons. The polarisation of experts' opinion on key

issues like the implications of Soviet military strategy for western defence policy and the need for new military technology led to confusion and disillusionment.

Gone were the days of a clear vision of the world in black and white in which NATIS had simply to point to the number of Soviet divisions stationed in Eastern Europe to demonstrate the need for NATO and for rearmament of the West. In the 1970s, the public needed a guiding light to navigate the sea of intricate scientific, strategic and political issues. Communism was therefore one of many targets, and not necessarily the most important one, for NATIS. As Gregory Flynn (deputy director of the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs in Paris) pointed out, levels of trust in Soviet goodwill were minimal at the time and there were virtually no pockets in western society where the Soviet Union was genuinely seen as an alternative model of society. Thus, NATO's information work had to shift away from creating a negative image of the Soviet Union, as doing so had become redundant. The new core issue was to interpret the security threat that the Soviet Union posed and to explain the need to retain a militarily strong and politically cohesive alliance.[33]

The West's commitment to arms control and diplomatic dialogue was therefore an essential precondition for public support. NATIS had to show such commitment in all its information material. At the same time, it was important that NATIS respond to an increase in anti-American feelings in Western Europe. Many Europeans saw the Reagan and Carter administrations as too hardline and ideologically confrontational. Large sectors of the public, particularly in continental Europe, thought that the United States was abandoning the pursuit of détente. American suggestions of modernising NATO's nuclear arsenal and of stationing nuclear weapons in Europe through the dual-track concept were seen as aggressive moves and were therefore highly controversial across the political spectrum.[34]

Throughout the 1970s and in the early 1980s, each year NATIS discussed and planned more initiatives than the previous one. The problem – yet again – was not the lack of ideas but the lack of means, and NATIS's budget was often exhausted by the end of the summer.[35] As was discussed in the previous chapters, the lack of funding crippled the Information Service throughout the Cold War, and the 1970s were certainly no exception. Despite the harshly worded requests put forward by John Price and by Claus Koren, nothing changed. Price calculated at the time that the NATIS budget was one-third of the Common Market's information budget, and this figure was all the more painful given that the EEC had only six members and six working languages, while NATO had fifteen countries and eleven languages.[36] John Price's comparison with what could be afforded by the much better endowed Common Market Information Service had virtually no impact on the Council, which consistently refused to increase the budget.[37] In 1970, for example, the Council approved CONIO's suggestions about the need to launch a rigorous information

campaign at the time of delicate international negotiations. However, when NATIS put forward a request for a budget increase of 50 per cent to support the new campaigns that had just been approved, the Council first reduced it to 25 per cent – which would have paid only for a small part of the new initiatives – and later rejected it altogether.[38]

ATA and the NAA were aware of the change in public opinion and questioned why the NATO information budget was not increased appropriately. They also called for a greater effort by national authorities. The WEU Assembly also adopted similar recommendations on 17 June 1971 but to no avail.[39] The situation hardly improved throughout the decade and in 1981 the NAA noted with frustration that while anti-nuclear sentiments had become increasingly better organised and had gained significant level of public support, NATO's information work was lamentable and cripplingly underfunded.[40]

NATIS had no option but to make its small budget suffice. After the rationalisation and cuts to several programmes in the early 1970s, first Price and later Koren worked towards better coordination with the Common Market Information Service. In particular, they organised combined visits to the respective headquarters, as there was an understanding that people who travelled to Brussels to visit the EEC buildings might also be interested in NATO, and vice versa. This was a way to save money and to get a wider audience through the door. Moreover, this partnership had the advantage of promoting the idea that NATO was part of a wider political and economic project, a point repeatedly stressed by ATA.[41] Similarly, there was a renewed effort to stress the European participation in the political and defence structure of the alliance by focusing on new bodies like the Eurogroup and to demonstrate the multifaceted structure of NATO by highlighting the cooperation in scientific matters of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).[42]

Most importantly, the very nature of the protest movements required a rethinking of the alliance's information strategy. What is interesting to point out here is that at the time, contemporaries saw the protest movements as a response to the crumbling of détente as well as a sign of post-materialist society. Ronald Inglehart, who played a key role in advising US governments on how to react to this criticism, called the new protest movements the 'successor generation'.[43] The successor generation concept led to the launch of a series of new information programmes to engage with the younger generations and with the future leaders of tomorrow. Such exchange programmes were built at national level as well as between different countries, usually on a bilateral basis. The British-American Project and the Youth Exchange Program between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany were two of the most notable examples of exchanges of this kind.[44]

The peace movements of the 1970s and 1980s are also often referred to as the 'new social movements', whose primary constituency was the 'new

middle class' made up of 'social and cultural specialists' such as civil servants employed in the social and teaching sectors and those working in the arts and the universities. As has been pointed out, the 'new middle class' remained substantially sheltered from market competition and was primarily worried about the strains imposed by modernisation and about the dehumanisation caused by modern technology. In his study of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Frank Parkin spoke of 'middle class radicalism'.[45]

NATIS was aware of both the new, heterogeneous nature of the criticism mounting against NATO and the ever more important focus on the younger generations. This is clear in the articles published in *NATO Review*. An article by Tomas Torsvik published at the end of 1970 opened a discussion on how to engage with the younger generation and how to demonstrate the need for a strong military alliance when diplomatic talks about arms reductions were taking place.[46]

The NATO information officers were aware of the need to address moderate public opinion, and the middle classes more specifically. In their eyes, it was necessary to produce more sophisticated information material that could provide in-depth analysis of the strategic and political differences between the two blocs and address concerns about the implications of developing nuclear weapons and about the environmental challenges of the time. These were topics that greatly concerned large sectors of the public in all the countries making up the alliance. If NATIS were to capture the attention of young political leaders and academics, it had to produce more sophisticated material and engage more dynamically with European and American universities by offering academics the opportunity to contribute proactively to the debate.[47]

The survey of new NATIS output in this period also demonstrates the new focus on the younger generations and a progressively more marked shift away from straightforward anti-communism and a move towards the disenfranchised public more generally. The new information material stressed the political cooperation that took place within the alliance and responded to the claim that the NATO was an American foreign policy tool by focusing attention on the Eurogroup to demonstrate that Europe had a voice in NATO, and gave greater publicity to the public statements of Nuclear Planning Group. The very existence of the Nuclear Planning Group – which, significantly, did not have a counterpart in the Warsaw Pact – helped demonstrate the democratic nature of the alliance.[48] In addition, throughout the 1970s NATIS relaunched conferences, seminars and weekend courses both at the international and at national levels.

The new information programmes tended to focus on university students and on youth leaders. In collaboration with ATA, NATIS favoured the inclusion of the history of the alliance and the Atlantic community concept in high-school curricula, and encouraged the development of NATO-related modules in the emerging International Relations departments in universities

across the alliance. The Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers received a boost and offered teaching support material in English and French to schools and higher education institutions. In all information material, it was important to demonstrate that the West had to be able to negotiate from a position of strength, and in order to do so it had to be militarily strong and politically united.

The multiple approach was strengthened during the MBFR talks and later during the discussions surrounding the dual-track decision. Following the suggestions of CONIO, in 1973 the Council approved a new plan of action for international diplomatic talks whereby NATIS would work with the national delegations and agree a list of items that all agencies should highlight in their own public information campaigns. NATIS was therefore encouraged to engage proactively with national information officials and to present NATO's position with the aim of having the alliance included in all information initiatives surrounding the diplomatic talks.[49]

The voluntary organisations became all the more important in promoting NATO and the concept of a western military and political alliance among a wider audience. ATA and the NAA were particularly aware of the need for a concerted effort. New initiatives and publications took place in this period. In 1971, for the first time ATA invited a group of young political leaders from some European countries and the United States to take part in its annual assembly as full members of their delegations. ATA also initiated closer cooperation with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and promoted its own youth branch.[50] Throughout the 1970s, ATA published a series of pamphlets, such as *Impediments to the Free Flow of Information between East and West* (1973). These publications were based on research carried out by the Atlantic Institute in Paris and were primarily aimed at academics, university students and journalists. They were given wide circulation thanks to the network of ATA's voluntary organisations. The fact that several copies can be found today in numerous university and central libraries gives a sense of their capillary distribution at the time.[51]

The 1980s: a period of structural changes for NATIS

In the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union did not seek direct military confrontation with NATO in Europe and that it had turned its attention to the global South. Since the late 1970s, the Soviet Navy had intensified its presence in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans, which raised the question of whether and how NATO should react. The debate on the defence posture of the alliance and on the need to regain strategic and tactical nuclear weapons superiority, which had inflamed the 1970s, continued unabated in the following decade. The Soviet military intervention in Ethiopia in 1977 and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 were a painful reminder that Soviet armed interventions outside the NATO

area had destabilising effects for the alliance as a whole. The NATO members had radically different views about the need for military support and political involvement and whether it was possible or even advisable to lend such support in regional conflicts and national crises outside the NATO area. The lack of political cohesion within the alliance was of course perceived by its own members as a crippling weakness in NATO's defence strategy. It all became excruciatingly evident when the member countries were unable to agree on a common position regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which further widened the rifts within the alliance.[52]

In an influential policy paper published in 1981, the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS) recommended that all the alliance's member states improve their own bilateral relations with nations in crisis outside the NATO area and that the United States should take up a leading role in this process. According to ACUS, more attention should be paid to information, and it advised the United States to relaunch its foreign broadcasting and publication programmes so that all people, within and outside the alliance, were fully informed about US foreign policy goals.[53]

The Reagan administration was very much aware of the importance of using public diplomacy as a tool of US foreign policy. In 1983, President Reagan signed the National Security Decision Directive 77 (NSDD 77), entitled 'Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security'. NSDD 77 established an inter-agency Special Planning Group, answerable to the National Security Council, whose purpose was to strengthen US public diplomacy in relation to national security.[54] The Directive allowed the White House and the National Security Staff to coordinate public diplomacy across all government agencies and laid the basis for the Reagan administration's aggressive information strategy. It signalled the personal involvement in public diplomacy operations of senior administration policy officials and of the president himself. NSDD 77 also included guidance for inter-agency working groups to execute wide-ranging tactics for information dissemination both domestically and internationally. Carnes Lord, a principal author of NSDD 77, recalls that that the 'beleaguered and defensive bureaucracy was infused with money, high-caliber personnel, and a mandate, and for the first time in many years was admitted to an administration's inner councils'.[55]

In June 1981, Reagan appointed his long-time friend the Hollywood financier Charles Z. Wick to head USIA and Frank Shakespeare to chair the board of International Broadcasting. Wick was determined to improve America's image abroad and placed emphasis on 'fast media' such as Voice of America and Worldnet Television and Film Service. Wick focused in particular on Western Europe, where the stationing of US intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) was contested. Consistent with the stand taken by the Reagan administration, Wick revived the anti-communist and anti-Soviet verve in USIA's message through Project Truth (August 1981).[56]

The new propaganda effort of the Reagan administration did not translate into a greater involvement in NATO's information work – rather the opposite. NSDD 77 meant that the most experienced information officers were called back to the United States to work on the new programmes launched at the time. There was little interest from USIA in continuing to be involved in lengthy and ineffective talks within the CICR and NATIS, and officials working in Brussels at the time recall that the United States stopped pressing for more information within NATO.[57] In fact, many of the new programmes launched in the United States directly competed with the ones organised by NATIS, as was the case for the exchange programme and visiting scholarship programmes. In addition, the outright anti-communist approach adopted by the Reagan administration was seen by the West European members of the CICR as a step backwards after so many years had been spent on efforts towards producing a more articulated and less confrontational information strategy.[58]

The shift in the American approach to public diplomacy coincided with the appointment of the new Director of Information, Armin Halle, who succeeded Orla Møller after he died in office in 1979, only one year into his appointment.[59] In contrast to Møller, who had studied theology and had an academic background, Halle was a journalist and was therefore highly experienced and used to daily contact with the media.[60] At the time of his appointment, Halle was still involved in German political affairs, where he was building his own television persona. Because of his frequent absences, Halle was often criticised by the national delegations in the CICR, which eventually lost confidence in him and in his management of the information budget. By 1980, the national delegations were so critical of the Director of Information that they demanded a review of all NATO information work to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the Service.[61]

Halle left NATIS in 1983 and was replaced by another German, Wilfried A. Hofmann. At the time of his appointment, Hofmann was head of the NATO and Defence Department at the Foreign Office in Bonn, an appointment he held from 1979 to 1983.[62] Hoffman was less experienced than Halle in terms of dealing directly with the media. In terms of training and expertise, his profile was consistent with that of previous Directors of Information, apart from Halle. Hofmann knew the inner workings of the German Foreign Ministry and of NATO, having worked for many years in the corridors of both organisations, and he was probably seen by the CICR as a safe pair of hands.[63]

In Hofmann's view, it was important to engage with the peace movements and to broaden the discussion about NATO's defence strategy. According to him, in fact, millions of people were becoming involved with the details of nuclear deterrence to the point that they focused increasingly on questions of military hardware and on the characteristics of individual weapon systems rather than on the broad political and strategic issues that surrounded them. In Hofmann's view, NATIS and the national

information agencies should broaden the terms of the debate and initiate a new discussion on security and on the very concept of deterrence, resisting the tendency to reduce the debate about NATO to one 'hot topic'. The modernisation of NATO's nuclear arsenal should be placed within the wider context of Soviet military and political posture in Europe as well as beyond the NATO area. Most importantly, there should be a clearer information effort to explain the basic principle of 'flexible response' and 'no first use'.[64]

In 1984, Lord Carrington became Secretary General. This appointment was to bring a radical change in the way in which NATIS operated and in which the alliance as a whole dealt with public relations and the media. Before Lord Carrington, Secretary Generals did not have particularly good relations with the press, if they had any at all. As was discussed in the previous chapters, Lord Ismay and Paul-Henri Spaak did support the work of NATIS and made appearances in documentary films and newsreels, and gave interviews regularly. They both saw public support for the alliance as an essential element of the alliance's security strategy. Yet neither Ismay nor Spaak – nor their successors – issued specific guidance to NATIS and to the Assistant Secretary Generals about how to deal with the media. In 1955, for example, some guidelines were issued about how to present the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany but the document was so vague as to be virtually pointless.[65] In fact, for a long time there was no real communication policy worthy of the name and the Secretary Generals usually dealt with the press exclusively through official communiqués.

In Lord Carrington's view, communiqués were not a good way to foster relations with the press, as they relegated NATO to a passive role and left room for too much speculation from the media. Lord Carrington and his successor, Manfred Wörner, were aware that NATO needed to be more proactive and to engage with the media effectively. Thus, Lord Carrington introduced important changes that can rightly be seen as a watershed in the history of the alliance's approach to public diplomacy.

One of Lord Carrington's first decisions as Secretary General was to introduce the new Private Office meeting every day at 9.30 a.m. The participants included the director of the Private Office and all deputy directors, the Deputy Secretary General, the spokespersons, the Director of Security, the Executive Secretary and ad hoc experts, making a total of around eleven or twelve people. The meeting was designed to discuss any important business and to make sure that all key people were informed about what the others were doing so that there was a coherent message coming from the top echelons of the alliance. It was not, however, merely a matter of exchanging information; under Lord Carrington, the overall approach to information changed and marked a clear break from the top-down approach that was the norm under Joseph Luns. As an example, while Luns did hold meetings with the Assistant Secretary Generals on a regular basis, the Private Office would

not issue an agenda; the agenda would only be made clear by Luns himself at the meeting. Under Lord Carrington, and his successors, it was the director of the Private Office who consulted widely and prepared the agenda for each meeting, thus opening the possibility for all Assistant Secretary Generals to feed into the discussion. According to Lord Carrington and his director of the Private Office, Sir Brian Fall, communication within the alliance was as important as communication with the media.[66] This process was strengthened by the appointment of Robin Stafford as NATO spokesperson. Stafford was a very focused and energetic journalist who worked closely with Wilfred Hofmann and actively engaged with the media.[67]

Another important change introduced by Lord Carrington concerned the Press Service, which was removed from the Political Affairs Division and became part of the Office of the Secretary General. This change was designed to bring information work closer to the centre of the political process and to allow senior policy-makers to consider the information dimension of all decisions taken by the alliance and of how they could be communicated to the public. For many information officers working in the Press Office at the time, this was a welcome change as it meant that equipment, budget and missions now required approval from the Secretary General's Office. Because it worked in contact with the Press Office, the Secretary General's Office knew what was needed and could approve it quickly. In their eyes, less bureaucracy and more direct contact with day-to-day issues concerning the alliance would facilitated the work of the Press Office.[68] In addition, in an attempt to build more and better contacts with the press – something the previous Secretary General had not considered necessary – for the first time non-NATO-country journalists were accredited to the NATO headquarters.

Lord Carrington, Sir Brian Fall and Robin Stafford also agreed that the Secretary General should contribute more proactively to the way in which NATO projected itself to its own public as well as to the outside world. While Luns, for example, had made occasional trips to some key countries, namely the United States, France and West Germany, Lord Carrington made a point of visiting all member states and of addressing a variety of audiences: from retired officers to university students, from training troops to journalists. He targeted all age groups and all sectors of the public. He also visited neutral countries such as Austria, Switzerland and Sweden. The aim of these trips was to reinforce the idea of an alliance which was a political organisation with its own agenda and which engaged with the key issues of its time.[69] The result was a progressive disengagement from the multiple approach concept towards the projection of a more coordinated and consistent message to the outside world. From the late 1980s onwards, the alliance wanted to be perceived as a political actor with its own views of its political and security destiny, and less as a forum for consultation among independent member states.

The new Secretary General Manfred Wörner capitalised on the changes implemented by Carrington and went further. Wörner thought that NATO had to become a source of information for all media and that the alliance had to reach out to the public in a more proactive way by working closely with the member states as well as with other international organisations. In order for this to be possible, Wörner merged the Information and Press services into one office. The basic idea was that the two had the same goal: making NATO more approachable and more present in day-to-day discussions about current events. In Wörner's view, they should therefore work closely together and keep each other informed. Wörner appointed Gerd Westdickenberg, a West German lawyer, as NATO spokesperson, and Erika Bruce, a Canadian career diplomat, as Director of Information and Press, the first woman to hold that position.[70]

The changes implemented by Wörner proved particularly helpful in the light of the rapid change that took place between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, when the end of the Cold War put the future of the alliance in doubt. At that point, NATO was in a position to manage its public image much more effectively than it could have done five years earlier.

The changes implemented by Wörner did, however, allow some problematic situations. The new Director of Information and Press, for example, was now in charge with a much wider agenda and had to appoint a deputy, who would act as Press Spokesman. As such, the deputy would have direct access to the Secretary General's private office. The paradox was therefore that the Deputy Director of Information was in effect in a more powerful position than the Director himself, who was left with less direct contact with the Secretary General and therefore with less influence. According to Nick Sherwen, who worked for NATIS at the time, the merger meant that NATIS was removed from the political process (Political Division) to be placed closer to the Secretary General's Private Office. Information staff found themselves isolated from the daily politics of the alliance and often felt unwelcome and uncomfortable as part of the Private Office.[71] In addition, although the mandate of the Information Office was to represent NATO to the outside world, as opposed to working simply to promote the image of the Secretary General, the new arrangement opened the possibility of the Secretary General's falling victim to the temptation to use the alliance's information structures for self-promotion.

The Press and the Information sections also had different aims and different working methods, and it was often difficult for the two to work together. Generally speaking, press work requires one to react quickly to news events and to be able to produce quickly an agreed message that is clear and factual and that minimises the possibility of being misconstrued or misquoted. Information, on the other hand, is a much slower process that entails a careful selection of the material and the choice of the most appropriate media. It requires thinking about different audiences and

their sensitivities. Thus, it is not surprising that members of staff working in the NATO Press section grew increasingly frustrated about the slow response of their Information colleagues, while the latter resented the pressure and expectations to work to a different rhythm that were put on them.[72]

The end of the Cold War, 1989–1991

The end of the Cold War and the debate about the future of the alliance entailed diplomatic talks, high-profile visits and numerous summits. At the same time, NATO's information officials were aware of the need to inform the western public as well as the citizens of Eastern Europe and make sure that, despite the rapid pace of change, the public was kept informed and engaged.

Manfred Wörner lost no time and engaged with the debate about the future of the alliance. From the outset, in all his press conferences and speeches as well as in numerous articles published in *NATO Review*, Wörner stressed the political role of the alliance as a motor for peaceful change, as a vehicle to engage with the people of Eastern Europe as well as to promote democratic political culture and market economy in the East.[73]

The most symbolic step towards initiating new relations with the East was the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, to NATO Headquarters on 19 December 1989. The visit was aimed at giving a tangible sign of the alliance's central role in supporting the peaceful process of change that was under way in the East. Wörner himself visited Moscow in July 1990 and was in Prague, Warsaw and Budapest over the next few months. Overall, in 1990 and 1991 NATO Headquarters hosted a series of high-level exchanges by senior political and military officials, including, among others, Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Lech Wałęsa.[74] The meetings were announced in advance, and accredited journalists from the NATO area and beyond were invited to the press conference at the end of each visit, during which NATO officials and their guests reiterated the need to work together and to think in new ways about the security of Europe.

These were hectic times for the Office of Information and Press, and hardly a week went by without either the Secretary General or his senior staff receiving one or more delegations of officials, parliamentarians, journalists and academics from the member states and from Central and Eastern Europe. The Political Committee also visited several ex-Warsaw Pact countries and offered advice about the ongoing political changes. The summits and the rounds of visits to the headquarters were subsequently hailed as a success for the new NATO communication strategy. In the words of Wörner, 'NATO has been able to make instant history.'[75]

The events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw Pact as well as to the reunification of Germany have already been

examined in detail elsewhere.[76] For the purposes of this book, it may be helpful, however, to mention that the NATO Summit Declaration of May 1989 and, still more so, the summit in London the following year marked a radical departure in NATO's approach to the East in which the alliance actively engaged in the debate about Europe's security and political future.[77] The key concept underpinning the alliance's new approach to European security, which formed the cornerstone of NATO's information policy, was that, regardless of all the positive changes, there would always be a need for military and security cooperation and therefore for NATO. The alliance, however, did recognise that the stability and future challenges to European security did not lie solely in the military dimension. NATO itself – as well as its members – had to adapt to new challenges and develop a new security strategy that allowed for more flexibility. The new approach opened new discussions about how to accommodate different national priorities, interests and security concerns. Reinforcing the 'message from Turnberry', the London Declaration called for 'building new partnership with all the nations of Europe' across a wide spectrum of political and military activities, including the establishment of regular diplomatic contacts between those countries and NATO.[78]

In all NATO communiqués, press statements and interviews, as well as in the information material produced by the Office of Information and Press in the early 1990s, the word 'Europe' is omnipresent yet undefined. It included of course current members of the alliance as well as traditionally neutral countries such as Austria and Sweden. It also alluded to the ex-Soviet bloc countries, although there was a tendency to remain vague and not to name any ex-Warsaw Pact member in particular. 'Europe' was described as a geographical and cultural entity, while its security and political dimensions were left in the background. Thus, the end of the Cold War and the possible enlargement of NATO required a re-elaboration of the concept of 'Atlantic community'.

Broader discussions about a new European security framework and political architecture were also taking place, of course, within the European Union (EU) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The European Union in particular took the lead in the discussions through negotiations for a closer union via a single currency as well as by making rapid progress towards a rapid wave of enlargements. It seemed that in the new post-Cold War climate, NATO was redundant. Yet Wörner and his information staff were keen to demonstrate the enduring need for the alliance. NATO, they argued, had the added value of including the United States and Canada, and therefore of ensuring Atlantic cooperation. In addition, of all the organisations NATO alone had 'the binding treaty commitments among its members and common military assets to act as well as consult'.[79]

Under Wörner, NATO was therefore proactively engaged in the debate about its own future. The alliance perceived itself as a political actor in its

own right and not simply as a sum of its parts. Manfred Wörner was a central figure in the debate concerning the alliance and exploited all opportunities to build strong relations with existing members as well as with Eastern and Central European countries. In his words, 'NATO is ultimately seeking to convert a confrontational relationship into a cooperative one.'[80]

After thorny negotiations known as the 'Two Plus Four negotiating process', which involved the removal of Warsaw Pact forces from its territory, in October 1990 the ex-German Democratic Republic joined NATO as part of the reunified Federal Republic of Germany. German unification was a crucial moment for NATO as a whole and for the Office of Information and Press as it meant that around 16 million people joined the alliance without having undergone the process of becoming a member. They had therefore to be informed about the scope and aims of the alliance as well as about the future of European security in a post-Cold War environment. The Office of Information and Press produced targeted information material and worked closely with the German Foreign Ministry and with the Atlantic Treaty Association, which assisted with the circulation of the material.

As early as June 1990, NATO announced seventy research fellowships for 1990/1991, two-thirds of which focused on research on democratic institutions and were awarded for the first time to citizens of both NATO and Central and Eastern European countries.[81] This was only the first step and, as will be discussed more at length in the Epilogue, since the end of the Cold War NATO has welcomed twelve new members. NATO has also extended its activities into humanitarian and crisis management operations, fields that had not formerly been part of its security strategy.

In 1989–1991, NATO did not officially talk about enlargement to Eastern and Central Europe. Yet recent research has revealed that quite a hectic debate did in fact take place behind the scenes at that point.[82] It is, however, interesting to note that the hectic diplomatic and exchange debate that took place in 1989–1991 made it clear to NATO officials and current member states that NATO had an interest in the peace, security and good governance of its neighbouring areas. This was clear in the special Ministerial Declaration issued hours after the coup in Moscow of August 1991, when NATO declared that its own members' security 'is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe, particularly to that of the emerging democracies. We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe'.[83]

At the Rome Summit in November 1991, the three newly independent Baltic States were invited to join the allies in an institutionalised framework of consultation that would later lead to their membership.[84] This process also included the so-called outreach approach developed in the late 1980s, a policy based on the idea of extending information work to countries beginning to shed the 'difficulty' of the Soviet period. The

outreach approach entailed the circulation of pro-NATO information material via the embassies of the NATO members, which would also gather information about anti-NATO campaigns that should then be communicated back to the Office of Information and Press.[85]

Conclusion

In the last fifteen years of the Cold War, NATO developed a new relationship with the media. While in the previous decades, the alliance dealt with the press mainly via official communiqués, in the last decade of the Cold War the alliance became more proactive and engaged with all media. The merging of NATIS with the Press Office aimed to make the two sides of NATO's information work more permeable and to allow information polices to be informed by the latest events. However, this was a mixed success, and different aims, methods and schedules often disrupted the work of both offices and occasionally led to mutual distrust. The merger buried concepts such as the multiple approach and veered towards an agreed message to be applied across the spectrum. On the positive side, the decisions implemented in the 1980s meant that NATO's information work was in a better position to respond to the rapid changes that brought about and immediately followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. The new office of Information and Press helped the alliance to be proactive rather than reactive and to engage with the new political and security environment of the early post-Cold War years.

   Throughout the history of the alliance, on a few occasions 'hot topics' have attracted an unusually high level of attention from the media and the public. This was the case, for example, with the French withdrawal from the integrated command and the subsequent relocation of the headquarters to Brussels and the dual-track decision in 1979. The increased media attention opens opportunities for the alliance's information officers, which they are of course eager to exploit. NATIS hoped to capitalise on the higher-than-usual level of interest to show the wider scope and aims of the alliance. At the same time, however, because the increased media attention is due to the existence of one controversial issue, that very issue tends to monopolise the debate. The result is that the media want to focus on one specific issue at the expense of its wider political, diplomatic and security implications. In the late 1970s, for example, the debate about the modernisation of NATO's nuclear deterrent was dominated by technical details about radar control, delivery systems and force impact; far less discussion dealt with the geopolitical and diplomatic background. So, in times of crisis there is permanent tension between the aims of the NATO information officers – or those of any other international organisation, for that matter – who hope to enlarge the scope of the debate so as to showcase the structure and aims of the alliance, and the media, who want to narrow the debate down and to focus on the 'hot topic' at hand.

The last decade of the Cold War also saw a change in the role of the Secretary General. Lord Carrington and Manfred Wörner took a more active role in the information work of the alliance and in shaping its political and security agendas. The post-1990s changes will be briefly summarised in the Epilogue but it may be worth mentioning here that during the Cold War, the Secretary General was less important for information work than he is today. When the position of Secretary General was created in 1952, it was in response to the need for someone other than the chairman of the North Atlantic Council to become the senior leader of the alliance and to run all civilian agencies of the organisation, control its civilian staff, and serve the North Atlantic Council.[86] After the Suez Crisis – which had strained intra-alliance relations – and the Three Wise Men Report, the Council issued a resolution to make the Secretary General's main function the facilitation of political cooperation within the alliance.[87] In a similar vein, the Harmel Report focused primarily on the alliance as a place of political consultation where different voices should be heard and where the Secretary General's role was primarily that of coordinator and facilitator for political exchange.

During the last decade of the Cold War, the Secretary General became a central part of NATO's information work and both Lord Carrington and Manfred Wörner came to see themselves as the representative of the alliance on the world stage. They saw NATO as a political organisation with its own agenda, in control of its own future. From seeing themselves as mere mediators between a plurality of national points of view, the Secretary Generals became key players in the future of Europe and of the alliance itself.

Notes

1 The Jackson–Nunn Amendments (1973 and 1974) and Defence Appropriation Acts. Detlef, J. (ed.), *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War, 1945–1990: A Handbook* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

2 'The Eurogroup in NATO: report by West German Ministry of Defence', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 14/6 (1972), pp. 291–293. See Chapter 8 for the role of the North Atlantic Assembly in launching the debate about the Eurogroup.

3 Nuti L. (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985* (London: Routledge, 2009). For an effective summary of the changes in transatlantic relations in the 1970s, see Wenger A. and Möckli D., 'Power shifts and new security needs: NATO, European identity and the reorganisation of the West, 1967–1975', in Hanhimäki J., Soutou G.-H. and Germond B. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 103–122. See also Wenger A., Nuenlist C. and Locher A. (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006).

4 The report was commissioned by the Defence Planning Committee and was written by senior representatives of governments and of the three Major NATO Commanders (equivalent of today's Strategic Commanders), assisted by the civilian and military international staffs. AD 70 was approved at the ministerial

meeting in Brussels in December 1970. The official text is available on the NATO website: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2151977B-CB0331CE/natolive/official_texts_26792.htm (retrieved on 11 January 2013). Having withdrawn from the alliance's integrated command structure, France did not participate in the AD 70 study.

5 Final communiqué, 7 June 1973; available on the NATO website at: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-8BD98000-9C0824EC/natolive/official_texts_26873.htm (retrieved on 1 October 2012).

6 The first meeting of MODIO took place in June 1971 to 'provide an opportunity for discussing practical measures and cooperation between the NATO Information Service and Ministries of Defence Information Sections [and] to provide an opportunity for an exchange of ideas between the heads of these sections'. Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 9 July 1971, NA, CM(71)47.

7 Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 7 April 1972, NA, CM(72)19.

8 Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 9 July 1971, NA, CM(71)47.

9 Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 22 November 1974, NA, CM(74)80.

10 According to the AD 70 report, paragraph 6, 'progress towards a meaningful détente in an era of negotiation will, therefore, require the maintenance of a strong collective defence posture'.

11 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 3 June 1971, NA, CM(71)44.

12 'Atlantic Treaty Association: Sixteenth General Assembly. The Hague, 21–25 September 1970. Final Resolution', *NATO Letter*, 18/10–11 (October/November 1970); 'North Atlantic Assembly recommendations. The Hague. November 1970', *NATO Letter*, 18/12 (December 1970). See more details in Chapter 8.

13 As a member of the Norwegian Special Forces in Britain in 1942, Koren underwent special training as a Public Information Officer and subsequently joined the Norwegian State Broadcasting Company. In 1950, he launched and operated his own news agency, focusing on issues dealing with improving relations between the armed forces and the public. Prior to his appointment as Director of Information, Koren acted as Chief of Public Information at the Allied Forces Northern Europe Headquarters near Oslo, one of SACEUR's subordinate commands. *NATO Review*, 20/9–10 (September/October 1971).

14 The multiple approach to information concept was adopted by the Council in September 1973. See Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters on 12 September 1973 at 10.15 a.m., 26 September 1973, NA, CR(73)52.

15 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 27 September 1973, NA, CM(73)65; Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 20 November 1973, NA, CM(73)81.

16 CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, January 1967–June 1967', 6 July 1967, NA, AC/52-D(67)2.

17 See, for example, CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, 1st July to 31st December 1970', report by the Director of Information, 18 March 1971, NA, AC/52-D(71)1.

18 Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, chairman's report, 17 January 1974, NA, AC/52-WP(74)2; Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, 20 November 1973, NA, CM(73)81.

19 For a detailed analysis of the content of *NATO Review* and of the distribution network organised by the voluntary organisations, see Chapters 5 and 8.

20 Even the suggestion of combined CONIO–MODIO conferences was rejected as 'cumbersome and organisationally unwise', although CONIO conferences were often open to MODIO observers and vice versa. Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, chairman's report, 17 January 1974, NA, AC/52-WP(74)2.

21 Nehring H., *British and West German protest movement and the early Cold War, 1945–1970* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ch. 2. Benjamin Ziemann makes a distinction between 'pacifism' and 'peace movements'; the latter developed after the end of the Second World War and was able to attract volatile mass support. Ziemann B., 'Situating peace movements in the political culture of the Cold War', in Ziemann, B. (ed.), *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2007), pp. 11–38.

22 In his analysis of the history of the protest movements, Gerhard Wettig stresses almost exclusively Soviet intentions and geopolitical aims: Wettig G., 'The last Soviet offensive in the Cold War: emergence and development of the campaign against NATO euromissiles, 1979–1983', *Cold War History*, 9/1 (2009), pp. 79–110; Wettig G., 'Die Sowjetunion in der Auseinandersetzung über den Nato-Doppelbeschluss 1979–1983', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 57/2 (2009), pp. 217–259; Wettig G., 'Der Kreml und die Friedensbewegung Anfang der achtziger Jahre', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 60/1 (2012), pp. 143–149. This view has been challenged by Holger Nehring and Benjamin Ziemann. See Nehring H., and Ziemann B., 'Do all paths lead to Moscow? The NATO dual-track decision and the peace movement: a critique', *Cold War History*, 12/1 (February 2012), pp. 1–24. See also Wittner L.S., *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Meyer J.H. and Poncharal B., 'L'européanisation de la politique environnementale dans les années 1970', *Vingtième Siècle*, 113/1 (2012), pp. 117–126. In the mid-1970s, the peace movements expanded to include protests against civilian use of nuclear energy. These protests of course intensified in the aftermath of the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in April 1986 and led to the first independent peace and ecological movement in the German Democratic Republic and in other Eastern European states. Brüggemeier F.-J., *Tschernobyl, 26. April 1986: Die ökologische Herausforderung* (Munich: dtv, 1998).

23 Among the most helpful recent contributions are Nehring and Ziemann, 'Do all paths lead to Moscow?'; Ziemann (ed.), *Peace Movements*; Ziemann B., 'Quantum of solace? European peace movements during the Cold War and their elective affinities', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, 49 (2003), pp. 351–389; Wittner, L.S., *Toward Nuclear Abolition*; Suri J., *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).

24 END was founded in 1980 after the circulation of the 'European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal' by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. Mary Kaldor, E.P. Thompson and Ken Coates were instrumental in its foundation. Throughout its history, END suffered from problems in recruiting individuals and groups from the East and was also fiercely opposed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which refused to work with its East European counterparts. Matthias Finger reads this as a sign of the influence of the Communist Party of Great Britain on the CND. Finger M., 'The new peace movement and its conception of political commitment', in Kodama K. and Vesa U. (eds), *Towards a Comparative Analysis of Peace Movements* (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1990), pp. 217–233.

25 Kitschelt H.P., 'Political opportunity and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16/1 (1986), p. 71; Cortright D., *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 148.

