



PALESTINE AND THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

MODERNIZATION AND THE PATH TO
PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD

FARID AL-SALIM

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*This book is dedicated to my parents, Muhammad Salim
and Omayya Al-Salim. Their unlimited love and endless support
made this book's completion possible*

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Palestine can be divided into five main subdivisions as follows: Galilee and its narrow coastal plains around and north of Haifa-Acre Bay, including the Marj Ibn Amir, Lake Tiberias and the Hule Basin; the central and southern coastal plains with Tulkarm, Jaffa, Ramla and Gaza as centres; the central mountain areas of Nablus, Jerusalem and Khalil (Hebron); the Jordan Rift Valley south of Beisan, including the Jericho oasis; and the Naqab Desert, to the east and southeast of Gaza, with Bir al-Sab' as its centre.

In few countries of the world has geography influenced history more than in Palestine. Its geographical position as a land bridge between Asia and Africa, and between the Mediterranean and Red seas, and the great variations within the land's natural conditions (geology, topography and climate), have deeply affected the history of the country and influenced the course of human activities. Globally, Palestine's land bridge position connects far-reaching destinations in Europe at one end and eastern Asia at the other. Palestine is also part of a transitional area between the wet temperate maritime zone and the arid tropical zone (in other words, a transitional area between the desert and the sown). Being a part of the borderlands between the Mediterranean and the Arabian cultural zone, Palestine was always exposed to and influenced by any great developments or changes happening in both East and West. Regionally, Palestine was affected by the events and developments happening in both of its neighbours, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

One of the main goals of this book is to review historiographical trends and set new directions for late Ottoman history. This book demonstrates

that current research on the late Ottoman Empire still operates within the confines of the centre–periphery model, and sustains dualistic and state-centred narratives. Second, I argue that a ‘historical trajectory’ framework is a better analytical tool and empirical strategy. I show that the Ottoman Empire was characterized by distinct imperial paths during the nineteenth century, each representing an alternative route to state–society and local–global relations. The book further suggests that a trajectory-specific approach can provide new prospects for understanding the modern history of the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular especially from social and economic perspective.

In the last decades of Ottoman rule, Palestine was administratively divided into two provinces. Jerusalem, the southern province, was made an administratively independent province directly linked with the Ministry of Interior in Istanbul. Damascus, and after 1888 Beirut Province, contained the rest of the country. This included the northern part of Palestine and was divided into the sanjaks of Acre and Nablus. Both provinces helped to form the foundation of modern Palestine. Modernity in Palestine did not come about as a result of specific events, but rather as the cumulative effect of political, economic, and social developments that took place during the nineteenth century and persisted throughout the final years of the Ottoman period. Even though Palestine did not constitute a single administrative or political unit throughout this period, the history of its various districts and communities shows a striking cohesiveness. This cohesiveness, especially among the political and social elites, constitutes the foundation of modern Palestinian society, which continued to develop from the mid-nineteenth century until the twentieth century despite changing relationships between the central authority and local leaders.

This book addresses the role of the late Ottoman administrative system and the new social structure in provincial Palestine. In particular, it emphasizes the impact of Ottoman reforms on the new administrative centres and countryside of Palestine, using the history of the District of Tulkarm between 1876 to 1918 as a case study. Tulkarm, the administrative centre of this qada’ (district), was a small village in central Palestine until 1876, when the Ottomans created a new qada’ called Bani Sa`b-Tulkarm. The Ottoman strategy in constructing the new districts shifted authority away from established local and regional leaders toward new towns which previously had not held political or economic power. As such, from 1876 to

1918, the village of Tulkarm, which became the seat of the new qada`, and its district underwent social, economic, demographic, and environmental changes that vividly illustrate the cumulative effect of modernity throughout Palestine. The Ottomans combined centralized administrative practice with decentralized practice by the incorporation of intermediate groups such as grant lands holders and tax farmers into the central administration. This new policy started in 1839 and reached a new stage by 1858 with the Ottoman Land Code.

The primary goal of this research is to begin exploring the missing history of modern Palestine, namely its provincial history. The nineteenth century saw not only a new emphasis on monetary relations over the whole of Palestine with the expansion of both the regional and the global markets, but also the initiation of capitalist social relationships of production and exchange. Accompanying these shifts were structural changes in the land tenure and ownership systems, the development of industrial, artisanal and service activities, labour force transformation, population redistribution, and commensurate urban growth. The Ottoman authorities introduced administrative, legal, and governmental reform (rationalization) and centralization, which also contributed to the process of transformation. No less significant was the new 'peaceful crusade' of religiously inspired European immigration, investment, and institutional development.¹ Modern education expanded and increased in scope, as social values, norms, and lifestyles changed. Arab and Palestinian nationalism, as well as Islamic modernist consciousness, awoke. All of this occurred in the context of a rapidly increasing population, mainly due to natural increase and immigration, which restructured the demographic composition of the country. The linkages among the central state, provincial officials, local intermediaries, and peasantry were influential in the centralization process. The Tanzimat reform period brought many changes in the province that affected the points of contention between the state and local population.

Recent social historians of Greater Syria, such as Seikaly, Kark, Lerman, Ghanaym, Yazbak, and Doumani, focused on the major cities of Palestine, especially the coastal cities. The focus of this research is on the main suppliers of those cities: the countryside and small administrative towns like Tulkarm, Beisan (Bayt Shan) and Bir al-Sab`a (Birsheba) that the Ottomans created in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several radical transformations occurred in Palestinian social, economic, educational, and demographic institutions, as well as in political anatomy and infrastructure. Alexander Scholch was among the pioneers to shed light on this matter in his book, *Palestine in Transformation*.² The Ottoman Empire established modern governmental administrative systems attempting to emulate the European systems in civil and land laws, administration, education, and health services.

There were many reasons for the Ottoman establishment of a new modern administrative system in Palestine. The first objective was to centralize Ottoman rule in order to increase the budget revenues from the new land tax. Beginning in 1865, the Ottoman government ordered all landowners to register their holdings in official documents. This new land tax meant that all landowners were required to pay a 10 per cent land tax directly to Ottoman officials. The second objective, especially after the second half of the nineteenth century, was to end the role of local notables as mediators, tax collectors, and local leaders. The third objective of the Ottoman administrators was to establish a modern centralized security system based on police agents, border guards, and a standing army. The Seventh Ottoman Army was stationed in Nablus and the Eighth Army in Tulkarm. Finally, the Ottomans wanted to keep all provinces in general, and Palestine in particular, under direct control of Istanbul because they feared an imperialist thrust by the European powers.³

Tulkarm represented a town in which all Ottoman concerns for modernization converged and, therefore, provided a unique opportunity for understanding the development of modern Palestine. Tulkarm not only represented one of the new administrative centres of the time within the interior of the Ottoman Arab provinces, but also its location within Palestine presented the Ottomans with the gravest need to modernize administration in order to meet the pressing challenges of European penetration and Zionist immigration by the 1880s.

Modernization and growth in Palestine in the late Ottoman period resulted from changes in the modes of production, including technological changes. The changes were not only expressed in an increase in the amount of product, but in important structural changes as well as in the sectors of agriculture, manufacture and services, in the patterns of consumption and

savings, and in the distribution of capital and incomes. Integration into the world economy exposed Palestine's economy to the influence of the changes taking place in the economies of Europe, and generated new forces and processes in them. However, though the operative factors were to a great extent external, the bearers of this growth were primarily Palestinian Arabs, Muslims and Christians.

Tulkarm represented the second largest administrative unit in Ottoman Palestine in the nineteenth century.⁴ During this period, forms of administration such as land tenure, education, and the governmental departments underwent a number of important changes. These changes were partly the result of administrative reforms undertaken by the Ottoman central government known collectively as the Tanzimat. They were undertaken as part of the new policy of Ottoman governmental centralization and partly as the result of new political and economic pressures resulting from increased contact with Europe.

This study takes for its starting point the declaration of the Ottoman constitution (*dustur*) of 1876. This year marks the beginning of the most significant changes in the administration and exploitation of the Palestinian lands since the imposition of the semi-feudal *iqta`* system in the early Ottoman period (1516). The year 1918, which witnessed the withdrawal of the Ottoman army and the indefinite occupation by British military forces, constitutes the end of the period under study.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Palestine and the rest of the Ottoman Empire faced fundamental reforms that affected its status. The reforms were implemented to centralize, modernize, and strengthen the Empire's sovereignty. In this era, Tulkarm and the Bani Sa`b area underwent considerable demographic, economic, political, and administrative development. This investigates the consequences of these developments by focusing on the social and political elites of the time. The new administrative system and the privatization of land tenure led to a change, in particular, in the circumstances of the upper class. The old class system was formulated between urban and rural areas in a utilitarian relationship. Two groups enjoyed upper-class status in the old system: the socio-religious and the socio-political. The *`ulama* (religious scholars), *Qadi al-Shara`* (the Islamic Court judge) and the Ashraf (Prophet Muhammad's descendants) formed the socio-religious class. This group

worked as the legislative body to provide a balance against the socio-political group. They enjoyed many privileges due to their status, such as freedom from taxation and conscription. The socio-political group was comprised of urban and rural officials. The urban leader was the bek or the agha, who was appointed as district governor (mutasalim) and tax collector. The bek or the agha was the chief commander of local troops, which were used to maintain order and ensure security. The rural leaders were the shaykhs or mashayaikh (the leaders of powerful peasant families). They were in control of many nearby villages called nahiya. The shaykh was in charge of the peasant militias. His main duties were to collect taxes and to keep order and security. Two powerful families, the al-Barqawi and the al-Jayyusi, ruled the Tulkarm area before 1876. Both families had close relationships with the Tuqan and `Abd al-Hadi families in Nablus, the main city of the region.

The implementation of the Tanzimat led to a transformation of the old social system to one characterized by a centralized bureaucratic government. This transformation was a turning point in which power shifted from the old upper class to land owners, office-holding aristocrats, merchants, and businessmen. The centre of economic and political power shifted to the plains and coastal areas such as Yaffa (Jaffa) and Haifa. Most of the traditional affluent urban and rural families adapted to the new system and retained their position. Families such as the al-Jayyusi and `Abd al-Hadi supported the new system and prospered, while families like the al-Barqawi and the al-Nimr who opposed the new system lost their position.⁵ Members of the old socio-religious class were more careful in their reactions to the new system. Due to their position in the legislative body, they enjoyed some level of independence, and thus managed to preserve much of their privileges by working with the new order. The religious leaders had a great sense of consciousness about the changes in the administrative system, and by 1876 members of leading families such as the al-Karmi, Isma`il and al-Tayyah became part of the bureaucracy by becoming landowners and by participating in the new administrative councils.

Contrary to expectations, remarkably reliable and rich local sources on this subject are accessible to historians. The primary local sources that this study focuses on are the records and registers of the Muslim Law Court

(*Sijil al-Mahkamah al-Shar'iyya*) of Tulkarm, Nablus, Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and Yaffa.⁶ Unfortunately, the Court in Tulkarm lost most of its records during World War I, leaving only the two Ottoman records now available. Since Tulkarm was a qada', and was connected to a higher administrative unit, the Mutasarifyya (district) of Nablus, I consulted the records there. In addition, the records of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and Yaffa were consulted because of the religious importance of the first documents and the economic importance of the second. All these records are available in microfilm copies at the Center of Documents and Manuscripts at the University of Jordan in Amman. From 1918 to 1929, the people of the Tulkarm district established a new land register.⁷ They issued new deeds by using the elderly people as witnesses and by bringing their own copies as a proof of their claims. This event can be seen clearly in the Tulkarm Muslim Law Court annals from record numbers 3 to 16.

One of the important characteristics of these registers is that they contain local information. The Islamic registers cover the social, economic and political matters in the administrative area of interest and also the surrounding area. In fact they cover all the local events of the Tulkarm qada and connect the qada with the other parts of the Ottoman Empire. These registers contain many firmans (the Ottoman Imperial orders) to all kinds of locations including to the city, village, and tribe. What makes these registers unique is their comprehensiveness. The registers deal with all kinds of daily activities based on the Islamic Code. The Islamic Court of Law serviced other monotheistic sects as well. Many cases relating to Christians, Jews, Druze, and Bahais were considered by the Court. In addition, the service was not only for the elites or the high class. It functioned for the public in general, and it was trusted by people of all classes for its verdicts and judgments. The role of the Islamic Court of law was never withdrawn, though the Ottoman Empire created other legal institutions during the second half of the nineteenth century, such as the Civil Court, the Landscape Department and the Islamic Pious Foundations Department. The courts of Shari'a law remained a safe and trusted institution for all kinds of Ottoman people, regardless of their religious affiliation.⁸

In general, these registers contain the following types of materials. First, details of pleas entered in the Qadi courts and the decisions that were made. Second, certifications and verifications of official and private documents

and actions, the details of which are set down in the registers. Third, registration in detail of properties of merchants, soldiers, officials, and learned men, including much information about their life histories, properties, and positions in society. The organizations of the military, religious and economic groups, and the administrative and financial organization of urban and rural areas were also included, along with economic information such as prices, taxes, coinage, and the movement of trade.⁹

The materials in the Muslim Court of Law were written by members of a scribal institution, rigorously trained in certain methods of writing and penmanship. The script in which they wrote was regular in form throughout the centuries of Ottoman rule. However, it appears that the scribes in religious courts were not similarly trained in a regular system of calligraphy. The scripts in which the judicial registers are written vary widely, are quite irregular, and present far greater difficulties of decipherment than do those in administrative registers. However, the materials contained in these registers are of such importance for the study of the political, social and economic structure and development of the Ottoman empire that these difficulties must be surmounted and the materials in these archives consulted in the course of any research about the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰

The registers were a kind of daily journal, and their orders were used as legal evidence, especially with regard to land tenure issues. The court serviced almost every Ottoman citizen and it was open all the time (except on religious holidays). The public trusted the Islamic courts because it was impartial and objective. No higher authority could interfere in their rulings. The registers were further protected by the court staff through active judicial review and strict custody.

The registers were organized according to the Islamic calendar and in some cases classified under subject categories. Personal affairs were among the most important rulings of this court. Examples include marriage contracts, divorce, and inheritance. The inheritance documents record the social status and the wealth of the family. They contain the names of the wives, sons, daughters, and in many cases a listing of the deceased man's or woman's properties was included. The lists include land holdings, houses, stores, animals, clothes, shoes, kitchen and other equipment. In the marriage

contracts, scholars can ascertain the family names, witnesses, the name of the local authority (mukhtar), the amount of the dowry (which can reflect the social status of the family), and the names of religious leaders who approved the marriage contract. Another important service that the court provided was recording land tenure and small deeds. All land sales, loans, and mortgages, were processed through the Islamic Court of Law. The court handled such matters, even though there were other governmental departments specifically designed to address these matters. These documents can provide us with many useful details, such as the names of payers, sellers, methods of payment, the borders of property and their types (land, house, store, garden, furniture, and crops).¹¹ In addition, the registers list information on town divisions (hara) and boulevards. Furthermore, the registers list the building materials used in construction of houses as well as architectural details of the houses like al-aq`ad (the rooms built with arches), al-hush (the enclosed area) and al-diwan (the guest room). This provides us with valuable information about many aspects of the city of Tulkarm and its influence on the surrounding civil society.

There are many ways that these records explain in detail the establishment of the civil society and the social classes in Tulkarm and the surrounding area. They list the names and titles of merchants, statesmen, government employees, large landowners, educated people, various religious figures like the mufti (the interpreter of Islamic law), qadi (judge) and the imam (the prayer leader). All those mentioned above were known as `ayan (the elites and the upper class of society). Land agents, small landowners, vocational specialists, craftsman, and peasants were considered part of the middle class. Agricultural land workers and the nomads comprised the lower classes. The records demonstrate the social transformations that took place at the end of the nineteenth century and their impact on the relationship between the new landowners (the town inhabitants) and the old owners (the villages and countryside inhabitants).¹²

The Islamic registers explain many economic activities. For example, they list the types of currency used, the names and titles of professional labour forces, internal and external trade, trade transactions, trade agents and merchants' representatives, the measurement standards used, types of crops and trees, kinds of local animals and the use of those animals such as transportation, agriculture or food. One of the most important markets in

Tulkarm was the livestock market, which had its own regulations. After closing a sale, the animals were branded by the buyers, then stamped and registered in the Islamic court. This operation highlights the importance of animals as measures of wealth in the area.

The second primary source is the records of the department of Pious Endowments and Religious Foundations (*Awqaf Nizara*). This department was established in 1856 during the early stages of the Tanzimat. The main duties of this establishment were to supervise and manage all the affairs related to the Islamic endowments. These records show the sultan's actions related to property endowments and their renovation, revenues and expenses. They also reveal names of the directors and employees; the correspondence between the departments in Tulkarm, Nablus and Beirut; and the orders issued from Istanbul to other centres in Palestine. These records provide scholars with the names, locations and the cadastral survey of lands and properties that contributed their revenues to Islamic sites such as the Dome of the Rock and al-Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Prophet Ibrahim's shrine mosque in Hebron, Islamic schools, and many other Muslim charitable establishments.¹³

The third primary source is the Ottoman *Salnama* (the Ottoman Empire's annual report). Salnamas come from six sources: Salnama Dulat (the Ottoman Empire annual report), the military, the navy, Foreign Affairs ministry, education affairs, calendar and astronomy and the annual reports of the provinces. Two types were used in this research: The Ottoman Imperial Salnama and Wilayat (provincial) Salnama. The Salnama contain important information about the administrative workings of the Ottoman Empire at the provincial and district level. They also contain information on the qada (sub-districts), nahiya (sub-sub districts), villages, farms, and the geographical location of the province and its borders. It includes the provincial budget, revenues, infrastructure plans, and information about completed and unfinished construction projects such as roads, railroads, postal services and telegraph. The Salnamas have detailed statistical information about every department in the province, including the processes of electing and appointing the members of the administrative councils, the names of its members, their ranks and titles and the number of employees in each department. For the judiciary field, they report the rates and kinds of courts, from the Islamic to trade and civil courts. They also list the names of

the judges, the staff members, and the names, ranks and sects of elected council members. In the case of governmental education service, these records review the forms of schools, their numbers and locations, their curricula, the names of teachers, and the number of students. The Salnama kept a census for the province, starting from the provincial capital down to the smallest administrative units. This census provides scholars with information that is essential to understanding the social changes that took place in Tulkarm and its surrounding area. In addition, the Salnama furnish the names and numbers of almost every facet of social and economic life. They list factories, clinics, soap factories, presses, markets, coffee shops, motels, prisons, and police and military forces. The Salnama is generally an excellent statistical source.¹⁴

The fourth source is the 1876 Ottoman Constitution (*Dustur*) which spells out the formal and legal framework of the empire. It lists the responsibilities of Ottoman officials from the sultan, the head of the state, down to the lowest ranked government employee, and details their duties. The Constitution classifies the government branches, departments, provinces and districts. It lists the budget and the collection of all types of taxes. For this research project, the Constitution was particularly useful because it specifies the duties of Tulkarm's qa'im maqam (the head administrator of the qada`) and his assistants, the administrative council, the qadi, the mufti, the municipality, the chamber of commerce and agriculture, courts and its types, customs, and taxes. It was not necessarily the case that the Ottoman Constitution was implemented to the letter. However, there was a generally standardized system throughout the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵

The fifth primary source is the Financial Registers (*Muhasibi Nizara*). This primary source is considered to be one of the important sources for the study of Ottoman administrative practice. It provides scholars much more detailed, organized, and authoritative materials about administrative and financial details than the information contained in other types of registers. The Daftari Mufasal (Cadastral) register provides detailed information on the urban and rural population and administrative practice or organizations in most of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, especially for the sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries and to lesser extent for the century's thereafter.¹⁶

The sixth primary source consists of newspaper coverage of the period. Newspapers are very important because they present additional information that is not available in previously mentioned sources. There are many newspapers available in microfilm, such as *al-Bashir*, *al-Muqtabas*, *al-Ittihad al-`Uthmani*, *al-Muqtataf*, *al-Kawkab*, *Wilayat Suriyya*, *al-Karmil* and *Filastin*. Some of these papers were privately owned by individuals or organizations. There was only one formal newspaper presenting the official views of the Ottoman government, *Jaridat Wilayat Bayrut* (*The Beirut Province*). *Al-Bashir*, published in Beirut, was one of the earliest newspapers in greater Syria. It maintained a moderate line in its coverage, while *al-Muqtabas* (published in Damascus) and *Filastin* (published in Yaffa), represented a liberal line. *Al-Kawkab* represented the right wing because of its support of the Allied forces' invasion and its depiction of the British troops as Palestine's liberators from the Turks. *Al-Kawkab* was published in Cairo and was financially supported by the British. The British authorities used this newspaper to disseminate Allied propaganda during World War I. The Ottoman authorities closed all newspapers after the establishment of martial law upon the outbreak of war in 1914.

The newspaper accounts cover a large range of political, economic and social events such as appeals for more reforms in the Ottoman Empire; the establishment of new administrative centres in Palestine like Bir al-Sab`a in 1905; prices of crops; taxes on properties, crops, sheep and goats; security issues and the call for increasing police force numbers; the news of transportation systems like new roads, bridges and railroads; and the general complaints of the local people. In the political arena, newspapers like *Filastin* and *al-Muqtabas* were very active in their coverage, especially in relating the fears of local people concerning the Zionists and their purchase of lands in Palestine. They criticized the Ottoman government for giving the Zionists permission to establish more settlements.

The seventh source of primary information comes from the accounts of British and German expeditionary ventures and land surveyors who worked in Palestine during the second half of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The most informative of these is the *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement* (PEFQS). This journal, published from 1869 till the present, consists of numerous scholarly and professional articles addressing a wide range of topics related to Palestine. Sponsored by the British monarchy and government, the main goals of this journal have

been to reestablish connections with biblical Palestine and to “rediscover” the Holy Land in order to support the peaceful Crusader movement, which enjoyed increasing support in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. The journal covers a diversity of subjects such as history, geography, archeology, geology, environmental studies, anthropology, sociology, landscape, land tenure, and old and new languages among many other subjects. The journal contains data that is useful to scholars in different fields. For example, there is Chaplin and Glaisher's research on Palestine's climate and Bergheim's work on land tenure. However, care must be taken in using this journal, especially issues from its early years. The journal presents the imperialist views of Great Britain toward Palestine, focusing on its strategic importance as a route between Africa and Asia. The journal represented the religious views of the “new crusaders movement” mentioned above. Many of the articles, such as F.A. Klein “Life, Habits, Customs of the Fallhen of Palestine” published 1881, demonstrate these sentiments. This article in particular helped to establish Britain's sense of superiority over non-Europeans and non-Christians.

The surveys of First Lieutenant Claude R. Conder and First Lieutenant Horatio Herbert Kitchener (later Lord Kitchener of Khartoum and the Secretary of War during World War I) of the British Royal Engineers, entitled *The Survey of Western Palestine* (1884) and *Map of Western Palestine* (1877), provide remarkable data. Conder published his own work on Palestine in 1879, titled *Tent Work in Palestine*. Many editions of *The Survey of Western Palestine* have been published, the latest version containing 13 volumes. Conder and Kitchener left a tremendous account of Palestine in the late Ottoman period. However, we should again be very cautious about citing their work, especially Conder's. He described the Palestinian peasants as “liars, ignorant, fanatics ... they should be only working as hewers of wood and drawers of water ... in the colonist's farms and groves ...”.¹⁷

Conder and Kitchener's greatest contribution to the history of Palestine is *The Map of Western Palestine*. This map contains 26 sheets and displays a one-inch scale for every 6,000 miles. It covers the area from south Lebanon to the north of the Negev (Naqab), and was published by the military landscape department of the Royal British Army in 1880. The map became an important historical document and an eyewitness account of the

economic and social dynamics of Palestine in the late nineteenth century. The map covers the urban areas in detail and every other feature, such as roads, harbours, ruins, shrines, churches, saints tomb, sacred trees, telegraph lines, railways, castles, farms, orange groves, olive gardens, unpaved roads, and any other sites of interest excavated, drawn or photographed. In addition, place names, geological and natural history specimens, and antiquities were collected and casts of inscriptions were made.¹⁸

Included in this category of sources is the journal of the German Palestinian Association, *Festschrift des Deutschemark Palestine Veering*, or ZDPV for short. This journal began to publish articles on subjects related to Palestine in 1879, and is still published today on an annual basis. The ZDPV was created specifically to bolster Germany's imperialist competition with Great Britain for the Ottoman Empire. The German and Austrian scholars decided to compete with their British counterparts by establishing an organization that emphasized fields such as landscape surveys, archeology, history, climate, environment, urban and rural studies, and infrastructure planning, railway, theology and Semitic languages. The research published in the ZDPV tended to be of superior quality, and was more accurate and objective than the British works of the time. This research cites many articles from ZDPV, such as the work of Gustaf Dalman, *Palestinischer Diwan*, on Palestinian culture and the landscape survey of the Austrian engineer Schick on the railway projects through Tulkarm.¹⁹

The eighth category consists of the memoirs and biographies of many politicians, religious men, local elites, poets and community leaders who, through their accounts, help us to envision the socio-political system that emerged after the implementation of the Tanzimat and the Ottoman Constitution. *Ayyam al-Siba (Days of Youthfulness, 1986)*, the memoirs of Dr Yusuf Haykal, who held a PhD in Law from the University of London, articulate many local aspects of Tulkarm's society and the relation between Tulkarm and Jaffa. Haykal's oldest sister, Asya, was married to Mr Yusuf Hanun from Tulkarm, an orange and citrus fruit merchant who, with his four brothers, owned large orange and citrus groves west of Tulkarm. Dr Haykal visited Tulkarm many times with his family before World War I. From 1915 to 1918 his family relocated to Tulkarm because the British

Navy began bombarding the coastal cities and harbours such as Jaffa.²⁰ He described the economic crisis, shortage of food supplies, starvation, the movements of the Ottoman and German armies, the plague of locusts, the withdrawal of both Ottoman and German armies from Tulkarm on September 20, 1918, and the activities of local leaders and elites of the area. Ahmad Shuqayri, the first chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, spent early childhood in Tulkarm from 1908 to 1915 before he was sent back to his father's, Shaykh As`ad Shuqayri, house in Acre. He mentioned Tulkarm in his book *Arbua`un `Aman fi al-Haya al-`Aamah (Forty Years in Public Life)*.²¹

This work also employs the biography written by Ghada Bettlow on the life of the famous Palestinian poet `Abd al-Karim al-Karmi (1908–1980). Al-Karmi had two nicknames: “The Olive Tree of Palestine” and “Abu Salma”. Al-Karmi was born and raised in Tulkarm. He moved with his father, Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi, to Damascus in 1919, where he finished his education. Abu Salma honoured his father by writing his biography, entitled *Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi, 1850–1935: Sirathu al `Ilmiyyah wa al-Siyasiyyah (The Scientific and Political biography of Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi)*. Shaykh al-Karmi graduated from Al-Azhar in Cairo, where he was a student of Jamal Al-Din al-Afghani and a friend of Shaykh Muhammad Abdu, the famous Egyptian Islamic reformer. In 1895 he was appointed by the Ottoman authority to be the Mufti of Bani Sa`b (Tulkarm). He was a member of Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya (the Decentralization Party). The Ottoman authorities arrested him for his political activities and sent him to the Central Prison in Damascus, where he was imprisoned from 1916 to 1918. He represented Tulkarm in the General Syrian Assembly in 1919 with Salim `Abd al-Rahman Hajj Ibrahim. In 1922, after the collapse of the Faysal regime, he was appointed as the chief of the supreme court of Trans-Jordan.<sup>22</sup> The books of `Ajaj Nwihid *Rijal Min Filastin (Men from Palestine: Biographies, 1978)*, Yaqub al-`Awdat, *`Alam al-Fikr wa al-Adab fi Filastin (Intellectuals from Palestine, 1981)*, and `Adil Man`a, *`Alam Filastin Fi al-Qarn al-Tas`a `Ashr (The Distinguished People of Palestine in the Nineteenth Century, 1990)* were used as reference sources on public figures for this study.²³

Local history books comprise the ninth set of primary sources for this research, including *Tarikh Jabal Nablus (History of Nablus Region, 1976)*

by Ihsan al-Nimr,²⁴ `Ali Hassan's *Qissat Madinat Tulkarm (The Story of Tulkarm, 1983)*<sup>25</sup> and *Tulkarm laha Tarikh (Tulkarm Has a History, 1990)* by Ibrahim al-Barqawi.<sup>26</sup> These sources tend to suffer credibility problems, as authors like al-Nimr and al-Barqawi came from old `ayan families and produced studies that favoured their families. The al-Barqawis were local leaders in the Tulkarm area along with the al-Jayusis. Both families had strong ties with other leaders in the area through the semi-feudal system. At the same time, we cannot afford to neglect these sources, as many contemporary historians, such as Doumani and Man`a, have cited them. These sources will therefore be used with great caution. Of these local sources, two credited books were used, *al-`Arab wa al-`Uruba (Arab and Arabism)*, written by Muhammad `Izzat Darwazh,²⁷ and `Abd Al-Rahman al-Mhruk's book monograph, *Physical Planning and The Physical Spatial Structure of The Human Settlement: The Case of Palestine from Late 19th Century to 1994 with Special Reference to Tulkarm City, West Bank*.²⁸

Many histories, geographies and travel accounts were consulted to support the general argument of this research. The travel account of Mohamet (Muhammad) Rafiq al-Tamimi and Mohamet Bahjat al-Katib, *Bayrut Vilayat (Beirut Province)*, is a valuable source. Al-Tamimi and al-Katib recorded their travel experiences in the Beirut Province from 1914 to 1916. Their book is generally recognized as an important source of information related to the province, such as economic activities, history, culture, education, population, religions, antiquities, the environment, and general social issues such as morality, health conditions, languages, literature and customs. This journey was undertaken at the behest of Beirut's governor, Azmi Bek, who requested that the director of the Beirut Trade Office, al-Tamimi, and the Principal of al-Maktab al-Sultani, al-Katib, tour the province in order to write a scientific and sociological guide book that would be useful for both government officials and the inhabitants of the province. The guidebook would also help to inform the government of the needs and hopes of the people and to explore its future plans for each district, sub-district and sub-sub district. The authors visited Tulkarm in 1915 and left a detailed account.²⁹

Alexander Scholch, the late German historian, and the author of *Palestine in Transformation: 1856–1882: Studies in Social, Economic and Political Development* is esteemed as the pioneer among the western

historians who have researched the social and economic history of Palestine in the late Ottoman era. His work was based on the massive use of western archival and diplomatic materials and the use of local Arabic sources. His book is considered one of the earliest impartial histories of modern Palestine to be written in the west. Scholch paints a vivid picture and acknowledges information that challenges old theories regarding Palestine in a critical and decisive period of its modern history. Scholch refuted the allegations and assumptions of imperialist and Zionist myths, which claimed that Palestine was little more than a barren and empty land, using scientific methods to support his main argument. For example, based on trade statistics, he found that between the years 1856 and 1882 “Palestine produced a relatively large agricultural surplus which was marketed in neighboring countries and Europe.”³⁰ Products such as wheat, barley, sesame, olive oil, soap, and cotton were exported, which gave Palestine the chance to integrate into the global economy. Scholch challenged the earlier theory promoted by Gabriel Baer who stated, “the transformation in agriculture use as a main source of income which was associated with the ‘modernization’ of Palestine did not begin until the German and Jewish immigration in the second half of the nineteenth century”. Scholch concentrated his research on the western sources related to this matter, such as the consular reports on imports and exports through the harbours of Jaffa, Acre, and Haifa. Scholch demonstrated that exports not only responded to the European market, but also that they outstripped the import of European manufactured goods. In general, most Zionists and European historians viewed Palestine before the start of European influence and the Jewish immigration as an economically fragile, politically anarchic and scarcely populated country, a prejudice that Scholch disproved.³¹

The Palestinian–American historian Beshara Doumani has greatly contributed to the field of the social history of Palestine. In his book, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus, 1700–1900*, Doumani focused on the city of Nablus and the Jabal Nablus, as the region was called. Tulkarm is located on the western part of Jabal Nablus and there has long been a special relationship linking the two cities. Local people see Tulkarm as the “daughter of Nablus”. Doumani used the Shari’a court registers and the private papers of elites such as `Abd al-Hadi, `Arafat, Nimr, and Tuqan families in his work. His book explains the cultural, economic and political relationships between the city of Nablus, as

the centre of the region, and the surrounding villages, with which it formed a unique set of social relationships built on economic integration, beneficiary dynamics, and trade networks. Raw materials from the countryside such as olive oil and cotton were manufactured in Nablus into soap and textiles, which was consumed not only in Palestine, but also throughout the empire. The merchants of Jabal Nablus played an essential role as distributors and sellers of the many goods that were needed in the countryside, and as financiers who kept capital flowing. The merchants of Nablus had divided the region among themselves and preserved the socio-economic relationships with the peasants over several generations. They joined in an alliance in which olive oil merchants recommended certain goldsmiths, clothing merchants and carpenters for their peasant customers.³²

Past historians have dealt extensively with the new Ottoman administrative reforms. Yet the discussion of local implications of these reforms is often limited. This work seeks to expand the scope of previous histories that focus almost entirely on the coastal cities. It builds upon the work of Doumani, who clearly sought to illustrate the integrated nature of the Palestinian interior. This work focuses on Tulkarm, which functioned, like other such smaller towns, as a supplier to the main cities, such as Nablus. This research explains the relationship between Tulkarm as an administrative centre and market town for Bani Sa`b villages, arguing that the region had a deeply rooted and locally explicit social formation and cultural identity.

The role of oral history cannot be neglected, if used as a supplement to archival and other contemporary materials. Oral history is a method of gathering and preserving historical information through recorded interviews with participants in past events and ways of life. Oral history records the living memories and feelings of all kinds of people, many otherwise hidden from history, and creates a more vivid picture of the past. Many interviews with people from Tulkarm were conducted in the years between 1990 and 2004. Searching for oral histories is not an easy task for Middle East historians. Informants may refuse to allow an interview to be recorded, or may reject questions about some events that are considered disgraceful to the family history. Most of the data gathered from these interviews was consistent with the historical facts, though some information was

exaggerated. The interviews with Hasan al-Karmi (1905–2007) were very informative concerning his late father, Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi, and his late brothers, Ahmad Shakr, Mahmud and `Abd al-Karim (Abu Salma), all of whom were well-known figures in public life, politics, poetry, translation and literature. Ibrahim al-Hajj Ibrahim (born in 1925), provided useful information about his late father, `Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim, and his late brother Salim `Abd al-Rahman. In addition to the interviews with the former mayor of Tulkarm, Hilmi Hannun, now deceased, interviews were conducted with Muhammad Mustafa Tayyah, Salah Amin Salah, Sa`adah Jallad, Kamil Abu al-Rub, Dr `Awwad `Awwad, Khalil al-Barqawi and many others.

CHAPTER 2

ATTEMPTS TO REFORM

The Ottoman government made many attempts during the nineteenth century to reform the whole system of the Empire. The Tanzimat started in 1839 after the Ottoman army was defeated by Muhammad `Ali in 1830 during the Egyptian campaign in Greater Syria and by the Russians in 1831. Tanzimat, Turkish for “reorganization”, was a programme that based itself on the changes started by Sultan Mahmud II, who ruled from 1808 until 1839. The actual programme was started under Sultan `Abd al-Majid, and was corrupted and destroyed by Sultan `Abd al-`Aziz, who ruled from 1839–1861.

The Tanzimat programme was initiated by reformists who understood why the empire was growing weaker while neighbour countries were growing stronger. The situation was clearly illustrated by numerous military defeats. Inside the empire, there were many dangerous tensions that led to conflicts and demands for autonomy. This had already happened in Egypt, when Muhammad `Ali achieved autonomy. High in the empire there were many people with conservative ideas, as well as many who (accurately) feared for their own positions, and who opposed the reform processes. One characteristic of the Tanzimat that made it hard for many to accept was because it was based upon European ideas and ideals. There were three major stages of the Tanzimat: first, the Hatti-i Sharif of Gulhane of 1839, second, the Hatti-i Human of Tanzimat al-Khiryya of 1856, and finally the declaration of the 1876 Ottoman Constitution. Foremost among the laws were the security of honour, life, and property for all Ottoman subjects, regardless of race or religion. Other reforms, which sought to reduce

theological dominance, included the lifting of monopolies, fairer taxation, secularized schools, a changed judicial system, and new rules regarding military service. In the early nineteenth century the societies of the Ottoman Empire, especially in Greater Syria, began to undergo fundamental transformation. Economic encroachment by the West and incorporation into the global economy, the emergence of “modern” states in the region, and the domination, formal or informal, of much of the area by European colonial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formed the overarching economic and political parameters of the transformation.¹

Ottoman reforms were a response to the decline of the empire that started at the end of the sixteenth century and became increasingly evident in the course of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries with the military defeats suffered at the hands of the Western powers and Russia. Reform was thus an attempt to arrest the decline and to find an adequate answer to the Western challenge by adopting techniques and institutions from the West. It can thus be viewed as a case of “defensive modernization” (according to Dankwart Rustow, father of transitology, which is the study of the process of change from one political regime to another) as a means of successfully opposing the West and preserving the empire. While pursued with a conservative objective in mind, reform actually unleashed new forces and led to substantial changes, ending in a totally new polity.² The reform efforts began (quite typically) as limited reform in the military sphere with the idea of strengthening the Ottoman military. However, it soon became clear that this could only be done by reforming other spheres – education, to bring some knowledge of the sciences, the finances and all that implied reform of the central and provincial administration. It also transpired that some old institutions stood in the way of the reforms and blocked them. Old institutions had to be weakened or abolished to make the reforms effective.³

The so-called Tanzimat era (1839–1876) was presided over by `Abd al-Majid (1839–1861), `Abd al-`Aziz (1861–1876) and by `Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1909). Reform was conducted under the energetic Rashid Pasha and (after the Crimean war) by his followers `Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha. It began in 1839 with the proclamation of the Sultan's rescript Gulhane Hattishef, worked out previously by the great reformer Rashid Pasha with the agreement of Mahmud II. The Gulhane Charter, which was reminiscent of the French declaration of rights, guaranteed certain rights such as the

security of life and property. It promised a just way of allocation and collection of taxes and a regular army recruit, all that to be applied equally to Muslims and the other millets (religious communities). While it was not a constitution, it designated the fundamentals of the new political and legal order and contained the idea of limiting the arbitrary executive powers of the sultan. Most important was the principle of equality of religions and peoples – a translation of the Western principle of social equality onto Ottoman soil. It aimed at preserving the unity of the empire by securing the loyalty of its Christian subjects by making them juridically equal. This expressed in essence the idea of “Ottomanism” (elaborated later by Midhat Pasha), of forging a unitary Ottoman nation. In actual fact, it spurred the nationalist sentiments by encouraging the subject populations to act in defence of their rights. On the whole, the Tanzimat defended the interests of the Ottoman administration and accelerated the process of centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman Empire “an epoch of the bureaucracy”, as the well-known Turkish historian Halil Inalcik names it. Another important reform act was the imperial rescript Hatt-i Humayan issued after the Crimean War in 1856, which restated the Hatt-i Sherif and translated it into more concrete terms.⁴

The Tanzimat pursued a policy of secularism, trying to establish a demarcation between “temporal” and “religious” and creating actually a duality or dichotomy in most spheres. The Tanzimat had its liberal critics known as “Young Ottomans”, most notably Ibrahim Shinasi, Namik Kemal, Ziya Bey and `Ali Suavi. They agitated between 1865–1876 for a constitution, parliament, Ottomanism and patriotism. However, as regards religion and radical Westernization they were more conservative than the Tanzimatists and tried to reconcile Western political institutions with Islam. The Tanzimat culminated in the proclamation of the Constitution of 1876. This took place under the pressure of the reformers, led by the energetic governor of Syria, Midhat Pasha, in specific international circumstances of exacerbation of the so-called Eastern Question. An international conference was then convened in Istanbul following the cruel suppression of the uprisings in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria.

The Constitution was another expression of “Ottomanism” as it proclaimed the equality under law of all subjects independent of confession; it also guaranteed an array of personal rights and bourgeois liberties

(security of life and property, freedom of the press, etc.) and regulated the collection of taxes. It provided for a two-chamber parliament, a Senate consisting of persons appointed by the Sultan and a lower chamber of elected deputies. However, it did not establish a real parliamentary regime. It compromised heavily with the absolutism of the sultan, investing him with enormous powers, including the right to banish any person on will. Some authors see the Constitution as no more than a tactical move to avoid international interference, while others point to the strong pressure of reformers.⁵

Tanzimat reforms represented efforts, sincere or otherwise, to satisfy European demands and prevent the further intervention for which abuses provided a rationalization. Consequently, the promulgation of two important documents declaring an end to arbitrary practices occurred at the time of great international crises, when the fate of the empire was at the mercy of European powers. Sultan `Abd Al-Majid (1839–1861) gathered the notables of the empire and had his foreign minister read a statement that has come to be known as the Noble Rescript, Hatt-i Sharif, in 1839. On February 18, 1856, the same sultan issued another statement that is known as the Imperial Rescript, Hatt-i Human, also called Tanizimat al-Khairyya. Both were issued under pressure from European government and were made partly to appease those governments. They nevertheless inaugurated and gave the sultan's endorsement to an era of reform in the Ottoman Empire. It must be noted however that Tanzimat was as much the result of upheavals in the eighteenth century as it was the cause of changes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.⁶

The hitherto impregnable Ottoman “iron curtain” was gradually pierced, resulting in the emergence of the reform movement commonly referred to as the Tanzimat. Tanzimat ideology held that modern European society was in many ways superior to the Ottoman, and that imperial survival required adaptation to that society rather than nostalgic hankering for an irretrievable past. More specifically, the basic aim of the Tanzimat reformers was centralization in order to get rid of the `Ayan or local notables, and their allies who controlled most of the provinces. This goal was gradually achieved, partly by armed force, as in the crushing of the Janissaries in 1826, who had opposed all substantive change, and partly by successive

reform decrees that in many cases were never effectively implemented, but did begin the process toward real progress.⁷

The Tanzimat contained the germs of individual liberty and constitutional government. It was used to mollify the liberal elements among European powers, but it also sprang from the intellectual and administrative ferment that had been going on within the Ottoman Empire for some time. Tanzimat was a “palace revolution” that strengthened the position of the bureaucrats who were in power. Almost all the changes in the machinery of the government were designed to give more power to the bureaucracy. In 1856 the imperial rescript decreed by the same sultan, which was mostly a product of foreign pressure, was more extensive. It eradicated, at least on paper, the differences that existed between Muslims and Christians, and extended to Christians all the rights and privileges that were enjoyed by Muslims. This meant equality in taxation, military service and education. It also envisaged the founding of banks and fiscal and agricultural reform. The principle of equality for all the sultan's subjects, regardless of religion, occupied a prominent place in Tanzimat decrees. The relative tolerance of Islamic practice notwithstanding, this was a radical idea that contradicted the concept of dhimmis (Christians who lived under Islamic rule) as protected peoples subject to certain legal disabilities and special taxes. Full application was perhaps too much to expect at once. Indeed, opposition to equality came from the dhimmis themselves. Some Christian church leaders were wary of losing their special position as millet leaders. Although the end of the jizyah (poll tax) on dhimmis was welcomed, the prospect of being conscripted into the army just like Muslims was not. A compromise that emerged – allowing non-Muslims to pay a special tax equivalent to the jizyah in return for their old privilege of exemption from military service – was a reversion to Islamic principles in a disguise that pleased everyone.⁸

The secularization of the legal system began on the second stage after 1839. The Noble Rescript, perhaps the Ottomans’ first open break with Islamic principles, announced “new rules” as though to defy the concept of an immutable body of law, and no fatwa by the highest religious authority was sought to legalize it. A criminal code, enacted in 1840, was based on Islamic rules, but a subsequent series of codes, such as the Commercial Code of 1850, brought a large degree of westernization of law. Published in

stages between 1870 and 1876, the Majalla codified the Hanafi civil law, covering contracts and related matters, thus giving this aspect of Ottoman jurisprudence a European form while retaining Islamic substance. Only the law of personal status was too sacrosanct for tampering. The subsequent legal system reflected the growing duality in the Islamic world between aspects of life governed by Western style law and those ruled by religious courts. Both the political and economic measures of the reform leaders proved futile in the long run.

