


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
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
UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies, University of Innsbruck, Austria

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Foreword

To any peace and conflict researcher brought up in a “North Atlanticist” tradition of positivism, empiricism, and practice, the notion that the term “peace” itself can have a multitude of meanings in a wide variety of cultures and traditions – in other words, a “contested concept” – can initially be rather disturbing. Peace researchers have all learned to accept and live with Johan Galtung’s distinction between “negative” peace, with its simple absence of major, organized violence, and “positive” peace, which additionally entails often slippery ideas such as justice, equality, tolerance, reconciled enemies, and options for maximizing “human potential.” Peace practitioners have learned to seek for something beyond a mere cessation of killing and mutual destruction in post-conflict peace-building, even in such apparently hopeless situations as South Africa, Northern Ireland, El Salvador, Mindanao, or Colombia.

However, in this new book, Wolfgang Dietrich, the UNESCO Professor for Peace Studies at the University of Innsbruck, has presented a salutary shock to our idea that – at the very least – we knew where we were going and what we were (or should be) looking for. He has raised, in a very profound form, the basic issue of what is meant by the term “peace” and what we do if, in fact, we discover that there are many “peaces” that can be sought – and indeed have been sought – throughout recorded history. Drawing examples and ideas from an impressive array of time periods and cultures, Dietrich challenges us to embark with him on a fascinating voyage, partly of discovery, partly of rediscovery. In the latter sense, he invites us to reconsider what we thought we knew about the nature of peace and what the term can imply for people seeking a right and proper way to live and to organize their societies. In the former sense, he undertakes a wonderfully detailed study of peace traditions that many of us may just have heard about, but of which few among us have much detailed knowledge.

This latter factor provides one of the great strengths of Wolfgang Dietrich’s work, presented comprehensively in book form for the first time. His first volume of the planned three-volume series surveys traditions and varieties of peace from classical China to traditional Africa, via indigenous North America, the Mayan civilization, and many others. Embarking on the book involves a voyage around ideas from a huge

variety of writings and writers, some from the mainstream of peace research but many others, such as Fritjof Capra, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Ervin Laszlo, Friedrich Nietzsche, Frederick Perls, Albert Einstein, Lao-tse, and Jiddu Krishnamurti, who are never considered to be part of the “canon” we teach our students but who undoubtedly should be. It means being prepared to examine ideas from the Tantric writers, from feminist authors, from ancient Indonesia, and from the traditions of the Lakota, and to combine these intellectually with the second law of thermodynamics.

Moreover, the book does far more than simply survey ideas from times and cultures as different as classical Rome or ancient Etruria. It organizes these as a progression of approaches to the idea of “peace,” starting with what Dr Dietrich intriguingly describes as “energetic” approaches to peace, proceeding through “moral” and then “modern” approaches and arriving at rather more familiar ground in a discussion of “post-modern” views on the subject. Chapter 6 explores what Dr Dietrich describes as “transrational” peace, which, he argues, is an approach that combines many of the positive aspects of previous traditions while avoiding many of their drawbacks.

Here, in short, is a work which may look difficult to read and digest but which is well worth the effort involved. In one sense, it provides an intellectual challenge to even the best informed of us to enter unknown territory, to (re)consider an idea that we imagined was fully explored and understood – even passé – and to help open up paths of research and ultimately practice that we thought might have reached a dead end. In doing this, Dr Dietrich has provided a signal, regenerative service to the field of peace and conflict studies, and deserves our thanks and congratulations.

Christopher Mitchell
Emeritus Professor of Conflict Research
George Mason University

1

Introduction

You are what you seek.

Hindu wisdom¹

1.1 Author's perspective

The distinction between what in this book I call the *morally* founded image of world and peace and what I term the *energetic* at bottom has been known to me since my childhood. The corresponding concepts have been and still are in the air and want to be spoken, just like a melody that is in the air wants to be sung and listened to. Yet they only gained relevance in my consciousness after long years of a nomadic academic life, which led me not just many times around the globe, but also straight through many scientific disciplines.

I read for the first time the explicit distinction between *morally* and *energetically* founded worldviews in Franz von Magnis-Suseno² while I was researching *damai*, the term for peace in Indonesia's official language, Bahasa Indonesia, with its meanings overlaid by Buddhism, Hinduism, and Islam. Put briefly, *damai* is not about ultimate truths or an image of what holds the world together in its innermost core, but about understanding one's own existence. *Damai*, says Magnis-Suseno, is mainly used to grasp the experiential world's confusing elements within a manageable frame in order to escape the chaos of the incalculable and to orient oneself within one's own existence. *Damai* is a tool in the attempt to reach a state of inner calm, tranquility, and balance, a psychic state that would be expressed in the harmonious relations

between the members of society, their *Mitwelt*,* and the cosmos. The aim of human existence would thus be to find one's place in the world. This occurred through the observance of tradition, respect for others, consensual conflict transformation, and self-moderation. "Look for your place and act accordingly" is Javanese wisdom that sums up the central tenet of this worldview.

Damai is so significantly different from what I have come to know in the Idealist tradition within German-speaking peace research. On the other hand, *damai* is very similar to the perceptions of peace that I had the opportunity to study previously in Central America with the Mayans, in India, or in Africa.

In contemporary Europe, we perceived those obvious deviations in the understanding of a term so central for shaping human existence within society, nature, and culture, among others, in the acrimonious debates around the universality of human rights prior to the U.N. conference in Vienna in 1993. I subsequently connected my experiences as a leading staff member of Amnesty International, at the time, and my observations about those fundamental differences in perceptions with the philosophy of *postmodernity*, as Jean-François Lyotard³ had interpreted it. Out of this came my most quoted and translated article "A Call for Many Peaces,"⁴ in which, in short, I argued for understanding the term "peace" as a noun with a plural, because perceptions founded on an Idealist and in consequence a singular, strong, and perpetual concept of peace would be violent within a communication system. At the time, my main focus was on the argument about the multiplicity of peace. The concrete examples from the world of my own experience with which I aimed to empirically substantiate my argument – in addition to *damai*, also the Mayan term *utziläj k'aslen* and *kindoki* from the Congo basin – in themselves were not yet as important for me. Crucial for me at that moment was the simple proof that there could be more than one legitimate possibility for thinking and living peace.

About a decade later, this argument appears so self-evident to me, that it is only the continued astonishment of each new generation of students at my lectures on peace and conflict research which reminds me that others do not see it that way. Especially, people who have been socialized in Europe or North America affectively perceive peace as

*Translator's note: *Mitwelt* has no direct English translation. It is differentiated from the related term *Umwelt*, environment, insofar as that it specifically connotes the common aspect of a shared world.

singular, just like they also see God, reason, truth, justice, or security as a singular figure.

The search for didactic methods to convey this multiplicity has led me, together with interested students and colleagues from all over the world, to begin something like a common archeology of the peaces. In my seminars, I asked students from all over the world to research the etymological root of the word for peace in their corresponding mother tongues, and I still remember one class's bewilderment when a student from Burkina Faso said that the word for peace in his mother tongue meant nothing else but "fresh air."

At that moment, after having already collected many such meanings and derivations, I realized that I could not just restrict myself to the empirical proof *that* there is multiplicity of different concepts of peace around the world. In the sense of postmodern philosophy, it is much rather about *how* they are concretely defined, and in which manner they differ and relate to each other. Peace philosophy is, as I realized, foremost the meta-science of the ethics and aesthetics of empirically observable concepts of peace.

Because astonishment about "fresh air" was followed by enthusiasm about the beauty of the word: Can there be a better way to experience peace than breathing fresh air? Is breathing in itself not the most fundamental and indispensable act of all beings, for themselves and yet in necessary relation to each other, and thus the most alive measurement for peaces as such? Do we not take the whole *Mitwelt* into ourselves each time we breathe in? Do we not release something from our deepest inside, something very intimate and authentic, into the environment each time we breathe out? Do particles of our breath not re-enter the lungs and bodies of other beings so that we could say that all that is alive is more intimately connected through breathing than through any other activity? Is breathing not the elementary sign of life, in many languages synonymous with soul, and therefore is fresh air not the best possible description of a peaceful existence?

What the colleague from Burkina Faso had conveyed to us paraphrases mysticism's deepest insight, which is in no way surprising for Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, Tantrics, Sufis, yogis, ascetics, and shamans of all directions, just as well as for singers, dancers, and actors. For all of them, the conscious regulation of breath is at the center of every activity that is about inner or also social peace, and about connectivity and aesthetics.⁵ Today, after long years of study, it appears to me that quite an estrangement of human beings from nature is necessary in order to be amazed by fresh air as a concept of peace.

Out of this insight and over the years that research interest which I take as the basis for this book developed: in what manner are societies which can perceive peace energetically, for example as fresh air, different from those which have substituted the ultimate explanation of peace with a construction of normative, moral precepts or proscriptions? How and why has this occurred? And are there further ideal-type models?

Whoever asks these questions will soon be engaged in a discussion which differs widely from that which we in Europe debate under the title of *pax, peace, paz, paix, pau, pace*.⁶ By this I do not just mean the so-called peace plans of high diplomacy and daily politics of recent years. It is much more about the depth of our understanding of peace, which, as we can commonly read, is supposed to have something to do with the ratification of treaties, with pacts derived from *pax* and with security.

The initial hypothesis was that there would have to exist at least two large families of worldviews and corresponding perceptions of peace. One built upon however-founded norms which legitimize themselves via God, reason, law, power, or morals, and the other that feels the peaces out of an energetic experiencing of being, perceives them via the dynamics of life and the connectivity of all beings, and interprets them as mystic, harmonious, and aesthetic resonance. Initially, so I assumed, this need not have been a duality. The one may be – or may have been – connected to the other. From the outset, this appeared probable to me. Yet the question remained where and how those interpretations could have lost their mutual reference to such an extent that communication between the corresponding *frameworks* in the sense of Lyotard became difficult or impossible.

Initially it caused me deep unease to belong to a culture which supposedly has contributed nothing more to the idea of peace than a form of contract ending a quarrel or war and normatively regulating relations between human beings. The desire to know it more concretely grew steadily and stood as a leitmotif at the beginning of the year-long research project which finally led to this book.

However, at the beginning of this venture there was also self-doubt resulting from my *moral-modern* socialization. How could I – on the foundations of my white, male, enlightened Catholic and educated bourgeois identity of the deepest Austrian province – pretend to climb into the depths of foreign cultures, to want to experience and understand them? I differ from my home society's unsophisticated mainstream in almost no aspect of my lifestyle – and what is more, I even feel good with that!

Yet there is a certain level of superficiality in the daily rituals within this saturated milieu that has always aroused my suspicion. Is Catholic Christianity really intended to be as moralizing, zealous, and “spiritless” as local practice has conveyed to me since my childhood? In the course of my research, I was to find out that in Aramaic, the language which Jesus probably used, the word “spirit” is also used in the translations of the words breath, air, or wind.⁷ The Christian bringer of peace, the Holy Spirit, therefore would at least also be imaginable as “holy air” and thus more closely related to the “fresh air” of my later student from Burkina Faso than all his astonished classmates and I myself had initially thought. The deeper, almost mystic message lies hidden under the surface of the concepts and rituals, and I assumed that this would be the case not just for Catholic Christianity.

The call for an inquiry into the deeper meaning of the different perceptions of peace and their mutual relations in the end was ingrained deeper into my bourgeois biography than I myself had wanted to acknowledge for a long time. My original family’s solid socialization had namely experienced a not insignificant rupture in the fate of my father. He himself derived from a respected lawyer’s family in Brno in today’s Czech Republic, yet he experienced in his youth not only all the horror of the Second World War’s eastern front, but as a member of the German-speaking minority, also the subsequent expulsion from the then Czechoslovakia as well as the loss of citizenship and sense of social belonging. Certainly, more than a decade passed between his family’s violent expulsion and my birth in the Tyrolean province, a time during which he was able to finish his studies and regain his lost social position. Yet my father never completely succeeded in recovering from that traumatizing flight and the change in living conditions from the bourgeois surroundings of Brno to rural village life. For the local population he remained, despite all professional and societal success, a bizarre *Zugereister*,^{8*} and I, as his son, somebody who in the case of conflict amongst children or youth, was frequently given to understand that he could not properly belong to the established, landowning families of the rural village aristocracy.

This resulted in a latent feeling of exclusion which sharpened my perception about narrations and their deeper content. Because of this heightened sensibility I finally came to perceive myself as not being the only misfit in my village. What arose was much rather the impression

*Translator’s note: local Tyrolean dialect for newcomer or immigrant, literally somebody arriving by travel. The term often carries a pejorative meaning.

that it was full of such misfits and almost nobody appeared to fulfill what the dominant narration prescribed.

As a misfit amongst misfits did I thus grow up, with attentive, open ears whenever conversation was about the nuances of the community's self, endless arguments about the manner of narration upon which the different narrators could not agree. When I began to study it almost inevitably drew me to those topics – the reason for, and the art of narrating in, the historical sciences and literature, the law and the art of setting and interpreting norms, music and the secrets of its *unerhörten** messages, and finally the interpretation of the world in culture, philosophy, psychology, and religion.

The Austrian universities at the time were not the ideal playground for a child of such spirit. The students' movement cultivated dogmatic Marxism. Teaching mainly followed the rude Positivism of the Vienna circle. Karl Popper was omnipresent.⁹ Even the Idealism which dominated German academic life was somehow foreign here, not to mention the Frankfurt School's post-Marxist approaches or the ideas – in this country completely misunderstood – which spilled over from the further West, from France and England, and in extreme cases even from the East. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent," is how the young Wittgenstein¹⁰ was quoted frequently, gladly, and in the wrong context. "I" was considered a scientifically inadmissible term which was not supposed to appear in seminar papers. Positivists need no perspective, because for them truth is objective. Although Frederick S. Perls had already written in 1947:

[...] previously it was accepted that the scientist observes a number of facts, and draws conclusions from them. We have, however, now come to appreciate that everybody's observations are dictated by specific interests, by preconceived ideas and by an – often unconscious – attitude which collects and selects facts accordingly. In other words: there is no such thing as objective science, and, as every writer has some subjective viewpoint, every book must depend upon the mentality of the writer.¹¹

Yet such thinking was not in vogue at the Central European universities of the time; it barely was known. It is probably no coincidence that

**Translator's note:* the author here plays on the different connotations of the German adjective *unerhört*, which in this context can mean unheard of, but just as well unrequited or outrageous.

Perls' book was only translated into German more than 30 years after its publication. This was not an ideal climate for someone looking for deep cultures, ambiguities, and fresh air, even if he did not yet know the latter at this point. This is how my wandering years began, through disciplines, countries, and cultures, until I could summarize my academic work under the title of peace research and finally return to the original and deeper motivation of my search.

At the end of the journey there remained finally nothing else but the insight that I had been searching for something which I had always already had – myself – and that I was driven by the desire to give a form to the relations with other misfits which I could experience as a harmonious resonance of perceivable things. That is what my science is about – and that concern is behind the considerations I will engage in this trilogy.

1.2 Research interest

My initial hypothesis was that there are at least two great families of worldviews and corresponding perceptions of peace, which I, in allusion to Magnis-Suseno, have called energetic and moral. Since these are categories which I as author of this book have experienced, it was my concern to verify this hypothesis through the systematic organization of the materials I had gathered over the years. "At least" is here an important phrase because although I did not consider myself committed to the philosophy of postmodernity, I nevertheless had integrated it into my broader academic horizon, into the larger context of my knowledge and thinking, and had differentiated it against this background. That is why I did not need to necessarily subsume every empirical result under the two mentioned categories in order to be able to keep up the hypothesis. Concepts of peace beyond those categories seemed imaginable and did not frighten me, because I had assumed that I would not encounter a rude dualism between energetic and moral concepts of peace, but rather communicative patterns in social systems which, in the course of their changes, now and then might banish certain connections from people's consciousness. If it were indeed the case that energetic and moral peaces were in a fundamental relation, but that the perception of this relation can disappear in one or other direction out of the social actors' awareness, then it could not be ruled out that even both interpretations might be forgotten and be replaced by a third interpretation. If such a phenomenon were to occur, it would only need to be checked in which relation it stood to the two original categories.

In what manner, I subsequently asked, are societies which primarily perceive peace energetically, for example as fresh air, different from those which have substituted the ultimate explanation of peace with a construction of normative, moral precepts or proscriptions? How and why has this occurred?

If I assumed that the categories here and there developed and existed independently of one another, then it would be sufficient to empirically survey and subsequently simply portray them. Yet, as an author of the twenty-first century, I have to assume that even if they did develop independently from each other in completely separated frameworks, because of the course of globalization, nowadays a connection nevertheless exists which necessarily forms a central part of the research interest.

Thus the question arose about how to organize this study. The idea of a chronological depiction provoked resistance in me, since a vectorial understanding of history is part of the mechanistic worldview that I tried to escape from – both for my own sake and for the sake of my readers. An evolutionist depiction, which ascribes the energetic concept to the magic and mythic stages of human development and still perceives the moral as part of rational *modernity*¹² appeared tempting to me on the one hand, yet insufficient on the other, because whoever has for once accepted the notion about fresh air can no longer perceive peace as a pure question of morals. Also, the perceiving subject of the twenty-first century is breathing and it is thus connected to the energetic peaces.

This led to a turn toward the approaches of systems theory that also have a certain tradition within peace research. Within this frame it soon became clear that the differentiation of concepts of peaces can very well occur in the form of connections of efficacy, yet not in chronological linearity. This posed one of the biggest challenges for the current volume. The finally chosen system of five chapters is the attempt to meet this challenge. During the course of this study, further connections emerged out of the basic assumption of the energetic and the moral categories, which combine characteristics according to their perspective and so each justifies and necessitates its own designation.

1.3 Method and structure

I wish to create this text as a kind of dialogue between my two main scientific identities: between on the one hand, my originally gained stock of a worldview as an Idealistic – maybe critical – but in any case

continental European peace researcher, and on the other hand, my experience as an academic, world-crossing vagrant¹³ who can draw from the rich well of additional experiences of all those people whom he has met on the road. In my case, they are not least of all the many students, colleagues, and friends from all over the world who have accompanied me for a part of the road and let me partake in their stories. In all of this, my struggle is not about an argumentative competition between stock and experience, but about the harmony that arises when both voices enter into resonance with each other.

This is why the structure of this work may not be so dissimilar to the schematic of other textbooks on peace research, yet it is continuously broken in its argumentation by the interferences deriving from this inner dialogue. This dialogue thus stands for the approach of system theory. “The *limits of my language* mean the limits of my world,”¹⁴ Wittgenstein said. Agreeing with him, I attempt in this text, just as in my life, to go to the limits and thus also to risk being contradictory. To me this appears more exciting than mechanistic logic. It is nothing else but the expression of those types of feedback loops which become noticeable whenever the perceiving subject perceives itself as part of the perceived.

The structure follows a conventional scheme: I will first approximate the two conceptual families of energetic and moral peaces. In doing so, it appears to me expedient to begin with the energetic peaces, because of the far-spread astonishment about “fresh air.” The relation between the energetic and the moral will be inbuilt in each subsequent chapter. They deal with the differentiation between *modern*, *postmodern*, and *transrational* concepts of peace, which all relate to this tension as well. There is thus no separate section dedicated to this relation, so that the structure does not insinuate a separation which is rejected by the research interest. The further the text proceeds, the easier it is to perceive the structure of relations.

The material drawn upon here is necessarily based on a lot of literature, on preliminary work which others, without intending it, have done for me. As far as this concerns authors in the classical sense of the word, I will make it explicit, and in the following chapters will dedicate grateful attention to those which are the most important for me. I have, however, received many suggestions or hints from my students in unquotable seminar papers or just in discussions inside and outside of the classroom. I subsume this acquisition of knowledge from experience whenever it is connected to conversations with all kinds of people, to personal impressions and observations, which I will bring into this

text as witness. In a strictly scientific manner this is not unproblematic, because the conversations mostly took place in an informal setting, often surprisingly, and at best have been recorded in my own protocols of memory. I rarely conducted interviews in the technical sense of the term because I have discovered that on those occasions the form mostly determines the content, even far more than happens with normal observation. Therefore I also venture methodologically to the limits of what is allowed within the customary academic point of view. If I now and then have to call myself as crown witness for my own arguments I will try to be as moral, that is as candid, as possible. I will choose a style of intersubjective communication with my audience that in principle makes it possible to check, confirm, or falsify my statements. This means that, as author of this work, I certainly claim scientificity, even if I am aware that my research interest at times will force me to the limits of the standardized understanding of science.

The extraordinary breadth of the source materials used poses a challenge to the rules of a coherent referencing system. I have decided to consistently quote in the notes that version of a text which I have actually consulted. This can sometimes be misleading, as new editions, and especially Internet versions, of less known classical or older texts give the impression of standing outside the narrated temporal context. In the bibliography I have thus always included the date of the first edition in order to facilitate the corresponding orientation for my audience. With Internet sources I always quote the access date and not the creation date, even if this is mentioned on the site. The endnotes furthermore include the date of birth and death for central authors and actors, and I thus hope to facilitate the at times difficult orientation in the chronology of events, without having to interrupt the argumentatively broad thread of narration too often.

1.4 State of the art

Whoever intends to write an innovative, comprehensive piece about the interpretations of the concept of peace more than 50 years after the official date of the birth of peace research as an academic discipline, will not avoid referring to the great names of this discipline. Whether they be Kenneth Boulding, John Paul Lederach, or Nigel Young in the Anglo-Saxon area, Ekkehart Krippendorff, Dieter Senghaas, or Norbert Ropers in the German-speaking realm, Johan Galtung, Hakan Wiberg, or Maria Stern in Scandinavia, Vicent Martínez Guzmán, José Maria Tortosa, or Vicent Fisas in Spain, Ervin Laszlo, Ferenc Mészlivetz, Dean

Adjukovic in Eastern Europe, Kumar Rupesinghe, Sikander Mehdi, or Vinya Aryaratne in South Asia, and Ali Mazrui, Mahmood Mamdani, or Macharia Munene in Africa, to name just a few. Their texts define the current state of discussion and they are important for this work. Yet in this book it is not my intention to give a comprehensive overview of what has been produced in the frame of peace studies by those classics. I much rather want to propose my own view, which of course has been influenced by all of them and many more, as a new perspective suitable to look beyond the narrow borders of the classical schools, without thereby becoming as eclectic as is the case for some of the key texts of peace studies.

That is why I would prefer to address those works which are usually not found under the heading of peace research but are of central relevance for my work's core hypotheses. From within peace studies in the narrower sense I can only pick up Karlheinz Koppe's *Der vergessene Frieden* in this respect, not because Koppe's Idealist approach and descriptive writing style would be that much closer to me than some others, but because this carefully collected and didactically very well edited volume systematizes an abundance of materials which have proven to be important for me as well. All other texts from within this circle are quoted whenever used, yet taken to be known here.

In the chapter on the energetic peaces, I have initially transgressed the border between peace studies and women's studies, because some of the key texts of feminist historiography show much more perceptivity for energetic worldviews than the modern peace research. This almost necessarily brought me to the topic of matriarchy studies, even today hotly debated, and amongst others I have chosen Heide Göttner-Abendroth's classics *The Goddess and Her Heroes* and *Das Matriarchat – Geschichte seiner Erforschung*. For my purposes it was here less decisive how convincingly this controversial author works on the level of facts, as much rather her fundamental presentation of the energetic worldview which appeared very useful to me. Furthermore, it is not quite clear to me why authors working on encyclopedias, like Barbara Walker, are supposed to be less contentious. It is possible to draw similar conclusions from *The Women's Encyclopedia of Myths and Secrets* as from Göttner-Abendroth's works; it is only that the former leaves it to the audience to do so. To me the hypothesis of matriarchy, just like feminism in general, in any case appears to be much too little reflected in peace research, which not incorrectly gives rise to the common accusation that this discipline is a realm dominated by men. Among declared peace researchers, women like Elise Boulding, Mary Kaldor, Jenny Pearce, Maria Stern, or Annette

Weber are really a minority within the discipline and many of them furthermore do not perceive themselves as feminists. That is why it has been important for me to include this aspect, even with the danger of being castigated by both feminists and peace researchers alike and additionally being criticized for the superficiality of this undertaking. That energetic concepts of peace do exist I know from the simple experience and observation of everyday life.

For the sections on the “Holy Wedding” and the “Great Triad” I have drawn more from theological, philosophical, and anthropological literature. I have been especially impressed by Daniélou’s *Gods of Love and Ecstasy – the Traditions of Shiva and Dionysus*, Helmut Uhlig’s *Das Leben als kosmisches Fest – magische Welt des Tantrismus*, as well as the classic *Patanjali and Yoga* by Mircea Eliade and Jean Campbell Cooper’s *Taoism: The Way of the Mystic*. All of these works are, in part, very enthusiastic “translations” of what is commonly known as Eastern wisdom into the enlightened scientific language of the so-called West. This may manipulate and reduce my own perception in a certain manner. Yet the inquiry into the spiritual literature of the corresponding cultural areas, like Swami Veda Bharati’s fantastic *Yoga-Sutras of Patanjali with the Exposition of Vyasa*, has clearly shown me that an independent and earnest immersion into all those worlds would surpass at least my scientific lifetime in its entirety. Generalizing surveys, like the one intended here, could never develop if such a depth were presupposed for research interest. Yet, since it is not my aim to discuss questions of detail regarding single religions and philosophies, but to discuss their narratives’ peace philosophical content on a general level and to show the practical consequences deriving from them, I am very grateful for these simplifying translations by Western authors. During my stays in their corresponding regions I have nevertheless striven to absorb as much relevant knowledge as possible from these inexhaustible cultural depths.

For the delimitation of separate chapters and the assignation of concepts, authors who, sometimes long before me, have been driven by a similar research interest have great importance. Here I first have to name Karl Jaspers, with whom I feel related in many ways, although I owe as much to his theses in “*The Origin and Goal of History*” as I disagree with them.* What connects me to him is mainly a great amazement about the comprehensive diversity of human existence and the

* *Translator’s note:* this text by Karl Jaspers is quoted frequently throughout the current book. As the English translation is out of print, all references recur to Jasper’s German original *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*.

attempt to somehow grasp and structure it with the own senses and concepts. His thesis on the Axial Age appears fascinating to me, but not completely sustainable. Yet even just Jaspers' approach and questions are very helpful. Over large stretches I have worked through them when trying to find the connection and transition between the energetic and the moral images of peace.

Ken Wilber, and most of all his best-known work *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*, was helpful to me in a similar manner when distinguishing the moral from the modern concepts of peace. Wilber's evolutionist worldview remains fundamentally suspect to me; I do not follow it. Yet I cannot deny that in method and content the very broad design of his works – with all the legitimate critique that an extreme generalist like him is necessarily exposed to – enable insights which a narrower viewpoint would not admit. His treatise on the influence of reduced interpretations of Plato and Neoplatonism offers exceedingly valuable insights for peace philosophy.

For the transition from the modern to the postmodern image of peace there could hardly be a more convincing work than Fritjof Capra's *The Turning Point*. This disciple of Werner Heisenberg is an author who has been attacked from many corners because he unabashedly has transgressed the borders of his discipline, physics, and he has applied its insights to different contexts beyond this field. The result is, in my opinion, a convincing explanation of the great transformation of the world and with it the images of peace between modernity and postmodernity for which philosophy as well as the historical and the political sciences can be thankful to him. Capra is thus a pioneer for many further authors. Let us not forget that many of the well-known names in peace research originally did not hail from the social sciences but from the natural sciences and systems theory, beginning with Albert Einstein and up to undisputed icons of peace research like Kenneth Boulding or Ervin Laszlo.

Up to this point I could have recourse to concepts which are common in the debate within the humanities and social sciences and which thus also could be applied without problem to peace research. However, a substantial concern of this volume is not just to retrace their development, but to theoretically accompany the drive toward a *transpersonal* and *transrational* concept of peace as can be observed in practice today. Conceptually, I thereby was able to refer once more to Ken Wilber and Fritjof Capra, who long before me pulled those concepts over from psychological technical language into the broader debate within the *Geisteswissenschaften*. To also apply their theses on transrationality to

the question of peace beyond postmodernity is a task which nobody has taken up so far. I therefore had to find the border between postmodern and transrational images of peace on my own and everything that follows are new grounds for peace research.

For the elaboration of the chapters on the moral and modern concepts of peace, however, I did not need any key literature, because those topics have already been discussed on a very broad basis. That is why it appeared tempting to me to confront the seemingly self-evident with provocative counter-theses, like for example Neil Douglas-Klotz's *The Hidden Gospel* or Marc Ellis's *Revolutionary Forgiveness*¹⁵ and then to draw my own conclusions from them. I think that the result is an exciting narrative which is able to stimulate the reader's thinking even on this rather worn-out topic.

With the chapter on postmodern concepts of peace it was much more difficult, since in my view the whole of peace research is a postmodern discipline. With that I do not mean to say that all or even just the majority of peace researchers follow the postmodern philosophy. I also do not refer here to the eclecticism of some of the discipline's "fathers," like Johan Galtung or Kumar Rupesinghe, but I intend to say that the crucial questions of peace research as an academic discipline have developed out of the corresponding societies' postmodern mentality. That is why it was important for me to lead this chapter back to the roots of postmodern philosophy. I therefore had to engage with Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of peace and trace its path through Sigmund Freud's hypotheses via Structuralism and Poststructuralism. Out of this emerged something like a self-avowed subgroup of postmodern philosophy within peace research, whose most outstanding representative to me appears to be Francisco Muñoz. His *paz imperfecta* has, in my opinion, in summary concluded the whole discussion within the discipline. Yet, postmodern philosophers who never understood themselves as peace researchers like Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Peter Sloterdijk, and most of all Jean-François Lyotard and Gianni Vattimo, have contributed more to the debate on postmodern peaces than the discipline understanding itself as such, which is why I include their works in my considerations. Yet this too is a debate which largely appears concluded to me.

That is why the last chapter of this volume will deal with that new ground in peace research, which to me appears especially important for the current understanding of the peaces, yet it has received scarce attention in the frame of the discipline. It is therefore the part which is the most difficult to convey. For this purpose, I have decided to resort on the one hand to the psychological roots of this debate, and on the

other to the extra-European roots around the transpersonal and transrational. Reading Sri Aurobindo's *The Life Divine* has been very helpful for me. I found the transcripts of Jiddu Krishnamurti's speeches, published in many different forms, to be as deep as they are stimulating and entertaining. He served as an important inspiration for me, if not the most important of all. Fed back into my own life circle, I again encounter those thoughts deriving from Indian philosophy within some schools of European and American psychology. First with Carl Gustav Jung, later within humanistic psychology, and finally in that transpersonal psychology as founded in the works of Abraham Maslow and Stanislav Grof.¹⁶ As relevant for this volume, I could cite almost every text of the pioneers of the *Human Growth Movement* or the *Human Potential Movement*, which had its focus in Esalen in California, whether those works had been written by Grof himself, by Frederick Perls, Paul Goodman, or others. In the little-known work and even more in the practice of one of those pioneers, namely Jeru Kabbal,¹⁷ I found the classical approaches of psychoanalysis and humanistic psychology to be innovatively connected to the teachings of Sufism, Zen, Tantra, and the Advaita Vedanta.¹⁸ As this will play a larger role in the second volume of this trilogy than in the first, instead of further listing names I just refer to the influence which all those preliminary works have had on acknowledged peace and conflict researchers like John Paul Lederach, whose texts¹⁹ probably mark the highest point of discussion within the discipline. At this stage I have to again mention Ken Wilber and Fritjof Capra, whose perceptions of the question of the transrational have been exceedingly helpful to me for this volume's most difficult venture.

If I should succeed with what I have intended, then this volume will convey the liberating effects which transrational images of peace have in a largely postmodern-feeling world. It would, however, be contrary to this school's line of thinking to try and convince anyone of its own superiority in respect to others. This book neither proselytizes nor appeals; it just proposes different perspectives on the interpretation of the peaces. Perhaps it serves to broaden the horizon and spectrum of interpretations, feelings, and narrations of peace accessible to us. Yet, may it at least serve toward developing a more open understanding for others' interpretations of peaces. In times of irritated intercultural communication this would already have to be viewed as a success.

2

Energetic Interpretations of Peace



The symbol for yin and yang is an ideal type representation of energetic peaces. Everything is contained within everything. Peace implies the sublation of all dualities and a comprehensive harmony between heaven, the human being, and earth.

Who could live, who could breathe,
if there were not this inner glow of bliss?
Taittiriya-Upanishad 2.7¹

The mountain lake, cast into nocturnal silence, in whose profound waters starlight reflects the infinity of the cosmos, does not know that it is peaceful.

When the hurricane traces a path of destruction through the subtropical coastal landscape it does not have any evil intent.

In its ultimate encounter with the fox, terror may raise the rabbit's every last hair. Fear of death may paralyze it or let it try a last vain dart sideways. In the horror of the capturing bite, bodily pain may still be the most endurable aspect. Yet the rabbit will not waste its last breath on a thought about the world's injustice.

The fox, in turn, when its hour has come, will face death without the slightest remorse about its violent acts. Fox and rabbit are similarly innocent.

For the mountain lake to be peaceful, the hurricane to be terrible, the rabbit a victim, and the fox a murderer they all need an observer who is conscious about her own *Dasein** in the world and thus capable of

*Translator's note: The German term *Dasein* has no direct English translation. *Dasein* plays an especially important role in the philosophies of Ludwig Feuerbach, and later Martin Heidegger. The word is composed of two parts

designing such abstract criteria as peaceful or terrible, poor or evil for herself, and in consequence, also for others.

The mountain lake and the hurricane belong to the physiosphere, which is composed of elements that are not independently alive and does not know such criteria. The fox and the rabbit are creatures of the biosphere, which may well make them suffer life, yet does not impose on them to also reflect upon this. Thinking about one's own *Dasein*, and about that of other creatures is reserved for the sphere of the mind, the noosphere, which, according to our knowledge, so far is only accessible to the human species.²

The mountain lake is neither objectively peaceful nor in itself,³ but its image can trigger a feeling of peace in the human observer. The combination of the aspects of silence, depth, infinity, being sheltered, water, and starlight has an effect on many people which they connect with peace and which they seek. Out of this perpetual human longing the Eastern practice of yoga arose in times immemorial, the goal of which is described in Patanjali's Yoga-Sutras:

Yoga is the control of the modifications of the mind-field. Then the seer rests in his own true nature.⁴

Yoga is thus a practice which shows us one of several possible ways to the subjective perception of peace, a peace for which I, for simplicity's sake, will subsequently propose and use the metaphor of the mountain lake.

If the human being is, however, capable of reflecting on the world and on herself, and if the metaphor of the mountain lake is suitable for the description of a sensation of peace, then the question arises, why, in recognizing this, she does not spend her whole life meditating at her inner mountain lake. She would be an agreeable being to herself and others. This question leads to the insight that the human species may well appear to be the only one for which the noosphere is accessible. Yet this does not imply that it can exclusively live and experience there.

In contrast, the second law of thermodynamics states that within the physiosphere all systems develop from order toward disorder, whereas biology assumes that life essentially generates more complex forms out of simple ones, and that for the development of each new kind, it thus has to draw on already existing patterns.⁵ Every being to whom the sphere of the mind is accessible, is also and beforehand a creature of the

da-sein and at times it is translated, albeit inexactly, as either being there or simply as existence.

physiosphere and biosphere, which implies that she always has to deal simultaneously with the growing disorder and increasing complexity of the system to which she inescapably belongs.

In this sense, the complex form enjoys no privileges over the simple. Consciousness needs a brain, and this needs matter. Yet matter can do without the brain and the brain without consciousness. If a complex species proves to be incompatible with the system in the long run, it disappears in the one or the other way from the globe. The human species is not immune against that. The system can get by with the simpler species and form itself anew. The extinction of species is a constant dynamic of all systems and not an accomplishment of *modernity*. Only its discovery is so. This fact is neither to be welcomed nor regretted, even if it fills the self-reflecting human species with existential anxieties or fears about the future. It simply “is.”

The first and foremost obstacle for a human being’s lifelong meditation at the inner mountain lake is thus her own self, with her fundamental needs:⁶

- As a living being she is given over to metabolic processes and doomed to take in nourishment. This she has to seek, conserve, prepare, ingest, and excrete.
- As a mortal being she is fundamentally not designed for narcissistic singularity, but rather to be a link in a chain, or rather a node in a web of life. The corresponding rituals occupy her throughout her whole life and urge her to look after her own children until they are capable of sustaining themselves.
- The human species forms communities, because for individuals, the first two points are only, if at all, achievable temporarily and under very favorable conditions. In such communities, each member has to secure an appropriate place, act accordingly, and shape its relations to others. Beyond this, these communities in turn search for their appropriate place in the world and cultivate relations amongst one other.

All of this distracts us humans from the peaceful, permanent stay at our inner mountain lake. Furthermore, these three factors are in a precarious relation to each other. As a simple rule of thumb I could say that within a certain size of community the probability that the question of food becomes a problem threatening the existence of the individual is very low, and that deprivation is such a rare phenomenon that I call it a natural or social catastrophe, an exceptional case.

Also the games and rituals which arise around the question of procreation and the corresponding acts, sexuality, are lived out in a more relaxed manner in group sizes where the choice of potential partners is sufficient yet manageable. It is not for nothing that for example, the German term *Befriedigung* (satisfaction), contains the relational core term *Frieden* (peace). If the abovementioned categories are accepted, then the question of which conventions a society agrees upon as regards *Befriedigung* is elemental for its understanding of peace. *Selbst-Befriedigung**, which occurs frequently in real life, is a paradox because the relationality thereby is at best an imagined one. Conversely, not every manifest bodily union implies a *befriedigende* (satisfying) peace-making connection or relation on all levels of existence. On the contrary, this is the exception. *Befriedigung* (sexuality) is imperfect and a paradoxical relational factor within societies, which bestows tension, uncertainty, plurality, dynamism, and *energy* to their practice of peace. The more conscious a society is about this factor, the more flexibly it will deal with it, and the less conflict around conventions will appear in it.

The price for relaxation in larger groups is that these groups are more difficult to oversee and demand a more complex organization. To orient oneself therein, to find one's own place and tend to one's own relations, is thus a correspondingly bigger challenge for the individual person, which in turn keeps her from her meditation at the inner mountain lake.

This depiction of the human dilemma with the peaces may be greatly simplified, yet I think that due to this very indistinctness it can be proven to exist in most known societal forms. It is nothing other than the narration about the expulsion from paradise. The price for entering the sphere of the mind is the certainty that most of one's life cannot be spent there alone. From this realization, the question arises of how human beings organize themselves in order to individually and collectively maintain the possibility of visiting their inner mountain lake with satisfactory frequency. The answer to this question says a great deal about those societies and their peaces. I will show that there are many possible answers, many different roads to the peaces. From the ascetic attempt to suppress worldly desires in order to constantly remain at the inner mountain lake, to complete renunciation of its silence in favor of a strategically attempted position in the manifest world. This book is about the corresponding possibilities.

*Translator's note: Masturbation; yet literally translated also *self-satisfaction*.

2.1 The Great Goddess and the energetic peaces

During the past decades, women's studies⁷ have repeatedly put the topic of the Great Mother, Great Goddess, and Great Whore up for discussion. From the perspective of peace research, I would like to make use of the preliminary insights gained by those efforts. In any case, to me the hypothesis appears interesting that war and violence played, if any role at all, then a greatly reduced one in those societies which are or have been ruled by mother cults than in those with patriarchal patterns of organization.⁸ In Heide Göttner-Abendroth's hotly disputed classic on matriarchy,⁹ the question of the peaces is not explicitly at the center of her research interest. Yet her depiction of matriarchy¹⁰ builds on the hypothesis that it would be freer, just, and harmonious – that is, more peaceful – than patriarchy:

Gentrified societies, which in the case of matriarchy did not at all remain on the simple level of hordes but developed urban cultures, had no need of the state in this sense. Because [...] for them systems of kinship and political organization were identical. They had not been conquered by strangers who took the fruits of their labor, but they all were related to each other and knew each other, a "homogenous" society. The situation was non-exploitative and trustful. To need no state [...] if "state" implies compulsion and public force, law, punishment, police and prison, taxes and state officials is more an achievement than a deficit. It testifies to higher social intelligence to lead a large group of people without force and police, than to have to resort to such means. That is why the matriarchal formation of states differed greatly from this: on the high level of development it was a loose federation of "mother cities" and "daughter cities," which came together voluntarily and without military.¹¹

In historical matriarchy research, so much that is substantial for the topic of peace is being said that a peace research oriented on the present cannot carelessly pass over its hypotheses. The dispute within the historical sciences or ethnology on the interpretation of the sources is here of less relevance than the narration itself.¹² If matriarchal societies – no matter if in the distant past or immediate present – can be described in this manner, then they become a politically relevant pattern within our horizon of imagination. This means that they can be introduced and argued as reference points in the current debate around the peaces. Within the context of my research question I would therefore like to illuminate Göttner-Abendroth's hypotheses more closely.

The oldest of all cultic records in Europe can be found in Laussel, in what is today France. Even if the interpretation of those oldest reliefs, sculptures, and paintings has to remain speculative, the references for the cult are still dense and coherent.¹³ Whether that really implies that the societies which paid homage to this mother cult also were organized in a matriarchal manner, as Göttner-Abendroth's initial hypothesis supposes, is contested. Ken Wilber, for example, holds that especially those early societies which practiced the mother cult would have been organized in a "body masculine" manner and that matriarchy would have developed only as a consequence of agriculture.¹⁴ For Wilber's evolutionist thinking, even earlier forms of organization than matriarchy must exist. His description of matriarchy nevertheless differs only a little from that of Göttner-Abendroth:

It is almost unanimously agreed that in typhonic cultures murder was almost totally nonexistent; war as we know it rarely existed. The most violent substitute sacrifices, as we saw, were finger joints. But from fingers to whole human beings, and from whole human beings to nations – such has been the history of substitute sacrifices [...].¹⁵

For Wilber, murder and war as vehicles for substitute sacrifices only appear in the age of a developed temporal consciousness of agriculture. With that he means that out of the consciously realized fear of one's own mortality, murdering the other is committed as an act of substitution, which is supposed to symbolize and reflect immortality. The formula is that the more of the other's blood is sacrificed, the more probable one's own immortality. This formula would have turned into a striving for power and cruelty and would have led to ever more excessive acts of annihilation.

The Great Mother: peace out of fertility

In the greater area between Egypt and India which under inclusion of the Middle East could be called the Aegean–African–Asian region,¹⁶ at least 55 cultures can be named for which the Great Mother, Great Goddess, or Great Whore symbolized the highest principle.¹⁷ The number of miniature sculptures of goddesses that have been found in this area goes into the tens of thousands.¹⁸ Most authors use the terms Great Mother, Great Goddess, or Great Whore interchangeably. Ken Wilber, however, introduces a path-breaking distinction. For the mother image in its natural-biological aspects he uses the Great Mother and for the mother image in its transcendental and mystical aspects Great Goddess. Thereby he sees the Great Mother preceding the Great Goddess. Many

of the corresponding goddesses thus begin their “career” as local symbols of fertility. In the temples and rituals they transform step by step into the personification of the power of space, time, and matter within whose limits all beings emerge and pass away. All that has form and name derives from her mother womb.

For Wilber, the fundamental difference arises between the Great Mother as a simple biological symbol of fertility and the Great Goddess as the subtle oneness of transcendence.¹⁹ Thus for him they are two different meanings of what is often the same figure, existing in parallel within different structures of consciousness. Both meanings may have been simultaneously present in the corresponding rituals as exoteric and esoteric aspects and they may have been perceived by the participants according to inclination and talent.²⁰

The term “Great Whore” is not used by Wilber at all, because it may be misunderstood and the author wants to highlight the aspect of virginity to his Christian audience. He emphasizes that the Great Mother is actually hermaphroditic, because while those men that the Mother selects for her lovers can impregnate her, and they may even be fertility gods, they always remain phallic consorts to the Great Mother, akin to drones which serve the queen bee. If she is thus always portrayed as a virgin this does not imply that she would not have sexual intercourse. On the contrary, to her men are carriers of the consort phallus which can be interchanged at will. She is a virgin in the sense that she is always the same and that she does not belong to any of the men which come and go. She rules over the phallic cults. The goddess of fertility is both mother and virgin, the hetaera who belongs to no man.²¹ If this understanding of virginity is considered as well, then the term “Great Whore” is expendable. I will nevertheless continue to use it in order to be able to name the respective different aspects of the Great Goddess more explicitly.

The city Çatal Höyük, located in Anatolia, gives evidence about one of the earth’s oldest cultures. It was flourishing for centuries at around 7000 years BCE. Çatal Höyük, which is thought of as the world’s largest, even if not the oldest, Neolithic hill settlement that was never conquered or even attacked. No traces of belligerent activities can be found. Yet there are hints of a matriarchal societal order, which could be one of the many possible pieces of evidence for the initially quoted hypothesis about the connection between matriarchy and a low propensity for violence or, respectively, a high capability for peace.²²

The research on Dravidian Indian culture in Harappa and Mohenjo Daro brought a similarly fascinating result. It flourished mainly in the

fourth and third millennia BCE. This culture developed its own scripts and achieved amazing feats in agriculture as well as in the construction of cities and channels. During its centuries of growth, its area of influence expanded into what is today Afghanistan. Yet excavations do not indicate any larger fights or destruction. Even no weapons have been found with which neighboring communities could have been assaulted. Even if it is not known in detail how this bloom and expansion came about, it appears as if agricultural aptitude, diplomacy, and hospitality would have played a significantly larger role than war and violence.²³ Some authors²⁴ want to see a connection between this culture's peaceableness and Shaktism as its archaic religion. I will engage with this further on.

There is an entertaining anecdote regarding the confusion of the archeologist Arthur Evans who, at the turn of the twentieth century, successfully dug for the palaces of King Minos on Crete. At first it seemed unintelligible to him that he did not find any depictions of belligerent figures of gods or kings, but instead those of the mother goddess of this ancient Cretan culture (since that time called Minoan) together with some slim, naked youths serving the goddess. Finally he recognized in her that figure which Greek mythology called Rhea. As such, she is one of the oldest known incorporations of the Great Goddess in this region and representative of an order that had probably spread in predynastic Egyptian times from the Nile delta into the whole Aegean, and into Asia Minor.²⁵

Before going over further examples of such Great Goddesses, a prior systematization of their appearance in the mythos is necessary: under the sign of the Great Mother the female principle stands for fertility, life; and that is experienced as being identical to what we nowadays call peace. In archaic forms this is symbolized via a single earth goddess. The astral moon goddess is differentiated from the earth goddess in so far that she represents the triad of heaven, earth, and underworld, which to my knowledge all cultures on earth have discovered, even if it is connoted, named, and interpreted differently.

This tripartite cosmos is perceived as completely suffused by life, female *energy*, which is depicted in different forms and colors, symbolized by the uterine cycle and woman's life ages. The wild girl stands for the building up of blood and the heavenly form of energy (white), the sexually active and birthing woman for the abundance of blood and earthly form of energy (red), the wise crone for the ebbing of blood and the underworld (black), while in their perpetual sequence the cycle of vegetation and life is also perceived.²⁶ Female energy thus appears

in mythology at different stages of life, and with different names and forms. Also goddesses interpreted in a newly personified manner are always perceived as just further aspects of the same *energy*. Each of those goddesses thus represents the triad. In the older forms they still do this alone, without any male aspect.

At least in Mediterranean mythology, the Great Goddess appears not only cyclically at different life stages, but also in the succession of generations. The earth mother Gāa turns into Rhea and her daughter is Hera/Demeter. Yet it always remains the same goddess which appears from generation to generation in younger form.²⁷ Rhea appears as a girl (Amaltheia), as a woman (Io), and as a crone (Adrasteia). Likewise, Demeter appears as a girl (Kore), a woman (Persephone), and a crone (Hekate).²⁸ The same pattern is also known from Indian myths: the earth mother Uma is personified in the trinity of Parvati, Shakti, and Kali.²⁹

According to this interpretation of the female trinity, the male aspect only appears in younger variations, in the beginning not as god, but as Heros, the goddess's son/lover.³⁰ His form of appearance is adapted to that of the goddess and it is through her that he receives his manifest role in the fertility-related sequence of Holy Wedding, sacrifice, and return. Where this rite develops, the goddess is represented by her priestesses during the cyclical seasonal celebrations. The sacred king, the Heros, as aspect of the human, unifies with her and finally sacrifices himself in order to give new life – peace – to the people. Those rituals were not just symbolic, but they were actually executed. The initiation bestowed royal dignity. In this worldview the public Holy Wedding with the Great Mother is the expression of fertility, of life, of peace. The blood of the sacrificed king should make all life fertile for the following cycle. In the next cycle the king subsequently rearises in the form of his successor. This one is called “son,” unites once more with the Great Mother and is sacrificed again. This self-sacrifice for land and people is the hero's apotheosis. The male passes away, the female endures.³¹

I now follow this interpretation, not entirely free from contradictions, of the *energetic* concepts of peace – from the Great Mother via the Holy Wedding to the Great Triad – and thereby especially consider the changing relation between the female and the male principle.

The Great Whore: peace out of lust

One of the oldest known Great Goddesses is the Phoenician Astarte, who was venerated as the highest principle of fertility, from which male heroes, kings, and institutions were derived as sons and lovers. As goddesses creating, nourishing, and destroying all life, also the

Sumerian Inanna, the Hittite Kubaba or Arinna,³² the Phrygian Kybele, the Syrian Atargatis, the Arabian Al'Lat, who in pre-Islamic times was also venerated at the Kaaba, and the already mentioned Mycenaean Demeter, correspond to her. Also the Persian Anahita or Mitra with her Heros Mithra, who later ascended to become the sun god Mithras in order to be fought and replaced by the Zoroastrian Ahura Mazda, belongs here.³³

The Great Goddess's old Semitic name is Istar. She sometimes is also known as Anat, Aschera, Ashtoret, or Aschterot. In the Bible her name is Esther, which means mother of all male gods.

The sexual aspect of Istar is Har, the Great Whore, who, through her indiscriminate compassion, personifies peace.³⁴ This aspect of the Great Goddess may be astonishing at first. Yet it points to an important differentiation. As Great Mother she stands for peace out of fertility; as Great Whore she is still the same goddess, yet represents the pleasure principle, which I will soon describe as peace out of harmony. The Great Goddess is the symbol of life as such, the trinity of cyclical creation, nurture, and passing away.

In the ritual of the Great Whore, sexual union itself is an expression of the veneration of the goddess, of life, and of peace. This ritual unification is placed beyond the connection between acting persons. In the ritual frame, the ideal of a complete satisfaction of relations in all aspects of life is relinquished in favor of an imperfect peace for the participants and their societies. That is why the image of Istar, as Har astride her lover in bodily union, represents the peaceful aspect of this goddess. Testimony for this understanding of peace can be found across all physical space as far as the Himalayas, where Shakti or Tara were depicted in bodily union just as Har was in the Mediterranean.

In the temples and rituals of Har, bodily union was consequently celebrated as peace. The priestesses of peace were called *harines*, Greek *horae*, and Persian and Arabic *huri*. The designation as temple whores, while in principle is correct, is problematic if the term is transposed into the modern understanding of prostitution, which is misplaced in this context. The *huri* were understood as eternally young and virginal – because they belonged to no man – angel-like creatures. Their energetic rituals have nothing in common with the later “commercial sexuality” installed and exploited by men.³⁵ The use of the term for the commercialization of the mainly female body, which in occidental literature became established very early on, cannot be applied to those ritual acts. It only becomes suitable with the formation of states and religious institutionalization and thus with the rise of patriarchy.³⁶

In their societal function Har and the *harines* were bringers of peace. Their services were seen as divine. *Malkuta*, their honorific title in Kanaan, is the same Aramaic word that, according to the Gospels, Jesus is supposed to have used to describe what is usually translated as “heavenly kingdom,” yet more revealingly would have to be called “queendom.”³⁷

The connection is convincing: in the temple, sexual unification is not seen as a necessity for procreation and neither as quick satisfaction of lust. It is an energetic relation between the bodies which, following long-established rituals, through breath, movement, and voice tries to reach an ecstasy in which queendom can be accessed as a quasi-deathless floating in the divine – *alaha*.³⁸ Sexual unification, thus practiced, is a prayer, a meditation, which leads to the inner mountain lake, to the ritual experience of a peace free from the burdens of mundane existence, and it is therefore cosmic. It ritually overcomes death, the border between the person and the divine. Therein only the One exists, the Holy Unity of the Great Goddess – *alahat*³⁹ – “the One that is embodied Here and Now.”⁴⁰

Besides that, says Douglas-Klotz, *malkuta* is a word whose roots

[...] point to a fully formed (M) extension of power (L) that is centralized and determined. This root – MLK – is the sign of the creative word, the empowering vision, the counsel that rules by its ability to express the most obvious next step for a group. On a personal level, this root expresses that which says “I can” to life.⁴¹

With this reference to the root word in the sense of a Bija-Mantra,⁴² it becomes even more explicit why the concept of peace in the context of the Great Goddess is energetic. The term “mantra”⁴³ means “tool of the mind.” Mantras serve during spiritual practice, during the ritual veneration of different entities, as remedies on the physical, energetic, and soul level, but especially important in our context, for the purification and calming of the mind and the strengthening of compassion and of the power for transformation and liberation.⁴⁴

Vajrayana-Buddhism, for example, assumes that all that is manifest or imagined does not have a real existence, but is only a representation of the One, the undivided divine – *Shunya*. Yet, the representation also of a multiplicity of godheads – always as aspects of the human – is seen as useful for contemplation and thus for the peaces, which is why the human mind always has to connect to the divine in order to be able to identify with those godheads. Since godheads do not have a real

existence, they have to be pulled into the realm of the mind with the help of the respective supporting tools. In the case of the Bija-Mantra, the divine takes the form of an entity corresponding to the seed syllable and from there on exists in the mind of the practitioner as a positive idea, with which it becomes real.⁴⁵

The “I can” delineates a creative act on the personal and the communal levels that liberates one from the burdens of everyday life and opens up the queendom. Inner peace and the freedom from material obligations go hand in hand. This peace does not aim for any standardized or normatively determinable state, but for a *Harmony* perceived both from the perspective of the individual and the community. This word derives from the name for the bringer of peace Har, the Holy Whore, and it is the basic concept of every energetic understanding of peace. The name of the goddess herself, if heard as Bija-Mantra, in its phonetics means nothing else: H-A-R stands for divine breath, breath of life (H), the All-One (A), rhythm, ritual (R).⁴⁶

The question of whether the rituals of the Great Mother and the Great Whore are about procreation or “just” about simple lust can quickly be dismissed as mere historiographic sectarianism. From the perspective of peace research this is a matter of a first, important dividing line between two different interpretations of peace: peace out of fertility as an archaic principle of life, and peace out of harmony as a transcendental concept. In the sense of Wilber’s already quoted distinction, peace out of fertility can be assigned to the Great Mother and it is mostly of a local, concrete, and thus in its communal orientation, limited reach, whereas peace out of harmony, as a principle of the Great Goddess or also Great Whore, crosses through space and time and twists* the local interpretations.

The symbol of Har and the *harines*, the white dove, is thus a deep cultural basic stock for (at least) all Mediterranean interpretations of peace.⁴⁷ The sublime dove, Yahu, was originally the Sumerian Inanna’s sexual aspect. The invading Semitic tribes usurped both the name and the symbol from her. The dove became one of their central sacrificial animals. The sexual component, however, was repressed.⁴⁸ Yahu turned into Yahweh, the name for the god of fertility, atmosphere, weather,

*Translator’s note: to twist is the English translation of the German verb *verwinden*, a term which appears in Martin Heidegger’s philosophy and has been introduced to peace studies by Gianni Vattimo. For the author’s discussion of *verwinden*, the corresponding noun, *Verwindung*, and its different meanings, see section 5.4.

and war. The dove as a symbol of female sexuality turned into a peace sign of the ascetic Holy Spirit.⁴⁹

Another symbol of the energetic peaces with deep cultural significance which is widespread in the Mediterranean is the crescent moon, which is used in connection with Artemis, Diana, Tanit, Venus, and many other Great Goddesses up to the Christian Virgin Mary, and which clearly points toward the female cycle of fertility. After the fall of the goddesses this symbol continued to be used in many cities, temples, and heraldic emblems,⁵⁰ for example in Byzantium/Constantinople. Islamic teaching originally rejected the use of holy symbols. When the Ottomans conquered Constantinople in 1453, they at first took over the crescent (and star) as the symbol of their worldly rule. This symbol endured over centuries, during which it became closely connected with Sunni Islam, finally leading to an identification of the crescent moon with Islam. Today it can be found on the flags of most Islamic states, yet only few know about the symbol's archaic connection to the energetic understanding of peace.

At a time when this understanding was still socially powerful in the Mediterranean area, the heroes had to prove their virility by impregnating *harines* in order to become kings in the sense of peace out of fertility. Later on the priests took over this task until the rituals of peace out of harmony began to predominate. Not only priestesses bestowed this grace. The rituals of Har and of all the Great Whores were in many societies also celebrated by simple women. Those periodically undertook their celebrations of peace together with the temple's visitors who searched for and probably also found, besides counsel and shelter, also sexual ecstasy and enlightenment with the *harines*. In Babylon, many ordinary women served in the temple before marriage. Holy Whores occupied a high social rank in all these societies, and they were valued for their education.⁵¹ A memory of this lives on in the Islamic-Sufi image of the *huris* waiting in paradise.⁵²

Arthur Evans writes the following on Minoan culture:

The orgiastic element so characteristic of this Eastern group is also visible here. We see the *Soma* of the Sacred Tree acting as the agent of spiritual possession [...] stirring the Goddess – or it may be the votary who takes her place – to an ecstatic dance, at times perhaps, [...], to a Shamanistic trance.⁵³

In the Greek Olympus Istar, Astarte or Har lived on as changed interpretations of the original Cypriote Aphrodite, not of the peace goddess

Eirene, and in Rome as Venus, and not as the peace goddess Pax. The separation between love and peace was thus enacted in mythology and the peace cult of all those goddesses had to give way to the new institutions and the Aryan invasions. Yet it did not disappear completely. Starting from the second century AD it reached a new and sustained flowering in India within the frame of tantric practices and it was only pushed back further by the Islamic invasions. In the Mediterranean area it merged into the cults of Kybele, Dionysus, or Bacchus and in the Greek and Roman classics it long continued to have meaning as a form of rebellious practice against the power of the polis and empire.⁵⁴

The elemental human experience of being inseparably connected to the nourishing womb of “mother earth” is recognized in the cult around the Great Goddess. Not contradiction but unity, not the entangled but the interwoven stand at the beginning.

In horticultural subsistence cultures the emphasis with which the image of the Great Mother is manifest is especially great. The physical difference between man and woman plays a lesser role under this form of livelihood than in agriculture, livestock farming, let alone hunting. In horticulture, even pregnancies or infants constrain women only comparatively little. Such constraint is more common in other activities demanding a larger sphere of movement or more physical effort.⁵⁵ In this system, fertility is equated with the female, and that in a double sense: on the one hand “mother earth” gives nourishment to human beings; on the other, it is the female that gives birth to the fruit of their kind. Fertility is female and therefore the peace out of fertility is also female. If the fruits of the garden and of one’s own kind prosper sufficiently, then the place of belonging can be found the relationship to fellow human beings can be lived, and the inner mountain lake can be visited more often. It is for this reason that the Great Goddess is not just venerated in rituals, but that peace is respected as a divine aspect in every woman.⁵⁶

The cyclic sacrifice of the Hero

The organization of communities nevertheless very often rests in the hands of male leadership personalities, who are perceived as sons of the Great Mother, as lovers of the Great Whore, and most of the time as both at the same time. The thus legitimized Heros/king had the noble task of ensuring the wellbeing of the Great Mother’s people. If the fields were bearing fruit, the livestock were healthy, and the advancement of his own group was secured, then there was peace in the name of the Great Mother. If this state was disrupted by bad harvests, disease, strife,

or invasions, then this was felt as peacelessness and it was ascribed to the king's management. He could then be chased away or sacrificed as a scapegoat in order to once more evoke her benevolence. His blood was sacrificed to Astarte, to Istar, or whatever she may have been called in the local context, so that the earth might become fertile once more, the livestock might procreate, disease and strife leave the community, or the enemy would leave the land.

This aspect of the Great Goddess appears cruel, violent, and peaceless. Indeed, to feel empathy with this understanding of peace is a great challenge for any morally or idealistically thinking person, just because he thinks, evaluates, and judges morally or idealistically.⁵⁷ However, in an energetically founded worldview and image of peace there exist no ultimate values, but only dynamic relations. That is why an absolute abstention from violence or a mimetic spiral of violence is not even thinkable in this worldview. Just like all life, human life is nourished by other animal and plant life. That is why it cannot completely abstain from the consumption of other life, but it can at best show gratefulness and respect toward the life-sustaining service that the other's dying does for the maintenance of its own life. A morality may possibly arise from this which rejects the consumption of all life that one has not killed oneself.⁵⁸ That is why the concept of the vernacular is so important in this context. Because it distinguishes not just between that which has been produced by oneself, at one's own farm or house, from that which has been bought at the market, but it also includes that which has been killed by oneself. It is about the harmonious balance of all elements. If the situation becomes imbalanced in any one direction, measures are necessary which allow for the reestablishment of that balance between society, the *Mitwelt*, and the world of the goddesses (heaven). For this purpose, violence is one of several possible tools and obviously also a human sacrifice has its appropriateness in such an understanding of the world.

The reason for this is that people in such societies often interpret blood literally as the juice of life. Since life is born out of blood, in the frame of a peace out of fertility also the all-creating Great Mother needs blood in order to bring forth new life. The blood sacrifice of the king was therefore not necessarily to be understood as punishment for his failure, but as self-evident sacrifice for the prosperity of their own kind. Hence, the corresponding rituals were always carried out at the beginning of the cycle of vegetation.

A moral condemnation of this situation may serve the self-satisfaction of the modern observer, yet not the gaining of knowledge. Primarily it is to be investigated whether all societies within this frame, the conceptual

world of the Great Mother or Great Whore, have tended toward or rejected violence in a similar manner. That the findings differ in this regard is not surprising. Yet, despite all the uncertainties which the scarce sources leave open, it appears as if some societies would have managed for a surprisingly long period of time to maintain this balance and get by with very little violence. In this respect, to me, the observation appears to be crucial that violence in such a worldview was a possible and quite accepted means for the regaining of lost harmony, yet at the same time no social or spiritual rules existed that established goals inevitably necessitating the use of violence. It therefore remained up to the skill of those who managed those structures to keep the balance and secure peace.

It is furthermore prudent to exercise caution when observing cruel representations and narrations about human sacrifices. Very often they served as allegories for the human and not as truthfully accepted manifestations of the divine. That is to say, then, that they were recordings of psychic or spiritual processes – of dreams, fears, visions – and not positive sources intended to narrate history. Finally, let it be pointed out here once more that the Great Mother also appears as an aspect of passing away, and may thus also be fearsome to behold. The terrible is not peaceless, because the cyclical passing away, death, is understood as natural, as belonging to life. Those cyclically thinking cultures do not banish death out of consciousness but accept dying as an aspect of the divine, as a transcendent becoming one with the One, *alaha*, so that it is death that finds the human being alive and not life that finds death. Here Wilber's differentiation between the Great Mother and the Great Goddess comes into play again, because the type of sacrifice that has to be made to either one of them is very different:

The great outward difference, therefore, is that offerings to the Great Mother were always sacrifices involving literal body death or blood murder, whereas the sacrifice of the soul to the Great Goddess was a self-sacrifice which occurred in the heart, and never involved literal body murder. However, with that sole exception of body murder, all the other outward forms of ritual, ceremony, and myth could be, and were often, quite similar.⁵⁹

I will discuss the importance of the I-sacrifice* extensively in the chapter on *transrational* peaces. Wilber's reference to them already at this

*Translator's note: the German translation of the above quote has rendered Ken Wilber's original term *self-sacrifice* as *Ich-Opfer*, which literally means "sacrifice

point appears helpful to me, because he thereby indicates the much less spectacular, yet in content much deeper, interpretation of the I-sacrifice as a spiritual path to higher consciousness, and furthermore calls to mind that not every ritual was a barbaric bloodbath. What is horrible about death is the imagination of beings that cannot or do not want to give up their boundaries. To them, death can mean nothing else but threatening physical mortality.⁶⁰ The fear of death as motivation for moral or even modern philosophizing about peace requires this image of a passing away in death.

At the moment the concern is not yet about such a conceptual horizon. Later on I will discuss the point that the boundaries of being, as perceived by the modern consciousness of the I, are also, ultimately, only illusory. Because if it is understood that the I is not a definite unity, then that which dissolves in death cannot be the true being, but only a boundary, which is never real but always imagined. Once the individual has created the illusion of the I and its boundaries, it fears nothing more than their dissolution and strives for symbolic immortality.⁶¹ However, this condition is a project limited in time and space, undertaken by certain concrete societies. Even if these societies play a dominant role in the currently prevalent forms of narration within the *Geistesgeschichte*, they still are neither the only interpretation nor a supratemporal interpretation of being. I will repeatedly return to this.

2.2 The peaces of the Holy Wedding

The second perspective on the energetic concepts of peace that I would like to address leads toward the concept of peace out of harmony. Peace out of fertility is not unknown to it, yet it twists that concept, which will be an important step for further observations in this volume.⁶² On the outside the differences between the two are often minor; the rituals are similar, overlap frequently, and transitions are fluid. Yet I draw attention away from the Great Mother as a local and magical symbol of fertility in the perception of a *matriarchal monotheism*,⁶³ toward more mythic rituals of the personification of power and space, of time and matter, as symbolized in the celebration of the Holy Wedding as a festivity of peace. The Holy Wedding is rooted in the magic ritual of fertility.

of the I" or "I-sacrifice." Since the distinction between self and I is of importance for the author's further discussion in the chapter on transrational peaces, the *Ich-Opfer* will from here onwards be retranslated into English as I-sacrifice in order to keep the coherence of the author's overall argument.

What, however, is of interest here is its relevance in societies in which fertility and consequently peace are not just thought of as female, but as a relation or unity between male and female. It is about contexts in which the male aspect emancipates itself from Heros to god. Livestock farming very often plays a larger role in those societies.

This transformation takes place in connection with the rise in power of single societal groups, and the position of their male leaders. With the emergence of rivalries between single communities and the subsequent appearance of male leader personalities, new societal structures begin to form, in which not just the oppression of women in everyday life gains hold, but also a reinterpretation of the ritual. Men emancipate themselves in the realm of divinities, and religion is no longer an expression of cosmic all-connectedness out of the primal force of female birthing and sustaining life, but also a functional ritual and cultural union for the creation and maintenance of power.⁶⁴

The term *hieros gamos* or Holy Wedding relates to the unification between two gods, one human and one divine being, or two humans in ritual. In the old Mesopotamia it originally meant the ritualized unification between the Heros and the priestess as representative of the Great Goddess. Different records testify that this took place in the frame of a public ritual.⁶⁵

This was accompanied by the belief that the human partners would become divine for the duration of their participation in the ritual. In the Holy Wedding the human and the divine thus unify during the sexual act. Man and woman take on the identity of the respective goddess and god and celebrate their union as lovers. For the participants this ritual is, on the one hand, about fertility for themselves, their land, and people, and, on the other hand and increasingly, about a deep spiritual experience, the visit to the inner mountain lake, and thus about peace out of harmony.⁶⁶

If earlier I mentioned the image of Inanna as astride her Heros Tammuz, similar to Astarte with Adonis or Cybele with Attis, then the male increasingly attains an independent role in this reading. He does not just serve the Great Goddess, but he is an aspect of the principle of fertility and peace, and he has a name and function. It is now about a unification of the Great Goddess with the respective god of vegetation, who in his youthful form only lives through one cosmic year, in order to die with the end of the period of vegetation and be reborn in spring as a young god. The best known examples for this come from Mesopotamia; the most enduring ones are from India and China, and they are mostly from the tantric philosophies.

The Tantric principle of harmony

Tantra is the umbrella term for all those practices, methods, rites, and techniques that connect the millennia-old experiences of the yogis to the universal principles of the Sankhya philosophy. In its core, the term implies freedom from all mental constructions, freedom from all the games of the intellect, freedom from all structures. Tantra interprets the cosmos as divine body and deems an autonomously acting person outside of the universal body, an independent creator god, to be unthinkable. Tantrism thus uses all the human being's physical, psychic, intellectual, and spiritual potential in order to experience the connection between the diverse aspects of the physical life and cosmic body. Sexuality is not covered with taboos. No life, no feeling, no thinking, and no spirituality would be possible for Tantrism without the physical body and its vital functions, which it sees as a basis, as a "vehicle of divine experience."⁶⁷ Tantra venerates the female as creative energy, from which everything originates and to which everything returns.

In the West, in order to understand Tantrism as peace-teaching, and to be able to evaluate it justly, it is necessary to free oneself from the familiar order and principles as they have been set up by the institution of the state and patriarchal religions. The measures of value conveyed by Church-based Christianity or also Islam, the dualisms of good and evil, of moral and immoral, block the view of the energetically experienced peaces, interpreted in the tantric manner.

Tantra, just like matriarchal monotheism, in the first place venerates the female principle, Shakti or *praktri* as the active, nourishing, or birthing one. Yet she can no longer get by without the male aspect, Shiva or *purusha*, as a guiding spirit of contemplation and calmness. It is crucial to understand that in this teaching no monotheistic conception of one single Great Goddess or of one god is imagined, but that the *divine* is perceived in pantheistic fashion as one single all-encompassing yet impersonal energy. To the human senses this divine energy manifests as *purusha*, the male spiritual-energetic principle interpreted as conscious and passive, and *praktri*, the female material-energetic principle interpreted as unconscious and active.⁶⁸ This does not include a valuation and at bottom both those apparent contradictions are one.

The term "Tantra" is derived from the Sanskrit root *tan* for "expanding." Tantra therefore means "that which expands awareness."⁶⁹ The whole cosmos is reflected in the human body. According to tantric teaching, every individual is a manifestation of cosmic energy. As epistemology, Tantrism places the identity of the absolute and the manifest world at the beginning of its cosmovision. This view is illustrated by

the *Kalachakra*.⁷⁰ It means cycles or wheel of time and describes the synchronization, the harmonization of the outer and inner worlds.

The outer *Kalachakra* is a description of the emergence and composition of the manifest world, the planets and the stars. It symbolizes outer cycles of life and time, like the days of the year, and contains a comprehensive cosmology. The inner *Kalachakra* describes the cycles of life and time of the human body, especially the breath and the flow of subtle energies within the astral body. This also serves as a foundation for the science of medicine in India and China. The *Kalachakra* represents a comprehensive training program for practitioners. It describes methods for how the basis described in the outer and inner *Kalachakra*, our *Mitwelt* and our bodies, can be transformed into the state of enlightenment, and how harmony and peace can be attained. An important element in Tantra consists in the practitioners not identifying themselves with their everyday ego and its problems, but experiencing themselves through corresponding practices as enlightened beings.

The body, the cosmos, and time are the three elements of the tantric worldview, with time not being thought of in a linear fashion, but as the cyclical energy of all being. For tantric metaphysics, whether in the Hindu, Buddhist, or Taoist versions, all dualities and polarities are united in the primal ground.⁷¹ Therefrom derives the presentation and actualization of mental principles via sexual symbolism, because it is assumed that the universe is formed by the polarities active and passive, female and male, Shakti and Shiva. The energy which flows between them is life. To unite them and actualize them in the ritual implies visiting the inner mountain lake – peace.

Tantric practice is thus a spiritual and mystic path which is based on metaphysical assumptions, yet at the same time follows a very practical goal of peace, namely the sublation of all dualities. In Tantra, outer actions are performed as a mirror of those inner goals, since it is assumed that all reality is of an energetic nature and that microcosm and macrocosm are interwoven. For this purpose Tantra can make use of images, forms, and narrations of the most different religions and philosophies. The Tantrics do not see the sensual world as negative. They are not adherents to asceticism, because with its constant circling around abstention and renunciation, asceticism is only the other side of the intense desire for possessions and consumption. The ascetic may have repressed those wishes, yet through her striving to suppress possession and consumption she is continuously occupied with them. Tantrics use all means of bodily and mental energy to reach the cosmic unification which they perceive as divine.

In this version, the Great Goddess does not live in a heaven understood as somewhere outside. Rather, the divine energy lies in the body of each human being. Concretely speaking, it is imagined as resting at the base of every human's spinal column in the form of *Kundalini*-energy. If awakened to life by meditative practices and rituals, it rises up to open the different chakras⁷² on its path. In the uppermost one it is finally united with Shiva, the male aspect.

