

Political Cleavage Structure, Cross-Pressure Processes, and Partisanship: An Empirical Test of the Theory

Author(s): G. Bingham Powell, Jr.

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*Political Cleavage Structure,
Cross-Pressure Processes,
and Partisanship: An Empirical
Test of the Theory* *

The study presents a theoretical discussion and an empirical test of a theory of cleavage structure and cross-pressure processes: structure of political cleavages → perceptions of cross-pressures → partisan intensity. Austrian survey data support the prediction that those in cumulative cleavage positions will be stronger partisans; those in cross-cutting cleavage positions, weaker partisans. Exploration of attitudinal and affiliative linkages between cleavage position and partisanship gives further evidence of the role of attitudinal cross-pressure processes in the Austrian setting. These relationships are robust and statistically significant, but do not explain a high proportion of the total variance in partisan intensity.

Theories of cleavage and cross-pressure attempt to link the partisanship of individuals to objective characteristics of social groups in a society (Pinner, 1968). The position of an individual in the structure of political cleavages is thought to affect the intensity with which he supports a given party over

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another. *Political cleavage* means an objective demographic division, such as class, ethnicity, or religion, in which particular membership categories are strongly associated with a particular political party. Individuals whose demographic group memberships are all commonly associated with the same party are described as occupying cumulative cleavage positions. They would be predicted to be strong partisans. Individuals for whom one group membership is commonly associated with one party, while a second membership is associated with another party, are described as occupying cross-cutting cleavage positions and would be predicted to be weak partisans.¹ From the analysis of partisan intensity comes the further prediction that at the macro level, political systems with cross-cutting cleavages will exhibit more moderate levels of conflict in political life than those with cumulative cleavages.

The idea of cross-cutting cleavages and cross-pressure seems intuitively plausible and has been widely discussed. A reviewer of theories of conflict regulation observes that “the hypothesis that politically relevant divisions which cross-cut each other contribute to the mitigation and regulation of conflicts is probably the explanatory hypothesis most widely accepted among American political scientists” (Nordlinger, 1972, p. 93). Discussions of the effects of cross-cutting cleavages can be found in the works of many important theorists of social conflict (Almond, 1956; Blau, 1964, pp. 391–409; Dahl, 1966, 1967; Dahrendorf, 1959; Deutsch, 1953; Easton, 1965, ch. 15; Kornhauser, 1959, pp. 80–81; Lipset, 1960, chs. 3–4; Parsons, 1959; Simmel, 1956; Truman, 1951). However, empirical tests of the theory have been few, and the evidence mixed. Nordlinger (1972, pp. 93–95) argues that its acceptance by conflict theorists rests upon the plausibility of the idea, rather than on well-founded evidence. In the last decade Lijphart, Nordlinger, Verba, and others have questioned “cross-cutting cleavage” as an explanation for conflict regulation (Lijphart, 1968a, 1968b; Nordlinger, 1972; Powell, 1970; Ra-bushka and Shepsle, 1972, pp. 57–59, 109; Rae and Taylor, 1970; Verba, 1965).

The concept has had a similar fate in individual participation studies. Cross-pressure as an inhibitor of participation has been the subject of speculation since it was introduced in the early voting studies (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1948). An overview of the cross-pressure analyses in individual behavior research suggests that the rather speculative and crudely empirical

¹ Readers interested in a more complete exposition of the present analysis, including formal definitions of concepts and additional data presentation, may write to the author for an earlier draft of the present article.

studies of the 1950s found the idea appealing and produced some weak supportive evidence for the hypothesis (Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz, 1954; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Campbell and Miller, 1957; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960; Janowitz and Marvick, 1956; Lipset, 1960). But Lane (1959, pp. 202–203) was already warning that the appropriate use of the theory was a complicated matter and that “in specifying the effect of reference group conflict, the nature of the group, the nature of the identification, and the relation of the group to the issue in conflict must also be specified.” The more theoretically rigorous and methodologically sophisticated studies since the mid-1960s tend to ignore the concept (Verba and Nie, 1972); or find it deficient as usually formulated (Converse, 1966; Horan, 1971; Melson and Wolpe, 1970; Melson, 1971; Powell, 1970; Sperllich, 1971).

Three problems emerge in evaluating the existing studies which attempt to test the cross-cutting cleavage and cross-pressure theory. One problem is that most of the studies focus on participation or conflict as the dependent variable, rather than directly examining partisan intensity as the intervening variable affected by cross-pressures. As both participation and conflict are obviously affected by variables other than partisanship, the evidence of cross-pressure processes may well be obscured. A second problem is that many studies do not distinguish between attitudinal cross-pressures (involving group benefits) and affiliative cross-pressures (involving face-to-face groups) in their analysis of the perceptual process linking cleavage position and partisanship. A third problem is that the theory most clearly generates testable hypotheses when it posits two well-defined and salient political cleavages and two political parties. The American political scene seldom approaches the former condition, yet most tests of the theory have used American data.