In matters of politics, the “men of the Tanzimat” were hampered by their class origins.⁹ They were themselves the children of the older Ottoman ruling class, and were unwilling to push reforms to their logical conclusion, which would have imperiled the estates and revenues of parents or relatives. The reform leaders had been educated in European ways, which made them Europeans in dress, in manners and in spirit. This tended to a certain deracination, which led them to scorn or ignore the illiterate village masses. They considered themselves to be Ottoman gentlemen, and they not only wore different clothes and affected different manners, but also spoke a different literary form of Turkish that was far removed from the purer but cruder idiom of the typical Anatolian Turkish peasant. Ottomanists were referred to by the Constantinople gentlemen-officials. This attitude was fully reciprocated, which explains why Sultan `Abd al-Hamid II was able with virtually no opposition to dismiss the reformers in 1877 and to maintain his autocratic regime until 1909.¹⁰

During the Tanzimat period, the government encouraged the sending of students to Western Europe, chiefly to France. The first high school for girls was opened in 1861. Two years later, Cyrus Hamlin, the American Congregationalist missionary, opened Robert College in Istanbul. This institution and the American Syrian College for Girls in Beirut have played important parts in the modernization of the Ottoman Empire. In 1862, the Ottoman Scientific Society was formed and many more similar organizations followed. In gatherings of this sort, young men who had returned from Europe discussed their observations in many subjects and writers expressed their thoughts. In the enthusiasm of the period, Ottomans shaved their beards, wore European tunics and trousers, listened to Western music, and exchanged the turban for the fez.¹¹

Apparently imperial finances were the main concern of the Tanzimat in 1839, and the prescribed administrative innovations were mostly designed to realize a substantial increase in state revenues by means of a more centralized revenue system. All state revenues were to be collected directly by and go into the Central Treasury. All state expenses were to be paid from and by the same treasury. The old revenue system was to be reorganized accordingly. To make way for the new order it was decided that the system of farming state-revenue collection should be abolished, and both the farming out of tithe collection and the system of state leases were ordered discontinued immediately.¹²

The abolition of the system of tax farming was the most far-reaching and the most radical of all the reforms the High Council had initiated. Owing to lack of means and personnel, the new system, which through a revolutionary decision had taken the place of a centuries-old institution, resulted in complete chaos and anarchy in revenue matters. In addition the fact that a rather good-sized group of people, consisting mainly of tax farmers and bankers with all their affiliates, now suddenly realized that their means for earlier easy gains had been cut off. It has to be added immediately that many of the notables `ayan and aghas in the provinces also made their money as small-scale provincial tax-farmers.

To aggravate matters, provincial notables and aghas in general found out that as a result of the new system of proportional taxation according to financial standing, not only would they be deprived of the benefits they had previously realized from the inhabitants through forced labour and other customary practices, they would also have to pay considerably higher taxes. The principle of equal taxation and the ensuring abolition of all exemptions and privileges were also strongly objected to by the Christian notables, who until then had been paying very little or no taxes at all. Levying of taxes on the Christian religious endowments, and decreasing their sources of income, turned the clergy, whose influence over the people was very great, against the reforms.¹³

The proclamation of the Tanzimat did not bring great changes at the local level. The old local notables still prevailed not only in the councils but also in the lower-echelon government positions. Just as in the old order, in the new system too, the administrator and the deputies were selected by the governor from among the prominent, most influential `ayan of the area. The

only thing the central government did was to ratify their appointment. The central government was aware of the problems, but the number of personnel schooled and trained for administrative work was far too small to replace provincial officials who ignored the new regulations.¹⁴

The `ulama in many instances opposed the reforms. They were sometimes assisted by members of the bureaucracy who had become established in the existing system and did not want further change. Indeed, they were often not content just to express their defiance by siding with the reactionary `ayan on the councils, but even went so far as to openly incite the population to rise up. For instance, in Nablus, a group of the inhabitants, a number of council members among them, had upon the instigation of the `ulama there refused to pay the new taxes on the soap industry that the Ottoman government issued in 1854.

The Ottoman government believed that the Tanzimat could be best achieved through centralized government and under tight controls and by establishing a representative government with the participation of the nationalities. It was hoped that this would foster a feeling of belonging to the same homeland among all the diverse peoples in the empire, and would counteract the nationalist desires for separation. Some advocated abolishing the millets as legal entities altogether and replacing them with a single Ottoman nationality. Measures to reduce the millets to merely religious functions and abolish their civil autonomy were actually undertaken in the late Tanzimat period (1856–1876). Another way to subvert the autonomy of the millets was to interfere with local self-government by incorporating it into the Ottoman administrative system. The Young Turks and especially the Society of Union and Progress tended to disregard the millets as communal organizations with no political significance. The reforms had to overcome the resistance of various established traditionalist forces: the Janissaries (exterminated) and the `ulama (reduced in importance), secessionist provincial potentates and notables (`ayan), who also instigated the religious and master-minded the sociocultural system. In addition, rising nationalist movements of the subject populations were interested in breaking the empire, not in reforming it. Given that the reformers typically took recourse to centralization (and the crushing of any opposition), securing the support of the sultan and, if not, develop plots or armed

“revolution” against him. Initial modernizing measures, later attempts at liberalization and finally nation-building had to be pursued mostly by force.

The objective of the reforms changed in the course of time as did the nature of the polity. Reform started as limited military and administrative modernization, transforming the traditional Islamic theocracy of the Ottomans into sultan's despotism as a consequence of the elimination of the traditional checks on his power, and the absence of new intermediate bodies to take their place.¹⁵ This became the starting point of a liberal struggle for limiting the absolutism of the sultan by means of constitutionalism, representative government, and individual rights. It resulted in a sequence of constitutional and revolutionary movements (1876, 1808), that were either suppressed (1876) or that produced modernizing authoritarian governments, and finally transformed a multi-ethnic and multi-confession empire into a nation state and a republic. Lending the reforms an overarching meaning was the struggle between Islam and the secular sphere (conductive to a growing secularization of various domains, such as education and law) as well as a process of Westernization, i.e. adoption of Western ideas and institutions.

The Tanzimat objectives were pursued in various ways: by inclusion of Christian representatives in the administration at various levels and in the courts, the establishment of mixed schools for Christians and Muslims, and the promulgation of a law of Ottoman citizenship (1869). This was accompanied by energetic fiscal and economic “rationalizing” policies: improvement of the taxation system, the encouraging of industrial activities, arrangement of a kind of agricultural credit, improvement of communications, and sanitary measures in the towns.

The Tanzimat found a clear expression in the Constitution of 1876. It declared all subjects of the Ottoman Empire to be Ottoman citizens with equal rights irrespective of confession or race. It also proclaimed an array of “bourgeois” rights and liberties. At the same time it declared Turkish the official language of the empire and Islam the official religion. All schools in the empire were to be under state control. While the Constitution remained largely a dead letter, its Ottomanist tendency is obvious. In fact, the meaning of reforms is subject to interpretation by the historians. The major guidelines in making sense of the “Age of Reform” of the Ottoman Empire have been modernization, westernization, secularization (of various spheres

from the control of Islam), and liberalization (the struggle for a constitutional rule and parliamentary representation).¹⁶

While it was elaborated by the Tanzimat reformers, it was also the favoured ideology of the “Young Ottoman” critics of the Tanzimat, finding expression in the Constitution of 1876. Midhat Pasha (1822–1883), was the most famous reformist and administrator in the Tanzimat period. He was appointed as a governor of Bulgaria, Iraq and Syria, and later became a Grand Vizier. Many historians called Midhat Pasha the father of the Ottoman Constitution. As governor of Bulgaria he succeeded within the few years of his tenure (1864–1869) in raising the country from misery to relative prosperity. Schools, roads, and granaries were built from funds obtained by local taxation. His hostility to pan-slavism caused the Russian ambassador at Constantinople to secure his transfer to Baghdad. Midhat Pasha was briefly grand vizier (chief executive officer) in 1872. In 1876, at the head of the reforming party, he led the revolution that brought `Abd al-Hamid II to power in 1876. Late in 1876, he was appointed grand vizier for the second time, Midhat secured the promulgation of the first Turkish constitution, but as soon as `Abd al-Hamid regained control over the situation he sent Midhat into exile. After being recalled as governor of Syria, Midhat was charged with the murder of `Abd al-`Aziz, imprisoned, and strangled. The most dramatic and far-reaching changes in Iraq and Syria are associated with the introduction of the new Ottoman provincial system and the governorship of Midhat Pasha. Midhat was one of the chief architects of the Ottoman Wilayat Law of 1864, and he applied it with great success in the Tuna wilayat (Danubian province) before arriving in Baghdad in 1869 with a handpicked corps of advisers and assistants.¹⁷

Midhat transformed the face of Baghdad by ordering the demolition of a section of the old city wall to allow room for rational urban expansion. He established a tramway to suburban Kazimayn, a public park, a water supply system, a hospital, textile mills, a savings bank, paved and lighted streets, and built the only Tigris River bridge until the twentieth century. Several new schools were opened, modern textbooks were printed on the press that Midhat founded, and Iraq's first newspaper, *al-Zawra'*, began publication. To develop the economy, he promoted a regular steamer service on the Tigris and Euphrates and shipping in the Persian Gulf, set up ship repair yards at Basra, began dredging operations on the Shatt al-'Arab, made some

minor improvements in the irrigation system, and expanded date production in the south. Municipalities and administrative councils were established in accordance with the new vilayet regulations, and military conscription was enforced. Perhaps the most fundamental changes resulted from Midhat's attempt to apply the Ottoman Land Law of 1858, which aimed at classifying and regularizing land tenure and registering land titles to individuals who would be responsible for paying the applicable taxes. His objectives were to pacify and settle the tribes, encourage cultivation, and improve tax collection.¹⁸

However, the traditional system of tribal and communal landholding and the fear that land registration would lead to greater government control, heavier tax burdens, and extension of military conscription to the tribal areas – combined with inefficient and inequitable administration – limited the effectiveness of the reform and produced unintended results. Most land was registered not in the names of individual peasants and tribesmen, but rather in the names of tribal shaykhs, urban-based merchants, and former tax farmers. Some tribal leaders became landlords, tying them more closely to the Ottoman administration and widening the gap between them and their tribesmen. Other *shaykhs* refused to cooperate.

A combination of developments stemming from the reforms begun by Midhat Pasha resulted in a decline of nomadism in Iraq. The proportion of nomads fell from about 35 per cent of the population in 1867 to approximately half that figure by the end of the Ottoman period. As wali of Baghdad and commander of the Ottoman Sixth Army, Midhat's authority extended north to include Mosul, Kirkuk, and al-Sulaymaniyah as well as Basra and Alhasa in the south. He personally led an inspection tour to Kuwait and Alhasa and, taking advantage of divisions within the Sa`udi family, sought to reassert Ottoman sovereignty over the Wahhabi dominions in Najd. His success in the latter effort was ephemeral, as were many of the projects begun by Midhat. Nevertheless, his brief rule set in motion developments that profoundly changed virtually every aspect of life in Iraq, tying it more closely to Istanbul than ever before.¹⁹

The primary objectives of Midhat's reforms were to reorganize the army, to create codes of criminal and commercial law, to secularize the school system, and to improve provincial administration. He created provincial representative assemblies to assist the governor, and he set up elected

municipal councils in the major cities. Staffed largely by Ottoman notables with no strong ties to the masses, the new offices nonetheless helped a group of provincial notables gain administrative experience. By establishing government agencies in the cities and by attempting (to settle the former local authorities), Midhat altered the tribal–urban balance of power, which since the thirteenth century had been largely in favour of the countryside.

The most important element of Midhat's plan to extend Ottoman authority into the countryside was the 1858 land law. The new land reform replaced the feudal system of land holding and tax farms with legally sanctioned property rights. It was designed both to induce tribal shaykhs to settle and to give them a stake in the existing political order. In practice, the land laws enabled the countryside shaykhs to become large landowners; tribesmen, fearing that the new law was an attempt to collect taxes more effectively or to impose conscription, registered community-owned tribal lands in their shaykhs' names or sold them outright to urban speculators. As a result, rural and tribal shaykhs gradually were transformed into profit-seeking landlords while their tribesmen were relegated to the role of impoverished sharecroppers.²⁰

While he was a governor of Iraq and Syria, Midhat also attempted to replace the clerically run Islamic school system with a more secular educational system. The new secular schools provided a channel of upward social mobility to children of all classes, and they led slowly to the growth of intelligentsia in Greater Syrian and Iraqi. The schools also introduced students for the first time to Western languages and disciplines. The introduction of Western disciplines in the schools accompanied a greater Western political and economic presence in Iraq and Syria. The British had established a consulate at Baghdad in 1802, Damascus in 1830, and Jerusalem in 1839. French consulates followed shortly thereafter. European interest in modernizing Iraq and Syria to facilitate Western commercial interests coincided with the Ottoman reforms. Steamboats appeared on the rivers in 1836, Beirut became a new commercial harbour in the eastern Mediterranean, the telegraph was introduced in 1861, and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, providing Greater Syria and Iraq with greater access to European markets. The landowning tribal and rural shaykhs began to export cash crops to the capitalist markets of the West. The basic motivation of Ottomanism was to find a new basis of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.²¹

The “equalization” of the ethnically and religiously diverse peoples of the empire under the law and their “fusion” (as `Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha put it) into some “Ottoman nation” were the means envisioned. The Ottomanists hoped to counteract in this way the divisive tendencies within the subject populations. The model of Ottomanism was provided by various European states, composed of subjects of different denomination and diverse ethnicity. As shown by Bernard Lewis, Ottomanism was adopting the type of nationalism, or rather patriotism prevalent in consolidated Western states, based on common territory and a common sovereign authority (as well as common rights and duties). It is not accidental that Ottomanism created the concept of Vatan, meaning “homeland”, by extending it beyond the local to the meaning of the French *patrie*, and adapted the religious concept of millet to mean a (vaguely defined) Ottoman nation. This contrasted with the Romantic concept of a nation assimilated by the subject populations. What defines the nation in the latter in the absence of a state and sovereign authority is the belonging to a “people” defined in cultural terms (language, religion, customs, etc.) plus common descent and history.²²

The Men of the Tanzimat believed that their aims could be best achieved through centralized government under tight controls. In contrast, the Young Ottomans advocated a representative government with the participation of the nationalities in the hope that a feeling of belonging to the same homeland (watan) would be fostered among them, countering the desire for separation. Some thought of abolishing the millets as legal entities altogether and replacing them with a single Ottoman nationality. Measures to reduce the millets to merely religious functions and abolish their civil autonomy were actually undertaken in the late Tanzimat period (1839–1876); another way to subvert the autonomy of the millets was to interfere with local self-government by incorporating it into the Ottoman administrative system. The Young Turks and especially the Society of Union and Progress also tended to disregard the millets as communal organizations (collectivities) with political significance.²³

Ottomanism found a clear expression in the Constitution of 1876 that declared all subjects of the Ottoman empire to be Ottoman citizens with equal rights irrespective of confession or race. It also proclaimed an array of “bourgeois” rights and liberties. At the same time it declared Turkish the

official language of the empire, and Islam the official religion. All schools in the empire were to be under state control. While the Constitution remained largely a dead letter, its Ottomanist tendency is obvious. Making Muslims and non-Muslims “equal” inevitably meant a far-going commitment to secularization. The Tanzimat leaders were prepared to go even further in this direction than the Young Ottomans, who were more attached to Islam and attempted a synthesis that could only be very artificial between constitutional liberalism, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other hand. As remarked by David Kushner, even if one concedes that the champions of Ottomanism were sincere, the old religious allegiances were too strong and a totally secular outlook had yet to be developed. Apart from that, the doctrine was mainly a means to secure the stability of the state and to please foreign powers while maintaining the dominant position of Islam and of the Muslims in the multinational empire.²⁴

The Tanzimat evolved in response to the practical problems of the empire. Underlying the problems was the search for a solution to the perennial question of the reasons for the weakness of the empire and the ways to improve its condition. There were attempts to strengthen the loyalty of the various ethnic and religious groups living in the empire and to create some common identity. The Tanzimat had different views on the nature of the state and how to govern it, on the place of Islam, and on the relations between the ethnic and religious groups, and on the economy. The ideological trends elaborated their stands on the various issues by engaging in debates. The ascendancy of a certain ideology had to do with the surrounding conditions, especially with the internal political regime, the wars, and the international situation of the empire. Thus, Ottomanism was an attempt to rescue the empire by uniting its peoples; While the reforms could not save the Ottoman Empire, they proved to be the first steps towards the Middle Eastern nation states through secularization and transformation of the empire into a nation state.²⁵

On the whole, the Tanzimat defended the interests of the Ottoman administration and accelerated the process of centralization and bureaucratization of the Ottoman Empire. The Vilayet (Ottoman Turkish for province, borrowed from Arabic wilaya) Law of 1864 aimed at rectifying the situation in the provinces by combining central control with local authority and accelerating the conduct of public business in the provincial

capital. The intention of the law was to eliminate both local discontents and foreign complaints on behalf of minorities by introducing a public selection of lowest officials. There was a hierarchy of officialdom which represented a mixture of centralization and decentralization. Governors holding the highest posts had wide-ranging powers over the police, political and financial affairs, and execution of imperial laws. Viewed from Istanbul, this represented decentralization of authority where the governor could act on his own initiative. From the provincial point of view, it meant considerable centralization in the vilayet efforts since the Hatt-i Hu'mayun of 1856 to improve local government and the functioning of the partly representative provincial councils that had been sporadic. Tours by inspectors had achieved something by way of improving the councils, but only by ad hoc methods such as dissolving corrupt ones and requiring new elections. In 1864 a complete overhaul of regulations on the organization of provincial government was attempted, and a slight further revision was made in 1867. The new scheme obviously owed much to the French example of department–arrondissement–canton–commune, which emerged in the Ottoman law as vilayet–sanjak–qada'–qariyya (or nahiya).²⁶

The representative principle was incorporated in three separate institutions set up under this law: (1) in the administrative council (majlis al-idarah) in each wilayet, sanjak, and qada; (2) in the local courts; and (3) in a general assembly (majlis al-'Umumi) created for each wilaya. For the administrative councils and the courts, the electoral system was immensely complex and indirect. Only the members of the qada council were elected by something approaching a direct ballot. The whole law was nevertheless suffused with the idea of representation. It was still representation based on property ownership in most cases. In addition to their ex-officio members, the administrative councils of the wilaya and sanjak were to have two elected Muslims and two elected non-Muslims. The counts were to have three elected Muslims and three elected non-Muslims. The wilaya general assembly was to be composed of two elected Muslims and two elected non-Muslims from each sanjak. Only in the qada` administrative councils was the religion of the elected members left unspecified. At the bottom of the ladder, the council of elders (majlis al-ikhtiyariyya) of each commune was presumably homogeneous in religion, whether Muslim or Christian.²⁷

The Wilaya Law, with changes and additions, had a long life. Its operation was attended with many difficulties, and complaints about it were numerous. The balance it attempted between centralization and decentralization between Istanbul-appointed officials and local representatives could breed friction, inefficiency, or collusion. The representative element within the system, depending on the locality and the appointed officials at any given moment, was often more shadow than substance. However, there is no question that the law itself was fundamental in establishing the representative principle in Ottoman government and in linking it to an electoral process, however indirect. Some historians have taken a statement in Midhat Pasha's memoirs that the new law was intended by `Aali Pasha and Fuad Pasha as "a preface to a chamber of deputies" literally.<sup>28</sup> This seems, in the case of `Aali Pasha, most unlikely, and doubtful in the case of Fuad Pasha. It is possible that Midhat Pasha, who helped to prepare the law, had some such idea in mind at such early a date. The aim of the law seemed to be simply to secure better government by a combination of some popular voice with central administrative authority in each locality. It is, however, undeniable that when the constitution of 1876 was being prepared, the electoral law that accompanied it was based squarely on the electoral provisions of the wilaya law.²⁹

The first connection between the provincial assemblies and an organ of the central government was soon made when the former Majlis al-waliya was replaced by the Council of State (majlis al-wilaya) in 1868. The Council of State, now the major law-drafting body of the empire, was to meet each year with three or four delegates from the general assembly of each wilayet and to discuss with these delegates the desires set down in memoranda sent from the wilayet. This marks the first link between elected provincial representative bodies and a permanent central body which operated on well-defined rules of parliamentary procedure and was itself partly representative of the peoples of the empire. The Council of State was more truly representative of the peoples of the empire than its predecessor, the majlis al-wali. Of the 38 original members appointed in 1868, nearly one-quarter were provincial notables. Nearly one-third, including some of these notables, were non-Muslims, though the proportions were all askew in relation to millet population totals. For example, the Beirut state council had four Maronite members, drawn from a minority group; three were Eastern Orthodox, two were Jews; one was Druze, and one was Protestant.

This was representation by religious groups instead of property ownership, but the idea to represent groups remained the same. Therefore, this was corporate representation.²⁸

CHAPTER 3

TULKARM: THE EARLY HISTORY AND THE OLD LOCAL ESTABLISHMENTS

The old Canaanite name of Tulkarm was Birat Sorqa. This name has two parts, Birata, which means “the well” and Soreqa, which means the “chosen vine”. This old name still existed during the Roman period; the village of Birata Soreqa was part of Neapolis district from the second to the seventh century AD. The Arab Muslims changed the name to Toorkarm, which means the Mountain of Vines. Since the Arabic and Canaanite languages are both Semitic, one can understand the relationship between the old and the new meaning. Some sources indicate that Turkarm was the battlefield of Ajnadayn, one of the famous battles between the Arab Muslims and the Byzantines around 636 AD. According to Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, the Crusaders changed the name from Turkarm to Turcarne, which may be interpreted as a branch of the old name. The village of Toorkarm was considered part of the Arsouf Forests of the central coastal plains of Palestine.¹

The village of Turkarm was documented in the historical chronology of al-Mqrizi, *Alsuluk li Ma`rifat Duwl al-Muluk*. In 1265, the Mamluk Sultan al-Zahir Baybars split the feudal revenues (iqta`) of Turkarm between two of his army commanders, Amir Badr al-Din Bilik al-Khazindar and Prince Badr al-Din Bisary al-Shamsi al-Salhi.² The village was captured by the Ottomans in 1516; the Ottoman army led by Sultan Salim went through Toorkarm and its western plains on their way to Egypt. From 1516 until

1918, Turkarm was under the rule of the Ottomans, and during this period the village name was changed in the Ottoman records from Turkarm to Tulkarm.³

Linguistically, the Ottoman Turkish language came from the Hindu-European group. Ottoman Turkish borrowed the Arabic language script, which makes it confusing to read in some cases. In the case of Tulkarm it was so easy for the Ottomans to pronounce “Tul” instead of “Tur”, and since the late seventeenth century the village name was changed permanently to Tulkarm. The oral history of the region provides us with another narrative, that the name was written the wrong way by an Ottoman tax collector, who either wrote the letter lam instead of the letter rah, or he wrote the rah longer so it looks like the letter lam. Condor and Kitchener misspelled the name of Tulkarm – they wrote it Tul Keram – but they gave it an accurate meaning “the place of long of the vineyard”.⁴

Tulkarm was recorded in many Osmanli Defter-i Mufasssal, the early tax registers of the Ottoman Empire, as a village in the subdistrict of Qaqun, part of the Nablus district in the Sham Sharif Vilayat (Greater Syria Province). These records provide detailed information about taxpayers, types of taxes and the taxes objects.

1. Tax-paying household (khane), a married man with his family constituting a fiscal unit. Only the name of the household appears on the lists.
2. Tax-paying bachelors (mujarrad). In the lists the names of bachelors are usually marked with a small mim (the letter m).
3. Householders or individuals exempt from tax (mua`af). These fall into three primary groups:
 - (a) Muslim religious officials such as imams, khatibs, muadhins, sharifs, as well as residents of zawiyas. Non- Muslim clerics were not exempted by the state, and therefore are not indicated.
 - (b) Disabled persons such as the blind, mad, and crippled. In accordance with Hanafi law, exemption on this ground is granted to Christians and Jews as well as Muslims.
 - (c) Peasants on lands that are waqfs (religious endowments) of al-Haram al-Sharif of Jerusalem and Hebron, the Hajj (pilgrims) and

madrasa.⁵

The main taxes on agriculture in Palestine were levied by two methods, qasm and dimus. These two methods, inherited from previous regimes, are probably of very early origin, and are variants of the classical muqasama (divided shares) and *musha`*. In qsam villages the tax was assessed as a share (qasm) of the crop, at the rates of one-third, one-quarter, one-fifth, or one-sixth, according to the fertility and situation of the land. The registers give both the quantity of each crop levied from each village and its money equivalent, probably at conventional rates fixed for accounting purposes. The second method was the dimus. In dimus areas the village tax was assessed at a fixed rate (maqtu`a, or moqatt`a) according to the area cultivated, in the registers this tax was stated only in money. In the majority of villages certain taxes were assessed in money. These included the taxes on livestock (sheep, goats, cows, buffaloes, and bees are named), on fruits, nuts, vineyards, summer crops (sayfi), and certain categories of olives (assessed by the number of trees and not, as with the qasm olives, by the crop), and occasional revenues such as bride (`arus) taxes, fines and other taxes.⁶

In many towns and large villages there was an elaborate list of market taxes. These include taxes on sales of various commodities, toll charges on goods entering and leaving the town, or country taxes on the use of public weighing or measuring centres, brokerage dues, and taxes on the slaughtering of animals for food, on mills, baths, and khans (inns), and taxes for the provision of town and country watchmen. Taxes on industry included levies on tanneries, day shop, and olive oil presses. Each tax was marked as belonging to the imperial or to the governor's khass, while some were reserved to the waqf. The information given on the rates of assessment and the amount collected provide precious knowledge on economic life of the country during this time.

Osmanli Defter-i Mufasssal were the major study of three scholars. First, there was Bernard Lewis, who wrote an article entitled "Studies in Ottoman Archives, Part One". Lewis analyzed the Defter-i Mufasssal of the Sanjaq of Nablus during the years 1533 and 1548. The records gave statistical survey reports of the towns, villages, mizra`as (farms), pieces of land, households, bachelors, zau`ama, sipahis, timars and many other revenues and taxes. In addition, the records indicated the people who were exempted from taxes

such as the al-Ashraf, imams, katibs and the peasants of the waqf of the al-Haram al-Sharif (mainly in Jerusalem and Hebron).

In 1535, all the agriculture lands of Tulkarm were categorized as waqf. The peasants of Tulkarm paid one-third of their harvest as tax under the category of qasm. The population was 95 khaneh (almost 522 people all married). The Karmis (the name used to signify residents of Tulkarm) paid 10 qerats (carat) of wheat and 5 qerats of barley. On average, one qerat is equivalent to 200 kg; in this case Tulkarm paid to Pasha al-Durah, the tax collector, 2,000 kg as tax, leaving 4,000 kg for the inhabitants of the village. The total of the wheat harvest, 6,000 kg, was an excellent amount, for it provided a sense of contentedness, self-sufficiency, and surplus. This surplus in essential crops encouraged many outsiders to immigrate and settle in Tulkarm. Scholars differ in their estimates of the number of persons per khane, but the most accepted average number is five and a half. In 1548 the records show a sharp increase in population; it reached 189 khaneh, almost 1,089 people (multiplying the number of khane by 5.5) and four mujarrads. The village paid 2,000 kg of wheat as a tax of one-third, and 1,400 kg of barley.⁷

The second major source for early Palestine Ottoman history is *The Historical Geography of Palestine: Transjordan and Southern Syria*, by Wolf Dieter Hutteroth and Kamal Abdul Fattah. The authors mentioned a tax record for Tulkarm in the year 1596, based on the Defter-i Mufasssal of Sham Sharief Vilayet. Tulkarm was listed as part of the Badi Shah (the Ottoman Sultan) property list, which meant that the village lands were under the control of the Islamic government represented by the Ottoman Sultan. The village had 176 khane, each with an average of 5.5 people. In this case the population of Tulkarm in 1596 could be as high as 968 people. Tulkarm was the largest populated village in the Nablus district in the late sixteenth century. For example, Qaqun had 19 khana, Baqa al-Sharqiyya 59 khana, `Atil 58 khana and Kafr al-Labad had 57.⁸

The total taxes collected from Tulkarm were 21,600 uqga. This amount was divided into 7,100 uqga for grain, 1,875 for barley, 1,630 for corn and sesame. On olive and brides taxes each paid 1,000, honey bees and goats 1,600, and the olive oil press 1,775. Other taxes were to be paid to Pasha al-Dura after the month of Ramadan; the main tax was the head tax. The governor of Sham Sharief collected this tax for Hajj expenses. This tax was

paid by mature males only: the men of Tulkarm paid 6,620 uqga in the year 1596 as a head tax. The total tax amount of 21,600 uqga was divided into 24 parts (qirat), 23 parts went to the expenses of the Hajj, and the other Islamic endowments like the Al-Madrassa al-Jawhariya in Jerusalem and the Prophet Abraham shrine in Hebron (al-Haram al-Ibrahimi al-Sharif). The one part left from the 24 parts was sent to the Ottoman government in Istanbul.⁹

There was social antagonism between city (in this case Nablus) and country, between central state apparatus and rural direct producers. This conflict was epitomized in the household of the Ottoman sultan. The land and other assets of the empire were the personal property of the ruler, to be distributed for the benefits of various members of the ruling class, who were concentrated around the Ottoman government. The social relationship between the Ottoman government and the direct producer in the villages or distant province of the empire was one of direct authoritarian rule; the subject had no natural or constitutional rights, and the sultan's power was absolute. This relationship was reformed during and after the Tanzimat period, and in the last years of the Ottoman empire the sultan had no control over the government.¹⁰

Since the return of Palestine to Islamic rule in the late twelfth century, the Ayyubid and Mamluk rulers designated all of Tulkarm's lands as a waqf to al-Madrassa al-Farisiyya in Jerusalem which was located in the north side of the al-Harm al-Sharif (al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock). In 1354 the deputy governor of Syria, Amir Faris al-Din al-Baki, the son of Amir Katalu Malik Ibn `Abd Allah, issued an executive order stating that all agricultural land of Tulkarm should be considered as a waqf to al-Madrassa al-Farisiyya. In the early years of Ottoman rule, this waqf was transferred to al-Madrassa al-Jawhariyya, which was located in the Muslim Quarter of the old city of Jerusalem.¹¹ All waqfs are, by definition, khayri, or charitable. Ideally, a waqf endowment would immediately and directly transfer the properties in question from the hands of the owner to a mortmain under the control of the waqf administrator (waqf mutawali).

In 1875 the Ottomans created a new ministry called Nizarat al-Awqaf (Waqf Administration Ministry). Under the direction of wazir (minister) of awqaf, all waqfs were registered and re-documented by 1879. The mutawali and later the wazir was in charge of all public waqf and its related

institutions such as mosques, sufi lodges, schools, shrines, monasteries, hospitals, orphanages, water wells, canals, drinking fountains, roads, and bridges. In most cases the waqf could be under the control of religious figures, such as a Qur'an reciter (muqria`), a Sufi leader or religious scholar, and this position could be inherited by their sons.¹²

Waqfs were established for a wide variety of reasons. The Ottoman imperial family and many of the empire's high officials extensively used charitable (khayri) waqf endowments, especially during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to strengthen the infrastructure of their rule as well as to line their own pockets. In addition, waqf was used as a major instrument to gain political and military control over the Ottoman empire.¹³ Whole villages, large amounts of agricultural land and numerous commercial establishments were endowed to provide income for social and religious institutions and public works projects. The goals were to increase the authority and legitimacy of Ottoman rule, to invigorate economic development, to tie the province closer to the centre of power and to enrich the administrators of these waqfs in Istanbul, along with their local allies. Provincial notables, particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, also used the institutions of waqf for the same general goals, sometimes on a smaller scale and other times at the expense of the central government, especially when it came to controlling the rural surplus. At certain historical junctures, the resort to waqfs proved to be very important in transforming local social, political, and economic landscapes.¹⁴

The majority of the population in the Tulkarm area was Sunni Muslim, almost all of them peasants (fallahin). Under a decentralized Ottoman administration, many notable families ruled Tulkarm's area until 1861. These included Turabay al-Harithi in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, `At`aut in the eighteenth century, and later the Barqawi and al-Jayyusi families in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Tulkarm peasants were closely loyal to the Ottoman government because it represented Islamic law and order. Across the entire Ottoman empire, the millet system had traditionally provided not only for relative security for various ethnic and religious groups, but also as a part of their political and cultural autonomy.¹⁵

During the seventeenth century Tulkarm remained under the control of the Turabay family, a branch of the Haritha, one of the famous Arab tribes.

They had an alliance with the Ridwan and Farrukh families, the rulers of Gaza, southern and central Palestine, and were also the holders of Amir al-Hajj (the prince in charge of pilgrims, an honourable official position during the Mamluk and Ottoman eras). These relationships developed through military alliance and loyalty, but also through marriage and kinship between the three families. The three families had to share their resources in order to buy arms, acquire estates for other allies, and pay Bedouin shaykhs who joined them. The joint economic venture created a new long-term reason for the alliance and renewed interests between those families. The assets of the Ridwans, Farrukhs, and Turabays became inextricably bound together. In some cases these families were involved in corrupt deals and used their influence to break religious laws concerning endowments.¹⁶

According to Mahkama Shariyya Sijil (the Islamic Court of law records) of Nablus, a questionable business deal was made through the Islamic court regarding the waqf of Tulkarm between `Assaf Pasha, a son of Farrukh Pasha, and Husayn Pasha Ridwan, the governor of Gaza:

His Excellency `Assaf Pasha, governor of Nablus and Amir al-Hajj, leases from Mustafa Aga ibn Sulayman Tuqlizade, with his own money, on his own behalf, what the latter had himself leased from the exalted Amir al-Ummara Husayn Pasha, the governor of Gaza. This same property was leased by Husayn Pasha from the famous `alim, Jarallah, the mufti of the Hanafis in Jerusalem, who is also supervisor and comptroller of the waqf of al-Jawhaiyya Madrasa and al-Uthmaniyya Madrasa in Jerusalem. The first rental contract was signed in accordance with a legal ruling in the court of Gaza on 26 Rabi`a al-Thani of the year mentioned below. The property rented is a tract of land named al-Maqsam, measuring 42.5 out of 60 faddan, in the land of the village of Tulkarm. The area known by all concerned and recognized by the inhabitants, which renders its exact description here unnecessary. The leases is permitted to use the land for winter and summer crops, and for other accepted uses for period of one year beginning on 26 Rabi`a al-Thani of 1066 H. The rental is 250 ghurish paid directly to the lessor. The present lessee acknowledge having received the property. All this was proved and certified at the qadi's court after all the shari`a aspects of the

matter were taken into account. Recorded on 15 of Rajab 1066 H. (Nablus Mahkama Shariyya, Sijil, 1:43 #3. 15 Rajab 1066/ May 9, 1656).¹⁷

It is clear from this document and other records that the Farrukhs and the Ridwans were involved in a long series of joint business ventures, not all of them in accordance with Shari`a law or any Ottoman common law. This record is imbued with shai`ah legalistic jargon and raises some interesting questions: Why was such a long chain of lessors needed? Why did `Assaf Pasha, the governor of Nablus, need the mediation of his father in-law, Husayn Pasha, and another Ottoman officer to rent a tract of land from a waqf in Tulkarm? There was another waqf in Tulkarm, the waqf of al-Zawiyya al-Rifa`iyya. The Ottoman authorities approved the waqf of this sufi monastery, which included all the lands of Harat al-Fuqaha` (the southwestern part of the village) and many fertile lands in the west of Tulkarm. The waqf of Zawiyya was canceled in the late Ottoman period and the lands were reissued as a waqf of the Hijaz railway by 1905. The waqf financed not only religious institutions but also public buildings, highways, bridges, and the like. It was, moreover, an important factor in economic life.¹⁸

Many kinds of waqfs existed in the Ottoman Empire, such as the public waqf (`amm), special waqf (khas) and family waqf (dhuri). Most waqfiyyat contained many conditions. The income of the waqf must first be used for renovation of the property and for its maintenance, and only the residue of the income could be distributed among the beneficiaries. It was forbidden to lease the property for a period longer than four years in one term; the waqf administrator (mutawalli) was free to include or exclude beneficiaries. The Islamic Court of Law was considered the legal guardian of Muslim, Jewish and Christian waqfs. There were many reasons behind establishing waqfs in the Ottoman Empire. First was the security provided for the founder's property, protecting it against confiscation by state authorities. Second, was the tax exemption for the waqf property, which in most cases had been mulk (private) property before its endowment and was theoretically not exempted from taxes according to Ottoman law.¹⁹

Family politics and social organizations

Tulkarm is located in a strategic setting between the foothills of Jabal Nablus and the costal plains of Palestine. Directly to the west are the Costal Plains, Wadi al-Sha`ir (the Barley Valley) lies to the north, Wadi al-Tin (the Figs Valley) to the south, and the Nablus hills and mountains to the east. This geographical and topographical location made the village unique for many reasons. First, it is the first hill that faces travelers from the coastal plains to the central hills and mountains of Palestine. Second, Tulkarm is on the main entrance path between Nablus, the major city of the central mountains, and the Mediterranean Sea and coastal plains throughout Wadi al-Sha`air. Third, the village houses are located on the top of a hill at an elevation of 125 metres above sea level with smooth deviation to the west, allowing the inhabitants to command a view of the surrounding country and providing a nearly impregnable defence in ordinary village-to-village warfare, as well as from any invaders.²⁰

Even though the coastal plains are more fertile than the hills, Tulkarm had two advantages from this location; it was healthier and safer. Throughout history, the coastal plains were the natural geographic path for travelers, caravans and invaders of Palestine, such as the Crusaders, Napoleon, and the Bedouin. The creeks and small rivers in the costal plains made many marshes during winter and spring, which in turn caused malaria. Therefore, villages like Tulkarm, which possessed both plain and hill land, would be located in the higher ground. Peasants descended to the plains to sow and reap, sometimes erecting small huts and tents in which to spend the early spring and summer. Thus, the hill of Tulkarm served as redoubts for Karmi (people from Tulkarm) farmers when refuge was necessary, with the result that throughout the period before the Tanzimat, the Tulkarm hill was densely populated relative to available resources.²¹

In the times of insecurity, especially when the feuds between villages led to revenge, Tulkarm village history provides the social, political, and economic conditions in which the majority of Palestine's inhabitants lived before the serious implications of the Ottoman Tanzimat. The village had to be self-sufficient, because the absence of a strong government combined with the ruggedness of the country to make long-distance communications and trade difficult.²² There were three water sources in Tulkarm: first, the

water collected from rain during the winter and stored in water wells in every house of the village; second, the water from natural well spring in the west side of the village; and third, water from Wadi al-Sha`ir located north of the village. Since Wadi al-Sha`ir was considered the natural border between Tulkarm, Shwukah and Dhanabah there were many violent disputes between the fellahin of these villages. Villages in the Tulkarm area fought over water sources and grazing rights. Logically, the Karmis built the village in a defensible location in order to withstand forays by their enemies. The archeologists of Palestine developed a theory about the physical structures of Palestine villages. The theory said that one can trace and follow the physical developments and constructions of the Palestinian villages throughout their history by finding their highest point (in some cases it may be the tower, the burj), around which the early village clustered.²³

Tulkarm was constructed with a defence in mind. The white stone houses were built on top of the hill around the Old Mosque. They were built very close to each other with very wide walls. There were two kinds of house holdings in Tulkarm, the Hush and the `Aqd (the private house).²⁴ The hush was a subdivision of many close rooms, in general ten to 20, and animal barns. The hush had one or two gates with a closed circle in the middle, which was shared publicly by all the inhabitants. Hush residents were from the same clan (hamula). The sizes of rooms differed from one Hamula to another according to the available financial resources.²⁵ Some rooms, called bayka, occupied large space with large walls. The bayka rooms had three to four columns connected to each other with arches, which were used for extra space for storing household equipment.²⁶ Each hush held an average of six to ten families, but most of families lived independently. The famous hushs in Tulkarm were hush `Alabih, Sawad and Abu al-Rub and hush Tarabih.

The second type of house holdings was the `aqd (the private house). There were many reasons for the Karmis to leave the hush system for the `aqd. First, the families had a natural expansion in their numbers and the hush became overcrowded. This population increase forced the people to build outside the hush. The `aqd were independent house units, that had primarily two rooms, one for rest and sleep, and another that served as an animal barn.²⁷ Livestock was very valuable for the fellahin in their

agricultural work and it was also a sign of wealth. There was a special place to store food supplies, the *khabiyya* (the hidden place), mainly grains like wheat, barley, and beans like lentil.²⁸ The *`aqd* was surrounded by a *hakura*, a grove planted with fruit trees, like figs and almonds, and had some gardens to grow vegetables and herbs.<sup>29</sup> In every house there was a cistern to collect rain water in the winter and early spring and store it for use during the dry season of summer. *`Aqds* were built from strong white limestone, mortared together and covered with plaster.³⁰ The ceiling formed a small dome with balanced bending and edges to allow the collection of rainwater. Every side of the *`aqd* had clay pipes connected to the cistern. The wealthy families started to add a roof or a second floor to their *`aqd*, which they called *`ailyya* (highest floor).<sup>31</sup> The *`aliyyas* started to appear in Tulkarm after 1865, following implementation of the Tanzimat, and the restoration of safety and security and the social transformations that took place during that period.

As with many other Palestinian villages, Tulkarm was inhabited by family groups (*hamulas*). The family members of the *hamula* were related to one another through a common ancestor on their father's side, through blood relation, by kinship and marriage, and by loyalty. Most common was the blood relation. The constituent *hamula* remained the same generation after generation, lending stability and social calmness to many of the village families. This social calmness allowed for continued exploitation of the soil by families whose rights to the land were based on custom, not written law.³²

Strangers who came to live in Tulkarm had to be adopted through a kinship relation with one of the established *hamulas* in order to be fully accepted and integrated into the village. This was the case between the Sawad family and Abu al-Rub families in the late eighteen century. Two members of Abu al-Rub family moved to Tulkarm from Qabatyya after a land dispute within the family. The Sawad family adopted the newcomers through marriage, and thereafter the Abu al-Rub family was considered part of Sawad *hamula*. The main reason for this adoption was the social status of the Abu al-Rub as the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, which gave them the title of *Ashraf*. Until 1910 *Ashraf* had many privileges in the Ottoman Empire, including tax exemptions, an exemption from serving in the Ottoman army, high social status, special dress code (mainly green

turbans and green coats), and membership in the Niqabat al-Ashraf of Nablus district. Kinship with the Abu al-Rub family gave the Sawad family the courage to seek the position of Tulkarm local rulers and develop strong ties with the al-Barqawi family, the rulers of Wadi al-Sh`air al-Gharbi (the western part of al-Sh`air valley). The last local ruler of Tulkarm before the implementation of the Tanzimat was Salem Sawad, who voluntarily gave up his authority to the new Ottoman government in the 1860s.³³

Members of a hamula had many obligations to one another. The families of the hamula lived in the same residential quarter (hara) of the village. The land tenure of the same hamula was shared under the *musha`* system. Lands belonging to members of a particular hamula were next to each other. Importantly, all members of the same hamula were held responsible for a wrong committed by any one of them, and at the same time all were entitled to receive compensation or exact punishment for a wrong committed against any one of them.³⁴

As a tradition, marriage was restricted to within hamula limits, reinforcing the hamula structure and social system. Rose Mary Sayigh describes this marriage system as a coherent system; a village was a family of families, closely linked by a shared history, interests and continuous intermarriage.³⁵ Tulkarm traditions were passed on by both mothers and fathers to their children, encouraging village particularism which was culturally expressed in embroidery and fashion styles, dialect songs, folk sayings and dishes, weddings ceremonies, religious activities and the `aqdeh (helping each other in building houses during the summer season).³⁶

The *musha`* land system was a communal land tenure characterized by a periodic redistribution of agriculture plots among peasant cultivators. Its practice differed from village to village and also changed over the course of time. The *musha`* system was a model of social organization, providing an all too facile explanation for both the origin and demise of social changes from semi-nomadic communal pasturage to stable agriculture settlement. *Musha`* was allegedly maladapted to the intensive production and co-operation required of a functionally viable society. This system did not benefit the fellahin. Kenneth Stein describes this system as:

[T]he *musha`* land system evolved from tribal organization in which there were common grazing rights over certain territory ...

the most harmful aspect ... was its process of periodic redistribution. Most fellahin lacked interest in improving their temporally held land when the fruits of improvements would be taken from them ... manuring, weeding, terracing, or crop alternation was rarely employed, and the already nutrient-deficient soil was future depleted ... Local notables and landowners who were most often entitled to large percentages of rent and shear ... were unwilling to give the local economic development and political leverage that the maintained over a musha` community. When musha` shareholders fell into debt, they often remitted their shares as debt payment and remained as tenants on land they once owned collectively ... musha` shears that developed through inheritance forced a fixed amount of land area be divided among a geometrically increasing number of heirs ... musha` was described by every major authority on land in Palestine as the most debilitating factor affecting the fellahin economic betterment.³⁷

The hamula system was a corporate patronymic group; in most cases it was defined by tracing the family to the fifth grandfather, but in some cases it was not genealogically integrated. Nevertheless, membership in the corporation was expressed in patrilineal idiom; aid due (`awan) to a member of the same hamula was aid owed to patrilineal kinsman. If a man was too sick to plough, harvest or thresh, it was incumbent upon his fellow hamula members to come to his aid. If he was in conflict with someone outside the hamula, then members of his hamula would be obliged to come to his defence. When this happened, the whole residential quarter of the village might be converted into one strong line of soldiers. Hamula members also exercised a marked degree of control over the disposition of each other's women. Although direct lineal kinsmen had first say as to who their relatives should or should not marry, other hamula members could vote on giving women in marriage to another hamula. Moreover, the fact that hamula members were adjacent plot holders in the musha` lands required constant co-operation in agriculture details. The political, economic, and social integrity of the multifunctional village hamula were bound together.³⁸

The village was also a moral agent that encouraged the political, social, and economic association of the different hamulas, with great influence of the chieftain on the social system. Conflict between hamulas was subject to arbitration of at least those village elders whose own families were not directly involved. The patriarchal social system of the elders (ikhtiyariyya) assured the common defence of the village against attack and set the particular modalities for protecting the village patrimony. For example, in anticipation of a Bedouin raid during harvest time, the elders would call upon the hamulas to help one another to cut and bury away the greatest quantity of crop in the shortest possible time. The elders also mediated between government authorities and the various hamulas, although there was a greater tendency for a hamula to come to its own terms with the agents of the government, especially in matters of tax collection.³⁹

Tulkarm was divided into five sections called harat (singular hara). The centre of the village was the Old Mosque or Jama` al- Shaykh `Ali al-Jazri al-Mugrabi. The five sections were the western, eastern, northern, southern (al-qabala) and al-Fuqaha (the scholars) haras. Those families which were considered to be the original families of Tulkarm were established by the end of the eighteenth century. The families of the eastern hara were Abu Shannab, Hamshari, Badran al-Shraqa, and from this latter family offshoots like Abu Safiyya, Hatu, Dal`ab, al-Akhras, and `Abd al- Hadi. In al-Qabala (southern) or al-Hara al-Qibliyya (the name came from qibla the direction toward Mecca) there are Jallad, `Aaysa with many branches such as Baraka, Surghuli, and Shenar, `At`aut, Abu Safaqa, Karmi, Tayyah, and `Aouda with its many branches such as Hajj Qasm, Abu Khatr, and Nasif families. In the western hara there were `Awad, Qatu, Yaqub, Baruq, Tayih, Zaydan and al-Ramaha which divided into many families like Budir, Badran al-Gharabah, Ashqar, Nassar, Nasr Allah, `Awwadiyya, Harun, Zahir and al-Mabruk. The northern hara had four sub-quarters: first, Hindash, which included the B`aba`a, `Awwad, and Abu Taqa. In the second subquarter of the northern hara there were Sawad, which included Hajj Khalil, Abu al-Rub, al-Ghadban, and al-Naser. The third subquarter inhabited by Jaber's families such as Sabah al-Shamalah, Dana, al-Far, and `Alabeh's families, which divided into D`amh, Zaghal, Abu al-Rus. The fourth sub-quarter residents were al-Mara`aneh's families like Dhbe`a, al-yahya, Samara, al-Zaqla, and al-Balasiyya.⁴⁰

The name of al-Fuqaha hara came from al-Zawiyya al-Rifa'iyya. Ahmad ibn Ali al-Rifa'i (1106–1187) was founder of the Rifa'iyya Sufi tariqa. His disciples founded four different independent tariqas, the Badawiyya, Dosuqiyya, Shadhiliyya and Alwaniyya. Until the fifteenth century, the Rif'aiyya, was the most widespread of all the tariqas.⁴¹ Both the Mamluks and Ottomans encouraged the spread of sufi orders in the thirteenth century.⁴² Al-Zawiyya al-Rifa'iyya was the second centre for religious activities in Tulkarm after the Old Mosque.