According to this concept all main godheads similarly live in the human body, mostly in the center of the chakras, and they can be read as aspects of the respective personality. Just as Shiva and Shakti (Parvati) are united within one body in the figure of Ardhanarishvara, according to this concept so would the right half of each human be male and thus Shiva, while the left, female half, would correspond to Shakti (Parvati). I will deal with this aspect of androgynous unity later on.⁷³

In Hindu Tantra all female goddesses have a male counterpart, from which a multiplicity of pairs and corresponding communities of faith and ritual derive. Radha and Krishna, Lakshmi and Narayana, Rama and Sita, Shiva and Parvati, Purusha and Prakriti may be mentioned as different manifestations of a unity of divine energy which in its core is always identical.⁷⁴

The godheads of meditation in the younger Buddhist Tantra or Vajrayana can appear in peaceful, joyful, or wrathful forms, as aspects of emergence, existence, and passing away or heaven, earth, and the underworld. The joyful godheads are depicted and visualized in sexual unification, called *yab-yum* in Tibetan. Tantrism appears in many religious and philosophical currents in different manifestations, ritualizations, and narrations. Among the younger of these are the Chinese Chen-yen or Mizong, the Japanese Shingon-shu,⁷⁵ and most of all the Tibetan Vajrayana.

The core syllable *shi* (peace) in Tibetan is connected to several meanings: *Shi wa* as a noun means peace, and as a verb it means to pacify, to calm. *Shi de* is the most frequently used combination of the core syllable and it implies peace out of happiness. This combination expresses the inseparable unity of peace and happiness and the term can refer to all areas from the personal to the intersocietal. *Shi ne* means the peace that is won through, and in meditation.⁷⁶ In all these variations, this concept of peace is connected to the idea of the emptiness and unity of all things, which is fundamental to Tibetan Buddhism.

The rise of the male aspect

In many cultures there exist pairs of gods and goddesses or abstract principles like yin and yang, which form polarities and complementary

opposites and which embody the highest unity, peace as such, in a process of mutual permeation, transformation, separation, and unification. The holy form of sexual unification, the *hieros gamos*, the Holy Wedding, is a widespread phenomenon, which constantly takes new forms and appears to be an archetypal image of humanity.⁷⁷

The world of the Great Goddesses is not godless. It is populated by a multitude of male heroes who are gradually apotheosized. Baal, the lord, is to the ancient Semites Heros, son and lover of the Great Goddess. Baal is simultaneously the denomination for mortal kings, whose rule once ended through ritual sacrifice. During the course of advancing state formation these *Baalim* differentiated and integrated the principle of the Great Goddess, thus turning the image of fertility and peace through the unity of the female, responsible for agriculture, and the male, responsible for livestock farming, into a commonly observable and easily comprehensible phenomenon.⁷⁸

The Sumerian myth of the Holy Wedding between the goddess Inanna and Tammuz (Baal) emerged in prehistoric times. The crucial change, which had been occurring in the cultural turn of events since the third millennium BCE was the increasing male dominance of the *hieros gamos*. While in the beginning it had been the human king which ascended toward the goddess Inanna, with increasing institutionalization it was the male god who descended from above in order to unite with the human priestess of the goddess Istar or Inanna. In this change, the decline and suppression of the female element became manifest. The eventual consequence was the profanation of the ritual and the humiliation of women.⁷⁹

Göttner-Abendroth sees the rise of the male principle in myths and religions taking the following steps:

- Phallic primordial serpent personifying water or wind
- Chthonic fertility-Heros (earth aspect)
- Astral fertility-Heros (sun aspect)
- Deified Heros: fertility god, sun god, god of the atmosphere, god of the death, all as dying but ever reborn gods
- Immortal god of heaven (sun god)
- Fertility god (land and sea)
- God of death (early patriarchal triad)
- Omnipotent father god with son
- Absolute father god as solitary principle⁸⁰

The debasement of women in the rising patriarchy must not be overlooked or forgotten during the following observations, because it has

grave consequences for the perception of peace in any society. Somewhat provocatively I could also raise the hypothesis that a society's capacity for peace can be read not least from the manner with which it deals with its whores. In any case, I hold the commodification of the Holy Wedding to be an aberration that should not obstruct the view of its deeper meaning, which in our context for now is of greater importance than a moral critique.

Egyptian scriptures tell us: "In the beginning there was Isis, the Oldest of the Old. She was the Goddess from whom all becoming arose."⁸¹ That is a further ancient example of the Great Mother who in Egypt first appears as Nout or Neit (Mother Earth), as her daughter Hathor, the lover, mother, and daughter of Re/Horus, and finally in her most commonly known form in the shape of Isis. Also she is the giver and destroyer of all life and mother of all heroes/kings/gods.⁸²

Isthar/Hathor stood for the throne of Egypt. The Pharaohs sat on her lap and were protected by the arms and wings of Isis.⁸³ Egyptian mythology describes how Isis and her brother Osiris, the male god of fertility, salvation, and the underworld, already loved each other in their mother's womb and gave each other protection and comfort. That is why they also became a couple as adults. In the corresponding cult Isis devoured Osiris each year and gave him life again. He was torn to pieces and reassembled. In doing so Isis formed him a new penis of clay and breathed life into him. Thus Osiris arose and they held the Holy Wedding, whereupon life could go on.⁸⁴

The unification of opposites

Thus Isis and Osiris formed a divine couple and in their annual cultic unification the cycle of creation, life, and destruction was celebrated. We may research, speculate, and quarrel about this cult's origins and societal ramifications.⁸⁵ What is certain is that it spread in many different variations, over long periods of time and large areas, and it was also the precursor to many great narrations about the secret of life and resurrection, rebirth, and salvation.

In any case, the question of what relation the almost worldwide equivalents of this cult have to one another remains a topic of speculation or scientific interpretation. I do not want to lose myself therein. Yet some of those equivalents shall be mentioned, as representatives for many more, in order to further enlighten the topic of the Holy Wedding for the purposes of peace research.

In the Roman context, Mars is usually portrayed as the god of war. Yet he only became so under Greek influence, with the emergence of the

Roman system of state and through taking over the Hellenistic notion of Ares, the god of war. In the older Etruscan phase he was still a god of livestock farming. In mythology he, in this version,⁸⁶ is the son of Marica, the female trinity of birth, dusk, and New Year, which, according to this account, also gave birth to the god king Latinus, the progenitor of all Latin tribes.⁸⁷ Similarly, the Latin word *pax*, as root for many European terms for peace (*pace, paz, pau, paix...*) within old Latin originally denotes the principle of fertility in agriculture.

The Etruscans venerated a triad composed of the earth goddess Ceres, and the male as well as female aspects of animalistic fertility, Liber and Libera. Like similar older forms they were later overlaid with Greek interpretations in which they corresponded to Demeter, Dionysus, and Kore. Out of the veneration of this triad resulted the *Liberalia*, the orgiastic cultic celebrations at which young men were clothed for the first time with the toga of men. Just like Liber, the lower-Italian Bacchus was also associated with Dionysus, so that finally those three gods and their veneration all stand for the energetic, excessive, and orgiastic aspect of peace out of fertility and harmony.

Pax and Mars, like many others, derived as complementary principles out of the vernacular ambience of the pre-Imperial time and acquired their Hellenized meaning only during the period of the formation of the Roman state. Earlier they had formed a holistic, harmonious principle of peace and fertility. It is only through the formation of the Roman state and Empire and through the adoption of Greek perceptions that they were perverted into the antagonists of war/peace.⁸⁸

The characteristics of Pax in Imperial time increasingly came to be associated with Venus, the old Roman variation of the Great Goddess, the aspects of birth, love, and death. In her temples schools existed in which, just as in the examples described earlier, the holy temple whores, the *venerii*, supervised the teaching of sexual practices to open the path toward divine grace, *venia*.⁸⁹ During the course of Hellenization the characteristics of the (domesticated) Greek goddess of love Aphrodite were transferred onto Venus, while Pax was equated with the Greek goddess Eirene. In the time of Emperor Augustus this culminated in the cultic veneration of the goddess Pax as a symbol of Roman world domination (*pax romana* or *pax augusta*) in combination with the goddess of victory (Victoria) in the sense of a victorious peace.⁹⁰

The Holy Wedding of Mars and Pax/Venus therefore turned into very different symbols. The Hellenized Pax in the end found herself in a dualistic antagonism with the similarly Hellenized Mars. Older representations leave no doubt about the original practice, its reference to

hieros gamos and the successive reinterpretation. They thus testify to the momentous digression of the former goddess of fertility, peace, and love toward the imperial Pax Victoria and Venus Victrix as the "bringers of victory."⁹¹ On Roman coins Pax is depicted with the victor's laurel wreath, armed with lance, spear, and shield and her foot on the neck of a vanquished enemy, Mars with lowered lance and an olive branch.

The European northwest yields a similar picture. The name-giving earth goddess Erin appears in Ireland with the Heros Lug and the earth mother Dana in the Celtic version with her Heros Dagda. In Wales they are known as Modron and Bran.⁹² In Germanic mythology the pair of siblings and lovers appears in ideal type as Freya and Frey. They are the children of the earth mother Jörd⁹³ and belong to the (matriarchal) Vanir tribe of gods who, in contrast to the belligerent (patriarchal) Æsir, were associated with blessings, peace, and richness.⁹⁴

Freya, the term for the goddess of love and fertility in the oldest Germanic notions of belief, was originally not a name, but a noun for "the Beloved One,"⁹⁵ slowly ascending to the rank of a name. This emphasizes that aspect which appears most strongly in her mythological character. Yet Freya is also a goddess who appears in all aspects of the triad also as girl and a crone.

Since there is no South Germanic record of Freya, it is assumed that during the time of the Vikings⁹⁶ the Vanir aspects, love and love magic, were separated from this Great Goddess under the name of Freya, while her Æsir aspects became represented in Frigg, wife of Odin. The development would thus be similar to that of Pax and Venus. Freya, who appears under further names,⁹⁷ is in any case the original "ruler" and at the same time the most important goddess of love and fertility, who represents many aspects of what I have already mentioned about the Mediterranean goddesses.

Also Freya's brother, Frey,⁹⁸ properly has no name. He is the "Lord" or "Seed." As the highest god of fertility and vegetation he guards over rain, sunshine, and the growth of the earth. After everything that has been said so far it is not surprising that his cult contained strong sexual elements and that at times he only appears in the shape of a phallus. Together Frey and Freya symbolize peace out of harmony, female and male lust, and fertility in a very vivid manner. At the time of their Holy Wedding the common people also celebrated rites of sexual permissiveness. If they were given a sacrifice it strengthened the corresponding aspects of the participants in the ritual and thus contributed to fertility and harmony. In this manner the old Scandinavian cultures also followed the familiar image of the Holy Wedding between the goddess

and the Heros/king. Freya, or her respective equivalent, in pre-Christian times married the Heros and thereby made him king. As husbands to the fertility goddess they suffer the real or symbolic death of the hero when the time of their reign draws to an end, whereas the goddess never dies.⁹⁹ The Mediterranean and northern European myths are not only comparable regarding their image of peace conveyed via the Great Goddess and the Holy Wedding. There are many obvious commonalities. In some cases the path on which the myths and rituals travelled from southeast to northwest are verifiable.

Also at the other end of the world, in Japan, there exists an almost congruent image with the twins Izanami, the embodiment of the uterine sea, and Izanagi, the symbol of phallic lightning. The mythos recounts how the two discovered sexuality and used it as the magic of creation. Izanagi brought the sea to foaming movement so that the "primal womb" brought forth the solid matter.¹⁰⁰

In Lakota mythology in North America, the "Great Secret," *Wankan Tanka*, is always composed of a female and a male aspect which are connected to each other in love. In this manner, for example, are Inayan, the Rock, with Wankinyan, the Thunder, or Wi, the Sun, with Hanwi, the Moon.¹⁰¹

The Holy Wedding is thus about a prototypical fundamental pattern in which peace is composed out of the trinity of the divine that is experienced as omnipresent and manifested in the Great Goddess, the emergence of the earthly in living beings and the human sacrifice through which those humans are connected to the divine. The implementation of the respective rituals may vary according to time, place, and cultural surroundings, and range from factual consummation for all participants, via public or secret rituals of the aristocracy in communities with an increasing male dominance, to symbolic hints and substitute acts, often under hostile conditions, in patriarchal or morally oriented societies.

The androgynus

Now back to tantric thinking, where there is no dualism but only an all-connectedness of appearances, which find their highest expression in the figurative unification of the only apparent contradictions in the manifold, many-limbed, and complicated *yab-yum* groups of godheads. This image is at times further enhanced in the notion of androgynous godheads, for example, in the Indian epic poem *Kumarasambhava* in which an ambisexual godhead, Ardhanarishvara, emerges out of the endlessly long copulation of Parvati and Shiva. The hairstyle of this

figure is half male and half female. Only one half of the body shows a female chest and the facial expression combines beauty, grace, and strength. On some images one-half wears female clothing, the other wears male clothing.

Greek mythology almost congruently speaks of Hermaphroditus, the son of Hermes and Aphrodite, from whom emerged an ambisexual being out of the strong and enduring embrace with the nymph Salmacis.

Helmut Uhlig¹⁰² contends that androgynous traits could be discovered in almost all popular religions of the old high cultures. He interprets this as a hint of the archaic belief that the separation of sexes did not always exist, but described a later state of being human. Besides Ardhanarishvara, Uhlig sees a further Indian parallel to this conception in the bodily oneness of the great Hindu godheads Vishnu and Lakshmi. He also invokes Plato's *Symposium* in which the author lets the comedic poet Aristophanes appear as a character who speaks about a primal ambisexual globular human being. Through its quickness and dexterity this being would have become dangerous to the gods, which is why Zeus ordered Apollo to divide the globular human into two halves in such a manner that man and woman would emerge.¹⁰³ Since then human beings have been consumed by the desire for reunification.¹⁰⁴

Uhlig interprets the tantric ritual as an attempt to regain the unity of the separated genders. Yet in the tantric conception it is only in death that this old unity, the genderless being, can be rediscovered. Peace in this interpretation means the overcoming of gender— the return to that androgynous state of cosmic being which, according to this belief, was at the beginning. The androgynous here is the origin and goal of all being.

Alain Daniélou contributes by listing another dozen androgynous godheads in Asia Minor.¹⁰⁵ He thus introduces a narration which at first seems to be in contradiction with our story so far, because for Daniélou, it is peace culturally, not matriarchal monotheism, which originally connects the mentioned area between Egypt and India. The mutually influencing cults around Osiris, Shiva, and Dionysus finally, under the names of Bacchus and Liber, intrude far beyond Rome into the European north and west.

The contradiction is only apparent. In Indian Shivaism, deriving from pre-Vedic times and still cultivated today, just as in the parallel myths around Dionysus and Osiris, the centrifugal force which leads to the beginning of the universe is called Shiva. Shakti is the opposite centripetal force which holds the solar system and stars together. The harmonious and vital simultaneity and equivalence of opposites in all aspects

of life are characteristic for all these worldviews, and that is why the ascription of male and female to the one or other force for now is irrelevant and just a matter of perspective, as it is also perfectly symbolized by the divine androgynous. This might apply to all energetic images of world and peace which are guided by a polymorphous monotheism.

It is only the increasing institutionalization of society and religion which causes an imbalance of the harmonious interpretation of this image. It freezes the contradiction between energy (interpreted as female) and order (interpreted as male), and it replaces that which had been deemed female in Shaktism with the male aspects Vishnu or Apollo.¹⁰⁶ The adoption of the principle of matter, order, or form into the male sphere, as expressed in the mythos, relegates the energy interpreted as female from a primal and inseparable complementary toward a secondary position.

Ecstasy in the Dionysian ritual

The outer appearance of Dionysus changes considerably over time. While older images rather depict an old, bearded king in whom the male aspects are dominant, from the fifth century BCE – that Axial Age which I will later dwell on in more detail – onwards he appears as a delicate youth with long hair, wrapped in female clothing. Similarly, the satyrs, lecherous spirits of the forest which accompany Dionysus, are in the older images half-man half-billy goat, and later on become graceful youths. Men taking part in Dionysian rituals over time are more and more often depicted as disguised, grape-bearing women.¹⁰⁷ The androgynous Dionysus turns into the representative of the originally female energetic sphere, which under the rule of the male, material, and order-creating Apollo is perceived as secondary, inferior, or at the worst evil and threatening.

This development has a significant influence on the images of peace. In the older forms of narration the gods were, according to different versions, torn to pieces by titans, the threefold goddess, three princesses, priestesses, a boar or a bull. The variations of these sacrificial myths show Dionysus with the phallic scepter as prototype of the redeemer god. In the beginning he was really sacrificed in order to fertilize the earth with his blood. The “wine of his blood” was offered as a gift of sacrifice and Dionysus was reborn as a grapevine or holy child and placed in a grain basket.

During the Dionysian ritual, the priestesses, Maenads or Bacchantes, as a result of their devotion and the communion, achieved divinity themselves through dismembering (*sparagmos*) the sacrificial animal

representing the earlier scapegoat king and his earth-redeeming death, partaking of the still warm flesh and wine (*omophagia*) and dancing naked in a trance. While doing so they sang and played the dithyrambs, an enthusiastic antiphony.¹⁰⁸ The participants in the rituals of Shiva, Osiris, or Dionysus did not just execute more or less brutal and lecherous symbolic acts. The rules of conduct as they are recorded in the *Linga Purana* provide information about this aspect:¹⁰⁹ whoever dedicates herself to this path of searching for wisdom or “peace out of happiness” must not steal, must lead a wandering life and abstain from social obligation and marriage, be without ambition, renounce worldly goods and practice nonviolence (*ahimsa*). To this is added, control of anger, obedience of the disciples to the master, cleanliness, a moderate diet, and diligent study. The disciples had to undertake long and strict practice in order to be properly prepared for the rituals. It is only then that, according to this teaching, peace reveals itself in ecstatic eruptions of the creative primal forces of the universe. In this world, the sinner is the ascetic and the most pious figure is the bacchante.¹¹⁰ The original interpretation of the energetic principle as “peace out of fertility” up to this point appears clearly visible to me. Yet, at the same time a second aspect of the Holy Wedding is thereby addressed, which is inseparably connected to those ecstatic rituals: the search for peace as an inner mountain lake in the unification itself. Daniélou points out that the aspect of fertility is not part of the ritual of unification within Shivaism, and he highlights the moment of directly experienced peace out of joy or peace out of harmony in this frame. Sexuality and dance would thus be the most direct forms of connecting the human with the supernatural. This would be the goal of the ritual.¹¹¹

In the cult of Dionysus, conceptions of salvation can be observed which in their substantial aspects correspond to the tantric traditions of India and Egypt. Many of his attributes are considered to be blueprints for later biblical narrations about the redeemer god. In any case it is misleading to just disqualify the Holy Wedding as a simple orgy or “sinful” sex. In Shivaism, just as in the cult of Dionysus, it is about passing through the sexual – the second aspect of my initial considerations – for the goal of salvation, which is manifested in the ideal type in the androgynous representations of Ardhanarisvara, Hermaphroditus, Dionysus, Osiris, or also Obatalá in Voodoo. A mature Bacchante does not need an external ritual partner, because he can at any time peacefully and joyfully encounter the female principle within himself, and the same goes reciprocally also for the female Bacchante. In this instant, the ascetic and yogic traditions of peace merge into a peace out of harmony.

If the Dionysian ritual is not about fertility but about ecstasy, the question nevertheless remains open whether the two of them can simply be separated. Daniélou¹¹² emphasizes that Shivaism was originally based on a matriarchal societal order. Property, houses, land, and servants belonged to the women and were passed on from mother to daughter. In pre-Aryan Indian societies, man led a contemplative life as wanderer, artist, intellectual, or warrior and besides that served the women for diversion and reproduction. In this rendering, man was free from concern about the offspring and the question of fertility may really have resided in the knowledge and desires of women. Under this precondition, peace out of fertility results exclusively from the skill of women, while direct access to peace out of harmony is open to both sexes. The latter is also the only one known to men. That is why it is logical to qualify the narration about peace out of harmony as a male tendency, and the one about peace out of fertility as a female tendency. And already the question arises of what happens to such an agreement if the societal framework changes.

That the concrete act of reproduction should take place in matrimony and not in an ecstatic ritual is comprehensible as a moral commandment. Yet it is just this which makes the argument so suspicious, for does morality not already belong to a world in which the male principle, with all its fears about paternity and claims of possession, has gained the upper hand? Is the exclusion of the principle of fertility from the ritual of the Holy Wedding as a precondition for peace out of harmony not the decisive step which turns women, celebrating the fertility of the world and their body, into objects of male "need for joy?" Do the formation of elites and the professionalization of what previously was a communal and community-building ritual not already derive from this commandment? Was the subjugation under the moral impositions during the course of patriarchy not already carried out through the separation of the images of peace out of fertility and out of harmony? Are elitist secret teachings, as they can be proven to exist all across history from the cults of Dionysus up to Voodoo and professionalized prostitution anything else but the direct result of this separation?

I will keep these questions in view during Chapter 3, when dealing with the fundamental changes brought by the so-called Axial Age.

2.3 The Great Triad

If I add one further aspect to the results already gained then I do not arrive at a new category, but at a perspective which offers an enlarged,

but perhaps more complete outlook. I found it best expressed in the Taoist description of the Great Triad. It refers to the relationship between heaven, human beings, and earth. Heaven implies spirit, being, "divine breath", but it is never related to the imagination of a personalized god.¹¹³ Earth denotes matter and nature. The human being who partakes of both is understood as the intermediary. The human being's accomplished capacity for peace manifests in the realization of her potential in all its yin-yang aspects. As synthesis and intermediary she occupies the central position in the tension between heaven and earth and recognizes the underlying unity of the apparent contradictions. In the world of appearances, matter and mind are held together by the third element, the human being, in which the former two are united. Heaven, earth, and a human being are the fundament of creation. Heaven creates it, earth nourishes it, and the human being completes it.¹¹⁴

The most common translation of the term "Tao" is path, and it implies the movement of the celestial bodies, the rhythms of vegetation, and the fortune of communities and individuals. The dissolution of apparent dualities and the harmonious relations within the Great Triad is a complete description of the energetic understanding of peace that retains validity far beyond the borders of China and of Taoism. It is reflected in the most diverse constellations, descriptions, concepts, ethics, and rituals of many cultures and it will subsequently serve as a central point of reference. It will, not least, reappear at a rather unsuspected point, namely in connection with Sigmund Freud's structural hypothesis in the famous form of superego-ego-id.¹¹⁵ Yet for now, the principle of yin and yang for female¹¹⁶ and male¹¹⁷ follows the previous section.

After everything that has been discussed it is no longer difficult to perceive the image of the symbolic unification of both principles in the Holy Wedding and a quasi-androgynous state of both original and ultimate harmony between them. Androgynous is another word for the yin-yang, which has regained complete and absolute unity in Tao. There is no longer a strict "either-or." In Taoism, whoever speaks about "good" or "bad" does not render a final verdict, but always one that is subject to change. One says that something appears as good or bad in one's own eyes, right now, in a certain context. Therefore there is nothing which can be good (right) as such or bad (wrong) as such. Just as with good (right) and bad (wrong) there also is no decision possible with weak and strong, about which of them would be the better. Weak is not used in a derogatory sense, but symbolically corresponds

to yin, which always needs a yang and already carries it within itself. The world is a flowing play of contradictions which induce one another and then dissolve again. Arguments, standpoints, and ideas are relative and relational. They all may be right or wrong. I-consciousness and perception are deceptive. This implies that every judgment is built on the corresponding perspective and its respective relations, and this relates to all circumstances. Yin, the negative principle, is of sublime passivity; yang, the positive principle, is of powerful activity. The correlation between the two results in that kind of harmony through which all things are created.

Thus it becomes clear that peace in this worldview can only be understood as that balance and harmony between heaven and earth as it is perceivable and producible by the human being. Everything that stands outside this harmony, whether physically, psychically, or mentally, within the individual or within the world in general, has to be perceived as a failure or disturbance of the balance between yin and yang. Such a disturbance is a natural, everyday process. This is similar to homeostasis, the natural urge to return to balance. To get out of balance and to regain equilibrium would thus be a natural process within the life of the individual and of groups and no sharp dividing line can be drawn between the two. It is dynamic.¹¹⁸ This insight prompted Karl Jaspers to the poetic statement:

We do not live in the eternity of the complete harmony of the souls, but in the time of the always incomplete necessity of becoming-other.¹¹⁹

Once the yin–yang, however, has become unbalanced to such an extent that the urge toward harmony can no longer be followed, then the two great cosmic forces fall apart to form a duality of simple good and bad, which suggests the existence of good and bad actors. This assumption then spreads into the consciousness of the masses and connects with their emotions, wishes, and desires, as they are particular to human beings, toward an imbalance of the system, peacelessness, which in turn generates fear and dynamically leads the imbalance toward disaster.

He Ping and Wu Wei

The term for peace in Chinese Canton, *he ping*, is therefore a derivative one. It connects peace (*ping*) with harmony (*he*) toward a philosophical concept which initially can be translated as “peace out of harmony.” The symbol for *ping* is in turn a compound. Its elements can be translated

separately with "everything in the world" and "calm breath," which would make peace synonymous with "calm breath in the whole world."

Because the Great Triad peace, the calm breath in the whole world, in Tao is unthinkable as standing by itself alone as a single term or state of being, but only as a perception derived from the harmony of yin and yang. The symbol for harmony, *he*, is also bipartite, with one, the left part, signifying the exhaled *h* which determines the pronunciation and stands for divine breath or breath of life,¹²⁰ while the other refers to the mouth as content. Combined this means echo or resonance in a musical sense.¹²¹ The term was correspondingly taken over into the Japanese and there is called *he wa*. In all the interpretations deriving from this root, peace out of harmony is the "resonance of the divine breath." The corresponding concept of peace in its totality thus signifies the "calm breath in resonance with the divine breath in the whole world,"¹²² with which I again would arrive at an equivalent to the introductory metaphor about fresh air at the proverbial mountain lake.¹²³ On the road to this mountain lake, controlling one's breathing and bringing it into rhythm plays a central role in Taoism. This technique has become known in the West as embryonic breathing, *t'ai-si*. In contrast to the Indian *Pranayama* it does not serve as preparation for spiritual concentration, but accomplishes it by itself.¹²⁴

In Taoism, harmony arises whenever the human being disturbs the resonance of the divine breath, the flow of the natural, as little as possible. That is why the high art of any kind of thinking, speaking, or acting in Taoism thus consists in refraining from arbitrary intervention into the course of things. If no confusion is created, then all things behave according to their Tao and peace reigns. This letting-happen, *wu-wei*, is a virtue in the Taoist understanding of peace.¹²⁵

This may sound simple, yet it is hard to live in practice because every new situation, every new challenge, demands an immediate reaction of the person trying to live according to a Taoist understanding. She can no longer have recourse to a predefined canon, any norms or eternal laws, yet she is still subject to a cosmic ethic. Human beings aspiring to *te*, a form of life in correspondence with the Tao, can only draw upon literarily demanding educational poems, anecdotes, meaningful stories, and allegories which have deeply marked the Chinese image of humankind and which may give orientation but do not provide binding guidelines for action on how to keep the harmony, the resonance with the divine breath in the whole world of the Great Triad.¹²⁶

Harmony, the resonance of the divine breath in this sense, arises first of all within the human being itself. From this grows harmony with

others, and from that in turn, harmony with the whole world. It is the purpose of the human world to follow the harmony of the natural world. For the individual it is about avoiding trouble, about relenting and coming to a maximum understanding of the position of others. On a higher level, it is about a lack of passions, which leads to the liberation from tensions and onto the path toward one's own actualization. Peace is manifested through not desiring and not wanting to control, the letting happen.¹²⁷

Wu Wei, if it really is achieved, if it is completely realized, is one of those rare moments in life which may be perceived as real, genuine, spontaneous, pure, natural and free. Those rare moments signify the peak of an ineffable "correspondence" in our life, a sweet harmony of peace and calmness.¹²⁸

Wu-wei implies letting happen, forgoing security. Life is dynamic, constantly changing. The idea of security invariably awakens the thought of possible insecurity. Through preoccupation with tomorrow, whose problems may perhaps never be realized, fear is created and the present remains un-lived. That is why in Taoism, paradoxically, the complete forgoing of security is the only possibility for security that ever existed.¹²⁹

Wu-wei also excludes the attempt to convert or proselytize, which only confuses and violates the individual. The peaces are not exportable because this would presuppose that some would know more about them than others, which cannot be the case in a harmonious system where regular breath echoes throughout the whole world. In Taoism no god, no rule, no science nor authority can show what is right. Every thing and every living being has its own idiosyncratic nature and only becomes complete if it actualizes it. It follows that every form of violence, including intellectual and cultural violence, is an impossibility for the human being in Tao. It is always symptomatic of a lack of self-control and signifies imbalance and thus the end of human dignity. The one who starts the conflict is seen as the loser. Whoever is last to raise a weapon, including a mental one, is seen as brave. In such an intellectual atmosphere, war and violence are perceived as unnatural, as the deepest debasement of the human being.

In this manner of thinking peace implies nonviolence and it is not based on weakness or cowardice, but it is only possible for those who possess the true courage of restraint and prudence to overcome the urge for revenge. To save face, as the old Chinese demanded, thus has a deeper meaning. If both parties recognize from the outset that the existence

of a conflict is already the consequence of their actions or desires and if they accept their share in the disharmony, then no embitterment will remain in the course of conflict transformation from which future conflicts could ensue. The *win-win* principle of modern mediation thus has always been inherent in the Taoist worldview.

From all this it follows that within Tao human beings in their natural state just live. It is only when they are ruled that artificiality and utility enter the communities. Every government, according to this worldview, forces people to follow the same standards, and that runs counter to the nature of each individual. Freedom from government would thus be the best government. For Taoism, institutions imply a disturbance of harmony and thus of peace. The idea of progress is similarly rejected, because it leads the human being away from its origin.¹³⁰

In these aspects Taoism reflects the societal conditions at the time of its emergence. Even if, as it always is in such cases, no precise hour of birth can be named for this teaching, it nevertheless gained shape, based on older traditions, during the famous Axial Age in the middle of the last millennium BC. It finds its expression in the Tao Te Ching, which is ascribed to Laotse and is amongst the world's most read and quoted texts. The historical existence of Laotse is contested but Taoism points toward that phase of Chinese history in which the transition from communal to private property took place, the monetary system arose, economic systems based on the division of labor were introduced, and thus the feudal order with a permanent bureaucratic apparatus appeared.¹³¹ Taoism is the philosophical expression of the resistance against this development, which is why, despite all its syncretism it remained in dispute with conformist-normative Confucianism.

With respect to philosophy Taoism probably delivers the clearest, simplest, and at the same time, most mature interpretation of energetic concepts of peace. The persuasiveness of this concept should, however, not lead to the mistaken assumption that it would be as easy to live as it is to understand it. From the Great Triad's energetic and therefore aesthetic fundament derives an ethical, but never complete, canon of values which human beings as well as communities have to interpret in a situational manner and act accordingly. This demands a high measure of ethical maturity and aesthetic sensitivity, because the person acting in a Taoist manner has to be able to perceive and live the natural progression of the world in all its interrelations. This demand is far from comfortable because of the firmly entrenched morality of modern societies, and yet it is humanly possible, as it has been thought, lived, and proven across history in many contexts.

Shanti and Ahimsa

From the concept of peace within Taoism it is no big step to the Indian *ahimsa*, which is easily comprehensible not just because of the previous observations but also because of the translations and interpretations that Mahatma Gandhi in particular has left us and which are accessible to the Western mind.¹³²

The Sanskrit word *shanti* is used for peace in many of the Indian languages. It actually means the liberation of the human soul from rebirth and it is thus a metaphysical term. The word *ahimsa*, more commonly known in the West, does not stand for peace in Sanskrit, but is literally not-harming and thus implies nonviolence, according to which no living being should be killed or harmed. In the tradition of yoga, *ahimsa* also – and mainly – relates to the body, which is why excesses of ascetic practice are rejected here. An analogy to Tao *shanti* is thus on the same level as *he ping*, and *ahimsa* to that of *wu-wei*. For the contextualization of this concept of peace some further basic terms from within Indian philosophy¹³³ are necessary as reference points: *ātman*, *brahman*, *karma*, and *dharma*. *ātman* is phonetically reminiscent of the German term *Atem* (breath). It is etymologically related to it and it also means the same thing. It implies force of life and I-consciousness, but not the “I” of the manifest persona.¹³⁴ This is because the creatures of the world only exist in their consciousness and this is part of a general world-soul, *brahman*,¹³⁵ in which everything is connected to everything else.¹³⁶ The image of the net of Indra, the Hindu god of the atmosphere, of storms, rain, and battle may serve as an illustrative expression of this all-connectedness. He has four arms. One holds a lightning bolt, the second a spear, the third arrows, and the fourth the said net. This consists of a multiplicity of cut gemstones with manifold facets in which the gemstones are mirrored and reflected until infinity. None of these exists by itself. Each is connected and reflected in all the others.¹³⁷

World existence is the ecstatic dance of Shiva, which multiplies the body of the God numberlessly to the view; it leaves that white existence precisely where and what it was, ever is and ever will be; its sole absolute object is the joy of dancing. The Supreme in itself is the timeless and spaceless pure Existence, one and stable, to which measure and measurelessness are inapplicable.¹³⁸

Nothing new is therefore ever created, but *energy* constantly changes its form. Just like the pot is already inherent in the lump of clay, the sculpture in the log of wood, the ice cube in the water, *ātman* is prefigured

in *brahman* and constantly changes its form.¹³⁹ Both form an inseparable unity. Liberation of the human soul from rebirth thus means the merging of the individual aspects into the world-soul, and the disappearance of the individual traits of being.

Out of this concept of salvation a system of ethics arises which gives the individual hints as to how that goal can be reached. This does not occur in the form of commandments, but through the explanation of a chain of causalities that is called *karma*. According to the effects of its own deeds in life, a being will find itself in one or the other form in the next one, until salvation from this cycle occurs via the merging of *ātman* into the primal energy of *brahman*. This path is prescribed in the Upanishads. It describes the main goal of the ascetic cults of renunciation.¹⁴⁰

Shanti is an energetic, personal, and metaphysical concept of peace. In the material world it cannot manifest by itself but only through the deeds and relations of individual beings, who move toward it in the sense of the teaching. Similarly, *karma* itself is not manifest. It expresses itself through the creatures' actions.

The reference point for that is *dharma*. This is an absolute and general ethical law which includes and transcends all secondary, conditional, and special *dharma*s. In the Vedas there is an ultimate law, which results from the primal energy, but its concrete manifestation depends on the perceiving being, which is why it is not hermetic despite its claim to absoluteness. Most Hindus assume that while *dharma* is eternal, it is changeable as regards content and not at all times the same. This in turn is only possible due to their perspectivist understanding of truth.¹⁴¹

This view does not represent Indian philosophy as such, because its image of the world is not only rejected partially or completely by the *nāstika* philosophies¹⁴² of Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvaka, but also by Hindu reform movements which expect reward for ethical actions in the manifest world. Hinduism is not a closed system of belief, based on a uniform teaching. More than a religion, it is the synopsis of different philosophies, forms of rituals and nomenclatures, the greatest commonality of which is represented by the polymorphous monotheism on which all those systems are based.¹⁴³

In Brahmin Hinduism, *dharma* simply turns into right action according to the caste's ethical commandments and obligations. *Dharma* here gains a normative and hermetic character, which it did not have in the previous interpretation. What all teachings, however, have in common, and which is here of greater importance than the myriad deviations and sects, is *ahimsa*, the principle to kill no living being. Although this

principle does not actually mean peace, it is still the manifest and thus central consequence of a peace concept that is energetic in its origin. *Ahimsa* is also subject to the perspectivist relativity of the concept of *dharma*. The Indian concepts of peace, just as well as the Chinese concepts, emanated far beyond the limits of their own respective contexts. Their influences can be observed in the whole East and Southeast Asian area. There they mixed with vernacular concepts as well as other external influences so that in large countries like Indonesia or Malaysia it is very difficult to speak about overarching peace cultures, although it is just those two countries which are officially Islamic. But all throughout the region, deep hybrid cultures shimmer through the thin surface of this state religion. That is why it is illuminating to speak about local ethics and not about regional cultures or religions.¹⁴⁴

2.4 What is an energetic image of peace?

The previous listing of examples of energetic understandings of peace is by no means exhaustive. Those listed are just a small sample, yet they are illustrative and rather common examples, the compilation of which shall show that energetic concepts of peace can be found everywhere across time and space. Some of them have long faded; others are still binding for many people on this earth. With the energetic worldview I may assume that nothing in it is limited to mere historical interest, because in this worldview no energy is lost. Nothing remains without consequence, nothing disappears without leaving its trace in history; everything is twisted and preserved in one way or another.

Seen from this perspective, it may be correct that the living conditions of whole societies change so much in the frame of what we call modernization, development, or progress, that they lose awareness of energetic concepts of peace. However, when taking a closer look, hints of an energetic understanding of world and peace can be found everywhere, beneath the surface of a capitalistically commodified world. Very often just the modern languages are telling. Whenever concepts like to (not) be in a good mood, a story full of tension, a vibrant atmosphere or one charged with eroticism, attuned minds, pulsating music, electrifying news, a radiant smile, and other expressions are used to describe social and communicative processes, then they give testimony to a deep culture, a collective memory, and a sensorium in which the potential for such understanding is inbuilt. In the course of modernization, some of the consciousness of this may have been lost and the corresponding

social technique withered. The possibility of reactivating and training it is, however, always an option.

As a quintessence of the examples we have had so far, I will attempt to define energetic peaces. At this point it is important to emphasize once more that the three sections about the Great Mother, the Holy Wedding, and the Great Triad do not describe three different categories, but just three perspectives of the same content.

(a) I begin with the finding that energetic images of world and peace do not place a personified world creator at the origin. The first and highest principle for them is always a primal energy, about whose description those images struggle. In the mythology of the Central American Mayas a red gemstone, which existed at the beginning, contained all the essences of heaven as well as the “drops of change,” all the aspects of matter and energy. Furthermore there was *brahman*, the world-soul, or *kósmos*, the wholeness of the world, the divine breath of the Great Triad, and much more.

A matriarchal monotheism does not contradict this. In this context, I have observed that aspect and have, without taking heed of the corresponding quarrels in historical science, theology, or ethnology, assumed it as real, because of its existence in discourse. *Malkuta*, the queendom, or *alaha*, the holy unity of the Great Goddess, the goddess of earth or moon are themselves variations of concepts which come very close to those mentioned above and are at least thought of in an energetic fashion. They also describe a primal energy in which all beings, and thus also the human being, take part. The Great Mother is an interpretation and visualization, a name for the *Dasein* of the human being and its perceptions. That is why she is the triune creator, preserver, and destroyer of life. But she is neither the creator of holy unity nor can she impose conditions on us humans for partaking therein. That is why she does not give us any norms, but only signs in the form of changes in the perceptible, and constantly demands new interpretations of those signs.

If I translate this archaic understanding into a modern language, then this implies that every activity in the closed system world has permanently continuing consequences for everybody and everything. That is why peace is the harmonious vibration of the All-One. This insight is also expressed in many modern languages. This is the case, for example, in Russian, where the term *Mir* with good reason simultaneously stands for world and peace, but it is perhaps even more explicit in the Serbo-Croatian *Sve-mir*, in which the literal meaning of the All-One as peace has been completely maintained. The image of the Great Goddess constantly reminds the human being of this. As an aspect of

fertility, her signs contain the extreme possibilities of prosperity and destruction. The art lies in the balanced interpretation of those signs. The responsibility of the leader of communities, lifting herself to the status of being one who knows about those interpretations, is correspondingly large.

The Great Mother, as an aspect of fertility, is in charge of all questions regarding life, but that is not all that the holy unity has to offer. I said that the noosphere needs both the biosphere and the physiosphere, but not the other way around. All life could perish, the human being and even the Great Mother could pass away, and still the holy unity would continue to be. In this consequence, the image of the Great Mother is fundamentally different from patriarchal monotheism, a difference which will be dealt with later. Here I restrict myself to the statement that this condition places the fertility-oriented cult of the Great Mother side by side with those worldviews that use no image of a personified primal godhead, but only of a primal energy.

This does not keep all those cosmovisions from creating their own godheads and demons. These are not entities freely roaming around, but more or less friendly manifestations of the movement within the system. Because the latter change constantly, they can also take on new forms and names, occupy new places, leave old ones, or be at several places at the same time.

In this worldview, in order to attain the peaces it is necessary to let go of the web of illusions which we call reality, together with all its deceptions. Whether the gods and demons are entities or concepts deriving from fears or hopes is therefore irrelevant in an energetic worldview. Both belong to the mundane world of the humanely perceptible. Both are just energy in a certain form. The last truth on this matter remains a question of interpretation and perspective. That is why those godheads may well move through history, stories, and narrations, transform into material idols or philosophical metaphors, and appear in ever new shapes without losing their relevance for believers and nonbelievers, for those who are clueless or those who believe they know. In the closed system of the holy unity their energy is never lost. We reach peace, the inner mountain lake, not via intellectual understanding or empirical demonstration, but through letting go of all concepts which bind us to this earthly life. The not interpretable primal energy itself is the first and highest principle for every energetic worldview. Even the Great Goddesses and demiurges are subordinated to it.

(b) From this first proposition follows the question about the interpretation of human existence in such a holistically and energetically

founded world. Whole libraries have already been written about this topic, and it is impossible to explain all these aspects. I will try to reduce this question to the smallest possible dimension which is indispensable for the definition of the energetic concept of peace.

First of all, to me the supposition appears decisive that the microcosm of the human body and mind is not only an inseparable part of the universe, but also corresponds to it in all its aspects. Secondly, from the conception that this universe is cosmic breath or energy, derives the microcosm's desire to resonate in harmony with the macrocosm. Thereby, the paradox occurs that the microcosm disappears under conditions of total coincidence with the macrocosm. In some of these worldviews this event is the goal and destiny of *Dasein*. That which we call existence at the same time is only perceptible if its "frequency" is distinct from that of the universe. The difference makes the being, and thus also the human being, whose simple *Dasein* already implies deviation. Throughout her whole material existence she resonates around the basic tuning of the universe, until she again becomes reattuned and thus fades.

Human *Dasein* is thus relational in a double sense: in relation to other living beings and toward the universe. It is in the consonance or dissonance of those vibrations that harmony or disharmony arises. It is not the meaning of worldly *Dasein* to resonate in complete concord with the universe, but in harmonious relation to it. Therefrom results that which the human senses perceive as peace.

Thus, the art of being human on the one hand resides in correctly interpreting the signs of the divine breath. In order to also be able to act accordingly it is indispensable to know, care for, and put to use the "vehicle" which is available for the adventure of worldly *Dasein* – the self. Also there are many terms and explanations for this, for example the concept of a soul, of *ātman*. The Buddhists speak about *Vajra*, the diamond, the Sufis about essence, and *malkuta* says "I can." The small gemstone of the thus understood "ability" is hidden under the mud of the burdens and distractions of everyday life. All these worldviews thus elevate introspection to a virtue. For this purpose they create supports and rituals, but only if a human being succeeds in bringing this inner ability into harmony with the divine breath of the universe does she become capable of experiencing peace.

Energetic peace is thus never a state and it is not tied to objective conditions. This peace begins on the inside of the self and spreads from there as a harmonious vibration into society, nature, and the universe. The human being who does not first look for peace within herself

will not find it on the outside, because there is no objectifiable peace there. Even if it were there, it would still be imperceptible as long as the observer's "I can" is not found and activated. In Buddhism this is called enlightenment or awakening. Since it is known that only a few achieve this, it thus becomes recognizable in those concepts how difficult it is to live the energetic peaces.

At the same time these teachings do not demand perfection. Since there is no binding standard, peace has to be read as plural. There are as many "diamonds" as human beings and each one of them can be a shining knot in the net of Indra. In less poetic words the insight is also helpful, that peace begins in the self and that relations to fellow human beings, society, other creatures, nature, and the universe are shaped from there. Even if the individual being is perhaps not exactly enlightened, conflicts can be transformed on the basis of such a worldview and the prospects for nonviolent relations under these conditions are not so bad.

(c) It follows from the first two points of this section that energetic concepts of peace do not refer to ultimate truths. In most cases they do not even count on them. Wherever religious or poetic texts make the attempt to formulate a truth, like for example in the Indian *dharma*, they relativize it through the concession that truth has to remain beyond that which can be expressed through language. This follows from the insight about the perspectivity of all observation. Since the perceiving subject is always a part of the world as a whole, it can observe the world only from its own perspective and never in its totality. Just as the eye may be capable of seeing many different things on and in the world, but never the whole world. No eye can see itself and yet all eyes are part of the world.¹⁴⁵

This insight characterizes energetic images of peace in their practical application. Since the ultimate truth is supposed to be imperceptible they do not use the law, but relations as the first criterion for the configuration of societal questions. All decisions in the manifest world shall be taken with regard to their consequences for the net of perceptible relations between human beings, their *Mitwelt*, and the *kósmos*, not on the rigid basis of an ultimate binding norm. Conditions are constantly changing with every breath. Therefore decisions also have to be adapted to those changes. What is right here and today may be wrong tomorrow or elsewhere. This has nothing to do with arbitrariness. Also in an energetic worldview, ethics and norms are founded in order to enable human beings to orient themselves in the world. Yet they are conscious of the flowing relationality of this ground on which they

move. Their aesthetic of peace differs from rigid norms that are built on trusting in the binding character of an ultimate truth. And it shows at which point in such a frame conflict transformation can begin and which methods it can use.

(d) If I said earlier that the art of being human in an energetic image of world and peace resides in the balanced interpretation of the signs that the Great Goddess or “the system” emits, then this art increases to the sublation of all apparent dualities through the corresponding thinking, speaking, and acting. As a juggler of divine and mundane energies, the human being is assigned a not at all modest and for itself existential task in this worldview. She needs the harmony in the Great Triad, out of which peace follows, in order to be able to live. It is only in harmony that her own kind and the *Mitwelt* flourish, with whom she is in resonance. This resonance can also be dissonant. Then she has the task of reattunement. That is why such societies are often very permeable and accepting of foreign elements. Respect, hospitality, and interest in others derive from their striving toward harmony. This competitive weakness is at the same time cooperative strength, because the capability to absorb others’ elements enriches and fosters one’s own.

If the resonance is lacking, anomy, the lack of orientation of the single person and of society, arises. That is why it is impossible for those people to think or even live their existence as separate from heaven or the *Mitwelt*. If they are driven into such a situation, then what occurs is that which I call *amok* – total self-annihilation – because it is no longer possible to find and maintain one’s own place in the world.

The striving for the sublation of dualities is founded in the belief that everything has been one at the origin and will become one again. Male and female thus can become one in the Holy Wedding or even in the androgynous. The corresponding rituals are illustrative. Since, in the last instance, everything is perceived to be one, the separation of body and mind is also not possible in this worldview. From this it follows in turn that both can unrestrictedly be used as “vehicles” for transformation.

An ascetic attitude, hostile to the body, is unlikely in this cosmopolitanism. The people who follow it in everyday life are neither hedonists nor ascetics. That goes for all areas of their ethics. They are moderate in their consumption, in their passions and desires, in their pride and anger, but equally moderate as regards diligence, achievement, courage, order, sense of duty, or chastity. This pragmatic attitude results from the idea that everything in the material world, and thus also every virtue, only receives its reality through the existence of an opposite. That

is why pure dualisms are seen as an impossibility and thus avoided in arguments. Nobody can be only good, only strong, and only intelligent. Everything also contains its opposite. A distinct Buddhist school after Nāgārjuna¹⁴⁶ emerged from this insight, which is called the Middle Path and its philosophy avoids extreme viewpoints. The term may also be interpreted in a worldlier manner and applied beyond the limits of Buddhism.

Since the appearance of all things is subject to constant change and transformation of its energy, within the energetic understanding of world and peace there can also be no philosophizing driven by the fear of death. From access to the noosphere, the capacity for reflective recognition of one's own self follows no fear of its certain demise, death, but much rather the conviction that death is no more than a transformation of energy, a transition from manifest to transcendent *Dasein*. Final disappearance into harmonious consonance with the macrocosm would even be considered the most fortunate outcome that could happen to a human soul. Fear of death may thus be a subjective sensation, but not the impulse for philosophically founded action.

These worldviews in further consequence do not rely on the principle of security, because they know that it does not exist. Being armed for every possible event does not make any sense in their context, because they know that every thought about security already implies one about insecurity, just as every security measure produces new insecurity. This makes these societies in tendency nonviolent and willing to take risks. According to this manner of thinking, the high degree of willingness to take risks and peace are obviously related. This is also connected to the willingness to let all things happen. Just as well-being arises in the microcosm of the body, if all blockages in the respiratory system, muscles, and vessels are eliminated, so is the world equally perceived as peaceful if things take their course and there is no intervention by an institution. Whoever perceives the world energetically wants all energies to be able to flow without obstruction. If this is the case, it is experienced as peace.

(e) Since body and mind are not perceived as separate, they can unrestrictedly be used as a vehicle for the sublation of all dualities, for the exploration of the inner mountain lake. Peaces are first of all to be sought there, and emanate from there toward the outside, not the other way around. Energetic peace can thus neither be taught, nor exported, nor "produced" via objective conditions, but it can only be experienced and put into context. The sensorium for the corresponding experience is provided in the manifest world by all our senses, body, and spirit.

Part of the art of being human is also, and mainly, the corresponding use of this sensorium, which wants to be learned and practiced. The method is mostly called meditation. Resonance always has to do with vibration. If the human being, with all her faculties, wants to bring herself into harmonious resonance with the macrocosm of the universe, to experience peace, then she has to mobilize all those aspects of herself that can resonate. According to experience these are breath, voice, and movement. It is for this reason that these are the central means for energetic rituals and celebrations of peace, out of which emerged music, dance, and theater, which Friedrich Nietzsche called the "*Dionysian arts*":

In Dionysian art and in tragic symbolism the same nature cries to us with its true, undissembled voice: "Be as I am! Amid the ceaseless flux of phenomena I am the eternally creative primal mother, eternally impelling to existence, eternally finding satisfaction in this change of phenomena."¹⁴⁷

(f) Since the contemporary approaches of humanistic psychology and transrational peaces will play an important role in subsequent chapters, I close this chapter with some thoughts on the connection between energetic worldviews and evolution, development, and experience. Ken Wilber sums up this twentieth-century debate in his book *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*,¹⁴⁸ which appeared for the first time in 1995. In his respective argumentation he follows the approach of Jürgen Habermas,¹⁴⁹ who proposes interpreting humanity's evolution in analogy with the development of the individual. The corresponding stages he calls archaic, magic, mythic, and mental. The extensive elaborations of these two authors are convincing insofar as proof seems to be found in every child's room across the world. None of modernity's predominant schools of thought is in fundamental contradiction to them.

The twentieth century was characterized by a liberal belief in progress, historical materialism, fascism, and in its second half by the Idealist myth of development. As contradictory as those positions appeared to be, as much as they fought each other, little did they differ in terms of their vectoral understanding of time, their latent potential for violence, and their concept of the human species' stages of development. While this recourse to the image of a linear model of stages is not surprising for authors from Friedrich Engels¹⁵⁰ or Walt Rostow¹⁵¹ to Jürgen Habermas, because of their declared belonging to the corresponding schools of thought, Ken Wilber's¹⁵² massive excursion into this stages-theory and

his apotheosis of Hegel are somewhat surprising, as he leads his audience toward transpersonal psychology.

The problem of these vectoral stages-theories may be that they apply Darwin's theory of evolution, which relates to the biosphere, to exactly that phase of human history at which the noosphere begins to become accessible to the human being. The evolutionary threshold of *Homo sapiens* at which the organic-cultural hybrid of evolution gave way to an exclusively social one poses an argumentative problem for both Habermas and Wilber. For Habermas,¹⁵³ the natural mechanism of evolution comes to a standstill, which can only mean that the species from this point onwards no longer undergoes any significant changes with regard to its biological characteristics. Yet, for both authors the historical stages theory only sets in at this point. They assume that evolution in the noosphere would continue in the same way as in the biosphere. Since Wilber has already explained that development in the biosphere would run from the simpler to the more complex, from the lower to the higher, the application of this observation to the noosphere implies that the human mind also moves from the simpler to the more complex, from the lower to the higher. This entails a deterministic valuation, which is no problem in Habermas' worldview, although the twentieth century has clearly shown its danger. For Wilber's road to the transrational this evolutionist approach produces many contradictions. Wilber frequently and willingly confirms his claim that there is an inherent potential in the human being, enabling it in its perception as a social being to surpass the limits of rationality in an integrating and differentiating manner, with references to pre-rational wisdom and especially to the great personalities of the so-called Axial Age.¹⁵⁴ How does he thus explain the achievements of Buddha, Lao-tse, Zarathustra, Patanjali, Isaiah, Christ, Mohammed, Hildegard of Bingen, Francis of Assisi, Teresa of Ávila and all the other great mystics who, if they lived at all, without doubt did so in the past? How does he deal with the fact that many of the eminent teachings of peace have emerged at times which, from our perspective, are the dim, grey past?

[T]hey cannot be explained as an inheritance from the past; they are strange Attractors lying in our future, omega points that have not been *collectively* manifested anywhere in the past, but are nonetheless available to each and every individual as *structural potentials*, as future structures attempting to come down, not past structures struggling to come up.¹⁵⁵

From an energetic viewpoint this is comprehensible and appealing. Since no energy is lost within a system – according to Wilber – Buddha, Jesus, and all the others are preserved for humanity as attractors. Yet this does not really answer the question which he himself has raised. No matter how these great personalities may function as potentials within the all-temporal system, as far as they are historical, they too, as emanations of important teachings, had a context. In their humanness also, and especially, they were relational and not monadic or anomic. This means that none of those teachings may be understood as the brilliant single achievement of an isolated and inspired mind in the Hegelian sense, but each time as a collective creation by a societal whole that has entered the collective memory under the emblematic name of a personality. This contradicts the supposition of a quasi-biological evolution of the human mind. If thoughts that from today's perspective point toward a spiritual future could already have been thought and expressed as a collective achievement 2000 or 3000 years ago, which task would evolution then have had in the 100 or 200 generations since?

In the frame of an energetic worldview, as Wilber, in contrast to Habermas, finally proposes it, this evolutionism leads to an unnecessary hierarchy of values and worldviews. In the nineteenth century, this hierarchy already found its expression in the paradigm of civilization, and in the twentieth century it found it in development thinking. These both assumed that later generations would be more developed than earlier ones and that if the developed generations take corresponding measures, then with their help the underdeveloped¹⁵⁶ can be freed faster from their vale of misery. With all the *Chronos* it appears as if the *Kairos* that otherwise plays such an important role for Wilber, would have gotten lost here. As seen from an energetic perspective this is necessarily connected with violence. Even more, it is intellectual violence by itself.

In contrast to the above-mentioned authors I think that one should talk of a human evolution only insofar as that the species has been equipped with the potential for access to the noosphere and, as Wilber believes, perhaps even beyond. This implies, however, that the noosphere with all its potential was, in principle, already accessible for the first generation of *Homo sapiens*, which is what finally defines it. The evolutionary equipment in the biosphere created all the prerequisites. A further evolutionary step would imply changes which can barely be imagined in their consequences. It would make the human species, as

we know it today, disappear. This implies, differently put, that everything we achieve in the noosphere is not part of evolution but of experience – just because we are capable of it. Experience is passed on from generation to generation, so that astonishing cultural feats are possible through the accumulation of corresponding knowledge in single areas. In one instance this may lead to the building of pyramids, in another to the Internet or to humanistic psychology. Experience, contrary to vectoral development as it is envisioned by liberals, Idealists, and Marxists, is relational. It is up to the respective generations and contexts to decide what they deem to be worth remembering, what to pass on and what not to pass on. Later generations have the advantage of being able to draw from the stocks of knowledge that have been built up by earlier ones. However, this is not a matter of evolution, but of attentiveness of consciousness, of teaching, learning, remembering, and recording, all of which takes place within that potential that the human species, as a temporary manifestation of evolution, has at its disposal. Collective knowledge becomes ever greater, but not necessarily better.

This approach also implies silence and forgetting. No value, no knowledge, and no facts for themselves are better or more worthy of remembrance than others, but always only according to situation. Many of them are forgotten in order to avoid an individual or collective death by exhaustion through too much knowledge. In a closed system, as the energetic image of the world presupposes, they are not lost forever, but perhaps might later on have to be painstakingly searched for again and reconstructed under the application of suitable methods.

This assumption, based on the energetic concept, fits Wilber's yearning for spirituality better than evolutionism. Under these preconditions it can be accepted that Buddha's teaching is waiting, as an Omega point, for its realization in the future, but as a system-inherent potential of the whole species and not as the untimely single achievement of an enlightened individual.

I conclude that with the question about evolution and experience, it is no different than with quantum physics and Newtonian mechanics. Classical physics with its rules remains an important instrument for the management of everyday life, although quantum physics has shown us the limitations of Newton's and his successors' mechanistic assumptions. It may well be correct that the human as a species is subject to the process of evolution, which will carry it into spheres yet undreamt of. However, this movement is occurring on such a large scale

that in our worldly limitedness we cannot grasp it and have to make do with the possibilities of mind and body. Both have a potential which has certainly not been exhausted by the totality of our common experiences and memories. From this viewpoint, I can much more easily accommodate Wilber's considerations on humanistic psychology and transrational peaces than on the basis of his evolutionist proposal.

3

Moral Interpretations of Peace



The eye of God symbolizes the moral understanding of peace that finally refers to a God standing outside of the world who is identified with the human traits of a loving and punishing father and is omnipotent and omniscient. He is the True, Beautiful, Good. Whether human beings do justice to his peace is interpreted in the manifest world by an elite group of spiritual leaders.

But if freedom coincides with the necessity of the true,
then our freedom always remains brittle.
Because of the true we are never on the whole and finally
certain.

Karl Jaspers¹

The panorama that has been sketched in the previous chapter might perhaps raise the suspicion that energetic concepts of peace are a kind of anthropological invariant – the normal case since human beings think peace. At first, the evidence of morally read interpretations does not appear to contradict this, because such interpretations are not the antithesis of the energetic understanding. Rather, they form a subset derived from that understanding. If it is supposed in the Bible that in the beginning was the “word” or, as with the Central American Mayas, the “red gemstone,” then these expressions always refer to that primal energy which was already there before the creator god, however that god may be understood. Each norm that is set and meant with an appeal to him is thus founded on the human attempt to resonate in synchrony with this primal energy. The terminology and the narrations around this concept vary, but they can always be reduced to this lowest common denominator, as far as they are energetically founded images of world and peace.

In this chapter I will show that there are images which do not refer to this primal energy. For their supposition of the validity of eternal laws and ultimate truth, they refer to other forms of justification. Some of them are only known in this version; others transform, and partly emerge from, the energetic basic pattern. They differentiate its characteristics and integrate it into a new narration. The best-known examples concern the religions of the Mediterranean area, namely Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and in further consequence, their secularized derivations. Similar tendencies can be observed within worldly Hinduism, in ascetic Jainism, in some interpretations of Theravada- and Mahāyāna-Buddhism, in the high cultures of the Americas, and in Confucianism and its derivations. This led Habermas and Wilber to ascribe the energetic concepts to an archaic-magic stage of humanity's development, and the moral image of peace to the mythic stage. From this derives the mental or, as Wilber calls it, egoic-rational vision-logic of the Enlightenment.²

As a twenty-first-century peace researcher I object to this evolutionist point of view, because from my current perspective the theory of relativity, quantum physics, and the Big Bang theory demand a principally energetic image of peace. Besides social creativity, this also necessitates the constant reevaluation of all results gained from the rational natural and social sciences. From this perspective it follows that the moral-rational image of peace would be the more primitive one, which is to be "twisted," and the energetic the highly complex one which must be painstakingly (re)gained.

This implies, first of all, that the energetic understanding of peace cannot be shrugged off as characteristic of primitive stages of development, but that it much rather constitutes a fundamental human experience which can be narrated in the language of religion-founding myths just as well as in the complex formulas and sequences of the natural sciences.

This chapter will discuss the characteristics of morally founded images of peace, inquire into their histories, and explore their capacities and their limits.

Methodologically helpful in this respect is the concept of the Axial Age, which was introduced by Karl Jaspers³ in his observations on the philosophy of history concerning the period between 800 and 200 BCE. In this Axial Age, according to Jaspers, independently of each other several cultural areas achieved those extraordinary philosophical and technological advances which form the foundation for all human civilization. In this point he clearly distances himself from the Hegelian

model of stages. According to Jaspers, it was during the Axial Age that those basic forms were worked out in which we continue to think even today. Jaspers especially refers to the emergence of the great world religions and the struggle of the One God against the myriad of previously imagined demons which do not exist in these new concepts. He also calls this change within the human being spiritualization, the fight of *logos* against *mythos*, or, because this development was accompanied in Greece with the polis form of government, “the emergence of the political.”⁴

The cultural areas mentioned by Jaspers are:

- a. China, where Confucius and Laotse are supposed to have worked during that time.
- b. India, where the Upanishads first founded the Hindu natural philosophy and where, between 500 and 300 BCE, Buddha’s teaching subsequently left its mark on the area’s culture.
- c. The Orient, where Zarathustra, a Persian religious founder and prophet of the sixth and seventh century BCE, taught the struggle between good and evil in the form of a distinct cosmovision.
- d. Israel, whose biblical prophets, especially Isaiah, brought forth with their divinations an important moment of the spiritual design of this Axial Age.
- e. Greece, where the foundations of the European-Occidental world-view were formed by the Homeric epics the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* during the eighth century BCE, by the natural philosophers since the first half of the sixth century, and subsequently through Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

Jaspers considers the last three together as the coherent cultural area of the Occident, and thus speaks of three worlds.

Karlheinz Koppe⁵ imported the term Axial Age and Jaspers’ linear understanding of history into peace studies. I consider this to be a methodologically helpful proposal, even if my manner of dealing with the Axial Age and its interpretations will diverge from Jaspers’ and Koppe’s. I cannot follow Jaspers’ basic confession: “In my proposal I am carried by the hypothesis of faith that the whole of humanity would have one origin and one goal,”⁶ but I do think that it is beneficial to enter into a dialogue with Jaspers’ hypothesis.

Koppe already modifies Jaspers’ selection of the most important thinkers for the purposes of peace research. If I shift this selection from Koppe’s civilization-friendly preference toward the principle of the

many peaces,⁷ then what is missing is the consideration of the Americas, Central and Northern Asia, and the Pacific Area, where Jaspers supposes the existence of peoples without a history. In the case of Africa, Jaspers has to take recourse to sleight of hand by integrating Egypt, Kush, and Meroë together with their whole area of influence into the Occident in order to be able to exclude the rest of the continent from his considerations. Joseph Ki-Zerbo's⁸ classic work on the history of sub-Saharan Africa has later corrected this image.

Even so, the image of an Axial Age in the sense used by Jaspers serves as a helpful tool for entering into further discussion. I examine whether Confucius, Laotse, Buddha, Zarathustra, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle really can be placed in the same line, as Jaspers suggests. In order to meaningfully commence with this task, we must first answer the question of what, in one and the same geographical area, could have led these cultures away from matriarchal monotheism, the Holy Wedding and the Great Triad, toward the new teachings of the Axial Age.

3.1 The one truth of Phobos

The prevalent teaching within linguistics and ethnology assumes that between 2200 and 1500 BCE, prehistoric peoples migrated to the Iranian plateau and caused a cultural upheaval there. Those peoples might have originated in the Central Asian area and called themselves Aryans. In science they are often called the originary Indo-Europeans, yet this rather misleading term has to be understood in a linguistic, not ethnological, manner. Verifiable terms in their language have led to the assumption that they shared as a common characteristic a patriarchal, seminomadic society which knew the plow and used horses. This so-called Indo-European or Aryan invasion also constitutes a turning point in the history of Greece, as it occurred there at about the same time as in Iran and India.

In all of these cases there is substantial historiographic, linguistic, and ethnological doubt about the corresponding hypotheses. I will not explore these further here. The theory of an invasion does not in any case hold great explanatory potential for my intention of studying the areas described by Jaspers, because even if it should be true that those groups coming from the north were superior in their technology of war, may have been equestrians, and may have been organized in patriarchal fashion, this is no explanation of why they were so very different from those whom they defeated in direct confrontation. Thus, how did their patriarchy arise?

In the tradition of Marx and Engels⁹ the emergence of private property regarding the means of production could be cited as a reason for this. Yet the question is still not answered, because from this plausible hypothesis the renewed question follows: why would private property and the corresponding means of production have arisen in certain societies in the first place? In this context, Göttner-Abendroth¹⁰ introduces a study by Christian Sigrist about Gentile societies in Africa and with the help of it she approximates a general answer to this question. Sigrist¹¹ has found out that while under everyday conditions there may have existed a "natural authority" of male personalities in the societies he studied, this could not be called a rule in the stricter sense of the term, because it always had to put forward all its proposals to the community for decision making. Only under exceptional circumstances, triggered either by drastic changes within the environment or by man-made threats, would an itinerant following assemble around a charismatic leader who in this context was able to gather a "staff of enforcement" for the execution of his orders. Once he had succeeded in this he used the political hierarchy to suspend the normal economic processes of redistribution and install a model of accumulation based on private property favorable to him. In order to legitimize himself he would take care to maintain the state of exception on which his rule was established, for example via continued migration or warfare. Over time patriarchal war ethics derived from this, which sought out and thereby reproduced the corresponding environmental conditions.¹² Sigrist's functional explanation of patriarchy, which, based on Alfred Weber's earlier work had already been hinted at by Karl Jaspers,¹³ has prevailed in women's studies. It is convincing insofar as it is globally verifiable and makes dispensable an ethnopolitical ascription of certain characteristics to different "tribes," "peoples," or "ethnic groups." The largely unfounded hypothesis regarding the "Aryans" or "Indo-Europeans" only yields the image of an invasion of violent barbarians into the world of peaceful high cultures. With Sigrist a much more plausible interpretation can thus be found for why those communities functioned in such a manner. However, Sigrist does not explain why and how the men who gained power during the state of exception perpetuate their staff of enforcement once the danger is over. Here Wilber once more enters with his hypothesis of murder as substitute sacrifice for the threatening death of the I:

And it is this death impact that is extroverted, at the membership level, into the peculiarly morbid, vicious, and unmitigated form of aggression only known to humankind.¹⁴

Wilber asks where the popularity of war came from, and gives the answer that it was a simple and easily accessible immortality symbol, because no special talent was necessary for leading war. If the death of the I were the precondition for experiencing the peaces, then being afraid of death would obstruct access to the peaces. The corresponding frustration awakened the desire for substitute sacrifices. The human being's deepest wish pointed toward sacrificing his own I in order to find transcendence. If that could not be achieved, then the human being would have a tendency to murder somebody else as a substitute. In this manner he would try to overcome the fear of confronting his own death.¹⁵ Murder and war thus are not the opposite of peace, but acts of substitution for denied peaces. The experience of being deprived of peace generates rituals of fear-driven acts of substitution, which become ever greater in extent and refined in rules, and form an ethic of war that appears irresistible on the basis of its own self-defined reason.¹⁶ It thus follows that transcendence is the best remedy for the human being – for that animal endowed with the capacity for reason and spirituality.¹⁷

The synopsis of Sigrist's and Wilber's approaches appears more convincing to me than the also very popular approach of René Girard.¹⁸ He assumes that all cultures are based on a "foundational murder" following the scapegoat pattern. What follows therefrom, in the sense of his hypothesis about mimetic desire, is a fear-driven anthropological pessimism. People are evil because they imitate the originary evil in new forms which constantly proliferate and evolve. The only salvation for this depraved humanity thus rests on strong and effective institutions. I do not believe that this path of thinking and feeling is very helpful for researching the transition from energetic to moral images of peace.¹⁹

The rise of patriarchy

I thus adopt the supposition that single heroes made use of crisis-prone states of exception in order to escape their fated purpose as a sacrifice, to hold on to worldly power, and to tilt their community's energetic peaces in such a way as to allow them to establish permanent rule. The vehicles for this were political-economic-military institutions that allowed for the accumulation and defense of private property. In case of success, the heroes in this position turned into patriarchs. Yet the term is misleading, because patriarchs are not good fathers who prepare the road for the next generation according to nature, but heroes who block the path for the next generation due to their refusal to be a sacrifice. They age in office, but they do not mature. Patriarchs are heroes who become old and bent on power and deny their fate. I can thus see a lot

of merit in Jutta Voss's provocative proposal to call the wily rule of aged heroes the *good old boys*, more "pueriarchy" than patriarchy. In order not to cause any further confusion in terms, I will, however, refer readers to Voss's extensive discussion on this topic and will subsequently continue to use the commonly known term of patriarchy.²⁰

Like Sigrist, I begin the discussion with the hypothesis that due to the permanent necessity of migration, hierarchic and stable structures of patriarchy developed first in the wide plains of Central Asia and then, based on a nomadic way of life, they were finally carried into the privileged coastal areas and river cultures in India, Iran, and Greece. The ramification of this ethic of war for settled societies' concept of peace is the topic of this chapter.

Those invasions occurred, roughly speaking, from 2000 BCE onwards and at first marked a decay of the respective regions' social and cultural order. The patriarchal logic of rule and ethic of war needed centuries in order to bring forth that organizational and philosophical depth which enables Jaspers to speak so optimistically about an Axial Age. It especially needed to completely overcome the old worldview, which was soon vanquished militarily yet turned out to be very resistant in its deep culture, so that opposition against the worldly rule of the ethic of war frequently arose.

Also in the case of Israel it is about an appropriation of land by nomadic pastoral peoples. If I do not rely on the Bible in this case, but focus on a time that is historiographically fairly based on evidence, then I may assume that the infiltration and settling of different nomadic tribes in the cultural area of Palestine began about 1500 BCE. The biblical 12 tribes only slowly developed a common language and leadership. Their feeling of togetherness was mainly founded on the faith in Yahweh, "The Lord of Hosts," exercised at certain cultic spots. Step by step he displaced the old goddesses and gods.²¹ The peculiarity of this male god is already discernible by his Tetragrammaton *YHWH*, which identifies him as the almighty and sole god of creation,²² a role which up to this point no male god would have claimed for himself alone.

Each of the 12 tribes who venerated him retained a high degree of autonomy and had their own rites and narrations. Their coherence was mainly founded on the holy sites where regular sacrificial feasts took place. In the case of an external threat to one or more of the tribes, they went to war together. It is only during the time of the kings that armies of mercenaries were assembled. Max Weber²³ saw those tribes as a confederacy, conceived as an alliance for war with changing members. Yahweh was their common point of reference. He is the expression

of the Israelites' arduously won belief about their own special status among peoples. They saw it as their task to make their god known to the world as the single creator of all humanity, whereby they introduced a new form of hatred into history – hatred of pagans, heretics, and idolaters.²⁴ For Max Weber, Yahweh, originally a local weather god on the northern Sinai, was therefore a god of war.²⁵ The sacral male covenant of this theology of kings and temples has promoted a powerful interpretation of the One God, which over the centuries could justify all kinds of wars of expansion.²⁶

Jaspers' Axial Age is in all cases preceded by a longer period of belligerent appropriation of land by semi-nomadic pastoral peoples or horseback warriors of patriarchal organization. Seen from the point of view of peace research, the philosophies of the Axial Age are an improvement over those belligerent epochs. Yet, the image of the movement of monotheism as a form of civilizational progress, originating and advancing from the Axial Age, is incomplete. The destruction of energetically oriented cultures of peace through those invasions is an important prior process, which prohibits the civilizational notion of a linear understanding of history.

Monotheism, justice, and vectored chronosophy

Although Jaspers perceives Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, and Jesus as the greatest philosophers and most eminent human beings, from the perspective of peace research I still enter the discussion of the Axial Age with the prophet Isaiah. He lived in the eighth century BCE and he was the first to criticize the settled Israelite tribes' ethics of war centered on Yahweh by advocating a separation between god and military power. Trust in god and trust in the military were, for him, mutually exclusive. In order to maintain the community he suggested a trustful and calm renunciation of violence as a feasible alternative to military security. He saw this renunciation as the only chance of survival for the community, and as a basic requirement for peace with their neighbors.²⁷

Which peace does he mean?