26 Among the most recent contributions are Scholtyseck J., 'The United States, Europe, and the NATO dual-track decision', in Schulz M. and Schwartz T.A. (eds), *The Strained Alliance: U.S.–European Relations from Nixon to Carter* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 333–354; Spohr Readman K., 'Germany and the politics of the neutron bomb, 1975–1979', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 21/2 (2010), pp. 259–285; Spohr Readman K., 'Conflict and cooperation in intra-alliance nuclear politics: Western Europe, the United States, and the genesis of NATO's dual-track decision, 1977–1979', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13 (2011), pp. 39–89; Nuti L., 'The origins of the 1979 dual track decision: a survey', in Nuti (ed.), *The Crisis of Détente in Europe*, pp. 57–71.

27 Nehring and Zeimann, "Do all paths lead to Moscow?'; Gassert P., Geiger T. and Wentker H. (eds), *Zweiter Kalter Krieg und Friedensbewegung: Der NATO-Doppelbeschluss in deutsch-deutscher und internationaler Perspektive* (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2011).

28 Nuti L., 'A continent bristling with arms: continuity and change in Western European security policies after the Second World War', in Stone D. (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2012), pp. 339–355.

29 Nehring H., 'Diverging perceptions of security: NATO and the protests against nuclear weapons', in Wenger *et al.* (eds), *Transforming NATO*; Nerlich U., 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen für multilaterale Rahmenbedingungen', in Kaiser K. and Maull H.W. (eds), *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik*, vol. 1: *Grundlagen* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997), pp. 153–174.

30 Conze E., *Die Suche nach Sicherheit. Eine Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1949 bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: Siedler, 2009), pp. 540–544. Kaufmann, F.-X., *Sicherheit als soziologisches und sozialpolitisches Problem. Untersuchungen zu einer Wertidee hochdifferenzierter Gesellschaften* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1973), pp. 341.

31 Spohr Readman, 'Germany and the politics of the neutron bomb'; Haftendorn H., 'Das doppelte Missverständnis. Zur Vorgeschichte des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses von 1979', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 33 (1985), pp. 244–287.

32 'Declaration on Atlantic relations' (Ottawa Declaration). Available at: www. nato.int/cps/en/SID-AAB10714-03575DFE/natolive/official_texts_26901.htm (retrieved on 1 October 2012). The contentious eleventh paragraph was eventually brokered by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues.

33 Flynn G., 'Public opinion and Atlantic defence', *NATO Review*, 31/5 (September 1983).

34 Scholtyseck, 'The United States, Europe, and the NATO dual-track decision'.

35 See, for example, 'NATO Information Service Survey output, 1973', 20 March 1974, NA, AC/124-D(74)1.

36 In addition, in 1970 the Common Market Information Service had a staff of sixty-seven A-grade officers against the twenty-five of NATIS, and it had regional officers in all member countries and in others that were not yet members: Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 3 June 1971, NA, CM(71)44.

37 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 20 July 1971 at 10.15 a.m., 12 August 1971, NA, CR(71)40.

38 In effect, in 1971 NATIS operated with a lower budget than in 1970 as the final increase of 5 per cent was insufficient to cover the rising costs in the first year

of VAT in Belgium. CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service, 1st July to 31st December 1970', report by the Director of Information, 18 March 1971, NA, AC/52-D(71)1.

39 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on Tuesday, 20 July 1971 at 10.15 a.m., 12 August 1971, NA, CR(71)40.

40 Lamb C.J., 'Public opinion and nuclear weapons in Europe: a report of the 27th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly', *NATO Review*, 29/6 (December 1981).

41 Conference of National Information Officials, report by the chairman, 27 September 1973, NA, CM(73)65; 'XIXth Annual ATA Assembly, Brussels (10–14 September 1973)', *NATO Review*, 21/5 (September/October 1973).

42 More information on the launch of the CCMS is available in Chapter 7.

43 Inglehart R., 'Generational change and the future of the Atlantic Alliance', *Political Science and Politics*, 17/3 (Summer 1984), pp. 525–535; see also Platt A. (ed.), *The Atlantic Alliance: Perspectives from the Successor Generation* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1983), pp. 1–5, 8; and Osgood R.E., *The Successor Generation: Its Challenges and Responsibilities* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1981).

44 The British-American Project is a fellowship programme involving around 600 leaders and opinion formers from a broad spectrum of occupations and political viewpoints, from the United States and the United Kingdom. The Project was launched in 1985 to perpetuate the close relationship between the two countries established by an earlier generation during the Second World War. Scott-Smith G., 'Searching for the successor generation: public diplomacy, the US embassy's International Visitor Program and the Labour Party in the 1980s', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 8/2 (2006), pp. 214–237. The Youth Exchange Program has a similar aim. It was launched in 1983 and was co-founded by Congress and the Bundestag. Tuch H.N., *Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990).

45 Parkin F., *Middle Class Radicalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968); Klandermans R. (ed.), *Peace Movements in Western Europe and the United States* (London: JAI Press, 1991).

46 Torsvik T., 'Youth, war and peace', *NATO Letter*, 18/10–11 (October/November 1970). See also 'Aligning NATO and youth: a debate of the problem of making the Atlantic Alliance acceptable to young people', *NATO Letter*, 17/3 (March 1969).

47 CICR, 'Activities of the NATO Information Service. January 1969 to June 1969', note by the Director of Information', 22 July 1969, NA, AC/52-D(69)2.

48 Heuser B., 'Alliance of democracies and nuclear deterrence', in Mastny V., Holtsmark S.G. and Wenger A. (eds), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 193–217. The NPG was founded in December 1966 as a consultative agency on nuclear policy within NATO.

49 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 12 September 1973 at 10.15 a.m., 26 September 1973, NA, CR(73)52; Conference of NATO Information Officials, report by the chairman, 15 July 1974, NA, 15 July 1974; Conference of Heads of Information Sections in Ministries of Defence, report by the chairman, 22 November 1974, NA, CM(74)80.

50 'Atlantic Treaty Association 17th Annual Assembly, London, 20–24 September', *NATO Review*, 19/11–12 (November/December 1971). In addition, the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders (AAYPL) received further support from many voluntary organisations and national governments. The AAYPL was

composed of young politicians representing major political parties in most of the NATO countries and organised seminars and conferences as well as exchanges on a bilateral basis.

51 R. Spencer Oliver, 'Young political leaders invest in the future', *NATO Review*, 20/3–4 (March–April 1972); 'Young political leaders', *NATO Review*, 25/6 (December 1977). For the post-Cold War developments of ATA, see the Epilogue.

52 Westad O.A., *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 9; Scott J.M., *Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). For the increasing tensions betweent the two blocs outside the European area, see Calandri E., Caviglia D. and Varsori A. (eds), *Détente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

53 The paper was written by the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent. Wolf J.J., *The Credibility of the NATO Deterrent: Bringing the NATO Deterrent Up to Date* (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 1981). It was summarised in two influential articles published in the *NATO Review*. See Rush K., Scowcroft, B. and Wolf, J.P., 'The credibility of the NATO deterrent: bringing the deterrent up to date' (Parts 1 and 2), *NATO Review*, 29/5 (October 1981) and 29/6 (December 1981); Hofmann W., 'Is NATO's defence policy facing a crisis?', *NATO Review*, 32/4 (August 1984).

54 The official text of NSDD 77 is available at: www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1966t.gif (retrieved on 11 January 2013).

55 Lord C., 'The past and future of public diplomacy', *Orbis*, 42/1 (Winter 1998), pp. 49–72. See also Waller J.M., *The Public Diplomacy Reader* (Washington, DC: Institute of World Policy Press, 2007); Malone G.D., 'Managing public diplomacy', *Washington Quarterly*, 8/3 (1985), pp. 199–213; Alexandre L., 'In the service of the state: public diplomacy, government media and Ronald Reagan', *Media, Culture and Society*, 9/1 (January 1987), pp. 29–46.

56 Laurien A., 'In the service of the state: public diplomacy, government media and Ronald Reagan', *Media, Culture and Society*, 9/1 (January 1987), pp. 29–46. Wick is usually remembered in connection with the launch of Radio Martí, broadcasting to Cuba.

57 Nick Sherwen and François Le Blévennec, interviews with the author.

58 In 1983, Reagan's International Youth Initiative programmed supplemented existing schemes such as the International Visitor Program (IVP) and launched new ones like the British-American Project for the Successor Generation.

59 'Death of NATO's Director of Information', *NATO Review*, 27/2 (April 1979). Prior to his NATO appointment, Møller had been Minister of Defence and Minister of Justice in the Danish government.

60 'New Director of Information appointed', *NATO Review*, 27/5 (October 1979). Halle started his career with the Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation and was later editorial writer and special correspondent for *Süddeutsche Zeitung* in Munich. He taught at the Deutsche Journalistenschule in Munich and at the Swiss School of Journalism in Zurich. In 1970, Halle was appointed press officer of the Federal Ministry of Defence and later became spokesman and chief of the Ministry of Information and Press Office. Halle had also been spokesman of the German Defence Minister, Georg Leber, and at the time of his NATO appointment he was working as head of the Information and Communication Division in the Chancellor's Office.

61 Nick Sherwen, interview with the author.

62 After leaving NATO, Halle had a high-profile television career in Germany, which many in the CICR suspected was something he had been working

towards throughout his time at NATO. Armin Halle's biography (*Armin Halle: Medien und Persönlichkeitstraining*) is available on his website: www.medientraining.de (retrieved on 11 January 2013).

63 'New Director of Information appointed', *NATO Review*, 31/3–4 (October/ November 1983). Born a Catholic, Hofmann converted to Islam. After his retirement from diplomatic duties, he published several books and essays on Islam's place in the West and on the need for peace and understanding.

64 Hofmann W., 'Is NATO's defence policy facing a crisis?', *NATO Review*, 32/4 (August 1984).

65 CICR, 'Press guidance prior to the next ministerial meeting', 19 April 1955, NA, AC/52-WP/8.

66 Sir Brian Fall, interview with the author.

67 Robin Stafford had been foreign correspondent for the *Daily Express* (London) and acted as SHAPE deputy spokesperson before his NATO appointment.

68 François Le Blévennec, interview with the author.

69 See articles in *NATO Review* with comments on Lord Carrington's trips. Sir Brian Fall has provided additional information on this point.

70 Gerd Westdickenberg studied law and obtained a PhD in 1974. He entered the German diplomatic service in 1975 and served abroad as well as in the German Foreign Ministry and Chancellery before his appointment to NATO. Erika Bruce obtained a PhD in political economy and business administration in Vienna and worked in Germany, Canada, the United States, Kenya and Portugal. Before joining NATO, Bruce gained extensive experience in information policy by working for several cultural institutions (the Killam Fund, the Tinker Foundation) as well as serving as clerk to three Canadian Senate committees (security intelligence service; social affairs, science and technology; and youth). Her most recent appointment before joining NATO was as Director General of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada: *NATO Review*, 38/5 (October 1990).

71 Nick Sherwen, interview with the author.

72 Nick Sherwen and François Le Blévennec, interviews with the author.

73 See, for example, Wörner M., 'A time of accelerating change' and 'North Atlantic Council Communiqué', both in *NATO Review*, 37/6 (December 1989).

74 See 'Chronology' in the *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), pp. 432–448, and articles published in *NATO Review* at the time. In March 1991, Václav Havel gave an historic speech at NATO Headquarters when he addressed the North Atlantic Council, the first foreign leader to do so.

75 As quoted in Wegener H., 'The transformed alliance', *NATO Review*, 38/4 (August 1990). The Office of Information and Press also organised numerous seminars on the future of European security open to officials and policy-makers from Central and Eastern Europe. In the autumn of 1991, special courses at the NATO Defence College in Rome and the SHAPE School in Oberammergau were opened to military personnel of the Soviet Union and of Central and Eastern Europe. See Wörner M., 'NATO transformed: the significance of the Rome summit', *NATO Review*, 39/6 (December 1991).

76 Among the most recent contributions are: Sarotte M.E., *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Engel J.A., *The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy of 1989* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Bozo F., *Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War, and German Unification* (New York: Berghahn, 2009); Spohr K., 'Precluded or precedent-setting? The "NATO enlargement question" in the triangular Bonn–Washington–Moscow diplomacy of 1990/1991 and beyond', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 14/4 (Fall 2012), pp. 4–54.

77 'Declaration of the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 29–30 May 1989'. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c890530a.htm (retrieved on 12 November 2012); London Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance, issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, 5–6 July 1990. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm (retrieved on 12 November 2012).

78 'Message from Turnberry', ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7–8 June 1990. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608b.htm (retrieved on 12 November 2012).

79 Wörner M., 'NATO transformed: the significance of the Rome summit', *NATO Review*, 39/6 (December 1991). See also Legge M., 'The making of NATO's strategy', published in the same issue of the *NATO Review.*

80 Wörner M., 'The Atlantic Alliance in the new era', *NATO Review,* 39/1 (February 1991); see also Wörner, 'NATO transformed'.

81 *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), p. 439.

82 In May 2008, Gorbachev maintained that a commitment had been given that NATO would never expand further east. See Blomfield A. and Smith M., 'Gorbachev: US could start new Cold War', *Telegraph* (London), 6 May 2008. Recent research carried out by Kristina Spohr has highlighted the complex negotiations and intense diplomatic contacts that sorrounded the queestion of further NATO enlargment towards the East: Spohr, 'Precluded or precedent-setting?'

83 'The situation in the Soviet Union', statement issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in ministerial session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 21 August 1991. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c910821a.htm#FN1 (retrieved on 12 November 2012).

84 The Baltic Republics officially joined NATO in March 2004, along with Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

85 Nick Sherwen, interview with the author.

86 The position of Secretary General was officially approved in February 1952 at the Lisbon Conference.

87 Final communiqué, 16–19 December 1957. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17551.htm (retrieved on 12 December 2012).

Part II

NATIS and its outputs

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5   NATO publications

During the Cold War, the structure of NATIS was modified several times to respond to the changing priorities of the alliance and of its information work. Generally speaking, the competences of the Service fell under three headings: publications, public relations and 'special media'. The Publication Section, as the name suggests, dealt with all forms of NATO's official publications, including the best-selling *The First Five Years* by Lord Ismay, and the *NATO Letter*, a monthly publication with key information about the alliance. Material for teachers and university lecturers was regularly updated and circulated through the network of voluntary organisations and the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers. Other publications with key data, such as *Facts and Figures*, were distributed to visitors to the headquarters and to those attending the conferences and summer schools. The Public Relations Section dealt with visits to the NATO headquarters, the visiting professorship and scholarship schemes, and links with the network of voluntary organisations. The key task of the Public Relations Section was to strengthen relations with the leaders of tomorrow and with 'opinion formers', particularly academics. Finally, the Media Section and its ancillary Media Library dealt with the production of documentary films as well as with travelling exhibitions. The Media Section also kept contact with journalists and organised the distribution of photographs and material that could then be used by specialists in the field.

A wide range of publications: too much of the same?

The main responsibility of the Press Section was to provide 'those who form and guide public opinion with suitable documentation about the alliance'.[1] In order to do so, the material had to be factual and informative, with the right level of detail. It was crucial that what was published by NATIS was trusted or it would have not been used by the recipients. Whether particular material was directed at troops, journalists or university students, accuracy and consistency were paramount. There was to be no conflicting information and all details had to be checked to avoid the risk of allowing the material to be identified as 'propaganda' by the alliance's critics.

Following its inception, the Press Section launched a wide variety of publications to address different audiences. They can be divided into three kinds according to their intended audience. The first group comprises publications aimed at the wider public, which means items that addressed a specific kind of audience (such as troops undergoing training, or MPs visiting the NATO headquarters) but could then be seen by anybody and could take on a life of their own by being passed on from hand to hand. These publications, like Ismay's *The First Five Years*, or items like *Facts and Figures*, targeted a specific audience while at the same time making sure that the key points would be clear to anybody approaching them.

A second group of publications were not intended for wider circulation and were supposed to remain within the restricted channels of communication between NATIS, the national information agencies and a relatively small group of selected contacts. This kind of material, such as *Speakers' Notes*, offered factual information so that the national information agencies and their contacts could write accurately about NATO. In this way, NATIS hoped to ensure that a consistent message about the alliance was produced in all its member countries. Although this kind of material aimed to be as objective and as factual as possible, it was often written in such a way that the alliance would have not want it to be circulated to wider audiences.

A third kind of publication was circulated within the CICR. Technically speaking, these reports did not fall within NATIS's remit, but it may nevertheless be helpful to mention them here, as they help to explain the wider approach to publications and the circulation of information within the alliance. As was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the national delegations within the CICR produced reports on the activities of the national communist parties as well as of the international communist organisations. These reports were circulated to all national delegations and were often forwarded to the national information agencies and their contacts. They were secret reports that offered background information that journalists, MPs and trade union leaders could use but not refer to directly.

The most popular publication produced by NATIS was Lord Ismay's account of the origins of the alliance. *NATO: The First Five Years* was written in 1955 and gathered together all the key information that the alliance was keen for the wider public to be aware of. The volume offers a summary of the events that led to the signing of the Washington Treaty as well as of how the alliance evolved in its early years. It examines the aims and tasks of the alliance. Given the time of its publication, the book pays a lot of attention to the alliance's military dimension and great effort is expended in explaining the military strength of the Soviet bloc and the need for the West to come together to defend itself. Only one chapter is devoted to non-military cooperation. More than half of the book consists of official documents, maps, and appendices containing key texts such as the Washington Treaty, the Protocol of Admission of Greece and Turkey, as well as

the list of chairmen of the North Atlantic Council and of Permanent Representatives. There are also numerous charts that give further details of the military structure of the alliance and of the various commands. National defence expenditure and the size of armed forces are also illustrated in detail. The aim of the book was:

> to prepare an authoritative publication suitable for a parliamentary library or as a work of reference for government officials, and at the same time of sufficiently [*sic*] interest to appeal to press commentators, students of political affairs, members of pro-NATO voluntary organizations and the general public. Thus the document would have a technical value as well as a public relations one.[2]

Initially, around 26,000 copies in English and 22,000 copies in French were printed. The volume went through several reprints and was translated into all languages of the alliances. In 1960, NATIS produced an updated version under the title *Facts about NATO.* More than its predecessor, *Facts about NATO* aimed to be a serious reference book. The autobiographical paragraphs reflecting Ismay's own views were removed and the text was given a more matter-of-fact and informative tone. *Facts about NATO* was subsequently published under the title *NATO: Facts and Figures.*[3] A comparison of the three books shows a consistent shift away from military themes and more emphasis placed on political and economic cooperation. In the latest edition of *Facts and Figures,* which was published in 1989, the military tasks of the alliances are discussed after the 'political framework' of NATO, and only 7 pages of the 500-page volume are dedicated to the Warsaw Pact.

Other publications of similar kind included *Aspects of NATO,* a short pamphlet distributed during the tour of the headquarters, in response to direct mail enquiries and to the voluntary organisations and the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers. In the words of a NATIS officer, *Aspects of NATO* was to 'be given to those who do not merit the more expensive reference book *NATO: Facts and Figures*'.[4] *Why NATO?* and *NATO Pocket Guide* were two 'popular pamphlets'. The former aimed at 'low level audiences, including troops', the latter at secondary school teachers and university students.[5] Finally, the *NATO Handbook* was a summary version of *Facts and Figures*; it was directed at journalists and MPs, and provided key data and information in a pocket-size manual.

NATIS also produced more specialised literature such as *NATO Map Sheets, Non-military Cooperation in NATO, NATO Latest* and *Speakers' Notes,* which addressed specifically journalists, MPs and government research departments. *NATO Latest* was a Roneoed series of sheets of papers with limited distribution. It consisted of the complete texts of speeches and communiqués, and was distributed immediately after major NATO meetings. Speed was the priority, as it was vital to get the right information to

journalists and policy-makers as quickly as possible. *Speakers' Notes* contained a selection of speeches and communiqués as well as more background information on specific subjects. It was addressed at lecturers and journalists. It was published on plain paper and was sent on to key contacts, who were supposed to use the material but not to refer directly to it. All the above publications were translated into all languages of the alliance and were distributed free of charge by NATIS, the national information agencies and the voluntary organisations, as will be discussed.[6]

If this was not an already long list of publications, in 1970 the decision to make the *NATO Letter* a bimonthly magazine released funds that went towards new titles. The expansion of interest in the environment led to the publication of material relating to the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, such as *Man's Environment and the Atlantic Alliance.* At a time of negotiations with the East, the Service also produced *The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact.*

There was a wave of new publications in the early 1980s, when the two blocs engaged in what information officers called the 'battle of the booklets'. In October 1981, the Reagan administration published *Soviet Military Power*, which provided an estimate of the military strategy and capabilities of the Soviet Union to alert the western public to the enduring threat posed by the Soviet armed forces.[7] *Soviet Military Power* was almost 100 pages long, had numerous pictures, maps and charts and was printed on glossy paper, making the publication as attractive as possible. The information gathered in *Soviet Military Power* was based on reports from the intelligence service.[8] In 1982, the Soviet Union responded with the publication of *Whence the Threat to Peace.* Equally lavishly illustrated with colour photographs, maps and charts, this glossy seventy-page booklet was produced to show that it was the United States that posed a threat to peace.

In 1984, NATIS contributed its own title – *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons* – and a series of leaflets and brochures illustrating the difference in levels of armaments and conventional forces between the two alliances.[9] In its fifty pages, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact* offered a comparison of the armed forces of the two military alliances. The data and estimates relating to the Warsaw Pact were of course based on documents produced by the national intelligence services. For NATIS, it was much more problematic to discuss the actual strength of the alliance itself. First of all, it was not clear whether France should be included, as the country's armed forces were outside the alliance's military command. Second, the data produced by the allies were not always considered reliable and some figures seemed higher than the actual military strength of the members, as was argued by one officer working for the Press Section at the time.[10] Some members produced their own version based on a collation of their own assessment as well as on data already produced in *Soviet Military Power* and *NATO and the Warsaw Pact.*[11]

Finally, as has already been mentioned, the CICR also put together numerous information reports that were circulated among the national delegations, which then passed them on to carefully chosen contacts. These included journalists, trade union leaders, MPs, government research departments and academics. The national information agencies were also important recipients of this kind of information material and they were supposed to integrate the information they received from the CICR in their own propaganda material. The rationale behind the operation was to ensure that official sources relied on the same set of data so that inconsistencies and contradictions could be reduced to a minimum. The alliance was not the only topic the CICR reports focused on, and in fact the majority of the documents circulated in the 1950s and early 1960s dealt with communist-related issues. Reports such as 'Problems of enlightening public opinion', 'Communist front organisations' and 'Trends of communist propaganda' discussed ways to respond to anti-NATO, and more generally anti-western, communist propaganda. As was discussed in Chapter 2, it is clear that the national reports were based on intelligence information gathered by the national secret services.

Throughout the Cold War, NATIS and the CICR circulated a wide variety of material that targeted different audiences and that served different purposes. However, as will be discussed, to a large extent the material tended to repeat itself, and on several occasions the sheer amount of publications as well as the lack of an effective redistribution network at the national level often meant that these publications did not reach the intended audience but ended up in some basement to collect dust.

The *NATO Letter*

During the Cold War, the circulation of the *NATO Letter* ranged from an initial 20,000 copies to 130,000 copies per month. The *Letter* was initially published in the two official languages of the alliance, English and French, under the title *NATO Newsletter*. NATIS and the CICR soon decided that a version in each of the NATO languages should be added to maximise circulation and effectiveness. For the tenth anniversary of the *Letter*, its editor, Jean de Madre, took cheer from the fact that 133,000 copies were printed on average each month (47,000 in English, 32,000 in French and the remaining 52,000 in other languages).[12]

The *Letter* was sent to NATO personnel and to all national civil servants and politicians whose work was connected to the alliance. The pro-NATO voluntary organisations also received copies and redistributed them among their members. NATIS sent them to academics, journalists, trade union leaders, youth leaders and whoever signed up during one of the visits to the headquarters, when attending a talk or at the end of a visit to a NATO exhibition. The 'opinion formers' could also subscribe to receive subsequent copies. Subscriptions were free of charge.

Given the terms of reference of NATIS, the circulation of the *Letter* was restricted to the NATO area, although from the 1960s it was decided that a selected group of contacts in non-NATO countries should also be sent copies via the members' embassies.[13]

National information agencies, like information and press offices of the Foreign Ministries, also acted as redistribution channels and often had their own contacts to which they sent copies. In all cases, the distribution costs were covered by NATIS.[14] According to John Price, 'The *NATO Letter* is primarily intended to keep those interested in NATO regularly informed of the developments concerning the alliance. Many, though not all, of these are also opinion-moulders who need to be kept up-to-date.'[15]

An analysis of changes in the content and format of the *NATO Letter* throughout the Cold War provides a tangible sign of how the developing information policies suggested by the CICR found their practical implementation in the information material produced by NATIS. It is clear, for example, that the *Letter* soon moved away from the strictly defined military themes of the early years and engaged with the opinion formers by stressing the political dimension of the alliance. Progressively more attention was paid to article 2 and to economic and political cooperation among the members. The role of the voluntary organisations and that of NATO's work in the scientific field were given increasingly wide attention, and the annual meetings of the Atlantic Treaty Association and of the North Atlantic Assembly and their final recommendations were regularly reproduced in full. From 1970, the *Letter* also included regular updates about the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society.

The first issue of the *Letter* was published in September 1953. At first, the *Letter* had a strong military focus and its main aim was to inform the troops and all military personnel about the need for common defence, weapons standardisation programmes as well as the political reasons behind the creation of the alliance itself. The early issues of the *Letter* include information about the rearmament effort and tables with a breakdown of the costs of rearmament and of national contributions, along with official documents and communiqués. Considerable attention was also paid to calculations about the expected military strength of the Soviet Union and of the Eastern bloc. There were no original articles or commentaries, and the majority of the text consisted chiefly of speeches, official communiqués and reports on routine activities.

These early Roneoed issues are functional, simple and plain, printed in black and white without photographs. It could be said that at this point little effort was made to make the *Letter* look appealing and to catch the eye of new readers. This was of course consistent with the aims of the alliance's information policy at the time, but the simplicity of the content and format was also due to the fact that NATIS itself had just been launched and that at this point the Service had very limited staff and a meagre budget.

Following the review of NATO information policy in the aftermath of the publication of the Three Wise Men Report (1956), the *NATO Letter* underwent substantial changes, and the Press Section attempted to widen its readership. From May 1959, the inclusion of diagrams, maps and photographs along with the introduction of a more sophisticated and modernised formatting aimed to reach beyond the strictly defined alliance's personnel. Articles signed by journalists and academics started to appear more regularly. The topics discussed acquired a wider breath and included articles like 'The nature of communism today'. In the late 1950s, the alliance's key mission was still identified with the protection of the West from a Soviet attack, but there is an attempt to go beyond the analysis of the Warsaw Pact's military strength and to discuss the inherent problems of the communist system, from the lack of personal freedom to the state of the Soviet economy. There is also an evident attempt to draw parallels between political solidarity among the members of NATO and the European integration process.[16]

The Soviet 'peaceful coexistence' campaign forced NATIS to focus on the defensive nature of the alliance and to explain that the aims of organisations went beyond the military sphere.

> More than ever Communist propaganda tries to divide the Western allies, to distort the real aims and objectives of the Atlantic Alliance and to discredit NATO by presenting it to the public as an aggressive alliance which endangers world peace. Without in any way engaging in a direct anti-communist campaign it is considered essential … to intensify our efforts actively to present to the public the real facts about NATO's aims and achievements.[17]

Thus, it was decided that the *Letter* should print 'more interesting' articles and that circulation should aim for 200,000. The decision to move away from the purely military dimension of the alliance is even more evident in the course of the 1960s. The *Letter* produced special issues or long feature articles on each member state, discussing their economy, political system and role within the alliance. The increased attention on the member states was consistent with NATIS's attempt to portray the diversity of the alliance and to focus more on the people and their different cultures than on the military strength of the alliance itself. As will be discussed more in detail in the next chapter, this was also the time when the Media Section started to produce short films on each member country. The CICR had asked NATIS to 'give greater emphasis to human beings and their achievements rather than to political, economic and sociological questions'.[18] Thus, in May 1964 the *Letter* included its first special issue, on the Netherlands.[19] Each special issue included longer articles from well-known journalists of the country in question, examining its political system; the articles were accompanied by photographs and charts.

These attempts to appeal to a broader readership can be exemplified by the fact that from 1962 the *Letter* has a colour picture on its cover. The inclusion of colour pictures, which were more expensive, is a sign of the attempt to catch the eye of 'general readers' who might not have been interested in the military aspects of the alliance. Significantly, the first picture used on the cover of the *Letter* portrays the Erechtheion in Athens, to stress NATO's peaceful dimension as well as to link the alliance to the long-term political development of the West since the time of ancient Greece. In fact, throughout the 1960s the pictures used on the cover hardly seem to relate to the alliance at all. The following issues see a man moving logs on the Gatineau River in Canada, a view of the Rhine valley, an aerial view of patchwork fields in Luxembourg, and so on. The editors also tried to lighten the tone with humorous comments. The cover page of the September 1962 issue, for example, shows a Portuguese wine cellar. The photo is rather dark, as one would expect from a cellar, and at first glance it is not clear what the objects lying on the floor are. Only on more careful examination is it clear that they are rows upon rows of bottles of wine as far as the eye can see. The inside cover reads 'Stockpiled shells? No – Bottles of port in a Portuguese cellar. Wines and brandies rank amongst Portugal's principal exports and the NATO countries are her leading customers.' The caption stresses the peaceful nature of the alliance and points to the fact that its membership fosters closer economic ties with other friendly nations. In February 1963, the cover of the *Letter* showed a picture of a young girl, probably six or seven years of age. It is a sunny day and the girl is walking on a cobblestoned street with a view of the sea in the background. The caption in the inside cover explains that 'NATO means more than a military alliance against communism as this little Italian girl may realise when she is able to look back on an education free from subtle propaganda'.[20] The irony that this message appeared on the inside cover of a propaganda magazine may have been lost on the reader at the time but not on the scholars of propaganda today. Subsequent issues saw pictures of British steel mills, a busy street in Copenhagen, icebergs in Greenland, and so on. The pictures were selected to reinforce the message of the alliance's diversity and of its peaceful aims. According to the editor, Jean de Madre:

> The *NATO Letter* aims at being a true reflection of the Atlantic idea and at stimulating interest in the alliance. In order to do so effectively, it must keep in tune with unfolding developments in the history of our era. The task is not an easy one, for it must be borne in mind that we have as many 'bosses' as there are member countries and that the faithful interpretation of the sovereign will of fifteen national [member states] demands a degree of diplomacy with which journalists are seldom blessed.[21]

In the light of de Madre's comments, it is therefore not surprising that the *Letter* published numerous articles and special issues on individual members. It was much easier to agree on how a member wanted to be portrayed than to present the alliance itself. In fact, although all members agreed on the fact that NATO was a military *and* political alliance, each of them placed different emphasis on the two, and finding an agreement that pleased everybody was not always easy. As an official quotable NATO publication, the *Letter* had to secure the agreement of all national members on any controversial topic and could not, for example, publish a report before a ministerial meeting or discuss any subject in advance of an agreed document.

> This is a limitation that applies to all publications of international organisations and has to be accepted, but inevitably makes the magazine duller than one independently produced.... It cannot be claimed that the *NATO Letter* converts anyone to the cause of the alliance. All it can hope to do is to keep supporters informed.[22]

If the attention to individual members reflected the guidelines issued by the CICR, as mentioned above, the focus on the national dimension suited the information officers too because in this way they could work around the members' contrasting visions of the alliance.

From 1963, the number of original articles written for the *Letter* increased, and regular sections such as 'The voice of the USSR' and 'Life in the Soviet Union' started to appear. These sections sought to give a snapshot of life in the Soviet Union at a time of diminished tension between the two blocs. In the new international environment, it was possible to devote more attention to the Eastern bloc and to expand the focus onto its social and economic conditions. The conciliatory approach towards the Eastern bloc became more evident and consistent after the publication of the Harmel Report. The articles on the Warsaw Pact and on its members were based on sources circulated to all western information agencies by NATIS. As was discussed in previous chapters, reports like 'Communist front organisations' and 'Trends of communist propaganda' were put together by the national delegations – particularly the British and the Americans – and were based on intelligence information. On several occasions, the achievements of the East were praised, particularly as far as technological development was concerned. Yet each article allowed its author to draw comparisons on issues like individual freedoms and the open market. In a new section, 'Focus on NATO', the reader could find updates about new appointments within the alliance and updates about the events organised by the major pro-NATO voluntary organisations.

The publication of the Harmel Report also brought about a wider spectrum of topics, including a new focus on 'out-of-area' regions. Good examples of this new attention are articles on the long-term implication

of decolonisation and the consequences of the oil crisis of 1973. But it was the environment that attracted consistently higher levels of attention. The September 1969 issue included a ten-page-long article entitled 'Man and the environment', the first of a series of pieces on pollution and on the threat it posed to the NATO members and their populations.[23] The new attention to the environmental question was of course linked to the debate that was taking place at the time within the Council, a debate that eventually led to the launch of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. The *Letter* produced regular updates and feature articles on the CCMS, including details about its research projects and publications.[24]

The appointment of John Price as Director of Information and the review of the work of NATIS carried out by the Information Working Group brought about substantial changes, including numerous cuts to the range of publications. At this point, the *NATO Letter* absorbed around a third of the entire NATO information budget, and the Working Group stressed the need to release funds for other activities, such as films, visits, lectures and pamphlets. For this purpose, monthly editions (English, French, German, Italian and Dutch) were cut back and appeared every two months.[25] The *Letter* acquired a new focus on the day-to-day work of NATO, including an 'open forum' with discussion in which the authors could speak in a personal capacity about the activity of NATO and the challenges it faced.[26]

In 1971, the magazine was relaunched under the new title of *NATO Review*.[27] In January 1975, Peter Jenner became its new editor. He remained in post until 1996.[28] During Jenner's long tenure, the *Review* became less an official in-house publication and more an open forum for discussion. Experts and journalists were invited to contribute original articles and to offer different aspects of the alliance and on its developing security concept. Jenner himself contributed several articles.[29]

These efforts were, however, temporarily halted by the tensions that followed the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the dual-track debate. The *Review* engaged with the discussions about weapon modernisation and with the criticism advanced by the peace movements. It did so by publishing articles on the military strength of the Warsaw Pact and on security and arms control to demonstrate the need for NATO to maintain high levels of defence expenditure before agreeing on mutual force reduction. In October 1979, at the peak of the discussions of the dual-track decision, the *Review*'s front page showed a map of Central Europe with data about the balance of conventional military forces. In April 1980, the cover offered an aerial view of the amphibious assault ship USS *Saipan*, and the following issue showed Soviet armoured personnel carriers in Afghanistan. Thus, in the period 1979–1981, there was a clear return to military-based themes reminiscent of the early years of life of the *NATO Letter*.

The appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 brought the attention back to the political debate and opened possibilities for a new diplomatic dialogue between the two blocs. The *Review* went back to feature articles and gave ample space to the discussion about changes in the Soviet Union and the US–Soviet talks about arms control. Data about levels of defence expenditure and comparisons between the military strength of the two blocs continued to be widely discussed inside the *Review*, but all pictures, on the cover and inside the magazine itself, were only of political leaders and experts talking and shaking hands – a clear attempt to focus on the political and diplomatic relevance of the talks.

In the period that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall, Jenner was determined to make sure that the *Review* followed the approach of Secretary General Wörner and that it engaged with dialogue with the East and with new notions of peace and security. Several articles by Wörner as well as extracts from his speeches were published regularly. In addition, experts and key military figures were asked to contribute articles with their views about the future of NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was of course a time of rapid radical change, and the articles stand out for the wide range of topics and the breath of the discussion. While all authors who published in the *Review* naturally thought that the alliance still had a role in the post-Cold War environment, what this role could be was the object of a lively discussion. In this sense, the *Review* did succeed in offering a platform for the discussion of key topics and it acted as an open forum in which authors replied to the points made by others and put forward their own views. After 1991, it became clear that NATO was moving towards a new kind of security concept that included crisis management and peacekeeping, and with the beginning of the war in the Balkans, the debate was cut short. Not surprisingly, in August 1989 and again in February 1991 the *Review* underwent significant changes in terms of format. Glossy paper and a new, larger font size tried to make the *Review* look more appealing to a wider public, making it look like a modern topical magazine.