The Ottoman regime induced sufis to establish Zawiyyas throughout the empire. Various incentives were given to the sufi orders, such as allocations of land, defraying the cost of settlement and cultivation, exemption from taxes and from the duty to supply grain to the army at low prices, and immunity from interference by Ottoman officials in the affairs of the zawiyya. The zawiyya served as a hostel for travelers and wayfarers and was responsible for routine security in the region, including the safety of travelers on roads. Some sufi shaykhs had garrison troops at their disposal and participated themselves in military and police operations. Thus, the zawiyyas were defence posts or gendarmerie stations.⁴³

What makes the Fuqaha hamula interesting is that they are a mixture of many families with no blood relations between them and, at the same time, they are all related to each other as al-Rifa'is, which related all of them to the family of the Prophet Muhammad. This hamula included many families from different tribes, such as, the Tarabeh, which is part of Turabay al-Harithi, a branch from famous Arab tribe Tay'a. The Huwaliyya family for example was related to the Prophet's Muhammad's companion `Abd Allah ibn Huwal. The only explanation of this phenomena comes from Ihsan al-Nimr:

The sufi sects had mixed up the genealogy lineage between their followers (atba'a) and the Ashraf. All of the founders of Sufi tariqas, like Refa'ai, Badawiyya, Dasuqiyya, Shadhiliyya, al-Qadriyya, Gelaniyya and others, were a pious Shayk related to dynasty of the Prophet. The Ottomans increased the numbers of Sharif titleholders by a new divination. Not only, the descendants of Hassan and Husayn are the Ashraf, but also all the members of Prophet Muhammad's tribe, Qurish, and all the families of the

companions. The Sufi orders had established a new tradition by issuing the theory of al-Mahsub ka al-Manssub. This means that the followers of the tariqa has the same last name and privileges that the founder of the sect had.⁴⁴

This partially explains why the Fuqaha family, which was a mixture of families in Tulkarm, kept the last name of Rfa`ai. In 1913 Mustafa ibn Ahmad Yunus, one of al-Fuqaha family members, instituted legal proceedings in Tulkarm Shari`a court against Ahmad ibn Mustafa al-Jallad. Yunus claimed that Jallad's late father gave by will 790 qurush to al-Ashraf al-Fuqaha in Tulkarm. Yunus submitted to the court a long list – the Fuqaha family tree – tracing him and the rest of the family to Husayn Ibn `Ali, the grandson of the Prophet. The court ordered Jallad to pay Yunus his share from his late father's estate, which was ten qurush. The main witness of Yunis was Hajj Ahmad Abu al-Rub, which made this case more interesting. Abu al-Rub family considered itself to be Ashraf, the same as al-Fuqaha, but after 1909 the Ottoman empire canceled all the privileges that the Ashraf had possessed for centuries. The Abu al-Rub shifted their political interests and became part of the new Ottoman official class, the Afandiyya. Hajj Ahmad Abu al-Rub was the second Mayor of Tulkarm, between 1894 and 1900.⁴⁵

Members of the Fuqaha hamula not only belonged to the sufi order, but also had strong links to the `ulama, with six important scholars associated with Hanbali madhhab. They were the famous Shaykh Mar`ai ibn Yusuf Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Ahmad Al-Jazzri al-Karmi al-Hanbali, his two sons Shaykh Ahmad and Shaykh Yahya, his grandsons Yusuf and Ahmad, his cousins Shaykh `Abd al-Rahim and Shaykh Mustafa Ibn Yusuf al-Karmi. The most famous one was Shaykh Mara`i al-Karmi, who was born in the late sixteenth century and died in 1624.⁴⁶ He traveled from Tulkarm to Cairo and attended al-Azhar at Ruwaq al-Hanabilah (the Hanbali school). Al-Azhar was and still is considered a high ranking institution for Islamic studies. According to the oral history of his family, there is an ironic story behind his immigration to Egypt. At the age of 16, working one day with his father in their fields west of Tulkarm, he lost the family donkey and his step-mother refused to take him back until he found it. He then ran away with a group of Egyptian merchants who usually came in the early summer to purchase watermelons. At al-Azhar, he was a student of Shaykh Mansur

al-Bahwati, the head of Ruwaq al-Hanabila.⁴⁷ Shaykh al-Bahwati admired Shaykh Mara`i for his smart and quick thoughts. Al-Karmi finished his first book *Dalil al-Talib* (*The Student Guide*) when he was only 18 years old. When he asked his mentor to review the text, Shaykh al-Bahwati said, “son, you have already become a raisin before turning into sour grapes”.⁴⁸ This was an Arabic metaphor that meant, “you have already become a professional, not a student”. Shaykh Mara`i eventually became the main scholar of the Sultan Hassan mosque in Cairo. He was the author of more than a hundred books, of which only 81 survive. He wrote on many subjects such as jurisprudence, doctrinal writing, history, poetry, Qur’anic studies and Islamic interpretations. He was buried in Cairo.⁴⁹

Shaykh Mara`i left two sons, Ahmad and Yahya, both of whom also studied at al-Azhar. Shaykh Yahya returned to Tulkarm and then moved to Nablus, a major centre of Hanbali thought. Shaykh Yahya, and later his son Yusuf, became mufti of the Hanabila in the district of Nablus (al-Deyar al-Nablusiyya).⁵⁰ Three other relatives of shaykh Mara`i also became shaykhs; Ahmad Ibn Yahya al-Jazzri, `Abd al- Rahim al-Karmi, and Mustafa Ibn Yusuf al-Karmi, all graduates of al-Azhar.⁵¹ There was another scholar from this family, Hasan ibn Yusuf al-Karmi al-Hanbali whose name appeared in the Tayah family's documents. These `ulama gave the Fuqaha family an excellent social status not only in the Tulkarm–Nablus area, but also in Jerusalem, Damascus, and Cairo.⁵²

The Fuqaha hamula accepted an Egyptian refugee family from a village called Shunbara al-Teninat from al-Sharqiyya district. The grandfather of the newcomers, Mansur ibn Muhammad, was a shaykh who married into the Fuqaha family. His son, shaykh `Ali al-Mansur, took the last name al-Karmi when he went to study in Damascus. The reason for getting the last name of Karmi was because he came from Tulkarm, not from any blood relationship to the shaykh Mara`i family; in fact there was no blood relationship between the “old” and “new” Karmi.⁵³

The western hara was the hara of families who sought refuge in Tulkarm for protection, shelter and safety. This is illustrated very clearly and vividly by the cases of three families. The Badran al-Ramaha family (or Badran al-Gharabah) was originally from Sifarin, a village east of Tulkarm. According to the oral history there were two haras in Sifarin, the eastern and western. The two haras had a bloody fight for unknown reasons and one woman who

was pregnant fled to Tulkarm. She asked the protection of her relatives in Far`aun, but they could not shelter her, so she asked for the protection of Shaykh Badran al-Aryash Badran, the local governor of Tulkarm. She was outside his area of control, however, since she did not cross Wadi al-Tin (the figs valley) which was the natural southern border between Tulkarm and Far`aun. Shaykh Badran and his family were waiting for her on the other side of the valley. When they saw her they started shouting at her to run, but they did not know her name so they called out, “ta`ali ya ramaha (come on runner)”. She gave birth to a baby boy in Tulkarm and named him Badran, after Shaykh Badran, the governor. The nickname of Ramaha (the runner) stuck to this family, but they carried the proper name of Badran al-Gharaba (the western Badran). The family had many branches later on like Budir, `Ayash, Dhahir, and Mabruk, al-Ashqer, Harun, Budir, Nassar, Nasr Allah, al-Khalid and Islim.⁵⁴

The second family that sought refuge in Tulkarm was the `Awad family. This family emmigrated to Tulkarm from Dayr `Asfin, a small village southwest of Tulkarm in the costal plains. Dayr `Asfin dates back to the second century AD., when this village was a Roman town called Theraspis.<sup>55</sup> It was inhabited by the al-Qatatwawa tribe under Ottoman rule until 1799. The village ruins now are part of al-Tereh, an Arab city in Israel. The `Awad family left their own village because of the French invasion of Palestine in February 1799. The French took the coastal plains road in their march to Acre, the capital of Ahmad al-Jazzar Pasha, the governor of Acre, Sidon, and Damascus. The French destroyed many villages on their march to Acre in order to safeguard their long supply lines to Egypt. Dayr `Asfin was one of those villages which suffered from the French invasion. The `Awad family and their relatives Katu, `Adam, Baruq, Qas, and Y`aqub, found refuge in Tulkarm and stayed there after the French invasion ended.⁵⁶

The third refugee family was Tayih. They came from Aldhahriyya, a village southwest of Hebron. This family was part of the Tayyah, a major tribe in the Bir al-Sab`a area (the Naqb). The Tayih moved from Aldhahriyya because they had a land dispute which turned into a bloody war between many tribes in the Hebron-Bir Alsab`a area. One of them moved to Tulkarm in the late seventeenth century and he later moved the whole family to Tulkarm.⁵⁷

Why was the western hara the refugees' hara? There is no specific explanation, but perhaps the answer relies on the old inhabitants of this hara. When the Ayyubid recaptured Palestine from the Crusaders in 1187, many Kurdish families moved to Palestine to fill the population emptiness that was created during the Crusaders' rule. The Zaydan family was one of the oldest families of Tulkarm. This family ruled the village during the late Mamluk and early Ottoman period. They lived on the west side of the mosque near the natural water well. One of the major duties of the local ruler was to collect taxes and keep security. The Zaydans used harsh methods in collecting taxes in order to keep their position and to please the Ottomans. One summer they ordered all the inhabitants, without exception for age or gender, to finish the collecting and cultivating of grains. Almost 25 brides were forced to leave their husband's homes to participate, which was humiliating. The women of the village challenged the men to stand up for their honour. The adult men of Tulkarm met secretly and conspired to kill all the Zaydan family during the Friday prayer. Only a few members of the Zaydan family, the very old and very young, survived the attack. The massacre of the Zaydan family affected a power transfer from the western to the eastern hara. The Badran al-Sharaqa family became the new leading family.⁵⁸

The destruction of the Zaydan family made space in the western hara for newcomers. In order to eliminate any influence left for the Zaydans, the new shaykhs, the Badrans, distributed all the land that had been under the control of the Zaydans to the new immigrants, starting with the Ramahas, Taiehs, `Awads, and later on Habayb. The Badrans left small pieces of agricultural lands for the few surviving Zaydans, just enough to allow them to make their living.⁵⁹

The second reason for considering the western hara as a refugee's hara was its location. This hara faced the threat of any attack coming from the west and the south of the village. Hara al-Gharbiyya suffered many attacks from the nomads, French, and Egyptians. Attackers usually came from the west when invaders were passing through the coastal plains of Palestine. In order to avoid wetlands and marshes, the attackers used the old Roman road or Via Maris route which followed the junction path of the foothills and the coastal plains and passed through the western side of Tulkarm.⁶⁰ Since the topographical shape of the country stayed the same without any major

changes in the last 5,000 years, the route of this Roman road was used to build the railway in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶¹

Throughout modern history, Tulkarm suffered many attacks from various armies, Bedouins and other groups. The French strategy in 1799 was to avoid military engagements in the hills or the mountains and to keep the French army marching through the coastal plains until it reached Acre. Local leaders organized a guerilla resistance. In retaliation, the French army burned all crops, especially grains, in the western plains of Tulkarm. A French column was attacked by the Karmis west of Tulkarm near the ruins called Kherbet Burin, a Crusader castle called Castle Neuf.⁶² The French followed the Karmis into the outskirts of the western hara and camped in the area of the village cemetery. The Karmis and men from nearby villages reacted by sniping at the invaders. The French killed many local people and bombarded the western hara with artillery before they withdrew. The Karmis and men from other surrounding villages then tried to ambush General Kleber (the assistant commander of the French forces during the 1799 campaign) east of Qaqun. The plan was to attack the French, and then quickly withdraw to Wadi al-Sha`ir, a trick intended to lure the French into Wadi al-Sha`ir and then start shooting at them from the hills. The hills gave the indigenous people a tactical advantage in this ambush. Kleber, however, realized that it was an ambush and did not engage them in the hills. He had learned from the mistake that General Dumas had made in `Azun, which almost cost Dumas his life in March 2, 1799.<sup>63</sup> Kleber stopped his pursuit of the native warriors at the mouth of the valley and started bombarding Tulkarm, Shwikah, and Dhenabeh with his cannons. The famous Egyptian historian `Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, reported that Napoleon marched from Jaffa to Jabal Nablus; his army fought a battle in Qaqun, where the French scored a victory. Al-Jabarti mentioned that Napoleon burned five villages in the area of Qaqun. The reports of al-Jabarti back up and support the oral history of the region.⁶⁴

Local leaders and political system before Tanzimat

Until 1858, Palestine was ruled in delicate balance between rural and urban leaders. In an article published in *The Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly*, Stewart Macclister and E.W. Masterman described the political and social life in Palestine before the implementation of the Tanzimat.

Each district (of the central mountains) was domineered over by certain chieftains, or sheikhs, belonging to great families who by their skill in war, their wealth, or their traditional position, were able to keep themselves on top ... The sheikh was first recognized by the people, and by accumulation of bribes and other emoluments, in time collected enough money to secure his recognition by the government as well. The office generally was hereditary.⁶⁵

These men were known as nahiya (district) shaykhs and they exercised authority over the villages in their district. Central Palestine includes three major geographical areas: Jabal Nablus, Jabal al-Quds (Jerusalem), and Jabal al-Khalil (Hebron). This region was divided into 20 to 22 nahiyas (districts), each with its own ruling clan. The Jabal Nablus area was ruled by two families with a chain of alliances, the `Abd al-Hadi family in `Araba and later in Nablus, and the Tuqans of Nablus.⁶⁶

A sharp political partition in Palestinian society existed between two groups, the Qays and Yaman, a division between local clans that went back to the rivalries between the Northern (Qays) and Southern (Yaman) Arab tribes in the formative years of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and their later resettlement in Greater Syria. The region's rural inhabitants were politically linked to each other by their affiliation with either the Qays or Yaman coalitions, which also had urban and Bedouin affiliates. The origins of this division into two coalitions are unclear, but it exercised a powerful influence on loyalties of Palestinians. After the collapse of a decade of Egyptian rule in Palestine in 1840, open warfare between the Qays and Yaman parties engaged in large areas of the central mountains, affecting commerce and the safety of travel. By creating a common political identity between people of different regions and backgrounds, the Qays and Yaman coalitions contributed to social order. The alliances were flexible, which added to their usefulness. Villages and families changed their affiliations when their interests warranted it. Sometimes families of one camp were

splinters of families in the other; this was the case of the `Aotibah tribe, which split into the al-Barqawi and Hayf, and some villages became internally divided between Qays and Yaman clans.⁶⁷

Because of the power of the rural shaykhs, the Ottomans had to govern through them until 1859, which in practice meant that the rural population was virtually self-governing. In Jabal Nablus, the `Abd al-Hadi family led the Qays while the Tuqan led the Yaman. The Qaysi had the red flag as their sign motto while the Yaman adopted the white. It was not only the flags but also the dress code; the Qaysi woman wore red-coloured clothes while the Yamnis put on white clothes.⁶⁸

It was almost impossible before 1859 to have any marriage relationship between Qays and Yaman families. In the Tulkarm area, the chiefs over the Qays clan were the Jayyusis in Kur while the Yaman clan was under the leadership of the Barqawis in Shofh then Dhenabeh. The Ottomans utilized these divisions in Palestinian society to maintain competition in order to assure the loyalty of those families. The divisions between Qays and Yaman made for many bloody disputes, the most famous of which was the civil strife from 1849–1859.⁶⁹ This war ended when the Ottomans began to seriously curb the power of these families. The Ottomans used strife between 1849 and 1859 as a reason to put an end to the shaykhs' power. By late 1859, the Ottoman government started to enforce the Tanzimat. The first and the most important step was to annul the local leaders' power and establish a new central rule over all the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁰

The Jayyusi family

The Jayyusis were descended from Zahr al-Dula al-Joyyoshi, one of the Ayyobieds military leaders. This family is mentioned in many historical accounts of the Mamluk and Ottoman periods. Zahr al-Dula moved with his family to Palestine and settled in Joyyush, a small village between Qalqiliyya and Nablus. The name of the village was later changed to Jayyus, and this family took their name from the renamed village (Jayyusi). The Jayyusis were the shaykhs of the Bani Sa`b area during the era of Mamluk rule, from 1259 to 1516. Some historical chronicles like Mujir al-Dein al-Hanbali and Ibn Ayas describe the Jayyusis controlling the area

from Ramla and Lud to Bani Sa`b. In 1472, The Mamluk sultan Qaitabai stationed his parade near Berket al-Jamous (the Buffalo Pond) near Ramla. Some clothes and valuable materials went missing from the Sultan's tents and he ordered the shaykh of the nahiya, Harab al-Jayyusi, brought to his camp. Qaitabi ordered Harb to find out who stole his valuable belongings and to kill them. Jayyusi could not find out who stole the Sultan's belongings and Sultan Qaitabi got mad at him. The Sultan arrested Harb al-Jayyusi and imprisoned him in the Cairo Citadel until he died.⁷¹

In 1544 the family moved to a new village called Kur after a bloody dispute in Jabal Nablus. Kur became Kursi al-Mashyyakha, the district seat of Bani Sa`b. The leader of the Jayyusi during this time, Shaykh Yusuf al-Jayyusi, was killed with many other local leaders like Bakr al-Gurmi, the shaykh of Gurm tribe. Ibn Ayas reported that Shaykh Abu Bakr al-Jayyusi was appointed by sultan Qanso al-Ghori as the governor of Jabal Nablus in 1512.⁷² The Ottoman Sultan Salim kept the Jayyusi family as the local leaders of Bani Sa`b because they did not resist Ottoman rule. In fact, the Jayyusi family welcomed the Ottoman army south of Tulkarm in the area between Irtah and Qalnsa. A second reason was to assure other local leaders that they would not lose their privileges and benefits in order to keep their loyalty.⁷³

Shaykh Tubah al-Jayyusi was the leader of this family during the early Ottoman rule of Palestine. The Radwan family (the rulers of southern and central Palestine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) had a dispute over the Bani Sa`b area with the Jayyusis. Shaykh Tobeh al-Jayyusi sought a secure refuge for himself and his family in Nablus, which was under the control of Amir Ibrahim al-Talawi. Amir Ahamd Radwan asked Amir al-Talawi to hand over his fugitive enemy, Shaykh Tobah. Al-Talawi refused Radwan's demands and kept his protection over the Jayyusis.⁷⁴

It appears that the Jayyusi lost their influence during the rule of the Radwan, Farrukh, and Turabay families in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the early eighteenth century, however, the family had restored its control over Bani Sa`b. In 1712, Muqlad al-Jayyusi was appointed shaykh of Bani Sa`b after the assassination of Shaykh Muhammad al-Shbiti.⁷⁵ The Jayyusis strengthened their headquarter in Kur by building fortresses, prisons and towers. Mustafa al-Bakri al-Sidiqi mentioned

Shaykh Moqald as the main chief in the Bani S`ab area during his travels in Palestine.⁷⁶

During the French invasion Shaykh Yusuf al-Wakid al-Jayyusi and Skayukh Nassir al-Barqawi led the resistance against the French, even though the Barqawis and Jayyusis were enemies because the Barqawis were Yaman and the Jayyusis were Qays. They had many blood disputes and disagreements, but whenever these shaykhs felt a greater external danger, they unified their efforts and joined together to fight the French. The Ottoman sultan and the governor of Acre, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, ordered all the local shaykhs to join their troops and to organize a resistance. Al-Jazzar sent letters to most of the shaykhs of Jabal Nablus mentioning to them the invasions of the French, asked for their help, and ordered them to fight on behalf of the Islamic Nation (al-Umma al-Islamiyya) against the infidels.⁷⁷

The Tuqan family, leaders of the Yaman in Jabal Nablus, established a strong relationship with the governors of Acre, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar and his successor, Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil. Suleiman Pasha sent a letter to Istanbul recommending that the Bani S`ab area be given to the Tuqans at the expense of the Jayyusis. Al-`Adil Pasha based his recommendation on many reasons, but the strongest was the loyalty and the services that the Tuqans had rendered the empire. Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil, governor of Acre from 1804 to 1819 and Damascus from 1806 to 1808, used his influence in the capital to fulfill his request. In 1807, he issued a firman giving the rule of Bani S`ab to Muhammad Pasha Tuqan with the right of the Tuqans to inherit this positions in the future.<sup>78</sup> According to the survey of C.R. Conder, the Jayyusi family had ruled 31 villages in Bani S`ab area when it was transferred to Tuqans.⁷⁹ The Jayyusis tried to resist this decision, but were unable to challenge the governor orders. Shaykh Ahamd al-Jayyusi appealed to Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil, asking for some villages to be kept under his control. In the summer of 1810, the governor asked all the local leaders to meet with him in Acre to discuss the appeal of al-Jayyusi. The shaykhs who attended this meeting were: Dawud Jarar, Ahmad Jarrar, `Isa al-Barqawi, Qasim al-Ahmad, Husayn `Abd al- Hadi, and `Abd al- Rahman Abu Ghush. The governor ordered the Tuqans to leave three villages under the control of al-Jayyusis. These villages were Kur, Baqa al-Hatab, and al-

Funduq.⁸⁰ The author of *Tarikh Jabal Nablus*, Ihsan al-Nmir added two more villages to this list, Irtah and Qalansuwa.⁸¹

The agreement was documented in the register of the Islamic Court of Law in Nablus and in Jerusalem. Two years later, in 1813, the Jayyusis began restoring their influence in the Bani S`ab area. The Tuqans had many problems with the fallahin of Bani Sa`b who remained loyal to the Jayyusis, because of the harsh treatment they received from the Tuqans. The Jayyusis incited the fallahins to disobey Tuqans orders and to abstain from paying the taxes due to Pasha al-Durah, the governor of Damascus who collected the taxes for the Hajj season. The Jayyusis led a rebellion against the Tuqans and the Ottoman governor. They started to strengthen their castle in Sufin east of Qalqilyya, which controlled the road between Jaffa and Nablus through the `Azon valley.⁸²

The Tuqans sought the help of the governor of Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha Katkhuda, and the governor of Acre, Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil, to suppress this rebellion. Shaykh Muhammad `Auda al-Jayyusi was the main leader of this rebellion that threatened the position of the Tuqans and later on the Ottoman officials. The rebels burned the food and military supplies of Pasha al-Durah's troops in Qalansuwa, Jaljulyya and `Ayn al-Asawar near `Ara. The governor of Damascus Ibrahim Pasha Katkhuda issued three Firmans (executive orders) to the Shari`a court in Nablus ordering the people of Jabal Nablus to restore security and to help the Tuqans in their battle against the Jayyusis.⁸³ The Jayyusis refused to negotiate with the governors and instead asked the help of all Qaysi clans in the area. The situation got very critical by 1814, and the area of Bani Sa`b fell out of Ottoman control. The governor of Damascus Ibrahim Pasha Katkhuda asked for the help of Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil after he failed to crush this rebellion. Al-Adil sent Hajj Shamdin Agha, one of his army leaders, to deal with this rebellion. Shamdin Agha and his troops blockaded Sufin castle and forced all the supporters of al-Jayyusi to evacuate the area. The siege lasted three months and ended with the surrender of the Jayyusis and what was left of their supporters to Shamdin Agha. The Ottomans destroyed Sufin and forced all the inhabitants to move to Qalqilyya. Some families of today's Qalqilyya such as Nazal, Shrim, and Dawud claim that they are from Sufin originally. Shaykh Mahmoud `Auda al-Jayyusi was jailed in Jerusalem. After many interventions from local leaders such as al-Nimr, the

Ottoman government accepted a payment of 2,000 qurush as ransom and Shaykh Jayyusi was released.⁸⁴

The feud between the Jayyusis and the Tuqans never calmed down; in fact it became more intense. Shaykh Ahmad al-Jayyusi the son of Shaykh Muhmmoud `Audeh traveled to Istanbul in 1820 to petition for the return of the Bani Sa`b area to his control. Shaykh Ahmad succeeded in regaining some parts of Bani Sa`b to the family control. He used many recommendations from his clan, the Qaysi, in order to achieve his goal. Musa Bek Tuqan was the leader of Tuqan family and the clan of Yaman in Jabal Nablus.<sup>85</sup> In 1821 he entered an alliance with `Abd Allah Pasha al-Khazindar, the wali of Acre and the successor of Suleiman Pasha al-`Adil, and also with Saleh Pasha the wali of Damascus. The Qaysi clan reached the conclusion that without getting rid of Musa Bek there would be no peace in Jabal Nablus. On November 20, 1823, the leader of the Qaysi clan, Shaykh Qasim al-Ahmad, invited the local leaders of Jabal Nablus to a banquet in order to reach a peaceful agreement between the two sides. The Qaysi included al-Ahmad, `Abd al-Hadi, Jarrar, Jayyusi and Hajj Muhammad families, while the Yaman clan was represented by Musa Tuqan, al-Barqawi and al-Rayan. The Qaysi leaders met secretly before this banquet and decided to kill Musa Bek by poisoning his coffee. The conspiracy succeeded and Musa Bek Tuqan died the next day in Nablus. The Tuqans and the Yaman clan lost a strong leader and competent politician.⁸⁶

Palestine under Ibrahim Pasha 1831–1840

The Jayyusis welcomed the Egyptian occupation of Syria in 1831. Shaykh Abd al-Wahab al-Jayyusi met Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Muhammad Ali in his camp in Haifa in December 1831.⁸⁷ Ibrahim Pasha appointed Shaykh `Abd al-Wahhab as the Shaykh of Bani Sa`b.⁸⁸ The Jayyusis did not join the rebellion against Egyptian rule in 1834; in fact they kept themselves out of the struggle and accepted the direct rule that the Egyptians established after Ibrahim crushed the uprising in 1835.

Ibrahim Pasha put in place a new administrative system in Syria. Following the example of his father in Egypt, he enacted direct taxes paid

to the state, equal rights and duties for all the Syrian subjects, especially Christians, direct control of trade and state manipulation of cash crops, and military conscription of all Syrians without any exceptions for religion or ethnicity. In 1839, `Abd Allah the son of Shaykh Yusuf al-Jayyusi was drafted to serve and train in the Egyptian army.⁸⁹ The Jayyusis were never active in the revolution against Ibrahim Pasha, even though they were allied with Qasim al-Ahmad. The Egyptian ruler approved the position of the Jayyusis; however, later Ibrahim Pasha removed them as local rulers and reappointed them as government employees. The main reason was because of the new policies the Egyptian leaders adopted in Syria to create strong central government rule. The Jayyusis, who were weakened and exhausted from a long struggle with the Tuqans, accepted the new way of administration for a while.

The Jayyusis later participated in the civil war between the Qays under the leadership of the `Abd al-Hadis, and the Yaman, led by Tuqan that erupted into a new war in 1853. The `Abd al-Hadis gained much power under Egyptian rule and they now challenged the Tuqans for the position of mutasalim (local governor) of Nabuls. The Ottomans were preoccupied by the Crimean War, and France and Britain helped the Ottoman Empire in this war on the condition of opening up the Empire to them for free trade and capital markets and to start implementing the Tanzimat with a strong central rule as the Egyptians did between 1831–1840.⁹⁰ The Ottomans appointed Mustafa Thurayya Pasha as governor of the whole area with orders to crush civil strife and restore safety and stability to the region. Thurayya Pasha was given all the authority he needed and was supplied with a new army of 15,000 well-trained troops and advanced new military equipment. The troops and the military supplies landed off the shores of Abu Zabura, a small harbour in the Mediterranean Sea west of Tulkarm.⁹¹ This harbour was the transportation junction and trade port for the Tulkarm area with Egypt and Lebanon. The civil war was suppressed in 1859 when Ottoman troops occupied and destroyed `Arabeh, the headquarters of the `Abd al-Hadi family. From April 17, 1859 until October 1918, the Ottomans controlled directly every aspect of civil life and civil society in Palestine.⁹²

The Barqawi family

The political opposite of the Jayyusis was the al-Barqawi family, the leader of Yaman in Wadi al-Sha`ir al-Gharbi (the western barley valley). Family descendants reported that they are related to the `Atayba tribe in the eastern part of Arabia.⁹³ This tribe moved with the Muslim conquerors to North Africa and Spain. Some branches settled in Burqa, in present day northeastern Libya. Sultan Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi asked many Arab, Turk, and Kurdish tribes from Libya, Egypt, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq to move into Palestine after he recaptured Jerusalem and the southern part of Palestine in 1188. The `Atayba tribe moved to Palestine by the early thirteenth century and settled in two locations in Palestine, both of which they named Burqa after their ancestral home. The first Burqa was a village northeast of Gaza and the second village west of Nablus. Mustafa al-Dabbagh relates the families of Sayf and Hayf to the al-Muqadam family in Tripoli, Lebanon, and the al-Sha`r family in Damascus, but in another narrative these families were of Kurdish origin. The grandfather of al-Muqadam and al-Sha`r was Shams al-Din ibn `Abd al-Malik ibn al-Muqadam, a high ranking officer in Nur al-Din Zengi's army.⁹⁴

The `Atayba tribe was part of the Qays clan, who were appointed by the Ottomans to be the Shaykhs of Wadi al-Sha`ir. They took the rule of Wadi al-Sha`ir from the `At`aut family in Ramin.⁹⁵ In the middle of the eighteenth century a quarrel developed between two parts of the family, the Sayf and the Hayf. The quarrel led to a bloody dispute between the two families in which the Sayfs were forced to leave Burqa. The Sayfs settled in Shufa, where they established a new fort and militia headquarters. The `Ataybas decided to divide Wadi al-Sha`ir into two parts, the western for the Sayfs and eastern for the Hayfs. The Sayfs included a family named al-Barqawi because they came from Burqa – a very common way to use and relate the family last name to the village or the area they came from.⁹⁶ It is interesting to note regarding the `Atayba tribe that after they were divided the Hayfs kept the loyalty to the Qays clan, but the Barqawis or Sayfs changed to the Yaman clan, even though the tribe claimed that they were Qaysis.

The Barqawis were divided into two branches, the Shufa and Dhenaba. In 1770, Shaykh Musa al-Barqawi moved his headquarters from Shufeh to Dhenaba. The reason behind this transfer was the new alliance and kinship by marriage between Zahir al-`Umar al-Zaydani and Shaykh Musa al-

Barqawi. Khadir, the son of Shaykh Musa, married a daughter of al-Zaydani. Al-`Umar encouraged al-Barqawi to move to Dhenaba, promised to help him financially, and assured him the supplies of building materials and construction workers from Acre. Barqawi finished the construction of the new palace and castle in 1770. The construction workers added a wall surrounding the village and the Barqawi compound.⁹⁷

Tulkarm village was part of al-Barqawis` Iqta`, therefore, it was considered a Yamani village. According to the *Survey of Western Palestine*, the Barqawi family had control over 21 villages in Wadi al-Sha`ir al-Gharbi from 1765 to 1861.⁹⁸ Although the Kursi of the Barqawi Mashyakhah was in Shufa, and later in Dhenaba, the Barqawis had special interests in Tulkarm. They dismissed Badran al-Sharaqa from the position of local governor and appointed the Sawad family as their representatives in the village. Sulayman ibn Salem Sawad had many business relationships with Shaykh Nassir al-Barqawi, such as sharing half ownership of the grain mill. This new economic interest increased the alliance between the two families. The Tayyah family in Tulkarm still has legal documents with the signature of both Shaykh Nassir and `Isa al-Barqawi in their family holdings.⁹⁹

The Barqawis have been mentioned in many historical chronicles as a powerful family in the western part of Jabal Nablus. The Ottoman Sultan Salim III issued a firman in 1807 to Muhammad Bek Tuqan ordering him and all the local troops to be ready to fight any British invasion into Palestine. When British troops bombarded and occupied Alexandria and Dumyat in Egypt in 1807, the Ottomans feared a British invasion into Egypt and Palestine similar to the French invasion in 1799. The firman mentioned the troops of Barqawi by name and read, "Incite the Barqawi Shaykhs to be prepared for the battle."¹⁰⁰

The famous leader of the Barqawis from 1813 to 1834 was Shaykh `Isa. `Isa was a strong charismatic leader, whose name appears in many events related to Jabal Nablus during the 1820s and 1830s. In 1830, Shaykh `Isa was accepted as a mediator in the negotiations between the Jarrar family and `Abd Allah Pasha, the governor of Acre. The Jarrars challenged the authority of `Abd Allah Pasha when he appointed a Turkish officer to be the mutasalim (Governor) of Jabal Nablus. The Jarrars and almost all the notable families in Jabal Nablus opposed this appointment and declared their disobedience to the Pasha's orders. `Abd Allah Pasha sought the help

of Amir Bashir al-Shihabi, the governor of Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon). Shihabi mobilized his troops toward Sanur castle, the Jarrar's headquarters. Amir Bashir accepted the mediation of Shaykh Isa al-Barqawi and authorized him to mediate between the two sides. Al-Barqawi succeeded in his mission; the Jarrar's agreed to evacuate their castle and to obey the governor's orders.¹⁰¹ Shaykh Husayn `Abd al-Hadi instigated `Abd Allah Pasha to destroy the Jarrar's castle and to eliminate their power in Jabal Nablus. Abd al-Hadi's behaviour related to the competition between the two families and shows the increasing influence of Abd al-Hadi's position. The Jarars never forgot this, and they sought revenge against the `Abd al-Hadis'. In 1859, the Jarrars joined the troops of Thuriyya Pasha, the new Turkish governor, in the siege of `Arabeh and they engaged with the Ottoman troops in destroying and burning the town.¹⁰²

The three-year French occupation of Egypt ended in 1801 with a humiliating defeat, but it left Egypt in a turbulent state during which the Mamluks, the Ottomans, as well as the British, who had played a role in the defeat of France, all tried to put different candidates in power as governor of Egypt. Finally by 1805, Muhammad `Ali, the leader of an Albanian wing of the Ottoman forces in Egypt, was able to consolidate power. With French backing, Muhammad `Ali gradually broke away from Ottoman control as he set up what was essentially an independent state that, at times, even went to war against the Ottomans to expand the amount of territory under his rule. For a brief period, 1831–1840, Muhammad `Ali occupied Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, a region which he placed under the governorship of his son Ibrahim. The Egyptian army commanded by Ibrahim Pasha, a modern army with advanced weapons bought from France, marched through Palestine and camped in Haifa. Ibrahim Pasha got help from local leaders such as the `Abd al-Hadi and al-Jayyusis. Ibrahim conquered the country and advanced into Asia Minor. In 1832, the Ottoman sultan recognized Muhammad Ali as the governor of Greater Syria. The territory was controlled from Damascus. In the capital and in the provincial centres, the governors were Egyptians, but they were assisted by councils representing the population. New taxes were introduced and strictly collected, agriculture was encouraged, and the Bedouin pushed back. After an abortive attempt to introduce trade monopolies, Ibrahim encouraged European traders by maintaining better security. The Christian and Jewish populations were treated with consideration.¹⁰³

During Ibrahim's siege of Acre, Shaykh `Isa al-Barqawi again involved himself in the negotiations between Ibrahim Pasha and `Abd Allah Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Acre. Barqawi gained agreement to end the siege and surrender Acre to Ibrahim. He headed the group of delegates who went out on the city's wall with the mufti of Acre and the deputy governor of Acre. `Isa al-Barqawi waved the white flag to seek peaceful surrender and to secure the city from bloodshed. This event showed the leadership and the charismatic personality that Shaykh `Isa had. As a reward for his service, Ibrahim Pasha retained Shaykh `Isa al-Barqawi position as the shaykh of Wadi al-Sha`ir al-Gharbi.¹⁰⁴

Relations later soured between Ibrahim Pasha and the local leaders of Palestine. In 1834 the Pasha issued a series of orders to reform the district system in Palestine and Syria. The reforms were not accepted by the shaykhs and urban notables because it eliminated and undermined their power and threatened their social, political, and economic positions. The points of contention for the shaykhs were implementation of a military draft from ages 18 to 38, new taxes that they were required to pay to government officials, state manipulation of cash crops, the disarmament (mainly guns and rifles) of the local people, the dismissal of local militias, and the removal of the Shaykhs from their position as local leaders to be replaced by government employees. The Egyptian rulers canceled the *iltizam* (tax collections) for the local shaykhs, which was the main source of income for them. The shaykhs used to have five to ten per cent of the local taxes, such as the *miri*. The new system, by preventing them from collecting taxes, caused the shaykhs to lose their influence over the region. The cancellation of the *iltizam* system was a major factor that drove the shaykhs to declare a rebellion in 1834. Ibrahim Pasha ordered Shaykh Qasim al-Ahmad and his son Muhammad to pay the amount of 120,000 qurush to the Treasury for the previous four years (1831–1834) in the form of taxes that al-Ahmad collected on behalf of the Egyptian authority.¹⁰⁵

Ibrahim Pasha underestimated the link between local leaders and the populace that had developed out of the long history of strong rule via control of local agricultural lands and strong between the local landlords, religious leaders and merchants. A good example of this was olive cultivation and processing: olive mills supplied olive oil to the soap factories in the major city, Nablus. There were 36 soap factories in Nablus

which depended on olive oil produced locally. The owners of these factories were urban notables such as Tuqan, al-Nimr, and Qasim, religious leaders such as Naqib al-Ashraf Muhammad Murtada al-J`afari and `Abd al-Qadir Hashim al-Hanbali, and urban merchants such as Muhy al-Din `Arafat and Isma`il Kamal.¹⁰⁶

The biographer of Sulyman Pasha al-`Adil, described the relationship between the Barqawis and his peasants as this:

The people of that area (Wadi al-Sha`ir) have very strange tradition ... they (the fellahin) had a blind obedience to their masters "the Shaykhs" ... whenever a small paper came from Barqawi asking the villagers to join his troops in a fight at another village ... they drop any thing in their hands, even if they are eating dinner, and take their guns and rifles to the locations where Barqawi has called them to be, or at Barqawi's castle, with pleasure and happiness. The fellahin never obey any divine law when ever it comes to their master's orders ... Their properties, money, food supplies, livestock were permissible to their masters and to Pasha al-Durah ...¹⁰⁷

In 1834 the mountain area of central and northern Palestine rebelled against Ibrahim Pasha. The leaders of this rebellion were `Isa al-Barqawi, Qasim al-Ahmad, Nasir al-Mansur al-Hajj Muhammad, Mustafa Abu Ghush, Mas`ud and his son `Isa al-Madi, `Abd Allah Jarrar, Isma`il al-Samhan, and others.<sup>108</sup> These local leaders came from both Qays and Yaman clans and most of them viewed each other as enemies. This alliance between those competitors, except `Abd al-Hadi family, demonstrated how furious and disappointed they were with Egyptian rule. The rebellion was successful in the beginning, and threatened the life of Ibrahim himself.¹⁰⁹ The Egyptians lost control of the mountainous area of Palestine and only the coastal cites remained under their control. Muhammad `Ali landed in Yaffa with 15,000 Egyptian soldiers; this was a major reinforcement to support the declining position of the Egyptian rule. Ibrahim waged military campaigns around Yaffa, then marched up the coastal plain. The first village to resist his army was al-Tayba, south of Tulkarm, the second was Qaqun. Ibrahim's army burned the two villages and left them in ruins, and forced their inhabitants to flee. The Egyptians followed the rebels to their den,

located north of Tulkarm near Zita, then Dir al-Ghusun and Shuwika. Ibrahim used harsh tactics such as destroying and burning in order to subdue the revolution. Tulkarm inhabitants sent a delegation to Ibrahim's camp north of town to declare their loyalty and to renounce the actions of Shaykh `Isa al-Barqawi. The delegation consisted of Shaykh Muhammad al-Tayyah, Shaykh Mansur al-Muhammad al-Karmi and his son Shaykh Ali Mansur al-Karmi, Dawud Salim Sawad, Mustafa Abu al-Rub, Khadir Jallad, Hamad `Awad, `Abd al-Hamid al-Hajj Hasan al-Rmaha and Muhammad al-Hamshari.<sup>110</sup> Ibrahim and his army entered Tulkarm and camped there for a few days. Ibrahim accepted the hospitality of `Abd al-Hamid al-Ramaha and stayed in his house for a few days. He appointed Shaykh Muhammad al-Tayah Mudir Nahyya of Tulkarm (local administrator).¹¹¹ Shaykh `Ali al-Karmi was a young man at that time; Ibrahim admired him and ordered him to join the Egyptian army, where he started as a second lieutenant and reached the rank of *Qul Aghasi*. He served in Damascus until 1839, when he ran away from the Egyptian army and came back to Tulkarm.¹¹² The stance taken by the Karmis saved Tulkarm from punishment and kept peace in the surrounding area. This attitude was one of the major reasons why the Ottomans chose Tulkarm as the new headquarters of the qada` of Bani Sa`b in 1876. Ibrahim next marched toward Shufa, the headquarters of Shaykh `Isa al-Barqawi, destroyed the castle and burned the whole village. Shaykh `Isa and his allies, Qasim al-Ahmad and Nasir al-Mansur al-Hajj Muhammad, fled to Hebron, then Karak in Jordan and finally to the Jordanian desert. Ibrahim followed them to Jordan and sent a strong warning to the Jordanian Bedouins not to give any hidden cover or shelter to rebels. Al-Barqawi, al-Qasim and al-Hajj Muhammad were captured by Shaykh Samir al-Dukhi, the Shaykh of `Aniza who delivered them to Ibrahim Pasha. All of them were sentenced to death and hanged in the main square of Damascus in late 1834.¹¹³

Three years later, in 1837, an earthquake struck the region. It happened during the holy month of Ramadan, ten minutes before the breaking of the fast. The timing of the earthquake was very bad because all Muslims families were gathered around iftar banquets or at the mosques. Tulkarm had massive destruction and suffered almost 300 casualties, about half of its population. The Old Mosque or the Mosque of Shaykh `Ali al-Mughrabi al-

Jazri and its minaret were destroyed. From oral history sources, it appears that this earthquake was a strong and devastating one. The people of Tulkarm still, after many generations, narrate this event in horrible, sad stories.¹¹⁴

In 1839 war broke out between Muhammad 'Ali and his master, the Ottoman sultan. Ibrahim defeated the Turkish army, but in 1840 the European powers intervened. After an ultimatum, a British, Ottoman, and Austrian force landed on the Syrian coast; there was a local insurrection encouraged from outside, and the Egyptians were forced to withdraw from Syria, which reverted to the Sultan's government.