Schalom, the Hebrew word for peace, is the expression of a comprehensive wholeness and wellbeing that encompasses the complete person, his body, soul, the community, the group, the natural *Mitwelt*, and even all the relations within which he lives.²⁸

The seed syllable SLM²⁹ describes force, life, accomplished human being, and manifest godhead.³⁰ It means reconciliation in and with

god and it implies a way of life in which all those living together have enough, first of all in the sense of the fulfillment of their basic material needs, but then also in an emotional–social–mental–spiritual sense. Justice and peace thus are close to each other. Originating from such a basic meaning this word spread into a variety of different contexts, from a form of greeting, through physical or material well-being in everyday life, to transcendent connotations.³¹ The same seed syllable refers to *shelemut*, which means wholeness. This term contains a feeling for harmony and right living and relations.³² The energetic origin, in which peace was the partaking in *alaha*, the kingdom of god, the house of god, name of god, and thus the perception of the divine itself, is unmistakable. The word is interpreted as “having enough,” which implies that peace is understood as a way of life in which satisfaction is done unto all in all aspects. This raises the crucial question about who is “all”: all human beings on earth or only the members of one’s own community? For already during biblical times, the term began to slant toward the material, which makes it necessary to interpret *shalom* as peace out of justice. Already as a form of greeting in the nomadic context of its origin it includes an offer of shelter. In this context the word implies the liberation from all kinds of worldly hardships.³³

Shalom thus does not imply the absence of war or violence, and includes conflict for the sake of justice. The opposite to *shalom* in classical Hebrew is not war but *mahloket*, which means divisiveness or a quarrel. The attempt to overcome this divisiveness is the aim of *tikkun olam*, the improvement of the world, traditionally with the intention of establishing the kingdom of god on earth, which would imply the deliverance of humans from suffering, the realization of mutual respect among different peoples, and the protection of the earth. But the Hebrew *shalom* is only thinkable in connection to the specific Israelite god of war:

If you follow my decrees and are careful to obey my commands, I will send you rain in its season, and the ground will yield its crops and the trees of the field their fruit. Your threshing will continue until grape harvest and the grape harvest will continue until planting, and you will eat all the food you want and live in safety in your land. I will grant peace in the land, and you will lie down and no one will make you afraid. I will remove savage beasts from the land, and the sword will not pass through your country. You will pursue your enemies, and they will fall by the sword before you. ³⁴

It is a peace which energetically connects society, nature, and supernature. Divisiveness is seen as the opposite of peace. Divisiveness is a domestic affair of the creator god's chosen people and its friends. War is not excluded as a means of combating enemies and improving the world. *Shalom* designates that point of reference starting from which the mending of the world shall take place, when the divisiveness of the world is coming to an end in messianic times.³⁵ Against this background, Isaiah sums up the meaning of *shalom* as follows:

The fruit of righteousness will be peace; the effect of righteousness will be quietness and confidence forever.³⁶

What is righteousness if it is quasi-perceived as the seed of peace? The noun *sādāk* (SDK) names the cosmic order, which is concretized in wisdom and right and is to be guaranteed in the worldly frame by the king. *Sedak* (SKDH) correspondingly means the orderly, or the order-creating action within this horizon.³⁷

The crisis of the Babylonian exile sparked an interpretation of Isaiah's prophetic message in which its realization and the reconstitution of such a peace are postponed until the future, when the Messiah will create justice and peace in and with the world.³⁸ This structure of thinking can easily be recognized as the anticipation of Idealism, which, not accidentally, adopted Isaiah's quote about the transformation of swords to plowshares and spears to pruning hooks.³⁹ Isaiah thereby transforms the god of war, Yahweh, into a bringer of peace between the peoples, who has nothing more to do with war. It is thus a veritable transformation of Yahweh's belligerent energy that is taking place, which quite merits the term Axial Age.

This has its price: instead of a cosmic energy with its visible allegories, now the personified creator god Yahweh as sole and highest principle enters the believers' conceptual horizon. This narrows the respective understanding of peace considerably. The peace of this god manifests in worldly justice, also and just because it remains promised. It introduces a linear understanding of time into the hitherto energetic concept of peace, thereby secularizing it. Peace is thus no longer perceived here and now, but it is projected forward from a pitiful now into a better future, which first of all has to be imagined.

If this vectoral understanding of societal time is connected to the material aspect of justice, then it is not far from an ideology that has revenge for injustice suffered in the past, hate toward others – the heretics – in the present, and greed for more of such justice in the future

written on its banners. To link revenge with the past, hate with the present, and greed with the future results in a highly problematic ethic of peace. It is thus much rather a fear-driven and exclusionary legitimization of violence and war.⁴⁰

Yahweh does not overcome his character as a god of war, because he remains jealous and vindictive if anybody venerates other gods besides him, which does not make the subjective search for the inner mountain lake any easier. The Lord of Hosts demands absolute loyalty on the road toward the future, assent to one's own suffering in the now, and in return promises salvation. Crucial for this concept of justice is not the perpetrator's outer punishment for his offense, but that disregard for divine law falls back onto the perpetrator himself. The Old Testament thus forms a kind of destiny-creating sphere of deeds for the human being. This sphere is not dissimilar to the Indian *karma* and, according to the human being's actions, surrounds him in a wholesome or unwholesome manner. Yet it differs from *karma*, in that here it is the personified One God who judges His people by completely abandoning them to the consequences of their own absolutely good or bad deeds. This creates a permanent fear of damnation and only a vague hope for salvation, tied to uncountable conditions.⁴¹ The believer pays for the latter by relinquishing his power of self-determination. Regarding the time of the Babylonian captivity I could say that this price was traded in a currency, freedom, which was not available in any case. Yet such a connection misses the problem. More decisively, where there is a fear-driven surrender to the narrow standard of a divine hierarchy, consent to a worldly hierarchy soon follows, and from this the people ultimately come to expect, and are given the illusion of, justice.

The legitimization of authority through the exclusive interpretation of the will of the One God standing apart from the world, and thus the proscription of other alternatives, is the blueprint for a model of rule which, over the generations, arises again and again in Mediterranean history. In this manner the experts of belief inserted themselves between the divine and the world. The peaceless and dualistic character of monotheism is thus already inherent as a basic matrix to its original history.⁴²

On a more solid historiographical basis, Koppe⁴³ points toward the influence the Babylonian Codex Hammurabi⁴⁴ had on Israel. Here we read the early insights of a successful warlord and conqueror, which tell us that law and justice are good for the stability of a state. The famous talion principle is documented here, and later it can also be found in

the Bible. I am inclined to doubt whether Hammurabi's "civilizational insight" really is an achievement of peace that, as Koppe supposes, stands in contradiction to his cruel and extensive belligerent campaigns. I much rather see it as a consequent, and thus timely effect, of the Axial Age's way of thinking. It is only the adoption of this manner of thought that enables the formation of those institutions that will determine the new time and the coagulation of the belligerent ethics into the corresponding philosophies.

The duality of good and bad

The same goes for the teachings of Zarathustra, who might have lived no later than the sixth century BCE. His religion can be traced back to the Aryan veneration of the god of heaven Ahura Mazdā. It is monotheistic, but Ahura Mazdā created the world according to a dualistic principle. Every manifestation includes a good and an evil aspect. The evil demon Ahriman is thus considered to be the antagonist to the god of heaven. Symbolically speaking, Ahura Mazdā and Ahriman are twins through whose interrelation the world exists. For good to exist there has to be evil, and the other way around. In the midst of this interaction, every human being has the opportunity to decide for good, support the struggle of Ahura Mazdā against evil, and thereby contribute to the realization of the plan of God. Ahura Mazdā never forces the human being into anything. Humans are endowed with minds and can reach God through free decisions and personal insight if they follow the principles of good thoughts, good words, and good actions.

The pious one, who travels the paths of wisdom, will achieve prosperity, progeny, power, health, and longevity. The idolaters, however, who have decided on evil, will be condemned at the Last Judgment and brought to an evil place, hell. The antagonism between truth, justice, good, and order on the one hand and lies, injustice, evil, and chaos on the other are here of crucial importance.⁴⁵

Dualism also exists in the Holy Wedding and in the energetic images of peace. However, in the moral context of a warrior culture it has a different meaning. In contrast with yin-yang or the image of Shiva-Shakti, here the dualism of male and female does not unite to create cosmic harmony; instead this duality is thought of as an insurmountable antagonism between good and evil. The human being, under the threat of cruel punishment, is supposed to decide for the one and against the other. The assessment of good and evil does not reside relationally between human beings, but with the creator god. He is above any willpower and in possession of the absolute truth.

This warrior ethic created its own religion that is accessible via the Avesta, the religious book of the Zoroastrians. It also influenced the Old Testament. In Ahriman one can easily discern the blueprint for the devil. The dualism between heaven and hell, which was previously nonexistent in Judaism, was introduced. In the Aramaic there was no evil which could have been separated from the unity of *alaha*.⁴⁶

The Daeva are female demons which, according to Zarathustra, enter into carnal relations with evil people or try to seduce the good ones and thus bring drought, malformation, pestilence, and other plagues upon the world. With this image of the Daeva the overpowered dualism of the Holy Wedding fades in the cult of Mitra,⁴⁷ through which the new religion rises powerfully and violently. Whoever still engages with the old ethics will go to hell. The human being's freedom to decide is coupled to the naked fear of absolute evil. In the long run this proved to be an excellent tool of domination, because in this manner the relational and unconditional claim of truth within the energetic concept of peace turned into the absolute one of morality.⁴⁸

Jaspers understands, in allusion to Nietzsche, an unconditional claim to truth as open in regards to content and geared toward transcendence, in which the peaces can subjectively be perceived by whoever is "completely himself" or "completely herself" and thus enters in harmonious resonance with the divine. The absolute concept of truth, however, claims objective veracity. It is determined in its content and it is subject to the dominant interpretation of an elitist bureaucracy of knowledge which dogmatically refers to an ultimate point of reference outside of this world and from there immunizes itself against critique. This image does not allow for degrees and differentiations. It recurs to simple friend-foe images that legitimize the exclusion of evil others, and that promise to compensate the suffering of the believers with the prospect of a future salvation to come. Since this ultimate definition is directed against the flow of life it can take on pathological traits such as the fantasy of the total destruction of all otherness. In history this has expressed itself often enough through the explosive abreaction of pent-up fears.⁴⁹

In this extreme form it is not possible to live out this absolute concept of truth in any historical context. As a single guiding principle it cannot be imputed to any religion, culture, or even ethno-political group. Yet it also cannot be denied that it has gained entrance to the Bible and from there it has founded a deep cultural basic pattern for all monotheistic religions in the Mediterranean area. It frequently mixes with their relational aspects and fosters their tendency toward hermetic explanatory

images and guidelines for action, especially in cases in which the moral teaching gains the upper hand over the respective religions' energetic aspects. In their belief that they can express truth in words, monotheistic religions of the book very often confuse the word with the truth itself, and thereby overlook the fact that a word is never more than a hint toward the truth.

Jesus of Nazareth and his followers did not hold any political power. They also did not seek it. It is for exactly this reason that their energetic concept of peace, oriented not on high politics but on the inner mountain lake, meant such a revolutionary break with the dominant institutions of the time. The reinterpretation of Jesus' message into a moral teaching guarded by experts, decades after he had been tortured to death, is amongst the most momentous chapters in the history of peace and peacelessness.⁵⁰

In the case of Judaism, this was brought together in the Talmud, that post-biblical main work in which a kind of secondary breakthrough of the Axial Age manifests itself. It arose out of a centuries-long written and oral tradition and was completed at the end of late antiquity, in about 500 BCE. It is significant that during the course of this development the original aspect of peace out of justice was embedded into a dual context. This implies a considerable change in meaning. The earlier relational having-enough turns into a binary either-or of justice and injustice and that considerably changes the meaning and practice of peace.

This provokes the following questions: Does the ultimate concept of truth, as it is imagined in the moral understanding of peace, reside relationally within the societal whole and its tenets of belief, or objectively outside of it? Are the norms derived unconditional or absolute? Who is called upon for their interpretation and application? Is the One perceived as the harmonious resonance of the Many in the Whole, or as the exaltation of the self under annihilation of every other?

I approximate an answer through contrasting the tradition of Zarathustra with that of the historic Buddha. Zarathustra's principles of good thoughts, good words, and good actions can be found almost correspondingly in the Buddhist "eightfold path." This path describes *magga*, the fourth of the "four noble truths" which form the foundation of Buddhism.

Buddha's teaching emerges in the Indian kingdoms and aristocratic republics after the Aryan invasion. With increasing sedentariness the priests, Brahmins, took over the position of spiritual authority. On the basis of the pre-Aryan teachings of Shivaism, Shaktism, and on the

holy texts of the Vedas they founded a complex sacrificial cult that was directed toward worldly riches, progeny, and joy and was jealously overseen and interpreted by them.

Vis-à-vis Buddhism stood the ascetic community of the Jains, appearing in the eighth century BCE. They followed the teaching of the legendary Parshvanatha. Their name is derived from the term *Jina*. This means conqueror. They understand themselves as those who know how to conquer, in the sense of overcoming, passion, and desire.⁵¹ In the sixth century, at about the same time as the lifetime of the historic Buddha, Mahavira is supposed to have formalized their religious teaching, which, among others, is characterized by the principle of nonviolence, *ahimsa*.⁵² The teaching of the Jains is not atheistic. Yet it supposes that the human being cannot know with certainty whether there is a principle of creation or not. That is why dealing with this problem is deemed superfluous. Ritual and dogmatic questions consequently have a secondary position behind their path-breaking teaching on morals, which is about the nonharming of living beings, vegetarianism, and poverty. The influence of the Jains reached from India as far as Greece. Their teaching emanated to Southeast Asia via Hinduism, which took over the ideas of the reincarnation of the soul and of vegetarianism that did not exist in this form in the Vedas or Shaktism.⁵³ Parshvanatha and Mahavira are thus further important actors of the Axial Age.

Buddha was looking for a path between the hierarchic rigidity of normative Brahmanism and the equally rigid asceticism of the Jains, oriented on spiritual development. For this he could refer to the Upanishads. They were fed by the energetic contents of the religious belief of the Dravidian population subjugated by the invasion and aimed at overcoming the separation between *brahman* and *ātman*. As a suitable road to this goal, Buddha discovers works on awareness and meditation. Yet he rejects the concept of *brahman* and *ātman*. At bottom he, just like Mahavira, discards the possibility that the human being, previous to finding actual awakening, would be able to speak about an absolute principle or even to have an approximate experience of the true self.⁵⁴ Buddha's teaching is committed to an energetic understanding that does not need a personified godhead. From there he derives a road to the final goal, *nirvāṇa*, the indistinct merging of the subjective, worldly energy into the cosmic. The path thereto is a process which begins with self-recognition. The seeker has to recognize the causes of the permanent emergence and perishing of living beings and the role which *karma*, as the consequence of one's own actions, plays in this. According to Buddha, this is spoiled by the three poisons

of the mind: greed, hate, and ignorance.⁵⁵ The term *karma*, however, is not moral in the sense of a reward or punishment for better or worse deeds. What is meant is a causal chain of events, just as a painful blister is not a punishment for touching a hot iron, but an effect thereof.⁵⁶

Through cleansing himself of these poisons of the mind, Buddha is supposed to have been able to formulate the four noble truths on which his teaching rests: the truth about suffering, the truth about the origin of suffering, the truth about the cessation of suffering, and the truth about the road which leads to the cessation of suffering. The fourth truth is simultaneously the road to bliss, the eightfold path.⁵⁷ Buddha divides the process of clearing the consciousness for the awakening of the mind into those eight synchronous steps which are summarized under three aspects: the practice of ethics and virtue; meditation and concentration of the mind; wisdom.

The eight steps of this path build upon one another, and complement and support each other. The eighth step refers back to the first. That is why this teaching is often symbolized by a wheel with eight spokes. The eight steps are right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration.⁵⁸

The term *samyak*, deriving from Sanskrit, which I render as "right" is also translated by "holistic." This probably protects it from reflexes of moral interpretation more effectively than the somewhat biblical sounding, but more often used, "right." Right view implies openness toward the new or abstention from preconceived views. Right intention means that this openness should be guided by the goal of letting go of worldly desire, and of avoiding anything that could arouse greed, hate, or ignorance. Right speech points out that a manner of speaking does not just powerfully affect the outside, but also the speaking person himself. Speaking is thus first only the linguistic expression of his own intentions and resolutions, yet by speaking, the speaker also commits himself to corresponding action. This right action should abstain from killing, stealing, violence, and bodily misconduct. It follows that right livelihood is perceived as a way of earning one's living without envy or greed. All this is completed by the three figures which are less oriented on the practical than on the spiritual: right effort is the attitude which makes it possible to walk the eightfold path. It delineates everything that saves one from greed, hate, and ignorance. Right mindfulness also means the critical self-perception of body, mind, feelings, and circumstances. Right concentration is meditation. In Mahāyāna's version, however, it is also interpreted as the readiness to also turn the

liberation of other beings into one's own heartfelt concern. It is thus the summary of this teaching in its relevance for peace studies.⁵⁹

The teaching of the eightfold path is no listing of norms, commandments, or prohibitions, which could be fulfilled or transgressed, but an enumeration of *karmically* healing behavior. Whether it is followed is only up to the practitioner. It cannot be equated with the Ten Commandments of Christianity, the *fard* in Islam, or other deontological teachings.

Details at this point would confuse rather than enlighten. In the basic frame of Buddhist thinking, a road sign toward the inner mountain lake can be found. Its teaching about suffering, which arises out of desire, is an analysis of human nature rather than a guide for action. The poisons of the mind are an unavoidable part of human existence. They seduce the self into desiring things, people, and situations. Since these are all fleeting, imperfect, and unreal, suffering emerges from disappointment. Suffering is the fear of losing pleasure or the fear of not gaining it. This fear blocks the view of the inner mountain lake.

Although a highly differentiated ethic derives from these considerations, it is an ethic that remains open because there is no final authority to evaluate what "right" means in the eightfold path. The practitioners find out according to the effects of their efforts, and whether they arrive at the inner mountain lake. Buddhism here only offers help, no directives or judgment. According to Buddhist teaching, every human being unafraid of the effort can, in principle, reach that awakening which Buddha achieved.⁶⁰ Whoever does not make it into *nirvāna*, after death has to reenter the cycle of reincarnations, which is not to be understood as the rebirth of the same persona, but as that energy which at death does not resonate in synchrony with the universe and thereby causes the embodiment of this energy in another being.⁶¹ Out of this chain of dependent becoming, the energy of the deceased being manifests anew in one of the six areas of suffering existence.⁶²

Buddhism offers the ideal image of an energetic understanding of peace, while tightly interweaving relationality and rationality. From this derives a convincing, yet not coercive, ethic which separates the unconditional from the absolute.

It is possible that other teachings of the Axial Age had the same intentions, and it was only their being embedded into their societies' patriarchal ethics of war and the directives of hierarchic castes of priests that gave them a different, socially powerful, direction. The Avesta, Talmud, and Bible can also be read in the light of their relational aspects. If, for example, one understands good and evil in Zarathustra not as

normative concepts, but as inner aspects of the person struggling on his path to inner peace, then one somewhat approaches a Buddhist understanding. It is only the historical effect which, from the perspective of peace studies, suggests highlighting the possible tendencies toward the absolute in all these cases.

Also, Buddhism did not remain free from such interpretations. Every approach to the development of consciousness can petrify into rigid forms. Early Buddhism, probably not altogether uninfluenced by its Brahmin environment, had a tendency toward dogmatically sticking to rules, and its adherents spent a lot of time classifying and meticulously differentiating negative or positive states of mind.⁶³ This led to monkish quarrels about the interpretation of the teaching among the emerging groups of experts and to a fragmentation into several schools of thought.

The proponents of the old school, Theravada, still today reject any new interpretations. They adhere to the original approach of seeking awakening as “single-actualizer,” *arhat*. They perceive themselves as able to gain the highest insight from their own strength, or, better expressed, to become one with *nirvāṇa*. Characteristic of this conservative interpretation is that it identifies the road to the inner mountain lake as the sole purpose of being, but thereby tends toward a dogmatic world abandonment which neglects the relational character of Buddha’s teaching. Relational is here only the dissolution of the self in the wholeness of *nirvāṇa*. The road thereto is individual. It is often said of the followers of the old school, Theravada, which translates as “small vehicle” or Hīnayāna, that they lacked the compassion to share their insights with other beings and thus make the road away from suffering accessible to them.

This compassion is propagated by the adherents of Mahāyāna, which means “the great vehicle.” The central point of their teaching is the *bodhisattva* who, like the *arhat*, has reached the capacity of becoming one with *nirvāṇa*. Yet he delays his final merging for the good of all beings until even the last one of them has reached liberation. Through the always new embodiment of the *bodhisattva*, he is able to liberate other people from the cycle of rebirths.⁶⁴

Depending on perspective one can either see Mahāyāna as a movement of reform, which is directed against the petrification of monastic Buddhism, or as a teaching that placed new emphases, or as a further development, or even as an adulteration of the “original” Buddhism.⁶⁵

Buddhism emerged as the attempt to find a path between Brahmin tradition and asceticism. It often proved capable of rebalancing the extremes of its own teaching. Vajrayāna or Buddhist Tantra also developed in this manner. The latter manifests a renewed impulse toward an energetic approach, which Buddhism received from its encounter with the Tibetan Bön-religion.

Vajrayāna perceives the final goal of complete liberation to be hidden in the dirt and dust of everyday life. This is not only in contradiction to the older teachings, but especially to the cultural environment, in which all kinds of narcissistic rituals of purification occupy a central place and even define societal stratification. Buddhist Tantra turns this logic upside down. It develops a radical alternative which expresses itself not by relying on the texts of the Sutras, which present Buddha's classical teaching in linear constructive fashion like a thread, but on the Tantras, which are described as deriving from Buddha, yet which are composed of a secret and highly complex fabric of teachings. Buddhist Tantra is pragmatic. It is not interested in spirited speculations. Tantra aims at making the Buddhist truth directly tangible, accessible, and able to be experienced. It comprehends the universe as a game of energies and thus sees no reason to reject any kind of experience. Any form of energy, including the seemingly negative, is grist for its mills. Whoever perceives things as fixed and unchangeable has to reject certain experiences. Whoever perceives the world as energy, will experience energy, which is temporarily enclosed in forms experienced as confining or negative. This energy is at the same time a source of power, a potential that can be freed and used. This is a crucial sentence for the respective understanding of conflict transformation. The negative energy of the conflict can be used, transformed, and perceived in a positive manner. Vajrayāna therefore deals with negative feelings differently than Theravada and the main current of Mahāyāna. The latter try to keep feelings of desire and animosity at bay through exercises of attentiveness. Vajrayāna, in contrast, allows those feelings as an expression of the highest reality just like all others. They are regarded as powerful energy, resources for personal transformation.⁶⁶

In India, the energetic image of world and peace resisted the normative intentions of the warrior ethic relatively successfully through the centuries until the Islamic invasions. At bottom no strict dualism between the two can be observed, but rather there is an autocorrective mutual interrelation. All Indian philosophies and religions are founded on an energetic point of view and none of them is immune from normative institutionalizations, as is drastically expressed in some aspects

like the Brahmin caste system. But one can hardly speak of a rivalry between closed systems. Brahmanism, Jainism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and the variations of Tantrism much rather integrate and differentiate both dynamics within themselves. The permeability between the teachings of the one and the other is remarkable. Indian philosophies only rarely found or advocate their own schools of thought. Most often they restrict themselves to reinterpreting the traditional teaching in the language of their respective time. In this undertaking there is no substantial disagreement about ultimate matters. Notwithstanding all the necessary limitations, this conveys the image of remarkably resilient peace cultures.

Institutionalization: state and norm

The history of Buddhism as teaching peace shows that its basic attitude was repeatedly threatened by its institutionalization and reinterpretation into a religion. This implies that if it is turned into an eternally valid faith controlled by a priesthood, then the center of interest shifts to the institutionalized religion's capability to provide the state with moral legitimacy and to satisfy the piety of the powerless at the same time.⁶⁷

When Buddhism – long after Jaspers' Axial Age – came to China, it encountered the energetic tradition of Taoism which is not all that dissimilar to it. Despite some rivalries it remained, as far as it penetrated those spheres, more of an enrichment and addition than a contradiction. As the most important teacher of this tradition, Laotse, if he did exist, was not just the Chinese counterpart to Buddha, but also a like-minded person in the sense of the energetic concept of peace. If Koppe⁶⁸ calls him a rational pacifist, then the same could also be said of Buddha.

This similarly holds true for Mo Di, the founder of the school of Mohism who also lived around this time. Mohism, in differentiation to the older Tao, is an immediate, pacifist reaction of the lower classes against the aristocratic Confucians. Their point of departure is a radical anthropological pessimism. The Mohists, just like the Confucians, also recognize the necessity to establish an authoritarian state, but from this they derive the demand for a rigorous control of the powerful and their tendency toward luxury. They see luxury as humanity's greatest evil and understand war as its most extreme form. This is not far from Buddha's views on desire as a cause of suffering. According to Mo Di, luxury is only possible through material exploitation and prevents happiness for the greater part of humanity. War, as the most pernicious

form of luxury, keeps the peasants from tending their fields. The state falls into disarray. The final result would only be more state and more power for the mighty. Wars are thus elaborate children's games which cause suffering. Mo Di does not just condemn war from a pragmatic point of view, but also from a moral one. He would be blind who did not see the injustice in war. Although Mohism remained in explicitly pacifistic opposition to Confucianism, it still did not twist the latter's ideological paradigms, but much rather perceived itself as a purifying movement of reform, which therefore was not of independent historic durability.⁶⁹

Since the Axial Age, Taoism has been the energetic counterpart to Confucianism's moral ideology of state. The latter claims to regulate the life of the whole population by emphasizing piety and loyalty toward those of higher standing and by devising a strictly regulated ethical codex. It is this-worldly, and disapproves of teachings which give up worldly ties in favor of a spiritual goal.⁷⁰

The Art of War by General Sunzi⁷¹ emerged out of the charged relation between Tao and Confucianism in the fifth century BCE. In this oldest known book about military strategy, the author places great emphasis on the notion that war and fights should be avoided whenever possible, because they ruin the state and people. In Sunzi's opinion it is best to thwart the enemy's strategy. As a second-best approach he recommends breaking up the enemy's alliances. Fighting and victory only follow in third place. In this, the book is Taoist. It also hails from about the same period as the Tao Te Ching. Sunzi begins with the admonition that war is a great risk, a point of origin for life and death, and a road to survival or perdition. He thereby remains within the frame of the Taoist tradition of being cautious about any kind of belligerent conflict, but furthermore follows the political and strategic aims of Confucianism. This book, because of its long-term effects and influence on politicians, dictators of all times and countries, and recently also on managers has to be taken into consideration for any evaluation of the Axial Age equal to the philosophical works.

Confucianism does not look to nature for the measure and laws of right living as Tao does, but to the study of the old scripts, institutions, and to tradition. What can and should be learned from their study is right conduct in human relations. From the relationship between children and parents, through the one between subject and official bureaucrat, to the relationship between minister and emperor, they are all strictly regulated. The rules shall guarantee a peaceful coexistence within and between societies. These rules of Confucius are to be anchored in the

people via instruction by the bureaucrats, through their constant example, and the continued study of the scripts. In that respect this worldview is similar to the Idealism of the enlightened European tradition.⁷²

In China, this socially powerful tradition of thought split during the fourth century BCE into the “Idealist” teaching of Mencius and the “Realist” of Xun Kuang.⁷³ Mencius deemed the human being to be by nature good; Xun Kuang, in his famous book *Xunzi*, described it as bad. Both nevertheless derive from this a call for totalitarian education, with the help of which the human being could be cultivated and his violent tendencies could be curbed. The call for institutionalization and an authoritarian directing society repeatedly follows from Confucianism and its derivations.

At the end of the period which Jaspers calls the Axial Age, China was finally ruled by the Qin Dynasty. The legalistic state philosophy bearing its name stands for the seamless regulation of public and private life via criminal law. Starting from a pessimistic image of humankind and the perspective of a consolidated politics of domination, Qin-Legalism does not refer to morals, virtue, or reason as providers of peace, but to rigid legal positivism. An ideal state would be achieved if the population was provided for and every attack from the outside fended off. Both can be achieved on the basis of authoritarian measures and technical progress.⁷⁴ Legalism in this extreme form perished as state ideology together with the Qin Dynasty, but forms a sustained segment of the deep cultural understanding of peace in China.

One truth

I return to the Mediterranean Europe of the Axial Age in order to conclude this tour through Jaspers' hypothesis. According to his opinion, a kind of freedom developed in ancient Greece that was not to be found anywhere else in the world at that time. Thereby the antique *polis*, in his opinion laid

[...] the basis for all occidental consciousness of freedom, in the reality of freedom as well as in the thinking about freedom. China and India do not know freedom in this political sense.⁷⁵

I agree with Jaspers in so far that Europe, since Plato, fundamentally differs from the rest of the world. The Greeks founded the Occident as a mental and political category. Yet, as a peace researcher of the twenty-first century I cannot follow Jaspers' civilizational euphoria and Eurocentric evaluations of this fact. That is why my common road with

Jaspers ends here, in recognition of his vision yet without agreement on the further evaluation of history.

Europe's radical turning away from its Phoenician origin and neighborhood is expressed in an anticipatory manner in the mythological abduction of the virgin Europe through the Indo-European father god Zeus appearing as a bull, which was first written down by the poet Moschos during the second century BCE. The virgin Europe dreams that two continents, in the guise of women, were fighting over her possession. One was Asia, evoking her right of motherhood, and the other a stranger, who with strong arms pulled away the girl Europe from her mother, and declared that it would be Europe's destiny to follow the World-Shaker Zeus as bride to a new part of the earth and bear him children. According to legend, a son of this union, Minos, became the namesake for that ancient Cretan culture which Herodotus⁷⁶ in the fifth century BCE distinguished as the region's first thalassocracy⁷⁷ from the politico-military systems of the surrounding land-based powers.⁷⁸

Europe's contrast to everything known so far can be explained, among other reasons, via its concept of peace. The Greek word for peace, Eirene, is the name of a goddess which the Indo-European immigrants brought to Greece together with their warrior ethos. This society defined itself through war and the virtues of the warrior. Peace, Eirene, in its value system is the state of nonwar, the silence between the war melody's sounds. In this binary worldview peace is only thinkable as nonwar and it is useful only as a phase of rest and rearmament for further glorious deeds of war. It has no value in itself.⁷⁹

In mythology, Eirene is a daughter of Zeus, of power, of the World-Shaker, of the evident manifestation of belligerent patriarchy, and of Themis, law. Peace is thus an offspring of military strength and political norm. Her sisters are Eunomia, order, and Dike, justice. Together they symbolize the basic notion of the state in Athens, Argos, and Olympia. The Greek democracy that comes from this perspective and the corresponding notion of freedom that so much enthused Jaspers, begin as political forms of organization for war. While the road to this democracy is a road up to the "heights," it at first nevertheless leads us through delusion and crime.⁸⁰

With the formation of the institutions of the *polis* this binary understanding of a little appreciated notion of peace attains the legal-institutional character of a contract. The war culture of Greek philosophy took effect also in Rome, where it determined the new understanding of Pax/*pax*⁸¹ that would remain effective for millennia. Via its translations it mutilated Jesus of Nazareth's originally energetic message beyond

recognition⁸² and lent wings to the combative aspect of Islamic philosophy and theology, building upon Aristotelian logic as its methodological base.⁸³ According to Koppe this is rather the birth of a sustained culture of war than the cradle of that unique freedom which Jaspers perceived.⁸⁴ This is indicated by the differentiated terms for war which emerge in this culture. For the virtuous action of the Greek warrior it makes a difference, whether he tests his mettle against an opponent of his own kind, Greeks, or against strangers, who are indiscriminately called barbarians.

And therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes, they will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature enemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war (*polemos*); but when Hellenes fight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder and discord, they being by nature friends and such enmity is to be called discord (*stasis*).⁸⁵

Plato, the most important thinker of the Axial Age, develops from this differentiation a first approach to what later on should be called *ius in bello*. This is valid only for *stasis*. There follows from this neither a restriction of violence in *polemos* against the barbarians, nor does he fundamentally doubt the *ius ad bellum*, the right to wage war. For him war is a necessary consequence of the cultural development toward a functioning state, which is why there also cannot be any kind of peace with the barbarians. Human beings to him are faced with the decision of choosing either culture or peace. In this binary logic it is not the goal of the state to lead wars but to provide for the well-being of the community. Yet this would also include protection from possible attacks by other states. Such attacks can never be ruled out, which is why, contrary to earlier interpretations of Eirene, victory in war for Plato has no higher value, yet it is still perceived as a necessary evil for fulfilling the task of securing welfare.

This stance presupposes a fundamental decision about the nature of the human being and society. If the value of a person can be measured according to the amount of goods which he accumulates during his lifetime, then it is the purpose of the community, society, and state to provide the framework for the corresponding ventures. In this perspective, states that achieve this are legitimate and of culturally high standing. Under this assumption war is a necessary evil. Yet this image of humankind neglects anybody who voluntarily or involuntarily does

not participate in the undertaking of accumulating goods and securing welfare. What is a person who only is what he has, if he loses what he has? Nothing but a vanquished, broken, pitiful being, testimony to a wrong way of life?

Whoever can lose what he has, is concerned that he will lose what he has. People and especially societies who think like that are afraid of thieves, economic change, disease, death; and they are afraid to love, afraid of freedom, of change, and of the unknown. They live in constant anxiety, chronic hypochondria. They become defensive, hard, mistrustful, lonely, and driven by the need to have more. The fear and insecurity which arise through the danger that a person may lose what he has, is part of the understanding of peace of such warrior ethics. Whoever is what he is, and not what he has, cannot be robbed or threatened. While *having* is diminished by use, *being* grows with practice.⁸⁶ This consideration does not find space in Plato's understanding of peace. I can acknowledge his achievement of releasing peace from the position of a mere interruption of war and of turning it into a positive, independent value, yet I believe that sustained peace-cultural impulses could not derive from his thinking because it was war-culturally minted at its core.⁸⁷

Aristotle's political philosophy, in contrast to his metaphysics, in the beginning played a smaller role in Greece than Plato's. It achieved its effects in the Occident only through its late reception by Thomas Aquinas. On first sight it appears as if Aristotle had been closer to the idea of a positive peace than Plato had been. Aristotle wants to show through anthropological and moral-philosophical considerations that the human being can only find happiness via political peace. Peace to him is more than the absence of war. He tries to fill the concept of a life in peace with content:

And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. Now the activity of the practical virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs, but the actions concerned with these seem to be unpleasurable. Warlike actions are completely so (for no one chooses to be at war, or provokes war, for the sake of being at war; any one would seem to be absolutely murderous if he were to make enemies of his friends in order to bring about battle and slaughter) [...].⁸⁸

Yet all these considerations are only valid for the elites for whom he philosophizes. However, he accepts the exclusion of the barbarians,

slaves, and disenfranchised masses, their oppression, and the warfare against them.⁸⁹

[...] for truly, as the proverb says, "There is no leisure for slaves," and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader.⁹⁰

Also his concept of the state, including foreign politics, therefore remains determined by political and military aspects and considerations that Cicero, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas were later to formulate into the thesis of the just war.⁹¹ In the Greek Axial Age, and not least in Aristotle, a structure of thinking thus reveals itself that will enduringly determine the occidental understanding of peace in its Christian connotation: the exclusion and persecution of the other who, in dualistic fashion, has to be evil, since the self is good.

The Greek understanding of peace during the Axial Age remained an only slightly modified warrior ethic, and was embedded into another of their achievements which, more than any other aspect, justifies speaking about Europe's separate path. I refer to the invention of the Truth, the philosophical view onto the exclusive totality of things. According to European thought, rational conduct in the world commences with the question of last reasons, causes, and principles. This implies that from now on philosophical Truth no longer has the structure of a description, as in the mythical narration, but that of a negation. It claims the ability, even the necessity, to exclude all that which it cannot affirm. This capability for exclusion will be called foundation or ground, and those philosophical discourses will be founded or grounded which do not restrict themselves to affirming or to describing something, but are able to show the necessity of this affirmation and the impossibility of its opposite.

The Truth constructed in this manner separates Greek philosophy from Oriental worldviews, where the aim is not the creation of irrefutable knowledge, but the liberation of the human being from the illusion of the world. As many linguistic and conceptual correspondences as there may be between the two forms of knowledge, the distance still remains unbridgeable, just like the separation between the problem of peace out of harmony, in which Oriental philosophies dwell, and the problem of peace out of Truth.⁹²

With the invention of the Truth, Europe really becomes a different world, as it had been heralded in the myth. The Greek word for soul, *ánemos*, also stands for wind, and *psyché* means breeze, breath.

The original relation to the concepts of the neighborhood, which I have mentioned in the chapter on the energetic peaces, is unmistakable. *Ánemos* and *ātman* are kindred concepts and the notions of peace derived therefrom are as well. Yet, by building reason, logic, and Truth around the soul, the European Axial Age designs a new concept of peace that no longer asks about relationality, that equates relativity with lack of founding, and that succeeds in taking away the final ground for the truth of peace from the affected people's power of definition. In this manner it is less the glorious road to a democratic freedom that becomes accessible, but instead the possibility of positing self-founding truths. These are managed by experts such as priests, jurists, and politicians. They become indubitable and untouchable because they are no longer relational. The step toward the institutionalization of this truth in the *polis*, state, empire, and in churches turns into the imposition to enforce it upon those organizations' substratum – that is, upon the subjected people – and into the characteristic of this structure of thought. With the ascent of the god of war, Yahweh, to the One God, guiding principles were formed, like those in Paul's letter to the Romans from the New Testament:⁹³

Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.

Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves.

Twentieth-century peace research would call this cultural violence. It is amazing that from the cults of Dionysus up to postmodernity this logic was repeatedly only questioned by fringe groups, although its aggressive and violent character manifested for over 2000 years. Perhaps this is because the thus posited truth is, in itself, not even capable of deploying the whole potential of its cruelty. If that which has been excluded from truth were simply that which is false, then perhaps one could still live with it. However, once this fundamental dualism between true and false coincides with the earlier mentioned dualisms of good and evil, heaven and hell, god and devil, then not even the One God will be merciful unto the false ones, because he is invariably conflated with the One Truth.

The Greek interpretation of the Semitic god of war, Yahweh, is based on Plato's depiction of *Dasein* as a road ascending towards the True,

Beautiful, and Good. This may not have been the intention of Jesus of Nazareth, to whom an energetic understanding of peace is very often ascribed.⁹⁴ Yet it became historically powerful. The one and personified God of creation became conceptualized as the beginning and end of all *Dasein*, as the source and goal of all that is True, Beautiful, and Good, and as the highest and only truly satisfying meaning of life and suffering.⁹⁵ The encounter of Greek philosophy and Christianity led to attempts, by most philosophical theologians during the Middle Ages and almost all Platonizing poets and philosophers of the *Neuzeit*,* to understand Christian thought in terms of Greek categories:

Greek texts are understood from the perspective of the Christian experience of belief, and Christian belief is reflected with the help of Greek philosophy.⁹⁶

This undertaking is pejoratively characterized by Ken Wilber⁹⁷ in reference to Alfred North Whitehead, as fractured footnotes to Plato. His attempt to distinguish Plato's work from the history of its reception and effects is not insignificant for the purposes of peace research. Wilber follows the dominant narrative insofar as that he sees the Plato of *Symposium* and *Politeia* as the classic philosopher of ascent. Plato describes a movement from the body toward the mind, the soul, and cosmos, culminating in one Good (God). It rises above being and reveals itself in an enlightenment that is the peak and goal of the soul's journey through time. The Good, God, is the universal goal of desire. According to Plato, it is that which draws all souls toward itself. The destiny of human beings during material life is the contemplation of this absolute and essential Good. If this Platonic aspect of ascendance is taken for itself alone, then the whole manifest world appears as shadow, copy, and illusion. The soul moves from the miserable, this-worldly now, toward the redeeming, otherworldly future.

What is remarkable, says Wilber with Arthur Lovejoy,⁹⁸ is that Plato not just gave to European thinking about the other world its characteristic form, expression, and dialectic, but in the *Timaios*, he also did the same for the opposite tendency – an exuberant form of this-worldliness.

* *Translator's Note:* *Neuzeit* translates into English as *modernity*. Within a vectoral chronosophy this signifies the historical epoch after the Middle Ages. Since the author, however, uses the term *modernity* in a different fashion, the German term *Neuzeit* and its adjective *neuzeitlich* for *modern* have been kept in the translation whenever this chronological meaning is implied. For the author's own discussion on the different uses of *modernity* and *Neuzeit*, see Chapter 4.4.

This is because he also emphasizes the necessity and value of all imaginable finite, temporal, and imperfect embodied beings. The manifest is not just a world of shadows, but emanation and embodiment of the True, Beautiful, and Good. This is central for Wilber's thinking. To him Plato is not just the usual philosopher of ascent from the mundane Many toward the divine One, but he is also at the same time the philosopher of descent from the divine One, toward the mundane Many. Whereas the Good, the Beauty, the True strives from mundane multiplicity to divine Oneness, Goodness points into the inverse direction from divine Oneness towards mundane multiplicity. The path of ascent is the path of the Good. The path of descent is the path of Goodness, and not of evil or of the devil. In Wilber's understanding of Plato, both of these paths are equal and simultaneous. If the equality and simultaneity is ignored, duality arises and the Many becomes the false and bad, and sinful becomes hell and the devil. Wilber introduces a series of nondual formulations of this cycle from the Many to One, to Many to One. He says that the Many returning to the One is the Good, and calls it wisdom, love, Eros.⁹⁹ The turn of the One toward the Many is Goodness and it is called compassion, mercy, Agape. Wisdom without compassion is just as dual as compassion without wisdom. The way up is the way down. The way down is the way up.

Wilber's hypothesis is that both roads, that of ascent and that of descent, would take a fatal turn if posited as absolute. For him the teaching of Plato, and mainly also the neo-Platonic teaching of Plotinus,¹⁰⁰ do not differ from Eastern modes of thinking. With Plotinus' thinking he reaches the conclusion that every path of ascent would need to envelope and permeate the lower so that ascending and descending movement constantly interconnect. Wisdom would always need to be connected to compassion. In this manner he draws a dynamic balance and overcomes the duality between development and standstill. He can accept the dynamic of life, without falling into the destructive euphoria of a this-worldly, vectoral view of development.

The dynamic balance of this understanding of peace fails whenever Eros turns into Phobos and Agape into Thanatos. Eros, in the guise of Phobos, flees the material aspects of life whenever the path of ascent is understood as a one-way street, and whenever in the striving for the higher/divine the multiplicity of the aspects of this-worldly *Dasein* are not respected and integrated but rejected and repressed. From this derives the fear that everything this-worldly will hinder the path of ascent, contaminate it, dirty it, or drag it down. In the logic of the pure, vectoral thinking of ascent fear of the material world, Phobos turns

into the all-dominating factor. Phobos, in its headless rush to reach a better world, pushes the pure ascenders toward ascetic repression, to denial, fear, and hate of all that is of this world – denial of pure aliveness, sexuality, sensuality, the nature of the body, and also always of the female. All of this makes those driven by Good, the pure ascenders, very dangerous. Behind their blatantly announced love of the higher, hides the violent hand of Phobos, if it is not possible to reconcile them in Agape.

Thanatos, conversely, is descent divorced from ascent. It is the flight of the mundane from the divine, or better, the this-worldly from the otherworldly, the Many from the One. Thanatos is an empathy that does not just want to embrace the material but to regress to it. Eros, in the guise of Thanatos, flees the divine. Thanatos is Eros without Agape, staring transfixedly at the marvels of the this-worldly Many and trying to place the infinite within the finite. In this manner, Thanatos casts the shadow of a striving for power disguised as charity.¹⁰¹ Thanatos is a seemingly enlightened modern mirror image of a Phobos indiscriminately striving for the higher but, as he is caught in the purely material world, he is just as dangerous. Thanatos is able to rationally perceive the fatal results of Phobos, without becoming aware that he is no less driven by duality and isolation.

From Phobos, just as from Thanatos, results a kind of security thinking, which is incapable of peace yet wants to keep its respective path free from any movement in the other direction. This is ultimately impossible because the wholeness and simultaneity of movements are inscribed into being as a dynamic balance. The striving for security therefore leads, in the sense of either Phobos or Thanatos, to peacelessness.

Wilber's interpretation of Plato's and Plotinus' fundamental thoughts is important for the further understanding of my arguments in respect to the many peaces. I will try to visualize this in graphic form (Figure 3.1). This should mainly serve to illustrate my interpretation of the often differently used terms Eros, Agape, Phobos, and Thanatos for the further progress of the current work.

For Wilber it was not so much the True, Good, and Beautiful bequeathed to Europe by Plato that so fundamentally distinguished this region from its neighborhood, but the series of fractured footnotes, as they are called by Whitehead, which followed from this thinking. In this sense it may be asked whether this True, Good, and Beautiful should not rather be understood, as Nietzsche or Deleuze did later, as the divine, rather than as the One God. This difference is of great importance when thinking about peace.




Figure 3.1 Thinking about ascent and descent. After Ken Wilber, graphically displayed by Wolfgang Dietrich

When the Good is striving toward the divine, it dissolves beyond the personality into divine energy, comparable to *brahman* in Advaita Vedanta or *nirvāṇa* in Buddhism. All mundane Goodness derives from this. But if the world is thought of in a dualistic fashion, then the thus understood ascent ends with the One, personified, God, creating the world and norms. Descent, however, leads to his equally personified counterpart, the devil. From the perspective of energetic worldviews, the dualistic system is incomplete because neither the One God, if he is assumed to exist, nor the multiplicity of gods, but only the divine itself which can manifest in all aspects of the multiplicity are assumed to be final. It is only the separations in the sense of a Christian Phobos and an enlightened Thanatos which have, due to their limited, vectoral nature, turned energetic experiences into aggressive philosophical speculations.

Some have called this the second breakthrough of the Axial Age in late antiquity. This refers to the Greek interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth, the creation of the Talmud, the development of the Roman *corpus iuris civilis*, and finally the Christian–Syrian–Aramaic-inspired Islam.¹⁰² In India, at the same time, Nagarjuna founds Mahāyāna-Buddhism and Tantrism blossoms. This image of peace emanates as far as China and Japan and becomes increasingly distinct from the European one.

3.2 Great *pax* and small *vride*

While the model of the *polis* had still been a state-political attempt of limited reach, it was with the Roman Empire that the so-called Occident took on its unbroken and comprehensive war-cultural shape for the first time. The legal character of the *Pax Victoria*, newly interpreted in this context, gives this term its special connotation in different applications. The term “security,” *se-curitas*, without which peace from now on can no longer be thought of, derives from *se-curus* and implies being free from claims of debt. This is a Roman neologism without predecessors in any other Indo-European language and refers to freedom from claims by the state.¹⁰³ Ever since its verifiable appearance, the concept of security presupposes the existence of the institution of the state. It is not thinkable without the state, and it follows its development in the transformation of its own meaning. The military and political aspects of security are those dimensions of *pax* with whose example the problematic relation between ideal image and historical reality can best be shown; because institutional security can never be absolute, unlike, for example, religious trust in divine occurrences.

The work of war-cultural thinkers of peace like Thucydides, Polybius, or Cicero in this sense developed long-term effects enduring over millennia. From the institutional character of the Greek *polis*, the Roman Empire and the Christian Church grew as powerful, supranational constructs based on norms and laws, and imposed principles of faith claiming to regulate all aspects of life of the people subjugated to them.¹⁰⁴ Ivan Illich impressively described the tension between this institutionalized concept of peace and all deviations:

For the Semitic father, peace is the blessing of justice that the one true God pours over the twelve tribes of recently settled shepherds. To the Jew, the angel announces *shalom*, not the Roman *pax*. Roman peace means something utterly different. When the Roman governor raises the ensign of his legion to ram it into the soil of Palestine, he does not look toward heaven. He faces a far-off city; he imposes its law and its order. There is nothing in common between *shalom* and this *pax romana*, though both exist in the same place and time.¹⁰⁵

This sentence should not be read in the sense of a dualism between the good *shalom* of the local Semites and the evil *pax* of the Imperial Romans. The 12 nomadic tribes had brought a patriarchal societal structure and

a jealous god of war into their settled way of life, which could not claim any moral superiority over the victorious Roman goddess of norms Pax. What is remarkable about Illich's observation is the simultaneous validity of different concepts of peace in the same place, in this case two moral dualistic concepts that mutually exclude one another. The encounter of those two moral reductions of formerly energetic concepts of peace implies that both try to destroy the respective other. In factual history, both concepts of peace had their successes. Both demonstrated their high capacities for organization as well as their aggressiveness toward all deviations. This is why Illich continues:

War tends to make cultures alike, whereas peace is that condition under which each culture flowers in its own incomparable way.¹⁰⁶

Even if the term "energetic" itself is not mentioned, this is still the kind of peace which Illich means, identical to neither this *pax* nor to *shalom*. In the essay from which the above quote is taken, he speaks about "people's peace" and relates this to the "vernacular" communities which he supposes to be free from the conditions of moral peace.

The vernacular, one of Illich's key terms loaned from Roman law, signifies all that which has been created, done, or produced at one's own place, in, on, or at one's own house, farmstead, field, workshop, or parlor. This ranges from raising livestock and agriculture through gardening, handcraft, art, language, and music, to cover all areas of human activity, and it is distinguished from that which is bought at the supraregional, later on industrial, or even capitalist market. For Illich, in a post-Marxist sense, it is about the human being's alienation from his work, which he equates with peacelessness. To him this distinction is fundamental for any discussion about society and peace, because vernacular communities are organized differently than those penetrated by institutions. Illich opposes his concept of peace to the empire as institution, as Gandhi and Martin Luther King had done in their time. They all stand for the same concern, the same issue. I will later on refer extensively to this unruly concept of peace which aims for the own, the vernacular. Yet in this instance I follow the ethics of peace emanating from the Roman Empire.

Natural law and just war

Cicero¹⁰⁷ adopts the fundament of Greek philosophy discussed earlier and claims that there is a natural law founding the existence of the state as institution. This law, in its uniform, eternal, and unchangeable

validity, is reasonable to all “normally abled people.”¹⁰⁸ In this way he inflates and trivializes the Platonic concept of truth in order to form the fundament of his war-cultural concept of peace. He declares his own truth to be the natural one and reasonable to all “normally abled people.” This allows him to formulate his conditions for a just war, which would apply to any extension of the Roman sphere of influence because he assumes that the subjugated people would feel better after their submission to Rome than before. For their own good, nature would give power over the weak to the most capable. That judiciousness and competence would legitimize claims to rule, and that ultimately those lacking these virtues could permissibly be forced under this rule, remained Cicero’s political legacy. The author himself provided the moral canon for the application of this “peaceful warrior ethics.” War should only be the last resort in order to decide a dispute or to end injustice. War must not be an end in itself, but it has to serve a good or just cause. War must be grounded on a legal basis, which can only be given if the belligerent party is a legitimate institution, such as the Roman Empire. Just like the Greek philosophers on whom Cicero relies, he rejects the idea that war in itself is a virtuous action, but he nevertheless remains committed to it as *ultima ratio* for his technocratic concept of peace.¹⁰⁹

In this manner Cicero founds the peace ethics of the Roman Empire according to which a strong center of power should secure the lasting absence of war. In the epoch of the emperor Augustus this became leading principle in Rom’s realpolitik. The Greek sisters Eirene, Eunomia, and Dike now appear, politically matured, as an ideological trinity holding dominion throughout the centuries and continents far beyond the *orbis romanum*. Emperors and dictators of all persuasions claim for themselves the role of Zeus, shaker of worlds, and assume that Themis, the goddess of law, is faithfully on their side. *Si vis pacem para bellum*, if you want peace, prepare for war, is the manifest motto that results from this understanding of peace. It is an interior political peace of contractual assimilation and subjugation from which derives compliance to a codified catalogue of norms, but no world peace in the sense of a relational understanding between neighbors. Outsiders remain “barbarians” and are always the object of “just” physical violence. Thus it is about unity for all who submit to the yoke of peace.¹¹⁰

Furthermore, this leads to the Church Father Aurelius Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo.¹¹¹ Walking the border between energetic and moral concepts of peace, he drew momentous conclusions from his experiences. In his epochal work *De Civitate Dei* he starts from an energetic understanding of peace, introduces the concepts *pax aeterna* and *pax*

temporalis as a dualism, and holds that perpetual peace and perpetual justice would only be possible in the state of transcendent perfection. Within the frame of the cosmic principle of order, every being has to find its place for peace to reign and the one, true God is the source of this peace. Peace and justice on earth are only a temporary and imperfect image of the *pax aeterna*. That is why God must always be seen as the final goal of any peace in this world. Augustine ventures to reinterpret Christ's energetic message of peace into a moral principle, on the basis of Jewish concepts of justice and Greek-Roman concepts of truth. He transforms peace from the name of God into the gift of God, and the human being from a participant in the House of God into a wanderer burdened by sin and on the moral road toward God who is manifested by the Church as a norm-giving institution. Social conformity, this-worldly obedience, thus becomes the imperative for the individual constructed as a being in time. This makes it possible to introduce the dualistic distinction between true and false peace, with the verdict on the difference no longer residing in the hands of human beings, but in the hands of the Church's experts on the interpretation of the one, true, and personified God. For human beings, this is a God standing apart from the world. Life is directed toward the other world, and the human being determined by his knowledge of the material world's transience. The only thing common to human beings would be their descent from Adam. From this comes neighborly love, friendship through and in God, which shows itself in good deeds. Neighborly love is love of God, who is present in the other. In order to fully disempower the human capacity for discretion, Augustine finally adds an apparent peace, a *pax apparens* to the *pax vera*. Even if human beings, in full possession of their senses, believe that they are living and experiencing the peace, the experts still have the power to judge whether or not this is in fact a *pax apparens*.¹¹² From the imperfection of temporary peace and temporary justice on earth, Augustine derives, in allusion to Cicero, a reduced right for a just war for peace. Thus *ordo* became the complementary concept to *pax*, and *bellum* the opposite concept.¹¹³ *Pacem volo, bellum paro*, as he calls it: Peace is what I want, therefore I prepare for war.¹¹⁴

The moralizing aspect of his philosophy and his moral understanding of peace are clearly shown here, because Augustine is no ethicist of war. He recalls Jesus of Nazareth's commandment of nonviolence and wants to contain war, not justify it. Unlike Cicero, he combines the prerequisites which would allow a just war in such a manner that they can almost never occur. First, the opposing party would need to be clearly at fault (*iusta causa*); secondly, the war would have to be conducted with

the right intention, and the good resulting from victory be higher than the evils of war (*intentio recta*); and thirdly, the just war would need to be led by an authority legitimized by God (*legitima potestas*).¹¹⁵ As difficult as it is to think of a just war according to these criteria, it is as easy to lead one in practice. With his dualistic thinking Augustine himself gives a means to all those who want to decide what is just and unjust, right and wrong, good or evil, legitimate or illegitimate:

For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not, therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more to their mind. [...] And thus all men desire to have peace with their own circle whom they wish to govern as suits themselves. For even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own, and impose on them the laws of their own peace.¹¹⁶

On the basis of his teaching, the Christian Occident would murder, torture, and pillage at all times and in all countries – and Augustine himself provided a violent example with his approach to the Nestorians, Donatists, and Arians, all of them Christians.¹¹⁷ Augustine is a philosopher of pure ascent, guided by Phobos and thus violent. In the history of its reception and effects, his thinking founds a sustained philosophy of intellectual violence, even if it may have been intended otherwise.

St. Ambrose,¹¹⁸ another church father, who was in dispute with the Arians and was Augustine's contemporary, suggested wine and usury as methods for dealing with the amorphous peoples subsumed under the term "barbarians," who had nothing more in common with each other than living beyond the Limes. He was of the opinion that wherever martial law ruled, on the one hand charging interest was likely to be allowed and, on the other, wine would be the best means toward the self-destruction of the enemy.¹¹⁹

Over the centuries, Christian dualism has frequently turned against deviating forms of faith and life. Vernacular communities, however, as Ivan Illich understands them, always deviate because their peace can by definition only be their own. Freya is the Great Goddess who stands at the beginning of all energetic understandings of peace in northern Europe. The old High German root word *frī* for *frei* (free) and finally also the terms *Friede* (peace), *Freiheit* (freedom), and *Freund* (friend) as abstract forms, are all derived from the Germanic adjective *frija*. The meaning of *frei*, in turn, etymologically comes from *priya* (prai-, pri-

meaning "own," or also "near" or "dear."¹²⁰ The meaning of "own" as a reference point for the peaceful is not to be understood in the modern or Roman legal sense of the term, as describing that for which one has a legal claim, but it is about that which one has produced oneself, as Illich describes it. Whoever understands society, friendship, peace, and freedom in this manner has to start from the continuously confirmed experience that not only is one's own community vernacularly active, but that others are as well. Respect for the vernacular activities of others, without certainty about reciprocity and without recourse to the security-providing force of a higher authority, from this viewpoint is precarious and risky, but it is the only thinkable means of maintaining one's own freedom. Whoever enters into a compromise with security relinquishes his own vernacular freedom to a degree similar to that of concession.

The antinomy between these open, own, vernacular, and energetic concepts of peace (which in purely linguistic terms can be traced from northern Europe as far back as the ancient Indian *prinati*, for enjoying or relishing) and the spreading moral peace of the institutional state and Church, as imagined by Cicero and Augustine, could not be greater. A history of violence, repression, and annihilation arises from their encounter because the vernacular peaces have to be open and vulnerable in order to understand themselves and in order to exist, while moral peace is often designed in a dualistic and exclusionary manner.

The destruction of vernacular communities and their peaces by the state and Church is, despite all violence, not a linear history of annihilation. Even if the extinction of all otherness is a pathological consequence of the phobic thinking of ascent, there is still a subtle line of energetic resistance that can be traced from the Liberalia in late antiquity up to the present. Even in the Occident gnosis, hermeticism, Greek-Egyptian alchemy, and hesychasm testify to this fact.¹²¹ Mystics of all kinds prove that energetic resistance does not just result from seemingly autochthonous groups, but also constantly forms itself anew within the belligerently assimilating and expanding system. They all dispute the Christian dualistic hypothesis of the arch-contradiction between a divine sphere in heaven and a human one on earth.¹²²

The spread of Christianity brought the notion of Satan and his power into the discussion, which had previously been unknown in the thinking about peace. At the same time, the Church established itself as that institution which persecutes all those who have fallen under the spell of the devil's supposed power or – as in most cases – have just been suspected and accused of dealing with this power. Manifested in the

history of the institution is the whole dilemma of Christian dualism, the split between this world and the other.¹²³ It is in this manner that the dualistic thinking of ascent in the sense of Phobos was established and managed through violence. It was not overcome until Descartes and other thinkers of the Enlightenment reversed the ascending Christian dualism of Phobos into the descending one of Thanatos, toward the separation of nature and culture.

Moral concepts of peace are therefore often dualistic and violent. Or they are interpreted in this manner for reasons of power politics. Yet this is not always and necessarily the case. They are not of this kind whenever they are not directly tied to ultimate explanations of the world or phobic claims to truth. In this case, they either migrate out of an energetic worldview – as concepts of limited reach – or they exist besides them as a pragmatic regulative for the relations of everyday life. As such, they neither demand pacifistic totality nor do they reach particular spiritual depth. On the other hand, they are also not normatively independent. They have to be embedded into a greater worldview, without therefore immediately having to form its core.

Fridu and Werra

A classical example of this is the concept of peace that has developed in the German language since prehistory and shifted from the energetic origin of Frey and Freya toward a moral concept. The Middle High German abstract *vrīde* that emerged out of the Old High German *fridu* and therefore from the earlier discussed seed syllable *pri* for free, near, and own implies treating others like members of one's own kin.¹²⁴ The close relation in meaning to friendship and freedom thus remains perceptible. This is crucial for the understanding of the normative concept of peace during the Middle Ages.¹²⁵

This is because *fridu* does not mean the absence of war, but much rather implies the protection of people and their means of subsistence from physical violence. The term *Krieg* (war), which emerges from the Old Franconian *gurei* or the Old High German *werra* for exertion or tenacity (a meaning it acquired later) and finally quarrel, dispute, took on the meaning of organized armed combat only in Middle High German.¹²⁶ Until then, it could also signify disputes that were carried out without any physical violence, like for example a legal dispute. In any case, it only concerned confrontations of limited reach that could be settled in different ways. *Fridu* and *werra* are thus not a pair of dualistic contradictions. Both can exist next to each other at the same time and without *werra*, *fridu* cannot even be made. Conflict is accepted

as a catalyst for social processes and yet limited in its destructive potential.

The *ve(he)de*, feud, however, implied an open, angry hostility, the combative persecution of one's own interests as the right of every free man.¹²⁷ The counterpart to the feud was *treuga* – the truce. The reconciliation of disputes consequently had to be as relational as the dispute itself. Here one really encounters a dualistic contradiction – either there is combat or not – but this is not immediately related to the understanding of peace.

Vride protected the people, places, goods, or times that were exempt from combative actions. To most people, on a personal level, peace as a right to hospitality was the most important one. Beyond that, many further peaces existed next to each other in this world: from the small peace of the home to the geographically greater peaces of kin, things, villages, cities, land, the king's peace and the comprehensive imperial peace, up to the chronologically defined God's peace, which referred to Sundays, holidays, Advent, or Lent. In sum, up to 260 days a year were reserved for *vride* – or conversely, belligerent actions were possible on 80 to 99 days, which were always interrupted by days and periods of *vride*.¹²⁸

Vride was supposed to protect peasants, merchants, women, and monks from the consequences of the feud. The feud itself was considered an appropriate way to resolve conflicts between the elites. *Vride* thus concerned specific people, times, and places. No matter how bloody the conflict among lords and knights, *vride* protected the oxen and grain on the stem. It safeguarded the emergency granary, the seed, and the time of harvest. Generally speaking, *vride* shielded the utilization values of the commons from violent interference. It ensured access to water and pasture and to woods and farmland for those who drew their subsistence from those commons. To the aristocrats it may not have been more than an *ius in bello* which, as previously with the ancient Greeks, did not concern their *ius ad bellum*. From the point of view of the common people, who formed the vast majority of the population, however, it constituted a more or less reliable framework of norms for morally coping with everyday life.

Ivan Illich,¹²⁹ whom I have followed in those evaluations, perceives this legal frame as the people's peace which can subsist despite the elites' violence. Illich interprets *vride* as a relational norm of hospitality and even accepts the parallel presence of physical violence as long as this serves as a valve for the possible balancing of the whole society. This institution-critical medievalist thereby reaches a much more positive

image of the Middle Ages than the civilization-friendly Karlheinz Koppe.

Koppe¹³⁰ perceives late antiquity and the Middle Ages as periods of civilizational decay, only intermittently interrupted by short and local phases of peace. He sees them as a dark age, in which an order of peacelessness also reigned far beyond the Occident in China, Japan, India, and even in pre-Columbian America, before national areas of peace led to the development of Western civilization in the *Neuzeit*. Koppe perceives a New Axial Age at that point where Illich regrets the turn toward *homo oeconomicus* as a historical error of development. This difference in evaluation is not least of all founded in the circumstance that Koppe acknowledges the interpretation of the Germanic *vride* as a factor of social adjustment, yet pays less attention to the power of this term in vernacular everyday life than Illich does.

One has to agree with Koppe if he argues that medieval society does not know a worldly concept of peace as an independent value or as the highest value, and if he principally assumes an ethics of feuds that postulates the fight of all against all, and then contains it via agreed times and places of peace, yet without banning it. Labeling this as perversion or schizophrenia,¹³¹ however, overlooks that all those peaces were subject to the moral and communal agreement and disposition of the involved actors themselves, and at least at times, prevented great slaughter. This is even more the case if the feud is perceived as a long-established process for dealing with conflicts between lords and armies from which the mass of the population should unconditionally be spared. Under those conditions *vehede* and *treuga*, *werra*, and *fridu* are parts of a socially powerful legal order for groups tending toward the vernacular, which can get by without a central state monopoly on violence. This arouses sympathies in Illich and concern for the Idealists of modernity who demand an absolute concept of peace.

Pax

This can be found in the Christian continuation of the late Roman *pax*, which in its juridical and theological aspects was maintained by the work of the Church and the royal houses. Just as in Augustine and others, this *pax* can be observed in all attempts to build empires and institutions in the Middle Ages. The contradictory simultaneity of several concepts of peace in the same place is once again encountered here. *Pax* implies an absolute, abstract peace oriented on the one, true God and his authoritatively interpreted norms; a peace from which, under certain conditions, a just war can also be derived. *Vride*, however,

describes a concrete, vernacular connection that continued to exist even during a feud, and that indeed had to continue if the quarreling elites did not want to destroy their own means of subsistence.

Pax and the principle of a just war finally experience a further culmination in Thomas Aquinas¹³² ethics of compromise, which conceives of war and peace as a dualism. Thomas Aquinas modified this principle by declaring war to be admissible only as a means of attaining peace. For this, several conditions would have to be met. The warlord had to be the highest authority (*auctoritas principis*), a just cause (*causa iusta*) had to be given, and the war must further the cause of good (*recta intentio*).¹³³ To this, he adds the principle of proportionality of means (*debitus modus*) that also contains the distinction between combatants and civilians.¹³⁴ Everything that has been said regarding Cicero and Augustine is also valid here, because with Thomas it is the diagnostic power of the institution that decides in a dualistic manner what must be deemed good and just, and what is bad and unjust.¹³⁵ What is more, the institutionalized war is now separated from the old Germanic–anarchic concepts of dispute, feud, and peaces and is declared a moral matter for the authorities. *Pax* thus becomes a negative nonwar.

The work of Thomas Aquinas was a landmark for interpretations of peace in the *Neuzeit*, as they were to be further developed by for example, Francisco de Vitoria, one of the founders of modern international law. Like Aquinas, other scholastics founded their thinking on Aristotle's teaching of the state, which had found its way back to Europe via Islamic-Arabic scholars. But they arrived at different conclusions. Marsilius of Padua¹³⁶ and William Ockham¹³⁷ developed from this the idea of a strict separation between worldly authority and church office – for the time an almost heretical idea. As author of one of the most important and early texts that explicitly makes the keeping of peace its topic, *Defensor pacis*, Marsilius opted for a princely law. He also considered the claim of the Popes to have the last word in worldly issues to be a disturbance of peace. These ideas were later taken up by Niccòlo Machiavelli in his *Principe* and, very differently, by John Locke in his version of the people's sovereignty versus the king's sovereignty.

As different as each of the scholastics' thoughts and especially their later reception may have been, they were all still concerned with the great peace, *pax*. They consistently either scorned or ignored the forms of small, vernacular peace. Their gaze was directed toward great spaces, lofty goals, ultimate solutions, and irrevocable ideals. They wanted to expand *pax* beyond the borders of single principalities and

empires toward a comprehensive, universal concept. By around the year 1300, Dante Alighieri¹³⁸ was already dreaming of a *pax universalis* under the supervision of the Holy Roman Emperor. Pierre Dubois,¹³⁹ a forefather of modern international law and Dante's contemporary, revealed the crux of all universalism. He called for a Christian confederation of states which should be founded by a council convened by the Pope and regulated via a kind of international court of arbitration. The "universal" size of this *pax* was therefore limited to all Catholic dominions. Its expressed aim was directed against the Muslim Turks. This is only one of the many possibilities of defining a dualistic universalism, which always declares others to be barbarians and defines them as a force of evil. Up to this day, no universalism, not even that of human rights, has been able to overcome this structure of exclusion handed down since antiquity. This makes visible its latent propensity for structural, cultural, and also finally, physical violence. The same also goes for the concept of peace devised by the Bohemian king, Podiebrad, from 1464, which is often quoted because of its detailed regularization, and which was actually written by the French adventurer Antonio Marini. Besides Bohemian self-interest, he also had an alliance against the Turks in mind.¹⁴⁰

These propositions of an absolute concept of peace and the corresponding regularizations of conflicts over centuries were perceived as civilizational progress. What the Idealist sympathy ignores, however, is the fact that to the same degree that the medieval *pax* became greater and stronger (meaning that it could be decreed by an effective central power as the peace of the land, empire, or god), was also became more organized, greater, and stronger. The more successful the suppression of the small feud and its relegation into the realm of an authoritatively punished crime, the more devastating become the acts of violence committed by centrally organized institutions.¹⁴¹ Whoever equates peace and institutions in the Middle Ages, can consequently only detect a lasting failure of the elites, state, Church, and their norms in the face of social reality. At least until monopolies of violence are formed within the first nation states, which take on the task of keeping the inner *pax* and often connect this with large-scale external warfare.¹⁴²

Through the strengthening of institutions, dualistic thinking turned into purist pathology. While for example, the apostle Paul and the poet Prudentius had described the struggle between good and evil in a martial manner, but still identified it as being located within the human soul, medieval allegories increasingly interpreted it as physical confrontation which should end in the complete annihilation of that evil which

manifests in other humans.¹⁴³ Consequently, in order to accomplish the comprehensive *pax* of absolute purity, it was considered just to fight and annihilate as embodiments of evil heretics, pagans, schismatics, Jews, Muslims, gypsies, and vagrants, or simply others. This thinking nourished the large-scale acts of violence associated with the persecution of heretics and Jews, the Inquisition, the Crusades, *Reconquista* and *Conquista*, religious wars, *Bauernlegen*,* racism, and the early nationalistic language purism of the late Middle Ages, all of which could be committed in the name of *pax*. The respective structure of thought was taken over into the *Neuzeit* and underpins the great topics that were to found capitalism as a world system – race, class, and nation – in just as violent a manner, but now enlightened and modified as regards content.¹⁴⁴

The humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam¹⁴⁵ stands between those times. When a great congress on peace was planned in 1517 amid the belligerent confusion of the early *Neuzeit*, Erasmus received a commission to draft a peace treatise to mobilize all peace-loving forces. It is amazing how fast, clear, and untimely he formulated the problem of purist thinking. On the basis of an optimistic image of humankind, he morally and radically turns against the clerical-authoritarian interpretation of *pax* and the just war. The Church and princes are no longer, as in Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, guardians of *pax* and necessary lords of the just war; to Erasmus they appear as a source of war and misery:

There is scarcely any peace so unjust, but it is preferable, upon the whole, to the justest war. [...] the greater part of the people certainly detest war, and most devoutly wish for peace. A very few of them, indeed, whose unnatural happiness depends upon the public misery, may wish for war [...]. Now then it is time to pursue different measures; to try the experiment, what a placable disposition, and a mutual desire to do acts of friendship and kindness, can accomplish in promoting national amity. It is the nature of wars, that one should sow the seeds of another; it is the nature of revenge to produce reciprocal revenge. Now then, on the contrary, let kindness generate kindness, one good turn become productive of another; and let him be considered as the most kingly character, the greatest and

* *Translator's Note*: the process of expanding and consolidating larger manorial agricultural properties at the expense of small peasants, beginning in the eastern part of Germany during the fourteenth century. In its effects, the *Bauernlegen* is comparable to the enclosure movement starting a little later in England.

best potentate, who is ready to concede the most from his own strict right, and to sacrifice all exclusive privilege to the happiness of the people.¹⁴⁶

Significantly, the peace conference of Cambrai planned for 1517 never took place. Yet with *The Complaint of Peace* Erasmus wrote an untimely classic of lasting relevance. It was important enough to be publicly burned by the Faculty for Theology of Paris in about 1525. Of similar alignment is the *Kriegsbüchlin des Friedes* (Little War-Book of Peace) by Erasmus' contemporary, Sebastian Franck. Franck contested the idea of a just war. He did this, however, in a manner that was equally as dialectical as the concept of just war itself.¹⁴⁷

The subsistence-oriented meaning of *vride* was lost, when the *Befriedung* (pacification) of the commons was turned into their *Einfriedung* (enclosure) for the purposes of early capitalist production. If *vride* until that time had meant the protection of that minimal subsistence from which the wars between the elites also had to sustain themselves, subsistence itself now became the victim of an allegedly peaceful aggression. The commons became the prey of expanding markets and *vride* ceased to protect concrete communities and goods from physical violence and extermination.¹⁴⁸

The new peace under the sign of Thanatos aimed for an abstract ideal. It was tailored according to the measure of *homo oeconomicus*, the universal man, who was supposed to have been created by nature in order to live by consuming the goods produced elsewhere and by others. The *pax oeconomica* now guarded production just as *vride* had protected the commons.¹⁴⁹

3.3 Peace as right to hospitality

The image of the weak *vride* of the Middle Ages is not limited to Europe. As a greeting, the term *shalom* from Judaism implies the offer of shelter and the fulfillment of the guest's bodily needs, and liberation from immediate mundane necessities. It is the moral assertion and confirmation of a vernacular right to hospitality.¹⁵⁰ Each person is responsible for the well-being of his guest.¹⁵¹ Used in this form, *shalom* describes neither a political order nor cosmic harmony, but a pragmatic attitude between human beings encountering one another. As a moral norm of limited reach, *shalom* remains embedded in a larger worldview.

The same also goes for the Arabic *silim*. The root syllable SLM underlies the pre-Islamic Arabic term *salima* or *salamah* for recognition, concord, submission, reconciliation, conservation, but also dying. Later, in Arabic the commonly known and Islamically charged concept of peace, *sālam* (for being complete, being whole) derived from this. And even the word *Islam*, freely translatable as submission to God, can be traced back to this root. Islam means to submit in peace, or that peace occurs when the human being surrenders to the divine order.¹⁵² The Arabic greeting of peace *sālam alaikum* means “peace be upon you.” It expresses the offer of peace as right to hospitality. The answer to that is *wa alaikumu s-sālām*, “and upon you be peace,” with which a mutual understanding of peace between the greeting persons is agreed upon.¹⁵³

When one greets another with *shalom*, *shalama*, or *salaam* (the Arabic form), it can be an instant of Sabbath. Both people have the opportunity to remember their origins as beings whose beginning is ultimately a mystery. This remembrance can help clear away a history of offenses given, received, and perceived. It can produce peace on a very deep level, not by invoking certainty or idealism, but by bringing awareness of uncertainty and the ultimate mortality of all forms.¹⁵⁴

The hospitality emanates from the host and it is mirrored by the guest, who convivially stays with the host. In Arabic culture, to give is a holy and social obligation. The giving person is highly esteemed in each case. But a purely linguistic interpretation of this ritual of hospitality would fall too short because *sālam* energetically implies an encompassing state of being whole and well, which includes the entire human being along with his body, soul, community, and his *Mitwelt* in all relations. Embedded in this larger context, this formula has, since the emergence of Islam, only been used between Muslims. With the regulated exegesis of the Qu’ran the original energetic concept of peace turned into a normative concept exclusively for Muslims. For non-Muslim communities or people, the term of *sulh* or *sulha* is reserved, which means a truce or negative peace.¹⁵⁵ Forgiveness is seen as a preliminary stage to peace and occupies a central position. The Christian commandment of neighborly love is found almost correspondingly in the Qu’ran passage 41: 34, which states that the human being should repel evil with that which is better. Then the erstwhile enemy will be found to be a close, affectionate friend.¹⁵⁶ Also in the Qu’ran patience, forgiveness, and mutual consultation are perceived as aspects of peace.