In the early post-Cold War years, the *Review* published articles by journalists and political leaders from the new democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine. It also engaged with topics like peacekeeping, crisis management and European political integration, which had not been part of the *Review*'s interest in earlier years. As NATO expanded, the *Review* was translated into the languages of the new members. Today, a version in twenty-eight languages, including Russian and Arabic, is available online.[30]

Translation and distribution

All NATO information material was and is initially produced in the two official languages of the alliance, French and English. This is also true for

all official documents, such as speeches, communiqués and press releases.[31] Translation into the other languages of the alliance usually takes place within the following two weeks.

Translation was always a problematic issue for NATIS in terms of bearing the costs of providing translations for a wide variety of material. After the launch of the Information Service, there was a discussion about who should pay for the translation costs. Should the Service provide the official version in English and French and leave the translation costs to the other national information agencies? This proposal would have meant that the British, American, Belgian and French delegations would have not had to pay, as they already had the material in their own language. Not surprisingly, the other delegations protested, saying that they did not have sufficient resources and that the delay in translating the material would be an obstacle to the promotion of a coherent information campaign throughout the alliance. It was argued that it would have been best if NATIS could supervise the translation process and release the translated versions of the material in languages other than English and French at the same time. The Press Section was therefore stuck with the costs and the organisation of the entire translation process, which required expertise and funds.

The Three Wise Men Report recommended that 'provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments'.[32] The early implementation of this proposal was crucial in allowing NATIS to proceed with the translation of key publications into all languages of the alliance. Yet the allocation from the Civil Budget was not sufficient. Ten years later, Price lamented that:

> NATIS has no translator and the present system of using 'pool' translators in their paid spare time is highly unsatisfactory. These translations have to be revised extensively since the translators cannot write in a journalistic style. A French–English translator is badly needed not only for the *NATO Letter* staff but for all publications.[33]

A careful reading of the documents, and conversations with information officers who worked for NATIS at the time, reveal an interesting paradox. Translation and print runs were decided by the Information Service, but not necessarily on the basis of criteria such as demand and distribution capacity in the different countries. The decision was based on requests from the national information agencies. The requests put forward, however, were not necessarily linked to the demand for additional copies but more to the desire of some national agencies to show their commitment to NATO. Thus, quantities to be produced in some languages were artificially inflated on the insistence of some member countries, irrespective of rational criteria. The result was that for some years, large unused

stocks of books and pamphlets languished in dusty cellars and were eventually shredded.[34]

A similar problem affected the versions in English and French. It has always been the rule in NATO that official documents must be issued in both languages in as close a time-frame as possible. This decision was based on the unspoken agreement that the official languages of the alliance were equally important and therefore the same number of English and French copies had to be produced even if it was clear that there was much more demand for the English version, English being more widely spoken throughout the alliance than French. Again, the result was that stacks of French editions were put aside and later disposed of.[35] In the words of Nick Sherwen, during the Cold War:

> [t]he Information Service fell over backwards to respect this rule and religiously insured that all its publications were issued in both languages. However, extending this notion to the printing of materials in equal quantities, regardless of demand or need, was manifestly absurd. Equally, delaying the publication of one language edition until the availability of the other (in the case of a large reference book by as much as a year), without regard to the purpose of the publication, was clearly a nonsense and a waste of resources. It is nevertheless an indication of the stakes involved and the power of national prejudices that both these occurred.[36]

Expenditure on the production and translation of the *NATO Letter* was the highest single item in the NATIS operational budget, even surpassing that of films.[37] The possibility of selling the *Letter* was considered but rejected as counter-productive. The idea of carrying advertisements was abandoned too on the ground that 'such advertisements would inevitably be military and would give the magazine a too military aspect'.[38]

Film production was of course costly, and required expertise and a dedicated circulation network. NATIS was in no position to oversee the entire process. Initially, the films were produced by or with the assistance of the United States Information Agency. Translation was costly but rather straightforward, as the films were documentary-style productions with one voice-over narrator. This meant that no actors had to re-enact the scripts and only one person could read the translated script. Most of the translation costs were covered by the national information agencies.

All information material produced by NATIS was open to the public. Publications like the *NATO Letter* were sent directly to the subscribers free of charge. Many others circulated through the network of voluntary organisations. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, throughout the Cold War NATIS was assisted by a network of pro-NATO organisations. There was at least one in each member state, but often more. Their aims and target audience varied but overall they shared the view that NATO and closer

Atlantic ties were essential for the peace and security of the West. The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) was particularly helpful in distributing NATIS publications. Other institutions like the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers acted as a vehicle for further distribution of material aimed at educators. Troops received copies of the key publications during their training and when taking part in joint military exercises. Non-communist trade unions were also a vehicle for the distribution of material.

All NATO publications, including pamphlets, brochures and leaflets as well as more substantial pieces like *Facts and Figures*, were also distributed directly to the public who attended the travelling exhibitions, to those who visited NATO Headquarters, to journalists who reported on ministerial meetings, and so on.

The national information agencies themselves acted as an outlet. They were often located within the Foreign Ministries and – as was discussed in Chapter 4 – from 1971 the Ministries of Defence were also involved. Not every country had a well-organised distribution network, and surveys carried out by the CICR revealed that the material often remained unused. According to the survey carried out in 1969, however:

> Distribution of NATO Information Service material is very uneven, being at its highest in relation to population in Norway and Denmark and at its lowest on the North American Continent. Methods of distribution vary widely from country to country and the question of the most effective method is a subject deserving more study.[39]

NATIS was particularly concerned that it was often difficult to know how many of the copies passed on to the CICR delegation were in fact forwarded to the capitals and how many were retained. The fact that in 1969, 900 copies of the *Letter* were found in the offices of the Italian delegation was not an encouraging sign.[40]

The background material circulated by the CICR was not intended for a wider audience. It was sent directly to specific contacts such as trade union leaders, journalists, MPs and academics. The intent was to allow them to write and talk about NATO more accurately. NATO archival documents also show that from the mid-1960s on, the embassies of some NATO members were occasionally used to distribute information material about NATO to key contacts in countries that did not belong to the alliance. This was particularly the case for western embassies in African and South-East Asian countries that had recently become independent. However, it should not be forgotten that their terms of reference specifically prohibited the CICR and NATIS from addressing the public outside the NATO area and therefore the use of embassies was never fully discussed and was done on an ad hoc basis, often on the member country's own initiative.[41]

Conclusion

The Press Section could not be accused of lack of initiative and enthusiasm. An overview of the list of publications produced during the Cold War demonstrates that the Section was very active and tried to address a wide variety of audiences. No effort was spared, and it appears that perhaps too much was produced. There was a tendency to repeat the key information over and over again. A more thorough discussion about how to measure the success of the information programmes promoted by NATIS can be found in the Conclusion of this book but it may be helpful to discuss briefly the degree of overlap among the publications and the distribution problems.

The actual publications produced by NATIS were carefully planned and they targeted different audiences. *Facts and Figures,* for example, was a helpful handbook for anyone who wanted to understand the history and inner workings of the alliance. The *NATO Letter* focused on current affairs and the position of the alliance therein. Other, more specific publications such as *Man's Environment and the Atlantic Alliance* targeted a specific audience and dealt with a well-defined aspect of the alliance. In this sense, there was little problem with overlap and repetition. Other publications had a shorter time-span and were coincidental with a specific task of the alliance, so, for example, *The Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact* was produced and updated only for a few years and then withdrawn. However, a review of the list of contacts used by NATIS reveals that a few people received most of the publications produced by NATIS – hence the feeling of being inundated by virtually the same kind of information over and over again.

The reports circulated by the CICR, on the other hand, tended to be very repetitive indeed. This was mainly due to the fact that the CICR did not have a plan for what reports should be produced and simply forwarded all those that the Committee deemed interesting and helpful for the national information agencies. On several occasions, the same data and information were repeated in different publications, and the result was that the recipients felt inundated with virtually the same sort of material and did not know what to do with it, as is revealed by some of the comments sent back to NATIS.[42]

The people who received the publications were in some way already connected to the alliance and the publications did little more than preach to the converted. In terms of fostering support for the alliance beyond the circle of specialists, NATIS could only hope that the publications would be used as a source of information and a reference point for journalists, politicians and scholars. Yet the Press Section had no possibility of assessing whether the information was indeed passed on, let alone of measuring the impact that it had on the wider public.

Notes

 1 'The Lisbon reorganization', text of Lord Ismay's report to the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn, May 1957. Available at: www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/text.htm (retrieved on 23 January 2013).
 2 Foreword by the NATO International Staff, Archives Section. Available at: www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/foreword.htm (retrieved on 22 January 2013).
 3 Eleven editions were produced in the following years up to 1989.
 4 'Survey of the NATO Information Service Output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 99.
 5 Ibid., pp. 107–117. To celebrate the tenth anniversary of the alliance, the Secretary General, Paul-Henri Spaak, wrote a pamphlet on the history and mission of NATO. The sixty-page booklet was published in English and French by Penguin and Plon respectively. It was translated into most languages of the alliance. Although the publication was encouraged by NATIS, the Service did not produce or circulate it.
 6 The distribution networks will be discussed later in the chapter. The *NATO Handbook* carried a small charge. 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1.
 7 An updated version of *Soviet Military Power* was published every year from 1983 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It was published by the US Department of Defense and was translated into a variety of languages, including German, French, Japanese, Italian and Spanish.
 8 Many of the illustrations used in *Soviet Military Power* were in fact paintings of Soviet military hardware and installations, as it was not possible to use classified US satellite imagery and intelligence sources.
 9 *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984).
10 Interview of Nick Sherwen with the author.
11 A good example is *Force Comparison, 1987: NATO and the Warsaw Pact*, published by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal government.
12 De Madre J., '*NATO Letter*'s tenth anniversary', *NATO Letter*, 11/12 (December 1963).
13 CICR, '*NATO Letter*, note by the Acting Director of Information', 21 June 1960, NA, AC/52-WP(60)26.
14 A list of the *Letter*'s target audiences can be found in 'Survey of the NATO Information Service Output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1.
15 'Survey of the NATO Information Service Output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 46.
16 See, for example, the issue of the *NATO Letter* published in September 1961, which included articles entitled 'Europeanism and Atlanticism', 'Historical considerations' and 'Citizenship'.
17 CICR, 'Proposed 1961 information programme', note by Director of Information', 21 August 1960, NA, AC/52-WP(60)36.
18 CICR, 'Proposed new Atlantic community series', note by the Director of Information, 24 November 1961, NA, AC/52-WP(61)49/2.
19 The following special issues focused on Britain, Belgium and Greece. Special issues usually appeared in the summer.
20 *NATO Letter*, February 1963, 11/2.
21 De Madre J., '*NATO Letter*'s tenth anniversary', *NATO Letter*, 11/12 (December 1963).
22 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 76.

23 *NATO Letter*, 17/9 (September 1969).
24 'Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society', *NATO Letter*, 18/1 (January 1970).
25 Quarterly editions in Danish, Greek, Icelandic, Norwegian, Portuguese and Turkish remained unaltered.
26 'English edition of *NATO Letter* to appear six times a year', *NATO Letter*, 18/10–11 (October–November 1970).
27 The name of the magazine changed only in English and French and remained unaltered in the other languages. The French title actually changed a little later, in January 1974, from *Nouvelles de l'OTAN* to *Revue de l'OTAN*.
28 Jenner joined the International Staff from the Central Office of Information in London in 1968 and was first Assistant Editor. Shea J., 'Peter Jenner retires as Editor of *NATO Review*', *NATO Review*, 44/6 (November 1996). Online version available at: www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9606-b.htm (retrieved on 25 January 2013).
29 See, for example, Jenner P., 'NATO solidarity and undiminished defence basis for progress towards détente', *NATO Letter*, 21/1 (November–December 1974); 'NATO summit: leaders reaffirm commitment to alliance and collective security', *NATO Letter*, 23/3 (May–June 1975).
30 The latest issue of the *Review* can be found at www.nato.int/docu/review/index_EN.htm#2. There is also an archive where it is possible to find issues that go back to 1991; see: www.nato.int/docu/review/2012/Archives/EN/index.htm (retrieved on 23 January 2013).
31 All documents circulated within the alliance, including secret reports, are produced in both languages. The NATO archives keep a copy of each document in both languages using the same archival reference.
32 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, 13 December 1956, point 86.c. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-96747985-4802FC23/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm (retrieved on 23 January 2013).
33 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 76.
34 Interview of Nick Sherwen with the author.
35 From 1960, different numbers of copies of the *Letter* were printed in the two languages but still too many copies in French were not distributed. In 1963, for example, 47,800 copies were printed in English and 32,700 in French. De Madre J., '*NATO Letter*'s tenth anniversary', *NATO Letter*, 11/12 (December 1963).
36 Interview of Nick Sherwen with the author.
37 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 77.
38 Ibid., p. 77.
39 Ibid., p. 2.
40 Ibid., p. 75.
41 The distribution of the NATO films will be discussed in the next chapter.
42 Interim Report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 8 July 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)34(Final).

6 Reaching out to the wider public
NATO films and travelling exhibitions

Since the Second World War, information officers had been aware that 'moving pictures' were a unique information medium with a strong impact on the public and an immediate effect. Films' ability to reproduce images, movement and sound produced a sense of immediacy and opened new possibilities for nuanced and indirect propaganda messages. Films also created visual icons that could shape historical consciousness and influence public awareness much more profoundly than any other propaganda tools. Most importantly, compared to other information material produced by information officers at the time, films could reach the wider public and, through the choice of themes, the selection of frames and pictures, and the music, they could create different levels at which the message was conveyed. By touching upon a wide range of sensibilities and concerns, films enabled the information officers to address different audiences at the same time.

During the Cold War, films became a crucial weapon in the propaganda war between East and West, and a rich body of literature is now available for specialists as well as for the general public.[1] Like all other information agencies at the time, the NATO Information Service was aware of the propaganda potential of films. NATIS produced numerous short films, often in partnership with national information officers and particularly with the United States Information Agency (USIA). These were usually short documentary-style films that had a non-commercial circulation through the network of pro-NATO associations and national television broadcasting stations. As will be explained in this chapter, however, the costs involved in the production of the films and the organisational problems connected with their distribution often caused delays and undermined the efforts of the Media Section.

The launch of the Media Section

Initially, NATIS relied heavily on the help of national information agencies both for the production of radio broadcasts and visual material and for their circulation through the national networks. Given its limited

means, initially NATIS proceeded with the production and circulation of broadcast interviews to key political figures, mainly the Ministers of Defence, to explain the need for the alliance. This material offered official information and data upon which journalists could base their articles and radio programmes. NATIS also helped organise meetings between journalists and ministers at the end of official meetings. In-house production of video recordings remained beyond its reach, however.[2]

As was discussed in Chapter 2, following the creation of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) in the summer of 1953, the NATO Information Service was divided into three sections: Press Relations (under the chairmanship of George Parsons Jr), the Editorial Section (under Oliver de Sayve) and the Media Section (under Peter Pooley). NATO's and national information experts had long been aware of the need to engage with the 'new media'. They knew all too well that newsreels and short films in particular were an excellent tool with which to reach a wider public, but the costs involved and the need to find the right people for the job had caused delays.

Under the leadership of Peter Pooley, the Media Section became an important part of NATIS and dealt with the production of all NATO films, photos, exhibitions and other visual and audio aid services. Peter Pooley started his career as an announcer for the BBC World Service, which at that point was called the Empire Service. In 1940, he founded and became the first editor of BBC's *Radio Newsreel* programme, which rapidly became a success because of its accuracy combined with a lively presentation style, which was a refreshing change compared with the grave style of the other news programmes of the time. Yet despite the widely acclaimed success of *Radio Newsreel*, Pooley resigned from the BBC in 1947 when Tahu Hole was promoted Editor, as he disagreed with Hole's plans for the Service.

Pooley went on to become an associate producer in John Grierson's Crown Film Unit. Formerly known as the GPO Film Unit, during the war the Crown Film Unit had been part of the British government's Ministry of Information. Its output included short information and documentary films, as well as longer drama-documentaries. Building upon the pre-war 'documentary movement', the Unit produced some 130 films for cinemas and non-theatrical venues over twelve years. During the war, the Unit undertook increasingly innovative projects in which non-actors played themselves and their own experiences.[3]

In 1946, the Ministry for Information was abolished. It was replaced by the Central Office of Information (COI), for which the Crown Film Unit continued to work. Thus, when Pooley joined, he did so at a time when the Unit was experiencing radical change. As it had done during the war, the Unit continued to make short, relatively inexpensive films fulfilling the requests coming from COI, yet it also started more prestigious productions, some of which are today seen as key contributions to the history of

British documentary. They are characterised by a strong focus on social issues, to which the public was beginning to turn its attention.[4]

While working at the Crown Film Unit, Pooley was seconded to the Office of Information of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) in Paris to assist with the production of short films to promote the Marshall Plan. As David Ellwood has amply demonstrated, the early experience of the Marshall Plan propaganda campaign shaped the way in which the Atlantic community was presented to the public in the following decades, and therefore this experience offered Pooley an important insight into how to promote such a complex concept.[5]

His time at the Crown Film Unit was of course also important for Pooley, as he moved into the field of film and documentary production, which gave him importance first-hand technical experience that would later become very helpful when he had to produce similar short films to promote NATO. The association with the production of the Marshall Plan films was also important to establish contact with information officers in other countries associated with the Plan, including USIA. All of these experiences would be extremely helpful for Pooley when it came time to produce NATO films promoting the concept of the Atlantic community.

The Crown Film Unit was closed by the Conservative government in 1952 despite a vigorous opposition campaign organised by the Labour Party and numerous left-wing intellectuals.[6] The end of the Crown Film Unit coincided with the launch of NATIS. Given his experience in radio broadcasting and film producing, Pooley was the ideal man to set up the audio-visual media section. Pooley joined NATIS at the beginning of the Service's history and for many years worked as Assistant Director of Information.[7]

Upon his arrival to NATIS, Pooley was concerned with the need to expand the use of new media, which were the most apt to reach a wide audience and which – once the initial production costs had been covered – promised to be a very cost-effective information tool. In 1953, Pooley lamented that the Information Service had no camera team of its own and no facilities for development of photos. It was not possible, Pooley argued, for NATIS to rely routinely on support and assistance from SHAPE's Information Division and from USIA. Such help was not sufficient and did not give NATO the possibility of having its own, independent information media policy. Like all experts involved in NATO's information policy, Pooley pointed to the small size of the budget. Given the current levels of budget, he claimed, NATIS could only hope to produce two reels of about twenty minutes per year which was, he argued, clearly insufficient. In addition, there was a serious problem with distribution. For this too, NATIS was forced to rely on other organisations. Pooley was instrumental in focusing the attention of the national delegations of the CICR onto the films and newsreels and organised a special meeting in Paris with key national information officials as well as with commercial producers and distributors.[8]

Pooley also established a photo library – which later became a media library – holding a large collection of photographs, newsreels and films that national delegations were invited to contribute to, and to use in their information programmes.[9] The Media Library received numerous requests for material from national information agencies and journalists, and the demand increased year by year throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The Library was an essential tool in NATIS's information campaign, as it opened the possibility of placing photo-feature stories in large-circulation magazines. In addition, the Media Library supplied photographic prints for use in mobile exhibits and was often called upon to prepare material for use in official briefings. Official photos and press coverage of all ministerial meetings and of distinguished people visiting the headquarters were also kept by the Library for future reference and to support the work of NATIS, of the national information agencies and of the voluntary organisations.

Throughout the Cold War, the Media Section offered facilities to national radio broadcasters at the headquarters. They also recorded radio broadcasts of all Ministerial and Council meetings as well as *Report from NATO*, a fortnightly programme lasting fifteen minutes on average. It offered a summary of the latest events, and interviews with and comments by key figures of the alliance. It was sent out on tape to a list of regular contacts, such as USIA and Radio Free Europe, which would then be able to use the material in their own productions.[10]

The 1950s did indeed offer great opportunities in terms of development of media information campaigns as more national television stations came into operation and existing TV services lengthened their programme hours. The Media Section was established precisely in response to the increasing demand for information material (photographs, documentaries, recorded interviews) from national information agencies and broadcasters. Pooley joined the Director of Information's calls to obtain more funds for NATIS, calls that – as discussed in previous chapters – remained unanswered.[11]

The first short films about NATO

Like all NATIS's other activities, initially the Media Section's efforts were almost entirely absorbed by the education of the troops. As part of their military preparation, the new NATO troops had to be taught about the advantages of being part of the Atlantic Treaty Organization and of working together with soldiers from other countries, which included nations that a few years earlier had been considered enemies. Not surprisingly, the material produced for this purpose focused on military defence and security cooperation. In these short films, NATO is identified as the only way to prepare Western Europe to respond to an imminent attack from Warsaw Pact. A good example of this kind of material is the *Atlantic*

Review series. Produced between 1954 and 1960, these short films focused almost exclusively on the military aspects of the alliance, and particularly on the coordination of weapon production, the launch of joint military research projects and the creation of a common defence strategy. The first documentary of the series (*The Atlantic Review: Number 1*, 1954), for example, discusses the mobility and long-range striking power of the NATO land forces. It features different types of missiles and rockets and aerial reconnaissance, and NORDATLAS troop-carrying aircraft in service with the German Air Force.

Although the training of troops remained one of its key objectives, NATIS soon became aware of the need to respond to the anti-NATO propaganda campaigns carried out by the Soviet Union and the national communist parties. In addition to promoting the exchange of information among its national delegation, NATIS launched its own campaign to expose 'Soviet imperialism' and to demonstrate the 'purely defensive nature of the alliance'. Part of NATIS's action was consistent with the information activities carried out by its members, and thus it aimed to expose the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime and it emphasised the need for the western governments to act as 'the guardians of freedom and democracy'.

As has been discussed in previous chapters, the death of Stalin and the end of the Korean War brought about a temporary relaxation in East–West relations. The new Soviet 'peace offensive' replaced frontal opposition to the United States and NATO with a more articulated strategy directed at weakening the unity of the alliance. Calls for the peaceful coexistence of the two blocs resonated strongly among wide sectors of the public. Precisely because it blurred the line between communists and non-communists, the new Soviet strategy was seen by the NATO information officials as extremely dangerous and led to an increase in the West's information activities. At the same time, the admission of West Germany into NATO in May 1955 made an overhaul of NATO information policies all the more necessary, as it was important to inform the overwhelmingly neutralist West German public opinion about the need to have a strong NATO. Large sections of the West European public had to be reassured that a rearmed and sovereign Germany was not a threat to peace precisely because of its NATO membership. Thus, a lot of pressure was suddenly exerted on NATIS.[12]

Following the recommendations of the 1956 Three Wise Men Report, the Conference of National Information Officials suggested replacing the strictly military-based themes widely used in the early 1950s with a new focus on the economic and social integration promoted by NATO, a view shared by the CICR.[13] The scope of NATO information policies was thus widened in terms both of the themes used and of the audiences targeted. According to NATIS, it was necessary to address the 'opinion makers' without losing sight of the wider public, particularly the younger

generations, who were becoming increasingly sceptical about the need for NATO. The information experts suggested that the overall language used in all information material should become more positive and constructive. NATO's material should move away from strictly defined military themes (article 5) and portray the alliance as a means of fostering economic and cultural ties among its members (article 2). The new NATIS material should explain that the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty had brought peace in Europe and stopped Soviet expansion. Most importantly, the Conference of National Information Officials advised NATIS to make clear that western expenditure on defence was not undermining the economic recovery of Western Europe by diverting funds towards rearmament, a point forcefully made by the communists. The new propaganda material should illustrate the dramatic economic progress in countries like Italy and West Germany and show the high standard of living enjoyed throughout the alliance.[14] Thus:

> NATO information policy should stress the need for Western unity, regardless of the Communist threat. It should emphasise the positive aspects of NATO as an alliance which functions on practical matters – infrastructure, common production, alignment of policies, etc. – and … a positive front to the current political challenges with which the West is faced.[15]

The greater attention paid to economic and political themes is clear if we compare *Power for Peace* (1952) and *Alliance for Peace* (1955). *Power for Peace* was technically a NATO film as it focused on the alliance and was circulated by NATIS, but it was an external production. It is a good example of the first generation of short films, offering an introduction to NATO for a wider audience. It was made before the NATO Information Service took over the production of motion pictures, and was edited by SHAPE in association with the Film Section of the Mutual Security Agency in Paris. *Power for Peace* offers a summary of the events from April 1945 to the establishment of NATO in 1949. The fourteen-minute-long film argues that while the western nations disarmed at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union refused to do so.[16] The film shows a map of Europe in which the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe is marked by each country becoming progressively darker until the whole screen is black, with the exception of a white spot indicating West Berlin. *Power for Peace* argues that because of the threat of a Soviet military invasion, the West had reluctantly to take up arms once more in order to be able to secure peace through strength. While showing steel factories at work, the narrator explains that '[b]ecause in today's world of Soviet aggression the only safety is in strength, and plans all over Western Europe push ahead to build weapons that alone can make aggression costly and therefore impossible'. The movie then shows Generals Eisenhower,

Montgomery and Juin as well as tanks, airfields, aircrafts, warships and sol-
diers training. Its last frame shows the 'Vigilia Pretium Libertatis' insignia
of SHAPE.

Despite its attempt to address the wider public, this black-and-white film
focuses almost exclusively on military defence and on the need to rearm
and be ready to respond to a military invasion. The threat is clearly identi-
fied with Soviet Russia and its satellites. This short film follows closely the
guidelines issued by the CICR earlier the same year, whereby:

> Owing to its aggressive policy, the USSR must shoulder the entire
> responsibility for the present armament race, precluding the use for
> other purposes of the immense productive capabilities of the great
> democracies in the West. A halt in the armaments drive would imme-
> diately release productive resources for the benefit of all countries
> including those now occupied by Russia.[17]

In 1955, NATIS produced an updated version of *Power for Peace* under the
title of *Alliance for Peace*. Despite the fact that *Alliance for Peace* uses some of
the same footage as the SHAPE short film, the final result is substantially
different.[18] The movie opens with the newly designed NATO flag flying to
the sound of music played by the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra. Again, it
reminds viewers of the immense military might of the Soviet Union and it
shows the same map of Europe turning increasingly darker. The map is
here followed by extracts from speeches by General Eisenhower, Lord
Ismay and President Truman. *Alliance for Peace* is almost twice as long as
Power for Peace, and in the additional twelve minutes it recalls the trip of
General Eisenhower to all the member capitals in preparation for the
signing of the Treaty of Washington. This trip offers the chance to
produce a very short portrait of each member state. Less than twenty
seconds is spent on the Netherlands, and most of this time is used to show
two young girls ice-skating in traditional clothes, while Italy is represented
by a group of youngsters riding Vespas through the streets of Rome.
Despite being very stereotypical, these portraits nevertheless have the
merit of conveying the diversity of the alliance while at the same time
stressing the member states' common cultural heritage. The film explains
how the aim of NATO is to defend Western Europe as well as to strengthen
the economic and political ties among its members. In its conclusion, the
documentary explains that:

> [i]t is not the job of NATO either to threaten or to intimidate. For the
> aims of this alliance of the North Atlantic are the reverse. Its very exist-
> ence is an assurance that each new dawn breaks over a western world
> at peace, over the countryside, villages, towns of a community of
> peace-loving people. [*While showing pictures of the NATO capitals*] A
> bond welding the Old World and the New, an assurance that a family

of 430 million people remains free. Free to live their lives as they wish to live them, to protect and preserve, by vigilance and readiness. These are the aims of the Atlantic alliance, an alliance for peace [*showing the new NATO flag fluttering in the wind*].

Like *Power for Peace, Alliance for Peace* includes footage of the training of troops and pictures of tanks, airplanes and warships but it argues that military defence is only one – and, it seems to suggest, not even the most important – of the tasks of the alliance.[19]

In the same period, NATIS produced *Around This Table* (1954) about the decision-making procedure within the NATO Council and Secretariat. This short film tackles three issues used with considerable success by the communists in their anti-NATO campaigns. First, the communists claimed that the establishment of NATO – and the creation of NATO military bases in particular – undermined national sovereignty. Second, they accused NATO of being part of a wider imperialist plan by the United States to impose its political will and economic might on Western Europe. Finally, the communists argued that the rearmament programme imposed by NATO weakened the economies of its members by demanding that a large proportion of their budget be diverted towards defence.

Around This Table counters this criticism by explaining how NATO helped achieve an effective defence system 'without jeopardising the economies of the countries involved' and how the establishment of the NATO bases did not infringe on national sovereignty. While showing the construction of a new airfield, the commentator points out that:

[t]his field is on the soil of an *independent sovereign state* [emphasis in the original]; yet, should the need ever arise, it will be at the disposal of all the NATO forces operating under one command for the defence of all the NATO members.

The documentary reiterates the fully peaceful aims of the alliance. It then shows a group of civilians watching a baseball game, thus indirectly identifying them as Americans and as peaceful:

These are the people who would rather not make another weapon of war or give another son to be a soldier but these are people who have learned from sad experience that in a divided world, freedom depends upon unity, unity backed by strength.

These short films were shown to the troops during their training as well as to the journalists and politicians who visited the NATO headquarters. They also had a non-commercial distribution, particularly through educational institutions and summer schools, and were occasionally broadcast on national tele-

vision channels.[20] Information officers recognised that 'this medium was beginning to offer extraordinary opportunities for contacting the general public in Europe, and NATO could not afford to miss it'.[21]

Distribution was often hampered by the need to translate, adding to the costs of the material. Providing appropriate translations was difficult and expensive. NATIS produced all material in French and English, the official languages of the alliance, and additional translations had to be made by the member states. Translation was too costly or too slow for the member states to carry out on their own.[22] On more than one occasion, USIA offered to help and carry out the translations on their behalf.[23] Yet the diverse distribution network and the lack of cooperation from the national delegations, which rarely sent feedback, also meant that NATIS was unable to produce even vague estimates about the number of people that saw the films.[24]

The travelling exhibitions, 1951–1959

In an attempt to involve as large a portion of society as possible, in the 1950s NATIS and the national governments collaborated in the preparation of travelling exhibitions. At first, these were small displays usually set up in trailers and tents, where the public could see pictures of NATO Headquarters, read figures about the progress of rearmament and be reminded of the enduring danger of Soviet aggression. The exhibitions consisted of pictures and posters, with simple messages and figures, and they often included a large amount of information about the country where the exhibition was taking place in an attempt to increase the viewers' interest. The wide use of pictures and drawings minimised the need for translation, which was costly and time-consuming.

The idea of a travelling exhibition to explain to the public the origins and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty originated in May 1951 and received technical assistance from the United States Information Service.[25] Initially, the exhibition was housed in a large tent and four extendable trailers, and had two themes: first, what NATO was about, and second, the role in NATO of the individual country where the exhibition was being shown. Numerous devices were used for attracting attention and for driving home the importance of NATO: photographs, graphic displays, moving devices, illuminated panels, maps, and the projection of films and newsreels.

The NATO travelling exhibitions followed the established model set by the propaganda campaigns designed to promote the Marshall Plan in Western Europe, a model that – somewhat ironically – had first been used by the Soviet Union in a campaign to promote the achievements of the October Revolution through travelling exhibitions on trains and ships.[26] Between 1948 and 1952, stationary and travelling exhibits on trains and ships had been part of the vast advertising campaign organised by the Economic Cooperation Administration. They included pictures, short

films, newsreels, posters and pamphlets to explain the benefits of the Marshall Plan and argue that American generosity did not conceal any imperialist greed, as claimed by the communists.[27]

Following the example of the Marshall Plan exhibitions, the NATO mobile exhibitions combined the need to explain that NATO was part of a wider process directed towards tighter transatlantic political and economic cooperation, without forgetting of course the need to defend Europe from the spread of communism. The first theme was hosted in Trailer 1. The exhibition began by recalling through photographs the happy days of summer 1945, when the West hoped for continued peace and worked to reconstruct western countries and their economies. Then, in the tent attached to the trailer, came a reminder of Soviet armed strength and of the acts of Soviet aggression between 1946 and 1948. Next, under the heading 'Answer to the threat', exhibits showed how the NATO countries came together on equal terms for the defence of peace and freedom by showing pictures of NATO summits and of political leaders as well as soldiers working together. The exhibition illustrated NATO's military capability and explained the military framework of the organisation. At the same time, attention was drawn to the increasingly close political and economic cooperation between the member states beyond the purely military field. Trailers 2 and 3 were placed at the disposal of the government receiving the exhibition to explain the country's contribution to and position within NATO.

In the 1950s, the content of the information material placed in the trailers and tents and of the publications distributed to the visitors focused on the Soviet Union as a military threat and on the fear of an imminent attack coming from the East. Thus, rearmament and common defence were identified as the only way to protect western democracy, freedom and peace. Not surprisingly, therefore, military themes occupied a central position in all propaganda material.

The first exhibition was sent to Italy. At the Italian government's request, it was shown under the name 'Caravan for Peace'. Between February and August 1952, the Caravan made a successful tour of the principal Italian cities (Naples, Rome, Florence, Genoa, Turin, Milan, Venice, Bologna and Bari), where it was seen by 1.5 million visitors. After some adaptation, the exhibition toured Greece and Turkey.[28] On the recommendation of the Secretary General, in January 1953 the French government asked for the exhibition to be brought to France on its return from Turkey. A committee was set up to adapt the themes to French public opinion and the French version was called 'Exposition Atlantique: Défense de la Paix'. The national part of the exhibition covered the French defence effort as a whole and the French struggle against communism in Indochina as well as the country's contribution to the Korean campaign. The total number of visitors during the French tour was just above 1 million.[29]

In each of the four countries, the presence of the exhibition was the object of press articles and of extensive newsreel coverage, which was organised by the NATO Information Service in cooperation with the national broadcasting corporations. According to the final report, the NATO exhibition received extensive national press coverage, and 2.6 million publications produced by NATIS were handed out to the visitors.[30]

Despite numerous requests by national governments to host the exhibition, in March 1953 the Information Service was advised that it could not expect further financial support for the project. In view of the costs involved, the NATO civil budget was unable to make extra contributions and it was therefore impossible to meet further requests. The exhibition programme was suspended and it was left to the individual member states to take the initiative and bear the costs.[31]

The French government requested that a revised and smaller version of the Atlantic Exhibition be made available to tour provincial towns and rural districts in France. This new exhibition, called 'Amitié Atlantique', laid more stress on the idea of an Atlantic community than on the notion of military defence and rearmament. The French government was responsible for financing the entire operation and NATIS could only offer technical assistance.[32]

In the same period, the NATO information budget underwent a significant change too. As was discussed in Chapter 2, in the early years the Information Service had been generously assisted by USIA with contributions of up to half a million dollars per year. Such contributions had the financial backing of the counterpart funds available to the ECA, which meant that the contribution stopped when the Marshall Plan ended. Thus, although the information budget for 1955 showed an increase over the budget voted in 1954, the overall amount of funds actually available to the Information Service fell dramatically, as it could not rely on the extra contributions from USIA.[33] Special projects, like the travelling exhibitions, were the first to suffer, and more attention was given to publications and the visiting programme to the headquarters, which were thought to offer better value for money. As discussed in Chapter 2, even if the new legislation prevented the United States from making direct contributions, USIA did continue to offer technical support to NATIS for the production and distribution of documentaries and newsreels.[34]

In the meantime, some member governments – particularly the French and Italian – offered more generous contributions, which softened the blow of the American withdrawal. Thanks to the support of individual member states and of the voluntary organisations, the travelling exhibitions could restart and in 1954 they were visited by 3.8 million visitors. In the summer of 1955, three mobile exhibitions toured Turkey, Italy and Denmark, where they stopped in seventy-five cities and were seen by over 1 million people. Some 700,000 copies of various publications on NATO were distributed to the visitors.[35] In July, the British Atlantic Committee – one of the most active

pro-NATO voluntary organisations – organised exhibitions in London and Oxford entitled 'Partners for Freedom', which included an extensive section on NATO. Opened by HRH the Duke of Edinburgh, the exhibition attracted considerable attention and was given ample space in the press.[36]

By October 1957, seven mobile truck-trailer units were in use throughout the alliance. The actual vans had been donated by the US government, together with the appropriate exhibition equipment such as panels and display machinery.[37] More countries asked NATIS to organise the tours, and the hosting governments often combined the mobile exhibition with a static one in the capital. In 1959, for example, while the NATO 'Britain and NATO' exhibition travelled across the United Kingdom, one exhibition took place at the National Hall in Olympia, which was visited by 17,000 people in two weeks.[38] NATIS also organised additional exhibitions on an ad hoc basis for special events like the Atlantic Treaty Association annual assembly or the Armed Forces Exhibition in Aarhus.[39] In addition, four smaller exhibition panels were placed in the public area of NATO Headquarters for the thousands of visitors touring the building every year to see.

