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

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
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
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U.S. NAVY / NATHANAEL MILLER

Aboard the USS Ponce during the mission in Libya, March 2011

By any measure, NATO succeeded in Libya. It saved tens of thousands of lives from almost certain destruction and enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world's longest-ruling dictators.

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NATO's Victory in Libya

The Right Way to Run an Intervention

Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis

NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi. And it did so by involving partners in the region and sharing the burden among the alliance's members.

NATO's involvement in Libya demonstrated that the alliance remains an essential source of stability. But to preserve that role, NATO must solidify the political cohesion and shared capabilities that made the operation in Libya possible—particularly as its leaders prepare for the upcoming NATO summit in Chicago this May.

RAPID RESPONSE

When the people of Libya rose up against Qaddafi in February 2011, many hoped that the nonviolent protests would follow the successful path of similar uprisings

in Tunisia and Egypt. But rather than capitulate, as had Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Qaddafi launched a brutal crackdown.

The international community responded swiftly. In late February, the UN Security Council placed sanctions, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze on Libya and referred Qaddafi's crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Shortly thereafter, the Arab League suspended Libya from its sessions and then called on the international community to impose a no-fly zone. On March 17, the Security Council granted that request, mandating "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.

The United States facilitated this rapid international reaction. In late February, Washington was the first country to cut off Qaddafi's funding, freezing \$32 billion in Libyan assets and prompting other countries to follow suit. Washington also led the charge for the UN resolution that authorized the intervention, justifying the action as consistent with "the responsibility

IVO H. DAALDER is U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS is Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the U.S. European Command.

NATO's Victory in Libya

to protect,” the norm that calls on the international community to intervene when governments fail to safeguard their own civilians. And on March 19, following the UN authorization, the United States led a coalition in launching air and missile strikes against Libyan forces—including against a large concentration of armored vehicles approaching Benghazi, the headquarters of the revolution and home to 750,000 people whom Qaddafi had labeled as “rats” when he threatened to “cleanse Libya house by house.” The initial intervention rescued the people of Benghazi, obliterated Libya’s air defense system within 72 hours, and deployed aircraft and naval vessels to enforce the UN resolution.

Following this early success, U.S. President Barack Obama sought NATO’s agreement to take over command and control of the operation in order to ensure the effective integration of allied and partnered militaries. Washington would continue to participate in military operations but would do so mainly by gathering and analyzing intelligence, refueling NATO and partner aircraft, and contributing other high-end military capabilities, such as electronic jamming.

With many NATO countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, already contributing to the intervention, NATO was the logical choice to assume command, and it agreed to do so on March 27. Dubbed Operation Unified Protector, the alliance’s mission in Libya consisted of three separate tasks: policing the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone, and protecting civilians. Although it immediately solidified the maritime blockade and the no-fly zone, it encoun-

tered difficulties in protecting the Libyan people. The proximity of the regime’s forces, facilities, and equipment to civilian infrastructure; the initially limited ability of the Libyan opposition to defend itself and the population centers under its control; and the need for NATO to minimize harm to civilians all slowed the operation and at times led to a perception of deadlock and stalemate.

By the middle of August, however, the opposition had gained enough strength to attack Qaddafi’s strongholds, first in Tripoli and then in Sirte. Within two months, the Libyan National Transitional Council had secured control over the entire country and rebels had captured and killed Qaddafi. Operation Unified Protector ended on October 31, 222 days after it had begun.

A TEACHABLE MOMENT

By any measure, NATO succeeded in Libya. It saved tens of thousands of lives from almost certain destruction. It conducted an air campaign of unparalleled precision, which, although not perfect, greatly minimized collateral damage. It enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world’s longest-ruling dictators. And it accomplished all of this without a single allied casualty and at a cost—\$1.1 billion for the United States and several billion dollars overall—that was a fraction of that spent on previous interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

But the Libya operation had its challenges as well, both in conception and in execution. If NATO is to replicate its success in the future, it must examine and learn from these challenges.

The first lesson is that NATO is uniquely positioned to respond quickly and

Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis

effectively to international crises. Some countries have significant military reach. But when a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a coalition—which confers political legitimacy—only NATO can provide the common command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and execute complex operations. Multilateral coalitions built on an as-needed basis, by contrast, have no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common capabilities or command structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign, and no standing mechanisms for debating and then deciding on an agreed course of action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a single nation to bear the brunt of security burdens that ideally should be more equally shared.

In Libya, NATO coordinated the actions of 18 countries—14 member states and four partners—under a unified command. The United States certainly played a critical role, providing intelligence, fueling, and targeting capabilities. But other states made similarly indispensable contributions. France and the United Kingdom flew over 40 percent of the sorties, together destroying more than a third of the overall targets. Italy provided aircraft for reconnaissance missions and, along with Greece, access to a large number of air bases. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates deployed fighters for combat operations, and Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Qatar helped enforce the no-fly zone. Many of these states, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, also deployed naval assets to enforce the arms embargo.

The second lesson of Libya is that although NATO's political unity is improving, more work must be done. NATO allies overcame their early differences on Libya and forged a course of action acceptable to all. Every ally contributed to the operation through NATO's command structure, and no allies restricted the use of their personnel assigned to NATO command centers in places such as Mons, Belgium; Naples, Italy; or Ramstein, Germany. But although 14 member states contributed directly to Operation Unified Protector, an equal number did not. Many of the countries that did not participate lacked the resources to do so but still lent their political support. Some countries, such as Germany, however, decided not to participate even though they could have. Berlin did not block NATO's decision to act in Libya and even assisted alliance operations as a whole by increasing its involvement in aerial surveillance in Afghanistan. But it abstained from the UN Security Council vote authorizing the intervention and stayed out of the military operation. And even though Poland assisted by selling precision munitions to other NATO countries, it, too, refrained from participating directly.

Some commentators, such as Anne Applebaum, have expressed fears that the absence of a substantial number of NATO members from the mission in Libya signaled a lack of solidarity or, worse, the emergence of a two-tiered alliance, in which some members focus on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and others bear the burden of combat.

Such a concern is misplaced—at least for now. When NATO's work is viewed through the context of the entire span of its missions, from that in Afghanistan to

antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it becomes clear that every member state participates to the best of its abilities—including Germany and Poland, both of which are playing significant roles in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Yet although the Libya operation showed that the allies' political commitment to NATO is improving, the allies must work to translate this political will into reality by sharing more equitably in the alliance's overall defensive burden.

The intervention in Libya also demonstrated that a politically cohesive NATO can tackle increasingly complex, and increasingly global, security challenges. For its first 40 years, NATO concentrated on defending the borders of its member states. But after the Cold War, the alliance expanded its focus beyond deterrence, making it the partner of choice for international security operations. This trend began with the Partnership for Peace in the mid-1990s, a program of practical cooperation and political dialogue with nonmember states across Europe and Central Asia. And it has continued into the current century, with 50 nations placing their forces under NATO's command as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

NATO again took the lead in Libya. Some countries hesitated to place NATO in charge of a military action, fearing that the alliance would not garner enough support in the region, but it turned out that Arab states preferred to work through NATO; several of them, such as Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, had already participated in NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and others had fostered closer relations with NATO through the Mediterranean

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Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. These programs, launched in 1994 and 2004, respectively, expanded NATO's ability to partner with countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

These partnerships with non-NATO members signify the increasing role of the alliance beyond its borders. Such cooperation may not have a decisive military impact; as in the Balkans and Afghanistan, alliance members supplied the bulk of the military capability in Libya. (Nearly 90 percent of the non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan, for example, come from countries in Europe.) But this kind of burden sharing is politically essential to the overall effectiveness of NATO's operations. The participation of Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and their support for Libyan opposition forces proved critical to the liberation of Tripoli, both by demonstrating Arab political support and by providing additional military capabilities. Regional participation also helped allay potential friction within the alliance, reassuring many otherwise reluctant NATO members of the mission's legitimacy.

IT GETS BETTER

However successful, NATO's intervention in Libya suggested that the organization must strengthen its basic infrastructure if it hopes to increase its role in global security. NATO's integrated command structure and shared funding bind the alliance together, but serious gaps remain in its overall capabilities. Within the command structure, for example, the alliance has failed to devote the necessary resources to developing key skills, including the capacity to find and engage the types of

mobile targets common in contemporary operations, plan joint operations in parallel with fast-paced political decision-making, support the targeting process with legal advice, and provide timely and reliable information on operational developments to the public. NATO has also neglected to cultivate essential tools for military campaigns, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, precision targeting, and aerial refueling—despite nearly two decades of experience that have demonstrated their value.

Instead of investing in NATO, many member states have depended on the United States to compensate for these deficiencies. In Libya, Washington provided 75 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data employed to protect Libyan civilians and enforce the arms embargo. It also contributed 75 percent of the refueling planes used throughout the mission—without which strike aircraft could not have lingered near potential targets in order to respond quickly to hostile forces threatening to attack civilians. And U.S. commanders in Europe had to quickly dispatch over 100 military personnel to the NATO targeting center at the outset of the intervention when it became clear that other member states lacked the knowledge and expertise to provide their aircraft with the correct targeting information.

The heavy reliance of alliance members on the United States during the conflict highlighted the cost of a decade of European underinvestment in defense. On average, U.S. allies in Europe now spend just 1.6 percent of their GDPs on their militaries, and many spend less than one percent; the United States, in contrast, spends over four percent of its GDP. The

NATO's Victory in Libya

fact that Washington spends nearly three times as much on defense as the other 27 NATO allies combined has opened a growing divide in the capabilities of the member states. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in his valedictory policy address last June, this imbalance threatens to create a two-tiered alliance that will ultimately prove unsustainable.

NATO began to address these shortfalls before the war in Libya began. At the Lisbon summit in November 2010, for example, the alliance adopted a new “strategic concept” to guide it for the next decade. In it, the allies committed to deploying the “full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of [its] populations.” It also identified and prioritized the ten capabilities that member states agreed were essential to the organization’s strength not only in today’s operations (such as enhanced methods to counter improvised explosive devices and improvements in information sharing) but also in the future (such as missile defense and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—a key deficiency in Libya).

The alliance will now have to summon the political will to implement these standards in a period of fiscal austerity. NATO countries can continue to invest in their military capabilities on their own—which means investing inefficiently and often insufficiently, while leaning on an increasingly impatient United States to make up the difference. Or member states can invest through NATO and other multinational programs, saving money, promoting cooperation, sharing capabilities, and demonstrating solidarity. NATO will

continue to succeed only if every member state chooses the latter course.

Should NATO members rise to the challenge, their investments will fund vital programs that can address some of the shortfalls of the Libya operation. One such program is the Alliance Ground Surveillance system, which is designed to help locate mobile and concealed ground forces and will thereby strengthen NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Members should also consider pooling their investments in aerial refueling and precision-guided weapons and sharing data on their own national munitions stockpiles in order to improve planning.

The allies must also remember that the operation in Libya was relatively small—about one-fifth the size of that in Kosovo in terms of the number of military assets involved. If defense spending continues to decline, NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another decade. NATO members must therefore use the Chicago summit to strengthen the alliance by ensuring that the burden sharing that worked so well in Libya—and continues in Afghanistan today—becomes the rule, not the exception. 🌐

Rethinking Latin America

Foreign Policy Is More Than Development

Christopher Sabatini

Running down the list of the U.S. State Department's Latin America policy objectives in *El País* in September 2010, the economist Moisés Naím noted that they focused almost exclusively on domestic concerns: building democratic institutions, promoting local social and economic opportunity, and so forth. These issues were not only given a higher priority in policy toward Latin America than they were for other regions, but they were also issues largely beyond Washington's ability to control.

Naím was correct, but the point can be taken further. The focus on politics within Latin American states rather than on relations between them is characteristic not simply of the State Department but also of the Latin American regional studies community in the United States more generally, from where the U.S. policy and advocacy community absorbs much of its personnel and intellectual orientation. Such attitudes have harmed U.S. policy by focusing excessive attention on small countries with little geostrategic influence and fostering the facile notion that

political and economic liberalization are the necessary and sufficient criteria for the advancement of all major U.S. interests. This approach has distorted Washington's calculations of regional politics and hampered its ability to counter outside influences and deal sensibly with rising regional powers.

U.S. scholars and policymakers need a reminder that development does not mean the end of politics and that twenty-first-century Latin America has its own, autonomous power dynamics. A little realism would go a long way.

THAT '80S SHOW

When it comes to Latin America, for decades U.S. universities and regional studies centers have focused almost exclusively on matters of comparative politics and political and economic development. In the 1970s and 1980s, the last time scholars paid much attention to the region's international relations, their chief concern was the workings and implications of U.S. hegemony. The issue facing both scholars and policymakers

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today, however, is what happens as U.S. power declines and new forces in the region emerge, and unfortunately, when it comes to these questions, there is little intellectual capital on which to draw.

A quick glance at the faculty of major U.S. universities reveals that work on Latin America concentrates on social movements, economic development, voting behavior, civil society, and the like. There have been no major U.S. academic studies published on inter-American relations in decades, and there are few articles on the topic published in scholarly journals.

Think tanks and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to the region, meanwhile—on both sides of the political spectrum—tend to focus on domestic concerns, as well. Many working in this community began their careers debating human rights issues during the Cold War, fighting over whether Communists or right-wing forces were the greater danger to local citizens. Those violent, politicized years have thankfully passed, but much of the NGO community has failed to move on. The left pays a great deal of attention to Colombia and Guatemala (and to denouncing free trade). The right obsesses about Cuba and Venezuela. Throw in El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which were the objects of ideological combat a generation ago, and you can account for the vast majority of U.S. discussion of Latin American issues. Yet none of these countries is a power broker in the hemisphere today, and combined they account for barely 20 percent of the region's population.

Such myopia can have serious consequences. On June 30, 2009, the Honduran military, acting on orders supposedly from the Honduran Supreme Court and

Congress, roused President Manuel Zelaya from bed and placed him on a plane to Costa Rica. Zelaya's own actions had contributed to his unceremonious ouster, but the regional (and international) consensus was clear: what had occurred was that classic Latin American maneuver, a coup. In the hyperpolarized world of Latin America policy in the United States, however, politicians and regionalists quickly took sides. The result was Senator Jim DeMint (R-S.C.) proclaiming that what had occurred was not a coup and attacking the Obama administration for saying otherwise. DeMint was joined by some Cuban American colleagues, with several of them traveling to Honduras to declare their support for the new government of President Roberto Micheletti—and with DeMint holding up the nominations of the former National Security Council official Arturo Valenzuela to be assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and one of the country's most seasoned and well-respected diplomats, Thomas Shannon, to become U.S. ambassador to Brazil.

This absurdity—blocking for nine months the appointment of a regional assistant secretary of state and an ambassador to the region's most important player (and the world's seventh-largest economy) over a minor ideological spat regarding a tiny country—shows the lack of seriousness of the workings of the U.S. Congress in general. But it also shows how unseriously Latin America is taken in particular and what sorts of issues are considered important.

GROWING PAINS

For the last two decades, U.S. policy toward Latin America has rested on two

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pillars: the promotion of democracy and the promotion of free trade. Security and narcotics concerns have influenced a few bilateral relationships, but the core of Washington's regional agenda has been driven by the belief that democratic political development and multilateral economic liberalization would reinforce each other and benefit both locals and the United States. Unfortunately, this approach has largely ignored local economic logic and the persistence of competition between states, not to mention the diversity of market economies.

For example, the basic idea behind the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)—announced by U.S. President Bill Clinton at the Summit of the Americas in 1994—was that as Latin American economies reformed, they would hitch themselves to the U.S. market. But that overlooked the hard realities of the U.S. market and its conflict with the comparative advantages of countries such as Argentina and Brazil, which saw U.S. agricultural subsidies as a threat. Washington's trade strategy involved slowly picking off the hemisphere's weaker partners and then, once a bloc had been established, convincing Brazil and others to join on U.S. terms. But Brazil and the other Mercosur countries (Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay) decided to pursue their own agenda and negotiated free-trade deals with India, Mexico, and Peru, as well as partial trade agreements with Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

As a result, the United States has spent almost two decades negotiating some lesser treaties—with the Dominican Republic, Central America, Colombia, Peru, and Chile—that fall far short of creating a hemispheric single market.

And even that agenda has been undercut by others, as when Canada recently took advantage of lengthy U.S. haggling with Colombia over fine points of labor and human rights safeguards to negotiate its own trade agreement there, allowing its farmers and manufacturers to get a leg up on their U.S. counterparts.

Beijing has also stepped into the void, using its growing economic strength to weaken Washington's economic leverage in the hemisphere. China recently displaced the United States as the main trading partner of Brazil. And China has signed bilateral trade deals with Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Peru and provided concessionary loans to Ecuador and Venezuela.

Democratization, meanwhile—part of the standard boilerplate in any U.S. official's speech on Latin America from the 1980s onward—has increasingly become a matter of subjective interpretation and beyond the reach of U.S. influence. During President George W. Bush's first term, Washington began to shift its policy from supporting democratic processes in general to supporting specific outcomes, particularly in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Under Barack Obama, the focus has returned to the sanctity of democratic institutions in general, but calls to respect and strengthen them have become the catchall way of admonishing U.S. enemies (such as President Hugo Chávez's Venezuela) or encouraging friends (such as President Sebastián Piñera's Chile).

For all the rhetoric, however, consensus around democracy and democratic rights has proved elusive. One reason is that the expansion of the franchise and the eclipse of traditional party systems have

raised the prominence of anti-American and antimarket voices in the region. In Bolivia and Venezuela, for example, the result of political liberalization was the election of populist governments that have stoked distrust of Washington to consolidate their domestic support. Neither of those countries today even has a U.S. ambassador—Bolivia drummed out Bush's last appointee for supposedly intervening in local politics, and Venezuela refused to accept the one Obama appointed after he criticized the government in Caracas.

For an example of how local democratization and economic reform, however worthwhile in their own right, can lead to divergence and rivalry with the United States rather than closer partnership, one need only glance at the region's rising great power, Brazil. Brasília has always pursued an independent course, but under the last two governments—of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff, both of the Workers' Party—it has actively sought to check U.S. power globally and regionally.

A sense of Brazil's economic arrival and U.S. decline has fueled Brazil's long-standing desire to assert greater international influence and try to rebalance the global order in favor of the developing world. This agenda can be seen in Brazil's efforts to gain a seat on an expanded Security Council at the United Nations, its negotiation of a deal with Iran and Turkey to head off UN sanctions against Iran, and its support for a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. In Latin America, meanwhile, Brazil has supported the creation of the 12-member Union of South American Nations, or UNASUR, a regional forum

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that pointedly excludes the United States. Much of the UNASUR agenda has been U.S.-oriented, including a presidential summit devoted to the expansion of U.S. military basing rights in Colombia and a meeting of finance ministers to discuss the effects of U.S. monetary policy. And Brazil's efforts to engage, rather than isolate, Bolivian President Evo Morales and Venezuelan President Chávez, however defensible on policy grounds, are also designed to offer a clear alternative to U.S. attempts at hemispheric leadership.

A BETTER APPROACH

Brazil's actions do not constitute a direct threat to the United States. But they do represent an emerging challenge to a number of important U.S. interests. And since Brazil has 200 million people and South America's largest economy, its status as a regional and global player is here to stay. To deal with it and other current challenges in the region, Washington will have to rethink its attitudes toward the hemisphere.

The first step should be acknowledging that in a diversifying global economy, the role of the United States in the Western Hemisphere has shifted from dominance to preeminence. Whatever ability Washington might once have had to directly influence local domestic politics and policies has diminished. The second step should be recognizing that political and economic liberalization, however important and desirable they may be, will not by themselves assure the advancement of all the United States' national interests in the region. U.S. policy, in short, needs to be guided by a cool calculation of Washington's own priorities and its relative ability to achieve them.

Take economic integration. Today, facing Asian competition and Brazilian resistance, the United States needs to make a major push on regional trade. But it should do so in a hardheaded, rather than naive, way, taking into account the true constellation of regional economic interests. Leveraging Congress' recent approval of the U.S.-Colombian and U.S.-Panamanian free-trade agreements, Washington should move aggressively to consolidate the welter of free-trade agreements it currently has into a larger market. This would do more than just make good on the long-promised idea of the FTAA, especially in light of growing evidence of Chinese exports undermining Latin American manufacturing; it would also serve as a rallying point from which Washington could begin to reassert its regional economic role and interests.

Linking such an initiative to the recently negotiated Trans-Pacific Partnership, meanwhile, would allow the United States to put itself at the forefront of the promotion of economic ties between Latin America and Asia, creating the sort of significant incentives necessary to bring Brazil into the trade fold. Such a move might also help ease controversy over trade policy within the United States. The strategy of negotiating free-trade agreements one by one and selling each to a skeptical Congress has run its course; if any more trade deals are going to be sold to Congress and the American public in the near future, they will have to be large ones that mobilize broad constituencies.

Beyond trade, U.S. policy needs to shift its focus from internal issues in small countries to strategic issues involving larger ones. (The only exception is Mexico, where internal political issues, including

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security, remain central to U.S. interests.) In Guatemala, the security situation will inevitably have human rights implications, and the political changes in Cuba during the waning days of the Castro regime will have historical importance, but these sorts of policy questions should not be the prism through which Washington reacts to the region.

Across the hemisphere, Washington should focus its attention on balancing challenges to its leadership and managing the growing economic and political rivalries among the region's most important players. The United States may no longer be the only entry point for Brazil or Mexico onto the global stage, but it must play a fundamental role in working with them to recast the G-20, the International Monetary Fund, and the UN Security Council in a way that reflects Brazil's and Mexico's rise but is also favorable to U.S. interests. Similarly, U.S. policymakers should establish tax and investment treaties with Brazil and other states that aim to deepen investment and commerce, which will be especially important as China's economy slows down. Last, energy cooperation across borders to tap a diversity of energy sources, from newly discovered fossil fuels in Argentina and Brazil to renewables, would build a powerful motor for economic and regulatory integration and reduce the United States' dependence on the region's more volatile exporters, such as Venezuela. Part of this effort should involve working with Brazil to extend U.S. military security to Brazilian rigs positioned far off the coast.

As Washington updates its approach to Latin America, it could use the help of the regional studies community. For

that to happen, however, regional experts will need to undergo some soul-searching of their own. From dependency to democratization, Latin America has long served as fertile ground for academic scholarship and theory building regarding the developing world. Today, the region is entering a new phase of its history, one marked by higher levels of development, intra-regional rivalries, and an increasing degree of geopolitical autonomy. It needs to be addressed with the mindset and tools of international relations, not just those of comparative politics. 🌐

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Keeping Safe in Cyberspace

Adam Segal

In March 2011, the U.S. computer security company RSA announced that hackers had gained access to security tokens it produces that let millions of government and private-sector employees, including those of defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, connect remotely to their office computers. Just five months later, the antivirus software company McAfee issued a report claiming that a group of hackers had broken into the networks of 71 governments, companies, and international organizations. These attacks and the many others like them have robbed companies and governments of priceless intellectual property and crucial military secrets. And although officials have until recently been reluctant to name the culprit, most experts agree that the majority of the attacks originated in China.

In response, analysts and policymakers have suggested that Washington and Beijing work toward some form of *détente*, a broad-based agreement about how countries should behave in cyberspace that might eventually turn into a more

formal code of conduct. Proponents argue that the two sides' long-term interests are aligned, that one day China will be as dependent on digital infrastructure for economic and military power as the United States is today. As Major General Jonathan Shaw, the head of the British military's Defence Cyber Operations Group, has said, China's "dependence on cyber is increasing, the amount of cyber crime taking place inside that society is huge, and the impact on their economic growth and their internal stability is also going to be huge. . . . There's more common ground than people might suggest."

But a grand bargain won't be struck anytime soon. Both China and the United States consider operations in cyberspace a valuable tool, and China currently has little interest in cracking down on hackers, who pose a constant threat to its economic and military rivals. This doesn't mean that there is nothing Washington can do, however. Instead of engaging in a futile effort to achieve some equivalent in cyberspace to nuclear *détente*, the

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U.S. government should pursue a wide-ranging approach to protecting American interests that includes working closely with other Internet powers and raising the costs of hacking. Cyberattacks are less like on-off switches and more like dials. The goal of U.S. policy should be to turn them down.

INTERNET IDEOLOGY

Washington and Beijing won't agree to a broad treaty governing cyberspace mainly because they hold fundamentally incompatible views on the Internet and society. The U.S. government, in its International Strategy for Cyberspace, says that it will promote a digital infrastructure that is "open, interoperable, secure and reliable" while supporting international commerce, strengthening security, and fostering free expression. It has championed an approach to the Internet that lends influence to commercial interests and nonstate actors, opposing calls from other countries for more authority to be given to state-centric organizations such as the UN or the International Telecommunication Union.

China, by contrast, regulates the Internet strictly, and although the country may share an interest in security and global commerce, it defines these concepts differently than the United States does. It is not that China has nothing to fear from cyberattacks: the country suffered close to 500,000 such attacks in 2011, with nearly 15 percent of them appearing to come from computers in the United States. Yet this vulnerability has not brought the two sides together: whereas Americans talk of promoting "cybersecurity," a fairly narrow term that implies protecting communications and other critical networks, Chinese officials like to talk

about "information security," a much broader concept that also includes regulating content.

China's stance is a matter of legitimacy and political control. Chinese policymakers, unlike their American equivalents, fear that communications technologies could foment instability. Beijing views attempts by the U.S. State Department and digital activists to overcome Internet filters as just as threatening as hackers trying to penetrate an electric power grid. Thus, in June 2011, for example, responding to reports that the United States was developing an "Internet in a suitcase" and other firewall-circumvention technologies, an editorial in the state-run *People's Daily* contended, "The U.S. State Department has carefully framed its support of such projects as promoting free speech and human rights, but it is clear that the policy is aimed at destabilizing national governments."

China's obsessive drive for indigenous innovation explains its opposition to global standards for both the technologies that keep the Internet operating and those that allow different types of devices to communicate online. As Chinese technology firms expand abroad, they will need an interoperable Internet as badly as any other international businesses, and they would benefit from the economies of scale and lower prices that global standards allow. For this reason, the Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo helped found the Digital Living Network Alliance, a trade group that seeks to promote interoperability among consumer electronics. But the Chinese government views such attempts at unity as an effort to lock the rest of the world into technology standards dominated by U.S. companies.

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As part of its plan to reduce its technological dependence on the West, China has proposed technology standards of its own.

CHINA'S CHOICES

In February 2011, weeks after Google publicly announced that hackers had tried to steal its sensitive computer codes, security experts traced the attacks back to Shanghai Jiao Tong University and a vocational school in Shandong Province. Both schools denied any involvement, and it is possible that their computers were hijacked by others, but U.S. intelligence officials claim that 20 groups associated with the People's Liberation Army and several Chinese universities are responsible for the majority of the attacks on Google, RSA, and other U.S. targets. Attributing responsibility is often hard. Some hackers drift in and out of Beijing's orbit over time, whereas others are independent criminals with no links to the state. Overall, however, much of the hacking originating in China can be classified as government-sponsored or government-tolerated. Beijing sees such hacking as a good way to eke out economic and military advantage—which creates another obstacle in the path of a U.S.-Chinese agreement.

China's motivation in this area is not mysterious. The government desperately wants its economy to move up the value chain, to become a source of innovation rather than just a producer of cheap goods. To make that happen, it has employed the traditional instruments of science and technology policy, but it has also relied on industrial espionage directed at foreign high-tech companies. Hackers have reportedly targeted the negotiation

strategies, business plans, and financial information of foreign energy and banking companies, too.

Beijing also tolerates cyberattacks out of concern for internal stability. In some cases, the government appears to direct attacks at its domestic enemies, such as the Falun Gong movement, whereas in others, it seems to encourage political hacking as a sort of release valve for frustrated citizens. During the late 1990s, for example, the government called on "patriotic hackers" to vandalize U.S. government Web sites in response to the U.S. military's accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the collision of a U.S. surveillance plane with a Chinese fighter jet. The Chinese government's attitude began to shift by the middle of the next decade, when prominent editorials and high-profile arrests signaled that it was starting to view independent hacking as unwanted interference in foreign relations.

But Beijing has continued to allow such hacking during tense times. After the human rights activist Liu Xiaobo won the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, for example, Chinese hackers defaced the Nobel organization's Web site, and after Vietnam asserted sovereignty over contested islands in June 2011, they targeted Vietnamese sites. In both cases, the government turned a blind eye to the illegal hacking in deference to the population's nationalist impulses.

China's military also finds value in cyberattacks, which would be an integral part of any Chinese military action in the region. Much of the Chinese open-source literature on information warfare suggests that the military, in the event of a conflict, would conduct quick cyberattacks on its

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adversary's command-and-control centers. Although the People's Liberation Army has recruited some high-profile hackers and set up "cyber-militias" at technology companies, the military would probably stop short of rallying outside hackers during a conflict, since doing so would cede control to them over picking targets and make it difficult to stop escalation.

Cyberattacks also help China send a message of deterrence: that a limited regional conflict might not stay that way. Chinese intrusions into U.S. power grids or other critical infrastructure, especially when evidence is left behind, act as a warning that the U.S. homeland may not be immune to attack in the case of a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

PLAYING DEFENSE

Given the obstacles standing in the way of a grand bargain, Washington should focus on improving its defenses, raising the costs to Chinese hackers, and cooperating with other Internet powers. The centerpiece of any comprehensive strategy should be cooperating with the private sector to defend the country against computer attacks, especially when they target intellectual property. The U.S. government has already begun to make progress in this area; since May 2011, for example, the National Security Agency has shared classified intelligence on cyberthreats with 20 defense contractors and their Internet service providers. Although the Pentagon is considering expanding the project to even more defense companies and to critical infrastructure sectors, such as electricity generators and power grids, for the time being the rest of the U.S. private sector remains on its own.

This is a problem, since the rash of successful attacks over the last five years suggests that U.S. firms need all the help they can get against their highly capable Chinese foes. A mix of government regulations and incentives could push American companies to spend more on security. But since attackers will breach defenses anyway, these companies need to do a better job of protecting intellectual property and trade secrets. They should take inventory of all data stored digitally, remove critical information from vulnerable servers, limit the time hackers are able to spend on networks by deploying effective intrusion systems, and lure attackers into so-called honeypots, decoy computers sometimes baited with fake data.

The United States should also seek to raise the costs of cyber-espionage through trade policy. As the defense consultant James Farwell has argued, China's tight control over the Internet suggests that it has the ability, and thus the legal responsibility, to stop attacks coming from its soil. The United States could make the case to the World Trade Organization that Chinese intellectual property theft violates China's WTO obligations. A ruling against Beijing would allow Washington to label China a pirate state, collect damages or apply trade sanctions, and help mobilize international support for pressure on China. Even without a WTO ruling, the United States might consider levying economic sanctions on China and placing travel restrictions on cyber-spies.

More aggressive measures may be in order but for now are legally and strategically difficult. The United States'

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strategy in cyberspace has always been about more than just defense; as Chinese officials are quick to note, it was the United States that first set up a cyber command and thus, in their view, militarized cyberspace. Although U.S. defense officials have hesitated to talk about how they would attack other countries' networks, this reticence is hardly working. (Consider this headline that ran in the *PLA Daily* on July 16, 2011: "The Offensive Posture of the U.S. 'Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace' is Difficult to Conceal.") It is time to give up the act. Chinese analysts are no doubt aware that Washington is planning offensive operations, and they probably believe that it is behind other attacks—in particular Stuxnet, the computer worm credited with slowing down Iran's uranium-enrichment program at its facility in Natanz.

Last March, the Obama administration considered using cyberattacks to disable Libya's air defense systems but chose not to for various legal and strategic reasons. The legal issues of responding to Chinese intrusions are even more complicated, since espionage does not violate international law and so does not justify large-scale attacks in response. In other words, the United States cannot turn off the lights in Shanghai because terabytes of data were stolen in Washington. Self-defense is allowed, but the authority under which the U.S. military can exploit foreign networks in defense of private industry is unclear.

Now that U.S. intelligence officials have identified the specific groups behind some of the attacks the country has faced, the United States could

target individual computers and personal or financial data. The U.S. government may have already hired private companies to conduct offensive operations in cyberspace. Several prominent security researchers have admitted selling previously undiscovered software vulnerabilities known as "zero-days" to defense contractors, who may use these exploits themselves to penetrate Chinese networks or may pass them on to U.S. government agencies. The benefits of contracting out hacking, however, must be weighed against the operational and legal issues that private but government-sponsored attacks would raise, as well as the damage they could do to diplomatic efforts to convince Beijing to rein in its own patriotic hackers.

CREATING CONSENSUS

Even as the U.S. government attempts to defend itself against Chinese hackers, it must also work directly with the Chinese government to try to solve the problem. It has taken some preliminary steps in this direction. In May 2011, for the first time, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue included discussions regarding cyberspace; such issues were also on the agenda in July when Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with General Chen Bingde, chief of the general staff of the People's Liberation Army. U.S. and Chinese officials, along with experts from think tanks, have also been privately discussing these issues in a parallel set of track-two meetings.

Yet these official bilateral discussions are not expansive enough. Diplomats should take their cues from the planned

dialogue on cyberspace between the United States and Russia, which is to include discussions about how each side's military views the Internet and an effort to establish a hot line that could be used during a cybersecurity crisis. Washington and Beijing need to have a clear communications channel in case of emergency. To build trust over the longer term, the two sides should also discuss some common threats, such as the potential for terrorist attacks on power grids.

Negotiations on these topics are likely to be protracted and held hostage to the overall state of the U.S.-Chinese relationship. In the past, military-to-military discussions have often been canceled by one side or the other to signal displeasure. Confidence-building measures that reduce mutual irritants, such as a recent joint effort to reduce junk e-mail, are more likely to be sustainable. In the same vein, as Gu Jian, the deputy head of network security for China's Ministry of Public Security, has suggested, the two sides could act against activity that is illegal in both countries. For example, they might shut down Web sites that attempt to trick users into handing over their bank account numbers.

Perhaps more promising than these incipient discussions with China is the U.S. government's effort to work with allies and other like-minded countries to define international norms about cyberspace. It is especially important to find common ground with rising powers such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa. Agreements with them about acceptable behavior would ratchet up the pressure on China,

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which rarely prefers to remain an international outlier.

Companies and governments should also call out China for its hacking crimes in the hope that this will embarrass the government into ending them. Google used this strategy when it announced in January 2010 that it had been the victim of sophisticated attacks and would no longer operate its search engine in China, as did the U.S. State Department in April 2011, when it pressed the Chinese Foreign Ministry about attacks against a Web site supporting the dissident artist Ai Weiwei. Naming and shaming, besides highlighting the fact that Beijing is violating international norms, may also embolden those within the Chinese government who worry that hacking's long-term costs—in particular, the damage it does to relations with Japan, Europe, and the United States—outweigh its short-term gains.


The U.S. government should also keep lending a hand to other countries so that they can fight cybercrime on their own, especially those developing countries that lack the relevant expertise. In July 2011, for instance, the State Department sponsored a conference for six East African countries on investigating and prosecuting cross-border cybercrime. If the United States does not help such governments, China would be happy to do so. Yet along with its expertise, Beijing would seek to export its own attitudes about the Internet, values that could tempt these governments to adopt more totalitarian approaches to cyberspace and join China at the UN in its push to limit the role of nongovernmental groups in Internet governance.

Assembling an international consensus on norms about cyberspace, however, is a strategy that will probably take a long time to pay off, if it ever does. There is little the United States can do to alter China's conception of cyberspace, a vision it is actively promoting abroad. With a growing population of 500 million Internet users, it is easy to see why the Chinese believe that the future of cyberspace belongs to them. In the meantime, the most pressing tasks for the United States are to raise the costs incurred by Chinese hackers and to improve the security of networks at home. Yet U.S. officials should be realistic: Chinese-based cyberattacks will not disappear anytime soon. 🌐



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Essays



China's ambitions in space could force another "Sputnik moment" for the United States—as long as politics don't get in the way.

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The Case for Space

Why We Should Keep Reaching for the Stars

Neil deGrasse Tyson

IN 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama articulated his vision for the future of American space exploration, which included an eventual manned mission to Mars. Such an endeavor would surely cost hundreds of billions of dollars—maybe even \$1 trillion. Whatever the amount, it would be an expensive undertaking. In the past, only three motivations have led societies to spend that kind of capital on ambitious, speculative projects: the celebration of a divine or royal power, the search for profit, and war. Examples of praising power at great expense include the pyramids in Egypt, the vast terra-cotta army buried along with the first emperor of China, and the Taj Mahal in India. Seeking riches in the New World, the monarchs of Iberia funded the great voyages of Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Magellan. And military incentives spurred the building of the Great Wall of China, which helped keep the Mongols at bay, and the Manhattan Project, whose scientists conceived, designed, and built the first atomic bomb.

In 1957, the Soviet launch of the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, spooked the United States into the space race. A year later, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was born amid an atmosphere defined by Cold War fears. But for years to come, the Soviet Union would continue to best the United

NEIL DEGRASSE TYSON is Director of the Hayden Planetarium at the American Museum of Natural History. His latest book is *Space Chronicles: Facing the Ultimate Frontier* (Norton, 2012), from which this essay is adapted.

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States in practically every important measure of space achievement, including the first space walk, the longest space walk, the first woman in space, the first space station, and the longest time logged in space. But by defining the Cold War contest as a race to the moon and nothing else, the United States gave itself permission to ignore the milestones it missed along the way.

In a speech to a joint session of Congress in May 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Apollo program, famously declaring, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth.” These were powerful words, and they galvanized the nation. But a more revealing passage came earlier in the speech, when Kennedy reflected on the challenge presented by the Soviets’ space program: “If we are to win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny, the dramatic achievements in space which occurred in recent weeks should have made clear to us all, as did the Sputnik in 1957, the impact of this adventure on the minds of men everywhere, who are attempting to make a determination of which road they should take.”

Kennedy’s speech was not simply a call for advancement or achievement; it was a battle cry against communism. He might have simply said, “Let’s go to the moon: what a marvelous place to explore!” But no one would have written the check. And at some point, somebody has got to write the check.

If the United States commits to the goal of reaching Mars, it will almost certainly do so in reaction to the progress of other nations—as was the case with NASA, the Apollo program, and the project that became the International Space Station. For the past decade, I have joked with colleagues that the United States would land astronauts on Mars in a year or two if only the Chinese would leak a memo that revealed plans to build military bases there.

The joke does not seem quite so funny anymore. Last December, China released an official strategy paper describing an ambitious five-year plan to advance its space capabilities. According to the paper, China intends to “launch space laboratories, manned spaceship and space freighters; make breakthroughs in and master space station key technologies, including astronauts’ medium-term stay, regenerative

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life support and propellant refueling; conduct space applications to a certain extent and make technological preparations for the construction of space stations.” A front-page headline in *The New York Times* captured the underlying message: “Space Plan From China Broadens Challenge to U.S.”

When it comes to its space programs, China is not in the habit of proffering grand but empty visions. Far from it: the country has an excellent track record of matching promises with achievements. During a 2002 visit to China as part of my service on a White House commission, I listened to Chinese officials speak of putting a man into space in the near future. Perhaps I was afflicted by a case of American hubris, but it was easy to think that “near future” meant decades. Yet 18 months later, in the fall of 2003, Yang Liwei became the first Chinese *taikonaut*, executing 14 orbits of Earth. Five years after that, Zhai Zhigang took the first Chinese space walk. Meanwhile, in January 2007, when China wanted to dispose of a nonfunctioning weather satellite, the People’s Liberation Army conducted the country’s first surface-to-orbit “kinetic kill,” destroying the satellite with a high-speed missile—the first such action by any country since the 1980s. With each such achievement, China moves one step closer to becoming an autonomous space power, reaching the level of (and perhaps even outdistancing) the European Union, Russia, and the United States, in terms of its commitment and resources.

China’s latest space proclamations could conceivably produce another “Sputnik moment” for the United States, spurring the country into action after a relatively fallow period in its space efforts. But in addition to the country’s morbid fiscal state, a new obstacle might stand in the way of a reaction as fervent and productive as that in Kennedy’s era: the partisanship that now clouds space exploration.

THE POLITICS OF SPACE

FOR DECADES, space exploration stood above party politics. Support for NASA was not bipartisan; it was nonpartisan. Public support for NASA, although it has waxed and waned, has generally not been correlated with the categories that typically divide Americans: liberal versus conservative, Democratic versus Republican, impoverished



REUTERS / SCOTT AUDETTE

End of an era: the last U.S. space shuttle launch, Cape Canaveral, Florida, July 8, 2011

versus wealthy, urban versus rural. This political neutrality has been reflected even in NASA's locations. As of 2010, the congressional districts that house NASA's ten main sites were represented in the House by six Republicans and four Democrats. A similar balance existed in the Senate delegations from the eight states where those sites are located: eight Republicans and eight Democrats.

But beginning in 2004, NASA's immunity from partisanship began to fade. Following the fatal loss of the Columbia space shuttle orbiter in 2003, in which seven crew members died, experts, media commentators, and lawmakers began to push for a new vision for NASA. Less than a year later, President George W. Bush endorsed that goal with a set of policies known as the Vision for Space Exploration. The plan called for the completion of the International Space Station and the retirement of NASA's workhorse, the space shuttle, by the end of the decade. The money saved by ending the shuttle program would be used to create a new launch architecture that could take Americans to destinations farther than low-Earth orbit.

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In February 2004, I was appointed by Bush to a nine-member commission whose mandate was to chart an affordable and sustainable course for implementing the new policy. The plan ultimately received bipartisan support in Congress. But during the debate over its merits, party allegiances began to distort and even blind people's ideas about space. Some Democrats were quick to criticize the plan on the grounds that the nation could not afford it, even though the commission was explicitly charged with keeping costs in check. Others complained about the plan's lack of details, although supportive documents were freely available from the White House and from NASA. A number of liberal critics questioned the advisability of spending on space when the cost of fighting two wars was already draining the Treasury and the federal government was sidelining other important programs in favor of tax cuts. They apparently failed to remember that in 1969 the United States went to the moon while fighting two wars—one cold, one hot—during the most turbulent decade in American history since the Civil War. A typical response came from former Vermont Governor Howard Dean, who was then contending for the Democratic presidential nomination: "I happen to think space exploration is terrific. Where is the tax increase to pay for it? It is not worth bankrupting the country." Writing in *The New Yorker*, Hendrik Hertzberg criticized Bush's "lack of seriousness about his interplanetary venture" and derided the plan's "Wal-Mart price tag." Criticisms such as these revealed a partisan bias I had not previously encountered in two decades of exposure to space policy.

Since Obama entered office, Republicans have taken to politicizing space exploration with no less verve. In a speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010, Obama put forward a new space policy, which, among other things, reaffirmed Bush's plan to retire the space shuttle. He sketched a hopeful vision for the future, built around the goal of reaching multiple destinations beyond low-Earth orbit, including asteroids. Obama even went one step further than Bush, suggesting that since the United States has already been to the moon, why return at all? With an advanced launch vehicle, he said, NASA could bypass the moon altogether and head straight for Mars by the mid-2030s.

Rather than celebrating Obama's ambitions, scores of protesters lined the causeways surrounding the Kennedy Space Center that day,

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CELEBRATING THE POWER OF IDEAS




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
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
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The Case for Space

wielding placards that pleaded with the president not to “destroy NASA.” The conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer scoffed at Obama’s “abdication” of the United States’ leading role in space, labeling the plan “a call to retreat.” The Republican governor of Texas, Rick Perry, accused Obama of “leaving American astronauts with no alternative but to hitchhike into space.” Taken at face value, such reactions to Obama’s plan could have reflected honest differences of opinion. But their partisan nature was revealed by their target: after all, it was not Obama but Bush who had originally called for the end of the shuttle program.

Ultimately, the fight over Obama’s plan became all about jobs. The plan left a gap of uncertain length between the phasing out of the shuttle and new launches beyond low-Earth orbit, meaning that for some period of time, there would be no need for shuttle workers, especially the contractors who work with NASA in support of its launch operations. Since the shuttle is a major part of NASA, and since NASA’s industrial partners are spread far and wide across the country, the unemployment ripples would be felt far beyond Florida’s Space Coast. In his April 2010 speech, the president did promise to fund retraining programs for workers whose jobs would be eliminated. He also noted that his plan would erase fewer jobs than Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, although he spun the difference by saying, “Despite some reports to the contrary, my plan will add more than 2,500 jobs along the Space Coast in the next two years, compared to the plan under the previous administration.” A mathematically equivalent but blunter version of that statement would have been, “Bush’s plan would have destroyed 10,000 jobs; my plan will destroy only 7,500.”

This emphasis on jobs led the public debate into a rhetorical cul-de-sac, since few politicians can afford to defend any federal agency, much less NASA, as a massive government jobs program. So instead of dwelling on his plan’s impact on employment, Obama has focused on space travel’s historic impact on technology and innovation. In a rousing speech to the National Academy of Sciences in 2009 to alert scientists of the coming benefits from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the president noted that the Apollo program “produced technologies that have improved kidney dialysis and water

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purification systems; sensors to test for hazardous gases; energy-saving building materials; and fire-resistant fabrics used by firefighters and soldiers. And more broadly, the enormous investment of that era—in science and technology, in education and research funding—produced a great outpouring of curiosity and creativity, the benefits of which have been incalculable.” He could have added much more to that list of revolutionary spinoff technologies, including digital imaging, implantable pacemakers, collision-avoidance systems on aircraft, precision LASIK eye surgery, and global positioning satellites.

These constitute perfectly reasonable arguments in support of spending on space. Still, there was something disingenuous about Obama’s rhetoric. The economic stimulus legislation proposed dou-

Countless women are alive today because of efforts to fix a design flaw in the Hubble Space Telescope.

bling the budgets of the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy’s Office of Science, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. But although Obama heaped praise on the legacy of space research, all that NASA got from the stimulus act was a directive on how to allocate \$1 billion of its existing budget—no extra funding at all. Given that space exploration formed the rhetorical soul of the

president’s speech, that absence of additional dollars defied rational, political, and even emotional analysis.

In his second State of the Union address, delivered in January 2011, Obama once again cited the space race as a catalyst for scientific and technological innovation. He then noted the hefty investments that other countries are now making in their technological future and the fact that the U.S. educational system is falling behind, declaring these disturbing imbalances to be this generation’s Sputnik moment. He laid out four goals: to have a million electric vehicles on the road and to deploy the next generation of high-speed wireless Internet service to 98 percent of all Americans by 2015 and to derive 80 percent of U.S. electricity from clean energy and to provide 80 percent of Americans with access to high-speed rail by 2035.

Those are all laudable goals. But to think of that list as the future fruits of a contemporary Sputnik moment is dispiriting to proponents

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of space exploration. It reveals a change of vision over the decades, from dreams of tomorrow to dreams of technologies that should already exist.