The differentiation between *salām* and *sulh* is explicable from the Jewish/Christian/old Arabic, but mainly Hellenistic, roots of Islam.¹⁵⁷ Therefrom derives the concept of the one, true, and personified God, the Platonic concept of truth, and the construction of a privileged community of believers, the *ummah*, which to the prophet Mohammed meant that which Greekdom had meant to the Greeks. The rules for dealing with internal and external conflicts also derive from this. *Dar al Islam*, the world of Islam, follows the Greek *stasis*. *Dar al harb*, the world of war, follows the Greek *polemos*. Islam, like all worldviews that presuppose a final truth, derives from this belief the obligation to carry the One Truth of the right faith into the whole world. As a classic proselytizing religion Islam demands of all righteous believers that they convince the unbelievers and punish, subjugate, or annihilate the infidels.

At this point the idea of a holy war against infidels needs to be distinguished from the earlier discussed idea of a just war against evildoers. While the latter idea assumes that the enemy has committed some kind of infraction, for righteous believers it is enough that the enemy believes in the wrong god, uses the wrong name for god, or worships the right god in the wrong manner. All post-Hellenistic monotheisms have followed this definition of enemies without mercy. The wars they have fought against each other over the centuries are rooted in the same radical, dualistic imagining* of Truth and God, thought of in a phobic manner. Indeed, it is just that – an imagining: the one, ascending Truth imagined before the personalized God, in order to avoid seeing the descending divine that leads to tolerance and respect for the mundane and all its multiplicity.

Other structural similarities of the Mediterranean monotheisms can also be explained from this common root. They are all strictly hierarchic. Hierarchy may well mean the submission to a divine order and not to a human or even political institution, but whether Papacy or Caliphate, monastery or school of Qu'ran, everywhere the worldly experts of the

*Translator's note: The German noun *Vorstellung* and the corresponding verb *vorstellen* have no direct English translation. *Vorstellung* is rendered here as imagination, yet literally it also means something that is put in front of something else. The author's subsequent play on words is lost in the English translation. The German original reads: "Die Kriege, die sie durch all die Jahrhunderte gegeneinander geführt haben, wurzeln in derselben radikal dualistisch und phobisch gedachten Wahrheits- und Gottesvorstellung. In der Tat eine Vorstellung: die Eine, aufsteigende Wahrheit vor den personalisierten Gott gestellt, um das absteigende Göttliche, das zu Toleranz und Respekt vor dem Irdischen und seiner Vielheit führt, nicht zu erkennen."

interpretation of the will of the one, true God accrued enough diagnostic and institutionalized power to manipulate the masses.

The comparisons of *silm* and the small *salām*, as right to hospitality, with *fridu* or *vride*, of the great, hierarchic, and exclusive *salām* with the imperial and institutionalized *pax*, or of *sulh* with *treuga*,¹⁵⁸ testify to the commonalities that find their strongest expression in the similarity of the Arabic-Islamic *jihad* and the Germanic *werra*. The root syllable *j-h-d* originally meant, as did *werra*, the comprehensive effort for a good cause. As commitment to justice – a key term which Islam almost congruently shares with Judaism and Christianity, together with all the problems this entails¹⁵⁹ – it can also entail defensive efforts. When the term is used in the Qu’ran in the sense of struggle or highest effort it is to be understood in this manner. From the times of the prophet Mohammed it is documented that *jihad* does not necessarily have to be equated with the force of weapons: “the best *jihad* is the word of truth and right in front of an unjust ruler”¹⁶⁰ the prophet declared. Haneef further defines a primary or greater, inner *jihad* and a secondary, lesser or outer *jihad*. The former is the struggle against one’s own inadequacies and deficiencies, against egoism and drives. The armed struggle for the spread of Islam, in contrast, is considered the lesser *jihad*.¹⁶¹

The inner *jihad* takes precedence because the believer first has to attain inner consolidation and conviction before he can spread the true faith outward. Some schools of law, especially in the Shía, even conclude from the principle of *taqiya* – the exculpable transgression against duty – that there is no ultimate obligation to fulfill the secondary *jihad*. The interpretations vary according to time, region, context, and school of law. Islam is finally caught, just like all monotheistic teachings of ascent, in a tension between the moral love of peace, and the exclusionary construction of enemies with a latent potential for violence. In secondary *jihad*, Islamic law only allows for the killing of enemy combatants. Noncombatant civilians, the elderly, women, and children should always be spared. This principle of peace is also very similar to European thinking. In whichever manner the outer *jihad* is interpreted, the inner one, in its moral frugality, coincides with the Christian hostility toward the body. This hostility toward the body, in both Christianity and Islam, is a substantial psychic prerequisite for violent tendencies in the outer struggle. This is often less recognized in the intercultural discussion than the aspects of mutual physical and cultural violence.

Those intersections occur due to the common roots, but also from the frequent encounters between corresponding systems of belief. Islam

and the Arabic world fertilized European cultural life for centuries, translating and disseminating art and science from outside Europe, and rediscovering the latter's ancient cultural heritage, especially as regards the teachings of Aristotle.¹⁶² The question of whether this gift, crucial for intellectual history, was also politically helpful in terms of peace, may remain open. The Occidental Renaissance can in any case not be explained without the Arabic-Islamic fertilization.¹⁶³

3.4 What is a moral image of peace?

For a summarizing panorama of morally founded images of peace, a quick reference to the norm as an all-explaining factor would be seductive. It would also be correct. A moral image of peace is given whenever a norm that legitimizes itself through its sheer existence and social power also constitutes the ultimate explanation of this peace. In the widest sense, this occurs whenever peace is understood as a contract, as *pax*.

Yet this normative approach leads to a circularity that is only partially instructive: peace is, because peace is. Therefore the question has to follow of why some societies content themselves with such an understanding of peace, while others refer to the more demanding energetic definition. For an answer I will once more stress the metaphor of the inner mountain lake. All I have said about it finally centers on the question of consciousness. The mountain lake can be experienced with the senses that the human being has at his disposal, if his consciousness is not clouded by fears, hopes, memories, or passions. As easy as this sounds, it is equally difficult in practice. That is why, as shown in the examples cited, cultural techniques have been developed that enable the purification and calming of consciousness and make peace perceptible. Even if this context also knows the setting of norms, these nevertheless serve the final goal and they are not the goal themselves.

It is via morals that the norm is separated out of this energetic context and becomes independent. Not every norm is moral, but I was able to find many examples in which the transformation of energetic concepts of peace into moral ones led to an elevation of the norm. This is the case because institutions play a central role in such constructs and to them the norm is at first a tool for rule, but later turns into a reason for their existence. Such tendencies can mainly be triggered through societal situations of crisis, and through chronic states of exception. Here the sensitive line of transition from the energetic to the moral concepts of peace can be found. Preparing for *Dasein* replaces *Dasein*.

The crisis in the here and now, the acute threat to survival, is experienced by every human being with the same senses with which he can also perceive the energetic peaces and the inner mountain lake. The threat can be heard, seen, felt, smelled, and even tasted. The chronic crisis, however, is a construct, an emotion which is closed to those senses. It aims at recalling situations during which people felt threatened and helpless. Those memories and emotions have to be activated via authoritative discourses in order for people, out of fear that the traumatizing event might repeat itself, to submit to the authoritative norms that claim to be able to protect them from those remembered fears. The time of effect of moral peace is thus not the present, in which the norm is placed, but the future, as it is narrated into existence by those setting the norm. For this purpose they use the historic moral according to their own manner of narrating the past.

Moral peaces have a lot to do with the future and past, but little with the present. Yet the human consciousness, directed by the senses, lives in the present, which is why moral understandings of peace are mainly a matter for the subconscious, which is guided by past experiences and fears.

This is why moral images of peace need a topic. They cannot be sufficient in themselves, because without a traumatizing primal ground and a teleological goal they would not be comprehensible. A peace without a topic can be experienced by our senses in the present, but neither as a past nor as a future event. Moral peace must have a topic in order to be narratable, which is why it appears in the variations of peace and security, peace and justice, or peace and truth. Through these combinations moral peace becomes narratable. The narrator can refer to past situations during which the community was threatened in its security, during which it suffered injustices, or was caught in errors. The norm-setting declares peace to be the future salvation from those adversities and promises such a peace, if people follow its authority and its norms on this path.

In order for these narrations to gain efficacy they need a further discursive element – dualism. In energetically oriented models, dualisms like male–female, up–down, weak–strong, and hard–soft are evaluated functionally and dissolved in tendency, with the ideal being coaction or even unification of the contradictions. The androgynous is the perfect example of this. In morally oriented modes of narration on the other hand, all these contradictions can be inscribed into the basic pattern of right–wrong or good–evil and the dualism turns into a binary exclusivity. Somebody or something can either be good and right, or

evil and wrong, but not both at the same time. The triumph of good over evil, true over false, God over Satan for this reason turns into a moral commandment of peace.

Seen from the present such a moral can only be understood in a vectoral manner. The worst has to lie in the past, and the better in the future. Otherwise, evil is effective in the present and it has to be exterminated in the name of peace. Moral concepts of peace point from insecurity toward security, from injustice to justice, from error to truth – and on the basis of this fundamental assumption, the corresponding normative concepts are also congruent. Whoever has subscribed to the principles of faith of this dualism and to the vectoral chronosophy, will not be able to accept any other manner of thinking than the moral one. The problem is that such people and communities do not act on the basis of their conscious perception, but based on narrations which charge and activate the subconscious with emotions. The driving force comes from fears that derive from the experiences of helplessness and potential threats in the past and that form the basic matrix of people and groups of people. The functioning of people on the basis of this matrix has to do with remembered reality, not with the reality that is current in the respective situation. If those primordial fears are institutionalized, if moral teachings are constructed from them and used as a means of rule, then an image of peace develops which is not just moral but phobic. Fear-driven societies long for peace, but at the same time act in a manner that is very dangerous for others. They create tension, because they try to become something other than what they are. They do not accept being, they deny it, and they exalt something different as an ideal that must be reached. A fundamental tension exists between that which is, and the goal. The goal is in contradiction to that which is, and leads to tensions. That is why moral people have such a high propensity for conflicts. They demand something that is not even visible. Conflicts arise from possibilities which are not actualized. In the pure present there are no tensions. Tension always comes from the past and from an orientation on the future, from the imagination.

This tension became especially institutionalized in Europe during the Axial Age. Europe was invented from its material, and this has also made the European dream so momentous, although there were at all times voices that recognized this danger and warned against it. A culture that is based on a philosophy driven by fear about survival is dangerous, no matter what kind of political-administrative organization it gives itself.

However, there are also moral concepts of peace that are not dependent on an ultimate, absolute self-reference. They are small, of limited reach, delimited in time and space, relational, and pragmatic. Rights to hospitality illustrate this character very well. Although peace out of hospitality is a moral concept, such a peace can nevertheless neither be ordered, nor threatened with or sold as promise of salvation. It occurs between human beings, who encounter each other in concrete situations and who, for comprehensible reasons, decide to be hospitable with each other. It might be said that hospitality is a positive value, morally good, but hospitality is, similar to gratitude, a figure that can only be experienced consciously in the here and now. Hospitality is in contradiction to security and thus to all great moral concepts of peace. As a small, vernacular, and weak concept of peace it can occur, despite its moral character, in the environment of an energetic culture, as well as of a great moral peace culture. The limited reach of peace out of hospitality is characteristic. As soon as it touches upon questions of the final reason of existence, it loses its independent character and either merges into the greater concept or in turn falls victim to the fear-driven thinking of security, which dissolves hospitality and its small peace.

4

Modern Interpretations of Peace



The perception of the world as clockwork or machine is characteristic of modernity. Modern concepts of peace correspondingly believe that peace can be produced through repairing broken social relations; that is, via conflict resolution. The basis for this is the belief in a reason that is presupposed to the visible world and provides the guiding principle of human action.

Instead of an infinite *above*, the West
pitched its attention to an infinite *ahead*.

Ken Wilber¹

In the last chapter I addressed Ken Wilber's interpretation of the philosophy of ascent (Eros), and the philosophy of descent (Agape), and pointed out that Eros without Agape, ascent without compassion, leads to Phobos, the fear of the supposedly higher before the lower, or more explicitly, of the One before the Many, and to a corresponding purism. Agape without Eros (pure this-worldliness), however, spells a destructive materialism, Thanatos. A dramatic example of the former is provided by the phobic aberrations in the history of (not exclusively, but mainly) the Occident, with the prosecution of those of different faiths and countless Holy Wars. This chapter will concern itself with the other side, the enlightened Thanatos and the concepts of peace corresponding to him.

Before beginning with this analysis, I would at first like to mention some concepts of peace of a completely different persuasion that have arisen in the same cultural context, in order to show that the image of peace drawn by European modernity was by no means inevitable in the sense of the enlightened image of humankind. Heretic points of view can be traced across the European Middle Ages, from the cults of Dionysus to Gnosis, Hermeticism, and Neo-Manichaeism, as well as the

Albigenses, Waldensians, Patarini, Bogomils, Humiliati, and Cathars. The classical European premodern science is alchemy, a combination of the Egyptian tradition of mysteries, Greek philosophy, and the technical-metallurgical art of artisans and smiths. Modernity would reduce this holistic approach of religion, art, and science into the one-dimensional viewpoint of the natural sciences; and premodern, heretic knowledge would be prosecuted by the Christian churches by the Orthodox just as fervently as by the Catholic.² This was and is disastrous because with the sacrifice of alchemy in favor of a mechanistic reductionism a worldview was forsaken that, while erroneous in its exaggerations and hasty conclusions, had still provided healing insights due to its understanding of the unity of all beings. Premodern alchemy ultimately believed, speculated, and exaggerated hardly less than did the modern, natural science which was to emerge from it later on.³

One of the campaigns of extinction that was directed against the Cathars began in the year 1209, the very same year in which a young man of wealthy family in northern Italy founded a monastic community. Francis of Assisi,⁴ however, devised his ascetic teaching on the spirituality of poverty in a manner that did not question the authority of the Church. This spared him from the stake, and bequeathed the Occident one of the most important teachings of peace, drawing from the Christian understanding of the world and showing its potential.

4.1 Eros and Agape in modern mysticism

Francis of Assisi placed the capacity for compassion, Agape, at the center of his teaching on peace. He was untimely, therefore, living as he did in the midst of an environment plagued by purist phobias of ascent. Yet his balancing act between heresy and saintliness was far more radical than that. It was not limited to peace among human beings. It reached beyond the mundane and into the cosmos. The reconciliation of all dualities was his concern, not their differentiation into good and evil. This allowed him to see himself not just as brother to all human beings, but to perceive all living beings and things as his brothers and sisters. He wanted to encounter everything and everybody with respect.⁵ In his often quoted and theologically deep *Canticle of the Sun*, he praises God in all his creations, without his own mystical understanding of the world remaining hidden in any single line. Running the full risk he thus turned away from Phobos' anthropocentric tendencies, from the separation between heaven and human being and toward an

energetic point of view. This can also be observed with many of his contemporaries. A turning away from the Church's institutionally petrified apparatus of power, toward a spiritual ideal of poverty as *imitatio Christi*, was in evidence throughout the Middle Ages. But wherever such teachings of peace became socially powerful they met the resistance of the Church, which fought and destroyed them as heresy. The work and life of Francis of Assisi signify a kind of sounding out of the extremes still possible within the institution of the Church.

Christian mysticism

With his mystic and radical pacifism, Francis was in the best energetic company. From the Dervish communities in the Moorish Spain he borrowed the rule for his order, together with the idea of a lay brotherhood and his famous *Canticle of the Sun*.⁶

Be praised, my Lord,
through those who forgive for love of you;
through those who endure sickness and trial.
Happy those who endure in peace,
for by you, Most High, they will be crowned.⁷

Similar quotes can be found in Christianity since the oldest of times. An early example is Boniface, who already during the eighth century interpreted the Holy Scriptures in such a manner that "no evil may be returned with evil, but even evil with good." He preached against phobic dualism and against fear of those who kill the body, teaching that the soul lives eternally and cannot be killed.⁸ This force cannot be repressed permanently. It manifested itself especially powerfully in Francis of Assisi, but during the thirteenth century also in Berthold of Regensburg who, in his great sermon on peace, held that not only every human being but every creature naturally strives toward peace. Almost in anticipation of humanistic psychology he describes the nature of all being and therein goes far beyond the moral peace of his time or the institutionalized *pax*.⁹

Occidental mysticism culminates in the life, work, and influence of Teresa of Ávila,¹⁰ who was as important for Christian mysticism as Thomas Aquinas was for Christian dogma.¹¹ Teresa cannot be called a thinker of peace in the narrower sense. However, for an energetic interpretation of the concept of peace her writings "The Way of Perfection" and especially "The Interior Castle"¹² provide valuable pointers, influenced by Sufism, toward the inner mountain lake. They therefore serve

as germinal cells, potentials, and approaches to a Christian-inspired teaching of peace, which is also especially appropriate for modernity's language and manner of thinking.¹³ In "The Way of Perfection" Teresa offers a timeless guide for inner prayer. She writes that she knows from her own experience that it is not within the power of human beings to simply avoid evil. Therefore she does not advise prioritizing the struggle against evil, but remaining in prayer, in friendship with God. Part of the character of this inner prayer, as an Augustinian friendship with God (or, as I call it, an experience of the inner mountain lake) is to let others partake in it. In this respect, Teresa's approach of Agape, despite her fixation on suffering in the *imitatio Christi*, shows more parallels to the energetic concept of peace of Mahāyāna and its orientation on awareness, than to the phobic Christianity of her time. This is why she was sanctified, while her teaching was fought by normative and reactionary trends within the orders she herself had founded.¹⁴

I have noted that the tension between monotheism, with its tendency toward violent inclinations, and a philosophy of peace balanced between Eros and Agape, is not only a concern for Christianity. In the Muslim world the same phenomenon is represented by the Sufis, who, just like the similarly influenced Christian mystics Francis of Assisi, Teresa of Ávila, Ignatius of Loyola, John of the Cross, or Master Eckhart, underwent a balancing act between belonging and heresy. For the most part, Sufis perceive themselves as especially devout Muslims, but they are often excluded by the mainstream trends and accused of apostasy from the true faith. Either side has its justification, because Sufism is rooted in pre-Islamic Asceticism. In its ethical orientation it has a lot to do with Plato, but often even more with Advaita Vedanta, Jainism, Taoism, or Buddhism, with which it shares the energetic notion of peace regarding the divine breath. Yunus Emre, the fourteenth-century Turkish mystic, wrote that every human being is part of God and cannot be separated from him.¹⁵ The *unio mystica*, the state of being one with the divine, is the Sufis' highest goal. Via meditative techniques they strive for a transformation of their I and toward experiencing the divine within themselves already, in this world. The Sufi recognizes that nothing and no one is separated from God, the divine. While the multiplicity of divine creation is praised, this teaching still emphasizes its inherent unity.¹⁶

Abstention from adhering to individual characteristics, purification of the I for the love of God, and merging into the divine are principles of energetic peace. For Jalal ad-Din Rumi, the founder of the Mevlevi Order of Dervishes and outstanding Persian mystic of the thirteenth

century, this begins with the sublation of all dualities. He describes his experience in a poetic manner, as a journey in which contradictions are sublated. For him, whoever has decided for the philosophy of love never returns to the level of hate, which is mistakenly categorized as the opposite of love. Hate dissolves in love. Just as a fire burns the moist and the dry, the good and the evil, the beautiful and the ugly alike, so also the flame of love transforms everything that is not love.¹⁷

Islamic mysticism

Sufi literally means “child of the moment.”¹⁸ In this sense, overcoming time is an important part of its teaching. Rumi calls wallowing in the past and dreaming about the future the shackles of the free mind and advises:

Past and future veil God from our sight; burn up both of them with fire.¹⁹

All of this only limitedly points toward the moral codex of mainstream Islam around which Sufism formally orients itself. Its path follows the law, *shari'a*, which is mostly given a primary position, inextricably interlinked with mysticism (*tariqah*), the truth (*haqiqa*), and knowledge (*ma'rifa*). In the Sufi tradition, mystic knowledge is passed on through a living line. That is why it is indispensable for a Sufi to entrust himself to the spiritual leadership of a *sheikh*, teacher, who is connected to the divine source of knowledge through a line of transmissions. The function of the *sheikh*, which corresponds to that of the Indian *guru*, is indispensable not least of all because the Sufis know about the dangers of the deceptions of the I.²⁰

The Sufis understand Islam as a duty implying surrender and peace, and themselves as intermediaries between the religions. For them Islam does not just mean a ritual, normative, and moral peace, but an energetic one which encompasses all of creation.²¹ During the course of centuries Sufism therefore connected with many Islamic and non-Islamic currents, engendering teachings, forms of belief, art, and rituals, all of which are characterized by their energetic interpretation of peace, worldly tolerance, and little inclination for dogmatism, but also by their cunning and determined resistance against religious and secular institutionalism.

The Alevi philosophy may be mentioned as an especially illustrative example²² in which the Sufi teachings since the thirteenth century combine with Shia, Jewish Kabbalism, Christian Mysticism, Zoroastrianism,

and pre-Islamic Mesopotamian and Anatolian teachings. In this world-view *ma'rifa* takes precedence before *haqiqa*. Thus knowledge comes before truth. Alevis philosophy states that truth and the divine are accessible to all human beings, which is why science is especially important to it. Because of their undogmatic and enlightened attitude, Alevis today can often be found in democratic parties, humanitarian organizations, or civil society movements. They tend toward opposition within any kind of regime. When they speak about *baris*, the Turkish term for peace, they understand it in a relational sense, without a proselytizing or dogmatic approach. This is decidedly different from the etymological meaning of the term, according to which the Turkish *baris* signifies a parallel concept to the Greek Eirene and to negative peace.²³

Alevis do not need mosques, no authoritative liturgy, and no dogma. However music, poetry, and esoteric rituals, as they are recorded in their holy book, the *Buyruk*, play an important role in their practice. They reject the *shari'a*, which is why they are usually not recognized as Muslims by the dominant schools and are often prosecuted. Here there are parallels with the undogmatic and unconventional religious practice of the Bektashi in the Balkans, and, with reservations, perhaps also for the Druze and Alawis in Syria and Lebanon.²⁴

The energetic orientation of all quasi-Sufi currents moving on or beyond the borders of the Islamic teaching of faith is impressively demonstrated by their attitude toward music and dance. Without wanting to overlook the great importance of poetry for the Sufis, it is these *Dionysian* arts in all their variations that play a key role for community building and contemplation. A *cem* ceremony cannot be imagined without music and it is indispensable for carrying out religious duties. Music creates a mystic atmosphere, and through it the individual can gain his spiritual insight. As Rumi writes:

All spiritual paths lead to God. I have chosen the path of dancing and music. [...] Whoever loves nourishes his love by listening to music, because music reminds him of the joys of the first union with God.²⁵

Music is the Sufis' energetic expression on their path to peace, to the inner mountain lake. This fundamentally distinguishes Sufi teachings from the dogmatism of Sunnite and Shiite traditions. Enlightened mysticism in both Islam and Christianity twists the normative morality of the monotheistic concept of peace. The precondition is that in those teachings the One God is not personified but is interpreted, more or

less openly, in an energetic manner as the divine. The legendary mystic Haji Baktāsh Wali, after whom the Bektashi are named, thus taught that the universe is nothing other than the visible form of God, from which a corresponding ethical attitude in this world would follow. For the Alevis, neither heaven nor hell exists and the cosmos originated in a light which they call *HAK*. Everything perceptible, including the impermanent human being itself, is already contained within *HAK*. In Alevism, just like in Taoism, the human being mediates between heaven and earth and has to perish in order to maintain the harmony between all. The human spirit is the self-understanding of *HAK*, embodiment and characteristic of creation. From this derives respect for all human beings, respect for nature, and the relational and thus flexible peace ethics of this philosophy.²⁶

The contemporary Sufi A.H. Almaas writes in his book on the essence of being:

Service is not a morally good action. It has nothing to do with morality. Service is the useful and necessary work or action that is needed for the realization and development of essence, without regard to boundaries of self and other.²⁷

This ethic characterizes Sufism and all its derivations. This is not changed by the fact that different sects, from Persia through Syria to Northern Africa, cultivated Sufi techniques, especially the *dhikr*, the ritual and meditative veneration of Allah, in order to prepare themselves for violent and belligerent actions. The potential for this kind of use is inherent to all energetic teachings and occurs mostly when the energetic practice of the ritual is transferred into a moral, dualistic, and normative understanding of peace. This was the case with the Ismailites and assassins, but often it can be observed also in the North American communities' struggle for survival against the European invasion or in sub-Saharan Africa. What remains in those cases is the ritual force of an energetic charge, which in a dual context is directed against that which is perceived as evil or inferior and thus leads to the application of physical violence.

The beginning of that epoch which in Europe is called *Neuzeit* displays a conspicuous global simultaneity of energetic peace teachings, which, in varying density and importance, can be found from Japan through Asia all the way to the Atlantic. The small rights of hospitality in sub-Saharan Africa and both Americas add to this image without disturbing it in any way. These teachings are consistently rooted in ancient

insights and rituals, but appear in actualized, structured, and time- and context-relevant forms. They show flexibility in their engagement with the moral majority opinions of the monotheistic religions and only occasionally react to their aggressiveness with counter-violence. This result altogether exhibits the enormous peace-cultural potential for a balanced treatment of the decline of phobic forms of societal organization perceptible since that time.

This cannot be stressed empathically enough, because it documents that even at the beginning of the *Neuzeit* there were still enough peace-cultural alternatives to modernity to which the importance of the balance between Eros and Agape was comprehensible. Twenty-first century peace research might be inclined to identify, in an allusion to Jaspers, yet another Axial Age. This might include Teresa of Ávila, Haji Baktāsh Wali, Guru Nanak, Matsyendra Nath, Kabir and perhaps one thinker from Shingon-shu as persons of reference. But even the thought is heretic. The attention of official historiography is on others and elsewhere. The epochal change from Phobos to Thanatos founds modernity. The inevitable necessity of this turn belongs to the realm of the great narrations, just like the hypothesis that this would have been an evolutionary progress. Energetic teachings of peace have often reformed or substituted moral teachings that had become rigid or no longer credible. Whether this was good or bad is something about which the proponents of dualistic principles of faith may quarrel. These energetic renewals, however, in terms of chronology, repeatedly follow upon the institutional petrifications of moral images of peace and are, in situ, perceived as spiritual liberation from normatively closed confines. It can hardly be denied that the corresponding reforms originated in the needs of many of the people affected, who consciously worked in this direction, often putting their life at risk, and who understood themselves as forces of bodily, spiritual, and mental liberation, and not as agents of conservative persistence in phobic prejudice.

4.2 The flight from Phobos to Thanatos

It is indeed a remarkable coincidence that the Spanish grammar of Antonio de Nebrija, as the first of a modern European language, was published in the year 1492. The creation of language rules may superficially not appear to be a particularly spectacular act; in its deeper meaning, however, it constitutes an attack on vernacular speech and thinking. Since speaking is a function of thinking, language rules imply a deep intervention in the self-perception of people.²⁸ Whoever before

had just expressed himself could from now on do so in either the right or the wrong manner according to a dualistic logic, through which his value, his belonging, his being thus and not other were determined. That is why the grammar of Nebrija takes equal place next to other deeply symbolic acts of violence of the year 1492 in Europe.²⁹

The end of the *convivencia* in Spain, which in 1492 found its expression in the fall of Granada as the last Muslim city on the Iberian Peninsula and which brought death and displacement to tens of thousands of people,³⁰ at its core was not founded on enmity toward the concerned people, but on the dwindling Christian trust in their own faith. The Pope elected in 1492, Rodrigo Borgia, who as Alexander VI led a reign of terror in Rome and was unable to effectively counter French pillaging in Italy, symbolizes the tension between the Catholic Church's claim to universality and its low capacity to also represent it.

Also the work of Nicolo Machiavelli³¹ is part of this genre's view. His fateful work *Il Principe* mirrors this circle's corresponding understanding of peace. Cesare Borgia, the son of the Pope, served as the blueprint for Machiavelli's ideal image of princely rule. At the turn of the century, Borgia led an absolute and violent rule in the Papal State.³² It was Machiavelli's opinion that only the strong hand of a prince endowed with the corresponding powers and competences could contain societal chaos. He was no cynic, but fearfully driven by a pessimistic image of humankind, he firmly believed in the ordering force of a strong hand whose most effective functioning at any cost was in the center of his interest. That is why he referred to the princely law as Marsilius of Padua had once proposed it and thereby pointed the way for the later thinking of Thomas Hobbes and the so-called realist school of international relations. Driven by fear, he strengthened war-cultural thinking. His teaching is credible because it is simple and its attractiveness for rulers made it more difficult for many a concept of peace to find an open ear during successive generations.³³

In 1487, five years before Pope Alexander's assumption of office, the so-called *Malleus Maleficarum* had appeared in Strasbourg, intended to systematize the rules of evidence in trials against witches as they had begun in this form during the previous hundred years. However one interprets the subjective intention of single inquisitors, their work was the destruction of vernacular and traditional wisdom and its carriers – mainly women – both of which were subsequently replaced by medicine as the institutionalized power of experts.³⁴ Customary perceptions passed down through the centuries of the *Mitwelt*, the community, and even of the human body were threatened by this prosecution, until the

people themselves stopped trusting it and began to discard it.³⁵ The Inquisition's terror prepared the mental and spiritual wasteland from which modernity would lift itself. It thereby successively stripped the Christian faith of its character, so that it was no longer a question of self-understanding, but a legal question. The moral decay of the Church provoked ascetic moralizing fanatics like Girolamo Savonarola,³⁶ and later on the Reformation. For a deeply unsettled society, however, this was less a way out than an expression of the spreading lack of orientation. The old world shattered over its fear of itself, before the new one's promises of salvation were designed.

The creeping threat to everyday life, the phobic perception of life as the last possibility in the wake of the devastating experience of epidemic diseases, demonstrated, in a dramatic manner, the loss of the vernacular power of disposition over body and consciousness.³⁷ This may have contributed to the emergence of the varied fears, utopias, and even the invention of America as the materialization of the European dream³⁸ hardly less than did the concrete threats presented by the campaigns and wars of this time.

The Utopists

Under these impressions, the Utopists, Thomas More,³⁹ Tommaso Campanella,⁴⁰ and Francis Bacon,⁴¹ in different ways prefigure the most important components of what would later on come to be called the Idealist school of international relations. In More's *Utopia* the aspects of reason, humanism, and justice are predominant and they are upheld from a position of armed strength. In Campanella's *City of the Sun*, an all-powerful central force dictates the justice of social redistribution and fair labor, and legitimates itself via an energetic and in any case impersonal concept of god in the form of an Echnatonic or Mithraic veneration of the sun. In Bacon's *The New Atlantis*, the aspect of technical progress is central. Common to all three of them is that they discard the current state of affairs in their contemporary societies, and draw an ideal other-world in novelistic form, because a direct critique of the rulers would have been, and indeed was, fatal.

No less utopian are the peace plans of Emeric Cruce,⁴² *Le Nouveau Cynée*, and *Le Grand Dessein* by Maximilien de Béthune, Duke of Sully.⁴³ With his emphasis on free trade for peace Cruce picks up another topic that would later on count among the central considerations of the Idealist school of international relations: war does not pay off. The good businessman needs and produces peace. The Duke of Sully reintroduced the idea of a European federation into the debate and for this purpose

referred to a proven method: the construction of an external enemy against whom a holy war, a permanent crusade, should be waged in order to secure European unity, which at his time had thoroughly been shaken by inter-Christian wars between Catholics, Calvinists, Huguenots, and Lutherans.⁴⁴

In the five authors mentioned above, all the ideals of the modern European debate on peace announce themselves, long before the Peace of Westphalia and the famous classics of Enlightenment: reason, humanism, justice, redistribution and fair labor, technical progress, free trade, and federalism.

The fact that these topics, in constantly evolving narratives, repeat themselves throughout the centuries is founded in their common, deep cultural roots, in a structure of thought that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle and which, under the name of Natural Law, helps to form the basic traits of the so-called Enlightenment's thinking. Natural Law is a jurisprudential term for that which is imagined to be superordinate to the positive law codified in norms. Natural Law is thus perceived as an eternal right, pre-existing and above the state, which every person shares by the force of their own *Dasein*. During the Enlightenment this was often perceived as very distinct from the Christian-medieval understanding that freedom could be granted only through the gracious authority of God or princes, without founding the entitlement of a right. The appeal to super-positive law assumes that certain legal rules claim validity independently of any concrete definition in the legal order, and therefore can neither be created nor revoked through any act of positive codification.

Such suppositions are the precondition for thinking of the universality of human rights, but they can just as well be used for the legitimization of Fascist rule. The difference to the medieval Catholic canonic law which has marked European history is primarily a formal one. The *ius divinum naturale* was understood as an active, authoritative act which did not need to be written, while the *ius divinum positivum* was expressed in texts. The legal principles taught in Natural Law are ascribed to different, but always external, sources beyond human influence.

The Enlightenment could not escape the fundamental dilemma within the thinking of Natural Law, even though it replaced Augustine's medieval God, standing outside the world, with nature or reason. Those values which are supposed to be obvious to all human beings due to the very fact of their *Dasein* remain subject to the observer's evaluation because the final grounds of being cannot be proven in this world.

Whoever has the power to declare their own evaluation to be universal can do so with reference to God, nature, existence, or reason without having to bear the burden of proof. Whether such an act is received as despotic or as wholesome is left to the impression of those affected. Despite their claim to universality, the principles of Natural Law are subject to the discursive contexts of concrete communities, and it is according to the respective evaluations of these communities that they become socially powerful or not.

Yet this reveals itself from the perspective of the twenty-first century, and especially from the experience gained through an intensive debate around the universality of human rights, and out of the trauma of Fascism. Those whose ideas were based on the premises of Natural Law and whom I will go on to quote, could not yet draw from these experiences and in this they were no different to those thinkers who had preceded them. Many of the antagonisms fervently fought over in the European *Geistesgeschichte* and in real politics go back to the same fundamental assumptions of Natural Law. That they so violently differed and differentiated among themselves is due to this very assumption, which mesmerized them with the possibility of an ultimate truth.

Natural Law has nothing to do with energetic concepts of peace. It rationally excludes relationality. It is rooted in the same ground as the moral concepts of peace, and transports those from the idiom of Phobos into that of Thanatos. The disputes of enlightened European jurisprudence about Natural Law and Positivism take place beyond the energetic concepts of peace, and ignore them consistently.

Modern warfare and the invention of America

At the end of the fifteenth century, warfare differed from earlier forms, mainly due to the importance of artillery. Since it had become mobile and it could be used on ships, artillery created great powers. It not only enabled Spain's rise to become a world power in Granada in 1492, but it was also a decisive factor in the advancement of the Ottomans in Eastern Europe. Whether their spreading power in the Levant was the reason for Europe's expansion to the west as is commonly asserted, or whether conversely, the orientation of the European ruling houses toward the Atlantic in fact enabled their incursion as far as Vienna may remain unanswered. In any case, the so-called Turkish threat remained present for Christian Europe as a menacing image.⁴⁵

Since the early *Neuzeit*, wars were led with technology that had a markedly higher inherent destructive power. This simultaneously

demanding and enabled an ever greater mobility, greater armies, and thus ever more elaborate preparations for war. Christian seafaring experienced a technological revolution during this time, instigated by the influence of Arabic and Chinese knowledge. Through this new type of warfare the connection between economic and military power became so close that soon the two were no longer separable or even distinguishable from each other. This omnipresence of war, even when for once there was no actual fighting going on, is perceived by many as the beginning of the capitalist world system, the actual engine for the fundamental transformation of Europe at the turn of the times. Max Weber⁴⁶ held that the technological and social formation of the military determined the configuration of the modern state and society and that in *modernity* the military ceased to be a tool of politics. Instead it became the engine and shaper of state and society. The hierarchy-based efficacy of institutions like monasteries became the ideal image for barracks and these in turn, together with their military drill, became the blueprint for factories, schools, hospitals or, more generally, for an effectively producing competitive society. Michael Mann summarized this in one concise sentence:

Though states have other purposes too, they have been principally concerned throughout history with warfare.⁴⁷

This observation prefigures a central point of discussion within twentieth century peace research⁴⁸ and refers to the social change at the beginning of modernity, which most contemporaries met only fearfully. This fear evoked the longing for an escape, for the land of unlimited possibilities, the land of gold, in which desires, passions, and noble and base drives could be given free rein. The contrast between the moral concept of peace in the centers, and the concept of peace in colonies, became a defining characteristic not only of the Spanish wars of conquest. The massacre of strangers without need for ritual justification (*polemos*) is contrary to the ritual practice of burning others at the stake in Europe (*stasis*) and the human sacrifice in America. It is the herald of Thanatos, who at the beginning of modernity was pushing for his breakthrough in the name of Christianity.⁴⁹

The metamorphosis from Phobos to Thanatos began to unfold when formal-legal conceptions started to displace theologically or philosophically founded ones. Natural-legalistic prejudice about the equality of all people became an important instrument for the rapidly growing legal system to spread European values across the world, while prejudice

about the inferiority of the other continued to exist as a political instrument of violence. After the *Mudéjares*⁵⁰ in Spain were given the choice between expulsion as inferiors or formal assimilation through mass baptism, this model was soon transferred to the whole world. In principle, modern international law should have the same validity for Native Americans as for Europeans.

These norms conveyed a European understanding of *morals* and law, even if such important Humanists like Francisco de Vitoria,⁵¹ one of the intellectual fathers of international law, wanted to understand this fundamentally as a protection of people. The law, which should be valid for all alike, had first been charged with European value concepts and thus became a fatal legitimization for colonial wars. For Vitoria, the belligerent Christian is not fundamentally in contradiction with the Gospels because there are always recalcitrant human beings with a penchant for vice who can hardly be swayed by words. These have to be kept from evil with force and intimidation. For him it is about keeping the temporal peace of the communal system, which justified war as the means for the implementation of the *lex humana*. A just war would serve as preparation for salvation, the defense of God's honor, because through it sins could be prevented. That is why, according to Vitoria, just war exists in Natural Law. But not only that; according to Vitoria, even an offensive war can be just, because its deterrent effect for miscreants would serve the maintenance of peace and security within the state. The welfare of the whole earth depended on the active containment of injustice and the protection of the innocent and the righteous, which also included securing the Ecclesia Cristiana through rulers ready for action.⁵² This justification of offensive or defensive wars through one's own evaluation of the other party's injustice exhibits a reflex dating back to the Roman politics of conquest, whose principles endured over the centuries in the writings of the Church Fathers and also still characterized Vitoria's teachings. In its efficacy, however, modern international law is the catalogue of norms necessary for the expansion of the capitalist world system, and it was devised as such at the time.

When those utopias that I have mentioned earlier found their way into the Americas under the name of civilization, progress, or modernity, the people living there previously had to give way. The chronicles describe details of the cruelties and destruction that were brought upon communities and societies, which often vanished from history without a trace and before the chroniclers could even record their names. The question of why the Europeans acted in that manner can be answered in different ways. One explanation of many is that they were occupied

so much with their own self-understanding and their fear, that they did not even perceive the others in their essence. Helmut Knolle refers to the principle of growth as an ideological idiosyncrasy of Occidental civilization:

Whether it was the territory that was supposed to grow during the age of discoveries, whether it was the population during the time of emigration, or the economy in the present – the “principle of growth” has [...] always dominated the occidental civilization [...]. Its highest principle still reads: Be fertile and multiply, populate the earth, accumulate capital!⁵³

What follows from this urge is a paradigmatic ignorance of everything foreign, since the concentration of force and space for one's own expansion takes precedence over the principle of Agape in dealing with others. For societies who interpret peace as the right to hospitality, an encounter with such a force is lethal. Just as Thanatos gives precedence to human beings over all other life and disturbs the natural balance through this anthropocentrism, he also gives precedence to the Occidental human being over the non-Occidental, and destroys his space of life. Since Francis Bacon's utopia and since the emergence of the capitalist world system this has been called progress. The purposeful preoccupation with others has left a trail through the centuries. Equality as prejudice and love as method are not the opposite of this, but are much rather the slowly fading phobic aspect of a collective behavior which, under the impression of the dawning Enlightenment, increasingly takes on the features of Thanatos without being able to keep the balance between Eros and Agape even for a short period of time. The radical mode of the European reconfiguration between the so-called Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the French Revolution of 1789 is impressive.

4.3 Anthropological pessimism/anthropological optimism

Everything I have discussed so far can be found in reference books and handbooks on international law or international relations, if at all, and then mostly just as a short introductory reference. This is the case because both disciplines declare their subject to be the relations

between modern nation-states and define the beginning of the relevant time period with the Peace of Westphalia of Münster and Osnabrück and the system of states that developed therefrom:

Due to their technical and organizational superiority (especially through firearms and in seafaring) the European states dominate world politics since the beginning of the *Neuzeit* and shape the slowly emerging “classical” International Law according to their concepts of values and interests.⁵⁴

The international system, which has become the research topic of a nowadays largely accepted scientific discipline, is the product of five centuries of European expansion and can be grasped only out of this historicity, namely with the break in human history occurring with the capitalist revolution.⁵⁵

Those two exemplary quotes reveal how the research interest of the corresponding disciplines has been oriented since the very beginning. The corresponding disciplines derive from the phenomenon itself, as Krippendorff furthermore states.⁵⁶ This means that the disciplines of international relations or international law can only exist after there are international relations which can be understood in this way, or a respective body of law reaching across states. Since consciousness about a problem only appears with substantial delay after the problem itself, the corresponding disciplines emerged some time after the political creation of the new conditions. It was only when the practice of conflict regulation and its attendant frame of interpretation – up until then proven and valid – turned out to be unsuitable for working on current conflicts that the need arose for systematic and scientific research on those relations and their norms.⁵⁷

That is how the self-understanding of the mentioned disciplines defined itself. This explains why they have produced great insight within this frame of definition, but at the same time remained reduced in their understanding of peace onto viewpoints that only had limited reach, due to the presumption of the modern state of law with its basic components: state territory, state people, and state authority. This limitation holds for all those cases in which this understanding encountered groups of people that could not follow this concept. During the age of discoveries and capitalist expansion, that encompassed the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

Anthropological pessimism

The rearrangement of the inner European legal order furthermore implied a substantial self-limitation on the part of the elites in light of previous history. The traumatizing experience of the inter-Christian religious struggles during the so-called Thirty Years War led to an almost panicked flight out of the phobic philosophy of ascent as the churches had been able to dictate it up until that point. Since fighting Phobos with panic does not lead to balance, a fast turn toward Thanatos' philosophy of descent ensued within European politics, which was soon to express itself in the three pillars of so-called modernity: secular thinking of progress, radical dogmatism of reason, and rigid political absolutism. From the perspective of peace research, the concerns raised relate to the fact that this new order and self-understanding arose from the trauma of war and hence place a Roman legacy in the center of interest that has proven to be problematic for the peaces: security.

The analysis of foreign and international politics should therefore ensue under this aspect. The search for knowledge should be guided by the intention to first maintain the existence of the individual (security) and then to develop it (economic welfare and participation in governance). Thereof results the highest value for foreign politics and international politics, that is, avoiding and successively eliminating the possibility for the application of organized military violence.⁵⁸

This at first sounds understandable and also consequent within the known order. But through the tacitly accepted preconditions of the new international order many real existing possibilities for thinking and perceiving the peaces are excluded. That is the dilemma of the two most important currents of thought that both, albeit differently, interpret the natural law on which they are founded and that determined the European understanding of peace during the centuries after the peace of Westphalia. Prefiguring their designation in the twentieth century, I call them the Realist and the Idealist schools of international relations.

Thomas Hobbes⁵⁹ is commonly named as the predecessor of the Realist school. In the context of peace research his efficacy is less that of an originary thinker than the expression of a mentality arising from personal experience as an eyewitness to the Thirty Years War. His low opinion of man, which was that of man's wolf,⁶⁰ can be understood from his biography. The same goes for his fundamental fear of the

human beast that he pours into the intellectual concept of *Leviathan*,⁶¹ and into the proposal of an absolute state power that should guarantee inner security and protect the individual from outer attacks.⁶²

Compassion for that author's personal perspective and experience does not protect one from the fundamental consequences of his rational-mechanistic philosophy. Hobbes discarded the scholastic tradition of thought and replaced the primacy of truth with that of peace. Everything that makes people take up arms, in his opinion, cannot be true, because the highest truth of reason would be the natural law toward peace. This implies that Hobbes does not discard the problematic figure of thought of the One Truth. He just gives it a new connotation in terms of content, and calls it peace. This slight of hand reaches no further than Plato's critical handling of Eirene about 2,000 years earlier. The desired peace, for Hobbes, is the absence of physical violence, which is why he consequently exalts the principle of security. He sacrifices the possibility of peace on the altar of security and founds, based on remnants of older considerations from Thucydides to Machiavelli, a manner of thinking that lets pass the chance for an Occidental peace culture as it could have arisen, out of the phobic principle of rule's manifest failure.

Therefore, the contrary occurred. The principle of fear was secularized and, as paradoxical as this may appear, it is just this very principle which guides the analytical reason of this early *neuzeitlichen* empiricist. Therefore he builds, on the basis of what he perceives and thus holds to be true, an ideology that later on, despite all evidence to the contrary, will be called Realist, a label that would lead to lasting confusion in the discussion.

The fear of death leads, with Hobbes, via the deployment of a reason understood in an instrumental rationalistic manner, to the desire for security. The latter would only be possible through submission under the power of an overall sovereign. For Hobbes, human beings are all equal, firstly because they all want the same things and secondly because the mutual threat they pose to each other remains ever the same. The strongest could be killed by the weakest through deceit and cunning. The fear of death makes all humans equal. The things for which human nature strive can be traced back to self-preservation and the satisfaction of lust. However, since the increase in pleasure reaches its limits whenever two individuals desire the same thing, fights between them are inevitable. Since all things are limited and not all human beings can enjoy all scarce goods equally and unlimitedly, the question about the power of assertion against the claims of others subsequently arises. Power and

competition, according to Hobbes, only cease when they encounter an even greater power. This higher ranking and all-regulating power for him is the *Leviathan*.⁶³

Hobbes inspired and legitimated the newly emerging nation states. They entered a race for power, influence, resources, and possibilities for accumulation, while the elites were able to increasingly include the broad masses in their competitive and, in ultimate consequence, belligerent activities, so that the latter came to see their suffering and dying as a patriotic duty. Even if the dying occurred ever less for God and ever more for the nation, fear and the desire for security still remained the decisive driving force for confrontation as well as fuel for the fantasy of the complete annihilation of the other. The question of structural violence did not arise for Hobbes. This shows the conceptual limitations of his Realist view of the human being, state, and peace.

For those following this philosophy, or better, this mentality, *pax* is only as great as one's own angst. This term is to be taken literally: angst, *angustia*, narrowness means the lack of breath in the face of an immediate threat. Its memory can always reactualize the emotion of the once experienced threat and reconstitute the corresponding lack of breath, even if the threat itself has long passed.⁶⁴ As a peace-political motif, fear is thus disastrous. Since the beginning of modernity the fearful strive, breathlessly following Thanatos, toward the endless accumulation of mundane goods for whatever is considered one's own, whether that be the person or the state. They produce ever greater and more devastating wars and a state-political order of peace that Michel Foucault has succinctly described as the continuation of war by other means.⁶⁵

As universal scholar, Hobbes is entitled to a prominent place among the founders of the mechanistic worldview. As political philosopher he derived momentous conclusions from his undertaking to place all actions and events that determine being under a methodological superstructure. After all the political experiences with this kind of Realism accrued between Hobbes and our time, those conclusions can hardly be accepted from the perspective of a study of twenty-first century peaces. His work nevertheless had effects reaching far into the twentieth century, where it not only influenced the proponents of classical Realism like Hans Morgenthau,⁶⁶ but also the so-called Neo-Realist, often named Systemic, school of Realism after Kenneth Waltz.⁶⁷ Peace research as a scientific discipline has not taken up these approaches. On the contrary, it largely owes its emergence since the late 1950s to the explicit rejection of this so-called political Realism.

Anthropological optimism

Hobbes' Dutch contemporary Hugo Grotius,⁶⁸ who in literature is often called the father of modern international law, was similarly marked by the experiences of the Thirty Years War. To deal with his trauma he referred to the figure of natural law and assumed that humanity as an abstract legal community would be above the law of states. He does not want to see this international law implemented in the form of a global state, but in an alliance of free states submitting to elementary ethical obligations. Grotius did not believe in the possibility of producing a lasting peace via this instrument and in his main work⁶⁹ called for a legal regulation of war. Grotius took up the thinking about the concept of just war where Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria had left off. He arrives at the conclusion that it would be possible to have a legitimate authority on both sides of the conflict, from whose perspective also the other premises would be fulfilled. This means that a war can be just from the point of view of both parties.

He thus overcomes the theory of the One Truth but does not make use of this opportunity to also discard the model of the just war. On the contrary, he enlarges it to the *bellum iustum ex utraque parte*, which implies that finally any war led by an authority is just and any civil resistance against it inadmissible. This is because Grotius, just like Hobbes, assumes that an independent people could transfer the rights to governance to such a degree onto one or several rulers that nothing would remain of them. A thus endowed authority would be authorized to lead just wars. Therefrom results Grotius' concern to legally regulate confrontation itself and to normatively prohibit or command the social human being to do that which would be naturally reasonable to all. In this category belongs the distinction between combatant and civilian, as well as the proscription of torture and the prohibition of violence against the unarmed.⁷⁰ All these are topics that were already known to the old Germanic law but had been lost in the course of the enlargement of *pax* and the modernization of warfare and thus needed to be regulated anew.

If Huber and Reuter⁷¹ hold that it is one of the paradoxes of European history that the breakthrough to a European international law that included legal rules for warfare of all times occurred exactly during the period of the Thirty Years War – a war which surpassed all previous ones in length and cruelty – then I cannot see the paradox here. Grotius accepts the existence of war as a given, and without illusion aims for its humanization. That this always remains an attempt within the culture of war should not surprise anybody.

I have already demonstrated in several examples in the current work, how easy it is to fall into the trap of natural law. That is, to pre-assume erroneously circumstances that appear reasonable to all healthy human beings. This leads easily into violent dogmatism. Grotius was caught in it, although he perceived the perspectivity of all violence-founding truth. This is because he failed to notice the narrow limits of his own logic-rational and empirical, but simultaneously pessimistic, perception of human nature. Out of his own biography this is understandable, but it does not imply the necessity to lastingly interpret his call for a humanized warfare between lords and armies as civilizatory and an inescapable right of the peoples.

Just like the Realist school, the beginnings of the Idealist school, in principle, can be dated as far back in history as one wants. It has become customary to contrast Thomas Hobbes' pessimism with the image of humankind of another British universal scholar, John Locke.⁷² Locke describes peace as the natural coexistence of beings endowed with reason, who in freedom and equality practice conflict regulation through damage control. He therefore refers to the ideas that British Utopists like Thomas More and Francis Bacon had already voiced, and expresses them in a language adequate to his time, which in my opinion is of more relevance for the sciences of the state than it is for peace studies.

Locke's anthropological optimism and the principle of the sovereignty of the people which he deduced from this, interpret natural law in such a manner that for peace to be maintained its implementation needs to be placed into the hands of all. This was considered to be the antithesis to Hobbes' or Grotius' teaching of absolutism. It was also developed later on with Rousseau and Kant in a manner more relevant for peace research, and had its real political influence on the drafting of the American Declaration of Independence and on the French Revolution.

For Locke, the mature, free, and equal subject of private law, who represents a morally and politically free personality, also always owns property. The right to property through independent work emancipates the citizen, who distinguishes himself from the aristocracy, the unpropertied, and wage laborers through the accumulation of capital. Locke is the advocate for the rising, propertied bourgeoisie. And it is this bourgeoisie that is meant when Locke demands that all power should derive from the people. Property for him is the central characteristic of reason. Things gain their value through human labor, whose fruits are a person's absolutely private property. Through his work a person comes to own and create the market value of goods. Since the

reasonable person claims his property, he creates ownership, surplus of work. The property-owning person should therefore also represent his claim to a reasonable regulation of the relations of exchange. Locke rejects war and violence for this reason, because they disturb the free flow of those relations of exchange.⁷³ This discussion, however, belongs in the context of the struggle over dominance in the new system of state between the aristocrats and the bourgeoisie and does not yet take into consideration the challenges of the nineteenth century as regards mass poverty and democracy. That notwithstanding, concern about the cost-induced unreasonableness of warfare became a lasting argument for Idealism in all its facets.

Locke abolished all moral concerns regarding property and the disposition over capital. Reasonable behavior for him is possessive. Those without property are unreasonable. The majority of the population is left behind in this model and is integrated as irrelevant into its image of peace. This last fact explains why Locke, although he should be recognized for his achievements for the theory of the state, cannot be an iconic figure of peace research. He does not know energetic peace, and twists the moral one with the help of natural law toward a modernity oriented on property, which accepts the misery of the many in order to justify the rule of the few under the banner of power to all. Locke is the co-founder of an ideology that does not ask what is good for the human beings and their peaces, but for the growth of the economy. The unfounded hypothesis that everything that is good for the economy would also foster the wellbeing of people conceals the unwholesome character of the dynamic that is thereby set in motion.

This argument is later furthered by Adam Smith⁷⁴ who pointed toward the high costs of warfare and the impoverishment of the state induced by it. Put briefly: people trading with each other should not shoot at each other, because that would not be profitable.⁷⁵ David Ricardo⁷⁶ finally turned this into the liberal ideology of growth according to which capitalism is a system in which everybody wins in the long run by exploiting the comparative advantage of costs.⁷⁷

The Marxist-inspired psychologist Erich Fromm would later on call those considerations a form of radical hedonism. He saw them as promises that cannot be fulfilled, because besides the system-immanent contradictions, also their two most important psychological premises are not correct. These claim that, firstly, the goal of life is the maximization of pleasure, defined as the satisfaction of any desire or subjective need that a human being may feel; and secondly that egoism, selfishness, and greed – as the system needs to generate them in order to

exist – lead to harmony and peace.⁷⁸ According to Fromm both are tragic errors. He says they lead at best, and that only in exceptional cases, to healthy national economies at price of sick people. As long as societies are mainly formed by people whose primary motivations are having materials and greed, they will necessarily lead wars against one another. This is because it is inevitable that they will envy what other societies have, and attempt to obtain what they themselves desire through war, economical pressure, and threats. Those methods are applied, contrary to the supposed economic reason, especially against weaker societies. A society which is oriented in this way will act aggressively as long as there is even a slight chance of victory. Not because it urgently needs something, but because the desire to have more and conquer more is deeply rooted in the mode of the existence of having. Under those conditions, peace will never be more than Eirene. According to Fromm, the idea that one could build peace while encouraging the striving for possessions and profit is an illusion, and a dangerous one at that, because it keeps people from recognizing that they have to face an alternative: either a change of paradigm or perpetual war.⁷⁹

In France, the number of thinkers whose works led to the convolutions of the revolution was greater than anywhere else. It is hard to decide to which of them to attribute a prominent peace-political role that goes beyond the general dimension of law and the philosophy of state. Koppe⁸⁰ here suggests the *Plan of Perpetual Peace* by the Abbé de Saint Pierre⁸¹ from 1713, which was only published in 1778. I can agree with him here, because this proposal, which has little regard in scientific debate, builds a bridge between the Duke of Sully and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.⁸² The latter is one of the most interesting personalities for consideration in this chapter. Out of all the things that could be said about him I will only take up the aspect which becomes important for further argumentation in this book.

In his writings,⁸³ Rousseau innovatively combines anthropological optimism with a deeply pessimistic philosophy of history. History for him cannot be interpreted as the self-unfolding of humanity's natural destiny, but as an unnatural step out of the state of nature that by no means would have been necessary but is the result of coincidence and catastrophes. In a deeper meaning this corresponds to what I have said in allusion to Sigrist about the emergence of patriarchy. The ill of inequality in material possessions and secular conditions of life for Rousseau is the product of a deliberate dynamic, the economic, social, and mental consequences of which change the being of humanity. This inequality would find its origins in private property, division of

labor, and a fraudulent political institution normatively safeguarding the existing conditions of injustice.⁸⁴ In consequence this would result in an order based on the right of superior force leading to those Realist conditions as Hobbes has depicted them. This is expressed in one of the author's most frequently quoted thoughts from his early text *Discourse on the Basis and Origin of Inequality among Men*:

The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying: This is mine, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars and murders, from how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by pulling up the stakes, or filling up the ditch, and crying to his fellows: 'Beware of listening to this impostor; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.'⁸⁵

In his main work, *The Social Contract*, Rousseau consistently demands a political order that would heal the break between abstract law and the thus regulated reality, so as to provide a normative concept of order for the practical critique of existing institutions. If under such conditions every human being followed his or her own reason, then a majority, a consensus, the *volonté générale*, would form all by itself, which would be for the benefit of all.⁸⁶

That is Idealist because the human being for Rousseau has to know what should be in order to be able to evaluate what is. He develops the ideal of a largely egalitarian society in which the person and the assets of each are defended, yet in which each person, because he unites with everybody else, obeys while remaining as free as before. True freedom would thus consist in all people committing to the law. They themselves have previously created the law. Therefore also they themselves benefit from giving up their natural equality for that higher form of equality. This proposal is therefore more than just Idealist. It is radically democratic and risky, because the *volonté générale* is no guarantee for reason and agree.

Rousseau's proposal in its diverse interpretations had the greatest effects for the intellectual and political history of subsequent times. In Rousseau, many of Enlightenment's different currents of thoughts flow together toward an innovative creation out of which a rainbow of political possibilities for thinking and action in modernity, and even more so in postmodernity, should derive. This has not only led to liberating and peaceful developments. Even Fascism chose to appropriate elements of

Rousseau's teaching and merged it with Realist thought toward a violence-laden ideology.

That notwithstanding, Rousseau's texts are also a source of critical peace research. This mainly refers to his radically democratic philosophy of state, which deftly twists Hobbesian fear and Lockean mechanics. He enables a rational yet optimistic cultural criticism and opens a view of societal and philosophical alternatives to the fascination with Thanatos during his time. The ideas of Johan Galtung in the twentieth century, but also the postmodern schools of peace research, would hardly be imaginable without Rousseau's previous work.

Rousseau's personal and mental effort, which in several instances was in extreme contradiction to the thinking of his time, is marked by his dramatic fate and his fragile personal psychological condition, a situation which is also known for many others sharing the same fate. The story of the many peaces told so far coincides with Rousseau in many of its approaches and appraisals, without harboring any illusion about the brittleness of his basic assumptions on human nature.

Perpetual peace

Immanuel Kant,⁸⁷ inspired by Rousseau, shares this optimistic image of human nature. At least within continental European peace research, probably no text has been more widely received than his famous philosophical treatise *On Perpetual Peace*.⁸⁸ Kant assumes, like Hobbes, that war would be the natural state of societies. As a being principally endowed with reason, the human would, however, be able to create and live peace under certain conditions:

It is for completely natural reasons that self-preservation, which makes people egoistic and aggressive, forces them to get along, because it becomes pointless to want to preserve oneself if this preservation of the self can only be gained through its sacrifice when fighting for it.⁸⁹

He perceives those conditions mainly in the form of a republican and democratic constitution of states founded on the separation of power, because he deems it unlikely that people would democratically decide for a war that they afterwards would have to fight themselves.⁹⁰ To the democratic state of law Kant adds on the international level the idea of a federation of free states which settle their differences in a reasonable manner. Kant's thinking thus renders concrete both the notion of the modern state of law as well as that international system which will later

on find its form in the United Nations.⁹¹ Also human rights are a concern for him and he early on recognizes the problem of nationally organizing states around a standing army. He therefore criticized the logic of a civil administration permanently oriented on war and called for a general conscription controlled by the people themselves as a lesser and temporary evil compared with professional standing armies.⁹²

Kant takes over many of these thoughts, not just the title for the groundbreaking text, from the Abbé Saint Pierre and other French authors. This also goes for the universalistic and institutionalist elements of his work. The separation of powers dates back to Charles de Secondat, Baron of Montesquieu,⁹³ and his main work *De l'esprit des lois* from 1748. The aspects of critical reason point toward Rousseau, Hume, and other early thinkers of this direction.

Kant was furthermore also a proponent of moral Idealism. As such he founded an utopist peace,⁹⁴ the influence of which remained especially strong in Germany. He is justifiably considered the founder of the so-called Idealist School within the discipline of international relations. This school thinks peace universally and morally in both the general sense and in the specific one of my definition. That is why this school thinks peace dualistically and normatively. Since Kant's time Idealism turned against the unjust, bad colonialism, and imperialism.⁹⁵ It is emphatically engaged in the ideals of the good world-citizen right or human rights and therein refers to Kant who extensively dealt with established peace out of hospitality.⁹⁶ Although most proponents of this school admit that those ideals remain unreachable in their practical fulfillment, they still approve of every step in that direction and work on models that could favor movement toward them.

Early on, something akin to a nineteenth-century peace movement arose on this basis. In this context the British Peace Society was founded in London in 1816, the American Peace Society was founded in 1828, the German peace movement of Königsberg was founded in 1850, and the Österreichische Friedensgesellschaft [Austrian Peace Society] was founded under Bertha von Suttner in 1891.⁹⁷ The innovative contributions of this early Idealist civil society are not insubstantial. The principle of hope stood, in allusion to Kant, at the center of their mentality. Characteristic of all of their proposals is the turn from the national or Eurocentric toward the universal, but nevertheless originary, European ideals and consequently an interpretation of *pax* that understands this direction as great and as institutionalized contractual law. For the continental European approaches to peace research, Kant and his peace out of law are an indispensable reference. Among many others in

the twentieth century, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate of 1954, Albert Schweitzer, also explicitly refers to him.⁹⁸ Later Jürgen Habermas⁹⁹ referred to him. The school of peace research around Dieter Senghaas would finally follow him in Idealist euphoria.¹⁰⁰

Marxism

An Idealist of a different persuasion was Karl Marx,¹⁰¹ the youngest of those philosophers and scholars that I would like to mention in this short overview. Just as with the other classics, it can here only be about casting a concentrated look on his explicit understanding of peace.

Expressed shortly, one could say that Marx¹⁰² inverts the liberal-Idealist creed of Locke, Smith, or Ricardo. The latter says that capitalism would be a system in which everybody wins in the long run. Marx, however, holds that within this system ever more people would have to lose in the long run, for an ever smaller number of people to win. The relation of exploitation would be the cause of any form of physical violence. He connects this negative verdict, which he believes to be able to corroborate scientifically via Historical Materialism, with the good news that things would not have to remain that way. With the lifting of class antagonism the causes of the permanent condition of violence would also cease. The road toward peace among people and states would thus automatically be cleared and states become superfluous as instruments of domination, and consequently they would wither away.

In my terminology so far this implies that peace is a consequence of justice. I have already discussed the problem of such a supposition in the context of the biblical concept of peace. If the completely equal distribution of all material goods is demanded under the banner of justice, then this hides an attitude thoroughly oriented on having that can be summarized in one word: envy. He who demands that nobody should be allowed to have more than himself is thus protecting himself from the envy he would feel if anyone had even an ounce more of anything. The idea of a classless society in a socialist world filled with the spirit of greed is therefore just as illusory and dangerous as the idea of permanent peace between greedy nations.¹⁰³

But the road of justice is historically pre-given for Marx. The struggle to overcome class antagonisms, and therefore capitalism, as fast as possible, would be the decisive means for the creation of a lasting peace. The Marxist approach thus sees the revolutionary subject as an actor in his own history and wants to overcome the worker's alienation from the means of production. In terms of concrete analysis, orientation,

and guidelines for action for the revolutionary subject, he therefore demands more than those Idealist approaches that already know beforehand what is good:

Philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.¹⁰⁴

That is why Marxism investigates the societal system more meticulously than is done in any other school. Protest against societal conditions is replaced by the attempt to scientifically analyze its causes and immanent trends of development. The society imagined as ideal should not just be construed out of the head and speculatively developed, but derived from real trends and contradictions within existing conditions. Change will not be brought about by appealing to reason, to the pity of the property owners, and to the efficiency in educating people toward good, but through the dependent workers' class struggle. Marx does not hope, he expects what he has scientifically calculated.

During the next centuries those attempts have both methodologically and factually contributed to the career of the social sciences far beyond the borders of Marxism. Especially the turn from mechanistic to Structuralist and system-theoretical approaches within social sciences is substantially also owed to the origin of Historical Materialism within the history of the Enlightenment. The epochal work of Immanuel Wallerstein¹⁰⁵ from the 1970s can be mentioned as exemplary in this respect, which would have been unthinkable without those earlier Marxist works.

As clearly as the Marxist mode of thinking may be understandable out of its historical context, little of it is free from internal contradictions if perceived from the perspective of peace research. The question arises: what, under aspired-for revolutionary conditions, should happen to those bad people that stand in the way of change for the better? This is a question which repeatedly and dramatically has posed itself in the real history of revolutions. Peace research, furthermore, asks how those acts of violence or even wars that contribute to the advancement of revolutionary conditions would have to be evaluated. Here Lenin gave a clear answer, quoting the famous sentence by Clausewitz that war would be the continuation of politics by other means:

Marxists have always rightly regarded this thesis as the theoretical basis of views concerning the significance of every given war. It was

precisely from this viewpoint that Marx and Engels always regarded different wars.¹⁰⁶

Lenin writes furthermore that socialists would differ from pacifists insofar that they

fully regard civil wars, i.e., wars waged by the oppressed class against the oppressing class, slaves against slave-owners, serfs against land-owners, and wage-workers against the bourgeoisie, as legitimate, progressive and necessary. [...] In history there have been numerous wars which, in spite of all the horrors, atrocities, distress and suffering that inevitably accompany all wars, were progressive, i.e., benefited the development of mankind by helping to destroy the exceptionally harmful and reactionary institutions (for example, autocracy or serfdom), the most barbarous despotisms in Europe [...].¹⁰⁷

From the point of view of my research interest this is a clear, but not a satisfying, answer on the relation between Marxism and peace. In this light the question arises whether the hermetic claim to truth of rational scientificity with which Marx has stated his view of history can be upheld empirically. Because there is no scientific proof that only science will produce truth. As long as this proof is missing, any such claim can only be pure ideology and hence violent.

The late work of Friedrich Engels¹⁰⁸ contains not only a systematic synopsis of Marx's and his own philosophical teaching, but also a shift from the real-utopian telos of Historical Materialism toward the attempt to found his theory of science within Ethical Materialism.¹⁰⁹ Engels stresses the difference between the philosophies of Idealism, which claim the primordially of spirit before nature and thus proceed from a however imagined creation of the world, and those which see nature itself as the primordial. According to Engels, the latter would be atheist. With this epistemological attempt Engels carries forth Thanatos' concept of progress that manifests itself even stronger in this matured form of Marxism than in economic liberalism.

The inversion and accentuation of older Idealist thinking by Marx and Engels do not extract their teachings from the vectorial, Idealist, and moral logic. Despite all seemingly radical contradictions they move in opposing directions within the same matrix. Thereby they complete the shift from Phobos to Thanatos. The question about which of the great ideas of peace is the right one pointed the road toward the mass deaths of the twentieth century.

4.4 What is a modern image of peace?

What is still missing in order to not just summarize but also evaluate this chapter is the discussion of the key term in its title: modern. As with the works of all the known philosophers and founders of religions that I have already mentioned, this cannot be about yet another contribution to an already overflowing conceptual debate, but only about making this term applicable for further considerations from the perspective of peace research. I have therefore used it in the sense of the colloquial French *temps modernes* which signifies what in the German language is called *Neuzeit*. This use dates back to the Latin word *modernus* for new, recent, and current and derives from the adverb *modo*, for recently or just now.

The use of the term *Moderne* in German is not always clear. It can imply the *Moderne* of the eighteenth century and the so-called Enlightenment, but also the nineteenth-century's *Modernisierung* (modernization), the progressive program of the process of industrialization, or the *Moderne* of the twentieth century, with its artistic avant-garde, the foundational crisis of science, political totalitarianism, and lifestyle dictates.¹¹⁰ In this interpretation, modern describes the new as opposite to the old. In a worldview that perceives societal time in linear fashion it follows that the modern of today is the good, but tomorrow it will be overcome and thus bad. This is why the modern in such a dual world has to constantly invent and define itself anew by dissociating from the old. Understood in this manner, the concept is barely graspable as a historical category and of little use. Antony Mansueto¹¹¹ therefore simply and pejoratively called modernity a Christian heresy.

For this reason there exist proposals that do not define modernity as an epoch, but try to grasp it qualitatively. One of the founders of German sociology, Ferdinand Tönnies, proposed to perceive modernity's defining criterion in the societal form of organization, which he distinguished from the communal one.¹¹² This does not solve the problem. Communal sounds old and ultimately bad, societal *neuzeitlich* sounds modern and good. Here the objection raised by Ivan Illich with his already discussed view of the vernacular, strongly comes to mind. Fritjof Capra¹¹³ counters this dynamic dichotomy with his distinction between the organic and the mechanistic worldview. I will return to this later.

Immanuel Wallerstein rejects dualities like modernity and tradition, rationality and superstition, and freedom and mental oppression as criteria of distinction. He equates the modern world system with historical

capitalism. He refers to Eric Hobsbawm's older hypothesis that tradition itself is a creation of modernity and thus part of its grand narration. This definitional slight of hand would make it possible to turn the majority of the earth's population into a reserve army for worldwide established capitalism because cheap labor serves the accumulation of capital. In this manner capitalism became a global phenomenon. According to Wallerstein, universalism is a precondition for this turn, and globalization is the consequence. Universalism is

[...] a set of beliefs about what is knowable and how it can be known. The essence of this view is that there exist meaningful general statements about the world [...] which are universally valid and permanently true, and that the object of science is the search for these general statements in a form that eliminates all so-called subjective, that is, all historically-constrained, elements from its formulation.¹¹⁴

Also, Wallerstein thus hits upon the topic of universal truth. But in defining this topic as a characteristic of modernity he does not contrast it with a tradition of multiplicity, but points to its application toward the creation of a worldwide bourgeois framework that can cater to different "national" variations. For science and technology, but just as well for political ideas it applies:

The exaltation of progress, and later "modernization" summarized this set of ideas, which served less as true norms of social action than as status-symbols of obeisance and of participation in the world's upper strata. The break from the supposedly cultural-narrow religious bases of knowledge in favor of supposedly trans-cultural scientific bases of knowledge served as the self-justification of a particularly pernicious form of cultural imperialism. It dominated in the name of intellectual liberation; it imposed in the name of skepticism.¹¹⁵

I dare to ask whether Wallerstein really means universalism. The inflexible bias of the dawning modernity's supposedly enlightened rationalism, as he describes it, represents abstract, mechanistic, and formalistic versions of universal truth, which disregard the individuality, peculiarity, and differences as they are exactly postulated by the enlightened thinking of freedom. Universal stands for uniform, because the worldcentric perspective of a monologic and objectifying universalism easily leads into a violent thinking of uniformity. The rejection of the multiplicity of religious explanations of the world in this epoch, in

its context understandable, excessively turned into an attitude that no longer allows any isolated and contradictory truths which Wilber comments upon as follows:

There thus arose a positive mania for the universal and “common truths” of humankind, truths that could speak to everybody, and thus truths that must be “truly true,” deeply true for all peoples. All merely individual preferences and tastes, all peculiarities, all local differences, were dismissed as not being part of a common and universal humanity.¹¹⁶

This research for universally valid and everywhere similar laws engulfed all of public thinking’s forms of expression – science, political theory, social theory, and even art. The notion of many peaces is inaccessible for such an approach. All human beings have to be objectified so that their commonalities can be found. There can be only one peace here, which is as codified and uniform as the human rights that form the core principle of this modern image of humankind. When the conventional understanding of human rights as universal in its deeper meaning is replaced by the notion of uniformity, then their repeatedly problematized ambivalence and propensity for violence show themselves. For Wallerstein, all of this is the expression and result of capitalism.

Capitalism is commodification, when everything turns into goods. Capitalism has a beginning, which Wallerstein perceives as the transition toward the modern world system. This is not a fact but a socially powerful interpretation. Here the reference to the postulate of the One Truth is important, because it shows that the turn toward modernity has not led to new freedoms *sui generis*, but to a one-dimensional inversion of the imagined vector of social orientation. It is a turn away from the ascending Phobos toward the descending Thanatos, as Wilber would call it. Commodification is just another term, another focus within the same consideration.