Even though Ibrahim Pasha ruled Palestine for only nine years, the Egyptian administration had a remarkable impact on the social life of Palestine. Ibrahim's administration ended the non-centralized rule that the Ottoman administrations had used for centuries. The whole of Greater Syria was transformed into one province divided into *iyyalas* (districts), *mudiriyyas* (sub-district) and *Markaz* (regional centres). The Egyptian administration established many new departments such as education, health, transportation, taxes, and judicial affairs. The administration was very firm in implementing the new rules and carrying out its orders. The economy was under direct control of the government, which manipulated external trade and cash crops such as silk, cotton, and grain. Taxes were paid directly to the government, and the military draft became mandatory with no exceptions. During Ottoman rule there had been no serious action to implement laws and local authorities could avoid payment of taxes through bribes or resistance. The Egyptian administrators issued harsh punishments to anyone who refused to pay taxes or serve in the army. Ibrahim considered Christians and Jews the same as Muslims under the law, with equal rights and obligations and canceled all restrictions for non-Muslims. In addition, the Egyptians opened doors for European investment and permitted the establishment of European consulates and trade representation in Palestine. Seeking European support and aware that the local Muslim population remained loyal to the Ottomans, Ibrahim undertook a policy of favouring local Christians for administrative posts. The Ottomans could not match Ibrahim's modernized army, which in 1839 seemed on the verge of marching on Istanbul. The British, who distrusted the pro-French

Muhammad `Ali, ultimately intervened to help the Ottomans push Ibrahim out of Syria and Palestine in 1840.¹¹⁵

James Finn, the British Consul in Jerusalem from 1848 to 1843, described Palestine before 1856, “The yoke of subjection to Turkey did not press heavily upon the village population ... the fellaheen of Palestine were, on the contrary, suffered to govern themselves pretty much as they liked.”¹¹⁶

Ottoman rule was very weak before 1856 and did not appear in the countryside, not even in a major city such as Nablus. Finn reached a conclusion:

[T]he local factions and by means of the local and native chiefs, civil and religious. Every tribe, clan and village had its ruling Shaykhs or Elder; these were confirmed in of face under the Turkish Pasha for time being, and continued their administration of local affairs as heretofore, according to the local and native codes.¹¹⁷

The governing of Jabal Nablus alternated between the Tuqans and Jarrars and later on between the Tuqan and `Abd al-Hadi families, with the Ottomans playing one against the other. James Finn described the situation:

The Turkish visible government at this time [1853] in the Nabloos district was barely a mere scarecrow with scarce any terrors. There was just enough power for the levying of taxes and as for rival factions so injurious to the well-being of peasantry, they were but as two scales, now up, now down, as the beam of the balance within the Seraglio at Jerusalem was sloped either by means of bribery, or as the factions themselves were affected by the result of their sanguinary fightings.¹¹⁸

The Ottomans obtained “power for collecting taxes” only by offering to support one of the two factions against the other in exchange for taxes. This was the situation in the Tulkarm area before the Ottomans started seriously implementing strong central rule. Starting in 1858 and lasting until 1918, sharp social, political and economic changes began with the implementation

of the Tanzimat and Ottoman reform movement. These changes will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

THE SECOND WAVE OF THE TANZIMAT: THE 1858 LAND CODE AND THE NEW SOCIAL ORDER IN THE TULKARM REGION

On February 8, 1856, Sultan `Abd al-Majid issued a new imperial edict, the Hatti-i Hu'mayun, or the Ottoman Bill of Rights. This firman was followed by three major reforms that made radical changes in the social structure of Palestinian society: the Ottoman land tenure code of 1858, the new province and administration law of 1861 and the Ottoman constitution of 1876. These reforms affected not only the old establishments of the empire such as the army and the administration, but also created a new social order and changed the structure of Ottoman society. Palestine in particular underwent sharp social transformations after the declaration of the land code in 1858. This law changed the relations between the state's ability to implement the new reform laws (Tanzimat) and the response of the people. In addition, the 1858 land code changed the social pyramid and the economic structure of Palestine. The land became legally and individually registered and owned and there was an increase of local and European capital investment.

Ottoman reform policy in the late nineteenth century aimed at furthering administrative centralization, the main function of which would be the

maintenance of social control and an increase in state revenues. In order to understand the mechanism of centralization in the Ottoman empire, it is necessary to understand the state and societal relations at the local level. The state-building process cannot be studied apart from the relations between the central state and social groups at the local level. The important point, which is largely overlooked in the literature, is to identify the state sectors and social groups whose interaction influenced centralization and to systematize the relations between them. Four major groups can be identified as social actors. These actors were the central state, provincial officials, local intermediaries, and the peasantry. This sort of engagement can come through direct contact with representatives of the state at the local level, mainly provincial officials, local power holders, *`ayan* (notables), and intermediaries between other social groups and the state. Resistance offered by other social forces to the designs of the state, as well as the incorporation of the groups into the organization of the state, changes its social and ideological underpinnings. Thus, state–society relations are mutually transformative; different interaction patterns between the state and social groups shape the formation of the state–society.

Within the provinces, different mechanisms of centralization can be observed as a result of region-specific political, economic and social conditions. During the Tanzimat reform period, the general trend for modern state building was not to destroy but to eliminate the power of the old elite and previous forms of political organizations. The second factor was to regulate their relations with the new form of central government and incorporate them gradually into the new system. Three common mechanisms of incorporation into the central administration can be identified. These strategies were: 1) the mobility of political elite, 2) the inclusion of local powers in the provincial councils, and 3) the use of informal networks between the centre and periphery.

Instead of destroying the old power bases, the Ottoman government tried to eliminate their autonomous power and incorporate them into the new system. The main reason behind this was that the old power holder status was challenged by the new state administration as part of the centralization project. The central state appointed the members or relatives of the old political elite to the new state bureaucracies. By transferring the members of three distinct elite groups (religious, military and bureaucratic officials) from one category to another, the Ottomans provided the communication

among them and maintained the necessary support for reforms; for example, when Mahmud II abolished the Janissaries in 1826 and formed the new army. The old ruling elites, especially the members of the old religious and military elite, and their protégés monopolized the top military ranks. Although the formation of the modern army evolved slowly as a result of favouritism, the inclusion of old administrators into the military provided easy acceptance of the modern military by the old elite whose interests were threatened by this new institution. The findings also show that religious officials and local families supported Tanzimat reforms in order to benefit from the bureaucratic openings at the local level.¹

Besides the entrance of local notables into the administration cadres, founding provincial advisory councils became an important mechanism for the incorporation of local intermediaries who had no previous administrative appointment by the central state. In the provincial administration the executive function was separated from judicial functions and given to the advisory councils. The establishment of the provincial advisory councils contributed to the centralization policy of the empire and increased the role of local notables in the decision-making.² The provincial councils were semi-bureaucratic structures since the governor of the qada (the qaimmaqam), the judge or the deputy judge (qadi and naia`b), the financial and revenues administrator (mudir al-maliyya), the secretary (katib), and the leaders of the non-Muslim communities were all members of this council.<sup>3</sup> The remaining six members of the councils were chosen from male residents, who were generally local `ayan. These councils represented the central state in the application of reforms. At the same time, they were the focus of local power. By appointing local notables to the provincial advisory, the centre retained political supremacy, and local notables kept substantial power and wealth. The local elite dominated provincial councils both by being elected to them and by joining the provincial bureaucracy.⁴

The inclusion of local notables in the provincial administration and the mobility of the political elite were achieved via a third mechanism for incorporation into the central state: the use of informal networks, for example patron–client relationships, between the periphery and central administration in the decision-making process. Patron–client relationships can work in various ways. Patronage relations played an important role in

the mobility of the old political elite and in the election and appointment of bureaucrats to the provincial administration. Local notables were elected and appointed to the provincial administration partly because they knew the locale, and partly because of their patronage relations with the central state authority. An interesting illustration of this point is the 1867–1918 mutasarrافیyya (province) period of Jerusalem. Abu Manneh, Scholch, and al-`Aarf all show how local notables, local state officials, and European powers influenced the public life of Palestine in the late Ottoman period. Patronage hindered the development of public mindedness, civic identity, and diminished the efficiency of public service and served as yet another link between the people and the government.⁵

The duality of organizations and the existence of both formal and informal networks responsive to the central state affected the centralization process. While the new state institutions were being created, the old political institutions were not directly abolished. Instead they were eliminated gradually. A number of parallel institutions carrying out similar duties were a striking feature of Ottoman administration. Even after the abolition of old institutions such as the religious schools, which were replaced by the state educational system, the groups whose interests were supposed to contradict the new system influenced the relations between the centre and the province by using their previous relationships, which became informal ties with the members of the new central administration. The old institutions contained certain religious leaders and local notables who had lost their privileged tax farming rights, such as the Jayyusis and Barqawis. The formation of informal ties was affected by many factors, such as ethnic and religious origin, as well as wealth and close relationships with the European powers. The mobility of the political elite and the inclusion of local notables in the provincial councils also became a part of this process. However, once an informal tie became structurally equivalent with the formal office appointed for the same task, a dual relationship was observed among the central state-appointed official who had formal ties with the centre and local power holders, who had informal ties with the centre.⁶

The duality of formal and informal ties did not necessarily lead to inefficient administration at the local level. Depending on the form of special relationship, informal relations could be useful for maintaining central control since the centre received information from two sources. In

other cases, however, this duality served to diminish the responsiveness of bureaucracy to the top leadership, depending on the task. Since two people were responsible for the same job, officials could manoeuvre easily within the structural loopholes and escape responsibility.⁷

The function of the system in the provinces necessitates the consciences of formally and informally responsible parties at the local level referring to their interests. The relationships among the central state, provincial officials and local elites affected the success of reforms and centralization. When the consensus between local intermediaries and provincial officials was maintained, the implementation of the reforms was more successful. The conflict between the local parties, however, constrained the success of centralization. Depending on the historical context and the task, the consensus of parties at the local level may not have been the logical outcome. While attempting to implement the reforms, the appointees of the state could encounter difficulties with the parties tied to the centre. Locals with strong unofficial ties to the centre could challenge the appointed officials by using their connections to higher state authorities. The ties among peasantry, local intermediaries and provincial officials were also important since all parties were responsible to and had strong connections with the peasants. If local intermediaries had strong relations with the peasants, provincial officials could have a low degree of social control in the absence of their strong ties with peasantry. In contrast, direct supervision of provincial officials over the peasantry could decrease the importance of local notables in this dual relationship.⁸

In 1830, the Ottoman government had attempted to implement a series of agrarian reforms. Sultan Mahmud II dissolved the feudal military *sipahi* system in the Jabal Nablus area.⁹ The sipahi landlords, who had tax-farming and rent-collection privileges on miri (state property) lands, were forced to withdraw from the land, receiving a pension in lieu of their former income. Instead of openly revolting against this policy, they chose to manoeuvre within the legal system. The sale of the land only applied to the miri lands. There were no obligations for withdrawal on mulk lands since they were private property. Although mulk lands consisted of the small property holdings by the peasantry and farming rights, many landlords converted as much miri land as possible into mulk property.¹⁰ By the time Egyptian rule of Greater Syria ended, all the *sipahis* (Ottoman cavalry) and *timars*

(Ottoman feudal system) had been abolished and replaced by mulk or miri land. Between 1518 and 1848 there were 427 timars in Jabal Nablus; by 1849 the timar numbers had been reduced to 18 and by 1858 the timar system had totally disappeared.¹¹

The Ottoman Land Code was based on the French Land Code. The immediate object of this legislation was to tax every piece of land. This goal was to be achieved by clearly establishing the title to the land by registering its legal owners. The Land Code abolished the system whereby the right of possession to cultivators was given in the name of the sultan through the *sipahis*, and later through the *multazim* (tax collector). From 1858, land of the miri category (which comprised the majority of land in Palestine) was to be acquired by the agent of the government appointed for the purpose.¹² At first, treasury officials (*maliyya*) were entrusted with this task. Later, land registries were established which to this day are commonly called *tapu* (Ottoman Turkish for soil). Henceforth, the right of possession was granted directly by the state upon the payment of a sum in advance, called the *tapu* fee. In return, the possessor was granted a title deed bearing the imperial cipher.¹³

In the early part of the nineteenth century the influence of European, especially the French, systems of law and government began to be strongly felt among the intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman lawmakers were anxious to emulate the French system and so the codification of laws began at that time. The Civil Code (known as the *Majalla*, or *Majallat al-Ahkam al-`Adliyya*) was also compiled during the same period. Prior to the Land Code, the judges based their decisions on their knowledge of Islamic law and whatever other statutes were in existence. In these circumstances, there could be no certainty about the state of law among the public. To overcome these difficulties, the *Majalla* was compiled. It also dealt with questions pertaining to immovable property and other issues related to land ownership.¹⁴

The Land Code classified lands into five categories, but it conceived of land as falling into one or the other of three main classes: *waqf* lands, mulk land, and miri land.

Waqf lands were lands that were dedicated to some pious purpose. Several classes of *waqf* land existed. Where a *waqf* was created, the proprietary right to the grantor was divested and it remained thenceforth

under the implied ownership of the Almighty. The *usufruct* (the legal right to use another's property) alone was applied for the benefit of human beings, and the subject of the dedication became inalienable and non-hereditary in perpetuity. Dedicating land to a family waqf (waqf dhurri) insured for the owner all its benefits to himself and his descendants; while the property was protected by the strongest legal and religious sanctions known to Muslim law from seizure by the state or its officers. The term waqf applied for Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religious endowments.¹⁵

The closest equivalent in English law to waqf is the trust, but the two are by no means identical. The principle of the English trust was that the trustee is the owner of property entrusted to him; while the enjoyment of the property was for beneficiaries designated to enjoy the property according to the terms of the trust. The obvious advantages derived from turning the land into a waqf induced many land owners to take this step and consequently a large proportion of land in Palestine was so dedicated. However, later legislation and the distinctions created between different classes of waqf affected the strictness of principle that no tampering with waqf land should be allowed, which lay behind the meaning of waqf as explained above.¹⁶

The form of cultivation of waqf land was similar to that of the mulk (private owned) land; that is, cultivators worked for a share fixed according to tradition. Two-fifths share would go to the institution which provided the land and three-fifths would go to the cultivators of mulk land. Cultivators of waqf land, however, felt more secure with regard to future cultivation since the threat to individual ownership and the possibility of land transfer were relatively absent from this form of cultivation.¹⁷

Mulk land was the second class of land. The origin of this class of land was the miri lands (Arabic word means the land of the prince or the governor) given respectively to the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the conquered areas. In return they were required to pay the 10 per cent tax (*`ushr*) or the *kharaj* (land tax on non-Muslims). By 1858, mulk land had been enlarged to include four kinds, which were enumerated in Article 2 of the Land Code. Private lands were considered as mulk, which comprised "houses, sites for houses within towns or villages, and pieces of land of an extent not exceeding half a dunum situated on the confines of towns and villages which can be considered as appurtenant to dwelling houses" and "land separated from miri land and made mulk in a valid way".¹⁸

The miri and later on mulk land was controlled by the Islamic state, which represented all Muslims. The Ottoman sultans granted the miri land to urban and rural notables in return for military and/or civil services. Land in this category was held in absolute freehold ownership. Land ownership comprised two rights: the raqaba, or right of absolute ownership, and the tasarruf, or right of usufruct. In the mulk category both rights belonged to the individual. Cultivation on mulk land was carried out by direct producers, either living on the land or drawn from a nearby village. The organization of production in this system was based on share cropping (hussa or husas) with a traditionally fixed share. The owner (al-Malik) provided the land and, at the end of the season, received two-fifths of the produce. The cultivator (share cropper) provided his tools, seeds, natural fertilizers, and his family's labour and retained a three-fifths share. In addition to cultivation, the direct producers working mulk land had to provide the owner with extra services, such as service on the land and the house of the owner, mobilization of the harvest from the fields to the village, and so on.

Miri land (state land), *matruk* (abandoned), and *mawat* (wasteland or uncultivated lands) comprised the third type. The common element in these categories was the fact that ultimate ownership (or raqaba) of all three categories lay with the state.¹⁹ An individual could gain rights over miri land by cultivating it and paying taxes, but the state continued to regulate its transfer and improvement. The tenant's rights to miri were forfeited by failure to cultivate the land; such forfeited land was termed *mahlul*. Miri land could be converted by order of the sultan into *matruk mahmiyya* (property for general public use, such as lakes or roads) or into *matruk murfaqa* (property for use only by the communities such as public markets and graveyards). *Mawat* was wasteland that an individual could turn into mulk with the permission of the authorities. He could also turn it into miri land by cultivating it for a given period of time and paying the taxes on it.²⁰

The miri system of cultivation was the predominant form of land holding and presents basic similarities with French land tenure. Land was possessed by one *hamula* and the head of the hamula (the mukhtar) was at the same time one of the main leaders of the village. He was responsible for redistribution of the land between families in the same hamula and other hamulas. Taking into consideration the size of the family and the quality of

the land, the redistribution was carried out at intervals of three to five years in an attempt to avoid, or at least minimize, inequalities between deaths and/or births within families. Cultivation of the village land was carried out by families, each family farming its own plot and collecting the produce. Whereas the state had the right of ownership of the village land, families had the right of hereditary possession and use of this land subject to rights of redistribution by the head of the hamula. Under this system the mukhtars of the village were the mediators between the direct producers and the state, and were thus responsible for the surplus extracted from the land. Under the miri system, heads of large hamulas had certain privileges. In return for military and civil services that they provided to the state, the state awarded them extra plots of land.²¹ This land was cultivated either by the members of the village or by outside cultivators. It is important to note that not all heads of villages were heads of large hamulas. There existed small villages composed of different families, and the heads of such villages were chosen on the basis of old age rather than on basis of clan relationship. In addition to the village land cultivated by miri holders, the village used the common land outside the village for pasture and the forests for food. In the case of Tulkarm, these lands were located to the west of the village.

To understand the division of land into these categories, it must be borne in mind that the theory underlying land law was that all land was owned by the sultan by right of conquest, with the exception of waqf and mulk property. All the lands owned by the sultan, comprising arable fields, meadows, summer and winter pasturing grounds, woodland and the like, were termed miri. This kind of land lay close to the villages. Lands falling between several villages used by all as common pasture were categorized by the code as matruk, meaning land which the state has left (tarakat), hence matruk for public use.²²

Vacant land such as mountains, rocky places, stony and sandy fields, and grazing ground not in the possession of anyone by title deed, or not assigned to the use of inhabitants of a town or village, and which lay at such distance from towns and villages from which a human voice cannot be heard at the nearest inhabited place is called dead or *mawat* land.²³ The definition of mawat (dead land) appears in the Ottoman Land Code as “any one who is in need of such land can, with the leave of the official, plough it

up gratuitously and cultivate it on the condition that the ultimate ownership (*raqaba*) shall belong to the sultan.”²⁴

The mulk and waqf categories were dealt specifically with in the *mejella* (the *Ottoman Law Journal*) and other special laws. Before the passing of the Land Code, it was easy to convert miri land into mulk by building on it or cultivating it. The effect of this was to transfer the *raqaba* from the state to the individual. On becoming full owner in this way, the individual was under considerable inducement to pass the land into the waqf class by dedicating terms that would ensure all its benefits to himself and his descendants and protect it from seizure by the state. The effect of this was obviously to deprive the state of valuable benefits. The Land Code was intended to put a stop to this, and at the same time to bring the cultivators of the lands into direct relations with the state without any intermediaries.²⁵

It is worthwhile remembering that these systems could overlap. A miri holder could at the same time be a sharecropper cultivating, in addition to his land, that of the village head or that of the individual mulk. This was not a very common practice in Palestine, however. A change in this system began to become obvious in the second half of the nineteenth century. Pressing demands for revenue compelled the Ottoman state to introduce a number of legal changes with regard to land policy. The Land Code aimed at the extraction of additional surplus from the direct producers. Article 8 of the Code stipulated that the land of a village or of a town could not be granted in its entirety to all of the inhabitants nor to one or two persons chosen from among them. Separate pieces were granted to each fallah and a title was given to each holder showing his right of possession. In other words, the code aimed at breaking the traditional organization of miri, instituting instead an individual landholding system whereby each holder would become responsible for his own holdings. Moreover, the Code stipulated that “only the cultivated land could be the lot of the fallah. Non-cultivated land would be under the control of the state.”²⁶ This meant that the Ottoman empire would take control of common land, previously the property of the peasants. The main target of the Ottoman Land Code was to maintain the rights of the state over the land and to restore government control over state domain. On the other hand, this should not be taken to mean that the expropriation of the *musha`* land resulted in the immediate expropriation of direct producers from these lands. On the contrary, some of

the producers continued to use some of this land, especially land that was not under cultivation by new owners.

Another major aspect of the Ottoman Land Code was taxation. Taxes were imposed on each individual lot. There were two main categories of taxes. One was the tithe levied at the rate between 10 and 12.5 per cent of the gross annual product and *tapu* fees. The actual value of the tithe was 10 per cent, and 12.5 per cent was levied as a fund for the direct producers and invested in the Ottoman Agricultural Bank as a financial source for the peasants to supply them with help as needed. The second type was the *tapu* fee, that is, registration fees for each transaction and for title deeds to the land.²⁷ Tute has argued that after the abolition of the feudal condition in the Ottoman land revenue system after 1839 a confiscatory and corrupt system of tax farming emerged which harmed the tenants and reduced of state revenue, “It was ... to restore the prosperity of the agriculturalist” and “that the Land Code of 1858 was framed ... It is clear that this legislation could only be given effect to by setting up a system of land registration.”²⁸ The *Tapu* law provided the issuance of title deeds, “Procedures for registration, not only of old title, but also of transfers, inheritance, vivification of *mawat*, the auction of transformed land and the issue of prior purchase ... were dealt in the *Tapu* law.”²⁹ The *Tapu* code also states, “No one in the future for any reason whatsoever will be able to possess *miri* without title deed.”³⁰

In 1876, the Ottoman Empire found itself in need of additional funds. As George Antonius noted, “‘Abd al- Hamid came to the throne at a moment when the outlook for the Ottoman Empire seemed gloomy ... the public chest was empty and the treasury had already defaulted.”³¹

Political and economic difficulties had pushed the state to introduce further legal measures, and the 1876 Land Law was decreed. According to this law, *mulk* land previously held by the *shaykhs* who failed to pay taxes or to supply the state with military service was to be seized by the new land system. In order to make immediate profits from these lands, the Ottoman empire adopted what was then called “an open policy” which made state land available for European investment.³²

The Ottoman Land Code was based on the French Land Code. It is therefore civil law, not *Shari`a* that governs inheritance. The main difference lies in the treatment of gender. The *Shari`a* gives a woman half the share of a man, while in civil law their shares are equal. In civil law

children are heirs of the first degree, but if a spouse or a parent (or more than one) of the deceased survive they are entitled to one-quarter and one-sixth, of the inheritance, respectively. The equal share in inheritance was only in miri land not in mulk, and this caused many conflicts that exist to this day in Palestine.³³

The Land Code created a major shift in Palestinian society. One of its main targets was to eliminate the power of the old political and economic establishments. At the same time, the Ottoman government had no intention to completely destroy the old establishment. The Ottoman government knew that the shaykhs retained some local influence over their areas and they needed their help in the new era. Although the Ottoman empire canceled entirely all the positions of the shaykhs and appointed many officials in cities and major towns like Nablus, Jerusalem, and Gaza, the Ottomans opened the doors for the shayks and their family members to join the new administrative system and to be involved in the new economic opportunities. Some families understood the power transformation and became involved in the new Tanzimat system such as Tuqan, `Abd al-Hadi, and Jayyusi. Other families such as Jarrar and Barqawi refused this shift and rejected the new administrative formula. The oral history of the region supplies narratives of the reaction of the Jarrar family to their land registration. Yusuf Jarrar, the family leader, refused to register his lands. He showed his sword to the Mamur al-Tapu (the land registry official) and said, "This is my tapu." By the end of the nineteenth century, the Jarrar family had lost most of their lands to other families.³⁴ Other elites used the Ottoman Land Code to restore their economic and social positions. Families like Jayyusi, Barqawi, and `Abd al-Hadi registered thousands of dunums (each dunum equals 1,000 square metres) in their family leaders' names. For example, Barqawi registered 7,000 dunum in Ghabat Shufeh under Mustafa Barqawi.³⁵ The Jayyusis registered all the land of Kur and half the land of Irtah and Qalansuwa under their names. The `Abd al-Hadi family had 60,000 dunum in al-Sha`rawiyya al-Gharbiyya, north of Tulkarm.

The Ottoman Land Code opened the doors for the Tulkarm peasants to have agrarian reform in the western plains. The use of repeating rifles in the Ottoman army and police forces was very useful for law enforcement and brought safety and stability in the coastal plains and the whole region.³⁶ These plains were covered by forests almost from Ramla and Lud to Haifa

Bay. Most of the villagers moved down to the central part of the coastal plains north of Yaffa to the foothills of Karmel Mountain and started to cut down trees such as oak, terebinth, aspen, hickory, pine, locust, mulberry, and willows. The peasants used the woods to make charcoal, and for building huts, barns, and bridges. Ashes were used as fertilizer. The old large Arsuf forest was divided between many villages and named after these villages, such as Ghabat Miska, Ghabat Jayyus, Ghabat Altibeh, Ghabat Kafr `Abush, Ghabat Shufa, and Ghabat Kafr Sur.³⁷

The New `Ayan of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code

In Ottoman Palestine, the most fertile area was the coastal plains. This area was the most heavily taxed. It was also the most densely populated. Unlike other areas subject to irregular rainfall and damaging desert winds, in the coastal plains the extreme variability of harvests was not a problem for the peasants. Hence the relative assurance of a good return for his labour was a condition of the peasant's subjection to his exploiters, for the exploiters' ability to extract a greater surplus rested on the higher yield of land to which more intensive labour could also be applied.³⁸

The attempt by the Ottoman Empire to register land titles for tax purposes facilitated a pattern of change to the detriment of the cultivators, eliminating any intermediary between the government and individual owners, so that the state could appropriate the maximum tax itself. But in most or, perhaps many cases:

The villagers, fearing that the registration was preliminary to a call for military service or for taxation purpose falsified the returns, registering the property either in the name of the head tribe or in the name of the member of the family who would not be liable for military service. In practice they disregarded the titles granted (sanad tapu) and continued to farm on the musha` system recognizing the customary quota-holders as the real owners.³⁹

The class significance of the legal changes can only be understood when it is recognized that the 1858 Land Code was a moment in the intensification of surplus generated by peasant production. Those who describe its super-structural, accidental character are mistaken. In the more productive areas, especially in the more fertile, densely populated plains, the Land Code immediately institutionalized and reinforced preexisting relations of dependence between indebted cultivators and debt-owning usurers (in this case they were local merchants and urban notables). The registration of land title became an instrument for stepping up the appropriation of the cultivator's product by his exploiters and not merely the occasion for legal misunderstanding and deception.

The 1858 Ottoman Land Code required the registration in the name of individual owners of agricultural land that had been held as state property before 1858. Most of those newly listed names had never been previously registered. Before 1858, they were treated according to traditional forms of land tenure, generally *musha'a*, or communal usufruct domain. The new land law had many legal and social implications for Palestinian peasants. For the first time, the *fellaheen* had the rights of private ownership with legal documentation. The previous land system gave the peasants the right of usufruct but not ownership. The Land Code granted peasants not only title deeds to the land, but also the right to live on it, cultivate it, and pass it on to heirs, which had formerly been inalienable. Under the provision of the 1858 law, communal rights of tenure were often ignored in general. The *`ayan*, financiers, creditors, and merchants found great benefits in this 1858 Land Code by registering large sums of lands under their names. By doing so they adeptly manipulated and circumvented the legal process. The *fallahin* always thought that they were the real owners of the land because they farmed it. The new deal between the *fallahin* and the *`ayan* was as follows: the cultivators did all the agricultural services that the land needed such as ploughing, seeding, irrigation, grassing, weeding cultivating, and harvesting. At the end of the agriculture cycle the *fallahin* would then deliver to the *`ayan* 25 to 33 per cent of the crop. In return, the *`ayan* registered the lands under their names and paid all the taxes to the Ottoman government. This arrangement kept the *fallahin* from dealing with Ottoman officials and made their names disappear from the rolls of a military draft.⁴⁰

This kind of arrangement was called *alja`*, from the Arabic *lujua`* (entrust or seeking shelter). The *alja`* was reported as a legal method in Islamic Court *Sijils* of Nablus, Al-Quds, and Yaffa, and in addition was mentioned by the British General Counsel in Jerusalem.<sup>41</sup> The primary reasons for the *alja`* were to elude the military draft, and to avoid the arbitrariness and greediness of the Ottoman tax collectors and high ranking officials. The Palestinian peasants feared serving in the Ottoman army because of the long period of service, which could be between 7 and 10 years. Large numbers of Palestinians who served in the Ottoman army between 1876 and 1914 were killed, lost in action, or never came home. The *fellaheen* were pessimistic about military service and they believed that the draftees would not survive. During the last decades of Ottoman rule, Palestinians in general refused to permit their daughters, sisters, or relatives to marry an army draftee. This created a social problem in Ottoman Palestinian society.⁴²

The second reason for resorting to the *alja`* was to protect the *fallahin* lands from confiscation by Ottoman officials if the *fellahen* could not pay the estimated taxes, especially in drought seasons. The *affendi* (the merchant or an urban notable) who now legally owned the land via the *tapu* (title deeds) could negotiate with Ottoman officials to reduce the taxes in bad seasons because they had strong connections and interests. Third, the peasants needed the *affendiyyas* as guardians for themselves and for their crops from any attackers or usurpers such as *Bedouins*, foreign investors, and local officials.⁴³

In the Tulkarm area of Bani Sa`b many farmers chose not to register their lands located in the coastal plains under their names. Instead they registered them under the names of the elders of the family, the *mukhtar* of the *hamula* or the *hara* of the merchants from village, town, or from Nablus. The position of *mukhtar* was created during the Egyptian rule in Palestine 1831–1840.⁴⁴ After 1858 the Ottoman Empire adopted this position as part of the new administrative system. The *mukhtar* was the lowest ranking official who represented and helped the Ottoman officials in their administrative duties, especially in collecting taxes and registering the land. Other local authorities such as the *affendiyya*, the religious figures such as *imam*, *khatib*, the *qadi*, the *naib* (deputy judge), and *mufti* were among this new landlord notable class.⁴⁵

The Land Code of 1858 created a new formation within Palestinian society in the late Ottoman period. This new social system emerged from the old elite's foundation, whose members accepted being part of the new administrative system and the new bureaucracy of the imperial government officers and employees. By 1865, the new structures of the Palestinian society were the `ayan of urban and non-urban areas, the new high and middle rank administrative officials, and the new merchants and financial bourgeoisie, which in many cases were called the affendiyya, in addition to the fallahin, the massive majority of this society.

The New Social Order

In 1865 the `ayan consisted of old landlords and rural families, such as Jayyusi, Barqawai, `Abd al-Hadi, Tuqan, and Jarrar in addition to the religious elite families such as the, al-Karmi, al-Khmash, al-Juhari, Tamimi, Tufaha, Tibi, Tayyah, and Abu al-Rub. Most of these families took advantage of the Land Code and registered thousands of dunums under their names. The most noteworthy was the `Abd al-Hadi family, who registered 60,000 dunums under family figures' names.

Urban and rural leaders had dominated the political and economic scene from 1516 to 1845. The emphasis on continuity of the leading role of these families has obscured the changes that occurred during the late Ottoman period. The composition of the sociopolitical elite of Palestine in general and its sources of power were transformed fundamentally during the nineteenth century. The formative period of this group can be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Its final composition about a century later was the outcome of interaction and accommodation of the leading sociopolitical families with the new realities of modernization and centralization. Not all the leading families who dominated political power until the mid-nineteenth century strengthened their position. On the other hand, some powerful urban families and to a greater extent certain rural ones, who dominated their localities, lost sociopolitical leadership. On the other hand, modernization opened new opportunities for mobility that were seized by middle class families, mainly merchants' families. Thus, the

sociopolitical elite of the post-Tanzimat period was substantially different from that of the early nineteenth century.⁴⁶

As a result of the socioeconomic development and the process of centralization in the government of the Ottoman provinces, local leaders emerged as actual partners in administration. The central government generally accepted the reality of the existence of these local leaders and tried to use them to maintain security and stability. As long as they raised the annual taxes and pledged loyalty to the sultan, Istanbul recognized the de facto position of these local powers. Furthermore, the recently acquired political power was transmitted from father to son or to a close relative. Thus a group of families succeeded in monopolizing positions of power and in consolidating sociopolitical leadership in their communities. The emerging urban elite were defined as “notables” by several scholars who studied this subject. Both Khoury and Hourani have pointed out the analytical problem which this term means and how it fit in the new social order.⁴⁷ Scholars differentiate between the old established notables such as the socioreligious group of `ulama, ashraf, mufti, imam, khatib, and katib. These groups were the office holders in socioreligious administration. This traditional leadership of the Muslim city was an important element in checking and balancing the powers of the governor without resort to military assistance. The famous examples of this group in Tulkarm region were Khamash, Juhari, Karmi, Tayah, and Abu al-Rub.

The second part of the old establishment was the secular notables or, as Albert Hourani called them the `Ayan. This part was divided into two groups: the urban leaders who hold the titles of Bekat and Aghawat (singular Bek and Agha) who were appointed governors of the region of Nablus (mutasallim, an Ottoman of Governor) and similar offices. Military skills were essential for the holders of these posts. The examples of this group were Tuqan, al-Nimr, Jarrar, and `Abd al-Hadi. The second group was the rural leaders, the shaykhs, who were the heads of powerful peasant families such as Jayyusi and Barqawi. The shaykhs were appointed as rural leaders of their districts/nahiya. Usually these chieftains commanded peasant militias and were responsible for order and security and tax farming in the villages of the nahiya.⁴⁸

In Palestine during the pre-Tanzimat period most of the political power available for local elements was held by members of the previous groups.

They controlled by direct or indirect means the financial resources of the country and shaped the sociocultural environment of the society. The special status of this group was recognized by the rest of the people because of its wealth and interest in public affairs, control of military power, or senior religious positions. This was obviously not a homogeneous group. As a leading stratum of fragmented and disintegrated society its sources and bases of power were characterized by diversity.⁴⁹ The unifying aspect of the group was its control of the administrative, political, economic and cultural institutions. Dominance was the basis for monopoly of power in the society. Before 1859, the Ottoman authorities did not oppose the emergence of local elites because they played a conservative stabilizing role. Thus they consolidated their position and became official members of the ruling class, at least in the second half of the eighteenth century.⁵⁰ The common interest of central government and local elite was disrupted by the Western challenge. The response of Istanbul was centralization and modernization of governmental institutions.⁵¹

The strong impulses of the second phase of Tanzimat created a new group, called the affendiyya. Affendi or (Effendi) is an Ottoman Turkish title that means master or lord. It was a title of respect, equivalent to the English sir. It follows the personal name and was generally given to members of the learned profession, high and middle educated people, and to government officials who had not reached the higher rank of bey or pasha. Before the Tanzimat period, this title was used only for `ulama, qadi, and Islamic scholars. The possessive to affandim (my master) is used by common people and peasants in formal introduction.⁵²

The afandiyya consisted of two parts, the new administrative official and the new network of wealthy and middle-class merchants in urban centres. The merchant and entrepreneur class benefited from the weakening of the traditional elite. Integration into the world market improved security and communication in the country and opened new opportunities for this group. Under the new realities of the Tanzimat quick profits were possible for those involved in international commerce and investment in neighbouring areas of the plains such as Tulkarm. The examples of these afandiyya families in Bani Sa`b area were: Hajj Ibrahim, Salah, al-Sukhun, Hannun, Muhyar, `Awwad, Jallad, Abu al-Rub, Sawad, Hajj Khalil, al-Jabali, al-Hamdalah, al-Qubag, al-Nashif, al-Khadir, Abu al-Sisan, Shadid, Jayyusi,

Samara, Abu Hantash, Tayyah, Taieh, shaykh Ismail `Abd Allah and his son shaykh Kamal, and the Masarwa in Taybih. In addition, families from Damascus such as al-`Umari and from Beirut such as al-Qabani were able to transform their families' wealth and land ownership into sociopolitical leadership by entering the provincial council of Bani Sa`b, the Nablus Mutasarifyya Majlis, and the Wilayat Beirut Majlis.⁵³

Centralized Ottoman rule factionalized and exhausted the traditional elite and made access to power bases possible for this group. A good example was `Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim, the mayor of Tulkarm from 1904 to 1939. `Abd al-Rahman was the son of Hajj Ibrahim Isma`il `Abd al-Qadr al-Mqdadi, a grain and cotton merchant and owner of a cotton ginnery from Taybih Bani Sa`b south of Tulkarm. Hajj Ibrahim was a commissioned trade agent of Ali Sha`rawi, a wealthy merchant in Jaffa. Hajj Ibrahim became a member of the Majlis al-Qada' in 1886. In 1896, he moved with his family to Tulkarm and built a house east of the Old Mosque. In 1903 he purchased a large tract of land from Hajj Khalil and Hajj `Abd Allah Yusuf al-Khalil. This land, located in the centre of the town, occupied an important future location in the town, especially after his son `Abd al-Rahman became mayor. Two major commercial streets were opened and paved on Hajj Ibrahim's property, creating Main and Market Streets. Hajj Ibrahim built a new European-style house on this land. As the price of land became higher in Tulkarm and its surrounding area, Hajj Ibrahim purchased another large plot of land on the west side of the town from Budir al-Qasim Budir, Yasin al-Taieh, and Saleh `Abd Allah al-Taieh. In addition, he purchased and registered 1,000 dunums in the costal plains west of Tulkarm.⁵⁴

Hajj Ibrahim Isma`il `Abd al-Qadir al-Mqdadi had three sons; `Abd al-Rahim, `Abd al-Rahman, and `Abd al-Latif. All of his sons had the title of afandi because they were educated in Tulkarm, Yaffa, and Beirut. `Abd al-Rahman was appointed deputy director of land registration in the qada of Bani Sa`b, and in 1904 he became the fourth mayor of Tulkarm after Saleh `Awad, Hajj Ahmad Abu al-Rub, and Muhammad Husayn al-Baraka. It is illustrative that mayors of the city were elected more than once from this group of "newcomers" to the elite; this is very clear in the case of `Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim. His second son, `Abd al-Rahim, became the general prosecutor of Bani Sa`b from 1895 to 1918. The third son, `Abd al-

Latif, graduated from al-Madrasa al-Sultaniyya (the imperial school) in Beirut. This school was part of the new education system that had adopted European methods. `Abd al-Latif was a specialist in Islamic law and he was appointed qadi in many cities in the Ottoman empire such as Tripoli in Lebanon, Benghazi in Libya, Gaza and Jenin in Palestine, and Husn al-Akrad in northern Iraq. After 1918, Shaykh `Abd al-Latif returned to Tulkarm and invested his money in a large citrus grove west of town in the coastal plains which he had inherited from his late father.⁵⁵

Other examples of merchant families who engaged trade agencies and administrative positions were Muhammad `Abd al-Halim al-Jabali, a cloth merchant, financier and food supply businessman, who became a member of the qada council. The Sukhun family came from Nablus and established a trade agency, warehouse (khan), and grain mill. Sadiq al-Sukhun and his cousin Kamil were trade agents for Antwan al-Tayan, a wealthy Christian merchant in Yaffa and Beirut. The qada council and other new administrative positions had also many members from the landowning class. Hajj `Abd Allah al-Khalil was a landowner and director of the Agriculture Bank (al-Bank al-Zira`ai, or Zira`at Bankasi) between 1895 and 1902. Shaykh Qasim al-Jallad, member of the municipality board and later the director of the Agricultural Bank (1904–8). Salim Hajj `Abd Allah, Musleh Muhyar, Mahmud Abu Shanab, Budir al-Qasim, and Muhammad al-Hamshari and Christian Arab families such as Khouri, Sabagh, Saba, Habib, Sayigh, Durzi and Abu `Ata moved and settled in Tulkarm during the Tanzimat era, and they were heavily involved in this new social elite class.⁵⁶

The Ottoman authorities created two new councils, an educational council in 1883 and the antimonopoly and high interest rate council in 1890. The Ottomans appointed Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi a director of both councils. The other members of these councils were Hajj Khalil Yusuf al-Khalil, Mahmud Abu Shanab, and Qasim al-Jallad.⁵⁷ The new sociopolitical elite of Tulkarm could be characterized by pluralism. The supremacy of the bekat, aghawat, and some rural chiefs was replaced by a less autonomous but wider base of urban elite.⁵⁸

The `ulama families of Bani Sa`b district were not actual opponents of the new central administration. The Tanzimat did not adversely impact their positions. The Ottoman government appointed the Qadi (Islamic judge) and

the Mufti as natural members (A`ada` Tabi`in) of the district council. In sub-districts such as Tulkarm, the qadi had the title of Na'ib al-Shar`a al-Sharif (the deputy of the honoree Shari`a law). Before 1866, the qadi of Jerusalem appointed his deputy in Nablus and the na'ib of Nablus appointed other deputies in the district. After that year the qadi `askar of Anatolia appointed directly the judge of Nablus and gave him the authority to appoint his deputies in the sub-district.⁵⁹ The Mufti position was the second of the religious positions. The Mufti was appointed by the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul and held this position for lifetime. The Mufti had the authority to issue Fatws (interpret and expound Islamic laws). Na'ib al-Shar`a always sought the help of the Mufti in many legal cases to make up and support his legal decision.<sup>60</sup> The first Mufti of Bani Sa`b qada was Shaykh `Abbas al-Khamash from Nablus, who stayed in this position from 1881 to 1901. The second Mufti was Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi (1901–1921).⁶¹

The Ottoman Tanzimat aimed chiefly for three objectives: 1) to bring the semi-autonomous and virtually independent local rulers under the direct rule of the central government; 2) to improve the social and economic conditions of the subjects; and 3) to create a new Ottoman political community in which Muslims, Christians and Jews would be equal members. This meant the replacement of the decentralized local autonomies with a centralized rule, the termination of the peasants' servitude to local shaykhs, the beginning of direct subjection to the central government, and the liberation of non-Muslim subjects from their former status to make them equal with the Muslim population.

The Tanzimat reforms were unpopular with large sections of the population, mainly with the traditional ruling class, whose old vested interests were seriously threatened. As a result, the Tanzimat had to be imposed from above against the will of the major part of the Ottoman society, and its process and pace were largely determined by struggle between the reforming authorities and the conservative ruling elite in the provinces and the countryside.

One of the major achievements of the Tanzimat was the improvement in the situation of urban centres and the increase of urban population. There was considerable increase in security in many areas, thanks to more effective police forces.⁶² Justice was more even-handed; a network of secular courts for civil, criminal, and commercial cases was established.

These provided better redress against injustices. Above all, the tyranny and arbitrariness of the pashas of old times were replaced by a more practical and moderate regime.

The new elite class of landowners, merchants, and educated government employees was the main class that benefited most from the new system. Not only did the elite have a big share in the local administration, but its members also used their positions to enrich themselves at the expense of both the government treasury and the fallahin. This they did by means of iltizam (farming credit), which they were allowed to farm, and through speculation in wheat prices and other cash crops.⁶³ Some families from the old elite class joined the new system and they were involved heavily in the Tanzimat establishments, such as `Abd al-Hadi, Tuqan, Jayyusi, al-Karmi and Khamash. The families who rejected the Tanzimat reforms and refused to join the new system faced a sharp decrease in their social and political status, such as al-Barqawi, al-Qasim and al-Nimr.

CHAPTER 5

THE WILAYA LAW OF 1864

Since the destruction of the Janissary Corps in 1826, and particularly after 1839, the beginning of the Tanzimat period, the powers of the Ottoman imperial government were on the rise. To prevent the repetition of the Muhammad `Ali example, increasing attention was given by the Sublime Porte to the provinces. The trend towards centralizing the administration started, and the provinces were drawn closer and closer to Istanbul.¹ The walis' powers shrank as walis now had to refer almost everything to Istanbul. Attempts made in 1852 to widen walis' powers were fruitless. By the time of Sultan `Abd al-`Aziz (1861–1876), the Tanzimat period had contributed to the growth of the Sultan's power. Consequently, the need for constitutionalism and centralization arose in order to limit the powers of the sultan. The Wilaya law of 1864 was a step towards a new phase of centralization. It was designed to give Ottoman subjects in the provinces a measure of responsibility in public affairs, through participation in electing about half the members of the local administrative councils and judges. The ultimate objectives were to reduce the ill-effects of absolute centralization and to create a pyramidal administrative system.²

The Wilaya law of 1864 was modeled on French provincial administration and successfully tested by Midhat Pasha in the Danube Wilaya between 1871 and 1874.³ Consequently, it was applied in the Ottoman wilayat after 1867. According to this law, wilayas were divided into a number of mutasarrifiyyas, each mutasarrifiyya into qadas, with each qada being composed of several nahiyas and villages. In case some villages were not large enough in size and population to form a qada, they were

organized under the name of nahiya, and incorporated into the nearest qada.⁴ At the head of each wilaya, mutasarrifiyya, and qada, there was a wali, a mutasarraf, and a qa'immaqam residing in the capital of his respective district.⁵ The nahiya was administered by a mudir, while each village in the nahiya had one to three mukhtars, depending on the population; on average there were two mukhtars for each village, to look after governmental and other villages' affairs. Thus, the chain of responsibility in this system rose from the base to the top.⁶ The mukhtars were either responsible to the nahiya mudir (in case a nahiya existed) or to the qa'immaqam. The qa'immaqam was responsible to the mutasarraf, who in turn was responsible to the wali, and the wali to the central government in Istanbul.

The Wilaya government

At the wilaya level a number of functionaries and official bodies helped the wali administer and look after the needs of the people. Besides the wali, two functionaries were most important. They were the secretary (maktubji) and the treasurer (daftardar). Two bodies were particularly important, at least in theory, on the wilaya level. They were the Council of Administration (Majlis al-Idara) and the General Council (al-Majlis al-'Umumi). The formation and duties of these bodies, starting with the functionaries, is as follows.

The Wali (Governor)

According to the Wilaya Law of 1864, the wali was appointed by an imperial firman and charged with various responsibilities in several domains. He was the civil governor general of his wilaya, responsible for its administration in accordance with the wilaya laws and within the limits of his powers.⁷ He was directly responsible to the Nazarat al-Dakhiliyya (Interior Ministry) in Istanbul.