The advantage of considering cleavage structure and partisanship in the Austrian context is that it approximates the situation of two salient political cleavages and two major political parties. Along the class dimension, working-class citizens in Austria are usually associated with the Socialists, while businessmen, professionals, and particularly farmers, are usually associated with the People’s Party (OeVP).² Along the religious dimension, which in Austria takes the form of pro- and anticlerical divisions among the predominantly Catholic population, secular citizens are usually associated with

² In subsequent textual discussion I shall use the initials OeVP or the name People’s Party to refer to the Oesterreichische Volkspartei and SPOe or Socialists to refer to the Sozialistische Partei Oesterreichs.

the Socialists and religious, church-going citizens are usually associated with the People's Party. In such a situation, the cleavage theory would describe secular workers and religious businessmen or farmers as occupying cumulative cleavage positions: both of their objective demographic memberships are usually associated with the same political party. On the other hand, such groups as religious workers and secular businessmen occupy cross-cutting cleavage positions: one cleavage membership category is usually associated with the Socialist Party, while the second is associated with the People's Party.

The present study attempts to develop the cleavage and cross-pressure theory in systematic terms, and to test specific hypotheses in the Austrian context. It focuses on partisan intensity as the dependent variable. The attitudinal and affiliative group pressure versions of the theory are used to generate alternative theoretical models. Provisional tests of the intervening relationships within each of them are reported.

Explication of Two Cleavage and Cross-Pressure Theories

Frank Pinner's (1968) perceptive essay on cross-pressures suggests a basic distinction between theories which emphasize attitudinal cross-pressures and theories which emphasize affiliative cross-pressures. Attitudinal cross-pressure theories argue the effect of perceived benefits to groups. The individual is cross-pressured because he perceives one important reference group as benefited by one political party, but a second reference group as benefited by a different party. Affiliative cross-pressure theories focus on the effect of face-to-face groups, such as personal friends, neighbors, and work colleagues. When some of these personal associates favor one party and some favor a different party, the individual is cross-pressured in affiliations. It is quite possible, of course, for both types of cross-pressure processes to affect an individual.

Cleavage Position and Attitudinal Cross-Pressures

The attitudinal cross-pressure theory, perhaps the more common of the two basic approaches to cross-pressures, may be most simply stated as a theory of preference and indifference. Two initial assumptions are needed:

Assumption 1_{At}. Individuals who are objectively members of cleavage groups, such as occupation, ethnic, or religious groups, will be aware of these memberships and will identify some of their interests with those of the group (i.e., the membership group is perceived as a reference group).

Assumption 2_{At}. If an individual is a member of a political cleavage category, he will perceive the electoral interests of that group to be linked to a particular political party—the party usually associated with the group. That is, he will perceive that the group will benefit from that party's electoral success (e.g., that a Socialist victory will benefit workers).

For the moment, at least, we can consider the group pressure variable to have only two values. If an individual perceives that the same party benefits all of his cleavage membership groups, he is cumulatively group pressured. If he perceives that one party benefits one group, but that another party benefits another of his groups, he is cross-pressured. *Proposition I_{At}* in the cleavage and attitudinal cross-pressure theory follows from our definitions and the first two assumptions: *Individuals in cumulative cleavage positions will perceive cumulative group pressures; individuals in cross-cutting cleavage positions will perceive group cross-pressures.*

However, Proposition I_{At} sets forth only the intervening variable in the attitudinal cross-pressure theory. We must also link attitudinal cross-pressure to partisanship. Two more assumptions are made about the cross-pressure situation:

Assumption 3_{At}. Group benefits are significant criteria used by many individuals in establishing party preference.

Assumption 4_{At}. In establishing their preference for parties, many such individuals consider simultaneously the interests of both cleavage group memberships.

If we define partisanship as an ordinal attitudinal variable referring to the intensity with which an individual prefers a victory for one party rather than another, *Proposition II_{At}* follows from these two assumptions and an assumption of citizen rationality: *Individuals perceiving cumulative group pressures are likely to be stronger partisans; individuals perceiving cross-pressures are likely to be weaker partisans (ceteris paribus).*

In an extreme example, which seems implicitly assumed by many theorists, all citizens would use these group benefit perceptions, and only such perceptions, to rate the parties. Moreover, every citizen would identify equally strongly with each reference group, and would perceive equal amount and probability of party benefit for each party-group pair. In this case, all the cross-pressured citizens will be rationally indifferent to the electoral outcome; the cumulatively pressured citizens will be strong partisans. These conditions of equal and symmetrical intensities are unlikely to be realized in practice, however. Hence, the assumptions are here presented in weaker form, and used to generate the probabilistic propositions formally stated above and below.

These propositions will follow logically as long as the initial group identification and benefit intensities, as well as nongroup criteria for rating the parties, are randomly distributed across the cleavage groups. (Hence, the need for the *ceteris paribus* qualifier in Propositions II and III.) Of course, the strength of these probabilistic relationships (and hence some of the implications for participation and conflict) may depend on degrees of salience and intensities.