That is why it is difficult to define *modernity* as a historical period. Neither the invention of America nor the Peace of Westphalia, Enlightenment, or the French Revolution constitutes a material turning point in time that makes it possible to factually declare the beginning of modernity. Jean-François Lyotard calls it a mentality in which a dominating meta-text ascribes undoubted meaning to any societal and individual action. He takes modernity to be that chronologically not exactly definable societal project characterized by Newtonian physics, Cartesian reductionism, and the nation state of

Thomas Hobbes. According to Lyotard, these pillars provide meaning for the political action in modernity and cause a self-evidence of aims and guidelines for action which are experienced as real and ensure compliance.¹¹⁷

Modernity in this sense never existed. Such self-evidence has never undisputedly occurred at any place or time. That is why many people suggest that from the very first moment of modern thinking, post-modernity would have been invested in it as its rational, critical, and inherent counterpart. Lyotard therefore proposes that at best it might be possible to speak of a classic work that treats future and past in a manner as if, taken together, they embraced the totality of life in one coherent unit of meaning.¹¹⁸ That is, in Lyotard's definition of the classic work, the beginning and end of a narrated story are organized and structured so credibly that a quasi-stable, prolonged now is perceived therein. Lyotard's understanding of the classic work connotes something like a small modernity, which is limited in space, time, and actors, but nevertheless true within this framework and effective far beyond it also in contexts that themselves do not identify with it. That is why classics of modern thinking can be named, modern conditions, forms of production, and concepts of peace, even if modernity itself remains a phenomenon ungraspable and contradictory in its entirety.

This consideration prompted me, when outlining this chapter, to begin with a description of energetic concepts of peace, although they are not usually referenced under the title of modernity. They are not premodern or traditional, because they arise at the same time as European modernity and just like the latter refer to knowledge gathered previously. Just like them they turn against the social petrification of morally founded images of world and peace in their vicinity. Yet they embark into an unmodern direction in which they seek to reunify Eros and Agape in a balanced manner, while European modernity, at least in its classic form, executes the fateful flight toward Thanatos. It thereby integrates the phobic basic structures inherent in the One Truth. The resultant concepts of peace can only be understood within those premises and exhibit many similarities in argumentation to the phobic logic of the moral peaces. Security, justice, truth, and norm as determinants for the moral peaces, as I have discussed them in the previous chapter, also penetrate the modern peace. In the latter's variations, the weight attributed to them is different, yet they always play a crucial role.

In this chapter on Europe's modern peaces I have restricted myself to a few voices that, out of their jurisprudential or state-philosophical self-understanding, explicitly refer to questions of peace. For the time being

the perspective remained limited to this aspect. To further illuminate the respective background will be my task in the next chapter.

In summary I want to differentiate those modern images of peace arising out of the “volcanic spirit of daring,” as Fridell has called it, to such extent that their commonalities and differences within modernity become visible. For this purpose I use Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Marx as ideal types of the four main variations of thinking modern peace, without implying just those authors alone. They stand for traditions of thought, philosophical currents, which are effective even today.

They all subject their peaces to an absolute dictate of truth. That is why the question about their perception of human nature is a crucial starting point for any further deductions. Differences already arise here. Hobbes follows a radical anthropological pessimism, while Rousseau and Kant each choose optimistic approaches that trust in reason. In Marx this question is overshadowed by his image of history, which is guided by the assumption that the human in its being would be born free and by nature capable of love, yet finds itself facing an objective world that teaches and perpetuates social injustice, oppression, and evil intent. It is the superstructure that makes the human being bad and this can only be overcome by revolution. For Marx, the human being is not by nature bad, but made bad. If I also take into consideration the other schools’ image of history, significant differences arise. For Marx it is as positive as it can only be negative for Hobbes. For Kant it is positive in tendencies, which Rousseau cannot share from his deeply negative findings, although he does not exclude a corresponding potential (see Table 4.1).

As problematic as the simplification of complex constructs of thought to such a presentation may be, it nevertheless vividly shows the correspondence and divergence of the respective images.

Hobbes’ pessimism coagulates to a conclusive and therefore sustainable concept. The human being and his actions are considered irredeemably bad. Security thus turns into the indispensable basic

Table 4.1 Ideal types of the four main variations of modern peace thinking

	Hobbes	Rousseau	Kant	Marx
Image of humanity	–	+	+	–
Image of history	–	–	+	+
Knowledge-constituting mentality	Fear	Doubt	Hope	Expectation
Basis for peace	Security	Harmony	Truth	Justice

condition for peace. This statement remains true wherever fear is supposed to be the knowledge-constituting mentality. Corresponding measures are necessary on the individual level as well as on the societal level. As the oldest of the modern attitudes, Hobbes' is still connected the most to the phobic stance, which however is already broken by the turn toward Thanatos in the guise of the Leviathan. The turn away from Phobos does not imply an overcoming of fear, but just its redirection into the worldly sphere. The Realist School that is built on this supposition thus tends to be dangerous for all those of whom it is afraid. This is documented by the history of the *Neuzeit*. The name this school has given itself suggests, together with the simplicity of its teaching, that it would communicate what really is. The presupposition for that in turn is the theorem of the One Truth. All of this taken together concocts an explosive mixture which, for the concerns of peace research, does not lead particularly far.

This is different in Rousseau, who well considers the course of history in modernity an aberration, and in his finding does not differ much from Hobbes, but because of his anthropological optimism reaches different conclusions. For him, this aberration gives rise to the need for Eros and Agape. The question about societal norm and communal norm-setting is his crucial concern. This leads to a continuous and justified doubt about the right path as knowledge-constituting mentality. Rousseau thus prefigures what later will be called postmodern thinking, but also the postmodern mentality. In the world of the One Truth even the suspicion that this truth might only be imagined is frightening, liberating, and unleashing. This kind of doubt is nothing for fearful characters. Its path leads to threatening precipices but also contains potential for the many peaces.

With Immanuel Kant, the image of history and humanity are congruent. He stands for optimism in its pure form. Therein resides his appeal for peace research as well as for the Idealist School of international relations. Hope as knowledge-constituting mentality appears attractive and inspiring. But the morally decreed road toward an approximation to this ideal easily slips into intellectual and cultural violence whenever it is decontextualized or exported, because this approach also remains attached to the notion of the One Truth. Peter Sloterdijk has grandiosely summarized the efficacy of an unleashed version of Idealist modernity in one sentence:

Inspired by a history-making mixture of optimism and aggressiveness, it aimed at the creation of a world in which everything

happens as we think, because we are able to do what we want, and willing to learn what we are not able to do.¹¹⁹

Since their foundation at the end of the so-called World War I, the Idealist and Realist schools, as main currents of international relations, opposed each other's dogmas as unyieldingly as if they were really incommensurable,¹²⁰ as if fear and hope were contradictions and not just two sides of the same coin – two irrational expressions of the same human energy. This supposed contradiction has drawn much attention and led to the withering of cultures of peaces. Amazingly enough, both approaches obstinately refer to *ratio*. The French alchemist Fulcanelli, who characterized this war the following way, is, however, considered an advocate of premodern perceptions:

To all philosophers, all educated, all scientists just as to all interested we take the liberty to pose the following question: have you ever thought about the fatal consequences that arise out of unlimited progress? Just because of the multiplicity of scientific achievements the human being can now only live with the help of energy...in an unhealthy environment. He has created the machinery which increases his powers hundredfold...but he has become its slave and victim: its slave in peace, its victim in war.¹²¹

Karl Marx, on the other hand, appeals to progress and heightens the Idealist hope to scientific expectation, without referring to an overly optimistic image of humanity. From the moral concepts of peace he adopts the assumption that peace would result out of justice and believes to be able to scientifically as well as rationally prove and implement this insight. In the Marxist modernity, the image of Thanatos is thus fulfilled for one brief historical moment in the sense of a Lyotardean classic. The rapid collapse of those political forms of organization explicitly referring to Marx to me does not appear as the fundamental failing of his teaching. Because of the Idealist roots of Marxism, it was very easy for a real Idealism of Western persuasion to twist its teaching, independent of the question of how Marxist the real existing socialism might actually have been. This similarity in attitude and structure of thought can best be observed in the supposedly scientific doctrine of neo-liberalism. Thanatos has many forms of expression.

Common to all those approaches is that their founding figures perceived themselves as kinds of engineers for the machine called society. Rousseau and Kant, as well as to a lesser degree Marx, appear

as pedestrian, almost naïve, tinkers that worked on optimizing the clockwork in its objective dimensions so that the principally good within the subject would achieve a breakthrough. For Hobbes, however – and this tradition leads from him all the way to Freud – this is exactly a horror vision. Those thinkers function like blast technicians who try to avert the uncontrolled explosion of a highly volatile and problematic substance subject through outer measures. All those approaches mirror a view that perceives world and society as a manipulable machine. In the next chapter I will discuss how far this image carries.

4.5 On the mechanistic basis of the modern image of peace

Up until now I have chosen those voices for this chapter that have been more or less explicitly involved in the creation of the modern understanding of peace. None of their teachings can be called peace studies in the narrower sense of the term, because all of them were proposed by universal scholars whose topics and interests encompassed a much broader spectrum. They are mostly philosophers of state for whom peace is a consequence that is desirable, yet derived from more fundamental questions. That even goes for Kant. With his philosophical sketch on *Perpetual Peace* he may have created one of the key texts of peace studies, yet in his overall *oeuvre* it occupies a rather marginal position.

It follows that everything that has been said in this chapter only makes sense once those fundamental changes within the Occidental worldview are also taken into consideration from which the corresponding interpretations of peace and the possibility to think any kind of however-understood modernity, derive. Behind what I, in allusion to Wilber, have called the flight out of Phobos into Thanatos, hides the deepest break in Occidental culture since the Axial Age. The separation of the human being from the queendom carried out at and for the first break has left a worldview which, from the energetic approach's holistic perspective, appeared mutilated. Yet it was organic and saw the human being in a mutual relation with nature, organized in corresponding communities that regulated their material and spiritual needs out of such an understanding. Even if the human being no longer was an aspect of the divine, he still strove toward God and organized his life within the material world accordingly, as Augustine had determined it. The aim of scientific research was thus to understand the world on the basis of reason and faith, and not to change or even to predict it.

This organic worldview was radically changed by modernity's mechanistic approach. If Christianity had separated humanity from heaven, modernity separated it from nature and installed the conception of a world running like mechanical clockwork. The associated thoughts are represented by names and writings that I have so far, if at all, only mentioned in passing. Whoever wants to understand modernity's mechanistic image of the world needs Hobbes and Bacon but at the same time cannot pass over Copernicus, Kepler, Galilei, Descartes, Newton, and Darwin. I thus want to shortly engage with those conceptions which have marked this mechanistic approach and are thus foundational for all modern images of peace.¹²²

With his heliocentric hypothesis, Nicolas Copernicus¹²³ contradicted the geocentric explanation of the world and provided the intellectual cornerstone for that paradigm shift which rightly is named after him: the Copernican Turn. He was succeeded by the Pythagorean Mystic Johannes Kepler¹²⁴ who, when searching for the harmony of the spheres, was able to empirically formulate the planetary motion and thus support Copernicus' hypothesis. All this was finally turned into a stringent scientific theory by Galileo Galilei.¹²⁵ Galileo's mathematical approach to science led him to the point of view that research should restrict itself to studying quantifiable, objective properties of material bodies, that is to shapes, numbers, and movements. All other properties like color, sound, taste, or smell for him were subjective mental projections that he wanted to exclude from research.

With that he made a far-reaching decision, because he banned aesthetics, morals, values, sensations, feelings, intentions, consciousness, and finally even spirit and soul out of science. On this basis, the possibilities for a science of peace become very limited. I would thus like to remember Galilei's adversary Giordano Bruno,¹²⁶ who sharply opposed the mechanistic worldview and drew completely different conclusions from Copernicus' hypothesis. Bruno not just discarded the geocentric worldview but also the heliocentric and instead recognized the noncentralized infinity of the universe. From there he reached the conclusion that all parts of the universe would contain soul, and that there existed a world soul imbued with universal reason. This supposition might have been able to steer the debate around the new paradigms into an energetic direction interesting for peace research. However, this suited neither the guardians of the moral tradition nor the pioneers of the dawning modernity. Bruno died at the stake and the history of science moved in a different direction.¹²⁷

Galilei's reduction of what from now on could be called scientific methods and questions combined itself in revolutionary manner with the reorientation of the aims of scientific activities promoted by Francis Bacon.¹²⁸ No longer should it be about the organic understanding of the world and neither about the glory of God or the natural order, but about domination and control over nature. Bacon understood nature to be female, yet wanted to treat her with the same inductive method of experiment and conclusion as corresponded to the manner of dealing with women during the witch trials of his time. Perhaps at no other point was the Occident further away from the peace image of the Great Mother as in his thoughts and efficacy.

In his doctrine about the certainty of scientific cognition, René Descartes¹²⁹ finally founded the basis of modern thinking. He shifted the principle of God's absolute and ultimate truth into science. This allowed – and even demanded of him – to doubt all knowledge as it had been handed down, to disassemble thoughts and problems into pieces, and to line them up in a logical order. He founded his view of nature on the fundamental distinction between the human spirit and natural matter. The material universe to him was a machine in which there was neither meaning nor life nor spirit. Nature, including plants and animals, to him functioned according to mechanical laws. Everything in the world of matter could be explained in terms of the alignment and movement of its parts. Even the body of the human being to him was an animalistic machine.¹³⁰ Descartes provided a new direction for scientific thinking – nature as a perfect machine, determined by exact mathematical laws. The Cartesian perception of the world as mechanistic clockwork provided that scientific justification for the manipulation and exploitation of nature that was to become so characteristic of modernity. Morality and spirituality, important elements of the images of peace described earlier, for him belong to the realm of the mind and thus do not play a role in this context.¹³¹

The mechanic image of nature divorced from spirit dominated all the scientific paradigms until the new physics in the twentieth century showed the limited reach of Cartesian thinking and even proved that Descartes' basic assumption about the certainty of scientific insight and all the conclusions derived therefrom were an error. There are no absolute truths – even in science. The new creed postulated that all concepts and theories are bound by perspective and limited.

Descartes, just like Galilei, found a prominent but finally overpowered opponent regarding this topic. Giovanni Battista Vico,¹³² who only worked after Descartes, opposed the latter's reductionist rationalism

and held the opinion that the human being only recognized that as true which he had created himself. Nature, however, would have been created by God, and consequently could only be adequately recognized by God. The only truth completely accessible to the human being would be that of his own history. That is why human history should also be the preferred object of research. In difference to a nature pre-given to the human being, humanity would shape history itself. Its principles thus were also to be found within the modifications of the human mind.

Knowledge, according to Vico, does not just derive from the reflecting intellect but also from sensual perception. He perceives the course of history cyclically and in this context proposes to understand mythology as the originary form of stating truth. The deepest insight into the foundations of cultures would be yielded by researching their mythological beginnings. This approach would lead to a relational and accessible concept of peace, because cultures and their narrations are made by humans. Yet Vico does not consign human history to an energetic relationality, but to the responsibility of divine providence which would work through human efforts in order to reach its goals.¹³³ He thus gave his teaching a structurally conservative sheen that limits his importance for our debate.

The person to realize the Cartesian dream and complete the scientific revolution was Isaac Newton.¹³⁴ Newtonian physics¹³⁵ yielded a closed mathematical theory of the world that remained the basis for all scientific thinking until the twentieth century. Newton combined all previous discoveries by formulating the general laws of motion governing all objects within the solar system, from the simple stone to the planet. Because of their general applicability, those laws seemed to confirm the Cartesian view of nature. Newtonian mechanics reduced all physical phenomena to the movement of material particles in space, caused through mutual attraction – gravity. The effect of this force on a material object is mathematically described by Newton's equations of motion that form the basis for classical mechanics. They were seen as fixed laws determining the movement of material objects. This science believed itself able to explain all perceptible changes in the physical world through those laws.¹³⁶ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe therefore accused Newton of an understanding of the world that would literally put nature on the torture wheel in order to answer the researcher's questions.¹³⁷ Morris Berman even held, "that Europe, after taking over the Newtonian view of the world, collectively lost its mind."¹³⁸

The mechanistic perception of the world is tied to a strict determinism, to the belief in a causal and calculable cosmic machine. According to this view, everything that happens has a definite cause and effect. The future of any part of the universe could be predicted with absolute certainty, if its state at any given moment were known in all details.¹³⁹

Descartes and Newton changed the concept of peace to such an extent that the normative-moral approach to the organization of societies developed fully, because even morality now became subject to rational laws. Norms were derived from calculable principles that were supposed to regulate the interaction between individuals and society. Norms are in effect because, as the best possible forms of shaping society toward common well-being, they are perceived as generally valid.

What Newton accomplished for the charting of the physiosphere, Charles Darwin¹⁴⁰ achieved for the biosphere. His bestsellers on the evolution of species and the descent of man published in 1859 and 1871 replaced the moral biblical narration about creation with a modern theory of evolution worthy of the Enlightenment. Darwin realized that over the course of many generations living beings evolve in different directions and thus produce not just new individual traits but also new species. Living beings with newly formed biological traits, he argued, could only survive if they were successful in adapting to the outer world. They thus would be exposed to a selective pressure enabling the survival of only well-adapted specimens. The human being would have emerged out of this dynamic as well.

These are the since then commonly undisputed elements of Darwin's observations. Problematic are the conclusions that he himself and the schools following in his footsteps drew from this finding. The first of those conclusions is that species would be engaged in a permanent antagonistic struggle over existence, caused by the selective pressure between and within them. In the reverse argument, the process of selection under the pressure of the struggle for survival would be the driving force for species' development from lower to higher beings. This war of nature, the struggle for survival, as well as the demise of the weak and the survival of the fittest, would thus be the biological basic characteristic of all living beings. Cooperation, solidarity, empathy would therefore just be auxiliary tools or alternatives for the case of crisis and subordinate to this struggle. In this manner, Darwin at the same time also provided a meaning to his epochal observations. The meaning of evolution and thus of life as such would be the production of superior individuals, species, and races in place of the inferior.¹⁴¹

Natural sciences thus seemed to confirm the assumption of the war of all against all. On this basis, a person cannot expect anything from his fellow human beings but combat and will only survive if he secures himself as effectively and powerfully as possible from the threat that is posed by the others. The fear-driven politics of the twentieth century with all its consequences was paradigmatically prepared. The theory of evolution moved up into the ranks of the great narrations of modern explanations of the world. What was overlooked, as is so often the case with this kind of system of belief, was the intermingling of factual observation with constructed production of meaning. This led to a racist reception of this concept of the struggle for survival in its hostility to nature, especially in Germany, but not only there, which legitimated fear as a guiding principle of politics and founded a modern ideology of inhumanity. This had effects far beyond the time of National Socialism.¹⁴²

Prefiguring later chapters, it may be pointed out that Darwin's interpretation that the natural process of selection would be a struggle of all against all also is not proven in the sense of common natural scientific methods. Factual claims based on systematically produced evidence purport the contrary about the origin of species and the human being. Selection and adaptation do not necessarily imply combat and annihilation of the other. Life takes place because everything is connected to everything else. Interdependence demands the capacity for cooperation rather than superiority. Darwin's model overlooks this fundamental importance of phenomena of cooperation and mutual dependence at the origin of all biology. Not the struggle for existence, but cooperation, engagement, mirroring, and resonance are the fundamental figures of biological systems.¹⁴³ Those are the rule, struggle is the exception. While competition also exists in nature, it usually takes place within a bigger frame of cooperation, so that the larger system maintains equilibrium. Even predator-prey relations that are lethal for the prey are generally beneficial for both species. This finding is in sharp contradiction to the Social Darwinists' point of view, which saw life exclusively as competition, struggle for survival, and fantasy of annihilation. From the point of view of modern science, such an understanding has no validity because it does not take into consideration integrative and cooperative principles, and hence, fundamental aspects of the manner in which living beings organize.¹⁴⁴

That living beings want to live is a tautology. That the central drives of living systems are geared towards a maximum spread and towards fighting each other, however, is ideology.¹⁴⁵

That is of crucial importance for the questions of peace research, because it is about the human species' fundamental peaceableness. If Darwin's struggle for existence could have been proven, social theories would only have to preoccupy themselves with "Realist" theories. Yet the contrary much rather seems to be the case. Darwin's doctrines led into the great wars of annihilation of the twentieth century¹⁴⁶ at the end of which neurobiology confirmed the principal orientation of the human brain toward cooperation and peaceableness.

The image of the world-machine drawn so far, despite all modernity, needs an outside creator, regent, and giver of meaning. The early thinkers all assumed that God would rule the world from above by imposing His divine law. The physical processes themselves were not considered to be divine. Since, under the dictate of modern sciences, it became ever more difficult to believe in such a God, the divine finally disappeared out of this worldview altogether and in its wake left that spiritual vacuum which has become so characteristic for modern concepts of peace under the sign of Thanatos. The image of the world-machine made these absolute and dissociated them from the human perspective. The objective description of nature turned into the ideal for modern natural sciences. The example of Darwin shows how fast and imperceptibly the empty space of God can be occupied by a constructed meaning in such a system of thought.

For rationality and the plurality of perspectives inherent to it, the goal cannot be the extrapolation of commonalities, even if this may appear useful in some areas, like for example, medicine. Rationality empowers the human being to see things from the perspective of others and to perceive the mutual enrichment that arises from all differences. Rationality affirms the plurality of perspectives and it does not subject them to abstract questions about uniformity. Against the precursors of modernity this stance was adopted from the very beginning by romantic and Idealist counter-positions searching for a life beyond the self-defined persona, yet this insight only reached fruition in postmodernity which in this respect can be seamlessly derived from Romanticism.

All of this is important because the enthusiasm about the insights of Cartesian reductionism, Newtonian physics, and Darwin's theory of evolution reached far into the social sciences and even aroused the image of a social physics. Thomas Hobbes, for whom all knowledge was based on sensual perception, again comes into play. This was taken over by John Locke, who compared the human mind at birth with a *tabula rasa* on which knowledge would be imprinted through sensual perception. On this basis he built his atomistic perception of the human being

and society and directed the emphasis of social scientific interest toward the behavior of individuals. In this manner, Locke founded the assumption of all human beings' equality at birth, which remained effective until Freud. When he applied this theory of human nature to societal phenomena he was guided by the conviction that within the frame of the interlinked order of being, human society would be directed by natural laws in the same manner as the physical universe. Just like atoms contained in gas would reach a state of equilibrium, also human individuals in society would do the same as long as they are not inhibited by an outer force. This idea is presupposed to his theorems of peace research about freedom, equality, and property and decisively influenced the whole further debate and most of all the school of Idealism.

Those assumptions form the framework for the concepts of peace discussed in this chapter. This also literally circumscribes their limitedness, as Newtonian mechanics has long lost its role as a fundamental explanation of the material world and even more of the biosphere and noosphere. Electrodynamics and the theory of evolution go far beyond the Newtonian model. They reveal that the world is more complex than Newton and Descartes could imagine it.

In the century after Einstein and Heisenberg, the method of analytic reductionism is still only unwillingly doubted or even discarded. It became a characteristic of modern scientific thinking. The belief that all aspects of complex phenomena could be understood if they are just reduced to their components guided modernity and enabled it, mainly within the natural sciences, to achieve impressive results, until it found its limits in the new physics.

It is remarkable that almost all the voices quoted in this chapter refer to God. This may in part have to do with the relations of power in their respective states. Religious doubts often were dangerous. Yet to me it appears more important that in their manner of thinking they actually needed God as reference, as meaning. Most of them no longer argued for him as a personified and immediate mover of the world, as this had been the case in the two-dimensional frame of the moral images of peace. With nature they insert a distinct and separated new level between God and the human being. God quasi-moves to the third floor from where he shapes the second that the human being perceives from the lowly first one. On this second level, natural laws are scientifically calculable and predictable. Yet they are founded in the act of creation by the divine inhabitant of the exclusive third floor. Modernity's mechanistic image of the world needs this creator God that it derives from the Christian tradition. But, having become incapable of cosmic integration

due to his seamless omnipresence, God flees into the abstraction of the higher floor. Abstractions provided new fuel for the logic-dialectic game. But they lost all human traits and thus also the divine as utopian ideal image. The reasonable and mechanic stepped into its place. He thus worked on making himself in the last consequence completely obsolete – this modern monotheistic and patriarchic God.¹⁴⁷

The primal ground of modern concepts of peace remains where it also rests for the moral ones – beyond the relational availability of humanity. The difference is that now the priests have been replaced by the scientists as experts in the interpretation of the world's absolute laws. The new experts not only claim to be able to interpret the clockwork world and to predict its movements, but furthermore, also maintain to be able to manipulate the cogs in a reasonable manner so that a more peaceful world can thereby arise.

5

Postmodern Interpretations of Peace



Contrary to a commonly held view, the most widespread peace symbol of the twentieth century is not based on a rune, but on the letters N and D of the semaphore flag. It was designed by the British artist Gerald Holtom in 1958 on the occasion of a protest march against the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston. The N stands for nuclear, the D for disarmament. The symbol of the "Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament" was adopted by the Civil Rights Movement in the USA and found its way into the protest movements against the war in Vietnam and into the subcultures of the 1960s. Its origin in the resistance against the rational-belligerent technology of progress turns this symbol as expression of "No, thanks!" into the ideal type symbol for postmodern thinking of peace (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2008).

There are no facts, only interpretations;
and this too is an interpretation.

Gianni Vattimo¹

At the end of the previous chapter I dealt with the definition of the concept of modernity, even if this to some extent has led me away from the question of the peaces in the narrower sense. This academic exercise is necessary for the systematics of this text not to get lost in a jungle of attractive opinions on peace that offer themselves to an ever greater extent. The point of this exercise will become obvious in this chapter, because the relations between the terms turn even more complex and I will urgently need the clarifications of the previous chapter. Just the very term "postmodernity" implies that it is now about a topic that somehow has to do with modernity and the latter consequently should be an applicable term at least in this text. With Lyotard I have already pointed out that, when speaking about postmodernity, I do not mean the period which chronologically follows after modernity. I already classified modernity itself not as a period but as a mentality and state of

mind, which believes in that great narration that is founded in Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton.

Creative minds could now suggest, at least, that the classic period of modernity is the epoch between the birth of Hobbes as the start and the death of Newton as the end. Classic modernity would have thus lasted from 1588 until 1727. But that is not what Lyotard meant: he spoke of a classic work if in a certain social context, future and past are treated as if taken together they would encompass the totality of life in one coherent unit of meaning. This does not even apply to the biographies of the three pillar saints of modernity. I have shortened their teachings in the last chapter in order to be able to recount that which is of relevance for peace research. However, from a slightly broader perspective I see in Hobbes an empiricist and skeptic, whose corresponding teachings have opened a line of thought that developed far beyond any realism of political science and astonishingly enough has secretly blossomed even within postmodern philosophy and transpersonal psychology. Descartes, the world's mechanic, desperately tried to prove the existence of God and it was just he who introduced the concept of subjectivity into modern philosophy.² Newton, the world's machinist, was an alchemist and mystic. He represented the alliance between two ways of thinking that both refer to experiment and immediate sensual impression and thus together assailed the closed worldview of the then-contemporary mythology with its moral concept of peace. Similar stories could also be told about any of the other authors mentioned in the previous chapter.³ A modern classic in the sense of Lyotard manifests not even in their own biographies and works.

Paraphrasing Lyotard, I would have to turn "classic" itself into a term with a plural. Because, even if the first great precursors of modernity were thinking, living, and acting in a contradictory manner, such classics in resonance with the modern worldview nevertheless existed. They occurred so often and at so many places that in light of such a density of different classics with limited reach and duration it finally again becomes feasible to speak of a modernity. This modernity can, however, not be classified in terms of periods with final certainty. But that is also not necessary.

Postmodernity does not relate to an epoch but to a mentality and state of mind, namely the one in which people do *not* believe in the great narration that has been built upon the three pillar saints, Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton. Seen from this perspective, postmodernity begins with the first doubts within the thinking of the oldest of those precursors. Put casually, I could thus name Hobbes as the

first postmodern. Yet, historical philosophy has awarded this title to Friedrich Nietzsche, in whose work criticism, disagreement, and skepticism are condensed in such an epochal manner that the audience does not need to perceive them as fine differentiations of thought, but they are driven in with a hammer as Nietzsche himself said in his *Twilight of the Idols*.⁴ Postmodernity is not a dismissal of modernity but its twisting, its radicalization in the form of a critical reworking. Understood in this way, postmodern philosophy is founded in Nietzsche.

The postmodern mentality accompanies modernity everywhere. Its classics have many aspects which crystallize in concepts like Enlightenment, reason, secularization, freedom, equality, justice, growth, free trade, tolerance, democracy, human rights, progress, technology, development, security, sustainability, pop culture, and many more and in always new formations. Wherever they appear they also cause contradictions, discomfort, disagreement, frustration, and protest or, in short: postmodern mentalities. Someone can always be found who rejects the modern claim and its promises. In this manner, every modern classic newly produces its postmodern actors.

It is left to the disposition of free research whether the methods and insights of postmodern philosophy are included when exploring questions around the peaces. Peace research can also be Idealistic, opinionated, modern, and ingenuous, as is the case frequently and in many places. The postmodern mentality of societies, however, can be found wherever modernity has effect. That is why, as structures of thought, I have to say goodbye at this point to the "sound" peace teachings of the previous chapter. They belong to the metaphysic of the mechanistic worldview and accord only to this frame. Yet the latter was demolished in physics, biology, the arts and cultural sciences, philosophy, and psychology at the turn of the twentieth century.⁵ It is therefore expedient to perceive in Nietzsche's work that crucial impulse on which also peace research may depend.

It is paradoxical enough that the history of the discipline runs completely asynchronous to this development. The twentieth century opens with the first war that has been given the name world war. In the course of the so-called peace negotiations in Paris, which ended the first part of this world war, it was decided to found scientific institutions for research on international relations. In 1920, the American Institute of International Affairs was founded, which from 1922 onwards turned into the Council of Foreign Relations, as well as the British Institute of International Affairs, which from 1926 onwards was called the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House). Others would

follow.⁶ They all agreed that capitalism was the best societal and economic mode of organization and should remain in existence for the foreseeable future. The world war was assessed to be an operating accident within an in principle peaceful system. The prevention of war thus became the topic of the new discipline. The Occident had arrived back at Plato. The new institutes occupied themselves with codifications, parliamentarization, and international law. They especially concerned themselves with the harmonization of interests within that world society, which was seen as the natural enlargement of the equally natural nation states that were legitimized by their material successes as industrial and affluent societies. The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice were the answers to the peace-political challenges of the time.⁷

The scientific institutes largely worked without connection to the earlier pacifist initiatives emerging in civil society, as they had been suggested by Bertha von Suttner's novel *Lay Down Your Arms* published in German in 1889. In the German-speaking area in this respect, the foundation of the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft by Alfred H. Fried has to be mentioned, whose *Friedens-Warte*⁸ constituted an important publishing organ for this movement. Furthermore, the Internationale Liga für Frieden und Freiheit under Emile Arnaud may be mentioned, in America, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was founded in 1910, the World Peace Foundation originated in Boston in 1911, and the American Friends Service Committee has been in existence since 1917. The Hoover Institution in War, Revolution and Peace, instituted in 1919 at Stanford University in California, is probably the oldest research institution of this kind.⁹

The rivalry between the Idealist and Realist traditions of thought has accompanied the new discipline since its inception. This did not occur without presupposing the corresponding modern concepts of peace, at a time when modernity just began to discard its fundamental principles of faith. The new discipline attuned itself in two voices to a world which had just faded. That it could contribute nothing to averting the second part of the worldwide war has been lamented often enough. After this war had been suffered through as well, this discipline obstinately thought out a variety of neo-versions of its failed paradigms, which claimed to have integrated new insights and the new conditions into the old stock.

The postmodern discontent with this neo-classic was so great in some places that a generation of pioneers felt themselves called to invent a new discipline that no longer wanted to focus on the Idealist

prevention of real wars within the capitalist system, but on questions of peace despite of or beyond this system. Johan Galtung in Europe and Kenneth Boulding in America are commonly named as representatives for this generation of pioneers. I will come back to them later.

In this manner of narration, peace research had already been a post-modern discipline since its very inception. One could define all theories and methods that occupy themselves academically with the question of peace as postmodern, as far as they are not based on Idealist or Realist paradigms. This would have the advantage of being able to trace a clearly definable line of separation between international relations as a discipline and peace research. But it has the disadvantage that through such a definition the greatest part of academic work that understands itself as peace research would be excluded. As far as the Realist school predominant in the Anglo-Saxon area is concerned, this also does happen frequently. Even a British-American author like Nigel Young defines narrow boundaries in this respect. In continental Europe, especially in Scandinavia, Spain, and the German-speaking area, this however also affects those Idealist trends that see themselves as the core of international peace research. If I define them away out of peace research then only the post-Marxist schools of thought would remain, as well as the radical-democratic and critical tradition that can be traced back via Nietzsche to Rousseau. Since I do not just want to ban the Idealists from peace research, I define those latter two approaches that both are not indebted to Idealism as postmodern peace research.

I do not know whether Galtung or Boulding would agree with this ascription. Both have adopted positions in their early works that would admit such a conclusion, even if both of them, and most of all their followers, have not claimed or consistently sustained this line. The Idealist biotope in which peace research grows, especially in Europe, demands its tribute.

Be that as it may, this chapter is about those interpretations of the peaces that arise beyond the modern mainstream and that incorporate the fundamental crisis of twentieth-century science into their considerations. This implies that they do not make peace out to be just a function of the actions of nation states, abstain from reductionist methods, and know that the world is not a clockwork in which one cogwheel just moves the next. They no longer think peace is linear and mechanistic as one-dimensional strings, bands, or chains, but networked and systemic as multiple fabrics, structures, or fields. Through this postmodern direction of peace research, the North Atlantic area quasi-recognizes the net of Indra and catches up with the older schools in the East and South.

5.1 The return of Dionysus to Apollo

I have named Friedrich Nietzsche as the key author for the understanding of this chapter. Therefore, the question arises of what in his undoubtedly remarkable oeuvre is so important for peace research, which as a scientific discipline only emerged half a century after his death. Nietzsche several times expressed himself directly on questions of war and peace, in combination with his harsh critique of Idealist optimism and the nationalistic elites' fear-driven real politics. An excerpt from *Human, All Too Human* castigates fearful warmongering and culminates in almost Taoist fashion:

Better to perish than to hate and fear, *and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared* – this must one day become the supreme maxim of every individual state!¹⁰

But even in such statements openly directed against war Nietzsche does not fit the pacifist frame that his idealistically inspired contemporaries propagated so enthusiastically. In war and even in societal life as such he saw also and foremost the energetic moment that had been suppressed by the moral and modern positions. That is what makes him so suspicious and easy to misunderstand from their perspective. Another quote from *Human, All Too Human* illustrates that:

War. – Against war it can be said: it makes the victor stupid, the defeated malicious. In favour of war: through producing these two effects it barbarizes and therefore makes more natural; it is the winter or hibernation time of culture, mankind emerges from it stronger for good and evil.¹¹

Nietzsche prefigures insights that will come to dominate the critical debate of the twentieth-century postwar period, for example, Carl Gustav Jung's decisive rejection of all political movements that sought to augment the power of the state. Jung criticized, long after Nietzsche, that they would deprive the individual of his right to become authentic, to be true to the law of his own being.¹² Or Michel Foucault's insight that war is not the continuation of politics by other means, as the Realists had assumed, but the politics of the nation state much rather is the continuation of war by other means. In Nietzsche's idiosyncratic language, similarly much of that can be read which Johan Galtung, 100 years later, highlighted under the catchy phrase of structural violence.

However, if it had stayed a matter of just those explicit statements, then Nietzsche would have remained linguistically forceful and contradictory, but in any case only one among thousands of admonishing voices just in his generation of whom I cannot mention all. The significant element in Nietzsche's works is hidden in an early text whose title one at first would not suspect had anything of relevance for peace research, and which he himself, 16 years after its appearance, called in a devastating self-criticism an impossible book.¹³ I mean *The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music* from 1872.¹⁴

Dionysus revisited

Written during the Franco-German War of 1870–71, this unconventional text constitutes something like Nietzsche's secret declaration of war. The subtitle "Hellenism and Pessimism" discloses the mood of the author. One possible manner of reading this text, which from the viewpoint of modern science is barely acceptable, is that via referring to ancient Greek tragedy the author wants to gain insights into the then-present and future conditions. The supposedly cultural–historic investigation thus turns into an at the time current and explosive political statement.¹⁵

What is so scandalous about this text in its context, yet in light of my investigations so far easily comprehensible, is Nietzsche's rediscovery and veneration of Dionysus less *in* than *through* Greek tragedy. Without being further concerned with references, but referring to the writings of Aristotle,¹⁶ Nietzsche assumes that tragedy would have emerged in the successive transformation of the Dionysian ritual. He derives the function of the choir during the drama from the Satyrs' dithyramb during the ritual, which implies that music stands at the origin of artistic creation.

[...] the emotional power of the tone, the uniform flow of the melody, and the utterly incomparable world of harmony. In the Dionysian dithyramb man is incited to the greatest exaltation of all his symbolic faculties; something never before experienced struggles for utterance – the annihilation of the veil of māyā, oneness as the soul of the race and of nature itself. The essence of nature is now to be expressed symbolically; we need a new world of symbols; and the entire symbolism of the body is called into play, not the mere symbolism of the lips, face and speech but that whole pantomime of dancing, forcing every member into rhythmic movement. Then the other symbolic powers suddenly press forward, particularly those

of music, in rhythmic, dynamics, and harmony. To grasp this collective release of all the symbolic powers, man must have already attained that height of self-abnegation which seeks to express itself symbolically through all these powers – and so the dithyrambic votary of Dionysus understood only by his peers.¹⁷

Tragedy arises as visible staging of this orgiastic music. The choir is not just frame, accessory, or commentator for the plot, but much rather the creative force itself. And it creates what Satyrs used to create – the energetically charged praise for the fate of Dionysus, who is sacrificed again and again, in order to be created anew, whose blood saturates the soil, so that it, and human life, may become fertile. In his own manner, Nietzsche describes the energetic concept of peace.

Since every dithyramb serves the praise of Dionysus, each of its manifestations tells this one story. No matter how the heroes of the early tragedies may be called, Oedipus or Prometheus, for Nietzsche they are just appearances of the eternal and tragic Dionysus. To him, Dionysus is the god or aspect of the energetic arts, at least of music and dance, as well as derived from and secondary to them, of lyricism and poetry. He contrasts this with the material art of Apollo. Architecture, sculpting, and painting he calls *Apollonian*.

In the theatrical art of tragedy both are combined. Through Apollonian form the pure energy of Dionysus attains a place, frame, plot, and expression. Nietzsche admires the art of tragedy as fusion of both aspects and how

[...] the Dionysian and the Apollonian, in new births ever following and mutually augmenting one another, controlled the Hellenic genius.¹⁸

His charge, put forth with powerful words, against Socrates and all dramatists inspired by him, is that they suppressed and replaced the Dionysian aspect in tragedy through morality and reason. What resulted therefrom is an irrelevant and cleverly moralizing form of entertainment, the bourgeois mediocrity of an Euripides for the post-Socratic urban audience, which does not even deserve recognition as art.

The argument is known; with the difference that Dionysus has been described so far as the subaltern partner, the Great Goddess' male sacrificial animal in the Holy Wedding, or also as androgynous. Even if Nietzsche nearly ignored the, at his time not yet discussed, aspect of the Great Goddess, here Cybele, Demeter, or Aphrodite, he still observes

the same turn of events and arrives at the same conclusion. The separation of contradictions that unify in a fertile manner leads to desolation, boredom, and cultural violence. I have already discussed that this principle of separation and suppression, which he calls Socratic, continues with Plato and significantly influenced institutional Christianity and Islam. The male Apollo turned into the symbol of light, identified with the True, Beautiful, and Good, the One God of the Christians. Dionysus, being androgynous and the sole representative of female energy, turned into the symbol of darkness, into the False, Ugly, and Evil, into Satan. Separated and irreconcilable, it thus describes the beautiful world of the just, who judge over others and lead just wars.

Virtue, in this world of duality, means knowledge. One sins due to ignorance. The virtuous one is felicitous. I have already discussed this structure of thought in the chapters on the moral and modern concepts of peace. Nietzsche ascribes it to Christianity, which he thus treats in this book with "careful and hostile silence."¹⁹ In the context of the modern interpretations of peace he is the first author who recognizes the separation of dualities and the repression of evil as the fundamental problem of an inherently belligerent culture, when

[...] under the stern, intelligent eyes of an orthodox dogmatism, the mythical premises of a religion are systematized as a sum total of historical events; one begins apprehensively to defend the credibility of the myths, while at the same time one opposes any continuation of their natural vitality and growth; the feeling for myth perishes, and its place is taken by the claim of religion to historical foundations.²⁰

A culture which permanently represses its own energetic nature as well as its internal and external conflicts as evil reduces itself to a formal construct which—owing to this very formal character—can neither respect nor imagine diverging cosmovisions. Such a culture becomes stubborn, strong and, as seen from the perspective of others, dangerous:

It is certainly the sign of the "breach" of which everyone speaks as the fundamental malady of modern culture, that the theoretical man, alarmed and dissatisfied at his own consequences, no longer dares entrust himself to the terrible icy current of existence: he runs timidly up and down the bank. So thoroughly has he been pampered by his optimistic views that he no longer wants to have anything whole, with all of nature's cruelty attaching to it. Besides, he feels that a culture based on the principles of science must be destroyed

when it begins to grow illogical, that is, to retreat before its own consequences.²¹

The rediscovery of the energetic in the modern context is hence Nietzsche's first substantial achievement. Unlike Marx he does not just decide for the antithesis. Dionysus is energy, but

[t]hat he appears at all with such epic precision and clarity is the work of the dream-interpreter, Apollo, who through this symbolic appearance interprets to the chorus its Dionysian state.²²

The separation of the elements of the Great Triad is healed in Nietzsche through the Dionysian principle:

Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost son, man. Freely, the earth proffers her gifts and peacefully the beasts of prey of the rocks and desert approach.²³

As already this text's second great achievement, he recognizes the separation of the moral from the energetic, the dogmatic repression and educational suppression of an energetic deemed to be evil, a white man's disease, the root of the modern, Western human being's neurosis.²⁴ At least according to Plato's *Aristophanes*, it was Apollo who cut the globular human being, androgynous like Dionysus, into a male and a female half, which since then desperately seek each other to make peace, because each by itself alone is not just incomplete but also sick and handicapped.²⁵

Nietzsche quotes Anaxagoras: "In the beginning all things were mixed together; then came the understanding and created order." From there he proceeds to Euripides, Socrates, and Plato with their key phrases: "To be beautiful, everything must be conscious" and "To be good, everything must be conscious." In almost the same breath, Nietzsche exposes Descartes, who was only able to prove the reality of the empirical world with an appeal to the truthfulness of God, and develops his whole text as a desperate cry against this one-sided Apollonian worldview.²⁶ Finally he asks:

Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the Logician is exiled? Perhaps art is even a necessary correlative of, and supplement for science?²⁷

He calls a deep-seated delusion Socrates' belief that thinking, guided by the red thread of causality, would reach into the deepest recesses of being and that thinking would not just be able to recognize, but also to correct being. His warning could not be any more drastic:

We must not be alarmed if the fruits of this optimism ripen – if society, leavened to the very lowest strata by this kind of culture, gradually begins to tremble with wanton agitations and desires, if the belief in the earthly happiness of all, if the belief in the possibility of such a general intellectual culture changes into the threatening demand for such an Alexandrian earthly happiness, into the conjuring up of a Euripidean *deus ex machina*. Let us mark this well: the Alexandrian culture, to be able to exist permanently, requires a slave class, but with its optimistic view of life it denies the necessity of such a class, and consequently, when its beautifully seductive and tranquilizing utterances about the “dignity of man” and the “dignity of labor” are no longer effective, it gradually drifts toward a dreadful destruction. There is nothing more terrible than a class of barbaric slaves who have learned to regard their existence as injustice and now prepare to avenge, not only themselves, but all generations.²⁸

In the image of Dionysus as repressed by Apollo, suppressed and separated, Nietzsche lays the blueprint for the later work of Sigmund Freud. Nietzsche's Dionysus can also be recognized in Carl Gustav Jung's Wotan, the passionately irrational god of storm, when Jung writes already in 1918:

Christianity split the Germanic barbarian into an upper and a lower half, and enabled him, by repressing the dark side, to domesticate the brighter side and fit it for civilization. But the lower, darker half still awaits redemption and a second spell of domestication. Until then, it will remain associated with the vestiges of the prehistoric age, of the collective unconscious, which is subject to a peculiar and ever-increasing activation. As the Christian view of the world loses its authority, the more menacingly will the “blond beast” be heard prowling about in its underground prison, ready at any moment to burst out with devastating consequences.²⁹

Through such insights, the energetic aspect found its path through postmodernity and further into the transrational approach within

peace research and it was released from its conceptual banishment in premodernity. This alone would turn Nietzsche's innovative text into an epochal piece of writing. But it accomplishes much more. When Nietzsche's narration lets tragedy emerge out of the dithyramb, he thereby recognizes music as the archaic manifestation of this Dionysian energy. That is, he elevates music to the most originary expression of the resonance of human and communal energy, out of whose ritual nurturing the eternal cycle of living and dying, fertility and withering, and thus peace springs forth. Besides the question of the maintainability of his hypothesis within the history of culture, this constitutes a deep insight into the functioning of human communities and is of highest relevance for my topic.³⁰ In the frame of the moral and modern images of peace, music was always relegated to the realm of Dionysus, the wild and uncontrollable, and thus evil. That is why the moral and modern understanding of art tried to regulate it in an Apollonian manner within its own aesthetic, or even better to ban it altogether. This has a long tradition within the history of Islam and Christianity.

Harmony and music

From the Pythagoreans up to Nietzsche, many thinkers of importance for my topic have engaged with the question of music and its fundamental meaning for the peaces: Nicomachus, Francis of Assisi, Descartes, Kepler, Rousseau, and Schopenhauer, to name just a few Occidental voices. On this point Nietzsche is at one with his admired Sufi-poet Khwāja Šamsu d-Dīn Muhammad Hāfez who lived in fourteenth-century Persia.³¹ Nietzsche brings this central insight about humanity's deep nature manifesting in music back into modernity and thus allows it new perspectives on the peaces in regard to both method and interpretation.³² That is why music and all the arts deriving from it belong in peace research. A peace research that forgets about the power of music, dance, lyricism, and poetry, does not deserve its name. This is not about the primary intentions of some peace-smitten romantics, but about pre-intention, that which socially is "in the air" and can be made audible and visible by talented media. Music after Nietzsche is not just an auxiliary tool for the psychology of communication, but originary expression of natural energy and thus a core topic for any kind of investigation oriented on society.

A further achievement of this early text by Nietzsche is the recognition of the necessity to think the harmonious unity of irreconcilable

contradictions at the same place and the same time via the image of Dionysus:

[...] the contradiction at the heart of the world reveals itself to him as a clash of different worlds, e.g., of a divine and a human one, in which each, taken as an individual, has right on its side, but nevertheless has to suffer for its individuation, being merely a single one beside another. In the heroic effort of the individual to attain universality, in the attempt to transcend the curse of individuation and to become the one world-being, he suffers in his own person the primordial contradiction that is concealed in things, which means that he commits sacrilege and suffers. [...] All that exists is just and unjust and equally justified in both.³³

This statement, Tantric in its core, is the fundament for his later explicit formulations on war, the overcoming of revenge, and the rebuke of the nation state. Also Koppe highlights this in his history of ideas on Occidental peace:

But that means to reserve morality to oneself and to accuse one's neighbor of immorality, since he has to be thought of as ready for aggression and conquest if our own state is obliged to take thought of means of self-defence; moreover, when our neighbour denies any thirst for aggression just as heatedly as our state does, and protests that he too maintains an army only for reasons of legitimate self-defence, our declaration of why we require an army declares our neighbour a hypocrite and cunning criminal who would be only too happy to pounce upon a harmless and unprepared victim and subdue him without struggle. This is how all states now confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbour and a benevolent disposition in themselves.³⁴

With that Nietzsche repeats Hobbes' empiricist insight regarding the plurality of perspectives, yet sheds its phobic tension and opens the possibility for a new, postmodern engagement with it. He furthermore recognizes this contradictoriness as already inherent to the androgynous Dionysian figure and celebrates its eternal return:

In this existence as a dismembered god, Dionysius possesses the dual nature of a cruel, barbarized demon and a mild, gentle ruler. But

the hope of the epopts looked toward a rebirth of Dionysus, which we must now dimly conceive as the end of individuation. It was for this coming third Dionysus that the epopts' roaring hymns of joy resounded. And it is this hope alone that casts a gleam of joy upon the features of a world torn asunder and shattered into individuals; this is symbolized in the myth of Demeter, sunk in eternal sorrow, who rejoices again for the first time when told that she may once more give birth to Dionysus.³⁵

Even if Nietzsche himself later harshly criticized the *Birth of Greek Tragedy*, if many of its exegetes do not appreciate it and even if it allows for many different ways of reading, to me this text nevertheless already contains many of those elements that later return perhaps a bit clearer, and perhaps better worked out and partially also in corrected form. This goes especially for *Beyond Good and Evil*, that text in which he shatters the classic notion of morality by putting it into the plural, thereby giving a lesson to postmodernity and inspiring the idea of the many peaces:

There are moralities which are meant to justify their creator before others. Other moralities are meant to calm him and lead him to be satisfied with himself. With yet others he wants to crucify himself and humiliate himself. With others he wants to wreak revenge, with others conceal himself, with others transfigure himself and place himself way up, at a distance. This morality is used by its creator to forget, that one to have others forget him or something about him. Some moralists want to vent their powers and creative whims on humanity [...].³⁶

His engagement with the pre-Socratic manner of thinking during his early years determined his further path. The rediscovery and fertilization of this forgotten philosophy at a time when the modern thinking seemed to be at its irresistible peak, are an extraordinary achievement. He opened a wide range of perspectives not just for himself, but also for the thinking of his time and subsequent generations.

Nietzsche's vision of violence

From the point of view of Idealist pacifism, Nietzsche, however, is nothing more than a troublemaker, a single irritation, an annoyance. On many pages it even appears as if he were not just an anti-democrat, but an aestheticizing justifier of war and murder. Many Idealists wanted to

read him as such. But if he had just been that, he would have long been forgotten. His approach to questions of war and violence derives from the tension between his bourgeois context and his marked pre-Socratic interests. On one side stands his critique of the existing conditions in which he astutely recognized what today is called structural violence. On this point he is in agreement with Marx. Yet, he is more strongly interested in the aspects of cultural violence – the violence of thought within his bourgeois context and its democratic understanding of peace. It is this kind of peace against which he writes. He recognizes the inseparable connection between physical, structural, and cultural violence and knows that there can be no lasting peace where structural and cultural violence rule. Therefrom derives Nietzsche's hypothesis that peace always has to be created anew. He follows the pre-Socratics' view about the order of nature and concludes that war would destroy, but also create the new. It would clear the path for the yet-to-come. According to Nietzsche, peoples perish from the outwardly quiet conditions of structural and cultural violence just as well as from physical violence.

Under peaceful conditions a warlike man sets upon himself.³⁷

Out of this understanding of the inseparable connection between all forms of violence he deduces that the physical one would be no worse than the others. This equalization scares all those who profit from the conditions of structural violence and categorically reject armed resistance as physical violence. Nietzsche is faced with this challenge just like Marx, who wants to reach the final peace through the means of violence.

In Nietzsche, the theory about war understood in this way and the affirmation of life belong together. This cannot be understood as a guideline to action for reactionary regimes, their ideals, and forms of rule. For him it was about liberation from that slave mentality which Nietzsche perceived all around him, about the conditions and results of cultural violence, which to him were as important as structural violence was to Marx. His often misunderstood Overman was somebody who had arisen out of this submissiveness, had liberated her/himself and no longer had the need to resort to violence. Yet the Superman is not an ideal, but an always recurring appearance, an attempting, striving, self-overcoming being.

Nietzsche therefore recognizes the necessity of liberation from the conditions of structural and cultural violence, and just like Marx, criti-

cizes the violent, grave-like silence of bourgeois society. Similarly to the latter, he also holds the suppression of physical violence under those conditions to be impossible and pointless. But in the face of this dilemma he refers, unlike Marx, to the energetic principle of the pre-Socratics. The insight thus gained is that peace should not be confused with boredom. He calls for living dangerously, which would lead to awareness and is nothing else than what in other contexts is called *werra* or *inner jihad*.³⁸ Nietzsche's Overman is an awakened being, a *bodhisattva* who does not need to be afraid because s/he has already gone through all the passions of life. It is thus certainly no blueprint for a *völkisch*-racist ideology of the master race, as it has also been interpreted. The Overman has outgrown the slave morality because s/he has recognized the world in its wholeness:

This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expand itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income [...].³⁹

This is a poetic formulation of the first law of thermodynamics, that teaching which already during Nietzsche's lifetime decisively contributed to enlarging the borders of classical physics, so that only a little later all fundamental principles of natural science believed in until that point had to be revised. He makes it clear that all energy remains effective within the system world, because nothing is lost. To philosophize away war and violence out of it does not make sense, simply because war and violence did and do exist. Yet, different than with Realism, this insight with Nietzsche does not lead to the call for security. The road to the peaces leads via paths fraught with danger and temptation. The art of the peaces consists in walking those paths in a balanced manner, without creating or suffering unbearable disharmonies.

Together with many of his contemporaries in the humanities, natural and social sciences, Nietzsche's works reflect an orgiastic high and turning point in the history of science. By discovering and communicating the outrageous they crown the reason of modernity by its own means and thereby dissolve it. One of the principles for this new understanding of science was formulated by Nietzsche like this:

[...] a conviction may obtain admission to science only when it ceases to be a conviction.⁴⁰

This thinking, because it is reasonable, does not leave any certainties, does not sell any concluding truths, mistrusts reason, and forces the audience to not just believe or even know its statements, but to constantly interpret them anew, to broaden the limits of imagination. To do so is risky, error can be fatal, as the twentieth century has taught, during which Nietzsche was by far not the only one whose scientific and artistic energy were implemented destructively. But just the very fact that this result cannot be unequivocally determined and is dependent on the perspective of the observer also points the road for peace research into postmodern praxiology. On this basis, many originary thinkers have tried themselves on the topic of peace during the course of the twentieth century.

5.2 The turning point: systems theories and peaces

What Fritjof Capra has called the “turning point”⁴¹ is as important for the systematics of the current work as Karl Jaspers’ Axial Age. In both cases it is about a fundamental shift in the interpretation of the world and thus the peaces. While the observation of the physiosphere was still taken to be a core task of philosophy during the Axial Age, at the turning point a separate scientific discipline had been formed for this purpose; a discipline that now spectacularly went about transgressing its own limits. Since the physiosphere has already been discerned as a basis for the biosphere and the noosphere, does it concern here a fundamental shift in the double sense of the word? I do not repeat Capra’s⁴² whole argumentation but initially follow him and summarize wherein the enormity of this shift consisted. I am speaking about the exploration of quantum physics, about those insights in the first half of the twentieth century that are inextricably connected to names like Max Planck,⁴³ Albert Einstein,⁴⁴ Niels Bohr,⁴⁵ Erwin Schrödinger,⁴⁶ and Werner Heisenberg.⁴⁷

During their study of subatomic particles, this generation of researchers realized that an electron is neither a particle nor a wave. It can take on particle-like properties in some situations and wave-like properties in others. In this manner, a continuous transformation ensues, from particle to wave and the other way around. That implies that neither the electron nor any other atomic “object” possesses inherent features that are independent of its environment. Its characteristics depend on the observation. The observer sees it in an interrelation. Particle and wave are two complementary descriptions of the same reality, each of which is only partially correct and limited in its applicability. Both truths are necessary in order to fully represent atomic reality. This paradox

compelled physicists to accept an aspect of reality that questions the foundation of the mechanistic worldview since Newton: the notion of the reality of matter. On a subatomic level the solid material objects of classical physics dissolve into wave-like probability structures.

In the observations of atomic physics, subatomic particles have no meaning as isolated units, but only as connections and correlations between different processes of observation. Subatomic particles are not things but connections of things, and those things are themselves connections of other things and so forth. Things do not exist in quantum physics, only textures and interrelations. This has far-reaching consequences.

In order to calculate probabilities, classical physics uses hidden variables that are supposed to exist as inherent to the relevant object and are thus called local. During the experimental observation of the smallest elements of matter it turned out that particles do not just exhibit the famous wave-particle feature, but also the character of position uncertainty or nonlocality. This means they show interrelations which override the normal boundaries of time and space. A particle is not exactly localizable in one spot, but it is in several spots simultaneously – it is nonlocal. Beyond the local variables, quantum physics thus also knows nonlocal connections whose effects are instantaneous and immediate. The hidden variables in classical physics are local mechanisms, while in quantum physics it is about nonlocal immediate relations to the universe as a whole.⁴⁸ Every event in the world is influenced by the whole universe.

For a long time this was perceived as the quirk of a small circle. And indeed, those theories and calculations did not noticeably change that which is perceived as the manifest world. Apples still fall from trees, just like the legendary one that is supposed to have inspired Newton in his theory of gravity. In practice, Newton's teachings did not lose relevance. Nevertheless, in a quite literal sense the ground was pulled out from under them. As soon as science turns to smaller units, the influence of nonlocal connections becomes stronger. Physical laws can only be formulated as probabilities and it becomes more difficult to imagine parts of the whole separately. This is in contradiction to the assumptions of the mechanistic worldview. While in classical mechanics it is the characteristics and behavior of the parts that determine the whole, the situation is reversed in quantum physics: the whole determines the behavior of the parts.

As every object that can be perceived with the human senses in turn consists of smaller parts, this reversion implies a revolution in the

perception of the world. The Cartesian separation between mind and matter, observer and observed, can no longer be upheld. Nobody can speak about nature without at the same time speaking about her/himself. If the Newtonian laws appear correct to human perception then this is not because they are objectively true, but because they are perceived as such with the senses and the senses' possibilities and influences.

The second great insight of the time was that the cosmic fabric is by nature dynamic. The dynamic aspect of matter arises from the wave nature of subatomic particles. From the human perspective, some material objects may appear passive and dead. But if a dead rock is enlarged until its particles become visible, it shows its activity. The closer it is observed the more details become visible, the more it becomes alive. New physics describes matter not as passive and inert but as in a dancing and vibrating motion whose rhythmic patterns are defined by the molecular, atomic, and nuclear configurations. No static structures exist in nature. Stability does exist, yet it is the stability of a dynamic equilibrium. The most important consequence of the relativistic frame, new at the time, was the insight that matter is nothing else but a form of energy. Even an inert object contains energy stored inside its mass. The relation between the two is expressed in Einstein's famous formula $E = mc^2$.

This insight constituted a radical break with the traditional basic research in physics which until that point had been directed toward finding the fundamental building blocks of matter. At the same time it is a breakthrough toward the notion of the material world as a dynamic fabric. Not only had the thought about fundamental building blocks of matter to be abandoned, but also that about fundamental entities of any kind. The universe is perceived as a pulsating, expanding network of mutually connected events. No characteristic of any one part is foundational for this fabric. This means that there is no ultimate reason, no final explanation, no personified creator god, and no final truth outside of the universe. Whoever wants to think god has to imagine him as this universal, pulsating fabric of the All-One, as many old teachings express it in their own language.

The characteristics of all parts derive from the characteristics of the other parts. The correspondence of their interrelation determines the structure of the whole network. If all the particles' characteristics are determined by principles that are dependent on the methods of observation, then this implies that the structures of the material world are constructed out of the manner in which they are perceived. The observed structures of matter are reflections of the structures of consciousness.

In the words of Werner Heisenberg, this means that every word or every concept, clear as it may seem to be, has only a limited range of applicability. Scientific theories can never provide a complete and definitive description of reality. They will always only be approximations of the nature of things. To put it bluntly: scientists do not deal with truth; they deal with limited and approximate descriptions of reality.⁴⁹

It is astonishing how the new physics in its own tongue confirms what Nietzsche previously said in his philosophical and poetic language. $E = mc^2$ expresses nothing else but the dynamic (c^2) relation between Dionysus (E) and Apollo (m). It describes the drama of life. That everything is connected with everything else belongs to the basic assumptions of the energetic understanding of world and peace, which in this manner reappears in modernity. Therefrom derive notions of peace that no longer deny, repress, or displace Dionysus or energy, because peace is unthinkable without energy. What would a dead peace be that cannot even be thought? In this newly gained worldview, peace is the stability of the dynamic equilibrium within the pulsating world system, and it is thus a constantly changing phenomenon, dependent on observation, a reflection of consciousness.

Quantum physics was assisted by further disciplines within the natural sciences. Chemistry and microbiology followed, with the conclusion that the fundamental phenomenon of life on earth could only be understood if the whole world system is perceived as one single living organism. Planet earth is not just teeming with living beings, but it is itself alive. The whole of living matter, including the atmosphere, the oceans, and solid ground, forms a complex system which possesses all the typical characteristics of self-organization. With their Gaia hypothesis, named after the Great Earth Goddess, James Lovelock and Lynn Margulies in remarkable manner closed the circle between modern natural science and the energetic concepts of peace.⁵⁰

This hypothesis includes all being, all elements of the Great Triad, and refers to the resonance of all with all. It also dissolves the established teleological concept of morals which forms the foundation for the modern image of peace. It only allows for an ethics in the sense of the Indian concept of karma, which assumes that every action has consequences whose interpretations, however, are beyond good and evil.

Many of the initially mentioned pioneers did not receive those insights euphorically at all. The older generation tried to rescue as much as possible of the modern worldview for themselves and their own worldviews. That is humanly understandable and exactly an expression of the postmodern mentality. They realized that the old was about to be

irrevocably lost and that it would be the task of science to newly think and explain the world, to draw new conclusions for the *Dasein* and for human relations. However, they could not yet use their own insights as a basis for such a coherent interpretation of the world and for orientation within it. The new had not unfolded when the old broke apart. The enormous insight that those pioneers had discovered remained unintelligible not just for the mass of humanity but also for the mainstream of the social sciences. In their postmodern mentality they thus held fast to the modern articles of faith from Newton via Marx to Darwin.⁵¹ From the point of view of the twenty-first century this is only to be observed and not evaluated, even though the explosive mixture of the technology enabled by new physics and the *realpolitik* upheld during those decades as modern led to Fascism and Stalinism, to Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and into a century of large-scale annihilation.

Peace studies as a postmodern discipline

After all that has been said so far, it is not further surprising that the social scientist Quincy Wright⁵² with his 1935 monumental work *The Causes and Origins of War and the Conditions of Peace*⁵³ founded the modern, scientific research on the causes of war just during the recess of the Great War. However, at the end of the Great War, it was the physicists who stood at the cradle of that current of peace research that I here have labeled as postmodern.

The American use of nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki dramatically showed the natural sciences the point which the belligerent potential of their inventions had reached. The shock over this realization, combined in paralyzing manner with the horror over the Holocaust, lasted for almost a decade before the problem was approached in an approximately analytic and radical manner. In July of 1955, Albert Einstein, together with the British mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell⁵⁴ and nine other natural scientists, mainly physicists, published that famous manifesto which since then has been regarded by many as the impulse document for peace studies as a discipline. In short, this manifesto pointed out that the use of hydrogen bombs could destroy all of humanity and demanded, in a time of the beginning of the arms race, nuclear disarmament on all sides. It furthermore was a call to remembering their own humanity and a conscious decision against armed conflicts, because only by those means could the continued existence of humankind be safeguarded.⁵⁵

The so-called Pugwash movement arose out of this impulse. The name, sounding rather like an occult sect, in fact comes from that Canadian

hamlet where the first Conference on Science and World Affairs took place in 1957. From that point onwards, renowned and influential scientists came together to meet at international conferences and workshops and give contributions toward the questions of nuclear threats, armed conflicts, and problems of global security. Since this time, Pugwash International continues to hold regular annual conferences and workshops on the topics of nuclear disarmament, biological and chemical weapons, regional conflicts, proliferation of modern weapons technology, the responsibility of natural sciences for progress, war and peace, and it has also taken up the environmental question.⁵⁶ Since its founding, Pugwash has enjoyed a great international reputation. It is only consistent that in 1995, exactly 50 years after the dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan, when Józef Rotblat,⁵⁷ a founding member alive then, received the Nobel Peace Prize as a representative for the whole movement.

Nevertheless, it remains noteworthy that the people united in Pugwash were unable to reach radical philosophical conclusions out of their own scientific insights. Observed over the decades, their actions led to some spectacular successes, like their influence on the nuclear test ban in 1963, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1968, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, and the ban on chemical and nuclear weapons of 1972 and 1973. They also were involved in a consulting function during the SALT disarmament talks from 1969 until 1979, as well as during the preparation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). As commendable as that is, from the perspective of peace research it paradoxically ensued from the basis of a traditional, mainly Idealist, approach. This may initially have had to do with the fact that the group in the founding generation around Einstein was rather composed of people unwilling to give up on the modern worldview and thus draw the political consequence from their scientific insights. Later on, successful communication with the elites may have led to an entrenchment of this style. The crowning of this work with the Nobel Peace Prize impressively corroborates that.

Pugwash's successes can only be evaluated within this logic. It can be argued that without Pugwash the twentieth century might possibly have seen even bigger catastrophes. On the other hand, with its approach, Pugwash remained unable to lead the way out of the inherently aggressive character of modernity toward a turning point, a new image of world and peace, even though its natural scientific potential would have suggested actions in this direction. Pugwash is thus a prominent example of a postmodern mentality, not of postmodern peace philosophy.

After 1945, many institutes of research on the causes of war, conditions of peace, and conflict resolution emerged in U.S. universities and also brought out corresponding study programs. In their theoretical orientation, most of them moved somewhere between traditional international relations, international law, and behaviorism. It was only between the late 1960s and the 1980s that many people's deep uncertainty regarding their own role and the role of the country in the world system opened the gates from a postmodern but still highly moralizing lack of orientation toward a rainbow of approaches, methods, and teachings that allow us to speak of something like a praxiology of postmodern peace research.

Peace studies and system theory

The necessary precondition was the willingness on the part of the then-established scientific disciplines' proponents to bring themselves to a cross-disciplinary method of peace research that tries to correspond to the principal knowledge about the systemic character of the world. This was suggested in 1954 by the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy,⁵⁸ who called into being the Society for General Systems Research at the University of Stanford. Also on board were the mathematician and systems theorist Anatol Rapoport,⁵⁹ the physiologist Ralph Gerard,⁶⁰ and the economist Kenneth Boulding,⁶¹ who, as the best known of this quartet, came to be called the father of interdisciplinary peace studies in the United States. What this circle meant by interdisciplinary is what I understand in the current work as postmodern. The common interest of this school's founders was general system theory. This theory tries, on the basis of methodological holism, to find and formulate common regularities in physical, biological, and social systems. Principles that can be found in one class of systems should therefore also be applicable to others. Such principles are for example complexity, equilibrium, feedback, and self-organization.

The guiding observation for this school's research is that 85 to 90 percent of all societal and intersocietal activities occur nonviolently. Only about 10 to 15 percent of human activities are concerned with war or its preparation, yet due to their spectacular character they receive much more attention than the nonviolent processes of what they call *inclusive peace*. On the basis of this observation they placed processes of peace in the world system at the center of their interest and understood violent escalations as the periphery, the limit point of their area of work.⁶² With that they inverted the orientation of international relations and research on the causes of war and conflict as it had been practiced hitherto. This substantial difference was repeatedly lost out of

sight in later works of peace research and forever had to be discovered anew. Elise Boulding followed this task throughout her life.⁶³ In Europe it was Francisco Muñoz who successfully took up this topic.⁶⁴

The concept of dynamic equilibrium as proposed by Bertalanffy refers to the insights of new physics recounted above and from there defines a new notion of peace, beyond all moral and modern approaches. The universal scholar Anatol Rapoport, by the way another musician among the pioneers of peace research, brought cybernetics into this pool of knowledge and made the older game theory, which was also used by other approaches, applicable to this context. Ralph Gerard brought in the psychological aspect that would become a dynamic element for this school of thought.

The Quaker Kenneth Boulding finally stood for the theoretical foundation of a nongrowth-oriented economy. He emphasized the role of the national economic basis for the satisfaction of human needs. In a closed system, societies have to try to get by with as little percolation as possible. These thoughts, and especially the metaphor of the spaceship Earth that was coined by him, have been widely received and criticized. In 1945, he had published a work under the title *The Economics of Peace*,⁶⁵ which hinted at the direction that his lifework would later take and which at least in its basic idea never lost its current relevance. Boulding's call for system-oriented science implies that economic theory should not be the basis for national politics. He reduced economic science to a discipline of accounting whose primary task lay in calculating the real, ecological, and human costs of economic doing.⁶⁶

In this school's work the question about the peaces is connected with ecological principles. A greater part of peace research drew inspiration from there. It needs to be mentioned that this founding generation, which was practically completely composed of European immigrants, was at least not primarily motivated by a moral outrage about the existing conditions or an Idealist belief to know it better, but by a profound scientific insight into the nature of being. This postmodern knowledge, however, did not free them from their personal embeddedness into their times' postmodern mentality, in which their approaches in political terms were minority positions. Despite cyclical phases of attention they could not inspire a shift away from the Idealist–Realist mainstream of daily politics. Boulding pointed out the difference in one of his later articles:

I admit that I am much more interested in how peace turns into the characteristic of an ecosystem, and less about how it becomes part of an organizational structure.

The dissociation from the Idealist approach follows:

What do we mean, for example, when we say that things rather turn towards the better than the worse? How can we become clearer about such processes and what kind of politics can we imagine that, in the process of a realistic societal dynamic, consecutively realizes states that are actually perceived as better and not worse by a broad public?⁶⁷

In many disciplines systems theory became a scientific fashion, but then often remained a method whose epistemological reach was not recognized by quite a few of the people using it. Many believed to be able to argue Idealist concerns with systems-theoretical methods, which is an irreducible contradiction. John Paul Lederach stresses that within a systemic approach the basic attitude of trust in self-regulating capacities has to be ranked higher than the submission to an ideal:

First, we must trust the capacity of systems to generate options and avenues for change and moving forward. Second, we must pursue those that appear to hold the greatest promise for constructing change. Third, we must not lock rigidly onto one idea or avenue.⁶⁸

The contradiction between systems theory and Idealism surfaced especially strongly in the debate on development politics, a scientific field that also emerged as interdisciplinary after U.S. president Harry Truman had declared the age of development in his famous speech from 1949:

We must embark on a bold new paradigm for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of the underdeveloped areas. [...] The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit – has no place in our plans.⁶⁹

In this first official proclamation of underdevelopment Truman was inspired by the theory of modernization, which again reversed Karl Marx's linear understanding of history and stood it back on its liberal Hegelian feet. The best-known exponent of this school of thought, Walt W. Rostow,⁷⁰ a little later formalized this in his also famous *Non-Communist Manifesto*.⁷¹ The name of the development-political theory of modernization sufficiently explains which image of world and peace it belongs to. Its equally modern counterparts were the dependency approaches, which since the 1950s have been discussed especially in Latin America⁷²

and which began a worldwide career at the seat of CEPAL⁷³ in Santiago de Chile. Their best-known representative is Raúl Prebisch.⁷⁴

At bottom both approaches had the same goal in sight, namely the fastest and most efficient possible *modernization* of those states throughout the world defined as underdeveloped. In hectic competition they analyzed the causes of this underdevelopment and designed recommendations and policies on how this undesirable state could be overcome. The antagonism between these schools did not reside in their objectives, but in the analysis and moral evaluation of the initial situation. The theory of modernization believed in a successful, and therefore in its perception good, center that should help the underdeveloped and thus bad periphery in its efforts of modernization. The dependency approaches saw the good, but in consequence poor periphery being exploited by an evil center. Therefore they looked for salvation in dissociation.⁷⁵ Even if in the course of time more complex proposals were put forward which also included the human factor and later on even nature, defined as the environment of the human sphere. Still both models kept following a mechanistic manner of thinking. Here one might assume that during the second half of the twentieth century such models could no longer be of guiding relevance for scientific insights. The opposite situation was the case. Both schools not merely experienced a bloom in their reception, but development politics spread as world mechanics in an almost eschatological euphoria across the globe, with the apparent antagonists outdoing each other in their reductionist experiments, casting society after society into misery.

Social scientific systems theory only entered this ambiance at the beginning of the 1970s. One innovative contribution came from the already repeatedly mentioned Immanuel Wallerstein,⁷⁶ who, put shortly, proposed to understand capitalism itself as a system and analyze it accordingly. Wallerstein combined systems theory with the innovative teachings of the French *Annales* School, especially of Fernand Braudel,⁷⁷ who placed the historical movements below the level of the history of events in the center of interest. Wallerstein furthermore referred to his own reinterpretation of Marxism and finally took up many concepts from the *dependencia*-School.⁷⁸

The second systems-theoretical approach of relevance for peace research emerged at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1972 and gained fame as a report to the Club of Rome under the title *The Limits to Growth*.⁷⁹ What the authors Donella and Dennis Meadows accomplished together with their colleagues was the fulfillment of Kenneth Boulding's dream. They put together what for the time was a highly

powerful, computer simulation for analyzing the world system within a mathematical model that took into consideration the high connectivity of global processes. On this basis they calculated several scenarios with different assumptions about the reservoir of global resources, efficiency of agricultural production, birth control, or environmental protection. The result was again a collapse of the linear principle of growth. In the first version this occurred around the year 2030, in later versions that had been refined and actualized as regards the data material and model of calculation still during the course of the twenty-first century.⁸⁰ Their work was often misinterpreted in such a manner that they would predict the end of the world for a certain year. They neither could nor wanted to do so. They can just calculate models under certain assumptions and correlate as many components as possible in realistic connections. Technological development has enormously expanded the possibilities of their WORLD3 model. It nevertheless remains a model of calculation that can never take into account all aspects of reality. It only shows trends, from which conclusions for economic, political, social, and cultural actions derive.