There is also a deeper flaw in Obama's plan. In a democracy, a president who articulates a goal with a date of completion far beyond the end of his term cannot offer a guarantee of ever reaching that goal. Kennedy knew full well what he was doing in 1961 when he set out to land a man on the moon "before this decade is out." Had he lived and been elected to a second term, he would have been president through January 19, 1969. And had the 1967 Apollo 1 launch-pad fire that killed three astronauts not occurred, the Apollo program would not have been delayed and the United States would certainly have reached the moon under Kennedy's watch. Now, imagine if in 1961, Kennedy had instead called for achieving the goal "by sometime in the 1980s." With a mission statement like that, it is not clear whether American astronauts would have ever left Earth. But that is essentially what Obama has done by calling for a mission to Mars by the mid-2030s. When a president promises something beyond his years in office, he is fundamentally unaccountable. It is not his budget that must finish the job. Another president inherits the problem, and it becomes a ball too easily dropped, a plan too easily abandoned, a dream too readily deferred. So although the rhetoric of Obama's space speech was stirring and visionary, the politics of his speech were, empirically, a disaster. The only thing guaranteed to happen on his watch is the interruption of the United States' access to space.

THE LESSONS OF HUBBLE

THE PARTISANSHIP surrounding space exploration and the retrenching of U.S. space policy are part of a more general trend: the decline of science in the United States. As its interest in science wanes, the country loses ground to the rest of the industrialized world in every measure of technological proficiency. For example, in recent decades, the rate of U.S. submissions to peer-reviewed science journals has dropped or barely held steady, while the rates of submissions from Brazil, China, Japan, and western Europe have risen sharply. Data on graduate-level education tell a similar story. According to the latest

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available annual census by the National Science Foundation, nearly one-third of the graduate students in science and engineering fields in the United States and more than half of the postdoctoral researchers in those fields are foreign nationals studying or working in the country on temporary visas. Moreover, those numbers partly cloak the fact that in some of the nation's best engineering departments, almost all the students are foreign nationals.


Until recently, most of those students came to the United States, earned their degrees, and gladly stayed for employment in the U.S. high-tech work force. Now, however, department chairs are anecdotally reporting that foreign nationals in their graduate programs are choosing to return home more frequently, owing to a combination of widespread anti-immigrant sentiment and increased professional opportunities in China, India, and eastern Europe—the places whose citizens are the most highly represented in advanced academic science and engineering programs in the United States. This is not a brain drain, because the United States never laid claim to these students in the first place, but a kind of brain regression. Thus, what is bad for America is good for the world. In the next phase of this shift, the United States should expect to begin losing the talent that trains the talent, which would be a disaster. Ever since the Industrial Revolution, investments in science and technology have proved to be reliable engines of economic growth. If homegrown interest in those fields is not regenerated soon, the comfortable lifestyle to which Americans have become accustomed will draw to a rapid close.

Nevertheless, there are still reasons to be hopeful. One of the most popular museums in the world, with attendance levels rivaling those of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Uffizi, and the Louvre, is the National Air and Space Museum, in Washington, D.C. Some of its visitors are, of course, foreign tourists. But Americans' continued interest in exhibits such as the Wright brothers' original 1903 airplane and the Apollo 11 moon capsule reflects the way that an enduring emotional investment in space exploration has become part of American culture.

Or consider the fate of the Hubble Space Telescope. Hubble's scientific legacy is unimpeachable. Its data have been used in more published research papers than data from any other single scientific


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
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
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instrument, in any discipline. Among the highlights of Hubble's achievements is the way it helped settle a decades-old debate about the age of the known universe (now agreed to be about 14 billion years). Yet in 2004, when NASA announced plans to cancel an upcoming mission to service Hubble, owing to a lack of funds and the risks inherent in using an aging shuttle fleet, the loudest voices of dissent were not those of scientists but rather those of everyday Americans.

Hubble is the first and only space telescope to observe the universe using primarily visible light. Its crisp, vibrant, and detailed images of the cosmos make it a kind of supreme version of human eyes in space. No matter what Hubble reveals—planets, dense star fields, colorful interstellar nebulae, deadly black holes, gracefully colliding galaxies—each image opens up a private vista of the cosmos. Hubble came of age in the 1990s, during the exponential growth in access to the Internet. Soon, Hubble images, each more magnificent than the last, became screen savers and desktop wallpaper on the computers of people who had never before found reason to celebrate, however quietly, Earth's place in the universe. Those gorgeous images made Americans feel that they were participants in cosmic discovery. And so, when the source of those images was threatened, there followed a torrent of letters to the editor, online comments, and phone calls to Congress, all urging NASA to restore Hubble's funding. I do not know of any previous point in the history of science when the public took ownership of a scientific instrument. The largely unorganized campaign to save Hubble succeeded: the decision was reversed, and the funding was restored.

Hubble offers another lesson about the value of space exploration. When it was launched in 1990, a flaw in the design of its optics system produced hopelessly blurry images, much to NASA's dismay. Three years later, corrective optics were installed. But during the intervening time, astrophysicists at Baltimore's Space Telescope Science Institute, the research headquarters for Hubble, continued collecting the murky data and also worked to design advanced image-processing software to help identify and isolate stars in the telescope's otherwise crowded, unfocused images. Meanwhile, in collaboration with Hubble scientists, medical researchers at the Lombardi Comprehensive Cancer Center at Georgetown University Medical Center recognized that the challenge

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faced by the astrophysicists was similar to that faced by doctors in their visual search for tumors in mammograms. With the help of funding from the National Science Foundation, the Lombardi researchers adapted the techniques that the Hubble scientists were using to analyze the telescope's blurry images and applied them to mammography, leading to significant advances in the early detection of breast cancer. Countless women are alive today because of efforts to fix a design flaw in the Hubble Space Telescope.

PLANNING FOR TOMORROW

ONE CANNOT script those kinds of outcomes, yet similar serendipitous scenarios occur continually. The cross-pollination of disciplines almost always stimulates innovation. Clearly defined, goal-oriented support for specific outcomes in specific fields may yield evolutionary advances, but cross-pollination involving a diversity of sciences much more readily encourages revolutionary discoveries. And nothing spurs cross-pollination like space exploration, which draws from the ranks of astrophysicists, biologists, chemists, engineers, planetary geologists, and subspecialists in those fields. Without healthy federal support for the space program, ambitions calcify, and the economy that once thrived on a culture of innovation retreats from the world stage.

Other good reasons abound for supporting space science. Humans should search Mars and find out why liquid water no longer runs on its surface; something bad happened there, and it would be important to identify any signs of something similar happening on Earth. We should visit an asteroid and learn how to deflect it—after all, if we discover one heading toward Earth, it would be rather embarrassing if big-brained, opposable-thumbed humans were to meet the same fate as the pea-brained dinosaurs. We should drill through the miles of ice on Jupiter's frozen moon Europa and explore the liquid ocean below for living organisms. We should visit Pluto and other icy bodies in the outer solar system, because they hold clues to the origin of our planet. And we should probe Venus' thick atmosphere to understand why the greenhouse effect has gone awry there, raising surface temperatures to 500 degrees Celsius. No part of the solar system should be beyond our reach, and no part of the universe should hide from our telescopes.

The Case for Space

What the Bush plan and the Obama plan have in common, apart from having exposed partisan divides, is an absence of funding to bring their visions closer to the present, let alone an unspecified future. In the current economic and political climate, it might be difficult to imagine much support for a renewed commitment to space exploration—even in the face of a direct challenge from China. Many will ask, “Why are we spending billion of dollars up there in space when we have pressing problems down here on Earth?” That question should be replaced by a more illuminating one: “As a fraction of one of my tax dollars today, what is the total cost of all U.S. spaceborne telescopes and planetary probes, the rovers on Mars, the International Space Station, the recently terminated space shuttle, telescopes yet to orbit, and missions yet to fly?” The answer is one-half of one penny. During the storied Apollo era, peak NASA spending (in 1965–66) amounted to a bit more than four cents on the tax dollar. If the United States restored funding for NASA to even a quarter of that level—a penny on the tax dollar—the country could reclaim its preeminence in a field that shaped its twentieth-century ascendancy.

Even in troubled economic times, the United States is a sufficiently wealthy nation to embrace an investment in its own future in a way that would drive the economy, the country’s collective ambitions, and, above all, the dreams of coming generations. Imagine the excitement when NASA, bolstered by a fully funded long-term plan, starts to select the first astronauts to walk on Mars. Right now, those science-savvy future explorers are in middle school. As they become celebrities whom others seek to emulate, the United States will once again witness how space ambitions can shape the destiny of nations. 🌍

God and Caesar in America

Why Mixing Religion and Politics Is Bad for Both

David E. Campbell and Robert D. Putnam

FROM THE day the Pilgrims stepped off the Mayflower, religion has played a prominent role in American public life. The faithful have been vital participants in nearly every major social movement in U.S. history, progressive as well as conservative. Still, the close intertwining of religion and politics in the last 40 years is unusual, especially in the degree of the politicization of religion itself. Indeed, religion's influence on U.S. politics has hit a high-water mark, especially on the right. Yet at the same time, its role in Americans' personal lives is ebbing. As religion and politics have become entangled, many Americans, especially younger ones, have pulled away from religion. And that correlation turns out to be causal, not coincidental.

It is no surprise that religion and politics should be connected to some degree in a highly religious and democratic nation. In the nineteenth century, U.S. political parties were divided along sectarian lines: pietistic versus liturgical, low church versus high church, Protestant versus Catholic. But whereas the past saw partisans of different religions (often with an ethnic tinge) face off in the political arena, today partisan divisions are not defined by denomination; rather, they pit religiously

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God and Caesar in America

devout conservatives against secular progressives. Moreover, to a degree not seen since at least the 1850s (and perhaps not even then), religious mobilization is now tied directly to party politics.

In fact, over the last 20 years, church attendance has become the main dividing line between Republican and Democratic voters. (African Americans are a sharp, but singular, exception; although most Democratic voters are now secular, African Americans, the most loyal Democrats, are also the most religious group in the United States.) The so-called God gap, between churchgoing Republicans and secular white Democrats, rose sharply throughout the 1990s and early years of this century. Before the 2008 presidential election, one team of consultants even specialized in teaching Democratic candidates how to “do God,” so they could eat into the Republicans’ support among religious Americans. Yet in 2008, the God gap remained as wide as ever: according to data we collected, among whites, 67 percent of weekly churchgoers voted for Senator John McCain, as compared with 26 percent of those who never attended church.

The connection between religiosity and political conservatism has become so deeply embedded in contemporary U.S. culture that it is startling to recall just how new the alignment is. In the 1960s, churchgoers were actually more likely than nonchurchgoers to be Democrats. Into the 1980s, there were still plenty of progressives in the pews on Sunday morning and plenty of conservatives who stayed home. The rather sudden shift since then has, and will have, both short-term and long-term implications for both politics and religion. For now, Republicans must seek to appease their fervently religious base without alienating a general electorate that increasingly finds the mixture of religion and politics distasteful. In the long run, the trend could undermine the historic role of religion in the United States, as younger generations reject organized religion itself. The country has arrived at today’s close nexus between religion and partisanship only recently, and understanding how it got there—and how the role of religion in the United States has changed in recent decades—will help explain where it might be headed.

IN THE BEGINNING

TO GET a better sense of how novel the present political-religious landscape is, we must go back to the 1950s. That decade was highly religious;

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indeed, some historians argue that it was the most religious in all of American history. Of course, there are many ways to gauge national trends in religiosity, but for decades, one Gallup poll question, “Is religion’s influence on American life increasing or decreasing?” has proved a finely tuned seismometer of religious tremors. In 1957, 69 percent of those Americans surveyed told Gallup that they thought the influence of religion in American life was on the rise. Only 14 percent said it was declining. Every objective measure indicates that they were right: more Americans than ever were attending religious services, more churches were being built to accommodate them, and more books of Scripture were being sold and read. But in President Dwight Eisenhower’s America, religion had no partisan overtones. Ike was as popular among those who never darkened the door of a church (or synagogue, and so on) as among churchgoers.

Then came the 1960s, and a dramatic turn in attitudes toward authority and especially toward conventional sexual morality, an issue tightly connected to religious belief. In just four years, between 1969 and 1973, the percentage of Americans who approved of premarital sex doubled, from one-fourth to one-half. That increase was stunning and almost entirely concentrated among the baby boomers, who were then coming of age. By 1970, fully 75 percent of Americans surveyed concluded that religion’s influence in American life was waning. Collapsing church attendance confirmed their view. Yet even then, religiosity did not skew more to the right than the left; neither during the religious boom of the 1950s nor in the religious bust of the 1960s was religion linked to partisan politics.

Nor did the 1960s put the United States on an inexorable path toward secularism. Far from it: instead, among more conservative Americans, the moral earthquake triggered a return to religion, or at least a particular type of religion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, in an aftershock to the 1960s, conservative forms of religion, especially evangelical Protestantism, expanded. At the same time as liberal Protestantism and churchgoing Catholicism were virtually collapsing, many Americans who sought a reaffirmation of traditional norms, especially when it came to sex and “family values,” found what they were looking for in evangelical Protestantism. The new evangelicals also broke free of the self-imposed cultural exile of their fundamentalist

forebears. They did not shun a sinful world but instead sought to change it, including its politics.

An early harbinger of evangelicalism's new political role was the 1976 presidential campaign of the Democrat Jimmy Carter, who spoke openly of himself as a "born-again Christian," a label once unthinkable in mainstream U.S. politics. At the other end of the political spectrum, meanwhile, moral conservatives banded together to fight the Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights, and abortion. Evangelicalism began morphing from a purely religious movement into a political one that allied devout Americans from many denominations, including Catholics and Mormons. Once more, Gallup's seismometer noted the increasing prominence of religion. In 1976, it registered that 44 percent of respondents thought religion was gaining influence, and 45 percent thought it was losing influence.

Then, in his 1980 presidential campaign, the Republican Ronald Reagan actively courted the religious vote with considerable success. Unlike Eisenhower in the 1950s or even Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford in the 1970s, Reagan and the Republican presidential candidates that followed him began to pick up the support of formerly Democratic evangelicals in the South and observant Catholics in the North.

The first aftershock to the 1960s thus had two components: one religious (the rise of evangelicals) and the other political (the rise of the religious right). The political movement continues, but the religious dimension ended in the early 1990s. As a fraction of the total population (and, even more dramatically, as a fraction of Americans under 30), the number of evangelicals has been declining for nearly 20 years and is back to where it was at the beginning of the 1970s.

Although many of the political organizations associated with the religious right, such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, have disappeared or faded into near irrelevance, their legacy remains strong: a Republican activist base that advocates both moral traditionalism and a greater role for religion in the public square.

The rise of the religious right echoes in some respects a common theme in U.S. history. Most major social movements, both progressive and conservative, have included important religious themes: "the right to life" and "family values" today, abolitionism and prohibition

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yesterday. But today's unusually intimate ties between organized religion and one particular political party have had unintended consequences for both politics and religion.

THE GOD-GIVEN RIGHT

WITH THE rise of the religious right came the much-discussed God gap between Republicans and Democrats. Each year, fewer and fewer Americans identify as secular Republicans or religious Democrats. What happened to those who once did? Did they adjust their politics to fit their religion, or vice versa? Surprisingly, politics has mostly determined religious practice. Formerly religious Democrats (except among African Americans) have drifted away from church, and formerly unobservant Republicans have found religion.

Take the Tea Party. Even this ostensibly secular movement has strong religious undertones. A large, nationally representative survey that we first conducted in 2006 (before the Tea Party was formed) and repeated with the same respondents in 2011 casts doubt on the conventional wisdom about the movement's origin. In its early days, the Tea Party was often described as comprising nonpartisan political neophytes who, hurt by the Great Recession, had been spurred into action out of concern over runaway government spending. This is a triple myth. In reality, those Americans who support the Tea Party were (and remain) overwhelmingly partisan Republicans. They were politically active even in the pre-Tea Party days, and they were no more likely than anyone else to have suffered hardship during the recent economic downturn.

Indeed, it turns out that the strongest predictor of a Republican becoming a Tea Party supporter is whether he or she evinced a desire in our 2006 survey to see religion play a prominent role in politics. And that desire does not simply reflect members' high religiosity. Tea Partiers are, on average, more religiously observant than the typical American, but not more so than other Republicans. Rather, they are distinctively comfortable blending religion and politics. Tea Partiers are more likely than other Republicans to say that U.S. laws and policies would be better if the country had more "deeply religious" elected officials, that it is appropriate for religious leaders to engage in political persuasion, and that religion should be brought into public



debates over political issues. The Tea Party's generals might say that their overriding concern is smaller government, but the rank and file is after a godlier government.

Tea Partiers' views in this respect are increasingly out of step with those of most Americans. According to Gallup polls, as early as 1984, just as the alliance between religious and political conservatives was crystallizing, most Americans opposed the idea of religious groups

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
campaigning against specific candidates. Moreover, according to the widely respected national General Social Survey, as the public visibility of the religious right increased between 1991 and 2008, growing numbers of Americans expressed the conviction that religious leaders should not try to influence people's votes or government decisions. In 1991, 22 percent of those surveyed said they "strongly agree" that religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions; by 2008, that figure had nearly doubled, to 38 percent. In our 2011 survey, 80 percent of respondents said that it is not proper for religious leaders to tell people how to vote, and 70 percent said that religion should be "kept out of public debates over social and political issues."

It should thus come as no surprise that many Americans have negative views of the Tea Party. In the same 2011 poll, the Tea Party ranked at the bottom of a list of two dozen U.S. religious, political, and racial groups in terms of favorability. (It was even less liked than Muslims and atheists, two groups that regularly meet with public opprobrium.) One of the few groups approaching the unpopularity of the Tea Party was the religious right. Both movements (which overlap heavily) might have won the staunch support of a minority of American voters, but they have also won the staunch opposition of a much larger group.

This shift has created a dilemma for Republican candidates seeking the Tea Partiers' support. Not only must Republicans toe the conservative line on fiscal issues, immigration, and national security, but Tea Party sympathizers (who compose barely a quarter of the national electorate but more than half of the Republican primary electorate) also expect them to favor a fusion of religion and politics. The problem for the Republican Party is that this fusion is unpopular among the general electorate and is becoming more so. Thus, as culture warriors fire up the Republican base, they leave independent voters cold. In contrast, more centrist candidates are attractive to the moderate middle but win only tepid support among the activists who want more God in government.

LOSING MY RELIGION

THE CONSEQUENCES of the melding of religion and party politics extend beyond electoral politics; the commingling has also reshaped the United States' religious landscape. Just as the 1960s spurred a re-



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
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vival of traditional religion, the last few decades have led directly to an unprecedented turning away from organized religion, especially among younger Americans.

Consider the growth in the number of people whom sociologists call “nones,” those who report no religious affiliation. Historically, this category made up a constant 5–7 percent of the American population, even during the 1960s, when religious attendance dropped. In the early 1990s, however, just as the God gap widened in politics, the percentage of nones began to shoot up. By the mid-1990s, nones made up 12 percent of the population. By 2011, they were 19 percent. In demographic terms, this shift was huge. To put the figures in context, in the two decades between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, the heyday of evangelicalism, the fraction of the population that was evangelical grew by only about five percentage points. The percentage of nones grew twice as much in the last two decades and is still climbing. Moreover, the rise is heavily concentrated among people under 30, the so-called millennial generation. To be sure, the young are always less religiously observant than their elders; people tend to become more religious when they get married, have children, and put down roots in a community (demographers call this the life-cycle effect). Yet 20-somethings in 2012 are much more likely to reject all religious affiliation than their parents and grandparents were when they were young—33 percent today, compared with 12 percent in the 1970s.

The millennials’ movement away from organized religion has recently accelerated. Between 2006 and 2011, the fraction of nones in the population as a whole rose modestly, from 17 percent to 19 percent. Among younger Americans, however, the fraction increased approximately five times as much. Similarly, over the same five-year period, the fraction of Americans who reported never attending religious services rose by a negligible two percentage points among Americans over the age of 60 but by three times as much among those 18–29. And younger millennials are even more secular than their slightly older siblings; our 2011 survey showed that a third of Americans in their early 20s were without religion, compared with a quarter of those who were that age when we surveyed them in 2006.

The Gallup religious seismometer has signaled a plunge in religion’s influence in American life, too. And in our survey, Americans

David E. Campbell and Robert D. Putnam

of all walks of life, religious and secular, white and nonwhite, rich and poor, urban and rural, liberal and conservative, old and young, highly educated and less educated, reported the shift in about equal measure. Since we interviewed the very same people in 2006 and 2011, we can even see large numbers of individuals lowering their own estimates of religion's role in American life.

The best evidence indicates that this dramatic generational shift is primarily in reaction to the religious right. Politically moderate and progressive Americans have a general allergy to the mingling of religion and party politics. And millennials are even more sensitive to it, partly because many of them are liberal (especially on the touchstone issue of gay rights) and partly because they have only known a world in which religion and the right are intertwined. To them, "religion" means "Republican," "intolerant," and "homophobic." Since those traits do not represent their views, they do not see themselves—or wish to be seen by their peers—as religious.

Our data support this theory. By tracking individuals for five years, between 2006 and 2011, we found that Democrats and progressives were much more likely to become nones than were Republicans. The religious defections were concentrated specifically among those Americans who reported the greatest discomfort with religion-infused politics, regardless of their own partisan loyalties. In effect, Americans (especially young Americans) who might otherwise attend religious services are saying, "Well, if religion is just about conservative politics, then I'm outta here."

These data point to a rich irony about the emergence of the religious right. Its founders intended to bolster religion's place in the public square. In a sense, they have succeeded. Yet at the same time, in a classic demonstration of the danger of unintended consequences, the movement has pushed a growing share of the population to opt out of religion altogether.

FOR GOD'S SAKE

AMERICAN RELIGIOUS groups have historically been distinctive in their adaptability and self-correcting tendencies. Rather than signaling the certain death of religion, our 2011 nationwide survey found hints that, feeling the heat from their too close association with partisan

God and Caesar in America

politics, religious leaders are beginning to pull back. Indeed, one of the most significant differences between our 2006 and our 2011 data was the drop-off in political activity within U.S. religious congregations. In 2006, 32 percent of Americans who belonged to a congregation reported hearing sermons with political content “once every month or two” or “several times a month.” By 2011, that figure had fallen to 19 percent. The trend held among those of all religious traditions, in all regions of the country, among conservatives and liberals, young and old, and urban and rural. Presumably, clergy across the country have sensed what we see in the data, namely, Americans’ growing aversion to blurring the lines between God and Caesar. So they have opted to stick to God.

The decrease in politicking from the pulpit will likely not have an immediate effect on the God gap. The chasm has become a fixture of the U.S. party system and is likely to persist in the short term, barring a sweeping political realignment. However, if clergy continue to retreat from politics, candidates of the religious right will have fewer opportunities to tap into church-based social networks for political mobilization. And if Republicans continue their exclusive alignment with organized religion, they will encounter ever more resistance from moderate voters, especially in the younger generation, who are in their politically formative years now and will be around for a long time.

Future historians may well see the last third of the twentieth century as an anomaly, a period in which religion and public life in the United States became too partisan for the good of either. Republican politicians facing the loss of the religiously moderate middle and pastors seeing a rapid graying of their dwindling flock are both paying a belated but serious price for the religious right’s dip into politics. Beyond that, all sides—progressive and conservative, religious and secular—should be concerned that placing a partisan label on religion has hurt the ability of religious leaders to summon moral arguments on behalf of causes that transcend left and right. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s prophetic call for racial justice was persuasive in part because his words and deeds drew on powerful religious symbolism that could not be reduced to base partisanship. Indeed, religion has historically inspired change across the U.S. political spectrum. American public discourse—and the country at large—will be impoverished if religion is reduced to a mere force for partisan mobilization. 🌐



LIECHTENSTEIN A GLOBAL VILLAGE

Spotlight on Liechtenstein's relationship with the United States

Americans need to expand on their idea that Liechtenstein is only a financial center, and they should take a closer look at its industrial strength and manufacturing base to get a better handle on what this principality has to offer.

Liechtenstein may be many things to many people; to some it is a financial center that seems as secretive as it is successful, and to others it may just seem like a very small country landlocked within Europe's Alpine mountain range.

However, the country is much more than either of those opinions: it is a country that can boast more registered companies than citizens—thanks to its highly industrialized free-enterprise economy. It is a country that can also claim the second-highest GDP per capita in the world and the world's second-lowest unemployment rate. Liechtenstein also has the luxury of being the world's least indebted nation.

The principality has not achieved these accolades by being a shelter for the rich and privileged; quite the contrary. Successive governments have fought hard to turn the economy into a slick, competitive, and globally focused machine. Some observers may say that being only 62 square miles in size—about the size of Washington, DC—and having a population of just 36,000 are reasons why Liechtenstein might be so successful. But on the other hand, it could be argued that such a small nation might have a hard time standing alone and achieving industrial success. It is only because of the economic policies in place and the strength of its industrial base that Liechtenstein has flourished.

Commercially speaking, this means that many Americans buy or use products that come from Liechtenstein, making for a viable commercial relationship between the United States and the principality. The two countries also work closely together on financial matters and law enforcement, which further demonstrates important close political cooperation.

Prime Minister Dr. Klaus Tschütscher is very clear on why the relationship works. "We signed a law enforcement treaty on joint operations to combat money laundering back in 2002. This was the first treaty we signed with the U.S. and it was then followed by the Tax Information Exchange Agreement in 2008," he explained, adding that, "the agreements define the quality of the relationship between us as we can be seen to be working together. These agreements do not only exist on paper, but also in practice."

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economic Affairs Dr. Martin Meyer added to the plaudits of the strength of the relationship when he spoke about the common interest the two nations have in combating illegal banking activities and money laundering. "The diplomatic relationship between Liechtenstein and the United States is, and has always been, a good one. We work very closely together in the United Nations on matters of human rights and in the common fight against terrorism. In this respect we share the same goals," he explained. As Liechtenstein's ambassador to the United States, Claudia Fritsche, pointed out, "In the past four years, Liechtenstein has signed twenty TIEAs and seven double-taxation agreements."

The deputy prime minister touched on another important point: "From an economic perspective, we are very interested in a close partnership with the U.S." If you are under the impression that Liechtenstein is solely a financial center, then this comment might surprise you. But when you take into consideration that the financial sector makes up only 33 percent of GDP, while almost 40 percent of GDP is generated by the industrial sector and, more importantly, industrial exports, then you begin to understand the importance of the U.S. market.

After Switzerland and Germany, the most important export market for Liechtenstein's products is the United States, and according to the general manager of Liechtenstein's Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Josef Beck, if you take into account only the principality's largest companies, then the United States becomes its foremost export destination.

"Our relationship with the U.S. is vitally important," Mr. Beck explained, adding that during the past decade, Liechtenstein's industrialists and members of the U.S. Congress have been encouraged to meet for roundtable discussions. "We started to invite congressional delegations to Liechtenstein and we also started a biennial 'Day in Washington' to present what we have to offer," Beck added.


The ambassador explained that the relationship will continue to develop. "We intend to move forward on several fronts to deepen the relationship. We have already established the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University. We also hope to increase academic exchange programs—not only to inform Americans about Liechtenstein, but also to increase our understanding of what America is, and thus build on what is already a positive relationship," Fritsche said.

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Industry and precision manufacturing are the most important elements of Liechtenstein's economy and the principal-ity can boast of companies operating at the cutting edge of technological innovation.

Each year Liechtenstein exports over \$500 million annually to the United States, which is no mean feat for the small principality. Liechtenstein's companies also employ more than 3,500 workers in the United States. These companies that do business with the world's largest economy are both well-known household names and some lesser known high-tech manufacturers that U.S. industry relies on.

The principality also understood early on the value of reinvestment and research and development (R&D) for industrial growth. Staggeringly, almost 32 percent of Liechtenstein's revenues are reinvested in R&D, making the industrial innovation and development sector a strong driving force of the economy.

This policy of reinvestment and innovation has ensured that high-tech exports have been the secret success of the economy in recent years. Many of Liechtenstein's companies operate within internationally sought-after niche markets, and many of these companies are among the world's elite.

This is a long way from the parlous state of the principality seventy years ago, which ensured that the principality had to turn entrepreneurship into an art form and then guarantee its own prosperity by carving out a production line of niche products.

One example is Liechtenstein's premier manufacturer of innovative electrical and electronic interconnection products and systems. Founded as a two-man operation in 1975, Neutrik has emerged as a world leader in the design, manufacture, and marketing of audio, coaxial, power, and circular connectors. The company now leads the way in the professional audio market.

Committed to excellence and innovation, the Neutrik Group now has subsidiaries in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and China and has exclusive distributors in more than eighty countries worldwide. CEO Werner Bachman was the company's second employee when he started, and he confirmed the reason behind the company's success: "From the very day I started work here, innovation and quality were our priorities," he said.

Given the very nature of their products, the company had to look abroad to create a market large enough to make their business worthwhile. Curiously, Neutrik's first customer was in Georgetown, Connecticut. "However, our products have reached into the very heart of the United States, as we now supply the U.S. Capitol," added Bachman.

Their innovation and quality has led to the brand becoming confused with the product. Across the world, customers do not ask for this-or-that connector; they ask for this-or-that Neutrik. That is not a surprise when you consider that 50 percent of the world's professional audio systems are connected with Neutrik's products.

Another company that mirrors the principality's success is ThyssenKrupp Presta, the principality's second-largest employer. Belonging to Germany's ThyssenKrupp Automotive, one of the world's largest automobile suppliers, its research center and headquarters is in Eschen, Liechtenstein. Presta is the world market leader in assembled camshafts, and it develops innovative steering systems for almost all of the world's most significant automobile manufacturers.

As recently as 1985, the company had no steering business, yet it now has 25 percent market share of the worldwide steering column business. The company's CEO, Guido Durrer, pointed out just how far Presta has come in the past two decades: "We supply most of the steering columns for Ford and a large proportion of the columns used by Chrysler." He added that this shows the importance of the Liechtenstein-U.S. relationship, saying, "We are a very industrialized country, yet for some reason we are thought of only as a banking center. But it is very harmful to us that the U.S. may have the wrong image."

When Presta first started making steering columns, having the wrong image cost them one of their first orders. In those early days, Volkswagen refused to give Presta an

order for steering columns, perhaps under the misapprehension that the company was a post office box address and nothing more.

Presta stuck at what it knew best and emerged as one of the world's leading innovators. "Our competitive advantage is the technology we use. We have cold forging technology, assembly technology, and innovative people. Our people are the main drive behind our innovative capabilities," Durrer explained.

To be closer to their main clients, Presta has production plants worldwide. "A steering column is a big part of the automobile assembly process, so we like to be close to our customers, and for that reason we have plants in the U.S., Mexico, and Brazil, for example," Durrer concluded.

As business begins to pick up for most of the world's automobile makers, Presta is looking to increase its workforce. It may be the world's fastest assembly maker of steering columns and its high levels of automation ensure good quality and high volume, but it needs to increase its human resource base. This just goes to prove that Liechtenstein's policies of innovation and industrial development have been the right ones.

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The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations

Conflict Is a Choice, Not a Necessity

Henry A. Kissinger

ON JANUARY 19, 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a joint statement at the end of Hu's visit to Washington. It proclaimed their shared commitment to a "positive, cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship." Each party reassured the other regarding his principal concern, announcing, "The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region."

Since then, the two governments have set about implementing the stated objectives. Top American and Chinese officials have exchanged visits and institutionalized their exchanges on major strategic and economic issues. Military-to-military contacts have been restarted, opening an important channel of communication. And at the unofficial level, so-called track-two groups have explored possible evolutions of the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

Yet as cooperation has increased, so has controversy. Significant groups in both countries claim that a contest for supremacy between China and the United States is inevitable and perhaps already under

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way. In this perspective, appeals for U.S.-Chinese cooperation appear outmoded and even naive.

The mutual recriminations emerge from distinct yet parallel analyses in each country. Some American strategic thinkers argue that Chinese policy pursues two long-term objectives: displacing the United States as the preeminent power in the western Pacific and consolidating Asia into an exclusionary bloc deferring to Chinese economic and foreign policy interests. In this conception, even though China's absolute military capacities are not formally equal to those of the United States, Beijing possesses the ability to pose unacceptable risks in a conflict with Washington and is developing increasingly sophisticated means to negate traditional U.S. advantages. Its invulnerable second-strike nuclear capability will eventually be paired with an expanding range of antiship ballistic missiles and asymmetric capabilities in new domains such as cyberspace and space. China could secure a dominant naval position through a series of island chains on its periphery, some fear, and once such a screen exists, China's neighbors, dependent as they are on Chinese trade and uncertain of the United States' ability to react, might adjust their policies according to Chinese preferences. Eventually, this could lead to the creation of a Sinocentric Asian bloc dominating the western Pacific. The most recent U.S. defense strategy report reflects, at least implicitly, some of these apprehensions.

No Chinese government officials have proclaimed such a strategy as China's actual policy. Indeed, they stress the opposite. However, enough material exists in China's quasi-official press and research institutes to lend some support to the theory that relations are heading for confrontation rather than cooperation.

U.S. strategic concerns are magnified by ideological predispositions to battle with the entire nondemocratic world. Authoritarian regimes, some argue, are inherently brittle, impelled to rally domestic support by nationalist and expansionist rhetoric and practice. In these theories—versions of which are embraced in segments of both the American left and the American right—tension and conflict with China grow out of China's domestic structure. Universal peace will come, it is asserted, from the global triumph of democracy rather than from appeals for cooperation. The political scientist Aaron Friedberg writes,

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for example, that “a liberal democratic China will have little cause to fear its democratic counterparts, still less to use force against them.” Therefore, “stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy [should be] to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China’s one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place.”

On the Chinese side, the confrontational interpretations follow an inverse logic. They see the United States as a wounded super-power determined to thwart the rise of any challenger, of which China is the most credible. No matter how intensely China pursues cooperation, some Chinese argue, Washington’s fixed objective will be to hem in a growing China by military deployment and treaty commitments, thus preventing it from playing its historic role as the Middle Kingdom. In this perspective, any sustained cooperation with the United States is self-defeating, since it will only serve the overriding U.S. objective of neutralizing China. Systematic hostility is occasionally considered to inhere even in American cultural and technological influences, which are sometimes cast as a form of deliberate pressure designed to corrode China’s domestic consensus and traditional values. The most assertive voices argue that China has been unduly passive in the face of hostile trends and that (for example, in the case of territorial issues in the South China Sea) China should confront those of its neighbors with which it has disputed claims and then, in the words of the strategic analyst Long Tao, “reason, think ahead and strike first before things gradually run out of hand . . . launch[ing] some tiny-scale battles that could deter provocateurs from going further.”

THE PAST NEED NOT BE PROLOGUE

Is THERE, then, a point in the quest for a cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship and in policies designed to achieve it? To be sure, the rise of powers has historically often led to conflict with established countries. But conditions have changed. It is doubtful that the leaders who went so blithely into a world war in 1914 would have done so had they known what the world would be like at its end. Contemporary leaders can have no such illusions. A major war

between developed nuclear countries must bring casualties and upheavals impossible to relate to calculable objectives. Preemption is all but excluded, especially for a pluralistic democracy such as the United States.

If challenged, the United States will do what it must to preserve its security. But it should not adopt confrontation as a strategy of choice. In China, the United States would encounter an adversary skilled over the centuries in using prolonged conflict as a strategy and whose doctrine emphasizes the psychological exhaustion of the opponent. In an actual conflict, both sides possess the capabilities and the ingenuity to inflict catastrophic damage on each other. By the time any such hypothetical conflagration drew to a close, all participants would be left exhausted and debilitated. They would then be obliged to face anew the very task that confronts them today: the construction of an international order in which both countries are significant components.

The blueprints for containment drawn from Cold War strategies used by both sides against an expansionist Soviet Union do not apply to current conditions. The economy of the Soviet Union was weak (except for military production) and did not affect the global economy. Once China broke off ties and ejected Soviet advisers, few countries except those forcibly absorbed into the Soviet orbit had a major stake in their economic relationship with Moscow. Contemporary China, by contrast, is a dynamic factor in the world economy. It is a principal trading partner of all its neighbors and most of the Western industrial powers, including the United States. A prolonged confrontation between China and the United States would alter the world economy with unsettling consequences for all.

Nor would China find that the strategy it pursued in its own conflict with the Soviet Union fits a confrontation with the United States. Only a few countries—and no Asian ones—would treat an American presence in Asia as “fingers” to be “chopped off” (in Deng Xiaoping’s graphic phrase about Soviet forward positions).

It would be unusual if the world’s second-largest economy did not translate its economic power into increased military capacity.

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Even those Asian states that are not members of alliances with the United States seek the reassurance of an American political presence in the region and of American forces in nearby seas as the guarantor of the world to which they have become accustomed. Their approach was expressed by a senior Indonesian official to an American counterpart: “Don’t leave us, but don’t make us choose.”

China’s recent military buildup is not in itself an exceptional phenomenon: the more unusual outcome would be if the world’s second-largest economy and largest importer of natural resources did not translate its economic power into some increased military capacity. The issue is whether that buildup is open ended and to what purposes it is put. If the United States treats every advance in Chinese military capabilities as a hostile act, it will quickly find itself enmeshed in an endless series of disputes on behalf of esoteric aims. But China must be aware, from its own history, of the tenuous dividing line between defensive and offensive capabilities and of the consequences of an unrestrained arms race.

China’s leaders will have their own powerful reasons for rejecting domestic appeals for an adversarial approach—as indeed they have publicly proclaimed. China’s imperial expansion has historically been achieved by osmosis rather than conquest, or by the conversion to Chinese culture of conquerors who then added their own territories to the Chinese domain. Dominating Asia militarily would be a formidable undertaking. The Soviet Union, during the Cold War, bordered on a string of weak countries drained by war and occupation and dependent on American troop commitments for their defense. China today faces Russia in the north; Japan and South Korea, with American military alliances, to the east; Vietnam and India to the south; and Indonesia and Malaysia not far away. This is not a constellation conducive to conquest. It is more likely to raise fears of encirclement. Each of these countries has a long military tradition and would pose a formidable obstacle if its territory or its ability to conduct an independent policy were threatened. A militant Chinese foreign policy would enhance cooperation among all or at least some of these nations, evoking China’s historic nightmare, as happened in the period 2009–10.

“We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon.”

– President Obama,
Prague, April 2009

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
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DEALING WITH THE NEW CHINA

ANOTHER REASON for Chinese restraint in at least the medium term is the domestic adaptation the country faces. The gap in Chinese society between the largely developed coastal regions and the undeveloped western regions has made Hu's objective of a "harmonious society" both compelling and elusive. Cultural changes compound the challenge. The next decades will witness, for the first time, the full impact of one-child families on adult Chinese society. This is bound to modify cultural patterns in a society in which large families have traditionally taken care of the aged and the handicapped. When four grandparents compete for the attention of one child and invest him with the aspirations heretofore spread across many offspring, a new pattern of insistent achievement and vast, perhaps unfulfillable, expectations may arise.

All these developments will further complicate the challenges of China's governmental transition starting in 2012, in which the presidency; the vice-presidency; the considerable majority of the positions in China's Politburo, State Council, and Central Military Commission; and thousands of other key national and provincial posts will be staffed with new appointees. The new leadership group will consist, for the most part, of members of the first Chinese generation in a century and a half to have lived all their lives in a country at peace. Its primary challenge will be finding a way to deal with a society revolutionized by changing economic conditions, unprecedented and rapidly expanding technologies of communication, a tenuous global economy, and the migration of hundreds of millions of people from China's countryside to its cities. The model of government that emerges will likely be a synthesis of modern ideas and traditional Chinese political and cultural concepts, and the quest for that synthesis will provide the ongoing drama of China's evolution.

These social and political transformations are bound to be followed with interest and hope in the United States. Direct American intervention would be neither wise nor productive. The United States will, as it should, continue to make its views known on human rights issues and individual cases. And its day-to-day conduct will express its national preference for democratic principles. But a systematic

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project to transform China's institutions by diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions is likely to backfire and isolate the very liberals it is intended to assist. In China, it would be interpreted by a considerable majority through the lens of nationalism, recalling earlier eras of foreign intervention.

What this situation calls for is not an abandonment of American values but a distinction between the realizable and the absolute. The U.S.-Chinese relationship should not be considered as a zero-sum game, nor can the emergence of a prosperous and powerful China be assumed in itself to be an American strategic defeat.

A cooperative approach challenges preconceptions on both sides. The United States has few precedents in its national experience of relating to a country of comparable size, self-confidence, economic achievement, and international scope and yet with such a different culture and political system. Nor does history supply China with precedents for how to relate to a fellow great power with a permanent presence in Asia, a vision of universal ideals not geared toward Chinese conceptions, and alliances with several of China's neighbors. Prior to the United States, all countries establishing such a position did so as a prelude to an attempt to dominate China.

The simplest approach to strategy is to insist on overwhelming potential adversaries with superior resources and materiel. But in the contemporary world, this is only rarely feasible. China and the United States will inevitably continue as enduring realities for each other. Neither can entrust its security to the other—no great power does, for long—and each will continue to pursue its own interests, sometimes at the relative expense of the other. But both have the responsibility to take into account the other's nightmares, and both would do well to recognize that their rhetoric, as much as their actual policies, can feed into the other's suspicions.

China's greatest strategic fear is that an outside power or powers will establish military deployments around China's periphery capable of encroaching on China's territory or meddling in its domestic institutions. When China deemed that it faced such a threat in the past, it went to war rather than risk the outcome of what it saw as gathering trends—in Korea in 1950, against India in 1962, along the northern border with the Soviet Union in 1969, and against Vietnam in 1979.

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The United States' fear, sometimes only indirectly expressed, is of being pushed out of Asia by an exclusionary bloc. The United States fought a world war against Germany and Japan to prevent such an outcome and exercised some of its most forceful Cold War diplomacy under administrations of both political parties to this end against the Soviet Union. In both enterprises, it is worth noting, substantial joint U.S.-Chinese efforts were directed against the perceived threat of hegemony.

Other Asian countries will insist on their prerogatives to develop their capacities for their own national reasons, not as part of a contest between outside powers. They will not willingly consign themselves to a revived tributary order. Nor do they regard themselves as elements in an American containment policy or an American project to alter China's domestic institutions. They aspire to good relations with both China and the United States and will resist any pressure to choose between the two.

Can the fear of hegemony and the nightmare of military encirclement be reconciled? Is it possible to find a space in which both sides can achieve their ultimate objectives without militarizing their strategies? For great nations with global capabilities and divergent, even partly conflicting aspirations, what is the margin between conflict and abdication?

That China will have a major influence in the regions surrounding it is inherent in its geography, values, and history. The limits of that influence, however, will be shaped by circumstance and policy decisions. These will determine whether an inevitable quest for influence turns into a drive to negate or exclude other independent sources of power.

For nearly two generations, American strategy relied on local regional defense by American ground forces—largely to avoid the catastrophic consequences of a general nuclear war. In recent decades, congressional and public opinion have impelled an end to such commitments in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Now, fiscal considerations further limit the range of such an approach. American strategy has been redirected from defending territory to threatening unacceptable punishment against potential aggressors. This requires forces capable of rapid intervention and global reach, but not bases ringing China's frontiers. What Washington must not do is combine a defense policy based on budgetary restraints with a diplomacy based on unlimited ideological aims.

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Just as Chinese influence in surrounding countries may spur fears of dominance, so efforts to pursue traditional American national interests can be perceived as a form of military encirclement. Both sides must understand the nuances by which apparently traditional and apparently reasonable courses can evoke the deepest worries of the other. They should seek together to define the sphere in which their peaceful competition is circumscribed. If that is managed wisely, both military confrontation and domination can be avoided; if not, escalating tension is inevitable. It is the task of diplomacy to discover this space, to expand it if possible, and to prevent the relationship from being overwhelmed by tactical and domestic imperatives.


COMMUNITY OR CONFLICT

THE CURRENT world order was built largely without Chinese participation, and hence China sometimes feels less bound than others by its rules. Where the order does not suit Chinese preferences, Beijing has set up alternative arrangements, such as in the separate currency channels being established with Brazil and Japan and other countries. If the pattern becomes routine and spreads into many spheres of activity, competing world orders could evolve. Absent common goals coupled with agreed rules of restraint, institutionalized rivalry is likely to escalate beyond the calculations and intentions of its advocates. In an era in which unprecedented offensive capabilities and intrusive technologies multiply, the penalties of such a course could be drastic and perhaps irrevocable.

Crisis management will not be enough to sustain a relationship so global and beset by so many differing pressures within and between both countries, which is why I have argued for the concept of a Pacific Community and expressed the hope that China and the United States can generate a sense of common purpose on at least some issues of general concern. But the goal of such a community cannot be reached if either side conceives of the enterprise as primarily a more effective way to defeat or undermine the other. Neither China nor the United States can be systematically challenged without its noticing, and if such a challenge is noted, it will be resisted. Both need to commit themselves to genuine cooperation and find a way to communicate and relate their visions to each other and to the world.

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U.S.-Saudi Relationship Increasingly Strained, Says CFR Report



“From now on, trade-offs will characterize the [U.S.-Saudi] relationship more than a common worldview.”

The U.S.-Saudi relationship has become strained by increasing mistrust and misunderstanding—most recently over Egypt and Bahrain—and is no longer moored to the two anchors that stabilized it in the past: a common Cold War perspective and U.S. operation of the Saudi oil industry, argues F. Gregory Gause III. In this Council Special Report from CFR’s Center for Preventive Action (www.cfr.org/cpa), Gause writes that the two countries can no longer expect to act in close concert, and the United States should recast the relationship as transactional, one based on cooperation when interests dictate.

Gause recommends that the United States spend its political capital where it really matters: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, maintaining regional security, and dismantling terrorist networks. “If Washington keeps its own priorities in the relationship clear and speaks with one voice about them to the Saudis, it should be able to realize those common interests with Saudi Arabia.”



Read this report at
www.cfr.org/saudi_arabia_csr.

Some tentative steps in that direction have already been undertaken. For example, the United States has joined several other countries in beginning negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a free-trade pact linking the Americas with Asia. Such an arrangement could be a step toward a Pacific Community because it would lower trade barriers among the world's most productive, dynamic, and resource-rich economies and link the two sides of the ocean in shared projects.

Obama has invited China to join the TPP. However, the terms of accession as presented by American briefers and commentators have sometimes seemed to require fundamental changes in China's domestic structure. To the extent that is the case, the TPP could be regarded in Beijing as part of a strategy to isolate China. For its part, China has put forward comparable alternative arrangements. It has negotiated a trade pact with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and has broached a Northeast Asian trade pact with Japan and South Korea.

Important domestic political considerations are involved for all parties. But if China and the United States come to regard each other's trade-pact efforts as elements in a strategy of isolation, the Asia-Pacific region could devolve into competing adversarial power blocs. Ironically, this would be a particular challenge if China meets frequent American calls to shift from an export-led to a consumption-driven economy, as its most recent five-year plan contemplates. Such a development could reduce China's stake in the United States as an export market even as it encourages other Asian countries to further orient their economies toward China.

The key decision facing both Beijing and Washington is whether to move toward a genuine effort at cooperation or fall into a new version of historic patterns of international rivalry. Both countries have adopted the rhetoric of community. They have even established a high-level forum for it, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which meets twice a year. It has been productive on immediate issues, but it is still in the foothills of its ultimate assignment to produce a

Lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its need to “grow up” and behave “responsibly” can be needlessly grating.

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truly global economic and political order. And if a global order does not emerge in the economic field, barriers to progress on more emotional and less positive-sum issues, such as territory and security, may grow insurmountable.