The approval of the Three Wise Men Report meant that NATIS had to adapt the themes and approach of all its information material. In the films, newsreels and publications, NATO began to be described more openly as an Atlantic community, and although information on military defence was still provided in the background, more emphasis was placed on economic and political cooperation. This was partially due to the need to respond to communist allegations that the alliance and rearmament would soon drag Europe into a new war. The focus on economic and political integration built on the launch of the Common Market and the general enthusiasm for closer economic ties within Western Europe.

As far as the exhibitions were concerned, it was recommended that the organisers place posters promoting NATO alongside those portraying the successes of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the European Recovery Programme and the emerging Common Market.[40] The juxtaposition was intentional and was designed to persuade the viewers that NATO was part of a wider plan to improve economic and political relations between its members. At the same time, the travelling exhibitions were adapted to suit the education of the troops, and more material on the political and cultural dimensions of NATO was added to the military data.

In 1957, the first truck designed to tour military bases visited British forces stationed in West Germany. The following year a special exhibition toured Allied air bases in Europe: two Royal Canadian Air Forces (RCAF) bases in West Germany and fifteen United States Air Force (USAF) bases in France and West Germany, where it was visited by 17,000 people. One exhibition was sent to the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)

base in Naples.[41] At the same time, the larger exhibitions for the wider public were slower in adapting, as the changes approved by NATIS required the production of a large quantity of new information material to be put on display.

At the end of 1959, the CICR reviewed the use of the mobile exhibitions and opted for smaller and more manageable units. The vans were either sold or sent to be refurbished. The decision was due to the fact that operational costs connected with updating the mobile exhibitions trailers were relatively high for the NATIS budget. The Information Service did not have a graphics section and the mounting of any new exhibition required the employment of consultant designers, which was very expensive. The Service was never in a position to appoint a dedicated Exhibition and Visual Aid Officer, and the work was to be carried out by the Photo Officer. Unable to update the information material put on display in the travelling exhibition, NATIS decided to suspend the exhibition programme until such updating was feasible.

New themes and new audiences: NATO films in the 1960s

Despite the fact that production of short films continued, in the early 1960s it was recognised that 'at present NATO's film output is, of necessity, almost exclusively reserved for military or para-military subjects' and that new material should be produced so as to 'give greater emphasis to human beings and their achievements rather than to political, economic and sociological questions. For example the old series was called "Introducing Norway", the new series might be "Introducing the Norwegians" '.[42] The NATO information officers thought that this new focus would increase the appeal of the films for the wider public and help promote the alliance as a political organisation. At the same time, the establishment of regional officers on the International Staff at NATIS, charged with supervising the selection and supply of material for particular countries and regions, ensured a more effective production of information material and quicker translations and distribution.[43]

At the time, information experts also lamented the 'excessive use made of the word "NATO" which appealed very little to the imagination and which should be replaced as often as possible by the expression "Atlantic Community" '. For the same reason, they recommended not speaking of the 'Soviet or Communist threat' too often.[44] According to the minutes of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, there was wide agreement that:

> the introduction of a new subject in NATO's film production is long overdue and that there is a need for films on NATO which stress virtues other than military preparedness. What appears to be needed is a new Atlantic community series which would stress the contribution

each member country is making to the community and its way of life and in which audiences throughout the alliance can recognise their neighbours, their allies and their friends. The new series should be in colour.[45]

According to the Director of Information, Raban Graf Adelmann, the new material should concentrate on 'widening the scope of the present output by including more subjects of a non-military character' so as to respond to the Three Wise Men Report as well as to increase the overall appeal of the material among the general public.[46]

Consequently, in the 1960s NATIS produced more short films on each member state; the circulation of this material was supposed to help the public of the member states to get to know, and therefore to trust, each other. 'Television tours' – as the information officers called them – on each member state were produced with this aim in mind and were widely circulated throughout the 1960s. Each 'tour' consisted of a 20-minute documentary film showing the political system, economy and culture of each member state and explaining its historical ties to Europe and its contribution to its economic development and defence. Series of 'tours' were then broadcast on national television so that the viewers could 'tour' the alliance in the comfort of their own home.[47]

Documentaries on wider regions were also produced to highlight the common cultural elements across borders as well as the existing economic and political cooperation holding the region together. *The Inland Sea* (1961) is a good example of this kind of short film. It shows the Mediterranean basin as an area sharing common culture, history and trade as well as similar security concerns.[48]

One of the most widely distributed NATO films was *High Journey* (1959), which contains a commentary by Orson Welles. It is filmed entirely from low-flying aircraft and it shows views from North Cape to the Bosphorus. The film focuses on the natural beauty of the landscape and of the historical capitals of Europe. The commentary and the images also point attention to the lack of physical barriers and to the 'uninterrupted beauty' of the landscape, thus stressing the common cultural heritage of the Atlantic community. *High Journey* was the first NATO film to have theatrical distribution as a prime target. According to a NATIS report, 'it is essentially a soft-sell and had the message been more apparent, it would have not obtained such wide theatrical use'.[49] Interestingly, in all cases the threat of communism or of an attack from the East is never mentioned directly, although it is hinted at several times.

Throughout the 1960s, the production of information material for the troops continued. In fact, it constituted the majority of the NATIS film productions. Here too, however, it is possible to notice a new focus on cultural and economic issues. *Arctic Vigil* (1961), *Baltic to North Cape* (1961), *Lapp Home Guard* (1961) and *Northern Flank* (1962), for example, focus on

how Norway poses unique defence problems, which are contextualised within a broader political context.[50]

The new approach adopted by NATIS is particularly evident in short films like *The Changed Face of Europe* (1964), in which there is an attempt to link the foundation of NATO to the Marshall Plan and to the European integration process, hence demonstrating that NATO is much more than a military alliance. Here, the narrator explains how the signing of the Washington Treaty is part of a wider operation in which the two sides of the Atlantic came closer together through the Marshall Plan, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Schuman Plan and the Common Market. Despite the fact that the film shows the Berlin Wall and East German police patrolling the border, neither the Soviets nor the East Germans are mentioned. In what can only be defined as a casual tone, the narrator explains that:

> [t]his is why we need NATO today, just in case those on the other side, who sneer and smile, are tempted to do something desperate. But for us, no time for war; we have a train to catch! [*showing images of a fast train*]. If they over there cannot join us, then that's a pity, because Europe is moving fast and there is the danger of being left behind. As much as we wish them with us, even without them we over here are going at full speed ahead, together.

In the same period, NATIS produced *Two Worlds, Twenty Years* (1969), in which Belgium and Czechoslovakia are compared. The film shows how the two countries were equally devastated by the war and had similar economic and language problems. Yet the film argues that thanks to the Marshall aid, free market economy and the protection granted by NATO, Belgium prospered while Czechoslovakia was 'deprived of this help by the USSR and drawn into her orbit'. The film concludes with a description of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Given its topic and the requirement of some historical and political background knowledge, NATIS considered this kind of film a 'hard-sell' and as such 'it is more popular with adults than with young people'.[51]

In the late 1960s, the climate of détente and the student movements brought new opportunities – and challenges – to NATIS. As was discussed in the previous chapters, western public opinion called for the opening of a new diplomatic dialogue with Moscow, and support for NATO was once more being challenged. Thus, the CICR issued new guidelines to advise that all NATIS material should make clear that:

> [t]he decrease in tension in our relations with the Soviet Union is due to the equilibrium of forces between West and East. It should be pointed out that this balance is the result of joint efforts of member countries to build up effective deterrents and an integrated defence

force. The maintenance of this equilibrium is essential for the con-
tinuation of an improved atmosphere in East–West relations.[52]

Once again, information material had to undergo a substantial review.
The 'Soviet threat' had to be pushed further to the margins and the polit-
ical and economic cooperation fostered by the alliance further
underlined.

   The change in the content and style of the short films is most evident
through the comparison between *The Atlantic Decade* (1959), produced for
the wider public to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the
NATO Treaty, and *Europe: Two Decades* (1969), produced to celebrate its
twentieth anniversary. Both films start with the end of the Second World
War and with the reconstruction of Western Europe. *The Atlantic Decade*
incorporates some material taken from *Alliance for Peace* to show the
need to protect Western Europe from an attack from the East. Again,
the movie shows the map of Europe becoming increasingly darker as
Soviet expansion progresses, and there is a direct mention of Soviet
military might. Interestingly, for the first time there is an attempt to
address female viewers. Contrary to the usual trend of all NATO material
produced up to this point – where women were seen only walking down
crowded streets with young children – women are here shown working as
secretaries and shop assistants, and reading newspapers in cafés. When
presenting Turkey, the narrator makes a point that 'here too women have
been liberated'.

   Europe: Two Decades links more clearly the foundation of NATO to the
Marshall Plan and to the European integration process, and suggests that
they are all steps in the same effort to create a more united Europe and to
foster transatlantic relations within the context of the Atlantic community.
The film shows the signing of the Rome Treaty establishing the Common
Market in 1957 as a turning point in European history and as the begin-
ning of a new phase of economic cooperation and prosperity in Western
Europe. Among the aims of the Common Market is 'the need to protect
our western lifestyle'. NATO itself is mentioned only tangentially, despite
the fact that the film is supposed to be celebrating its twentieth anniver-
sary. It is interesting to note that *Europe: Two Decades* adopts a friendly tone
about the Russians, who are never called 'Soviets'. The film even includes
a few pictures of passers-by in Moscow's streets. The narrator suggests that
the tensions experienced in the past were due to the problematic person-
alities of Stalin and Khrushchev (who is repeatedly called 'Mister K') and
that these tensions have been left behind. The map of Europe turning
black is not used in *Europe: Two Decades* and there is no mention of
weapons or of military threats.

   There was a clear discrepancy between the information material pro-
duced for the general public and that directed to 'opinion makers'. In the
latter case, even in the 1960s the Soviet threat never disappears completely

and viewers are warned against the temptation of opening a premature dialogue with the Soviet Union. *Introducing NATO: A Briefing Film* (1967), for example, explains the work done at NATO Headquarters. The film is directed at journalist, academics and university students, and it adopts rather technical language. The 'Soviet problem' is here mentioned directly: after having reminded the viewer that despite the climate of détente the Soviet Union was still investing massively in military defence, the narrator warns:

> That's the Soviet capability. Can we afford to ignore it? To disband NATO in the face of such capability would be to say the least a trifle unwise. This doesn't mean that NATO is not interested in improving relations with the East. The governments of the Atlantic alliance are conscious that there is a thaw, a détente. They know that they must take this opportunity to improve relations, to negotiate with the Soviet Union and with the countries in Eastern Europe. Maybe, at last, we will arrive at positive results. But until we have positive results – our disarmament, control of nuclear weapons, the settlement of Berlin and the whole German problem – the governments of the alliance must remain vigilant and hard-headed. Their responsibility is the security of the western world and on that security may well hang the peace of the entire globe.

From the mid-1960s, the Media Section worked more closely with the public television networks so as to give maximum publicity to the ministerial meetings. Initially, news events took place in the security area of NATO Headquarters, to which television networks were not admitted. Thus, press final communiqués and official statements were filmed by the Media Section and the material was then passed directly on to the national television networks. The material was also made available via Eurovision, which meant that it was widely accessible to all private and state-owned broadcasters.[53]

John Price disliked this approach as it made the alliance look distant, and disengaged from the public. Pre-recorded communiqués with no question-and-answer sessions with the press gave the impression that the alliance was not interested in the reactions of the public. Hence, Price opened the television studios located within the headquarters to some national television networks, like CBC and NBC, and allowed them to film parts of the discussions. The Secretary General's official statements started to be filmed by television networks with their own cameras.

By 1966, twenty-three television networks and agencies requested NATO television shorts and maintained steady working relations with the Media Section, making numerous requests for material each year. By initiating cooperation directly with state and private broadcasting companies, the Media Section gradually moved away from liaising uniquely with

governmental information agencies. The collaboration with private broad-casting networks also revealed the inadequacy of the facilities offered by the Media Section and made equipment modernisation all the more necessary. It also helped the Section establish and maintain relations with experts in the field and promote the circulation of its own media production through a variety of radio and television networks.[54]

The NATO Mobile Information Centres, 1960–1969

Despite the budgetary and organisational problems, the CICR and NATIS recognised the value of the travelling exhibitions. It was decided to move the exhibitions away from a set of trailers and tents, which required staff to assemble them, and to use instead a small van, which would be a self-contained unit for the transport and exhibition of information material. Thanks to the profits made by the sale of the old vans and by the contributions from the French government and USIA, which had made some of the trucks available in the first place, the operation was possible despite the limited NATIS budget.[55]

The two NATO Mobile Information Centres (NMICs) were originally aimed at audiences who could not be reached by other means, particularly in regions often neglected by other media (like the south of Italy or the Greek islands). NMIC1 was designed to be used in southern countries and could include open-air film shows, while NMIC2 toured Northern Europe. In the much more confined space, the information centres could be used as mobile classrooms seating forty people. Both vans were equipped to show films and to host lectures and debates. The NMIC also included a graphic display that explained the organisation of the alliance, again with a particular emphasis on the country hosting the exhibition.[56] According to NATIS officials:

> With two technicians and an official in charge, only one hour is needed to get the truck ready and attract the public by broadcasting music through loud-speakers.... It can remain in place as long as necessary and set down again as soon as it has served its purpose. In other words, the NATO truck is a roving ambassador which carries the message of the Atlantic alliance to the most remotely situated people.[57]

The Mobile Information Centres were sent to smaller towns, often in conjunction with trade fairs, armed forces days and air shows so as to maximise attendance and impact. The NMIC stayed for a period ranging from one week to three months. In 1961, NMIC1 was put to the test and it spent a week in Gibraltar and a week in Naples in connection with the tenth anniversary celebrations of the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). Then it toured Portugal for three months and Greece for an

additional five months.[58] According to the report of the Portuguese representative, the NMIC was a very effective information tool, particularly in the countryside and small centres, where people had not yet been reached by other propaganda means. The tour was announced daily on the radio, and reports appeared in the local and national press.[59] The NMICs continued their tours throughout the 1960s and the annual reviews of NATIS output show that a consistently high number of people visited the centres and that requests for new tours from member governments were sustained.

In 1969, it was agreed to reduce the number of NMICs from two to one and eventually to cease the operation altogether. Although the two vans were very popular and demand remained steady, this method of briefing was considered to be the least cost-effective among those used by the Information Service at the time. With a population of 500 million in the alliance, individual oral briefing had only a limited impact. The use of the NMICs in villages and schools could only have a negligible effect in moulding the public of the alliance as a whole.

On the grounds of cost-effectiveness, it was therefore decided that exhibitions should always take place in conjunction with large events, such as trade fairs, with a ready-made audience on an ad hoc basis. One van was therefore put out of commission and sold; the remaining van was joined by a minibus and was used to carry additional display panels, serving as both information centre and mobile exhibition centre during special occasions such as the ministerial meetings.[60]

The cuts imposed on the NMIC programme were part of the overhaul of the NATIS output which was put in place by the new Director of Information, John Price. As was discussed in Chapter 3, upon his arrival in Brussels Price carried out a detailed survey of all NATIS's outputs and substantially revised the working procedures and outputs in the name of cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Not surprisingly, the travelling exhibition programme was deemed to be too old-fashioned and to provide little in return for the complicated organisation it required. Price opted for a rationalisation of the work of the Media Section and for more investments in film production.

Widening the audience, 1970–1989

The appointment of Price took place around the same time of the publication of the Harmel Report, 'Future tasks of the alliance'. The Harmel Report advocated strong defence along with new diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc and called on the NATO members to use the alliance in the interests of détente. As far as NATO's information activities were concerned, the Harmel Report stated that public support for the alliance's defence efforts was vital to the accomplishment of the task ahead and that it would be important to bring home to public opinion the rationale

underlying NATO strategy and the alliance's efforts to preserve the balance of security between East and West.

Public support for the defence effort was an essential factor in the credibility of NATO's deterrent, and this support had to be made clearly visible. Effective modernisation of the defensive system, rearmament and any defensive policy and military operation could only be achieved with public involvement and full support. Without it, according to the Harmel Report, NATO's deterrent value would be seriously undermined.[61]

The approval of the report therefore brought a review of the NATO information effort which coincided with the appointment of the new Director of Information. As was discussed in Chapter 4, in the 1970s NATO documentaries continued to address a wide variety of audiences and to touch upon military as well as political and cultural themes. There was a new attempt to portray the life of the NATO troops and the involvement of civilians in defending the western way of life. The films produced in this period skip over problematic events that might have damaged the alliance. De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from the integrated command of NATO and his demand to have NATO Headquarters relocated, for example, are never mentioned in the short films addressed to the general public. France is presented in the same way as any other member, overlooking the fact that the country was not part of the allied integrated command structure. Other problematic issues, such as the *Ostpolitik* of Willy Brandt, the West German chancellor, are equally ignored. As in the past, the task of the information material produced by NATIS is to portray a united alliance in a fully positive light.

This was a time when NATO struggled to adjust to a world that was no longer divided into two clearly opposite camps. While NATO information material ignored the 1973 events in Chile, it did focus extensively on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and on the Brezhnev Doctrine as evidence that Soviet imperialism was still threatening the NATO area.

The new peace movements and the public's opposition to NATO's weapons modernisation programme required an urgent revision of the propaganda output, including films. This brought about a renewed effort to inform the younger generations, who did not have any experience of the East–West tensions of the immediate post-war period. *Versus* (1971) is an eleven-minute colour film addressed to viewers aged 16 to 25. It explains that despite the current climate of détente there was still a need to remain vigil and to be ready to protect the West. *Europe and America* (1976) clearly targets university students and offers a summary of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Western Europe over the previous 200 years, identifying democracy, market economy and freedom of religion as the common ideas that held together the two sides of the Atlantic. Other documentaries focus on how civilians can contribute to the defence of the West. In *Lives* (1979), the viewers can follow the life of five people (two teachers, one scientist, one sailor and one civil servant). The

commentator explains that despite their different backgrounds, they are all united by their commitment to western values and therefore to NATO.

Education of the troops of course remained paramount throughout the Cold War.[62] Greater attention was paid to the experience of the servicemen in the NATO forces. While in the 1950s the short films for the troops focused primarily on military cooperation, on the Soviet threat and on the need to work together, in the 1970s they offered additional material to explain the added value of being part of the Atlantic alliance. *Four Days in Autumn* (1980) shows the activities of US soldiers during four days of exercise in the Federal Republic. In addition to the usual survey of training and weapon standardisation programmes, common in all material of this kind, the piece concludes with a statement about the benefits of travelling around Europe and getting to know different cultures.

In 1984, the documentary *Barriers* was given a bronze award at the British Film and Video Festival in Brighton. Narrated by the American actor Charlton Heston, the short film targeted young audiences and covered the events leading up to the creation of NATO. The focus is not on the Soviet threat – which is hardly mentioned – but on 'common Western values' holding Western Europe and North American together.[63]

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Media Section moved progressively away from producing its own films and started to commission material from external producers. This was due in part to the lack of funds but also to Price's new approach to information. According to Price, it was more effective to stimulate independent work that portrayed NATO in a positive light than to produce outright information material. NATIS's own productions would be easily identified by the public as 'propaganda' and as such would be labelled as misleading and unreliable, thus failing to engage with the audience. In order to ensure that broadcasters and producers put forward a positive view of the alliance on their own initiative, it was essential to establish personal relations. Yet NATIS was aware that:

> [t]his is a slow process and can only be done by constant visits and personal liaison.... One of the difficulties is to try to persuade TV companies to take an interest in the non-military work of the alliance but it is hoped that the [Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society] will provide more scope for this in the future.[64]

Thus, the Media Section worked closely with the Public Relations Section to establish and maintain close relations with national television broadcasters and film producers.

The Media Section strove to portray the complex nature of the alliance, which at this point reached far beyond the coordination of its members' defence. *The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society* (1974) shows the attempt of the CCMS to explore solutions to problems such as air pollution, water pollution and car safety in collaboration with the national

governments. This ten-minute colour film was produced by the Dedo Weigert Film Company in Munich. It is quite different from all the other material produced by NATO. It makes a clear attempt to appeal to the emotions of the viewers. The short film opens to the sounds of folk music with a horse running through a field in the sunshine. After images of chimneys releasing thick smoke and of waste being dumped into the sea to the sound of loud organ music, the camera cuts back to the horse, which has fallen to the ground, and then closes in on the face of a terri-fied child. Three minutes into the film, the narrator opens by explaining that modern society damages the environment by polluting the water, air and soil and that the CCMS is working to find an effective solution. NATO is not even mentioned.

Because of financial difficulties, in the late 1980s NATIS stopped pro-ducing films altogether. The end of the Cold War forced NATO to rethink its role in the world and its own strategic concept. Even if the Soviet Union and international communism had ceased to be a threat, other dangers might still menace the western world. This is the point made by *Citizens of the World*, a short film produced in early 1990 to explain NATO's role in the post-1989 era. The reference to 'other dangers' remains conveniently vague and – one might argue – ineffective. Material produced in the late 1990s, after the alliance's participation in the war in Bosnia, made a clearer attempt to explain the need for the existing NATO members to work together and to include new members, as well as to be ready to respond to emerging crises in other areas of the world. As NATO was finding its new place in world affairs, so the films became more precise about its mission. *The New NATO* and *A New NATO for a New Europe*, both produced in 1997, make this point quite effectively. For the first time, the narrator is a woman, and new issues such as peacekeeping and crisis man-agement are identified as the main aims of the alliance.[65]

Conclusion

The Media Section became an important part of NATIS. Films and news-reels were able to reach a wider audience than the publications and visit-ing programmes could ever hope for. Although they were rather expensive to record, once a piece of footage had been obtained, it could be used in in-house-produced films and newsreels as well as being passed on to national broadcasting corporations and voluntary organisations. Thus, the Media Section absorbed an increasingly large share of the Service's budget, as it was seen as an expensive but still cost-effective part of NATO's information action. It was a matter not only of production costs but also of frequent costly technological updates. Throughout the Cold War, NATIS struggled to keep up with new technologies. It con-tinued to rely heavily on the support of national information agencies, USIA in particular.

Like all NATIS's information programmes, the films and the exhibitions initially focused primarily on the danger of an imminent Soviet attack and on the need to rearm quickly. In the early 1950s, in the short films, photographs and exhibitions produced and circulated by NATIS the alliance was presented as a defensive military organisation and great attention was given to common military training, weapon standardisation and the construction of military bases. The main target audience was the troops themselves, but soon the need to address the wider public emerged forcefully. As the 'peaceful coexistence' campaign gained ground, 'opinion formers' became a crucial audience, as they were seen as one of the best channels through which to persuade the public of the benefits of being part of NATO and of investing large resources on defence. The advantages of closer economic and political cooperation were given increasing attention, thus squeezing strictly defined military defence themes to the side. NATIS – and the Media Section with it – started to include geopolitical, economic and cultural factors in their programmes to explain the need for the western countries to work together. In the films and exhibitions, the Atlantic community was defined as a community of values and shared heritage as well as of common security concerns. Focusing on the provisions of article 2, the alliance was portrayed as one of the many steps towards a more integrated Europe, and as part of a wider project in which the two sides of the Atlantic were coming closer together. The 'Soviet threat' was replaced by indirect phrases in which the 'enemy' was not mentioned and the more indefinite 'need to remain vigilant' reiterated.

From the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, a new focus on the younger generations and on the need to engage with new issues like the environment and weapons modernisation brought about a further revision of the information material produced. The Media Section paid increasing attention to the cultural diversity of the alliance and tried to demonstrate that despite their radically different ways of life, traditions and histories, all NATO members were united by a love for freedom, peace and democracy. The role of the individual became increasingly important. In the early movies and exhibitions, the alliance as a whole was at the centre of the message but from the 1960s onwards, individuals' contribution to the safety and prosperity of the West was the key message. According to NATIS's material, it was not only soldiers but also civil servants, metalworkers, teachers and women who contributed every day to the stability and prosperity of the West.

The message put forward by NATIS was consistent with what was being done by other western information agencies at the time. From the late 1960s, the Cultural Cold War saw the expansion of themes and a general tendency to adopt a more conciliatory tone. At a time when the younger generations, and particularly the peace movements, were radically critical of both superpowers and when one of the key concerns was the

environment, it was crucial to revise the security concept of the alliance and to show this change in the propaganda material produced at the time.

The launch of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was a crucial step in this direction. It helped demonstrate the complex nature of the alliance's security concept and at the same time it could be presented as further evidence of the alliance's peaceful nature. Yet the fact that the Committee was launched in 1969 and that the first film about it was produced in 1974 gives a sense of the time delay that affected NATIS's modus operandi. As will be discussed more thoroughly in the Conclusion, throughout the Cold War NATIS's propaganda effort was consistently undermined by delays and lack of funds. Because of the longer time and of the costs involved in film production, there was an evident discrepancy between the fast-changing nature of the Cold War and the slowly updated content of the material produced by the Media Section. NATO films took so long to reach their final stage of production that they often needed updating even before entering the circulation network.

Notes

1 'Films' can include documentary-style productions, short films, fictional screenplays and newsreels, all of which were widely used throughout the Cold War. Among the most recent and significant contributions are Shaw T. and Youngblood D.J., *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); Youngblood D.J., *Russian War Films: On the Cinema Front, 1914–2005* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); Shaw T., *Hollywood's Cold War* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); D'Almeida F., *Images et propagande* (Florence: Giunti, 1995); Hubert-Lacombe P., *Le cinéma français dans la guerre froide 1946–1956* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996); Kenez P., *Cinema and Soviet Society from the Revolution to the Death of Stalin* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001). Some priminary findings discussed in this chapter were published in two articles: Risso L., 'Propaganda on wheels: The NATO travelling exhibitions in the 1950s and 1960s', *Cold War History*, 11/1 (2011), pp. 9–25; Risso L., '"Don't mention the Soviets!" An overview of the short films produced by the NATO Information Service between 1949 and 1969', *Cold War History*, 9/4 (2009), pp. 501–512.

2 Information Policy Working Group, 'Positive information towards people of NATO countries', note by the UK delegation, 24 September 1952, NA, AC/24-D/7.

3 Good examples are *Target for Tonight* (1941) and the expensive, full-colour *Western Approaches* (1944). They were directed by Harry Watt and Pat Jackson, respectively. It is also worth remembering classics like Humphrey Jennings' *Words for Battle* (1941) and *Listen to Britain* (1942).

4 Among the most interesting examples are Lee's *Children on Trial* (1946) and Philip Leacock's *Life in Her Hands* (1951). A significant proportion of the post-war productions reflect Britain's evolving relationship with its colonies and the 'home front'. Films like *From the Ground Up* (1950) captured the progress of reconstruction.

5 David Ellwood has written extensively on the subject. Among his most interesting contributions are Ellwood D.W., '"You too can be like us": Selling the Marshall Plan', *History Today*, 48 (October 1998), pp. 33–39; 'The propaganda of

the Marshall Plan in Italy in a Cold War context', in Scott-Smith G. and Krabbendam H. (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), pp. 186–196; *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction* (Harlow, UK: Longman House, 1992); and the most recent, *The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). See also Hemsing A., 'The Marshall Plan's European Film Unit, 1948–1955: a memoir and filmography', *Journal of Film, Radio, and Television*, 14/3 (1994), pp. 269–297.

6 Chapman J., *The British at War: Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939–1945* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Swann P., *The British Documentary Film Movement, 1926–1946* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

7 Henry Peter Krohn Pooley (1912–1996) retired in 1977. Miall L., 'Obituary: Peter Pooley', *Independent* (London), 8 February 1996; Aubourg V., 'A history of NATO Information Service: NATO films and filmography', unpublished paper presented at 'NATO at 60: A Conference Exploring NATO's Past through Its Archives', 13 March 2009, Brussels, NATO Headquarters. Pooley's successor as the head of the Media Section was Peter Daniel (Canada), who later became Director of Information (1997–2000).

8 NATO Information Conference, February 1953. Summary record of a meeting held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris on 4–7 February 1953, 3 March 1953, NA, AC/24-R/15; Information Policy Working Group, 'Proposal from Information Conference', note by the secretary, 6 March 1953, NA, AC/24-D/34.

9 Information Policy Working Group, 'Proposal from Information Conference', note by the secretary, 6 March 1953, NA, AC/24-D/34.

10 For a list of all contacts, see 'Survey of the NATO Information Service Output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 242.

11 CICR, 'Problems of enlightening public opinion', report by the Director of Information', 9 April 1954, NA, AC/52-D/44.

12 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of these issues.

13 'Implementation of the recommendation made by the Committee of Three', note by the Deputy Secretary General, 10 January 1957, NA, CM(57)3. For more details, see Chapter 2.

14 'Conference of National Information Officials', 1 March 1960, NA, RDC/60/44; 'Information programme for 1956', report by the chairman of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations, 20 February 1956, NA, CM(56)18.

15 'Conference of National Information Officials', 1 March 1960, NA, RDC/60/44.

16 There are two versions of *Power for Peace*. The version distributed by NATIS is a fourteen-minute-long documentary film. USIA produced and distributed another version lasting twenty-eight minutes with additional details about the role of the United States in shaping the reconstruction of Western Europe.

17 'Counterpropaganda and action against subversive activities', memo by the Greek delegation, 13 June 1952, NA, CM(52)32.

18 As in the case of *Power for Peace*, there are two versions of *Alliance for Peace* (1954). The one used by NATIS was an updated version of a Marshall Plan movie of the same title. More material on NATO was added, such as the opening scene with the NATO flag. *Alliance for Peace* was later revised and became known as *Why NATO?*

19 *Alliance for Peace* was updated in 1956. Some frames were changed; the Netherlands, for example, was represented by views of the Dutch dams. The new version also included the accession of West Germany with footage of Chancellor Adenauer signing the membership agreement. The new script is also available in CICR, 'Tenth anniversary of NATO', 19 July 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)25/2.

20 Some NATIS films also had commercial non-theatrical distribution through the Inforfilm association, a distributor with outlets in most NATO countries.
21 'NATO Conference on Information Policy', summary record of a conference held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris from 25 to 28 January 1955, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.
22 CICR, 'Proposed 1959 NATO information activities', note by the Director of Information, 10 November 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)60.
23 See, for examples, data available in CICR, 'Tenth anniversary of NATO: tenth anniversary film project', 19 July 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)25/2.
24 For rather harshly worded comments on the lack of data provided by the national delegations, see 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1.
25 CICR, 'NATO Atlantic Exhibition, 1952–1954. Italy, Greece, Turkey, France', report by the Director of Information, 3 September 1954, NA, AC/52-D/54.
26 Kenez P., *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 58–62.
27 Ellwood, 'You too can be like us'. For an overview of the key themes, see Burk K., 'The Marshall Plan: filling in some of the blanks', *Contemporary European History,* 10/2 (July 2001), pp. 267–294.
28 In Greece, the exhibition visited Thessaloniki and Athens (September–November 1952), where it was seen by 755,148 people. In Turkey (January–March 1953), it stopped in Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul and was seen by almost half a million people. CICR, 'NATO Atlantic Exhibition, 1952–1954', NA, AC/52-D/54.
29 The exhibition stopped in Strasbourg, Lille, Paris, Lyon, Marseille, Toulon, Nice, Bordeaux, Rennes, Nantes and Le Havre (September 1953–June 1954). CICR, 'NATO Atlantic Exhibition, 1952–1954', NA, AC/52-D/54.
30 CICR, 'NATO Atlantic Exhibition', AC/52-D/54.
31 Ibid.
32 CICR, 'NATO Atlantic Exhibition', AC/52-D/54.
33 See more details in Chapter 2.
34 Summary record of the thirty-fourth meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on 17 November 1954, 19 November 1954, NA, CR(54)43. For a detailed analysis of the budget, see Aubourg V., 'Creating the texture of the Atlantic community: the NATO Information Service, private Atlantic networks and the Atlantic community in the 1950s', in Aubourg V., Bossuat G. and Scott-Smith G. (eds), *European Community, Atlantic Community?* (Paris: Soleb, 2008), pp. 390–415.
35 Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1 December 1955 to 1 April 1956, 26 April 1956, NA, CM(56)54.
36 Survey by the Secretary General of Progress during the period 1 May 1955 to 30 November 1955, 6 December 1955, NA, CM(55)122; CICR, 'Proposed information programme for 1956', note by the Director of Information, 1 December 1955, NA, AC/52-D/144.
37 The capital equipment was valued at approximately 90 million francs. CICR, 'NATO information activities in 1958', note by the Director of Information, 22 October 1957, NA, AC/52-D/267.
38 Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1st July to 31st December 1958, 18 March 1959, NA, CM(59)29.
39 Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1st July to 31st December 1959, 26 April 1960, NA, CM(60)47; CICR, 'NATO information activities in 1958', note by the Director of Information, 22 October 1957, NA, AC/52-D/267.
40 CICR, 'NATO information activities in 1958', note by the Director of Information, 22 October 1957, NA, AC/52-D/267.

41 Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1st July to 31st December 1958, 18 March 1959, NA, CM(59)29.

42 CICR, 'Proposed new Atlantic community series', note by the Director of Information, 24 November 1961, NA, AC/52-WP(61)49/2.

43 'Conference of National Information Officials', 1 March 1960, NA, RDC/60/44.

44 'NATO Conference on Information Policy', summary record of a conference held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, 25–28 January 1955, 8 February 1955, NA, AC/87-R/1.

45 CICR, 'Proposed 1962 information programme', note by the Director of Information, 11 September 1961, NA, AC/52-WP(61)49.

46 CICR, 'Information policy: proposed general lines to be followed in information activities in 1965', note by the Director of Information', 15 April 1964, NA, AC/52-D(64)1.

47 Titles include *UK Tour 1960, France Tour 1960, Italy Tour 1960*, and so on.

48 The film was later updated and its title changed to *The Mediterranean*.

49 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 197. For the distribution of *High Journey*, NATIS signed a contract with S.N. Pathé giving them theatrical distribution rights on a world basis for a seven-year period. In 1969, the film was updated with a sequence on Berlin and the Wall.

50 For the debate on the content of this seiries, see CICR, 'Information activities during the first quarter of 1960', report by the Director of Information, 23 April 1960, NA, AC/52-WP(60)17.

51 'Survey of the NATO Information Service 0utput, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 194. *Two Words, Twenty Years* was a joint production with USIA.

52 CICR, 'Information policy: proposed general lines to be followed in information activities in 1965', note by the Director of Information, 15 April 1964, NA, AC/52-D(64)1.

53 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1.