This model provides important insights toward a systems-oriented peace research, which in the sense of Boulding does not separate the human species from the ecosystem, but perceives it as one element therein. That by itself is not yet system-oriented, interdisciplinary, or postmodern peace research, because the models of calculation are lacking the character of values. Their results can also be interpreted idealistically and be bent toward an apocalyptic "save the world" campaign, which has at times occurred.⁸¹ In a globalized world society that continues to be constituted in postmodern fashion yet thinks in a modern manner, this deteriorates to moral self-referentiality. The role of postmodern peace research as the science of society is thus to twist the modern concepts of society and to integrate the systemic character of the world into the analysis of the succession of social processes. In order to do so without itself falling back into moralizing appeals it needs a plausible philosophical concept that makes systemic thinking socially acceptable. The systems theorist Ervin Laszlo, a prominent member of the Club of Rome, has taken up this thread. But I will present more on that later.

5.3 *Thanatos* is rampant

The different variations of systems theories were mainly formulated by European immigrants in the United States. From there they contributed

to postmodern peace research. In Europe, however, the postmodern orientations derived from Structuralism, in itself a vague collective term for a large group of scientific methods that referred to Freud's structural hypothesis. They all share the supposition that things in the world do not exist by themselves alone, but always in interrelation with other phenomena. Insofar Structuralism coincides with systems theories.

Peace studies and structuralism

Structuralism defines its core concept of structure as a not always visible order of relations and dependencies of the parts toward each other and within a whole. Structuralism assumes in modern and mechanistic manner that the parts form the whole, while systems theories, originating in the insight of the new physics, work with the postmodern knowledge that the whole determines the parts. Following Kantian epistemology and the yet to be discussed Cartesian theory of the subject, Structuralism supposes that structure as such would not exist, but only be constructed by the observer:

Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call nature, and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there.⁸²

Structure thus exists only in perception, which the observer constructs as part of her/his reality. But since the observer herself/himself is part of this reality, structure is also immanent to reality. On the basis of this assumption, Structuralism segments the perceptible and describable things according to the constructivist method and then reconstructs the connection between them. According to this approach it is only through this creative act that the world is generated out of its parts, because these would be correspondingly recognized and understood. The subjects' reason forms the world out of its parts.⁸³ This mechanistic method is based on the desire to analyze all phenomena with natural scientific precision and it thus moves into a direction opposite to systems theory. This procedure was also applied to cultural and social scientific questions and developed further into differentiated techniques of analysis. It gained lasting influence mainly in francophone philosophy, where language turned into a central topic for the Structuralists. Because they assume that also the supposedly autonomous subject of the Enlightenment could not really be autonomous, not even after the full integration of its unconscious organic drives.

It would remain within the context of linguistic structures, which autonomously determine meaning without the subject's influence. The linguistic structures themselves would also not be really autonomous, because they exist in the context of prearticulate worldviews that make use of language, without language being aware of it. Those worldviews in turn are parts of the great and thick fabric of societal practice, which many authors in the wake of Hegel have called spirit.⁸⁴

The school following Claude Lévi-Strauss,⁸⁵ important for peace research, assumed that not only language but also cultural products would be systems of signs. The structures on which these are based could similarly be researched. Structuralism thus turned into a general research method, especially in ethnology, but just as much in psychology and sociology. Apollo and Dionysus reappear with Lévi-Strauss in a new form as two opposed but equal systems of thinking. The "savage mind" expresses itself in signs, the scientific mind in concepts. Both patterns of thought would be similarly structured and capable of generalizing and forming analogies. Lévi-Strauss held that myths and rituals follow a certain, often ignored order. He denied historical totality and perceived history as a multiplicity of stories without a central subject. He strictly turned against any hierarchy in the evaluation of civilizations and thus provided a sharp contrast to the modernizing concepts of developmental politics prevalent at the time.⁸⁶

Structuralism in its political guise can be interpreted as the left-intellectual attempt of a mostly francophone circle after the experiences of Fascism, to understand the unconscious in the collective practice. For this purpose it attempted to construct a new, socially adequate epistemology. It thus wanted to *modernize* Marxism by combining it with Freudian psychoanalysis.⁸⁷

The Structuralists' political intention until Paris of May 1968 was critical of ideology, and hence broke apart over these events. They reacted aversely to the revolt and became the target of heavy critique themselves. While it was just this factor that established their teaching at the universities, this came at the price of being accused of integrating into bourgeois philosophy and mechanistic psychoanalysis.⁸⁸ This critique came from a current that finally came to be called Post-structuralist. For many Post-structuralist authors the political question that became crucial was how societal structures and cultural formations producing domination and oppression could be undermined by subversive practices.

Both Structuralists and Post-structuralists can hardly be summarized as schools. Both currents rather brought forth intellectual icons and the borders between them remained fluid. The approaches often intersect

within their biographies. That is why ascriptions are risky. The best-known example of this would be Michel Foucault.⁸⁹ Not all the great names emerging from the philosophical and linguistic debate are of relevance for the purposes of this book. The intellectual climate, however, is an important frame for the emergence of the postmodern tradition of continental European peace research.

Peace studies as a postmodern phenomenon

The polyglot Norwegian Johan Galtung⁹⁰ is usually called its “father.” With the foundation of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959 and the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964, two important biographical landmarks of his life are equated with the discipline’s institutionalized emergence in Europe. The early works of this author’s immense oeuvre⁹¹ give the impression of an Idealist inspired by Gandhi,⁹² with slightly anarchistic tendencies,⁹³ whose early publishing successes are closely linked to the concept of structural violence, which he defined as follows:

As a point of departure, let us say that [structural] *violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.*⁹⁴

In the context of the debate on Structuralism this definition is neither original nor radical. One of Galtung’s repeatedly proven talents is to mold complex topics or theories into simple forms. What Galtung says none of the dozens of Structuralist-oriented authors were able to formulate earlier on in a manner even close to being this easily understandable. What is more, structural violence is the teaching of Marx and Freud – reduced to three lines. That is the strength of a key term that since its appearance cannot be thought away from European peace research, like the discipline’s standard bearer on its road to general acceptance within the academic world. Structural violence was a magic formula with which post-Marxist thinking became presentable in Western European universities and institutions. At the same time this is also its weakness, because it is weighted with all the Structuralist ballast of Freudian psychoanalysis and philosophical Marxism. At its core it is thus a mechanistic and Idealist concept whose roots date back to those biblical times during the Axial Age when peace was yoked to justice. This is the reason why it so easily found its way into everyday language and was met with surprisingly little critical resistance.

Galtung's first definition of structural violence makes naming a violent perpetrator dispensable; not even a victim understanding herself/himself as such has to be given. Structural violence scandalizes the existing conditions as unjust and can thus set in motion all those poisons of the mind that already have been problematized in the chapter on Buddhism – revenge, hate, and greed. Galtung may have meant Agape, but a substantial part of his audience heard Thanatos. This is understandable. On the one hand Thanatos rampaged like an angry troll of modernity through the postmodern mentality of the 1968 activists' generation and their followers, and he is to be suspected wherever the word "structure" appeared. On the other hand, Galtung himself caused irritation through the uncompleted character of his concept. Agape without Eros finally is Thanatos and thus the one who criticizes structural violence had to be asked the same question as any other prophet of justice from Isaiah via Thomas Aquinas up to Marx: is it feasible, or even necessary, to use violence for furthering the cause of good?

In the frame of the political discussion at the time, Galtung was in the same boat with Michel Foucault⁹⁵ or Herbert Marcuse,⁹⁶ who earlier and in a more profound manner had shown and criticized the impersonal structures of power and violence. In the context of the student movement between 1968 and 1972, all those concepts served as legitimization for a natural right to resistance against the system, capitalism, and the establishment. The sexual revolution that the movement at the time proclaimed with reference mainly to Herbert Marcuse and Wilhelm Reich,⁹⁷ was not primarily about revolutionizing the sexual codex as an aim in itself, but about changing the structures of power via the revolutionary reinterpretation of the sexual as societal impetus. In Reich's understanding, the liberation of sexuality should effect a peaceful change of societal structures. The resistance thus turned not so much against concrete persons, against perpetrators of physical violence or oppressors knowable by name, but with Foucault against the order of things, with Marcuse against repressive tolerance, or after Galtung against structural violence within capitalism.

For peace research as a young continental discipline, the problem arising therefrom was that Galtung's concept was not only met with great enthusiasm in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa, where the great time of the national Marxist movements was just beginning, which started to advance their more or less successful revolutions on the basis of easily comprehensible demands for social justice. In those regions the concept appeared empirically to be hardly refutable. Yet, radically thought to its end, it should also be applicable in Western

Europe and the United States. When the Rote Armee Fraktion (Red Army Faction) in Germany and the Red Brigades in Italy took possession of it, the discipline was faced with more than just an intellectual problem. That the establishment repeatedly pushed peace research and left-wing terrorism into the same intellectual corner was not due to the intention of the actors, but down to the weakness of the concepts. If Structuralism was a modern concept in a postmodern world, then structural violence described a partial truth that, due to its incompleteness, had to be misunderstood. If he considered it feasible to counter the structural violence of the top dogs with the physical violence of the underdogs, then Galtung opened all the doors for those interpretations and their consequences.⁹⁸

Galtung therefore supported this catchphrase with a definitional distinction, which also found lasting acceptance in the jargon of European peace research: negative and positive peace. As regards negative peace, he made use of the Greek Eirene, the absence of physical violence. Positive peace he conceptualized as the mirror image of structural violence, as a condition in which no structural violence exists. Negative peace would thus remain incomplete, yet still be a peace in which no physical violence is exerted, while positive peace would have to be striven for as the complete fulfillment of the ideal. This sounds friendlier, but it is no solution in content. Because this positive peace, just like structural violence, is also a diffuse and materialist concept subject to an arbitrary evaluation, which can be read in different and thus contradictory manner.

Continental European peace research, which at the time was mainly Scandinavian–German, early on broke apart over this question into three main currents: One, for which Ekkehart Krippendorff⁹⁹ can be named as the most prominent exponent, remained on the track of a critique of states and institutions, even if Krippendorff himself executed a sharp turnaround during the mid-1980s from the political–economic direction to a power- and foremost military-centered critique of international relations, which in its approach is not dissimilar to French Structuralism.¹⁰⁰

While Krippendorff with his critique of the state at times got close to the original thinkers of anarchism, Dieter Senghaas¹⁰¹ chose the opposite direction. Famous for having imported the Latin American *dependencia* to Germany and as an early proponent of the dissociation approach in development politics, which later was to fail spectacularly, Senghaas as a peace researcher mainly stands for civilizational thinking in which state and institutions play a central role for the peace order. He completely consigned himself to Thanatos and the path of develop-

ment- and peace-political Idealism.¹⁰² With the “civilizational hexagon” he also found a marketable emblem for this approach.¹⁰³ He received much applause for his conformist works, but thereby entered a field of little relevance for the observations of the postmodern peaces.

Galtung embarked on that physical and mental odyssey which in the course of decades freed him from Structuralist limitations and enabled him to enrich his concept with energetic concepts of peace. Eros would appear to him 20 years later in the term of cultural violence. Combined with his talent for catchy formulations and audience-friendly communication, this search opened up a plenitude of discoveries and rediscoveries of potentials for peaces within European science and politics to which I will come back later.

Theology of liberation

During those years, the tense relation between a peace out of justice and the application of violence also preoccupied the Catholic Church. The Second Vatican Council 1962–65 still dealt with this question in a relatively moderate manner. This is reflected in the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* by Pope John XXIII of 1963, which served as an orientation for the Council. In 1967, only a little later, the succeeding Pope Paul VI took up the topic anew in the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* against many of his advisers’ protests. The most controversial chapter in this encyclical is entitled “Development, the New Name for Peace,” where the Pope states, with reference to *Pacem in Terris* and significantly earlier than Galtung’s corresponding formulation:

For peace is not simply the absence of warfare, based on a precarious balance of power; it is fashioned by efforts directed day after day toward the establishment of the ordered universe willed by God, with a more perfect form of justice among men.¹⁰⁴

The development which the Pope meant was, according to the spirit of the time, the notion that was discussed in the field of tension between the theory of modernization and *dependencia* and thus in any case is a modern concept. The intellectual impetus within this debate derived, corresponding to the general trend, from Latin America, where something like the final struggle about Christianity seemed to be at hand. Che Guevara remarked:

The day when the Christians integrate themselves into the revolution, it will be invincible in Latin America.¹⁰⁵

This assessment, which in its content was also shared by the Pope at that time, was not unfounded, because pastoral deficits in Latin America throughout the twentieth century had led to the formation of Christian basic communities, which since the 1950s dynamically began to interpret the Gospel from their own concrete situation of poverty and to prepare corresponding guidelines for action for themselves.¹⁰⁶ Revolutionary concepts for the attainment of a just peace gained ever more popularity. Between those groups and their priests, overwhelmed in pastoral terms yet responsible for them, a dynamic alliance developed that needed a conceptual interpretation. Such emerged in the course of the 1960s out of the coming together of a Bible exegesis oriented on the poor and a Marxist analysis of society. This movement attained its pastoral and intellectual breakthrough on the one hand during the famous Second General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate in Medellín in 1968 and on the other through the influential work of Gustavo Gutiérrez.¹⁰⁷ On the occasion of a speech in Switzerland in 1969 he coined the term "Theology of Liberation." His theological bestseller of the same name appeared two years later.¹⁰⁸

Proceeding from a Catholic point of view, Gustavo Gutiérrez asked the question of how it could credibly be preached to the poor that God loves them. The poor and disenfranchised became the central topic of his theology. After Gutiérrez, the poverty that needed to be overcome would not just be an economic or social phenomenon, but rather multidimensional. To be a Christian for him means to take the side of the poor and live in solidarity with them. In his theology, Gutiérrez explains the movement from development to liberation.¹⁰⁹ According to the spirit of his time he understood development as economic growth and as a comprehensive social process that encompasses economic, social, political, and cultural aspects. Seen from his humanistic perspective, economy is a

[...] discipline of the transition... from a less human to a more human condition [...]. Under this perspective development means to have more, in order to be more.¹¹⁰

According to Gutiérrez, liberation relates to needs and aspirations of social classes and peoples oppressed in this sense. The term "development" to him appeared like a euphemism in face of the conflict-prone, unjust societal situation in the underdeveloped countries. The term "liberation" to him was more radical, deeper, and thus more accurate.¹¹¹ It also was more easily communicable within the Structuralist spirit of

the time, because it was related to, and borrowed from, this model of thought.

At the same time, and on a deeper level, liberation for Gutiérrez is the dynamic personal process of every human being through which she/he takes responsibility for his/her own destiny. Liberation in this context implies not only improvement of the material living conditions for human beings, the radical change of structures, a social revolution, but more: the continuous development of a new form of living. The human being, in this conception, is a dynamic and historical subject which, together with other members of society, is constantly oriented toward the future.¹¹² Finally, liberation for Gutiérrez also contains a theological aspect that is taken from the Bible and is not contained in the term "development." This is, on the one hand, the equally paradigmatic as metaphoric liberation of the Jewish people from Egypt and, on the other, Christ as all-encompassing redeemer:

Christ makes humankind truly free, that is to say, he enables us to live in communion with him; and this is the basis for all human fellowship.¹¹³

For Gutiérrez, the different dimensions are contingent upon each other. The Latin American Episcopate agreed to this position at its General Conference of 1968 in Medellín, by harshly condemning existing conditions in Latin America and demanding radical changes:

For our true liberation we human beings need a profound change, so that the kingdom of justice, love and peace may come. The origin of all depreciation of the human being, all injustice, has to be sought in the inner imbalance of human liberty, which in the history of all times needed a corresponding correction. The originality of the Christian message does not directly consist in the affirmation of this necessity of a structural change, but in the insistence on the salvation of the human being, which finally requires such a change. We will not gain a new continent without new and reformed structures. There especially will be no new continent without new people, who understand how to truly be free and responsible in light of the Gospel.¹¹⁴

The bishops unmistakably took the side of the poor and declared that,

[...] the misery, which is a general fact, screams to heaven.

From this they concluded:

[...] corresponding to the command of the Gospel, to defend the rights of the poor and oppressed [...] [and] [...] to resolutely indict the abuses and the unjust consequences of the disproportionate inequality between rich and poor, powerful and weak. Peace can only be attained by creating a new order, which brings about a more perfect justice amongst the people.¹¹⁵

This approach was explosive in *realpolitik* terms and its consequences preoccupied the Catholic Church throughout the following decades, far beyond the equally controversial Third General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate in Puebla in 1979. The inner indecision of the institutional Church cost many prominent members of the clergy who oriented themselves on the Theology of Liberation not just their office but also their lives, as was the case, for example, in 1966 with legendary Colombian Camilo Torres. The death toll was especially high in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s. Here one may just recall the killing of Archbishop Romero in El Salvador.

For peace research the implications of this debate in regard to theology and within the Church, like for example around the brothers Boff, the brothers Cardenal, Miguel D'Escoto, Ignacio Ellacuría, Segundo Montes, Enrique Dussel, Jon Sobrino, and many more, are less important than the political consequences. With traditional Christianity and Marxism two currents are united in the Theology of Liberation, one which belongs to the moral and the other to the modern direction, but which both together condemn societies' postmodern mentality.

Ad hoc this could indicate a simultaneity of Phobos and Thanatos – a somewhat paradoxical assumption taking into consideration that both of them together should foster something like a balance between Eros and Agape. The just-mentioned quotes, however, show that the Theology of Liberation's enlightening intention gave the whole undertaking a rather marked orientation toward Agape. The understanding of peace within the Theology of Liberation in its character corresponds to that of the Structuralists and is a modern concept. The aspect of Eros often remained underfocused and Phobos in modern fashion gave way to Thanatos. It is for this reason that the Theology of Liberation was met with rejection in conservative circles within the Church, who initiated a counter-movement under the guidance of then Cardinal Ratzinger.

All of this could have stayed a discussion which, albeit spectacular, might have remained limited to the Catholic Church or the region of Latin America, if there had not been a ruling class on the other side that

in Phobic manner rendered homage to Thanatos. That means, this class believed in an almost religious manner in the legitimacy of its earthly privileges and saw those – correctly – threatened by the Theology of Liberation. They saw their peace out of security challenged by the demand for a peace out of justice and so reacted as people do when they fearfully and aggressively found their peace on security. The popularity of the doctrine of national security, adopted from Fascism, to which almost all the Latin American governments of the time resorted, expressed this emphatically.¹¹⁶ Those governments, or, more correctly, the elites that constituted them, had their counterparts and allies in the United States, namely those who made good profits out of the exploitation of resources in Latin America. That is why the term “civil war” is insufficient to describe the escalation of violence which at this time especially engulfed the Greater Caribbean area between Colombia and southern Mexico. It was rather about the violent clash of two unbalanced modern images of peace under conditions of postmodernity. The involvement of the Theology of Liberation in this struggle – and not just on the side of the victims – shows the risks of this concept which also was soon drastically toned down by the hierarchies in the Church. Yet in its core it was nothing else but a modernized version of the ancient Jewish–Christian–Muslim myth about peace out of justice that already has carried so much violence into the world. On the debates and events within the Church I will not dwell.

5.4 The twisting of postmodern peace research

In Europe, the term “Post-structuralism” has been in use since the 1960s and it is mostly associated with the Paris of May 1968. As a reaction to Structuralism and mainly to the soon overflowing debate about repressed aspects within the cultural- and scientific establishment of the time, it implies a turn away from the great promises of salvation. This term thus describes not only a decisive turn in the European *Geistesgeschichte*, but also marks a break in the biographies of key authors like Gilles Deleuze¹¹⁷ or Michel Foucault. At the end of the 1980s the considerations of this school of thought would gain a renewed impetus with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Under the title of postmodernity it subsequently spread in the theory and practice of all sciences and cultural activities. In this chapter I will inquire about the consequences for peace studies.

Post-structuralism and peace studies

As points of reference, Hegel, Marx, Kant, Nietzsche, and Freud are as important for the Post-structuralists as they had been for the

Structuralists. However, for the Post-structuralists it is now even less about the order of things or its possible formation and even more about niches within the system, places of exile and resistance. Marginalized groups move into the focus of interest, migrants, prisoners, the insane, the unemployed and homeless, women, blacks, homosexuals, and so on. The interest of the most important authors like Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard,¹¹⁸ and Vattimo¹¹⁹ is now no longer oriented on conquering state power or its destruction, but on its pluralist dissolution from the margins. Primarily the older authors, Foucault and Deleuze, radically focus their thinking on this world. To them, life is the highest value, manifested in the body that interests them more than the spirit or the striving for a selfless, objective insight for truth. The turn away from the grand narratives or meta-texts, which becomes the rallying point for this group, in the course of the realpolitik events not only includes Platonism, Christianity, and Rationalism, but also Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis.¹²⁰

This debate also has a focus on literature studies around Jacques Derrida,¹²¹ whose method of deconstruction became influential far beyond the limits of his discipline, similar to discourse analysis after Michel Foucault. Apart from these methodological or better praxiological questions, the following commonalities of the Post-structuralist method can tentatively and in summary be discerned:

- the notion of the One Truth is considered to be hostile to life;
- the notion of an essence that would determine being is rejected;
- the modern construction of a conscious, rational, and autonomous subject is recognized as such and twisted;
- language and its rules are recognized as instruments of power, investigated, and treated accordingly.

Post-structuralism implies the abstention from referring to a center, to a subject, to a privileged point of reference or an origin. Therefrom derives the rejection or at least critique of all those central articles of faith on which the systems of thought and images of peace since Plato have been erected and which I have followed in the course of the current text up until now. They all are then assigned, if at all, only a limited validity within the notion of the acknowledged multiplicity and simultaneity of contradictory truths.

Post-structuralism is not about building true theories or knowing it better. It much rather understands theories as explanations of connections, which as such, and only as such, can be more or less useful within

a given context. That is why it does not produce methods, but practices of deconstruction that do not lead to a conclusive outcome.

This means that postmodern peace thought in the wake of Post-structuralism doubts the truths of modernity in a philosophical manner. This makes it suspect to many, which is shown by the furious attempts to prove the untenability of this approach.¹²² These are all correct, but only so within their own modern meta-text which has to remain irreconcilable to Post-structuralism, similar to how energetic interpretations of peace are inaccessible for the purely modern ones. If, for example, Jürgen Habermas evaluates Post-structuralism and post-modern thinking as neoconservative,¹²³ then this is correct because from the Idealist position of a modern philosopher he himself can only perceive as wrong anything that is not right, as bad anything that is not good, and consequently as backward anything that is not progressive.¹²⁴ And progressive is, indeed, not what postmodernity wants to be. To reach that finding no captious argumentations about the moral untenability of postmodernity would have needed to be written.

Just like postmodernity twists rationality by rational means, some postmodern authors deconstruct the Marxism (of the 1960s) with Marx. The result of doing so is not the *One Postmodernity* but a plurality of postmodern knowledge and postmodern viewpoints that very often are opposed to one another. What to me appears to be of special importance within this plurality – besides the general importance of plurality for understanding the peaces – is the rediscovery of the Nietzschean reading of Dionysus through Gilles Deleuze.¹²⁵ For Deleuze the tragic Dionysus is a guarantor for creativity and plurality.¹²⁶

Deleuze sees *life* as hampered, mutilated, and made reasonable wherever the interconnectedness of the conditions of thinking and living are not taken into consideration. Deleuze speaks about a distortion of philosophy if *thought* judges life and opposes it with higher values, if life is measured according to those higher values, and if it is placed under limitations. The type of voluntarily and captiously subjugated philosopher, for which Socrates figuratively stands in Deleuze, appears whenever life turns into something that has to be judged, measured, and limited, and that has to be domesticated in the name of higher values, like the True, the Beautiful, the Good.

The superman has never meant anything but that: it is in man himself that we must liberate life, since man himself is a form of imprisonment for man. Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object.¹²⁷

Life, that is Nietzsche's Dionysus, is repressed in the Occident. *Thinking* stands for Apollo. Both of them, however, do not face each other in a hostile, dualistic, manner but the active force of life and the affirmative power of thought move each other, and attract and complement each other. Deleuze conceptualizes a commonality of dualities in the sense of an energetic understanding of peace. The One universal Truth with him thus falls apart into uncountable local truths that can vary according to context and interest:

We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, of the value of what we believe.¹²⁸

If truth in postmodernity simply has a conventional character and is bound to space and time, then it cannot claim universal validity because it is the expression of special constellations and of relations of power. Postmodernity thus says goodbye to the notion of a conceptual truth just as much as to the rationalistic and Marxist–Hegelian ideal of generally valid scientific knowledge. From this view results postmodernity's general rejection of meta-texts or grand narratives. While they all agree on that aspect, probably none of its proponents has emphasized this so clearly as Jean François Lyotard in his critique of Kant, Hegel, and Marx.¹²⁹ During the collapse of socialism as practiced in the communist states he thereby reached a broader audience when calling Marxism the last offspring of Christianity and Enlightenment that now would also have lost its critical power and would have fallen together with the Berlin Wall.¹³⁰ Lyotard concludes that conflicts cannot be settled in the frame of an overarching meta-discourse, because such an attempt would overlook or disregard the incommensurability of the group languages and corresponding interests by subjecting them to the power claims of a higher-ranking language. To him, conflicts between heterogeneous language games cannot be transformed into a decidable case of litigation via referring to a language or language rule of a higher order without committing a wrong. With that he introduced an interesting definition of this last term. A wrong results from the fact that the rules of the genre of discourse by which one judges diverge from those of the judged genre, which is why these can only be convicted genres of discourse.

For this reason, it seems neither possible, nor even prudent, to follow Habermas in orienting our treatment of the problem of legitimation in the direction of a search for universal consensus through what he calls *Diskurs*, in other words, a dialogue of argumentation. [...] Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But

justice is a value that is neither outmoded nor suspect. We must thus arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus.¹³¹

Lyotard thus dissolves the traditional notion of a peace out of justice. Justice for him only results out of a plurality, which also necessarily implies a plurality of justices. For Idealists this notion is terrifying, unacceptable, and scandalous. Yet, when taking a close look at any conflict, even they will not be able to proceed from any other factual state as from that of a plurality of different claims and different understandings of justice and thus from the point of view of several contradictory justices that each are subjectively felt to be true. This is a simple definition of conflict. How one deals with this plurality is a question of method, not of interpretation. Lyotard opposes plurality to universalism and derives this from the results of actions based on the latter's articles of faith, which to Lyotard were unconvincing.

Lyotard emphasizes the importance of dispute. "Consensus is a horizon," he said, "that is never reached."¹³² His philosophy of state consequently takes the form of a radical critique of institutions and calls for an uprising of everything particular against the universal, that is, against Platonism which he identifies with capitalism, against reason as outgrowth of the power of the state and against all centralizing thinking. He thus becomes the advocate of the new social movements, of civil society.

Weak thought

Also, Gianni Vattimo derives his considerations on the notion of "weak thought" from a postmodern insight, which for peace studies is important. He deems the Hegelian sublation or the Marxist overcoming of existing societal conditions to be impossible.¹³³ Therefore Vattimo replaces the dialectic term overcoming, understood as a process based in truth, with twisting (*Verwindung*). He derives the concept of twisting from Nietzsche and Heidegger.¹³⁴

Heidegger's *Verwindung* is the most radical effort to think being in terms of a "taking account of" which is at once a taking leave of, for it neither conceives being as a stable structure nor registers and accepts it as the logical outcome of a process.¹³⁵

The truth of twisting for Vattimo is a recollecting one; it is thus the result of a perceiving, of verification, which it produces while taking into consideration earlier experiences, belongings, and affiliations.

Reexaminations and agreements always take place within the respective ruling horizon, which circumscribes interpersonal relations just as much as relations between cultures and generations. Truths are constituted within this horizon. Nothing and no one proceed from a stable ground but always only from the relations and affiliations that constitute herself/himself. Truth is thus the fruit of interpretation. Yet this does not proceed in a manner in which a direct and real reference to truth can be reached through any kind of interpretation, but only through understanding the process of interpretation itself as that form through which truth is constituted. In this rhetoric conception of truth, being enacts its weakness. It becomes transmission (*Überlieferung*) by also dissolving itself in the processes of rhetoric.¹³⁶

The Christian categories of *pietas* and *caritas* are the starting points for Vattimo's peace-political message. If somebody acted with piety, then this would occur in a manner liberated from the heavy weight of metaphysics.¹³⁷ Such a claim necessarily evokes protests from the protagonists of a moral and modern concept of peace. In Vattimo's case even Pope John Paul II became active, who wrote in his 1998 encyclical *Fides et Ratio*:

It is an illusion to think that faith, tied to weak reasoning, might be more penetrating; on the contrary, faith then runs the grave risk of withering into myth or superstition. By the same token, reason which is unrelated to an adult faith is not prompted to turn its gaze to the newness and radicality of being.¹³⁸

In contrast, according to Vattimo, faith in the superiority of truth over untruth is founded in the conviction that the human being could perceive things as such. This conviction asserts itself in situations in which it seems necessary to overcome insecurities or fight a war of all against all.¹³⁹

What Vattimo says appears reasonable at the end of this long survey. "Weak thought" is the practice of peace studies in postmodernity. It is a recollecting, twisting, and unfounded thinking, unconditional, relational, and not consigned to any god of whichever name that could lend even the slightest claim of commitment to metaphysics. Recollecting past forms of thinking does not have the function of preparing something different. It has emancipatory power in itself. The belief in progress, however, according to Vattimo, is founded in a metaphysical understanding of time and constructs a succession of points of now that would be in an ecstatic-functional relation to each other. This

means that within the thinking of progress each moment in time gains its meaning not out of itself, but out of those other moments which precede and succeed it. Vattimo calls this the estrangement of the moment, the separation of the human being's factual existence from its meaning.¹⁴⁰ In light of this critique Vattimo contrasts the metaphysical ethics of development, growth, and progress in modernity with postmodern ethics of *pietas* and *caritas*,¹⁴¹ or, in different words, an ethic of love for life and appreciation of the other. The chance of such an ethic would be that this might not just lead to a critique and overcoming of modernity, but to human beings striving to own their potential. Vattimo crosses through postmodernity and accentuates postmodern philosophy with peace studies. Where there is no absolute truth to which somebody could refer, there also is none that could legitimize killing.

Imperfect peaces

When continental European peace studies developed a new and important focus in Spain at the end of the twentieth century, it was finally possible to connect all these philosophical considerations into a concept explicitly grounded in peace studies. It has become famous under the key phrase of *la paz imperfecta*¹⁴² launched by Francisco Muñoz at the turn of the millennium and it has been called an "epistemological turning point in peace studies"¹⁴³ by Vicent Martínez Guzmán.¹⁴⁴

In this key text, the historian Muñoz accomplishes the translation of Post-structuralist thinking into the sociolect of peace studies. He thereby writes one of the first texts within this discipline to stringently argue in a postmodern manner, without the necessity to permanently refer to postmodern philosophy and its authors. His concept of the imperfect or unfinished peace means the following:

By using the adjective imperfect, I am able to reveal the meanings of Peace in some way. Although it is an adjective of negation – which, by the way, I greatly dislike applying to the concept of Peace, which I strive to free from that particular orientation – it can also be understood etymologically as "unfinished," "procedural," and this should be taken as its core meaning.¹⁴⁵

This definition is very close to my concept of the "Many Peaces," which I proposed shortly before Muñoz in Austria in the form of an essay inspired by Lyotard. In correspondence with all the previously mentioned authors it also means the same. Muñoz commences with the deconstruction of the Idealist understanding of peace, as Spanish peace

research has taken it over mainly from Germany. He sees strong thinking as founded within the concept of original sin and as continually effective also under conditions of the Enlightenment:

This “violent-logical” perspective is not exempt from a certain cognitive discord, sometimes bordering on schizophrenia, given that peace is more desired, sought after and valued, yet contemplated in terms of violence, which eventually – after a corrupt process – leads to the view whereby it is somehow clearer than peace itself. Therefore, many of the “prejudices” with which peace is perceived depend not only on the initial ethical and axiological assumptions, but also on the methodologies employed to approach the subject, as well as the epistemological and ontological postulates that sustain them.¹⁴⁶

From there he pays homage to Nietzsche:

Events reach the human consciousness through a symbolic or conceptual mediation. Words and concepts do not operate within a vacuum of our consciousness. We interpret events by way of assumptions, schemas or symbols. In a certain sense, there are no events as such, just symbolically measured interpretations.¹⁴⁷

Muñoz thinks of the human as a being designed for cooperation and conflict. The duality between cooperation and conflict for him is not dialectic, but almost Taoist. Conflict is just as inherent to cooperation as the other way around, and peace can only be defined and lived on the basis of acknowledging both. Cooperation and conflict are processes and not states. To Muñoz peace is procedural. For explaining that he explicitly refers to Heraclites’ statement that everything is in constant flow. In this manner one of the key passages read:

This approach also allows us to consider peace as a process, an unfinished road. That is how one could interpret Gandhi when he said that there is no road to peace, peace is the road. It could be no other way: social and environmental realities are continually “evolving,” as are the forms of confliction. Such peace is not a teleological objective, but rather a presupposition that is both recognized and built from day to day.¹⁴⁸

This is followed up by a treatise on the relational triangle of idea–peace–power reminiscent of Foucault and recollecting twisting of the guiding

principles of peace research in both the guise of the American systems theory after Boulding and the continental European approach after Galtung. Muñoz brings his proposal to the point:

From any perspective, peace should not be considered as “total,” closed, the endpoint, an almost impossible to achieve “utopian” goal, – except at great expense – unrealistic and, consequently, frustrating, but as counterproductive inasmuch as it can be a source of violence.

Thus, *imperfect peace* could be used to provide an intermediary path between maximalist utopianism and conservative conformism: it is a matter of changing our reality based on our knowledge of human limitations and present scenarios (knowledge provided by the different sciences, forecasting and future studies), yet without having to renounce making plans for the future or having a goal: imperfect peace, which, although more modest, is still a desirable, overall goal (hence also with a normative dimension).¹⁴⁹

With Muñoz and Martínez Guzmán, Spanish peace research, as a representation of the whole continental European debate, concludes the shift from the Structuralist episteme toward a postmodern rhizomatic. Within the borders of the discipline this shift had already been heralded about ten years earlier, when Johan Galtung enlarged his Structuralist concept of violence with the element of cultural violence:

“Cultural violence” here is defined as any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form.¹⁵⁰

Once more Galtung presents a sentence that is just as simple as it is revolutionary. It brings the previous years’ complex philosophical debates into a commonly understandable form. Galtung is of the opinion that secularism would not be capable of producing binding norms for human behavior. As a global salvation story it would produce cultural violence and anomy while structural violence led to atomy. Both together would be the price of modernization¹⁵¹ which he subjects to a critique from the perspective of peace research.

With allusion to Freud, I have in this context called Galtung’s explications on direct, structural, and cultural violence the iceberg of violence.¹⁵² The metaphor of the iceberg appears instructive to me, because with an iceberg it is usually the part that lies visible above the water which draws the observer’s attention. This situation is similar with

violence, which is always then given special attention when it is applied physically and thus clearly visible. The less spectacular, larger and more dangerous part of both an iceberg and violence lies hidden. If the attempt is made to physically remove the tip of the iceberg above the waterline, this will only lead to a new tip emerging from the depth of the sea. Also physical violence can be “removed,” that is suppressed by greater violence, until new physical violence emerges from the depth of human societies where structural and cultural violence maintain and newly form themselves. Even if a part of it is rising above the sea, an iceberg still consists of the same material everywhere. The same goes for violence, the different manifestations of which in physical, structural, or cultural violence cannot be understood as a linear chain of cause and effect but as an interrelation having effects in all directions. Physical violence is not just the consequence of structural and cultural violence, but also their cause. Out of the individual or collective memory of physical violence structural violence is built up and fostered as cultural violence, which now and then becomes visible once more as physical violence. Yet an iceberg does not just consist of all the same material in itself. Also in relation to the water in which it floats, it is the same. Ice is frozen water. Violence is similarly nothing foreign to human societies but only an emotionally frozen and solidified form of social interaction. An iceberg loses its danger to ships if, through slow warming, it turns into water. Conversely water can always freeze and turn into ice. Through interpersonal warmth violence can also be transformed into a state of peaceful normalcy, while even the seemingly most peaceful society carries the potential for cultural, structural, and physical violence.

This is a further central element from Galtung’s teaching on peace, which can be attributed to this creative phase that I have termed Post-structuralist. Galtung once more is in the middle of the time’s current debate and he is able to offer the audience a concise and useful formulation for the analysis of conflict. Also here the mirror image of cultural peace has to be considered, which with Galtung does not substantially differ from what Muñoz mentions.

5.5 What is a postmodern image of peace?

On the basis of this chapter it can be summarized that a postmodern image of peace is one that twists the Hobbesian nation state, Cartesian reductionism, and Newtonian physics. Derived from the usual formula for the description of postmodern thought this definition is, however,

for that purpose not sufficient. What kind of peace is that supposed to be, which on the one hand recollects Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton, while on the other hand sublates their central teachings? Is this triple twisting enough? Is it not necessary to also simultaneously twist Kant, Marx, Darwin, and Freud? The answer will be positive, but that raises the question about another dozen important names and could be continued almost indefinitely. Postmodernity is the incomplete twisting of different partial aspects of modernity. If modernity had been twisted completely, we would no longer be able to either think or feel in a postmodern manner. As this is not the case – because twisting is a complex, multiple, and asynchronous process – multiplicity has to remain the central element of postmodern thinking on peace. Postmodern peaces can only be thought in the plural, because every homogeneous standard can only do wrong to the asynchronicity of twisting.

To be imperfect, incomplete, as Muñoz says, is the only common characteristic for any of the uncountable, small, everyday, and unspectacular peaces that postmodernity opposes to the universalistic culture of violence. This small peace unifies the duality of cooperation and conflict toward a practice that is defined out of the respective context. But this is just the point: it is defined, relational, contextual, vernacular, and anything but arbitrary. That is why the many postmodern peaces are much harder to recognize, to define, and to discuss than the concepts of modernity which are based in the One Truth. Postmodern peaces do not promise salvation, which is why they are so often and so angrily fought over. Since they constantly have to be invented and struggled for anew, they also are not for lethargic minds. One can never rely on a postmodern peace. It always wants to be lived, practiced, and won anew.

Postmodern peaces defy the difference between what should be and what is and dissolve the linear modern chronosophy in this manner. Under postmodern conditions progress and development, justice and security lose their attraction. Where the deceptive character of their promises of salvation, the vacuity of their intellectual husks has been recognized, the “should” is stripped of its power. That is how postmodern freedom is understood.

Where there is no linear chronosophy, prefixes like “post-” or “pre” lose their vectoral meaning. In the context of postmodern philosophy a periodization into premodern, modern, and postmodern thus would make no sense. Not that past or future would be denied as experiential categories, but the past is never understood as true. It is nothing more and nothing less than the totality of our memories available at each

instant, even if those memories are often unconscious. Already during the next moment they give way to a new totality and thus form a new perspective, while the future just represents a sea of possibilities.

The conception that evolution would have meaning, for the fulfillment of which the better would have to triumph over the worse, is not available within postmodernity. For postmodernity every action has consequences, since the world is a system in which everything is connected with everything else. The corresponding changes, however, are never progress toward the better but adaptations to the new. This also goes for all subsystems, including the human species and its fate. This attitude opens the door for postmodern thinking to encounter the *unmodern*, which I will discuss in the next chapter. This door has to remain closed to the modern. The difference between the postmodern and the unmodern is not perceived as that between the timely and untimely, but between the one experience which had to go through the modern and the other, which was spared in this respect. The temporal vector is dissolved without value judgment. This allows communication, not necessarily understanding, but at least an exchange which can enrich and support the postmodern actors. It creates the possibility for new relations and thus for new peaces.

Postmodern and unmodern concepts of peace can thus celebrate their correspondence in the life-related multifariousness of the interpretations of peace. The liberation of Dionysus from his suppression via moral and modern concepts of peace turns into the central fate of postmodernity. It translates insights that have been passed down in ancient wisdom and religions into a language communicable to people unchained from modern one-dimensionality. As regards the biosphere, the fundamental reinterpretation by quantum physics of mass and energy in time may be mentioned in this respect, as regards the biosphere the thinking in terms of the dynamic equilibriums of systems, and for the noosphere the recognition of the participatory perspectivity of any observation.

I cannot say that postmodern peaces are founded on those insights. For it is exactly this they do not do. They do not, because in postmodern thinking nothing is founded. They only form themselves into imperfect and unfinishable connections, that is, to dynamic equilibriums, which in a momentary and perspectivistic manner can be perceived as certain, as long as their small truth is not elevated to the status of something permanent like security or justice. The moment this occurs they disappear again and new efforts for peaces are once more necessary. Postmodernity enacts the peace ritual as it has been known since the

old cults of Dionysus. It dismembers and fragments modernity's god of peace that has become powerful, this-worldly, and a global threat. It soaks the soil with the remains of his meaning and so fertilizes the growth of many new peaces. The modern flight into Thanatos has robbed Dionysus of this function as a sacrificial god. While postmodernity tentatively frees him from his exile, it is now the material Apollo, the True, Beautiful, Good that in postmodern thought has to be sacrificed so that new peaces can grow, living and thinking, and that can celebrate the Holy Wedding and create new relations and new connections. Connection is the key term that leads into the next chapter.

6

Transrational Interpretations of Peace



The Indian Sri Yantra is counted among one of the yogis' favored tools for meditation. It stands for the inner peace of the All-One. The multidimensional triangles within the circle symbolize the connection between the energetic and the rational. The downward-facing triangles stand for Shakti-energy, the upright ones for Shiva-form. The unification of the two results in the rational-energetic harmony of the All-One. The Sri Yantra derives from an ancient peace culture and represents the contemporary insights of transrational peace philosophy.

All of the transient, is parable, only.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe¹

We have to be grateful to postmodernism mainly for twisting the moral and modern concepts of peace. Gratitude to me appears to be the appropriate category, because this twisting is the liberation from the monological and violent severity of the peace concepts founded in God, Truth, security, or justice.

Regarding its means and methods, on the other hand, postmodernity remained obligated to that from which it strove to liberate itself. The Theology of Liberation is again founded in God and Truth, and the freedom that Structuralism and Post-structuralism have bestowed is thoroughly reasonable, exhilarating, and fear-inspiring. The liberation from modernity's rigid guiding principles by means of its own reason constitutes the qualitative moment that the prefix *post-* describes. Postmodernity thus ends where rationality hits upon the limits of its bindingness and criticability. The current chapter will be about those limits; yet the topic shall not be a modern turn back into premodern approaches of alchemy, magic and myth, but much rather the question of which fields are opened up for peace research when surpassing the limits of a truly twisted modernity.

The key terms for this attempt are *transpersonality* and *transrationality*. With that I venture into a new terrain for peace research. That is why it is important for me to introduce the land that opens up within this enlarged horizon. If previously I have spoken about a twisted modernity, then at this point I no longer regard it with Habermas as unfinished or with Muñoz as imperfect, but as really faded. The notion of twisting says that that which has faded is recollected and integrated into the enlarged *Dasein* beyond its limits. I will not forget modernity's reason, but preserve it in the framework of an enlarged conception of peace by thinking it as embedded into a world beyond its ultimate validity and by aiming to neutralize its monological aggressiveness. I will not call for a metaphysics of peace unconscious to reason, but I will suggest a conscious overstepping of the limits of reason.

For that I first of all have to ask how peace research imagines the human as a being capable of peace. Via whose relations shall peace be perceived and understood? This chapter's crucial question thus is: who or what is the person that can and should be the actor within a *transrational* world of peace?

Within the energetic traditions of India's peace philosophy this question would not be all that exceptional. Because a modernity in the sense of my initial definition about Hobbes, Descartes, and Newton has never existed in India and that is why Indian teachings, which argue free from mechanistic perceptions, can neither be qualified as modern nor postmodern and least of all as premodern. At best they can be perceived as unmodern in the sense of not being obliged to or touched by modernity. Yet they themselves considerably influenced the crisis of modern thinking on the northern shores of the Atlantic. Since this influence is important for postmodern and transrational concepts of peace I will begin this chapter by introducing influential Indian peace thinkers of the twentieth century and will then follow up with the discussion on transpersonality and transrationality.

6.1 Unmodern messages from India

For the theory and practice of the peace in the twentieth century there is probably no better known symbolic figure than Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi,² known as Mahatma Gandhi. His name overshadows those of all the other fathers of peace research. This can be explained and justified through his remarkable biography and his special role in the Indian struggle for political independence. Yet fixation on his biography and personal teachings often obstructs the view of the

fact that the Indian subcontinent has at all times enriched the world with original thinkers and teachers. Especially since the nineteenth century, European philosophy and literature have been substantially influenced by the subcontinent, in a movement quasi-reciprocal to the economic and military colonization. This goes especially for Indian peace philosophy. Gandhi was neither the first nor the last great Indian thinker and activist who, by studying in England early on in his life became familiarized with the modern manner of thinking without giving up his own spiritual roots. In this manner he and people like him learned to communicate straight through the language games, philosophies, ideologies, religions, cultures, and traditions. Therefrom derives their general publicity yet the vastly different receptions of their thinking and texts in India, Europe, the United States, and other regions of the world. Also the equally different evaluations of their importance can be explained in this manner.

Following the Indian habit those thinkers drew from the treasure of the millennia-old teachings on the subcontinent, yet did so in an original and personal manner, without much concern about dogmatic prescriptions or confessional borders. Most of them can only be reduced to themselves and not be named as representatives for larger currents beyond their immediate following. I introduce some of those outstanding Indian pioneers and discuss their influence on peace studies.

Sri Aurobindo

Aurobindo Ghose from Calcutta, famous as Sri Aurobindo,³ was sent to England at the age of seven. In 1893 he returned home at the age of 21 as a nationalist and activist in the Indian independence movement. He became a publicist and the first politician to publicly advocate complete Indian independence. For this he was arrested in 1908. During his stay in prison he completed the transformation that had begun earlier from a secular nationalist into an internationalist and yogi. He was regularly published in the magazine *Arya*, where one can observe an astounding simultaneity between sober political essays and the spiritual texts by the Yogi Aurobindo.

As a political author he tended toward a sharp critique of the institutions of the state, which in part appears to follow the theory of imperialism and in part is formulated in juridical terms.⁴ Those works served as a blueprint for many later theorists and give a chillingly current impression even 100 years after their first publication. With some of his detailed considerations, like for example on the "United States of Europe,"⁵ or the "World-Union,"⁶ his thinking was far ahead of his

time. As peace thinker he prefigured Immanuel Wallerstein or Michel Foucault when emphasizing that politics within capitalism would be nothing but the continuation of war by other means, and not the other way around. His critique of the understanding of peace within high diplomacy at the end of World War I showed foresightedness:

But how is war to be entirely averted if the old state of commercial rivalry between politically separate nations is to be perpetuated? If peace is still to be a covert war, an organization of strife and rivalry, how is the physical shock [of a war] to be prevented?⁷

This question, like all of Aurobindo's political texts, could easily be conveyed to the European or American audience of 1919. Also his call for a spiritualized religion of humanism, a sort of World Ethos, as Hans Küng was to call it later, as a precondition for humanity's peaceful unification, could easily be explained. This prefigured several of the twentieth century's political and moral initiatives. Aurobindo lived to see the founding of the United Nations and the European Communities and died a passionate advocate of those developments.⁸ Yet the spiritual substance of his notion of a World Union still differed significantly from the Idealist currents that finally came to guide those institutions.

From 1910 onwards Aurobindo lived in Pondicherry. There he founded his Ashram and the teaching of integral Yoga or the comprehensive development of consciousness. Although he successively began to retreat from politics and publicity, during the time of World War II he still took a massive stance against National Socialism and Indian tendencies toward cooperating with Hitler and the Japanese,⁹ as exemplified by Subhash Chandra Bose.¹⁰

The most important source for Aurobindo's spiritual inspiration was the Bhagavadgita. This allows us to call him a Hindu yogi, although this is an insufficient definition. His spiritual teaching, which outside of India was much more difficult to communicate than his political writings, tries on the one hand to lead together the traditional schools of Yoga and on the other to go beyond their limits. Aurobindo says that the One, *brahman*, in all its states of being, aspects, and manifestations would always remain this One and would only be veiled by a lower nature. He integrates the divine into the mundane, material world. Therefore he does not need to reject or overcome it. *Ātman* is sublated in *brahman* in a double sense – as both surpassed and hosted. All the parts of a human's being have to be offered to the divine. Body, emotion, mind, the inner being, and the individual soul, *ātman*, are

transformed according to a model of stages up to the *supermind*. In the sense of the Indian yogic traditions it is for Aurobindo about overcoming the forces of the ego and gradually bringing the human being's will into accordance with the will of the divine energy, Shakti, which is at the center of all his considerations.¹¹

The terminological proximity to Nietzsche and Freud is not coincidental. Aurobindo dealt intensively with both. Freud he called primitive. The Aurobindo interpreter Ken Wilber explains this by pointing out that in Aurobindo's opinion the term "depth psychology" would be a misnomer for Freud's approach. It would much rather be a "shallow psychology," a surface one. In the nine-layered onion of the self as Aurobindo uses it, matter is the first sheath or skin, libido is the second. Although penetration to the second layer that Freud accomplished would be progress vis-à-vis remaining on the simple material surface as Behaviorism does, yet Aurobindo asks about the other seven layers. The digging down into the libido was not a digging down into any great depth, but ignored all higher or deeper cognitive faculties in order to temporarily argue from a shallower – in the ontological sense – more surface level as if that would encompass all of life.¹²

Aurobindo contrasts Nietzsche's Superman with his supermind, who lives in unity with all and accepts all things in order to transform them. If one were successful in overcoming one's own egoistic instincts, then such a transcendent human being would recognize the regularities in the actions of other beings and understand them from within. Compassion would derive therefrom, because she/he recognized a part of herself/himself in others.¹³

Aurobindo formulates a contemporary manner of narrating the older Hindu traditions and a reinterpretation of their practice adapted to his time. This also includes, without him explicitly calling it that, an actualization of Hinduism's energetic peace teachings for the challenges of the twentieth century. After World War II, and especially after 1968, his teaching gained considerable importance in Europe and the United States, where it found its effects in the alternative and peace movements, even though their proponents were not always aware of its origin in Aurobindo.

Mahatma Gandhi

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi¹⁴ was three years older than Aurobindo, yet he entered the struggle for Indian independence at a later point because he only went to England to study at the age of 18 and subsequently developed his political profile as a lawyer in South Africa before

returning to India in 1915. On this occasion the Indian philosopher and Literature Nobel Prize Laureate Rabindranath Tagore, who already had written poetic praise for Aurobindo, gave Gandhi the honorific title *Mahatma*, great soul. Gandhi became famous under this name despite the fact that he himself little liked this title. So much has already been published about Gandhi's life and work that I will limit myself to shortly describing him in the context of the other Indian peace thinkers of the twentieth century.¹⁵

While Aurobindo turned toward Hinduism against the background of a parental home hostile to religion and oriented on Western education, Gandhi's parents were Vishnuites and thus belonged to one of Hinduism's main currents. Yet they were also connected in friendship to other Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, and Jains. It is mainly the latter's ascetic teachings and the principle of *ahimsa* that influenced Gandhi from his early days. In London, Gandhi also read the Bible and the Bhagavadgita, which from that point onwards became his most important source of inspiration just as it had been for Aurobindo.

Gandhi had already found the keyword for his peace teaching, *satyagraha*, in South Africa. This linguistic creation can closest be translated as "power of truth" and it was conceptualized in the context of the political practice to consciously overstep unjust laws. This was a further development of passive resistance and civil disobedience as Henry David Thoreau,¹⁶ a main source of inspiration for Gandhi, and also Leo Tolstoy had proposed it. *Satyagraha* was about the active engagement against an immoral regime, always oriented on the principle of nonviolence, *ahimsa*.

Gandhi conceptualized the *satyagrahi* as a nonviolent fighter who acted from a position of political and military inferiority, yet simultaneously out of moral superiority. For this purpose he took over the first levels of Patanjali's old Yoga Sutras as a *satyagrahi's* central virtues: truth, nonviolence, chastity, and lack of possessions. As further virtues he added courage, right nutrition, nonstealing, work, religious as well as social tolerance, and vernacular housekeeping, as I have already discussed in the context of Shivaism. He linked this to the duality of obedience and voluntariness in addition to discipline and trust as organizational and guiding principles. In this manner the morally superior *satyagrahi* should encounter the authorities of oppression in a polite and friendly manner in order to convince them of the weakness of their own position and encourage empathy with the suffering of the oppressed.

While Gandhi's political tactic shows modern characteristics, his metaphysics is entirely unmodern. For him, just like for Aurobindo, the

human being's highest task consists in actualizing God or the divine within the world. All her/his political, social, and religious activities have to be guided by the goal of recognizing God. This is the self-actualizing goal of all *Dasein*. When speaking of God, Gandhi probably had the image of Rama in mind. At times this is not unequivocal because Gandhi was of the opinion that all religions are correct in their own manner, while at the same time being incomplete and thus subject to a permanent process of change and mutual influence. He thought little of loyalty to dogmas, and when speaking about truth in a religious context he held that humans could well strive for it, but never possess it. Truth to him was synonymous with God, always desirable, but never to be possessed or ultimately fixed. That notwithstanding, his thinking was obliged to holistic conceptions:¹⁷

I am a part and parcel of the whole and I cannot find "Him" apart from the rest of humanity.¹⁸

With Gandhi, all living beings are one. Violence against any living being is thus always violence against oneself and obstructs self-realization. What is more, anybody's violence against any living being obstructs the self-realization of all. That is why the *satyagrahi* has to not just act nonviolently herself/himself, but also has to take care that violence is averted. The self-realization of the individual is dependent on the self-realization of all. The *satyagrahi* thus has to strive for the self-realization of all, even that of his own political enemies. Because there can be no self-realization for anybody, as long as there still is somebody who hates others. According to Gandhi, the human being cannot love God, in whichever form or narration that may be, and still hate fellow human beings at the same time.

If *satyagraha* was supposed to be a term for the political struggle, under these conditions it was then indispensable to define a corresponding concept of peace and violence. In this respect, Gandhi prefigured much of what would be discussed in Europe only during the second half of the twentieth century. Peace to him was not just Eirene, absence of war, but the construction of harmony within society and between nations. This harmony should be based on an abstention from individual and collective exploitation. That is why he proposed to found communities in which the nonviolent lifestyle could be nurtured and practiced.

It is easy to recognize therein that which Johan Galtung would later call positive peace. Gandhi broke new ground also regarding the concept of violence. To the obvious category of physical violence he added

the term "passive violence." With that he meant any action or statement which causes suffering to other people, without inflicting direct violence. The consequence of passive violence would be anger on the side of the victim and, if this victim knew of no other means of expression she/he would resort to direct violence to fight for his or her own right. For this reason it was important to Gandhi that human beings recognize the anger within themselves and understand the causes that provoke this emotion. He wanted them to learn to avoid the uncontrolled eruption of anger and to transform this energy into beneficial action. He did not share the opinion that anger was something evil, which humans would have to suppress or hide. He was convinced that humans would not have to be ashamed of their emotions, but only of their destructive use. The energy of anger and of other emotions would have to be used constructively toward the benefit of all beings, toward the general improvement of existing conditions. Just like darkness cannot be broken through darkness but only through light, violence, even in anger, could not be ended through violence, but only through respect and understanding.¹⁹ In this regard he is a precursor for the integration of spiritual and psychotherapeutic approaches. Gandhi did not want to know any enemies, any opponents, but only friends whose opinions and perspectives needed to be changed. His nonviolence is neither passive, nor weak or lacking intention. It grew from a political tactic into a strategy which in Gandhi's personal conception was connected to a concrete style of living.

Within this metaphysical system, service and life for the general public, as it is traditional, especially in northern Indian Hinduism, strictly speaking, finally is a service of the individual toward him or herself. Gandhi's greatest achievement as father of the nation consisted in having turned, through *satyagraha*, the colonized Indian people's feeling of inferiority and subordination in the face of the mighty English into a feeling of mental and moral superiority. He thereby contrasted the modern, civilizational image of peace with a concept characterized by Hinduism.²⁰

Applied to the Indian struggle for independence, *satyagraha* thus had to simultaneously use and connect two different systems of communication. On the one hand there was the predominantly energetic concept of peace of the masses of people on the subcontinent itself, which was split in multiple different interpretations and interests. For them, truth and its power were nothing absolute but situational and a question of perspective. On the other hand, there was the morally argued, normative, and civilizational claim to power of the colonial rulers, to whose consciousness the struggle of the *satyagrahi* appealed.

That is why *satyagraha* is a remarkable hybrid. Its ethical foundation is principally formed by that open variation of Hinduism that Gandhi had gotten to know in his parents' home. The integration of the guiding concept *ahimsa* from Jainism is here not at all surprising. Also the fact that the *satyagrahi's* mission is strongly reminiscent of the *bodhi-sattva's* in Mahāyāna Buddhism remains within the energetic context. All these are aspects that are known to an Indian audience across the religious borders. The concept of truth, however, which Gandhi places at the center of his linguistic creation, just like his recourse to a peace out of justice, both point toward the Christian Sermon on the Mount that Gandhi appreciated so much. His concept of God did not remain untouched by this fact. The energetic and holistic substance of his metaphysics is Hindu, yet because of Gandhi's consciously ambiguous use of the concept of God it can also be interpreted in a Christian fashion.

The double meaning of this terminological creation appears in this aspect. One of Gandhi's major achievements consists in having changed the classic Brahmin interpretation of *Dasein* in such a manner that a narcissistic striving for self-realization and a socially oriented life in the service of others no longer contradict but condition each other. Such considerations existed within Hindu reform movements long before Gandhi: *Sewa hi parmo dharma* – "Service is the first religion," as it says in Nepalese Hinduism. Gandhi did not invent this approach, but skillfully elevated it to the center of his teaching. From this he drew the moral superiority of his resistance movement vis-à-vis the violent colonial rulers. Only in the confrontation with them did this claim to superiority attain meaning, because it was them and not primarily the people in India themselves who thought and argued morally and thus could be targeted by the nonviolent and worldwide public appeal to their reason and empathy. They, as carriers of a modern, civilizational understanding of peace – and in this context only they – were convinced of the existence of an absolute truth before which they began to morally fail when confronted by Gandhi's challenge. That is why he could win a worldwide exemplary victory via moral superiority through nonviolence. With morals Gandhi had quasi-introduced a Trojan horse into the public battle, which weakened all those who were not immune to moral arguments.

Yet outside of that constellation this method failed, because it did not find an addressee. In India, the idea of truth was and remained unconditional and incomplete, which is why the force of truth also could not become an absolute and assertive concept in domestic politics. The historic triumph of *satyagraha* in the form of Indian political independence

was accompanied by the opposite of *ahimsa*: the political division of the subcontinent. This partition began with mass murder, expulsions, and orgies of violence, *amok*, and continued in interstate tensions which have not been overcome even today. From its very first moment of existence, the independent Indian state went into a completely different direction than Gandhi had proposed. His long-standing companions immediately reinterpreted the principles of *satyagraha* from strategic goals to tactical means. To the interested audience it revealed itself in no time that India was not populated by a super-moral people of *satyagrahis*, *bodhisattvas*, or superminds, but by a postcolonial society with all the unavoidable traumata and fragmentations that colonization leaves in its wake. Gandhi's violent death exemplifies this emblematically.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan

Less well known than Gandhi is his Muslim counterpart, Abdul Ghaffar Khan.²¹ This university-educated descendant of a relatively wealthy Pashtun family in the northwest of what is today Pakistan also symbolizes the nonviolent engagement for a united India independent from British colonial power. He oriented himself on Gandhi's strategy of *satyagraha* and passionately argued that the latter's ethics of nonviolent struggle could also be derived from the Qu'ran. Out of deep religious conviction he therefore felt himself called to build a nonviolent army of liberation, the Khudai Khidmatgar, the "Red Shirted Servants of God," right in the middle of the infamous belligerent culture at the northwestern gate to the Indian subcontinent. He began this venture on the basis of his educational, health, and social projects which he had started in 1910. He cooperated tactically with Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, yet always argued from a Muslim perspective. Just like Gandhi and Aurobindo, he also founded his projects on the service to God, here Allah. In this he made enemies not just of the British but also of many Muslim mullahs who did not agree with his interpretation of the Qu'ran and especially his understanding of violence during the primary *jihad*. One may here remember the already quoted words of the Prophet: "the best *jihad* is the word of truth and right in front of an unjust ruler."²² This is very close to Gandhi's *satyagraha*, the force of truth, an unmodern and moral image of peace and freedom.

The Khudai Khidmatgar in many ways are a curiosity and a novelty in the history of wars of liberation. They were organized according to the pattern of traditional armies, yet fought nonviolently for political, social, and economic reforms. Their oath demanded voluntary commitment to the point of nonviolently giving their own life and it asked

for unconditional, not absolute, obedience to every legitimate order. This implies that every subordinate had to ascertain the legitimacy of an order independently. A substantial difference from the traditional warrior ethic consisted in the fact that the willingness to sacrifice their own life for a higher goal was not just dissociated from the commandment to kill as many enemies as possible, but implied this willingness to a complete abstention from violence.

Ghaffar Khan's idea was to integrate the high value that was placed on bravery within the Pashtun warrior ethic into a social, egalitarian, and nonviolent utopia. To awaken the Pashtuns' feeling of moral superiority in the face of the British occupants may have been easier in this case than in Gandhi's as this attempt took place in the context of a worldview which had already felt itself to be morally superior to begin with. The great success in convincing this society of a nonviolent strategy is all the more astonishing. Until the British withdrawal, Ghaffar Khan had a similar political effect in his area of influence as Gandhi had among the Hindus.²³

The struggle of the Khudai Khidmatgar erupted fully in 1930, when British soldiers in Peshawar fired into a crowd of people peacefully protesting at Ghaffar Khan's arrest. Through this mass murder of unarmed protesters the British colonial power damaged its own prestige and morals. It became obvious that this kind of resistance did more to wear down the British and their superior firepower than any kind of beligerent reaction, no matter how heroic. Nothing was more painful to the colonial masters than a freedom movement acting outside of the military logic of violence. A nonviolent Pashtun soon appeared more dangerous to them than somebody acting according to the traditional logic of violence. In 1938, the Khudai Khidmatgar is supposed to have had about 100,000 active members, with women, whose rights Ghaffar Khan vehemently advocated,²⁴ being members of equal standing.

The English withdrawal was also a success for Ghaffar Khan and his Red Shirts. The epilogue to this Muslim success story can be read like a parallel to Gandhi's failure. Since Ghaffar Khan had opposed the partition of India and equally was against the integration of the Northwest Provinces into the new state of Pakistan, he found himself oppressed and persecuted by the government of the new state. The independent Pakistan took, just like India, a completely different direction than Ghaffar Khan had wanted. He himself was incarcerated or forced into exile several times, and it sounds like an irony of fate that during his long life he spent far more time in the prisons of the independent Pakistan than in those of the British colonial power against which he

originally had fought. The Khudai Khidmatgar were persecuted and lost their political importance. Abdul Ghaffar Khan today is not mentioned in any official Pakistani history book and he is practically forgotten outside of the Indian subcontinent, even though his remembrance could be of importance for this region's explosive situation. What would the Muslim world in today's global context need more than conciliatory symbolic figures that are capable of combining their own dignity, their own faith, and their own readiness for sacrifice with a worldwide communicable culture of peace?²⁵

Jiddu Krishnamurti

Jiddu Krishnamurti²⁶ was born into a Hindu Brahmin family in 1895 at the other end of India, in the furthest south. He may have been the most original of all the peace thinkers of the Indian subcontinent mentioned here. At the age of 17 he was brought to England by the Theosophists who wanted to see him as the new "World Teacher" or Messiah. Therefore they founded an order for him and gave him a corresponding education.

The Theosophic Society, which had existed since 1875, in the widest sense might be called a nineteenth-century peace community of civil society. Besides the exploration of the still unexplained laws of nature, its declared goals encompassed the creation of a universal brotherhood of humanity independent of race, belief, gender, or caste. Yet, in its zeal to cast off the shackles of conventional, violence-prone religious communities and social entities it showed tendencies toward sect-like behavior, institutionalism, obstinacy, and manipulating its members.²⁷

It is especially the latter that had affected Krishnamurti since childhood. He was only able to free himself in 1929 from being thus monopolized, after several personal catastrophes. His proper career as an idiosyncratic philosopher and psychologist began from 1947 onwards. Yet, he had already summarized the substance of his teaching in 1929 in one sentence of that famous speech with which he dissolved the order that had been founded for him:

I maintain that Truth is a pathless land, and you cannot approach it by any path whatsoever, by any religion, by any sect. That is my point of view, and I adhere to that absolutely and unconditionally. Truth, being limitless, unconditioned, unapproachable by any path whatsoever, cannot be organized; nor should any organization be formed to lead or to coerce people along any particular path.²⁸

Krishnamurti became a radical critic of religious and state institutionalism, an opponent to any kind of dogmatism and a proponent of a holistic worldview that perceives the unity of all things in a transpersonal sense. The thinker, the thinking, and that which is thought are one. On this he builds his worldview. To ideas and ideals he does not ascribe any meaning for the betterment of the world. On the contrary, he tries to show their danger. Because they find their origin exclusively in thinking and in the I, ideals to him are the origin of conflicts. He holds that ideas are often more important to people than reality. What they should be is closer to their heart than what they are. Their striving would be oriented on fitting reality into the ready-made model of their imagination. Since this could not be successful, they thus constructed a contradiction between what is and what should be. Yet ideas would only be a creation of fantasy. This led to a conflict between illusion and reality – not on the outside but within the human beings themselves. The mind would ask for certainty, security:

A mind that is safe, secure, is a bourgeois mind, a shoddy mind. Yet that is what all of us want: to be completely safe. And psychologically there is no such thing. See what takes place outwardly – it's quite interesting if you observe it – each person wants to be safe, secure. And yet psychologically he does everything to bring about his own destruction. You can see this. As long as there are nationalities with their sovereign governments, with their armies, with their navies and so on, there must be war. And yet psychologically we are conditioned to accept that we are a particular group, a particular nation, belonging to a particular ideology or religion. I do not know if you have ever observed what mischief the religious organizations have done in the world, how they have divided man. You are a Catholic, I am a Protestant. To us the label is much more important than the actual state of affection, love, kindliness.²⁹

Ideals for Krishnamurti are projections that would serve for people to distract attention away from themselves and real problems and conflicts, so that they do not have to look at them. For this reason conflicts would be externalized. People veil their characteristics with the exact opposite of what they are: they are violent, therefore they create the ideal of nonviolence. They hate, therefore they exalt love into an ideal. They themselves are uncertain and confused inside, therefore they strive for order and security. Facts, however, contain no contradiction. A fact remains a fact. Anger, violence, jealousy, and greed are facts. However, the moment somebody says "I am violent," immediately the

thought appears next to it that one should not be violent. And this “I may not be violent” turns into an ideal – into the ideal of nonviolence. Thus a battle arises between violence and the attempt to be nonviolent. Nonviolence is not a fact:

I know it is a fashion brought about through Tolstoy in India and so on, that we must all be non-violent. Whereas we are actually violent human beings. Would you admit that? Therefore why do we have its opposite? [...] Is that an escape from fact? And if it is an escape from fact why do we escape? Is it because we do not know how to deal with the fact? I escape from something because I don't know what to do about it, but if I know what to do I can deal with it.³⁰

Different from Gandhi or Ghaffar Khan, Krishnamurti wanted to transform violence by acknowledging it. This is an unmistakable parallel to the shadow work in the sense of Carl Gustav Jung, which I will deal with in more detail later. Krishnamurti refers to people who say that one should not apply violence under any circumstances. Then a peaceful life would become possible, even if it took place in aggressive and violent surroundings:

[...] it implies a kind of nucleus in the midst of people who are savage brutal, violent. But how does the mind free itself of its accumulated violence, cultured violence, self-protective violence, the violence of aggression, the violence of competition, the violence of trying to be somebody, the violence of trying to discipline oneself according to a pattern, trying to become somebody, trying to suppress and bully oneself, brutalize oneself in order to be nonviolent [...]?³¹

How can the mind free itself of violence? Krishnamurti does not call for pacifism, but for consciousness about the All-One. From this it follows that human beings do not commit violence against each other, because each is a part of the other and violence turns against the perpetrator her/himself. It is on this last point that he once more agrees with Gandhi, but in order to move beyond violence it cannot be suppressed or rejected. It has to be perceived and researched. This is not possible if it is condemned or justified.³² In Krishnamurti's holistic view violence is transformed through the realization of the connectivity of all. This cannot and may not turn into a moral commandment. It has to be an insight toward which everybody makes her/his own way throughout one's life. For Krishnamurti this is a rewarding task, because not only is violence twisted on this path, but also the fear which results from the

division between perception and imagination, between fact and wish. Any division as such is violence, which is why for Krishnamurti violence always begins with an inner division and ends with its twisting.

That is why chronosophy, the perception of societal time, is of special importance to him. Within Idealism, societal time is the margin between what is and what should be. It is a construct. Through envisioning what should be the attention, life in the now, is projected into an imagined future. Conflicts, problems, and wishes arise from it. These obstruct the acceptance of the respective current situation. Apparent problem solving is projected into an imagined future. Childhood fears, fear of death, wishes and the desire for the repetition of previously experienced lust are the fabric from which those projections are built. Because if thinking and not the current perception is guiding consciousness, then what else can be experienced but the memory of past perceptions that are gone as facts, but determine consciousness as memory, either as fear of or desire for repetition? These projections cause an attachment to time. Krishnamurti argues that this concept of societal time creates conflicts and is never able to solve them.

He turns Idealism into its opposite. Krishnamurti could be called a Realist if the term had not already have been coined differently and misleadingly in modernity. He calls for a peace which results from the recognition of what right now is. Just like modern Realism, Krishnamurti perceives the violent potential, the wolfish aspect of every human being and group. He does not believe in any kind of however-shaped ideal which could overcome that. He is no optimist. But he also does not derive any fear-driven philosophy or practice therefrom, because he assumes that the human desire for salvation, the deeper meaning of peace, would mean nothing but freedom from fear. This he deems to be possible. He is no pessimist. He does not provide any recipe for action for how this liberation might be realized, because he assumes that finding out about this would be a deeper meaning of *Dasein*. He is no modern. The linear perception of societal time as a construct of imagination instead of perception to him is the origin of all wishes, fears, and conflicts. Conflict-free action for Krishnamurti can always only be immediate and unconditional, and thus free from wishes and fears. It can neither be founded in the past nor realized in the future, but it can only take place in the here and now:

We have accepted fear and lived with it, as we have accepted violence and war as the way of life. We have had thousands and thousands of wars and we are everlastingly talking about peace; but the way we live

our daily life is a war, a battlefield, a conflict. And we accept that as being inevitable. We have never asked ourselves whether we can live a life of complete peace, which means without conflict of any kind.³³

For Krishnamurti, conflicts exist because people are full of contradictions inside. They have different and contradictory wishes, opposing needs. This would cause conflicts. But the human being would need to free herself/himself of all beliefs in order to find out whether something like reality, a timeless state, would exist. This would necessitate a freedom from fear, so that the consciousness may be clear: a clear consciousness is silent, and only the silent mind can find out whether the eternal exists. For Krishnamurti, silence cannot be reached through exercise or discipline. It derives from freedom, freedom from fear, brutality, violence, and jealousy. The mind can be free – and it can be free immediately.³⁴ This immediacy disables all moral and modern conditions for peace, like truth, justice, and security, without thereby becoming *immoral*, because every connection founds its own morals. The human being for Krishnamurti can be free from societal morality, because society's morals would not be moral at all. A mind which is not moral is incapable of freedom. That is why it would be important to understand oneself, to know oneself, to see the whole structure of the self – thoughts, hopes, fears, anxieties, ambitions, and the competitive aggressive state of mind.³⁵ As mentioned, Krishnamurti is not modern in the sense of my definition:

After all, what actually have traditional, bureaucratic, capitalist or communist societies to offer? Very little, except food, clothes and shelter. Perhaps one may have more opportunities for work or make more money, but ultimately, as one observes, these societies have very little to offer; and the mind, if it is at all intelligent and aware, rejects it. Physiologically one needs food, clothing, shelter, that is absolutely essential. But when that becomes of the greatest importance, then life loses its marvelous meaning.³⁶

In summary, peace for Krishnamurti always begins with the individual process of awareness and the twisting of passions, while violence derives from divisions in the psyche of people and groups. On this point his view corresponds with Nietzsche's. Ideologies and institutions derive from the striving for security. These feign security; yet the more security is fought for, the less it will be attained. The desire for security will only foster separation and strengthen hostility. Once that has been recognized and understood as true, people's relations to their immediate

surroundings change fundamentally; and only in this manner can unity and brotherhood be possible.³⁷ Most people will be consumed by fear and concerned about their security. They hope that wars will miraculously cease one day. At the same time they accuse others of instigating violence, while those in turn blame them for their misfortune. Although war and violence are so obviously harmful to society, everybody still prepares for them and thus fosters belligerent thinking:

In understanding the whole problem of fear, one has no belief whatsoever. The mind then functions happily, without distortion and therefore there is great joy, ecstasy.³⁸

The fear of the other thus is the first step toward violence. Krishnamurti's scathing critique of the foundations of modern thinking is concentrated on its competitive character that implies fear of defeat as a basic attitude and which is inherently violent. Modernity for Krishnamurti is based on an emotional state of being afraid of death and prone to violence, as well as on an egocentric worldview that would not deserve to be called philosophy: modern civilization would be founded on violence and courting death. As long as force is worshiped, violence would rule the way of life.³⁹

With the mischievous joy of a great intellectual Krishnamurti takes apart both the principles of faith of Western modernity and those of the Indian tradition. He topples all saints from their perches, denies all promises of salvation or guidelines for action, and just by doing so points the road toward the holistic approaches of transpersonal psychology and transrational peaces. Without explicitly entering the debate around postmodernity beginning in his time he thus reveals himself to be a master of deconstruction. His contributions are far from being cynical or offensive. On the basis of existing wisdom they develop a new perspective which does not direct but invites one to begin searching for paths toward the many peaces, which in his opinion ends in the All-One. In this respect he is untimely yet not postmodern, because the twisting of modernity is no concern of his. For that is simply too unimportant to him. He is unmodern.⁴⁰

6.2 On the polymorphous *pax universalis* of the transpersonal peaces

With this heading I am opening up a topic that has preoccupied philosophy for centuries yet raises a new question in the frame of the

current text. What does it mean to have or to be an individual, a subject, a person, an I, an ego, a self, or a personality? This has been the theme of manifold analyses and debates in the most diverse academic disciplines. I cannot bring this discussion to a conclusion, but will take a stance and illustrate my point of view for the purpose of further argumentation.