THE RISKS OF RHETORIC

AS THEY pursue this process, both sides need to recognize the impact of rhetoric on perceptions and calculations. American leaders occasionally launch broadsides against China, including specific proposals for adversarial policies, as domestic political necessities. This occurs even—perhaps especially—when a moderate policy is the ultimate intention. The issue is not specific complaints, which should be dealt with on the merits of the issue, but attacks on the basic motivations of Chinese policy, such as declaring China a strategic adversary. The target of these attacks is bound to ask whether domestic imperatives requiring affirmations of hostility will sooner or later require hostile actions. By the same token, threatening Chinese statements, including those in the semiofficial press, are likely to be interpreted in terms of the actions they imply, whatever the domestic pressures or the intent that generated them.

The American debate, on both sides of the political divide, often describes China as a “rising power” that will need to “mature” and learn how to exercise responsibility on the world stage. China, however, sees itself not as a rising power but as a returning one, predominant in its region for two millennia and temporarily displaced by colonial exploiters taking advantage of Chinese domestic strife and decay. It views the prospect of a strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political, and military affairs not as an unnatural challenge to world order but rather as a return to normality. Americans need not agree with every aspect of the Chinese analysis to understand that lecturing a country with a history of millennia about its need to “grow up” and behave “responsibly” can be needlessly grating.

On the Chinese side, proclamations at the governmental and the informal level that China intends to “revive the Chinese nation” to its traditional eminence carry different implications inside China and abroad. China is rightly proud of its recent strides in restoring

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its sense of national purpose following what it sees as a century of humiliation. Yet few other countries in Asia are nostalgic for an era when they were subject to Chinese suzerainty. As recent veterans of anticolonial struggles, most Asian countries are extremely sensitive to maintaining their independence and freedom of action vis-à-vis any outside power, whether Western or Asian. They seek to be involved in as many overlapping spheres of economic and political activity as possible; they invite an American role in the region but seek equilibrium, not a crusade or confrontation.

The rise of China is less the result of its increased military strength than of the United States' own declining competitive position, driven by factors such as obsolescent infrastructure, inadequate attention to research and development, and a seemingly dysfunctional governmental process. The United States should address these issues with ingenuity and determination instead of blaming a putative adversary. It must take care not to repeat in its China policy the pattern of conflicts entered with vast public support and broad goals but ended when the American political process insisted on a strategy of extrication that amounted to an abandonment, if not a complete reversal, of the country's proclaimed objectives.

China can find reassurance in its own record of endurance and in the fact that no U.S. administration has ever sought to alter the reality of China as one of the world's major states, economies, and civilizations. Americans would do well to remember that even when China's GDP is equal to that of the United States, it will need to be distributed over a population that is four times as large, aging, and engaged in complex domestic transformations occasioned by China's growth and urbanization. The practical consequence is that a great deal of China's energy will still be devoted to domestic needs.

Both sides should be open to conceiving of each other's activities as a normal part of international life and not in themselves as a cause for alarm. The inevitable tendency to impinge on each other should not be equated with a conscious drive to contain or dominate, so long as both can maintain the distinction and calibrate their actions accordingly. China and the United States will not necessarily transcend the ordinary operation of great-power rivalry. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to make an effort to do so. 🌐

The Arab Spring at One

A Year of Living Dangerously

Fouad Ajami

THROUGHOUT 2011, a rhythmic chant echoed across the Arab lands: “The people want to topple the regime.” It skipped borders with ease, carried in newspapers and magazines, on Twitter and Facebook, on the airwaves of al Jazeera and al Arabiya. Arab nationalism had been written off, but here, in full bloom, was what certainly looked like a pan-Arab awakening. Young people in search of political freedom and economic opportunity, weary of waking up to the same tedium day after day, rose up against their sclerotic masters.

It came as a surprise. For almost two generations, waves of democracy had swept over other regions, from southern and eastern Europe to Latin America, from East Asia to Africa. But not the Middle East. There, tyrants had closed up the political world, become owners of their countries in all but name. It was a bleak landscape: terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe that hurled itself in frustration at an order bereft of any legitimacy. Arabs had started to feel they were cursed, doomed to despotism. The region’s exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral embarrassment.

Outside powers had winked at this reality, silently thinking this was the best the Arabs could do. In a sudden burst of Wilsonianism in Iraq and after, the United States had put its power behind liberty. Saddam Hussein was flushed out of a spider hole, the Syrian brigades of terror and extortion were pushed out of Lebanon, and the despotism

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The Arab Spring at One

of Hosni Mubarak, long a pillar of Pax Americana, seemed to lose some of its mastery. But post-Saddam Iraq held out mixed messages: there was democracy, but also blood in the streets and sectarianism. The autocracies hunkered down and did their best to thwart the new Iraqi project. Iraq was set ablaze, and the Arab autocrats could point to it as a cautionary tale of the folly of unseating even the worst of despots. Moreover, Iraq carried a double burden of humiliation for Sunni Arabs: the bearer of liberty there was the United States, and the war had empowered the Shiite stepchildren of the Arab world. The result was a standoff: the Arabs could not snuff out or ignore the flicker of freedom, but nor did the Iraqi example prove the subversive beacon of hope its proponents had expected.

It was said by Arabs themselves that George W. Bush had unleashed a tsunami on the region. True, but the Arabs were good at waiting out storms, and before long, the Americans themselves lost heart and abandoned the quest. An election in 2006 in the Palestinian territories went the way of Hamas, and a new disillusionment with democracy's verdict overtook the Bush administration. The "surge" in Iraq rescued the American war there just in time, but the more ambitious vision of reforming the Arab world was given up. The autocracies had survived the brief moment of American assertiveness. And soon, a new standard-bearer of American power, Barack Obama, came with a reassuring message: the United States was done with change; it would make its peace with the status quo, renewing its partnership with friendly autocrats even as it engaged the hostile regimes in Damascus and Tehran. The United States was to remain on the Kabul hook for a while longer, but the greater Middle East would be left to its Furies.

When a revolt erupted in Iran against the theocrats in the first summer of his presidency, Obama was caught flatfooted by the turmoil. Determined to conciliate the rulers, he could not find the language to speak to the rebels. Meanwhile, the Syrian regime, which had given up its dominion in Lebanon under duress, was now keen to retrieve it. A stealth campaign of terror and assassinations, the power of Hezbollah on the ground, and the subsidies of Iran all but snuffed out the "Cedar Revolution" that had been the pride of Bush's diplomacy.

Observers looking at the balance of forces in the region in late 2010 would have been smart to bet on a perpetuation of autocracy. Behold-

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ing Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, they would have been forgiven the conclusion that a similar fate awaited Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and the large Egyptian state that had been the trendsetter in Arab political and cultural life. Yet beneath the surface stability, there was political misery and sterility. Arabs did not need a “human development report” to tell them of their desolation. Consent had drained out of public life; the only glue between ruler and ruled was suspicion and fear. There was no public project to bequeath to a generation coming into its own—and this the largest and youngest population yet.

And then it happened. In December, a despairing Tunisian fruit vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi took one way out, setting himself on fire to protest the injustices of the status quo. Soon, millions of his unnamed fellows took another, pouring into the streets. Suddenly, the despots, seemingly secure in their dominion, deities in all but name, were on the run. For its part, the United States scurried to catch up with the upheaval. “In too many places, in too many ways, the region’s foundations are sinking into the sand,” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed in Qatar in mid-January 2011, as the storm was breaking out. The Arab landscape lent her remarks ample confirmation; what she omitted was that generations of American diplomacy would be buried, too.

THE FIRE THIS TIME

THE REVOLT was a settlement of accounts between the powers that be and populations determined to be done with despots. It erupted in a small country on the margins of the Arab political experience, more educated and prosperous and linked to Europe than the norm. As the rebellion made its way eastward, it skipped Libya and arrived in Cairo, “the mother of the world.” There, it found a stage worthy of its ambitions.

Often written off as the quintessential land of political submission, Egypt has actually known ferocious rebellions. It had been Mubarak’s good fortune that the land tolerated him for three decades. The designated successor to Anwar al-Sadat, Mubarak had been a cautious man, but his reign had sprouted dynastic ambitions. For 18 magical days in January and February, Egyptians of all walks of life came together in Tahrir Square demanding to be rid of him. The senior commanders



REUTERS / AMR DALSH

Free at last: protesting in Tahrir Square, Cairo, December 21, 2011

of the armed forces cast him aside, and he joined his fellow despot, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had fallen a month earlier.

From Cairo, the awakening became a pan-Arab affair, catching fire in Yemen and Bahrain. As a monarchy, the latter was a rare exception, since in this season it was chiefly the republics of strongmen that were seized with unrest. But where most monarchies had a fit between ruler and ruled, Bahrain was riven by a fault line between its Sunni rulers and its Shiite majority. So it was vulnerable, and it was in the nature of things that an eruption there would turn into a sectarian feud. Yemen, meanwhile, was the poorest of the Arab states, with secessionist movements raging in its north and south and a polarizing leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had no skills save the art of political survival. The feuds of Yemen were obscure, the quarrels of tribes and warlords. The wider Arab tumult gave Yemenis eager to be rid of their ruler the heart to challenge him.

Then, the revolt doubled back to Libya. This was the kingdom of silence, the realm of the deranged, self-proclaimed "dean of Arab rulers," Muammar al-Qaddafi. For four tormenting decades, Libyans had been at the mercy of this prison warden, part tyrant, part buffoon. Qaddafi had eviscerated his country, the richest in Africa yet with an

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abysmally impoverished population. In the interwar years, Libya had known savage colonial rule under the Italians. It gained a brief respite under an ascetic ruler, King Idris, but in the late 1960s was gripped by a revolutionary fever. *Iblis wa la Idris*, went the maxim of the time, “Better the devil than Idris.” And the country got what it wanted. Oil sustained the madness; European leaders and American intellectuals alike came courting. Now, in 2011, Benghazi, at some remove from the capital, rose up, and history gave the Libyans a chance.

The Egyptian rulers had said that their country was not Tunisia. Qaddafi said that his republic was not Tunisia or Egypt. Eventually, Assad was saying that Syria was not Tunisia, Egypt, or Libya. Assad

Suddenly, the despots,
seemingly secure in
their dominion, deities
in all but name, were
on the run.

was young, not old; his regime had more legitimacy because it had confronted Israel rather than collaborated with it. He spoke too soon: in mid-March, it was Syria’s turn.

Syria was where Islam had made its home after it outgrew the Arabian Peninsula and before it slipped out of the hands of the Arabs into those of the Persians and the Turks. Yet decades earlier, Bashar al-Assad’s

father, Hafez—a man of supreme cunning and political skill—had ridden the military and the Baath Party to absolute power, creating a regime in which power rested with the country’s Alawite minority. The marriage of despotism and sectarianism begat the most fearsome state in the Arab east.

When the rebellion broke out there in 2011, it had a distinct geography, as the French political scientist Fabrice Balanche has shown, based in the territories and urban quarters of the country’s Sunni Arabs. It erupted in Dara’a, a remote provincial town in the south, then spread to Hamah, Homs, Jisr al-Shughour, Rastan, Idlib, and Dayr az Zawr—skipping over Kurdish and Druze areas and the mountain villages and coastal towns that make up the Alawite strongholds. The violence in the Syrian uprising has been most pronounced in Homs, the country’s third-largest city, because of its explosive demographics—two-thirds Sunni, one-quarter Alawite, one-tenth Christian.

Sectarianism was not all, of course. Syria has had one of the highest birthrates in the region, with its population having almost quadrupled



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


**Report Warns States on China's Periphery
Are Potential Sources of Regional Instability**

China's growing global engagement and presence has increased the number of conceivable places and issues over which it could find itself at odds with the United States, but potential developments in the territories immediately adjacent to China remain the most likely—and the most worrisome—sources of friction. In this Center for Preventive Action study, *Managing Instability on China's Periphery*, CFR scholars provide policy options for preventing a major crisis and mitigating the consequences in North Korea, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Central Asia.



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**Report Calls for Strengthening Global
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The Arab Spring at One

since Hafez seized power in 1970. The arteries of the regime had hardened, with a military-merchant complex dominating political and economic life. There was not much patronage left for the state to dispose of, since under the banner of privatization in recent years, the state had pulled off a disappearing act. The revolt fused a sense of economic disinheritance and the wrath of a Sunni majority determined to rid itself of the rule of a godless lot.

WHERE THINGS STAND

THERE HAS, of course, been no uniform script for the Arab regimes in play. Tunisia, an old state with a defined national identity, settled its affairs with relative ease. It elected a constituent assembly in which al Nahda, an Islamist party, secured a plurality. Al Nahda's leader, Rachid al-Ghannouchi, was a shrewd man; years in exile had taught him caution, and his party formed a coalition government with two secular partners.

In Libya, foreign intervention helped the rebels topple the regime. Qaddafi was pulled out of a drainage pipe and beaten and murdered, and so was one of his sons. These were the hatreds and the wrath that the ruler himself had planted; he reaped what he had sown. But wealth, a sparse population, and foreign attention should see Libya through. No history in the making there could be as deadly to Libyans, and others, as the Qaddafi years.

The shadows of Iran and Saudi Arabia hover over Bahrain. There is no mass terror, but the political order is not pretty. There is sectarian discrimination and the oddness of a ruling dynasty, the House of Khalifa, that conquered the area in the late years of the eighteenth century but has still not made peace with the population. Outsiders man the security forces, and true stability seems a long way off.

As for Yemen, it is the quintessential failed state. The footprint of the government is light, the rulers offer no redemption, but there is no draconian terror. The country is running out of water; jihad-ists on the run from the Hindu Kush have found a home: it is Afghanistan with a coastline. The men and women who went out into the streets of Sanaa in 2011 sought the rehabilitation of their country, a more dignified politics than they have been getting from

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the cynical acrobat at the helm for more than three decades. Whether they will get it is unclear.

Syria remains in chaos. Hamas left Damascus in December because it feared being left on the wrong side of the mounting Arab consensus against the Syrian regime. “No Iran, no Hezbollah; we want rulers who fear Allah,” has been one of the more meaningful chants of the protesters. Alawite rule has been an anomaly, and the regime, through its brutal response to the uprising, with security forces desecrating mosques, firing at worshipers, and ordering hapless captives to proclaim, “There is no God but Bashar,” has written its own regional banishment. Hafez committed cruelties of his own, but he always managed to remain within the Arab fold. Bashar is different—reckless—and has prompted even the Arab League, which has a history of overlooking the follies of its members, to suspend Damascus’ membership.

The fight still rages, Aleppo and Damascus have not risen, and the embattled ruler appears convinced that he can resist the laws of gravity. Unlike in Libya, no foreign rescue mission is on the horizon. But with all the uncertainties, this much can be said: the fearsome security state that Hafez, the Baath Party, and the Alawite soldiers and intelligence barons built is gone for good. When consent and popular enthusiasm fell away, the state rested on fear, and fear was defeated. In Syria, the bonds between the holders of power and the population have been irreparably broken.

WHAT FOLLOWS PHARAOH

EGYPT, MEANWHILE, may have lost the luster of old, but this Arab time shall be judged by what eventually happens there. In the scenarios of catastrophe, the revolution will spawn an Islamic republic: the Copts will flee, tourism revenues be lost for good, and Egyptians will yearn for the iron grip of a pharaoh. The strong performance of the Muslim Brotherhood and of an even more extremist Salafi party in recent parliamentary elections, together with the splintering of the secular, liberal vote, appears to justify concern about the country’s direction. But Egyptians have proud memories of liberal periods in their history. Six decades of military

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rule robbed them of the experience of open politics, and they are unlikely to give it up now without a struggle.

The elections were transparent and clarifying. Liberal and secular forces were not ready for the contest, whereas the Brotherhood had been waiting for such a historic moment for decades and seized its opportunity. No sooner had the Salafists come out of the catacombs than they began to unnerve the population, and so they pulled back somewhat from their extreme positions. The events in Tahrir Square transfixed the world, but as the young Egyptian intellectual Samuel Tadros has put it, “Egypt is not Cairo and Cairo is not Tahrir Square.” When the dust settles, three forces will contest Egypt’s future—the army, the Brotherhood, and a broad liberal and secular coalition of those who want a civil polity, the separation of religion and politics, and the saving graces of a normal political life.

The Brotherhood brings to the struggle its time-honored mix of political cunning and an essential commitment to imposing a political order shaped by Islam. Its founder, Hasan al-Banna, was struck down by an assassin in 1949 but still stalks the politics of the Muslim world. A ceaseless plotter, he talked of God’s rule, but in the shadows, he struck deals with the palace against the dominant political party of his day, the Wafd. He played the political game as he put together a formidable paramilitary force, seeking to penetrate the officer corps—something his inheritors have pined for ever since. He would doubtless look with admiration on the tactical skills of his successors as they maneuver between the liberals and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, partaking of the tumult of Tahrir Square but stepping back from the exuberance to underline their commitment to sobriety and public order.

The plain truth of it is that Egypt lacks the economic wherewithal to build a successful modern Islamic order, whatever that might mean. The Islamic Republic of Iran rests on oil, and even the moderate ascendancy of the Justice and Development Party, or AKP, in Turkey is secured by prosperity stemming from the “devout bourgeoisie” in the Anatolian hill towns. Egypt lies at the crossroads of the world, living off tourism, the Suez Canal, infusions of foreign aid, and remittances from Egyptians abroad. Virtue must bow to necessity: in the last year,

Before the revolt, the Arab world had grown morose and menacing.

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the country's foreign reserves dwindled from \$36 billion to \$20 billion. Inflation hammers at the door, the price of imported wheat is high, and the bills have to be paid. Four finance ministers have come and gone since Mubarak's fall. A desire for stability now balances the heady satisfaction that a despot was brought down.

There are monumental problems staring Egypt's leaders in the face, and the reluctance of both the Brotherhood and the armed forces to assume power is telling. Good sense and pragmatism might yet prevail. A plausible division of spoils and responsibility might give the Brotherhood the domains of governance dearest to it—education, social welfare, and the judiciary—with the military getting defense, intelligence, the peace with Israel, the military ties to the United States, and a retention of the officer corps' economic prerogatives. Liberal secularists would have large numbers, a say in the rhythm of daily life in a country so hard to regiment and organize, and the chance to field a compelling potential leader in a future presidential election.

For two centuries now, Egypt has been engaged in a Sisyphean struggle for modernity and a place among the nations worthy of its ambitions. It has not fared well, yet it continues to try. Last August, a scene played out that could give Egyptians a measure of solace. The country's last pharaoh—may it be so—came to court on a gurney. "Sir, I am present," the former ruler said to the presiding judge. Mubarak was not pulled out of a drainage pipe and slaughtered, as was Qaddafi, nor did he hunker down with his family and murder his own people at will, as has Assad. The Egyptians have always had, in E. M. Forster's words, the ability to harmonize contending assertions, and they may do so once again.

THE THIRD GREAT AWAKENING

THIS TUMULT, this awakening, is the third of its kind in modern Arab history. The first, a political-cultural renaissance born of a desire to join the modern world, came in the late 1800s. Led by scribes and lawyers, would-be parliamentarians and Christian intellectuals, it sought to reform political life, separate religion from politics, emancipate women, and move past the debris of the Ottoman Empire. Fittingly enough, that great movement, with Beirut and Cairo at the head of the pack, found its chronicler in George Antonius, a Christian writer of Lebanese

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birth, Alexandrian youth, a Cambridge education, and service in the British administration in Palestine. His 1938 book, *The Arab Awakening*, remains the principal manifesto of Arab nationalism.

The second awakening came in the 1950s and gathered force in the decade following. This was the era of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, and the early leaders of the Baath Party in Iraq and Syria. No democrats, the leaders of that time were intensely political men engaged in the great issues of the day. They came from the middle class or even lower and had dreams of power, of industrialization, of ridding their people of the sense of inferiority instilled by Ottoman and then colonial rule. No simple audit can do these men justice: they had monumental accomplishments, but then, explosive demographics and their own authoritarian proclivities and shortcomings undid most of their work. When they faltered, police states and political Islam filled the void.

This third awakening came in the nick of time. The Arab world had grown morose and menacing. Its populations loathed their rulers and those leaders' foreign patrons. Bands of jihadists, forged in the cruel prisons of dreadful regimes, were scattered about everywhere looking to kill and be killed. Mohamed Bouazizi summoned his fellows to a new history, and across the region, millions have heeded his call. Last June, the Algerian author Boualem Sansal wrote Bouazizi an open letter. "Dear Brother," it said,

I write these few lines to let you know we're doing well, on the whole, though it varies from day to day: sometimes the wind changes, it rains lead, life bleeds from every pore. . . .

But let's take the long view for a moment. Can he who does not know where to go find the way? Is driving the dictator out the end? From where you are, Mohamed, next to God, you can tell that not all roads lead to Rome; ousting a tyrant doesn't lead to freedom. Prisoners like trading one prison for another, for a change of scenery and the chance to gain a little something along the way.

"The best day after a bad emperor is the first," the Roman historian Tacitus once memorably observed. This third Arab awakening is in the scales of history. It has in it both peril and promise, the possibility of prison but also the possibility of freedom. 🌍

Why We Still Need the World Bank

Looking Beyond Aid

Robert B. Zoellick

IN 2007, the World Bank was in crisis. Some saw conflicts over its leadership. Others blamed the institution itself. When the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the cornerstone of what became the World Bank Group, was founded in 1944, poor and war-torn countries had little access to private capital. Sixty years later, however, private-sector financial flows dwarfed public development assistance. “The time when middle-income countries depended on official assistance is thus past,” Jessica Einhorn, a former managing director of the World Bank wrote in these pages in 2006, “and the IBRD seems to be a dying institution.” In roundtable discussions and op-ed pages, the question was the same: Do we still need the World Bank?

I took the helm of the World Bank in 2007, bringing with me a different vantage point, gained from historical perspective, personal experience, and my sense of the international landscape: that institutions matter. The creators of the Bretton Woods multilateral system had designed an international economic architecture to deal with the causes of the global financial breakdown in the 1930s and with the economic and security problems they thought would follow World War II. The World Bank was part of that framework, which covered monetary and currency issues, trade, investment, development, and the reconstruction of broken states.

In 2007, those challenges remained, although the conditions were vastly different. The rise and diffusion of private capital and free

ROBERT B. ZOELICK is President of the World Bank Group.



REUTERS/JASON LEE

Robert Zoellick in Beijing, September 5, 2011

enterprise around the world now offered developing countries a great opportunity. Yet that did not obviate the need for the World Bank, because it was never simply about loans and grants: its role has been to contribute to the development of market economies in an open international system—fostering growth, opportunity, and hope and overcoming poverty within a better political and security order.

Not only had the world changed, but the World Bank had changed, too. It now encompassed four policy and financing arms: the IBRD; the International Development Association, or IDA (the bank's special fund for the poorest 79 countries); the International Finance Corporation, or IFC (its private-sector arm); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (which offers investors insurance against political risk).

To accomplish its mission, the World Bank needed new directions, firmer guidance, and better execution. It had to adapt to shifts in economic influence, with emerging markets becoming new economic engines and development no longer being about a North-South hegemony. In developing countries, it needed to assist the private sector—whether investors from abroad or companies at home—to

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clear away obstacles to entrepreneurship. It needed to foster inclusive and sustainable growth, and shared responsibilities, within a changed international system. The job for our leadership team was to point out the new directions, build support and partnerships, translate the overarching vision into specific actions, remain alert to opportunities to innovate, and execute, execute, execute.

Before long, the institution was shifting from debating existential questions to asking new, practical ones. What could it do to promote food security and better nutrition in the face of rising food and fuel prices? How could it help China complete its transition to a market economy and to a growth model less dependent on exports and investment? How could it help countries in the Middle East meet the demand for jobs today and build sustainable political economies in the future? What could it teach cities dealing with climate change?

Communicating this new mission has remained a challenge. One of the problems of the World Bank is that it is called a bank. Most people associate banks with lending money (at least they have until recently), but financing is only one part of what the organization does. When it is most effective, the World Bank shares knowledge; develops long-lasting markets, institutions, and capacities; and offers diverse financing (whether it takes the form of equity, guarantees, loans, grants, or risk management). Combining all three elements, the bank can improve lives and countries.

These were the challenges before us in 2007. In a larger sense, the World Bank was one part of a bigger strategic question: How should the United States and others in the world modernize multilateralism? The world had inherited its regimes and institutions from the “Wise Men” who created them after World War II; after the Cold War, multilateralism was expanded but only slightly retooled.

Since 2007, the international economy has witnessed tectonic shifts and a reordering of power relationships as it has struggled to recover from the greatest blow since the 1930s. Developing countries have provided two-thirds of all economic growth over the last five years, helping compensate for the stumbling industrialized world. Developing countries have also become the source of economic ideas, development models, investment, and even foreign aid. The



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Industrial Commodity Statistics Yearbook 2008: Physical Quantity Data (Vol.I) & Monetary Value Data (Vol.II)


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What is in the two books that the China Central Party School Publishing House selected to translate and publish inside China?



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WANG GUANGYA, China's former Deputy Foreign Minister and UN ambassador, says: "These unique books fill important communication and perception gaps in China and America's relationship. John Milligan-Whyte is the missing man needed to articulate and integrate American and Chinese perspectives."

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Why We Still Need the World Bank

institutions, national and international, designed for the old order have been straining at their seams to accommodate this new dynamic.

Today, some of those who see only the weaknesses and failures of multilateral organizations advocate abandoning them altogether. But the world's multilateral bodies offer a thin but vital tissue connecting sovereign nations that pursue common interests. The pragmatic approach, then, is to make these institutions, with all their imperfections, work better. Over the past five years, the World Bank has customized its services to solve problems for diverse developing clients in the public and private sectors; expanded its capital base and innovative financing tools; emphasized the importance of good governance and anticorruption efforts; democratized development through openness and transparency; and updated its representation and operations to increase the voice and responsibilities of developing countries. Although the bank has made progress on all these fronts, it can—and should—do much more.

WORKING FOR CLIENTS

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES are the World Bank's clients—not the objects of old “structural adjustment” policies. This notion may seem obvious, but it represents an important shift in mindset. The bank should be a seeker of solutions, not a purveyor of prescriptions. If the best textbook solution does not fit the client's political economic context, the bank has not helped solve the problem. At the same time, the bank's experts need to be able to share knowledge about how other countries are solving similar problems. As one senior Indian official told me, “I don't need another expert on India. I've got more than a billion of them. I need world-class experts on pension systems, public-private infrastructure ventures, and educational attainment.” Finance alone is rarely the answer.

Clients have vastly different needs. Countries struggling to break out of cycles of violence, poor governance, instability, and poverty need much more than development theories. During my time in the U.S. government, I saw how the fields of security, economics, and diplomacy often worked together fitfully in countries struggling with conflict. The World Bank can help connect these disciplines. In 1944,

Robert B. Zoellick

the “R” in IBRD stood for the reconstruction of Europe and Japan; today, it represents the World Bank’s work in such troubled places as Afghanistan, Haiti, and Liberia.

Middle-income countries—Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey, and others—face entirely different problems. These countries,

The World Bank should be a seeker of solutions, not a purveyor of prescriptions.

which are still home to two-thirds of the world’s population living on less than \$2 a day, have stark development challenges of their own. At the same time, they are playing an increasingly important role in the world economy and in the development of other countries. Their actions will be indispensable to crafting sustainable solutions to transna-

tional problems, whether they involve health, trade, the environment, or financial integration. The bank needs to not only assist middle-income countries but also share their experiences with others and encourage them to assume greater international responsibilities.

An early challenge revealed the bank’s new problem-solving approach. At the end of 2007, food prices surged. Soaring fuel prices exacerbated the stress. Some World Bank economists, thinking in aggregate terms, said that returns from high commodity prices would allow most countries to offset the danger. Others suggested that the problem would be best handled by humanitarian agencies, not long-term development institutions. But tens of millions of poor people had no cushion to soften the blow. Families went without meals. Farmers could not get the inputs they needed. Food riots broke out. It made no sense to speak of the long term unless populations and governments could address the short-term crisis.

The World Bank moved swiftly, working with UN agencies to set up the Global Food Crisis Response Program and creating a rapid financing facility to support farmers. At the same time, higher prices and greater demand for farm products from growing populations offered an opportunity to promote growth if the bank could help boost productivity and production. Today, the bank’s crisis program has helped 40 million vulnerable people in 47 countries. Its investments extend across the agricultural value chain, involving research,

Why We Still Need the World Bank

property rights (including for female farmers), seeds, irrigation, fertilizer, storage, and marketing—always encouraging private-sector development. The bank's financial expertise can help farmers and food buyers manage risks through weather derivatives, crop insurance, and futures markets.

When the food and fuel crises were overtaken by a global financial crisis, the World Bank mobilized more than \$200 billion of financial commitments to support developing countries, disbursing much of it rapidly. Equally important, it addressed specific market breakdowns by expanding trade finance, recapitalizing banks in developing countries, and purchasing distressed assets. It cooperated with Australia, Japan, and the Asian Development Bank to offer Indonesia \$5.5 billion to draw on if the conditions there worsened; the backstop's very existence allowed the Indonesian government to spend more to counter the downturn and assured investors of its ability to fund its expansionary budget. Working with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank, the European Commission, and the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank announced that it would provide up to \$25 billion to encourage banks in the EU to keep credit flowing to eastern Europe.

The bank is also working with clients on long-term investments to lay the foundations for recovery, focusing on three areas. First, it is investing in infrastructure to help create jobs, increase productivity for tomorrow, and raise demand for machinery and services, including from developed countries. Second, it is fostering safety nets to protect the most vulnerable. Sharing lessons from Brazil and Mexico, the bank has helped over 40 countries start conditional cash-transfer programs, which pay poor families that keep their children in school and get preventive health care. Third, through the IFC, the World Bank has extended financing to the private sector, especially to small and medium-sized businesses and microfinance institutions. This customized approach is a far cry from the plain vanilla lending of the past. At times, the bank must say no to clients that refuse to meet standards on and safeguards regarding corruption, the environment, and governance. Yet the vast majority want to upgrade both the quality and the quantity of their growth.

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EXPANDING FINANCIAL INNOVATION

TO RAISE money and make effective investments, the World Bank must produce results, broaden its base of financial support, and offer its clients innovative financial tools. Every three years, the bank needs to replenish its fund for the poorest countries, the IDA. Even now, during a time of financial limitations, the World Bank's shareholders—its 187 member countries—decided that the institution's priorities and performance warranted first-rate financial support. In 2007 and 2010, two record-breaking IDA replenishment efforts raised more than \$90 billion. In 2010, the shareholders also backed the IBRD's first capital increase in more than 20 years, enabling the institution to meet its clients' needs in a time of crisis by issuing AAA-rated bonds.

These funding packages depended on making the “responsible stakeholder” concept for emerging economies—the idea that they should assume more responsibility along with their growing power—work in hard, financial terms. Developing countries have been playing an increasingly important role: they contributed more to the two IDA replenishment efforts than ever before and provided more than half of the IBRD's capital increase. The IBRD and the IFC earned revenues each year, which they used to build capital, to cover the costs of their administrative budgets (which the bank kept flat in real terms), and even to make multibillion-dollar contributions to the IDA. The countries that received the IDA's investments supported fundraising by sharing the World Bank's focus on results and accountability, including through the use of new lending tools that connect payments to specific achievements.

There is room for more innovation. With adjustments in the terms offered to recipients and through the flow of repayments from them, the IDA should move toward greater self-sustainability. Just as important, there are huge opportunities for the World Bank to cultivate private investment. Many countries in Africa have enjoyed high growth rates for a decade. They are taking steps to foster regional integration and infrastructure, and the bank is working with them to improve their business and investment climates. The bank's *Doing Business* report, for example, enables countries to assess how hospitable they are to small enterprises.



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This research project looks at the evolving nature and consequences of the intersection between politics and ethnic and religious identity across the Persian Gulf region.

The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East

In light of tectonic changes underway in the Middle East, this project examines some of the emerging patterns of state-society relationships and evolving sources of political legitimacy.

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Books

- *The International Politics of the Persian Gulf* (2011, Syracuse University Press).
- *Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions* (2011, University of California Press).

ABOUT CIRS

Established in 2005, the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar is a premier research institute devoted to the academic study of regional and international issues through dialogue and exchange of ideas, research and scholarship, and engagement with scholars, opinion makers, practitioners, and activists.



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The Immigration Crucible

Transforming Race, Nation, and the Limits of the Law

Philip Kretsedemas

“This book recovers the complexity of immigration and government efforts to govern it. One of the most exciting and well-written books on the subject.” — Saskia Sassen, author of *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*



The Will to Survive

A History of Hungary

Bryan Cartledge

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Jihadists, the Military and the People—The Struggle for Control

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When More Is Less

The International Project in Afghanistan

Astri Suhrke

“A timely, lively, and dispassionate investigation into the causes and consequences of the disappointing modern history of peacebuilding in Afghanistan.” — Michael Barnett, George Washington University

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China or Japan

Which Will Lead Asia?

Claude Meyer

“[This] provocative and important book ... should be required reading for anyone interested in the future of the world economy’s most important region.” — Gerald Curtis, Columbia University

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Why We Still Need the World Bank

In 2009, the IFC created the IFC Asset Management Company, which adds to the IFC's traditional model of raising money in bond markets and then investing it. The AMC taps the substantial financial resources held by sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors and channels them to profitable investment opportunities identified by the IFC. The AMC now totals over \$4 billion, almost \$3 billion of which comes from outside investors that have had little exposure to Africa and other less recognized emerging markets. For now, these investors are relying on the IFC's strong track record of combining development with returns. Over time, their ranks will expand as they become more familiar with these growth markets.

The World Bank has taken the lead in developing novel ways to use finance to tackle other global problems. Encouraged by former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, the bank raised over \$6 billion from governments for new "climate investment funds" to help countries improve energy efficiency and technology, lower their emissions, and protect themselves against climate change. These funds have mobilized about \$50 billion worth of projects in 45 developing countries. As negotiators debate what a UN "green fund" might look like, the World Bank already has one up and running. The bank has also brought financial innovation to bear on plans to develop medicines, protect wildlife, lower the costs of humanitarian food and supplies, and create natural-disaster insurance.

The bank's approach is to "crowd in" others. The bank has multiplied support for projects and benefited from each partner's comparative advantage. It has deepened its ties with regional development banks (including several Arab funds and banks), private investors, governments, and foundations. The IFC, for its part, can work with commercial banks and others to share risks, for example, by keeping trade finance flowing through operational partnerships with banks. The IFC is also committing around \$3 billion through about 180 private equity funds in developing countries to build markets through which investors can supply longer-term risk capital to owners of local companies. Over time,

As developing countries rightly demand a bigger say in how the world is run, the World Bank must reflect this change.

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the World Bank aims to build market infrastructure and experience, whether for local currency bond markets, equities, or financing for small and medium-sized companies.

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE AND PREVENTING CORRUPTION

PROMOTING GOOD governance and combating corruption are an integral part of development. When I arrived at the bank, its anti-corruption work was mired in frustration, suspicion, and conflict. An independent review panel headed by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker provided an invaluable “wiring diagram” to enable the bank’s integrity staff to work more effectively with field operators, clients, donors, and the bank’s own board of executive directors.

Yet the bank needs to do more than just investigate, prosecute, and penalize those who engage in fraud and theft. In many resource-rich countries, the primary challenge is for the government to use income wisely, counter corruption, and broaden the benefits of growth. Applying its experience, the bank needs to implement corruption-prevention measures, improve transparency, and involve civil society in supporting good governance. It also must help governments—increasingly, at the subnational level—strengthen financial management, procurement systems, auditors, and other checks.

The World Bank will need new tools to break through harder obstacles. In 2010, the bank pushed through an agreement with the regional development banks that makes sure that individuals and companies found guilty of stealing from one of these banks are punished by all. The bank’s integrity unit has introduced settlements for the guilty that combine sanctions with restitution payments and contributions to anticorruption groups. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative is assisting governments in recovering funds stolen by leaders who looted their countries’ Treasuries.

The bank also refers cases to national criminal authorities, and although governments exercise prosecutorial discretion, those that consistently fail to prosecute will jeopardize their relationship with the bank. To support the investigators, prosecutors, judges, and others who take on this often dangerous work, in 2010 the bank set up the

Why We Still Need the World Bank

International Corruption Hunters Alliance, a network of more than 200 anticorruption officials from 134 countries. The bank is also developing a fund to assist local citizens and civil-society groups that support accountability.

DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT

THE WORLD BANK does not have all the answers. When making decisions that can have an enormous impact on people's lives, it must listen to those closest to the issues. One of the many messages of the crowds that shook the Middle East in 2011 was that global economic freedom must be combined with good governance, citizen voice, and social accountability.

Inclusive and sustainable development depends on shifting from an elite, top-down approach to one that democratizes development. This means giving people the tools to gather data and better understand development issues, along with opportunities to share insights. Institutions resist opening up. Information is power. Opening up means revealing mistakes and addressing critics, which is difficult, but it ultimately makes institutions more effective. In the case of the World Bank, making the organization accessible improves performance and shows people what the bank does and how it works. Transparency is the best antidote to conspiracy theories.

In 2010, the World Bank rolled out a new access-to-information policy, which releases vast numbers of documents and gives the public more information than ever before about the bank's projects, its analytic and advisory activities, and the proceedings of its executive board. Modeled on freedom-of-information programs in India and the United States, the policy marks a groundbreaking change in how the bank deals with information and is the most extensive such policy of any multilateral organization.

The Open Data Initiative may turn out to be even more important. Under this program, the bank is making thousands of data sets freely available to anyone with an Internet connection. Anyone from a Ph.D. student in Australia to a farmer in Kenya can now analyze the bank's data. In 2010, the Apps for Development competition encouraged software developers around the globe to come up with new

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uses for this wealth of data, and World Bank researchers are building software applications to further increase the data's accessibility. The bank is also creating an "integrity app" to give citizens online access to information about the bank's projects and a means of instantly reporting corruption relating to them. The bank plans to work with communities to map their own social infrastructure—such as health clinics, schools, and water sources—so villagers can hold officials to account. The next step is to allow people to use hand-held devices to let the bank know, from any location, what is really going on with its projects.

All these programs represent a very different model from the "bank knows best" attitude of the past. Recognizing the World Bank's efforts, last year the organization Publish What You Fund ranked the IDA first among 58 multilateral and bilateral development agencies for transparency.

A MORE REPRESENTATIVE BANK

FINALLY, AS developing countries rightly demand a bigger say in how the world is run, the World Bank must reflect this change. In 2010, the bank increased the representation of developing countries on its board of executive directors from 44 percent to just below 50 percent. But since the board rarely votes, the addition of a new board chair for sub-Saharan Africa was probably more important, adding another voice around the table. Some countries advocate that control be split 50-50 between developed and developing countries. This preoccupation raises thorny questions: Which countries belong in the "developing" category? As more countries become "developed," should 50 percent of the votes still be reserved for the remainder? Should voting power also reflect countries' enhanced contributions to the IDA or other funds? Do these divisions reinforce a North-South logic that reflects an old paradigm?

The bank management's aim has been to base voice and representation on how the bank does its work, starting with treating clients with dignity and respect and better reflecting the bank's membership in its work force. It helps to be local: offices in more than 100 countries bring staff closer to clients and other shareholders.

Why We Still Need the World Bank

The bank's employees come from 167 countries, and nearly two-thirds of its staff members come from developing and transitional states. Its chief economist, the Chinese scholar Justin Lin, is the first person from a developing country to hold that position. Fifty percent of the bank's senior executives are now women, and about 45 percent of its senior executive hires come from developing countries.

The World Bank is also gradually expanding the global footprint of its efforts to share knowledge. It has built a center in Nairobi that assists postconflict countries and a hub in Singapore that focuses on urban and public-private infrastructure development. As these institutional changes reflect, development today is as much about knowledge as lending, and knowledge needs to flow south to south, east to west, from the grass roots to the corridors of power, no longer limited by the old hierarchies.

BEYOND AID

MY EXPERIENCE before coming to the World Bank led me to place a premium on results. The focus on outcomes may seem obvious, but public policy assessments are often driven by intellectual debates, political positioning, and current ideological fashions. International organizations in particular can become so self-absorbed with process and discussions that they overlook the vital role of effectiveness. A focus on practical outcomes is especially important in public organizations such as the World Bank, where checks and balances and procedures and committees can stymie initiative. Accomplishments build morale, support, accountability, and legitimacy.

The bank has made a concerted effort to become faster and more flexible. Yet there is much more to do. Executives need to help their teams connect the dots between the concerns of various stakeholders (about safeguards, sound procurement practices, governments' cooperativeness, and other issues) and the country counterparts whose problems they are trying to solve. They need to continually learn and improve, without letting process become paralysis.

Over the past five years, the World Bank's efforts to modernize have been part of the larger drive to modernize multilateralism. That push reflects a world economy shifting toward multiple poles

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of growth, an evolution that will boost opportunities, livelihoods, and innovation. At the same time, the world will need a healthy multilateral system to encourage more countries to tackle common concerns with increased shared responsibilities.

Over time, the World Bank's aim should be to help countries move beyond aid. There will always be a need for humanitarian aid, and for some time to come, poor and conflict-riven countries will require development assistance. The goal, however, should be to get past dependency. The World Bank should help developing countries create the conditions—through public health, education, and nutrition, as well as financial investment—that stimulate business, jobs, productivity, and links to global supply and logistics chains. It can assist with better governance, the rule of law, economic freedom, environmental sustainability, and social accountability. All countries, meanwhile, should open their markets to developing countries. And all countries should tap the energies and genius of all their people, especially girls and women, who represent an emerging source of growth everywhere.

Much of the World Bank's history has been associated with the Third World. The Third World is an outdated concept. But development is not. In fact, lessons of development—just like principles of sound economics—are increasingly applicable to all countries. Today, the world urgently needs to move beyond the economic crisis and lay the foundations for a world beyond aid. To do so, the world still needs the World Bank. 🌍

LEBANON

Rising like a phoenix

Sitting strategically at the heart of a region in turmoil, Lebanon is once again rising “like a phoenix” as the new government prepares for billion-dollar investments in telecommunications, oil, gas, and electric power, supported as ever by a robust financial sector.

Last year seems so long ago. Through the first half of 2011, Lebanon struggled to form a government under Prime Minister Najib Mikati. But by early 2012, just six months after taking the reins, the new cabinet was showing signs of getting to grips with longstanding problems. Optimism abounds.

“The phoenix: this is the image of Lebanon,” said Information Minister Walid Daouk. “The Lebanese have gone through very difficult moments and, every time, we have managed to overcome them because of our eagerness to live. The Lebanese have the same joy of life as the phoenix.” Non-Lebanese may feel bemused by the country’s ability to combine seemingly incessant political turmoil with prosperity and a vibrant lifestyle. But it’s all part of the tradition. “Lack of decision-making in the public sector has led the private sector to take matters into its own hands,” Economy Minister Nicolas Nahas explained.

Part of the problem—if problem it be—is that Lebanon is the quintessential Middle East melting pot; a regional microcosm that brings together many of the various religious and ethnic groups. In most neighboring countries, one group or another dominates and crowds out the minorities; Lebanon is the region’s best shot at a working democracy, alongside Israel. Some local businessmen call the political bickering the cost of democracy; others see it as a strength.

“We are the interface of all these people—Sunnis interacting with Shias, interacting with Christians, interacting with Druze, all in one platform—this doesn’t exist anywhere else,” said Tarek Khalife, chairman of CreditBank.

Perhaps because of Lebanon’s deeply ingrained tradition for commerce and finance, dating from the Phoenicians and the Silk Road, the country has proven adept at riding out twenty-first-century economic crises.

“This is Lebanon; The general public has a tolerance for risk; they have lived through risk so much that they don’t overreact,” Khalife said. Rather than shying away from risks, he said,

Lebanese tend to minimize them. They don’t buy houses with a zero down payment, for example. Neither would banks lend like that. This caution means that when a crisis comes along, prompted by internal or external factors, things don’t slam to a halt. They just slow down a bit. “Banks continue to lend, and merchants and importers continue to invest and import,” Khalife said. “All this creates a certain momentum. People look around and see that things aren’t so bad. Restaurants and hotels are still open. Occupancy may be lower but we can go have a drink or lunch, and this keeps things rolling. It’s like a self-fulfilling prophecy.”

Lebanon has been buffeted by unrest in neighboring Syria.

The countries have significant trade and investment links, so much so that Alex Demirdijan, general manager of Demco Steel, calls Syria “our big brother.” The impact to date has been mainly economic, for example reduced tourism, but that could change if the situation in Syria deteriorates further.

Much of the resilience is underpinned by the financial sector, which Freddie Baz, chief financial officer of Bank Audi, was only too happy to call “boring,” with no short-term borrowing from the market. “Boring banks are retail banks whose funding comes from their customer deposits,” Baz said. “This is the most stable and least costly type of funding.”

Lebanese banks enjoy another advantage: serving the country’s large and lucrative diaspora. The 4.2 million-person country has a labor force of some 1.5 million, but millions of Lebanese descendants live around the world and many send money to buy vacation homes in the “old country.” Specifically, some 400,000 short-term expatriate Lebanese professionals are working in the Gulf region and maintain strong economic links with home. Mazen Soueid, chief economist at BankMed, explained that this group has an average annual income of US\$80,000 to US\$100,000, compared with US\$10,000 inside Lebanon.

“If you look around, you would think Lebanon is a US\$20,000 per capita country, exactly because of this hidden, parallel labor force,” Soueid said.



Shaping up for Growth in 2012

Lebanese are pretty confident about 2012. The International Monetary Fund is looking to gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 3.5 percent, up from 1.5 percent in 2011, while Finance Minister Mohammad Safadi speaks of 4 percent.

Key drivers—in addition to a general economic recovery towards the 7 percent to 9 percent annual growth trend seen in the three years before 2010—could be greater investment in infrastructure, plus an oil and gas boom.

Prime Minister Najib Mikati has asked legislators to approve an ambitious plan that hikes taxes, reducing the government deficit and enabling public investment equivalent to 5.8 percent of GDP. Parliamentary approval

would constitute a major step forward, given that Lebanon has been without an annual budget since 2005. However, some analysts were skeptical that the tax hikes would win sufficient votes. That in turn could jeopardize plans to tackle what Nadim Kassir, general manager of Fransabank, called Lebanon's "1960s" infrastructure.

The solution, Kassir said, was privatization, although this is politically contentious. "Instead of financing the government, we would rather finance the private sector that would build the infrastructure," he said. "The banks are liquid enough;

we can privatize roads, electricity, and telecommunications. All these issues will make a difference for business and tourism. And it will cost the government not a penny; it will even bring in revenue, because these companies will pay taxes."

There's also great potential for private investment in offshore oil and gas, now that the cabinet has approved legislation that paves the way for oil exploration tenders. Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel are arguing about the exact demarcation of national frontiers in the Mediterranean Sea, but Energy and Water Minister Jibril Bassil said there was no impediment to starting work in Lebanon's undisputed areas, which industry experts put at some 20,000 square kilometers.



Tarek J. Khalife
Chairman & GM, CreditBank

"CreditBank is a little atypical of the [Lebanese] market. We're one of the most active commercial lenders."

How would you describe CreditBank in a nutshell?

We're one of the most active commercial lenders. We ranked fourteenth in the country by balance sheet, but seventh or eighth by loan portfolio. So we understand the value of being productive.