A somewhat different theoretical approach to attitudinal group analysis, we should note, makes essentially these same assumptions, but stresses the psychological discomfort of dissonance created by the two conflicting pressures (Lane, 1960, p. 200; Pinner, 1968; Sperlich, 1971).³

The first two propositions can be combined to imply *Proposition III*, which is the fundamental proposition of all the different versions of cleavage and cross-pressure theory: *Individuals in cumulative cleavage positions are likely to be stronger partisans than individuals in cross-cutting cleavage positions (ceteris paribus).*⁴

Cleavage Position and Affiliative Cross-Pressures

The second major approach to cleavage and cross-pressure theory bases the analysis on the effect of face-to-face group interactions, rather than on the effect of reference groups as criteria for establishing ratings of party preference. It builds, therefore, on the body of literature on small groups, rather than on choice analysis or on assumptions of psychological withdrawal under the discomfort of attitudinal cross-pressures (Pinner, 1968). Utilizing the definition of cleavage structure situation developed above, the affiliative approach begins from the assumption:

Assumption 1_{Aff}. Each cleavage membership group is made up of individuals with similar political preferences.

³More extended discussion of the psychological models and their relationship to the present analysis can be obtained from the author. The data do not allow a dynamic treatment of changes in perceptions of reference groups in response to psychological discomfort, although there is some weak evidence consistent with these processes. Proposition III follows from all of these models, but the linkage propositions can be developed in several versions, dynamic and static, for both psychological discomfort and simple indifference approaches.

⁴Yet a slightly different approach (Powell, 1970) assumes that individuals learn partisan predispositions early in life, and are reinforced or weakened as partisans by the effect of their reference groups. This approach leads to similar theoretical predictions, but slightly different empirical hypotheses, operating only within groups of party identifiers. These tests have been added below as controls.

Since individuals' patterns of personal association and friendship will presumably be shaped by occupational, ethnic, and religious memberships, we would then predict that: *Proposition I_{Aff}. Individuals in a cumulative cleavage position are likely to have all their personal interactions with others of similar political preference; individuals in cross-cutting cleavage positions are likely to have friends of more heterogeneous opinion.*

The implications of personal interaction patterns for political attitudes follow from consideration of face-to-face pressures in opinion formation. Individuals use opinion-leader associates to establish their personal preference ratings, or they are at least pulled to more or less intense partisanship by their contacts with the attitudes held by those around them. In either case, the development of *Proposition II_{Aff}* follows: *Individuals exposed to affiliative cross-pressures (heterogeneous friendship patterns) are likely to be weaker partisans than individuals exposed to cumulative pressures (homogeneous friendship patterns) (ceteris paribus).*

These two propositions can, of course, be combined to yield Proposition III, predicting the greater partisanship of those in cumulative cleavage positions, just as in the benefit group approach. In this form of the theory, obviously, the question of reference group perceptions is not relevant. The impact of the friendship groups tends simply to shape whatever partisan views the individual develops. These might also include reference group perceptions. In the concluding substantive section below, we shall consider the attitudinal and affiliative versions of cross-pressures as alternative or possibly complementary theories, and attempt to test directly the intervening propositions involved in each independently.

Cleavage Position and Partisanship: An Empirical Test

Before the basic theoretical statements can be tested, even in the specific Austrian context, the various concepts must be measured, or given operational meaning. The data used here to test the theory are from a nationwide sample of 1769 Austrian citizens, interviewed by the Institut f. empirische Sozialforschung organization under the direction of the author in 1969–70.⁵

⁵ See the acknowledgements at the beginning of the article. A sample of 57 communities was drawn from a population-stratified list of all Austrian communities over 500 in population. Names of citizens in each community were drawn from lists of registered voters. (All citizens are registered, by law.) Completion rate was about 78%. Comparisons of citizen data with census and aggregate electoral data suggest a very good national sample.

Measuring Cleavage Position

The Austrian cleavage structure has been strongly defined by historical circumstances (Bluhm, 1973; Englemann, 1966; Powell, 1970; Schlesinger, 1953; Stiefbold, 1974; Steiner, 1972). The exclusion of the working class from the social and political life of the old empire led to the formation of a working-class counterculture in Austria much as it did in Germany. Class cleavages were given strong organizational form by the Socialist Party long before the formation of the first Republic in 1919. Similarly, the identification of the Catholic Church with the forces of the old regime, and the militant anticlericalism of the early Austrian Marxists, locked religious cleavage into the political struggle at the inception of democratic political life in Austria. With only a tiny Protestant population, the religious cleavage has been between pro- and anticlerical Catholics, following lines primarily of church attendance rather than baptism, as in Italy and France. The intense strife in the First Austrian Republic, culminating in civil war in 1934, reinforced these two divisions.