In administration, the wali was the direct superior of the mutasarrifs and other wilaya officials in the wilaya capital. Through them, he supervised and watched over the work of the other public servants on the qada and nahiya levels. He could suspend, bring to trial, and dismiss public officials

under his jurisdiction if they faltered or misbehaved in carrying out their public duties. He appointed or confirmed office employees according to the law. Mutasarrifs passed to him problems they could not solve by themselves. He studied these problems, solved those that lay within his jurisdiction and referred the rest to the central government at Istanbul. Walis were expected to conduct inspection tours in their wilayas once or twice a year, or when necessary. As a rule, a tour lasted three months during which the wali visited outlying areas, listened to the complaints and demands of his subjects, and above all made certain that government business was carried out properly.⁸

Being the governor general of the wilaya, the wali was responsible for public security. The means at his disposal to keep order and security was the gendarmerie. The wali was responsible for distributing this force among the mutasarrifiyyas and qadas of his wilaya according to the exigencies of the situation. He had no authority over the army in the wilaya. In case of a serious disturbance of the peace with which the gendarmerie could not cope, the wali had to inform the central government immediately and await instructions. Meanwhile, the wali could take any measure he deemed fit on his own initiative, but he would be held accountable for it. In order to have recourse to the army, the wali had to submit a written request to the head of the military force in the wilaya (the mushir, army commander, in the cases of Damascus and Beirut).⁹ With only the gendarmerie at his disposal, the wali was supposed to keep roads safe, police the cities, and arrest individuals or groups disturbing the peace.

In financial affairs the walis were responsible for reporting into the Finance Ministry all the revenues and expenses of their wilayas. They auctioned iltizams, watched over tax-farmers (multazims), and saw that tithes and other taxes were properly collected. They could spend a limited amount of money not included in the wilaya's budget, but in case of large sums, walis had to consult with the finance ministry. Thus, their power over their administrative budget was limited.¹⁰

Besides administrative, financial, and public security functions, walis had a host of other duties. In theory, at least, they had to promote education, industry, agriculture, and commerce in their wilayas. They looked after public health, built hospitals, and constructed roads. Walis were required to

compile and keep statistics about commerce, industry, agriculture, and natural resources such as forests and mines.¹¹

In carrying out the wilaya administration, walis were helped by several other public officials of whom the secretary and the treasurer were the most important. The secretary was appointed by the Interior Minister and was responsible to him. He was in charge of the official correspondence of the wilaya and its archives. The official wilaya printing press was also under his authority.¹²

Being the wilaya treasurer and keeper of finances, the daftardar wielded strong influence and prestige. He was appointed by the finance minister and was responsible to him. The daftardar headed the wilaya bureau of finances and was responsible for all wilaya accounts.¹³ In carrying out his duties, he responded to instructions given to him by the finance ministry.

The administrative apparatus of the wilaya also included functionaries to look after agriculture, commerce, public works, and foreign relations (i.e. an intermediary who acted as a link between the wilaya officials and foreign representatives).

The Council of Administration

The Majlis al-Idara (Council of Administration) assisted the wali in carrying out wilaya government. This body was usually composed of eight members. Four were permanent and four (sometimes six) were elected by the people for a term of two years. Four were Muslims, and four were non-Muslims.¹⁴ The permanent members usually included the chief magistrate (mufattish al-ahkam al-shar'iyya, later replaced by na'ib al-markaz or na'ib al-shar'a al-sharif), the secretary, the treasurer, and the director of financial affairs.¹⁵ The wali or his representative presided over this body.

The election of the non-permanent members of the Council of Administration was indirect, subject to restrictions and fraud. A nominee had to be a literate Ottoman, well known, and a taxpayer of at least 500 qurush annually. A special electoral committee (lajnat tafriq) was formed to select the eligible persons from among those notables residing in the wilaya capital or the mutasarrifiyyas. Besides the permanent members in the Council of Administration, the electoral committee included the spiritual heads of the non-Muslims, mainly the local archbishop or clergymen for

Christians and local rabbi, and other Christians and Jews elected members. Presided over by the wali, the electoral committee chose a number of nominees equal to three times the number of members needed.¹⁶ This having been done, the names were then sent to the capitals of mutasarrifiyyas in the wilaya, where they were voted upon by the members of the Council of Administration. The names were then sent back to the electoral committee which counted the votes and dropped one-third of the nominees or those who got the fewest votes. The rest of the names (i.e. double the number needed) were then sent by the wali to Istanbul; the latter, in turn, selected half the men whose names appeared on the list and sent letters to them confirming their election to serve the wilaya Council of Administration.

The Council of Administration performed several functions. It conducted the public sales and purchases of the wilaya, supervised tax-farmers and saw that the wilaya revenues were properly collected. It auctioned state forests, checked all wilaya expenses, income, and property. It also constructed the necessary roads among the mutasarrifiyyas and encouraged trade and agriculture. It modified the administrative divisions in the wilaya as it saw fit, looked after public health, and advised on building clinics. It distributed the wilaya expenses amongst the mutasarrifiyyas and discussed administrative matters submitted to it by the wali. The Council of Administration also investigated abuses committed by civil employees on duty and brought them to trial. It solved problems arising among government departments and personnel with regard to conflict of duties. It also investigated peoples' complaints directed against the distribution of tithes and other expenses, and against public officials.¹⁷

The members of the Council of Administration were guaranteed freedom of discussion by law. The walis submitted their decisions to the imperial government which alone decided what should be carried out. Decisions were taken by majority vote; in case of a tie the wali's side (or that of his representative) prevailed. The members of the Council of Administration were forbidden from interference with the courts. If a dispute arose between the wali and his Council of Administration, it was relegated to Istanbul.¹⁸ Furthermore, the Council of Administration could appeal directly to the government.

The General Council

Next to the Council of Administration in importance was the General Council of the Wilaya (al-Majlis al-`Umumi). It was composed of members, four members from each mutasarrifiyya, two Muslims and two non-Muslims, who were elected in the same way as the members of the Council of Administration. It met once a year in the wilaya capital, for a session lasting not more than 40 days, under the presidency of the wali or his designate.¹⁹

The General Council deliberated over different issues of public interest, such as construction and maintenance of imperial roads, and maintaining security of communications at the wilaya, mutasarrifiyya, qada, and nahiya levels. It also looked after the construction and repair of public buildings and deliberated over means to improve agriculture, industry, and commerce. It studied problems related to the equitable distribution of taxes among the mutasarrifiyyas, qadas, and nahiyas.

The members of the General Council were required to submit to the wali the demands of their mutasarrifiyyas and qadas ahead of time. The wali in turn decided which issues to place on the agenda before the Council. After deliberation, the Council voted on the issues discussed, and its resolutions were conveyed by the wali to Istanbul. As was the case with the Council of Administration, the Ottoman government adopted or rejected any or all of the resolutions.²⁰

The Mutasarrifiyya Government

The government apparatus at the mutasarrifiyya level was similar to that on the wilaya level, but on a smaller scale. Thus, the mutasarrifiyya had a mutasarrif, a treasurer (called muhasibji on the mutasarrifiyya level), and a secretary (called mudir tahrirat). Besides these, there was a Council of Administration to help govern the mutasarrifiyya. The mutasarrifiyya in this case study was Nablus.

The mutasarrif

The mutasarrif was appointed by the Ottoman government. The mutasarrif was a symbol of the executive power in the mutasarrifiyya, representing the wali and responsible to him. The mutasarrifs carried out instructions

coming from the wali or from the government, pertaining to civil government, finance, and other matters. Similar to the wali, and under his direction, the mutasarrif was responsible for the government of his mutasarrifiyya, and the supervision of qa'immaqams and other public employees under him. He informed the wali of any irregularities in the government which he discovered in his inspection tours in the mutasarrifiyya and suggested ways to rectify them. The mutasarrif was the commander of the gendarmerie in the mutasarrifiyya and in consultation with the wali was responsible for its deployment in the qadas.²¹

Under the mutasarrif, but appointed by the government at the request of the Finance Minister, the treasurer was in charge of financial affairs in the mutasarrifiyya, under the supervision of the daftardar. The secretary performed the official correspondence of the mutasarrifiyya and preserved its archives.²²

The Council of Administration

As in the wilaya Council of Administration, membership in this Council was both permanent and non-permanent. The permanent members included a Muslim qadi, the mufti, the spiritual heads of the non-Muslims, plus the treasurer and the secretary. The non-permanent members varied between four and six, half Muslims and half non-Muslims. Hence, the total number in this body varied between 8 and 12 members.²³

The election of non-permanent members was similar to that of the wilaya Council of Administration. An electoral committee (lajnat tafriq), composed of the mutasarrif as president and the permanent members of the Council of Administration, prepared a list of eligible names three times as many as the required number, half Muslims and half non-Muslims. This list was then sent to the qadas where it was voted upon by the Council of Administration where the electoral committee met and discarded one-third of the names, or those who got the fewest votes. The remaining names were then double the number needed. A list of these names was then sent to the wali, who selected half the names and determined who was to serve on the Council of Administration.²⁴

The functions of the mutasarrifiyya level Council of Administration were similar to those of its counterpart on the wilaya level. Presided over by

the mutasarrif, the Council deliberated over matters of public interest. It supervised the mutasarrifiyya expenses, the collection of revenue, looked after state property, and examined conflicts arising among government officials. It also promoted good communications between qadas, distributed expenses equitably among them, improved public health, and encouraged agriculture, trade and commerce.²⁵ If a conflict arose between the mutasarrif and his Council of Administration, it was relegated to the wali.

The Qada' Government

Similar to the mutasarrifiyya Council of Administration, the qada had a qa'immaqam, a secretary (katib), a treasurer (called mudir al-mal on the qada level), and a Council of Administration.

The qa'immaqam

Appointed by the government, the qa'immaqam was the representative of the mutasarrif, a symbol of the executive power on the qada level. The qa'immaqam was responsible for public security, civil and financial administration according to the powers given to him by the law. He supervised government officials on the qada, nahiya, and village levels. He selected nahiya mudirs and, after consultation with the mutasarrif, determined when the municipal councils were to meet. Similar to the wali and mutasarrif, but on a lower level, he was the commander of the gendarmerie in the qada, and used this force according to instructions from the mutasarrif and in harmony with the gendarmerie laws and regulations. In the financial sphere, the qa'immaqam helped to collect the state revenue and, together with the treasurer, was responsible for its safety.²⁶ Working with the qa'immaqam, the treasurer was responsible for keeping up-to-date records of the money collected and spent. The secretary was responsible for the official correspondence and for maintaining the wilaya archives.²⁷

The Bani Sa`b qada occupied the western part of Nablus mutasarrifiyya and it contained four nahiyas; Wadi al-Sha`ir, al-Haram-Sidna `Ali, Bani Sa`b, and al-Sha`rawiya al-Gharbiya. The qada contained one major town, Tulkarm and 53 villages: Qalqilya, Al-Haram-Sidna `Ali, Jalil, Miska, Kafr Saba, Jaljulya, Altira, Umm Khalid, Wadi al-Hawarith, Qalanswa, Dhunaba, Kafr al-Labad, `Anabta, Kafr Rumman, Bayt Lid, Sufarin, Shufa,

Ramin, `Atarah, Bl`aa, Dir al-Ghusun, `Alar, Sida, `Atil, Zita, Baqa al-Gharbiyya, Baqa al-Sharqiyya, Qafin, Nazalt Abu Nar, Nazalet `Aisa, al-Nazleh al- Gharbiyya, al-Nazleh al-Wusta, al-Nazla al-Sharqiyya, Jatt, Qaqun, Shwikah, Kafr Sab, Firdisiyya, Irtah, Far`aun, Taybah Foqa, Taybah Tahta, Alras, Kafr Sur, Kafr Zibad, Kafr `Abush, Kafr Jamal, Falamah, Jayous, Khirbath Bayt Lid, Zalfah, Almanshiyya and Raml Zita.

Bani Sa`b region was classified as nahiya from 1856 to 1872. The Ottoman government decided to promote Bani Sa`b to qada status in 1873 and added two nahiyas: Wadi al-Sha`ir al-Gharbi and al-Sha`arawiya al-Gharbiyya. The Ottomans appointed the old elite class to administer these new regions, with administrators such as Mustafa al-Barqawi in Wadi al-Sha`air and Muhammad Wakid al-Jayyusi in Bani Sa`b. The first qa'immaqam was Hafiz al-Sa`id from Yaffa who served from 1873 to 1877. The list of qa'immaqams included Hassan Muharam (1882–1885), Abd al-Karim al-Yusuf (1892–1894), Jamil Bayk al-`Aabid (1895–1898), Hamid al-Rafi`i (1900–1903), Tawfiq Bayk (1903–1905), Hajj Ibrahim Wasfi Afandi (1905–1907), Saleh Pasha al-Rikabi (1907–1911), and Raghib Beak (1912–1915). The last Ottoman qa'immaqam was Muhammad `Ali `Abd al-Wahhab (1915–1918).²⁸

The Qada Council of Administration

At the wilaya and mutasarrifiyya levels, the Qada Council of Administration consisted of permanent and elected members. The permanent members were the qada equivalents of the higher levels: the qadi and mufti of the qada capital, the spiritual heads of the non-Muslims, plus the treasurer and the secretary. The elected members varied between three and six, half Muslims and half non-Muslims.²⁹

The election procedures of the non-permanent members were nearly the same as those on higher levels. An electoral committee composed of the qa'immaqam and permanent members of the Council of Administration was formed. This committee selected a number of persons, residing either in the qada capital or in the villages, equal to three times the number needed for membership, half Muslims and half non-Muslims. Nominees were Ottomans, over 30 years old, preferably literate, and taxpayers each of at

least 130 qurush, annually. A list of these persons was sent to every village, where the Council of Elders (al-Majlis al-Ikhtiyyariya) met and elected to the qada capital. The electoral committee met again and discarded one-third of the names, or those who got the fewest votes. The names left were then double the required number. A list of these names was prepared and sent to the mutasarrif, who in turn selected those he wanted to serve on the Council of Administration.³⁰ Letters were then sent to the new members confirming their appointment.

The qa'immaqam presided over the Council of Administration. It supervised the collection of revenue, checked qada expenses, and looked after the state property. It distributed taxes and expenses to villages and quarters (mahallas),³¹ looked after public health and brought charges against public officials to justice in case of misconduct. It constructed roads between villages and nahiyas in the qada, encouraged agriculture, looked after public security and saw that the qa'immaqam was properly conducting his duties.³²

The elected members of Majlis Idarah Bani Sa`b from 1882–1918 were: Shaykh Najib `Abd al-Manan Afandi, Khalil Yusuf Hajj Khalil, Qasim `Abd al-Hadi Afandi, Shaykh Nu`aman al-Juhari Afandi, Shaykh `Ali Mansur al-Karmi Afandi, Hamid Abu al-Rub, Yusuf al-Nashif, `Abd Allah al-`Umar, Shaykh `Abbas al-Khamash, Shaykh Khader al-Khamash, Shaykh Muhammad al-Kuzbari, Mahmud Abu Shanab, Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi Afandi, Shaykh Qasim al-Jallad, Muhammad al-Husayn, Hajj Ibrahim Isma`ail `Abd al-Qader, Muhammad Abu Hantash, Sulyman al-Sawad, `Isa al-Barqawi, Muhammad Mustafa al-Barqawi, Mahmud `Abd Halim al-Jabali, Mustafa al-Qubaj, Ahmad al-Hamdalah, As`ad al-`Amus, `Abd Allah al-Zamel, Qasim Abu al-Sesan Shadid, Budir al-Qasim Budir, Hassan `Abd al-Qadr al-Ramaha, Mekhaiel Saba, Khalil Sabagh, Yusuf al-Khori, Muhammad Hannun, Ibrahim Khalil, Ibrahim Samarh, Shaykh Tawfiq al-Tibi, and Shaykh Amin al-Tibi.³³

The Nahiya and Village Government

Large qadas and villages not large enough to form a qada were organized into nahiyas. Each nahiya had to have at least 500 males to be considered a

nahiya. A mudir and a Council of Administration administered each nahiya.³⁴

The mudir

The nahiya mudir was appointed by the wali and approved by the Interior Ministry. He kept the mukhtars informed of governmental instructions and regulations, reported all births and deaths to the qada government, and provided authorities with information concerning unused land and the like in his nahiya. He supervised elections of the mukhtars and the Council of Elders and reported the results to the qa'immaqam. He passed the people's complaints concerning tax collection and public works to the qa'immaqam. In the field of public security he worked closely with the qa'immaqam to keep law and order and conducted preliminary investigations when crimes occurred. The mudir also supervised multazims, and conveyed to the mukhtars information concerning tax distribution, and saw that taxes were collected.³⁵

The Nahiya Council

The Nahiya Council represented the villages in the nahiya, up to four members per village. The Council met four times annually, at times fixed by the wali, and presided over by the mudir. Each session lasted a week or less. Decisions were taken by a majority vote.³⁴ The Nahiya Council discussed matters of interest to the villages, such as public pastures and road building paid for by the villagers. The mudir reported the Council's decisions to the qa'immaqam, who in turn decided what was to be carried out.³⁵

The mukhtar

Each village of 20 houses or fewer had one mukhtar unless it was a mixed village, in which case each religious sect had its own mukhtar. Cities were

divided into quarters of 50 houses in each. Each quarter was then treated as a village.³⁶

The mukhtar and the Council of Elders (Majlis al-Ikhtiyariya) were elected by the residents of the village, each sect electing its own mukhtar and the Council of Elders for a period of one year only, with re-election permissible. To vote, one had to be an Ottoman, 20 years old or more, and a taxpayer of not less than 50 Majidi annually. A candidate had to be an Ottoman, 30 years old or more, and a taxpayer of not less than 100 Majidi annually.³⁷ The qa'immaqam, having been informed of the results of the election by the mudir, confirmed the mukhtar and the Council of Elders in their positions.

The mukhtar represented the government on the village level and acted as a link between the village residents and his superior, the nahiya mudir or the qa'immaqam. He informed the village residents of government instructions given to him by the mudir or the qa'immaqam. The mukhtar helped to distribute and collect taxes as instructed. He informed the nahiya or qada government of all births and deaths in his village and saw that persons wanted by the courts or the police were duly informed. Through him, military authorities learned of those who came of age for military service. He was also responsible for public security in his village. He supervised guards and wardens, and kept his superiors informed of all disorders that occurred.³⁸ A mukhtar could be discharged if he misused his position, or if the Council of Elders requested his dismissal. The mukhtars of Tulkarm in the late Ottoman period were: Hajj Ahmad Abu al-Rub, Muhammad Husayn al-Barakeh, Khadir al-Jallad, Muhammad al-Hamshri, Nimer `Abd al-Qader Ramaha, Hajj `Abd Allah al-Tayyah, Muhsen `Abd Allah al-Zaher, Hajj Hamd `Awwad, Salim al-Durzi, Qasim al-`At`aut, and Najib `Abd al-Nur.

The Council of Elders “Ikhtiyariya”

The Council of Elders to the mukhtar was like the Council of Administration to the qa'immaqam. Each religious sect in a village had its own mukhtar and Council of Elders. The latter was composed of a minimum of three members and a maximum of 12. The Muslim and non-

Muslim spiritual heads in the village were permanent members, each belonging to his respective Council of Elders.³⁹

Presided over by the mukhtar, the Council of Elders helped to distribute taxes equitably among the villagers, watched over public property, kept villages clean, and encouraged agriculture and commerce. The Council of Elders also solved minor disputes among the village residents through conciliation. In case of a problem of common interest to the whole village, all councils of elders met and discussed the problem with the mukhtar presiding. If a quarrel arose between two persons of different sects, their respective mukhtars and elders met in equal numbers and solved the issue. The Council of Elders conducted preliminary investigations into crimes committed in their village and kept their superiors informed of the whereabouts of outlaws and their actions. In case of a misdemeanor on the part of the mukhtar, the Council of Elders informed the qa'immaqam through the nahiya mudir.⁴⁰ The members of Tulkarm town council of elders were: `Abd Rahim al-Yahya, Salim Sawad, Shaker al-Zaghal, Nimr al-Swais, Ahmad al-Mabruk, Abd Allah Yasien al-Tayeh, Khalil al-Jallad, Sulyman al-Sawad, Saleh `Awwad, Hassan Hajj `Aisa al-Ramaha, Budir Qasim Budir, Ahmad `Awwad, Muhammad Hajj Qasim, Muslih Muhyar, Sa`id Qarut, Mekhaïel Saba, Hamdan al-Khalid, Mahmud Abu Shanab, Khadir al-Jallad, Mustafa al-Sa`adih, Muhamad al-Shunar and Sadiq al-Sukhun.⁴⁰

The administrative councils of mutasarifiyya, qada, nahiya, and the elders were directly incorporated into the administrative hierarchy of the empire as a whole. All councils included the spiritual chiefs, imams, and non-Muslim clergy. A majority of the members were elected annually by Ottoman subjects of the locality over 18 years of age who paid 50 silver beshlek a year in direct taxes. Each council served as an electoral body to choose the elective members of the administrative council. They were elected from a list prepared by the administrative officers of the qada, which contained three times the requisite number of names, simply by eliminating one-third of these. The list of twice the necessary number of names was then given to the mutasarif who eliminated half the remaining names to make the final selection of the elected members of the qada administrative council. The real choice thus rested with the administrative officers at all times. For election of members of higher councils like

mutasarifiyya and wilaya, the same process was repeated, with each element – the nominating officials, the electoral councilors, and the determining voice of the governor one step higher in the hierarchy.

An analysis of the Wilaya Law of 1864

This research has considered the mechanism of the Wilaya Law of 1864 and how it was meant to operate with a clear chain of responsibility moving upward from bottom to top. It starts with the mukhtar, to the nahiya mudir, the qa'immaqam, the mutasarrif, the wali, and beyond the wilaya limits to the Ottoman government and the sultan. The rationale behind this system was to increase centralization and, at the same time, give people of the provinces a measure of participation in managing their own affairs. Did theory meet practice in this case study of both Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut? In fact, there was a wide gap between theory and practice in both wilayas. This wide discrepancy resulted from serious shortcomings in the law itself, the way it was applied, and the personnel in charge of its application.

In the first place the law was made to add more acute centralization in the administrative system. The system was highly centralized and became more so with the growth of better communications and telegraph lines. It hardly left the wali any freedom of action since he had to refer almost everything to Istanbul. This was ameliorated somewhat by the degree of trust and confidence the wali carried with the sultan. As a rule the wali was a mere instrument to carry out higher instructions. The delay this caused in provincial administration in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut, plus the fact that Istanbul was not well acquainted with the problems of these wilayas, resulted in serious hardships to the people. To make things worse, the wali enjoyed no security in office. Several walis did not finish their first year. This frequent change of walis caused confusion and irresponsibility in local administration, because the extreme majority of public officials only worked when supervised.

The Wilaya Law of 1864 gave the wali little or no authority over employees working under him, such as the treasurer, the secretary, mutasarrifs, and qa'immaqams. He had no power to appoint them. He could suspend and bring them to trial, but there was no guarantee that they would be convicted. In most cases they could buy their way out or appeal over his head to Istanbul.

Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut suffered from a general lack of public security before 1859. Yet the wilaya law of 1864 gave the wali no authority over the army. Authority resided with the mushir, the commander-in-chief and the wali's biggest rival. Many a time the wali and the mushir had conflicting interests and personalities that were set against each other, to the misfortune of the wilaya. Istanbul certainly nourished these conflicts in order to assure its supremacy. This occurred at the expense of public security, for frequently the wali asked for the regular army to punish the Bedouins or other disturbers of the peace, but the mushir refused by making various excuses. The wali had only the gendarmerie under him, but they were small in number, poorly trained, ill-equipped, low paid, and corrupt to the core. Walis were given no authority over the courts, which were tied to the Ministry of Justice in Istanbul. Justice was very slow, if it operated at all, and judges were highly open to bribery. Both natives and foreigners complained, but the wali could do nothing to clean up profiteering judges.⁴¹ The Wilaya Law of 1864 asked walis to do more than the power it vested in their hands.

Did the Wilaya Law of 1864 provide the people with any measure of participation in managing their own affairs? At the outset one tends to think that it did, for councils of administration on the wilaya, mutasarrifiyya, qa'immaqamiyya, and village levels were designed to fulfill this objective. A study of these councils, their elections, functions, and membership reveals that public participation in government was clearly present.

In the first place, the councils of administration were supposed to act as a check and balance on the wali, mutasarrif, qa'immaqam, nahiya mudir, and the mukhtar. However, the Wilaya Law of 1864 did not give these bodies any significant powers to do so. The most important of them, the wilaya council of administration, had merely advisory power. It could meet, discuss, and make decisions, but it had no power to carry them out. Furthermore, the wilaya council of administration became a tool in the hands of the wali, and the lower councils of administration did not fare any better.

The election of these councils of administration was indirect, with membership subjected to financial, administrative, and other restrictions. Although the law demanded that non-permanent members be elected every two years, elections were subject to delay, fraud and interference from

above.⁴² Membership was limited; the candidates were screened first by the electoral committee (*lajnat al-tafriq*) before voting, then again after voting. Consequently, membership on these councils hardly represented the public, was open only to *`ayan*, and members were appointed more than elected.

Nothing could be said about the province general assembly (*al-Majlis al-‘Umumi*) of the *wilaya*. This body existed only in theory. It met for the first time in *Wilayat Suriyya* and *Beirut* in 1909, after the Young Turk revolution of July 1908.⁴³ The *Wilaya Law* of 1864 gave strong influence over the common people to the notables and the *shaykhs*. The spiritual heads of Muslims and non-Muslims were members of the election committee (*lajnat al-tafriq*) and councils by administration of right. They participated in choosing the names to be submitted for elections. This method of screening candidates, plus the fact that the law required those running for public office to be well known in their communities, plus restrictions already mentioned, made membership on the councils of administration open only to the notables, the *`ayan* and the *wujaha’* (prominent). The fact that the non-Muslim communities were represented in the councils of administration did not give them any guarantees. The interests of the Muslim and non-Muslim notables and spiritual heads often coincided and followed them blindly and unquestioningly.⁴⁴

Despite these shortcomings, the *Wilaya Law* of 1864 would have operated far better than it did if the men entrusted with its application had been of a higher calibre. On the whole, Ottoman public servants in *Wilayat Suriyya* and *Beirut* were essentially corrupt. Every public official from *walis* and judges down to the smallest civil servant was open to bribery. Public office was an opportunity to become wealthy. Few *walis* who governed in these *wilayas* left with a savoury reputation. For example, it is believed that ‘Uthman Nuri Pasha made 23,000 *majidi* from selling positions.⁴⁵ Bribes were openly taken in the *saraya* (government complex). This does not mean that no honest and responsible public servants existed, but they were few. Hence, the overall theme was corruption, not to mention illiteracy among the *wilaya* officials.⁴⁶

Under the Ottomans, Palestine continued to be linked administratively to Damascus until 1830, when it was placed under Sidon, then under Acre, then once again under Damascus until 1887–1888, at which time the

administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire were settled for the last time. Palestine was divided into the sanjaks of Nablus and Acre, both of which were linked with the wilaya of Beirut and the autonomous sanjak of Jerusalem, which dealt directly with Istanbul.

The advantage of the Wilaya Law of 1864 in Palestine in general and Bani Sa`bs in particular was increased security in the countryside. The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 encouraged development of private property, agricultural production for the world market, decline of tribal social organization, growth of the population, and enrichment of the notable families. An immediate result of Ottoman reform in the nineteenth century was the decline in rural autonomy in Palestine. This was a consequence of a series of administrative decrees, beginning with the Land Code of 1858, which aimed at the regulation of land ownership. This facilitated the dissolution of the communal musha`a ownership of village lands by the peasants and gave rise to absentee landlordism, but since the reform aimed at increasing agricultural productivity it succeeded in having other stabilizing results. Those included the establishment of security in the countryside from external pillage, a substantial growth in the urban population, and the integration of the region in a network of transportation routes and a railroad system and telegraph service.

Ottoman administrative reforms also contributed to the separation of the Jerusalem sanjak (which included, at that period, a majority of the population of the boundaries of mandatory Palestine after World War I) from the northern sanjaks (districts) of Acre and Nablus (which included the best agricultural lands). Jerusalem differed from the main urban centres of Palestine in that it was detached from its rural hinterland. Its elite, in the main, were not absentee landlords, nor was there any organized form of political interaction between the city and its rural population.

The intention of the law obviously was not only to improve the efficiency of government in the provinces, but also to eliminate local and foreign complaints in favour of minorities by extending the representative principle. It is an interesting question whether the latter aspect in 1864 was intentionally conceived as a step toward constitutional government, but it was surely a preface to a chamber of deputies.

Despite all its imperfections, the Wilaya Law of 1864 was a major step in the second stage of the Tanzimat. The new system worked indifferently

except when men like Midhat Pasha were in charge in Iraq and Greater Syria. It served as a training school for better administrators in the future. It provided a small amount of experience with popular representation on administrative councils and provincial assemblies, which could serve as preparation for future democratization and for a national assembly. A certain amount of public education was fostered by the wilaya system, not only with the councils and schools established in the province, but also with the spread of local newspapers. The Wilaya Law did provide some degree of local flexibility that hopefully might solve some administrative problems and contribute to the official goal of creating a unified Ottomanism in the empire.

Whether the wilaya system would realize its potential depended on many things. Among them were the existence of a forward-looking and stable ministry in the capital, the general progress of education among the people, and the development of officials who were intelligent, hard working, and patriotic. Critics could easily discover that none of these conditions were developing. Among the most important critics of the period were a small group of men who in the later 1860s represented the new identity of Ottomanism. The Tanzimat men's influence, brought to bear on questions of education, administration, and the representation and general progress of the empire, was first felt in the period of the Wilaya law's initiation, in the time of Midhat, `Ali, and Fuad. They called themselves the New Ottomans.

CHAPTER 6

EDUCATION AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Education

Education in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut and the Sanjak of Jerusalem was sectarian before the implementation of the second Tanzimat. Each religious community established, financed, and directed its own schools usually under the guidance of its religious chiefs. During the civil war of 1856–1860 the door was left open to foreign Christian missionaries to come and establish missionary schools in Greater Syria and Palestine to teach the natives and collect adherents. They included mainly French, British, American, German and Russian missionaries. The indigenous Christians also established their own schools with or without the help of missionaries. The Muslim population depended on the central and wilaya governments to provide education for their children. Although the wilaya government had no formal schools before 1871, several non-government Islamic schools (kuttab) had long been in existence, but they were inadequate and could not compete with the Christian schools. Consequently, the education gap grew wider between Muslim and Christian populations. An attempt was made in the late Ottoman period to bridge this gap through building and developing Muslim education. This section discusses only government and private Muslim schools in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and Sanjak of Jerusalem in the period under study.

Levels of education

Education was conducted in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and Sanjak of Jerusalem primarily in three types of schools. There were primary schools for elementary education, *rushdiyya* schools or higher elementary, and *`i`dadiyya* (preparatory) schools for secondary education. A shortage in all three types of schools existed, especially primary schools, which prepared the students for higher education. It is mainly in this area that the late Ottoman period is credited with success, although the achievement was below the requirements of the wilaya.¹

Primary schools

Two types of primary schools existed: government primary schools and private, or *ahliyya*, primary schools. In theory, every city quarter or village, or a combination of them, had a government primary school. Although they were called government schools, the expenses, construction, and teachers' salaries were paid by the community where the school was located, not by the government. The government's role was restricted to encouragement and supervision. Attendance in those schools was mandatory for girls between 6 and 10 years old, and for boys between 7 and 12. In case two primary schools existed in a locality, one school was assigned for girls. If not, girls could attend the boys' schools until a school was built for them. As a rule, mixed schools were forbidden. In the course of four years of study, the pupils learned the Arabic alphabet, Ottoman Turkish, *tajwid* or recited parts of the Qur'an by heart, writing, elementary arithmetic, geography, elementary French, and Ottoman history.²

In practice, public education in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and Sanjak of Jerusalem prior to the governorship of Midhat Pasha (1878–80) was almost nonexistent. The government was neglectful of public education,³ as were the majority of Muslims in the Damascus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Acre, Jaffa, Nablus and Beirut regions. In general, illiteracy was predominant in some areas. There were no formal schools for boys except for local village or town *kuttab*s. The *kuttab* was part of the local mosque. At the *kuttab*, the imam or the shaykh taught the boys the Islamic principles and Qur'anic

recitation. Rich Muslim boys either had tutors to teach them at home or attended Qur'an schools in mosques with other Muslim boys.⁴ The curriculum was confined to religious teaching for the most part and then Arabic reading and writing. Some Muslim boys, and to a lesser extent Muslim girls, enrolled in Christian schools, mostly in Jerusalem, Beitlahm, Yaffa, Haifa and Nazareth. However, the majority of Muslims, and particularly the 'ulama', resented this, fearful of conversion. Hence, whereas Christian children studied in well organized schools usually supported by foreign powers, Muslim children went to inferior Qur'an schools. That was the situation prevailing in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut at the coming of Midhat Pasha in 1876.

Midhat Pasha could be considered the father of primary education in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut. The government's effort in this direction certainly dates back to him. After he assumed his duties as governor in the wilaya, he turned his attention to rectify the deficiency prevailing in Muslim primary schools to provide the Muslims with a better education. To do this he formed new educational committees (lajnat al-ma'arif) responsible for establishing primary schools and providing the necessary funds for them. Midhat pressured the wealthy class to subscribe money for the new schools and succeeded in getting about 500 golden majidi from them out of a projected amount of 1,000. In addition Midhat allotted part of the charitable Muslim funds from the zakat and Muslim endowments to the establishment of schools. With this money some mosques were repaired and turned into primary schools. By November 1879 between 18 and 32 primary schools had been opened. Thus, the wilaya yearbook for 1880 listed 12 new primary schools in the Damascus area, including three for girls, with an enrollment of 1,059 boys and 380 girls.⁵

Midhat's efforts in establishing primary schools were not restricted to Damascus. Educational committees were established in other cities, such as Jerusalem, Nablus, Beirut, and Yaffa, and they in turn, established primary schools. It is estimated that by April 1880, 18 primary schools had been established in Damascus and Jerusalem,⁶ and 195 boys and 37 girls in Jerusalem. The enrollment of girls was usually far less than that of boys because of the lack of facilities and the many prejudices against female education. These pupils studied Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Islamic religion and thought, arithmetic, geography, French, and Ottoman history.

Besides opening primary schools for Muslim children to match and diminish the importance of foreign Christian schools, Midhat and his charitable organization turned their attention to establish a public library to preserve the books and valuable manuscripts found in different places in Damascus. The place chosen for this library was next to the `Umayyad Mosque and was called the Zahiriyya library, after the Mamluk Sultan al-Zahir Baybars, who was buried there.⁷ The Zahiriyya has become the most noted public library in Damascus for the number of books and manuscripts it shelters.

The successors of Midhat Pasha in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut and in Jerusalem Sanjak after 1888 continued government efforts to improve primary public education. Whereas Midhat's attention centred on big cities and towns, his successors such as Hamid Pasha (1881–1884) shifted their attention to the towns and villages of the rural areas. A very small percentage of its population, less than five per cent, were literate.⁸ Hamdi Pasha obtained permission from the Sublime Porte to open a number of primary schools in Nablus in order to lure the indigenous children away from the Christian missionary schools.⁹ Hamdi opened about six primary schools for boys and girls in different localities in Nablus sanjak.¹⁰ When he asked people to send their children to study in these schools they reacted in a negative manner. People in the Nablus and Jerusalem areas were afraid that sending their children to government schools would make them liable for military conscription and would lead to more government control.¹¹ The wali opened more schools for girls in Damascus and others for boys in Nablus, Hama, Acre, Gaza, and Balqa.¹² The people of these localities covered the expenses.

Until the end of the Ottoman rule, public primary schools continued to grow. In the 1890s about 300 primary schools were established in Wilayat Suriyya and 210 in Wilayat Beirut.¹³ Education was not looked upon as something desirable in some areas of Wilayat Suriyya such as in Tiberius, Safad and Haifa and Acre in northern Palestine. Youngsters were sent to school only when there was no more work for them in the fields.¹⁴ Afraid that their sons who attended the government school would become liable for military service, the Druze of Salkhad attacked and destroyed the school under construction in their village.¹⁵

Classified as primary schools, the ahliyya private schools were established by indigenous Muslim subjects through permission from the wali and the wilaya council of education. The establishment of these schools was primarily a reaction to foreign scholars as well as to the bad conditions prevailing in the government schools.¹⁶ There were five ahliyya schools in Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Jaffa with various degrees of quality. They taught a variety of subjects including speech, philosophy, history, geography, grammar, composition, religion, arithmetic, Ottoman Turkish, and French.¹⁷ Special attention was given to the Arabic language and Arab history in ahliyya schools, contrary to the government schools. Administered usually by Muslim shaykhs, the ahliyya schools were noted for the severe punishment frequently inflicted on the students.

The lowest of primary schools, the Qur'an schools (kuttab), were either conducted by Muslim shaykhs in mosques where Muslim saints were buried, or by women in their homes. In the city of Jerusalem, a woman in charge of a Qur'an school was called a *khuja* and she taught both boys and girls. In the Qur'an schools the pupils learned tajwid, or reciting parts of the Qur'an, the rules of worship, and some reading and writing.

The teaching method was primitive. The shaykh would call each pupil and give him his lesson separately. The pupils sat on wooden seats opposite each other and recited in loud voices. The louder the pupils repeated their lessons the happier the shaykh became for the noise gave the passersby a good impression that the shaykh was intent on teaching their children. The lazy ones frequently suffered harsh punishment with the approval of their parents, who wanted their children to quickly learn the Qur'an.¹⁸ A khuja was usually less harsh than her male counterpart.

Qur'an schools were supported by the people whose children attended the school. Shaykhs and khujas were paid or compensated according to the level of learning a pupil received. Thus, the first level brought the shaykh a mujaddara meal (made of lentils and rice cooked in olive oil) from the child's parents, and the second level brought him a chicken.¹⁹ Besides material gain, the shaykh enjoyed great prestige for being the scribe of his neighbourhood.

There was one kuttab in Tulkarm before 1884. This one was operated by Shaykh Khalil al-Karmi, his son Shaykh Ibrahim, and Shaykh Muhammad al-Shunnar. Other kuttabs existed in every village in Bani Sa`b qada, for

example the kuttab of Shaykh al-Tibi in Taybih, kuttab Shaykh Ghanim in Qaqun, and kuttab Shaykh Isma`ail in `Anabta.²⁰

In 1887 Sadiq Pasha, the mutasarrif of Nablus and Balqa, issued an executive order to Hasan Muharam, the qa'immaqam of Bani Sa`b to establish an education committee in the qada headed by the qa'immaqam. Muharam appointed Shaykh Sa'id al-Karmi, Shaykh Amin al-Tibi, and Khalil Yusuf Hajj Khalil as members. This committee established 18 primary schools for boys and two rushdiyya schools by 1893.²¹ According to Salnama Wilayat Beirut of 1311 H, (1893), the list of boys schools and the number of students were: Tulkarm 150, Tirah 48, Kur 37, Kafr Saba 55, `Anabta 79, Zita 50, `Atil 45, Kafr Zibad 64, Kafr Sur 30, Bl`aa 75, Taybih 50, Shwikah 80, Qaqun 34, Qalanswa 40, Baqa al-Gharbiyya 60, `Alar 50, Dir al-Ghusun 42, and Beat Lied 55.²²

The governmental primary schools lasted for four years and the curriculum contained the Arabic alphabet, Ottoman Turkish, tajwid, recitation of parts of the Qur'an by heart, writing, elementary arithmetic, geography, elementary French and Ottoman history.

Rushdiyya schools

Rushdiyya schools were higher primary schools established and supported by the government the same as primary schools. As a rule every locality of 500 houses or more was entitled to a rushdiyya school. Rushdiyya education lasted for six years, during which students studied religion, Turkish grammar, composition and dictation, Arabic and Persian grammar, French, arithmetic, elementary geometry, geography, and Ottoman and world history. Girls' rushdiyyas were staffed by female teachers and offered courses in housekeeping and needlework in addition to the above courses offered for boys.²³ A rushdiyya school had one to five teachers, depending on the number of students.

Rushdiyya education was in a poor state in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut. There were very few rushdiyya schools compared to the wilaya needs. The schools were poorly organized. The city of Damascus had a maximum of four rushdiyyas, one specifically for military recruits, one for girls, and two for boys.²¹ In Nablus there were two for boys and one for girls.²² In

Tulkarm city there was a rushdiyya school south of the Old Mosque. This school had 150 male students with five teachers: the principal `Aref `Awwad, Shaykh Tawfiq al-Tibi, Shaykh Hassan Taliq, `Abd al-Rahman Salam, `Uthman Abu Ghazalah, and Hafiz `Awwad, who graduated from Dar al-Mu`alimin (Teachers College) in Beirut. There was a girl's school established in 1906 not far from the boys' school. The girls school was headed by Hilmiyya Ja`far from Beirut. Ms Ja`far was married to Mahmud al-Karmi, the son of Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi, the Mufti of Bani Sa`b.²⁴

I`dadiyya schools

The I`dadiyya (preparatory), also known as Rashadiyya schools, accepted both Muslim and non-Muslim students who were graduates of rushdiyya schools. Towns of more than 1,000 houses were entitled to an i`dadiyya school constructed and supported by public funds. In the case of Tulkarm, the i`adadiyya school was established in 1913 and was in operation during World War I years, 1914–1918. The duration of i`dadi education was reduced from three to two years in 1901, during which courses in Turkish literature, composition, French language, geography, general history, geometry, logic, chemistry, physics, algebra, and drawing were offered. Each i`dadiyya school had six to nine teachers. Graduates of these schools could pursue their studies by going to the Madrasa al-Sultaniyya in Istanbul or al-Madrasa al-Malakiyya in Beirut.²⁵

I`dadi education in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut under Sultan `Abd al-Hamid was in a primitive stage. The lack of expansion in i`dadi education was the result of the neglect and disorganization at the previous two levels of education, since the former was dependent on the latter. Before 1911, there were only four i`dadiyya schools in Palestine, Acre, Nablus, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, all of which were established in 1885.²⁶

High schools

The high school had many names – al-Malakiyya in Beirut, Maktab `Anbar in Damascus, and al-Kulliyya al-Salahiyya in Jerusalem. Ahmad Hilmi al-

`Allaf, Salah al-Din al-Qasimi, `Abd al-Karim, and Hasan al-Karmi, all students of the `Anbar school of Damascus, provided information about it. The school had an enrollment of about 300 students with boarding facilities. Graduates of rushdiyya schools from all over the wilaya, as well as other places applied to it. Since these schools were crowded, applicants had a hard time gaining admission. In cases in which an applicant's father was a grocer or butcher, or had a connection with one of the teachers, the applicant had a better chance to get accepted. The school was staffed by Turkish teachers, and had seven classes, with Turkish being the language of study. Religion, and even Arabic grammar, were taught in Turkish.²⁷ Graduates of this school entered the medical school or other higher institutions of learning in Istanbul or sought government employment. Salim `Abd al-Rahman Hajj Ibrahim from Tulkarm studied at al-Malakiyya School in Beirut. He describes the school campus as “a beehive of Arab nationalists”.²⁸

Muslim education in general

The interest in education of the Ottoman government and the indigenous Muslim population of Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut was in essence a reaction against the Christian schools of natives and missionaries. This education interest became a major part in the second stage of the Tanzimat. When it became evident that Christians were getting a better education than Muslims, the state attempted to rectify this discrepancy by establishing public schools.

Here lies the main contribution of the late Ottoman period to public education. All schools opened by Midhat Pasha and his successors operated throughout the late period of the Ottoman empire, and never declined or closed due to lack of support from the government or the people.²⁹ In 1892–1893 Damascus was reported to have had 10 or 12 primary schools, four of them for girls. This number remained basically unchanged in 1897.²⁷ A census conducted by the wilaya council of education, most probably in 1899, found that Damascus had seven primary schools for boys with 554 students and six schools for girls with 384 students. There were 85 Qur'an schools for boys and 84 for girls, attended

by 12,860 children.³⁰ These numbers might not be fully accurate. These schools suffered from many problems such as disorganization, bad methods of teaching, and unqualified teachers who were concerned mostly with collecting their pay.³¹

Disorganized and few in number as they were, the schools in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut were plagued by censorship, especially in the 1890s, as government repression increased in intensity.³² Subjects such as history, geography, philosophy, and political science were dropped from the curriculum.³³ Imported and locally printed books were heavily censored. Any person wishing to publish a book had to first obtain permission. A final copy of a book was submitted to the censor for approval. The wali, together with the council of education, could grant or withhold such an approval within a period of three months. If the book was cleared for publication, the author was expected to provide four free copies to the Ministry of Education. No printing press was allowed to print any books or other materials without permission. Only certificates of deaths, marriages, births, and documents related to business transactions were printed without requiring such authorization.³⁴ Imported foreign books were censored at the customs. Ownership of books, newspapers, and periodicals frequently exposed the owner to banishment or punishment. Burning of books or burying them underground led to the loss of thousands of them.³⁵ Nobody was allowed to move printed materials from any of the privileged provinces in the Ottoman Empire to the non-privileged ones without going through the same procedures of censorship.