You have fewer branches than the larger banks, so what's your competitive edge?

There are banks with a hundred branches, but I disagree about the need. Lebanon is not California; you can cover it adequately with thirty. We have basically two advantages that I summarize as professional and personal. We can be more responsive [than larger banks]; we're more flexible and we don't try to fit clients into a mold. And on the professional side I'm talking about market savvy. For example, five of the largest franchise restaurants in Lebanon have grown up with us. We know that sector. And a startup naturally comes to us.



Ghaleb Mahmassani
Acting Chairman,
Beirut Stock
Exchange

Lebanese investors have a tradition of recouring to the banking sector for their financing needs, which is often seen as easier than going for fresh capital to the financial markets and the stock exchange. Growth of the Beirut market has been hampered by the fact that many local companies are owned by families that don't want to give up control, while some companies such as MEA, Casino du Liban, and telecom operators have not been able to join the exchange because of a lack of formal regulations to expedite the process. Nevertheless, Ghaleb Mahmassani is optimistic that plans to transform the ninety-year-old

exchange from a public institution into a joint stock company and privatize it will lead to greater flexibility, authority, and resources. New legislation and an independent regulatory commission, modeled on London and New York exchanges, should boost investor confidence. "We are very confident in the message that this commission sends to national and foreign investors: at last Lebanon has the tools, the proper legislation to control and regulate the financial markets," Mahmassani said. "I think the credibility exists because Lebanon has a long tradition of financial activity, financial reputation, and financial know-how."

Traditional bank seeks new pastures

Lebanon's largest bank is expanding throughout the region, leveraging its expertise and cultural sensibility.

With over 150 branches inside and outside Lebanon, the 180-year-old Bank Audi is the country's largest bank in terms of consolidated assets—US\$ 28.7 billion at the end of the third quarter of 2011. A majority of stock is held by families in Lebanon, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia, with Deutsche Bank owning almost 29 percent as Depository under the Bank's GDR program. Shares are traded on the Beirut exchange and the bank's Global Depository Receipts are listed in London.

In recent years the bank has stepped up its process of internationalization. There are already commercial, investment, and private banking subsidiaries in France, Switzerland, Monaco, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Gibraltar, plus a representative office in Abu Dhabi. But Bank Audi's new foothold in Turkey is seen as being particularly significant.



Samir Hanna
CEO, Bank Audi

"Everybody thought it was impossible to obtain (a license to operate in Turkey), but we were the only ones who believed it could be done," said Bank Audi CEO Samir Hanna. "We built a solid case, we presented a comprehensive business plan and we succeeded. And because Turkey's policy at the moment is to get closer to the East, and because they liked the idea of having a bank of our size and reputation, they granted us the license."

Hanna said Bank Audi sees Turkey as a place where it can add value and develop a business. "When you think of any growth potential, the potential to develop and build a franchise, Turkey becomes the natural choice. In addition, Turkey's population represents 24.3 percent of the consolidated Arab Middle East and North Africa (MENA) population and its GDP represents 34.2 percent of the consolidated Arab MENA GDP. So you can imagine the potential there, not to mention the fact that it is a very young country."

One strength in pursuing its international ambitions is empathy for local cultures. "In Egypt, we are an Egyptian bank; we are a Jordanian bank in Jordan; we are a Syrian bank in Syria; and we will be a Turkish bank in Turkey," Hanna said. "I believe that success will come from letting everybody, be they clients or staff, feel that they are taking their business to, or are working in, a Turkish bank."

A full-service bank at home, outside of Lebanon Bank Audi preferentially targets export-oriented companies with a sound cash flow, operating in non-volatile sectors. "We want to make sure that the loans we make will be paid back. We are a traditional bank; we do not borrow funds to lend funds. We take in savings deposits and we lend them out."

Hanna said that Bank Audi would like to expand further among countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, but unfortunately it is not easy to obtain banking licenses there.

UPHOLDING AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION STANDARDS IN THE HEART OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Established in 1835, the Lebanese American University (LAU) is deeply rooted in a tradition of excellence and passionately committed to offering American superior education to the youth of the MENA region and the world.

Accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), LAU has two major campuses in Beirut and Byblos, more than eight thousand students, and seven thriving schools: Arts and Sciences, Business, Engineering, Architecture and Design, Pharmacy, Medicine, and Nursing. Diversity graces LAU's student body with a national, regional, and international enriching mix.

As LAU marches forward, it will continue to pursue new milestones in excellence, celebrate new achievements, and reinforce its academic standing and reputation as a major force in higher education in the MENA region and beyond.

Lessons well learned



Brain power: a key Lebanese asset is being enhanced with a dynamic education sector, and the presence of several world-class institutions.

As a small country with sparse natural resources, Lebanon has long relied on its highly skilled and multilingual labor force to gain an edge on regional competitors. This gives Lebanon potential in areas like financial services, commerce, design, IT, and some manufacturing niches. It also generates revenues in an often-ignored way, by creating a highly qualified pool of workers who live abroad and send home thousands of dollars every year.

"Instead of exporting tangible goods and services, we export brains," said Freddie Baz of Bank Audi.

Top concentrations are business, arts and sciences, architecture and design, engineering, pharmacy, nursing, and medicine, many with international accreditation and a significant presence of foreign students, underlining the status of Lebanon and particularly Beirut as a regional center of learning.

"With globalization, it's very important for a university to open up to the outside world; that's how you stay on top of the game," said Dr. Joseph Jabbara, president of the Lebanese American University (LAU). One in five of his 8,000 students comes from outside of Lebanon, mainly from the Middle East and North America. Almost 20 percent of degrees awarded

in the 2009–2010 academic year were master's or doctorates. Equally impressive for a Mid-Eastern educational institution, no less than 48 percent of students are female.

Jabbara sees his university very much as an instrument for national and regional development: "The challenge for Lebanon is to find ways to send children to school, then to university. Institutions like ours go out and raise funds to provide an opportunity for those who are very bright but don't have the means to get education at LAU. This year we gave US\$15 million in scholarships; we don't want our university to become just an institution for rich people."

George Najjar, dean of the Suliman S. Olayan School of Business at the American University of Beirut (AUB), is equally concerned with quality. He aims to produce business leaders for Lebanon and beyond who combine technical expertise with a commitment to the public good: "Values of community service are deeply inculcated in the AUB student," Najjar said. The AUB has strong ties with leading international institutions like the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Harvard Business School, the London School of Economics, the Kellogg School of Management, and Yale and Georgetown universities.

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Lebanese American University

A leading institute that started as a women's college in 1835. Accredited by the Commission on Institutions of Higher Education of the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (CIHE-NEASC).

Beirut Duty Free

A joint venture between Phoenicia Trading Afro Asia and Aer Rianta International Middle East, run by Ciaran O'Neil, an Irish expatriate.



Alex Demirdijan
General Manager, Demco

"Lebanon has huge potential; it can become a pivotal point in the Middle East, if not *the* pivotal point, as long as there is domestic and regional stability. I left Lebanon, I went to Europe and the U.S., and I traveled around the world. But if now I'm back in Beirut, it's because I thought this country was special, different. The lifestyle, the nature of the Lebanese people, and the deep respect we have for human relations are not common elsewhere in the world."



Joseph Jabbra, Ph.D.
President, LAU

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Ciaran O'Neil
General Manager, Beirut Duty Free

"This is a wonderful country; I wouldn't have stayed here if I didn't love it. It's very open to visitors and could be a great holiday destination if it were packaged properly. The infrastructure is geared towards the high-end tourists, which is great, but 90 percent of people aren't in that high-spending 10 percent. We should build some hotels for the backpackers and the middle-class Europeans who want to spend a couple weeks but can't afford US\$500 a night."

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High-tech solution provider, close to the client

Businessmen in a small country like Lebanon must pick their niches and leverage their advantages. One great example of this is Hisham Itani, chairman and CEO of Resource Group Holding (RGH), a Beirut-based company that started as a security printing house some 40 years ago.

RGH is an investment group with a broad portfolio of businesses serving the Middle East, Africa, and Eurasia. The group's main activities cover different elements of the value chain and capitalize on high-tech solutions to create value.

"Our solutions currently span across ten core businesses managed by separate entities under RGH, with focus on the telecommunications, financial, and government sectors," said Itani.

RGH's products and services portfolio includes security printing, smartcard technologies, identification and payments solutions, mobile value-added services (VAS), turnkey elections projects, telecom infrastructure and managed services, real estate development, gaming, and entertainment.

Perhaps the best-known subsidiary is Inkript, the security printing and smartcard provider, which started as a local printing house and developed into a key regional player that leverages on manufacturing expertise and the capability to develop and integrate complex technical solutions.

"We try to remain close to our clients in order to understand their needs and build long and trusted partnerships," Itani said. "Businesses have specific requirements that can only be served with customized solutions. For this purpose, we operate through a comprehensive business model. First we assess our customers' needs and identify the technical and business requirements; then we develop the appropriate solution and proceed with integration and deployment." The approach and working model of RGH are best highlighted in the way the group supported certain African countries in crossing to the latest technologies and rolling out highly secure electronic and biometric passports. "In some instances, we have established a portfolio of build-operate-transfer (BOT) operations in agreement with related governments for the turnkey setup and management of production centers for electronic IDs and electronic passports," Itani said.

RGH is a fast-growing group and its expansion has been driven by the desire to bring advanced technologies and innovative solutions to the regions it serves. The group's reach extends to emerging and high-growth markets in the Middle East, Africa, Turkey, and countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

In the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, RGH capitalized on its extensive network and relations with established Lebanese expatriates and local partners to overcome cultural barriers and adapt to requirements specific to this region. The group's strategy to expand its footprint in Europe consists of establishing partnerships with technology-based companies. "The planned evolution for RGH will be to associate with one of our main technology partners in Europe, either through a partnership or a share swap," Itani said.



Hisham Itani
Chairman & CEO,
Resource Group
Holdings

Lebanon's telecom infrastructure is relatively underdeveloped. Isn't that a disadvantage?

The technical and language skills of the Lebanese labor force largely offset that. If you go to Dubai, for example, you have to import almost all the skills set, and thus the human costs are much higher. Many technology providers such as Ericsson, Nokia Siemens, Cisco, Tellabs, and others have made Lebanon a key hub to support their regional operations in countries like Turkey, Dubai, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and some African markets.

People are speaking about privatization of the IT sector.

Any public service costs much more than the same service provided privately, and is of lower quality. But the national interest dictates that you cannot have privatization without securing three main elements: a body to regulate the entire system, a legal framework to protect consumer rights, and an enforceable law.



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Clear and Present Safety

The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks

Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen

LAST AUGUST, the Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney performed what has become a quadrennial rite of passage in American presidential politics: he delivered a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. His message was rooted in another grand American tradition: hyping foreign threats to the United States. It is “wishful thinking,” Romney declared, “that the world is becoming a safer place. The opposite is true. Consider simply the jihadists, a near-nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China. No, the world is not becoming safer.”

Not long after, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta echoed Romney’s statement. In a lecture last October, Panetta warned of threats arising “from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from rogue states to cyber attacks; from revolutions in the Middle East, to economic crisis in Europe, to the rise of new powers such as China and India. All of these changes represent security, geopolitical, economic, and demographic shifts in the international order that make the world more unpredictable, more volatile and, yes, more dangerous.” General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in a recent speech, arguing that “the number and kinds of threats we face have increased significantly.” And U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced

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the point by claiming that America resides today in a “very complex, dangerous world.”

Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post–Cold War world is a treacherous place, full of great uncertainty and grave risks. A 2009 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that 69 percent of members of the Council on Foreign Relations believed that for the United States at that moment, the world was either as dangerous as or more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Similarly, in 2008, the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 foreign policy experts and found that 70 percent of them believed that the world was becoming more dangerous. Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public’s understanding of international affairs.

There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, and even in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools.

This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President Barack Obama’s most recent National Security Strategy aspires to “a world in which America is stronger, more secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world.” Yet that is basically the world that exists today. The United States is the world’s most powerful nation, unchallenged and secure. But the country’s political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into foreign policy and national security decision-making.

Clear and Present Safety

The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat-mongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hying dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited from attacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government—defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.

There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States, Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget—warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military’s “ability to protect the nation” and could create “dire consequences.” Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would “invite aggression” from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago.

In the United States, the chances of dying from a terrorist attack or in a military conflict have fallen almost to zero.

Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen

Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict. Indeed, the mindset of the United States in the post-9/11 world was best (albeit crudely) captured by former Vice President Dick Cheney. While in office, Cheney promoted the idea that the United States must prepare for even the most remote threat as though it were certain to occur. The journalist Ron Suskind termed this belief “the one percent doctrine,” a reference to what Cheney called the “one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon.” According to Suskind, Cheney insisted that the United States must treat such a remote potential threat “as a certainty in terms of our response.”

Such hair-trigger responsiveness is rarely replicated outside the realm of national security, even when the government confronts problems that cause Americans far more harm than any foreign threat. According to an analysis by the budget expert Linda Bilmes and the economist Joseph Stiglitz, in the ten years since 9/11, the combined direct and indirect costs of the U.S. response to the murder of almost 3,000 of its citizens have totaled more than \$3 trillion. A study by the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated that during an overlapping period, from 2000 to 2006, 137,000 Americans died prematurely because they lacked health insurance. Although the federal government maintains robust health insurance programs for older and poor Americans, its response to a national crisis in health care during that time paled in comparison to its response to the far less deadly terrorist attacks.

Rather than Cheney’s one percent doctrine, what the United States actually needs is a 99 percent doctrine: a national security strategy based on the fact that the United States is a safe and well-protected country and grounded in the reality that the opportunities for furthering U.S. interests far exceed the threats to them. Fully comprehending the world as it is today is the best way to keep the United States secure and resistant to the overreactions that have defined its foreign policy for far too long.

THE UNITED STATES, along with the rest of the world, currently faces a period of economic and political uncertainty. But consider four long-term global trends that underscore just how misguided the constant fear-mongering in U.S. politics is: the falling prevalence of violent conflict, the declining incidence of terrorism, the spread of political freedom and prosperity, and the global improvement in public health. In 1992, there were 53 armed conflicts raging in 39 countries around the world; in 2010, there were 30 armed conflicts in 25 countries. Of the latter, only four have resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths and can therefore be classified as wars, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, two of which were started by the United States.

Today, wars tend to be low-intensity conflicts that, on average, kill about 90 percent fewer people than did violent struggles in the 1950s. Indeed, the first decade of this century witnessed fewer deaths from war than any decade in the last century. Meanwhile, the world's great powers have not fought a direct conflict in more than 60 years—"the longest period of major power peace in centuries," as the Human Security Report Project puts it. Nor is there much reason for the United States to fear such a war in the near future: no state currently has the capabilities or the inclination to confront the United States militarily.

Much of the fear that suffuses U.S. foreign policy stems from the trauma of 9/11. Yet although the tactic of terrorism remains a scourge in localized conflicts, between 2006 and 2010, the total number of terrorist attacks declined by almost 20 percent, and the number of deaths caused by terrorism fell by 35 percent, according to the U.S. State Department. In 2010, more than three-quarters of all victims of terrorism—meaning deliberate, politically motivated violence by nonstate groups against noncombatant targets—were injured or killed in the war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia. Of the 13,186 people killed by terrorist attacks in 2010, only 15, or 0.1 percent, were U.S. citizens. In most places today—and especially in the United States—the chances of dying from a terrorist attack or in a military conflict have fallen almost to zero.

As violence and war have abated, freedom and democratic governance have made great gains. According to Freedom House, there were

Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen

69 electoral democracies at the end of the Cold War; today, there are 117. And during that time, the number of autocracies declined from 62 to 48. To be sure, in the process of democratizing, states with weak political institutions can be more prone to near-term instability, civil wars, and interstate conflict. Nevertheless, over time, democracies tend to have healthier and better-educated citizens, almost never go to war with other democracies, and are less likely to fight nondemocracies.

Economic bonds among states are also accelerating, even in the face of a sustained global economic downturn. Today, 153 countries belong to

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states.

the World Trade Organization and are bound by its dispute-resolution mechanisms. Thanks to lowered trade barriers, exports now make up more than 30 percent of gross world product, a proportion that has tripled in the past 40 years. The United States has seen its exports to the world's fastest-growing economies increase by approximately 500 percent over the past decade. Currency flows have exploded as well, with \$4 trillion moving around the world in foreign exchange markets every day.


Remittances, an essential instrument for reducing poverty in developing countries, have more than tripled in the past decade, to more than \$440 billion each year. Partly as a result of these trends, poverty is on the decline: in 1981, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than \$1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth. Like democratization, economic development occasionally brings with it significant costs. In particular, economic liberalization can strain the social safety net that supports a society's most vulnerable populations and can exacerbate inequalities. Still, from the perspective of the United States, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlate with long-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war.

A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and well-being. People in virtually all countries, and certainly in the United States, are living longer and healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from AIDS-related causes declined for the third year in a row. Tuberculosis rates

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


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
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continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has plummeted worldwide, thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines. In 1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety because countries with poor human development are more war-prone.

PHANTOM MENACE

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them—separately or in combination—justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.

Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.

According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their



perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China's rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China's proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China's senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending

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is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military.

While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China's military ambitions remain dominated by "regional contingencies" and that the People's Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that "extend global reach or power projection." In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China's legitimate regional interests. It is true that China's neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China's room to maneuver.

The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China's export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

NUCLEAR FEAR

IT IS a matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country. But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran's "military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future."


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Tehran's stated intention to project its interests regionally through military or paramilitary forces has made Iran its own worst enemy. Iran's neighbors are choosing to balance against the Islamic Republic rather than fall in line behind its leadership. In 2006, Iran's favorability rating in Arab countries stood at nearly 80 percent; today, it is under 30 percent. Like China's neighbors in East Asia, the Gulf states have responded to Iran's belligerence by participating in an emerging regional security arrangement with the United States, which includes advanced conventional weapons sales, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises, all of which have further isolated Iran.

Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon is "the greatest threat the world faces." But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran's leaders have been sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to contain Tehran and deter its aggression—and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.


Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of nuclear attacks. Obama's National Security Strategy claims that "the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon." According to the document, "international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased."

If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear missiles, is eminently deterrable and not a credible nuclear threat; it has no answer for the United States' second-strike capability and the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with which the United States could strike China.



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
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In the past decade, Cheney and other one-percenters have frequently warned of the danger posed by loose nukes or uncontrolled fissile material. In fact, the threat of a nuclear device ending up in the hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was dispersed across all of Russia's 11 time zones, all 15 former Soviet republics, and much of eastern Europe. Since then, cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts have resulted in the substantial consolidation of those weapons at far fewer sites and in comprehensive security upgrades at almost all the facilities that still possess nuclear material or warheads, making the possibility of theft or diversion unlikely. Moreover, the lessons learned from securing Russia's nuclear arsenal are now being applied in other countries, under the framework of Obama's April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which produced a global plan to secure all nuclear materials within four years. Since then, participants in the plan, including Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have fulfilled more than 70 percent of the commitments they made at the summit.

Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The United States' military strategy in Afghanistan, with its reliance on drone strikes and cross-border raids, has actually contributed to instability in Pakistan, worsened U.S. relations with Islamabad, and potentially increased the possibility of a weapon falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, Pakistani fears of a U.S. raid on its nuclear arsenal have reportedly led Islamabad to disperse its weapons to multiple sites, transporting them in unsecured civilian vehicles. But even in Pakistan, the chances of a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally small. The U.S. Department of Energy has provided assistance to improve the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and successive senior U.S. government officials have repeated what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in January 2010: that the United States is "very comfortable with the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons."

A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent "cyber-Pearl Harbor" or

Washington should not assume that every problem in the world demands a U.S. response.

Micah Zenko and Michael A. Cohen

“cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.”

Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.

A NEW APPROACH

DEFENDERS OF the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears.

Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country’s massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic

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governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post–Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military efforts, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.

Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than “sexier” problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks—all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking.

To avoid further distorting U.S. foreign policy and to take advantage of today’s relative security and stability, policymakers need to not only

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respond to a 99 percent world but also solidify it. They should start by strengthening the global architecture of international institutions and norms that can promote U.S. interests and ensure that other countries share the burden of maintaining global peace and security. International institutions such as the UN (and its affiliated agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), regional organizations (the African Union, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and international financial institutions can formalize and reinforce norms and rules that regulate state behavior and strengthen global cooperation, provide legitimacy for U.S. diplomatic efforts, and offer access to areas of the world that the United States cannot obtain unilaterally.

American leadership must be commensurate with U.S. interests and the nature of the challenges facing the country. The United States should not take the lead on every issue or assume that every problem in the world demands a U.S. response. In the majority of cases, the United States should “lead from behind”—or from the side, or slightly in the front—but rarely, if ever, by itself. That approach would win broad public support. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs’ most recent survey of U.S. public opinion on international affairs, less than ten percent of Americans want the country to “continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems.” The American people have long embraced the idea that their country should not be the world’s policeman; for just as long, politicians from both parties have expressed that sentiment as a platitude. The time has come to act on that idea.

If the main challenges in a 99 percent world are transnational in nature and require more development, improved public health, and enhanced law enforcement, then it is crucial that the United States maintain a sharp set of nonmilitary national security tools. American foreign policy needs fewer people who can jump out of airplanes and more who can convene roundtable discussions and lead negotiations. But owing to cuts that began in the 1970s and accelerated significantly during its reorganization in the 1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been reduced to a hollow shell of its former self. In 1990, the agency had 3,500 permanent employees. Today, it has just over 2,000 staffers, and the vast majority of its budget is

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distributed via contractors and nongovernmental organizations. Meanwhile, with 30,000 employees and a \$50 billion budget, the State Department's resources pale in comparison to those of the Pentagon, which has more than 1.6 million employees and a budget of more than \$600 billion. More resources and attention must be devoted to all elements of nonmilitary state power—not only USAID and the State Department but also the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and a host of multilateral institutions that deal with the underlying causes of localized instability and ameliorate their effects at a relatively low cost. As U.S. General John Allen recently noted, “In many respects, USAID’s efforts can do as much—over the long term—to prevent conflict as the deterrent effect of a carrier strike group or a marine expeditionary force.” Allen ought to know: he commands the 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan.

Upgrading the United States’ national security toolbox will require reducing the size of its armed forces. In an era of relative peace and security, the U.S. military should not be the primary prism through which the country sees the world. As a fungible tool that can back up coercive threats, the U.S. military is certainly an important element of national power. However, it contributes very little to lasting solutions for 99 percent problems. And the Pentagon’s enormous budget not only wastes precious resources; it also warps national security thinking and policymaking. Since the military controls the overwhelming share of the resources within the national security system, policymakers tend to perceive all challenges through the distorting lens of the armed forces and respond accordingly. This tendency is one reason the U.S. military is so big. But it is also a case of the tail wagging the dog: the vast size of the military is a major reason every challenge is seen as a threat.

More than 60 years of U.S. diplomatic and military efforts have helped create a world that is freer and more secure. In the process, the United States has fostered a global environment that bolsters U.S. interests and generally accepts U.S. power and influence. The result is a world far less dangerous than ever before. The United States, in other words, has won. Now, it needs a national security strategy and an approach to foreign policy that reflect that reality. 🌐

Brazil's Long Road Towards Development



By **Maurício Santoro**

Professor of Political Science at Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro

For the first time since the 1950's, Brazil has democracy and economic prosperity. GDP is not increasing at vertiginous Chinese or Indian rates, but a constant pace of growth (even in the midst of the global crisis) in combination with well-implemented social policies took 30 million people out of poverty. The country is becoming a middle class society, and the world sixth-largest economy, with a domestic market of almost 200 million consumers. Rio de Janeiro's revival is even more impressive. The city is serving as host to a number of international sports events that symbolize Brazil's new global standing, such as the Pan-American Games (2007), several matches of the World Cup (2014) and the Olympics (2016).

Rio was the capital of Brazil from the eighteenth century to 1960. It was praised worldwide as "the wonderful city" — an expression invented by a delighted French writer — but it has suffered a severe decline since the national government moved to Brasília. The military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was particularly harsh on Rio, where popular demonstrations against the regime were big. The generals ended the autonomous status of the city and forced it to merge with the much poorer and conservative hinterland of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The signs of urban decay were strong — the old port and industrial neighborhoods became dangerous and forgotten areas, many slums were taken by drug gangs and in the late 1990s violence escalated to 70 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants — one of the highest rates in the world.

Rio's Revival: From bullet-ridden decline to "the happiest city"

Then things started to change for better. The discovery of huge offshore oil reserves turned Rio into Brazil's energy capital — a kind of tropical Houston — as 70 percent of Brazilian oil is produced on Rio's coastline. The city is host to the giant state companies Petrobras and Eletrobras. Private investment returned with automobile plants in the hinterland, which grew faster than the capital. Traditional districts such as Lapa and Santa Teresa were revitalized, with bars, restaurants, and a vibrant night-life. A similar project

was undertaken for the old port, with a modern one being built in the bay of Sepetiba, near Rio.

After decades of useless security policies, Rio's state government developed a new approach, one that is community-oriented: the Pacification Police Units. It retook nineteen slums (there are plans to expand it to forty five communities) from drug gangs, reducing crime in an expressive way. Homicide rates fell to 25 in 100,000 — still high, but the lowest in a generation. Economic growth and social policy are also working. One of the biggest crime lords in the city said in an interview that he had lost many of his fellow gangster to jobs in the public works of the federal government, which is building infrastructure such as housing projects, roads and elevators in slums. But the drug dealer said that he was glad, because his friends deserved a better future than crime. No wonder that in 2009 *Forbes* magazine chose Rio as the happiest city on the planet.

The Bottlenecks of Brazilian Development

Although Brazil is changing, there are still many bottlenecks for growth, which may prevent the country from transforming into a fully developed society. The country is a complex Federative state, with confused lines of responsibility between national, states and cities governments. It is hard for them to work together, and difficult for citizens to pressure for accountability.

The electoral system combines proportional representation with huge districts that include up to seventy members in each. There are more than twenty parties in Congress, and Brazilian presidents are managers of large and heterogeneous alliances, distributing cabinet positions and jobs in the civil service to their supporters. Corruption and pork-barrel spending are widespread. President Dilma Rousseff's allies range from the far right to communist, and control 80 percent of parliament.

The price of stability is very slow institutional changes, because so many actors have veto power: — "The political cost of any of reform is so big that there is a huge risk of loos-

ing all the time and in the end achieving nothing" —, says Antonio Bonchristiano, co-chief executive officer at GP Investments. The state remains ineffective, dominated by political cronies, with the exception of pockets of professionalization such as the Ministry of Finance and the Foreign Service. The tax rate is over 35 percent, extremely high for Latin American standards, and close to that of west European welfare states.

But public services are much worse. Tests conducted by the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests show that Brazil's schools and are far behind not only the OECD countries, but also other developing nations such as China, Turkey, and Uruguay. Less than a third of Brazilians complete high school, and little more than 10 percent finish college. — "Brazil gave its first jump with basic income and health policies. The next big jump will be education" —, bets Flávio Castro, a partner in FSB Comunicações.

Roads, airports, and ports are usually in poor conditions and half of the population does not have access to sanitation. Public private partnerships would be a way to deal with these problems, but Brazil still has not been able to develop a framework for the arrangements: "PPPs demand a guarantee fund, and there are few states and cities with the resources to create one and assure their role in the projects", explains Regis Fichtner, the Rio governor's chief of staff.

The economy is still plagued by inflation (6.5 percent in 2011) and inequality (GINI over 0.5). Dependence on commodities exports such as soya beans and iron ore is rising, and industry is scared of Chinese competition. There are concerns about a credit bubble, as two-thirds of Brazilian families are in debt. Brazil has managed to evolve from a poor country into a middle-income nation. But there is still a long way between growth and development, and to the fulfillment of global-power aspirations. The Brazilian government and society need to deal now with the obstacles that were pushed off for so long.



FLAVIO CASTRO,
Partner
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The Iraq We Left Behind

Welcome to the World's Next Failed State

Ned Parker

NINE YEARS after U.S. troops toppled Saddam Hussein and just a few months after the last U.S. soldier left Iraq, the country has become something close to a failed state. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki presides over a system rife with corruption and brutality, in which political leaders use security forces and militias to repress enemies and intimidate the general population. The law exists as a weapon to be wielded against rivals and to hide the misdeeds of allies. The dream of an Iraq governed by elected leaders answerable to the people is rapidly fading away.

The Iraqi state cannot provide basic services, including regular electricity in summer, clean water, and decent health care; meanwhile, unemployment among young men hovers close to 30 percent, making them easy recruits for criminal gangs and militant factions. Although the level of violence is down from the worst days of the civil war in 2006 and 2007, the current pace of bombings and shootings is more than enough to leave most Iraqis on edge and deeply uncertain about their futures. They have lost any hope that the bloodshed will go away and simply live with their dread. Acrimony in the political realm and the violence in the cities create a destabilizing feedback loop, whereby the bloodshed sows mistrust in the halls of power and politicians are inclined to settle scores with their proxies in the streets.

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The Iraq We Left Behind

Both Maliki and his rivals are responsible for the slow slide toward chaos, prisoners of their own history under Saddam. Iraq today is divided between once-persecuted Shiite religious parties, such as Maliki's Dawa Party, still hungry for revenge, and secular and Sunni parties that long for a less bloody version of Saddam's Baath Party, with its nationalist ideology and intolerance of religious and ethnic politics. Meanwhile, the Kurds maneuver gingerly around the divisions in Baghdad. Their priority is to preserve their near autonomy in northern Iraq and ward off the resurrection of a powerful central government that could one day besiege their cities and bombard their villages, as Baghdad did throughout the twentieth century.

All sides hold the others responsible for all the friends and family killed during the Saddam era and the civil war that followed the U.S. invasion. All of Iraq's political leaders seem to live by the maxim that no enemy can become a partner, just a temporary ally; betrayal lurks around every corner. Each politician grabs as much power as he can, and unchecked ambition, ego, and historical grudges lead them all to ignore the consequences of their behavior for Iraq's new institutions and its society.

Maliki's tactics closely echo the pattern laid down by his predecessors, from Iraq's post-Ottoman monarchs to its first prime minister, Abdul Karim Kassem, to Saddam himself: put yourself first, and guard power with a ruthless security apparatus. Maliki's opponents, including his secular rival Ayad Allawi, the head of the Iraqiya Party, have given no indication they would act any differently. In the last year, Maliki has chipped away at safeguards for democracy, stocking the country's Human Rights Ministry with loyalists and using the state's anticorruption offices to target political enemies. Maliki's harassment and persecution of anyone deemed a threat to himself or his party has dramatically reduced freedom throughout Iraq. Most ominously for his country, and himself, Maliki, through his bullying and nepotistic rule, threatens to cause his own undoing and push Iraq back into civil war.

ABSENTEE WASHINGTON

THIS WAS not the Iraq the United States envisioned as it planned its invasion less than a decade ago. After toppling Saddam in 2003,

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U.S. policy aimed to create a democratic state that enshrined civil liberties; national reconciliation; a fair, apolitical judiciary; and freedom of speech. However, this goal was jeopardized from day one of the U.S. occupation by a series of debilitating blunders: not sending enough U.S. forces to secure the country, dissolving the old Iraqi military, and allowing a draconian purge of Baath Party members from civilian ministries. It was only belatedly, in Iraq's darkest hour, that the Bush administration sent thousands more troops to stop the civil war that had erupted. During the "surge," in 2007, the United States forced the ruling Shiite religious parties to take steps toward making peace with the Sunnis, blocked blatantly political arrests, and worked to marginalize, if not jail, officials implicated in violence. The hope was that improved security would allow Iraq to reach stability and acquire the trappings of liberal governance.

Maliki and his colleagues are not the only ones to blame for the dashing of these hopes and the slide away from democracy. Since the last months of the Bush administration and the beginning of the Obama presidency, rather than concentrate on shoring up democratic principles, as it had during the surge, Washington has instead focused on securing its long-term strategic relationship with Baghdad, especially with the prime minister, so that it could more easily withdraw U.S. forces. In the process, the United States failed to capitalize on the gains of the U.S. troop surge—the Iraqi people's renunciation of religious extremists and desire for normalcy—thereby damaging the chances that a unified, nonsectarian government could emerge.

Washington's biggest mistake of recent years came in the summer of 2010, when the United States dropped the pretense of neutrality by backing Maliki for the post of prime minister over Allawi—even though Allawi's party list had received more votes in the national elections held in March. U.S. officials argued that only a Shiite Islamist had the credibility and legitimacy to serve as prime minister and disparaged any alternative to Maliki. But by anointing Maliki, a devout Shiite who already had Iran's endorsement, the United States gave him the confidence to avoid serious compromises with Allawi, a secular Shiite supported by the country's Sunnis.

In November 2010, Maliki and Allawi reached a power-sharing agreement, sponsored by the Kurdish government in Erbil and Washington,



REUTERS / MOHAMMED AMEEN

Caught in the crossfire: an Iraqi soldier on patrol in Baghdad, March 2009

in which Maliki was supposed to relinquish his direct command of the security forces and his tight grip on the cabinet and most ministries. The agreement awarded the Defense Ministry to Iraqiya and appointed Allawi to head a new consultative policy body. U.S. officials bragged that they had outmaneuvered Iran and midwived a nonsectarian government in Baghdad.

But Washington quickly disengaged from actually ensuring that the provisions of the deal were implemented. U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, the Obama administration's leading figure on Iraq policy, was largely absent from Iraq for nearly a year as the power-sharing arrangement unraveled. At the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, officials complained in private about Maliki's refusal to share power as he had promised, but they kept quiet in public, even as Maliki's military command stepped up its campaign of harassment and arrests of those considered rivals. When I was in Baghdad last June, I asked a U.S. diplomat why the embassy had said nothing about an ongoing crackdown against pro-democracy activists, including an incident in which Iraqi security agents had beaten protesters in broad daylight. He said that although U.S. officials had a "regular" dialogue

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with Maliki about human rights, Washington’s “overriding focus and concern” was building a security relationship with the Iraqi government. But by turning a blind eye to Maliki’s encroaching authoritarianism, U.S. officials allowed Iraq’s political culture to disintegrate. (It was this disarray that also made it impossible for U.S. officials to get Iraq’s leaders to push an immunity agreement through parliament so that a small number of U.S. troops could stay on after 2011.) Rather than help Iraq move forward, the United States allowed the country to drift back toward sectarianism and authoritarian rule.

The political situation in Baghdad hit a new low last December. The day after the last U.S. soldier left the country, Maliki suddenly called for the arrest of Iraq’s Sunni vice president, Tariq al-Hashimi,

By turning a
blind eye to Maliki’s
authoritarianism, U.S.
officials let Iraq’s
politics disintegrate.

on charges of running death squads. With this move, Maliki abandoned any lingering pretense that he was interested in national reconciliation and undermined the promises that he and U.S. President Barack Obama had made just days before in Washington, when they declared Iraq a stable democracy. Hashimi fled to Kurdistan, and the country’s political process was plunged into limbo.

The crisis exposed the artificial, Potemkin-village-like nature of Iraq’s democratic system and how swiftly the feuds among Iraq’s national leaders could endanger the state.

No political figure, no matter how high ranking, now doubts Maliki’s ability to harness the law and the state to his ambitions. Still, Maliki lacks the authority to eliminate all his enemies, by virtue of being enmeshed in a parliament-based system, which was imposed by the United States after 2003. But he will keep striving for absolute power, using fear, intimidation, and cronyism. The opposition will conspire against him and attempt to sabotage his policies, positive or negative, out of the desire to see him fail. But handicapped by their own divisions, they will never succeed in ousting him. This corrosive deadlock will only fan further disillusionment with the current order, sending the political system hurtling toward implosion. One of three outcomes—all dangerous—will likely result.



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
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The Iraq We Left Behind

First, some specific event or series of events—for example, the local and national elections expected in 2013 and 2014, respectively, or an escalation of the campaign of arrests against Maliki’s foes—could trigger violence involving Iraq’s tribes, sects, ethnicities, and parties. Second, the ineffectual rule of the central government could lead Sunni and Shiite regional leaders to carve out their own autonomous zones, leaving Iraq a state in name only, a prospect that could also ignite bloodshed if Baghdad refuses to recognize those boundaries or the provinces begin to fight over territory. Third, Shiite political figures and military officers could mount a coup, claiming the current government was endangering the country and declaring special rule for an emergency period. Repressive crackdowns would follow, triggering a cycle of retributive violence.

To save Iraq from these fates—any one of which would prove disastrous and would mark a total defeat for the United States in terms of its aims for the country—Washington must push Baghdad to honor the power-sharing agreements reached over a year ago and take concrete steps toward transparent governance, the rule of law, and national reconciliation. As much as Maliki will try to resist U.S. efforts to rein him in, he still believes that the United States can help him rebuild Iraq. He is caught between his grand ambition to attain affluence for his country, making Iraq an envy of nations, and his roots as an underground Islamic revolutionary. If he sees his abandonment by Washington as spelling the end to his rule or leading Iraq down the path of international isolation, as Saddam once led the country, he will be susceptible to pressure.

THE AFTERLIFE OF THE EMERALD CITY

TO FULLY understand just how Iraq’s current rulers work, it helps to visit the government in the Green Zone, 3.9 square miles of fortified territory in the heart of Baghdad. In the Saddam era, the neighborhood was called Karradat Mariam, after a local woman who cared for the poor. The district’s homes, palaces, hotels, and monuments stood as garish displays of the Baath regime’s wealth and pretensions. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, the U.S. military took control of the area and formalized its boundaries with blast walls and barbed wire.

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Then, in January 2009, when the United States ceded control over Iraqi security, Maliki became the lord of the Green Zone. Much like his U.S. predecessors, he spoke of opening the major highway that cuts through the restricted area to ease people's daily lives. But also like his U.S. predecessors, he was unable to keep his promise: the world outside proved too dangerous. Instead, Maliki's rule of the Green Zone became all-encompassing. Only those with the proper badges or escorted by someone with a government-issued Green Zone identification card can enter. (Those badges have become a source of corruption: according to U.S. military officers and Iraqis living around the area, one can be had for \$10,000.) The beggars, widows, and families with sick relatives who once made a pilgrimage to the gates of the parliament building in the Green Zone to beg lawmakers for help are now barred from entry.

Maliki has mimicked many of the hierarchical controls created during the U.S. occupation. His office splits Green Zone badges into the same color-coded ranks (blue for the highest level of access, orange and red for the lowest) as did the United States, and Maliki awards badges to buy influence and patronage, just as U.S. officials once did. During the years of U.S. control, the U.S. Army stationed military police and army units to police and defend the Green Zone. Maliki has his own version: in late 2008, he created the Baghdad Brigade, a special unit that guards the area's gates and patrols its private roads. The brigade, which operates outside the normal chain of command, is comprised of soldiers from the country's Shiite heartland sympathetic to Maliki and his Dawa Party. (The religious nature of the force is visible on holidays, when banners depicting Shiite icons hang from the Green Zone's entrances.)

Moreover, Maliki has made the management of his office a family affair, to the point where some high-ranking government officials now wonder, as they told me, whether they serve a family or a state. This has created an irony obvious to many Iraqis: at a time when the rest of the Arab world is rejecting family rule, Maliki has surrounded himself with his kin and others from his birthplace of Twaireej, a rural area south of Baghdad. His son Ahmed, who is deputy to the chief of staff and in charge of his father's personal security, is arguably the most powerful person in Maliki's office. He has gained particular

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notoriety for his consolidation of property in the Green Zone, which he has achieved by ordering the Baghdad Brigade to seize houses belonging to Iraqis and foreign contractors. These seizures have driven most Western companies out of the Green Zone. The Iraqi government does have legitimate reasons for wanting to ease out those Western firms that claimed land in the Green Zone after 2003. But such heavy-handed tactics—and the fact that the seized property has largely remained under Ahmed's control—have created the impression that Maliki's inner circle is mostly interested in enriching itself.

Maliki has also deployed his forces to intimidate and hamper his enemies. After the announcement of the arrest warrant against Hashimi in December, for example, Maliki deployed tanks outside the homes of Hashimi and other Iraqiya leaders; forces from the Baghdad Brigade required guests to present their credentials before going inside. He has dangled security as a carrot, awarding body-guard battalions to allies while refusing to grant a similar request to a senior elected Sunni official whom he dislikes, despite the danger to his rival's life.

PALACES AND PRISONS

THE GREATEST symbol of Maliki's strength in the Green Zone is a compound known as Camp Honor, the site of a bombed-out palatial meeting hall, built by Saddam in the 1990s, whose ceiling has a mural of Iraqi soldiers fighting U.S. troops. The U.S. military turned it into a base, and then, in 2006, it became the headquarters for an Iraqi army division. Today, the unkempt grounds are home to the giant palace, overgrown weeds, prefabricated houses, and shipping containers.

Since 2009, Camp Honor has also been the site of the private detention center overseen by Maliki's military office, which supervises all security operations and whose authority supersedes that of the Interior and Defense Ministries. In an infamous case from October 2009, Iraqi counterterrorism and regular army units grabbed more than 430 Sunni men in Mosul on the orders of that office. The prisoners were first held in Camp Honor and then transferred to a secret prison at Baghdad's Muthanna Air Base, where they were discovered in March 2010 by officials from the Human Rights Ministry. Looking to avoid

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a controversy so shortly after the national elections held earlier that month, Maliki agreed to shut down the Muthanna jail. But he refused to relinquish control of the Camp Honor detention facility despite having pledged to do so. A year later, a committee of Iraqi lawmakers toured the jail and threatened to expose its findings publicly; in response, the government announced Camp Honor's formal closure. Yet as Iraqi parliamentarians and other government officials told me, Camp Honor in fact remains open as a secret jail for prisoners captured by Maliki's elite forces.

There are alarming signs that those held there continue to be tortured to extract confessions; then, once the desired testimony is obtained, they are sent off to regular, legally recognized prisons. Last May, the International Committee of the Red Cross wrote a confidential letter to Maliki demanding full access to the jail. (I obtained a copy through my work as a reporter for the *Los Angeles Times*.) Based on interviews with former detainees at Camp Honor, the Red Cross claimed that it had uncovered evidence of systematic torture and gross mistreatment, including rape and electric shock to the genitals. It wrote that it had learned that Iraqi judges had been present during some of the torture sessions to extract confessions. The Red Cross also added that it knew of three other secret Green Zone jails connected to Camp Honor that remained active and hid detainees in case of any international or local inspections. When I asked about the letter, the Red Cross declined to comment.

Last December, I met a middle-aged Iraqi man, Abu Ibrahim (this was an assumed name; he feared for retribution from military units close to Maliki), who told me that he had been picked up by Iraqi counterterrorism soldiers in a raid on his Baghdad neighborhood a few months earlier. Soldiers burst into his house in the middle of the night. A masked informant identified him and his father as suspected terrorists. He said he was first taken to the main airport in Baghdad, where he was well treated, thanks to the presence of U.S. forces. But once the counterterrorism troops drove him to the Green Zone, the treatment became rougher. For three days, he was brought to a cluster of trailers for interrogation, where he said he was chained to a bar and left to dangle until he passed out. The guards yelled, "Are you al Qaeda? Are you Baathist?" They later took him into a nearby trailer

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where a judge attached to the counterterrorism force was reviewing his file. The judge expressed doubts about the secret informant who had accused him of terrorism and ordered his release.

Another judge, however, refused to free his father, who had been a high-ranking officer in the Saddam-era army. Weeks after Abu Ibrahim was released, an intermediary told him that the secret informant would be willing to drop the allegations against his father in exchange for money. U.S. military officers and Iraqi human rights inspectors have uncovered a familiar pattern for those held in Iraqi jails: a security officer or an informant demands money for a detainee to be released, leading to protracted negotiations. But in the case of Abu Ibrahim's father, before any talks could take shape, the middleman disappeared. Now, Abu Ibrahim does not know if someone will ask him for money again or what will become of his father.

The situation is unlikely to improve anytime soon, as any investigator from the Human Rights Ministry or any official from any other government office who is brave enough to try to probe the jails would face immediate persecution. Three investigators have already fled the country, and those remaining are terrified. One former Iraqi official who worked on human rights issues and left the country last year because he was afraid for his safety told me that Maliki and the Dawa Party were essentially free to carry out whatever they liked in their jails. "Everything is under their control," he said. "It's easy for them to accuse anyone and destroy him."

EASY MONEY IRAQ

ENDEMIC CORRUPTION within the army and the police not only contributes to such prisoner abuse but also feeds into broader, more systemic problems within Iraq's security apparatus. The culture of graft leads to crippling inefficiencies and dangerous gaps: commanders pad military payrolls with soldiers who do not exist, military officers and ministry officials receive kickbacks on contracts for everything from food supplies to defense equipment, and senior officials create skeleton companies to pilfer money from the Treasury.

The toxic brew of corruption undermines any hopes for reform and improved governance. Adel Abdul Mahdi, who was Iraq's vice

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president until he resigned last summer in protest over Maliki's bloated cabinet and the culture of entitlement among officials, told me that corruption is so pervasive that it is blocking the provision of basic services. For example, as he explained, "mafias" in business and the government make money off the lack of progress in the electricity sector through overpriced contracts and sales funneled to politically connected but inefficient firms.

No political party or faction is immune to the lure of easy money, fed by the state's lucrative oil revenues and the lax controls on how cash is spent. The loyalty of a lawmaker, cleric, commander, or tribal leader can be bought with houses, cars, and cash. A longtime Iraqi civil servant close to Maliki's Dawa Party explained to me how it

With no plan to break the country's political stalemate, the only course left for all sides is brinkmanship.

works: political figures set up shell companies, helmed by a trusted businessperson or relative, that then bid to deliver goods or services to the government. The contracts, whether for building a sewage line or beautifying the Baghdad highway, are consistently overpriced, allowing the companies to divert revenues and assets to the foreign bank accounts of government officials. An electricity official told me that the Electricity

Ministry regularly purchases equipment for its distribution department that is purportedly German but is in fact cheap Chinese or Iranian knockoffs; similarly, a state-employed pharmacist in Baghdad complained about the cheap medicine that the government imports with no concern for quality because officials get kickbacks from particular companies or importers.

This culture of corruption filters up to the highest levels of government: even Iraq's national budget is shrouded in mystery, with appropriations announced and spent with little transparency. Baghdad has spent more than \$400 billion since 2004, but the government is only now preparing to release a final account of its budgets from 2004 to 2009. Most of the cash spent will likely never be properly accounted for. In 2011, Baghdad reported that it did not know how much of the \$25 billion that the central government had advanced to ministries, local governments, and state

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companies as of the middle of 2010 had actually been spent or if any excess funds could be returned.

Iraq's opaque finances create an atmosphere in which misdealings flourish. High-level politicians and officials can quickly put a halt to any investigation into wrongdoing among their associates or underlings. In April 2009, for example, Iraq's Commission on Public Integrity launched an investigation into Abdul Falah al-Sudani, then the trade minister and a member of a branch of Maliki's Dawa Party, for allegedly embezzling millions of dollars in public funds. A month after a shoot-out in central Baghdad between his staff and investigators, Sudani tried to flee the country and was briefly jailed. But almost a year later, a judge dismissed the case against him.