In contemporary Austria, of course, the intensity of the historical cleavages is greatly diminished. The Church has limited its political activity since World War II. Postwar prosperity has taken the edge from class conflict. And the presence of a highly successful Grand Coalition government from the years of Occupation until 1966 is likely to have diminished perceptions of partisan difference, despite the "armed truce" and national emergency origins of cooperation. In the 1969 survey, we asked respondents which outcome of the forthcoming elections would be best for the nation as a whole, and for various prominent social groups. The choices offered in the questions were a Socialist government, an OeVP government, or a new Grand Coalition. (At the time of the survey, the OeVP was in office alone. But an important national election resulted in a Socialist government a few months after the survey was completed.)

The results of the survey are shown in Table 1. They suggest both the relevance and limitation of the application of the cleavage theory to Austria. On one hand, some social cleavage membership categories are closely identified with a particular party—a necessary requirement for the cleavage theory, of course—among those not favoring the Grand Coalition. Thus Austrians were 13 times more likely to identify the interests of the farmers with the OeVP than with the Socialists; 11 times more likely to identify the interests of believing Catholics with the OeVP than with the Socialists; 9 times more likely to identify the interests of workers with the Socialists than with the OeVP. On the other hand, we must observe that at least 30% of the

TABLE 1
 Citizen Perceptions of National Electoral Outcomes
 and Group Benefits in Austria, 1969

What Outcome Will Be Best for Each Group*	Most Desirable Election Outcome for the Group					Total	(N)
	OeVP Gov't	SPOe Gov't	Grand Coalition	No Difference Don't Know			
Farmers	65%	5%	18%	12%	100%	(1769)	
Believing Catholics	54	5	15	26	100	(1769)	
Employees	24	34	25	17	100	(1769)	
Workers	7	63	19	11	100	(1769)	
Whole Austrian Nation	22	20	43	15	100	(1769)	

*The question was: "Soon there will be a national election. Three outcomes may result: an OeVP government, an SPOe government, or a return to the Grand Coalition of both parties. Which of these three outcomes would be best for farmers (*Bauern*)? For Believing Catholics (*gläubige Katholiken*)? For employees (*Angestellte*)? For Workers (*Arbeiter*)? For the Whole Nation?"

population in each case thought that the Grand Coalition would be better for the given group, or that it made no difference. Asked about the nation as a whole, citizens were divided about equally between the two one-party government possibilities, but a solid majority (58%) either favored the Grand Coalition or felt it made no difference. These marginals strongly suggest that for many Austrians the lines of social division have been weakened or eroded. For the cleavage theory, it suggests that we may expect to find cleavage—cross-pressure effects among some Austrians, but for others the assumptions of perceived group benefits (2_{At}) are unlikely to be met.

In Table 2 the traditional method of identifying cleavage groups is utilized by showing the reported vote of the cleavage groups in the 1966 national election. (Since turnout in that election was over 95% by official statistics, nonvoting is not a major question here.) The population is divided into two categories on the religious cleavage: Catholics who attend church at least monthly; and secular Catholics and nonreligious. The population is divided into four occupational groups: farmers, business (owners or managers), white-collar employees, and workers. (Finer subdivisions, as between skilled and unskilled workers, yield even sharper distinctions in some cases.) Obviously,

TABLE 2

Cleavage Group Memberships and Reported Vote in
Austrian 1966 National Parliamentary Election. 1969 Survey

Cleavage Group Memberships*		Reported Vote in 1966 National Election**					
Religious	Occupational	OeVP	SPOe	FPOe	Other	Total	(N)
Church-going	Farmer	95%	4%	1%	1%	101%	(133)
	Business	91	8	2	0	101	(127)
Catholic	Employee	61	34	3	2	100	(125)
	Worker	34	64	1	1	100	(184)
Secular	Farmer	78	17	6	0	101	(18)
	Business	52	39	4	5	100	(117)
	Employee	23	71	2	4	100	(171)
	Worker	9	86	3	2	100	(264)

*"Occupation" refers to occupation of head of household, at present or when last employed. Catholics are classified as "church-going" if they report attending church once a month or more. Respondents reporting no religious affiliation (5.5% of sample) are classified secular, as are Catholics not attending religious services. Protestants (5.7% of sample) are excluded from table.

**"Other" includes Communist, DFP, and spoiled ballots. Excluded from the table are 16.5% who refused to report their vote; 6% reporting that they were ineligible in 1966; 2% reporting they did not remember their vote; 2.9% reporting not voting although eligible.

the group voting divisions are quite striking, following the anticipated lines of historic cleavage and party support.

Although the choice of a cutting point in classifying groups as cross-cutting or cumulative is basically arbitrary, the data in Table 2 suggest strong lines of natural association. Three groups, the secular workers and the church-going farmers and business community, support one of the two major parties over the other by a ratio of 9 to one or more. I shall classify these groups as cumulative cleavage groups. On the other hand, three groups—secular businessmen, religious workers, and religious white-collar employees—give over one-third of their support to the opposition party. These groups I shall classify as cross-cutting cleavage groups.⁶ Two groups, the few secular

⁶The association of group and party has, in the literature, been traditionally measured in this fashion. Although in many ways direct evidence of the sort indicated by Table 1 is preferable—and consistent with the classification used here—I should empha-

farmers and the secular white-collar workers, fall between the cross-cutting versus cumulative distinction, and for the sake of clarity they are omitted from the analysis reported here. (In fact, historical and organizational development in Austria has led to sharp differentiation between public and private sector white-collar employees, and further group subdivision is needed to classify the secular white-collar group adequately.)