For the above reasons the level of education was low, but slowly improved. Those who learned some reading and writing sought employment either with the government or with the merchants in big cities and centres. Literate people boasted of their knowledge of reading and writing usually by placing a pencil behind one of their ears as a sign of literacy.³⁶

The press

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Damascus was far inferior to Beirut in intellectual activity. Not only did it have fewer schools, but it had

fewer magazines, fewer newspapers, fewer printing presses and a lower literacy rate. By the end of the nineteenth century Damascus had only eight printing presses, some of which existed only a short time. The oldest printing press was a private one owned by Hanna Dumani, which he imported from Europe in 1855. It was followed by the wilaya printing press and the military printing press in 1864. In 1865 the wilaya press was used to publish the official paper, *Suriyya*, in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. Three printing presses were acquired in the years 1880 and 1882, and another two in the 1890s. Several of these presses were old, having been bought second-hand from Istanbul and Beirut.³⁷

Until the Young Turk revolution of 1908, the city of Damascus was very poor in newspapers and magazines compared to Beirut. Whereas the Beirut press had a better market because of a higher literacy rate and a more sophisticated reading public, the Damascus press had no encouragement either from the government or from the public. The conservative atmosphere of Damascus was not conducive to a better press, in contrast with a more congenial atmosphere of Beirut. The first newspaper in Beirut appeared in 1858. During the course of about 50 years, 37 newspapers were published in Beirut, 11 of them between 1858 and 1876, and 26 between 1876 and the end of 1907.³⁸ In contrast, the first newspaper which appeared in Damascus was *Suriyya*, the official newspaper, first published in 1865. It was the only newspaper that appeared before 1876. Between 1876 and 1907, Damascus witnessed the appearance of only two newspapers.³⁹

With regard to magazines, Beirut had its first locally published magazine in 1852. By the beginning of 1876, ten magazines had appeared in Beirut in contrast to none in Damascus. In the period between 1876 and the end of 1907, 24 magazines were published in Beirut compared with only three in Damascus, of which the first was published in 1886.⁴⁰

The Beirut papers and magazines were published by foreign missionaries and indigenous people alike. Not all were political; some devoted more attention to religious and literary topics. Several of them were discontinued not long after they first appeared. Others endured and lived a longer life. *Lisan al-Hal*, for instance, first published in 1877, is still being published as a Beirut daily today.

The Press in the late Ottoman Period

For some months before accession of Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid II and through the governorship of Midhat Pasha in Wilayat Suriyya, the press enjoyed a period of relative freedom of expression. The newspapers aired the good news as well as the bad, criticized the government and its officials, and published articles exposing defects in the Ottoman administration. They reported the depositions of Sultans ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Murad as well as accounts of the murder of some ministers in Istanbul by Hasan al-Jarkasi in June 1876. During the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–78 censorship was applied to the press, but it could publish news of the Ottoman defeat in the war and the criticism directed against the central government by the Syrian deputies in the Ottoman Parliament.⁴¹

Under the governorship of Midhat Pasha in Wilayat Suriyya the press enjoyed unprecedented freedom. Anyone reviewing some of the newspapers of that period such as *Lisan al-Hal* cannot but be aware of the change in tone and subjects. The papers criticized the prevailing conditions in public security, in agriculture, and in the courts. They attacked arbitrariness and exactions of government officials, and called for the dismissal of the corrupt ones. When the newspaper *al-Janna* accused a mutasarrif of corruption, Midhat Pasha challenged the mutasarrif to refute the accusations in court, face-to-face with the editor of the newspaper. Unable to prove his innocence, he submitted his resignation.⁴²

The press was not restricted to only exposing corruption; it freely discussed methods of reform, probably under the inspiration of the wali himself. The newspapers called for reform in taxation and for an increase in the salaries of public officials and security men to eliminate bribery. They discussed the healthy influence of a free press on reform, and turned their attention to subjects not previously mentioned such as road construction, railway construction, building schools, and the causes of progress and decline.⁴³

With the dismissal of Midhat Pasha from Wilayat Suriyya in 1881, the freedom which the press had enjoyed in the late Ottoman period gradually eroded. The central government tightened its grip on Syria and press censorship grew more stifling. Religious laws were applied to the press whose infractions exposed the newspapers to confiscation, suspension, or

suppression.⁴⁴ Two decades before the Young Turk revolution of 1908 witnessed the climax of censorship. The press completely lost its influence and became a mere instrument in the service of the sultan and his men. Subjects dealing with social, administrative, and political problems were prohibited. Any criticism of the government and officials was prohibited. Outside the news of railway building and other limited developmental projects already referred to, the newspapers had little to write about. They published news of appointments, receptions, and travels of walis. They reported the appointments and dismissal of officials, the recipients of imperial medals, and showered lavish praise on the sultan and his government. Wide coverage was given to celebrations honouring the sultan's birthday and his accession day. A good deal of space was allotted to the news of deaths, thefts, murders, locusts, and epidemics. Because of the suffocating censorship on local issues, the press increasingly turned its attention to foreign affairs. Thus, whole columns of pages were filled with the news of the western world, usually copied from foreign newspapers.⁴⁵

The severe late Ottoman period censorship imposed a ban on certain terms referring to opposition groups, sultans, crowds, the constitution, and instruments of violence. Thus, words like young (referring to Young Turks), revolution, rebellion, band, mutiny, independence, liberty, republic, sultan, dynamite, dagger, deposition, constitution, and caliphate were prohibited. If a king or a president was assassinated in Europe or elsewhere, his death was reported in Syria to have resulted from a heart attack.⁴⁶ In order to help sink his deposed brother Murad into oblivion, Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid prevented all mention of him in the press. The same was true about his brother Rashad. Whenever the names "Murad" and "Rashad" were mentioned they were written as "Murat" and "Rashat" instead. It is difficult to know how much of the censorship was dictated by the sultan himself or by his ministries, and how much resulted from the whims of the censor.

In addition to the rigorous internal press censorship, Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid imposed an iron curtain around his empire, thus shielding it from undesirable foreign influences. Most foreign newspapers and magazines, especially those of Egypt, were denied entry into Syria. Only those supporting his rule were allowed into Syria after a careful screening.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the sultan strived to win over his critics in Europe (European

and Ottoman), or to silence them by means of bribery and intimidation. Professor A. Vambery, a close friend of the sultan, reported that:

There is no exaggeration in stating that the money he [the Sultan] spent in this direction [influencing European press and silencing antagonistic ones], together with the salary of his numerous spies, amounted annually to several millions sterling.⁴⁸

Sultan `Abd al-Hamid was fearful of an Arab movement which might eventually split Syria from the Ottoman Empire and proclaim an Arab caliphate. To thwart such a movement and to keep Syria under tight control, he sent numerous spies to Beirut, Damascus, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, not only to watch over the press, but also to keep an eye on the authors, writers, and other suspicious persons. Societies and groupings of any sort were forbidden. The only Muslim charitable society in existence, Jam`iyyat al-Maqasid al-Khayriyya, was under suspicion and heavy pressure because of its name Maqasid—the plural of maqsid meant “aim”, which was thought to imply ulterior motives. The general atmosphere was ripe for slander and malicious rumours. The slightest tip against a person, particularly writers, immediately brought the police to search their homes looking for incriminating seditious literature in the form of books, papers, magazines, or correspondence with disgraced people.⁴⁹ This seditious literature was classified into three categories. The first category, bearing the severest punishment, included harmful or dangerous literature. It was followed by forbidden literature, which involved a less severe punishment than the first. The third category, with the least severe punishment, included improper literature. Any publications with the slightest pretension to history, politics, or philosophy were classified under the first category.⁵⁰ There were no distinct divisions to help draw the lines between the three categories. To a large extent, classification was arbitrary and depended on the whims and the mood of the inspector.

The late Ottoman period repression of the freedom of expression had harmful consequences on the nascent literary movement and on the press in Syria. Numerous writers and journalists from Beirut, Tripoli, Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo were forced to flee their homeland and seek refuge in Europe and the United States. Egypt, which was outside the grip of Sultan `Abd al-Hamid, sheltered the majority of them.⁵¹ Cairo counted 28 Syrian

political refugees, among whom were Y`aqub, Sarruf, Faris Nimr, Shahin Makarius, Ibrahim al-Yaziji, Khalil al-Yaziji, Jirji Zaydan, Muhammad Rashid Rida, Amin Shmayyil, Salim Sarkis, and Muhammad Kurd `Ali. Most of them lived in Alexandria. They included Salim Taqla, Bishra Taqla, Adib Ishaq, Salim Naqqash, Khalil Naqqash, Najib al-Haddad, and Shanin al-Khazin.⁵² Several of these people were pioneers in journalism. Their influence on the Egyptian press is incalculable. Thus, among several others, the well-known newspapers and magazines of *al-Muqattam*, *al-Ahram*, *al-Muqtataf* (started in Beirut), *al-Hilal*, and *al-Manar* were founded by refugees from Syria.

An idea of the extent of the late Ottoman period suppression of the freedom of expression could be deduced from the number of newspapers and magazines that appeared in Beirut, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Damascus after the Young Turk revolution of July 1908. Censorship was suddenly removed (but not for a long time). Between August 1908 and the end of December 1908, ten new newspapers appeared in Beirut, four in Damascus, four in Jerusalem, three in Jaffa, and one in Haifa. By the end of 1909, eight new newspapers appeared in Beirut and nine in Damascus. As to magazines, Beirut witnessed the rise of two between August and the end of December 1908, and six in 1909. Damascus produced only one magazine, *al-N`ima*, of the Orthodox Church.⁵³

Palestine had 36 newspapers and magazines by the end of the Ottoman control in 1918. Between 1876–1908 there was only one official newspaper printed in Jerusalem, *al-Quds al-Sharif*. This paper was written in two editions, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. The chief editor was Shaykh `Ali al-Rimawi. After 1908 the number of newspapers and magazines sharply increased and were printed in Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. Newspapers dealt with political, local issues and literature. The important newspapers were: *Filastin* in Jaffa edited by `Isa al-`Isa and Yusuf al-`Isa, *al-Karmil* in Haifa edited by Najib Nassar, *al-Munadi*, *al-Insaf*, *al-Najah*, and *al-Akhbar*. The influential Palestinian newspapers in the late Ottoman period were *Filastin* and *al-Karmil*. Najib Nassar, `Isa al-`Isa and Yusuf al-`Isa were adherents and advocates of Arab nationalism. *Al-Karmil*, the first Palestinian weekly tackled issues related to the ambitions of the Zionist movement (until it was closed down by the British government in 1940). Najib Nassar favoured the programme of decentralization of Palestine but maintained his Ottoman

loyalty coupled with Palestinian patriotism. He published a book entitled *al-Suyoniyya: Tarikhuha, Ahdafuha, wa Ahamiyatuha* (Zionism: Its History, Objective and Importance) in which he described Zionism as a racist movement that aimed to replace the Palestinians in the Holy land. `Isa al-`Isa, the co-founder of *Filastin*, was a journalist and poet, who was considered one of the pioneers of Arab media in Palestine.⁵⁴

Many local intellectual and political leaders in the Tulkarm area were major supporters of *Filastin* and *al-Karmil*. They all shared the same political views and some were members of the same political parties such as Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi and Muhammad al-Shanti, members of Hizb al-Lamarkaziyya (Decentralization Party) and Najib Nassar and Salim `Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim members of al-`Arabiyya al-Fatah (Arab Youth Association). During Faysal's rule over Greater Syria (1918–1920) Shaykh al-Karmi and `Abd al-Rahman were the elected representatives of Tulkarm area in the Syrian General Assembly.

Analysis of the 1869 public education reform

The aim of elementary education in the Ottoman Empire before the Tanzimat was seen as integrally connected to religion, and this basic understanding was not initially challenged by the Tanzimat. Indeed, the original proclamation of the Tanzimat had nothing to say about education. Until the proclamation of a regulation on public education in 1869, educational reform emphasized middle and higher education, with elementary education left to existing Qur'an schools. It was only in the 1870s that the Qur'an schools began to be gradually displaced by state-run elementary schools, under the supervision of the ministry of public education and taught according to the new method. Policymakers continued to see education primarily as a means of creating a loyal populace through the inculcation of religious and moral values. They attached a great many hopes to education. Public educational institutions continued to have substantial continuities with the old Qur'an schools in terms of personnel, content, and style. At the same time, financial difficulties and shortages of qualified teachers meant that the homogenization and institutionalization of public education had many difficulties. The distribution of state-run schools

(not to mention their quality) varied greatly across the length and breadth of the empire.

Rafiq al-Tamimi and Muhammad Bahjat, the authors of *Beirut Vilayeti* (Beirut Province in Ottoman Turkish, translated into Arabic as *Wilayat Beirut*), provided a good description of public education in Tulkarm in 1914. This description can be used as an example of the Ottoman public education system in the period under study. However, this book should not be taken as a general statement of the whole system. In Bani Sa`b qada, the budget of Lijna al-Ma`arif (the education department) reached to 160,000 qurush in 1914. The local people of the qada contributed 50,000 qurush which paid for the salary of 60 teachers. The average number of teachers for the rushdiyya school was two to three. The largest student body in the qada was the school of Tulkarm, it numbered 250 in 1914.⁵⁵ The authors of *Beirut Vilayeti* mentioned that the school would be upgraded to i`dadiyya level in two years by adding two more classes, an indication that there were seven grade classes in the Tulkarm school. The girls' school had 46 students with three teachers.⁵⁶

There were two ambitious projects, one of which became real in 1910 and the other in 1929. The first was al-Manzil, a dormitory for students from outside Tulkarm. This dormitory housed 30 students in 1910, and the numbers were raised to 60 by 1915. It was a joint effort between the education department of Bani Sa`b led by Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi and the municipality of Tulkarm led by Mayor `Abd al-Rahman Hajj Ibrahim.⁵⁷ Before the establishment of the manzil, students from outside used to rent storage places near the school that were not healthy nor suitable for students. Mayor Hajj Ibrahim complained indirectly to al-Tamimi and Bahjat about the Ottoman authorities' seizure of the qada budget to support the military campaign because it paralyzed all future improvements and projects.

The second project was the agriculture school. Since agriculture was the main economic activity in the area, the need for more advanced scientific agricultural knowledge grew with the creation of Jewish settlements in the Bani Sa`b area such as Petah Tikva in 1878 and Hadera in 1891. Both settlements made a major improvement in land use by adopting new agricultural techniques, technology, swamp drainage, and irrigation.<sup>58</sup> The Ottoman Agriculture Department (Nizarat al-Zra`at) decided to establish an

agricultural service (Maktab Zra`at) to train and educate the peasants in the use of new agricultural methods. The expenses of this new governmental office would be covered and subsidized from three sources: the qada budget, the education department, and contributions by local people. The first Maktab Zra`at in Palestine was established in Jaffa in 1890.⁵⁹ Bahjat and al-Tamimi reported in 1915 that the building of Maktab Zra`at Bani Sa`b was established by 1905. The qada council bought 500 dunum of agricultural land located to the west of the city of Tulkarm for the use of the Maktab Zra`at. The office building and the land cost 1,000 gold Majidis, and this amount was paid by local sources.⁶⁰ Mayor Hajj Ibrahim indicated that the budget and the money saved for this project was seized by the Ottoman government when the war started. The project was postponed until an indefinite future date.⁶¹

In 1928 Sir Ellis Khaduri of Hong Kong donated 100,000 British pounds to the Mandate authority to establish an agricultural school in Palestine. The British Mandate government divided the money between Arab Palestinians and Jews and established two agricultural schools, one in Tulkarm for the Palestinians and the Jewish one near Nazareth. Only students who finished the second level of the secondary school were given the chance to study three years in these schools. They paid 12 Palestinian pounds as an annual fee. During the Arab Revolt (1936–1939) the British authorities seized the Arab school and turned it into a military camp and prison. In 1948 huge parts of the Agricultural School in Tulkarm were seized by Israel.⁶² Eli Khaduri Agricultural Station and College (as the Palestinians call it now) still operates under the supervision of the Palestinian National Authority.⁶³

The majority of Bani Sa`b people viewed the education process as a new future investment for their children. The population of the city reached 4,000 by 1918 and the percentage of the student body (250) compared to the city population was 6.25 per cent.⁶⁴ Another factor behind the increase in the importance of education was the influence of elite families such as Karmi, Hajj Ibrahim, Hanun, Salah, Abu al-Rub, `Awad, Jayyusi, and many others. Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi (1852–1935) was the Mufti of Bani Sa`b in the late Ottoman period. He sent his sons Ahmad Shakir and Mahmud to al-Azhar and Hasan, Husayn, `Abd al-Karim, and `Abd al-Ghani to Maktab `Anbar in Damascus. All of them subsequently became important figures in the fields of education, poetry, and literature.⁶⁵

Ahmad Shakir graduated from al-Azhar and from Dar al-`Ulum in Cairo. He was the chief editor of the *Alif Ba* newspaper in Damascus and a famous translator of literature from English and French to Arabic. His list of translation works includes Geoffrey Chaucer, Marion Crawford, Oscar Wilde, Alexander Pope, Mary Brown, John Rendell, Guy de Maupassant, and Rabindranath Tagore.⁶⁶

`Abd al-Karim Sa`id al-Karmi was a famous Palestinian poet. Abu Salma (his nickname) was born in 1907 in Tulkarm. He studied law and worked in Haifa until April 1948, when the Israelis occupied the city. He then moved to Acre and, thereafter, he left for Damascus. He was a dear friend of Ibrahim Tuqan. Their love of poetry and Palestine built their friendship. Abu Salma wrote about his love and yearning to return to Palestine. He was awarded the Lotus International Reward for Literature in 1978 by The Association of Asian and African Writers. He was also given the title “The Olive Tree of Palestine”. Abu Salma died in 1980.⁶⁷

His brother Hasan al-Karmi (1905–2007) was also a figure in the fields of translation, literature, journalism, and media. He graduated from Maktab `Anbar School and the Syrian University at Damascus in 1924. He was a faculty member of the Arab College in Jerusalem from 1936 to 1948. In 1949 the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) contracted with him to be the head of Arabic language broadcasting. In his 45 years of service he directed the BBC Arab section in addition to his own weekly broadcast show called *Qawl `Ala Qawl* (saying about saying). He enriched the Arabic–English libraries with his English–Arabic dictionaries such as *al-Manar*, *al-Mughni al-Farid* and *al-Mughni al-Kabir*. He was a member of the Arab Thought Foundation and many other literary associations.⁶⁸

Hajj Ibrahim's family members obtained their education in different places and schools. `Abd al-Rahman studied at al-Madrassa al-Sultaniyya in Yaffa. His brother, `Abd al-Latif graduated from the High Islamic Intuition in Istanbul and became Qadi Shar`ai in Benghazi (Libya), Tripoli and Hama. Salim `Abd al-Rahman was a student at al-Madrassa al-Malkiyya in Beirut and graduated from the American University at Beirut.⁶⁹

Other families sent their children to Istanbul, Beirut, Cairo and Nablus to obtain higher education: Yusuf Hannun went to Dar al-Funun (the Ottoman University); Nadim Salah to the Imperial Medical School; and Abd al-Latif al-Jayusi to al-Sultaniyya school in Istanbul. Shaykh Tawfiq al-Tibi, Hafiz

`Awwad and Ahmad al-Ghadban went to Dar al-Mu`alimian (teachers' school) in Beirut. Shaykh Qasim al-Jallad, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Ba`ba`a, Shaykh Ibrahim Samara went to al-Azhar in Cairo, Shaykh Ismail `Abd Allah, Shaykh Yusuf al-Qubag, and Shaykh Hasan Mansur went to Shaykh Ahamd Khamash Islamic School in Nablus.⁷⁰

Despite its weaknesses, the Ottoman public school system was successful in producing individuals who could have careers in the civil service. The educated generations of the late Ottoman period (1875–1918)⁷¹ made great contributions to modernizing the Ottoman Empire. These educated generations were fundamental contributors to the new Middle East states after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918.⁷²

CHAPTER 7

TAXES AND FINANCES

The people of Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and the Sanjak of Jerusalem paid several kinds of taxes, some of which were old, but others were established as the need for money became more acute during the last years of the Ottoman administration of Palestine. Taxes which were long established, such as the tithes (`ushr) and the military exemption tax (badal) were steadily increased. Among a number of newly established taxes were those on animals, land property, income, promotions, and titles.

Tithes

Also known as the `ushr, this was the tax collection on land produce. Tithes were the government's major source of income, sometimes amounting to 45 per cent of the total revenue. As a rule the peasants allotted the government 10 per cent of their total produce. An increase of 1.5 per cent was added in 1883 of which 1 per cent went to public works, and 0.5 per cent to public education. A surtax of 1.13 per cent was added in 1897 in order to pay for military expenses.¹ Consequently, after 1900 the peasant officially paid the original 10 per cent as 12.63 per cent. In practice, he was paying up to 20 per cent or more of his produce. Samuel Bergheim reported in his article to the Palestine Exploration Fund in 1894 that the per centage could easily reach 33 per cent.²

There was no uniform method of tithe collection applied through the Wilaya. The method differed depending on the mutasarrifiyyas and qadas

involved. Confusion, exploitation, and foul play went hand in hand with tithe collection. In the Nablus mutasarrifiyya, for instance, the qadas of Bani Sa`b and Jenin paid a lump sum in cash for tithes. On the other hand, the qada' of Jma`ain paid tithes in kind, in measures of wheat and barley.³ Whether a certain qada paid for tithes in kind or cash, the amount collected for tithes was usually on the rise, unless the harvest was a very bad one.

As a rule tithes were collected through *iltizam*, or tithe farming. Every harvest season an estimation of tithes was made based on quantity, quality, and price. After the amount of tithes to be collected from each locality was calculated, a public auction was held during which tithe farming concessions were sold.⁴ These concessions went to the highest bidders, mostly the notables who at times achieved a monopoly of tithe farming, or to the government personnel in partnership with others as a cover to corruption deals. In localities where nobody bid to collect the tithes, or where prices offered were lower than those of the previous year because of low prices of grain, pressure was applied either on the tithe farmers to match previous prices, or on the villagers to farm their own tithes to meet previous amounts.⁵ The mukhtars of a certain village were once arrested and not released until the difference in the annual tithes was paid. Tithe farmers sometimes suffered arrest because of their low biddings. As the tithe farmers had to pay high prices, the tithe collectors in turn compensated themselves at the expense of the peasants. There were many reports and complaints of the rapacity and greed of the tithe collectors.⁶

Village mukhtars cooperated with the tithe farmers to oppress the peasants. Instead of the 10 per cent, 11.5 per cent or 12.63 per cent tax established by law, the peasant paid 14 per cent and sometimes 20 per cent or more. Isma`il Kamal, once an acting governor of Damascus, said that tithes were usually fixed arbitrarily at more than the entire produce of a cultivator, and the peasants were forced to buy an extra quantity to complete the amount needed for tithes. This extortionate taxation drove the peasants to sell their land and become tenants in order to avoid the payment of tithes. Consequently, whole villages became the property of some influential individuals.⁷ Whereas the peasants had no protection against extortionate taxation, the notables and the rich employed various strategies to avoid taxes or ameliorate them. The list of names of tithes concessionaires in Bani Sa`b included: Hajj Ibrahim Isma`il, Yusuf al-Nashif (from Taybih), Muslih

Hannun (from Sufarin), Amin Salah, Sadiq al-Sukhun, As`ad al-Sukhun, Muslih Muhyar, Hafiz Tuqan, `Abd al-Fatah Tuqan, `Umar Za`itr (from Nablus), Ahamd Mukhtar al-Qabani, Hasan al-Qabani, Antwan al-Tayyan (from Beirut), and Rafiq al-`Umari (from Damascus).⁸ All of them were multazimin (tithes concessionaires) between 1882 and 1918.

Various attempts were made to improve tithe collection or substitute a money tax for tithes. Early in 1877, a measure abolishing tithe farming was adopted and went into effect in 1880. Tithes were to be collected on government account, by government agents, and were restricted only to the populated districts close to the capital.⁹ However, it proved to be unworkable and tithe farming was restored shortly after having been abolished.

Another measure of a different nature was attempted under the new Wali, Hamdi Pasha, in the spring of 1884. This time tithes were abolished altogether and a lump sum in cash was levied on each locality, to be collected at a fixed time during the year. This lump sum was calculated on the basis of the tithes collected for the last five years. The average of these tithes constituted the amount of the new tax.¹⁰ This method was called takhmis (from khammasa: to divide into five parts) and almost from the beginning there was a general outcry against it from the peasants. Although it delivered them from the exactions of the tithe farmers' gendarmes, it resulted in new hardships. The average of the last five years was a high one because of good harvests. The peasants were compelled to pay at this rate, even in case of a bad crop. Another more serious shortcoming of the new tax was the fact that it was collected at a fixed time. Since money was not usually available to the peasants, they were forced to borrow from moneylenders at high interest. The tithe concessionaires were the moneylenders. For these reasons, the takhmis method was unsuccessful, and tithe farming was restored early in 1885.¹¹

Not until 1897 were any new attempts to abolish tithes or improve their collection undertaken. In 1897 the wilaya government attempted to levy a fixed sum of money to replace the farming of tithes in Greater Syria. The peasants responded by fleeing their homes as an objection to tax innovations (and to escape conscription).¹² As a result, the government was forced to retract this measure. Henceforth, the question was not to abolish tithes, but to improve their collection. In 1898, the walis of Syria and Beirut

were instructed by Istanbul to abolish tithe farming and to collect tithes through government agents without the help of gendarmes as a means to intimidate the peasants. Despite this order, government agents collected only about 13 per cent of the tithes the following year; the rest were collected by the tithe farming method.¹³ Hence, tithe farming remained the principal method of tithe collection.

The land tax

The land tax constituted the second major source of revenue to the wilaya treasury. The amount of land tax collected each year was rather stable, with a tendency to rise, but not subject to heavy fluctuations. In 1880, the land tax was reorganized, fixed at four per thousand on all agricultural land subjected to tithes, and on houses of less than 20,000 qursh in value. Houses valued at more than 20,000 qursh were taxed at eight per thousand.¹⁴

Another reorganization of the land tax occurred in 1887. The four per thousand taxes on all agricultural land remained, but a five per thousand tax was levied on homes valued at 20,000 qurush or less. The eight per thousand home valued at more than 20,000 qurush was maintained, but ten per thousand was levied on all the other property, that is property-producing revenue, such as rented buildings, khans (warehouses and inns), hospitals, and shops.¹⁵ To these a surtax of 11 per cent on the total was added for education and military purposes. As with other taxes, influential people usually avoided payment of land taxes either in full or in part.¹⁶

The military exemption tax (Badal ‘Askari)

The origin of this tax goes back to jizya, the tax that was levied on Christians and Jews in the early days of Islam, and was later adopted by the Ottomans. The payment of this tax was briefly interrupted in 1856, when it was decided to introduce non-Muslims to military service. However, this measure failed because of the opposition of both Muslims and non-Muslims, and the tax was reintroduced. Before 1889 the military exemption

tax was levied on non-Muslim communities at the rate of 5,000 qurush for every 180 males, or approximately 28 qurush per male. In 1889 this rate rose to 5,000 qurush for every 135 males or about 37 qursh per male.¹⁷

As a rule the military exemption tax was paid by every male between 15 and 75 years old, instead of between 20 and 40, as it had been prior to 1875. Women, children, clergymen, and men over the age of 75 were exempted. In a wave of new taxes and tax increases in 1905, the military exemption tax was again raised by imperial decree from 37 to 50 qurush per male.¹⁸ According to the old rate, a Muslim who wished to be exempted from the military service paid the government the amount paid by 135 non-Muslims for their military exemption tax, or 5,000 qurush per year in cash (badal naqdi). This was equivalent to providing one conscript annually.¹⁹ According to the new rate, a man wishing to avoid military service had to pay 67,500 qurush annually. Rich Muslims could afford to pay these amounts in order to avoid conscription; poor Muslims could not pay and endured the hardships of Ottoman military service.²⁰

Until 1903, the distribution and collection of the military exemption tax was the responsibility of the religious chiefs of each community. Each year the clergy prepared a list of their followers, showing the names of those required to pay, the sum they paid, and the names of those who were exempted by law. Since the collection of this tax was a community responsibility, some poor members were either exempted by their religious chiefs or paid a fraction of what they were supposed to pay. Rich community members paid the balance. This method of tax collection – among other things – enhanced the position of clergymen as the protectors of their communities and increased their influence at the expense of the state. While it helped to draw the members of the community together, it increased the distance between the individual and the state, reduced the role of the state, and directed the individual's loyalty to his religious community. However, the law which was passed in 1902 turned over the collection of the military exemption tax to government agents instead of leaving it in the hands of religious chiefs.

The drawing up of lists of taxable members to be submitted to government authorities was subject to fraud. Mukhtars, for instance, were sometimes bribed in order not to report new births or taxable names. According to British consuls in Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem there were

150,000 registered male Christians and Jews in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut. In addition, there were about 17,500 males not registered in order to avoid the tax.²¹ The budgets of both Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut according to British consular reports show that the amount collected annually from the military exemption tax between 1895 and 1905 varied between a low of 12,700 gold majidi and a high of 15,616 gold majidi. After the increase of 1905 the military exemption tax jumped to 21,763 gold majidi; by 1908 it had increased further to 22,764 gold Majidi.

Tax on livestock

The people paid taxes on their domestic animals – sheep, camels, cows, and goats. The tax on sheep and goats was 3.5 to 4 Majidis per head. Camels were taxed at the rate of 10 qurush per head.¹⁹ The tax on livestock was extended in 1903 to cover horses, mules, cows, oxen, and donkeys. The peasants paid a tax of three Majidis per donkey and 10 Majidis per head on all the rest.²² The mukhtars were to determine the number of animals to be taxed in each village.

When the new tax went into effect in 1885, it encountered strong resistance in Palestine. Whereas the Christians were exempted from the new tax as a tactical measure, the majority of the Muslims refused to pay, causing a clash between them on the one side, the tax collectors and the gendarmes on the other. The gendarmes fired at the people, killing four persons and wounding two. Faced with this strong opposition, the government exempted the people of the Acre, Nablus, and Jerusalem mutasarrifiyyas from paying the new tax on the grounds of poverty.²³ In reality, the government could not enforce it.

As the budgets of Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and Sanjak of Jerusalem consistently revealed, the sheep tax constituted the third major source of revenue to the wilaya treasury. No way was ever devised to collect this revenue properly, justly, and without evasion. Confusion and bloodshed accompanied the annual collection of the sheep tax. The Bedouins were reluctant to submit to the sheep, goat, and camel tax. What the government collected from the Bedouins was a small amount of what they should have paid, and it was collected by sheer force. The same applies to the nomads of

southern and central Palestine, who did anything they could to avoid paying taxes. The Bedouins of Bir al-Sab`a, for example paid in 1901 on 600 sheep and goats instead of the 10,000 it was believed they owned.²⁴

Other taxes

There were a host of other taxes in addition to those already mentioned. The people paid municipal taxes on items of consumption. Butchers paid five qurush on every slaughtered sheep, lamb, or goat, two and a half qurush on every slaughtered young sheep or goat.²⁵ Any person practising a profession other than cultivation paid an income tax of five per cent annually. Despite the fact that tithes included a two per cent tax for public works and education, the people of every locality were taxed extra whenever a road or any other public facility was undertaken. Thus, every camel, horse, or donkey carrying a load, entering or leaving Damascus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, or Acre was taxed one, a half, and a quarter of a qurush respectively, under the excuse of building a road between Jerusalem and Jaffa.²⁶ Under the same excuse the people of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, Acre and Gaza paid a tax of about 19 qurush each three times, while the villagers worked four days each on the famous road which was never completed.²⁷

Between 1901 and 1905 new taxes were instituted to help finance the Hijaz railway. For example, men granted promotions and tithes in civil, military, or religious spheres were taxed, each according to the level of the qurush, the highest was 1,000 in the civil military spheres and 570 in the religious sphere. Medals were taxed, each according to class. Licences requested for various activities were taxed.²⁸ Salaries of functionaries were subjected to deductions varying between two days and 24 days pay a year, according to the amount of monthly salaries.²⁸ Persons practising a profession in the capitals of qadas, mutasarrifiyyas and wilayas endured new taxes from 15 to 35 qurush annually.²⁹ Landowners and traders in the same places paid from 70 to 200 qurush annually.³⁰

State of finances

In discussing the types of taxes collected in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut, the major sources of revenue have been cited, namely, the tithes, land tax, livestock tax, and military exemption tax respectively. The total revenue for the financial year 1893 amounted to 336,000 golden majidi, with Midhat Pasha's budget of 555,000 golden majidi in 1897, the wilayat budget increase from 333,000 in 1871 to 555,000 in 1897.³¹ The wilaya revenue continued to decline throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. As the revenue declined, expenses increased, with the result that the wilaya became unable to pay its expenses and the provincial government resorted to borrowing. As early as 1871, Nu`aman Qasatili reported a debt of 600,000 majidi; the wilaya had borrowed from the merchants, landlords, and wealthy people and then refused to pay back. As time passed the financial situation of the wilaya became more acute; by 1882 the wilaya debt had amounted to 750,000 majidi.

The annual budgets of Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut reported in British consular reports revealed that the revenue was obtained from the same sources, and spent on the same purposes. No new sources were found and old ones were not being improved. Particularly absent from the list of expenses were any allotments for internal developments such as road building, or the improvement of agriculture and industry. The budget strained expenses on war, salaries, and the Hajj caravan. In all 13 budgets reported, war and army expenses consistently occupied the first place, absorbing more than 36 per cent of the total expenses. In the budget of the financial year ending March 13, 1905, army allotments amounted to 55 per cent of the total expenses. Coming next to the army on the list of expenses, the Hajj caravan (in 10 budgets out of 13) occupied second place. Local expenses and those of the gendarmerie alternate between third and fourth places. After allotments for these four items were made, the revenue was depleted, leaving hardly any money for other purposes. A deficit was reported in seven budgets, and a surplus in six. The surplus was usually in the last years before 1909. The debt in 1908 amounted to 1,707,077 majidi.³²

In the late Ottoman period, the financial situation of Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut was under heavy, sometimes desperate strains. The wilaya had no spare money for contingencies. To meet recurrent emergency expenses, the authorities often had to turn to municipal, charitable, and religious funds.

Certain municipal taxes such as the slaughter tax, taxes on weights and measures, and the animal sales tax went to the wilaya treasury in 1888.³³ This action deprived the municipal budget of about a third of its income.

One measure the wilaya government constantly resorted to when in financial distress was to suspend payments of its military personnel and civil employees for several months. This happened with greater frequency after 1877. The hardships which the people and the low-ranking government and military employees endured during the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 have been discussed. However, they did not end with the end of the war. By February 1880, the military servicemen had not been paid for about nine months.³⁴ The same occurred during the establishment of the Acre and Nablus mutasarrifiyyas in 1888. This caused a mutiny among the gendarmes, and expressions of discontent among the regular troops.³⁵

Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut experienced acute financial problems in the years 1895–1897 because of the military operations against the Druzes in Hawran and the Bedouins in southern Palestine. The budget was deficient, the wilaya was in debt to the Ottoman Bank, and the salaries of military personnel and functionaries were several months in arrears.³⁶ Furthermore, the wilaya had to meet payments for Istanbul and the Hajj caravan. On top of all this the new Druze and Bedouin uprisings in 1896–1897 necessitated a new expedition to the Jerusalem mutasarrifiyya, whose expenses were not under consideration. Since the expedition expenses took precedence over all others, the wilaya resorted to about 30,000 majidi taken from orphanages, mosques, and municipal funds to finance the campaign.³⁷ This amount was not enough to solve the government's dilemma. The contractors supplying the troops in Hawran and Bir al-Sab`a refused to deliver any supplies to the troops for lack of money. One contractor agreed to do so only if paid in cash.³⁸ The solution lay in bringing the campaign to an end as soon as possible. The uprisings ended in 1898 with high expenses paid by the wilaya and mutasarrifiyya budget.

How did the military personnel, government functionaries, and other dependents react to this repeated suspension of salaries? It is important to note that those who were most affected by this suspension were the low-ranking personnel, in the government service and in the military. High-ranking officials in both areas were regularly paid and had no reason to complain.³⁹ In weighing the impact of the suspension of pay on the low

ranking personnel, the civil officials suffered less than their counterparts in the military because they had access to illicit sources of income, such as bribery. However, despite this advantage, disaffection in both civilian and military circles ran high against the government. The paid checks were exchanged in half of its values by the money changers.⁴⁰ Patience and endurance, so characteristic of the natives, sometimes gave way to action. Demonstrations as seen during the Russo-Turkish War, but not as violent, occurred in early 1897. Some Muslim women surrounded the saraya in Damascus where the acting wali and daftardar were at work. They demanded arrears in pay to their husbands, sons, or brothers in government service.⁴¹ The women acted for the men probably because the men feared government action against them, such as dismissal or imprisonment, whereas it was unlikely that the government would act against women.

The reaction of the military personnel to a long suspension of pay was more decisive, daring, and threatening than that of the civilians. The little money some officers earned from part-time work in bakeries or the like was not enough to alleviate their misery. In other cycles of financial crisis and loss of pay in 1902, approximately 103 low rank officers, having demanded their pay in vain from the Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem officials, went to the telegraph office and demanded to be put in contact with the sultan. The telegraph clerks refused at first, but then yielded under threat. Tahsin Pasha, the sultan's secretary, answered for his chief. The officers demanded their arrears in pay, insisting on an immediate answer. After relaying their message to the sultan, one month pay was granted.⁴² Threats proved successful. In a similar case in Jerusalem, 150 to 200 soldiers who had completed their military service but were never discharged and never paid, mutinied and occupied al-Aqsa Mosque in 1904. They refused to leave until they were handed their discharge papers and two months of pay in arrears due to them.⁴³ These incidents confirm beyond doubt that the Ottoman government yielded to collective pressure.

CHAPTER 8

PUBLIC HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, AND TRADE

Public health

Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and Sanjak of Jerusalem suffered from poor sanitary conditions prior to the 1890s. Most of the streets of Damascus, Acre, Safad, and Gaza were dirty, congested with debris, and filled with offensive odours. Dead animals were often left in the streets to be devoured by roving dogs and wild birds.¹ Fortunately, in summertime the hot sun quickly dried them up. Transport animals were left unattended in the city streets, leaving their refuse everywhere. The job of cleaning the streets and watching over public health in major cities fell upon the municipal government. However, the municipalities usually neglected their duty or suffered from the lack of funds. Meagre resources were diverted to other purposes such as mosque repairs, military spending, or paying to build a hospital or a saraya. Annual financial allotments to public health in the wilaya budgets were insignificant. In seven out of 13 budgets annual public health appropriations never exceeded 18 pounds. Only in 1893, public health was allotted 1,000 majidi. Foreign consuls in Damascus, Jerusalem, Haifa, Beirut, and Jaffa frequently complained to the wilaya government of the unsanitary conditions of cities in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut, but no lasting results were achieved. Furthermore, a bad situation became worse when no wali was present in Damascus and Beirut.

Adding to the overall unsanitary conditions, the people of many cities suffered from drinking unhealthy water. For the most part, Damascus depended on the Barada River and its tributaries for its water supply. The river became low during the dry season in the summer and was open to contamination especially when there was an epidemic in the city because of the residential areas nearby. Animals drank from it and people washed their clothes in it, then used its water for drinking and cooking.² Jerusalem took its water supplies from Birak Sulayman (Solomon's Pools) located south of the city. These pools collected rain and natural spring waters in winter for use in the dry season. In summer these ponds turned green from pollution, increasing the likelihood of the spread of germs and epidemics.

The sanitary conditions in small towns and villages were by no means better. A small stream supplied the city of Jaffa with its water needs. The `Awja River (Yarkun) was shallow and open. Animals wallowed in it and women washed their dirty clothes on its banks. Water carriers came and filled their water skins from the river to sell water to the thirsty people in the city.³ Many villages suffered from a lack of water, especially those that had neither rivers nor springs. Village water supplies were collected in open reservoirs in the winter. These reservoirs were exposed to wind, dust, and the sun. In spring and summertime when more Bedouins came to the area, the animals drank the water on equal footing with humans.⁴

With sanitary conditions being what they were, Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut were vulnerable to the spread of disease and epidemics. Malaria, smallpox, and cholera often struck. Malaria was generally a yearly phenomenon in the costal plains of Palestine and other outlying areas. Marshes, stagnant water, and open streams provided excellent breeding areas for mosquitoes.⁵ Every summer the people of Bani Sa`b implored the wilaya to do something about a swampy area located west of the town in the coastal plains. Cholera and smallpox were not as permanent as malaria, but they were deadly and carried away a high toll of victims whenever they struck. These diseases spread through Beirut or across the Jordan River from southern Palestine, or with the pilgrims returning from Mecca. Cholera struck in Palestine in the summer of 1883, then again in 1890, 1891, and 1902. It was particularly intense in 1902, when it spread from Transjordan to Palestine. The epidemic remained in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut until the end of 1903, disappearing for a time and then breaking out

again. It was particularly severe in the Jordan River Valley and the Palestinian coastal plains.⁶ Victims fell in their thousands, although the official figures about casualties are very unreliable. The authorities tried to minimize the severity of the disease and the people did not usually report their casualties to the government. Thus, in early March 1903 the officially reported cases in Damascus were 204, but the officially reported fatalities were put at 310. Unofficial estimations put the number of fatalities at about 600.⁷ By the end of 1903, when the epidemic was finally overcome, official figures put the total fatalities at 1,361 deaths in Damascus and 2,642 in other parts of the wilaya. The estimated numbers in other cities were: Jerusalem 100–150, Nablus 170, Jaffa 300–400, and in the Bani Sa`b area around 150. The British consul estimated that between 3,000 to 3,500 deaths occurred in Damascus alone, and 6,000 to 7,500 in the other parts of the wilaya.⁸

What preventive measures were taken to combat malaria and other diseases? While quinine was the common cure for malaria, vaccination was the measure adopted to prevent smallpox from spreading. Vaccination against smallpox was urged by the Ottoman authorities in 1885 and 1906.⁹ Not many people responded to the call for vaccination because of ignorance, a shortage of doctors, and a trust in providence. As for cholera, the epidemic was fought with improved cleanliness, quarantine, and disinfection. Whenever cholera threatened or broke out in major cities such as Damascus, Jerusalem, or Jaffa, the cities enjoyed better cleanliness but it was usually too late to prevent the disease from spreading. Thus in late 1902, when cholera appeared, Damascus was divided into 16 districts, each one being placed under the supervision of a doctor to see that their districts were kept clean and to disinfect houses.

Once more it was difficult to convince the people to clean the city and take precautions against the disease. The doctors in charge of doing the job were promised high pay but only received a fraction of their salaries. In February 1903, after three doctors had been accused of taking bribes, they were all dismissed and replaced by military physicians.¹⁰

Persons suspected of cholera infection were quarantined. `Aqaba, Gaza, Tabuk, `Amman, Yaffa, and Zarqa were places where pilgrims returning from Mecca spent several weeks in quarantine. If no disease appeared, they were allowed to proceed to other areas in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut.¹¹ In

addition to isolating individuals, when cholera appeared in a certain locality the whole area was placed under a quarantine and all communications with it were discontinued.¹² Houses where casualties had occurred were disinfected. This meant that most or all of the linen and furniture went up in flames. For this reason the people were very reluctant to report their sick family members.

Whenever the epidemic broke out normal public life was disrupted. Fear reached panic limits and many people fled the city to mountainous areas. Because of the quarantine, internal and external communications virtually came to a standstill. The postal service was interrupted and import and export trade stopped, thus necessitating the stoppage of the textile industry. Prices of foodstuffs increased while medicines and other vital goods disappeared from the markets.¹³ Undoubtedly the merchants tried to exploit the public misfortune in their interests and the government was unprepared to deal with the situation.

Developments in public health

Improvements in public health in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut were few under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid. Before 1876 there was no hospital in Damascus, although licensed doctors numbered about ten (there had been none in 1870).¹⁴ Another improvement was a stricter supervision of doctors after several persons practising medicine illegally had brought suffering and death to many. In 1880, a committee was formed to examine the credentials of doctors, a measure which led to the suspension of several practitioners. However, some of those disqualified went to the Health Department in Istanbul and obtained papers permitting them to resume their practice as before.¹⁵

The first civilian hospitals for women were founded in Damascus and Beirut in 1886. It was hastily constructed in about four months and opened in May 1886.¹⁶ Besides this women's hospital, there was another hospital exclusively for military personnel. Male civilians were without a hospital. In July 1897 during the administration of Nazim Pasha (1896–1899), the wali obtained permission to build a new two-storey hospital in Damascus, which was completed in the summer of 1899. The hospital, first called first

Mustashfa al-Ghuraba' (The Strangers' Hospital), was inaugurated on March 1, 1900, and renamed al-Mustashfa al-Hamidi, after Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid.¹⁷ Patients in the old hospital were transferred to the new one. After the collapse of Ottoman rule the name of the hospital was again changed, to al-Mustashfa al-Watani (The National Hospital). Next to this hospital Nazim Pasha established a lunatic asylum, a pharmacy, and centres for vaccination and fumigation.¹⁸

How did Nazim Pasha finance these projects? Similar to road construction, the people of Damascus contributed half of the charges and the second half came from the government, the municipalities, and Islamic endowments. Besides the subscriptions of wealthy Damascenes, a tax was levied on theaters and entertainers. The municipality of Damascus allocated part of its income to help build the new hospital. It was estimated that the people paid more than 225,476 qurush in subscription.¹⁹

A small hospital in Tulkarm financed by the municipality served both military personnel and civilians. This hospital was also in use as a quarantine centre when epidemics spread in the area. Tamimi and Bahjat reported that the health situations in Bani Sa'b qada and Tulkarm were not good, but at the same time were not scary.²⁰ They compare and contrast between birth rate and death rate to prove that there were some improvements in health conditions. In 1913 the health department reported 3,012 babies born in the qada and 160 mortality cases recorded. The previous year the numbers were 1,209 babies born compared to 199 mortality cases recorded.²¹

Building hospitals was meaningless if there were no physicians to attend to the sick. Until 1903, there was no Ottoman medical school in Greater Syria to graduate new doctors. Many foreign schools and missions had their own physicians to whom natives resorted for treatment. Medical treatment had become a means through which foreign political influence increased in Syria, and the Ottoman authorities became increasingly sensitive to this issue. Furthermore, the American and French medical schools in Beirut had already started graduating medical students. To counter their prestige and achieve parity with them, the sultan ordered the establishment of a medical school in Damascus.²²

The medical school opened its doors in the autumn of 1903 and had an initial enrollment of 26 students, four of whom were boarders. The majority

of students were Muslims, but a few Christians and Jews enrolled also. A house was rented to shelter the school until new facilities were built. The school was free, financed mostly through appropriations by the central government and through new taxes. Each boarding student paid an annual fee of only six golden majidi. Graduates of Ottoman `i'dadi schools were eligible for enrollment in medicine and pharmacy. The duration of study was six years for the former and three years for the latter. Chemistry, biology, physics, religion, and French were taught. Instead of military service, the graduates of the medical school were obligated to serve the government for five years anywhere in greater Syria (Syria, Beirut, and Aleppo provinces).²³ In 1906, the medical school was expanded and modernized to meet higher standards. One of the first class graduates of the Damascus Medical School was Nadim Salah from Tulkarm.