Those who have worked in the state's anticorruption bodies are bleak about the future. They have been blocked too many times by the powerful and realize that their lives are in danger. Some have been killed. The head of the Commission on Public Integrity resigned in September, frustrated by his inability to pursue corruption charges against high officials. Maliki replaced him with someone considered to be more pliant and less likely to antagonize those in power. In Baghdad, I met with an anticorruption official who showed me a number of veiled threats he had received on his cell phone from the boss of a company suspected of funneling money to the Dawa Party. One text message read, "Is it acceptable some government figures would provoke you to be against us? Do you think a big company like ours would not know about this?" It went on to say, "We are requesting that God protects you." The official was worried for his safety. He now never leaves home without a bodyguard. "Committing murder in Iraq is casual," he said, "like drinking a morning cup of coffee."

DASHED HOPES

DISENCHANTMENT WITH corruption and government dysfunction has spread to Basra, the oil-rich city in Iraq's Shiite south. It was here, with his 2008 campaign against the Shiite militias that were terrorizing ordinary Iraqis, where Maliki showed himself a bold leader willing to confront powerful Shiite armed groups even if it might cost him his job. Maliki's popularity soared; having saved the

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city from chaos, he was viewed as the best hope for security and development. But four years later, those hopes have largely been dashed: Basra is marked by open ponds brimming with sewage, sporadic electricity, and shantytowns made from looted sheet metal and bricks. Looking at the convoys of American and European oil workers driving across town and the two new luxury hotels that have opened in recent years, locals are sure that the money made from their oil fields is being whisked off to Baghdad.

Today, many local businesspeople and politicians believe that the creation of an autonomous region in the province of Basra is the only way to save it from poverty and the yoke of a corrupt elite in the capital. They are angry that Baghdad controls security and directs spending in the province, holding back funds from the local government in an effort to extend its dominance over the wealthy region. Last February, popular demonstrations in the province over poor services and official corruption forced the Dawa Party's choices for governor and chair of the provincial council to resign. (Protests have also forced the resignation of governors in two other Shiite provinces.) In late 2010, Basra's council voted in favor of a referendum on federalism, but the central government simply ignored the motion. Meanwhile, public anger in Basra and among Shiite communities across the country prompted the Iraqi Shiites' most revered spiritual guide, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose endorsement is readily sought by the Shiite political elite, to refuse all meetings with elected officials, including Maliki. Local politicians in Basra are sensitive to the popular mood, and even figures from Maliki's political slate feel they must assert their independence from Baghdad.

The new chair of the provincial council, Sabah al-Bazouni, who represents a branch of Maliki's Dawa Party, told me of Basra's woes: closed factories, electricity blackouts in the summer, miles of slums, dried-out irrigation canals. He wondered how the province that supplies 70 percent of the country's oil could be so poor. He said that Basra should be able to hold a referendum on greater autonomy, even over the objections of Maliki and the government in Baghdad.

If Basra does manage to become an autonomous region, Bazouni argues that the province should also gain the right to negotiate all future oil contracts in its territory, as well as manage its own port and

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borders and keep its own security forces. It would send back revenues to the Iraqi central government according to the national law, when it is finally passed, and whatever agreements Basra reached with Baghdad. The experiment could serve as a model for the capital's relationships with other restive regions, such as the two Sunni-led provinces currently also requesting independence. Of course, it could also cause splits, perhaps violent ones, within the country's Shiite majority. Those officials, such as Maliki, who advocate a strong national government could fall into conflict with their local counterparts who want greater power and control of Basra's lucrative resources. The temptation of being able to control a nearly autonomous region could also spark fighting among the local branches of Shiite parties, each of which sees itself as the rightful ruler of the wealthy region. Indeed, it was such competition that drove Basra to lawlessness before Maliki's intervention in 2008. Basra's residents seem to recognize these dangers, yet because they view Baghdad as pilfering their wealth, they see no better option.

“THE RIGHTEOUS HAVE THEIR OPPONENTS”

FACED WITH the prospect of his Shiite base splintering, Maliki has taken to fanning public fears of Iraq's Sunni minority. He seems to think that if he can keep Iraq's Shiites afraid of the Sunnis, they will not dare break with him and risk jeopardizing Shiite dominance of the political process. Maliki has accordingly begun to emphasize the Sunni atrocities committed during the Saddam era and the recent civil war. “Any successful person has enemies; the righteous have their opponents. Moses has his pharaoh, and every Hussein has his Yazid,” Maliki said in a speech on New Year's Day, referring to the caliph who massacred Imam Hussein and his followers in the seventh century, giving birth to the modern-day schism between Shiites and Sunnis.

Such a strategy marks a break from Maliki's rhetoric in 2008, when, in order to extend his writ, he used the national army to fight Shiite militias and explored the idea of forming alliances with Sunni leaders. These relationships were abandoned in the raw politics of the 2010 national elections and the ensuing competition between Maliki and Allawi. In Maliki's subsequent bid to consolidate his power, he has

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come to rely more and more on fundamentalist Shiite parties. Since the elections, Maliki and his supporters have polarized the country's politics by trying to arrest Sunni politicians and announcing a series of foiled terrorist plots by Sunnis.

As a result, whereas two years ago many Sunnis viewed Maliki favorably, they now perceive him as an Iranian-backed despot out to destroy their community. According to former Sunni allies of Maliki, the Sunni community now fears that if Maliki hangs on to power, he will continue persecuting Sunnis with arbitrary arrests and intimidation campaigns. The Speaker of parliament, Osama al-Nujaifi, a Sunni from the Iraqiya bloc, has warned that if Baghdad continues to carry out such hostile actions, the Sunni population will be forced to declare their own autonomous regions. Indeed, many Sunni leaders now champion self-rule, an idea they opposed in 2005, when it was legally enshrined in the constitution (an article that Maliki continues to ignore). At the time, Sunni leaders viewed federalism as a recipe for Iraq's destruction and loathed the Kurds for their autonomy in the north. Today, they see the way the Kurds have thrived as proof that the only way to get a fair distribution of Iraq's wealth and to protect themselves from Baghdad is by embracing a federalist Iraq.

Last October, after security forces from Baghdad arrested dozens of aging former Baathists in the Sunni-majority Salahuddin Province, Salahuddin became the first Sunni region to call for a federal system. The recent history of Samarra, a strategically important city in Salahuddin and home to the sacred Askariya Mosque, provides a measure of the toll that Iraq's sectarian battles have taken on ordinary citizens. The city was once a model of the country's rich cross-cultural traditions, with its gold-domed mosque worshipped at by Shiites and tended by the city's majority Sunni population. But in 2006, al Qaeda in Iraq blew up the sanctuary, thereby igniting the country's civil war. The city's streets belonged to al Qaeda and its foot soldiers, who terrorized the local population. Now, six years later, the violence has subsided, and Shiite pilgrims are again traveling to pray in Samarra—but the shrine remains walled off with giant cement barriers that make it look like a maximum-security prison. Samarra's Sunni residents, who once prayed by the shrine and celebrated their weddings there, largely keep their distance. Men stand idle in front of empty clothing

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shops and hotels that once catered to pilgrims but are now effectively sealed off from commerce. Even locals have stopped shopping in the city's center so as to avoid the national police who harass those who come too close to the shrine.

The more Baghdad imposes its will on Sunni areas, the greater the chances for wider sectarian unrest. With no plan to break the country's political stalemate, the only course left for all sides is brinkmanship, with escalating Sunni demands for freedom and Baghdad answering back with intimidation. Even the Iraqi Kurds are encouraging the Sunnis to push for self-rule: they believe that if the Sunnis, traditionally hostile to Kurdish ambitions, embraced federalism, it would legitimize their own privileges and prevent Baghdad from ever trying to encroach on their authority.

Federalism could indeed end up being an effective mechanism for the country's Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds to live together peacefully—but for it to work, a process of authentic national reconciliation would have to come first. Without shared decision-making in government, inclusive institutions, and trust and respect for the law, federalism would lead to the splintering of Iraq, turning the country into a proxy battlefield between Iran and the Sunni Muslim world. In this scenario, Iraq would exist only in name, leaving a collection of territories often at war with one another and at the mercy of foreign powers. Civilians would be subjected to terrorist attacks, caught in the middle of the ensuing regional struggles for oil and water. The notion of Iraq as a modern nation-state would fade, relegated to the ranks of failed twentieth-century colonial experiments.

SALVAGING THE AMERICAN LEGACY

THE ONLY hope Iraq has of escaping a future of war or corrupt, authoritarian rule is for the United States and the international community to start pushing hard for power sharing and democracy. Since Iraq's 2010 elections, Washington has completely failed on this score. But U.S. officials must not stay silent in the face of illegal detentions and crackdowns on civil liberties; neither should they back away from the power-sharing agreements they helped sponsor for the sake of short-term political considerations. Even with U.S. soldiers gone

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from the country, the United States retains leverage over Iraq. It can and should, for example, threaten to keep Iraq locked in its so-called Chapter 7 status in the United Nations, which deprives Iraq of full sovereignty and requires it to make reparations payments to Kuwait. And it should warn Iraq that it will cancel the sale of U.S. fighter jets, tanks, and surveillance equipment to the government unless it changes course. Iraq's leaders need to know that the international community has "redlines," and that secret prisons, the use of torture to extract confessions, and the harassment of democracy activists will not be tolerated. As for the danger of pushing Baghdad closer to Tehran, although Iran would gladly smother Iraq in a suffocating embrace, Iraq's own tortuous history of war with its neighbor means that Iraq will continue to seek a relationship with the West in part to counterbalance Tehran.

The local elections in 2013 and the national elections the year after will be a test of whether Iraq's leaders indeed believe in representative government or whether those in power now will try to hold on to it by any means necessary. Maliki is currently pursuing a number of officials on the electoral commission's staff with corruption investigations. And in January 2011, he won a court ruling that placed the commission under his authority, rather than under the parliament's. Whereas some Iraqi officials wonder if the next elections will be free and fair, several former U.S. military officers wonder if the elections will happen at all.

The United States must ensure that they do and that they are free and fair, and it must not countenance any democratic backsliding for the sake of political expediency. Confronting Maliki and his government on abuses and political arrests may strain relations, but ignoring such topics has only helped lead Iraq to its current, deeply troubled state. If Iraq slips into dictatorship or war, this will be the United States' legacy in the country. But Iraq should not be written off. With outside help, it could still manage to muddle through with an elected government that is somewhat accountable and somewhat representative. Such an outcome would go a long way toward redeeming the United States' disastrous misadventure there. 🌐

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How to Accomplish More With Less

Carter Malkasian and J. Kael Weston

THE UNITED STATES, facing deepening economic and fiscal woes at home, is preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan. More and more policymakers, congressional representatives, and members of the public are calling for the majority of U.S. forces to pull out as quickly as possible and for Washington to shift from an expensive counterinsurgency strategy, in which tens of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops protect the Afghan population, to a cheaper counterterrorism strategy, in which special operations forces strike at terrorist leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Afghans are left largely on their own.

The counterinsurgency strategy began in earnest in 2009, when the United States raised its total number of troops in Afghanistan to nearly 100,000. This Afghan surge led to tactical success: Kandahar and Helmand were largely secured, and the number of Afghan police and army soldiers nearly doubled. But it was expensive. In 2011, the U.S. Congress authorized nearly \$114 billion for the effort, roughly a fourth of the entire cost of the Afghan war since 2001. Given the current economic climate, such high annual outlays are no longer sustainable. Last June, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that 33,000 American troops will leave Afghanistan by the end of 2012 and that Afghan forces will take the lead in the country's security by the end of 2014. Although it remains undecided exactly how fast the

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withdrawal will proceed after 2012 and what sort of U.S. presence will remain after 2014, Washington is facing strong domestic pressure to bring its troops home and to focus on rebuilding the economy.

At first glance, shifting to counterterrorism would seem the best way to meet this goal. A counterterrorism approach would cut costs by pulling out most U.S. ground troops. Special operations forces would remain in the larger bases, with responsibility for launching missions to kill or capture al Qaeda members, high-level Taliban figures, and leaders of the Haqqani network. What is more, the U.S. Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden last May seemed to give this approach credibility by suggesting that knocking out al Qaeda—the primary reason why the United States entered Afghanistan in the first place—does not require tens of thousands of U.S. troops.

The problem with such thinking, however, is that it ignores the question of what will happen in the country after the Americans leave. More specifically, it largely overlooks the ongoing and vital role the United States is playing in advising, training, and supporting the Afghan government and its security forces.

A few counterterrorism advocates, particularly Vice President Joseph Biden, have called for the United States to keep military advisers (or what they refer to as “trainers,” a term that denotes a noncombat role) in Afghanistan after 2014, but such proposals are not detailed or instructive enough. There is no discussion of how many U.S. forces would fill this role, where they would be located, how long they would stay, or whether they would go into battle with their Afghan counterparts. Amid the drawdown, U.S. military commanders, running short on conventional forces and lacking orders to the contrary, would likely relegate U.S. advisory units to big bases or dissolve them altogether. Similarly, in the face of a military withdrawal, the U.S. civilian officials who work with their Afghan counterparts in the countryside would likely pull back to the embassy in Kabul and a handful of consulates. Thus, the soldiers and civilians most needed to hold Afghanistan together would end up too far away from the areas that matter—the provinces and districts—to make a difference.

Such a counterterrorism strategy would be unlikely to hold Afghanistan together. Once U.S. forces pulled out, Taliban fighters based in Pakistan would escalate their attacks against key Afghan provinces. At

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the same time, they would work to gain popular support by exploiting the tendency of the Afghan government and its domestic allies to mistreat the population and to squabble with one another, a process that would only be magnified once U.S. civilian advisers were gone. Although they have increased in number and ability in recent years, the Afghan army, police, and tribal militias would not be able to fend off the Taliban without the help of U.S. forces. (They lack the capability to call in air strikes, for example, and suffer from logistical shortcomings.)

The Afghan central government would likely lose control of the Pashtun east and south, the very ground the U.S. military and its allies have fought so hard to secure. Kabul would become the frontline, turned to rubble once more. Counterterrorism would also get much more difficult: intelligence would dry up as the Taliban scared Afghans away from working with the government, forward bases would have to be abandoned as they were encircled by insurgents, and Pakistan's tribal region would become more remote and harder to hit. The Afghan government, thrown on the defensive, would be unable to prevent the return of al Qaeda to the vast Pashtun heartland. In other words, although a full counterinsurgency strategy may no longer be sustainable, a pure counterterrorism strategy is scarcely more attractive, as it could cause Afghanistan to backslide, quickly and perhaps irrevocably, taking with it the United States' ability to combat al Qaeda.

From Washington's perspective, giving up on eastern and southern Afghanistan and accepting a heightened terrorist threat might be acceptable if, in fact, there were no way to recoup a decade's effort in Afghanistan at a manageable cost. But this is not the case. Salvaging the war will not require 100,000 troops. A gradual but steady withdrawal that leaves thousands of U.S. military and civilian advisers in the country after 2014, as well as special operations forces and airpower, is a viable alternative.

In relying more on small, elite advisory teams, living out in the field and working side by side with their Afghan counterparts, the United

Not only can an advisory strategy bring about a stable, secure Afghanistan, but it also offers the United States a strategic model for its new age of austerity.

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States could enable the Afghan government to fend off the Taliban at an affordable cost. This strategy differs dramatically from counterterrorism because it prioritizes holding Afghanistan together (many counterterrorism advocates, such as the U.S. diplomat Robert Blackwill, readily concede that a divided, Pashtun-less Afghanistan may be the outcome). Not only can an advisory strategy bring about a stable, secure Afghanistan, but it also offers the United States a strategic model for its new age of austerity. Future challenges can be met, and even prevented, at a low cost by the aggressive use of military and civilian advisers.

THE TACTICAL EDGE OF ADVISERS

THE UNITED STATES can draw on a long and successful history of deploying advisers to fight insurgencies abroad, beginning in 1950, when U.S. Army Colonel Edward Lansdale and a few dozen military advisers helped Filipino President Ramón Magsaysay defeat the communist Hukbalahap Rebellion in the Philippines. A more recent and well-known success story is El Salvador, where between 1981 and 1989, a handful of U.S. military and civilian advisers backed by roughly \$8.7 billion in aid (adjusted for inflation) enabled the government to hold off 10,000 guerrillas. The military advisers oversaw the growth of the El Salvadoran army from 11,500 to 57,000 soldiers, and the civilian advisers targeted the root causes of the insurgency by enacting a wide-ranging campaign to strengthen democracy. The effort kept the insurgency in check until 1992, when the loss of Soviet and Cuban aid forced the exhausted insurgents to sign a peace accord. A similar process has played out in Colombia. Since 2000, fewer than 1,500 U.S. military and civilian advisers, together with over \$7 billion in largely military aid, have helped the Colombian government push back the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and reduce terrorist attacks in the country by 90 percent. Finally, in Afghanistan itself in 2001, fewer than 10,000 U.S. special operations forces, marines, and soldiers embedded with the Northern Alliance and President Hamid Karzai's Pashtun allies drove out the Taliban—good proof of what can be accomplished by a few bold men.

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In all these cases, advisers focused on supporting a preexisting government (or local alliance, in the case of Afghanistan) rather than on carrying out independent combat or counterterrorist operations of their own. The host government and its armed forces functioned, even if they were often ridden with problems. (For this reason, Iraq in 2004 and Afghanistan in 2006 stand out as examples where an advisory strategy may not have been feasible, given that the host militaries were being overrun.) In no cases above did an opponent have a marked numerical or material advantage, such as in aircraft, artillery, or armor. In short, as long as the security forces of the host country have the motivation and basic combat skills to stand up and fight and are not facing overwhelming odds, then small teams of foreign military and civilian advisers can provide the tactical edge and political cohesion necessary to fend off opponents, if not defeat them altogether.

In Afghanistan, advisers may not be able to fully clear mountainous areas where the Taliban are strong, such as Kunar and Nuristan, but they could prevent most of Afghanistan, including its Pashtun heartland, from being overrun by the Taliban. This would require a serious commitment from the United States. Foreign advisers would need to remain in the country well beyond 2014, until one of two things happened: either the Afghan government reached a formal or informal truce with the Taliban or Afghans on their own were able to make a Taliban presence in populated areas untenable.

IMPARTING VALUES

THOUSANDS OF U.S. military and civilian advisers are currently based in Afghanistan. Teams of military advisers, ranging in size from 12 to 28 soldiers or marines, are embedded with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and the Interior in Kabul all the way down to the army battalions and the district police forces on the frontlines, often living, working, and fighting beside their Afghan counterparts.

Outside the isolated mountain valleys of Kunar and Nuristan, where the local terrain has allowed the Taliban to win a string of victories, the Afghan army and police generally get the better of insurgents in daily operations. Afghan forces performed well last summer in firefights in Kabul, Kandahar, and Lashkar Gah. Yet they still depend on U.S. fire,

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air, and logistical support—and on their advisers to coordinate such support. A report last October by the U.S. Department of Defense showed that 114 of 161 Afghan army battalions and 150 of 218 Afghan police district forces could plan, execute, and sustain operations, but all still needed assistance or advisers from U.S. and NATO commands. According to the report, no Afghan police forces and only one Afghan army battalion was effective without foreign support. The critical shortcoming of the Afghan forces is in air and artillery power, without which no army, U.S. or Afghan, can easily overcome insurgents who are entrenched in mud-walled villages. The Afghans rely on their U.S. and NATO advisers to call in artillery and air strikes. This is a technical issue not easily remedied: requesting such strikes requires specialized training and encrypted equipment, which means that U.S. and NATO aircraft would be of little use to Afghan soldiers and police if they had no advisers with them.

Afghan units also suffer from delays in receiving reinforcements and ammunition, a problem that, if left unchecked, can make an otherwise motivated unit ineffective in combat. By monitoring the readiness of their Afghan counterparts and keeping an eye on levels of ammunition and fuel, advisers can help ensure that supplies and reinforcements arrive on time from Afghan stockpiles and depots.

Even military analysts who are skeptical of full-scale counterinsurgency agree on the usefulness of advisers. For example, Bing West, a military analyst and author who has been critical of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, argues in his book *The Wrong War* that “the primary U.S. mission” in Afghanistan should be to transition to scores of small “adviser task forces.” As West writes, “These advisers would go into combat with the Afghan forces, provide the link to fire support, and have a voice in who gets promoted.” Military advisers fill a larger moral role, as well. By teaching, watching, and living with their Afghan counterparts, advisers impart values that will help build an Afghan army and an Afghan police force that can not only defeat the Taliban but also serve the Afghan people long after.

SIGNALS OF COMMITMENT

IN ADDITION to their military counterparts, civilian advisers—political officers from the U.S. State Department, development and governance

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experts from USAID, specialists from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and many others—have been working in Afghanistan since 2001. These civilians are often part of the provincial reconstruction teams that are run by the United States or another NATO member in nearly every Afghan province; on the more local levels, 38 Afghan districts have analogous district support teams. Civilians provide guidance to provincial and district governors and work to improve governance, reduce corruption, and drive economic development. Based on their established relationships with local elders and government officials, civilian advisers also act as a key liaison with Afghan leaders when military forces damage property, disturb women in a raid, or cause inadvertent civilian casualties.

To be sure, civilian advisers face a complicated task: Afghanistan's political and social problems are vast. Government is overly centralized, denying locals a say in their own administration, and corruption is rife. On the district and provincial levels, governors, the police, and other leaders have a history of stealing land, levying illegal taxes, appropriating foreign aid, falsely imprisoning innocent people, and even torturing prisoners—the sort of behavior that caused people in Kandahar to turn to the Taliban in the first place. A bigger problem is that the central government and its allies—various tribes, mujahideen warlords, and former communists—are not terribly united. For centuries, Afghan governments have had to balance the country's many tribes and ethnicities, using promises of money or political positions and threats of military force to keep them in line. Such a system has proved unstable and allows the Taliban to co-opt groups aligned with the government, as they did when they first seized power in 1994 and again when they took over parts of southern Afghanistan in 2006. Under the weight of these problems, it is hard to see how the Afghan government could hold together against the Taliban on its own.

Although there is no sure solution to these problems, civilian advisers can go a long way toward mending them. In some cases, civilians have been able to improve governance by reducing the degree of centralization in the Afghan state. In Helmand, for example, British development experts pioneered district community councils, whose members were elected by tribal leaders, religious leaders, doctors, and teachers; these

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councils are now up and running throughout the province and give locals a say in district government. Similarly, U.S. civilian advisers have been able to reduce corruption and abusive behavior, such as in Kunar, where they built a court system that is now overseeing public trials, exactly the kind of fair and open process that experts have long called for in Afghanistan.

Finally, civilian advisers have fostered unity among Afghanistan's disparate factions. In Khost, for example, U.S. civilians worked with

If the United States wants to retain its international dominance, it will have to tolerate more risks and the sacrifices that go along with them.

the provincial government to reach out to the religious community in an effort to officially register more madrasahs; in the process, local Afghan officials engaged dozens of Taliban foot soldiers, who were then reintegrated into Afghan society. And in Helmand, civilians working in district support teams helped bring tribal leaders back to the pro-government camp. In 2010, they coordinated negotiations between the Afghan government and the Alikozai tribe in the hotly contested town

of Sangin that resulted in key tribal leaders' pledging to oppose the Taliban. According to Shah Jahan, one of southern Helmand's more powerful tribal leaders, the civilian advisers "hold things together and keep the district governor, police chief, and tribal leaders from fighting with each other." The advisers bring with them mediation and alliance-building skills, which will be needed in Afghanistan for years to come. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton touched on this point when she wrote in these pages in 2010, "Properly trained and equipped, civilians are force multipliers. One effective diplomat or development expert can leverage as many as ten local partners, and when local partners build their own capacities and networks, communities become stronger and more resilient."

Both military and political advisers serve one other purpose: they signal commitment. Their presence would reassure Afghans that international forces will not surrender their country to the Taliban, a fear that the Taliban have exploited. For example, Mullah Naim Barech, the Taliban's shadow governor of Helmand, sent messages to tribal

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leaders in 2010 and 2011 that the United States would be leaving by 2014 and that the Taliban would soon be back. As a result, a number of tribal leaders started hedging their bets, not wanting to be seen as allies of the government. Advisers countered these messages, explaining that U.S. policy was to let Afghans take the lead in security in 2014 but not to abandon the country entirely, reassuring most of the tribal leaders. In this way, as U.S. forces leave the country, advisers could act as a symbol of the United States' continuing commitment to Afghanistan and show Afghans that their support of the government would not be in vain. The presence of military and civilian advisers would also signal to NATO allies and Pakistan, as well as to regional rivals such as China and Iran, that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan will endure, albeit in a modified and reduced form.

LOW COST, HIGH IMPACT

A POLICY BASED on maintaining advisers in strategically important locations need not drain U.S. blood and treasure. At the moment, there are between 8,000 and 12,500 military advisers who work with a total of 170,000 Afghan soldiers and 136,000 Afghan police officers. By the end of 2012, the U.S.-led coalition plans to have 195,000 Afghan soldiers and 157,000 Afghan police officers in the field; that means that to maintain the existing ratio of advisers to Afghans, the U.S.-led coalition would need to keep a total of approximately 9,000–14,500 advisers in Afghanistan, a rather hefty number. Yet if the United States and its allies focused on key districts in the east and the south, the number of advisers could be kept below 7,000, not including logistics and support personnel.

Meanwhile, roughly 1,300 U.S. civilians are now deployed in Afghanistan, marking the height of what Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan before he died in late 2010, called the “civilian surge.” More would not be needed. In fact, the overall number of civilian advisers could be reduced as long as a core team of State Department and USAID officers remained with frontline provincial reconstruction teams and district support teams. They should serve two-year tours and be given adequate language training and a small amount of funding to run low-cost governance programs, not

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expensive infrastructure projects. To save costs, these civilians could move into the same locations as the military advisory teams.

What is critical is that both military and civilian advisers are deployed in the field, working with their Afghan counterparts. To do their job, military advisers need to live with the Afghans, so that they are close by when fighting breaks out. As the United States learned in Iraq, rushing to the scene of a battle from a giant forward operating base does not work. Time after time, Iraqi police and army units under attack were left on their own, unable to call in air support, waiting for U.S. military reinforcements. Most firefights last less than 30 minutes, and it is tough to get out of the front gate, let alone to the action, in that much time. Nor will civilian advisers have much success if they are cloistered in the U.S. embassy in Kabul and in a few consulates. Similar attempts at long-distance advising failed to get a grip on the poor governance and crippling feuds that nearly brought down the Afghan government in 2006. If posted far away from local government leaders and power brokers, civilian advisers will lose track of the intricacies of Afghan politics and will become too uninvolved in day-to-day events to react to problems. They need not live side by side with their Afghan counterparts—such a constant presence would cast a shadow over Afghan sovereignty—but they should see them daily, which means living out in the country's provinces and districts.

Advisory strategies that look cheap in theory can end up being quite expensive because of the security (what the military calls “force protection”), medical, and logistical costs of keeping small teams in the field. The size and cost of an operation can quickly balloon when factors such as U.S. soldiers to guard bases, dining facilities, and administrative staff are included. For the advisory approach to work in Afghanistan, the United States would have to forego these elaborate comforts. The teams would be expected to live without the giant bases and quick-reaction forces that now epitomize the Western way of war. Although they might have some vehicles and small security details, they would move and operate with the Afghans, and share the same risks. Through such measures, the number of support personnel could be held to well under current levels, as they were in previous wars. Special operations forces and airpower would stay in place to carry out counterterrorist missions and back up Afghan forces when needed.

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The advantage of such a strategy is that it would be far less costly than full-blown counterinsurgency and is in keeping with the U.S. public's aversion to financing an overexpanded empire. The total number of U.S. troops and civilians in Afghanistan, including special operations forces and air and support personnel, could be brought down to 25,000, if not fewer, after 2014; based on research by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, this would cost only \$30 billion per year, almost a quarter of current operational expenses. If U.S. allies also contributed to the advisory effort, the cost could be brought down even further.

The strategy does carry risks: advisers would inevitably be killed operating far from U.S. bases, away from quick-reaction forces and ready medical care. But their loss, however tragic, would be bearable if the overall effort enabled the Afghans to hold their country together at a lower economic and human cost than keeping tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers in the country. The only other alternative would be to abandon Afghanistan, which would mean that the United States sacrificed ten years, thousands of lives, and hundreds of billions of dollars for nothing. A little more patience and effort will go a long way toward preserving hard-won gains.

Moreover, such a strategy would have obvious applications for the future. The United States is facing a new strategic paradigm. Since Vietnam, the country's wealth has allowed it to prosecute a form of war that minimized risk to its men and women. But that wealth is running dry. If the United States wants to retain its international dominance, it will have to tolerate more risks and the sacrifices that go along with them. Leaving small numbers of advisers in places such as Afghanistan is one way to maintain influence and accept risk. Military and political advisers cannot solve every problem—sometimes large-scale interventions are necessary—but there are many crises in which a few experienced soldiers and diplomats can prevent a problem from getting much worse. 🌐

The Globalization of Animal Welfare

More Food Does Not Require More Suffering

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THE UNIVERSAL Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, articulates the idea that it is wrong to exclude any member of the human species from the circle of moral concern. This enlightened vision was a tremendous advance over earlier, more restricted views about who matters morally; yet it still excludes a far larger number of beings who can both enjoy life and suffer: nonhuman animals. They, or at least those capable of feeling pain, which at a minimum includes all vertebrates, are also entitled to concern. Pain is pain, irrespective of the species of the being that experiences it.

Concern for the welfare of animals is not a new idea. In the fourth century BC, the Chinese Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi said that compassion should permeate relations not only between humans but also between all sentient beings. Buddhist teachings consider caring for all sentient beings a central ethical precept. The Indian emperor Ashoka, who ruled in the third century BC, issued edicts against the unnecessary killing and mutilation of animals, including hunting for sport. He also established animal hospitals and promoted, but did not require, a vegetarian diet. In seventeenth-century Japan, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi, the so-called Dog Shogun, enacted various rules protecting animals,

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especially dogs. The Hebrew Bible requires that the Sabbath be a day of rest for oxen, as well as for humans, and other texts command Jews to relieve the suffering of animals, even if they belong to an enemy. The Koran, too, encourages Muslims to treat animals with kindness; the Prophet Muhammad is said to have cut off the sleeve of his shirt rather than disturb a cat who was sleeping on it.

The modern animal welfare movement started in the West. Beginning in the early nineteenth century, first in the United Kingdom and later in other European states and North America, governments passed laws to protect animals from at least some forms of cruelty, such as whippings and beatings, and from being deprived of food and water. Western states went on to extend legal protection to animals in industries, such as those used in experiments, and, later, to those raised on farms and slaughtered for human consumption. The European Union today has a number of protections for agricultural animals, including the banning of sow stalls for pregnant pigs, intensive confinement of young calves, and barren cages for egg-laying hens. Meanwhile, national governments and the global community have increasingly voiced concern for farm animals, no matter where they may be raised.

But despite these advancements in domestic policy, including various but limited animal protection laws, a regulatory framework for animal welfare has largely been absent on the international level. Although there have long been international agreements to protect certain species from hunting—for example, the 1946 agreement that established the International Whaling Commission—no comparable agreements exist to govern the treatment of animals raised to be eaten by humans or to produce eggs or milk.

In the past decade, however, the welfare of farm animals has become an issue of international concern. In part, the shift has been caused by the growth in international trade in animals and animal products, and in part, by Westerners' reactions to what they perceive as cruel practices both in their own countries and outside their borders. Between 1980 and 2006, total meat exports increased more than threefold, dairy exports more than doubled, and exports of eggs nearly doubled. This growing trade in animal products has heightened awareness of welfare concerns, as has the export of animals themselves. Last June, for example, an Australian television program aired undercover video showing the

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slaughter of domestic cattle who had been exported to Indonesia. Workers were shown knocking the animals to the ground and strapping them down—fully conscious, in panic, eyes bulging—to await the slaughterer’s knife. Such gruesome scenes were simply unacceptable to the Australian public; shortly after the program aired, Canberra suspended the export of Australian cattle to Indonesia until the Indonesian government permitted inspections to ensure that slaughterhouse conditions would be made more humane.

A new movement is emerging. With an increasing number of animals being raised for international markets, and with a growing ability for people to watch previously unseen footage of animal handling, policymakers, businesspeople, nongovernmental organizations, and ordinary citizens are showing greater interest in how animals are treated, wherever they may be. It is no longer sufficient for governments to be concerned for the welfare of animals within their own borders: animal welfare is quickly becoming an issue of international concern.

WHERE’S THE BEEF?

TODAY, ECONOMIC growth and development around the world are leading to a rise in the demand for animal products. According to the World Bank, increased global demand caused total meat production in the developing world to almost triple between 1980 and 2002—from 45 million to 134 million tons—with the greatest escalation taking place in countries experiencing rapid economic growth, led by China. According to the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in developing countries since the early 1960s, milk consumption has almost doubled, meat consumption has more than tripled, and egg consumption has increased by a factor of five. (Yet even despite the increased consumption in the developing world, the average person in an industrialized country still consumes far more animal products each year: 181 pounds of meat, 459 pounds of dairy, and 29 pounds of eggs, as compared with 68 pounds of meat, 110 pounds of dairy, and 18 pounds of eggs for each person in the developing world.)

The world’s farm animal population has grown to meet this rising demand. In 2009 alone, more than 60 billion land animals—nearly



nine times as many as the human population—were slaughtered for food. (This number included approximately 52 billion chickens, 1.34 billion pigs, 656 million turkeys, 521 million sheep, 403 million goats, and 298 million cattle.) In addition, around 1.18 trillion eggs were produced for food that year.

These huge numbers raise concerns about pollution, the soaring demand for grain and soybeans to feed these animals, and the significant contribution that farm animal production has on global warming. At the same time, the conditions under which the animals live pose problems for their welfare. The vast majority of the world's animal products are supplied by intensive confinement systems, which deny animals the opportunity to live in a way suited to the normal behavior of their species. As the world's appetite for meat, eggs, and milk has

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grown, the intensive confinement model of animal production, initially developed in the years after World War II in Europe and North America, has continued to supplant more traditional farming practices. Today, industrial systems—those that purchase at least 90 percent of their animal feed from other enterprises and house a single species in intensive conditions—produce around two-thirds of the world’s poultry, meat, and eggs, and more than half the pork. And these industrial methods place severe limits on animals, in terms of both space and their ability to engage in natural behavior.

Given the sheer numbers of chickens that are raised for meat and eggs each year, the poultry industry is arguably the most egregious violator of animal welfare. Egg-laying hens, for example, are typically kept in barren, wire-mesh enclosures known as battery cages. These cages are so small that even if there were just one hen in each cage, she would be unable to fully stretch and flap her wings—and there are often at least four, if not more, hens per cage. Under such crowded conditions, the birds are unable to establish their usual social hierarchy. Subordinate hens have no way of isolating themselves from their more dominant cagemates and, as a result, are likely to have their feathers and bodies pecked by the dominant birds, resulting in injury and sometimes even death. But instead of providing the birds with more space or genetically selecting for traits to minimize feather-pecking behavior, many egg producers simply sear off portions of the birds’ beaks, often with a hot blade and rarely, if ever, with anesthesia. In *The State of the Animals 2001*, a group of leading animal scientists called the procedure a “stop-gap measure masking basic inadequacies in environment or management.”

The European Union banned the use of barren battery cages beginning in January 2012. European producers must now raise hens in cage-free environments or, at a minimum, use enriched cages that include nesting boxes and scratching posts, which allow hens to satisfy at least some of their primary behavioral instincts. Although these cages are an improvement, they still keep hens in intensive confinement without the means to behave in the ways that their instincts dictate.

The overwhelming majority of chickens reared for meat are also raised in restrictive conditions, often in large sheds that can hold more than 20,000 birds, packed so densely that each chicken has only as

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much space as the equivalent of a single sheet of letter-sized paper. In addition to the limitations imposed on their welfare by such confinement practices, the widespread use of selective breeding has an adverse impact on the well-being of tens of billions of animals each year. Simply put, chickens are forced to grow much fatter and much faster than is natural or healthy: in 1925, chickens reached 2.5 pounds in about 16 weeks; today, most commercially raised birds grow to 5.5 pounds in less than seven weeks. Such unnatural and rapid growth rates leave many chickens debilitated, suffering from bone deformities, gait abnormalities, ruptured tendons, and metabolic diseases—despite their being slaughtered when they are, in effect, still juveniles. Reaching slaughter weight at approximately 42 days of age, many birds cannot walk properly and suffer from other ailments because their immature bones cannot support their abnormally heavy bodies.

Of the mammals eaten by humans, pigs are raised in the greatest number—and may be the most intelligent of all animals commonly eaten. Commercial farming methods have relegated these animals to confinement in large sheds on bare concrete or slatted flooring without any mental stimulation or basic comforts, causing frustration, boredom, and physical distress. Female pigs, when they are about to give birth, build a nest from straw or leaves and twigs in order to create a comfortable and safe place where they can nurse their litter. But in many of today's industrial production facilities, pregnant pigs are still often caged in sow stalls so narrow that they cannot turn around or even walk more than a step forward or backward, without any straw or bedding material. Right before they give birth, they are often moved into farrowing crates, which are metal enclosures scarcely larger than their own bodies and constructed to physically separate mother from piglets. It is in these barren and restrictive crates, which leave the pigs virtually immobilized, that they give birth and nurse their young—although only for a fraction of the time they would in the wild, as their piglets are prematurely weaned and soon taken away for “fattening.” The sows are then once again impregnated. Although sow stalls for gestating pigs have already been banned throughout the European Union and are slowly being phased out in some U.S. states, they are still widely used elsewhere, and restrictive farrowing crates remain the common agricultural model.

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These methods, developed over the past 60 years in order to reduce the need for skilled labor, produce a standard product irrespective of season or weather. And in the pursuit of efficiency and economies of scale, they have now spread from Western countries to many developing nations, particularly those in Asia and Latin America. The result has been an unmitigated disaster for animals: more animals in more places are confined in restrictive conditions utterly unlike their natural environments and are pushed beyond their physiological limits to produce ever-greater numbers of eggs, gallons of milk, and pounds of flesh. It is a tragic turn of events that just as these methods are being modified or even phased out in the countries where they were first invented, they are being introduced in their old, unmodified forms in other countries around the world. The exportation of industrialized animal-production models has inflicted misery on animals on an unprecedented scale—not to mention causing higher grain prices for the poor, greater greenhouse gas emissions, and a serious threat to human health, as seen by the rise of various zoonotic diseases and the pollution of land, air, and water.

BATTLE OF THE COWSHED

THE REPLICATION in developing nations of the worst forms of intensive animal farming is grim news. But there is hope: people in the industrialized world are beginning to show concern about the treatment of animals beyond the borders of their countries. At the same time, some developing countries already have animal welfare legislation, although enforcement varies greatly, and others, including China, are discussing it. Meanwhile, international regulation is making some progress, as are corporate policies in favor of better farm animal welfare. The question now is whether these gains can be consolidated into a centralized and uniformly-agreed-on set of rules.

The European Union has been a leader in passing legislation intended to improve the welfare of farm animals across national borders. To a large extent, this effort has been driven by public attitudes: in March 2007, the European Commission released a survey called “Attitudes of EU Citizens Towards Animal Welfare,” which found that more than 34 percent of those polled felt that animal welfare was of

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the highest possible importance and gave it a score of ten out of ten points, whereas only two percent deemed animal welfare unimportant. (Overall, those surveyed gave animal welfare an average rating of 7.8 points.) And the European public is not merely content with existing regulations. Although the majority of the EU's most significant animal welfare rules (for example, bans on sow stalls, barren battery cages, and individual confinement stalls for calves raised for veal) were enacted in the late 1990s and early years of this century, a resounding majority (77 percent) of those responding to the 2007 European Commission poll wanted further improvements to protect farm animals.

There is broad public interest in animal welfare in the United States, too. For example, 64 percent of those responding to a 2008 Gallup survey favored "strict laws" governing the treatment of farm animals. A 2007 survey sponsored by the American Farm Bureau Federation found that 95 percent of those polled said that it was important to them how farm animals were cared for, with 76 percent of respondents saying that the well-being of these animals was more important than low meat prices. And when these questions have been put to an actual vote, the results have validated such sentiments: in California, for example, a 2008 referendum to ban the standard battery cage and sow and veal stalls passed with a 63 percent majority. Yet the United States lacks any federally mandated protections for animal welfare, in no small part due to effective and entrenched agricultural lobbies.

In China, where food production is not stringently regulated and animals are often raised in dire conditions, public attitudes also favor protections for animals raised for food. A 2005 poll conducted there by the International Fund for Animal Welfare found that 90 percent of respondents believed that they had a moral duty to minimize animal suffering, and 77 percent favored legislation to do so.

And there are signs that attitudes among China's commercial and political power brokers are beginning to shift. In 2007, the director of the Beijing Chaoyang Anhua Animal Product Safety Research Institute and the president of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce signed a memorandum of understanding on humane slaughter with the World Society for the Protection of Animals. The agreement calls for efforts, including training, to ensure the humane transport, handling,

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stunning, and slaughter of farm animals in China. As of August 2009, more than 2,300 people from nearly 950 companies from different parts of China had received training on animal welfare. Given the size and scale of China's animal agricultural industry, these numbers may seem insignificant; what is important is that business leaders, scientists, and other stakeholders in the country have made such a commitment and are making available educational modules on the treatment of farm animals.

Also in 2007, a team of Chinese legal experts submitted a draft proposal of an animal protection law to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The proposed law would be China's first piece of national legislation on animal welfare and would afford basic protections to animals on farms, in laboratories, and in the entertainment industry, as well as to pets, service animals, and wild animals. Although the law has not yet passed, its basic principles, which acknowledge the need to protect animals and regulate the treatment of them, are a sign of changing attitudes. Chang Jiwen, one of the law's drafters and a researcher with the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Xinhua News Agency in 2009 that he is "convinced—along with the enhancement of people's awareness of animal welfare—laws and regulations in this respect will become more sophisticated and complete."

WELFARE GOES GLOBAL

ALTHOUGH NATIONAL legislation plays a key role in improving the welfare of animals raised for food, it is not the only answer. Indeed, even in those countries with animal protection laws, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are limited. In a growing number of cases, the consumer marketplace is driving new policies, and international organizations are helping raise consciousness and fill the gaps left by national laws.

The need to improve the welfare of farm animals has been accepted by a number of such multilateral bodies, including the World Organization for Animal Health (known by its initials in French, OIE). Created in 1924 to combat the global spread of animal diseases, the OIE, aware of the link between the treatment of animals and their

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well-being, has expanded its attention beyond animal health to include animal welfare. The acceptance on such an international level of the importance of animal welfare is a strong indication of the global community's interest in farm animal well-being. In 2008, more than 400 participants met in Cairo at the OIE's second Global Conference on Animal Welfare, where they put forth a resolution stating that ethics is as important as science in the development of animal welfare standards. For the OIE, a scientific authority on animal health and disease, to acknowledge the ethical significance of the mistreatment of animals indicates a momentous shift in opinion at the highest level.

Animal production practices not only influence the welfare and health of the animals themselves but also affect food security, the environment, and community sustainability. In recognition of this, the FAO has joined the global call for improved welfare, recognizing the myriad effects of how animals are raised for food. In 2008, the FAO convened a forum on animal welfare practices, which led to a report stating that as human and farm animal populations continue to rise, "the resulting escalation of animal production raises a number of ethical issues, including environmental sustainability and secure access to food, which must be considered alongside the growing concern about animal welfare." It went on to say, "Animal welfare is coming to be recognized as highly relevant to success in international development."

Soon after its 2008 meeting, the FAO launched the Gateway to Farm Animal Welfare, a Web portal that contains information on diverse aspects of animal agriculture, including animal welfare, in various countries and agricultural sectors. It serves as a single access point for scientific reports, case studies, training opportunities, expert directories, events, and more. The gateway aims to facilitate information sharing around the world, primarily for professionals and producers in less developed countries. On the portal, the FAO explains the importance of focusing on animal welfare: "In many regions, a secure supply of food for people depends on the health and productivity of animals, and these in turn depend on the care and nutrition that animals receive." But, as the FAO goes on to note, "animal welfare practices,

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despite their evident positive impacts, are insufficiently applied” both on traditional and on industrial farms.

The private sector is also highlighting farm animal welfare as a necessary component of sound business models. In 2006, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank published “Creating Business Opportunity Through Improved Animal Welfare,” which pointed out that consumers around the world are increasingly demanding that their food be produced humanely and safely, which in turn means that “animal welfare is also important for commercial reasons, both directly, by increasing a business’s overall sustainability, and indirectly, by addressing society’s expectations of how animals should be treated and how food should be produced.”

Just last year, the International Organization for Standardization, or ISO, a network of the national standards institutes from 163 countries, issued its “ISO 26000” guidelines, which serve as the internationally accepted standard on social responsibility for both the public and the private sectors. The new document marks the first time that the ISO has included references to animal welfare, requiring those observing the standard to respect “the welfare of animals, when affecting their lives and existence, including by providing decent conditions for keeping, breeding, producing, transporting and using animals.”

Although such initiatives represent welcome progress, more work needs to be done. Given that farm animal production affects diverse communities, human and nonhuman alike, a collaborative strategy that unites the public and private sectors is necessary. Global Animal Partnership, an international charity dedicated to farm animal welfare, founded in 2008, embodies this multistakeholder approach. (One of the co-authors of this essay is executive director of the organization.) It brings together farmers and ranchers, animal welfare advocates, animal behavioral scientists, and food retailers to agree on common principles and to speak out with a unified voice for continuous improvement in animal agriculture. Recognizing the diversity of animal production methods, the charity’s flagship initiative is an assessment program that contains different sets of progressively higher welfare requirements covering nearly every aspect of on-farm production. The 5-Step Animal Welfare Rating Standards program, as opposed to binary certification schemes, encourages innovation and empowers

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producers to move up the so-called welfare ladder. Participating farmers and ranchers adhere to production standards and subject themselves to auditing and certification by independent third parties. In less than three years, more than 1,750 farms and ranches that together raise more than 140 million animals each year have sought this certification. The program's multitiered structure allows a wide variety of producers, from small farms to large-scale operations, to participate. Each tier in the program has its own set of comprehensive standards, covering basic provisions, such as food, water, and shelter, and enhancements that encourage foraging and other natural behaviors. These tiers lead to progressively higher welfare practices, including prohibitions against the transportation of live animals and against physical alterations, such as beak trimming or castration. The multitiered system gives producers incentives to improve their farming practices and modify their production systems in ways that lead to better animal welfare. Higher ratings serve as further information for consumers and, in many cases, allow certified producers to charge higher prices. Other stakeholders also benefit from the program: retailers are able to offer wider product selection to meet customer demands, consumers are given transparent and more accurate sources of information on how the animals were raised for the meat they purchase, and, of course, the animals raised in these systems enjoy better lives. Global Animal Partnership completed a pilot program last year with Whole Foods Market, North America's largest natural food retailer, and is now in discussions with restaurants, producers, and other grocers in a number of countries around the world.