54 CICR, 'Activities of the Information Service. 1st July to 31st December 1964', report by the Director of Information, 19 January 1965', NA, AC/52-WP(65)1; CICR, 'Activities of the Information Service. 1st July to 31st December 1965', 21 January 1966, NA, AC/52-D(66)1.

55 'Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1st July to 31st December 1959', 26 April 1960, NA, CM(60)47; CICR, 'Meeting held on Thursday, 5 October 1961', action sheet. 11 October 1961, NA, AC/52-R(61)22.

56 Sünder R., 'NATO's roving ambassador', *NATO Letter*, 15/10 (October 1967). 'Survey of the NATO information output, 1969', NA, AC/123-D(70)1, p. 272, and leaflet 'The NATO Mobile Information Centre', published by NATIS in 1961.

57 De Madre J., 'NATO on the road: first stop Portugal', *NATO Letter*, 9/6 (June 1961).

58 CICR, 'Proposed 1962 information programme', note by the Director of Information, 11 September 1961, NA, AC/52-WP(61)49; CICR, 'Second mobile information centre', note by the Director of Information, 11 September 1961, NA, AC/52-WP(61)49/1.

59 CICR, 'Meeting held on Thursday, 5 October 1961', action sheet, 11 October 1961, NA, AC/52-R(61)22.

60 These changes meant a 50 per cent cut in the budget, from 1.8 million Belgian francs to 0.9 million. CICR, 'Proposed 1969 information activities', note by the Director of Information, 5 November 1968, NA, AC/52-D(68)3; 'Survey of the NATO information output, 1969', NA, AC/123-D(70)1, pp. 272–275.

61 See more detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

62 See, for example, *Project Nadge* (1967, 1970) on the need for the new North Atlantic Air Defence Ground Environment system, and *Stanavforlant* (1969) on the Standing Naval Force Atlantic.
63 'Bronze award for "Barriers"', *NATO Review*, 42/4 (August 1984).
64 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 188.
65 See the Epilogue for a short summary of the post-1990 events and their impact on NATO information policies.

7   Engaging with science, academia and the leaders of tomorrow

The Public Relations Section gave the 'human touch' to the alliance's information policy action.[1] It was the part of the Service that actually met the 'opinion formers'. Public Relations officials welcomed journalists, policy-makers, academics and university students to the headquarters, offered them cups of coffee and talked them through the tasks and aims of the alliance. They also assisted with the organisation of the visiting professorship and scholarship schemes and with the fellowship programme, which they publicised, and were often involved in the publication of the academic findings in the form of monographs. Public Relations officers also wrote articles for the *NATO Letter* to explain how the fellowship programme contributed to the creation of an alliance-wide community of scholars. Finally, they maintained close relations with the network of voluntary organisations by taking part in their events as invited speakers and by overseeing the use of NATO contributions through the Special Fund. In short, the key task of the Public Relations Section was to build a personal relationship with the 'opinion formers' and the leaders of tomorrow.

This chapter offers an overview of the key programmes managed by the Public Relations Section and gives a sense of the number of visitors as well as of the changing nature of the target audiences. Because the fellowship programmes and grant schemes were also linked to the development of NATO's interest in science, this chapter discusses briefly the development of NATO's third dimension through the creation of the Science Committee and the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society. The commitment of the alliance to scientific cooperation had important implications for NATIS as it changed the way in which the alliance perceived itself and its own mission. The new 'third dimension' – following the political and military dimensions – helped NATIS demonstrate the alliance's peaceful nature and it contributed to an expanded vision on NATO's security concept.

NATO's public relations

According to Joseph Nye, successful public diplomacy requires the building of long-term relationships and mutual trust so as to create an enabling

environment for government policies.[2] During the Cold War, numerous western governments engaged in activities that aimed precisely at strengthening cultural ties with other, similar nations so as to project a positive image of their own country abroad and to strengthen its international position. None of the programmes implemented by the Public Relations Section was based on new ideas, and the information officers of NATO limited themselves to emulating some of the initiatives used by its members. Thus, it may be worth mentioning here briefly the most important cultural diplomacy operations launched in the immediate postwar period to give a sense of the environment in which NATIS operated and which programmes they took inspiration from.

It is already well known that the United States was extremely active in this field and carried out numerous cultural exchange programmes aimed at promoting the image of a peaceful, rich and advanced nation. Its information agencies also promoted behind-the-scenes programmes to support democratic left-wing political parties, intellectuals and artists in an attempt to discredit the communists and to erode their support base. These efforts were directed towards the United States' allies as well as the Eastern bloc. The US government carried out these operations through a network of state–private networks, including institutions like the Mellon and Ford Foundations.[3]

After the signing of the Smith–Mundt Act, the US government engaged in educational and cultural exchange programmes on a massive scale.[4] Among these was the Foreign Leader Program (FLP). Launched in 1950, the FLP offered young leaders the opportunity to travel to the United States and to spend some time there. The candidates were usually at university level and had already demonstrated an interest in a future political career.[5] Certain programmes targeted specific allies on a bilateral basis, like the British-American Project and the Youth Exchange Program between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.[6] The basic idea was to set up personal contacts, transfer ideas and establish long-term relations on an informal basis. Thus, throughout its history the FLP programme saw the participation of numerous young people who later became political leaders in their home countries; their knowledge and positive view of the United States may have influenced their policies and political choices as leaders. The programme grew during the Cold War and received a boost under the Reagan administration, which made it central to its new public diplomacy effort.[7]

Throughout the Cold War, western information policies had a strong focus on education, particularly at the secondary school and university levels. The United States encouraged the adoption of the history of the United States and the concept of Atlantic community in its own schools as well as in the schools of its allies. From the 1950s, USIA made the expansion of American studies as a serious discipline abroad one of its priorities. A more advanced understanding of American history and culture was seen

as essential for international understanding and to form a solid base upon which to establish American international leadership. The FLP and the support for American studies as a university subject are good examples of the model of public diplomacy that the Public Relations Section aspired to.

The first initiative organised by the Public Relations Section was tours of NATO Headquarters, which were launched as soon as the information officials arrived in their new offices in Paris in 1952. The first groups of visitors included primarily journalists and MPs. Later, invitations were extended to academics, trade union leaders, youth leaders and university students. Active and reserve officers were also regularly invited as part of their training.

In 1953, the Council asked Dr Hendrik J. Reinink to carry out a survey of the existing cultural contacts between the member states and to suggest ways in which further collaboration could be fostered.[8] The result was the launch of the first NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programmes, which had the rather ambitious aim of promoting:

> the study of historical, political, constitutional, legal, social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and strategic problems which will reveal the common heritage and historical experience of the Atlantic countries, as well as the present needs and future development of the North Atlantic area considered as a Community.[9]

The cultural exchange programmes implemented by NATO throughout the Cold War fell under the remit of the Political Affairs Division, which decided the research themes, managed the budget connected to the project and selected the candidates. The Public Relations Sections assisted with the publicity campaign that supported the scheme and liaised with independent publishers to ensure the publication of the key findings.

The Three Wise Men Report drew further attention to the importance of cultural cooperation, and suggested strengthening the existing cultural exchanges programmes and possibly expanding them further. The point was therefore to promote the alliance itself through tours of the headquarters and talks with opinion formers, and to embed these activities in a wider programme of initiatives designed to strengthen the concept of the Atlantic community. In this way, NATO could be perceived by the public as part of a well-established and enduring partnership between the two sides of the Atlantic. According to the report:

> A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realisation of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural cooperation among their

peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance.[10]

In collaboration with the national governments, the Public Relations Section worked towards the creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies, which started to appear in the late 1950s, as well as the adoption of the concept of Atlantic community in school and university curricula. In addition, the Public Relations Section assisted with the promotion of NATO visiting professorships and a series of government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of academics and postdoctoral researchers. Most importantly, the aim of the Public Relations Section was to make sure that these bilateral contacts did not involve only continental Europe – which was something the EEC Information Service already dedicated attention to – but reached out and built stronger transatlantic ties. If the idea of the Atlantic community had to be strengthened through these programmes, it was crucial that the United States, Canada and Britain were brought into the picture.

It was equally important to make sure that there was no unnecessary – and possibly confusing – duplication with what was already done by the national governments on a bilateral basis as well as by the voluntary organisations. Wherever possible, NATIS was advised to support the national governments in their efforts and to assist the voluntary organisations by contributing to their initiatives, as discussed more in depth in the next chapter.

Throughout the Cold War, NATIS targeted a wide range of opinion formers. Members of Parliament were a major concern, particularly in countries where there was parliamentary opposition to NATO. According to an internal NATIS report:

> Parliamentarians are accorded first priority.... A practical difficulty is to persuade Parliamentarians who are opposed or apathetic about NATO to join visits to the headquarters. The standard knowledge about NATO among Parliamentarians who do not specialise in foreign affairs or defence is often surprisingly low.[11]

Thus, NATIS worked closely with the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), a voluntary organisation that brought together pro-NATO MPs across the alliance. Together they tried to widen the support base for the alliance in all members' Parliaments. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the NAA was particularly helpful in fostering support through seminars, invited lectures and cultural exchanges.

Journalists, trade union leaders, academics and university students were also regularly invited to the headquarters. The visits included a tour of the part of the building which was open to the public and a series of lectures from the Public Relations Section. Occasionally, according to the importance of the people invited, senior members of staff also gave talks. Visitors

were usually offered lunch and refreshments throughout the day and received copies of key NATIS publications. Depending on the groups of visitors, NATO movies were also shown during the tour. The visit usually lasted a full day, although in the case of tours by senior editors of major newspapers or of news agencies the visit could cover two days, with extra seminars and meetings with key figures of the alliance.

From the 1970s, the tours of NATO Headquarters were usually combined with a visit to the Common Market institutions in Brussels. This was done to share the costs and to bring in visitors who might otherwise not have been interested in visiting NATO. As was discussed in previous chapters, the idea of sharing the tours with the EEC information Service also offered the advantage of presenting NATO as part of a wider political project for closer economic and political cooperation of the West, thus stressing the peaceful nature of the alliance.[12]

The number of visitors grew constantly. In 1954, there were eight tours of small groups of journalists for a total of just over 100 people.[13] Only five years later, NATIS welcomed 274 groups (9,362 people).[14] While the number of visitors then settled on an average of around 12,000 people every year, NATIS tried to shift the focus onto the younger generations. From the later 1960s, NATIS aimed to increase the number of university students, and in 1971 more than 8,000 of them visited the headquarters, 36 per cent more than the previous year.[15]

A survey of the annual reports produced by the Directors of Information reveals that between 1955 and the end of the 1970s, West Germany was the country that sent by far the most visitors to Brussels. In 1970, for example, 3,246 West German opinion formers visited the headquarters. To give a sense of the proportion, the second largest group was provided by Britain, with 493 people.[16]

NATIS also regularly sent its information officers to give lectures and take part in seminars organised by the national information agencies and the voluntary organisations.[17] NATIS considered the 'outside lectures programme' particularly helpful to address the younger generation, as:

> [s]o far as young people are concerned, oral briefing is not only a cost-effective method but almost the only method which works satisfactorily since young people who are sceptical about NATO are generally unwilling to read anything put out on the subject by NATIS.[18]

NATIS also provided support for conferences and seminars organised by the national information agencies and voluntary organisations. Support could take the form of providing speakers as well as to cover part of the costs through the Special Fund, which was specifically designed to support the initiatives of the pro-NATO organisations. NATIS was particularly eager to take part in workshops in which time was dedicated to open debate sessions, which the information officials considered particularly

helpful in engaging with the youth. In the words of John Price, Director of Information, 'students who are not prepared to listen sympathetically to a lecture can be persuaded more easily to take part in general discussions'.[19]

Selected groups of journalists and MPs were also sent on tours of NATO countries. These tours were sponsored by NATO, often with a contribution, mainly in terms of facilities, from the national governments involved. The US government tended to sponsor a large number of tours under its own auspices, usually on a bilateral basis with other NATO members as part of their own public diplomacy effort. One of these initiatives, the 'NATO Leaders Programme', was entirely paid for by the State Department and had nothing to do with NATIS, although the title may suggest otherwise. Thus, except for the tours of the headquarters, the Public Relations Section relied heavily on the initiative of national governments and voluntary organisations to organise events.

The Public Relations Section organised events like high school essay prizes. It often did so to celebrate the alliance's anniversary. The essay prize competition was often linked to topics like 'the Atlantic community' or 'freedom and peace' and was open to all high-school students. The prize consisted of a trip to Brussels, a tour of NATO Headquarters and a ceremony at which the best students were given a prize: a plaque or small trophy.[20]

Following the example of Charlemagne Prize, in 1984 NATO launched the Atlantic Award. The award was presented once a year to a citizen of a member country who had made an 'outstanding contribution to the objectives of the alliance'. The award ceremony, which was organised by the Public Relations Section, took place at NATO Headquarters and saw the participation of the Secretary General, senior members of staff and numerous journalists from all member countries.[21]

Finally, the Public Relations Section dealt with most of the fellowship and grant schemes. These were run by the Political Affairs and Science Divisions, which were in charge of the choice of research themes and with selection of the candidates. Yet the Public Relations Section publicised the call for applications and the publications that resulted from the fellowship and grants schemes. The publications were produced not by the Press Section of NATIS but by independent publishers with which the Press Relations Section struck a deal. The publications were therefore marketed by the publishers themselves. Reviews of these works regularly appeared in the *NATO Letter*.

Science: NATO's third dimension

Science and technology have a central role in the alliance's strategic concept and defence planning. Throughout the Cold War, it was essential to keep the edge in scientific and technological research and to make sure that the West could compete with the Soviet bloc.[22] At the same time,

cooperation in scientific and technological development was an important factor for the cohesion of the alliance itself. During the 1960s, many member governments became concerned about the increasing gap between the scientific and technological achievements of the United States and those of the West European countries, which lagged behind. The problem became more serious in the 1970s, when the balance of payments between the two sides of the Atlantic was affected by patent costs.[23]

At first glance, the history of the NATO Information Service is not directly connected to the alliance's engagement in scientific and technological development. Yet it may be helpful to recall here some of the key steps that led to the strengthening of scientific cooperation. NATIS was eager to capitalise on the creation of NATO's 'third dimension', as it helped demonstrate the complex nature of the alliance and show its peaceful aims.

Not surprisingly, the first joint scientific projects were closely linked to military defence and weapon standardisation. However, it became soon clear that research and development in these fields had economic implications that were highly relevant for the governments involved and for the alliance itself. Most importantly, if the alliance wanted all its members to make substantial progress in the field of scientific research, it had to promote a wide range of initiatives and joint projects.

Following the recommendations of the Three Wise Men Report, in February 1957 the North Atlantic Council established the 'Task Force for further action by NATO in the field of scientific and technical cooperation'.[24] The Task Force was chaired by Joseph B. Koepfli, an organic chemist from the California Institute of Technology, and soon became known as the Koepfli Group, which met from June to October 1957. The group studied ways to maintain effective military defences while at the same time developing joint research projects that could allow the West to keep the edge in the scientific and technological fields. The events were precipitated by the launch of Sputnik 1, which gave a sense of the rapid progress of the Soviet Union. Staff in the NATO Scientific Affairs Division later spoke of the launch of Sputnik as a 'psychological shock'.[25] Given the circumstances, it was therefore decided that the Koepfli Report would exceptionally be submitted directly to the heads of government to speed up the process.

The Koepfli Report suggested that NATO engage in pure science through the creation of a Science Committee, a recommendation that was approved by the Council in December 1957.[26] The NATO Science Committee (SCOM) met for the first time in March 1958 and was chaired by NATO's new Science Adviser. The aim of the NATO Science Committee was to advise the Council on issues connected to scientific and technological developments, and on ways in which member countries could strengthen scientific cooperation. The Committee also placed great emphasis on scientific education and training.[27]

The first Science Adviser was Professor Norman F. Ramsey of Harvard University, who later received the Nobel Prize for Physics. The very fact that only a few years later (in 1962) the post of Science Adviser was raised to Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs is a sign of the increased importance of science within NATO.[28] It soon became a tradition that the Science Adviser was an academic, and for the first ten years all Assistant Secretary Generals for Scientific Affairs were based in American universities.[29]

The Science Committee created a series of subcommittees and advisory groups on an ad hoc basis to study specific problems of concern to the alliance. One of the most important ones was the 'Study Group on increasing the effectiveness of western science' (September 1959–June 1960). It was also known as the Armand Study Group, from the name of its chairman, Louis Armand, former president of Euratom and president of the École Polytechnique at the time. The launch of this new study group was due to the double concern that the alliance and its members were not making the best use of their scientific knowledge and technological talent to meet the challenges posed by the Soviet Union and that they were not able to satisfy the needs of their own population. The final report recognised that the training of young scientists and engineers was paramount and thus it focused on a programme of NATO-financed science fellowships to allow the movement of scientists and postdoctoral researchers to provide targeted training.[30]

More generally, the Science Committee encouraged bilateral agreements between the NATO members for the exchange of experts. It made wide-ranging recommendations for the strengthening of pure science. The ultimate aim was to increase the number of scientists and technicians across the alliance and to improve scientific and technical education. The programme aimed at reinforcing international cooperation, including the free flow of specialists as well as of knowledge between the member states. The Science Committee also set up ad hoc working groups to explore specific aspects of scientific cooperation, and regularly organised international conferences and symposia.[31]

Initially, the subjects that were considered eligible for funding were chemistry, physics, engineering and mathematics. Later, medical sciences, biology and geology were also included.[32] The Science Committee also launched the NATO Graduate Apprenticeship Programme, which was designed to enable young scientists to spend a couple of years in research institutions in another NATO country.[33]

In this endeavour, the Science Committee received the support of the North Atlantic Assembly. The NAA was particularly aware of the need to provide adequate scientific training as well as to embed science and technology in the school curricula of the nation-states so as to ensure that future generations of scientists would have the right skills to keep the scientific edge of the West. Thus, the NAA welcomed the launch of

the Science Committee, and between 1956 and 1963 it passed an exceptionally high number of scientific- and technical-related resolutions.

Yet despite all these efforts it is important not to overestimate the impact that these programmes had on the national research cultures. The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs did not actually have the power to influence the research carried out by the member states and could not shape their priorities, let alone the institutional cultures of their universities and research centres. As John Kriege has pointed out, joint research ventures were often aborted because of the fear of sharing cutting-edge discoveries with other members or for fear that information relating to national security might be leaked. As a result, many national delegations on the Civil Budget Committee vetoed the most audacious projects. Thus, after a promising start the pure science programme budget stabilised and the projects approved settled at a low level, where all national delegations felt comfortable. These projects were hardly groundbreaking and exciting for scientists, and therefore did not receive the participation of the biggest names in the field, as was initially hoped.[34]

It is also worth pointing out that within the Science Committee, the decision-making process and research priorities were determined by the experts volunteered by the national governments. For that reason, the experts were very conscious of their own government's concerns, and the interests of the Committee were always subordinated to those of its individual members. In addition, officers responsible for everyday science-related issues within the national delegations often had little or no scientific training. This is because NATO science was not perceived as a priority and the person assigned to 'science matters' was more often than not one of the most junior members of the delegation.

In 1964, the Council appointed a new Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs. Dr John L. McLucas was different from his predecessors in that he came to NATO not from a university but from the US Department of Defense. McLucas was less interested in pure science and he saw the science programme primarily as a way to strengthen military defence and communication technology.[35] McLucas created the Defence Research Directors Committee (DRDC), which was composed of officials from national defence research centres. They were to give expert advice to the Council on the practical application in the military field of the most recent discoveries in science and technology. Most importantly, the DRDC did not have its own independent budgetary allocation and all its studies were to be paid for by the national agencies that decided to take part. Hence, the DRDC's members had more freedom to decide the topics they were to discuss and to set their own priorities. Precisely because of its structure, the DRDC was in the hands of its most proactive members, who were in a position to set the Committee's priorities and to influence its conclusions and recommendations. Given that the resulting documents were supposed to influence how the Council would review the alliance's scientific

approach, it is clear that the national representation on the DRDC, and particularly the Americans, who had a big stake in it, could exert substantial influence.[36]

Not everybody was satisfied with the turn that things had taken since the arrival of McLucas, and tensions grew. Thus, only one and a half years into his appointment, McLucas left and took two members of the defence science staff back to the United States with him.[37] The DRDC was abolished and the military aspects of the science programme were removed from the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs.[38]

The McLucas episode opens a window into the legitimacy and transparency of NATO science. During the Cold War, all nations were nominally interested in promoting closer scientific cooperation. Yet either the fear of jeopardising national security or a simple lack of funds meant that most of them did little more than pay lip-service. The United States usually bore the largest share of the costs of the research projects and, in the light of its commitments, demanded a say regarding the Committee's priorities. Yet these calls were often frustrated by the opposition of the other delegations, and the result was a lack of enthusiasm for pure science across the spectrum.[39] Military leaders were also hardly enthused by scientific cooperation in pure science and tended to favour its technical implementations for defence purposes only.[40]

The lack of progress pushed the Italian Foreign Minister, Amintore Fanfani, to express concern about the increasingly dangerous 'technological gap' between Europe and the United States.[41] The Council recognised the problem and appointed a Special Working Group on International Technological Co-operation (AC/262) to explore the possibility of expanding the NATO science programme with the specific aim of bringing Western Europe to the same level of investment in science as the United States.[42]

Yet again, the discussions were hampered by internal disagreements about the level of spending that should be directed towards scientific research at the alliance level, and reciprocal distrust and reluctance to share details about the most cutting-edge projects. The result was, once again, a compromise that was destined to disappoint all parties concerned. The final 'Resolution of international technological cooperation' approved by the Council was little more than a declaration of intent about closer scientific cooperation. When it came to the role of the alliance itself, the resolution could only 'encourage co-operation between its members', 'contribute towards narrowing the technological disparities which may exist between them' and invite the Permanent Council to pursue its studies and report further.[43]

From its inception, the Science Committee was strongly focused on training and education, and in this endeavour it received support from the NAA, which passed numerous resolutions calling for more cooperation

in scientific education and lobbied the national governments to support the Science Committee's work. Thus, it launched a Science Fellowship Programme, which was largely subsidised by the American government, while the Ford Foundation paid for many of the Committee's summer schools.[44]

Thus, despite a promising start the NATO science programme received little support from the alliance. National research institutes initially seemed more interested. They offered administrative services and, wherever possible, some financial support to the pure science programme in the hope that this would help them attract further funding from their own national governments.[45] Further support came from the North Atlantic Assembly, which discussed the issue at length during its annual meetings. Yet the NAA's resolutions had little effect on national policies. National executive bodies continued to be reluctant to contribute money to projects that they deemed unrealistic and far-fetched.

Overall, there was resistance in Europe to any scientific project that might hamper the national research institutes that were being set up at the same time. This was a time when national governments were eager to show their own achievements, and all available funds were directed towards strengthening the national dimension of scientific research. Thus, the national governments were interested in the Science Committee only if it were to act as a source of additional funds for their own national research institutes, but when this appeared not to be the case, the lack of interest jeopardised the Committee's ability to act. Academics and researchers themselves were often opposed to the project, as they feared that new international research institutes would drain away the best minds.

The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society

In the late 1960s, air and water pollution were widely discussed by experts, government agencies and the public more broadly. The rapid pace of industrialisation and dramatic economic changes meant that all NATO countries suffered industrial waste problems, water and air pollution, congestion of their transport systems and overcrowding of the major towns. Wide sectors of the public, and particularly the younger generations, became increasingly critical of the way in which the economy was being run and the environment being damaged.[46]

In April 1969, the United States proposed that the alliance establish a new body to 'explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be marshaled toward improving the quality of life of our peoples'.[47] The project was the brainchild of Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Henry Kissinger, who saw it as a way to demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the alliance on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary.[48]

Despite the initial scepticism of some members, in November 1969 the North Atlantic Council agreed to establish the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).[49] Together with the Science Committee, the CCMS became NATO's 'third dimension', complementing the alliance's military and political roles. It was rooted in article 2, according to which the member countries are committed to promote conditions of stability and well-being, and as such it was part of the alliance's security concept. In the 1970s, it was clear that in addition to protecting the West from military attacks, the alliance had to ensure that the national governments were ready to react promptly to natural disasters and that they understood the wide-ranging implications of massive industrialisation and urbanisation. Most importantly, it was crucial to prevent natural disasters by working together and by studying the causes and consequences of environmental problems.[50] For these reasons, the launch of the CCMS was enthusiastically welcomed by the Atlantic Treaty Association and the North Atlantic Assembly.[51]

From the start, it was understood that the CCMS would be a new kind of organisation, revolutionary in mission and modus operandi. The CCMS was to further the political aims and overall cohesion of the alliance by focusing on a limited number of well-defined problems. Learning a lesson from the failures of the Science Committee, the CCMS had a limited mandate and no full-time international staff. During the Cold War, a high level of decentralisation was the CCMS trademark. National representatives, at cabinet and sub-cabinet levels, met twice a year in plenary sessions. No funds from NATO's budget were allocated and projects had to be initiated by the member countries. If approved by the Council, they were administered and paid for by the proposing country and other interested national governments. The 'pilot country' would also coordinate the project's execution, prepare the necessary reports and, most importantly, promote follow-up action. Precisely because of its limited mandate and light structure, the CCMS managed to avoid the problems that hampered progress within the Science Committee and it was able to run its first pilot studies in 1970.

Three concepts characterised the work of the CCMS. First, all its work was intended to lead to policy action. For this reason, the country that ran a pilot study would also monitor progress and press for follow-up action – such as new legislation or further study – by exerting political pressure in all international organisations and through bilateral contacts.

Second, the CCMS would not be running its own independent research but would build upon research carried out by the national governments and research institutions. It would be directed towards questions of government policy formulation and legislation, suggesting ways to bring about improvements to the natural and social environment.[52]

Finally, and crucially important for NATIS, all CCMS results were to be entirely open and accessible to international organisations or individual

countries anywhere in the world.[53] Publicity was indeed deemed crucial, as the CCMS dealt with problems that affected the daily life of the citizens of the alliance and beyond, and contributed to the policy-making process. NATO had to explain why the alliance was engaging in these new fields and to what extent it was not duplicating what was already being done by other organisations, particularly the OECD.[54]

As far as the work of NATIS was concerned, while the CCMS was intended to help demonstrate the progressive character of the alliance, any publicity should be measured against the prospects of concrete results and should stress that such results could be obtained only gradually and with the cooperation of all nations involved. Thus, all public statements about the CCMS avoided overambitious public demonstrations, which were deemed counter-productive. Given the wider implications of the topics studied by the CCMS, cooperation was open to non-NATO members, 'including developing countries and the Communist ones'.[55]

In the eyes of the Council, the CCMS was therefore to be at the centre of a carefully orchestrated yet powerful publicity campaign. For these reasons, all NATO pilot studies were unclassified and made available to any other countries and international organisations. The press was invited to the CCMS inaugural session and for the first time the invitation was formally extended to journalists from outside the NATO area. Journalists were welcomed at the headquarters and the invitation was renewed every time the CCMS met in plenary session. The final press conferences were very popular with the media, and the facilities for the press in the Council Room soon became inadequate, so a larger conference room had to be used.[56]

From the start, NATIS was fully involved in supporting the CCMS. The *NATO Letter*, which was about to be relaunched in a modernised and colourful version as *NATO Review*, duly reported on all CCMS plenary sessions and meticulously listed all pilot studies, giving plenty of details. The CCMS was given several pages, with pictures and articles by leading experts on the topics studied by the CCMS. The Media Section also commissioned a short film entitled *The Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society* (1974), which stands out from the rest of the films circulated by NATIS in this period for its artistic choice of frame and for its lyrical tone.[57] Archival documents also reveal that NATIS information officers engaged proactively with the national media to obtain maximum coverage of the first pilot studies carried out by the CCMS.[58] In all these cases, the CCMS was presented to the public as one of many examples of the multifaceted action of the alliance and of its entirely peaceful aims – a refrain repeated several times in all information material items.

From 1977, the CCMS Fellowship Programme was launched and was highly publicised by NATIS, which included it in its suite of academic exchanges and fellowships.[59] The newly elected US president, Jimmy Carter, was very supportive of CCMS and publicly praised its work.[60] That year, 1977, was also the year of the Ekofisk oil rig blow-out, when an

estimated 126,000 barrels of oil was spilled in the North Sea. Studies published in the same period showed how increasing air pollution was accelerating the degrading of Europe's most important monuments and cultural heritage sites, with Venice a case in point. The Ekofisk disaster and Venice's degrading monuments provided NATIS with further evidence of the necessity of the work of the CCMS and were amply used in its information material. The *NATO Review* dedicated its cover page and several articles to pollution in Venice.[61]

In its early years, the CCMS played an important part in the development of treaty law.[62] Taking advantage of the scientific, technical and organisational expertise found within the alliance, the CCMS became an international forum for the exchange of research ideas and new technologies on a wide range of environmental matters. The list of topics addressed by the Committee over the years was wide-ranging and included air pollution, water pollution, spill response, hazardous waste clean-up, disaster preparedness, noise abatement, indoor air pollution, risk assessment, pollution prevention, pollution from radioactive waste stored on land and at sea, and the storage and dumping of chemical weapons. The CCMS also contributed studies looking into ways of preserving historic monuments and buildings.

With global environmental awareness strengthening during the 1970s, other, more appropriate forums were launched to address the legal aspects of wide-ranging environmental problems. The 1970 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in particular, gave birth to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which became responsible for coordinating most of the international community's efforts to address global environmental issues.[63] The CCMS continued to serve as a forum for discussion and exchange of ideas but was soon sidelined by the new body, which encompassed a larger number of countries. Thus, in the 1980s it became more difficult for NATIS to promote CCMS, and the third dimension of NATO with it, as NATO science seemed redundant and less ground-breaking than what was being done by UNEP.

Conclusion

The Public Relations Section acted as a link between the Publications and Media Sections and the public. During visits and outside lectures, Public Relations officers distributed material and showed movies. They welcomed visitors to the headquarters and talked them through the information material produced by the rest of NATIS. Except for the tours of the headquarters, all other initiatives promoted by the Public Relations Section depended on the initiative of the member states, their information agencies and the voluntary organisations. More than taking the initiative, the Public Relations Section aimed to complement and to support the efforts of other bodies. Thus, it perceived its own role as very different from the

rest of NATIS. The other sections were concerned primarily about the way in which to distribute their own material and to address different audiences, whereas the Public Relations Section aimed to maximise the impact of the initiatives taken by other NATIS branches.

The partnership with the voluntary organisations was particularly important for the Public Relations Section, as it was necessary to keep all organisations engaged but at the same time to make sure that resources were directed where they were most needed, and not necessarily towards the most proactive organisations. It was in fact often the case that the keenest organisations operated in countries where NATO was not a controversial topic and where the alliance was widely accepted. In countries where the alliance was the object of criticism, it was also the case that the voluntary organisations were weaker, localised and less active. The Press Relations officers were therefore required to carry out careful decisions so as to keep the enthusiasm of the keenest associations while stimulating the less active ones.

As for all other NATIS branches, Public Relations officers often attempted to measure the impact of their activities. NATIS information officials were also aware of the need to distinguish between 'what is popular' and 'what is effective'. In the words of John Price,

> a file full of appreciative letters may indicate that the visitors enjoyed and appreciated the briefing given but it gives no indication as to whether those briefed actually pass on the information to a wider audience.... A distinction can clearly be drawn between those activities which have the effect of persuading opinion moulders and ultimately the public of the value and necessity of the alliance and those activities which are necessary to keep supporters of the alliance up to date and provided with the latest facts they can use.[64]

The problem was that, as was outlined earlier, the people who toured the headquarters and took part in seminars on NATO-related topics were in some way already connected to the alliance, and these activities did not attempt to engage with outright critics of the alliance. Even when preaching to the converted, it was difficult to assess how much the knowledge and enthusiasm that resulted from the tours and lectures then translated into articles, parliamentary speeches and lectures back home and what impact these pieces had on the wider public. In other words, NATIS personnel had no means of assessing how much of the message was actually passed on to the secondary audiences. This predicament lies at the core of NATIS's entire propaganda campaign. Throughout the Cold War, the aim was to target the 'opinion formers' because they were in the best position to influence the wider public. Yet there was no means to assess to what extent this operation was successful and contributed to a better understanding of the alliance and its aims.

Notes

1 In the NATO archival documents, the Section is called 'Public Affairs' as well as 'Public Relations'. I use here only the latter in the name of consistency and clarity.

2 Nye J.S. Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).

3 See detailed bibliographical references on this point in Chapter 8, note 1.

4 US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (Public Law 80-402). Original text available at: www.state.gov/pdcommission/library/177362.htm (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

5 It was renamed the International Visitor Programme in 1965 and the International Visitor Leadership Program in 2004. Scott-Smith G., *Networks of Empire: The US State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950–70* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008). For background information about the FLP, see Elder R.E., *The Foreign Leader Program: Operations in the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1961).

6 Tuch H.N., *Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990).

7 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 130 of 6 March 1984. Available at: www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

8 Reinink was the Secretary General of the Netherlands' Ministry of Education.

9 As quoted in 'Text of Lord Ismay's report to the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn, May 1957'. Available at: www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/text.htm (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

10 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, 13 December 1956. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-235A420C-C1FE896A/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

11 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 27.

12 NATIS paid for refreshments and occasionally contributed to the accommodation costs. Travel expenses had to be covered by the individuals, the national information agencies or the voluntary organisations.

13 CICR, 'Proposed NATO information activities in 1954', note by Director of Information', 29 September 1953, NA, AC/52-D/17.

14 'Report by the Secretary General of progress during the period 1st July to 31st December 1958', 18 March 1959, NA, CM(59)29.

15 'The NATO Information Service: survey output, 1971', NA, AC/273-D(72)1, p. A.1. The number of university students increased at the expense of trade union leaders.

16 'The NATO Information Service: survey output, 1970', NA, AC/273-D(71)1, p. A.12.

17 In these cases, NATIS covered the travel costs and accommodation of its own speakers.

18 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', NA, AC/273-D(70)1, p. 28.

19 Ibid., p. 36.

20 See, for example, CICR, 'Tenth anniversary of NATO', 1 May 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)25.

21 During the Cold War, the prizewinners were Per Markussen (Denmark, 1984), Professor Ernst van der Beugel (the Netherlands, 1985), Professor Karl Kaiser (Federal Republic of Germany, 1986), Pierre Hamel (Belgium, 1987) and Paul Nitze (United States, 1988). The prize was suspended for a few years following the end of the Cold War and was relaunched later on. The International

Charlemagne Prize of Aachen has been awarded once a year since 1950 by the German city of Aachen to people who have made an outstanding contribution to 'the unity of Europe'.

22 During the Cold War, NATO science was divided into pure science, defence science and military science. Pure science was the remit of the Science Committee. Defence science and military science were that of the Defence Research Group. Not surprisingly, military science was the first to be established, in 1951. It included activities under various NATO military authorities such as the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development; the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre in La Spezia; and the SHAPE Technical Centre.

23 For an effective summary of the changes in transatlantic relations in the 1970s, see Wenger A. and Möckli D., 'Power shifts and new security needs: NATO, European identity and the reorganisation of the West, 1967–1975', in Hanhimäki J., Soutou G.-H. and Germond B. (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security* (London: Routledge, 2010), pp. 103–122. See also Wenger A., Nuenlist C. and Locher A. (eds), *Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s* (London: Routledge, 2006). See also Vincent A., 'The technological gaps: a three-dimensional problem', *NATO Letter*, 15/10 (October 1967).

24 Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, 13 December 1956. Chapter III: Economic cooperation, Paragraph IV on Scientific and Technological cooperation. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-235A420C-C1FE896A/natolive/official_texts_17481.htm (retrieved 28 January 2013). The documents on the Task Force are part of the AC/132 series (June–October 1957).

25 *NATO and Science: Facts about the Activities of the Science Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1959–1966* (Paris: NATO Scientific Affairs Division, 1967), p. 2.