A special note, finally, is in order concerning a test of the theory *within* party identification groups. One formulation of cleavage analysis (either attitude or affiliative cross-pressure versions) considers individuals' group memberships as reinforcing or deviating from their preexisting partisan identification. We shall want to use this approach as well. It is particularly useful as a check on possible spuriousness of tests using party identifiers from both camps, where short-run issues or other factors may create more intensity on one side. The classifications will be exactly as above, except that the groups which are cumulative for one group of identifiers are cross-cutting for the other. (E.g., Socialist secular workers are in a cumulative cleavage position; OeVP secular workers are in a cross-cutting one.)

Measuring Partisanship

Partisanship was defined above as an ordinal attitudinal variable, referring to the intensity with which individuals prefer victory for one party rather than another. The present data contain three questions designed to measure aspects of partisan feelings. The three measures were, briefly, the following: (1) Individuals preferring single-party national government to the Grand Coalition (as the outcome best for the whole nation) were classified more partisan; (2) Individuals who were opposed to the marriage of a son or daughter to a member of one of the two major parties were considered more partisan; (3) A partisan differential score was built from 11-point thermom-

size that group divisions do not necessarily *imply* individual partisan intensities. The cleavage theory predicts empirically that individuals in similar demographic circumstances will have similar perceptions. It is, however, an obvious aggregative fallacy to assume that a group which divides its support must be 'cross-pressured' in the way that individuals within it may be. The divided group may simply contain two sets of strong partisans, committed in opposite directions. As is suggested below, the "mechanical counting" of cleavages will be no guide to the study of partisanship, if the underlying assumptions about group perceptions do not hold. As we shall see, even in Austria, despite the sharp marginal divisions of Table 2, these assumptions hold only for some voters. There is, in short, no tautology implied in this measurement procedure: quite the contrary—the relationship between an individual's "objective cleavage position," as so measured, and his partisan intensity remains an empirical question.

eter scale ratings of OeVP and SPOe. Each measure was first analyzed individually, then the three measures were normalized and combined into a single additive summary measure.

Testing the Relationship between Cleavage Position and Partisanship

The theory of cleavage, cross-pressure, and partisanship predicts a positive association between occupying cumulative (rather than cross-cutting) cleavage position and being a stronger partisan. This prediction, given appropriate *ceteris paribus* conditions, follows from either the affiliative or attitudinal approach to cross-pressure processes. As the theory has seldom been subjected to direct empirical test, the major objective of the present research was to ascertain whether or not the predicted relationship held. For the entire sample of Austrian citizens, the relationship between cleavage position—as operationally measured above—and each of the three partisanship measures was analyzed.

For *each* measure, the citizens in cross-cutting cleavage positions were less intense partisans than those in cumulative cleavage positions. For each measure, the relationships were statistically significant by Chi-Square, Pearson, and Tau-Beta tests at the .01 level of significance, although in no case was the amount of variance explained very great. (For example, twice as many of those in cumulative as in cross-cutting cleavage positions were concerned about cross-party marriage—but the amounts were only 4% of the latter to 8% of the former, a gamma of .34.) The first part of Table 3 shows the relationship between cleavage position and partisan intensity as measured by the summary scale.

Concerned about possible spurious relationships created by the association of particular measures with a given party, I then examined the relationship between cleavage position and partisanship *within* those identifying themselves as supporters of each of the major parties. Here, too, with one exception (cleavage position and party marriage attitude among SPOe identifiers is not quite significant at .01 level), the relationships were significant as predicted. The relationship for the summary partisan score is shown in the second part of Table 3.

Finally, an additional test was undertaken, using an independent sample of party organization leaders in Austrian communities under 50,000 in population. These individuals were selected by formal position, and were not part of the national citizen sample, although the interviews were undertaken at about the same time and in the same communities. The measurement of variables

TABLE 3

Cleavage Position and Partisan Intensity among
All Citizens, Party Identifiers, and Local Party Leaders,
1969-70

Cleavage Position*	Partisan Intensity Scale**				(N)
	Weak	Moderate	Strong	Total	
PART I: National Citizen Sample					
Cross-cutting	48%	28%	25%	101%	(568)
Cumulative	41	27	32	100	(674)
PART II: Party Identifiers					
OeVP Cross-cutting	40%	33%	27%	100%	(244)
Cumulative	30	34	36	100	(260)
SPOe Cross-cutting	48%	24%	28%	100	(243)
Cumulative	31	27	42	100	(255)
PART III: Party Leaders					
OeVP Cross-cutting	20%	20%	60%	100%	(15)
Cumulative	4	14	82	100	(50)
SPOe Cross-cutting	20%	24%	56%	100%	(25)
Cumulative	4	12	84	100	(25)

*Measurement of cleavage position based on group support divisions in Table 2. Father's occupation used for occupational cleavage membership of party leaders.