Given the sheer magnitude of intensive confinement agriculture—in terms of the number of individual animals involved and in terms of the impact on animal welfare, human health, and the planet's limited resources—the sense of urgency cannot be overstated. Whether one spends his or her days in a corporate boardroom in India, a government office in Russia, a university classroom in Brazil, or a farm in Canada, all who are involved in the global food industry, as producers or consumers, have an obligation to find remedies to the problems caused by the growth in intensive confinement animal agriculture around the world. It is time for a global commitment to reduce animal suffering and to mitigate the many unintended and undesirable consequences of raising animals for food. 🌍

A Farewell to Fossil Fuels

Answering the Energy Challenge

Amory B. Lovins

NEARLY 90 percent of the world's economy is fueled every year by digging up and burning about four cubic miles of the rotted remains of primeval swamp goo. With extraordinary skill, the world's most powerful industries have turned that oil, gas, and coal into affordable and convenient fuels and electricity that have created wealth, helped build modern civilization, and enriched the lives of billions.

Yet today, the rising costs and risks of these fossil fuels are undercutting the security and prosperity they have enabled. Each day, the United States spends about \$2 billion buying oil and loses another \$4 billion indirectly to the macroeconomic costs of oil dependence, the microeconomic costs of oil price volatility, and the cost of keeping military forces ready for intervention in the Persian Gulf.

In all, the United States spends one-sixth of its GDP on oil, not counting any damage to foreign policy, global stability, public health, and the environment. The hidden costs are also massive for coal and are significant for natural gas, too. Even if oil and coal prices were not high, volatile, and rising, risks such as fuel insecurity and dependence, pollution-caused illnesses, energy-driven conflicts over water and food, climate change, and geopolitical tensions would make oil and coal unattractive.

Weaning the United States from those fossil fuels would require two big shifts: in oil and electricity. These are distinct—nearly half

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of electricity is made from coal, and almost none is made from oil—but power plants and oil burning each account for over two-fifths of the carbon that is emitted by fossil-fuel use. In the United States, three-fourths of electricity powers buildings, three-fourths of oil fuels transportation, and the remaining oil and electricity run factories. So saving oil and electricity is chiefly about making buildings, vehicles, and factories far more efficient—no small task.

But epochal energy shifts have happened before. In 1850, most U.S. homes used whale-oil lamps, and whaling was the country's fifth-biggest industry. But as whale populations dwindled, the price of whale oil rose, so between 1850 and 1859, coal-derived synthetic fuels grabbed more than five-sixths of the lighting market. In 1859, Edwin Drake struck oil, and kerosene, thanks to generous tax breaks, soon took over. Whalers, astounded that they had run out of customers before they ran out of whales, begged for federal subsidies on national security grounds, but Thomas Edison's 1879 invention of electric lighting snuffed out their industry. Whales had been accidentally saved by technological innovators and profit-maximizing capitalists.

As the world shuddered from the 1973 oil shock, the economist Phil Gramm predicted that just as with whale oil, innovators would innovate, capitalists would invest, markets would clear, and substitutes for petroleum would ultimately emerge. He was right. By 2010, the United States was using 60 percent less oil to make \$1 of GDP than it had in 1975. Now, the other shoe is dropping: since its use in the United States peaked in 2005, coal has lost one-fourth of its share of the U.S. electric services market to renewable energy, natural gas, and efficient use. After just a few centuries, the anomalous era of oil and coal is gradually starting to come to an end. In its place, the era of everlasting energy is dawning.

Underlying this shift in supply is the inexorable shrinkage in the energy needed to create \$1 of GDP. In 1976, I heretically suggested in these pages that this “energy intensity” could fall by two-thirds by 2025. By 2010, it had fallen by half, driven by no central plan or visionary intent but only by the perennial quest for profit, security, and health. Still-newer methods, without further inventions, could reduce U.S. energy intensity by another two-thirds over the next four decades, with huge economic benefits. In fact, as *Reinventing Fire*, the new book

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from my organization, Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI), details, a U.S. economy that has grown by 158 percent by 2050 could need no oil, no coal, no nuclear energy, and one-third less natural gas—and cost \$5 trillion less than business as usual, ignoring all hidden costs. Today's fossil carbon emissions could also fall by more than four-fifths without even putting a price on them.

This transformation requires pursuing three agendas. First, radical automotive efficiency can make electric propulsion affordable; heavy vehicles, too, can save most of their fuel; and all vehicles can be used more productively. Second, new designs can make buildings and factories several times as efficient as they are now. Third, modernizing the electric system to make it diverse, distributed, and renewable can also make it clean, reliable, and secure. These ambitious shifts may seem quixotic, but sometimes tough problems are best solved by enlarging their boundaries, as General Dwight Eisenhower reputedly advised.

Thus, it is easier to solve the problems of all four energy-using sectors—transportation, buildings, industry, and electricity—together than separately. For example, electric vehicles could recharge from or supply power to the electricity grid at times that compensate for variations in the output from wind and solar power. Synergies likewise arise from integrating innovations in technology, policy, design, and strategy, not just the first one or two.

This transition will require no technological miracles or social engineering—only the systematic application of many available, straightforward techniques. It could be led by business for profit and sped up by revenue-neutral policies enacted by U.S. states or federal agencies, and it would need from Congress no new taxes, subsidies, mandates, or laws. The United States' most effective institutions—the private sector, civil society, and the military—could bypass its least effective institutions. At last, Americans could make energy do their work without working their undoing.

MOBILITY WITHOUT OIL

THE UNITED STATES burns one-fourth of the world's oil, half in automobiles (which comprise cars and light trucks). Two-thirds of cars' fuel use is caused by their weight, yet for the past quarter century, U.S.

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cars have gained weight twice as fast as their drivers. Now, lighter metals and synthetic materials are reversing automotive obesity. Ultralight, ultrastrong carbon-fiber composites can trigger dramatic weight savings, improve safety, and offset the carbon fiber's higher cost with simpler automaking (needing four-fifths less capital) and smaller powertrains. In 2011, lightweighting became the auto industry's hottest trend. Ford's strategy rests on it, and the United States could lead it. So far, however, Germany has taken the lead: Volkswagen, BMW, and Audi all plan to be mass-producing carbon-fiber electric cars by 2013.

Ultralight, aerodynamic autos make electric propulsion affordable because they need fewer costly batteries or fuel cells. Rather than wringing pennies from old steel-stamping and engine technologies, automakers could exploit mutually reinforcing advances in carbon fiber, its structural manufacturing, and electric propulsion—a transition as game changing as the shift from typewriters to computers. BMW, whose chief executive has said, “We do not intend to be a typewriter-maker,” has confirmed that its planned 2013 electric car will pay for its carbon fiber by needing fewer batteries.

Electric autos are already far cheaper to fuel than gasoline autos, and they could also cost about the same to buy within a few decades. Until then, “feebates”—rebates for more efficient new autos, paid for by equivalent fees on inefficient ones—could prevent sticker shock. In just two years, France, with the biggest of Europe's five feebate programs, saw its new autos get more efficient three times as fast as before. Well-designed U.S. feebates, which could be enacted at the state level, need not cost the government a penny. They could expand customers' choices and boost automakers' and dealers' profit margins.

Autos could also be used more productively. If the government employed new methods to charge drivers for road infrastructure by the mile, its insolvent Highway Trust Fund would not need to rely on taxing dwindling gallons of fuel. Information technologies could smooth traffic flow, enhance public transit, and promote vehicle- and ridesharing. Better-designed layouts of communities could increase affordability, livability, and developers' profits. Together, these proven innovations could get Americans to their destinations with half the driving (or less) and \$0.4 trillion less cost.

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RMI's analysis found that by 2050, the United States could deliver far greater mobility by making vehicles efficient, productive, and oil-free. Autos powered by any mix of electricity, hydrogen fuel cells, and advanced biofuels could get the equivalent of 125 to 240 miles per gallon of gasoline and save trillions of dollars. By 2050, "drilling under Detroit" could profitably displace nearly 15 million barrels of oil per day—1.5 times as much as Saudi Arabia's current daily output.

Heavy vehicles present similar opportunities. From 2005 to 2010, Walmart saved 60 percent of its heavy-truck fleet's fuel through smarter designs and changes in driver behavior and logistics. Aeronautical engineers are designing airplanes that will be three to five times as efficient as today's. Superefficient trucks and airplanes could use advanced biofuels or hydrogen, or trucks could burn natural gas, but no vehicles would need oil. Advanced biofuels, two-thirds made from waste, would require no cropland, protecting soil and the climate. The U.S. military's ongoing advances in efficiency will speed all these innovations in the civilian sector, which uses over 50 times as much oil, just as military research and development created the Internet, GPS, and the microchip and jet-engine industries.

U.S. gasoline demand peaked in 2007; the oil use of the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development peaked in 2005. With China and India pursuing efficient and electric vehicles, Deutsche Bank forecast in 2009 that world oil use could begin to decline after 2016. In fact, the world is nearing "peak oil"—not in supply but in demand. Oil is simply becoming uncompetitive even at low prices before it becomes unavailable even at high prices.

SAVING ELECTRICITY

THE NEXT big shift is to raise electricity productivity faster than the economy grows—starting with the United States' 120 million buildings. Even though U.S. buildings are projected to provide 70 percent more total floorspace in 2050, they could use far less energy. Investing an extra \$0.5 trillion on existing or emerging energy-efficiency technologies and better-integrated designs could save building owners \$1.9 trillion by tripling or quadrupling energy productivity. These straightforward improvements range from installing

insulation, weather-stripping, and caulking to using more efficient equipment and controls, adopting better lighting design, and simply making new buildings the right shape and facing them in the right direction.

An even more powerful innovation, called “integrative design,” can often save far more energy still, yet at lower cost. Integrative design optimizes a whole building, factory, vehicle, or device for multiple benefits, not isolated components for single benefits. For example, in 2010, the Empire State Building remanufactured its 6,514 windows onsite into “superwindows,” which pass light but block heat. Requiring a third less air conditioning on hot days saved \$17 million of the project’s capital cost immediately, partly funding this and other improvements. In just three years, energy savings above 40 percent will repay the owners’ total energy-saving investment.

Integrative design’s expanding returns are even more impressive when built in from scratch. From tropical to subarctic climates, new passively heated and cooled buildings can replace furnaces and air conditioners with superinsulation, heat recovery, and design that exploits the local climate. European companies have built 32,000 such structures at roughly normal capital cost and cost-effectively retrofitted similar performance into Swedish apartments constructed in the 1950s and into century-old Viennese apartments. The business case would be even stronger if it included the valuable indirect benefits of these more comfortable, pleasant, and healthful buildings: higher office labor productivity and retail sales, faster learning in classrooms, faster healing in hospitals, and higher real estate values everywhere.

Integrative design can also help double industrial energy productivity, saving \$0.5 trillion. Pumps, for example, are the world’s biggest user of electric motors. Pumps, motors, and controls can improve, but first replacing long, thin, crooked pipes with short, fat, straight ones often avoids 80–90 percent of the usual friction, saving ten times as much coal back at the power plant. When RMI and its industrial partners recently redesigned existing factories valued at more than \$30 billion, our designs cut predicted energy use by about 30–60 percent with payback times of

The world is nearing
“peak oil”—not in
supply but in demand.

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a few years. In new facilities, our designs were expected to save around 40–90 percent of energy use while usually reducing capital costs. This is not rocket science—just elegantly frugal whole-system thinking.

Adopting energy-saving innovations as quickly nationwide as some U.S. states do today will require patiently fixing perverse incentives, sharing benefits between landlords and tenants, allocating capital wisely, and designing thoughtfully—not just copying the old drawings (“infectious repetitis”). None of this barrier busting is easy, but the rewards are great. Since the Dow Chemical Company embraced efficiency innovation in the 1990s, its \$1 billion investment has returned \$19 billion. Savings and returns, far from petering out, often kept rising as the engineers learned new tricks faster than they exhausted old ones.

REPOWERING PROSPERITY

THE UNITED STATES must replace its aging, dirty, and insecure electric system by 2050 just to offset the loss of power plants that are being retired. Any replacement will cost about \$6 trillion in net present value, whether it is more of the same, new nuclear power plants and “clean coal,” or centralized or distributed renewable sources. But these differ profoundly in the kinds of risks they involve—in terms of security, safety, finance, technology, fuel, water, climate, and health—and in how they affect innovation, entrepreneurship, and customer choice.

Choosing electricity sources is complicated by copious disinformation, such as the myth that nuclear power was thriving in the United States until environmentalists derailed it after the March 1979 Three Mile Island meltdown. In fact, bad economics made orders for nuclear power plants in the United States fall by 90 percent from 1973 to 1975 and dry up completely by 1978. Indeed, soaring capital costs eventually halted nuclear expansion in all market-based power systems, and by 2010, all 66 reactors under construction worldwide had been bought by central planners.

Even after the U.S. government raised its subsidies for new reactors in 2005 to at least their construction costs, not one of the 34 proposed units could attract private capital; they simply had no business case. Neither do proposed “small modular reactors”: nuclear reactors do not scale down well, and the economies sought from mass-producing

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hypothetical small reactors cannot overcome the head start enjoyed by small modular renewables, which have attracted \$1 trillion since 2004 and are adding another \$0.25 trillion a year. After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, John Rowe, chair of Exelon (the United States' biggest nuclear power producer), pronounced the nuclear renaissance dead. In truth, market forces had killed it years earlier.

New coal and nuclear plants are so uneconomical that official U.S. energy forecasts predict no new nuclear and few new coal projects will be launched. Investors are shunning their high costs and financial risks in favor of small, fast, modular renewable generators. These reduce the financial risk of building massive, slow, monolithic projects, and needing no fuel, they hedge against volatile gas prices. Already, wind and solar power's falling costs are beating fossil-fueled power's and nuclear power's rising costs. Some solar panels now sell wholesale for less than \$1 a watt (down 75 percent in three years), some installed solar-power systems in Germany sell for \$2.80 a watt, and some U.S. wind-power contracts charge less than three cents per kilowatt-hour—all far below recent forecasts. Solar power's plummeting cost, a stunning market success, is ruining some weaker or slower solar-cell-makers, but solar and wind power are extinguishing the prospects of coal and nuclear power around the world. So is cheap new natural gas—a valuable transitional resource if its many uncertainties can be resolved, but not a serious disappointment if they cannot, since higher efficiency and renewable energy should lower the demand for gas.

Skeptics of solar and wind power warn of their fluctuating output. But the grid can cope. Just as it routinely backs up nonworking coal-fired and nuclear plants with working ones, it can back up becalmed wind turbines or darkened solar cells with flexible generators (renewable or not) in other places or of other kinds, or with systems that voluntarily modulate demand. Even with little or no bulk power storage, diversified, forecastable, and integrated renewables can prove highly reliable. Such integration into a larger, more diverse grid is how in 2010 Denmark had the capacity to produce 36 percent of its electricity from renewables, including 26 percent from wind (in an average wind year), and how four

Skeptics of solar and wind power warn of their fluctuating output. But the grid can cope.

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German states were 43–52 percent wind-powered. But U.S. and European studies have shown how whole continents could make 80 percent or more of their power renewably by operating existing assets differently within smarter grids, in markets that clear faster and serve larger areas.

Diverse, dispersed, renewable sources can also make the grid highly resilient. Centralized grids are vulnerable to cascading blackouts caused by natural disaster, accident, or malice. But grid reorganizations in Denmark and Cuba have shown how prolonged regional blackouts become impossible when distributed renewables, bypassing vulnerable power lines (where most failures start), feed local “microgrids,” which can stand alone if needed. The Pentagon, concerned about its own reliance on the commercial grid, shares this goal of resilience and this path to achieving it.

Individual households can also declare independence from power outages and utility bills, as mine has. In many parts of the United States, a private company can now install rooftop solar power with no money down and charge the customer less money per month to pay for it than the old electricity bill. These and other unregulated services could eventually create a “virtual utility” that could largely or wholly bypass power companies, just as cell phones bypassed landline phone companies—a prospect that worries utility executives but excites venture capitalists. Today, solar power is subsidized, although often less than fossil-fueled or nuclear plants and their fuel. But sooner than those rivals could be built, solar power should win out even without subsidies.

A world where
countries buy no oil
would have less tyranny,
corruption, terrorism,
tension, and war.

In 2010, renewable sources, except for big hydropower dams, produced only three percent of the world’s electricity, but for the third year running, they were responsible for nearly half of all new capacity. That same year, they won \$151 billion of private investment and surpassed the total generating capacity of nuclear plants worldwide by adding over 60 billion watts of capacity. The world can now manufacture that much new photovoltaic capacity every year, outpacing even wind power.

The United States is a leader in developing renewable technology but lags in installing it. In June 2011 alone, Germany, with less sun than

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Seattle, added 142 percent more solar-cell capacity than the United States did in all of 2010. Stop-and-go congressional policies sank U.S. clean-energy investments from first place globally to third between 2008 and 2010. (Federal initiatives expiring in 2011–12 temporarily restored the U.S. lead in 2011.) From 2005 to 2010, while the renewable fraction of the United States' electricity crawled from nine percent to ten percent, that of Portugal's soared from 17 percent to 45 percent. In 2010, congressional wrangling over the wind-power tax credit halved wind-power additions, while China doubled its wind capacity for the fifth year running and beat its 2020 target. The same year, 38 percent of China's net new capacity was renewable. China now leads the world in five renewable technologies and aims to in all.

Legacy industries erect many anticompetitive roadblocks to U.S. renewable energy, often denying renewable power fair access to the grid or rejecting cheaper wind power to shield old plants from competition. In 34 U.S. states, utilities earn more profit by selling more electricity and less if customers' bills fall. In 37 states, companies that reduce electricity demand are not allowed to bid in auctions for proposed new power supplies. But wherever such impediments are removed, efficiency and renewables win. In 2009, developers offered 4.4 billion watts of solar power cheaper than electricity from an efficient new gas-fired plant, so California's private utilities bought it—and in 2011, they were offered another 50 billion watts.

A COOLER AND SAFER WORLD

THIS NEW energy future offers a pragmatic solution to climate change. Often assumed to be costly, reducing carbon emissions is actually profitable, since saving fuel costs less than buying fuel. Profits, jobs, and competitive advantage make for easier conversations than costs, burdens, and sacrifices, and they need no global treaties to drive them.

In 2009, the consulting firm McKinsey & Company found that projected greenhouse gas emissions could be cut by 70 percent by 2030 at a trivial average cost of \$6 per metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (the standard unit of global-warming impact). Including newer technologies and integrative designs could save even more carbon more cheaply, and thus could more than meet the United

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States' obligations under the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change while saving \$5 trillion.

Getting the United States off fossil fuels would transform its foreign policy. A world where the United States and other countries buy no oil because its price and price volatility exceed its value would have less oil-fed tyranny, corruption, terrorism, tension, and war. Washington, no longer needing an oil-centric foreign policy, could maintain normal relations with oil-exporting countries and treat diplomatic issues on their merits. The Pentagon would be pleased, too. Today, every one of the U.S. military's nine combatant commands must protect oil assets and transportation routes—fighting tanker-hijacking pirates off the coast of Somalia or pipeline-attacking militants from Latin America to Central Asia. The U.S. Army would love Mission Unnecessary in the Persian Gulf; the U.S. Navy would no longer need to worry as much about conflicts from the Arctic to the South China Sea. Proliferators, meanwhile, could no longer hide their intent behind civilian nuclear power in a world that acknowledged its marketplace collapse and the superiority of nonnuclear competitors. Nor could they draw on civilian skills, materials, and equipment.

Phasing out fossil fuels would turbocharge global development, which is also in the United States' interest. Energy inefficiency is one of the biggest causes of persistent poverty. Oil purchases underlie much of the developing world's debt, and wasted energy diverts meager national and household budgets. Developing countries are on average one-third as energy efficient as rich ones, and the poor often spend far more of their disposable income on energy than does the general population. Some 1.6 billion people live without electricity, leaving many basic needs unmet, hobbling health and development, and trapping women and girls in uneducated penury.

Investments in new electricity devour one-fourth of the world's development capital. There is no stronger nor more neglected lever for global development than investing instead in making devices that save electricity. This would require about one-thousandth the capital and return it ten times as fast, freeing up vast sums for other development needs. If the United States, Europe, China, and India merely adopted highly efficient lights, air conditioners, refrigerators, and TVs, they could save \$1 trillion and 300 coal plants. That is the goal of the

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Super-efficient Equipment and Appliance Deployment Initiative, an effort announced in 2009 and supported by 23 major countries.

Developing countries, with their rural villages, burgeoning cities and slums, and dilapidated infrastructures, especially need renewable electricity, and they now buy the majority of the world's new renewable capacity. Some remote villages are not waiting for the wires but leapfrogging the grid: more Kenyans are getting electricity first from solar-power entrepreneurs than from traditional utilities. Such efforts as the U.S. Department of Energy's Lumina Project have helped bring efficient and affordable solar-powered LED lights to millions across Africa. These projects improve education; free up kerosene budgets for mosquito nets, clean water, and other necessities; and could eventually prevent 1.5 million deaths from lung disease annually. Just by switching from kerosene lamps to fluorescent ones, one Indian village got 19 times as much light with one-ninth the energy and half the cost.

GETTING UNSTUCK

THE UNITED STATES cannot afford to keep waiting for a grid-locked Congress to act while the global clean-energy revolution passes it by. While U.S. fossil-fuel industries guard their parochial interests, Denmark is planning to get entirely off fossil fuels by 2050; Sweden has even aimed for 2020. Germany's campaign for renewables and energy efficiency helped push unemployment in the country to its lowest rate in a decade. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is winning her bet that the Russian company Gazprom is a less worthy recipient of German energy expenditures than German engineers, manufacturers, and installers. Brazil, Japan, and South Korea, meanwhile, are catching up in renewables. India has passed Japan and the United Kingdom in renewables investments and aims to rival China's global leadership in the sector.

As Washington's clean-energy research-and-development budget has shrunk, Beijing's has soared. In 2005, China's 11th five-year plan made lower energy intensity the top strategic priority for national development. In 2010, the 12th five-year plan launched a \$0.8 trillion decarbonization effort, created the world's largest carbon-trading zone, and effectively capped China's carbon emissions. The country's

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net additions of coal plants fell by half between 2006 and 2010, and the overall efficiency of its coal plants pulled ahead of that of the United States'. No treaty compelled Beijing's leadership—just enlightened self-interest.

The United States' halfheartedness raises a conundrum: if the vision of an efficient clean-energy economy is so compelling, what keeps all U.S. citizens, firms, and institutions from embracing it as vigorously as a few states have? The answer is that markets outpace understanding, disinformation and parochial politics abound, and the road remains strewn with barriers, myths, and pervasive favoritism for incumbents. But must Thucydides' lament become Americans' fate—that each politician pursues self-advantage while “the common cause imperceptibly decays”?

The chief obstacle is not technology or economics but slow adoption. Helping innovations catch on will take education, leadership, and rapid learning. But it does not require reaching a consensus on motives. If Americans agree what should be done, then they need not agree why. Whether one cares most about national security, health, the environment, or simply making money, saving and supplanting fossil fuels makes sense.

Wise energy policy can grow from impeccably conservative roots—allowing and requiring all ways to save or produce energy to compete fairly at honest prices, regardless of their type, technology, size, location, or ownership. Who would oppose that? And what if the United States reversed the runaway energy-subsidy arms race, heading toward zero? Let those energy producers that insist they get no taxpayer largess explain why they are so loath to give it up.

Moving the United States off oil and coal will require Americans to trust in their own resourcefulness, ingenuity, and courage. These durable virtues can give the country fuel without fear; help set the world on a path beyond war, want, or waste; and turn energy from worrisome to worry-free, from risk to reward, from cost to profit. 🌍

Reviews & Responses



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Michigan Governor George Romney and his son Mitt, New York, May 1964

The ideology and style of today's GOP would have been utterly alien to moderate Republicans of an earlier era, such as Mitt Romney's father, Michigan Governor George Romney.

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Review Essay

The Missing Middle in American Politics

How Moderate Republicans Became Extinct

Reihan Salam

Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party. BY GEOFFREY KABASERVICE. Oxford University Press, 2011, 504 pp. \$29.95.

The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism. BY THEDA SKOCPOL AND VANESSA WILLIAMSON. Oxford University Press, 2011, 264 pp. \$24.95.

After Lyndon Johnson's victory over Barry Goldwater in the 1964 U.S. presidential election, the once-mighty Republican Party was reduced to a regional rump. The Democrats won overwhelming majorities in the House and the Senate, which they used to pass Johnson's Great Society

legislation. Republicans, meanwhile, were at one another's throats, having endured the most divisive campaign in modern political history. Goldwater had managed to win the Republican presidential nomination over the impassioned opposition of moderate and progressive Republicans, who at the time may well have constituted a majority of the party's members. Moderates blamed Goldwater's right-wing views for the defection of millions of Republican voters.

To rebuild the party, a number of moderate Republican governors banded together to form the Republican Governors Association, designed to serve as a counterweight to the Republican National Committee, which had been

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captured by Goldwater conservatives. Shortly after the election, the association issued a statement, sponsored by Michigan Governor George Romney and other leading moderates, calling for a more inclusive GOP and criticizing Goldwater's campaign. Stung by the failure of many moderates to actively support or even formally endorse his candidacy, Goldwater retorted that he needed no lessons in maintaining unity, having urged party members in 1960 to look past philosophical differences and pull together to support Richard Nixon's presidential candidacy. Goldwater wrote a letter to Romney dripping with contempt: "Now let's get to 1964 and ask ourselves who it was in the Party who said, in effect, if I can't have it my way I'm not going to play? One of those men happens to be you."

Romney wrote a lengthy reply to Goldwater, warning against European-style polarization. "Dogmatic ideological parties tend to splinter the political and social fabric of a nation," Romney wrote. Worse, he added, political parties with fixed ideological programs "lead to governmental crises and deadlocks, and stymie the compromises so often necessary to preserve freedom and achieve progress."

Romney's words seem particularly prescient today, as polarized politics have caused the U.S. government to seize up. But what would the elder Romney, who died in 1995, have made of his own son's embrace of a more orthodox conservatism—the very kind of politics the elder Romney feared would damage the country?

Mitt Romney began his political career very much in the moderate mold. In 1994, running for the U.S. Senate seat in Massachusetts held by Ted Kennedy, the popular liberal Democratic incum-

bent, Romney forcefully maintained that he had been an independent during the Reagan years. On abortion, he was firmly pro-choice. While Republican candidates across the country were rallying around Representative Newt Gingrich's "Contract With America," Romney distanced himself from it. "If you want to get something done in Washington," he said in a debate during the campaign, "you don't end up picking teams with Republicans on one side and Democrats on the other."

Romney's defeat that year did not quite cure him of his moderate impulses. During the battle for the 1996 Republican presidential nomination, Romney, as a private citizen, purchased newspaper advertisements in New Hampshire criticizing the publisher and candidate Steve Forbes' call for a flat tax, deriding it as "a tax cut for fat cats." And as a 2002 gubernatorial candidate in Massachusetts, Romney defeated a weak Democratic opponent in large part by touting his moderate bona fides.

Yet as a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008 and now 2012, Romney has shifted decisively to the right, embracing the party's anti-tax consensus, reversing his decades-long support for abortion rights, and taking a much harder line on entitlement spending. He has been careful to avoid being outflanked on his right by his various GOP rivals, attacking Gingrich and Texas Governor Rick Perry for being insufficiently tough on immigration. And he has generally cheered on House Republicans in their fierce opposition to President Barack Obama's domestic agenda. Departing from the more decorous tone of his previous campaigns, Romney has described the president as "a crony capitalist," a "job killer" whose policies

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will “poison the very spirit of America and keep us from being one nation under God.” Like so many erstwhile moderates, Romney has survived in today’s more confrontational, ideological GOP by finally picking a team.

COMMITMENT ISSUES

The dominant ideology and style of today’s Republican Party would have been utterly alien to Romney’s father. In *Rule and Ruin*, the historian Geoffrey Kabaservice’s vivid account of the pitched ideological battles that shaped the postwar Republican Party, George Romney is cast as the last hope of a moderate Republicanism that has all but vanished. Born into poverty in a Mormon colony in northern Mexico, Romney rose to become the chief executive of the American Motors Corporation. There, he succeeded in taking on the Big Three car companies, scoffing at their “gas-guzzling dinosaurs” and offering sleek, fuel-efficient compacts that anticipated the later triumphs of the Japanese automobile industry. Like many self-made business executives of the time, Romney felt a deep sense of moral obligation, which flowed in part from his devout religious faith. As poor African Americans from the Deep South settled in and around Detroit, Romney made it his mission to better their condition. Shortly after his election as governor in 1962, Romney pressed for a massive increase in spending on public education and on generous social welfare benefits for the poor and unemployed. During Romney’s first term alone, Michigan’s state government nearly doubled its spending, from \$684 million in 1964 to \$1.3 billion in 1968. To finance the increase, Romney fought for and won a new state income tax, which would

become a thorn in the side of future Michigan Republicans.

What separated Romney from liberal Democrats who were similarly eager to expand government was his conviction that he was doing God’s work on earth. Today, it is entirely common for Republican presidential candidates to describe the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution as divinely inspired documents, as Romney did. But in the mid-1960s, as Kabaservice observes, such religiosity was unusual, at least for a moderate Republican. Kabaservice briefly speculates that Romney’s brand of moralistic progressivism might have resonated with many Christian voters who instead embraced a harder-edged form of conservatism infused with evangelical fervor. But Romney’s political program was badly undermined by the 1967 Detroit riots, which discredited the notion, fairly or not, that large-scale social spending was the most effective route to social uplift, at least among conservatives.

Disagreements on race and the Vietnam War fueled the split in the late 1960s between the radical New Left and the liberal Democratic establishment. But the upheaval of the late 1960s also divided the Republicans. Conservatives of that era saw themselves as defending the United States’ founding ideals against communism abroad and radicalism at home. Moderates, in contrast, sought to modernize the GOP: to keep up with the baby boomers’ shifting sensibilities on social issues and to share in their embrace of a more diverse and dynamic society. Some even praised what they saw, perhaps naively, as the freedom-loving spirit of the antiwar movement.

Yet as Kabaservice relates, the moderates never coalesced into a movement with

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a coherent program and ideology, despite Dwight Eisenhower's earlier attempts to build a modern party that embraced the New Deal and a vision of responsible American global leadership. This failure left moderate Republicans in an awkward position. Those who shared the Democratic faith in activist government, tempered by a desire for decentralization and fiscal rigor, found themselves gravitating to the left. Those who shared conservative skepticism of big government, tempered by a recognition that Social Security and Medicare were here to stay, found themselves gravitating to the right. There was no glue to hold the two sides together.

Ultimately, Kabaservice argues, it was this lack of coherence that doomed the centrists within the Republican Party. The absence of a rigid ideology freed them to embrace creative solutions to emerging social problems, which proved useful when they were in power. But precisely because they were so allergic to ideology, the moderates were disinclined to rally the troops or to wage scorched-earth campaigns against their political enemies. Even when they had the advantage of numbers, as they did after Goldwater's 1964 defeat, they routinely failed to coordinate their efforts, never managing to build the kind of grass-roots fundraising network that fueled the rise of the political right.

Instead of offering a set of clear political commitments, moderate Republicans instead asked voters to trust their judgment, to have faith that intelligent, thoughtful, evenhanded leaders would govern well. After Vietnam and Watergate, however, Americans hungered for politicians with clear convictions, leaders who would never betray them. This was true on the left but even more so on the

right. And the surest way to guard against betrayal was, and still is, to force politicians to commit themselves to a well-defined set of propositions. In the 1960s, that meant no recognition of communist China; today, it means no new taxes.

There is no question that such commitments reduce a politician's room for maneuver and make legislative compromise difficult, if not impossible. But political commitments also increase democratic accountability, which is prized by many voters, especially educated ones. Although today's political landscape might frustrate those who are eager for pragmatism and bipartisanship, there is no question that the Democratic and Republican Parties represent distinctive priorities and visions.

KEYNESIANS AND CONNALLYS

Kabaservice is searingly critical of the conservative movement that eventually triumphed within the GOP. His chief complaint is the distance between what conservatives have said and how they have governed. In a particularly vivid passage lamenting the failures of George W. Bush's presidency, he writes that "a Republican Party without moderates was like a heavily muscled body without a head." After Bush's 2004 reelection, Republicans held majorities in the House and the Senate for the fifth straight election, but, Kabaservice observes, "conservatives proved unable to achieve their goals, largely because they lacked the ideas the moderates had once provided and the skill at reaching compromise with the opposition at which moderates had excelled." The irony of the decline of the moderates is that it made the achievement of conservative goals all but impossible.

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Indeed, as conservative rhetoric has grown increasingly hostile to government since the mid-1960s, the size of government has continued to expand, even when conservatives have been in power. Bush himself, having promised to restrain the growth of the government, presided over an increase in federal spending as a share of GDP from 18.2 percent in 2000 to 20.7 percent in 2008, reversing the trend under his Democratic predecessor. And between 1950 and 2009, state and local spending increased as a share of GDP from 7.7 percent to 15.5 percent. Even in states where conservatives have dominated, such as Nevada and Texas, spending has increased at an alarming rate as conservatives have aped their liberal foils, responding to a growing appetite for public services by increasing spending rather than by improving the productivity and efficiency of existing institutions. And at the federal level, conservatives have generally acquiesced to increased spending while refusing to levy taxes high enough to pay for it. In effect, this has meant delivering big government while only charging for small government—a politically attractive proposition that has proved fiscally ruinous.

Moderate Republicans have been among those most attuned to the perils of such hypocrisy. During the late 1960s, a number of moderate Republicans—such as those associated with the Ripon Society, a think tank that served as an incubator for centrist policies—correctly predicted that a southernized GOP, shaped by a fusion of conservatism and populism, would “have an enormous appetite for federal subsidies in the form of defense spending, oil allowances, and agricultural supports,” Kabaservice writes. Indeed, the

conservative appetite for federal spending grew ever more voracious in the decades that followed. Call it redistribution for me, but not for thee.

As president, Nixon ratified the ascendance of big-government conservatism with his embrace of John Connally, a former Democratic governor of Texas whom Nixon appointed as treasury secretary in 1971. Whereas moderate and conservative Republicans alike tended to favor the decentralization of power, competitive markets, and private initiative, Connally was a different animal. He was a foreign policy hawk and a cultural conservative but also an avid defender of subsidies and tax breaks for the defense sector and energy interests, which fueled the Sunbelt boom and further enriched hundreds, if not thousands, of wealthy conservatives. Nixon saw Connally as his natural successor, a politician who could cement Nixon’s new Republican majority by bringing the southern white working class into the fold. Although Connally never lived up to Nixon’s high hopes, he did help usher into the GOP a generation of statist southern politicians keen to channel federal dollars to favored interests in their region. Connally still casts a long shadow on the party: one can see it, for example, when a conservative governor such as Perry eagerly spends millions of taxpayer dollars on Texas’ Emerging Technology Fund, a program that a more orthodox free-market advocate would reject as an unacceptable intrusion into the private sector.

“We are all Keynesians now,” Nixon is sometimes reported to have said in 1971. (In fact, his remark was less sweeping: “I’m now a Keynesian in economics.”) But Nixon’s treasury secretary may have

left a more lasting mark on the Republican Party than any economist. After decades of GOP support for subsidizing favored industries from defense to oil and gas to Sunbelt housing construction, a cynic might argue that Republicans are all Connallys now.

WEAK TEA

The rise of the Tea Party movement briefly seemed like an intriguing exception to this general drift. The movement has often been interpreted as a brand of populist conservatism virtually indistinguishable from the supply-side conservatism of the Reagan era. But supply-side economics was an optimistic creed that rejected the idea of the market as a zero-sum game and celebrated a vision of a flourishing society in which everyone should, could, and would be richer, freer, and happier if taxes were low and GDP growth robust. The Tea Party movement offers a far less sunny worldview. Far from inheriting the optimism of the Reagan-era supply-siders, the Tea Party shares more with the Old Right, the earlier form of conservatism that Reaganite supply-siders derided as “root-canal economics” for its emphasis on spending cuts—and, in some cases, tax increases—as instruments of hard-nosed fiscal discipline. Like the Old Right, the Tea Party conceives of the United States as divided between those who work hard and play by the rules and those who game the system, whether by engaging in petty welfare fraud or by seeking government favors through lobbying and campaign contributions.

This sentiment has not led to a compelling critique of the country’s broken financial and political systems, however. The fierce opposition of the libertarian

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Republican congressman Ron Paul to the Federal Reserve has earned him considerable standing among some grass-roots conservative activists. But for the most part, more realistic proposals to constrain the power of big banks and reduce the implicit and explicit subsidies that flow to them have fallen on deaf ears. Indeed, the Tea Party movement, like the conservative movement of the 1960s and 1970s, seems deeply hostile to technocratic proposals of any kind, even those that could foster a more decentralized and market-oriented society.

In *The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism*, the political scientist Theda Skocpol and her co-author, Vanessa Williamson, draw on a wide range of sources to describe the movement's origins and worldview. Although anchored by extended conversations with individual Tea Party activists, the book adds little to the thousands of newspaper and magazine articles that have been written about the Tea Party in the past few years, retracing an already familiar portrait. Skocpol and Williamson observe that Tea Party activists tend to be relatively affluent and middle-aged or older. The vast majority vote Republican, although some identify as conservative-leaning independents. They tend to be wary of claims of technocratic expertise and prefer citizen engagement over deference to elites. Reverence for the U.S. Constitution is an essential aspect of the Tea Party's ideology, and members of the movement often invoke the founding documents. Skocpol and Williamson also anatomize the three main components of the Tea Party movement: grass-roots organizations; well-funded national advocacy groups, such as FreedomWorks; and a

media nexus of Fox News and conservative talk radio.

Skocpol and Williamson attempt to maintain a disinterested tone. But they often cannot conceal their hostility to the Tea Party, the GOP, and conservatism more generally, as when they warn that Republicans "will continue to talk about 'America going broke' and the 'need to slash spending' and 'cut taxes,' without getting overly specific until just before they seize the chance—if one presents itself—to push through major restructurings of Medicare and Social Security." The reader is left to conclude that Skocpol and Williamson believe that there is something sinister about trying to reduce the national deficit and that efforts to restructure Medicare and Social Security are wholly unrelated to the federal government's fiscal woes.

Still, Skocpol and Williamson rightly diagnose a major weakness of contemporary Republican reform efforts. Because conservatives have so strenuously made the case against government and the welfare state, they have undermined their credibility as champions of reform. Scholars and voters alike are now skeptical when conservative Republican reformers, such as Representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, promise that they intend to put the U.S. social safety net on a sounder footing, not to destroy it.

There is no doubt that a reliance on antigovernment rhetoric has created a troubling vacuum at the heart of the conservative project. The Tea Party movement and its rejectionism now define public perceptions of the post-Bush Republican Party. And it is true that for years, congressional Republicans have been extremely reluctant to take

The Missing Middle in American Politics

on issues such as tax reform and health care—the kind of issues that consumed moderate Republicans in an earlier era—because conservatives see them as a political and intellectual dead end. Now, however, some Republicans, led primarily by Ryan, have advanced a number of significant proposals, including a sweeping Medicare reform and a base-broadening overhaul of the tax code. Ryan has shown an openness to the ideas of the avowedly moderate Bipartisan Policy Center and even to raising tax revenues, a move that has long been anathema to conservatives. Late last year, Ryan signaled a willingness to compromise by joining with Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, a Democrat, to advance a Medicare reform proposal—one that specifically addresses Democratic objections to an earlier plan Ryan had proposed.

Around the same time, congressional Republicans experienced a sharp political reversal in a showdown with Obama over extending a temporary payroll tax cut. Republican brinkmanship, which had earlier threatened chaos during a battle over increasing the debt limit, was met with near-universal opprobrium from the voting public. After the Republicans gave in to Democratic and popular demands that the payroll tax cut be extended, Obama experienced an immediate surge in his approval ratings.

Conservative Republicans and their Tea Party supporters were chastened by this defeat, and the Tea Party's grip on the GOP shows some signs of loosening. But moderate Republicanism will not return as a bona fide movement anytime soon, despite the efforts of right-of-center public intellectuals such as

David Frum and David Brooks. The social group that contributed so heavily to the moderate movement of yesteryear—upper-middle-class social liberals who live in big cities and their suburbs—has shifted overwhelmingly to the Democratic Party, and it seems unlikely that those voters will ever return to the GOP. Yet the moderates' flexibility and pragmatism are experiencing a tentative renaissance, as younger conservatives, led by figures such as Ryan, face up to their movement's shortcomings. Moderate Republicans may no longer exist, but their legacy persists, and conservative Republicans will need to recapture the moderates' creativity and problem-solving impulses if they ever hope to take power, hold on to it, and govern effectively. 🌐

Review Essay

Poker Lessons From Richelieu

A Portrait of the Statesman as Gambler

David A. Bell

Éminence: Cardinal Richelieu and the Rise of France. BY JEAN-VINCENT BLANCHARD. Walker and Company, 2011, 320 pp. \$30.00.

Armand-Jean du Plessis, better known to history as Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642), spent most of his career contending for and then exercising control over a deeply divided, indebted, and dysfunctional superpower. His country's politics were vicious, and its government paralyzingly complex. In short, if he were dropped into Washington today, he might feel right at home.

French historians have long hailed Richelieu as the architect of the absolute monarchy that dominated Europe throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Henry Kissinger, in *Diplomacy*, dubbed him “the father of the modern European state system.” Even critics, such as Alexandre Dumas,

who made him the villain of *The Three Musketeers*, often cannot help admiring Richelieu's icy savoir-faire, which is captured in the famous portrait by Philippe de Champaigne that adorns the cover of Jean-Vincent Blanchard's new biography. As Richelieu intended, it shows a master political player with the ruthlessness necessary to achieve his goals, chief among them raising France to greatness.

Richelieu was indeed a model statesman, but not for the reasons usually given. Despite his long-standing reputation (which Blanchard largely endorses), the cardinal was not really a great institution builder, still less someone bent on making France what Blanchard calls “a modern administrative state.” Nor do Kissinger's claims about Richelieu inaugurating an international order based on *raison d'état* hold up. The cardinal was hardly the first

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Poker Lessons From Richelieu

European statesman to place national interest above moral or religious imperatives, and the modern European state system, with its power balancing and alliances, did not really take firm shape until the Peace of Westphalia, six years after Richelieu's death. Richelieu was, however, one of the greatest examples in history of the politician as high-stakes gambler, notable less for what he did than for how he did it.

Richelieu's qualities as a statesman emerge most sharply when he is compared with other leaders of the period—particularly his great rival, Spain's chief minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, who lacked both the cardinal's keen foresight and his taste for risk but nonetheless came close to defeating him on many occasions. For this reason, the single best recent treatment of Richelieu remains the British historian J. H. Elliott's brilliant 1984 study *Richelieu and Olivares*. Blanchard's biography is engaging and well written but has a more sprawling and somewhat thinner feel. As a specialist in seventeenth-century literature, Blanchard has trouble situating Richelieu in the broader sweep of European history, particularly when it comes to the complex dynamics of ancien régime administration and diplomacy. Still, he has read the most important primary sources carefully and has a good eye for colorfully illustrative passages, along with a genuine sensitivity to his subject's personal strengths and weaknesses. Those who know Richelieu only from the movies will find in Blanchard's pages a very human character who triumphed in a setting far more frightening than anything Hollywood has recently devised.

ORBITING JUPITER

The tone of Richelieu's career was set by the savage and unpredictable political culture into which he emerged. The first two kings of France in his lifetime, Henry III and Henry IV, were both assassinated. The next king, Louis XIII, had his chief minister, Concino Concini, shot in the street, after which the man's naked body was ripped to pieces on the Pont Neuf. (Some reports claimed that members of the frenzied crowd even cooked and ate Concini's heart.) Several other leading figures of the period ended their days on the executioner's block, including the unhappy Comte de Chalais, whose headsman bungled the job and ended up frantically chopping away at his screaming victim with a small hatchet.

Richelieu himself was regularly in danger of meeting a similar fate. Chalais had plotted to have him stabbed to death, and another enemy tried to put a bomb under the seat of his carriage. Richelieu was Concini's protégé, and himself escaped from the angry Parisian crowds only because he had the presence of mind to order his retainers to start shouting, "*Vive le roi!*" (Long live the king!). Surviving in such a milieu, to say nothing of flourishing, required brilliant timing, courage, an uncanny ability to read and manipulate others, and a willingness to take dramatic risks—all qualities Richelieu had in abundance.

Richelieu rose to national prominence during a particularly perilous time, the years following the assassination of Henry IV in 1610. The popular monarch's successor, Louis XIII, was just eight years old when he took the throne and grew into an awkward, insecure youth with a bad

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stutter, psychologically overwhelmed by his ferociously ambitious mother, Marie de Médicis, who served as his regent. Sensing an opportunity to claw back some power from the monarchy, French nobles staged a series of revolts, and eventually Louis rebelled against his mother and sought to take control of the government in his own right. (One step in this process was the killing of Concini, who had been Marie's favorite adviser.)

It was Marie who originally saw the potential in Richelieu—at the start of this period, a relatively minor noble from western France who had joined the clergy merely to secure his family's rights to the revenues of a bishopric. She quickly brought him into the inner circles of power, placing him in charge of French foreign policy in 1616. In 1618, after war broke out between mother and son, Louis banished Richelieu to Avignon. But the young bishop managed to convince the king of his loyalty and proved instrumental in bringing about a family reconciliation of sorts. Following the 1621 death of Louis' chief adviser, the Duc de Luynes, Richelieu came to the fore, eventually becoming the king's most trusted and important councilor. In 1622, the pope agreed to make him a cardinal.

For the next two decades, Richelieu was a crucial player in French and European politics, but with his position resting on his ability to please and manipulate his vain, stubborn, and temperamental royal master—whom Blanchard nicely describes as “worn out by inner torments, military battles, and furious hunting.” As a Spanish diplomat of the time put it, Richelieu had come “closer to Jupiter, but also to his thunder.” Blanchard might have dwelt somewhat more on this fascinating relationship, in which Richelieu not

only flattered the king endlessly but also made sure the monarch was surrounded by attractive young men. Above all, Richelieu became a mentor to Louis, someone able to scold the king for his shortcomings, sometimes even in public.

As Richelieu's star and influence rose, Marie grew resentful of her former protégé, and a showdown became inevitable. On November 11, 1630, Marie exploded at the cardinal in front of the king, showering him with insults and forcing him to beg for mercy on his knees. Louis, apparently struck dumb by the outburst, left without acknowledging Richelieu, and Marie's supporters rejoiced that their nemesis the cardinal had fallen. That evening, the king summoned Richelieu to his hunting lodge at Versailles—for his execution, the cardinal thought, assuming he had finally lost the high-stakes poker game of court politics. Overcoming his urge to flee, Richelieu obeyed the king's command and discovered that he was in fact being restored to royal favor, in an episode that would become known as the Day of the Dupes, with Marie's leading allies arrested instead the next morning. By 1642, Louis could write to Richelieu, “I have never loved you so much. We have been together for too long ever to be separated.”

THE GAMBLER

Richelieu's statecraft involved as much dangerous risk taking as his domestic political career. In 1618, what would become known as the Thirty Years' War broke out—Europe's last great spasm of religious warfare, in which a furious conflict between a series of Protestant states, on one side, and the House of Hapsburg and its Catholic allies, on the other, tore the center of the continent apart. France, a Catholic



state itself, nevertheless intervened on the Protestant side, hoping to supplant the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs as the strongest power in Europe.