26 Final communiqué, points 25–29, 16–19 December 1957. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17551.htm (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

27 The documents of the Science Committee are available in the NATO Archives, series AC/137.

28 By 1966, the Science Committee had ten members of staff, two-thirds of whom were concerned with pure science.

29 Ramsey's successors were all American physicists: Professors F. Seitz (Illinois), W.A. Nierenberg (Berkeley) and W.P. Allis (MIT). After it left the integrated allied command structure, France became more interested in this aspect of the alliance, and since 1980 all Assistant Secretary Generals for Scientific Affairs have been French.

30 The Group was financed jointly by NATO and the Ford Foundation. Among the ideas put forward by the Armand Group was the creation of an Atlantic university or institute, which never took off, owing to lack of political support. Kriege J., *American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 211–225.

31 *NATO and Science*, op. cit. In 1959, the Science Committee also established the Subcommittee on Oceanographic Research, the Advisory Panel on the Advanced Study Institutes Program, and the Advisory Panel on Meteorology. In 1960, it created Advisory Panels on the Research Grants Program, on Defence Psychology (later to become the Advisory Panel on Human Factors), and on Operational Research, and in 1961 the Advisory Panel on Radio-meteorology.

32 *NATO and Science*, op. cit.

33 'NATO and science', 19 October 1965, NA, AC/137-WP/22.

34 Kriege, *American Hegemony*. Between 1959 and 1966, NATO's pure science budget rose from $1.15 million to $4.2 million. However, in the years between 1962 and 1966 the budget remained in the area of $4 million. 'Science Committee. The NATO Fellowship Programme. Report on the Programme for 1964', 15 February 1966, NA, AC/137-D/271.

35 Kriege, *American Hegemony*.

36 'NATO and science', 19 October 1965, NA, AC/137-WP/22.

37 Beer F.A., *Integration and Disintegration in NATO: Processes of Alliance Cohesion and Prospects for Atlantic Community* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969).

38 In its place, the NATO Council established the Defence Research Group (DRG), responsible to the Conference of National Armaments Directors and overseen by the Assistant Secretary General for Armaments and Infrastructure.

39 Beer, *Integration and Disintegration*, pp. 217–219.

40 General Norstad in particular was keen to promote collaboration in science purely as a means of maintaining a convincing deterrent. Gen. Lauris Norstad, 'NATO's military future: a stronger "shield", a sharper "sword"', *General Electric Defense Quarterly*, 1/1 (April 1958), as quoted by Beer, *Integration and Disintegration*, pp. 223–224.

41 See Fanfani's speech at the ministerial meeting of June 1966. His proposal was the result of an Italian Foreign Ministry's study which had been launched after his conversation with Secretary of State Dean Rusk in June 1966. This is the time when the idea of a 'Marshall Plan for Technology' was first discussed. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968*, vol. 8: *Western Europe Region*, Document 205. Available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d205 (retrieved on 12 February 2013).

42 The Special Working Group worked under the chairmanship of Secretary General Manlio Brosio, who delegated day-to-day responsibility to André Vincent, a French member of the International Staff. Vincent A., 'The technological gap: a three-dimensional problem', *NATO Letter*, 15/10 (October 1967).

43 'Resolution on international technological co-operation'. Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c670613b.htm (retrieved on 12 January 2013).

44 Kriege, *American Hegemony*, pp. 204–205.

45 For a list of such institutions, see NA, AC/137-WP 37, 22 May 1967.

46 The birth of the environmental movement is usually dated back to the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in 1962.

47 Address by President Nixon to the North Atlantic Council, Washington, 10 April 1969, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. 1: *Foundations of Foreign Policy*. Available at: http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/20701.htm (retrieved on 15 August 2012). This suggestion was included in the final communiqué (point 14). Available at: www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c690410a.htm (retrieved on 15 August 2012).

48 Von Ward P., Kendall G.R. and Bresee J.C., 'Ten years of CCMS: the record and the future', *NATO Review*, 27/6 (December 1979).

49 Summary record of a meeting of the Council held on 15 October 1969 at 10.15 a.m., 28 October 1969, NA, CR(69)46. For the consultation about the terms of reference and focus of the new committee, see 'Environmental problems', report by the Secretary General, 8 July 1969, NA, PO/69/338; Preparatory Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 6 October 1969, NA, CM(69)43; Von Ward *et al.*, 'Ten years of CCMS'. The Federal Republic of Germany was sceptical and saw the initiative as an attempt by the United States to regain international terrain after the lost Vietnam War. Hünemörder K.F., *Die Frühgeschichte der globalen Umweltkrise und die Formierung der deutschen Umweltpolitik (1950–1973)* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004).

50 'Environmental problems', report by the Secretary General, 8 July 1969, NA, PO/69/338.
51 Atlantic Treaty Association: Sixteenth General Assembly, Final Resolution, *NATO Letter*, 18/11–12 (October–November 1970).
52 The first pilot studies were on road safety, disaster relief, air pollution, open water pollution, inland water pollution, transmission of scientific knowledge, and problems of individual and group motivation in modern industrial society. Given its role in launching the CCMS, it is not surprising that the United States volunteered to act as pilot country for three out of the first seven studies carried out by the CCMS. 'CCMS recommends seven pilot studies at first meeting', *NATO Letter*, 18/1 (January 1970).
53 Preparatory Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, 6 October 1969, NA, CM(69)43; Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, *NATO Letter*, 18/1 (January 1970).
54 NATO answered this point by maintaining that it was crucial to have several independent studies showing the need for urgent action and to make recommendations more forceful. See 'Preparatory Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society', 6 October 1969, NA, CM(69)43.
55 'Environmental problems', report by the Secretary General, 8 July 1969, NA, PO/69/338.
56 'Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and NATO's third dimension', *NATO Letter*, 18/2 (February 1970).
57 More details about this film are provided in Chapter 6.
58 'Conference of National Information Officials', report by the chairman, 3 June 1971, NA, CM(71)44.
59 Sampas J.G., 'CCMS approves pilot study on drinking water', *NATO Review*, 25/2 (April 1977).
60 Sampas J.G., 'New US administration reaffirms strong support for CCMS during plenary session', *NATO Review*, 25/6 (December 1977).
61 See, for example, issue 27/6 (December 1979).
62 To cite one example, a CCMS technical study on oil spills initiated in 1969 led to a NATO resolution calling for an international effort to prevent further degradation of the world's oceans, which fed into the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
63 Other organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) also became important actors in the field and eclipsed the role of the CCMS.
64 'Survey of the NATO Information Service output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1, pp. 2–3.

8   Supporting the work of NATIS from the outside

The voluntary organisations

Throughout the Cold War, the activities of the NATO Information Service were supported by a network of associations and cultural organisations. The so-called voluntary organisations helped promote the Atlantic community concept, which was based on the idea that the West should unite militarily as well as politically and economically behind NATO. The voluntary organisations were independent and their scopes and aims went beyond the strictly defined terms of reference of NATIS. In some cases, NATIS was in a position to offer partial funding and expertise, but as a rule these organisations had to raise their own funds.

The origins of many voluntary organisations can be traced back to the war years. During the Second World War and in the immediate post-war period, a lively debate about Atlantic and European unity developed on both sides of the Atlantic. The American circles were particularly preoccupied by the spread of communism and anti-American sentiments in Western Europe, while the Europeans focused on the possibility of creating new forms of political and economic integration.

There is already a rich body of research on the state–private networks that operated in the West during the Cold War. A good example of this kind of initiatives was the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), a forum for anti-communist thought that secretly paid magazines such as *Der Monat* and *Encounter*. The CCF was in fact linked to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which hoped that by supporting the democratic left it would undermine European interest in the Soviet Union and ultimately encourage Europeans to embrace American culture. Studies into the role of the CIA and of the private American foundations in particular have highlighted the problematic issue of defining the degree of independence and autonomy of the voluntary organisations.[1] Frances Stonor Saunders notably denies the claims that the CIA and its friendly foundations provided aid with no strings attached.[2] The result was what E.P. Thompson called Natopolis, a concept that includes not just NATO but all military and political institutions that were integral to the Cold War mentality and culture associated with it.[3]

The concept of the Atlantic community can be traced back to the early modern era, when trade between the two sides of the Atlantic created economic and political ties that formed the basis for the creation of a community of common values and ideas, a community that long predated the foundation of NATO. The idea of a transatlantic community based on shared histories, similar political systems and economic policies was instrumental to foster support for the Atlantic alliance.[4]

The peak of endeavour was reached in the early 1950s, when scores of associations developed in the United States and Western Europe. These included of course the Atlantic Citizens Congress (ACC) organised by Hugh Moore, an industrialist from Pennsylvania whose ambition was to create an Atlantic movement on the model of the European movement, and the Atlantic Union Committee (AUC), founded in 1949 by the journalist Clarence K. Streit, who had been promoting the idea of an Atlantic federation since the late 1930s.[5] These groups pushed forward the idea of closer cooperation between North Atlantic countries, although with different emphasis on either political or economic aspects that such a federation should have, and the degree of integration. These initiatives received virtually no support from Congress, which remained sceptical about bonding American foreign policy too closely to Western Europe. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was opposed to any project that could be seen as an alternative to the European Defence Community project and was keen to keep the focus on the 'European' integration process. Because of the scepticism of the political establishment, the Ford and Mellon Foundations – which in later years would be actively involved – remained at bay. Although by 1953 the idea of an Atlantic political union had been more or less abandoned, support for closer links between Western Europe and North American remained appealing, and other, less ambitious projects for closer cultural and economic cooperation continued to flourish.

By the mid-1950s, most NATO member states had an Atlantic committee, or an organisation with a similar name, that promoted awareness about NATO. Most of these groups had been founded in the late 1940s by intellectuals and politicians to assist the ratification of the Treaty of Washington and continued their activities to foster support for the alliance at a time when rearmament, and the costs thereof, remained highly controversial issues. The level of funding, activities and effectiveness of these groups varied greatly, and so did the messages they put forward. Some associations saw the alliance primarily in terms of military defence and as a tool against communist imperialism; others saw it as part of a more general post-war movement towards federalism and political and economic cooperation.

The different levels of funding and discrepancy in the expertise of their members further jeopardised the associations' ability to put forward a coherent action, with the obvious result that a lot of energy and resources went to waste. Thus, not surprisingly, in the early 1950s the first talk

emerged of alliance-wide cooperation among such organisations. Given that it would be impossible to examine here the history and action of each national organisation, this chapter looks at two of the most important attempts to coordinate pro-NATO action: the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) and the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA).

The Atlantic Treaty Association

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an international non-governmental body composed of national voluntary organisations from the member countries of the alliance. Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, ATA's membership has expanded beyond the strictly defined NATO membership. Following an early application by the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria in 1992, the ATA's constitution was amended to accommodate associate members and observers from non-NATO countries. Given the shifting nature of security policies and NATO's continued transformation, in the post-Cold War years ATA has enlarged its focus beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic area, and today it promotes initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and as far from the Atlantic as the South Caucasus.[6]

Since its foundation, ATA has provided a link between pro-NATO national associations and the alliance itself. It acted – and still does – as a central clearing house for information and it promotes tighter cooperation and NATO-wide initiatives. 'Education' – defined here as the production of information material for students, teachers and academics as well as of a variety of cultural programmes and exchanges involving the wider public – has been at the centre of ATA's mission since its inception.

The Association was founded in 1954 to foster public understanding of NATO's goals and aims. The first Secretary General was John Eppstein, who had previously been secretary of the British Society for International Understanding and had extensive experience in educating public opinion. According to article 2 of The Hague Constitution, the aims of the Association are:

a   to educate and inform the public concerning the aims and the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;
b   to conduct research into the various purposes and activities related to the organisation;
c   to promote solidarity of the people of the North Atlantic Area;
d   to develop permanent relations and co-operation between its member organisations.[7]

Thus, ATA dedicated great attention to producing information material for teachers and academics, and targeted the younger generations in particular.[8] Initially, the British Society for International Understanding

offered secretarial support and office facilities at Benjamin Franklin House, at 39 Craven Street in central London. In 1960, the office moved to Paris, where it was housed in the same building as Western European Union. Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, one of the founders of ATA, recalls how at the time the majority of ATA members resisted the temptation to be housed directly at NATO Headquarters for fear of being absorbed and 'becom[ing] no more than a public relations exercise for the military staff'.[9] ATA's assembly meetings saw the participation of both the NATO Secretary General and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a tangible sign of NATO's official recognition of the work carried out by ATA.[10]

ATA was in favour of a greater degree of political unity within the alliance, which could be achieved by strengthening the Council and the Secretariat. Optimistically, Eppstein thought that the NATO Council would soon become 'a real political Cabinet of the Western World'.[11]

During the Cold War, ATA also liaised with NATIS and fed into the ongoing discussions about the development of NATO information policy. ATA, for example, produced a report to the Three Wise Men which suggested creating the post of youth specialist within the NATO Secretariat, something that was already being discussed by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations.[12] ATA also recommended giving a more permanent status to the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), a liaison group gathering together pro-NATO Members of Parliament from all member states which was coming into being in the same period. Although ambitious plans for a political union had by now been abandoned, the need for democratic validation within the alliance was still strong, and both ATA and the NAA thought that permanent links between pro-NATO MPs as well as between national pro-NATO associations would strengthen support for the alliance and provide an important democratic element. Thus, as will be demonstrated in what follows, ATA and the NAA worked closely together throughout the Cold War and collaborated on common projects such as the Atlantic Congress and the Atlantic Institute.

Other suggestions put forward by ATA in this period moved well beyond the strategic scope of the alliance. The Association, for example, stressed the need to strengthen cooperation in the economic and social fields through further involvement of free organisations of employers and trade unions across the alliance and by strengthening and extending consultation so as to include the economic policies of the NATO countries. ATA also looked into ways to promote more effective cooperation in the cultural and educational fields. Perhaps more surprising was the suggestion that 'the main obstacles to transatlantic travel should be removed', on the lines of what had been adopted by the European Coal and Steel Community, a sign of the still strong influence of the federalist wing of ATA.

ATA rapidly established itself within NATO circles. The presence of Lord Ismay and General Alfred Gruenther at the opening session of the Second Annual Assembly Meeting and the fact that some of the

suggestions put forward by ATA were discussed in the NATO Council are signs of this increased recognition. The fact that from 1956 the ATA Council's decisions were printed in the *NATO Letter* is a further indication that ATA was recognised as a means by which to sustain public support for the alliance. The relationship was mutually beneficial, and ATA assisted NATIS with the circulation of its publications, films and documentaries. Its member organisations ensured that the material produced by the Information Service was sent to their members and list of contacts. Publications were also distributed to the public that attended the events organised by the pro-NATO organisations. The ATA's members also supported their own national governments' effort by helping with the organisation of seminars, conferences and travelling exhibitions. In exchange, NATIS often co-sponsored their cultural initiatives and provided material for ATA's own publications. The partnership was synergetic and, in the words of John Eppstein, 'our co-operation with the NATO Information Service has been increasingly close and mutually advantageous'.[13]

The Special Fund had been established in 1958 during the preparations for the celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of NATO. The Civilian Budget Committee approved the establishment of this fund to subsidise the activities of voluntary organisations on the understanding that NATO's financial participation in each project would not cover more than half of the costs and that each project was approved by the CICR's delegation of the member country involved. Given its important role in ensuring that the weakest pro-NATO associations could organise their own events, the Fund was given permanent status and supported the voluntary organisations throughout the Cold War.[14]

In the 1950s, ATA's main problem lay in the nature of the national organisations it grouped under its wings. They were indeed numerous but uneven in terms of their resources and activities. The American, British and Danish members were the best organised and funded. They had a permanent secretariat and day-to-day activities. The other members, however, were less organised. They consisted of smaller groups whose main activity was merely an extension of the work of the institutes of international affairs that hosted them. While they had a visible and highly regarded home, and a secretariat of some sort, they tended to remain within the familiar limits or terms of reference of their hosting institutes.[15]

The three youngest member organisations – the Italian, Norwegian and West German ones – had hardly got into their stride. The Italian committee, for example, attracted the attention and participation of well-established personalities and organised successful conferences but was not yet producing an educational programme worthy of the name. In addition, its operational space was restricted to Milan and Rome. The Norwegian committee, which would later become a very important and highly active member of ATA, was still very small. It could take advantage of the presence of NATO military headquarters in Oslo for the briefing of troops

and it did produce a few study groups, but in the mid-1950s it did little more than that. The German Atlantic Society was formed in the spring of 1956, with powerful parliamentary support. It made full use of the NATO Information Service and in particular of the mobile exhibition in Hamburg and fifty smaller towns. It also organised distribution of the *NATO Handbook* in German throughout the territory of the Federal Republic. However, it was not yet in a position to carry out its own education and cultural programmes.

ATA's early annual reports provide no information about any Belgian Atlantic Committee except for the circulation of information material among university students. The reports also mention that in Greece, public opinion was allegedly so aroused by the Cyprus question that the Council for Public Enlightenment admitted that it could not find the time to devote any attention to NATO.[16]

This varied and uneven membership was a concern for ATA, which wanted all national associations to have at least one full-time officer, a secretary and regular educational programmes. Yet there was a correlation between where the voluntary organisations were small and under-funded and the countries where the alliance did not have a widespread support base. In those countries where the alliance was a controversial topic, governments were reluctant to support the alliance and its pro-NATO organisations openly, and often preferred not to touch the subject or to provide funds. On the other hand, the strongest pro-NATO organisations were usually found in countries where the alliance was already widely accepted by the public, as was the case for example with the British Atlantic Committee. In these cases, the work of the voluntary organisations was helpful to keep the public informed but they did not carry out the essential action of transforming the public's view of the alliance. Thus, the British Atlantic Committee essentially preached to the converted, whereas in Greece and Italy the pro-NATO associations remained neglected. To correct this situation, as will be discussed later, NATIS made strategic use of the Special Fund to support the weakest voluntary organisations.

A further reason of concern was the political problems within the alliance. The Suez and Hungarian crises were extremely problematic for ATA, and so of course was the ongoing Cyprus controversy. As already demonstrated, in the late 1950s there was widespread concern about the solidarity of the alliance, and the need to maintain public support was among the top priorities of NATIS, and consequently of ATA and its member organisations. More than ever, education was seen as crucial and the Three Wise Men Report attached great importance to it too.[17]

All ATA's efforts were chiefly directed to the younger generations, not only university students but also high school students. Initiatives and information material were produced to provide basic information about the purpose of the alliance and to stress its political, rather than its

military, function. In July 1958, ATA organised its first conference for political youth leaders at the NATO headquarters in Paris, which was attended by ninety-three delegates. This became an annual event co-organised by ATA and NATIS, with most of the funding coming from the NATO Civil Budget.[18]

The federalist wing of ATA was still strong, and in 1957 ATA discussed a paper produced by Jacques Vernant called 'National interests and the Atlantic community: the task of the Atlantic Treaty Association', which promoted the controversial idea that national interests are key but they must come after interests of the community as a whole.[19] Although nothing more came of it and the impact of ATA's federalist ideas remained negligible, it did offer a platform to like-minded American and European federalists to discuss common concerns and ideas about economic and political integration of the Atlantic area.

The appointment of Spaak as Secretary General was welcomed by ATA. As was discussed in earlier chapters, Spaak was determined to make sure that information became an important part of NATO's strategic thinking and he was keen to support all pro-NATO organisations. As soon as he was appointed, Spaak expressed a desire to know more about the work of ATA. He gave a speech at ATA's congress in Paris in September 1957 and visited ATA headquarters in London in November. Further confirmation of his support was the very fact that after his resignation as Secretary General in April 1961, Spaak himself became chairman of ATA.

Benefiting from its productive collaboration with NATIS and from the Secretary General's support, ATA was in a position to build a consistently more vigorous educational programme. It started with the idea of a conference of educational authorities called 'The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community'. The NATO Information Service agreed to offer facilities at NATO Headquarters and financial assistance up to 1 million francs towards the expense of the conference, which took place in September 1956.[20] Crucially, the conference saw the involvement of education ministers. This was an important development, as up to this point all initiatives in the NATO information field had been seen only as an issue concerning foreign ministers. ATA published the proceedings of the conference in the form of a pamphlet, which received wide circulation across the alliance.[21] Given the interest received by the conference, the ministers of education of the NATO countries – with the exception of the Danish one – agreed to form a standing committee to explore ways to make the concept of the Atlantic community an integral part of national curricula.[22]

As will be discussed later in this chapter, ATA also supported the proposal for an Atlantic Institute. The Association was strongly in favour of the creation of an institute of this kind as a means of strengthening and developing NATO-wide educational activities, although it was aware of the need to avoid overlap with what was being been done by the national research institutes already associated with ATA. The association and its

member organisations were of course very active in the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of NATO and worked closely with the NAA to convene the Atlantic Congress in June 1959.[23]

As part of its mission to promote the inclusion of the Atlantic community concept in all national curricula, ATA launched the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers in October 1963. The Centre was initially located at Benjamin Franklin House in central London, along with the British Atlantic Committee.[24] The Centre was designed to serve the teaching profession throughout the Western bloc by acting as a clearing house of information about the education policies of the NATO countries in all that concerned the study of international affairs and cooperation. The Centre also conducted reviews and, three times a year, published news digests for teachers under the title *The World of the School*, and provided teaching support material such as maps, articles and pictures.[25]

Throughout the Cold War, ATA also produced its own information material like *Impediments to the Free Flow of Information between East and West* (1973) and *Soviet Foreign Policy: Its Main Facets and Its Real Objectives* (1975). These publications were conceived as a source of factual and objective information that could be quoted and used by journalists, scholars and teachers. The pamphlets were usually rich in data and charts, accurate and clearly written. ATA worked hard with its member associations to make sure that an adequate redistribution network was in place.[26]

In the 1960s, ATA proposed a review of its activities, 'which must adapt to fit the needs of a new generation with no experience of the horrors of WWII' and tackle the 'deadly Soviet threat masked by the apparent friendliness of peaceful coexistence', which was in line with what was argued by the Harmel Report.[27]

In 1966, Spaak succeeded Lord Gladwyn as chairman of the ATA. This appointment followed within a few days of Spaak's resignation as General Secretary. As is well known, his resignation was in response to the lack of political unity within the alliance. Thus, it is not surprising that Spaak's priority as ATA's chairman was to use the Association's network of pro-NATO organisations to overcome the political problems of the alliance and to minimise the impact of the peaceful coexistence campaign on the alliance's internal cohesion. After many years during which he had been tied by protocol attached to the post of Secretary General, Spaak was now in a position to speak freely as ATA's chairman, and he certainly was not shy. In his first speech, Spaak warned that the West 'should not have an inferiority complex with regard to the Communist world'. According to him, Europe suffered a form of 'psychological condition' that clouded its judgement. No longer poor, Europeans were full of 'guilt-complexes' about the Third World and an 'inferiority-complex' with regard to the United States. Europe needed to be economically, politically and militarily united so as to have a stronger voice on the international stage. 'It is within NATO, and nowhere else, that we should decide in common our policy towards the Communist world.'[28]

Thus, the appointment of Spaak brought about a more explicit link with the European integration process.[29] Spaak was keen to stress how important it was that the United States should recognise the need for an economically and politically united Europe with the United Kingdom a part of it, a point relentlessly reiterated throughout his chairmanship.

The North Atlantic Assembly

During the Cold War, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) – today the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) – and its annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (NPC) operated separately from NATO but they nevertheless maintained strong links with the alliance, links that have further intensified since the end of the Cold War.[30] The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference was officially established in 1955 to allow all Members of Parliament of the NATO countries to meet once a year to receive briefings about NATO and to discuss issues pertaining to the alliance as a whole. The annual meeting was supposed to foster understanding of the alliance's aims and scope among political leaders.[31]

The ultimate aim was to create a pro-NATO front within each Parliament. In the eyes of its promoters, the NAA helped maintain and strengthen the transatlantic relationship and therefore cement the Atlantic alliance itself.

It may be worth pointing out that interparliamentary assemblies were key elements in the post-war political discourse. Such assemblies, in one form or another, were part of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Yet NATO did not have similar interparliamentary components, and this was perceived by many as indicating a lack of transparency and democratic accountability. When the proposal for a NATO Assembly was first made in 1951, the Council of Europe had been in operation for more than two years. Its Consultative Assembly had already demonstrated an ambition to overcome the limits of national approaches to economic and political reconstruction. This was also the time when the ECSC negotiations were completed and awaited ratification. The ECSC Assembly had the power to review the work of its executive and dismiss it if unsatisfactory. Albeit limited to the coal and steel sector, the ECSC was a bold step in the supranational direction. The European Defence Community (EDC) had also been proposed a year earlier and its possible evolution into a more wide-ranging European Political Community (EPC) was being discussed.

Thus, the American calls for a union of all democratic countries of the world met with the federalist movements of Western Europe and developed into a federalist project that embraced both sides of the Atlantic. The proposal for an Atlantic Assembly gathered together countries that had gradually come to think of themselves as an Atlantic community.

The origins of the Assembly have been investigated in detail elsewhere and recalled in the proceedings of the NAA itself.[32] It may nevertheless be worth discussing here the two competing approaches that characterised the early history of the Assembly, as the debate that developed at the time offered the base upon which the NAA further developed.

The project originated from a proposal made by American Senator Guy M. Gillette in November 1951.[33] In the same period, the Declaration of Atlantic Unity group (DAU) advocated regular meetings of NATO MPs.[34] Similar calls were made in Western Europe.[35] All these proposals agreed on the need to create a permanent body that would be fully integrated in the NATO machinery, outside the national parliaments' control, and therefore of supranational character.

Yet by 1953 the protracted discussions surrounding the European defence and political communities suggested that support for audacious political integration dreams was waning quickly. Thus, it is not surprising that when a second, less ambitious, approach developed in 1953 it attracted the attention of politicians on both sides of the Atlantic. Canadian Senator Wishart McLea Robertson spoke of the need for NATO parliamentarians to meet on a regular basis. Robertson had served as a delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 and thought that the same model could be applied to NATO. Robertson formed the Canadian NATO Parliamentary Association in 1954 with himself as president and encouraged the formation of similar associations in other countries. In Robertson's view, national groups of parliamentarians from the NATO countries should meet once a year to discuss common problems.[36] Given its less radical content at a time when the federalist push was losing steam, Robertson's approach was bound to receive wider support.

The first meeting of NATO parliamentarians took place in July 1955 at NATO Headquarters. It was attended by 200 delegates from all member countries. The debate was obviously absorbed by soul-searching questions about what the North Atlantic Assembly aimed to be and what role it could realistically play.

In preparation for the conference, a questionnaire had been sent to each of the over 5,000 NATO MPs to elicit their views on ways to enhance political cooperation within the alliance. Only around 20 per cent of the MPs replied. The majority favoured a revision of the Washington Treaty to increase economic cooperation and pronouncements by NATO on members' disputes. Interestingly, quite a few favoured mobility of NATO workers, something that was well beyond the scope of the alliance at this point and that mirrored what was seen as a success of the European Coal and Steel Community. Yet there was little support for a parliamentary assembly. The answers to the questionnaire show an awareness of the limitation of the national approach but do not go as far as showing support for political integration within NATO. Thus, radical proposals for a

parliamentary assembly with a consultative status attached to NATO were shelved and the Assembly settled for the interparliamentary model.

The North Atlantic Assembly reflected the desire to give substance to the premises of article 2 of the Washington Treaty, whereby NATO was the expression of a fundamentally political alliance of western democratic countries. The question was, however, whether to move towards a proper consultative assembly, on the lines of the Council of Europe, or to settle for a more modest interparliamentary assembly. Given that there was not enough federalist support for a consultative assembly, the NAA was established as a looser association of pro-NATO MPs meeting once a year.[37]

Generally speaking, interparliamentary assemblies seldom enjoy the same prerogatives as national legislatures and tend to have a mere consultative voice without any real power over the executive branch of the same organisation. Although their members may indeed be elected at the national level, their mandate does not usually stretch to the international aims of the supranational bodies they sit in. Hence, the legitimacy and accountability of the interparliamentary assemblies – the lack of which these assemblies aim to be an answer to – remain questionable.

The North Atlantic Assembly was not created by an international act. In fact, no treaty or document was ever drawn up to set its mandate and terms of reference. The NAA was more the fruit of personal contacts and the holding of similar visions than a clear political act, hence the empirical and pragmatic nature of the Assembly and its proceedings. At the beginning of its history, the very imprecision of its status was the the NAA's strength. Since member governments did not always view this forum favourably, the NAA's loose structure allowed it to stress areas of agreement rather than of difference and its modest mandate and seemingly ad hoc status did not arouse fierce opposition.[38]

NAA could not make binding decisions for NATO but it was in a position to mould public opinion and to shape the political debate about the alliance within the national parliaments. Although the reports on the annual conferences regularly appeared in the *NATO Letter*, NATIS was not involved in the proceedings. Until the appointment of Spaak as Secretary General, the CICR was even reluctant to authorise financial support and seldom offered more than space at NATO Headquarters. It is worth noting, though, that NATIS recognised the value of NAA and used it in its own information material as evidence that NATO was more than a defensive alliance and to stress its political dimension. The third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in November 1957 was the first to be given a complete range of publicity, and many sections were televised and broadcast. A number of sound and film interviews were recorded and sent to member countries, where wide press coverage was also put in place. As for ATA, the appointment of Spaak as Secretary General was felt by the North Atlantic Assembly too. Spaak offered his full support and was keen to follow the works of the parliamentarians' conferences.

Since its inception in 1955, the promoters of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference had been aware of the need to institutionalize it so that it could attain a permanent position within the alliance, and to provide a democratic element to it. In this sense, the Three Wise Men Report had been a disappointment. Spaak himself, despite being a staunch federalist and always supportive of the NAA, was rather cautious and worried about the political implications of these proposals, which risked further jeopardising the stability of the alliance at a time when cohesion was badly needed.

The key problem was that any attempt to give a more permanent status to the NAA and to link it to the NATO Council would have entailed a revision of the Washington Treaty and therefore was extremely problematic. In addition, given that there was no founding document and that its working procedures and membership were established on an ad hoc basis, the NAA's legal position was unclear. The issue was compounded by the fact that until May 1960 the International Secretariat was based in London, and according to English law the Conference had no recognised legal status.[39] It was only with the transfer of the Secretariat to Paris that the Assembly received the official status of a non-profit-making organisation.[40]

Cooperation between NATO and the NAA was strengthened in December 1967 when, in the aftermath of the publication of the Harmel Report, the North Atlantic Council authorised the NATO Secretary General, Manlio Brosio, to study ways to achieve closer cooperation between the two bodies. As a result of these deliberations, several measures were implemented. Most importantly, the Secretary General was to provide a response to all the North Atlantic Assembly's recommendations and resolutions adopted in its Plenary Sessions.[41] In addition, the Secretary General was to attend all NATO Parliamentarians' Conferences and report back to the NATO Council, thus acting as the official intermediary between the two. However, it is worth noting that other proposals, such as having the NAA President and Secretary General sit as observers in all the NATO Ministerial Council meetings, were rejected in Reykjavik in 1968.[42]

The other side of NAA's work was to strengthen support for NATO and more generally for closer transatlantic political and economic cooperation. The annual assembly was of course the most obvious way to allow pro-NATO MPs to meet and to establish personal contact. Attendees sat in seminars on the nature and scope of the alliance and on the current status of the transatlantic partnership. Information material produced by ATA and NATIS was also distributed.[43] The key aim was to build a pro-NATO front across all parliaments. Yet given that each parliament had its own procedures about who should attend the NAA meetings and that very often those who took part in the annual assembly were already somehow connected with the alliance by being, for example, connected to the Foreign or Defence Ministries, it is difficult to assess

whether the NAA meetings did in fact succeed in fostering support for NATO. There is also little evidence of the creation of a pro-NATO front across the parliaments of the alliance. National defence and foreign policy are clearly sensitive issues with ramifications that touch upon national sovereignty. Thus, all discussions connected to the alliance are inevitably subordinated to national interests, which work against the creation of a united front of all pro-NATO parliamentarians across the alliance.

From its inception, NAA focused on two key issues: scientific collaboration and assistance to the Third World. The parliamentarians' conference called for the creation of a special committee on scientific and technical personnel within NATO to foster cooperation in scientific and technological research. It also called for the organisation within the NATO framework of a conference of educationalists to train a sufficient number of scientists and technicians to maintain the leading position of the Atlantic community in the pure and applied sciences.

As was discussed in the previous chapter, the scientific and technological gap within the alliance – and particularly between Europe and the United States – was becoming a growing concern. Talk of a 'brain drain' of European scientists to the United States and the fact that the European countries were registering growing deficits in their balance of payments under the heading of exchanges of patents and licences with America led to concerns among the public and in official circles.[44] The launch of Sputnik in October 1956 made the West also acutely aware of the technological advances of the Soviet bloc and made the need to join forces and bridge the gaps all the more urgent. This was also recognised by the Three Wise Men Report and materialised in the launching of the NATO Science Committee in 1958.[45]

Aid to the Third World was the second main concern of the NAA. The Economic Section of the General Affairs Committee focused on the economic relations between the NATO member countries and underdeveloped areas of the world, with particular reference to the flow of capital, both public and private, regional development schemes and technical assistance. Initially, attention to the decolonisation process was linked to the fear that the Soviet Union could exploit the resentment against the European occupiers and that communism could eventually spread in Africa and South-East Asia. Later, however, interest in the Third World was linked to an expanded view of the Atlantic area's security concept. The NAA became increasingly aware of the impact that political destabilisation and economic problems in the ex-colonies could have on the NATO countries and it recommended political involvement to prevent crises of governance and economic investment to secure development and growth. In this sense, the NAA's understanding of the wider repercussions of decolonisation on western security were much more far-sighted than that of the alliance and of many of the national governments.[46]

From the Atlantic Congress to the Atlantic Institute

The publication of the Three Wise Men Report gave a boost to political and cultural cooperation within NATO. The impact of the report was also felt beyond strictly defined Atlantic circles, and many publications on NATO and the Atlantic community concept appeared in the following years, a sign of the increasing attention paid by academics and journalists alike.

One of the initiatives that stemmed from the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference and ATA's annual assembly was the idea of an Atlantic Congress to coincide with the tenth anniversary of NATO. The proposal received support from the British government, which offered to host the Congress in London. In the eyes of its promoters, the Atlantic Congress should be comparable to the Congress of Europe held at The Hague in 1948, which launched the European integration process.[47] Not all participants were keen federalists, however. Sir Frank Roberts, the British Permanent Representative, expressed concern about the excessive influence of the 'federalist radicals' on the Congress. Britain's Foreign Office was against any discussion about Atlantic political integration and preferred the concept of an Atlantic community built around the special partnership that already bound the United States and United Kingdom together. For the Foreign Office, the Congress should primarily offer NATO the maximum level of publicity and overshadow the problems created by de Gaulle's increasing criticism. Ultimately, the alliance had to be preserved as a permanent political and military structure so as to ensure its ultimate aim: American involvement in Europe. Thus, the original audacious ideas for a federalist Atlantic Congress were substantially moderated by British officials to a more sober and pragmatic version that put greater emphasis on political consultation and common defence than on idealistic discussions on tighter political integration.[48]

The Atlantic Congress took place in London in June 1959. It was opened by Queen Elizabeth and addressed by the prime minister, Harold Macmillan, the Opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell, and the Archbishop of York. There were 650 participants, who included personalities close to the official circles and representatives from ATA and the NAA.[49]

The proceedings of the Congress have already been examined in detail elsewhere but it may be worth mentioning here that, as expected, the federalist wing was keen to push for tighter economic cooperation within NATO.[50] It launched a petition in support of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity, which was signed by 156 influential people and called for, as the name suggests, the political and economic union of the Atlantic area.[51] These demands alarmed official and moderate circles. The Foreign Office was horrified and feared that if the Congress's conclusions were unrealistic, they would be ignored by national governments.[52]

The Atlantic Congress also recommended that 'national governments should not take major decisions affecting NATO unity without previous consultation', which had in fact already been said by the Three Wise Men Report. Finally, the Congress endorsed the plans for the Atlantic Institute. It also stressed the need for further integration of scientific research across the alliance, a theme dear to the North Atlantic Assembly.