In the late Ottoman period, Palestinians experienced the same general increase in life expectancy as inhabitants of the other Ottoman Mediterranean coastal regions. Decline in the rates of mortality in the latter half of the nineteenth century was similar to that seen in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The decline was not only due to the presence of medicine or doctors, but also to improvement in public security, trade, and production, changes resulting from the increased power of the central government. There was enough to eat, a bit more money, and relative peace from internal conflicts and Bedouin raids. The end of major epidemic diseases was statistically less significant, but still important. Plague, traditionally the worst epidemic killer, effectively disappeared in the 1880s. By the 1890s, the great plague epidemics were over.²⁴

Development in water supplies

Prevention of diseases is more important than curing them. Wali Nazim Pasha acted in this spirit. Beside the hospital that he built, the wali is still well remembered in Damascus for another achievement – supplying the city with clean, healthy water. The contaminated Barada River provided Damascus with its water supply and was a basic medium in spreading diseases. Wali Nazim Pasha eliminated this health hazard by drawing the clean `Ayn Fija water into the city.

The 'Ayn Fija water was a tributary of the Barada River, about 20 kilometres away from Damascus. Early in 1903, Wali Nazim Pasha submitted a plan to the central government requesting permission to draw Fija water in underground pipes from its source to Damascus. The plan was approved by the central government and permission was granted. Nazim Pasha's attention then shifted to attaining funds necessary to undertake the project. A sum of approximately LT 40,000 was needed for this purpose, to be collected within four years. As usual the wilaya budget was incapable of providing any funds. New taxes were levied, notably a five or six Majidis tax on every case of kerosene sold in Damascus. The municipality of Damascus and other municipalities throughout the wilaya paid annual contributions. Wealthy Damascenes were also called upon to subscribe.²⁴ By the autumn of 1906 less than half the amount was available. The Ottoman Bank offered a loan and the project was put up for contractors. It fell to the lowest bidder for LT 39,000.²⁵

The 'Ayn Fija water project was completed in less than two years. The pipes were installed and two reservoirs were built in Salihyya from which water flowed into the city for distribution. By July 1908, the Fija water was pouring into Damascus in front of the saraya. The sultan's accession anniversary that year was celebrated with electric illuminations and jets of Fija water. Water fountains were constructed in different quarters and markets of the city to provide pedestrians with clean water.²⁶

The Fija water led to a marked improvement in public health. A Damascene observer noted that sicknesses decreased in the city and the consumption of cures, particularly quinine, diminished by 60 per cent. Outside Damascus, however, there was little improvement in public health. After the construction of the Hijaz railway Tabuk became a major station where a hospital was built to attend the travelers and pilgrims.²⁷

Clean and healthy water also was made available for other cities such as Beirut and Tulkarm. In 1898, with the help of French engineers, the municipality of Beirut pulled fresh water through metal pipelines from the Kalb River. The water department in Beirut municipality built three water tanks to store fresh and clean water for the city.²⁸

The second example of a clean water project was in Tulkarm, where according to Bahjat and Tamimi, the municipality made a major contribution in providing clean water. In 1905, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj

Ibrahim, the mayor of Tulkarm, signed an agreement with the Wagner factory for water pipes and pumps for Jaffa to establish a steam water pump unit. The agreement terms indicated that the Wagner factory would dig an artesian well, assemble a steam engine on it, and build a metal water tank with the capacity to hold 400 cubic metre, to connect the city houses with the water tank through metal pipelines, and to provide for the maintenance of this water station.²⁹ The digging operation took place at the western spring during the autumn of 1905 and the project was completed by May 1907. The water tank was built near the Old Mosque, and from there water was distributed through pipes to some houses. The Municipality of Tulkarm charged connection fees of one-half majidi per month to each house that received its water supply through the municipality pipelines. Some houses were not connected to the water system because the inhabitants could not pay the connection fees. In their cases the municipality offered them the opportunity to fill their pottery jars from the water tank near the Old Mosque and the charges were two qurush per jar.³⁰ Water had always been free of charge, so this was the first time that water had been subject to fees or charges in the area. The provincial people of central Palestine therefore called the people of Tulkarm “the people who sold water”.³¹ In regard to the importance and success of this project, Tamimi and Bahjat, the authors of the Beirut Province Report, expressed their appreciation and admiration to Mayor `Abd al-Rahman Hajj Ibrahim and to the qaimmaqam at that time, Salih al-Rikabi Pasha (from a famous and wealthy family in Damascus and a member of the Arab Youth Association later on).³²

Agriculture and Trade

Agriculture was the foundation of the economy in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut, but it was not in great condition. For some time before and after the accession of the Tanzimat, the agricultural production of the wilayat stagnated, and previously flourishing crops declined. The production of cotton, once an export crop, almost disappeared after 1869. The annual yields of wheat, barley, and maize, the chief products, were not increased. Christian and Muslim peasants fled from their lands in the face of repeated Bedouin raids. Contemporary Syrian writers were keenly aware of the crisis

befalling agriculture and often called the attention of the authorities to it, but nothing was done to help lift agriculture out of its predicament.³³

The factors leading to the decline of agriculture were highly affected by a lack of public security, which was not of the most importance before the implementation of Tanzimat. Frequent Bedouin raids on peasant villages led to the desertion of these villages by their occupants. Threats of military conscription produced the same results. Heavy taxation and exactions by tax farmers, gendarmes, moneylenders, and government officials reduced the peasants to a constant state of debt and drove some to sell their land and work as tenant farmers. The peasants were in a real predicament, suffering from lack of protection, inhumane treatment, and extreme poverty. Since wheat was an expensive export crop, the peasants lived mainly on maize and barley bread, and in some cases on kardush bread (a mixture of wheat and corn).³³ The enjoyment of the crop which they grew was mostly beyond their reach.

Agriculture drew no encouragement or support from the government. There were no agricultural schools or committees, no subsidies to farmers, and no information bureaus to help them obtain information to fight animal sicknesses and locusts. An animal epidemic in 1879 carried away about 65,000 heads of cattle.³⁴ The authorities did nothing, or could do nothing, to fight the disease. Whenever locusts struck, the government required each peasant to kill several kilograms of locusts as a means of overcoming the onslaught.

Encouragement and protection of domestic agricultural products vis-à-vis foreign competition was one area where government help was essential, but never obtained. Cotton, an export crop in 1869, became restricted to the local markets of Damascus, Nablus, and Jaffa because of the competition of Egyptian and United States cotton.³⁵ Some other agricultural products were in a similar situation.

The establishment of an agricultural bank in Damascus in 1889 could have led to substantial improvements in agriculture and in peasant conditions. The bank drew its capital from tithes and was designed to offer loans to peasants at low interest. Prior to 1889, farmers resorted to moneylenders for loans at interest rates ranging from 13 to 15 per cent. Furthermore, they offered their agricultural instruments, crops, and land as security, a measure which sometimes led to confiscation. The agricultural

bank, on the other hand, charged six per cent interest, but offered loans only to dependable farmers of good standing.³⁶ There is no indication that the agricultural bank produced any positive results. Like most Ottoman institutions, corruption crept into its administration, and farmers in need of money paid the officials a bribe, which cancelled any benefit they were supposed to draw.

The development and expansion of agriculture was hindered by the lack of good roads and modern means of transportation. The Nablus–Tulkarm–Jaffa wagon road rendered important services to the Nablus mutasarrifiyya. So did the Jerusalem–Jaffa wagon road to the al-Quds al-Sharif mutasarrifiyya. In the late Ottoman period there were some satisfactory roads leading from the nahiyas and qadas to Nablus, Jaffa, and Haifa, places of exportation and importation.³⁷

According to the information provided by the French consul, Palestine produced annually between 5 and 16 million mudds (one mudd equals approximately one bushel) of wheat, barley, and maize.³⁸ Of this amount, a part was reserved for a bad year (three to four million mudd), two and a half to three million mudds were sent to Acre and Haifa for export, and the rest were consumed locally.³⁹ The average price of a mudd of wheat, barley, and maize in Palestine ranged between two and eight qurush respectively.

Camels were the major means of transport over long distances before railroads were introduced. After the harvest, caravans of 5,000 to 8,000 camels daily transported wheat to Acre, Jaffa, and Haifa. Each camel carried a load of about 250 kilograms. The price of transportation varied from 15 to 25 per cent of the value of wheat transported, depending on the season, distance, and state of roads. Transporting one mudd of wheat cost from two to four qurush to Damascus, four to six qurush to Haifa, and three to five qurush to Beirut.⁴⁰ Hence the transporter sometimes earned as much as the producer did. Partly because of this high price of transportation, wheat was the major export grain, followed by barley and maize. After railroads were constructed, an alternative to camels was provided and major improvement occurred between 1890 and 1918.

Another factor that slowed the improvement of agriculture was the use of outmoded farming methods. The peasants were a conservative class, hesitant to change, and ignorant of modern implements of farming and continued to use the instruments their ancestors had used for centuries.

They had no planning, no organization, and no cooperation. The government made unsuccessful attempts to set up some model farms, but made little effort to modernize agriculture and to teach the peasants new farming methods.⁴¹ The landowners and wealthy individuals were largely indifferent and took little initiative to modernize agriculture. On one occasion, some land proprietors in Marj Ibn `Amir (Jezrail plains) imported several ploughs and threshing machines from Britain and the United States. Because of mismanagement and lack of knowledge on how to maintain and fix the machines, they were left to rust and were rendered useless. One machine imported from the United States was returned when its owner could not find work for it. In general, the farmers could not meet the costs of the new machines and preferred to stick to the old methods.⁴²

In addition to the aforementioned factors, agriculture in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut depended entirely on rain for irrigation. The fact that rain was very precarious east of the Lebanese mountains, and did not fall when needed, or fell heavily when not needed, left the fate of crops hanging in the balance. An adequate rainfall or lack of it accounted for a good or bad harvest. It was not unusual that whole annual crops were wasted in Palestine because of the lack of rain. This uncertainty weighed heavily on the peasants, who were already unsettled by Bedouin raids.

According to Alexander Scholch, agricultural production began to improve in Palestine after 1856 for many reasons: improvement in administrative and security measures, better transportation and communications, the use of new agricultural methods and technology, and new internal and external investment.⁴³ The Tanzimat efforts reshaped the administrative hierarchy and introduced strong central control not only in the major cities, but also in the countryside. *Al-Bashir and al-Itithad*, newspapers published in Beirut, reported that the use of repeating rifles by the Ottoman army and police forces sharply reduced the Bedouin raids all over Palestine and greater Syria.⁴⁴ The nomads in central and southern Palestine started to settle in coastal plains agricultural settlements such as al-Dhamiri, al-Hwarth, al-Fuqara, al-Nfi`at, al-Malaha, al-Tamam, al-Barah, and al-Qatatwa.

The improvement in wagon roads, railways, and harbours encouraged agricultural production. Telegraph lines, postal services, and later telephone service contributed to increase communication and commercial

transactions. Planting new agricultural products such as citrus in the coastal plain, and the use of manual water pumps to irrigate the citrus groves, in addition to the agriculture circle were new approaches to improve agriculture and to earn good investment in cash crops such as citrus, wheat, barley, olive oil, cotton, and sesame.⁴⁵

From 1876 to the end of the Ottoman Empire, Tulkarm, and Bani Sa`b experienced the same improvement in status as Scholch mentioned above. A police station (Gendarme) with 36 to 42 men equipped with repeating rifles and horses to enforce law and order was established in the qada. A new wagon road connected Tulkarm with Nablus, Haifa, Jaffa and the coastal plains. The launch of a major railroad station, a small natural harbour (Mina Abu Zabura), located in the mouth of Ascandrona (Alexander) River and the Mediterranean Sea, Post Office, and other governmental services.⁴⁶ A major railway station between Haifa and Lud was established that connected Tulkarm with Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Damascus, and Beirut.

The authors of *Wilayat Beirut* reported the amounts of agricultural products that Bani Sa`b qada produced in bushels: wheat 120,000, barley 60,000, dry barley 48,000, rice 15,000, white corn 40,000, fava beans 120,000, lintel 150,000, sesame 30,000, and cotton 60,000. This was in addition to 206,250 liters of olive oil, 62.5 tons of citrus and 35–40,000 tons of watermelon.⁴⁷ The watermelon alone accounted for transactions of 80,000 golden majidi in 1914;⁴⁸ in addition there many fruits such as figs, grapes, apricots, mulberries, almonds, cherries, and carob. Fruit orchards and vineyards were planted in the yards surrounding the houses (hakura) and all of the qadi's villages.

The agricultural products were a major investment for peasants and created a network of local merchants who worked as agents for wealthy merchants, companies, warehouses, distributors, and bankers. The names of those agents from Tulkarm included Salih and Sadiq al-Sukhn for Nicola Gabriel al-`Agori from Beirut and Muhammad and Amin Abu al-Jbin of Jaffa,<sup>49</sup> `Abd Allah Samara for Antwan Tayan of Beirut and Salim Kasar of Jaffa, Ahmad al-Qabani for Salim Salam of Beirut, Hajj Ibrahim Isma`il Abd al-Qadr and his sons `Abd al-Rahim and `Abd al-Rahamn for Muhammad Sh`arawi and Elias Gharghur of Jaffa and Husayn al-`Asali of Damascus, Yusuf and `Abd al-Rahim Hannun for Mustafa Haykal, Hasan

al-Mustaqim, Yusuf and Sa'id Bedas of Jaffa and Habib Bustars of Beirut, Isma'il Ghanma and Salim Hajj `Abd Allah al-Khalil for Hafiz and `Abd al-Fatah Tuqan of Nablus and `Abd al-Rahman Wafa al-Dagani and `Abd al-Qadir al-Siksik from Jaffa, Khalil al-Sabbagh for Antwan and Hana al-Jallad, and Nimr `Abd al-Qader and Qasim al-Jallad for `Umar and `Abd al-Rauf al-Bitar of Jaffa.⁵⁰

Business relations between merchant networks were influenced by local and global supply and demand. Nicola `Agori supplied Salih and Sadiq al-Sukhun with kerosene, tea, sugar, fabrics, seeds, tobacco, and metal agricultural equipment such as plough, hoes, and hacks. In return, al-Sukhuns supplied `Agori with wheat, barley, cotton, sesame, raw silk, goat and sheep wool, maize, orange, lemon and other citrus products, fodder, hay, animal leather, and watermelons.⁵¹

The Bani Sa`b area was famous for producing olives, olive oil, grapes, and watermelon. Olive trees had been domesticated in Palestine throughout history and was one of the earliest trees that ancient Palestinian and Canaanites planted. Some olive trees were as old as 2,000 or more years—the peasants call them “zaytun romani” (Roman olive trees).⁵² The Bani Sa`b area produced 40 per cent of olives and olive oil from the Nablus mutasariyya in the late Ottoman period. The ancient olive press, made from limestone and olive wood, was still operating into the second decade of the twentieth century. The soap factories (masbana) in Nablus consumed 30 to 40 per cent of the olive oil for the Nabulsi soap.

In *Rediscovering Palestine*, Beshara Doumani analyses the relationship between trade, agriculture, politics and culture in Jabal Nablus by looking at the social relations that strongly connected the production and distribution of olive oil and soap:

Nabulsi olive oil merchants and soap factory owners came to wield considerable political power in the nineteenth century, a development that only accelerated the already ongoing process of urban–rural integration ... these merchants became much more aggressive in ensuring future supplies of olive oil, due to the vigorous expansion of soap manufacturing at this time and due to the increased regional and international trade in this commodity. Unlike foreign or coastal merchants, Nabulsi ones did not need to

lure peasants with high prices, profit sharing, and other incentives. Rather, they used their intimate knowledge of local conditions and their growing political clout to draw up highly unfavorable contracts not just with individuals but also with entire villages.⁵³

The watermelon was also an important cash crop of the Bani Sa`b area. Many muslim travelers and chronicles describe the local watermelon as “the most delicious watermelon on earth” and as an “amazing sweet watermelon”.⁵⁴ In *Demotic Life In Palestine*, Mary Eliza Rogers noted the importance of the watermelon as a major summer crop in the coastal plains west of Tulkarm. The watermelon from Bani Sa`b (called Sa`bi) was of average size, easy to carry and handle, and could be stored for long periods; its peel and seeds were used as animal fodder.⁵⁵ Watermelon trade reached 80,000 majidi in the late Ottoman period and 3,000,000 Palestinian pounds by the end of the British Mandate.⁵⁶ The Sa`bi watermelons were collected and sent to Abu Zabura harbour (north of what is now the city of Netanya), from where shipments were sent to Beirut, Jaffa, Haifa, and Alexandria. After the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Sa`bi watermelon reached as far as Jeddah and the holy city of Mecca. Surviving copies of the Ottoman post office records in Tulkarm provided a named list of watermelon merchants in the area. The list included `Abd al-Latif Abu Hantash, `Umar al-Ghadban, Yusuf and `Aref al-Nashif, Salih al-Hamdan, Salim al-Khuri, Salih and Sadiq al-Sukhn, Isma`il Ghanma, Salim Hajj `Abd Allah, Muhammad al-Jabali, Yusuf and `Abd al-Rahim Hannun, and Nimr `Abd al-Qader.⁵⁷

Other cash crops were planted in the area such as cotton and silk for the textile industry. The silkworms were fed on the white mulberry and fig trees of the area. Silk produce was collected and shipped to Damascus by camel caravans, via steam ships through Jaffa–Haifa–Beirut, and later on by railways. The textile industry and a few other crafts were centred in major cities such as Damascus and Beirut. Many forms of industry were flourishing in the middle of the nineteenth century, including sweets, candies, furniture, shoes, charcoal, tobacco for cigarettes and hubble-bubble, dry fruits (raisin, figs and apricots), steam engine mills for wheat flour and other grains, olive presses, factories for pottery, copper jars, and cookware, animal tannage, plaster for construction, and building materials.

Other crafts which were still alive and in increased demand included the textile industry, tanning, dyeing, and wood engraving.⁵⁸ Of these, the textile industry was the most important, but it was greatly affected by the competition of European textiles.

Over the years, Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut was famous for its textiles, especially the manufacture of silk and cotton cloth. It exported its loom products to markets in Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, and some European markets. The number of looms in Damascus alone were estimated at 34,000 in the late 1870s.⁵⁹ While there were conflicting estimations about the number of looms and textile workers around the end of the nineteenth century, there is no dispute that the textile industry continued its downward path because of the competition of European manufactured goods.⁶⁰ Most estimates of the number of looms in Nablus and Jaffa between 1879 and 1909 varied from 2,000 to 3,000. In 1909, Weakley estimated that there were 2,500 looms in Damascus, 500 in Nablus, and 1,000 in Jaffa.⁶¹ A German observer put the number of textile workers in Damascus in 1899 at about 10,000. This number dropped to 4,500 in 1902 and remained relatively unchanged in 1909, according to different observers.⁶² No reliable estimates are available for workers in other areas.

There was no governmental encouragement of industry and no protection from foreign competition. Because of easy transportation and cheap prices, European textiles competed with the locally manufactured ones in Damascus, Nablus, and Jaffa. The introduction of railways solved the transportation problem, but foreign competition remained strong. Textile factories in Austria and Switzerland closely imitated the silk of Damascus and Palestine and successfully competed with it.⁶³ Using machines, European factories produced more material than Syrian factories, and materials were sold at cheaper prices.

The spread of epidemics in greater Syria led to the discontinuation of external trade and the dismissal of workers or the reduction of their pay. These measures brought about protests and strikes by workers in 1901 and 1902. In 1901, the disagreement was solved by keeping wages as before. But in 1902 the workers called for a strike that lasted about 10 weeks. The result was not in their favour. The workers lost the strike, accepting a 20 per cent reduction in their wages.⁶⁴

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had adverse effects on the industry in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut. It diminished the number of caravans between Iraq and Syria from 20 or 25 a year to 10 or 12.⁶⁵ The return caravans were small. Traders were reluctant to take the land route because of the khuwwa (ransom) paid to the Bedouins and because of the dangers involved in the overland journey.

The Bani Sa'b area was a supplier of raw agricultural products. There were no industries or factories in the area except the traditional ones which included pottery jars and cookware, dry food such as figs and raisins, white cheese and butter, leather tanning, charcoal, goat and sheep wool, carob bean juice, molasses, sesame oil, honey, white plaster for construction made from limestone, and steam machine mills. Some families' last names came from their professions such as Jallad (skinner), Hattab (woodchopper), Fakhuri (pottery maker), Sayigh (goldsmith, silversmith), Najjar (carpenter), and Lahham (butcher).⁶⁶

The rapid increase in agricultural business created new services in the town of Tulkarm such as khans (warehouses and inns), qahwas (coffee shops), and Manshiyya (public garden). By 1890 there were ten khans in Tulkarm; four of them served as warehouse and inns, the rest were designed to serve and feed transportation animals such as horses, donkeys, camels, and mules. The names of these khans were al-Sukhun, al-Bitar, al-Masri, al-'Askari, Jabir, al-Blasiyya, al-Shalabi, al-'Adam, al-Far, and al-Terjali.⁶⁷

The khans provided places for exchange of goods, storage of merchandise, and temporary residential units. In big cities such as Jaffa and Nablus, each khan specialized both in terms of the commodity traded and the nature of the visitor, whether they were local or foreign merchants, or a traveling caravan. The number of khans erected in Tulkarm dramatically increased during the late Ottoman period when the city was made accessible to local and foreign merchants who required a safe place to stay for short periods of time.

The largest khan in Tulkarm was Khan al-Sukhun. The khan is usually two storeys, the first reserved for trade and storage, the second for resting. The building adheres to a rectangular plan that is defined by an open courtyard with a pool or fountain at its centre and porticos (riwaq) wrapping around the perimeter. The portico that shelters the path around the courtyard on the ground floor provides an open space in front of the entrances of the

shops and storage areas in the khan while creating a walkway on the second floor to connect different residential rooms. The storage rooms and shops are vaulted spaces with heavy stone walls separating each unit from the next. Vaulted spaces pierced with small apertures to provide adequate light from the outside serve as cool, dry areas for stored goods. The system of different scales of arches and vaults between repeated, modular units (doorway, room, and arcade) creates a functionally ornamented experience.⁶⁸

The coffee shop was a new addition to Tulkarm. It never existed in town until Tulkarm became the seat of the Bani Sa`b qada in 1878. The new immigrants from Nablus opened the maqhah or qahwa by late 1880s, Qahwa al-Saha (square coffee shop), Qahwa al-Karmul, and Qahwa al-M`arif. The coffee shops were meeting and resting places for city inhabitants and visitors. Smoking nargila, drinking tea and coffee, playing dice, social gatherings, political and sometimes business talks were the main activities in these qahwas.⁶⁹

The third new addition to the town was the Manshiyya (public garden or city park), an idea that came from Sulyman Fathi Bey, the mutasarriif of Nabus mutasarifiyya between 1909 and 1911. He was inspired by French city designs since he obtained his higher education in France. Fathi Bey ordered the Naf`ah (public construction) department and the municipalities in the mutasarifiyya to start planning for and to erect manshiyyas. Nablus and Tulkarm were the first cities in the mutasarifiyya to complete the manshiyya project in 1911. Tulkarm manshiyya was located on the south western side of the town, on land that had used part of the zawdiyya waqf. In 1869 the land was seized by the Ottoman government for public use and it was transferred to the city municipality in 1888.⁷⁰

CHAPTER 9

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

Before the Tanzimat, Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut, and Sanjak of Jerusalem suffered from poor communications and a poor transportation system. Primitive means of communications were largely responsible for the lack of security and the stagnation of industry, agriculture, and trade. While short distances were covered on foot, the donkey, the horse, the mule, and the camel were basic means of transportation. The camel was particularly useful in transporting loads over long distances. The train made its appearance in the middle of the 1880s but it hardly diminished people's dependence on the old means. This chapter discusses the various means of communication and the changes occurring therewith.

Roads

Until the appointment of Midhat Pasha to the governorship of Suriyya in 1878, there was only one wagon road in Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut, connecting Damascus with Beirut. It was constructed by a French company and opened to traffic in 1863. A wagon, called a diligence and drawn by horses, left Beirut daily for Damascus. It did not take long before the French company doubled its daily service, making it two wagons starting from opposite ends and meeting in Shtura, the largest rest station between Beirut and Damascus. The horses were changed several times on the way.

The trip took 14 hours to Damascus and 13 hours to Beirut.¹ Previously it took three days on horseback.

Midhat Pasha made plans to establish a network of roads in Wilayat Suriyya to connect major cities with Damascus and the Mediterranean Sea by the year 1880. The plan was based on improving old trade routes and creating new ones. The second major wagon road constructed in 1878 by the same French company was between Jaffa and Jerusalem. This road was part of a major road network that connected Palestinian cities with Jerusalem and Jaffa including Jaffa–Gaza, built in 1879; Jaffa–Tulkarm–Haifa in 1880; Tulkarm–Nablus in 1880; Nablus–Jenin–Haifa in 1881; Haifa–Samakh–Dar'a–Damascus in 1879; Beirut–Tripoli–Latakia in 1880, Nablus–Tulkarm–Lod–Ramlah–Yaffa–Majdal–Gaza, Jerusalem–Bethlehem–Hebron in 1881; Nablus–Jericho–Salt–Amman in 1882; and Amman–Damascus in 1883.² These road networks were based on old Roman roads that were further developed and maintained during Mamluk rule and later by the Ottomans. Most of those roads were stone paved, were in bad shape, and had major problems with safety and security. Construction of new watchtowers and police stations by the end of the 1870s marked a major improvement in security on the roads.

The French company monopolized traffic on this road and collected tolls from users. Traffic on the old road remained substantial because muleteers wished to avoid the high toll on the new road. Before 1871 the French company suffered from financial difficulties, but the situation improved after 1871 when more passengers and more goods were transported on the new roads.³

Not until the coming of Wali Midhat Pasha to Damascus were any active programmes of road building initiated. Despite the fact that his suggested budget (with financial allotments to public works) was rejected, in 20 months Midhat Pasha vastly improved communications between Damascus and among the cities of the wilaya. Early in 1879 Midhat ordered the construction of a wagon road connecting Tripoli with Homs and Hama, and Jaffa with Tulkarm and Haifa. At the same time work was started on another road to connect Damascus with Haifa, and another road to connect Haifa with Sidon.³ The new wagon road between Jaffa and Haifa through Tulkarm was completed in September 1879.⁴

Since there was no budget allotted to public works, Midhat resorted to unpaid labour in order to finance the Damascus–Haifa road. Many towns and villages close to the road provided the labour force. The municipalities provided money to buy tools. Work began at several points along the road; however the workers were indifferent and not enthusiastic to provide free labour for road building. They were permitted by the wali to go back and harvest their crops, provided they return to finish their work on the road soon after their crops were collected.⁵

Midhat also improved communications within major cities such as Damascus, Jerusalem, Nablus, Jaffa, and Beirut. In Damascus he opened markets (suqs), started building the Salihyya road, and built the street in Damascus which still carries his name.⁶

Midhat's successor, Hamdi Pasha (1880–1884), gave some attention to road building. He further repaired the Tulkarm–Nablus–Salt road and established a native transportation company to regulate traffic on it. He opened a wagon road to connect Nablus with Haifa through Jenin, and issued a concession to a native to organize wagon transportation between the towns.⁷

The Haifa–Damascus road was an important achievement. It rendered important services to the two cities. Almost all trade of southern Suriyya (Palestine) was conducted through Haifa and Damascus. The port of Haifa was the natural outlet for the products of the Palestinian plains and mountains. It was estimated that the port received from 1,000 to 1,500 camel loads of goods daily from the Nablus-Tulkarm-Jenin area.⁸ Sixty per cent of the exports of these cities passed through Haifa, and the remaining 40 per cent passed through Jaffa. The heavy tolls at the port of Jaffa diverted most of the exports to Haifa. Unlike the exports, 75 per cent of the imports of the Nablus–Tulkarm–Jenin area passed through Jaffa, 15 per cent through Haifa, and only 10 per cent through Damascus.⁹ This illustrates the importance of wagon roads between port cities and productive areas. Some major cities such as Aleppo had little trade connections with Damascus until the end of the nineteenth century.

A wagon road connecting Jerusalem–Jericho–Amman was a necessity for security and economic reasons. Wali Hamdi Pasha initiated this project, but progress was insignificant. Instead of using compulsory labour, a tax of 30 paras (three-quarters of a qurush) was collected on each camel entering

or leaving Jerusalem and Jaffa to finance this road. This method of financing the road could have been effective had it been administered properly. Instead, most of the money collected was used to pay the salaries of employees while the road remained unbuilt. Since the tax on camels was misused, it was cancelled and a return to the old method of unpaid labour to build the road was employed.¹⁰ The road was not completed far past Jericho. Later attempts to complete the road were futile. In 1888, the people of Jerusalem were asked to pay a majidi each or provide four days of labour on the road.¹¹ No tangible results were achieved. The road remained unbuilt, and the distance between Jerusalem and Amman was impassible in winter because of the high water of the Jordan River.

After Midhat and Hamdi Pasha, road building in Wilayat Suriyya slowed down even further with the exception of some new bridges and road repairs. In the 1890s new wagon road projects were completed connecting Damascus with Amman. The Mediterranean coast road runs from Beirut to Gaza via Sidon, Hiafa, Tulkarm, Jaffa, and Majdal. In 1900 the construction of the Jerusalem–Bir al-Sab'a road was begun and in 1903 it connected Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, Bir al-Sab'a, and Gaza.¹²

Means of transportation in major cities

Within the major cities in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and the Sanjak of Jerusalem, the most common way to cover short distances was walking. There were a few horse-drawn carriages available for rent. These were usually stationed in the centre of the city, such as Marja Square in Damascus or Jaffa Gate in Jerusalem and guaranteed transportation to the different quarters of the city and the surrounding area. Several families high on the social scale owned private carriages which they rode to public occasions such as religious feasts and receptions of walis and mushirs.¹³ Donkeys provided another means of transportation, although they were socially less impressive in Palestine and Greater Syria.

Donkeys available for rent had their tails painted red and other colours to differentiate them from one another.¹⁴ Donkey transportation in Damascus was well organized from a central office. If one wished to rent a donkey for an hour or even a day or more, one went to a small bureau and hired one. If

the customer was well known and trustworthy, he was provided with a donkey. In case he was not well known to the bureau, a driver accompanied the donkey to take care of it and to bring it back when the trip was over.¹⁵

Congestion caused by carriages and animals was similar to modern traffic problems. The people complained because the municipality was lax in supervising transportation in major cities. They complained about the high speed of carriages, and about animals allowed to run loose in the city. Further complaints involved charging high prices in violation of the price list approved by the municipal councils.¹⁶

Electric tramways were inaugurated in Beirut in 1902, in Damascus and Haifa early in 1906, and in Jaffa and Jerusalem in 1908. In 1900, a French electrical company designed and built an electric power plant in Beirut. A German electrical company established power plants in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem between 1906 and 1908. In 1904, under the governorship of Nazim Pasha, a Belgian company was granted a concession to supply Damascus with electricity and to install electric tramways connecting the various quarters of the city. Work began immediately in building necessary structures and installing the lines.¹⁷ About 1,000 electric lights were to be installed to light the main Damascus streets. By the end of 1906 a large part of the work was completed, including the tramway connecting the Maydan quarter with Marja and Salihiyya. About half the number of lights agreed upon to illuminate Damascus streets were installed. In early February 1907 the streets of Damascus, the government buildings, and the Umayyad Mosque were all electrically illuminated. A large inauguration ceremony was held on February 7 to receive the electric works from the Belgian company. About 200 officials and notables attended. The tramway between the Salihiyya and Maydan quarters, passing through Marja Square, was opened to traffic a week later, on February 14.¹⁸

The attitude of some Damascus inhabitants, especially those of the Maydan quarter, to the electric tramways was far from hospitable. Some were against them because they obstructed street traffic. Others viewed them as a Christian device to crush Muslims.¹⁹ Those dissatisfied vented their anger on the evening of April 6, 1907, after a boy suffered a fractured leg in a tramway accident. A large mob attacked the tramway in the Maydan quarter and destroyed three cars. The conductor was beaten and stabbed, while other employees fled. It took the wali and the commander of

the gendarmerie plus soldiers to disperse the crowd.²⁰ A few arrests were made.

Post and telegraph

While a special postal department was created in Istanbul in 1840, the telegraph made its first appearance in the Ottoman Empire in 1855, during the Crimean War. Both the post and the telegraph were later united under one administration in 1870.

Prior to the period of Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II, Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut enjoyed limited postal and telegraph services. Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa were tied to Istanbul and the large cities of the empire by means of a mail service conducted usually by tartars (dispatch riders) and gendarmes using horse-drawn carriages. The working of the Ottoman mail in Palestine can be comprehended in connection with the development of mail services for the whole empire. As the operation of mails depended not only on the capital but also on the provincial administration in Beirut and Damascus, it was closely connected to them.

Therefore, if one describes the postal services and their development in Palestine, one has to begin with the general arrangements. The Imperial Edict of 1840 created a number of postal services based in Istanbul. These were served by dispatch riders on horseback. The Orta Kol (central branch) led to Palestine by a route via Izmir–Kutahia–Konia–Antakiyya–Aleppo–Homs–Damascus–Beirut. Mail was forwarded once a week from Beirut by the Posta Multasim (contractor), who had bought the licence to carry mail to Palestine from postal headquarters in Beirut, which was responsible to the Posta Nesareti (the Ministry of Posts) in Istanbul. In March of every year, all postal routes in the empire were put up for auction. The highest bidder became the contractor and had the duty to provide the necessary packhorses as well as arranging a regular service on “his” route. The administration in Beirut provided the necessary Posta Thabtiyya (transport police) as protection. Two armed policemen on horseback accompanied every caravan. This situation changed after the establishment of railways in Palestine and Greater Syria.²¹

According to the Ottoman postal archive, there were 52 permanent *Telegraph Khaneh* post offices, branch post offices or agencies of the Imperial Ottoman Mail in Palestine.²² The Tulkarm Ottoman post office was established in 1879 and was the only one for the Qada of Tulkarm–Bani Sa'b. By 1897 the services of this branch included accepting both ordinary and registered mail for all destinations, insured mail and parcels for internal and international destinations, telegraph services and the sale of money orders.²³

The delivery of mail to Palestine by dispatch riders alone was insufficient; therefore the Ottoman government decided to extend the telegraph line from Istanbul to Beirut further south. When it first went into operation the Ottoman telegraph could only be used by government officials to transmit imperial orders from the capital to the provinces. Later, after the telegraph services were opened to private users, main post offices and sub-offices received telegraph equipment. In August 1864 the wire between Beirut–Jaffa–Jerusalem was completed. This gave Istanbul the means of rapid communication with the most important harbour in Palestine. The first telegraph issued in the Jaffa post office was by Nuri Afandi, the qa'immaqam of Jaffa, who sent a greeting addressed to his Majesty Sultan 'Abd al-Aziz. In this telegraph Nuri Afandi blessed the spirit of the new age.²⁴

The connection between Jerusalem and Nablus came a year later, in 1865. The telegraph system in Palestine was extended further under the control of the postal authorities and for the general benefit of the population. The following list gives the telegraph stations under the control of the Ottoman postal authorities and the year they started operation. Not every Ottoman post office in Palestine had a telegraph service. The post offices were: Acre 1876, Afula 1909, Bani Sa'b-Tulkarm 1896, Bethlehem 1880, Byrih 1905, Bir Al-Sab'a 1905, Beissan 1903, Shafa 'Amr 1899, Jenin 1900, Jisr al-Majam'a 1909, Gaza 1880, Haifa 1876, Hebron 1901, Jaffa 1864, Jerusalem 1865, Kysariyya 1915, Khan Yunis 1909, Majdal 1899, Nablus 1865, Nazareth 1885, Ramla and Lud 1895, Safad 1897, and Tiberius 1897.²⁵

The telegraph reached Damascus in 1861, when it was connected with Beirut and Aleppo. Under Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, both the postal and telegraph services were expanded in Wilayat Beirut and Suriyya. Beirut and

Damascus were connected with the capitals of the mutasarrifiyyas and qadas by postal service. The post and telegraph usually shared the same station. In 1885, Wilayat Suriyya²⁶ counted 43 postal and telegraph stations, and 18 postal branches. In Wilayat Beirut there were 98 post offices with mail and telegraph services; 52 of these were in Palestine. In these stations, half of the employees operated the post and the telegraph, and the other half worked in the post alone. Postal employees delivered both postal and telegraph messages, and some (between four to six) delivered postal letters and packages.²⁷ The number of postal employees undoubtedly increased as more postal and telegraph stations opened over time.

The mail service developed and improved slowly with the development of better means of communications. The mail between Beirut and the rest of the wilaya was usually delivered by a messenger on horseback one or more times a week. Sometimes mail was conducted by caravans. The opening of the wagon road between Jaffa and Jerusalem speeded mail delivery between the two cities. Mail service increased to three times weekly instead of once a week.²⁸ When trains appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries they were used to transport the mail where possible; however, the messenger on horseback remained indispensable in reaching the outlying areas.

The government mail service was precarious and in some respect unreliable. Diplomatic missions and foreign personnel had their own postal systems. Many natives and traders distrusted the Ottoman mail service and used the foreign ones. Letters, newspapers, periodicals, and packages were sent by mail. The Damascus–Istanbul mail also usually transported money and gold. Heavy protection did not prevent attacks on it carried out by Bedouins and highwaymen. The robbers generally succeeded in getting away with the money, leaving the letters behind.²⁹ The natives frequently complained of delay in getting their letters and newspapers. Since the mail was subjected to censorship, letters were opened, read, and sometimes lost or burned along with newspapers and magazines.³⁰ However, these may not sound like such harsh practices.

The telegraph service witnessed vast expansion in the period under study. Besides having been linked with major cities such as Beirut, Aleppo, and Jerusalem, a telegraph line linking Damascus with Madina became operational in January 1901.³¹ Within Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut and the

Sanjak of Jerusalem telegraph lines connected Damascus and Beirut with the capitals of the different mutasarrifiyyas and qadas, and with the military barracks and railway stations in the wilaya. The Acre and Nablus mutasarrifiyya had the largest number of telegraph stations. In 1882, Baedeker reported only seven telegraph stations in Wilayat Suriyya.³² By 1909, there were over 30 stations in the whole wilaya. With the exception of Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, stations which used French, English, and German, all other stations used Turkish and Arabic. From major post offices such as Beirut, Damascus, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Haifa, one could send a telegram in French, in addition to Ottoman Turkish and Arabic.³³ This extensive network of telegraph stations tied Wilayat Suriyya and Beirut closely to Istanbul and enabled Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid effectively to control the local affairs of the wilaya.

Railways lines: let the train take the strain

Railway construction started in the Ottoman empire in the 1860s, but no railway was built in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut, and Sanjak of Jerusalem until the late 1880s. Under Midhat Pasha in 1879 and 1880, there were several references in the local press to railway construction.³⁴ Midhat seriously studied the possibility of building a railway to connect the coast to the interior, beginning in Beirut, passing through Damascus, and ending in Hawran. The second project was a Jaffa–Jerusalem railway. The dismissal of Midhat Pasha from Damascus shelved this project until the 1890s. Railway construction was seen by local observers as essential to improve public security and bring life to industry and agriculture in Wilayat Suriyya. An alphabetical list of telegraph stations in Wilayat Suriyya including the mutasarrifiyya location, was adapted from Baedeker (1910 edition) and other sources.

In 1888, the Ottoman authorities in Wilayat Suriyya, Beirut, and Sanjak of Jerusalem designed two major railway projects, the Jaffa–Jerusalem and Damascus–Beirut lines. The second railway project was built in two stages, first from Damascus to Hawran and then from Beirut to Damascus. In 1890, a Belgian company obtained a concession to build the first stage between Damascus to Muzayrib, a distance of about 104 kilometres. The concession

to build the second stage from Beirut to Damascus, a distance of 147 kilometres, was obtained by a French company in 1891. The two companies merged in December 1891 under the name “Compagnie des Chemins de Fer Ottomans Economiques de Beyrouth–Damas–Hawran”, and their concession was extended to 99 years at the beginning of 1891.³⁵

The Beirut–Damascus–Muzayrib railway had a narrow gauge of 1.05 metres. By June 1892 the construction of the Damascus–Muzayrib section was well under way. Its construction did not present any particular difficulty since the line passed through flat country. By April 1894 the Damascus–Muzayrib section was completed. It had 13 serving stations connected by telegraph lines. Its inauguration occurred early in July 1894 and was opened to exploitation on the 18th day of the same month.³⁶

Unlike the Damascus–Muzayrib section, the Beirut–Damascus section of the railway was more difficult to build. The steep Lebanese mountains of the western and eastern ranges constituted a major difficulty. There was considerable doubt as to whether the line was workable because it attained a height of about 1,486 metres (almost 5,000 feet) above sea level between Beirut and Damascus.³⁷ These fears were dissipated later on, although trains had to proceed at a low speed. The construction of this section was completed in the middle of 1895. It had 26 serving stations between Beirut and Damascus. It was inaugurated on August 3, 1895, a year after the Damascus–Muzayrib section was opened.³⁸ A train left Beirut at seven o'clock in the morning and arrived in Damascus at half past four in the afternoon.

The construction of the Beirut–Damascus–Muzayrib railway had a new extension to Haifa by 1903 and it had a healthy effect on the economy in Beirut, Damascus and Palestine. It brought work to many unemployed workers and revived trade in the two cities. The railway facilitated the transportation of goods and passengers. The serving stations along the railway became active in receiving passengers and agricultural products from the interior.³⁹ Traffic on the Damascus–Muzayrib section was heavier than expected after the railway was opened to exploitation in 1894. The numbers of daily passengers varied between 100 and 120, and the transportation of goods was also increased.⁴⁰ Many data shows the monthly receipts, passengers, and the amount of goods transported on the Damascus–Muzayrib–Haifa railway in the first half of 1905.⁴¹

The other major railway project was between Jaffa and Jerusalem. This project was started in late 1888 and completed in September 1892 by a French railway company, The Société de Chemin de Fer Ottoman de Jaffa à Jerusalem et Prolongements. In fact this railway line was the first in Greater Syria. The length of this line was 86 kilometres and it had tracks on the 1.05 metre gauge. This line had 176 bridges, seven of which were hanging steel bridges.⁴²

The trip between Jaffa and Jerusalem took three and a half hours. The train went through eight railway stations: Jaffa, Lud, Ramla, Sujd, Dayr Aban, Batir, and Jerusalem. This line facilitated the transport of Christian pilgrims via Jaffa Port to Jerusalem. The construction of this line and other railway plans was a key part of the second wave of the Tanzimat and the new central administration policy. In addition, it had a major impact on developing economic ties in both external and internal trade and made possible excellent linkages with capital flows and technological improvements.⁴³

On the Beirut–Damascus line there was an increase in the number of passengers during the Hajj season. The receipts of the first four months of 1897 were very inferior to those of the preceding four months.³⁷ The high receipts in the last four months of 1896 were probably due to the transport of the grain harvest of the summer of 1896. In its first years of exploitation, the Damascus–Muzayrib railway transported between 80,000 and 90,000 tons of grain annually, or about one-third of the harvest of Hawran.⁴⁴

The opening of the Beirut–Damascus section in August 1895 made the railway operative from Beirut to Muzayrib and later on to Haifa. The transportation of passengers and goods on this line was light in its early years of use. Because the company had built this line without kilometric guarantee, its receipts until 1901 did not cover its expenses and the company fell into deficit.⁴⁵ Consequently, it was liquidated in 1902. The revenue of the Beirut–Damascus–Muzayrib railway increased markedly after 1902, reflecting an increase in passengers and the transport of goods. This increase was due partly to extending the railway to the port of Beirut. Before 1902, a distance of about two and one-half kilometres separated the port from the beginning of the railway. This addition to the line was completed in 1902, making the movement of goods possible directly to and from the port.