Richelieu initially felt that France could do no more than subsidize Protestant efforts and engage in strictly limited military campaigns. Ironically, he feared treachery from the Huguenots, France's own small Protestant minority, who had lingering grievances against the French state and control of several strategic towns, including the Atlantic port of La Rochelle. Realizing that he had to address the Huguenot threat before intervening seriously abroad, in 1627 Richelieu laid siege to La Rochelle and starved the city into submission. (By the end of the operation, even the rats had disappeared, and the starving locals were reduced to eating boiled shoe leather.)

Then, Richelieu made one of his boldest moves. With France exhausted

and indebted, he quickly raised another army and sent it on the dangerous route across the Alps into northern Italy, where an unstable political situation offered France the chance to break the Hapsburgs' extended supply lines. The gamble paid off, and a few months after the fall of La Rochelle, Richelieu and Louis watched French forces storm in triumph across the northern Italian plains.

After its victory in Italy, France continued to encourage and subsidize Protestant powers, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, without committing fully to the broader war. A series of Catholic victories in the early 1630s, however, finally convinced Richelieu to go all in, and in May 1635, he sent a gaudily dressed herald across the border to Spanish-ruled Brussels to issue a formal declaration of war.

At first, the gambit seemed to go terribly wrong. Spanish forces invaded France's northern provinces in the summer

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of 1636, capturing several strategic fortresses and coming within a day's ride of the capital. Panicky crowds flooded the streets of Paris calling for Richelieu's head. The cardinal fell into a deep despair. Yet François-Joseph le Clerc du Tremblay, the so-called Gray Eminence, who stayed at Richelieu's side throughout much of his career, managed to rouse him, and recovering his nerve, France's chief minister walked out onto the Pont Neuf to much the same spot where his predecessor, Concini, had been butchered two decades earlier. Admiring his nerve, the crowd cheered the man it had just been cursing. Meanwhile, the French armies held, then gained a respite when the Spanish broke off their offensive to rebuff an attack from the Dutch. Over the next six years—the last six years of Richelieu's life—France seized large new territories and established itself as a leading power in Europe.

THE CARDINAL'S VIRTUES

Many today might dismiss Richelieu's brand of leadership as archaic, something with little relevance to the far more ponderous process of modern statecraft, with its armies of bureaucratic functionaries analyzing all policy options in mind-numbing detail. Yet from Munich to the Cuban missile crisis to nuclear proliferation, recent history is replete with instances of international politics resembling nothing so much as a poker game. And was not the 2003 invasion of Iraq very much a gamble, with the Bush administration having its own, not-entirely-un-Richelieu-like power behind the throne, manipulating an inexperienced young leader struggling to emerge from the shadow of his powerful parent? In this sense, the survival skills that politi-

cians develop in their rise to power at home may serve them surprisingly well when they take on responsibility for international affairs, and Richelieu may offer a model of sorts.

As for his historical significance in France's long-term development, the record is less clear. Richelieu won important victories over his country's great rivals, Hapsburg Austria and Spain, but he did not consolidate those triumphs. He raised tax revenues manyfold, allowing France to fight effectively in the Thirty Years' War, but in the process he squeezed the peasantry and provincial elites so brutally that he provoked a series of ruinous revolts that culminated, soon after his death, in outright civil war. And although Richelieu improvised brilliantly, as when he sent out agents called *intendants*, armed with new powers, to help collect taxes and control the army in the provinces, he did not design permanent new administrative structures.

It would take another monarch and another chief minister—Louis XIV and Jean-Baptiste Colbert—to take the story further in the decades that followed. They were the ones who secured the French state's modern borders, who cooperated more closely with provincial elites and extracted even greater sums from the country with considerably less strife (in order to wage even more ambitious wars), and who turned Richelieu's *intendants* into established arms of the central state. Richelieu, in short, did not create modern France nor make it the leading force in Europe. But his actions paved the way for his successors to do so, which is no small feat. 🌐

Review Essay

Freedom's Secret Recipe

Balancing the State, Law, and Accountability

Michael Mann

The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. BY FRANCIS FUKUYAMA. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, 608 pp. \$35.00 (paper, \$18.00).

Francis Fukuyama shot to fame with a 1989 essay called “The End of History?” which he expanded into a 1992 book, *The End of History and the Last Man*. His thesis was a reworking of the “end of ideology” argument propounded in the 1950s by Daniel Bell and others, with an even more emphatic twist. “What we may be witnessing,” Fukuyama declared, “is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” The argument seemed hubristic, a product of the era’s American triumphalism.

Two decades later, Fukuyama has revisited the question of political development in another, more sophisticated book, *The Origins of Political Order*—the first of a projected two volumes, with the initial one running from prehistory to the French Revolution and its successor planned to take the story into the present and the future. Fukuyama still believes in the virtues of Western liberal democracy but now asks where it came from and how it might be sustained. At 608 pages, the first volume is long and dense, even though written with great fluency, and few are likely to read it cover to cover. But they should, since it is a brilliant book demonstrating great independence of mind and an astonishing breadth of knowledge.

THE SECULAR TRINITY

Fukuyama starts by asking why only a few nations behave like Denmark. That small Scandinavian country, he notes,

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combines three elements essential to political freedom: an orderly and efficient state, the rule of law, and government accountability to the people. The “miracle of modern politics,” he argues, is the balancing of a powerful, effective state with a transparent legal system and representative assemblies. As he demonstrates in a survey of political regimes across history, the combination of all three components in a stable liberal democracy is a rarity, generated by long and winding historical paths and much good fortune.

Fukuyama’s emphasis on an orderly and efficient state is notable and represents just one of his deviations from standard liberal theory, with its emphasis on free markets and small government as the recipes for progress and liberty. Fukuyama loves to take on opposing arguments, politely laying them out before declaring that, unfortunately, they bear no relation to reality. Against social contract theory, for example, he writes, “Human beings never existed in a presocial state. The idea that human beings at one time existed as isolated individuals, who interacted either through anarchic violence (Hobbes) or in pacific ignorance of one another (Rousseau), is not correct.”

As for that economic favorite, “the tragedy of the commons,” in which commonly held property supposedly stifles individuals’ drives to improve it, he calls it a myth. There is no evidence anywhere, he says, that an absence of private property rights has been a problem for economic or political development. Nor must the legal protection of property rights be absolute for development to occur; such protections must only be good enough, as they were in early modern Europe or contemporary China. (He might have

benefited here from the work of the political scientist Jean Oi and the sociologist Andrew Walder, who usefully write about the contemporary Chinese case by considering property rights as a “bundle,” including rights to control property, derive income from it, and transfer it.)

Such forays against utilitarianism make Fukuyama a card-carrying sociologist, and sure enough, the influence of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber (although not Marx) is clear and acknowledged. He does not refer to Karl Polanyi (that will probably come in the second volume), but his text offers emphatic support for Polanyi’s notion, taken further by recent economic sociologists, that market economies are not natural but rather always embedded in social structures.

Weber also seems to have inspired Fukuyama’s argument that the main enemies of the efficient, orderly state are the patrimonialism, cronyism, and corruption of family, kin, and tribal networks that protect their privileges and exact rents. He calls this “the tyranny of cousins,” since it stifles economic and political development, and he devotes much space to examining how various regimes have sought to combat it. China developed competitive examinations for its scholar-gentry bureaucrats to avoid letting jobs go to the kin of power holders. The Abbasid caliphs and the Ottoman Turks used abducted slaves (the Mamluks and the Janissaries, respectively) as officials and soldiers, since the slaves lacked blood ties to any local tribes and could not pass on their offices to their children. And the medieval Catholic Church under Pope Gregory VII introduced celibacy for priests in order to avoid kinship cronyism. Reliance on cousins and

tribalism, Fukuyama suggests, remain the default modes of political organization for humans when things go wrong—as they often do.

If Fukuyama is at his most insightful and original when discussing the need for an effective, orderly state, he is also sharp in stressing the need for the rule of law and accountability to substantial numbers of citizens. Here, he sees pre-colonial India as a counterexample to early China. China developed a strong state that protected citizens against the tyranny of cousins but left them open to the tyranny of the state itself. The Indian caste system produced a strong civil society that protected subjects from state tyranny but exposed them instead to cousins writ large in the form of castes. A combination of the two countries' traditions, he notes, would have provided a "better form of freedom," for that "emerges when there is a strong state and a strong society, two centers of power that are able to balance and offset each other."

Moving effortlessly from ancient global history to its modern European counterpart, Fukuyama discusses "weak absolutism" in Spain and France, "successful absolutism" in Russia, "failed oligarchy" in Poland, and, finally, "accountable government" in England, which, after 1688, became the first society to establish all three elements of his secular trinity. Other western European countries influenced by the Reformation, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, "also succeeded in putting together the state, rule of law and accountability in a single package by the 19th century."

Thus, he argues, the three elements of modern political order had evolved separately in different premodern civilizations:

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“China had developed a powerful state early on; the rule of law existed in India, the Middle East, and Europe; and in Britain, accountable government appeared for the first time.” Aware that this sounds a bit like Whig history or British triumphalism, he qualifies the argument by emphasizing the role of contingency. Development, he says, was “complex and context-specific.” For example, the decline in importance of extended families in early modern Europe resulted in part from the power of the medieval church. This meant that “an emerging capitalist economy in Italy, England, and the Netherlands in the sixteenth century did not have to overcome the resistance of large corporately organized kinship groups with substantial property to protect, as in India and China.”

HISTORY MAN

Religion and ideology play an important part in Fukuyama’s story. Where they establish a power base independent of the state, he claims—as have Hinduism in India, Islam in the Middle East, and Christianity in Europe—the rule of law develops most. Thus, he rejects reductionist attempts to explain political and social institutions as mere reflections of underlying economic or technological structures: “It is impossible to develop any meaningful theory of political development without treating ideas as fundamental causes of why societies differ and follow distinct development paths.” And in his account of the consolidation and expansion of states through the ages, military factors also often play a more important role than economic ones. Indeed, my chief criticism might be that Fukuyama tends to give too little prominence to economic power relations in general. But this is

hardly a dramatic failing, since the book manages to cover such an enormous range of subject matter and approaches.

Another concern is that Fukuyama’s attempt to ground social structures in sociobiology is unsuccessful; listing supposedly innate attributes of human beings does not help explain their social and political institutions. For example, he points to a putative human propensity for violence and war, citing the work of the anthropologist Lawrence Keeley and the archaeologist Stephen LeBlanc, who have argued that virtually all primitive and ancient societies repeatedly engaged in warfare. But their conclusions have been challenged by other scholars who emphasize the enormous variability of warfare across early societies, the surge in warfare that accompanied the rise of sedentary agricultural societies, and the great variability in war proneness across regions in more modern times.

Thus, Europeans were involved in wars in nearly 75 percent of the years between 1494 and 1975 and never went 25 years without fighting somewhere. In contrast, East Asia witnessed a 300-year period of peace between the 1590s and 1894, broken only by defensive engagements against barbarian incursions and five fairly small two-state wars. During the preceding 200 years, China had been at war only once. Yet in the period from about 750 BC to AD 200, as Fukuyama notes, the Chinese fought at least as many wars as the Europeans later did. The Chinese leopard changed its spots—as did the European leopard after 1960. The point is that warfare, although extremely important in some social contexts (such as when building up states and empires), is not invariant. It derives not from human

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nature per se but from certain types of societies and cultures with certain characteristics. Fukuyama himself, in fact, seems to recognize the limitations of sociobiology, since he never actually applies it to any historical context.

In any work of such breadth, there are bound to be some nits to pick. Thus, Fukuyama seems to believe the sizes of armies given in early Chinese sources, which are almost certainly vastly overstated; he writes that Denmark had representative government before 1800, when it still had an absolute monarchy; and so forth. But these occasional slips are trivial compared with the larger feat he has managed to pull off in covering so much diverse material so accessibly.

Fukuyama's method is not to cite an enormous quantity of historical scholarship but rather to rely on prominent scholars in each area. He has chosen these scholars well and is careful to present their positions accurately. It is downright refreshing to read a book of such breathtaking scope that manages to do so little violence to the work of the innumerable specialists whose insights it inevitably relies on. The bottom line is that Fukuyama's basic thesis is persuasive and he reveals good historical and sociological sensitivity throughout. The book is a great intellectual achievement and leaves one hungry for the next installment—which may be more of a cliffhanger than readers of his earlier work might assume.

Over the last two centuries, Fukuyama writes, liberal democracies have managed to discover a resilient political equilibrium, balancing state power, the rule of law, and accountability to citizens. But he warns that past results are no guarantee of future success. Continued legitimacy for today's

democracies will depend on their "being able to maintain an adequate balance between strong state action when necessary and the kinds of individual freedoms that are the basis of . . . democratic legitimacy and that foster private-sector growth."

Comments at the start and the end of the first volume show that he is deeply worried by the current political situation in the United States, and his recent article in these pages elaborated on that theme. The future of History might be a bumpy ride after all. 🌍

Response

Not Time to Attack Iran

Why War Should Be a Last Resort

Colin H. Kahl

In “Time to Attack Iran” (January/February 2012), Matthew Kroenig takes a page out of the decade-old playbook used by advocates of the Iraq war. He portrays the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran as both grave and imminent, arguing that the United States has little choice but to attack Iran now before it is too late. Then, after offering the caveat that “attacking Iran is hardly an attractive prospect,” he goes on to portray military action as preferable to other available alternatives and concludes that the United States can manage all the associated risks. Preventive war, according to Kroenig, is “the least bad option.”

But the lesson of Iraq, the last preventive war launched by the United States, is that Washington should not choose war when there are still other options, and it should not base its decision

to attack on best-case analyses of how it hopes the conflict will turn out. A realistic assessment of Iran’s nuclear progress and how a conflict would likely unfold leads one to a conclusion that is the opposite of Kroenig’s: now is not the time to attack Iran.

BAD TIMING

Kroenig argues that there is an urgent need to attack Iran’s nuclear infrastructure soon, since Tehran could “produce its first nuclear weapon within six months of deciding to do so.” Yet that last phrase is crucial. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has documented Iranian efforts to achieve the capacity to develop nuclear weapons at some point, but there is no hard evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has yet made the final decision to develop them.

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In arguing for a six-month horizon, Kroenig also misleadingly conflates hypothetical timelines to produce weapons-grade uranium with the time actually required to construct a bomb. According to 2010 Senate testimony by James Cartwright, then vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and recent statements by the former heads of Israel's national intelligence and defense intelligence agencies, even if Iran could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in six months, it would take it at least a year to produce a testable nuclear device and considerably longer to make a deliverable weapon. And David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (and the source of Kroenig's six-month estimate), recently told *Agence France-Presse* that there is a "low probability" that the Iranians would actually develop a bomb over the next year even if they had the capability to do so. Because there is no evidence that Iran has built additional covert enrichment plants since the Natanz and Qom sites were outed in 2002 and 2009, respectively, any near-term move by Tehran to produce weapons-grade uranium would have to rely on its declared facilities. The IAEA would thus detect such activity with sufficient time for the international community to mount a forceful response. As a result, the Iranians are unlikely to commit to building nuclear weapons until they can do so much more quickly or out of sight, which could be years off.

Kroenig is also inconsistent about the timetable for an attack. In some places, he suggests that strikes should begin now, whereas in others, he argues that the United States should attack only if Iran takes certain actions—such as expelling

IAEA inspectors, beginning the enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, or installing large numbers of advanced centrifuges, any one of which would signal that it had decided to build a bomb. Kroenig is likely right that these developments—and perhaps others, such as the discovery of new covert enrichment sites—would create a decision point for the use of force. But the Iranians have not taken these steps yet, and as Kroenig acknowledges, "Washington has a very good chance" of detecting them if they do.

RIDING THE ESCALATOR

Kroenig's discussion of timing is not the only misleading part of his article; so is his contention that the United States could mitigate the "potentially devastating consequences" of a strike on Iran by carefully managing the escalation that would ensue. His picture of a clean, calibrated conflict is a mirage. Any war with Iran would be a messy and extraordinarily violent affair, with significant casualties and consequences.

According to Kroenig, Iran would not respond to a strike with its "worst forms of retaliation, such as closing the Strait of Hormuz or launching missiles at southern Europe" unless its leaders felt that the regime's "very existence was threatened." To mitigate this risk, he claims, the United States could "make clear that it is interested only in destroying Iran's nuclear program, not in overthrowing the government." But Iranian leaders have staked their domestic legitimacy on resisting international pressure to halt the nuclear program, and so they would inevitably view an attack on that program as an attack on the regime itself. Decades of hostility and perceived U.S. efforts to

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undermine the regime would reinforce this perception. And when combined with the emphasis on anti-Americanism in the ideology of the supreme leader and his hard-line advisers, as well as their general ignorance about what drives U.S. decision-making, this perception means that there is little prospect that Iranian leaders would believe that a U.S. strike had limited aims. Assuming the worst about Washington's intentions, Tehran is likely to overreact to even a surgical strike against its nuclear facilities.

Kroenig nevertheless believes that the United States could limit the prospects for escalation by warning Iran that crossing certain "redlines" would trigger a devastating U.S. counterresponse. Ironically, Kroenig believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would be deeply irrational and prone to miscalculation yet somehow maintains that under the same leaders, Iran would make clear-eyed decisions in the immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike. But the two countries share no direct and reliable channels for communication, and the inevitable confusion brought on by a crisis would make signaling difficult and miscalculation likely.

To make matters worse, in the heat of battle, Iran would face powerful incentives to escalate. In the event of a conflict, both sides would come under significant pressure to stop the fighting due to the impact on international oil markets. Since this would limit the time the Iranians would have to reestablish deterrence, they might choose to launch a quick, all-out response, without care for redlines. Iranian fears that the United States could successfully disrupt its command-and-control infrastructure or preemptively destroy its ballistic missile arsenal could also tempt

Iran to launch as many missiles as possible early in the war. And the decentralized nature of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, especially its navy, raises the prospect of unauthorized responses that could rapidly expand the fighting in the crowded waters of the Persian Gulf.

Controlling escalation would be no easier on the U.S. side. In the face of reprisals by Iranian proxies, "token missile strikes against U.S. bases and ships," or "the harassment of commercial and U.S. naval vessels," Kroenig says that Washington should turn the other cheek and constrain its own response to Iranian counterattacks. But this is much easier said than done. Just as Iran's likely expectation of a short war might encourage it to respond disproportionately early in the crisis, so the United States would also have incentives to move swiftly to destroy Iran's conventional forces and the infrastructure of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. And if the United States failed to do so, proxy attacks against U.S. civilian personnel in Lebanon or Iraq, the transfer of lethal rocket and portable air defense systems to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan, or missile strikes against U.S. facilities in the Gulf could cause significant U.S. casualties, creating irresistible political pressure in Washington to respond. Add to this the normal fog of war and the lack of reliable communications between the United States and Iran, and Washington would have a hard time determining whether Tehran's initial response to a strike was a one-off event or the prelude to a wider campaign. If it were the latter, a passive U.S. approach might motivate Iran to launch even more dangerous attacks—and this is a risk Washington may choose not to take. The sum total

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of these dynamics would make staying within Kroenig's proscribed limits exceedingly difficult.

Even if Iran did not escalate, purely defensive moves that would threaten U.S. personnel or international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz—the maritime chokepoint through which nearly 20 percent of the world's traded oil passes—would also create powerful incentives for Washington to preemptively target Iran's military. Of particular concern would be Iran's "anti-access/area-denial" capabilities, which are designed to prevent advanced navies from operating in the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf. These systems integrate coastal air defenses, shore-based long-range artillery and antiship cruise missiles, Kilo-class and midget submarines, remote-controlled boats and unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles, and more than 1,000 small attack craft equipped with machine guns, multiple-launch rockets, antiship missiles, torpedoes, and rapid-mine-laying capabilities. The entire 120-mile-long strait sits along the Iranian coastline, within short reach of these systems. In the midst of a conflict, the threat to U.S. forces and the global economy posed by Iran's activating its air defenses, dispersing its missiles or naval forces, or moving its mines out of storage would be too great for the United States to ignore; the logic of preemption would compel Washington to escalate.

Some analysts, including Afshin Molavi and Michael Singh, believe that the Iranians are unlikely to attempt to close the strait due to the damage it would inflict on their own economy. But Tehran's saber rattling has already intensified in response to the prospect of Western sanctions on its oil industry. In the

immediate aftermath of a U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear program, Iranian leaders might perceive that holding the strait at risk would encourage international pressure on Washington to end the fighting, possibly deterring U.S. escalation. In reality, it would more likely have the opposite effect, encouraging aggressive U.S. efforts to protect commercial shipping. The U.S. Navy is capable of keeping the strait open, but the mere threat of closure could send oil prices soaring, dealing a heavy blow to the fragile global economy. The measures that Kroenig advocates to mitigate this threat, such as opening up the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and urging Saudi Arabia to boost oil production, would be unlikely to suffice, especially since most Saudi crude passes through the strait.

Ultimately, if the United States and Iran go to war, there is no doubt that Washington will win in the narrow operational sense. Indeed, with the impressive array of U.S. naval and air forces already deployed in the Gulf, the United States could probably knock Iran's military capabilities back 20 years in a matter of weeks. But a U.S.-Iranian conflict would not be the clinical, tightly controlled, limited encounter that Kroenig predicts.

SPILLOVER

Keeping other states in the region out of the fight would also prove more difficult than Kroenig suggests. Iran would presume Israeli complicity in a U.S. raid and would seek to drag Israel into the conflict in order to undermine potential support for the U.S. war effort among key Arab regimes. And although it is true, as Kroenig

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notes, that Israel remained on the sidelines during the 1990–91 Gulf War, the threat posed by Iran’s missiles and proxies today is considerably greater than that posed by Iraq two decades ago. If Iranian-allied Hezbollah responded to the fighting by firing rockets at Israeli cities, Israel could launch an all-out war against Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad might also try to use the moment to divert attention from the uprising in his country, launching his own assault on the Jewish state. Either scenario, or their combination, could lead to a wider war in the Levant.

Even in the Gulf, where U.S. partners are sometimes portrayed as passive, Iranian retaliation might draw Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into the conflict. The Saudis have taken a much more confrontational posture toward Iran in the past year, and Riyadh is unlikely to tolerate Iranian attacks against critical energy infrastructure. For its part, the UAE, the most hawkish state in the Gulf, might respond to missiles raining down on U.S. forces at its Al Dhafra Air Base by attempting to seize Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb, three disputed Gulf islands currently occupied by Iran.

A strike could also set off wider destabilizing effects. Although Kroenig is right that some Arab leaders would privately applaud a U.S. strike, many on the Arab street would reject it. Both Islamist extremists and embattled elites could use this opportunity to transform the Arab Spring’s populist antiregime narrative into a decidedly anti-American one. This would rebound to Iran’s advantage just at the moment when political developments in the region, chief among them the resurgence of nationalism in the Arab world and the upheaval in

Syria, are significantly undermining Iran’s influence. A U.S. strike could easily shift regional sympathies back in Tehran’s favor by allowing Iran to play the victim and, through its retaliation, resuscitate its status as the champion of the region’s anti-Western resistance.

THE COST OF BUYING TIME

Even if a U.S. strike went as well as Kroenig predicts, there is little guarantee that it would produce lasting results. Senior U.S. defense officials have repeatedly stated that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would stall Tehran’s progress for only a few years. Kroenig argues that such a delay could become permanent. “Those countries whose nuclear facilities have been attacked—most recently Iraq and Syria,” he writes, “have proved unwilling or unable to restart their programs.” In the case of Iraq, however, Saddam Hussein restarted his clandestine nuclear weapons program after the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor, and it required the Gulf War and another decade of sanctions and intrusive inspections to eliminate it. Iran’s program is also more advanced and dispersed than were Iraq’s and Syria’s, meaning it would be easier to reconstitute. A U.S. strike would damage key Iranian facilities, but it would do nothing to reverse the nuclear knowledge Iran has accumulated or its ability to eventually build new centrifuges.

A U.S. attack would also likely rally domestic Iranian support around nuclear hard-liners, increasing the odds that Iran would emerge from a strike even more committed to building a bomb. Kroenig downplays the “rally round the flag” risks by noting that hard-liners are already

firmly in power and suggesting that an attack might produce increased internal criticism of the regime. But the nuclear program remains an enormous source of national pride for the majority of Iranians. To the extent that there is internal dissent over the program, it is a discussion about whether the country should acquire nuclear weapons or simply pursue civilian nuclear technology. By demonstrating the vulnerability of a non-nuclear-armed Iran, a U.S. attack would provide ammunition to hard-liners who argue for acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Kroenig suggests that the United States should essentially ignore “Iran’s domestic political tussles” when pursuing “its vital national security interest in preventing Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.” But influencing Iranian opinion about the strategic desirability of nuclear weapons might ultimately offer the only enduring way of keeping the Islamic Republic on a peaceful nuclear path.

Finally, if Iran did attempt to restart its nuclear program after an attack, it would be much more difficult for the United States to stop it. An assault would lead Iran to distance itself from the IAEA and perhaps to pull out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty altogether. Without inspectors on the ground, the international community would struggle to track or slow Tehran’s efforts to rebuild its program.

CONTAIN YOURSELF

Kroenig argues that “a nuclear-armed Iran would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war” but still concludes that it is ultimately less risky to attack the Islamic Republic now than to attempt to contain it later. He warns that containment would entail a costly forward

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deployment of large numbers of U.S. forces on Iran's periphery for decades.

But the United States already has a large presence encircling Iran. Forty thousand U.S. troops are stationed in the Gulf, accompanied by strike aircraft, two aircraft carrier strike groups, two Aegis ballistic missile defense ships, and multiple Patriot antimissile systems. On Iran's eastern flank, Washington has another 90,000 troops deployed in Afghanistan and thousands more supporting the Afghan war in nearby Central Asian states. Kroenig claims that it would take much more to contain a nuclear-armed Iran. But U.S. forces in the Gulf already outnumber those in South Korea that are there to deter a nuclear-armed North. It is thus perfectly conceivable that the existing U.S. presence in the region, perhaps supplemented by a limited forward deployment of nuclear weapons and additional ballistic missile defenses, would be sufficient to deter a nuclear-armed Iran from aggression and blackmail.

To be sure, such a deterrence-and-containment strategy would be an extraordinarily complex and risky enterprise, and there is no doubt that prevention is preferable. Given the possible consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran, the price of failure would be very high. But Kroenig's approach would not solve the problem. By presenting the options as either a near-term strike or long-term containment, Kroenig falls into the same trap that advocates of the Iraq war fell into a decade ago: ignoring postwar scenarios. In reality, the strike that Kroenig recommends would likely be a prelude to containment, not a substitute for it.

Since a military raid would not permanently eliminate Iran's nuclear

infrastructure, the United States would still need to construct an expensive, risky postwar containment regime to prevent Iran from reconstituting the program, much as it did in regard to Iraq after the Gulf War. The end result would be strikingly similar to the one that Kroenig criticizes, requiring Washington to maintain sufficient air, naval, and ground forces in the Persian Gulf to attack again at a moment's notice.

A strike carried out in the way Kroenig advocates—a unilateral preventive attack—would also make postwar containment more difficult and costly. Many countries would view such an operation as a breach of international law, shattering the consensus required to maintain an effective poststrike containment regime. The likelihood that the United States could “reduce the political fallout of military action by building global support for it in advance,” as Kroenig suggests, would be extremely low absent clear evidence that Iran is dashing for a bomb. Without such evidence, Washington would be left to bear the costs of an attack and the resulting containment regime alone.

Finally, the surgical nature of Kroenig's proposed strike, aimed solely at Iran's nuclear program, would make postwar containment much harder. It would leave Tehran wounded and aggrieved but still capable of responding. Kroenig's recommended approach, then, would likely be just enough to ensure a costly, long-term conflict without actually compelling Iran to change its behavior.

THE OPTIONS ON THE TABLE

In making the case for preventive war as the least bad option, Kroenig dismisses any prospect of finding a diplomatic solution

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to the U.S.-Iranian standoff. He concludes that the Obama administration's dual-track policy of engagement and pressure has failed to arrest Iran's march toward a bomb, leaving Washington with no other choice but to bomb Iran.

But this ignores the severe economic strain, isolation, and technical challenges that Iran is experiencing. After years of dismissing the economic effects of sanctions, senior Iranian officials now publicly complain about the intense pain the sanctions are producing. And facing the prospect of U.S. sanctions against Iran's central bank and European actions to halt Iranian oil imports, Tehran signaled in early January some willingness to return to the negotiating table. Washington must test this willingness and, in so doing, provide Iran with a clear strategic choice: address the concerns of the international community regarding its nuclear program and see its isolation lifted or stay on its current path and face substantially higher costs. In framing this choice, Washington must be able to assert that like-minded states are prepared to implement oil-related sanctions, and the Obama administration should continue to emphasize that all options, including military action, remain on the table.

Some will undoubtedly claim that highlighting the potential risks associated with war will lead the Iranians to conclude that the United States lacks the resolve to use force. But in authorizing the surge in Afghanistan, carrying out the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, and leading the NATO air campaign to oust Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, President Barack Obama has repeatedly shown that he is willing to accept risk and use force—both as part of a coalition and unilaterally—

to defend U.S. interests. And as Martin Dempsey, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, told CNN late last December, the United States has a viable contingency plan for Iran if force is ultimately required. But given the high costs and inherent uncertainties of a strike, the United States should not rush to use force until all other options have been exhausted and the Iranian threat is not just growing but imminent. Until then, force is, and should remain, a last resort, not a first choice. 🌐

Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Humanity's Law. BY RUTI G. TEITEL.

Oxford University Press, 2011,

320 pp. \$35.00.

The human rights revolution of the last half century has begun to redefine the world's understanding of the relationships among individuals, the state, and violence. This masterful treatise by Teitel, a law professor at New York University, offers one of the best explanations yet of the complex, shifting normative foundations of international law. Whereas the old international legal order emphasized "state security," defined by borders, statehood, and territory, the emerging focus is on "human security": the protection of persons and peoples. The result is what Teitel calls "humanity's law," a new discourse on violence and world politics that brings together and crystallizes a multitude of small but important shifts in international human rights law, the law of war, and international criminal justice. She chronicles the way these ideas have changed as courts, tribunals, advocacy groups, and international organizations have interpreted and extended the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions,

and other enshrinements of principles about rights and responsibilities relating to war and justice. This book is an indispensable guide to understanding these intellectual transformations and their complicated implications for policymakers and the international community.

Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics. BY JOSEPH M. PARENT.

Oxford University Press, 2011, 256 pp.

\$99.00 (paper, \$27.95).

Scholars do not have good explanations for what causes states to voluntarily form political unions—a rare but important phenomenon. The United States did so in 1789, and today's European Union has come close. Realists expect states to tenaciously hold on to their sovereignty and are puzzled that states would ever try to unify. Liberals believe states are driven by the search for economic gains and democratic solidarity and are puzzled that political unions are so uncommon. In this provocative but carefully argued study, Parent makes the case that states create political unions only when they are imperiled by security threats. Unification is actually a type of "extreme alliance," in which states of roughly equal power bind together for mutual protection. Parent finds only two instances of successful

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political unification—the United States and Switzerland—which he contrasts with the failed efforts of Sweden and Norway and with Simón Bolívar’s attempt to unite South America. The book succeeds in building a realist explanation of unification. But with so few cases of voluntary political union, it is not clear whether Parent’s theory is all that illuminating. Still, the book does generate a clear prediction in regard to Europe: without an intense, enduring, and widely shared threat, the core European states will fail to merge into a true union.

Governance Without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited Statehood.

EDITED BY THOMAS RISSE. Columbia University Press, 2011, 312 pp. \$50.00. Sovereign nation-states that can uphold the rule of law, enforce order at home, and abide by international rules and institutions are frequently touted as the building blocks of effective global governance. If fragile and failed states are the problem, nation-state building is the solution. But this important study led by Risse, a German political scientist, demonstrates that many parts of the world will not soon or easily be transformed into capable modern states. Starting with the assumption that “limited sovereignty” is here to stay, at least in many developing and postcolonial societies, the authors explore ways in which the international community can help such places develop effective and legitimate governance. Several authors explore the various ways in which “multilevel governance” has been organized, ranging from colonial administration to modern protectorates, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and Kosovo. For readers who think the world is steadily moving toward the Westphalian ideal of a universal system of sovereign states, this book will be a revelation. For readers who despair at the chronic problem of weak and failing states, this book contains intriguing ideas about alternative forms of stable governance.

Taking Liberties: The War on Terror and the Erosion of American Democracy. BY SUSAN N. HERMAN. Oxford University Press, 2011, 296 pp. \$24.95.

Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11. BY JACK GOLDSMITH. Norton, 2012, 336 pp. \$26.95.

The unwinding of the Iraq war and the killing of Osama bin Laden have marked a symbolic end to the post-9/11 “war on terror.” What has not ended is the public debate over how the United States and other democracies can best square their commitment to civil liberties and the rule of law with protection against terrorism. Herman, the president of the American Civil Liberties Union, passionately calls for a rethinking of the costs and benefits of the emergency presidential powers that were put in place after the 2001 terrorist attacks. She notes that Congress passed the Patriot Act with little or no meaningful deliberation. And to the surprise of some, the surveillance programs that the Obama administration has justified and pursued are not substantially different from those of its predecessor. Much of the book is a catalog of episodes in which Americans have been “blacklisted, watchlisted, . . . spied on, and gagged.” Post-9/11 measures relating to the “material support”

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of terrorism have infringed on First Amendment rights. New surveillance techniques have threatened the privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Herman believes that although it might be understandable that fear and uncertainty led authorities to privilege security over liberty, they overreacted in the wake of the attacks. In defending the United States, the government must also defend the Constitution.

Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor, was on the frontlines of the legal debates after 9/11, working in the Defense and Justice Departments during the first term of the Bush administration. He acknowledges that the “war on terror” shifted power to the presidency. But he argues that this is only half the story. Less known but no less remarkable is a “revolution in wartime presidential accountability” that has simultaneously checked and legitimated the expansion of executive powers. Congress, often spurred on by media attention, has played a role in altering and regulating presidential policies relating to interrogation, detention, and surveillance. Federal judges have proved willing to review the legal authority of presidential military decisions. Outside government, Goldsmith argues, the traditional system of checks and balances has been supported by an expanding network of lawyers, investigators, auditors, bloggers, and public interest groups that have rendered executive decisions more transparent. In Goldsmith’s optimistic vision, it is this complex and messy system of accountability that reconciles a powerful presidency with a strong constitution.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World. BY MICHAEL LEWIS. Norton, 2011, 224 pp. \$25.95.

Lewis, the bestselling author of *Liar’s Poker* and *The Big Short*, has written a breezy, bottom-up account of the ongoing financial crises in Iceland, Ireland, Greece, and two cities in debt-ridden California: financially strapped San Jose and bankrupt Vallejo. The book is fun to read but also scary. Through his reporting and interviews, Lewis relates many amusing anecdotes about the roles of particular individuals and institutions and illuminates the social attitudes behind the naiveté and lack of discipline that laid the bases for the crises. Different cultures produced distinct responses to financial adversity: Irish acceptance and passivity, Greek anger and hostility, and an Icelandic decision to elect female politicians who were less macho and more sensible than the men who had damaged the country’s economy. Californians, Lewis reports, have not yet reconciled their desire for public spending with their aversion to taxes. He also explores how traditionally staid German banks came to lend so much to overborrowers, such as the Greeks, not only producing large losses but also rendering themselves vulnerable to future crises. The irony is that the German government now must decide how much financial assistance to give other members of the eurozone to help save Europe from a borrowing binge financed by those very German banks.

Recent Books

Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring. BY J. BRADFORD JENSEN. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011, 256 pp. \$25.95.

The United States now produces all its material output—food, minerals, manufactured goods, construction—with less than 20 percent of its labor force. Yet agriculture and manufacturing still receive disproportionate political attention. Jensen turns the spotlight on the more than 80 percent of U.S. workers employed in services, a diverse category that includes legal, accounting, architectural, educational, and medical services, as well as transportation and retail. He argues that many services are becoming increasingly tradable, meaning that some service jobs might move overseas. But tradable services typically require high levels of education and skill, so increased international trade in services should favor the American work force, which is relatively well educated and skilled. Jensen concludes that U.S. policy should aim to further liberalize trade in services to help American workers take advantage of the vast increase in infrastructure expenditures likely to occur in developing countries in the coming decades, which will create jobs that require advanced design and engineering skills. He also urges more attention to education at all ages to maintain American workers' high level of skills.

Plundered Nations? Successes and Failures in Natural Resource Extraction. EDITED BY PAUL COLLIER AND ANTHONY J. VENABLES. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 376 pp. \$32.00.

In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of economists put forward the notion of a

“resource curse.” According to this idea, a country rich in natural resources was condemned, at best, to lack development in tradable nonresource goods (due to having a too strong currency) and to possibly become a nonproductive rent-seeking society. At worse, the curse would lead to endemic corruption or even violent conflict over control of the dominant resource. Of the eight countries this book examines, only two—Chile (copper) and Malaysia (rubber, then oil)—have managed to convert their resource bases successfully into more diversified economies with sustainably rising standards of living. The only clear failure is Cameroon (oil), where the well-being of its citizens fell following the resource boom. The others—Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria (all oil), Russia (mainly oil and gas), and Zambia (copper)—have experienced mixed results. The editors provide an excellent analytic overview and suggest guidelines more likely to assure success, such as the creation and maintenance of overseas funds into which some of the proceeds from the exhaustible resource could be channeled. But the book also emphasizes the fact that there is no single way to manage resources and that for a country to be successful, its resource policies must take into account its particular circumstances.

Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change.

EDITED BY JAMES KRASKA. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 340 pp. \$90.00.

The Arctic has long been a place where only the most intrepid ventured. That is changing, slowly. Because global warming affects high latitudes more than low ones, melting sea ice (and improved technology) will increase access to the Arctic, both for transportation and for the exploitation of

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natural resources, which many experts believe are abundant in the region. Sea-travel distance from western Europe to Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and north-east China could be cut nearly in half if ships traveled through the Arctic Ocean north of Russia instead of via the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. In 2009, two German cargo ships traveled the Arctic route without relying on icebreaking escort vessels, which Russian ships normally use. This collection surveys the evolving possibilities of increased Arctic access and its implications for the five Arctic states: Canada, Denmark (which borders the Arctic by way of Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States. It is a useful introduction to a remote part of the world that will undoubtedly become more important in the coming years.

DDT and the American Century: Global Health, Environmental Politics, and the Pesticide That Changed the World. BY DAVID KINKELA. University of North Carolina Press, 2011, 272 pp. \$39.95.

When it was first used on a wide scale, in the 1940s, DDT (dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) was known as “the miracle pesticide.” It was cheap, easy to apply, persistent, lethal to insects, and apparently harmless to humans. It played an important role in modernizing Mexican agriculture and in the World Health Organization’s campaign against malaria in Asia and Latin America in the 1950s. But in the early 1960s, the biologist Rachel Carson and others revealed that DDT accumulated harmfully in birds and fish and could in fact pose risks to human health. The United States banned the domestic use of DDT in 1972, but it is still used in a number of poor countries. Kinkela

emphasizes DDT’s part in the larger Cold War project of using American technology to improve the lives of poor people around the world, including the role of fertilizers and pesticides in making possible the “green revolution.” He presents DDT as a useful product with undesirable long-term ecological effects, requiring careful judgment about when to use it. The U.S. chemical industry, in contrast, comes off badly, as it attempted to deny and dismiss DDT’s negative effects and to discredit anyone who pointed them out.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918. BY DAVID STEVENSON. Belknap Press, 2011, 752 pp. \$35.00.

The Beauty and the Sorrow: An Intimate History of the First World War. BY PETER ENGLUND. TRANSLATED BY PETER GRAVES. Knopf, 2011, 560 pp. \$35.00.

The suddenness with which World War I ended had lasting effects, not least the belief, later exploited by Adolf Hitler, that the only explanation for Germany’s defeat was a “stab in the back.” Rather than the deadly stalemates of the trenches, which still dominate popular views of the war, 1918 saw fast-moving offensives. The Germans went first. With Russia out of the war, extra German divisions were available. But they had little time and were anxious to strike before the Americans applied the full weight of their power. Germany’s spring offensive made rapid gains, pushing the Allies

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back, leading to British Field Marshal Douglas Haig's famous order to his troops to continue fighting "with our backs to the wall," from which Stevenson draws his title. But Germany and its army were exhausted. The offensive petered out, and the Germans were soon in retreat. Stevenson's book is a masterful, lucid analysis that does not simply tell the tale. It also considers in detail the factors of technology, morale, supply, economics, and politics that contributed to Germany's defeat. The tactics of the Allies were more imaginative, the blockade they imposed made life miserable for their enemies, and their leaders were more astute and attentive to the need for stability at home.

In a completely different book about the same war, Englund offers no comprehensive overview but instead reconstructs the conflict through the stories of a diverse cast of 20 people who lived through it. The book is an "intimate" history because Englund not only uses his subjects' own words but also provides his own, sometimes sardonic commentary, supplying the background the reader needs to understand the characters' situations and preoccupations. The cast includes a French civil servant who never heard a shot fired but wrote wry reflections on how a denial of the reality of war sustained morale in Paris. Another subject is a German seaman posted on a battleship that never saw combat; his only action came at the war's end, when he participated in a mutiny. Others are engaged in the war far from their own countries: a Venezuelan cavalryman in the Ottoman army, a Canadian married to a Polish aristocrat, a British nurse in a Russian military hospital. Like no other, this book brings out in a poignant and effective way the meaning

of World War I for those who lived through it, and allows them to speak to us almost a century later.

Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941–1944. BY ANNA REID. Walker and Company, 2011, 512 pp. \$37.50.
The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943. BY LLOYD CLARK. Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011, 496 pp. \$30.00.

Compared with southern and western Europe's experience of World War II, the course of the war in the East has been far less thoroughly researched. But the East is now catching up. The end of the Cold War gave researchers access to Soviet archives and survivors and has made it possible to consider this epic struggle free from the ideological distortions of the communist years and also to describe some of the human stories behind the staggering statistics, as these two books do. Reid begins on the first day of the 1941 German siege of Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg), in which some 750,000 people died as Hitler sought to starve the population out of existence. During the first winter, in particular, the search for nutrition became desperate, descending even into cannibalism, which Reid describes in grisly detail. Meanwhile, the Communist Party and the secret police continued to manage the city in the spirit of prewar purges and propaganda, ready to blame defeatists and traitors for the people's privations and never their own incompetence. Quoting from diaries, memoirs, and interviews, Reid brilliantly explodes Soviet-era myths and constructs a harrowing, unrelenting account that demonstrates how extreme human behavior can become in a struggle for survival.

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Clark describes the Battle of Kursk of July 1943, the last great German Wehrmacht offensive, which was an attempt to recover from the defeat at Stalingrad, five months earlier. The scale was enormous: four million men, 13,000 tanks, and 12,000 aircraft. The Soviets took heavier losses, but the Germans could not complete a decisive breakthrough and thereafter found themselves on the defensive. Clark puts the battle in context, explaining how Hitler's strategic misjudgments frustrated even his most loyal generals, who coped with the consequences as best they could, often with great tactical skill. Like Reid, Clark makes excellent use of firsthand accounts. Many of those who fought tell of an expectation of imminent death, as tanks fired into one another at close distance. "It wasn't a battle," reports a Soviet T-34 tank commander. "It was a slaughterhouse of tanks."

The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade. BY ANDREW FEINSTEIN.

Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, 704 pp. \$30.00.

Until 2001, Feinstein was a member of South Africa's parliament for the African National Congress. He resigned in disgust at the bribes paid by arms manufacturers to senior party figures as the country modernized its military. Arms acquisition by governments is a reliable recipe for corruption: massive contracts for equipment that might never be used, all surrounded by the secretive, protective aura of national security. "Merchants of death" have long been blamed for feeding war frenzies and profiting from misery. But in Feinstein's telling, the entire trade is a conspiracy between greedy businesses

and kleptocratic elites, counterproductive for the selling nations (because the weapons often fall into the wrong hands) and for the buyers (because arms contracts use up scarce funds without doing much for security). One might argue that there are genuine defense needs that cannot be met any other way and that the trade is not always as distorted as Feinstein contends. But the book is not trying to be balanced, and Feinstein makes his case with an impressive amount of detailed research and a gift for narrative that makes his findings hard to dismiss.

The United States

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government. BY JAMES T. SPARROW. Oxford University Press, 2011, 344 pp. \$34.95.

Warfare State is one of the most important books on the United States to be published in some time. Sparrow is not the first scholar to argue that it was World War II, rather than the New Deal, that shaped the postwar consensus in support of a stronger, more active federal government. But this clearly written, concise, and yet comprehensive book makes the argument more forcefully and fully than others. The generation that fought World War II—or that worked for victory on the home front—lived under a more powerful and more intrusive federal government than any Americans before or since. With enormous force, the war imprinted on the "greatest generation" the importance of the subordination of individual interests to group well-being,

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of coordinating individual and corporate action under national authority, and of a common national purpose that overrode antagonisms of class and, to an extent, race. As members of that generation fade, so do the assumptions and habits—good and bad—they acquired in the war. The multifaceted consequences of this passing include everything from the rise of the Tea Party to the corrosion of ethics on Wall Street. *Warfare State* is a book that historians and students of contemporary American politics need to master; this is scholarship at its best.

No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. BY CONDOLEEZZA RICE.
Crown, 2011, 784 pp. \$35.00.

The shadow of Dean Acheson looms large in Rice's memoir of eight years of service in the George W. Bush administration, first as national security adviser and then as secretary of state. In both form and substance, Acheson's memoir of the Truman administration, *Present at the Creation*, serves as a model for Rice's. Both Acheson and Rice served as secretary of state in administrations that were criticized for going to war as a result of policy errors (in Korea for Truman and in Iraq for Bush), and both turned the White House over to the opposing party after failures and difficulties abroad and at home. Acheson's skillful memoir helped revise the historical verdict; today, the errors and misjudgments of the Truman years are largely forgotten, and such achievements as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO dominate the historical memory. The Bush administration is unlikely to achieve so full a rehabilitation. Nevertheless, Rice's rigorous and fair-minded accounting will

likely help soften the historical verdict. Rice was one of the few principals of the Bush administration whose reputation stood higher in 2008 than in 2000; the crisp professionalism, love of country, and ability to see clearly and speak candidly on display in this memoir help explain why.

The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke in the World. EDITED BY DEREK

CHOLLET AND SAMANTHA POWER.

PublicAffairs, 2011, 400 pp. \$29.99.

After leaving the Clinton administration, Richard Holbrooke maintained an office at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he kept a picture of himself and the Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic on the mantelpiece. The two men were smiling; the caption read, "We had a frank and cordial conversation and then I bombed him." Holbrooke's untimely death in 2010 deprived the country of one of its finest, most inspiring, and at times most infuriating diplomats and public servants. It also motivated a group of his former colleagues, associates, and employees to write a spectacular series of essays retracing his life and career through the eyes of those who knew him best. Power's essay alone is worth the price of the book; reflecting on her mentor, Power is affectionate, exasperated, and eloquent, catching Holbrooke at his most intense, most personal, and most effective. One of Holbrooke's youngest protégés, E. Benjamin Skinner, writes about Holbrooke's experiences in college journalism and as an intern at *The New York Times* and also considers the ways Holbrooke quietly integrated humanitarian concerns into his diplomatic missions. Aided by Holbrooke's widow, Kati Marton, Chollet and Power have pulled together a collection of writings that reminds

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those who knew Holbrooke what they have lost and allows others to learn something about one of the great men of our time.