**Partisan intensity based on an additive scale of three normalized variables: thermometer ratings, cross-party marriage opposition, opposition to national coalition. Identical construction and cutting points used in all tables. Association between cleavage position and partisan intensity significant at .01 level (Pearson correlation coefficient and Kendall's Tau-B) in all tables.

was identical, except that the occupation of the respondent's father was used to identify his social class group, as many respondents had politically related jobs at some level in the bureaucracy. Somewhat surprisingly, given the other forces operating on such professional politicians, the prediction held up among this group also. Of course, the party heads were much more intense partisans than the average citizens, but an even stronger relationship between cleavage position and partisanship is present. This relationship is shown, for the summary measure, in Part III of Table 3.

Thus, although these relationships do not yield very powerful association statistics—a point that we shall discuss in conclusion—they are consistent, robust, and statistically significant in the directions predicted by cleavage theory. The prediction works, as we have seen, for various measures of partisanship, and for intrasample subgroups of OeVP and SPOe identifiers, as well as for local party leaders, and for the entire national sample. It continues to hold if one varies the measurement procedures somewhat, including the white-collar secular group, for example. If the models are tested within such population groups as the educated or better informed citizens, the relationships continue to be significant and the strength of association is usually increased.

The relationship between cleavage position and partisanship, moreover, resists various tests for spuriousness. Controls for age, sex, size of community, and education do not significantly weaken the relationship. Nor is the relationship an artifact of the individual demographic component variables in the cleavage structure as found by Horan (1971) in his American participation study. Dummy variables for occupation (coded pro-OeVP occupation=1 and pro-SPOe occupation=2) and religion were entered in a simultaneous multiple regression along with education and the cleavage variable, a procedure suggested by Horan's work. Only the cleavage variable remained independently significant as a predictor of partisanship, its Beta only slightly reduced from the zero-order correlation; the B remained nearly four times the standard error.

Although the cleavage position of an individual is obviously not the major determinant of partisan intensity in Austria, as indicated by the limited amount of total variance explained, the persistent significance of the relationships serves to increase the credibility of the theory as a *partial* explanation of partisan strength.

Cross-Pressure Processes: Exploration and Preliminary Tests

The cleavage and cross-pressure theory predicted associations between cleavage position and partisanship due to the effect of attitudinal or affiliative cross-pressures operating on the individual. We have seen convincing evidence of the associations, but they are much weaker than most statements of cleavage theory have predicted. It is, therefore, desirable to have some data bearing directly on the linking processes which shape individual attitudes. Such data will both increase the credibility of the theory—if positive linkages are found—and perhaps suggest why the strength of association is limited.

Measuring Attitudinal and Affiliative Cross-Pressures

The data are not ideally suited for the direct measurement of cross-pressure linkages, but questions were asked in the general study which do shed some light on the problem. The responses reported in Table 1 indicated whether individuals perceived an OeVP government, an SPOe government, or a renewed Grand Coalition as the electoral outcome most benefiting various groups in Austria. In a very crude way, lacking data on the salience of the groups to the respondent, or the strength of the benefits, we can use these responses to indicate perceived party-reference group linkages. Classifying individuals by the occupation groups likely to be closest to their interests (of the three asked about), based on the occupation of the head of the household, we can determine first if they see an advantage to that group of having a particular party come to power. This procedure classifies the respondent as pro-OeVP, pro-SPOe, or not pressured on the occupational cleavage dimension.

For church-going Catholics, we can follow exactly the same procedure, using answers to questions about which party government benefits believing Catholics. Unfortunately, we have no question as to which party benefits the secular group, and must use the Catholic responses to classify these also, by the salience and direction of pressure on the religious dimension.⁷ The two classifications—on occupational and religious dimensions—are then combined to classify all respondents as follows: both reference groups perceived as pro-OeVP pressure; one group pro-OeVP; no group-party linkages; cross-pressured (one group benefited by OeVP, one by SPOe); one group pro-SPOe; both groups pro-SPOe.

⁷ Ideally, we need direct measures of attitudes, positive and negative, toward the Church, and then measures of perceived benefit. In trying to approximate these with the present data, I have combined the question on benefit to Catholics with a double measure of the citizen's position: his frequency of church attendance *and* whether he considers himself to be a "strong believer," simply a "believer," "hardly a believer," or not a believer. This variable is, of course, very strongly correlated with church attendance, but it provides some additional protection against spurious association. Thus, individuals who are believers *or* who attend church at least monthly are assumed to consider themselves identified with "believing Catholics." If they see a party as benefiting this group (Table 1) they are classified as pressured towards that party. Individuals who fail to meet either criterion are assumed not to identify their interests with those of "believing Catholics," and hence are pro-SPOe pressured if they see "believing Catholics" as tied to the OeVP. All individuals perceiving neither single party government as better for "believing Catholics," are classified as not pressured on the religious dimension.