Despite the opposition of many national governments, and of course of the Foreign Office, the Congress called for an Atlantic Convention to explore the possibilities of a federal union of the Atlantic countries.[53] Nominated in March 1961, the Atlantic Convention met in January 1962 in Paris to explore how to attain greater political and economic cooperation. It was composed of 100 delegates who had been appointed by the member governments but who were nevertheless supposed to act as private individuals collectively seeking an alliance-wide solution to common political problems.[54] The key idea was to transform the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) into an Atlantic organisation in which the NAA would be given official status and would provide the democratic element necessary to achieve a genuine political union. This was not a new idea: an economically strong Western Europe was seen by many in the United States as a potential economic and political rival; at the same time, the breakdown between the Six of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Seven of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) showed the need for a new structure that would encompass the EEC, the EFTA and NATO.[55] The final 'Declaration of Paris' recommended the creation of a permanent supranational structure which would include a Council, a court of justice, an Atlantic council for youth education and culture, and the appointment of a special committee to work on the creation of a truly Atlantic community, something that was enthusiastically supported by ATA.[56]

Yet all efforts to put these suggestions into practice soon ran into muddy waters because of the opposition of the non-NATO members of the OEEC, which by 1961 was renamed the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as the scepticism of many NATO members. The project was therefore abandoned.

In 1957, a conference on the Atlantic community was organised in Bruges by the College of Europe and the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.[57] The most important outcome of the conference was the decision to establish an Atlantic Institute.[58] The Institute would help develop a stronger sense of community and create a transnational pro-Atlantic elite. It would do so by giving a cultural response to the challenge of communism and totalitarianism. The Institute was primarily conceived as a clearing house for research on Atlantic issues but it would also act as a vehicle for private efforts to promote the concept of the Atlantic community. The idea was also discussed and approved by the NAA and ATA, and the proposal was given its official blessing in 1959 when it was endorsed by the Atlantic Congress.[59]

In the autumn of 1961, the Atlantic Institute was formally established in Paris as a non-governmental international organisation whose aim was to promote concerted efforts in the cultural and information fields.[60] The first pamphlet, *Partnership for Progress: A Program for Transatlantic Action* (1963) was directed by Pierre Uri and was notable for its attention to Third World and East–West dialogue. Research absorbed a large part of the Institute's energies; the Institute made policy recommendations, collected data, carried out studies on Atlantic matters and convened international meetings with academics and experts. A good example of this was the conference organised in 1966 on 'peaceful engagement in Europe', which recommended that western countries should 'move beyond bilateralism' and 'continue the policy of détente'.[61] The Atlantic Institute published also its own journal, *Atlantic Studies*, which from 1964 featured original articles.

Official endorsement from the US government came in the spring of 1961, with declarations of support from President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It is worth remembering that conflict within the Kennedy administration developed among the Atlanticists, who wanted to establish closer links between the United States and Western Europe, and the Europeanists, who contended that Washington's highest priority should be the promotion of European integration. This was also the time when a prospering Europe had regained its confidence, the danger from an imminent invasion from the East had receded and Americans wondered about the need to maintain their costly defence commitments to Western Europe. More importantly, problems within the alliance after the return of General de Gaulle to the political stage and the impasse of the British application to join the Common Market generated fears that the western alliance was fragmenting.

The discussions surrounding the foundation of the Atlantic Institute were therefore an opportunity to bring closer together those in the Kennedy administration who believed in working for Atlantic unity. Under the leadership of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the three major Atlantic organisations – the Atlantic Council, the American Committee for the Atlantic Institute and the less well known American Council on NATO – merged into the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), which remained close to the State Department throughout the Cold War.[62] American support for the concept of the Atlantic community was therefore alive and well at a time when the European member states were absorbed by the protracted and frustrating negotiations of the first EEC enlargement.

In the United States, the Atlantic Institute also collaborated with ACUS to help establish Atlantic studies programmes in American colleges under the leadership of James Huntley. In the mid-1960s, the University of California at Berkeley and Stanford University began pilot seminars. Parallel European projects were launched under the aegis of a Committee on European and American Studies (CEAS) in 1966. The aim was to encourage the 'successor generation' to build a closer Atlantic community.[63]

In the 1970s, the Institute widened its membership to all OECD countries and gave attention to wider economic issues involving relations with developing countries, thus expanding its focus well beyond the strictly defined NATO area.[64] It also published a new series of *Atlantic Papers* on a variety of topics mainly dealing with international relations. The *Papers* addressed opinion formers such as journalists and academics and aimed at offering background information about the diplomatic talks that were taking place at the time. Interestingly, a substantial part of the topics discussed included the Third World and its economic and political development.

Most of these publications were based on research carried out by the Atlantic Institute in Paris and were given great circulation thanks to ATA and the NAA, and the support of NATIS. The Atlantic Institute also signed a deal with Praeger Publishing, which was a leader in the fields of international relations, Russian and German history, military science and art. Praeger published and sold numerous Atlantic Institute research studies in the form of monographs.[65]

A radical rethink or more of the same?

As was discussed in Chapter 4, the departure of France from the alliance's integrated military command and the relocation of NATO Headquarters to Brussels demanded a renewed effort to inform the public about these changes and about the nature and aims of the alliance. At the same time, the greater-than-usual attention of the media concerning the internal problems of the alliance and the new headquarters attracted the interest of the public and opened opportunities for the NAA and ATA. Similarly, the publication of the Harmel Report brought about an overhaul of NATO's information policy and redirected the focus more clearly towards the alliance's political dimension and the younger generations. Yet at a time when the Harmel Report promoted the political role of the alliance, the invasion of Czechoslovakia made military defence once more seem vital.

The end of the 1960s demanded therefore a rethinking of the NAA's and ATA's missions and of their activities. As far as the NAA was concerned, the official recognition of its role in the Harmel Report gave it a boost. It could now promote itself as the main channel for fostering political cooperation and for providing a democratic element that the alliance was missing.[66]

On the other hand, ATA and its member organisations discussed the relaunching of their youth programmes and the need to make education a central part of their activities. The information material used by the national associations and the focus of their education activities had to be revisited to mirror the shifting focus towards political cooperation within the alliance. In this sense, it was felt that NATIS should provide more guidance as to the direction such initiatives should take and supply

appropriate information material.[67] ATA became increasingly more aware of the need to capture disillusioned youth and to re-establish trust in international diplomacy. This was a time when many member states witnessed widespread protests by students and workers, and later vocal peace movements appeared. The appeal of NATO among the younger generations seemed at its lowest point, particularly in Italy, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, while ATA recommended vigorous information programmes, it also encouraged each member association to carefully tailor the material provided by NATIS to the national context.[68]

Yet the problem was that ATA itself was often perceived as a 'club of old boys', as the leading figures were all men of a certain age.[69] As part of its renewed attempt to address youth, ATA invested its energies in its Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders (AAYPL), which was launched in the late 1960s and which grouped together active young politicians representing major political parties in most of the NATO countries. The AAYP – which is still active today – organised seminars, conferences and study trips to enable its members to discuss topics of common interest and to build personal relations on a bilateral and multilateral basis. The initiative was expanded in the early 1970s so as to develop cooperation and contact with counterparts in countries that were not members of the alliance, including young political leaders in Asia, Africa and Latin America. As will be demonstrated in what follows, this was part of a more general attempt by ATA and the NAA to reflect the enlarged security scope of NATO in the 1970s and 1980s.[70]

Education was of course one of the top priorities of NAA, although in this case the target audience was primarily composed of MPs and civil servants. For this purpose, the NAA recommended the creation of a joint NATO–NAA committee to study information policy and youth problems.[71] The Standing Conference of Atlantic Organizations (SCAO) was launched in 1973 by James Huntley, one of the major promoters of the Atlantic Institute, and by Sir Frank Roberts, the British Permanent Representative, to gather together all pro-NATO bodies. SCAO acted as a point of contact for all associations interested in Atlantic relations and therefore indirectly in NATO too. Its membership covered the NAA, ATA and numerous other organisations that had been founded since the 1950s.[72] SCAO had the support of NATIS and, more substantially, of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. SCAO was an umbrella organisation whose membership was much wider and more heterogeneous than that of the NAA and ATA.

If the publication of the Harmel Report did indeed bring about a revived effort and new initiatives, there was little innovation in terms of programmes and ideas. No radical rethinking of ATA's and the NAA's approach to education and information policies took place at the time, another landslide of associations and abbreviations followed. In this sense, the rationalisation effort that had led to the creation of ATA in 1954 seemed to have gone to waste.

In terms of the themes discussed in the information material produced by the two associations in the aftermath of the Harmel Report, there was a clear attempt to move beyond addressing outright anti-NATO criticism and to engage with wider issues that concerned the public at large. A survey of the Atlantic Institute outputs, for example, reveals that in the 1970s and early 1980s the Institute organised numerous conferences and seminars and produced publications on issues such as North–South dialogue, economic development of the Third World, and the technological gap within the alliance as well as between East and West.[73]

What seemed to bring a new element into the debate was the NAA's call for a 'more cohesive European role in the alliance'. The NAA was instrumental in developing a 'European Defence Nucleus' within NATO, to represent European attitudes more clearly within the NAC, and to obtain better value for money in terms of European defence spending.[74] This suggestion was part of a more general move towards giving Europe a stronger voice, owing to increasing economic difficulties between Western Europe and the United States at a time of intensive diplomatic talks. The European element of the alliance was of course at the centre of attention because of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was launched in 1973. At the same time, the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries had opened in Vienna. In the mid-1970s, therefore, the alliance was caught between two parallel negotiation processes that although in principle were not necessarily contradictory, did pose problematic information and political challenges to the alliance and its members.

The transition to democracy of Portugal and Greece, two NATO members, and of Spain, an aspiring member, was welcomed by all those involved in the pro-NATO information campaigns. The presence of dictatorial regimes at the head of some member countries had been skilfully exploited by the anti-NATO – particularly communist – front, and the countries' peaceful democratic process had removed a thorny element in the pro-NATO information campaign. On the other hand, however, the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent Greek decision to withdraw from the integrated military command of the alliance only a few years after France had taken the same step dealt a blow to the public image of NATO. Further afield, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the subsequent energy crisis showed that peace and stability had to be safeguarded beyond the NATO area, which required a revision of the alliance's security concept.

The rapidly evolving international context posed difficult challenges for the pro-NATO voluntary organisations. In this sense, the publication of the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations (1974) provided new guidance about NATO's priorities and aims. Both the NAA and ATA recognised that NATO required a broader security strategy. The need for closer political consultation was seen as a priority and ATA recommended that in the light of the new nature of the problems, 'special attention should be

given to strengthening the North Atlantic Assembly'.[75] According to ATA, it was crucial to make sure that national parliaments were fully engaged in the discussions about NATO's security and strategic concepts.[76] In addition, ATA feared that talks about arms reduction might make NATO appear redundant and therefore further erode public support for the alliance. The ATA Assembly noted that:

> while the Soviet threat has increased, the perception of it in western public opinion has diminished. Indeed, in 1975 the cumulative effect of: a) the increase of Soviet military intimidation; b) social unrest heightened by economic circumstances; and c) the dangers deriving from the ideological and subversive influence of the western communist parties, present a continued challenge of the utmost gravity.[77]

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, ATA and the NAA asked for an increase in the NATO information budget to allow NATIS to cope with the new challenges.[78] As was discussed in Chapter 4, however, these demands remained unanswered and the size of the budget hardly increased. In 1981, the NAA noted with frustration that while anti-nuclear sentiments had become increasingly better organised and had gained a significant level of public support, NATO's information work was lamentable and cripplingly underfunded. The NAA was equally concerned by 'the apathy surrounding the growth in Western Europe of a pacifist and neutralist movement' and it urged the Council to pursue an 'active policy to make public opinion aware of the seriousness of the challenge to freedom'.[79] In the NAA's view – and ATA agreed – it was naive to dismiss the peace movements as a communist conspiracy. It was a miscalculation, the NAA argued, to assume that the peace movements could be countered with yet another information campaign on the same lines as the ones put forward up to that point. The West risked losing the battle for the hearts and minds of its own people, a battle that it was all the more vital to win, as without public support the very nuclear deterrent strategy of the alliance would be undermined.[80] Both ATA and the NAA were also aware that 'in scope and scale the problems confronting the alliance now transcend its present activities as well as the geographical area of the treaty. Many of these problems have become worldwide'.[81]

In order to strengthen its information effort and to reach beyond the NATO area, ATA became increasingly more interested in offering its support to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.[82] It also relaunched its publication programme and pamphlets like *Impediments to the Free Flow of Information between East and West* (1973), also known as the Grey Book – a pamphlet that received wide circulation within the NATO area and beyond.[83] At the same time, NAA strengthened its ties with the OECD and the European Parliament.

Conclusion

NATIS and the voluntary organisations worked closely together throughout the Cold War. The voluntary organisations assisted with the circulation of publications, films and documentaries produced by NATIS. They also supported the national governments' efforts by helping with the organisation of seminars, conferences and travelling exhibitions. In exchange for their help, these organisations often received contributions from NATIS's Special Fund as well as assistance in terms of expertise and information material. NAA also aimed to provide a 'democratic' element, and despite its ad hoc nature and its initial lack of institutional recognition, it did have the merit of bringing together Members of Parliament across the alliance. Yet it was only after 1967 that an official channel of communication between the Council and NAA was established via the Secretary General.

In both cases, however, the two bodies had an uneven presence in the NATO countries, and in fact they tended to be strong and well organised in those countries where the alliance was already widely accepted and had a large support base. In countries where it was contested or was simply not well known, the NAA and ATA were also weaker and less organised. Thus, NATIS had to make sure that it carried out a careful diplomatic operation whereby it offered contributions from the Special Fund to all voluntary organisations but that more help and support went where information work was needed, and not necessarily where it was claimed more often. These decisions had to be taken with the understanding that all voluntary organisations had to be supported but that some had to be helped more than others. The problem was particularly acute in those countries where requests for contributions from the Special Fund hardly came through at all, as the local voluntary organisations either were too small or were focused on other problems. Greece is a good example, as for a long time the Cyprus controversy absorbed all the attention of the Foreign and Defence Ministries and hardly any attention was paid to building support for NATO. Finally, because of the very nature of their structure and membership, ATA and the NAA addressed individuals who were in some way already connected to the alliance and therefore contributed little to expanding NATO's support base. As in the case of the work carried out by NATIS's Public Relations Section, it was virtually impossible to assess to what extent what the participants in the NAA's and ATA's events had learned was then passed on to secondary audiences.

In most cases, ATA and the NAA followed the lead of NATIS, and although the two bodies' remit was wider than NATIS's – they could, for example, address the public of non-NATO countries and touch upon a wider range of topics – they often followed the action programme outlined by NATIS. One notable exception is the NAA's focus on the Third

World and the problems linked to economic development, communist infiltration and political stabilisation. The attention to this topic originated from the NAA's own initiative and it proved to be very important to prepare the groundwork for the revision of the alliance's security concept in the post-Cold War era.

Notes

1 Among the most significant recent contributions are Lucas S.W., *Freedom's War: The US Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999); Scott-Smith G. and Krabbendam H. (eds), *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945–1960* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Scott-Smith G., *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA, and Postwar American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002); Scott-Smith G., *Networks of Empire: The U.S. State Department's Foreign Leader Program in the Netherlands, France, and Britain 1950–70* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2008); Berghahn V.R., *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone between Philanthropy, Academy, and Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Berghahn V.R., 'A public–private partnership? The cultural policies of the US administrations in Western Europe and the role of the big American foundations', in Geppert D. (ed.), *The Postwar Challenge: Cultural, Social and Political Change in Western Europe, 1945–58* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 299–317; Laville H. and Wilford H. (eds), *The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War: The State–Private Network* (London: Routledge, 2006); Gienow-Hecht J. and Schumacher F. (eds), *Culture and International Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Berghahn, 2002); Parmar I., *Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–1945* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Parmar I., *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Parmar I., 'Conceptualising the state–private network in American foreign policy', in Laville and Wilford (eds), *The US Government*, pp. 13–27. The Bilderberg group in particular has recently been at the centre of historical research: Richardson I., Kakabadse A.P. and Kakabadse N.K., *Bilderberg People: Elite Power and Consensus in World Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2011); Wilford H., 'CIA plot, socialist conspiracy, or new world order? The origins of the Bilderberg Group, 1952–55', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 14/3 (2003), pp. 70–82; Aubourg V., 'The Bilderberg Group: promoting European governance inside an Atlantic community of values', in Kaiser W., Leucht B. and Gehler M. (eds), *Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe 1945–83* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Aubourg V., 'Organizing Atlanticism: The Bilderberg Group and the Atlantic Institute, 1952–63', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18/2 (2003), pp. 92–105.

2 Saunders F.S., *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 2000); Lucas S.L., 'Revealing the parameters of opinion: an interview with Frances Stonor Saunders', *Intelligence and National Security*, 18/2 (2003), pp. 15–40.

3 Thompson E.P., *The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays* (London: Merlin Press, 1978).

4 For the development of the idea of an Atlantic community, see Aubourg V., Bossuat G. and Scott-Smith G. (eds), *European Community, Atlantic Community?* (Paris: Soleb, 2008); Aubourg V. and Scott-Smith G. (eds), *Atlantic, Euratlantic,*

or Europe-America? The Atlantic Community and the European Idea from Kennedy to Nixon* (Paris: Soleb, 2011); Mariano M. (ed.), *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Huber S., 'Europe in the American mirror: problems and possibilities of an Atlantic European political order', in Persson H.-Å. and Stråth B. (eds), *Reflections on Europe: Defining a Political Order in Time and Space* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 121–136.

5 In 1938, Streit published *Union Now*, which called for the political integration of Western Europe and the other English-speaking countries, including the United States.

6 Atlantic Treaty Association website: www.ata-sec.org (retrieved on 20 July 2012).

7 ATA's first Secretariat was composed of one Secretary-General (John Eppstein), one full-time Assistant Secretary (Edouard Molitor) and a secretary-typist. The chairman was Count Umberto Morra, who at the time was director of the Italian Cultural Institute in London.

8 'Report on the Second Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association to the Committee of the Three Ministers', in Atlantic Treaty Association, *The Spirit of the Alliance: A Progress Report: The Second Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Paris, 12–15 September 1956* (Paris: Atlantic Treaty Association), pp. 8–10.

9 De Freitas G., 'Introduction', in Harned J. and Mally G., *Atlantic Assembly: Proposals and Prospects* (London: Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, 1965), p. 5.

10 Atlantic Treaty Association, *The Spirit of the Alliance*.

11 John Eppstein, 'New life for NATO', *NATO Letter*, 5/1 (January 1957).

12 CICR, 'Conference for Representatives of Youth Organisations of NATO Countries', note by the Director of Information, 16 August 1956, NA, AC/52-D/183.

13 Atlantic Treaty Association, *The Spirit of the Alliance*, p. 12. The fact that in June 1957 Pope Pius XII welcomed the ATA's Third Assembly at the Vatican was another sign of the rapidly increasing international standing of the Association.

14 CICR, Special Information Fund for the Tenth Anniversary, 5 November 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)56. The size of the Special Fund in relation to the Civil Budget was increased after the publication of the Harmel Report, when John Price argued in favour of more support for the voluntary organisations. See CICR, 'Proposed 1969 information activities', note by the Director of Information, 5 November 1968, NA, AC/52-D(68)3.

15 Like, for example, the Canadian Atlantic Coordinating Committee, the French Committee for the Study of NATO and the Turkish Atlantic Committee based at the University of Ankara. In France, there was also the Association Française pour la Communauté Atlantique, which carried out propaganda of a more popular nature, with the involvement of university students.

16 'Work of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 1955–56', in Atlantic Treaty Organisation, *The Spirit of the Alliance*, p. 12.

17 'NATO and the citizens', in *A Progress Report: The Third Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association* (Paris: Atlantic Treaty Association, 1957).

18 *The Building of Atlantic Community: Progress Report 1958*, review of the year by John Eppstein.

19 Jacques Vernant was ATA Secretary for Research. The third assembly (Rome, 24–28 June 1957) created the Atlantic Community Awards, to promote good writing (there were three sections: journalists; political and critical works; imaginative writing) and allowed observers from NATO, the WEU, the Council of Europe, the NAC, the International Federation of Free Trade Unions and Portugal.

20 CICR, 'Study Conference on the Role of the School in the Atlantic Community', note by the Director of Information, 10 September 1956, NA, AC/52-D/185.
21 Two thousand copies of the bilingual edition of *The Role of the School in the Atlantic Community* were produced, with additional reprints in English and French. In view of its popularity, the pamphlet was translated into several languages. It discussed topics such as the teaching of European and North American history in the schools of the member states, and information about NATO countries in geography classes.
22 'Atlantic Treaty Association', *NATO Letter*, 6/9 (September–October 1958). In September 1957, ATA called for a second study conference, 'The Teacher and International Understanding', which took place at the Palais de Chaillot in September 1958. The Third Biennial Study Conference on Education was organised by the ATA in Luxembourg in July 1960. The conference recommended 'greater objectivity within the classroom' and an increase in the teacher/student Atlantic exchanges. 'Youth in the Atlantic community', *NATO Letter*, 8/9 (September 1960).
23 Atlantic Treaty Association, *The Spirit of the Atlantic Alliance* (Paris: Atlantic Treaty Association, 1956), p. 11; *The Building of Atlantic Community: Progress Report 1958*, review of the year by John Eppstein.
24 It later moved to 23–25 Abbey House, 8 Victoria Street, London SW1.
25 'The Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers', *NATO Letter*, 13/4 (April 1965). The governing body of the Centre was the Atlantic Treaty Education Committee (created in 1956). John Eppstein was the director. A biannual report was sent to the Director of Information at NATIS for review. See, for example, CICR, 'Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers', note by the Secretary', 4 December 1963, NA, AC/52-WP(63)43; CICR, 'Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers', 4 December 1965, AC/52-WP(65)7. In 1973, the North Atlantic Assembly granted consultative status to the Centre. '19th Annual Assembly of the North Atlantic Assembly', *NATO Review*, 21/6 (November–December 1973).
26 'Work of the Atlantic Treaty Association, 1955–56', in Atlantic Atreaty Association, *The Spirit of the Alliance*, p. 11.
27 De Madre J., 'ATA and the future of the Atlantic alliance', *NATO Letter*, 13/11 (November 1965). The same point was made the following year in Munich (19–23 September 1966) under the theme 'The present state of the Atlantic alliance and the nature of the communist threat'. See Vernon J., 'The ATA and the communist threat', *NATO Letter*, 14/11 (November 1966).
28 Spaak P.-H., 'The indispensable alliance', *NATO Letter*, 15/11 (November 1967). See also the articles 'The ATA and transatlantic partnership', Rostow E.V., 'Concert and conciliation: the next stage of the alliance' and 'Final resolution', all in the same issue of the *NATO Letter*.
29 'Final resolution adopted by the Thirteenth Annual Assembly of the ATA', *NATO Letter*, 15/11 (November 1967).
30 The North Atlantic Assembly changed its name to NATO Parliamentary Assembly in 1999. Between 1955 and 1966, the organisation was called the North Atlantic Assembly as well as the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (NPC). From 1966, it was called only NAA. To avoid any misunderstanding, the abbreviation NAA is used throughout this book.
31 It may be worth mentioning here that since the end of the Cold War, the NAA has extended its work to parliamentarians from countries in Central and Eastern Europe who seek a closer form of association with NATO. NATO Parliamentary Assembly website: www.nato-pa.int (retrieved on 20 July 2012).
32 Matthews J.A., 'The evolution of an Atlantic Assembly' (1962). Available

at: http://streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/North_Atlantic_Assembly_story.pdf (retrieved on 27 February 2013); Charman S. and Williams K., *The Parliamentarians' Role in the Alliance: The North Atlantic Assembly (1955–1980)* (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1981); Brumter C., *The North Atlantic Assembly* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Aubourg V., 'The Atlantic Congress of 1959: an ambiguous celebration of the Atlantic community', in Schmidt G. (ed.), *A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years*, vol. 2 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2001), pp. 341–357; Marschall S., 'Transnational parliamentary assemblies and European security policy', in Peters D., Wagner W. and Deitelhoff N. (eds), *The Parliamentary Control of European Security Policy* (University of Oslo: ARENA, 2008), pp. 109–132.

33 The speech was made at a time when a delegation of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe visited the United States and invited members of the US Congress belonging to both parties to attend the next meeting of the Assembly of the Council of Europe 'to discuss vital interests which bind us together'. As quoted in Matthews, 'Evolution of an Atlantic Assembly'.

34 The DAU received the support of numerous personalities, including John J. McCloy, the former US High Commissioner to Germany, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and Maurice Schumann of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire*. *Declaration of Atlantic Unity: Tenth Anniversary, 1954–64* (New York: NATO, 1964). The key DAU person was Walden Moore, a former member of the federalist Atlantic Union Committee and a close friend of Hugh Moore. According to Valerie Aubourg, the DAU was essential in bringing about the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. See Aubourg, 'The Atlantic Congress'.

35 For example, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas advocated the need to establish an Atlantic consultative assembly at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg and in Britain's House of Commons. Similar hopes were expressed by Finn Moe in the Norwegian Parliament. Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*, pp. 6–7.

36 'Canadian parliamentarians and NATO assembly', *NATO Letter*, 2/1 (February 1955).

37 The conference developed a working procedure that continued throughout the Cold War. It set up Military, Political, Economic and Cultural Committees, which produced a set of draft proposals that were the discussed by the conference in plenary session, which would then pass its resolutions. The NAA's and ATA's resolutions were regularly published in the *NATO Letter*.

38 Each country would decide who to send to the annual conference according to national procedures. No members of government were allowed to participate. See Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*, ch. 4.

39 This situation presented serious drawbacks, for it made relations with third parties difficult, as any obligation could not be taken on by the Assembly but only by any individual in the Secretariat willing to accept personal responsibility. This was a particular problem for the organisation of the Atlantic Congress, which was solved by the creation of a company called Atlantic Congress Limited to receive and manage the funds.

40 *Journal Officiel, République Française*, 10 December 1960 and 12–13 February 1962. Finally, after the transfer to Brussels in 1968, the NAA was recognised by the Belgian government as an international organisation. Act of 14 August 1974, quoted in Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*, p. 26.

41 Stevens V., 'NATO parliamentarians assemble in Brussels' and 'North Atlantic Assembly: resolutions and recommendations', *NATO Letter*, 16/1 (January 1968).

42 Today, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's Standing Committee meets annually with both the Secretary General and the Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to exchange views

on the state of the Alliance. The Secretary General routinely participates in the spring and autumn sessions of the Assembly and provides a written response to the recommendations passed by the Assembly at its autumn session. The Assembly's presidents, in turn, participate in summit meetings of the Alliance. See the NATO Parliamentary Assembly's official website: www.nato-pa.int (retrieved on 1 August 2012).

43 Charman and Williams, *The Parliamentarians' Role*, p. 27.

44 Vincent A., 'The technological gaps: a three-dimensional problem', *NATO Letter*, 15/10 (October 1967).

45 See Chapter 7 for a summary of the origins of the Science Committee.

46 See, for example, 'Conference of Atlantic Parliamentarians', *NATO Letter*, 4/12 (December 1956) and 'Report on the Alliance', *NATO Letter*, 6/12 (December 1958).

47 Among NAA's staunchest federalists were Douglas Robinson, executive secretary of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, and Sir Geoffrey de Freitas (treasurer and rapporteur to the NAA Political Committee). De Freitas and Robinson hoped to use the Congress as a platform to push for further political integration.

48 For a detailed examination of the origins of the Congress, see Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*, and Aubourg, 'The Atlantic Congress'.

49 Among the participants were Paul-Henri Spaak and General Lauris Norstad, Joseph Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister and president of the Atlantic Council, and John Cahan, Deputy Secretary General of the OEEC, ATA's Secretary General John Eppstein, and former government leaders such as Guy Mollet, Clement Attlee and Henry Kissinger. Other participants included Fritz Berg (president of the Federation of German Industries), Louis Armand (president of SNCF, the French national railway company) and J. Oldenbrock (General Secretary of the World Federation of Free Trade Unions). The Congress was widely publicised. See Danielou J., 'The spiritual and cutlural values of the Atlantic community', *NATO Letter*, 7/7 (July 1959).

50 Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*; Aubourg, 'The Atlantic Congress'.

51 Elmo Roper and Adolph W. Schmidt called for transfer of sovereignty to a new structure, a common currency and a common market.

52 Full text in Matthews, 'Evolution of an Atlantic Assembly'. John Eppstein of ATA also called for a more pragmatic approach. A more cautious position was put forward by Max Beloff and Kenneth Younger, who spoke in favour of inter-governmentalism. For a detailed examination of these discussions, see Aubourg, 'The Atlantic Congress'.

53 The proposal had first been put forward by the third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957. See 'Conference of Parliamentarians' and 'Atlantic Treaty Association', *NATO Letter*, 5/12 (December 1957). The Secretary of State approved $300,000 in 1960 from Congress to fund the works of the Convention. See US Citizens Commission on NATO, established by US Public Law 86-719, enacted in September 1960. For the origins of the convention, see Brumter, *The North Atlantic Assembly*, pp. 14–15.

54 The rules of procedures had already been agreed by a Preparatory Committee in October 1961. Matthews, 'Evolution of an Atlantic Assembly'; Small M., *The Atlantic Council: The Early Years* (1998). Available at: www.nato.int/acad/fellow/96-98/small.pdf (retrieved on 27 February 2013).

55 Milward A.S., 'NATO, OEEC, and the integration of Europe', in Heller F.H. and Gillingham J.R. (eds), *NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 105–124.

56 'The Atlantic Convention: 'Declaration of Paris', *NATO Letter*, 10/3 (March 1962). For the support of ATA, see 'The Atlantic Treaty Association', *NATO*

Letter, 10/11 (November 1962); 'ATA and the Declaration of Paris', *NATO Letter*, 11/6 (June 1963).

57 Among the participants were high-profile personalities like Paul-Henri Spaak, Robert Schuman, Henry Brugmans, Clarence K. Streit, Douglas Robinson (secretary of the NAA) and Adriano Olivetti. The conference received the support of the Ford and Mellon Foundations and the Olivetti Group, and it saw the participation of several private European and transatlantic groups. For a detailed reconstruction of the Institute's origins, see Aubourg, 'Organizing Atlanticism'. The Atlantic Institute closed in 1998 and its archives were destroyed in the bombing of its premises in Paris in July 1984 organised by Action Directe.

58 It is important to point out the crucial role played by James R. Huntley. He was a Foreign Service officer in occupied Germany from 1952 to 1955, where he was involved with re-education and American cultural policy. In 1956, he became a USIA officer in Washington.

59 *NATO Parliamentarians' Conference: Resolutions and Reports*, London, November 1957, p. 7. The Congress expressed support for the creation of a Studies Centre for the Atlantic Community (a plan advocated by the Canadian L. Dana Wilgress, former ambassador to NATO, and Paul van Zeeland).

60 The board of governors was headed by Paul van Zeeland; Henry Cabot Lodge became Director-General later that year. The vice-chairmen were Kurt Birrenbach, Lord Gladwyn, the Norwegian labour leader Nils Langhelle and the French economist Jacques Rueff. It was provisionally set up in Milan under Professor Gerolamo Bassani of the Italian Institute of International Politics. In November 1961, the Institute moved to Paris. Funding of $250,000 over five years was supplied by the Ford Foundation, with a further $800,000 given between 1969 and 1973. See *Atlantic Congress Report* published by the international secretariat of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (London, 1958). Small, *The Atlantic Council*. See also 'Atlantic Institute chooses Director-General', *NATO Letter*, 9/12 (December 1961).

61 Sington A., '"Peaceful engagement in Europe (the Atlantic Institute's Rome Conference on East–West Relations)', *NATO Letter*, 14/12 (December 1966). See also 'Atlantic Institute urges education plan', *NATO Letter*, 10/2 (February 1962).

62 Small, *The Atlantic Council*. The Atlantic Council, which was absorbed by ACUS, was itself to all intents and purposes the successor AUC.

63 Small, *The Atlantic Council*.

64 Sir Frank Roberts, 'Voluntary societies in support of NATO', *NATO Review*, 23/6 (November–December 1975).

65 Tuthill J.W, 'The Atlantic Institute: aims and achievements', *NATO Letter*, 18/1 (January 1970). Among the most widely circulated papers were Caldwell L.T., *Soviet–American Relations: One Half Decade of Detente Problems and Issues*, Atlantic Papers 5 (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1975); Ludz P.C. *et al.*, *Dilemmas of the Atlantic Alliance: Two Germanys, Scandinavia, Canada, NATO and the EEC* (New York: Praeger, 1975; Camps C., *'First World' Relationships: The Role of the OECD*, Atlantic Institute Studies 1 (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1975); Gasteyger C. (ed.), *The Western World and Energy*, Atlantic Papers 1 (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1974); Hager W., *Europe's Economic Security: Non-energy Issues in the International Political Economy*, Atlantic Papers 3 (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1975); Pierre Uri (ed.), *North–South: Developing a New Relationship* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1975); Basagni F. and Uri P. (eds), *Monetary Relations and World Development*, Atlantic Papers 4 (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977).

66 This role was to be acknowledged officially by the Ottawa Declaration of 1974.

Point 13 of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations issued by the North Atlantic Council (the Ottawa Declaration). Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/ SID-BAD55764-54951869/natolive/official_texts_26901.htm (retrieved on 12 December 2012).

67 'Recommendations of the 14th Annual Assembly of ATA', *NATO Letter*, 16/11 (November 1968).

68 'Aligning NATO and youth: a debate of the problem of making the Atlantic alliance acceptable to young people', *NATO Letter*, 17/3 (March 1969).

69 Similar concern had been expressed by John Price. For a list of all contacts, see 'Survey of the NATO Information Service Output, 1969', no date, NA, AC/273-D(70)1. See also Scott-Smith G., *Western Anti-communism and the Inter-doc Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), p. 216.

70 According to a report published in the *NATO Review*, 2,000 young political leaders participated in AAYPL programmes between 1969 and 1972, a number that was expected to double in 1972–1973. 'Young political leaders invest in the future', *NATO Review*, 20/3–4 (March–April 1972). In addition, from 1971, groups of young political leaders from some European countries and the United States took part in the Assembly as full members of their delegations. *NATO Review*, 19/11–12 (November–December 1971).

71 'Fourteenth Annual Session of NATO Parliamentarians', *NATO Letter*, 16/12 (December 1968).

72 For example, the Mid-Atlantic Clubs (a series of multinational luncheon clubs set up in London and other Atlantic capitals to discuss transatlantic issues), The European-Atlantic Movement (TEAM), the Ditchley Foundation, Wilton Park, the Atlantic Visitors Associations, the Trilateral Commission, the Commonwealth Fund, the English-Speaking Union, the Foundation of European-American Organisations, the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers and the Atlantic Institute.

73 See, for example, Lutz C., *The Road to European Union: A Plea for a Constitutional Revolution* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1976); Gasteyer C., *Europe and America at the Crossroad*s (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1972); Uri P. (ed.), *Trade and Investment Policies for the Seventies: New Challenges for the Atlantic Area and Japan* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1971); Uri P., *North–South: Developing a New Relationship* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1976); *Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguards: A Conference Report* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs; Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun [distributors], *c.*1981); Knudsen B.B., *Europe versus America: Foreign Policy in the 1980s* (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1984).

74 The proposal was first put forward by Erik Blumenfeld's report to the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. The report stated that a 'European Defence Grouping would most logically be based around the nuclear strength of Britain and France and the conventional strength of Germany.... Other Western European countries which are prepared to join in would be welcome to do so, on condition that they are prepared to accept a degree of supra-national control over the pooled defence system'. 'NATO and the role of Europe (extracts)', *NATO Letter*, 17/12 (December 1969).