Steve Jobs. BY WALTER ISAACSON. Simon & Schuster, 2011, 656 pp. \$35.00. Isaacson's magnificent, gripping biography of the Apple founder Steve Jobs is more than the life of the business visionary who created the world's most valuable company and changed the lives of millions of people. It is also a demonstration of the continuing vitality of American culture. Jobs—a vegan, antiestablishment, LSD-taking college dropout—ultimately created a series of products that helped reshape American industry. Like many great entrepreneurs, Jobs had a personality and views that were quirky, eccentric, and sometimes off-putting. But American society proved flexible and hungry enough to enable Jobs and his insurgent band of obsessives and dreamers to find the financing and make the deals needed to put Macs, iPods, iPhones, and iPads into the hands of eager customers all over the world. The ability of Isaacson to write books that capture an age as well as a man makes him one of our best and most important biographers. *Steve Jobs* shows Isaacson at his best.

Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations and the Rise of American Power. BY INDERJEET PARMAR. Columbia University Press, 2012, 368 pp. \$40.00. Parmar's flawed but important study of the role of foundations in American foreign policy during the last 70 years brings needed attention to a subject that has not received nearly enough scrutiny.

Parmar's most valuable insight is that although foundations have often failed in their stated objectives of promoting democracy and reducing poverty in developing countries, they have succeeded in creating networks of scholars and activists who have helped recast global intellectual life in the pragmatic American mold. These networks, along with the globalization of the American university and nongovernmental organization models, are among the most striking and important aspects of the post-World War II world, and Parmar does well to highlight their rise. But his book is too polemic to provide a full account of the phenomena it investigates; worse, Parmar seems to think that Americans could have easily reduced poverty and made the world a utopia had they only been less interested in their nefarious networking agenda. Still, students of this important topic will appreciate this pioneering work.

Western Europe

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Thinking the Twentieth Century. BY TONY JUDT WITH TIMOTHY SNYDER. Penguin Press, 2012, 432 pp. \$36.00. The late Judt was among the West's leading public intellectuals and among the greatest intellectual historians of the West. His gift was to meld the two: his history captured the excitement of past intellectual debates, and his commentary was infused with the perspective of a master historian. The magnum opus he never wrote would have been a grand intellectual history placing in historical

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context the modern ideologies he studied—socialism, nationalism, conservatism, liberalism, Marxism, Zionism, European federalism, religious fundamentalism—and maintaining their relevance for future generations. The closest he came are the series of testimonial conversations contained in this book, conducted with the Yale historian Snyder during the final months of Judt's battle with Lou Gehrig's disease. The book highlights his status as a perpetual insider-outsider in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which seems to have afforded him a keen appreciation of the peculiar cultural and historical circumstances of each. Yet most moving for the reader are Judt's fierce commitment to history as an indispensable key to understanding the present and his ability, even when speaking his final thoughts through a breathing tube, to express himself in clear, forthright language. Despite a sometimes meandering conversational form, the result is a volume filled with memorable insights that any educated person will enjoy.

The French Way: How France Embraced and Rejected American Values and Power.

BY RICHARD F. KUISEL. Princeton University Press, 2011, 544 pp. \$49.50.

This book captures France's deep ambivalence toward American economics, politics, and culture. After a scholarly lifetime explaining French attitudes toward liberal values, free markets, and foreigners, the political scientist Kuisel is uniquely suited to the task. Many French find the United States' inequality, materialism, populism, and global militarism deeply distasteful. Like so many things French, this response remains paradoxical: Americanization and anti-

Americanization coexist together. The French flirt with transatlantic fashions and ideas, from free-market economics to California Cabernet. Some of it sticks, as Euro Disney, 1,000 McDonald's, and many successful American TV shows attest. The French are more willing to use military force, support high technology, and oppose both communist and Islamist extremism than most other Europeans. Yet in the end, the French remain firmly wedded to views of democracy, family, work, and lifestyle that diverge from those of Americans, and there is little sign of change. These views are particularly pronounced on the left, but even French business is ambivalent about the United States, seeking more freedom from regulation but remaining suspicious of moving toward what is perceived as an underregulated U.S. model. Kuisel unpacks all this, making this book required reading for anyone interested in relations between the world's two oldest republics.

After the Fall: The End of the European Dream and the Decline of a Continent.

BY WALTER LAQUEUR. Thomas Dunne, 2012, 336 pp. \$26.99.

Laqueur is a commentator about whom it is hard not to feel ambivalent. On the plus side, as a widely published scholar of twentieth-century history, now retired from Georgetown and London's Institute of Contemporary History, he brings formidable intelligence and historical erudition to the task of putting Europe's current predicament into perspective. In contrast to commonplace conservative critics of Europe, Laqueur, when he cites Brooks Adams or Raymond Aron, Prince Klemens von Metternich or Jean

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Monnet, sounds as though he knows what he is talking about. On the negative side, this book repeats a set of one-sided criticisms about continental Europe typical of the Anglo-American right: it is militarily weak, demographically feeble, economically incompetent, fixated on human rights, overly critical of the United States, morally relativistic—and, above all, too Muslim. Laqueur searches in vain for the causes of these alleged problems, obsessing about demographics and non-Christian immigration even while admitting they are not the primary factors. When Laqueur advances such arguments, the subtlety and factual basis so evident in his more general analysis desert him. Still, this jeremiad will surely be discussed widely.

Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship. BY RICHARD ALDOUS.

Norton, 2012, 352 pp. \$27.95.

Great historical figures generate their own myths, often deliberately. One task of the historian is to recapture, as much as possible, things as they actually were. Few modern politicians have generated more fictions than—and few so deliberately as—the American and British conservative revolutionaries of the 1980s, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. According to their overlapping myths, they were idealists who stood together for freedom, robust militaries, and a firm hand against terrorism. Yet looking back, the truth seems more complex and subtle. Thatcher's inimitable Churchillian persona was the result of careful coaching by political professionals, and Reagan was far more pragmatic than most who invoke his name would have one believe. Aldous' startling conclusion is that Reagan and

Thatcher clashed repeatedly over issues such as the Falklands, Grenada, sanctions against the Soviets, the Strategic Defense Initiative, nuclear arms control and missile policy, the Middle East (especially Lebanon and Libya), and the West's relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev—all the while crafting an image of conservative unity for the media. In reality, the Anglo-American relationship during the 1980s was weaker in many ways than U.S. relations with France or Germany. This brilliant book reminds readers of the simple lesson that in diplomacy, interests often trump ideology—and spin trumps both.

Western Hemisphere

RICHARD FEINBERG

The Southern Tiger: Chile's Fight for a Democratic and Prosperous Future. BY

RICARDO LAGOS WITH BLAKE HOUNSHELL AND ELIZABETH DICKINSON. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 272 pp. \$28.00.

Forget the misleading title: this engrossing political memoir tells the inspiring story of how during the 1980s, a determined political opposition managed to outmaneuver an entrenched military dictatorship and restore democracy to Chile. As a tenacious leader of that opposition, Lagos built a strategy that eschewed violence, forged unity among quarreling factions, and lent courage to a fear-stricken population—timeless lessons for pro-democracy movements fighting authoritarian regimes everywhere. As minister of education and minister of public works, and later as

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president, from 2000 to 2006, Lagos improved social services for the poor—while the lifelong socialist also discovered the virtues of free-trade agreements and public-private partnerships. Still, the right remains powerful in Chile, and a conservative businessman was elected president in 2010. Lagos applauds the student protesters now demanding better access to quality education as “the children of Chile’s democracy.” As president of a small, remote country, Lagos advocated a rules-based world order to protect weaker states living in the shadows of more powerful neighbors. Overall, Lagos emerges as a judicious and compassionate leader, a worthy torchbearer for the best of Chile’s political traditions.

International Mediation in Venezuela. BY JENNIFER MCCOY AND FRANCISCO DIEZ. U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011, 320 pp. \$24.95.

Between 2002 and 2004, a period of dangerous political polarization in Venezuela, McCoy and Diez were members of a team from the Carter Center that negotiated between President Hugo Chávez and the Venezuelan opposition. The international mediation successfully channeled political energies away from potential violence and toward peaceful constitutional voting, although tensions remained after Chávez defeated a recall referendum and reaffirmed his executive powers in 2004. The book is smartly analytic, full of valuable lessons learned, and often self-critical; it is also a spirited defense of the Carter Center’s role in the standoff. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter is lauded for his personal capacity to build trust with all parties, including Chávez. In contrast, the then secretary-general of the Organization of

American States, César Gaviria, is portrayed as inflexible and distant. To justify the Carter Center’s endorsement of the recall vote, the authors detail the postelection scrutiny of the balloting procedures. They concede that as mediators, they should not have taken on the additional, delicate task of election monitoring. But their generally favorable commentary on Chávez’s leadership and social-transformation agenda and their repeated criticisms of his opponents will confirm in some minds the oft-alleged pro-Chávez tilt of the center’s mission.

Guantánamo: An American History.

BY JONATHAN M. HANSEN. Hill and Wang, 2011, 448 pp. \$35.00.

With a broad, ambitious sweep, Hansen takes the reader through Cuban history from the Spanish conquest to the present day, highlighting the role of Guantánamo Bay, a large natural harbor on the island’s eastern tip, where the United States has maintained a naval base since 1903. Much of the book retreads well-worn ground on Cuban history and U.S.-Cuban relations. Hansen seeks to elevate the strategic and symbolic importance of the bay, but the evidence often undermines him. As Hansen concedes, the bay’s remote location reduced the U.S. Navy’s influence in political intrigues, compared with the role played by the American embassy in Havana, and during the Castro era, both the Cuban government and the U.S. military have cautiously avoided embroiling “Gitmo” in otherwise tense bilateral relations. Expounding at length, Hansen bitterly denounces the opportunistic use of the facility to hold Haitian migrants and, after 9/11, suspected terrorists. The book’s analysis of U.S. policies

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toward Cuba is filtered through Hansen's reductive view of the United States as a nation expansionist to its materialistic, racist core, where narrow self-interest regularly trumps professed idealism. But Hansen collects interesting anecdotes that, if separated from the book's ideological riffs, would make for a colorful monograph.

Latin America and the Caribbean's Long-Term Growth: Made in China? BY THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION. World Bank, 2011, 68 pp. Free online.

Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead. BY AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE, ALAIN IZE, AND SERGIO L. SCHMUKLER. World Bank, 2011, 274 pp. Free online.

Most Latin American economies have done quite well during the last ten years or so, enjoying relatively high growth rates, low inflation, and measurable poverty reduction. But is this success sustainable in a volatile global economy? And can Latin American countries accelerate their growth to East Asian levels? Those are the key questions tackled in these two complementary, timely World Bank publications. *Latin America and the Caribbean's Long-Term Growth* is unequivocal in its judgment: surging trade and investment flows from China will not be enough to lift Latin America onto a sustainable high-growth path. The World Bank economists who authored the report find little evidence that the China connection is fostering significantly higher productivity—the key to higher output and, hence, to better living standards. China can deliver a positive external shock, but only if Latin America progresses more rapidly with

fundamental internal reforms: increased domestic savings, better education, more robust infrastructure, lower costs of doing business, and enhanced innovation capacity. The report does uncover some heartening news: growing evidence of technological modernization in agriculture in some countries and profitable improvements in the processes used to transform raw materials into metals.

Financial instability has long been the Achilles' heel of Latin American economies. But as *Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean* documents, regulatory regimes have been strengthened, local stock and bond markets have expanded (with some seeking greater safety through regional market integration), and institutions that lend to small businesses and micro-enterprises have also blossomed, creating more equitable capital markets. In contrast to the frightening chaos of the financial markets in developed economies, Latin American financial systems have so far remained strong and stable. But the authors caution that the region still has a long way to go in building financial systems that can protect consumer rights and provide adequate long-term credit to worthy enterprises. Stronger systemic supervision will require much better coordination among regulatory agencies and a significant improvement in the quality of supervisory personnel.

Reaching Out: Cuba's New Economy and the International Response. BY RICHARD E. FEINBERG. Brookings Institution, 2011, 102 pp. Free online.

Cuba has turned. It is recharting its future. Feinberg's lucid, succinct report describes the Cuban economy's self-

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defeating distortions and President Raúl Castro's economic reforms, which are vague and short on specifics but authorize a market economy that many other Cuban leaders still distrust. Last April, the Cuban Communist Party adopted the reforms, and their significance and reach have since become clear, as new markets for real estate and cars have emerged. Feinberg analyzes Cuba's receptiveness to assistance from Canada and Europe and its "emerging-market strategy" of making economic deals with Brazil, China, Russia, and Venezuela. He also provides apt comparisons between Cuba and two developing countries, Nicaragua and Vietnam, that have engaged with the world market and the United States while still retaining a marked measure of independence. In a thought-provoking chapter, he argues that international financial institutions should engage with Cuba, as should the U.S. government, thereby "nudging history forward in Cuba." Ultimately, though, only Cubans can make their own history, even if they cannot make it just as they please—as Karl Marx would have told those Cubans who still claim to rule according to his vision.

JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship.

BY ANDREW WILSON. Yale University Press, 2011, 256 pp. \$35.00.

Belarus sits like a large ellipsis at the center

of Europe, an authoritarian puzzle to much of the outside world, worrying to its immediate neighbors, and a vexatious ally to Russia. But is it, Wilson asks, even "a proper country?" To answer that question, he takes the reader through a compressed mass of history, from the tenth-century principality of Polatsk, through the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to the late-nineteenth-century stirrings of a national Belarusian movement. A clear yes-or-no answer does not quite materialize from the maze of claims and counterclaims by historians. But the search leads Wilson to a second question: Why today's authoritarianism? What explains the endurance of a throwback dictator like Aleksandr Lukashenko? As Wilson reveals in unvarnished detail, Europe's last dictatorship did not emerge and then entrench itself by accident, nor does it represent a break from all the history that came before. Today's repressive state might have been abetted by clumsy, miscalculating leaders in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, and later by the weakness and feuding of the political opposition. But Lukashenko knew the soil he tilled.

Leon Trotsky: A Revolutionary's Life. BY

JOSHUA RUBENSTEIN. Yale University Press, 2011, 240 pp. \$25.00.

Not much new can be added to the story of a man who has been wondered over, lionized, and demonized many times before. The merit of this trim book is that it pulls together all the essentials of the life of Leon Trotsky and the revolution he so significantly shaped into a seamless, intelligent, and wonderfully accessible synopsis. This book is part of Yale's series of biographies about noteworthy Jews,

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and its particular angle is to understand Trotsky as a Jew. On the one hand, he scorned the faith of his fathers: "I'm not a Jew; I'm a Marxist internationalist." On the other hand, he showed a special sensitivity to Jewish suffering in a dying Russian empire and gravitated toward Jewish communities abroad. Such dichotomies defined the man. He was brilliant, compelling, even admirable as a young revolutionary, but brutal, arrogant, and obtuse once in power—a contrast Rubenstein draws well. In many ways, his life was a metaphor for the Soviet revolution. "The tragedy at the heart of Leon Trotsky's life," Rubenstein writes, was that "it had begun with contagious idealism and ended entangled in a murderous dream."

The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia. BY GRAEME B. ROBERTSON. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 304 pp. \$95.00.

Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. BY VALERIE J. BUNCE AND SHARON L. WOLCHIK. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 396 pp. \$95.00 (paper, \$36.99).

By one count, somewhere between a quarter and a third of the countries in the world are neither fish nor fowl in terms of their political systems—that is, neither sufficiently democratic nor authoritarian enough to be considered one or the other. Robertson calls these "hybrid regimes," environments where political competition exists but in unfair conditions. Robertson, after long and detailed study, focuses on the dynamics surrounding protest efforts in Russia, both on the street and in the factory. Vladimir Putin's Russia is a model hybrid regime that sees

contestation—provided it is controlled by the state—as functional and therefore desirable. The durability of such a regime depends on three factors: the coherence of opposition protests, the regime's willingness to mobilize against opposition, and the level of unity among the political elite.

In an equally thorough study of nine countries, Bunce and Wolchik concentrate on elections held between 1998 and 2005, some of which led to the overthrow of relatively authoritarian leaders and others of which did not. They conclude that elections pose a genuine challenge to hybrid regimes, but whether they succeed or not depends on how innovative, ambitious, unified, and sanguine the opposition is. Opposition movements with those qualities can produce what Bunce and Wolchik call an "electoral model" of change. Once successful, this model spread to other eastern European countries, aided in important ways by transnational democracy advocates, although not aligning precisely with U.S. "democracy-building" schemes.

The arguments in both books provide complementary explanations for why the Russian presidential elections in March will likely leave Putin in power. But neither book does much to explain the outcome of the Russian parliamentary elections last December, which produced an important shift in political momentum away from Putinism and toward some still-unformed political alternative.

The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Yugoslavia. BY JOSIP GLAURDIC. Yale University Press, 2011, 432 pp. \$55.00.

Glaurdic pulls no punches: that Yugoslavia blew up so violently is the fault, in the

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first instance, of feckless, myopic European powers “more concerned with outmaneuvering each other than with solving real issues on the ground.” Glaurdic argues that the European Community failed miserably in Yugoslavia just as it was transforming itself into the European Union, thereby doing immeasurable damage to the larger project of European integration. He also blames the administration of U.S. President George H. W. Bush for washing its hands of the crisis as it escalated from tension to widespread bloodletting in 1991–92. The Americans had initially embraced Slobodan Milosevic as a nasty but potentially Western-oriented economic reformer, largely out of an overarching dread of instability as communism collapsed across Eastern Europe. Glaurdic’s heavy emphasis on Serbian culpability for the tragedy that followed will not sit well with those who point their fingers in other directions. Nor will his exculpation of Germany’s policy of pushing for recognition of the defecting republics of Croatia and Slovenia, seen by many at the time as speeding Yugoslavia’s bloody demise. But Glaurdic’s critics will have to argue against a case built from a wider range of primary sources than anyone before him has used.

The Strongman: Vladimir Putin and the Struggle for Russia. BY ANGUS ROXBURGH. I.B. Tauris, 2011, 288 pp. \$28.00.

Vladimir Putin is the quintessential Rorschach test for Western views of Russia: something between an emotionless, steely-eyed creature from a John le Carré novel and the personification of the shattered hopes for a liberal Russian democracy, comfortably ensconced in

the West’s embrace. Roxburgh paints a more compelling portrait. He is sympathetic to what motivates Putin but critical of what Putin has become during his years in power. Roxburgh sees Putin’s obsession with restoring Russian strength and his prickly sensitivity to affronts as understandable but details with obvious distaste Putin’s cynical manipulation of power, his crass image management, and the unimaginable venality of the political elite on which he relies. What distinguishes this account and makes it engrossing, however, are not such familiar characterizations. Roxburgh, a journalist and public relations specialist, worked on a splendid BBC documentary about the Putin era, and he uses interviews with many of the key figures around Putin and with senior Western policymakers to recount in detail what was said and done as Russia lurched in one direction and the U.S.-Russian relationship lurched in another.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

Ghosts of Afghanistan: The Haunted Battleground. BY JONATHAN STEELE.

Counterpoint, 2011, 256 pp. \$26.00. Steele, a veteran foreign correspondent for *The Guardian*, frames this exploration of the past three decades in Afghanistan by comparing the intervention of the Soviet Union in the 1980s with that of the United States in the first decade of this century. Both were ill conceived and should have been avoided, Steele argues, but the Soviets showed a better ability to cut their losses than have the Americans

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(and their NATO allies) thus far. Steele sets out to debunk “thirteen myths about Afghanistan,” including the false notions that the Afghans have always defeated foreign armies, that the Soviet invasion was an unprovoked attack, that the Taliban are much more oppressive than previous regimes (an admittedly low bar), and that the Taliban do not have any popular support. Steele views the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the anti-Taliban commander assassinated two days before 9/11, as no better than their opponents and offers a relatively positive appraisal of the period (1978–92) when Afghanistan was ruled by Afghan Communists, who, after all, did represent urban modernity. This eminently readable book is surely the most compelling revisionist history available of Afghanistan in the modern era.

The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East. BY KENNETH M. POLLACK, DANIEL L. BYMAN, AKRAM AL-TURK, PAVEL K. BAEV, MICHAEL S. DORAN, KHALED ELGINDY, STEPHEN R. GRAND, ET AL. Brookings Institution Press, 2011, 381 pp. \$26.95.

Eighteen authors cover the events that have roiled the Arab World since December 2010, when a despairing peddler from a town in the Tunisian hinterland set himself aflame to protest his treatment at the hands of an oppressive government. Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation ignited a chain reaction of challenges by hitherto seemingly acquiescent Arab societies to their authoritarian states. Some dominoes have fallen, others are a tilt, and all have been shaken. This well-integrated account of a regionwide revolutionary year—matching, if not

exceeding, in importance Europe in 1848 or 1989—includes chapters on all but two Arab states (Lebanon and Sudan) and one on the Palestinians. Other chapters treat the reactions of the non-Arab Middle Eastern states—Iran, Israel, and Turkey—and those of China, the European Union, Russia, and, most of all, the United States. The contributors examine a wide range of factors that influenced the revolts: new media technologies, economic development, powerful militaries, democratization efforts, and ascendant Islamist parties. This volume weaves together those disparate elements, justifying its claim to constitute not just a string of separate entries but a genuine “collaborative work.”

Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi’s Long Journey to Triumph in Iraq. BY RICHARD BONIN. Doubleday, 2011, 320 pp. \$27.95.

This is the most thorough telling of the story of Ahmad Chalabi, the scion of an upper-class Shiite Iraqi family who spent most of his life in exile but played a significant role in convincing the administration of George W. Bush to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003. It is, equally, the story of the domestic American roots of the war. Bonin reconstructs the relationships between Chalabi and his now-famous (or infamous) neoconservative allies in the Bush White House and also examines the roles played by members of Congress (Democratic and Republican), academics, and journalists eager for a scoop. The dwindling few within the Beltway who maintained that Chalabi and his opposition movement enjoyed more support along the Potomac than the Euphrates proved to be correct, but only after the

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fact. *Arrows of the Night* is a first-rate case study of both Middle Eastern émigré politics and the American way of dealing with the Middle East.

Iraq, Its Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power. EDITED BY HENRI J. BARKEY, SCOTT B. LASENSKY, AND PHEBE MARR. U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011, 300 pp. \$19.95.

Ten seasoned experts take their turns describing the changes wrought by the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the changes still under way, nine years into the post-Saddam Hussein era. Individual chapters are devoted to the Iraq-related diplomacy of the Gulf states, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Concluding essays address Iraq in the context of Arab political reform and consider the U.S. role in Iraq. This book bears out the dictum, expressed some decades ago by an Arab diplomat but still valid, that in the Middle East, everything is linked to everything else. According to the editors, the United States should pursue “increased engagement with Iraq’s neighbors” and avoid heavy-handed involvement in the region, which could “undermine steps Iraqis and the neighbors need to take to reconcile.”

Turkey and Its Neighbors: Foreign Relations in Transition. BY RONALD H. LINDEN, AHMET O. EVIN, KEMAL KIRISCI, THOMAS STRAUBHAAR, NATHALIE TOCCI, JULIETTE TOLAY, AND JOSHUA W. WALKER. Lynne Rienner, 2011, 258 pp. \$62.50.

This book brings together American, European, and Turkish experts on such diverse subjects as “reclaiming Turkey’s imperial past,” the country’s move “from

confrontation to engagement” in the Middle East, Turkey’s relations with its Black Sea neighbors, Turkish energy policy (including pipelines being planned or built), and Turkey as a possible model of democratization for other Muslim polities. Subjects usually given separate chapters in books about Turkey—for example, Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey’s relationship with the EU and the United States—are here woven into larger themes. Buttressed by many tables and figures and thus a bit ponderous at times, the book nevertheless offers many aperçus, including this one from Tocci and Walker: “Oddly, Turkey has quickly become more European, more democratic, more Islamic, and increasingly more nationalist simultaneously.” The book covers developments only prior to mid-2010, but it provides a useful background for taking the measure of issues that emerged later, such as Turkey’s changing relations with Israel and Syria.

Asia and Pacific

ANDREW J. NATHAN

Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand. EDITED BY SØREN IVARSSON AND LOTTE ISAGER. NIAS Press, 2010, 304 pp. \$90.00 (paper, \$32.00).

The contributors direct an unillusioned gaze at the mystique of the Thai monarchy. The country’s pliant news media have fostered an image of the king as a loving national father and a Buddhist quasi deity while building a cult of personality around members of the royal family. A network of conservative elites enforces a

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“magic circle of silence” around the court with a lese-majesty law that punishes offenders with prison sentences of up to 15 years. While popular religion venerates the king’s image as a source of prosperity, the monarch’s policy of village self-sufficiency and his sponsored development programs have only served to legitimate growing economic inequality. The monarchy positions itself as a defender of democracy, but the king allowed himself to be used as an alternative source of legitimacy by those who opposed a freely elected leader during the 2006 coup. Instead of helping consolidate national unity, the contributors argue, the royal cult increasingly polarizes Thai politics.

Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. BY CAROLIN LISS.

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010, 426 pp. \$54.90.

This fact-filled, groundbreaking survey of piracy in the waters of Southeast Asia and Bangladesh—the areas with the highest number of pirating incidents in the world—reveals the problem’s many forms and causes. Pirates in these waters range from opportunistic amateurs to criminal syndicates. Cargo boats are the most frequently attacked, usually to be stripped of their cargoes but sometimes to be reused or sold. Local fishermen are robbed of their nets, engines, and catches, chiefly by other fishermen who are impoverished because overfishing has depleted fish populations. Local navies and coast guards are underequipped and sometimes corrupt. A lack of international coordination across complex maritime borders makes the job of securing the straits and intricate coastlines even more difficult.

Private security companies have filled the gap to some extent, but they are virtually unregulated. Liss’ wide-ranging and detailed fieldwork validates her argument that piracy is an expression of deeper issues, ranging from coastal poverty to inadequate maritime regulatory regimes to the devastation of the ocean environment.

China’s Local Administration: Traditions and Changes in the Sub-national Hierarchy.

EDITED BY JAE HO CHUNG AND TAO-CHIU LAM. Routledge, 2009, 226 pp. \$148.00 (paper, \$44.95).

China’s system of territorial administration is complicated because the country is so large and diverse. This survey by a network of local-studies scholars is an indispensable guide to the administrative system below the central level. China’s constitution provides for three subnational tiers: province, county, and township. But the authors identify nine distinct governmental units, divided into five levels. Today, much of the action in economic development and social policy takes place in municipalities (*shi*), of which there are about 600, positioned at three different bureaucratic ranks, depending on their size. The key driver of the municipalities’ emergence has been urbanization, which created the need for city centers to administer their increasingly interdependent rural surroundings. A great deal of power and responsibility have been delegated to the *shi* level, along with substantial fiscal independence and the right to experiment with new policies. Still, the center retains ultimate control through its power over officials’ careers. Ambitious local officials provide much of China’s dynamism but also contribute to environmental problems,

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corruption, local protectionism, and economic overheating.

China's Thought Management. EDITED BY ANNE-MARIE BRADY. Routledge, 2011, 212 pp. \$125.00.

Looking beneath the superficial diversity of Chinese media, Brady and her contributors expose the continuing role of the Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department, officially renamed in English the Publicity Department in 1998. A softer style—"market-friendly, scientific, high tech, and politics lite"—has replaced Maoist indoctrination. But the news is still controlled: scandals are spun and quickly buried, and feel-good symbols of progress are eagerly promoted. Officials in government and the military memorize carefully crafted formulas that help them stay in line with party policy, and the general public imbibes a steady flow of happy talk that keeps it disengaged from politics. Case studies show how modern persuasion techniques maintain the high level of public support for the government, the ruling party's firm grip on the military, and the popularity of the current system even among Chinese émigrés. But the party has enjoyed less success in rebranding China internationally as modern and even democratic. Focusing on top-down propaganda strategies, the book does not assess the possible threats posed to thought management by the growing Chinese blogosphere or the emerging cadre of intrepid, truth-seeking Chinese journalists.

Diplomacy: A Singapore Experience. BY S JAYAKUMAR. Straits Times Press, 2011, 316 pp. \$26.00.

Jayakumar, a former UN ambassador and former foreign minister for Singapore,

originally prepared this series of case studies to help train his country's young foreign service officers. The language is prim by American standards, and the explicit lessons are fairly obvious: know your brief; be prepared. But the honest, meaty narratives offer insights into the strategic goals and diplomatic means of one of the world's most skillful foreign ministries. Singaporean diplomats use energy, charm, and expertise to magnify their influence in the UN and steer regional organizations in preferred directions. Singapore often stands up to bigger powers—China, the United Kingdom, the United States—to make sure no one takes it for granted. But Singapore takes care to manage its relations and avoid permanent damage. In dealing with prickly neighbors, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, the latter of which controls much of Singapore's water supply, Singapore relies on both international law and personal relationships. Jayakumar argues that other countries' nationalist media often pose obstacles to the rational settlement of issues. Nevertheless, Singapore's diplomats seem able to defend their country's interests all over the world without further inflaming opposition at home or abroad.

Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance. BY ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011, 236 pp. \$21.95.

Subramanian, an economist, argues that if China grows at roughly the same rate as other countries that managed to narrow the gap with richer competitors in the past, and if China's foreign trade increases at the rate some theories predict for

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countries of its economic size, then China will soon become the world's largest economy and its currency will become an international reserve currency. Those are two big ifs, but the author does not seem particularly concerned with establishing their likelihood. He is more interested in applying formulas derived from economic history to quantify the size and fix the date of the economic power transition that will happen—as soon as this decade, he says—if current trends continue. Words such as “eclipse,” “shadow,” and “dominance” lend a bracing urgency to that prediction, as do some nightmare scenarios scattered throughout the discussion. Yet such rhetoric contradicts the non-zero-sum principles of economics, as well as Subramanian's own advice that the United States should continue to cooperate with China. It remains unclear how the growth of China's prosperity and the convertibility of its currency—both longtime U.S. policy goals—will threaten American interests.

Social Networks and Japanese Democracy: The Beneficial Impact of Interpersonal Communication. BY KEN'ICHI IKEDA AND SEAN RICHEY. Routledge, 2011, 164 pp. \$130.00.

Ikeda and Richey aim to determine whether Confucian values in Japan—such as obedience to hierarchy and a preference for social harmony over debate—dampen the positive effects of civic engagement on Japanese democracy. Analyzing data from surveys of Japanese voters conducted between 2001 and 2005, they find that the legacy of Confucianism generally does not prevent civic engagement (defined as participation in informal networks) from producing positive democratic effects in

Japan. However, they also concede that Japan is less influenced by Confucian values than other Asian countries, where those values might interfere more with democratic governance. The book contains ten short chapters, many of which present regression tables using the same or similar independent variables. The authors, however, have chosen to write a new chapter for every new set of dependent variables—political engagement, political knowledge, policy preferences, and political tolerance, among others. And each chapter reviews the existing scholarly literature, methods, variables, and regression results. As a consequence, the book is short but nonetheless repetitive.

MARGARITA ESTÉVEZ-ABE

Africa

NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

Africa's Odious Debts: How Foreign Loans and Capital Flight Bled a Continent. BY LÉONCE NDIKUMANA AND JAMES K. BOYCE. Zed Books, 2011, 152 pp. \$107.95 (paper, \$22.95).

The numbers are startling. From 1970 to 2008, the combined foreign debt of African countries rose from less than \$50 billion to more than \$200 billion in constant dollars. During the same time, capital flight from the 33 sub-Saharan African countries for which decent data exists totaled \$735 billion. In this arresting analysis, two economists show that those numbers are closely related. A large proportion of the publicly contracted debt was siphoned off by individuals, often in key policymaking roles, and then expatriated for private gain. Ndikumana

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and Boyce estimate that as a result, Africa, the world's poorest region, is actually a net creditor to the rest of the world. Much of this lively and readable book is concerned with the combination of sheer incompetence, delusion, corruption, and regulatory failure that led Western banks and financial institutions to lend money to the region, even though it would obviously never be repaid. The book makes a compelling case that because of the way it was created, this "odious" debt should not be repaid today. Of course, the more important practical issue for Africa is how to bring about the repatriation of all that squandered capital.

Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence.

EDITED BY SCOTT STRAUS AND LARS WALDORF. University of Wisconsin Press, 2011, 320 pp. \$26.95.

There is still a steady flow of books about the Rwandan genocide of 1994. But Rwanda's present circumstances have been largely neglected. This edited volume is perhaps the first serious attempt to assess contemporary politics in Rwanda over the course of the last decade. The portrait that emerges is decidedly mixed. The country boasts what is perhaps the least corrupt civil service in Africa, a disciplined and sometimes visionary instrument of economic and social development. On the other hand, the book argues, the government of President Paul Kagame displays some dogmatically authoritarian tendencies, which might ultimately hamper economic and political development. The book's best chapters show the extent to which the government has instrumentalized the memory of the genocide to stifle dissent and international

criticism, sometimes with considerable cynicism. One theme that emerges from the book is that the regime's judicial system for dealing with the crimes of the 1990s, although innovative and sometimes genuinely participatory, has been manipulated to intimidate Kagame's political opponents, while the regime still refuses to address the considerable human rights violations its own agents committed during that era.

From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa. BY ADRIENNE LEBAS. Oxford University Press, 2011, 270 pp. \$99.00.

This book examines contemporary politics in Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to understand why some opposition parties manage to wrest power away from long-standing autocratic rulers, as in Zambia in 1991, and others do not, as in Kenya in 1992. LeBas' ingenious answer is that autocratic regimes establish the instruments of their own demise by creating relatively strong corporate actors, such as trade unions, to buttress their own rule. Indeed, trade unions created by African regimes have sometimes turned against their patrons and become the core of effective opposition parties. LeBas shows how a highly contentious transition to democracy can help strengthen political parties but also tends to increase the possibility of political violence—as it has in both Kenya and Zimbabwe. The book's analysis of party competition in these three countries is astute and rings true. But additional evidence from other political transitions is needed to determine whether LeBas' findings are applicable to other low-income countries.

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An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the 'New' ANC. BY FIONA FORDE.

Picador Africa, 2011, 274 pp. R150.00. Close to two decades of majority rule in South Africa have improved the welfare of its black citizens. But the country's level of economic inequality remains among the highest in the world; worse, wealth correlates uncomfortably with race, with whites controlling a hugely disproportionate share of assets and income. Forde's biography of Julius Malema, a rising populist firebrand, demonstrates that resentment of this racial inequality has long festered among the black population, providing ambitious politicians with a temptingly easy path to political notoriety. Forde portrays Malema as the most skillful of these politicians and documents his rapid rise to power, from a childhood of poverty through the ranks of the African National Congress, where he served as president of the Youth League—until the party suspended him from that post last year after he was convicted of hate speech against whites. Forde portrays the ANC as an increasingly flabby organization that is losing the legitimacy necessary to prevent the racialist demagoguery in which Malema dabbles. At the same time, her finely grained portrait of Malema makes clear that he is more interested in power than in redressing historical inequities.

inconvenient fact: during apartheid, the South African army gained substantial experience in nontraditional warfare and counterinsurgency, fighting against liberation movements across southern Africa. Following the transition to majority rule in the 1990s, official policy was to forget that experience, now viewed as a regrettable consequence of the apartheid regime's deplorable policies. This remarkable collection of essays by members of the South African security establishment has the objective of legitimating anew their expertise in counterinsurgency, in order to draw lessons for the contemporary mission of the South African army. It turns out that the strategies and techniques that the apartheid-era army developed in, say, Namibia in the late 1970s remain highly instructive for peacekeeping in places such as the contemporary Democratic Republic of the Congo. The authors also cannot help but remark that the counterinsurgency doctrines developed by the American and British militaries in Afghanistan and Iraq bear no small resemblance to the South African army's earlier efforts. 🌐

South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency: Roots, Practices, Prospects.

EDITED BY DEANE-PETER BAKER
AND EVERT JORDAAN. Double Storey
Books, 2011, 288 pp. \$37.95.

As the South African army has played an increasingly important role in UN and African Union peacekeeping operations, it has had to come to grips with a politically

Letters to the Editor

*Jack Chow on China's health crisis,
David Harris on Israel's quest for peace, and others*

COUGH IT UP

To the Editor:

Yanzhong Huang ("The Sick Man of Asia," November/December 2011) paints a troubling picture of a China that has rapidly industrialized yet lags in modernizing its health-care system.

Yet in his cogent history of China's health policy, much of which centers on self-reliance, Huang puzzlingly omits China's success in winning nearly \$1 billion in recent years from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. That the country's health officials have had to resort to tapping a fund ostensibly dedicated to helping the world's poorest countries speaks to their inability to persuade the government to pay for public health with its national coffers. Only when the incongruity of a financial giant getting grants at the expense of impoverished African countries was illuminated did China choose to stop taking Global Fund awards.

Ultimate responsibility for transforming China's health conditions lies squarely with the country's national leaders, not just its health officials. Considering the benefits derived from investing in health, the pathway ahead for China should be evident: identify attainable public health

goals and standards, bolster resources for health-care work on the frontlines, allow more nongovernmental organizations and private-sector groups to participate, and educate Chinese citizens about better habits, such as smoking cessation. In taking these steps, China would earn a long-term health dividend that would sustain its economy and bring its population to a standard worthy of international recognition and to a level commensurate with what it has accomplished in economic prowess.

JACK C. CHOW

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Global Health, Heinz College, Carnegie
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To the Editor:

Although Yanzhong Huang's overall assessment of the health-care challenges facing China is accurate, the current situation is not as desperate as the reader is led to believe.

Over the last four decades, China has experienced profound and rapid demographic, epidemiologic, and socioeconomic changes that would have tested the strength of any health-care system. But the country's investments in maternal and child health and infectious disease

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control have sharply reduced maternal and child mortality and the prevalence and deadliness of infectious diseases.

The infant mortality rate in China decreased from 38 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 16 per 1,000 in 2010, and over the same period, the mortality rate for children under five years of age dropped from 48 per 1,000 live births to just 18. The maternal mortality ratio has also fallen, from 110 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 38 in 2008.

Furthermore, the prevalence of tuberculosis cases in China in 2010 was estimated at 216 per 100,000, a reduction of 45 percent from the rate in 2000—thanks to the government’s tuberculosis control program. In 2008, China also became the first country in the world to eradicate the parasitic disease filariasis.

Huang makes only a quick and rather shallow reference to the health reforms that China launched in 2009. Beijing has clearly recognized the challenge that the increasing prevalence of noncommunicable diseases poses to the health-care system, and at that time, it launched a comprehensive health-sector reform based on five pillars: expanding health insurance to achieve universal health coverage by 2020; developing a national drug system to improve quality of care, lower costs, and reduce abuse; improving primary-care delivery; promoting equity in the provision of essential public health services; and reforming public hospitals. The reform agenda was set after a thorough consultation process involving several governmental entities; civil-society organizations; academics; international partners, including the World Health Organization and the World Bank; and private consulting firms.

Although China is nowhere close to reaching its health-care objectives in the near future, it has already laid the groundwork for a more prominent state role in developing and sustaining universal health coverage and improving equity in health and health care by 2020, steps in the right direction that the author failed to fully acknowledge.

SHENGLAN TANG

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ENIS BARIS

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TRUE PEACE IS HARD TO FIND

To the Editor:

After reading the compelling case made by Yosef Kuperwasser and Shalom Lipner in “The Problem Is Palestinian Rejectionism” (November/December 2011), it was quite jarring to read the companion piece, “Israel’s Bunker Mentality,” by Ronald Krebs.

Krebs’ argument boils down to this: Israel was doing quite nicely as a liberal, secular state until 1967, when a war mysteriously descended on it, and since then an illiberal, ethnocentric nationalism has taken over and redefined the country. In the process, Krebs contends, Israel became enamored with the occupation of territories acquired during the Six-Day War, helped along by a growing ultra-Orthodox community and large-scale Russian immigration.

It is not until the essay’s very last paragraph that Krebs notes, “Of course, Israel cannot end the occupation alone.” Yet until that point, he gives precisely the opposite impression, namely, that it

Letters to the Editor

is in Israel's hands to bring the conflict to an end.

Poll after poll has revealed that a majority of the Israeli public supports a two-state agreement. Even as they have coped with deadly waves of terrorism, Hezbollah's growing arsenal in Lebanon, Hamas' control of Gaza, Iran's nuclear ambitions, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas' refusal to negotiate, most Israelis still believe that a two-state deal remains the best possible outcome.

Moreover, four consecutive Israeli prime ministers—Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu—have endorsed the two-state vision, acknowledging the need for a painful and risky territorial withdrawal in exchange for a peace accord and an end to the conflict. But it has not happened yet. Why?

According to Krebs, one reason is that "Israel's commitment to peace has . . . too often been halfhearted." History suggests otherwise. Barak, in collaboration with U.S. President Bill Clinton, tried to strike a breakthrough two-state deal with the Palestinians until the very end of his term in office. Sharon broke with his own Likud Party to push through a total withdrawal from Gaza. Olmert went beyond Barak and Clinton, offering Abbas the equivalent of 100 percent of the West Bank. And Netanyahu led his reluctant Likud to accept the two-state principle and agreed to an unprecedented settlement freeze. Yet none of the four Israeli leaders found a willing partner on the other side and therefore had nothing to show for his efforts.

In the end, alas, neither the late Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat nor Abbas was willing to shatter the Palestinian people's

dream of Israel's destruction, which has been nurtured for more than 60 years. Nor were they prepared to abandon the "right of return" and thus affirm Israel's legitimacy, whatever its final borders, as the Jewish homeland.

DAVID HARRIS

Executive Director, American Jewish Committee

REPORTS OF THE BEAR'S DEATH ARE GREATLY EXAGGERATED

To the Editor:

Nicholas Eberstadt ("The Dying Bear," November/December 2011) is surely correct that a rapidly depopulating Russia would be confronted with a number of essentially irresolvable economic, military, and political problems. However, data from Russia's Federal State Statistics Service suggest that over the last decade, Russia's demographic indicators have in fact been getting better. Moreover, this improvement has intensified since the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, confounding a number of Western experts who predicted that the downturn would have a similar effect within Russia to that of the country's debt default in 1998, when fertility plummeted and mortality skyrocketed.

Russia's demographic improvements are considerable: between 2000 and 2010, Russia's rate of external mortality (deaths from vehicular accidents, alcohol poisoning, murder, and suicide) decreased by 31 percent, its fertility rate increased by 31 percent, and its natural rate of population loss (the rate at which the population is shrinking without accounting for immigration) fell by 75 percent. In fact, if one takes immigration into account, Russia's overall population has essentially been

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stagnant for the past three or four years—which would have been unfathomable ten years ago, when the country’s population was shrinking by a million people a year.

Eberstadt’s omission of any relevant comparisons is troubling. For starters, more enlightening than comparing Russians to Westerners—Russians have been more unhealthy, more drink-sodden, and shorter lived than their counterparts in the West since public health statistics were first collected in the late nineteenth century—would be comparing the Russians of today to the Russians of ten years ago.

Also glaring is the omission of Ukraine, a country that neighbors Russia and has performed significantly worse in terms of demographics over the past decade. In 2010, despite having a population of only 45.8 million people, Ukraine had a natural population loss of 200,000. In contrast, the so-called dying bear, with a population of 142 million people, naturally shrank by 240,000 that year. And it is not just Ukraine: that same year, three other countries that neighbor Russia—Belarus, Latvia, and Lithuania—suffered natural population losses that were proportionally more severe than Russia’s, as did Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, and Serbia. In other words, postcommunist eastern European countries are experiencing a systemic demographic crisis, which, in turn, suggests that Eberstadt’s call to publicly berate Moscow

would not have much of an impact on Russia’s demographic outlook.

MARK ADOMANIS
Arlington, Virginia

DEBATING EUROPE

To the Editor:

Andrew Moravcsik’s review of David Marquand’s book *The End of the West* (“Recent Books on International Relations,” September/October 2011) characterized Marquand as both a political turncoat and a weak-kneed, inconsistent thinker who has reversed his position on European integration. These are damaging accusations, and both are manifestly untrue. Marquand has always been a pillar of the United Kingdom’s democratic left; he stuck with the Social Democratic Party from start to finish, and he has never wavered in his advocacy of European integration.

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ForeignAffairs.com Top Ten

The top-ranking online articles from winter 2012.

1. *Christmas is No Time for an Iranian Revolution.* BY HOUMAN MAJD. Washington and the West have been ramping up the pressure with sanctions. None of it will work. The country is poised not for revolution, but more of the same. ForeignAffairs.com/Majd_Iran
2. *China's Real Estate Bubble May Have Just Popped.* BY PATRICK CHOVANEC. As the Chinese real estate market corrects itself, the country's economy is convulsing and sending shockwaves through the global economy. ForeignAffairs.com/Chovanec_China
3. *Obama's Counterproductive New Iran Sanctions.* BY SUZANNE MALONEY. The new sanctions regime places Washington's tactics and objectives at odds. In effect, it has backed itself into a policy of regime change, an outcome it has little ability to influence. ForeignAffairs.com/Maloney_Sanctions
4. *Best International Relations Books of 2011.* BY THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS CAPSULE REVIEWERS. Ten scholars pick the three best books of 2011. ForeignAffairs.com/Best_Books
5. *The Case For Regime Change in Iran.* BY JAMIE M. FLY AND GARY SCHMITT. The United States should plan a military operation that aims to destabilize the regime and, in turn, resolves the Iranian nuclear crisis once and for all. ForeignAffairs.com/Fly_Regime
6. *What it Will Take to Intervene in Syria.* BY MICHAEL WEISS. Outsiders are calling for a humanitarian intervention to stop Bashar al-Assad's killing sprees. But for it to work, Syria's various opposition groups will have to first coalesce into a single, unified force. ForeignAffairs.com/Weiss_Syria
7. *China's Pakistan Conundrum.* BY EVAN A. FEIGENBAUM. China will not simply bail out Pakistan. Rather, it will pursue profits, security, and geopolitical advantage regardless of Islamabad's preferences. ForeignAffairs.com/Feigenbaum_China
8. *Why Panetta's Pentagon Cuts Are Easier Than You Think.* BY LAWRENCE J. KORB. Defense budget cuts won't make the United States less secure. The Pentagon does not have a resource problem, it has an administrative problem. ForeignAffairs.com/Korb_Cuts
9. *Why Obama Can't Close Guantánamo.* BY CAROL ROSENBERG. Obama's self-imposed deadline to close Guantánamo within a year of taking office is long past. Why it remains open is a story of cynical congressional politics and bureaucratic inefficiency. ForeignAffairs.com/Rosenberg_Guantanamo
10. *How Assad Stayed In Power—And How He'll Try to Keep It.* BY TONY BADRAN. Throughout the year, Assad relied on Iran and Russia to block international intervention, hoping to buy time. It's not working—but he has no other options. ForeignAffairs.com/Badran_Assad

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