The affiliative version of pressure theory is based on the presumed effect of face-to-face relationships. Although we cannot, of course, determine the causal direction of friendship patterns, we did ask all respondents how many of their good friends were of the same general political orientation as themselves: almost all, the majority, about half, or a few? We shall use the responses to this question—excluding don't knows and no response answers—as a measure of affiliative cross-pressures. The more friends of opinions different from the respondent's, the more the affiliative cross-pressures.

Cleavages and Attitudinal Group Pressures

Analysis of the group benefit perceptions supports the theory that group pressures will shape partisan intensity, but indicates limitations in applying the cleavage analysis generally. The attitudinal cross-pressure theory predicted (Proposition I_{At}) that individuals in cumulative cleavage positions would be more likely to perceive cumulative group pressures; those in cross-cutting cleavage positions, cross-pressures. Among those citizens who perceived both their occupational and religious group membership as benefited by some party, the prediction is supported by the data (correlation coefficient .24), and holds also within the two groups of party identifiers (.31 in each), with all the relationships statistically significant at the .01 level.

However, the analysis also shows, as already suggested by Table 1, limitations in the applicability of the theory. About 22% of the Austrian citizens see neither group as differentially benefited by a given party's victory; and about 30% more see only one membership group as affected. (Some 27% of the sample perceived both groups benefited by the same party, and are thus cumulatively pressured; while about 21% perceived cross-pressures.) Although the marginals are no doubt affected by the failure to ask directly about anticlerical benefit, and by the special circumstances of 1969, this failure to perceive benefits to groups suggests that the theory is not very relevant for about half the population. *Assumption 2_{At}* is not satisfied for them; and for them, there is very little relationship between cleavage position and partisanship (.095 with the summary scale). If this limitation is widespread in Austria, given that nation's highly charged party-group identifications in the past, it is hardly surprising that the theory has very little explanatory power in nations such as the United States, where group-party lines have historically been less clear-cut.

It seems likely also that this fact represents a considerable change in Austria from the historical perceptions of groups and parties. The contrast between citizens and local party leaders is striking. Clearly, the heritage of

strong group-party linkages has been retained much more completely among members of the party substratum than among average citizens. Local party leaders are much more likely to see such linkages, at least as here measured, and, as we saw in Table 3, the general theory works more powerfully among them. (See Powell, 1970, and also Stiefbold, 1974, for more extended discussions of other data also suggesting such citizen-elite differences.) Sharp political differences between citizen and elite subcultures are common to many, perhaps most, political systems, as has often been pointed out. (Converse, 1964; Barnes, 1966; McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara, 1960; Putnam, 1973; Sartori, 1969.) For the purposes of the theory, however, the point is that low politicization of the population limits the relevance of the multiple pressure theory for many citizens.

Proposition II_{At} predicted, of course, the greater partisan intensity of the cumulatively pressured. This linkage in the theory works quite effectively. The relationships were significant with each partisanship measure, and with the summary scale. (Correlation coefficient .29 for all perceiving multiple linkages; .35 for OeVP identifiers, .24 for SPOe identifiers.)

The role of the attitude group theory, then, can be briefly summarized. About half the citizens perceive both groups to be party affiliated. Among these citizens the attitude group theory works reasonably well. All three propositions in the theory are supported, and cleavage position explains a significant amount of the variance in partisanship. Among other citizens we find little applicability of the theory. Among local party leaders the theory works even more effectively than among aware citizen subgroups.

Cleavages and Affiliative Cross-Pressures

The affiliative cross-pressure theory does not hold up well, as tested with the present data. The affiliative theory predicted (Proposition I_{Aff}) that individuals in cumulative cleavage positions will have more homogeneous friendship patterns than those in cross-cutting cleavage positions. It also predicted (Proposition II_{Aff}) that homogeneous friendship patterns will be associated with more intense partisanship. Proposition II_{Aff} is, indeed, supported by the present study. About 73% of our sample of Austrian citizens were able to comment on their friends' opinions. Among these, there is a significant correlation between homogeneity and partisanship for each partisanship measure (about .21 with the summary scale). The relationship holds up among identifiers with the OeVP and SPOe separately.

The problem with the affiliative theory as a cross-pressure linkage process is with Proposition I_{Aff}. For all citizens there is only a very weak association

(.06) between cumulative position and homogeneous friendship patterns. Among OeVP identifiers there is absolutely no relationship (.00). Among SPOe identifiers we do find some evidence of the predicted affiliative patterns, with the cumulative citizens having a significantly higher probability (correlation .16) of homogeneous friendships. Even in this group the relationship is not a strong one. Face-to-face relationships may well play a role in affecting the partisanship of individuals (as suggested by Proposition II_{Aff}), but in Austria these affiliative groups do not, for the most part, constitute a major linkage between cleavage position and partisan intensity.