The idea of the *per-sona*

The pioneering fifth-century Christian philosopher Boethius defined a person as an individual substance of rational nature.⁴¹ He did not invent the term. He used the Latin word *per-sonare*, which means “to sound through a mask” and etymologically is rooted either in the Greek *prosôpon* or in the Etruscan *phersu*. Both imply mask. During the early Greek rituals and tragedies the mask in turn represented the formal aspect of the divine. The mask or the role only portrays the visible surface of something bigger. During the Dionysian ritual and in pre-Socratic tragedy it was expressed through the music, the Dithyramb, which determined the events and not the other way around.⁴² In their material aspects, Apollo, events are not complete; they need energy, Dionysus, which sounds through the mask.

In the Christian tradition this energy is transmitted as soul. The person thus consists of body, mind, and soul. It was Boethius who introduced mind, rational nature, into this debate and among all existing creatures ascribed it only to the human being. The human being would be the highest of all forms of life, equipped with a special dignity and special rights. That is why, for Boethius, it is not any single one of the three described elements that makes a human being, but only the interplay of all of them. According to this definition the human being is a substantial appearance, which plays a socially discernible role in a rational manner and in doing so is guided by its metaphysical aspect, the soul, connecting it to God. This became the dominant teaching throughout centuries, although the metaphysical aspect always left open space for doubt, disagreement, and manipulation.

For his definition of the person, Boethius needs an individual substance, because matter is the basis for individuation. The individual is the material aspect of the person. It is less than a complete person. This term can also be applied to nonhuman forms of life. Yet, what is it that makes a living substance indivisible? How can the individual be distinguished from its herd, swarm, flock, or *Mitwelt*? Where does it end? Where does it begin? Is the air that it inhales and the food that it digests a part of it? Or are these separate things, although they can be found

within the body and are integrated, transformed, and again excreted in permanent succession?⁴³

The term "individual" insinuates that something can no longer be divided, that the smallest possible form of life had been reached. This raises a twofold doubt. On the one hand the question arises whether any form of life can be separated from its environment without thereby being killed. Ervin Laszlo contends that nothing which ever developed would exist by itself alone. Everything is connected to everything else; all is part of an organic whole. Every individual is part of a greater whole and in its autonomy is subject to the influence of greater forces and systems within which it has the status of a component. Conversely, the whole would also be represented in the individual. All things that exist and move together within the universe would be in perpetual and intimate contact. They would be linked through relations and messages, which would turn our reality into a gigantic network of interaction and communication.⁴⁴ If this is correct then nature or the cosmos, the All-One, is the only existing individual. Every concept of separation is then at least intellectual violence. This does not change anything as regards the basic pattern, but the supposed individual is subject to all kinds of restrictions and conditions that influence its possibilities of expression and action. In many ways it is subject to the regime of the higher-ranking order.

A further prerequisite for individuality in the understanding of Boethius would be that no part that is separated from the individual organism could continue to live by itself. But under that condition reproduction would be impossible. The popular question of how many individuals a pregnant woman would be is the simple starting point for a complex and controversial question, because the concept of individuality carries an inherent contradiction.⁴⁵ Henri Bergson has pointed out that individuality allows for any arbitrary number of levels and it is not fully realized in any of them, also not in the human being.⁴⁶ This has grave consequences for individualism in modernity. I can argue that the body is not at all the smallest possible unit of life. What happens if parts of the seemingly indivisible body are separated from the rest and artificially kept alive? Is that not an individual substance in the sense of Boethius? Which individual emerges, if those parts are connected with other living matter, as occurs all the time in modern medicine? Individuality throughout all its history may have been a mirage, but if that becomes obvious for simple technical reasons, then this calls for a new ethical orientation. This is one of the challenges of our time.

Dealing with this question did not become any easier in 1641 when René Descartes shattered the concept of the soul in his *Meditationes de prima philosophia* by launching the modern philosophy of the subject. His key term derives from the Latin *subiectum* and means the fundamental, the grounding. According to Descartes, the mind is the carrier of *cogitationes*, thinking, memory, idea, and imagination. The mind creates the subject, because it provides the certainty of a constitutive, continuing, and conscious self-reference. A subject thus is a being which has its own experiences and is able to remember and apply them. As seen from the subject's perspective, everything outside is an object. The subject is the conscious observer and an object is any thing observed. The subject consequently is a conscious, perceiving, remembering, and acting individual. Descartes equates thinking with being, identification, and consequently identity with thinking. Or, in different words, his subject is a person that does not need a soul or relation to God. Descartes was aware of the dogmatic scandal and logical weakness of his proposal that I could call a godless person. This has been correctly criticized, because even if such a subject no longer needs a God for knowledge, Descartes still needs God to explain its very existence. It is the finite subject's experience of the limitations in knowledge that provokes a latent awareness of God.⁴⁷ Descartes' philosophy therefore still needed God as an ultimate point of reference and he thus desperately tried to prove His existence in order to ground his own philosophy.

John Locke, in turn, defined a person as a living being that over time remains conscious of itself and hence is able to take conscious decisions about the future in the manner of

[...] a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it.⁴⁸

This rational definition still calls for a foundation. Enlightenment solved this problem by secularizing this foundation. It put reason and norms in the place of God and thus arrived at a seemingly stable foundation. On the basis of his supposition of a transcendental limit that could not be overcome, Immanuel Kant was of the opinion that objective knowledge would only be possible if the objects are founded within the subject's capacity for cognition.⁴⁹ The person thus finally became the autonomous subject and this in turn is the basis for knowledge in modern science.

The attribute which, according to John Locke, turns a person into a personality is its wish to influence the world. In its surroundings such a personality would try to change all those factors which it does not like in order to reach those conditions that make it happy. This leads to the judgment of what is right and wrong. To do the right thing in order to reach the aspired position therefore results from the personality's possibilities, from its knowledge, its experience, and its property, all of which the personality has acquired in order to be as successful as possible in the pursuit of happiness. That is why recognition and protection of legal status are of crucial importance for the personality because, according to this view, these allow it to prosper, which is for the common good of society. On this enlightened, materialistic, and positivistic basis a personality is thus an individual, a subject, and a person that is recognized and protected by the law. This normative principle is often combined with equality before the law on the basis of which civil rights, nationality, community, rights, and obligations are founded. It is in this manner that it also entered into most codifications of human rights.

Friedrich Nietzsche shattered all those concepts when pointing out that the autonomous subject would be nothing but a fiction of the grammatical kind and that there would be no actor behind the mask:

The true nature of things is a fabrication of the imagining being, without which it may not really imagine.⁵⁰

His critique points out that pure substance would not exist because everything would be made from oscillating formations of energy, which mutually influence each other and crystallize for a moment, in order to immediately dissolve again. Accordingly there would only be appearances, no facts. Human beings would only become aware of themselves as a heap of affects: and even the sensual impressions and thoughts belong to this revelation of the affects.⁵¹ Nietzsche considers subjective experience to be residing beyond modern science, because scientific cognition in modernity would demand an objective perspective that is diametrically opposed to the subjective standpoint.

Along with the ideas of Karl Marx, and a little later the structural hypothesis of Sigmund Freud, this notion provided the point of departure for a systematic questioning of the existence of a unitary, autonomous subject and thus of the foundation of the modern image of the human being and society. All these thinkers paved the way for the deconstruction of the notion of the subject by pointing out that morals and ethics can only be constructed relationally and intersubjectively.

Such a thing as morals would in no way be helpful to an independent individual. Also for the people in the so-called West, preoccupation with the peaces thus turned from a question of Christian morality or enlightened reason into one about adequate therapy. This had far-reaching consequences.

Sigmund Freud⁵² maintained the image of a threefold structure of the person and revolutionized it completely. Nietzsche's Dionysian energy appears in his work as the libido of the id that is led by drives, the Apollonian form in the superego. The consciously judging and acting ego mediates between the two of them. While Boethius had connected the person via the metaphysical soul with the universe, God and the All-One, Freud connects his superego in mechanistic form with the secular world of society and lets the energy of life flow via the individual's drives.

Freud's ego controls the voluntary movement of the body. It has the primary task of self-assertion, which it fulfills by getting to know external stimuli, storing experiences with them in memory, avoiding overly strong stimuli via flight, coping with moderately strong stimuli through adaptation, and learning how to influence the outside world in a functional manner to its own advantage. On the inside, the ego claims control of the drives against the id and decides whether their satisfaction should be allowed, postponed, or suppressed. I here refer to the parallel between the Freudian structure and the Great Triad of heaven (superego), nature (id), and the human being (ego).

The Freudian ego has differentiated itself from the unconscious id in such a manner that it can take the position of an observer not just toward stimuli coming from the outside, but also toward those from within. Yet it remains a part of that which is being observed and also holds unconscious aspects.⁵³ In this concept the ego-conscious is thus double, or I could also say split, because it is on the one hand subject, which means experiencing form and actor, and on the other hand object, which means the topic of its own experience.⁵⁴ In reference to itself the ego can be observer and observed at the same time. The ego as the subject of its own experiences is necessary, even when it momentarily is not aware of itself. Everything that a human being experiences, she/he can only experience in ego-reference. At all events she/he perceives herself/himself as the one who currently experiences. The ego forms the unitary point of reference for all of a person's experiences and is the quintessence of all characteristics, attitudes, and psychic acts which she/he ascribes to herself/himself. It perceives itself as that entity which reacts to surrounding events and to its own decisions. It is

conscious of itself as the constant element of its psychophysical unity, which is complete and all-connected at the same time. Freud's dissident disciple Carl Gustav Jung thus simply equated the ego with the consciousness.⁵⁵

According to this definition the ego is a prerequisite for a person's consciousness, because the subjective experiencing and the objective experienced interlock. The experience as its own personality is the precondition for the ego to simultaneously experience itself from the outside and be conscious of itself as part of the world. The ego is only imaginable as connected with others and with the world, although at the same time it forms an entity that is aware of itself and is in this manner complete. This mind-created duality is the peculiarity of the human species and the source of all complications in social and individual relations.

Freud's matrix of the interpersonal, for which I pose the question of the peaces, significantly differs from Boethius' model, because every being has more or less influence on the superego of all others. Although Freud perceives the ego in mechanistic fashion as individual, it is nevertheless structurally embedded in a greater context. That is why this teaching distinguishes between a human being's character,⁵⁶ which circumscribes the totality of the potential given to an individual, and the personality, which signifies that part of it that really unfolds within a concrete life and thus expresses itself in a manner visible to the *Mitwelt*.⁵⁷ As Carl Gustav Jung expressed this very floridly:

Personality is the supreme realization of the innate idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination.⁵⁸

The concept of I and ego

I and ego are often used as synonymous terms in literature, with English texts frequently using the term "ego" as a simple translation of the German *Ich* (I) and thereby connoting the organizational principle of the psyche. Ken Wilber points out that the empirical ego, which can be the object of consciousness and introspection, has to be distinguished from that which Kant, Fichte, or Husserl have called the pure ego or absolute subject, which under no circumstances can be seen as the object. The pure ego stands for a notion of radical autonomy.

It corresponds to the Hindu *ātman*, the pure witness, which is never object and thus can never be observed, but which contains all objects within itself.⁵⁹

Sylvester Walch distinguishes between the ego as a life-sustaining structure in the sense of Freud and the ego as the shadow aspect of the I (*Ich*), which asserts its goals against the claims of others, does not respect boundaries, and controls and manipulates in order to achieve a maximum for itself.⁶⁰ His definition of the ego largely corresponds to the concept of the shadow of Carl Gustav Jung.⁶¹ The latter characterized those parts of the *persona* as a shadow that had been pushed into the unconscious and from there would start to develop its own dynamic. We human beings would not just repress our shadows but also deny their very existence in ourselves and project them out on to others. This occurred unconsciously. We would not be aware that we acted in such a manner and this act of ego preservation would enable us to deny our own badness, ascribe it to others, and hold them responsible for it. This is Jung's explanation for the scapegoat phenomenon, and according to his view forms the basis for all kinds of prejudice against people belonging to a group defined as different. Shadow projection can thus massively threaten both social and international peace. This projection makes it possible to turn those whom we perceive as enemies into devils or vermin that legitimately have to be hated, attacked, and exterminated. Whole peoples can be manipulated on this basis. This is how the Holocaust was prepared. The same mechanism is effective in all pogroms, so-called ethnic cleansing, and wars.

Recognizing one's own shadows and learning to live with their contents, according to Jung, bestows the individual a higher level of aliveness. Willingness to take responsibility for one's own shadow would foster one's own moral behavior and make it more self-determined. Consciousness about the shadow, however, is not just important for personal development, but also a basic precondition for social peace and international understanding.

Comparable to Sylvester Walch, egoism for Erich Fromm means that somebody wants to have it all for herself/himself and it is not the sharing but the having that gives her/him pleasure. If having is my goal then I have to become ever greedier, because my ego is more if it has more.⁶²

Eckhart Tolle⁶³ subsequently defines the ego as a search for the self, during which the human being identifies the self with any kind of form. For him the ego is an agglomeration of constantly repetitive forms of thought and conditioned mental-emotional patterns which

are underpinned by a feeling of identification. This identification makes egoistic people blind to their attachments. Tolle argues that it is this kind of blindness that is meant by Christian original sin, suffering in Buddhism, and deception in Hinduism. He describes the ego as the pain body of the I, as the shadow of fear before the light of consciousness.⁶⁴ This pain body would be an emotion derived from residual pain of past injuries suffered by the I, which exists by splitting life energy off from the totality of the energy field. Through the identification of the mind with the somatic sensation of pain it thus attains a certain autonomy.⁶⁵ The ego would be the unattended mind that takes over a person's life if the I is not present as observing consciousness. The ego grows out of the identification of the I with thoughts or emotions. Here the distinction between emotion as a certain form of feeling remembered from past situations on the one hand and actual feelings in their currently experienced contexts on the other is just as important as that between thoughts as fragments of unconscious stories, which arise from the past, and the conscious rationality of actions oriented on the present. Those teachings thus do not turn against rationality as a principle, but against emotions and thoughts as nutrients for the ego and barriers for present consciousness.

The ego is a reaction against the memory of its own weakness, which results in a desire to have, possess, dominate, or even kill. It perceives itself as a fragment within a hostile universe, without inner connection to any other being and surrounded by other egos, which it either sees as a potential threat or tries to use for its own purposes. The needs of this ego are endless. It feels vulnerable and threatened and lives in a state of permanent fear and neediness. The ego needs competition, problems, conflicts, and enemies in order to maintain the feeling of separation which is crucial for its identity. That is why mind and body always nourish and satisfy the ego with new pain that has to be inflicted on oneself or on others. The ego thus stands at the beginning of all spirals of violence, whether in personal relations or in the case of collective catastrophes like war, genocide, slavery, or torture, which are all the result of the egos of those personalities striving for political or economic power and an exalted social position.

Ken Wilber analyzes the I and ego as an ambivalent achievement of Enlightenment:

We already saw that the rational Ego took as its goal the transformation from egocentric inclinations and ethnocentric dominator hierarchies to a worldcentric stance of universal pluralism, altruism,

benevolence and freedom. It was a “declaration of independence” in more ways than one: independence from religious and mythic domination, from state-imposed interference in personal life, from conformist modes of the herd and from a nature conceived as a source of not-yet-moral drives and inclinations. The autonomy of the rational ego had to be fought for, had to be actively secured against all those forces of heteronomy that constantly were at work to pull it down from its worldcentric stance of universal tolerance and benevolence.⁶⁶

Pluralism, altruism, and freedom for all are central values of modernity and postmodernity and furthermore are values that account for the greater part of human dignity. Yet no sooner had the rational I of Enlightenment gained a certain understanding of those values, than it began to not just differentiate itself from other values, but also to suppress them and wholly break away from them. Wilber⁶⁷ here recognizes and criticizes three main currents of the movement from the rational I to the ego:

- The turn away from all not personal or not rational components of the premodern peaces, because the rational I of Enlightenment was not willing to give up any part of its freedom toward a direction which could have to do with God, the divine, or spirituality.
- The disregard of the peaces’ relational dimension. The unrelated, insular, hyper-agentic subject of Enlightenment no longer perceives other human beings as communicating subjects, but only as informative objects.
- Instead of transcending and integrating the biospheric energy (Dionysus) the rational I of Enlightenment dissociates itself from it and suppresses it. Nature is objectified on the inside and outside, because no dependency of whichever kind is supposed to cross the new freedom of this rational, purely noospheric I.

In this manner the rational I deteriorates to the ego, which circles around itself. In the sense of an idea of peace going beyond Enlightenment, modernity, and postmodernity, the ego has thus to be transformed. Egoism is not just a manifestation in the personality’s behavior and a decisive question for the character formation of human beings, but also the pivotal point for every aftermodern idea of peace.

The transpersonal self⁶⁸ is (among others) a term within chakra psychology.⁶⁹ There it shines as the nonlocalizable ground of being through

the body–soul–mind unity of the personal self. The latter is sublated, hosted, and transcended within the transpersonal. Within the personal self there is an opening through which the transpersonal shines through.⁷⁰ It is that aspect of being which integrates, surpasses, and differentiates the simply personal sphere. In the self, just like in the pure ego, there are neither good nor bad characteristics. The self is free from characteristics. According to Sri Ramana Maharshi, the self is the pure being. This is how he interprets that quote in the Bible where it says “I am that I am.”⁷¹ The self is not body, not mind, not thinking. It is not feeling or sensation or perception. It is free from all that is object-like, all subject-like, all dualities. It can neither be seen, thought, nor recognized. It is beyond time and space and always there.

This teaching interprets the self as Locke had the personality, which however in this understanding has to be dissolved on the path toward awareness. That which Locke celebrates in Buddhism belongs to the three poisons of the mind. That is why Buddhist wisdom contains the invitation to detach the I from its worldly, egoic desire, to liberate it from material, subjective passions and thus open the path toward the consciousness for the higher self.

The self in the chakra-psychology of Yoga

To better understand this viewpoint I wish to retrace the “construction plan” of the self-consciousness within the chakra psychology of Yoga⁷² because it has been copied by Western psychology, for example by Wilhelm Reich or Abraham Maslow.⁷³ It furthermore offers a useful frame for the realm of conflict transformation in the tradition of humanistic psychology.⁷⁴ In most versions⁷⁵ it leads via several stages from the ego to nirvana.⁷⁶

The first chakra, *muladhara*, refers to the physical body and its material functions, like nourishment and excretion, birth and procreation, and breathing and dying. Its egoic aspect resides in excess, which however is not condemned morally as gluttony and debauchery, but due to its addictive character it is an obstacle toward the experience of the self that creates suffering. The path of Yoga thus recommends moderation. On the material level it is not the quantitative accessibility of resources that is at the center of the question of being, but the moderate way of dealing with them. A greedy I is perceived as just as poor as one suffering privation. Because it is to be observed: for a conscious I the opposite of having is not not-having, but not-wanting-to-have. Egoistic is he who desires and thus creates suffering for herself/himself. This is no longer strictly tied to the availability of material resources. Also and

especially somebody who has already a lot of material goods, often desires more and is thus poor, while persons who live in materially frugal conditions often, even though not necessarily, are plagued less by such a desire.

In the second chakra, *svadisthana*, memories are transformed into emotions. An emotion is, as already mentioned, an energetically charged pattern of memory in the present.⁷⁷ Mental fear and bodily pain together form the impetus for egoistic action. Courage is not the opposite of fear, but a different manifestation of the same energy. At bottom it is just the other side of the same coin. Yet also and especially the wish to repeat past experiences of bodily (sexual) lust belongs in this category. As long as it remains unbalanced and unconscious, sexual energy reproduces itself and thus leads to desire, which in turn continually forms itself anew as the propensity for violence and aggression.

The third chakra, *manipura*, concerns intellect and sociability. Its egoic aspect is the desire for social power, subjugation, and recognition. This leads to calculation and mistrust, both of which foster violent behavior because power over others is weakness that disguises itself as strength. The transformation toward inner strength via trust and consciousness on this level is all too rational. This does not imply that it would be particularly easy to reach because also here it is not the suppression of corresponding aspirations that leads to transformation, but rather a dispassionate manner of dealing with them, which ends the power games and quarrels that are so divisive in relations.

The fourth chakra is called *anahata*. Here it is about the qualities of heart-like love, compassion, selflessness, and devotion. On this level the I begins to purify itself from the ego, to surpass and transform itself, yet it is still beholden to the duality between male and female and thus to the potential characterized by passion, desire, and the striving for power. The dualities good–evil, love–hate, us–them, right–wrong, and like–dislike continue to be effective.⁷⁸ Love is here still person-related. The opening of the heart chakra allows the closer proximity of personal love, but regarding the spiritual aspect it transcends the mere interpersonal sphere and begins to communicate trans-personally, universally. Love is then no longer connected to people and conditions, but to flows and streams. It encompasses all that is alive, nature, cosmos, and life itself.

Before I get to the fifth chakra it has to be repeated that the I has a body and a mind but is neither one of them. It is more than both of them combined. Its peace begins when it realizes that it is identical with neither the body – the doer, nor the mind – the thinker. When

it is capable of observing its own thinker, then a higher level of consciousness is activated. According to this view *anahata* is the gate to the experience of peace. The Cartesian subject that believes it is, because it thinks, here reaches the limits of its possibilities. The mask of the persona is complete. Beyond awaits that which sounds through the mask, the peace of the self, which just is and does not need a justification for that. Individual, ego, subject, and person are form, but the peaces are formless. When consciousness is no longer caught in thoughts, a part of it is maintained in its formless, unconditional state, which this understanding calls peace.⁷⁹ In the Upanishads it says correspondingly:

Ātman is the I freed from all ignorance and darkness and delusion.⁸⁰

Ignorance, darkness, and delusion mean that which is treated as imagination or as illusion in academic psychology. It is the sum of all that has been experienced in the past, which in the form of fear, wishing, hope, evaluation, or desire, as thought or emotion puts itself before the current perception so that it cannot be experienced unbiased and in full consciousness.⁸¹

The “fully liberated I” no longer can, no longer may, or no longer wants to live from such imaginations. When this I listens to its own thoughts or emotions, then it is aware of them and at the same also of itself as their witness. In this manner the deeper self steps out of the shadow of the I lost in thought and driven by emotions. Its perception now is free of everything that is present. If one is successful in enduring the corresponding separation anxiety then the road opens toward the transpersonal peaces that are no longer dualistic and thus have no opposite.⁸²

The unmasked voice of the pure self is called *vishuddha*. On this level, love no longer is a feeling that is directed toward certain people or states, but a general, world-encompassing basic attitude. Complete freedom from all conceptions has the result that together with the conceptions nourished by the ego the I dissolves as well, because it can only gain its identity from memories. Identity implies that somebody coincides here and now with that which she/he imagines as her/his own previous being. She/he needs a certain capacity for self-preservation and coherence in time and space. Otherwise she/he ceases to exist as an identical individual.

I have already discussed memory as a constitutive characteristic of the persona. Since the past can only be remembered, because it is already gone and thus is no longer real in the present, the I expires together

with the memory of the one who I was. Yet, as long as there still is an I, also an other will necessarily exist and hence also the kind of fear that is nourished by duality. This fear vanishes with the death of the I. Identification with thoughts and memories is recognized as the root of peacelessness. When thoughts are overcome, the mind is not pushed aside but is conscious and present. That is why it can be as it is, without being entangled in its past stories. The split that is created by the self-reflecting consciousness is healed. There is no more ego that could love or hate itself, be proud of itself, or feel shame. Thereby the road toward the transpersonal form of peace and freedom is opened.

The outer conditions of life from this perspective are no longer perceived as either positive or negative, but simply accepted as they are. A dualistic happiness dependent on material factors gives way to an inner peace independent of them. Also dispute then becomes hard to imagine. A dispute presupposes that the opponents identify with their thoughts and with an attitude that reacts to the position of others and rejects it. Opposing opinions and polarities are thereby strengthened, and conflicts, which taken for themselves are nothing but the expression of social aliveness,⁸³ are overcharged with energy. These are mechanisms of unconsciousness that in *vishuddha* no longer take hold due to a lack of ego aspects.

The boundaries of the persona disappear here and a world opens up to perception that goes beyond those limits. I call it the *transpersonal* sphere. In literature it is often called spiritual. However, in my opinion these two terms are not to be used synonymously. Spiritual experiences are transpersonal, but not every transpersonal experience is spiritual. Many who have had transpersonal experiences, speak against the use of the word "spiritual" due to its institutionalized religious connotations.⁸⁴

However it may be called, also on this level confusion is possible. Since human beings are coming from experiences that are characterized by emotions and thoughts, they perceive the consciousness that is reached here as so blissful that they have the propensity of becoming attached to it. Perpetual bliss, if it is interpreted dualistically, is as tiring for the human mind as is always having the same melody in one's ear. Bliss is not the same as peace. That is why to persist in this feeling turns the potentially deep experience of peace into dull monotony.

According to the chakra psychology of Yoga, consciousness turns toward this peace from the sixth level, *ajna*, onwards and reaches it on the seventh, *sahasrara*. The self dissolves in the All-One, the divine, whereby the goal of the yogis' spiritual path is reached: the immediate

and formless awareness that is without I, without other, and without God. In this formless and silent awareness the yogi does not see God, because she/he is the divine. She/he recognizes it from the inside as self-feeling and not from the outside as object. The witness cannot be seen, because she/he is the one who sees. There is no boundary between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived. Everything visible is object, finite thing, or creature, image, concept, or vision – which is exactly what we are not.⁸⁵

The world is illusory;
Brahman alone is real;
Brahman is the world.⁸⁶

At this point the mountain lake that I have referred to so frequently attains its real meaning: if someone has moved beyond the limits and contradictions that the mind creates, then this inner mountain lake of the peaces becomes real:

When human beings make the experience that they have succeeded in feelingly remaining at a limit until that limit has dissolved, then they make the experience of a great happiness and for them it is like an arrival at oneself, on a new soil that they have charted for themselves.⁸⁷

The outer life situation and whatever occurs there are like the surface of the lake, cast in its place, mostly calm but at times also windy and rough, corresponding to times and tides. But in a deeper sense the mountain lake always remains still, because it is not just its surface. To the observer who is unperturbed by duality and connected to her/his own depth it means peace and harmony in its wholeness.

The peace in *ajna* and *sahasrara* thus is the death of the belief that existence is only individual. Under the conditions of such a freedom subjectless stillness takes the place where before there was the I. The human being has to accept the twisting of the I in order to reach this peace. To move from unconsciousness to the I-consciousness implies becoming conscious of the death of the I. To move from the I-consciousness to the transpersonal peace implies invalidating death.⁸⁸

The secret of the peaces, of existing, thus lies in dying before the body dies and so finding out that there is no death at all. The word “existence” has to be understood in the meaning of its Latin root *exsisto*, as a temporary stepping forth out of the All-One, which does not lead to

an individual death but toward the return to the All-One. Whatever appears in the manifest world, in the last instance is only a temporary aspect of the All-One.

In this worldview, peace and nonviolence are a task for heroes. The path to the transpersonal peaces leads through fear and through lust. Taboos bind the energy of the peaces. The conscious crossing through fear and lust transforms the egoic aspects and differentiates emotions from feelings and thoughts from consciousness. The distinction between compensatory emotions fed by memory and the present feeling reappears here. In the moment of threat fear is a feeling, but it is an emotion if it is fed by the memory of a past threat. Transformation does not occur via the suppression of fear and lust, but through the differentiation between the triggering emotions referring to the past and the feelings related to the present, which enable a situational resonance and calmness. This leads to the, in its core originary Christian, insight into the deeper meaning of charity. Only somebody who consciously feels herself/himself, can be conscious about the suffering of others and will not do violence to them.⁸⁹ It is not about a moral or ascetic suppression of those affects deemed negative or uncivilized, but about a conscious and acknowledged balance that is perceived as love, empathy, charity, or Agape.

This thought is scandalous for the Western understanding, whose philosophy from Greek antiquity to postmodernity is based on the fear of death. Previous to the transpersonal approaches it could never enter the canon of Western philosophy and psychology, although it has long been affirmed by the natural sciences and has been taken up again and again ever since Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Jung. But especially for peace philosophy this approach is decisive and liberating, since it does not just take away the terror of physical death but also every ground for violence.

The personal is universal

As a guiding principle for transpersonal peace and conflict research I thus postulate what John Paul Lederach⁹⁰ has pointed out with reference to Carl Rogers, namely that it is exactly those things that appear to be the most personal which we humans share universally. Whether it be the most terrible existential fears of survival, the most lurid sexual fantasies, the most brutal projects of domination, or the most intimate love toward another person – those egoic aspects in all their facets and the corresponding potential for being twisted are inherent to the whole species. Whoever consigns herself/himself to peace work first has to

cross through all of that within herself/himself. Whatever she/he finds there is more horrible, more noble, complete, and universal than the objective findings of empirical peace research could ever be. Therapy and analysis begin with the person of the therapist, and peace work has to commence in similar fashion:

Here I believe is a fundamental paradox in the pursuit of peace. Peacemaking embraces the challenge of personal transformation, of pursuing awareness, growth, and commitment to change at a personal level.⁹¹

This road may be paved with disruptions and crises of all kinds. This is the case because transformation forces one to relinquish fear and apparent security, trusted capabilities, and known patterns and images of self. The corresponding separation anxiety is all the greater in a modern context, because here everything that lies beyond belief in the individual existence is treated with the greatest suspicion and according to the linear chronosophy is consigned to a more primitive state of evolution and despised as such.

In terms of chakra psychology, between *muladhara* and *anahata* it is at bottom about a slightly differently pronounced narration of the persona both in the sense of Boethius or Sigmund Freud. The tradition of Yoga and subsequently also humanistic psychology and transrational peace research see therein only the gate toward the peaces that has to be passed through. In this manner it also becomes understandable that Sri Aurobindo deemed Freud's psychology to be primitive.⁹² He could rely on a living and ancient wisdom that had been lost to modernity. Freud was less an inventor than a rediscoverer guided by mechanistic thinking. As much as the enthusiasm of his followers in this regard may be shared from a Western perspective, it appears as miniscule from a yogi's viewpoint.

In the chakra psychology the persona is something like a constellation of energy. The energy, which is imagined as the innermost self, is contained in the body that itself is an accumulation of energy enclosed by a more or less firm form. This form is permeable, because every human being also has an energy field outside of his/her own body, and this field is influenced by other human beings, just like she/he herself also influences the energy field of others. This field furthermore continues to exist if the firm form of the body disappears. In a closed system no energy is lost.⁹³

The spirit of systems

Systems theories approximate this point of view to an amazing degree, with the concept of mind here playing an important role. Gregory Bateson⁹⁴ proposed defining mind as a systemic phenomenon, which is typical of all living things. He introduced a series of criteria which a system needs to fulfill in order to exhibit mind. Every system that corresponded to those criteria would be capable of processing information and developing phenomena that are associated with mind – thinking, learning, memory, and so forth. Within the layered order of nature the respective individual human mind is embedded into the more comprehensive mind of social and ecological systems. All emanate their thoughts, characteristics, and feelings onto other humans and receive the thoughts, characteristics, and feelings that are emanated from other humans. Whatever occurs in consciousness leaves traces in the world.⁹⁵ Everything that occurs in the world can be received by the brain. Human beings are integrated into the “planetary system of mind,” which probably corresponds to *ajna*. This in turn takes part in the cosmic or universal system, corresponding to *sahasrara*.

For Bateson, mind was a necessary and inevitable consequence of systemic complexity, which is present even before single organisms or bodies develop a brain or higher nervous system. He also held the opinion that mental characteristics do not just manifest within individual organisms, but also in societal systems and ecosystems. Mind would thus not only be immanent to the individual body, but also to the communication pathways and messages outside of the body. With this definition Bateson opened a new dimension within the *Geistes-Wissenschaften*, which the contested biologist Rupert Sheldrake⁹⁶ proceeded to prominently occupy with his theory of the morphogenetic fields,⁹⁷ but which is equally taken up by the systems theorist and peace researcher Ervin Laszlo:

The dawning and up to date still revolutionary insight is that the information, which our brain has at its disposal about the events and characteristics of the world beyond our brainpan, are not limited to the visible spectrum of electromagnetic waves and to the audible range of soundwaves but also include waves emanating from the holofield of the quantum vacuum.⁹⁸

This contradicts all those teachings that wish to see divine energy in a personally manifested form that is prior to the world. Thereby also the

importance of the historical shift from the energetic to the moral concept of peace and its personified Father-God and from there onwards to the modern one with its final meaning becomes ever more understandable. If the systemic image of mind is not restricted to individual organisms but can be extended to social and ecological systems, then groups of people, societies, and cultures possess a collective mind and dispose over a collective consciousness. To this the school of Carl Gustav Jung would add that to a collective mind also belongs a collective unconscious.⁹⁹

This proposal is often confronted by the critique of paving the road for totalitarianism and Fascism and that it could subsequently lead to physical violence, because it dissolves natural law's claim of individual rights of liberty in the name of a reason or being of a higher order. This becomes dangerous whenever the collective mind with its conscious and unconscious is attributed to an abstract larger entity like the people, the nation, the fatherland, the homeland, or similar entity. All these, however, have nothing in common with the collective mind that is meant here. They are much rather the expression of the pathology of a collective ego. Pathology is the commonly known term for "sick" and derives from the Greek word *pathos* for suffering. Since every ego creates suffering it is always pathological – in both its individual and collective forms. The collective ego exhibits the same traits as the individual one. An example is the need for enemies and conflicts, the desire for more, the propensity to put others in the wrong, and for itself to be right. Every collective ego sooner or later gets into conflict with other collectives, because it unconsciously aims for that and needs resistance in order to define its own limits and thus identity. The people or the nation are constructs of the mind, thoughts that are tied to past and future, emotions and malfunctions of the peaces in the here and now. They induce the understanding competition as a utmost natural aspect of societal being. In a deeper sense they are the tragic expression of a pathological way of thinking. In order to legitimize themselves they create or strengthen the idea of an enemy as the alleged evil. Often enough this image is more terrible and dangerous than the evil that initially caused the malfunction. The more unconscious single people, groups, and peoples are the greater is the probability that this pathology will take on the form of physical violence. Violence is a primitive but widely used means to which the ego resorts in order to assert itself and to prove that it is right and the other is wrong. Experience shows that a collective ego thereby acts even more unconsciously than the individuals out of which it is formed. That is why masses assembled in

temporary collective egos are capable of atrocities, which none of its members individually would condone and least of all commit.¹⁰⁰

A system that has not been made sick by ego aspects consists of concrete relations between similar elements among themselves and toward the higher entity. These relations are mainly cooperative— at times conflictive— but not principally of rivalry, as it is assumed by Social Darwinism. Most importantly, its borders are transparent, permeable, and never exclusive. There are social contexts like families, neighborhoods, associations of villages, working groups and similar others, which also dispose over a collective mind. Yet individuals belong to several systems at the same time. They can shift between them and at the latest, on the higher level, all – even only temporarily assumed boundaries – are again transformed.¹⁰¹ An entity like a tribe, state, people, or nation is always a supposition, a construct, or invention¹⁰² of limited temporal, spatial, and personal reach which within the systemic approach, does not legitimize any kind of exclusion or rivalry.

People take part in these mental relations, are guided by them, and simultaneously also co-form them. In psychology, one speaks about transpersonal experiences whenever the individual mind, or better, the pure or the self-integrated I, takes up contact with the collective and later in ascending order with the planetary (*ajna*) or cosmic (*sahasrara*) levels. That such a coming together is perceived as an experience of deepest peace is recounted by the Mystic traditions of all times and places.

Peace research may criticize those accounts in the postmodern manner. However, they are to be taken seriously because the simple existence of the narrative makes them socially powerful. Here I once more find myself facing the introductory metaphor of the mountain lake that appears to be indelible even from the most serious considerations on the peaces. The peaces in all their manifestations are at least also co-carried by this mystical aspect. This also leads to a surprising challenge to the postmodern concept of peace, which modern critics probably might call neoconservative.

If there is something like a planetary mind together with a corresponding planetary consciousness and subconsciousness, it follows that there is also something like a planetary and consequently universal peace, something akin to world peace. Yet, since the world is a single one, peace would thereby be conveyed from a postmodern plural into a transpersonal singular, which would be charged with the potential for violence of the moral and modern concepts of peace. This is dissolved by the energetic and therefore dynamic element of transpersonality,

which differs from the static–moral and mechanistic–modern world-view. In a dynamic system the transpersonal mind is pulsating constantly, just like the personal one. That is why the peace that can be experienced within it may well be of planetary or cosmic singularity, yet it will always appear and be perceived in different form. In this manner, peace appears as a cosmic mystery that allows human perception an infinite number of interpretations. Dependent on the respective consciousness there thus exists a multitude of different “worlds,” because the human world is created by that collective consciousness that is called mind or spirit.

Within such a collective human world there exist large differences, “underworlds,” according to who creates or perceives the corresponding world. Premodern mythologies, like discussed in Chapter 2, from this point of view attain a new meaning and appear less fantastic.¹⁰³ The rational plurality of peaces in the postmodern reading transforms itself into a *dharmic* peace that is universal but in its relationality can always only be grasped partially and according to perspective. I could also call this a polymorphous *pax universalis*. This means in more simple terms that also in mystic experiences the perception of the peaces through the individual mind remains multiform.

I am amazed by how little resonance this insight has found in modern and postmodern peace research, because it is almost impossible to say something more meaningful about peace. It has deep-reaching consequences for our own human attitude to our *Mitwelt*. Whoever separates phenomena of mind from the comprehensive systems to which they are inherent and reduces them to human individuals, subjects, or persons, has to perceive the *Mitwelt* as mindless. This was already known since the times of Romanticism and Rousseau. Despite this knowledge humanity continues to exploit the *Mitwelt* as a resource. The behavior would be completely different if there were agreement that the *Mitwelt* is not just alive, but like human beings also endowed with mind.¹⁰⁴

The contradiction between the autonomous subject of Enlightenment on the one hand, and the yogic self and the mind of systems theory on the other, at first appears to be unbridgeable. Many prominent authors from Carl Gustav Jung¹⁰⁵ via Roberto Assagioli¹⁰⁶ to Karlfried Dürkheim¹⁰⁷ have dealt with this question. Because of their insights they are all seen as heralds and precursors of transpersonal psychology. They all used different terms, yet agreed on the opinion that transpersonal experiences would be open to every human being. A precondition for experiencing this also as a process of healing would be the previous

formation of the I-consciousness and the transformation of the ego. I may add that it is only under this condition that transpersonality can imply peace. Nothing is more obstructive to the I than the ego, to the self than the I. The ego is a barrier in consciousness against the self. On the road to transpersonal peace these obstacles are to be successively integrated and transformed. A stable I-consciousness is the crucial precondition for all kinds of self-awareness in the frame of peace work and conflict transformation.

A clear terminology is crucial for the subsequent debate, yet literature is filled with different terms for the same or similarly perceived phenomena, or vice versa, it often describes different phenomena with the same terms. As a conclusion to my derivation of the personal and transpersonal I would thus like to clarify the terminology I have chosen:

I follow the chakra psychology of Yoga and call the single levels the material, emotional, social, mental, spiritual, planetary, and cosmic. An individual integrates the first two levels, a subject additionally the third, a person also the fourth. The integration of these four levels towards a mature I is the precondition for the transpersonal dimension of being to open up.¹⁰⁸ This occurs at first as experience of the self or pure ego. The collective consciousness, which some also call spirit, also integrates the self and is in turn itself embedded into the cosmic consciousness. I understand these levels as layers in space-time, as space- and timeless potential of realization and not as a succession within a chronological history of development or a hierarchic determination.

6.3 Humanistic psychology and transrational peaces

In the chapter on postmodern peaces I tried to show how the modern concepts of peace finally disproved themselves by their own methods, until systems theories, Structuralism, and Post-structuralism brought forth new relational paradigms on the basis of rational thinking. In my abbreviated narration, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud emerged as icons of the narration, in whose wake these new schools of thought could develop that finally also paved the way for peace research as a discipline.

For Freud, the unconscious was primarily of a personal nature, with aspects that have never been conscious and others that have been forgotten or repressed. For Carl Gustav Jung, the unconscious was that and so much more. He deemed the unconscious to be the original source of the conscious and held that life would begin with the unconscious and not with a blank matrix as Freud had thought. The conscious mind,

according to Jung, develops out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it. He therefore distinguished between the subconscious belonging to the individual and a collective unconscious in which all of humanity would partake and that, as described above, would represent a deeper layer of the psyche. He did not contradict Freud's hypothesis that personal experiences are decisive for the development of the single person, but rejected the notion that this development would take place in an unstructured persona. He held that the role of personal experience was to develop that which according to his opinion was already a priori immanent to the archetypal potential of the character. To him, the psyche was as much or as little the product of experience as the body is that of the food that it takes in.¹⁰⁹

Jung, who was equally interested in the symbolic world of alchemy as a process of individuation¹¹⁰ as he was in Tao and Yoga, proposed a psychology of connectivity between the individual and the whole species, the *Mitwelt*, the planet, and the cosmos.¹¹¹ He did not just think it inappropriate, but grotesque, to want to encounter the human psyche with a purely rational attitude:

Overvalued reason has this in common with political absolutism: under its domination the individual is pauperized.¹¹²

He thus became a trailblazer for humanistic psychology, and in further consequence for the transrational notions of peace. These relate to current processes, to the bodily sensations occurring in the famous here and now. This is important for peace research, because peace needs to be perceived and felt in order to be real. I once more recall the inner mountain lake, the experiences of the self that can only be called peaceful if somebody undergoes them.¹¹³

One current within humanistic psychology integrated concepts into their considerations that derived from the spiritual teachings of Zen Buddhism, Tantrism, Sufism, Yoga, and Christian Mysticism, and connected those with the insights of Western, rational research and so developed the transpersonal approach that to me appears to be highly relevant for peace research. It does not turn against the fundamental statements of classical science, but shows that their absolute and objective claim to truth is presumptuous.¹¹⁴

Abraham Maslow¹¹⁵ barely shared Freud's interest in mentally sick human beings. Both he and even more so Fritz Perls rejected the objectifying Behaviorism that lowers humans to the status of complex animals.¹¹⁶ They turned toward studying healthy human beings and

positive aspects in human behavior like happiness, joy, and peace and called for a generally applicable psychology of human growth. In allusion to the innovative Carl Rogers¹¹⁷ and the client-centered form of therapy developed by him, Maslow turned patients into clients who meet the therapists as equals and with an interest in personal growth. The therapeutic process is no longer perceived by him as the treatment of a disease but as an adventure of self-exploration. The therapist no longer plays a dominant role. She/he only creates the framework for the events in which the client is the main person and carries full responsibility.

In analogy, conflict research knows the figure of the mediator as a person who meets the conflicting parties as equals and brings in her/his history and interests. She/he can reveal this factor because of his or her own education and consciousness and so can create the frame for a successful conflict transformation from this position. This distinguishes her/him fundamentally from the distanced therapists and mediators of the modern format who deny their own interests and claim neutrality or even superiority. Both are inconceivable in a relational frame.

Leading beyond the individual level were those approaches that referred to the family and social groups as systems. Those are of crucial importance for peace research. Outstanding pioneers of this tradition are Virginia Satir and Ruth Cohn. Their approaches, which share some of the insights of gestalt therapy as it has been developed mainly by Fritz Perls,¹¹⁸ are based on gestalt psychology and deal with the perception of units of meaning. Their fundamental common opinion is that the human being does not perceive things as disconnected and isolated elements, but organizes them into a meaningful whole during the process of perception. A gestalt is a whole, something complete, an organic function, a final unit of experience, an experienced phenomenon, which only exists as a whole. If a gestalt is analyzed, divided into its parts, it becomes something different. If a gestalt is broken apart, it no longer is a gestalt. Gestalt therapy strengthens the awareness of this complete unit of experience in the here and now. It aims for the reintegration of suppressed or dissociated parts of the personality and the resultant broadening of the individual's or group's possibilities of action.¹¹⁹

Fritz Perls reduces the definition of gestalt therapy to the two words "how" and "now." The "how" expresses the understanding of *Dasein*, relations, and peaces as procedural and systemic. "How" asks, differently than the mechanistic "why," about the manner in which processes occur, not about their cause or goal. The "how" encompasses

all behavior that actually occurs. It connects to the “now” as the only real moment of perception. The past no longer is; the future is not yet. Both are imaginations which obstruct the perception of the peaces in the now. The aim of gestalt therapy is to twist the mind’s illusions and ever more come to one’s senses, to be more in touch with oneself and the world rather than with fantasies, apprehensions, and prejudices.¹²⁰

The relation between oppressor and oppressed, judge and person being judged, and mother and child that plays a large role in gestalt therapy, soon entered into Paulo Freire’s *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* and subsequently into Augusto Boal’s *Theatre of the Oppressed*. As both are important elements of conflict transformation I will deal extensively with those forms of therapy and the methods derived therefrom in the second volume of this trilogy.

Transpersonal psychology

The branch of humanistic psychology that concerned itself with the spiritual, transcendental, and mystic aspects of self-actualization is called transpersonal psychology, following a proposal by Abraham Maslow and Tony Sutich. It provides the platform from which I want to proceed further. Stanislav Grof introduced the term of transpersonal experiences into the debate. In his description of the main parts of the unconscious he distinguished them from the psychodynamic and perinatal. Under psychodynamic he counted experiences of importance for the soul that stem from the individual’s earlier periods of life. To the perinatal belong all those experiences connected with biological phenomena during the process of birth. Transpersonal are those experiences which surpass the person’s biographic boundaries and transcend the limitations of space and time.¹²¹ Together with Maslow, Grof is the founder of that school which particularly deals with this last aspect. Their transpersonal psychology is based on the following assumptions:

- The source of peace lies on the inside. The images from mythology are projections of the psyche. All gods of heaven and hell live in the imagination.
- The human being can grow beyond the ego and the I.
- All existence is interrelated and connected.
- The psychic situation of a single person cannot be dissociated from its environment of feelings, as well as its social and cultural environment. Yet the fate of each person rests in her/his own hands. Everybody is responsible for herself/himself and can only help herself/himself.

- The whole is contained in each part.
- The psychological structure of a human being can be altered by breath and by work on the body's muscle armor.

The corresponding forms of therapy assume that psychic experiences, and thus also disturbances in the sensation of peace, peacelessness, are stored in the memory of the body.¹²² That is why suppressed, traumatized, or frozen emotional reactions, disturbances of peace, shall be made accessible for direct experience and for acting them out in a controlled frame. Therapy succeeds through energy work close to the body. The energy locked in the muscles and perceived as a burden is released, brought to consciousness, and can be used for alternative action. In this therapeutic practice one can easily recognize the thoughts about harmony and balance deriving from that energetic understanding of peace that has largely been suppressed by modernity. Harmony reenters the thinking on peace, yet connects with a rational approach.¹²³ Toward this purpose the broad spectrum of schools of this direction developed an extensive repertoire of energetic techniques. Thus this viewpoint explicitly follows a synopsis of body, drive, socialization, feeling, and mind.

According to Grof's teaching the human consciousness is principally capable of two complementary forms of perception. In the Cartesian mode it perceives everyday reality in the form of separated objects, in a three-dimensional space and linear time. In the transpersonal mode the usual borders of sensual perception and rational thinking are surpassed and perception shifts from stable objects to flowing energy patterns. For Grof these two patterns of perception are complementary in the sense of the particle-like and wave-like quality of electrons in quantum physics. A fundamental and dynamic tension appears to exist between these two forms of consciousness.

Peace and Wilber's four quadrants

I could not find a more convincing description of these modes and their connections in literature than Ken Wilber's model of the "four quadrants,"¹²⁴ which I will therefore repeat in summary and in my own language. Wilber postulates that every complete act of human communication and relation would contain an interior just like an exterior, an individual just like a collective component. As a result of the discussion of the terms rendered above I would prefer to call the latter two singular and plural. None of those components can exist separated from the others. Based on this assumption Wilber constructed his matrix with

four quadrants, each of which stands for one aspect of being: intentional, behavioral, cultural, and social. I add the respective terms that I have up to this point found in the observation of the variations of the many peaces and that do not play a role for Wilber. This matrix then appears as shown in Figure 6.1.

It is easy to recognize where the attention of peace research within the corresponding approaches lies. Modernity perceives peace as a question of the exterior-plural quadrant and focuses on the visible aspects of behavior within the social, which it investigates and works on from family units to world-encompassing systems. This usually leads it to the moral or also Idealist demands for a peace out of justice. Such peace research is geared toward questions that can be grasped empirically. It is not wrong, because every relevant question of being has a social component. But it is rather incomplete. It is a challenge for all of modern social sciences to disengage from this positivistic trend and to investigate further aspects in addition to the purely behavioral aspects of social formations.

The quadrant relating to the inner-plural aspects, which usually are called culture, poses problems. Values, worldviews, and their truth claims are much harder to grasp than income disparities, unemployment, birth and death rates, analphabetism, criminality, levels of industrialization, or other phenomena from the world of the social that can similarly be described in quantitative fashion. Collective attitudes and feelings or even memories are subject to a certain imponderability. This poses a challenge to the perceiving subject which requires it to define itself and its own perspective and to argue its own interpretation. This is a more uncomfortable topic than the social. Postmodern philosophy and peace research has preferentially dealt with this field. In the

Interior Energetic and postmodern		Exterior Moral and modern
<i>Intentional</i> <i>Peace out of Harmony</i>	<i>Behavioral</i> <i>Peace out of Security</i>	Singular (individual)
<i>Cultural</i> <i>Peace out of Truth</i>	<i>Social</i> <i>Peace out of Justice</i>	Plural (collective)

Figure 6.1 Wilber's matrix of four quadrants

wake of Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, or Lyotard symbolism, language, and discourse have become its topics and it has developed praxiologies intended to help highlight those retraceable relations within the interior-plural aspect.

The exterior and interior aspects of peace relations are respectively described as social in the sense of empirically observable on the one hand, and cultural as a term for common images of the world, memories, expectations, value concepts, and truths on the other. They relate to each other like peace out of truth does to peace out of justice. The correlations and interrelations between the two are so tight that the one cannot be imagined without the other. It would nevertheless be misleading to want to reduce the one to the other or to investigate the one via the other. Justice is not simply true and truth not simply just. Both are different manifestations of one and the same communal energy, which would be mutilated by the sheer attempt to grasp the cultural aspect without the social, or the social without the cultural.

As regards the singular aspect it is obvious that every individual is embedded in the social stratification of its *Mitwelt*, which it can escape only by risking its life. As far as this relation occurs on the outside it again arouses the interest of modern science. An individual's behavior within its community can be observed, measured, classified, and qualified. This enables normative statements about right and wrong in general terms and thus can engender guidelines for the practical shaping of society, power, and order. The elaboration of knowledge leading to such guidelines is seen as the task of social sciences in modernity. The individual is of interest as a material building block for a materially larger entity, society, and should in this sense function as predictably as possible. If it acts accordingly, it is perceived as normal, sane, and secure. The relation between the individual and society here primarily turns into a question of security. If the individual acts against the norm then this is perceived as a risk to the security of the community and the individual is usually punished. In the reciprocal case, the community provides the physical and social security for that individual conforming to the norms.

The relation between the plural-interior of the cultural and the singular-exterior of the behavioral was the great topic of the Structuralists, of Foucault, and most of his successors. They presented culture somewhat like a gigantic superego that was supplied by the logic of the social structure and that would shape the individual in such a manner that it fits in with and functionally works in favor of the social structure. The behavior of the individual thus derives from the truths of cultural

imperatives and bolsters a social structure that is felt to be just without having to rely on physical repression. Nietzsche, for example, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, condemned this connection and what it does to individuals as slave morality and concluded:

The democratization of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants – taking the word in every sense, including the most spiritual.¹²⁵

This statement, sensitive then as it is now, results from the analytical connection between the singular-exterior and the plural-interior and their common reference to the plural-exterior. Nietzsche's often misunderstood and misused critique was geared toward the lack of reference to what I call the singular-interior. The fourth quadrant always posed the biggest problem for modern science, because its intentions cannot finally be investigated or proven with any of its methods. The relation between the individual's behavior and culture poses questions to science that cannot be answered with Positivism. And culture is still an intersubjective variable that can, even if not in its substance then at least in its manifestations, be observed, understood, and interpreted. Symbols, language, and discourse cannot be controlled in the interior of sender and receiver, but they can be perceived and interpreted by third persons on the road from sender to receiver. From this derives the reason of being for postmodern cultural studies, which however proves to be less secure than that of the modern, positivist social sciences.

The intentional quadrant also strips science of this auxiliary construction. Behaviorists are well able to study behavior resulting from intentions, neurologists can measure and localize brainwaves, identify active neurons and so forth,¹²⁶ but they will not be able to prove the singular thought, the sensation, the feeling itself from the interior. It is a sphere that can only be experienced. Plausibility or proof here are no criteria. It is a fascinating sphere, because it is known to every human being. Everybody knows that they think and feel and that there nevertheless is nobody who can prove thoughts or feelings with certainty. It is only when human beings communicate, articulating their thoughts, that they open this possibility to third persons. The by far largest part of experiencing the world occurs in this not communicated and not provable sphere. Whatever surfaces on the exterior is an expression of this inner energy of thought or feeling, never the thought or feeling itself.

Transrationality

This is the world in which my often stressed mountain lake rests, the peace that everybody can only experience for herself/himself, the harmony¹²⁷ that is only true, just, or secure if it is also really felt. This is the sphere where all great moral, social, and cultural designs, insights, and agreements begin and end. Here is the pivotal point for the transrational experiences of peace. Here it is about the pure self, not about the persona, the exterior mask. At this point all the considerations of the previous chapters become relevant. A discussion about the peaces without engaging with the self behind the persona and its meaning in the world makes no sense. This quadrant that circumscribes the seemingly smallest, most personal, and interior dimension of the peaces, is greater, wider, and deeper than all the others, although it is formed by them and cannot be without them. That is why it opens up the transrational dimension of the peaces.

It is known that Carl Gustav Jung took over the concept of the self from Taoism¹²⁸ and developed his general energetics of psychology on this basis.¹²⁹ Remarkable is his consideration that every human being's relation to the self at the same time circumscribes the relation to her/his fellow human beings, "[...] and no one can be related to the latter until he is related to himself."¹³⁰ On this basis, Erich Fromm completed the definition of transrational harmony, which presupposes the full realization of a human being's reason until a state in which it no longer keeps her/him from immediately and intuitively grasping nature. According to Fromm this goal is always in front of us, and not in the past, which is why transrationality is something completely different than the pre-rationality feared so much by modernity.¹³¹

Just as the social is not the sum of all individual behavior within a certain community, the cultural is not the sum of all individual intentions. In the frame of a transrational peace research all four aspects are much rather connected with each other and their peaces are more than the sum of all of them. The interior can thereby be understood as the energetic aspect. The exterior manifestations are not just the effigies of the interior aspects, but are that form which creatively feeds back to them.

Within transrational peace research, an image of peace extends itself that in the previous sections has remained fragmentary. Freud's and Galtung's icebergs are not wrong, they merely overlook one aspect of the peaces – namely the crucial one, the one which all connections need in order to transform their energy onto a transrational level. This is the case because, as Ken Wilber¹³² explains, in a situation of conflict every

society is faced with four options. In the first extreme it can adapt to such an extent to a rivaling or larger context that it completely merges into it, or, secondly, it can try to preserve itself to such an extent that it completely disconnects from other contexts. This pendulum swing between self-adaptation and self-preservation will in practice only rarely go to the extreme, but it will strive for approximation thereto. The obvious changes that occur are often celebrated as solutions to current conflicts. This pendulum swing is nevertheless a horizontal movement. Conflict resolution is only horizontal and beholden to the manifest. That is why it is superficial, weak, and hardly sustainable.¹³³ This is the case because in a horizontal movement the conflictive energy of the social connection is not transformed but only pushed around. This is just like rearranging the furniture in an apartment, which may convey a new sense of living but it is not a movement to a higher floor. Wilber calls this translation instead of transformation.

In the vertical direction the conflictive energy of such a connection can thirdly also lead to self-dissolution or destruction. Whether in the case of families or friendships, states or unions, practice frequently shows that conflictive energy can effect this self-destruction or also annihilation through third parties. This is a catastrophe for all affected, yet soberly seen it is normal, because descent from the more complex to the simpler is a natural process whenever the more complex proves unfit to survive. This also goes for humanity as a whole. As a creature of the mind the human being needs the biosphere for survival, but not the other way around. The biosphere in turn needs the physiosphere, but not the other way around.

The fourth option offered by conflict is self-transcendence. After Wilber,¹³⁴ within the holistic process conflict emerges out of limitations on a certain level, which lead to a drive for the higher level. Peaces therefore are whenever the enlarged horizon has been found and the balance in the system restored. This is not even thinkable with translation, but occurs self-evidently through transformation. If modern and postmodern peace research overlook the importance of the interior-singular, they restrict themselves to conflict translation and rob themselves of the gate toward transformation in a transrational sense. This is because from the position of modern rationality or from the postmodern mentality it necessarily follows that the desired peaces can only be reached via a transformation of the conflict into transrational perception.

Transrational peaces therefore are more than just the horizontal linking of the four single aspects. They are called like that because the

intentional moment, which in a manner is the energy-giving element for all peaces, is rational, but, at the same time, capable of both peace and conflict. My matrix is not two- but three-dimensional, shaped like a pyramid, and the intentional quadrant is something like the entrance to the stairway. The interaction of the individual aspects beyond the exterior and beyond rationality is the topic of transrational peace research. Taking intentionality into consideration, it surpasses the limits of rationality. It follows from this explanation that transrational peaces are also transpersonal, because even if the single aspects cannot be separated, the most intimate and individual sensation of peace is connected with plural aspects.

To experience reality exclusively on the interior level is irreconcilable with functioning in the daily world. Whoever experiences the conflict and clash between the two forms without being able to integrate them, will fall out of balance and experience peacelessness. The same goes for the exclusivity of the exterior, Cartesian mode of perception:

A person functioning exclusively in the Cartesian mode may be free from manifest symptoms but cannot be considered mentally healthy. Such individuals typically lead ego-centered, competitive, goal-oriented lives. Overoccupied with their past and their future, they tend to have a limited awareness of the present and thus a limited ability to derive satisfaction from ordinary activities in everyday life. They concentrate on manipulating the external world and measure their living standard by the quantity of material possessions, while they become ever more alienated from their inner world and unable to appreciate the process of life. For people whose existence is dominated by this mode of experience no level of wealth, power, or fame will bring genuine satisfaction and thus they become infused with a sense of meaninglessness, futility, and even absurdity that no amount of external success can dispel.¹³⁵

According to Yoga psychology, these people suffer from their restlessness on the first level of *muladhara*. Also from the point of view of peace research, this is a problematic state of mind and mentality, which can often be observed with people who strive for political or economic leadership positions. This is why special care has to be devoted to this, because

[t]he symptoms of this cultural madness are all-pervasive throughout our academic, corporate and political institutions [...].¹³⁶

Transrational peaces always reach beyond the limits of the persona into its oscillation with its environment, the physiosphere, biosphere, noosphere, and the All-One. From a modern perspective this aspect is often seen as esoteric and it is mostly rejected as unscientific. From a modern viewpoint this is consequent, but from the perspective of peace research it is impossible to ban evident aspects of human nature from the core area of research. On which image of the human being shall a notion of peace rest if not-communicated thoughts and feelings are left aside? But if transpersonality is accepted as a constitutive aspect of transrational peace research, then a corresponding image of the persona is necessary, as I tried to discuss in the previous chapter.

My methodological decision for chakra psychology is here only one among many possibilities. Whichever alternative is chosen, it has to cover all four of the aspects discussed here and take into consideration that no matter how complex a society or culture may be, it still draws its vitality from the personal energy of each of its individuals. This energy is a priori intentional, not rational. Mechanistic images of the human being, as they are rendered by Behaviorism or psychoanalysis and the models building on them, give incomplete results. To go beyond them does not mean to fall back into a prerational, magic, or mythic spirituality, but implies the integration of spirituality into a transrational, transpersonal, and more complete image of peace. A peace research that takes itself seriously will thus recognize transrationality and transpersonality as given figures within its research interest and will accept that the dissociation or omission of any aspect of human reality from the question of peace leads toward peacelessness and violence.

It is only recently that the transpersonal mode has become a topic of peace research. Ervin Laszlo¹³⁷ listed experiments that can be perceived as more or less relevant for this purpose. Yet in any case, it is certain that insights into the existence of a transpersonal mode of communication, which by definition has to concern itself with intersubjective relations on the micro- and macro level, yield completely new working hypotheses.

A transpersonal understanding of peace thus conceptually starts within the individual perception of peace, but from thereon is strictly relational. The topic of peace research is the relation itself and not an individual unimaginable as autonomous, self-sufficient, a monad, subject, or a society of individuals or subjects imagined as a closed group. In such an understanding of peace there cannot be an absolute Truth, Justice, Security, or Harmony that would lie outside of the All-One, nor can there be a Father God standing apart as an ultimate point

of reference. Fritjof Capra brought the necessity of this approach for peace research, to the point where this has a high relevance:

The integration of the Cartesian mode of perception into a broader ecological and transpersonal perspective has now become an urgent task to be carried out on all individual and social levels. Genuine mental health would involve a balanced interplay of both modes of experience, a way of life in which one's identification with the ego is playful and tentative rather than absolute and mandatory, while the concern with material possessions is pragmatic rather than possessive. Such a way of living would be characterized by an affirmative attitude towards life, an emphasis on the present moment, and a deep awareness of the spiritual dimension of existence.¹³⁸

6.4 The ethics and aesthetics of transrational peaces

The study of animate and inanimate matter again leads to two fundamental topics that often appear in the teachings of Mysticism, but also determine the peaces' relational character. These are, on the one hand, the connectivity and mutual interdependence of all phenomena out of which an ethics of the peaces arises and on the other, the dynamic nature of all relations, which determines the aesthetics of the peaces. Transrational notions of peace derive from these insights. Peaces here are as relational as they are in the energetic or postmodern understanding, but they additionally integrate the rational aspect.

In the ethics of peaces humans are beings that are connected with each other. The individual does not relate to a person but to a network, a fabric of relations like families, neighborhoods, clans, communities, enterprises, associations, unions, villages, cities, states, or the world society. This explicit structure derives peace from Cartesian truth. But this truth is not absolute in a Christian or Platonic sense. It rather corresponds to the Hindu notion of *dharma*, which in its wholeness is beyond human perception. Out of her/his limited earthly and temporal perspective the human being can only interpret a segment of it. The world and its truth are neither fixed as constants nor divisible. Their relational character implies that they permanently oscillate. Peace ethics realizes that and focuses on the transformation of conflicts immanent to it.¹³⁹ That is why a global ethics is only peaceful if it is free from ultimate norms, as has already been pointed out by postmodern philosophy. Truth, justice, and security lose their potential for peace ethics as soon

as they are charged dualistically with the absolute meaning of good and evil, right and wrong. Peace ethics connect, but they do not bind.

Etymologically speaking, aesthetics means sensual perception or clarity of the senses and it relates to those experiences or perceptions in their wholeness and not as parts. The aesthetics of peaces aims for human relations in their wholeness. Beyond the ethical moment this also and mainly implies their energetic aspect. It derives peace out of harmony. Harmony is when the energy of life can flow unimpeded. That is why the aesthetics of peaces is about the implicit relation of that which can be called soul, self, or *ātman*, toward others and toward the All-One, which can also be called God, world soul, *brahman*, existence, Kosmos, or universe. It is about the higher floors within my matrix as they become accessible from here. This is the Dionysian aspect of being that has become known under many different names: as *unio mystica* within the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition, as *satori* in Zen, *shunyata* in Buddhism, or *samadhi* in Yoga.

The aesthetics of the peaces relates to transcendental experience. It is metaphysical to a certain degree, and because it is energetic it constructs an individual system. But this does not imply esoteric speculation, because the implicit aesthetics of the peaces can be perceived within the physical world as an explicit characteristic of the above-mentioned structures. It sounds through the masks of the personae whether they want to let it happen or not, and it manifests in the characteristics of their relations:

Aesthetics help those who attempt to move from cycles of violence to new relationships and those of us who wish to support such movement to see ourselves for whom we are: artists bringing to life and keeping alive something that has not existed. As artists, aesthetics requires certain disciplines from us. Be attentive to image. Listen for the core. Trust and follow intuition. Watch metaphor. Avoid clutter and busy-ness. See picture better. Find the elegant beauty where complexity meets simplicity. Imagine the canvas of social change.¹⁴⁰

This praxis-relevant advice from John Paul Lederach will occupy me in the second volume of this trilogy. For now I follow its conceptual content of meaning and interpretation.

The ethics and aesthetics of the peaces are not exclusive or separated. Also as regards the peaces, I much rather agree with Wittgenstein that ethics and aesthetics are one.¹⁴¹ Peaces are the topic and characteristic

of relations, but due to the finite subject's limitations in knowledge it depends on the research interest whether they appear as one or the other, just like in quantum physics where it depends on the position of the observer whether she/he perceives a particle or a wave, although both are just aspects of the one.

That is why the peaces are subject to Gödel's theorem of incompleteness,¹⁴² which stipulates that a sufficiently powerful formal system has to be either incomplete or contradictory. It can be consistent or complete, but never both at the same time. If a system is in itself completely consistent, then there are fundamental truths that cannot be derived from it. That is why it is incomplete. But if the system is changed in such a manner that it can take in those truths, that is, if completeness is striven for, then contradictions will appear in some places and it will be inconsistent.

If I apply Gödel's considerations from mathematics to peace research, it becomes clear that a completely ethical Cartesian peace, as modern peace studies strive for in the spirit of Thanatos, will produce contradictions, just like a completely aesthetic peace will do, as it is engendered by the phobic conceptions of moral images of peace. Here "image" is the correct word, because in practice a perfect peace, whether ethical or aesthetic, has never been observed. Every approximately consistent peace in history has proven to be incomplete, because the inextricably interrelated ethics and aesthetics, the topic and the characteristic of peace, oscillate permanently between inconsistent completeness and incomplete consistency. The image of a complete and consistent peace is not just totalitarian but it is directed against the nature of being; it is equally inhuman as unrealistic.

Only if the perspective is focused on the transrational level and conflict resolution turns into conflict transformation, can the apparent contradiction be twisted. It is the same phenomenon as the contradiction between increasing chaos on the fundamental physiosphere, as the Second Law of Thermodynamics postulates it, and the increasing differentiation into ever more complex forms of life in the biosphere, which the theories of evolution point out. The twisting does not lie in an eschatological either-or. It is rather a transformational both-and, the integration of both movements within the frame of one mental perception. As far as the peaces as a relational factor are concerned, this contradiction between ethics and aesthetics cannot be resolved intellectually, but only integrated transrationally. Transrationality encompasses the simultaneity of the rationally contradictory as a dynamic element of systemic necessity. Therein it recognizes a more

comprehensive concept of peace which is reconciled with that. John Paul Lederach consequently defines peace work as follows:

...Peace work, therefore, is characterized by intentional efforts to address the natural ebb and flow of human conflict through nonviolent approaches, which address issues and increase understanding, equality and respect in relationships.¹⁴³

This has far-reaching consequences for peace research. On this basis the historically *de facto* unsuccessful approaches of Idealism and Realism have to be recognized as a mirage because from this viewpoint they are based on wrong assumptions. Neither do the autonomous subjects exist on which their axioms are founded, nor do societies constitute themselves consistently and completely according to the rules presupposed by them.

Fear is the energy that guides the research interest for Realism's approaches. Memories or narrations call forth emotions which manifest themselves as seemingly rational considerations. Within this frame that may well be true, but from a transrational point of view it is indubitable that fear as a characteristic of relations blocks the free flow of the energy of life, which prevents a manifestation of peace ethics. Fear and anxiety, as a chasm between the now and the later, cause the *élan vital*, the life energy which human beings carry inside themselves, to falter.¹⁴⁴ That is why fear-driven theories or even ideologies serve neither peace research nor the practice of peace.

Idealism, on the other hand, is energetically nourished by the principle of hope, which is favorable to the aesthetics of the peaces. It goes, however, hand in hand with the claim to know and to be right from which the thought of a "should" arises, that can take on violent forms when turned into the topic of relations.¹⁴⁵ The one who hopes, or even expects, believes to know what has to be done in order for the world to become better, and so blocks the ethics of the peaces with this aesthetic approach.

A change of position on the part of the observer is the only option for changing the relation whenever the topic, the object of intersubjective relations at the same time, is its characteristic. It does not matter whether this person is consciously taking part in the relation or seems to be a passive observer. That an active observer's change of position alters the relation is self-evident. And an observer is never passive, even if she/he perceives herself/himself in that manner, because no energy is ever lost. This means if the seemingly passive or neutral observer,

the mediator, changes position, it is not just that position and his own point of view that changes, but also the relation itself. On the one hand every perception of the observer is nothing but a projection onto her/his own horizon of imagination. Yet, since that in turn is a part of the overall system, her/his own projection does also change the system as a whole.

This is the basis for the call for a transrational conflict transformation instead of the modern or postmodern conflict resolution within peace research. It furthermore illustrates that John Paul Lederach's transpersonal peace philosophy relates to Johan Galtung's postmodern approach in about the same manner as Jung's psychology relates to that of Freud or the physics of Einstein relates to Newton's.¹⁴⁶

According to Grof's observations on the complementary forms of perception in human consciousness, the Cartesian or rational mode founds the ethics of the peaces, while the energetic one engenders the peaces' aesthetics. Not only Grof sees those two patterns of perception as behaving in a complementary manner akin to particle and wave. Also in transrational concepts of peace there exist a similar tension between ethics and aesthetics, which explains why pure ethics, morals, or modern understandings of peace fall just as short as the pure aesthetics of energetic and postmodern interpretations of peace. The transrational approach recognizes this tension. It tries to perceive, integrate, and balance it.

It follows that the traditional concepts of peace, be they oriented on Idealism or Realism, can have only a very limited reach within a transrational frame. Their teleology relates to transrationality like a thread to fabric. Whoever passes through rationality, finds room for transpersonality within the aesthetic experience. Human beings need this feeling.¹⁴⁷ Wherever this is recognized, it finds its echo also in the guiding questions of peace research.

Transrational peaces trust in the transpersonal effects of this seeking and perceiving. They are thus always also transpersonal, because through their aesthetic component they break up the limitations of the simple rational "should," for which Idealism calls, or an equally rational "must," for which Realism stands. In their place it puts a relational "can" that does not need anything but the relation itself in order to become manifest.