75 'Atlantic Treaty Association, XXth Annual Assembly in Ottawa, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 22/6 (December 1974).

76 Van Rossum G., 'XVIth Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association at The Hague' and 'Final Resolution', both in *NATO Letter*, 18/10–11 (October–November 1970). This point was reiterated throughout the 1970s and 1980s. See, for example, Corterier P., 'The ATA and a new approach to NATO information', *NATO Review*, 34/2 (April 1986).

77 'Atlantic Treaty Association, 21st Annual Assembly in Paris, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 23/6 (December 1975).
78 'North Atlantic Assembly, 17th Annual Session, Ottawa, 23–29 September, 1971', *NATO Review*, 19/11–12 (November–December 1971); 'Atlantic relations: perspectives towards the future', *NATO Review*, 21/2 (March–April 1973); 'XIXth Annual ATA Assembly, Brussels (10–14 September 1973)', *NATO Review*, 21/5 (September–October 1973) and *The ATA: Towards a Reappraisal: The Report of the Working Party on the Future of the Atlantic Treaty Association* (Duston, Northampton, UK: British Atlantic Youth, 1976).
79 Lamb C.J., 'Public opinion and nuclear weapons in Europe: a report of the 27th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly', *NATO Review*, 29/6 (December 1981).
80 Van Rossum G., 'XVIth Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association at The Hague' and 'Final Resolution', both in *NATO Letter*, 18/10–11 (October–November 1970).
81 'Atlantic Treaty Association, XXth Annual Assembly in Ottawa, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 22/6 (December 1974). See also Hitchens T., 'NATO parliamentarians call for increased information effort', *NATO Review*, 30/6 (December 1982).
82 'Atlantic Treaty Association, XXth Annual Assembly in Ottawa, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 22/6 (December 1974).
83 The Grey Book was published at the same time as *The Right to Know: A Report by the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting*. The ATA Assembly agreed that more publications should be produced to provide reference information to journalists and academics. See 'Atlantic Treaty Association, 21st Annual Assembly in Paris, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 23/6 (December 1975). The same point had already been made two years earlier. 'XIXth Annual ATA Assembly, Final Resolution', *NATO Review*, 21/5 (September–October 1973). See also Flynn G., 'Public opinion and Atlantic defence', *NATO Review*, 31/5 (September 1983).

Conclusion

The history of the NATO Information Service could be summarised as an ongoing struggle between the desire for a coherent alliance-wide propaganda campaign and the demands of the national governments to determine their own information policies. The need for NATIS is easily explained. Despite the relatively quick ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, large sectors of the public in several member countries remained unconvinced about the need for a common defence policy and for rearmament. While in the United States and Britain the level of dissent was minimal, in other member states – most obviously Italy and France – scepticism spread beyond the inevitable communist opposition to include nationalists, conservatives and more moderate political positions. In the early 1950s, the western communist parties as well as the Cominform were able to exploit distrust and support for neutralism and anti-militarism. Capitalising on the public resentment concerning the high costs of rearmament, the communists could attack NATO and the western approach to common defence with relative ease. The NATO information officers sought to respond to the appeal of calls for neutralism and disarmament. But the competing demands and initiatives of national governments created a degree of overlap and conflicting priorities that constantly undermined their efforts to promote NATO, and the result was often a hotchpotch of initiatives leading in different directions.

Each national government was naturally inclined to think it was in the best position to understand the concerns and sensibilities of its own public, and sometimes feared the interference of NATIS. National governments, moreover, were reluctant to focus their attention on any topic that was either too controversial (as, for example, in Italy) or too much a matter of course (as in Britain) to lend itself to political pronouncements. National differences and priorities also meant that centralised NATO information work was bound to tend towards the lowest common denominator. This tendency translated into a general – if not bland – portrait of NATO as an insurance policy and fire brigade, and an information service that was structurally unable to respond quickly to the demands placed upon it.

The study of the institutional history of the NATO Information Service reveals that throughout the Cold War there was a consistent delay between the time when the Council issued new guidelines about the alliance's priorities in the field of information and the time when NATIS was in a position to produce new material to reflect the shift. More often than not, by the time NATIS was in such a position, the Council's priorities had moved on and a new version of the information material had already become necessary. The peaceful image of NATIS, for example, was clearly defined in the films and touring exhibition that toured Europe in the 1960s but far less so in the travelling exhibitions of the late 1950s, even though the Council had agreed to review the core message of NATIS propaganda material immediately after the publication of the Three Wise Men Report (1956).

The reasons for the delay become clear when we consider the cumbersome and lengthy process by which the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) dealt with surveys of public opinion and with studies of the impact of the current information programmes provided by the national representatives on the Committee. After having reviewed the documents, the CICR would pass its report, with recommendations, to the Council. The Council and each national representative would then make comments and suggestions for improvement. These would then be passed on to NATIS for comments. After having heard back from NATIS and the CICR, the Council would finally approve the information programme. The whole process could take six to twelve months. Only then would NATIS be in a position to review its material according to the new guidelines approved by the Council and to organise the production of new pieces, which itself usually took another year. Unsurprisingly, NATIS material was often outdated even before it left NATO Headquarters.

The failed attempts to increase the information budget, which remained a cause of frustration for all Directors of Information and for the voluntary organisations, caused further delays. Thus, cumbersome institutional procedures, the limited budget and the low priority accorded to information work within the alliance and by the national governments worked against an effective information programme.

Although such frustrations were more or less constant, the role of NATIS itself changed in the course of the Cold War. In particular, NATIS tried to widen the focus of its information programmes so as to appeal to an ever-larger spectrum of audiences. In order to do so, the choice of themes and the emphasis placed on them had to be continuously recalibrated. NATIS moved away from the straightforward anti-communism of the early 1950s and engaged with the wider discussions about western governance and the political accountability of the alliance by stressing its political dimension and by presenting NATO as an Atlantic community of values with common interests and shared heritage. At a time when Western Europe was moving towards closer economic and political

integration, the alliance portrayed itself as part of the general trend towards bringing the West closer together. Thus, overt anti-communism and the predominance of the military aspects of the alliance, which were so important in the early 1950s, were progressively pushed to the side, and the role of the alliance as a forum for political discussion brought to the foreground.

The ambition, of course, was not only a matter of introducing new themes and ideas; it was also to widen the audience. Throughout the Cold War, the younger generations were a cause of great concern for all information officers in the West, and NATIS was no different. The Information Service launched numerous initiatives to capture the imagination of the younger generations and to influence the education policies of its members. University students, seen as the leaders of tomorrow, were particularly important targets and NATIS played its part by launching fellowship and scholarship programmes, visits to the headquarters, summer schools and seminars, and it produced target information material for students and lecturers.

Indeed, in the late 1960s, and even more so in the 1970s, the younger generations were the primary target of NATIS's information activities. The peace movements, in particular, forced NATIS to carry out a radical overhaul of its message and of its working methods. Anti-communism lost its central role and by the mid-1970s had been abandoned. In an age of intense diplomatic dialogue about disarmament, the alliance had to reinvent its information policies and to engage in new fields. The launch of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was a tangible sign of the alliance's attempt to develop a new security concept that had important repercussions for its information work.

It appears that NATIS's policies were informed more by what was happening within the alliance and its members than by what was done by the Warsaw Pact and the Cominform. There is no archival evidence to show that from the 1960s the NATO information officers were concerned by the anti-NATO propaganda action carried out by the Warsaw Pact. NATO's information policy became increasingly more self-contained as the driving forces that shaped the alliance's approach to information were primarily endogenous. In the 1980s, information and news management came closer together and the Secretary General assumed a more proactive role in the alliance's information work. As was discussed in Chapter 4, Information and Press were brought together, and although the results were mixed, the merger made the role of the Secretary General more central for NATO's approach to information.

Since Lord Carrington, the Secretary General has increasingly been seen as the personification of the alliance itself. This was particularly clear at the end of the Cold War, when Manfred Wörner actively engaged with the fast pace of political change. Between 1989 and 1991, there was a radical shift in the way in which the alliance perceived itself, as Wörner

was determined to show that NATO was a political actor in its own right and that in the post-Cold War environment there was still a need for the alliance. Since 1989, the Secretary General's role as mediator and facilitator of political consultation within the alliance may have been overshadowed by his role as political communicator with a variety of audiences that stretch well beyond the public of NATO's members.

The role of intelligence in the Cultural Cold War

The interplay between intelligence and propaganda is of primary importance in understanding the inner workings of the Cultural Cold War and is something that historians of Cold War cultural diplomacy could profitably devote more attention to. As has been demonstrated in this book, an effective propaganda campaign required an insight both into the aims and methods of the opponent and into the audience's sensibilities and concerns. Propaganda had to be based on reliable and detailed information so as to allow the information officers to respond effectively to the opponent's accusations – or to discredit them – and to connect with the sensibilities of the target audience by showing that they understood the key concerns of the audience's daily lives. Thus, the close link between intelligence and propaganda is a trademark of the Cold War as exemplified by the close connection between the Central Intelligence Agency and the United States Information Agency, as well as by the British Secret Service and the Information Research Department.

Nor was this a one-way process. Information work, in turn, fed back into the intelligence field. Propaganda agencies and their programmes opened up opportunities to the intelligence services for observation and infiltration. Conferences and cultural exchanges were a window through which both the intelligence services and the information agencies could observe the target audiences from up close and understand them better. International conferences and cultural exchanges are good examples of how intelligence and propaganda entered into a mutually beneficial relationship, finding their natural and most convenient place in international forums such as the CICR. Yet there were also tensions. Information and intelligence officers had different aims and priorities, and this heterogeneous set of goals could lead to confusion and disorganisation.[1]

There was of course another side to intelligence work within NATO, linked to the prevention of subversive activities. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the documents relating to the work of NATO's Special Committee are still classified.[2] Nevertheless, the study of the CICR's papers raises questions about the implications of carrying out propaganda activities and attempting to control political movements in democratic countries. The very same people who preached democratic values, including freedom of speech and association, looked for ways to prevent democratically elected western communist parties from working together. National

delegations within the CICR discussed measures such as denying visas to political leaders wishing to participate in conferences sponsored by communist 'front' organisations and temporarily closing borders to delegates from the East. These measures did not infringe the constitutions of the countries involved and were perfectly legal, as they stopped short of outright bans by the authorities. Yet such measures undeniably entailed a violation of the freedom of speech and association, albeit in the name of protecting democracy. It is a paradox of which we are all too painfully aware, in a very different context, today. During the Cold War, the West opposed the Soviet Union because it denied basic democratic rights to its own citizens and to the citizen of Eastern Europe. At the same time, western politicians believed that it could become necessary to ignore the principle of freedom of speech in the West if a particular form of opposition (i.e. communist) threatened their security and the safety of their country's citizens. Thus, democracy and freedom can prove to be very elastic concepts, and what is preached abroad is not necessarily what is done at home.

Open questions

This book offers the first sustained study of the history of the NATO Information Service during the Cold War. It investigates its institutional history and offers an analysis of a sample of its information products. It also touches upon the role of key national delegations as well as of key information officers and Secretary Generals. As I have already made clear, it makes no claim to be the ultimate account of the history of NATIS. Indeed, part of its purpose is to contribute to the opening up of a new area of research that offers rich material for future scholars. Research into several aspects of the history of the Information Service is needed.

The position of the national delegations in particular must be examined in greater detail in the light of national archival documents. The NATO documents offer a good means of examining the discussions that took place at the alliance level about security and information, and open a window on the main concerns and priorities of its members. They do not, however, answer fundamental questions about how the national information and intelligence services viewed the work of NATIS, how their priorities and working methods changed through time and to what extent – if any – the collaboration that took place within NATIS influenced their action and priorities. More research, on the lines of what Giles Scott-Smith has done for Interdoc, is needed.[3]

The links between intelligence and propaganda at the national level also need to be investigated further. This book has looked primarily at the role of Britain's Information Research Department but more work is needed to clarify the links between the IRD and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). Even if historians have now reached a point where they can

get at least a general sense of how the IRD and the British intelligence service – as well as USIA and the CIA – worked together, the connection between other national intelligence services and information agencies remains largely unexplored and more research is needed, at least where the declassification of the archives allows.

Finally, one point that is not developed here but that is worthy of further attention is the role of the embassies in the Cultural Cold War. Particularly in the early years of its life, NATIS made use of the missions abroad of its members to distribute copies of its information material. Initially, the focus was Eastern Europe but soon Africa and South-East Asia acquired more importance. Embassies were important channels through which to distribute propaganda material as well as to gather intelligence information, and their role needs to be assessed in greater detail.

Assessing impact and qualifying success

The most difficult questions for scholars of cultural diplomacy concern reception. 'What was the impact of the information programmes?' 'How successful where they?' The truth is that it is often impossible to give categorical answers. As was discussed in Chapters 5–7, the NATO archival documents give details about the number of people who visited the exhibitions as well as the number of visitors who toured NATO Headquarters. They also tell us the number of publications that were produced each year and how they were distributed. It is, moreover, possible to find numbers relating to the subscriptions to the *NATO Letter* and rough estimates of how many people saw the NATO films. Yet it is one thing to know the number of visitors who saw an exhibition and quite another to assess what impact the experience had on them and to what extent it was successful in persuading the visitors that NATO was a project worth supporting.

The CICR was itself aware of the problem. It regularly asked the national delegations to submit questionnaires about the activities of the national information services in relation to the alliance and about how the material produced by NATIS was circulated and received. Yet, as we have seen, not every national delegation submitted the questionnaires and they often provided only partial information. On a few occasions, the CICR set up special working groups to assess how the members used the information material sent by NATIS.[4] The results of these surveys were disappointing, as they revealed that in several countries there was no actual redistribution network and that on some occasions the material remained in a corner of some forgotten office.[5] Between 1969 and 1973, the Information Working Group carried out an extensive survey of all the NATIS information material and concluded that no assessment of the impact that such material had on the public could be made.[6]

NATIS primarily targeted 'opinion formers', yet the information offic-ers had no means of assessing to what extent the message was then passed on to the wider public in the form of articles, lectures and speeches. Most importantly, by targeting the opinion formers the NATO informa-tion officials were in fact preaching to the converted, and they targeted people who were – in one way or another – already connected to the alliance.

During the Cold War, all information officers working for information agencies repeatedly sought to gain a sense of the actual impact of their programmes, and produced reports bringing together data gathered through surveys and questionnaires as well as anecdotal information extrapolated from the public's letters and comments. This was done to create a feedback cycle for improved practice as well as to justify funding for certain information programmes, and possibly for the information agency itself. Yet the practitioners themselves did not have a blueprint by which to define success and, as one information officer admitted, 'most of us are less impressed with representative statistical data and much more with stories about real people and what they say'.[7] The resultant partial – and often inflated – data to justify increases in the information budget are of limited use in ascertaining *actual* success, though they offer an invalu-able guide to *perceived* success.

Historians confronting the same material face the same difficulties: hard evidence to assess the actual impact of any information programme is scarce, and scholars can rely only on anecdotal and partial information. As a result, their conclusions can only be careful educated guesses, which often do not stray far from the perceived success of the practition-ers of the time. Historical research on the cultural dimension of the Cold War is therefore destined to face the problem of defining 'success' and of measuring the impact of the information initiatives on the target audiences without being able to offer a definite answer. Despite the insightful work of historians such as Victoria De Grazia and Walter Hixson, and the theories of audience research analysis imported by media studies, the 'relevance question' is destined to remain open.[8] The prob-lems connected with measuring impact and qualifying success are here to stay, and historians rarely have sufficient evidence to reach solid conclusions.

All, however, is far from lost, provided we distinguish clearly between two forms of 'success' – *perceived* and *actual* – and focus upon what can be learned from the former. Even if historians cannot assess the degree of actual success of information programmes on the public, they can indeed measure the perceived success of such programmes in the eyes of their promoters and examine the institutional history of propaganda agencies in the light of what their personnel thought were the interests, sensibilities and concerns of their listeners. What the institutional history of the information agency can do is to focus on the agencies' own per-

ception of their role in the East–West confrontation and on their own assessment of the impact of their information programmes on their target audience. Thus, the institutional history of information agencies should not be too concerned about its inability to measure impact and should instead offer a more sophisticated examination of the information officers' own assessment of their success, of their priorities and their concerns.

The institutional history of information agencies needs to feed back into the broader political and cultural history of the period and contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of cultural influences across borders and across the Iron Curtain. Studies such as this, in short, have a crucial role to play in feeding into a cross-fertilisation of diplomatic history, foreign policy, intelligence and media studies that has the potential to deepen our understanding of the Cultural Cold War.

Notes

1 A similar point has been made by Ellen Mickiewicz. See Mickiewicz E., 'Efficacy and evidence: evaluating U.S. goals at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13/4 (Fall 2011), pp. 138–171.
2 A thorough examination of the connection between intelligence and propaganda within NATO and the role of the alliance in coordinating its members' actions in the field of prevention of subversive activities would of course require access to the papers of the Special Committee (AC/46), which – as was discussed in Chapter 2 – have not been declassified and most probably will never be.
3 Scott-Smith G., *Western Anti-Communism and the Interdoc Network: Cold War Internationale* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2012).
4 As was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, reviews of the work of NATIS were carried out routinely. On three occasions, however, major reviews with the intent of revising the working procedures and the terms of reference of NATIS, and possibly of the CICR, took place. The first was carried out after the publication of the Three Wise Men Report (1957–1958); the second review was led by John Price (1969–1972); and the last review took place when the CICR became increasingly critical of Halle's management of the information budget (1981–1982).
5 See, for example, 'Interim Report by the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations'. 8 July 1958, NA, AC/52-D(58)34(Final). For more details, see Chapter 2.
6 'Survey of the NATO information output, 1969', NA, AC/273-D(70)1; 'The NATO Information Service survey output, 1970', NA, AC/273-D(71)1; 'The NATO Information Service survey output, 1970', NA, AC/273-D(72)1.
7 Mytton G., 'Audience research at the BBC External Services during the Cold War: a view from the inside', *Cold War History*, 11/1 (2011), pp. 49–67 at p. 53.
8 Hixson W.L., *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997). Among the most influential works by Victoria De Grazia are *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); *The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); and *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century*

Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005). For key works on reception theories, see Thompson M.P., 'Reception theory and the interpretation of historical meaning', *History and Theory*, 32/3 (October 1993), pp. 248–272; Bruhn Jensen K. and Jankowski N. (eds), *A Handbook of Qualitative Methodologies for Mass Communication Research* (London: Routledge, 1991); Deacon D., Pickering M., Golding P. and Murdock G., *Researching Communications: A Practical Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis* (London: Hodder Education, 2007).

Epilogue

The end of the Cold War brought about a radical overhaul of NATO's purpose, security scope and geographical focus. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 removed the main adversary of NATO and the alliance's very *raison d'être* with it. The 1990s witnessed a hectic debate about the need for NATO and the state of transatlantic relations more generally. The hesitation of NATO's European members to intervene in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo made the need for an effective common European foreign policy very clear. Although there was widespread agreement that the alliance was still important to ensure Europe's security, how NATO could fulfil this role in a post-Cold War environment was far less clear. The involvement of the United States in European security also needed to be reassessed. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed in Paris in 1990 between NATO and the Soviet Union established limits on key conventional military equipment in Europe and imposed military reductions on the continent.[1]

NATO developed new and closer relations with the European Union and assisted in the strengthening of the Union's Petersberg tasks. Among the key steps in this direction, and as part of a more comprehensive package of arrangements known as the 'Berlin-Plus' agreement (2002), the European Union was allowed to use NATO assets if it decided to intervene independently in an international crisis. This, however, could happen only if NATO itself decided not to act according to the 'right of first refusal' principle.[2] NATO's political and military structures were also overhauled around this time.[3]

A new framework was also established to further cooperation between the NATO members and new 'partner countries'. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was launched in 1997 as a multilateral forum to improve relations between NATO and non-NATO countries on the European periphery. The EAPC works alongside the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, which aims to foster trust between NATO and other states in Europe, particularly ex-Warsaw Pact members. The EACP and the PfP programme allow for consultation and cooperation in a wide range of

areas, which include crisis-management and peace-support operations; arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.[4]

NATO's latest Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, focuses on the alliance's role in preventing crises, managing conflicts and stabilising post-conflict situations. According to the Security Concept, NATO must work closely with its international partners, and in particular with the United Nations and the European Union. Close cooperation with the European Union is seen as a particularly important element to foster an international 'Comprehensive Approach' to crisis management operations and stabilising actions which require both military and civilian means. The Chicago Summit in May 2012 reiterated these principles by underlining that NATO and the European Union share common values and strategic interests.[5] Thus, over the past two decades NATO has had to reinvent itself and it has done so by developing new peacekeeping, crisis management and security operations, which had not previously been part of its remit.[6]

NATO also began a new enlargement process that saw its membership increase from sixteen members in 1990 to thirty-five in 2009. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the first expansion of NATO after 1989 came with the reunification of Germany, which meant that the territory of the ex-German Democratic Republic became part of the alliance, as agreed by the Two Plus Four Treaty. Between 1994 and 1997, the process of expansion continued with the creation of forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its neighbours.[7] In 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined the alliance. Membership went on expanding, with the accession of seven more Northern and Eastern European countries to NATO in 2004 and two more in 2009.[8] Finally, in April 2009 the then French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, decided in favour of France's return to full membership.[9]

Of course, this was not simply a one-way process. Several Eastern and Central European countries engaged proactively with the alliance and with the pro-NATO voluntary organisations. Bulgaria is a case in point. Immediately after the fall of the communist regime, it created a very active political lobby group (the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria) headed by Solomon Passy, who later became Foreign Minister. The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria was instrumental in preparing the ground for Bulgaria's membership application to NATO and the European Union.

The end of the Cold War obviously had a strong impact on NATO's information work. Up to the late 1980s, the Information Service could plan its output in advance, as there was an agreed consensus and clear understanding of the alliance's role and strategic concept. Things changed radically with the end of the Cold War. The political message needed to be agreed almost on a daily basis, and the rapid evolution of events often meant that there was no political consensus to guide the day-to-day

information work and its long-term planning. In addition, new media, and particularly the use of video and of the internet – and later of social media – brought a new sense of urgency and immediacy.

The audience also changed. It was no longer a matter merely of addressing NATO's own public; it was also necessary to inform the public of potential new members about the structure, aims and mission of the alliance at a time when nobody was sure about what NATO actually was meant to accomplish. Promoting NATO in ex-Warsaw Pact members was a challenging task, as the enthusiasm for western democracy and culture was not always matched by support for military integration. The alliance had a notoriously bad reputation among the East European public, although – it should be pointed out – this was less the case for the political elites, who tended to view the alliance more favourably.

NATO's information officers hoped to capitalise on the massive interest for all things 'western' in the newly independent countries and therefore stressed the concept of Atlantic community, the political dimension of the alliance and the links between NATO and the European Union. The public – in current as well as aspiring members – needed to be informed about the changing nature of the geopolitical context and about the continuing need for NATO and for a common defence strategy. Cultural diplomacy based on bilateral agreements, cultural and scientific exchanges and joint research projects was relaunched and was opened to current and aspiring members as well as to countries considered as 'sensitive'.[10] The fall of the communist regimes also caused a massive increase in the contacts between East and West. NATO Headquarters saw a surge in visitors and meetings. Journalists, experts, academics, scientists from all countries involved were invited while official visits of political and military leaders also kept the NATO information officials very busy.

Secretary General Manfred Wörner was convinced of the need to engage with the media and to make sure that NATO put across its position in a proactive way. In his view, the alliance had to launch a new strategic communication policy and to establish a new relationship with the media. These changes became urgent during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995). NATO started by issuing daily updates on the conflict to explain its political, strategic and military developments. Jamie Shea, who at the time was NATO's spokesman and Deputy Director of Information and Press, also held regular briefings with the press. Initially, the national delegations were suspicious of such briefings and feared that NATO's communication policy might contradict and undermine the national governments. Manfred Wörner, however, was in favour of a more proactive communication policy and supported Shea provided that the briefings discussed the position of the alliance as a whole and that they avoided finger-pointing against any member state. NATO information officers therefore started to hold weekly off-the-record

background meetings with the journalists, as well as regular press conferences, which often saw the participation of the Secretary General.

The radical change took place with the conflict in Kosovo (1998–1999), when the attention of the public rose to unprecedented levels. This was the first conflict in which NATO was actively engaged militarily and politically. Initially, the Information and Press Service organised daily press conferences to ensure a constant flow of information. Officers working at NATO at the time recall a sense of permanent mobilisation and a steep learning curve for the entire Service. It was no longer possible to issue 'no comment' statements and the NATO information officers had to work closely with journalists to ensure the continuous flow of information as well as to anticipate questions and avoid possible embarrassments.[11]

At first, NATO held weekly meetings at the International Press Centre (IPC) in central Brussels. These were off-the-record statements to give journalists a background about what was happening in NATO and in Kosovo so that they could write accurately about the conflict and the involvement of the alliance. The meetings were very successful in terms of attendance as the Kosovo war attracted more and more media attention – so much so that the IPC rooms soon became too small to contain all the journalists, and the meetings had to be moved to NATO Headquarters, just outside Brussels.

The key problem was not the size of the rooms but the fact that the alliance was not in a position to respond effectively to the requests for information coming from the journalists. With the alliance's involvement being based purely on aerial operations, NATO could not provide on-the-ground information. The alliance could only produce aerial images taken from fighter planes. On the other hand, however, reporters on the ground and Tanjug, the Yugoslav news agency, published pictures of war and devastation, which captured the imagination of the public and were easily exploited by Tanjug.[12] When the all the major broadcasters began to report regularly from Serbia, NATO's inability to provide first-hand information from the ground left its media team exposed.

At the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999, the US president, Bill Clinton, and British prime minister, Tony Blair, recognised that something more had to be done to inform the public about the need for the alliance to be involved in the Balkans and about what was actually happening on the ground. Alastair Campbell, who at the time was Blair's Director of Communications and Strategy, was sent to the NATO headquarters shortly after the summit to assist Jamie Shea. Campbell set up a new Media Operation Centre (MOC). With the political clout provided by the backing of Blair and Clinton, the new team could persuade the military to engage with the media operation and to comply with the fast-moving pace of broadcasting. Several member governments contributed their experts and supported the work of Jamie Shea, who continued to be NATO

spokesperson and the most visible presence of the alliance at the time. The Media Operation Centre held meetings with journalists twice a day and organised interviews with senior members of the NATO international staff and of the national delegations. Most crucially, it coordinated the 'message', so that the top alliance's political and military figures would speak with one voice.[13]

In the post-Cold War era, the alliance has therefore moved away from its traditional long-term planning of its information policy towards short-term management on individual and often highly controversial campaigns. Through the Balkan wars, NATO was forced to review its information policies and to establish closer relations with the media. It was a watershed moment in the history of NATO's information policy. The recent war in Afghanistan has strengthened this process further and has put even more pressure on the alliance, which now also has to deal with new technologies and media. In today's world, information requires new skills, because of the deployment of a variety of media and the constantly changing political environment. The continuous stream of news is accessible by everybody at any moment and information officers have to address a heterogeneous set of audiences at the same time without creating confusion among the public.

In order to deal more effectively with the new challenges, in 2003 the Office of Information and Press was merged with the Science Programme and its name changed to Public Diplomacy Division (PDD).[14] In order to keep up with the most recent events and with the public's use of new media, the NATO Public Diplomacy Division has launched an internet television channel and a website with a sample of the material produced by the Media Section as well as up-to-date news on the different actions carried out by the alliance, and particularly on the situation in Afghanistan. The PDD also engages with social media and publishes regular updates on its NATO Facebook page, YouTube channel and a series of Twitter accounts.[15]

The role of the Secretary General as the 'personification of the alliance' has also become a more important part of NATO's information work. Today, the Secretary General's mandate is officially defined as 'NATO's chief spokesperson' in addition to being 'responsible for steering the process of consultation and decision-making in the Alliance' and before his duty as 'head of the Organisation's International Staff'.[16] The increasing importance of the Secretary General certainly has something to do with the personality of the various Secretary Generals and how comfortable they have been with the media. It is also indisputable that the new media have opened up new possibilities and that today more attention is paid to personalities than used to be the case during the Cold War.

The current Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is particularly at ease with the media and regularly appears in TV interviews, press

conferences and social media. He has his own video blog and Twitter page, which are updated regularly.[17] Yet it is worth noting that the unremitting demand for news and updates may take up too much of the Secretary General's attention at the expense of his duty to facilitate political cooperation within the alliance.

The end of the Cold War has of course had a strong impact on the network of pro-NATO voluntary organisations too. Over the past two decades, these organisations have had to rethink their role and the role of the alliance in new geopolitical and cultural contexts. Generally speaking, most of them have contributed to the debate about the future of the alliance and have prepared the ground for NATO information work and enlargement by initiating relations with pro-NATO lobby groups and associations in the new democratic countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) has strengthened its focus on the younger generations and the leaders of tomorrow. In 1996, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA) was formed during the ATA's General Assembly in Rome.[18] The creation of YATA was nothing more than the formal recognition of the youth groups already affiliated with nearly all ATA member organisations. Other programmes promoted by ATA and YATA include the Transatlantic Leadership Tour, the Young Atlanticist Summits (which is co-organised with the Atlantic Council, ACUS) and the Model NATO Youth Summit, in partnership with the Université Libre de Bruxelles and NATO.[19]

In November 1990, the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA), meeting in London, accorded associated status to parliamentarians from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In 1999, the NAA changed its name to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) to stress its democratic mission. At present, the Parliamentary Assembly has 257 delegates from the twenty-eight parliaments of the NATO member states.[20] The NATO-PA has been an eager supporter of NATO enlargement towards the East and has viewed NATO membership as an effective way to ensure the stabilisation and democratisation of NATO's periphery. It initiated contacts with the emerging democratic forces in Central and Eastern Europe immediately after the end of the Cold War. In 1991, the statute was amended to introduce 'Associate Status' for parliamentarians from Central and Eastern Europe, which allowed their integration into the Assembly before their respective countries became NATO members. The NATO-PA has been actively involved in the process of NATO enlargement and it has argued in favour of the alliance's 'open door' policy. At the same time, parliamentarians from ex-Warsaw Pact countries have used the Assembly as a channel to build support for integration into the alliance and into western organisations more generally.[21] Over the past decade, the NATO-PA has also demonstrated a particularly strong interest in relations with Russia and Ukraine and in the Mediterranean region.[22]

Notes

1 The official text is available at: www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cfe. html (retrieved on 12 January 2013). Crucially, in the CFE Treaty 'Europe' was defined as the geographical areas from the Atlantic to the Urals. As a result, the European members' share of NATO's military spending dropped from 34 per cent in 1991 to 21 per cent in 2012, which further fuelled Congress's demand for disengagement from the European theatre. 'The future of NATO: bad timing', *The Economist*, 31 March 2012.

2 The 'Petersberg tasks' are an integral part of the European Security and Defence Policy (now called the Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP – as of the Treaty of Lisbon). They cover humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; and post-conflict stabilisation tasks. For the 'Berlin-Plus' agreement, see: www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm (retrieved on 12 January 2013).

3 In June 2003, a major restructuring of the NATO military commands began as the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was replaced by a new command, the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which was established in Norfolk, Virginia, United States. At the same time, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) became the headquarters of Allied Command Operations (ACO).

4 See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm (retrieved on 12 January 2013). The EAPC was preceded by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC was founded in December 1991. See www.nato.int/cps/ en/natolive/topics_69344.htm (retrieved on 12 January 2013). The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which was established in 1994, is based on bilateral relations between each partner country and NATO. For the latest developments concerning the PfP programme, see www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm (retrieved on 12 January 2013). In May 1997, NATO launched the NATO Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC) in Ukraine and signed the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the NATO Information Office (NIO) was created in Moscow and in 2002 NATO established the NATO-Russia Council.

5 Lisbon Summit Declaration (20 November 2010) and Chicago Summit Declaration (20 May 2012). See www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828. htm?mode=pressrelease (retrieved on 12 January 2013). The political principles underlying the relationship between NATO and the EU were set out in the December 2002 NATO–EU Declaration on ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), the former name of the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy.

6 Elements of the NATO Response Force (NRF), for example, contributed to the security policy linked to the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens and were deployed to support the Afghan presidential elections in September 2004. In recent years, disaster relief has become an important part of the alliance's security strategy. In 2005, for example, NFR aircraft delivered relief supplies in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and the NRF delivered supplies to Pakistan following the earthquake two months later.

7 In addition to the Partnership for Peace programme, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. In 2004, NATO also established the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with four Persian Gulf nations (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates). The ICI offers practical cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism, training and education; disaster preparedness and civil emergency

planning; and cooperation on border security to help prevent illicit trafficking of drugs, weapons and people.

 8 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. All seven countries had participated in the newly devised Membership Action Plan before acceding to NATO. Croatia and Albania were the last members to join, in 2009.

 9 As such, France rejoined the integrated military command of NATO, while still maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent. France is therefore not a member of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

10 A number of fellowship and grants is regularly reserved to citizens of countries that are part of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

11 François Le Blévennec and Jamie Shea, interviews with the author.

12 The worst atrocity was the bombing of a refugee convoy near Djakovica by US planes on 14 April 1999, when eighty civilians died. At the time, NATO insisted that there were military vehicles in the convoy but no evidence of their presence has ever been found.

13 Stourton E., 'How the Kosovo war was spun', *Sunday Telegraph*, 17 October 1999; Campbell A., *The Alastair Campbell Diaries: Power and the People, 1997–1999* (London: Random House, 2011), pp. 717–728; Vickers R., 'Blair's Kosovo campaign: political communications, the battle for public opinion and foreign policy', *Civil Wars*, 3/1 (Spring 2000), pp. 54–70; Dixon P., 'Victory by spin? Britain, the US and the propaganda war over Kosovo', *Civil Wars*, 6/4 (Winter 2003), pp. 83–106.

14 The changes took place when George Robertson was Secretary General. Nicholas Burns (at the time US ambassador to NATO) believed that public diplomacy was crucial and pressed for the changes.

15 'NATO declassified'. Available at: www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/ (which is also available as a DVD box); NATO TV channel, available at: www.natochannel.tv (retrieved on 12 November 2012).

16 'The NATO Secretary General'. Available at: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50094.htm (retrieved 12 October 2012).

17 Secretary General's video blog, available at: andersfogh.info; Facebook page, available at: www.facebook.com/andersfoghrasmussen; Twitter: twitter.com/AndersFoghR (retrieved on 12 January 2012).

18 Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA), link from NATO: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69053.htm (retrieved on 12 November 2012). Interestingly, its headquarters are located at the Office of Education and the Successor Generations in Washington, DC.

19 Today, the Executive Committee of YATA meets at the ATA General Assembly to discuss ideas and to develop education and communication strategies. In the 1990s, the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association was particularly active and organised several conferences directed at young people interested in Atlantic security and international relations.

20 Official website: www.nato-pa.int (retrieved on 12 January 2013).

21 At the same time, NATO-PA produced a programme of specialised seminars and training programmes for parliamentary staff to support the development of parliamentary mechanisms and practices. The initiative is known as the Rose–Roth Initiative after the names of its promoters, president of the Assembly Congressman Charlie Rose and Senator Bill Roth. See: www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2730 (retrieved on 12 January 2013). The Rose–Roth Initiative is NATO-PA's primary tool for engagement with delegations from non-NATO member countries.

22 The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between the
    Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the NATO-
    Ukraine Charter (both signed in 1997) explicitly charged NATO-PA with
    expanding its dialogue and cooperation with both the Russian Federal Assem-
    bly and the Ukrainian Rada (Parliament). For this purpose, the Parliamentary
    Assembly created the NATO-Russia Parliamentary Committee (NRPC) and the
    Ukraine-NATO Inter-parliamentary Council (UNIC).

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APAG Atlantic Policy Working Group (1962–1972).
BC Civil Budget Committee (1951–1965).
CT Committee of the Three (1956).
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