Summarizing the Two Cross-Pressure Models: A Path Analysis

The discussion can be usefully summarized and illustrated with a path diagram and analysis of the linkages between cleavage position and partisanship. Figure 1 shows with arrows the linkages predicted by the two theories, assuming they do not interact with each other. In addition to the attitudinal and affiliative linkages between cleavage position and partisanship posited by the two theories, I have shown the subsequent path predicted to political campaign participation. As suggested by the above discussions, only about 40% of the individuals both identified the homogeneity of their friendship patterns and perceived their religious and occupational memberships as party linked. For these individuals I have calculated the appropriate path coefficients implied by the diagram and inserted these into the figure.

In path analysis, of course, we specify a set of simultaneous equations. Here, I assume that each variable in the diagram is causally prior to all variables following it on the right. Each variable is itself described by a multiple regression equation containing all variables causally prior to it, but none of the variables after it. Error terms are assumed uncorrelated. Four such simultaneous equations are needed to describe variables II through V in Figure 1. The path coefficients are simply the standardized Beta coefficients from these four equations. The four equations (deleting constants and error terms) are:

$$\begin{aligned} X_2 &= X_1 B_{12} \\ X_3 &= X_1 B_{13} + X_2 B_{23} \\ X_4 &= X_1 B_{14} + X_2 B_{24} + X_3 B_{34} \\ X_5 &= X_1 B_{15} + X_2 B_{25} + X_3 B_{35} + X_4 B_{45} \end{aligned}$$

Where: X_1 = Cleavage Position; X_2 = Reference Group Perception; X_3 = Friendship Homogeneity; X_4 = Partisan Intensity; and X_5 = Campaign Participation.




FIGURE 1

Linkages between Cleavage Position and Partisanship in the Two Cross-Pressure Models: Path Coefficients

(Test with all citizens able to identify homogeneity of friendship groups and perceiving both reference groups party advantaged. Path coefficients under .15 not identified. Theoretically predicted linkages shown by arrows, also indicating predicted causal direction.)

The numerous complex assumptions of path analysis are set forth elsewhere (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969, pp. 810–811). It is, in any case, not necessary here to analyze in detail the percentage of the cleavage-partisanship linkages going through the various causal paths. Only path coefficients of .15 or larger are shown in the diagram—these are all over three times the standard error and are statistically significant. Five possible arrows are not implied by the theories, and none of these reach .15. The linkages involving reference group perceptions hold up well in the theory; so does the predicted linkage between partisan intensity and campaign activity. (These also hold up within OeVP and SPOe identifiers, and with controls for education.) The linkage between cumulative cleavage position and affiliative friendships, however, is only .06 here and so is not entered. The theoretically implied arrow is shown with a dotted line. (That relationship is $-.03$ among OeVP identifiers, but a barely significant .15 among SPOe identifiers.)

Conclusion

The substantive arguments of the analysis can be summarized quite easily. The cleavage, cross-pressure, partisanship theory is appealing and intuitively plausible. It is, in fact, possible to develop relatively rigorous statements of that theory from several different theoretical perspectives, two of which have been presented here. Austria is a nation whose history suggested that the assumptions of these theories should apply. An empirical test of the cleavage and partisanship prediction yielded significant and robust correlations. However, these relationships did not explain very much of the total variance in partisan intensity. Examination of the affiliative cross-pressure model suggests that the patterns of friendships do not follow cleavage lines very closely. Examination of group benefit perceptions suggests that cross-pressuring and cumulative pressuring reference groups do play a role in shaping partisan intensity, but only for a (large) minority of the population.

It seems to me that we may appropriately draw two inferences from these findings. These inferences seem contradictory, but this contradiction is only apparent. On one hand, the findings suggest that the structure of cleavages does affect partisanship, and that at least in Austria today this effect works largely through cumulative or cross-pressuring perceptions of group benefits. Among some subgroups (as shown in Table 3 and Figure 1), these effects are of considerable magnitude, and may have important consequences for the political system. They are clearly linked to variation in campaign participation in Austria, for example. Given the very frequent references to this theory, it is comforting that an empirical test shows it to have some explanatory significance.

On the other hand, the relationships demonstrated hardly seem strong enough to comfort theorists who would rely exclusively on simple cleavage and cross-pressure explanations of conflict or participation. About half the Austrian citizens apparently do not perceive both membership groups as party affiliated. They fail to meet the assumptions of the theory and, indeed, their objective cleavage position explains less than 1% of the variance in their partisanship. If we cannot rely on objective cleavage position to explain the partisanship of so many Austrian citizens, surely we cannot expect the mere counting of the number and intersection of demographic memberships to be of much help in nations with less clearly structured cleavage alignments. We need to apply theories of the processes which lead citizens to perceive partisan benefits to groups. Even for the citizens perceiving such linkages, we need more effective theories and measures of salience and intensity in order to derive and test precise predictions about the strength (and implications) of

such relationships. From this point of view, a major implication of these findings is that we must take seriously the warnings of Lane, Nordlinger, and others that the theory must be applied with great care if it is not to be misleading.

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