For peace research this implies that the analysis of a conflict and a possible mediation under transpersonal assumptions cannot exclusively be focused onto a material intervention in the conflictive situation, but primarily onto the perception of the observer or

mediator herself/himself, who thereby energetically and manifestly influences the conflictive situation:

I am part of this pattern. My choices and behaviours affect it.¹⁴⁸

Often the most critical parts of the process are the cultivation of internal, self or intra-group spaces, where safe and deep reflection about the nature of the situation, responsibility, hopes and fears can be pursued.¹⁴⁹

I know that my understanding of conflict transformation is not the only one and probably I may not even assume that it is majoritarian within the discipline, although it is rather close to John Paul Lederach's views. But, due to its consciousness about the aesthetic component, *transrational* peace research means something completely different than modern or postmodern interpretations. On the theoretical level this appears to be sufficiently elucidated to me. In practice also the transrational approach is faced with the problem that peace and conflict as relational energy can be interpreted very well, but treated only with difficulty. For concrete action it also needs the ethics of the peaces and thus methods that deal with the actors, topics, and rules and structures. This classification as it has been proposed by Vayrynen¹⁵⁰ appears useful to me because its fourfold structure comes close to what the successful method of Nonviolent Communication after Marshall Rosenberg or the Psychology of Communication after Schultz von Thun apply in practice. Within transpersonal logic, every word and every thought about a seemingly independent conflict of third parties is a contribution to it. Both the ethics and aesthetics of the peaces can be expressed, thought, or imagined just as well into existence as the necessity of violence during conflict. This is why the question of how conflicts are dealt with aesthetically turns into a crucial question within the ethics of the peaces. This is the central question for transrational peace research and conflict transformation: how can destructive, violent narratives be retold in a new manner so that the relations, places in the world, and their own history heal?

This will be the topic of the second volume in this trilogy. Here I only point out that at least John Paul Lederach¹⁵¹ is of the opinion that there can be no mechanical answer to this question:

This quest is one that must take seriously the process of listening to the deeper inner voice, a spiritual and deeply human exploration that should not be relegated to occasional conversations among

friends or, worse, to the couches of therapy when professional life crises emerge. This is the heart, the art and soul of who we are in the world, and it cannot be disconnected from what we do in the world.¹⁵²

As peace workers are always part of the system of healing of which they want to contribute to, they need a high degree of intuition, empathy, ethical maturity, and aesthetic awareness which can be gained via experiencing the inner mountain lake – the transpersonal exploration of the peaces. John Paul Lederach's proposals follow less the prescriptive approaches of the modern manner of thinking than that which he calls *elicitive*, a method “elicited from the conflictive situation” which he conveys in his workshops and training programs¹⁵³ and which is also followed in the program for peace studies that I lead.¹⁵⁴ This program is not intended to turn students into engineers of the machine world. It offers a protected space for reflective practitioners within the network of life.

6.5 What are transrational peaces?

As a key phrase for the discussion about transrational peaces I point out that everything that can be said empirically about the human species as a whole can also be found within every individual in our species. As seen from the perspective of the perceiving subject or potential peace worker, transrational peace research therefore first casts the gaze inwards. Just as the training of therapists begins with self-therapy, peace workers oriented on the transrational approach first explore and work on their own egoic aspects and deal with the death of the I. From there they twist and surpass the limits of the persona and in this manner open themselves for communication and resonance with other human beings, with the *Mitwelt*, and in the widest sense, the universe. They become aware of their potential as actors within the elicitive method and train in its use. In doing this they understand that they themselves are an element within the overall system and therefore recognize that, on the one hand, peaces are constructed within their own perception and on the other, that they change the system through every impulse of thought or action. Mediation as peace work is never neutral. It should be consciously communicating.

Transrational peace work is no new concept in the sense of modern innovation. In its self-understanding it does not enter into competition with older, prescriptive concepts over the recognition of its

truths. It does not want to overcome but rather to sublate them via integration and differentiation. This approach recollects their truths, neutralizes their one-sidedness, and lifts them onto a perspective that allows for an enlargement of the familiar perceptions and interpretations of peace.

From the energetic approach, transrational peaces integrate the moment of transpersonality and spirituality, of intentionality as well as the connectedness between all things and thus the moment of peace out of harmony. The aesthetic connection of peace and truth to them is unconditional but not absolute, because they perceive the system world as the being-connected of the All-One, from which it follows that all values are relational and are only communicated intersubjectively. To determine absolute truths and objective valuations is thus impossible for transrational peaces. In this aspect they coincide with the energetic and the postmodern images of peace. From the former they differ insofar as that they have passed through the modern rationality, and know and acknowledge it. Just like postmodernity, they do so in an unconditional and relational manner, and not in an absolute or abstract manner. Relationality means more to them than it does to the postmodern peace philosophy, namely transpersonality. In a simplified manner this means that transrational notions of peace do not decide between spirituality and rationality, but integrate both.

Security and justice, which in the moral and modern notions of peace derive from absolute Truth, are just as relative as relational for the transrational peaces. This is not threatening, because the transpersonal background of the transrational peaces is supported by the conscious death of the ego and the I so that a philosophy based on the fear of death in a moral or modern sense cannot arise.

The precondition for all of this is an image of the human being that goes beyond the moral and modern concepts of individual, subject, person, and personality. The category on which the conceptions of peace research are based is that of the self-endowed with transpersonal potential. Via this category the person refers to the system world, to the human, natural, and cosmic dimension. Peace circumscribes the character and feature of this relation. Peace means the balance between the corresponding relations and not a judgment about single actors.

Transrationality does not deny rationality. It also does not overcome it, but crosses through it and adds the aesthetic component that is always inherent in interpersonal relations but that has not been observed that attentively by modernity. In this manner it brings back a definitional element into the social sciences, which Enlightenment had to shelve

in order to be able to argue the great insight into the value of reason. After this is now fulfilled under the critical eye of postmodernity, and while respectfully recognizing this feat and the accomplishments that derived from it, the human being may again be perceived with all its senses and potential. This does not imply reversion into premodern bigotry, but a breakthrough into an aftermodern transrationality which (again) sees the human being as part of a species connected with nature and the cosmos. Transrationality understands that questions of the peaces and peacelessness are nothing but questions about potential disturbances within the social human system itself or within its reciprocal relation with the physiosphere, biosphere, or noosphere in which it is embedded. Peace and peacelessness can manifest in an ethical just as well as in an aesthetic manner. That depends on the point of view of the observer.

Human beings' relations among themselves and to their whole *Mitwelt* are at the center of interest for this kind of peace research. The challenge resides in the fact that the object, the topic of interpersonal relations, at the same time is their characteristic. If the topic, the problem of a relation, the conflict, were resolved in the modern manner, then in a transrational context this relation would not just lose its characteristic, but would cease to exist altogether. Conflict resolution in this sense would be relation resolution. Since within a system everything remains connected to everything else and relations cannot be abolished, conflict transformation in the sense of peace research is the only rational option. Relations and their energies are maintained and brought into a dynamic equilibrium. That is an endless and timeless process, because conflict is an inherent and dynamic characteristic of every relation and relations never end, not with physical death and not even if the actors believe that, want that, or disappear out of sight.

I have defined harmony, truth, justice, and security as cornerstones for transrational peaces and at the same time I have pointed out that a final verdict about their relation is impossible, because within the material world they are only perceptible according to the perspective as characteristics of relations. Statements about the ethics of relations are possible, yet incomplete. The claim to final judgments about the One Peace, as moral and modern approaches raise it, fails due to the preexisting contradictoriness. Rational statements about the characteristics of peaces are concrete, small, relational, and thus incomplete – or they are contradictory.

There are two reasons for this: one is the unavoidable perspectivity of the human observer who is always a part of the system world. This is

why it is impossible for her/him to see the whole system. The observation determines what is seen.

The second reason is the permanent movement of all parts of the system. We human beings may again perceive this dynamic of the system's perpetual reformation as prone to conflict, but that is a subjective perception that does not allow a statement about the system's overall condition. This is the system's energetic aspect that often may be felt to be threatening or cruel, but it is only that way if it is perceived as threatening and cruel. The perspective once more determines the findings.

Transpersonal concepts of peace put an end to all modern illusions about final certainties. They provide clarity about the oscillation of the peaces' ethics and aesthetics and point out the limited capacities for perceiving the topic and characteristics of the peaces. The tension between the reintegrated energetic and the rational moment prevents any final certainty.

Transrational peaces send the human being on a lifelong quest in search of the dynamic balance in which ethical moments may manifest as characteristic of aesthetic ones, and aesthetic moments as a topic of ethical ones. Harmony may be a function of security, security one of justice, justice one of truth, which in turn can only exist in harmony. All those figures are thus conditional upon each other. This apparently banal and yet so large word, is way too small. That is because all those concepts are only categories, auxiliary tools. The ethics and aesthetics of the transrational peaces are unspeakable, unheard, and omnipresent.

For societies that had to suffer through postmodernity, transrationality appears attractive and frightening at the same time. It is attractive because it fills that vacuity that has been left by the displacement of God in modernity and the loss of modern meaning in postmodernity. It allows for a spirituality that can be experienced and conveys social warmth. Concepts like love or harmony may again be used for defining the peaces. The described mountain lake returns as a topic. At the same time, transrationality threatens, as spiritual teachings of all times and directions have done, to unveil the constructed character of individuality within the manifest world, without filling up the vacuity that God and meaning have left with a new teleology.

I suppose that such definitions are a challenge for the better part of my audience. The unavoidable protest of voices inspired by morals or modernity already sounds in my ears. How shall one make peace on this basis? Do such theories not rob us, those who are animated by peace,

of the foundation, goal, and even more, the means of our task – peace work? I do not think so. It much rather appears to me that it saves us from the seductions of a one-sided morality, which after all the frustrations of prescriptively designed peace work in any case only holds a few still seriously under its sway. I see the turn toward the elicitive methods in peace work as an attractive adventure, to which I will devote the second volume of this trilogy.

7

Conclusion of the First Volume

I began my research project with the hypothesis that the interpretations of the concept of peace in different cultures in our world can be divided into two nonconflicting large families, namely the energetic and the moral concepts of peace. During the course of this work that assumption has proven to be on the one hand correct, yet on the other insufficient. The interpretations of peace have proven to be more complex and varied than I originally assumed. Modern concepts of peace integrate the structure of thought of the moral ones, yet interpret peace in an inverse manner. What Phobos is to the worldview of the one, Thanatos is to the other, and due to structural similarities, the two views face each other irreconcilably. This observation, which especially in the context of the North Atlantic history is empirically hardly surprising, suggests holding the two of them in different categories.

It could be argued that this differentiation would rather cater to diverse manifestations on the surface than the deeper efficacy. I agree with that. However, this volume deals with the interpretations of the concept of peace, and the conviction within the respective *frameworks* to be completely different from the other was felt to be so great that it would take quite some academic arrogance to ignore the mutual demarcation.

By differentiating the modern from the moral images of peace, I have opened the door for further distinctions along similar lines of division. That postmodernity would be inherent to modernity has been pointed out by many authors before me. If I apply this insight to the corresponding images of peace, a result emerges which not just points toward a critique and doubt about modernity's postulates, but also in a spectacular manner constructs a deviating interpretation of the peaces as plural. The postmodern praxiology of deconstruction serves this purpose, because postmodern peaces are finally constructed with the same

intellectual tool as modern ones – with reason. But while this reason tells some that there can be only One World Peace, others reach the conclusion that all that claim universal, uniform, permanent, and ultimate validity cannot be peace. For postmodernity, peace is a plurality, small, weak, relational, and flexible. John Paul Lederach says that the world would be colorless if blue were the only existing color. Blue only turns blue in relation to other colors and it is this tension that makes the world colorful.¹ I could be tempted to try and convince both points of view that within their framework of inconsistent completeness they are looking for the same thing. I have discussed this, yet finally reached the conviction that it would make more sense to give different labels to the contradictory traditions of thought. That is how a separate chapter about postmodern concepts of peace came into being.

When those too reached their limits because of their rootedness in reason, the energetic moment reappeared. It became obvious that it was not an argumentative circle that closed here, but that all the discussed concepts condensed toward an ever more complex terminology. That postmodern paths of thinking open out, among others, also toward energetic interpretations does not imply a turn backwards toward pre-modern or prerational interpretations of peace, but the breakthrough toward what I have called transrational and have introduced as a fifth category. I have reached the conclusion that prefixes play an important role in the clarification of that which is meant by peace. This is because I agree with popular opinion that the term “postmodernity” may have become a conventional term for that doubting mind that is an inherent part of modernity, but that it ultimately is misleading. Postmodernity does not come after modernity, but is a part of it. The prefix “post” suggests a chronological succession as it is inherent in modern traditions of thought.

The transrational approach tries to move away from this. It does not introduce itself as a better or superior concept that would overcome modernity, but as a perspective that integrates it into a greater and broader concept, which, while respecting it, nevertheless goes beyond it. The transrational approach thus offers a more encompassing and differentiated interpretation of the concept of peace. It is not in contradiction to the other concepts. It recollects them and lifts them onto a level in which the apparent contradictions largely neutralize each other. Transrational peace recognizes plurality within unity and unity within plurality.

Transrational does not mean postrational – here I get to a point of division: while the linear succession of societal time is a constituent

characteristic of the modern concepts of peace in their dependency on progress, growth, justice, and security, from a transrational perspective this vectoral perception of time is recognized as a limiting construct.

Human senses perceive processes and effects in which a previous and an after exists. Contrary to the absoluteness of such a chronosophy within the mechanistic worldview, transrational concepts of peace perceive the inextricable connection between the observer and the event. Just like in quantum physics it is the observation that influences the observed, because the observer herself/himself is a part of the observed system. The procession of time is perceived, yet understood as relative. In other words, modern images of peace refer to identities that are based on past experiences just as well as on fears and hopes that relate to the future. The present therefore turns into a kind of corridor between past and future that is of practically no importance. For modernity, the present is between the past reason and the future goal.

A transrational understanding of peace recognizes the constructedness of such a chronosophy and does not focus on the progression of time but on its depth, as the energetic images do. Also this is no new thought. In Greek mythology, Chronos and Kairos face each other as symbols of quantity and quality, of progression and depth of time. Jean-Jacques Rousseau² pointed out that it is not the person who has counted the most years that has lived the most, but the one who has felt her/his life the most. Immanuel Wallerstein brought this thought into the social sciences.³

In this sense transrational concepts of peace, which are directed toward Kairos toward the quality, depth, and harmony of the lived moment, integrate all the other concepts and are themselves contained in them, but are not visible in their wholeness from the corresponding perspectives. That is why my text may also exhibit a temporal structure that enables communication between me and my audience. But I do not see the phenomena like a clockwork procession, but as feedback between the earlier and the later, so that everything at bottom is already contained in everything else. The chronology results from my reduced perspective as narrator. It is not about an objective development of quality but about the processes of perception on my horizon of experience. In the sense of Karl Jaspers I take my approach to history to be a struggle. History concerns me and that which concerns me enlarges itself constantly. What concerns me is a present question of my being. History becomes ever more present the less it is reduced to the pure portrayal of what has been.⁴

Reconciliation with the energetic peace can follow from this, a growing attention for the possibilities and perspectives of an image of peace that is more comprehensive than that offered by the schools and patterns of thought of Idealism and Realism. My research interest is also oriented toward broadening the spectrum of venues of actions fostering peaces.

Energetic concepts of peace perceive human existence as embedded in the All-Oneness of all being and assume a connectivity of all with all. That is why peace to them means the mutual harmony of all perceptible phenomena. In their mature form in the frame of the Great Triad, they understand the balance of the cosmic, natural, and societal energies and use a symbolic, often magic language for their interpretation. The task of human existence lies in the search for dynamic balance, the harmony of all being in the "storm of the cosmic breath." Societal peaces oscillate in the relations of individuals and communities. They constantly have to be defined and found anew.

Moral images of peace perceive the energetic moment in the form of a creator God standing outside of the world, a God who gives life and together with it the potential for peace. Since this God manifests only rarely, they need experts for the interpretation of His peace, experts who take over this task for society. The narrations are mostly mythic and the peaces are split between the eternal divine peace and the temporal one of mundane existence. The assumption of a creator God allows them to promise a coming hermetic and exclusive peace as the only true, beautiful, and good. That is why they are concerned about the security of the just. Since the mundane peace is perceived as a precursor to the eternal peace in God, all peaces of the persona consisting of body, mind, and soul theoretically are defined via the direct relation to Him. In practice this is subject to the priesthood's verdict about the quality of this relation.

Modern images of peace are based on a mechanistic understanding of the world that evicts God and supposes reason in His place. Since reason is not manifest from the beginning, modernity also needs a cast of experts that decide for the broad masses about what is reasonable. Structurally those images do not differ significantly from the moral ones; they only narrate the peaces in a rational manner. This means that all their assumptions, including those about interpersonal relations, are founded on the manifest world. The human being is defined as a perceiving subject and as being capable of reason, able to emancipate its secular relations from the abstract and invisible God. Since final decisions about the ultimate truth are assumed to be residing above the

world, justice and security remain crucial concerns. Rational explanations are available for this.

Postmodern images of peace doubt the existence of this ultimate Truth and declare God to be dead. The human being as a perceiving subject is thereby thrown back onto herself/himself and her/his own individual and collective relations within a singularly existing and perceptible world. The Great Triad no longer consists of society, *kósmos*, and nature, the persona no longer of body, mind, and soul, but of ego, superego, and id. The peaces turn into a question of how the rational ego deals with the ethical superego and the aesthetic wants of the id. Rationality unites with relationality. Truth, security, and justice are recognized as constructs and peace thus becomes multiform and in need of definition within each context.

Transrational peaces recognize the limitedness of a material understanding of the world and surpass modernity's image of the human being by rationally acknowledging the energetic nature of the human species. They enlarge the ethical and aesthetic moment of existence beyond the limits of the modern persona and into transpersonality and thereby gain the energetic without abandoning the rational. Because the individual experiences collective energy, conscious transpersonal harmony turns into a synonym for peace. Its narration is both rational and energetic, without being magic or mythic. Within the unmodern knowledge about the inseparable All-Oneness of existence, the peaces' aesthetics to them is nothing but their ethics. Justice and security are material aspects of the peaces, truth and harmony their dynamic ones. They integrate all the other manifestation of the peaces, preserve their contents, neutralize their one-sidedness and lift them onto a rational-energetic level.

I close this first volume with the insight that my original hypothesis about the two great families of peace concepts was just as correct as it was incomplete. The latter is due to the fact that such large families can be constructed at will, so that two is not the only possible number. Following the criteria of my research interest I have distinguished five such large families, which at first sight appear to be separated from each other, yet on a closer look are all connected in a nonhierarchical and synchronous form. What changes is not the substance of that which is called the peaces, but the image made thereof, and their embedding into social systems and their rituals. Seen this way, every interpretation of peace is contained within every other, but it is not perceptible from every perspective.

Due to the limitations in human perception each respective understanding of peace always appears coherent and complete, which is why we deem it to be natural and necessary. One result of the current study could be that it is exactly that – simultaneously coherent and complete – which peace can never be. Also, if human beings within a certain framework agree to a formula that appears coherent and complete, which is indispensable for living together, this nevertheless remains a small peace of limited reach. Human beings are not capable of anything else. This insight and the consciousness about the limitedness are crucial if this small peace is not to turn hermetic, powerful, stubborn, perpetual, and thus great and prone to violence. Therefore, my five families are five only because I defined them in this manner. If somebody were to apply different criteria, another number would result. This is a matter of convention.

The number two in my initial hypothesis was nevertheless not wrong. It can, however, not be related to real basic categories of the peaces, as I assumed at the beginning, but to the manifestations that oscillate between ethics and aesthetics. What I initially called energetic signifies the aesthetics of the peaces, which is no exclusive characteristic of energetic, postmodern, or transrational images of peace, of magic or mythic cosmovisions, or of pre- or transrational spirituality, even if others have little regard for them or ignore them. What I initially called moral, however, is the ethics of the peaces. Also it is no characteristic exclusive to moral or modern images of peace, rationality, or worldliness.

Peaces are always ethical and aesthetic at the same time. They circumscribe the relation between the real-existing. Everything that has stepped forth out of the All-One – that exists in the proper sense of the word – is at the same time matter and energy. The assumption that these two images do not conflict is thus accurate, because it is about different manifestations of one and the same relation. Whether I perceive it as one or the other, depends only on my perspective. Therefore it is the observation itself that determines which kind of peaces, if any peace at all, is perceived, whether peaces are. The metaphorical mountain lake is in final consequence an inner one. It depends on the observer whether she/he perceives it. Everything else is parable.

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Quoted after Rosenberg et al. (1991, p. 283).
2. Magnis-Suseno (1989, pp. 61ff.).
3. Lyotard (1984).
4. Reprinted in German, English, and Spanish in Dietrich et al. (2006).
5. In this manner, for example, Eliade (1976, pp. 69–83).
6. The Germanic term *fridu*, from which the contemporary German word *Frieden* derives, which in its current connotations is charged with the meanings of *pax*, originally meant something very different. This will be the subject of my investigation.
7. Douglas-Klotz (2001, pp. 1–5).
8. In his unpublished memoirs, my father addressed this core question of his life extensively.
9. Very well documented in Kreuzer and Haller (1982, pp. 12ff.).
10. Wittgenstein, 2005 proposition 7.
11. Perls (1969, p. 14).
12. Habermas (1976).
13. “Academic *Karrier*” would be a description with which I could identify, in view of all the time of my life I have spent in train carriages, busses, or cars – all *Karren* [carts] in the larger sense of the word. Yet this would be an unnecessary provocation for all those for whom the term carries a different emotional connotation.
14. Wittgenstein (2005, proposition 5.6).
15. Ellis (2000).
16. Since 1994 there has been a professional journal in the German-speaking area with this focus, the *Fachzeitschrift Transpersonale Psychologie und Psychotherapie – Wissenschaft des Bewusstseins*.
17. 1930 to 2000. Under his civil name, Richard Dorin Shoulders, known as the founder of dehypnotherapy, which emerged out of the approaches of Gestalt therapy and holotropic breathing. It is related to the techniques of neurolinguistic programming and neurolinguistic psychotherapy.
18. Kabbal (2006).
19. Eminent are Lederach (1995, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005).

2 Energetic Interpretations of Peace

1. Quoted in German after Das (2000, p. 34) Translation NK.
2. I follow the layering of Hartmann (1950). His approach is discussed extensively in Gloy (1996, pp. 168ff.) and in Wilber (2000, pp. 17ff.)
3. Animalistic dramas occurring at the shores and in the depth of real mountain lakes on closer observation could hardly be perceived as peaceful. Yet

here we are not concerned with matters of fact, but only with a feeling triggered by an image.

4. Quoted after the translation by Swami Veda Bharati (1986, pp. 93–121). The author also gives an extensive and convincing interpretation of the sentences.
5. Laszlo (1987, p. 9).
6. This is my (more strongly oriented on yogic chakra-psychology and thus slightly modified) reading of Maslow's pyramid of needs (Maslow, 1943, pp. 370–96, and 1954).
7. Boulding (2000), Daly (1990), Eisler (1987), Sanday (1981), Spretnak (1981), Vélez Saldarriaga (1999), Voss (1988), Walker (1983), Wolf (1994), and Campbell (1959–68).
8. Despite his harsh critique of the myth of matriarchy, even Wesel cannot avoid this result (Wesel, 1980, p. 48).
9. Göttner-Abendroth (1988, p. 48).
10. According to Göttner-Abendroth four conditions have to be fulfilled in order to be able to speak of matriarchy: (1) on the religious level, a mythology of an Earth Goddess or Moon Goddess; (2) on the ritual level, celebrations of seasonal cycles of initiation; (3) on the societal level, mother right and female rule and (4) on the economic level, gardening or agriculture and collective ownership by the clan (Göttner-Abendroth, 1995, p. 6).
11. Göttner-Abendroth (1988, p. 54). Translated from the German by NK.
12. The hypothesis of matriarchy has aroused much protest, critique, and modifications within the nomenclature. Those, however, are of no further importance for the question I pose. The excitement might have reached its temporary culmination in Cynthia Eller's polemic work, which in turn has been fiercely attacked for its own methodological shortcomings (Eller, 2000).
13. Uhlig (1998, pp. 38–48).
14. Wilber (1996b, p. 130).
15. Wilber (1996b, p. 156).
16. Eliade (1976, p. 178).
17. Galimberti (2005, p. 75).
18. Gimbutas (1982).
19. Within feminist literature the ascription of the pure aspect of fertility to the Great Mother is often rejected as a patriarchal reading. The corresponding authors interpret the Great Goddess as an expression of a female sexuality which is not yet oppressed by patriarchy and thus free. The connection between female sexuality and fertility would hence be the beginning of male oppression of women. See for example Voss (1988). From the perspective of peace research this argument is not very convincing. Even the idea of peace out of fertility would therefore suggest patriarchal intellectual violence. The fundamental topic of our *Dasein*, emergence, and passing away is too important for peace research to be reduced to a pure question of domination.
20. Wilber (1996b, pp. 126 and 142).
21. Neumann (1973).
22. Mellaart (1962) and Uhlmann (2008). Uhlig has also written extensively on this topic (1998, pp. 48–56).

23. Koppe (2001, p. 63).
24. Daniélou is emphatic on this subject (1984, pp. 77ff.).
25. Göttner-Abendroth (1988, pp. 97–102).
26. Voss (1988, pp. 58–60).
27. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 32).
28. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 28).
29. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 88).
30. Etymologically the word as such derives from the goddess Hera and it is found, for example, in the mythos of Heracles, the son/lover of Hera, who acts to her glory.
31. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 12).
32. Arinna is the astral form of the earth goddess Kubaba.
33. Camphausen (1999, p. 68).
34. All these aspects of the Great Whore, together with the necessary references, are described in detail in Walker (1983).
35. Kaller-Dietrich (2004, p. 104).
36. Uhlig (1998, p. 73). Prostitute (from *pro-stituere*, to expose) is today the official term for whore. Considering the above comments, this could be understood to mean that the commodifying offering of the body is, in patriarchal societies, rather more tolerated than the original attitude of the whore, which still resonates in colloquial language.
37. Douglas-Klotz (2001, p. 84).
38. *Alaha* is the Aramaic word for the divine, the holy union, the universe, the utmost force, the One without opposite.
39. *Allat* or *elat* in the Middle East are further denominations for *alaha*. The Arabic term *Allah* for the divine or God is closely related to it and it is not only used by Muslims.
40. Douglas-Klotz (2001, p. 28).
41. Douglas-Klotz (2001, p. 84).
42. *Bija* are monosyllabic seed-mantras which are especially used during meditations or ceremonies and affect the corresponding energy centers.
43. Composed of the Sanskrit root syllables *man* for thinking, consciousness or mind and *tra(m)* for activity or vehicle.
44. Riccabona (2004, pp. 2f.).
45. Uhlig (1998, p. 178).
46. Riccabona (2004, pp. 8–11).
47. The term *harem* originally meant the corresponding sector in the temple. The word for hour, *hora*, similarly comes from the dance of the hours by the *horai*, the Egyptian temple whores. Also the term *heresy* derives therefrom.
48. This can be retraced in the famous narration about the merchants' eviction from the market by Jesus in John: 2–23, in which the dove appears as sacrificial animal, but not as a symbol of sexuality.
49. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 78).
50. Walker (1983, pp. 746–51).
51. Walker (1983, pp. 374 and 819ff.).
52. For example, in the poetry of the Turkish master Yunus Emre. Quoted in Makowski (1997, p. 167). Extensive writing on this appears in Chebel (1995, pp. 196–7).
53. Evans (1931, p. 41).

54. A rather late testimony to that is the story of Messalina, wife of Emperor Claudius in Imperial Rome, which official historiography has turned into a simple moral judgment of Messalina as queen and whore.
55. Wilber (2000, pp. 163 and 392–400) with reference to Sanday (1981) and Chafetz (1984).
56. Shaw (1995, p. 203).
57. We also see the scapegoat pattern in the work of the philosopher of religion René Girard, which, due to its anthropological pessimism, appears to me to be of limited use for peace research. Of many other texts, Girard (1986) is a good example.
58. Daniélou (1984, pp. 175ff.).
59. Wilber (1996b, p. 144).
60. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 97). See also Wilber (1996b, p. 138). And for an extensive discussion on this topic, see the chapter about *transrational* interpretations of peace discussed within the current book.
61. Wilber (1996b, p. 360).
62. This refers to section 6.3 in this volume, in which the peaces out of harmony are once more given sustained attention.
63. Göttner-Abendroth (1988, p. 100).
64. Uhlig (1998, p. 56).
65. Kramer (1963, pp. 485–527).
66. Voss (1990).
67. Daniélou (1984, p. 148).
68. Swami Veda Bharati (1986, pp. 28–29) with reference to the interpretation of the Sankhya school.
69. Original quote in German in Uhlig (1998, p. 28).
70. Kalachakra for World Peace (2006).
71. Eliade (1976, p. 181).
72. Subtle centers of energy which can be imagined as rotating wheels. Usually, seven such chakras are mentioned, ranging from the root chakra to the crown chakra. I will return to this in section 6.2.
73. Uhlig (1998, p. 34).
74. Das (2000, p. 179).
75. Camphausen (1999, pp. 64–70). More on this in section 4.1.
76. Lekshe Tsomo, Karma (2011, p. 230).
77. Lama Thubten Yeshe (1987).
78. Only one of those *Baalim*, Yahweh, finally overcame the Great Goddess and suppressed his male colleagues. With this male form of monotheism a completely new image of peace emerged (Walker, 1983, pp. 82–8; Weiler 1984, pp. 92 ff.).
79. Uhlig (1998, pp. 68–75).
80. Göttner Abendroth (1995, pp. 122–3). This author adds further to the quoted scheme, with “abstract principles with no human personification” and “empty Nirvana” as its highest levels. To me this appears so polemic and misleading that I do not adopt it from this otherwise insightful and helpful scheme. I know of no personified father god that would have dissolved into abstract principles. Göttner-Abendroth also does not name an example. Perhaps she means the Enlightenment which has turned God into reason, but she does not say so. In her context it is in any case contradictory

since the almighty Father God is the strongest expression of a moralizing patriarchy with an ultimate concept of truth outside of the manifest world. Abstract principles without personification and Nirvana in Buddhism do not arise along this scheme.

81. Quoted after Walker (1983, p. 453).
82. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 50).
83. Galimberti (2005, p. 76).
84. For an extensive discussion of this topic see Walker (1983, pp. 453–6 and 748–55).
85. The diametrically opposed assessments and interpretations of Wesel and Göttner-Abendroth may be used as an example. Wesel simply denies the existence of matriarchy and Göttner-Abendroth, on the basis of the same sources, deems its existence to be proven.
86. Later, as god of war, he became the son of Jupiter, king of the gods, and his wife was Juno. Since then he was counted among the most important Roman deities and was considered an ancestor of the Roman people and father of Rome's legendary founders, Romulus and Remus.
87. Walker (1983, pp. 597–8).
88. Simon (1988, pp. 71–7).
89. Walker (1983, pp. 1043–4).
90. Dinkler (1973, pp. 22–3).
91. Mars/Venus (2006).
92. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. 105).
93. Passed down by the Romans as Nerthus.
94. Golther (2003, pp. 191ff.).
95. Golther (2003, pp. 337ff.).
96. This is usually considered to be the time span between AD 517 and 1066.
97. Also Syr (the Hog), Gefn (the Giver), Frau (Woman), Härn or Hörn (the Holy Whore), Gerd (Mother Earth), and Lofn (Love). On the archaic symbolism of the hog in the cult of the Great Goddess, see Voss's extensive, though not always convincing, treatment of the subject (1988, pp. 69–242).
98. Also Freir, Fro, Frö.
99. Walker (1983, pp. 324–5).
100. Walker (1983, pp. 457–8).
101. Little-wound (2008).
102. Uhlig (1998, pp. 20–34).
103. That it was just Apollo who divided the globular human is also discussed in the chapter on postmodernity.
104. Plato (2010).
105. Daniélou (1984, p. 64).
106. Daniélou (1984, p. 67).
107. The University of North Carolina (2006).
108. The word *enthusiasm* is derived from this ecstatic doing. It literally means to have the god within oneself.
109. First chapter, 89, 24–9, quoted from Daniélou (1984, p. 210).
110. Schubart (2001, pp. 29ff.).
111. Daniélou (1984, pp. 76–7, 157, 199, and 214). Similarly Kaller-Dietrich (2004, p. 104) and Campbell (1997, p. 90).
112. Daniélou (1984, p. 212).

113. Wimmer (2004, p. 189). Compare here the contradiction with Göttner-Abendroth's hypothesis. The concept of the divine in Taoism does not rest on the deification of a Heros. A distinctively patriarchal structure cannot be constructed on this basis.
114. Cooper (1977, p. 87).
115. On this subject see also section 6.2 about the *transpersonal* understanding of peace.
116. Derived from: down, cold, backward, downwards, contraction, descent, water, dark, matter, standstill, passive, reality, and world.
117. Derived from: up, warm, forward, upwards, expansion, rising, fire, light, energy, movement, active, ideal, and spirit.
118. Capra (1989, p. 173).
119. Jaspers (1955, p. 150). Translated from the German by NK.
120. Riccabona (2004, pp. 8–11).
121. Another meaning stems from the kitchen and means the flavorsome composition of ingredients for a dish.
122. Kam-por (2011, pp. 244–7).
123. Kam-por (2011, p. 247).
124. Eliade (1976, p. 74).
125. Wimmer (2004, p. 189).
126. Wimmer (2004, p. 190).
127. Cooper (1977, p. 77).
128. Béky (1972, p. 88). Translated from the German by NK.
129. Watzlawik (1988) works through this argument in an equally convincing and entertaining manner.
130. Cooper (1977, pp. 77–87).
131. Wimmer (2004, p. 86).
132. Gandhi (1968), Parekh (1997), and Richards (1992).
133. Whenever I use this deliberately chosen vague term, I mean the commonalities of the Vedanta schools with the Samkhya philosophy and with all directions of Buddhism present in India. Whenever I subsequently relate to a specific teaching, this will be stated separately in each case.
134. For an extensive discussion on this topic see section 6.2 on transpersonal peaces.
135. *Brahman* is not to be confused with the younger god *Brahma*.
136. I follow the opinion of the Advaita-Vedanta after Shankara. Other schools of thought also hold a contrary position to everything that is being said here.
137. Zettel (2006).
138. Sri Aurobindo (1960, p. 119).
139. Swami Veda Bharati (1986, pp. 29–30).
140. On this point the ascetic Indian traditions differ substantially from the tantric ones, although they share many mythic aspects, images, and practices.
141. Sharma (2003, p. 384).
142. *Nāstika* implies the denial of the transcendent world and in the Indian context, the rejection of the authority of the Vedas (Zahner, 1970, p. 70; Wimmer, 2004, pp. 212ff.).
143. Sharma (1939, p. 10).

144. In the German original, published in 2008, follows from here an extensive list of examples of the Great Triad in Asian, African, American, and Australian cultures. Most of them have been published in the meanwhile in Dietrich et al. (2011). Therefore I do not repeat them here.
145. Wittgenstein (2005, proposition 5.633): "*Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? You say that this case is altogether like that of the eye and the field of sight. But you do not really see the eye. And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye.*"
146. He is supposed to have lived in the second century CE and is considered the founder of Mahāyāna-Buddhism.
147. Nietzsche (1967, p. 104).
148. Wilber (2000).
149. Habermas (1976).
150. Engels (1995).
151. Rostow (1960).
152. Most empathically in Wilber (1996b, pp. 330–7). His fixation also appears questionable to me because he himself points out in his epitaph on Idealism at the end of his main work how misleading Hegel's thinking can be. Over long stretches of the same book, this insight is not discernible (Wilber, 2000, pp. 536–7).
153. Habermas (1976, pp. 147f.).
154. For more on this topic see Chapter 3.
155. Wilber (2000, p. 261). He repeats the same argument more extensively in Wilber (1996b, pp. 188 ff.).
156. The term was introduced into the political debate in 1949 by Harry Truman and experienced an enormous political boom in the second half of the twentieth century.

3 Moral Interpretations of Peace

1. Jaspers (1955, p. 151). Translated from the German by NK.
2. Wilber (2000, pp. 210ff.).
3. Jaspers (1955, pp. 14–31). Joseph Campbell calls the same concept "Great Reversal" (Campbell, 1962). I follow Jaspers' terminology.
4. Jaspers (1955, pp. 15–16).
5. Koppe (2001, pp. 61ff.).
6. Jaspers (1955, p. 13). Translated from the German by NK.
7. Dietrich (2006, pp. 282–305).
8. Ki-Zerbo (1981).
9. Engels (1995).
10. Göttner-Abendroth (1988, pp. 56–61).
11. Sigrist (1979).
12. Chafetz (1984) argues in a very similar manner.
13. Jaspers (1955, pp. 62–3).
14. Wilber (1996b, p. 159).
15. Wilber (1996b, p. 166).
16. For an impressive treatment of this topic, see Sorgo (1997, pp. 12–14).
17. This is a central point of discussion in Chapter 6, which deals with transnational peaces.

18. * 1923.
19. At the University of Innsbruck's faculty for Theology, René Girard is held in high esteem and he is discussed most controversially at the Research Platform World Order-Religion-Violence. Also see Palaver et al. (2007).
20. Voss (1988, pp. 73–84).
21. Walker (1983, pp. 86 and 472).
22. Riccabona (2004, p. 11).
23. Weber (1967).
24. Assmann (2006).
25. An opinion which continued to be disputed in twentieth-century Europe.
26. Huber and Reuter (1990, p. 35).
27. Koppe (2001, pp. 70–1).
28. Huber and Reuter (1990, p. 35). Translated from the German by NK.
29. It is also the basis for the Aramaic *shalim* and the Assyrian *shlomo*.
30. Riccabona (2004, p. 11).
31. Tunger-Zanetti (2008).
32. Ellis (2011, p. 89).
33. Friedli (1981, p. 57).
34. 3 Moses 26: 3–7. For an extensive commentary see Schmid (1971, pp. 57–8).
35. Ellis (2011, p. 89).
36. Isaiah 32: 17.
37. Schwager (1986, p. 11).
38. Isaiah 11: 1.
39. Isaiah 2: 2–4.
40. Maes and Schmitt (2004, p. 191).
41. Schwager (1986, p. 13).
42. Assmann (2006). This argument dates back to the last complete work of Sigmund Freud, published for the first time in 1938 as *Moses, sein Volk und die monotheistische Religion* [*Moses and Monotheism*]. In reference to it see Maciejewski (2002). The topic has already been dealt with earlier in Daniélou (1984, pp. 226–35).
43. Koppe (2001, pp. 65–72).
44. From 1793 to 1750 BCE.
45. Stausberg (2008).
46. Douglas-Klotz (2001, p. 132).
47. ...and also of Mithras rising to become a sun god.
48. Jaspers (1955, p. 31). In this passage he emphatically denies the existence of an ultimate truth.
49. Here I follow Salamun (2006, unpublished).
50. This is the central message of Douglas-Klotz (2001).
51. Sharma (2003, p. 49).
52. Dundas (2002).
53. Daniélou (1984, p. 28).
54. Eliade (1976, p. 158).
55. These are very similar to the older Hindu *gunas*, which tie the body in the apparent world of *maya*: *sattva* (vanity), *raja* (envy, jealousy), *tamas* (ignorance). Das (2000, pp. 67–80).
56. Schumann (1995, p. 58).

57. Golzio (1998, pp. 14–26).
58. Brucker and Sohns (2003, pp. 26ff.).
59. Gäng (2002, pp. 83–6); Keown (2001, p. 71).
60. Vessantara (1999, pp. 71–2).
61. Golzio (1998, p. 19).
62. Realm of the gods and demigods, realm of the humans, realm of the hungry ghosts, realm of the beings of hell, realm of animals. Brucker and Sohns (2003, pp. 29f.).
63. Vessantara (2003, p. 8).
64. Golzio (1998, pp. 44–5).
65. Gäng (2002, p. 151). Translated from the German by NK.
66. Vessantara (2003, pp. 17–18).
67. Batchelor (2003, pp. 29–30).
68. Koppe (2001, pp. 80–4).
69. Wimmer (2004, pp. 196–7).
70. Golzio (1998, pp. 60–1).
71. Sun and Griffith (1993).
72. Schleichert (1990).
73. In literature, Xun Kuang is sometimes also called Xunzi, like his book.
74. Wimmer (2004, pp. 197–9).
75. Jaspers (1955, p. 68). Translated from the German by NK.
76. Herodotus (1998).
77. Naval power.
78. For the translation of the legend see Schwab (1972, pp. 28–30).
79. Muñoz and Molina Rueda (1998) and Weiler (1995).
80. Geyer (1995, p. 9).
81. Subsequently the name of the goddess shall be rendered as Pax, and *pax* as the substantial meaning of the term.
82. Douglas-Klotz (2001, pp. 22–39).
83. Ulrich (2004, p. 91).
84. Koppe (2001, p. 93).
85. Plato (2000, p. 138).
86. Fromm (2007, pp. 89–90).
87. Ricken (1988, pp. 1–16).
88. Aristotle (2009).
89. Ricken (1988, p. 24).
90. Aristotle, Politics VII 15, 1334a 20–22. English version quoted after Aristotle (2010).
91. Koppe (2001, pp. 99–102).
92. Galimberti (2005, p. 85).
93. Letter to the Romans 13: 1 and 13: 2.
94. This is the central message of Douglas-Klotz (2001).
95. Wilber (2001) dedicates a whole volume to this topic. This is, however, in my opinion an only partially successful remake of the more thoroughly elaborated classic (Wilber, 2000, pp. 329–41) which appeared for the first time in 1995, two years earlier than *The Eye of Spirit*.
96. Heinzmann (1998, p. 26). Translated from the German by NK.
97. Whitehead (1957), quoted after Wilber (2000, pp. 329–41).

98. Lovejoy (1964, p. 45).
99. Wilber here refers to Socrates and emphasizes that Freud, in his image of Eros and Thanatos, was not able to dissolve the duality. Wilber (2000, p. 340).
100. Pages 205–70.
101. Schellenbaum (2004, p. 44).
102. Ohlig and Puin (2005).
103. Köbler (2008, p. 469).
104. A classic on this topic is Krippendorff (1985).
105. Illich (2006, pp. 173–4).
106. Illich (2006, p. 175).
107. 106–43 BCE.
108. Botermann (1987, p. 20). Translated from the German: “normalsinnige Menschen.”
109. Forschner (1988, pp. 8–17).
110. Huber and Reuter (1990, pp. 31–4).
111. 354–430 CE.
112. Breier (1992, pp. 70 ff.).
113. Dinkler (1973, p. 8).
114. Garber et al. (2001).
115. Koppe (2001, p. 113).
116. Augustine (2009).
117. Koppe (2001, p. 114).
118. 340–397 CE.
119. Rufin (1991).
120. Kluge (1989, p. 230).
121. Eliade (1976, pp. 76ff. and 178ff.). Gebelein (1996) is emphatic on this point.
122. Uhlig (1998, pp. 227ff. and 239).
123. Uhlig (1998, p. 232).
124. Kluge (1989, p. 232).
125. Hagenlocher (1992).
126. Ohler (1997, p. 13); Kluge (1989, p. 413).
127. Kluge (1989, p. 207).
128. Ohler (1997, p. 303).
129. Illich (2006, p. 179).
130. Koppe (2001, pp. 115–30).
131. Koppe (2001, p. 122).
132. 1225–1275 CE.
133. Ohler (1997, p. 67).
134. Koppe (2001, pp. 140–1).
135. Beestermöller (1990, p. 21).
136. 1275–1343.
137. 1275–1350.
138. 1265–1321.
139. 1250–1322.
140. Those drafts are discussed by Koppe (2001, pp. 137–58). Since an extensive description of these ideas would not be relevant for the aims of this work, I refer the reader to him.

141. The connection between a so-called crime and the authority of the state is a central topic of Hobsbawm's classic, *Bandits* (2000).
142. Norbert Elias, the most frequently quoted authority on civilization-oriented peace research in the twentieth century, was aware of this dilemma and was in this respect much more skeptical than many of those who invoke him. Elias (1988, pp. 178–81).
143. Ohler (1997, p. 62).
144. Balibar and Wallerstein (1992).
145. 1466–1536.
146. Steinmann (2001). English translation quoted from Erasmus (2009).
147. Raumer (1953).
148. Polanyi (1995, pp. 113–24).
149. Illich (2006, p. 179).
150. Ellis (2011, pp. 89–90).
151. Schnübbe (1992, p. 9).
152. Haneef (2011, pp. 123–6).
153. Lewis (2002, p. 134).
154. Douglas-Klotz (2001, p. 169).
155. Haneef (2011, p. 126).
156. Haneef (2011, p. 133).
157. Koppe (2001, pp. 130–6).
158. Both functionally loaned from the Greek Eirene.
159. Haneef (2011, pp. 136–8).
160. Passed down by Abu Said in the Hadith collection of Tirmidhi. Quoted in German from the *Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich* (2008).
161. Hofmann (1992, pp. 191f.).
162. For an extensive treatment of this see Koppe (2001, pp. 130–6) and Ohler (1997, pp. 59–81).
163. The German original version of this book, published in 2008, provides an extensive list of examples of peace out of hospitality in Asian, African, and American cultures. In the meanwhile most of them have been published in Dietrich et al (2011). I do not repeat them here.

4 Modern Interpretations of Peace

1. Wilber (2000, p. 420).
2. Gebelein (1996, p. 17).
3. Stefan George, quoted in Gebelein (1996, p. 382).
4. 1181–1226.
5. Huber and Reuter (1990, p. 59).
6. Makowski (1997, p. 10).
7. Francis of Assisi (2009).
8. Quoted in Ohler (1997, p. 13); Kluge (1989, pp. 76–7).
9. Koppe (2001, p. 144).
10. 1515–1582.
11. Ökumenisches Heiligenlexikon (2007).
12. Vogelsang (1979).

13. For an extensive discussion on this topic see Wilber (2000, pp. 301–9).
14. Teresa de Ávila (2007).
15. Makowski (1997, p. 181).
16. Rehman (2011, pp. 151–2).
17. Sheikhalaslamzadeh (2007, p. 70).
18. Arabic: *sufi ibn ul waqt*. Sheikhalaslamzadeh (2007, p. 70).
19. Jalal ad-Din Rumi, quoted in Tolle (2004, p. 53).
20. Said et al (2001).
21. Makowski (1997, pp. 11–12).
22. I thank Alev Cakir for suggesting this topic.
23. Shankland (2003, p. 1).
24. For more information on the different directions see Gülcicek (1996).
25. Quoted in German in Makowski (1997, p. 27) Translation NK.
26. Zeidan (2007).
27. Almaas (1998, p. 34).
28. Esteva (1995, p. 26).
29. Todorov (1985, p. 151). See the extensive section on the importance of language for the perception of peace in section 5.4.
30. Heine (1992, pp. 61–71); Kienitz (1992, pp. 37–45).
31. 1469–1527.
32. Hibbert (1992, pp. 86–95).
33. Koppe (2001, p. 150).
34. Illich (1982) and Knolle (1992) have written extensively on this topic. According to newer studies “only” two-thirds of the victims are supposed to have been women. Furthermore, all societal strata were affected by this prosecution, so that the stereotypical narration of the old, wise herb woman as “witch” cannot be taken by itself alone. That notwithstanding, the destruction of traditional knowledge was one of the many consequences of this fury.
35. For ground-breaking work on this topic see Duden (1990).
36. 1452–1498.
37. This is the central hypothesis in the classic text by Gronemeyer (1996).
38. O’Gorman (1958).
39. 1478–1535.
40. 1568–1639.
41. 1561–1626.
42. 1590–1648.
43. 1560–1641.
44. Koppe (2001, pp. 153–8).
45. Braudel (1992, pp. 12–21).
46. Weber (1922, p. 647).
47. Mann (1988, p. 130).
48. For example, Krippendorff (1986) and Wolf (1991, p. 189).
49. Bitterli (1989, pp. 52–70).
50. The Muslim population that had remained in Spain after the *Reconquista*.
51. 1480–1546.
52. Runde (2007).
53. Knolle (1992, p. 80). Translated from the German by NK.

54. Neuhold and Scheurer (1983, p. 13). Translated from the German by NK.
55. Krippendorff (1986, p. 28). Translated from the German by NK.
56. Krippendorff (1986, p. 25).
57. Krippendorff (1986, pp. 25–6).
58. Czempel (1990, p. 7). Translated from the German by NK.
59. 1588–1679.
60. Hobbes (1998b). The famous sentence “*homo homini lupus, homo homini deus*” is found in the book’s dedication to William Cavendish and not in *Leviathan*, as it is often claimed.
61. Hobbes (1998a).
62. Hüning (2005).
63. Münkler (1993).
64. Freud (1953, pp. 67–71).
65. Foucault (2003).
66. Morgenthau (1948).
67. Waltz (1979).
68. 1583–1645.
69. Grotius (2006).
70. Meder (2005, p. 243).
71. Huber and Reuter (1990, pp. 80–2).
72. 1632–1704.
73. Thiel (1990).
74. 1723–1790.
75. Smith (2007).
76. 1772 to 1823.
77. Ricardo (2007).
78. Fromm (2007, p. 3).
79. Fromm (2007, pp. 92–3).
80. Koppe (2001, pp. 165–8).
81. 1658 to 1743.
82. 1712 to 1778.
83. Here I mainly refer to Rousseau (1984).
84. Fetscher (1975).
85. Rousseau (2009).
86. Rousseau (1968).
87. 1724 to 1804.
88. Kant (1982, pp. 193–251).
89. Schweppenhäuser (1996, p. 22). Translated from the German by NK.
90. Hackel (2000, p. 257).
91. Extensive discussion of this topic is found in Beutin (1996).
92. This argument became a central and carefully elaborated thought with Krippendorff (1985).
93. 1869 to 1755.
94. Extensive discussion of this topic is found in Batscha and Saage (1979).
95. Cavallar (1992, p. 227).
96. Höffe (2001, p. 208).
97. Beutin (1996, p. 29).
98. Schweitzer (1955, pp. 12–13).
99. Habermas (1996).

100. * 1940. His later and best-known works in this direction can be found in the bibliography.
101. 1818 to 1883.
102. Marx and Engels (2009) and Marx (2009a).
103. Fromm (2007, pp. 69 and 93).
104. Eleventh thesis in Marx (2009b).
105. As the best known work from this school, Wallerstein (1974) may be cited here.
106. Lenin (2009).
107. Lenin (2009).
108. 1820 to 1895.
109. Engels (2009a, b).
110. Welsch (1994, pp. 2–3).
111. On the occasion of his lecture in the frame of the conference ‘Going Global – Interfaith Journeys on the Road to Liberation’ on November 10, 2007 at Baylor University in Waco, Texas.
112. Tönnies (2001).
113. Capra (1988, pp. 53–4).
114. Wallerstein (2003, pp. 80–1).
115. Wallerstein (2003, p. 83).
116. Wilber (2000, p. 482).
117. Lyotard (1991, pp. 24–36).
118. Lyotard (1991, p. 25).
119. Sloterdijk (1989, p. 22). English version quoted after Dietrich (2006, p. 289).
120. Krippendorff (1986, p. 30).
121. Fulcanelli quoted in German after Gebelein (1996, p. 127) Translation NK.
122. I here largely follow the descriptions by Capra (1988, pp. 53–74). If not indicated explicitly I follow here his thoughts.
123. 1473 to 1543.
124. 1571 to 1630.
125. 1564 to 1642.
126. 1548–1600.
127. Drewerman (1992).
128. 1561–1626.
129. 1596–1650.
130. Descartes (2009).
131. Poser (2003, p. 107).
132. 1668–1744.
133. Vico (1999).
134. 1642–1727.
135. Newton (2009).
136. Gleick (2004, pp. 11f.).
137. Quoted in German after Gebelein (1996, p. 119).
138. Quoted in German after Gebelein (1996, p. 306).
139. Heuser (2005, p. 103).
140. 1809–1882.
141. Bauer (2007, pp. 95–131).

142. Extensive discussion of this topic is found in Klass (2003, pp. 1–16).
143. Bauer (2007, p. 130).
144. Capra (1988, pp. 279–80).
145. Quoted in German after Bauer (2007, p. 221) Translation NK.
146. Weikart (2004).
147. Göttner-Abendroth (1995, p. xxiii).

5 Postmodern Interpretations of Peace

1. Vattimo (1997, p. 12).
2. The discovery of perspective was one of the greatest adventures of his time. It can be traced among others in painting since the fifteenth century. This line was continued in portrait painting and the novel as a form of narration.
3. Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei, for example, were prosecuted as adherents of the hermetic natural philosophy.
4. Nietzsche (1982, p. 463).
5. In this manner already, Toynbee (1947, p. 39).
6. Menzel (2001, pp. 32–3).
7. Krippendorff (1986, pp. 30–1).
8. *Die Friedens-Warte, Journal of International and Peace Organization*, 2008.
9. An extensive discussion of this topic is found in Koppe (2001, pp. 180–98).
10. Nietzsche (1996, pp. 380–1).
11. Nietzsche (1996, p. 163).
12. Stevens (2001, p. 152).
13. Nietzsche (1967, p. 19). The quote derives from a self-criticism in the preface to the edition from 1886.
14. Nietzsche (1967).
15. Althaus (1985, p. 159).
16. Aristotle (2008, pp. 1449 ff.).
17. Nietzsche (1967, p. 40).
18. Nietzsche (1967, p. 47).
19. Nietzsche (1967, p. 23).
20. Nietzsche (1967, p. 75).
21. Nietzsche (1967, p. 113).
22. Nietzsche (1967, p. 73).
23. Nietzsche (1967, p. 37).
24. Rock (1990, p. 33). Gabriele Sorgo (1997) painstakingly retraces this disease pattern in her work, without referring to Nietzsche.
25. This passage was, and still is, often quoted in the debate around homosexuality which, however, is here of secondary importance.
26. All of that within the space of two pages in Nietzsche (1967, pp. 85–6).
27. Nietzsche (1967, p. 93).
28. Nietzsche (1967, p. 111).
29. Quoted after Stevens (1982, p. 122).
30. Here Nietzsche has contributed substantial preliminary work for humanistic psychology, which will be the topic of section 6.3. See for example Rosenberg et al. (1991, p. 280).

31. Makowski (1997, pp. 87–8).
32. This fascination with the Sufis can also be found in Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Heinrich Heine, or Richard Wagner, but none of them has drawn as profound conclusions therefrom as Friedrich Nietzsche.
33. Nietzsche (1967, p. 71).
34. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*. Quoted in German after Koppe (2001, pp. 175–6). English translation quoted after Nietzsche (1996, p. 380).
35. Nietzsche (1967, pp. 73–4). On the term “epopts”: Greek for spectators, those who have been accepted into the third and final grade of the Eleusinian Mysteries and thus are admitted to the full insight into the holy secrets; it is also a derisive name for those who boast of possessing a secret insight that would be accessible to only a few, or even of immediately beholding divine matters; therefrom also the German word *Schwärmer* (enthusiast) (*Meyers Konversationslexikon*, 2007).
36. Nietzsche (1989, p. 99).
37. Nietzsche (1989, p. 81).
38. Althaus (1985, p. 511).
39. Fragment from Nietzsche's estate, written in 1885. Nietzsche (1968, p. 550).
40. Nietzsche (1974, p. 280).
41. Capra (1988).
42. Capra (1988, pp. 75–99). Earlier Capra (1975). A concise reading on Capra's understanding of peace is Capra and Gottwald (1998).
43. 1858–1947.
44. 1879–1955.
45. 1885–1962.
46. 1887–1961.
47. 1901–1976.
48. Laszlo (2002, p. 99).
49. Quoted after Capra (1989, p. 69).
50. Lovelock (1979).
51. Laszlo (1998, p. 117).
52. 1890–1970.
53. Wright (1965).
54. 1872–1970.
55. Einstein and Russell (2009). German translation of the full text in Koppe (2001, pp. 331–4).
56. Pugwash Online (2007).
57. 1908–2005.
58. 1901–1972.
59. 1911–2007.
60. 1900–1974.
61. 1910–1993.
62. Boulding (2001, pp. 257–63).
63. In summary fashion, Boulding (2000).
64. Muñoz (2006, 241–82).
65. Boulding (1945).
66. Boulding (1980a).
67. Quoted in German after Boulding (1978, pp. 1–8: Translation NK).

68. Lederach (2003, p. 54).
69. Truman (1965, pp. 228–9).
70. 1916–2003.
71. Rostow (1960).
72. Prebisch (1950).
73. United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; since 1948 its main seat in Santiago de Chile.
74. 1901–1986.
75. The so illustratively titled work by Galeano (1998) became especially popular.
76. * 1930.
77. 1902–1985.
78. Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989).
79. Meadows et al (1972).
80. Meadows et al. (1993, 2004).
81. In this direction I read the World Commission on Environment and Development (1987), the so-called Brundtland Report, and the Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development from Rio 1992.
82. Kant (2000, p. 241).
83. Barthes (1999).
84. Wilber (2000, p. 80).
85. Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) did not call himself a Structuralist, but is often ascribed to this category.
86. Lévi-Strauss (1958).
87. Althusser (1999).
88. Dosse (1998).
89. 1926–1984.
90. * 1930.
91. A selection can be found with Schmidt and Trittmann (2002, pp. 291–8). There they speak of more than 1,250 titles altogether.
92. Galtung himself describes this in Galtung (2007).
93. For the concept of positive peace, the young Galtung frequently refers to Kant, but otherwise likes to follow Gandhi, and together with him slips into intellectual proximity to the classics of enlightened anarchism like Joseph Proudhon (1809–65) or Mikhail Bakunin (1814–76). On this topic see also the assessment of Scherrer (2002, p. 76). More critical and with a different focus highlighting the positivistic side of the young Galtung is Lawler (1995).
94. The oldest definition I could find is the one quoted here from Galtung (1969, p. 169, brackets added, italics in the original). The definition in German in Galtung (1971, p. 57) is more elucidated: “Strukturelle Gewalt liegt vor, wenn Menschen so beeinflusst werden, dass ihre aktuelle somatische und geistige Verwirklichung geringer ist als ihre potentielle Verwirklichung. Frieden ist demnach nicht bloß die Abwesenheit von Krieg, sondern auch die Abwesenheit struktureller Gewalt.” In book format Galtung (1975). Galtung himself and others have repeated this quote in uncounted publications.
95. Foucault (1994).

96. Marcuse (2002).
97. Reich (1945).
98. Galtung (1975, pp. 24–30).
99. * 1934.
100. This is clearly expressed in Krippendorff (1985).
101. * 1940.
102. Exemplary is Senghaas (1985).
103. Senghaas (1994, 1995b, pp. 196–223).
104. Paul VI (2009, §76).
105. Freely translated after Richard (1980, p. 92).
106. The term “Church of the Poor” was introduced by Pope John XXIII on the occasion of opening of the Second Vatican Council. He named as the great tasks of the time: the opening of the Church toward the world, maintaining Christian unity, and the recognition of the Church of the Poor.
107. * 1928.
108. Gutiérrez (1993).
109. Kaller-Dietrich (2008b, pp. 68–82).
110. Gutiérrez (1993, p. 183). Gutiérrez took over the definition of development from Lebrecht (1967, p. 18).
111. Gutiérrez (1993, p. 24).
112. Gutiérrez (1993, pp. 24–5).
113. Gutiérrez (1993, p. 25).
114. II Conferencia General des Episcopado Latinoamericano (2007, II.3). Into English by the translator.
115. II Conferencia General des Episcopado Latinoamericano (2007, I.1). Into English by the translator.
116. Enlightening among many others on this topic are Tobler and Waldmann (1991).
117. 1925–1995.
118. 1924–1998.
119. * 1936.
120. Zima (1997, pp. 124–206).
121. 1930–2004.
122. Habermas (1998), Herzinger and Stein (1995), and Sokal and Bricmont (1999).
123. Habermas (1994, pp. 110–20).
124. The corresponding debate between Habermas and Lyotard is summarized clearly in Zima (1997, pp. 176–95).
125. 1925–1995.
126. Deleuze (2005, p. 16).
127. Deleuze (1988, p. 92).
128. Deleuze (2005, p. 97).
129. Zima (1997, pp. 124–44).
130. Lyotard (1993, p. 68).
131. Lyotard (1984, pp. 65 and 66).
132. Lyotard (1984, p. 61).
133. Since Vattimo is usually not counted as a peace researcher and the context may at first appear difficult, Sützl (2006) can be recommended for illuminating his work and its relevance for peace research.

134. Vattimo (1988, pp. 172–3).
135. Vattimo (2006, p. 235).
136. Vattimo (2006, p. 239).
137. Forti (2007).
138. John Paul II (2009, §48).
139. Vattimo (1994, p. 235).
140. Weiß (2003, p. 28).
141. The two terms presumably connote that which is called Eros and Agape with Wilber.
142. Muñoz (2001, pp. 21–66).
143. Martínez Guzmán (2001).
144. * 1949
145. Muñoz (2006, p. 241).
146. Muñoz (2006, pp. 243–4).
147. Muñoz (2006, p. 251).
148. Muñoz (2006, p. 259).
149. Muñoz (2006, p. 280).
150. Galtung (1990).
151. This is also the title of Galtung's book from 1997.
152. For the first time in Dietrich (1998, p. 169). Freud's metaphor of the iceberg has often been copied and used in various forms. Among others it also plays a larger role in Kabbal (2006, pp. 15ff.).

6 Transrational Interpretations of Peace

1. On this famous final sentence out of Goethe's *Faust* see Ekkehart Krippendorff's commentary, which reads among others: "Mephisto knows that transcendence is also a part of life and – we will live to see it – that a life without transcendence, a life in purely empirical immanence, without cosmological consciousness, that human action without humble recognition of an intellectual-spiritual order within the limits, as they are placed on our human perception, imply destruction and unconditional self-realization mean self-destruction – as good as the aims and intentions may be [...]. The time could be ripe for our generation to muster the courage of a reversal towards a religious attitude beyond organized religion, by reading Faust from its ending point and discovering therein Goethe's radicality of a cosmologically founded reason." Quoted in German after Krippendorff (2007, p. 1).
2. 1869–1948.
3. 1872–1950.
4. These essays have been translated into many languages and have been published under diverse labels. An English version of his works on the theory of the state can be found under a rather misleading title in Sri Aurobindo (1997).
5. Sri Aurobindo (1997, pp. 324–34).
6. Sri Aurobindo (1997, pp. 440–3).
7. Sri Aurobindo (1997, p. 468).
8. Sri Aurobindo (1997, pp. 556–71) [Postscript first published in 1950].
9. Sri Aurobindo (1994, pp. 7–81).

10. 1897–1945.
11. Sri Aurobindo (1972, pp. 761–78).
12. Wilber (2000, p. 501). I will return to this question more extensively in the next section.
13. Sri Aurobindo (1960, pp. 144–56).
14. 1869–1948.
15. For example Parekh (1997), Richards (1992), and Rothermund (1999).
16. 1817–1862; Thoreau (1967).
17. Arun Gandhi (2011, p. 469).
18. M.K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence (2007).
19. Gandhi (2011, p. 471).
20. Kantowyky (1986, p. 126).
21. 1890–1988.
22. Passed down by Abu Said in the Hadith collection of Tirmidhi. Quoted in German after the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (2008): “Der beste dschihad ist das Wort der Wahrheit und des Rechts vor einem ungerechten Herrscher.”
23. Mehdi (2011, p. 478).
24. This is a crucial point for Mehdi (2011, p. 481).
25. Extensively on Ghaffar Khan: Easwaran (1999), Mehdi (2011, p. 475), and Tendulkar (1967).
26. 1895 to 1986.
27. Blau (1995, p. 17).
28. Krishnamurti (2010a).
29. Krishnamurti (1972, p. 49).
30. Krishnamurti (2010b).
31. Krishnamurti (1973, p. 74).
32. Krishnamurti (1985, p. 49).
33. Krishnamurti (1972, p. 35).
34. Krishnamurti (1972, p. 36).
35. Krishnamurti (1972, p. 72).
36. Krishnamurti (1972, p. 70).
37. Krishnamurti (1981, pp. 71–2).
38. Krishnamurti (1973, p. 33).
39. Krishnamurti (1981, p. 75).
40. The German original version of this book discusses further Osho and the Dalai Lama. They will be discussed extensively in Vol. II of the English version.
41. Boethius (2007).
42. Nietzsche (1967).
43. I am not the first to raise these questions. Among many others on this topic, see Perls (1992, p. 27).
44. Laszlo (2002, p. 20).
45. Bachir Diagne (2007, pp. 49–60).
46. Bergson (1944, p. 16).
47. Fischer–see Rahner (2007).
48. Locke (1975, p. 335).
49. Kant (2000).
50. Quoted in German after Nietzsche (1983, p. 134) Translation NK.

51. Nietzsche (1983, p. 145). As previously with Kant, for Nietzsche it is also about the debate around "being or appearance." It is only phenomenology and authors like Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Waldenfels, and finally Sartre who would ultimately try to dissolve this.
52. Freud (1927).
53. Freud (1953, pp. 67–71).
54. This appears to be a paradox only within the modern mechanistic worldview that still guided Freud. Transrational worldviews, just like the energetic ones, are built on the unity of the universal or cosmic and the individual. They cannot follow modernity's subject-object division.
55. Stevens (2001, p. 62).
56. Not to be confused with the character or character structure described by Wilhelm Reich. These signify the fixed muscular locks, emotional reactions, and belief systems which manifest in the body and behavior.
57. For example Nowotny (1973, p. 181).
58. Quoted after Stevens (2001, p. 158). Augusto Boal would later on express it in this manner that the personality would be that miniscule part of a person's potential which really becomes active. The personality would thus be a person's partially voluntary limitation in action. A person's potential would figuratively simmer in the pot, while the personality escaped via the safety valve (Boal, 2006, pp. 35–6).
59. Wilber (2000, pp. 235–6).
60. Walch (2002, p. 141).
61. Stevens (2001, pp. 64–7).
62. Fromm (2007, p. 5).
63. Tolle (2006, p. 25).
64. Tolle (2004, pp. 36–46 and 2006, pp. 129–64).
65. Already the young Freud saw this in a similar manner when he held that the memory of the psychic trauma would take effect like a kind of foreign object that long after its intrusion still remained effective as a currently acting presence (Freud and Breuer, 1950, p. 227).
66. Wilber (2000, p. 479).
67. Wilber (2000, pp. 479–80).
68. With the term of the "self" I am opening up a complex, and in psychology extensively and controversially discussed theme, to which I cannot do justice in this volume. This will be the topic of further deliberations in the second volume. The self in the understanding portrayed here is similar to that of C.G. Jung, but it cannot be equated with it. Furthermore, the term how I use it is not connected to the psychology of the self in the tradition of Heinz Kohut, although there is some overlap with both.
69. Swami Veda Bharati (1986, pp. 3–23).
70. Walch (2002, pp. 140–52).
71. Sri Ramana Maharshi 1879 to 1950. Quoted after Wilber (2000, p. 314).
72. I here refer to Hatha Yoga, Kundalini Yoga, Kriya Yoga, Pranayama, and especially also Tantra Yoga. This pattern is described in Patanjali's Yoga Sutras. An extensive discussion is found in Swami Veda Bharati (1986).
73. Rosenberg et al. (1991, pp. 116 and 299).
74. Also developmental psychology more or less explicitly uses this frame. But I will not follow its nomenclature because its vectoral and ascending chrono-

- sophy to me does not appear appropriate in this case. It is essentially a modern concept.
75. Sylvester Walch points out that it would be more useful to speak of a movement in a form of a spiral instead of a fixed hierarchy, because the opening of the chakras does not necessarily and in each case follow a successive order. Each chakra would have an unconscious, material, and spiritual aspect. I am grateful for this observation. My exposition is portrayed hierarchically in order to keep it understandable, but it has to be understood in this dynamic, cyclical sense.
 76. Golzio (1998, pp. 27–58).
 77. Extensive discussion on this topic is found in Kabbal (2006, pp. 49–63).
 78. Jack Rosenberg sarcastically calls *svadisthana* the Freudian chakra, *manipura* the Adlerian, and *anahata* the Jungian. In my opinion *muladhara* would consequently be the Reichian, Perlsian, or Kabbalian chakra, but I do not think that Rosenberg would agree with that (Rosenberg et al., 1991, pp. 299–303).
 79. Tolle (2006, pp. 236–50).
 80. Quoted in German after Das (2000, p. 9) Translation NK.
 81. Kabbal (2006, pp. 63–77).
 82. Wilber (1996a, pp. 165–7). Walch distinguishes the definition I have rendered here from the “essential emotions,” which flowingly accompany our being-present and emanate presence. He proposes the distinction between patterned feelings, which have a compensatory character, and essential feelings, which create an open and wide atmosphere. I think with the former he means what I simply call emotions and with the latter what I call feelings.
 83. Lederach (2003, p. 18).
 84. Rosenberg et al. (1991, p. 274).
 85. Wilber (2000, p. 312).
 86. Sri Ramana Maharshi, quoted after Wilber (2000, p. 310).
 87. Quoted in German after Schellenbaum (2004, pp. 13–14) Translation NK.
 88. Wilber (1996b, p. 360). It is in this sense that the Sufis turn the Qu’ran’s Sura 6, verse 122 into their life principle: “die, before you die” (Makowski, 1997, p. 23).
 89. This observation, prominently discussed by Sigmund Freud, has been taken over from Buddhism by other European analysts with a completely different orientation (Freud, 1950a, p. 145). The later arguments have been widely published, as for example by Gruen (2002) and Schellenbaum (1984, 2004, p. 43).
 90. Lederach (2005, p. viii). Lederach quotes Rogers, but does not say, where Rogers has said or written, that those things that appear to be the most personal are what we humans share universally.
 91. Lederach (1995, pp. 19–20).
 92. Sri Aurobindo (1960, pp. 144–56). He thereby mainly referred to Freud’s mechanistic worldview and his, in Aurobindo’s view, embarrassingly reduced understanding of spirituality and God, as Aurobindo mainly read it in the *The Future of an Illusion* from 1927 and *Civilization and its Discontents* from 1930 (Freud, 1950b, vol. 14, p. 379 and 1950c, vol. 9, p. 434).
 93. Rosenberg et al. (1991, pp. 22, 24, and 279).
 94. Bateson (1972, 1979).

95. In complete agreement thereto of the Kriya Yoga approach of Paramahansa Yogananda (1950).
96. * 1942.
97. Shelldrake (1995).
98. Laszlo (2002, p. 261). Translated from the German by NK.
99. Jung (1951, p. 261).
100. Tolle (2005, pp. 125–7) in obvious reference to Canetti (1984).
101. Extensive discussion on this topic is found in Kaller-Dietrich (2008a, pp. 18–23).
102. Anderson (2006).
103. This is what Wilber, in allusion to Hegel, means by “superseding” – the differentiation and integration of previously acquired knowledge and consciousness.
104. Capra (1988, p. 290).
105. Jung (1971).
106. 1888–1974; Assagioli (1927).
107. 1896–1988; Dürkheim (1992).
108. Authors like Maslow (1954) or Walch (2002) furthermore emphasize the spontaneous experiences of being and breakthroughs. They point out that human development would not proceed in a linear fashion. This may be correct, but it is not the topic of the systemic research interest within peace studies.
109. Stevens (2001, p. 48).
110. Gebelein (1996, p. 17).
111. Shamdasani (1996).
112. Quoted after Stevens (2001, pp. 156–7). His rejection of mechanistic and rationalistic psychoanalysis appeared in its most radical form in 1932 in his famous settling of accounts with Sigmund Freud under the title *Sigmund Freud als kulturhistorische Erscheinung* [Sigmund Freud in His Historical Setting: Character and Personality]
113. The German original discusses here humanistic psychology as the root of transrational peaces and elicitive conflict transformation. This is a main topic of Volume II of this trilogy and is therefore skipped in this English translation.
114. For example, Perls (1992, p. 33).
115. Maslow (1962).
116. Perls (1992, p. 22).
117. For the first time in Rogers, (1951).
118. Perls (1969).
119. Perls (1992, p. 35).
120. Perls (1992, p. 70).
121. Grof (1976).
122. Reich (1980).
123. Walch (2002, pp. 24–33).
124. Wilber (2000, pp. 127–57 and 192–9).
125. Nietzsche (1989, p. 177).
126. Singer and Ricard (2002).

127. I call to mind Chapter 2, in which I discerned that the concept of peace out of harmony has twisted inside itself the anterior concept of peace out of fertility.
128. Jaffé (1971, p. 211).
129. Jung (1985).
130. Quoted after Stevens (2001, p. 155).
131. Fromm (1971, p. 122).
132. Wilber (2000, p. 48).
133. Lederach (2003, p. 12).
134. Wilber (2000, p. 85).
135. Capra (1988, p. 380).
136. Capra (1988, p. 380).
137. Laszlo (2002, pp. 139–58).
138. Capra (1988, pp. 380, 381).
139. Lederach (2003, p. 55).
140. Lederach (2005, pp. 73–4).
141. Wittgenstein (2005, proposition 6.421).
142. Gödel (1931, p. 173).
143. Lederach (2003, p. 21).
144. Perls (1991, p. 22).
145. Rosenberg (2003, p. 23).
146. Indeed, Galtung often lets his role in peace research be compared to that of Freud in psychoanalysis, which is why this comparison does not appear all that baseless to me. See: Österreichisches Studienzentrums für Frieden und Konfliktlösung (2008); Transcend. A Peace and Development Network for Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (2008).
147. Laszlo (1998, p. 121).
148. Lederach (2005, p. 35).
149. Lederach (2005, p. 10).
150. Vayrynen (1991, pp. 1–25).
151. Lederach (2005, p. 146).
152. Lederach (2005, p. 176).
153. Lederach (1995, pp. 37–73).
154. UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies (2008).

7 Conclusion of the First Volume

1. Lederach (2003, p. 55).
2. Rousseau (2008).
3. Wallerstein (1995).
4. Jaspers (1955, p. 257).

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