The French used the financial needs of the Ottoman Empire to construct a network of railways to increase their influence in the Levant. French financiers controlled 62.9 per cent of the Ottoman public debt. The Imperial Ottoman Bank, which acted as the state bank, was owned entirely by French and British capital.⁴⁶

Table 9.1 The annual receipts of the Beirut–Damascus railway between 1895 and 1913⁴⁷

<i>Year</i>	<i>Receipts (Maida)</i>
1895	984,711.20
1896	2,324,958.54
1897	2,173,551.90
1898	1,968,810.60
1899	2,500,000.00
1900	2,219,294.00
1901	2,305,000.00
1902	2,749,000.00
1903	3,057,000.00
1904	3,312,000.00
From 1905, the new extension between Damascus and Haifa added to this line.	
1905	4,013,000.00
1906	4,175,000.00
1907	4,289,000.00
1908	4,703,000.00
1909	4,610,000.00
1910	4,587,000.00
1911	4,359,000.00
1912	4,222,000.00
1913	4,241,000.00

The opening of the Beirut–Damascus railway dealt a heavy blow to the transport of goods and passengers on the old wagon road. Shipping one ton of goods cost 56 centimes per kilometre on the wagon road. The railway company reduced this rate to 20 centimes per kilometre.⁴⁸ The following table shows the annual receipts, expenses, and profits of the railway company before and after the inauguration of the Beirut–Damascus railway.⁴⁹ Its high profits dwindled to losses.

In August 1902, a French railway company inaugurated a railway line from Rayyaq station (Biqā') to Homs and Hama, a distance of 189 kilometres. Unlike the Beirut–Muzayrib–Haifa railway, this line had a standard French gauge of 1.445 metres. The Rayyaq–Hama railway had ten serving stations between the two cities. The same French company obtained a concession in 1905 to extend the line from Hama to Aleppo. This last section, a distance of 143 kilometres, became operative in August 1906.⁵⁰ The construction of the Rayyaq–Hama railway and its extension to Aleppo brought thousands of workers and enhanced travel and trade. About 12,000 workers were employed in 1905 in extending the line to Aleppo. Hama witnessed unprecedented activity. Several hotels and restaurants were built to accommodate the workers. Prices rose and the city found new markets for its meat and sheep in Beirut and Damascus.⁵¹ The line greatly facilitated the flow of goods from Damascus and Beirut to Homs, Hama, and Aleppo and vice versa. Before its inauguration, hardly any trade existed between Aleppo and its sister cities in the south. Because of the different gauge of this line, goods were unloaded at Rayyaq and reloaded again on different trains. The annual receipts of the Rayyaq–Hama–Aleppo railway increased consistently between 1902 and 1910, reflecting an increase in the movement of passengers and goods on the line.⁵²

The Hijaz Railway in Palestine: Dr'aa–Haifa– Tulkarm–Jaffa–Jerusalem Railway Line

The idea of building this railway goes back to 1880. The few attempts to bring it to fruition prior to 1900 all failed.⁵³ The concession then went to a British company. It did not fare any better. By 1901 only about nine

kilometres of railway were completed starting from Haifa. After the beginning of the Hijaz railway in 1900, the Ottoman government decided to extend it to the Mediterranean coast to connect it with Haifa. Consequently, it bought back the concession from the British company in 1902 for L 155,000 and built the Haifa–Dar'aa railway, a distance of about 160 kilometres, at its own expense.⁵⁴

Ottoman engineers played an important role in building this difficult line. Yet, in spite of the Sultan's desire to make as much as possible of Ottoman technical expertise, the chief engineer of the Hijaz railway and Haifa–Dr'aa line was a German named Heinrich August Meissner. Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid bestowed the title of pasha on him and he became known as Meissner Pasha. Meissner had lived in the Ottoman Empire since 1887 and had worked on the Ottoman railway in the Balkans. He spoke Ottoman Turkish, German, English, and Italian. In addition to designing and maintaining the railway, he contributed to the planning and construction of buildings and industrial installations related to the railways.⁵⁵

Work commenced on the railway between Damascus and Dr'aa in the Levant's southern steppes in September 1900 (the anniversary of the Sultan's ascension to the throne). The project came to a close in September 1908 with the opening of the Medina train station. During this period Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid II was the driving force behind the building of the railway. A secondary line was built between Dr'aa Hejaz Railway in Syria and Haifa on the Mediterranean coast. This branch was extended to the Tulkarm–Jaffa line, which connected with the Jaffa–Jerusalem line. This railway line was officially opened on October 15, 1905.⁵⁶

Extension of the Dr'aa–Haifa–Tulkarm–Jaffa line required massive quantities of construction materials and equipment. Each kilometre of the railway on this line exceeded the general cost of each kilometre of the Damascus–Medina line due to the difficulty of some of the regions it traversed on the way to Haifa. Experts believe that the costs of extending the line to Haifa exceeded that of other lines by more than 40 per cent. Haifa port was a source of employment for the massive numbers of labour contractors who worked at unloading the shipments designated for the railway extension.⁵⁷

The materials that were unloaded at Haifa port for the railway's construction included steel rails produced in Belgium, weighing up to

16,000 tons annually, and stone coal that in 1903 weighed approximately 30,000 tons annually. Trains and carriages produced in various European countries were also unloaded at the port to be used on the railway.⁵⁸

The total length of the Dr'aa–Haifa line was 161 kilometres, and the extension length between Haifa and Jaffa through Tulkarm 81 kilometres. The extension of this line was not only meant to enable the delivery of the materials and equipment necessary to construct the Hijaz railway, but also to facilitate the transport of Muslim pilgrims via Haifa port to the Hijaz. In addition, the secondary line from Dr'aa to Haifa formed a superior route for the transport of crops and products of the Hawran province, rich in all varieties of grains, in Syria to Europe via Haifa. In addition, Palestinian exports to Europe, particularly citrus, were on the rise around this time.

The Ottoman government viewed Haifa as the Hijaz railway's optimal access point to the sea. Due to the city's strategic location, the government granted Haifa advantages over other coastal cities. It was deemed preferable to Acre, whose status and role were in decline. Transport through Haifa thus increased and the amount of goods imported and exported via the port multiplied. With the extension of the Hijaz railway to Haifa, the city was connected to Damascus and the regions of Hawran and eastern Jordan, among others, turning it into a bona fide port city. The crops of these regions, particularly grains, were exported via Haifa while European and American goods and products needed by the regions were imported.⁵⁹

Prior to this development, exports and imports had been transported via the Beirut port and an extremely difficult mountain road connecting it to Syria. The Damascus–Dr'aa–Haifa, Tulkarm–Jaffa line, in contrast, passed mainly through level areas. Another advantage provided by the Haifa port was that it allowed the Ottoman government to fulfill its wish to rid itself of the French monopoly over the Beirut–Damascus line, which controlled commercial shipping and transport.

A further contribution to the rising status of Haifa and Palestine was the Ottoman government's decision to build the administrative headquarters of the Hijaz railway in Haifa. Maintenance workshops for the trains were built close to the general administration buildings, most of which remain standing to this day. The Hijaz railway project played a significant role in the development of Haifa from several perspectives.⁶⁰

Railway transportation between Haifa and Damascus was three times a week.⁶¹ A train crossed the distance in about 13 and a half hours. The Dr'aa railway competed successfully with the Beirut–Damascus line in transporting the Hawran crop to the Mediterranean coast.⁶² More than one-third of this crop found its way to Haifa and Acre. The fact that tariffs were higher at the port of Beirut than they were at the port of Haifa made the latter a strong competitor to its counterpart in the north.

The idea of constructing a railway connecting Damascus with the holy cities of the Hijaz and making the Muslims of the world pay for it goes back to 1884 and perhaps before.⁶³ For technical and financial reasons this idea did not initially materialize and was shelved until 1900, when it was revived through the efforts of 'Izzat Pasha al-'Abid, the sultan's private secretary. In the beginning of the twentieth century it became more feasible to connect Damascus with Madina and Jerusalem by means of a railway, and the sultan decided to carry out this outstanding project.

Work began on the Hijaz railway on September 1, 1900. A committee had been formed under the chairmanship of Wali Nazim Pasha in Damascus to supervise the work and handle subscriptions. This committee was responsible to the highest committee led by the sultan in Istanbul. A group of German engineers assisted by Ottoman engineers directed the work. Native contractors, as well as Italians and Greeks, participated in the construction. The number of workers digging and laying down the narrow gauge of 1.05 metres reached 7,000 about 5,000 of who were soldiers and officers.⁶⁴ Because the work was hard and tiresome, many soldiers and workers died due to fatigue, malnutrition, disease, and hot weather. Despite these hardships, work proceeded quickly in stages and on schedule. By early September 1904 the line had reached Ma'an, a distance of about 480 kilometres from Damascus, with 27 serving stations. The fourth stage between Ma'an and Tabuk was completed by September 1907. By August 1908 the line was completed to Madina, a distance of about 1,320 kilometres from Damascus. The first train arrived in Madina on August 22, 1908, but the official inauguration of the line occurred on September 1, the sultan's accession anniversary.⁶⁵

The Hijaz railway, which was the longest line passing through Syria, was totally financed by the Ottoman government and the support of Muslims throughout the world. Its total expenses are estimated differently, perhaps

amounting to as high as LT 8,500,000. Sultan ‘Abd al-Hamid spared no method of soliciting Muslim help. He called for subscriptions from all Muslims; he himself opened the subscription campaign with a donation of LT 50,000. Preachers were sent to Muslim countries to urge believers to donate money. The names of the subscribers were publicized in Turkish and Arabic newspapers. Special nickel, silver, and gold medals were established to honour the contributors. Nickel medals went to donors of LT 5 to 50, silver medals to those who contributed between LT 50 and 100, and gold medals went to contributors of about LT 100. It was estimated that a third of the total cost was collected in subscriptions. Muslim contributors shared the right of ownership, while the Ottoman government was responsible for the upkeep and repair of the line. To help defray increases in expenses, special stamps were sold for the benefit of the Hijaz Railway fund. A special tax was levied on mines, and civil and military employees whose monthly salaries exceeded 500 piastres allotted one-tenth of their salary for the month of May to the Hijaz railway fund.⁶⁶

Two interpretations, one religious and one military, were behind the construction of the Hijaz railway. One interpretation, publicized officially by the sultan and the Ottoman government, argued that the motive behind the construction of the Hijaz railway was religious. In this official view the Hijaz railway was meant to facilitate the access of pilgrims of the northern provinces to the holy places of Arabia. Military and economic gains were either disregarded or played down. On the other hand, the military interpretation argued that the basic motive behind the construction of the Hijaz railway was to strengthen the shaky authority of the Ottoman government in southern Syria, Hijaz, and Yemen by drawing these regions closer to Istanbul.⁶⁷ Great Britain stressed the military importance of the Hijaz railway and viewed it with suspicion lest it threaten British interests in the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. Accordingly, when the Ottoman government seriously considered extending the Hijaz railway from Ma'an to 'Aqaba in 1905 and early 1906, Great Britain intervened and prevented such extension. In addition, British consuls in Damascus frequently tried to discourage and cast doubts on the feasibility and benefits of the Hijaz railway.

Although Ottoman troops began using the Hijaz railway on their way to Yemen in the last quarter of 1904, the religious interpretation carried more

weight than the military one.⁶⁸ Until the construction of the Hijaz railway the pilgrimage from the Northern provinces was possible only by means of caravans across the desert to Mecca, or by sea across the Red Sea to Jeddah. The desert route took about 40 days and the sea route about 15 days. In both cases the journey was long, tiresome, and dangerous. The Hijaz railway drastically reduced the time needed to cross the distance from Damascus to the holy places to about five days.⁶⁹ Halim Dammus, a high ranking employee of the Hijaz railway, stated that the motive behind the railway was neither economic nor military. It was only built to facilitate the pilgrimage to Mecca.⁷⁰

It was important to Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid to appear to the Muslims throughout the world as the true pious believer and supporter of the faith of the Prophet. He propagated pan-Islamism and sought the support of the influential Muslim clergy. What better way was there to draw the attention and support of Muslims other than to build the Hijaz railway and facilitate the pilgrimage? Through organized publicity, the Muslims became aware of this holy enterprise and gave generously. The sultan skillfully exploited it to his benefit. Whenever a section of the railway was finished, it was always inaugurated on his accession anniversary. The Muzayrib–Dar'a section was inaugurated on September 1, 1901, and the Dr'aa–Zarqa section on the September 1, 1902. When the railway reached Ma'an in 1904, it was inaugurated as usual on September 1 with much publicity and fanfare. A special delegation came from Istanbul to represent the Sultan in the inauguration ceremony. The Sultan authorized newspaper correspondents to use the telegraph facilities at Ma'an free of charge in order to report the proceedings of the ceremony to the people.⁷¹ When the line reached Madina in August 1908, after the Young Turk revolution, it was also inaugurated on September 1, the Sultan's last accession anniversary.

What were the economic results of the railway? Although the Hijaz railway was not meant primarily for economic gains, its construction and operation revived economic activity in Greater Syria and Palestine. Contractors in Beirut, Damascus, Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem benefited from work on the line by providing and transporting supplies. The railway provided work not only to unemployed local workers, but also to many Bedouins and their camels. Some Bedouins even settled down near the railway track. The construction of the railway necessitated building many

stations along the line to accommodate passengers and to repair railway cars. Most important of these stations were the Qadam stations in Damascus, then stations in 'Amman, Ma'an, and Tabuk. Depots and some hotels were also built.⁷²

The economic sector developed significantly following the extension of the railway between Dr'aa–Haifa–Tulkarm–Jaffa, in fact, this line should have been named the Damascus–Jerusalem railway. In addition to the Ottoman government's decision to make Haifa the general headquarters of its Hijaz railway, the railway and the port provided many employment opportunities. Merchants were able to benefit from these two important economic institutions due to the commercial activity they brought to Palestinian cities and villages. Until the extension of the Dr'aa–Haifa line, Acre had been the primary beneficiary of Hawran's crops, a large proportion of which had been exported via Acre and the remainder through Beirut, which was reached via the Beirut–Damascus–Mizyarib railway line. This transformation, so beneficial to Palestine, took place in 1905 when the Dr'aa–Haifa–Tulkarm–Jaffa railway was opened. The transport of crops from Hawran, the Palestinian coastal plains, Palestinian mountains and Trans-Jordan to Haifa was simplified by the railway services that delivered products to the port where they were packed and exported to determined destinations, particularly Europe. The Ottoman authorities doubled the capacity of the Haifa port to enable it to accommodate the large commercial ships arriving there.⁷³

Various economic subsidiaries related to the railway station cities, known as “contributory services”, also flourished. These included small commercial shops within the city such as groceries, cloth and furniture outlets, restaurants, and small hotels. Railway cities welcomed thousands of Muslim pilgrims who arrived at them and then traveled to Dr'aa and then on to the holy cities in the Hijaz to perform their pilgrimage rites. They would stay in these cities for several hours or for a few days, but the cities' commercial and service interests benefited greatly from their presence. In actuality, transit activity in the Palestinian cities played a significant role in activating its commercial flow, whether by those heading to the Hijaz or those returning.⁷⁴

In its first year of operation the Hijaz railway enhanced the exchange of goods and passengers between Madina, Haifa, and Damascus. Pilgrims

passing through Damascus on their way to or back from Macca increased markedly in 1908. In 1906–1907, between 4,000 and 5,000 pilgrims passed through Damascus using the incomplete Hijaz railway. In 1908, between 10,000 and 15,000 pilgrims passed through Damascus, and the city reaped an important economic gain from them.⁷⁵

One obstacle hindered the full exploitation of the Hijaz railway. The railway was continuously harassed by Bedouin raiders. The Ottoman government paid the Bedouins along the Hajj caravan route up to LT 60,000 annually to guarantee the safety of the Hajj caravan. The Bedouins also supplied camels for transportation. The Hijaz railway deprived the Bedouins of this large revenue, a fact that brought about vengeful Bedouin attacks on the railway. In answer to these attacks, an imperial order established a camel corps in 1904 to protect the Hijaz railway beyond Ma'an and to help collect the sheep tax from the Bedouins. The company initially consisted of 100 men, and was later enlarged because this corps proved too small to provide adequate protection for the line. Bedouin raids against the railway, stations, and passengers continued. The telegraph lines were out, the railway tracks displaced, the stations destroyed, and the passengers robbed. It was estimated that in 1908, the Bedouins committed 108 attacks on the railway. Faced with such attacks, the Ottoman government was helpless and unable to punish the aggressors, who withdrew deep into the desert. Repairs could be made quickly but the raids could not be stopped.⁷⁶ The railway was finally blown up in World War I and was never repaired.

It is indisputable that the development of the Palestinian cities and ports and the extension of the railway from Damascus–Dr'aa–Haifa–Tulkarm–Jaffa led to a transformation of traditional economic activity (dominated by the feudal system) to a modern economic model based on mutual export and import. The dominant traditional economic structure in Palestine was thus gradually, and sometimes rapidly, replaced with a more developed and progressive economic model.

In their report, al-Tamimi and Bahjat stated that Tulkarm was blessed by three major transportation routes: Mina Abu Zabura (Abu Zabura harbour) on the Mediterranean Sea, the railway station at the west side of the city, and the road that connected Tulkarm with Nablus, Jaffa, and Haifa. Many local historians such as al-Nimr, Haykal, Shuqayri, and Darwazeh pointed

to the Tulkarm–Nablus road as a major development in the area.⁷⁷ According to Ihsan al-Nimr, this road witnessed its first automobile, which entered Nablus via Tulkarm in 1911.⁷⁸

The second major transportation way was the railway station located west of the town. Tulkarm was a major railway stop between Haifa and Jaffa and it was connected with Nablus and Jenin in 1915. According to Tamimi and Bahjat:

[T]he western road of the town is the most beautiful and colorful one, it has so many trees, bushes, plant vegetation and flowers. The railway station, located at the far end of this road ... connected Tulkarm with the costal plains. The train whistle announcing the departure or the arrival is considered as a life propitious song to the town...The black smoke which comes out of the train's smokestack is in fact a blessing of frankincense for the economic and social life.⁷⁹

The Abu Zabura harbour was located at the mouth of Alexander River on the Mediterranean Sea (Ottoman sources call it Iskila Abu Zabura). This location made it a natural harbour and fishing area used by the local people. The municipality of Tulkarm during the late Ottoman was in charge of administrating this harbour. It collected harbour taxes, tariffs, and service fees. Tamimi and Bahjat report that Mena Abu Zabura had a post and telegraph office connected to Tulkarm. In addition, there was a police station in the harbour. The revenues from Mina Abu Zabura were the highest in the Tulkarm Municipality budget of 1913. From the total budget of 69,000 majidi, Mina Abu Zabura taxes and fees provided the municipality with 25,000 majidi, almost 36 per cent of the budget. This harbour provided sea transportation services for agricultural goods only, not for passengers. Some of the major products shipped through Mina Abu Zabura were watermelon, oranges, olives, olive oil, sesame, cotton, silk, lupines, fava beans, lentils, citrus and grains.⁸⁰

CONCLUSION

This book offers a revisionist interpretation of the final years of Ottoman rule in Palestine and challenges conventional wisdom. It indicates that the Tanzimat (1839–1876 and the period that followed 1877–1914 during which the momentum for reform continued) reforms were successful and that significant improvements occurred in the administration of the country between 1876 and 1914 by searching the provincial history of Palestine through the study case of Tulkarm–Bani Sa`b qada between 1876–1914. A reassessment of the Tanzimat period is indeed warranted. The Ottomans sought in earnest to apply in Palestine the various reforms which they had devised for the empire as a whole. After long years of rule by either semi-independent governors or local chiefs, the government succeeded in restoring its control over the country. In the process, it subdued the traditionally rebellious mountain region and checked the Bedouin tribes from raiding and plundering the cultivated areas in the costal plains and the Jordan valley.

With security and stability established, new government and administrative practices were introduced. The taxation system was overhauled and local administration was expanded to include representative provincial councils and municipalities. The Tanzimat improvements and reforms occurred against a background of economic growth organized by indigenous Palestinians entrepreneurs and fuelled exports of cash crops (especially citrus) to Europe. In other words, the foundations of a modern state and economy were being laid in Palestine before World War I, and European Jewish immigrants played only a minor role in these developments.

The main argument of this monograph is to challenge the old theory and cherished beliefs that consider the idea that Tanzimat to have been a failure, and economic growth and development to have occurred in Palestine due to the presence of European colonists there, which became part of many myths

created later on. The failed Tanzimat views came from Arab historians such as Sati`a al-Husri in his book *Al-Bilad al-`Arabiyya wa al-Dawla al-`Uthmaniyya*, George Antonius in *The Arab Awakening* and `Abd al-Karim Rafiq's book *al-`Arab wa al-`Uthmaniyyun*, in addition to European authors such as C. R. Conder's *Tent Work in Palestine*, and the series of articles published by *PEFQS* (Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement) written by R. Macalister, E. Masterman and James Finn.

Unlike other authors whose sources have mostly been European accounts (consular reports, travel literature, etc.) local Ottoman records were used, which presently are part of the major collections of local sources from the Ottoman period written in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. Although some of the records are fragmentary, they provide sufficient evidence to make a convincing case. In fact the use of these two major sources creates a balanced and accurate study of an area of history in which balanced, unprejudiced studies are badly needed. I examine the main areas in which Ottoman governmental policy affected the people of Palestine, including the topics of land tenure, taxation, transportation, public health, education, trade and agricultural activities.

The first three chapters set the background for the detailed discussions of governmental and administrative reforms that follow. The next six chapters discuss the establishment of law and order, the administrative system, land tenure, demographic changes, education and public health, transportation and communication, and economic development in nineteenth century Palestine in the context of Ottoman Greater Syria as a whole. This approach was necessitated by the kinds of historical sources available. European trade reports do not always distinguish between Syria, Lebanon and Palestine; moreover, the most detailed indigenous account of how the Greater Syrian urban economy was organized comes from Damascus and later on Beirut. Syria in general and Palestine in particular experienced sustained economic and demographic growth after 1850, accompanied by and dependent upon an expanding commercial agricultural sector. The extension of the internal market encouraged the artisanate (or certain branches of it), despite potentially ruinous competition from European manufacturers. This book corrects the uniformly negative portrait of Palestine that emerges from some nineteenth century accounts emphasizing the country's stagnant agriculture, lawlessness, and insecurity, and primitive artisanate. By the end of the Ottoman period a solid groundwork had already been laid in Palestine for

the country's future development. The Tanzimat was a cumulative effect of political, economic, and social developments. The wider audience concerned with the contemporary Palestine conflict will find this research project noteworthy since it challenges the widely disseminated picture of Palestine as having been in ruins until being redeemed by technologically and culturally advanced Jewish colonists from Europe.

The heart of this monograph is a major discussion of political, social, economic, administrative, and judicial reforms in the Tulkarm–Bani Sa`b qada`, based on the Ottoman-era archives. On the basis of these documents and supplementary literary evidence, this monograph draws a number of interrelated discussions:

- (1) Ottoman rule became less personal and more bureaucratic in the course of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
- (2) The state bureaucracy reined in independent sources of wealth and authority such as tax farms and *waqfs*, turning them to its purposes.
- (3) Local government became a reality, after existing only on paper for years.
- (4) Secular courts based on Western models were successfully introduced, gaining the confidence of ordinary people who took their grievances to them.
- (5) Palestinian Arabs from leading families were integrated into the administrative apparatus.
- (6) Elective bodies (including municipalities and the administrative council of Jerusalem) played an important role in local affairs and represented a rudimentary kind of democracy.
- (7) The Ottoman land law of 1858 allowed small holders to secure title to their land in the Palestine region, contrary to the prevailing assumption that the law dispossessed such holders.
- (8) The state's fiscal demands on its subjects were reduced and rationalized over the course of the nineteenth century.

By the end of Ottoman rule in Palestine in 1918, major technological advancements had changed life in the region in numerous ways. The railway connecting Jerusalem to the nearest port city of Jaffa had been

established in 1892. Largely used in the first few years to transport pilgrims and travelers, it was soon exploited for more freight transport. Road and highways suitable for carriages connected all major cities and administrative centres: Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus, Tulkarm, Gaza, Hebron, Bethlehem, and Jericho. In addition, nearby villages had lain gravel pavements. Telegraph lines connecting Palestine with Egypt, Damascus, Beirut, and Europe were in place by the 1870s. Numerous postal services were available to the residents – Ottoman, Russian, German, Austrian, French, American, and Italian – but there was no unified service. In her book, *Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City, 1881–1949*, Bertha Spafford Vester, an American resident of Jerusalem, reported in 1899 that under Ottoman rule the American residents of the American colony in Shaykh Jarah had been allowed to install a telephone in the American colony. She quoted a writer, who used the pen name “Religious Rambler”, as saying, “The new courthouse in Jerusalem has been connected with the old Saraya (government services complex), and the system is to be extended until first all official points and then business houses and residences will be supplied with telephones.”¹

In 1863 a special firman created municipal councils (*majlis baladi* or *baladiyya*) and by the end of 1888 there were 21 *baladiyyas* in Palestine. One of its activities included installing a water and sewage system in the 1880s. In 1890, regular garbage collection was introduced, kerosene lamps were put up to light the cities, and certain times of the year the streets were sprinkled with water to keep down the dust and to cool down the hot summer temperature. City parks were opened to the public in large municipalities, such as the new city in Jerusalem on Jaffa Street in 1892 in front of the Russian Compound, where a military band performed on Fridays and Sundays, and in the city parks in Nablus and Tulkarm. Tamimi and Bahjat reported that just before World War I trees were planted along some streets and plans were discussed for more improvements in infrastructure, clean water supply, public squares, and main commercial roads. In 1914, a concession was granted by the Jerusalem municipality to provide electricity to the city. Other changes brought about by the municipalities included the introduction of city police force in 1882, a fire department by the early 1900s, and a municipal hospital in the 1890s, which had several beds and was open to all, treating nearby villagers three times a week free of charge. According to Scholch, the municipalities began to

issue building permits, and a register of these was kept from the late nineteenth century onwards. In 1907, a law was passed requiring a permit to build or enlarge homes or to add additional stories.

The improvements in educational and intellectual fields

Printing presses first came into use in Jerusalem in the 1840s. In this period there were presses in the Latin (Franciscan) Monastery, the Armenian monastery, and the Greek Orthodox community. Religious texts and commentaries were the first publications; however, church officials eventually expanded their printing work. Between 1876 and 1916 a number of Arabic newspapers and periodicals were published, including the government newspaper *al-Quds al-Sharif* (edited by Shaykh `Ali al-Rimawi), *al-Ghazal* and *Jabal Sahyun*, a publication of the teachers and students of Bishop Gobat's school (Madrasat Sahyoun). Twelve new publications appeared in Jerusalem in 1908. The famous Palestinian newspapers, *Filastin* and *al-Karmil* published in Jaffa and Haifa respectively, also appeared during this period. Important to the intellectual life of Palestine were the numerous educators and education councils, whose members dedicated themselves to their work and ideals. One of the most respected men, famous in Palestinian history for having had great impact on teaching methodology and the teaching of Arabic, was Nakhleh Zurayq. Born in Beirut in 1861, he came to Jerusalem in 1889 to teach at the request of English missionaries. In addition to being part of the revival of the Arabic language, he was part of a literary circle where the men of letters from Jerusalem would meet, such as Salim al-Husyni, a former mayor of Jerusalem, Musa `Aql, and Faydi al-`Alami. In 1898 a number of Jerusalem intellectuals, Zurayq among them, founded the more formal Jam'iyyat al-Adab al-Zahira (The Zahira Literary Society). The president was Dawud al-Saydawi, and the members included `Isa al-`Isa, Faraj Faraj Allah, Aftim Mushabbk, Shibli al-Jamal, Jamil al-Khalidi, and Khalil al-Sakakini. Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi and his sons Ahmad Shaker, Mahmud, Hassan, `Abd al-Karim and `Abd al-Ghani made great contribution to the intellectual and educational field in Tulkarm. We can add Shaykh Amin al-

Tibi, `Abd al-Latif al-Jayousi, Nadim Salah, `Abd al-Rahman Hajj Ibrahim, and `Abd al-Latif Hajj Ibrahim. The nineteenth century witnessed enormous expansions in educational opportunities for the elite, including girls. While some Ottoman reform of education was in the works to create military and civilian cadres for state service, foreign missionary projects founded many different types of schools. These schools played a major role throughout the Levant in the education of Christians, in particular, as it was not until the second half of the century that the Ottoman authorities allowed Muslim students to join. The exposure to European educational systems, languages, and points of view had an impact on the lives of Palestinians both socially and politically. While this influence manifested itself in different ways, including styles of dress, taste in music, and field of study. It succeeded in instilling in both Christian and Muslim students an increased consciousness of Arab cultural identity. In addition, the missionary schools had varying educational goals and sociopolitical orientations, which resulted in increased educational opportunities for the poor and for girls (beyond kuttab education). The situation improved dramatically after the implementation of the 1869 public education reform.

The educational and intellectual opportunities offered by the growth in the number of schools were numerous and far-reaching. First, they created a significant increase in the number of educated persons in Palestine. Second, many of the students were educated in other languages in addition to Arabic or Ottoman Turkish (Greek, Russian, French, English, and German). This knowledge not only provided students with new perspectives, but also enabled them to find work within the foreign diplomatic and religious missions and organizations, among other places, as teachers, administrators, guides, secretaries, and translators. Third, this educated cadre had increased opportunities in Ottoman government service, a group that was later mobilized by the British Mandate administration. Fourth, these new educational systems allowed this particular group access to resources outside their local and family support structures, specifically the sponsoring churches or charitable societies with opportunities to continue their studies.

In this monograph, I have divided the late Ottoman and Tanzimat period into two waves: 1839–1876 and 1877–1914. Many Ottoman historians either neglect or reject the fact that Tanzimat reforms were still in practice and accelerated during Sultan `Abd al-Hamid's rule (1876–1909). Disenchanted Ottoman bureaucrats led a second wave of the Tanzimat

reform movement. The Young Ottomans, in the 1860s and 1870s, advocated liberalization and *curtailment* of the sultan's power. This led, in 1876, to the establishment of a short-lived constitution and parliament. The Hamidian period (1876–1909) and the short rule of Young Turks (1909–1918) should be considered as the second wave of the Tanzimat.

Ottoman rule before the Tanzimat

By the early decades of the nineteenth century, conditions in the provinces of the Ottoman Empire that constituted historic Palestine had badly deteriorated. The effects of all three governmental policies – security, investment, and alliances – were to make life precarious and to drive communities from their low level capabilities, providing as few police and military forces as possible while still maintaining Ottoman suzerainty. The small number of billeted soldiers did not (and probably could not) control the wanton violence that permeated the area.²

One old Palestinian saying states, “Four are the ravages of the land: mice, locusts, thorns and nomads.”³ The Bedouins (nomads) certainly continued to make life extremely difficult for the fellahin (peasants) through raids and plunder. A vicious cycle of desertion of the land by the peasants and infiltration by Bedouins from the desert existed. The result was the depopulation of the central plains and valleys by the peasantry. Some relief from the physical insecurity came after the Egyptian-based conquest of the provinces by the forces of Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha (1831–1840); however, conditions worsened after the Ottomans reestablished their rule. Settled agriculture in the most fertile parts of the country became almost an impossibility given the Ottoman policy of providing insufficient local security forces.

Due to the administrative divisions of the empire, Palestinians were not integrated into it as a distinct people. In fact, there was no administrative unit known as Palestine; it was part of Greater Syria and, on rare occasions, was called Palestine. This lack of integration was compounded by the effects of Ottoman security policy. Inhabitants of Palestine tended to cluster in inward-oriented villages located in the mountains and hills of northern and central Palestine. They gained some measure of refuge not available in

the low-lying areas of the costal plains and planted a variety of crops that would not be subjected to repeated plunder.⁴ Others sought security behind the walls of the towns and stone-built villages, trekking long distances each day to reach their fields. Caprice entered their lives not only through the raids of the Bedouins, but also through the rapaciousness of tax-farmers and through largely uncontrolled, intermittent village feuding.⁵ There was almost no governmental intervention to stem the ravages of outside raids by Bedouins, strong-arm tactics by the private armies of tax-farmers, and the pathology of intervillage disputes.

Just as the security furnished by government forces was minimal, so too was any investment in economic or political infrastructure in the area. On the contrary, old port facilities such as Gaza and Acre were badly deteriorated in the later centuries of Ottoman rule, but others had major improvements such as Haifa and Jaffa. To offset the weak outside economic infrastructure, small communities utilized a number of cooperative economic and social measures. Many large portions of agricultural lands, for example, were not registered to individuals but to communities that were considered the basic administrative units. Within these communities, modes of mutual aid and communal interaction developed to offer some limited means of protection to the individual.⁶

Ottoman neglect forced the fellahin to use their own communal devices in order to survive. By no means did this type of insulation make village life idyllic. The Ottoman policy of alliances in the province was a major factor leading to internally harsh conditions on a local basis. Rural shaykhs (chieftains who usually inherited their positions) formed alliances with Ottoman rulers in order to gain authorization to collect taxes within the village. Such an authorization enabled resourceful shaykhs to wield considerable power in the Palestinian countryside, often with private armies. Barqawi, Jayusi, and Tuqan, `Abd al-Hadi were major Shaykhly families in the Tulkarm–Bani Sa`b area.

Ottoman rule after the Tanzimat

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, significant changes began to occur. Now outside forces exposed peasants to new risks and troubles.

Local rulers began shifting their alliances, leaving the village shaykhs, and joining with more powerful city dwellers. Tax-farming, with collection rights now going to the highest bidders instead of automatically to the shaykh, was increasingly in the hands of urban forces. War powers and judicial powers were also passing from the hands of the shaykhs. The new position of mukhtar (village leader) was mandated, creating weaker and more accountable village chiefs.

New patterns of political alliance by Ottoman rulers with town notables and local mukhtars resulted in subtle but critical changes in stratification patterns in Palestine. These changes included the predominance of a single, more cohesive leadership group (urban notables displacing rural shaykhs); more interdependence among different elements of the society; and greater social gaps between the layers of society. Most obvious was the accruing of broad, autonomous powers throughout the countryside by the rising, tax-farming townsmen.⁷

Slowly, there was a drift away from a pattern characterized by wanton intervillage warfare, by nonclass and nonideological cleavages (such splits as between camps of the Qays and Yaman), and by the autonomous power of rural strongmen who had few ties to one another. The new tendency was marked by less fragmentation and a more comprehensive pattern of stratification. The new town notables were developing into a self-conscious social class. Villagers came to be dependent not on leaders, whose power extended over only one or several villages, but on these urban leaders, whose power reached out from the cities to whole networks of villages.

These changes in Ottoman Palestinian society were accelerated in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. Ottoman authorities renewed their attempts to internally strengthen the empire by adopting the successful techniques of the West.⁸ Efforts were made toward political centralization that could lead to increased production and extraction of surplus from the provinces. The aim was to develop strong, centralized political institutions capable of fostering capitalist economic growth, and, in turn, drawing further political and military strength from that economic growth. Reform was not an isolated ploy by the Ottomans, but was almost identical in nature to reform programmes undertaken in numerous other countries.

The goal was to increase production without direct investments by the regime. The authorities hoped to use to their advantage new and renewed

alliances with those thought to be able to help increase central administrative control of rural areas and able to effect greater economies of scale. In different places these people were called *affendiyya*. In almost all cases one of the most critical components in dealing with the perceived threat of European capitalism was a change to more so-called “liberal” land tenure laws—laws that greatly aided the regime's new political allies in establishing their predominance.

The change in land tenure

The new Land Tenure, or Tapu, Law had the effect of undermining the peasants’ ability to maintain relatively autarchic, inward-oriented communities. In Palestine, peasants were given the option to demand a permanent division of the village-held land that had previously been redivided every few years (*musha`a*). Also, the law forbade the periodic redivision of state land (*miri*), which instead would be held in permanent tenure by the individual. The central aspect of the law was the call for all lands to be officially registered.

The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 required the registration in the name of individual owners of agricultural land, most of which had never previously been registered and which had formerly been treated according to traditional forms of land tenure, in the hill areas of Palestine, generally *musha`* or communal usufruct. The new law meant that for the first time a peasant could be deprived not of title to his land, which he had rarely held before, but rather of the right to live on it, cultivate it and pass it on to his heirs, which had formerly been inalienable. Under the provisions of the 1858 law, communal rights of tenure were often ignored. Instead, members of the upper classes, adept at manipulating or circumventing the legal process, registered large areas of land as theirs.

What is so interesting about this law is what it reveals about the changing relationship between peasants and government and the ability of new elites to establish themselves between the two. Peasants traditionally had received very little in services from the government and nevertheless had been made to pay a significant share of their incomes as a tithe to the tax-farmers appointed by the Ottoman authorities. Even the minimal service

of defence came only intermittently, as we have seen. When the peasants heard of the new tapu law, they had two reactions. The first was fear that it was a means to erase their anonymity within the village. They saw the law as an attempt by the government to extract higher taxes from individual households and to draft them into the imperial army.

Their second reaction was that it was possible to manoeuvre around the law given the usually limited administrative capabilities of the central institutions. In some cases they continued to work the land jointly but registered it under one or several names such as that of a village elder or a head of a clan (hamula). Frequently peasants sought the protection of a powerful figure and sold their land or handed it free to a tax-farmer, some other strongman, or a religious foundation (waqf) in return for the right to continue working it. In other cases they simply neglected to register the lands they were working.

The manoeuvrings of the fellahin turned out disastrously for them. Unregistered lands were reclaimed by Ottoman authorities, who auctioned them off at incredibly low prices to the urban notables.⁹ Where peasants had jointly registered their lands under the name of a single elder, they often found that the elder's heirs later claimed full ownership, thus changing the peasants into tenants, and religious foundations absorbed into their other holdings.

Other techniques were also adopted by the Ottomans in an effort to copy the West's successful formula. Attempts were made, for example, to increase tax rates, to reform tax collection, and to expand the base upon which taxes were levied.¹⁰ It was not overlooked that the British and French used their colonial presence in other parts of the world to increase greatly the amount of collected taxes. One goal was to shift from collection of taxes in kind to collection of money taxes. According to Granott, the tax was fixed on the basis of the average yield for the five previous years. Yearly fluctuations in prices for crops, however, put tremendous economic pressure on the peasants in particular years.¹¹

The changing structure of Palestinian society

Ironically, it was not the Ottoman authorities who benefited most from the reforms. Unlike the Western regimes it was trying to imitate, the empire lacked the capability to achieve significant centralization and administrative penetration. It was characterized by an endemic weakness of administrative control. What it did succeed in doing, however, was changing the social structure in the provinces. Peasants increasingly found the basis of their self-subsistence and autarchic communities slipping from under them.¹² Power was not accruing to officials in Istanbul but increasingly was in the hands of local political allies, the provincial urban leaders.

Demands for taxes in cash, for example, forced peasants to put their produce on the market and often to deal with powerful moneylenders (none other than notables, often Christians). There were perfunctory efforts to control the effects of such money lending through an 1887 law that fixed the maximum rate of interest at nine per cent and that prohibited the amount of interest from exceeding the amount of principal. The Ottoman Agricultural Bank also lent money at an interest rate of six per cent. In practice, however, interest rates were much higher, and the Ottoman Agricultural Bank could sell the farmer's land to the top bidder if a payment was missed.¹³

In short, through the middle and latter parts of the nineteenth century the Ottoman authorities shifted the emphasis of their policies in Palestine. Political alliances were forged with strong central rule and an urban-based Palestinian elite. Local councils established as part of the reforms came to be dominated by these urban notables. Preeminent families consolidated their influence, controlling critical municipal offices in the towns and gaining control of huge tracts of land in the countryside.¹⁴

Although the Ottoman policy was not to promote government investment, there was a new emphasis on granting local investment by creating the conditions for greater economies of scale. In some instances, local investment began to be achieved with growing export-oriented agricultural ventures such as large citrus groves.¹⁵ In other cases, the new policies resulted only in the dispossession of the peasants and their change to tenancy status. By the end of Ottoman rule, about one-half the landowning population was short of land, and about one-third of all lands were leased to tenants.

Another investment policy was to permit and/or encourage investment by limited numbers of German and Jewish settlers. Some economic growth did result from these investments, and the economic expansion probably did begin to affect the Palestinian population.¹⁶

The results of improved security were manifested most explicitly in population issues. First, there was resettlement of the plains and valleys in the centre of the country. In fact, a long-term trend of westward shift of population began around 1860. New settlements, *khirbes*, were established in areas that had previously been used only as village security outposts. Dyadic ties were established between original villages and their *khirbes* in the coastal and central low-lying areas.

Second, the indigenous Palestinian population began to grow, inaugurating a lasting trend of relatively rapid natural increase. From a low point of about 400,000 Arabs west of the Jordan River in 1800, the numbers grow to about 750,000 at the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁷ One major outcome of this population growth was a change from labour shortages to land shortages. Especially in the refuges of the rocky hill country, village agriculture was increasingly becoming insufficient to meet the population's needs.

Population growth undermined villages as corporate units. Villages found it more and more difficult to maintain their institutions as there were many more peasants living on much less peasant-owned land. The crucial point is the terrible bind in which poor peasants found themselves. They had viewed the world outside as basically exploitative, extracting much and giving little. The community, located on the rocky Palestinian soil, had shielded and protected them from facing the world alone. They had lived under the umbrella of the village organization with the tacit consent of weak governments and powerful notables. The changes emanating from the Ottoman central government now made the village an inadequate framework. Self-sufficiency was no longer a viable strategy. Their choice was between a now inadequate inward-oriented village or greater ties with the perceived exploitative world outside

The demographic character of the country was changing significantly, as the population grew, as many people migrated from country to city.¹⁸ By World War I, they owned great tracts of land in the coastal and central plains and valleys of Palestine. The City of Tulkarm, which was the seat of Bani

Sa`b qada, had a sharp increase in its population. This came from migration from Nablus and other villages surrounding Tulkarm such as Taybih, Sufarin, Dhenabeh, Kafr al-Labad, and `Anabta. The newcomers purchased lands, built homes, and established new businesses.¹⁹ The educated persons joined the governmental services system and became part of the afandiyya class. The city populations were less than 1,000 in 1876; Tamimi and Bahjat reported in 1915 that Tulkarm's population reached 3,800 inhabitants.²⁰ Norman J. Collins and Anton Steichele estimated Tulkarm's population at 5,000.²¹ This estimation came from Ottoman sources in 1918 before the withdrawal of the Ottoman Eighth Army from Tulkarm in September 20, 1918.²²

NOTES

Chapter 1 Introduction

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Chapter 4 The Second Wave of the Tanzimat: The 1858 Land Code and the New Social Order in the Tulkarm Region

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4. `Abd al-Aziz `Awad, *al-Idarah al-`Athmaniyya Fi Suriyya 1864–1914*, p. 37; Nawfal N. Nawfal, *al-Dustur*, 2 Vols (Beirut, 1301/1883), Vol. 1, p. 382; for a short account of the wilaya law of 1864, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York, Toronto, 1961), pp. 381–384.
5. The mutasarrifiyya named after the capital of the wilaya usually had no mutasarraf, its administration was devolved on the wali. (See Nawfal, *op. cit.*, p. 382). This however was not permanent, for Midhat Pasha was allowed to re-establish the position of the mutasarraf of Damascus, to be abolished again in 1885, making the mutasarraf an assistant to the wali and keeping the same salary as before. (See *Suriyya*, No. 1076, 18 Dhi al-Hijja 1303/1885; FO 195/1583, Dickson to White, Damascus, 2 August 1887; *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, No. 1464, 23 September 1886; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 898, 30 September 1886.)

However, in 1890 the position of assistant was abolished (*al-Bashir*, No. 1020, 9 July 1890).

6. `Awad, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 397.
7. `Awad, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 382; al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, p.49.
8. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 48–49; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 389–399; for a short account of walis' powers, see *al-Jinan*, 7: 1876, pp. 157–162.
9. `Awad *op. cit.*, 1, p. 51; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 384, 400.
10. `Awad, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–50; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 399.
11. `Awad *op. cit.*, p. 50; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 400.
12. `Awad, *op. cit.*, p. 52; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 383.
13. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 37; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 382–383. Sometimes members were 12, six permanent and six elected; see *Salnamat Wilayat Suriyya*, 1294/1877.
14. `Awad, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 383.; al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, 49; Vital Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, (Paris, 1896), p. 305; Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
15. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 395; Birru, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
16. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 412–413; `Awad *op. cit.*, pp. 62–63.
17. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 413; *al-Jinan*, 7: 1876, p. 161; Salim F. Shidyaq, *Kanz al-Ragha'ib fi Muntakhabat al-Jawa'ib*, Vol. 6 (Asitanna, 1295/1878), p. 314.
18. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 385; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 39.
19. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 386, 410–411; `Awad, *op. cit.*, pp. 39–40; *al-Jinan*, 8: 1877, p. 44.
20. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 386–388, 405–406; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 56; *al-Jinan*, 7: 1876, p. 161; al Shidyaq, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 314.
21. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 387; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 40.
22. *Salnameh Wilayat Suriyya*, 1294/1877; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 387; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 40.
23. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 394; Engelhardt, *op. cit.*, pp. 194–95.

24. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 411–13; `Awad *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 41, 65; al-Shidyaq, *op. cit.*, Vol. 6, p. 314.
25. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 389, 407, Vol. 2, p. 6; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 41–42, 57; *al-Jinan*, 7: 1876, p.161.
26. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 57–58; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 389, Vol. 2, p. 6.
27. `Awad *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 41–42; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 389; *Salnamat Wilayat Suriyya*, 1294/1877.
28. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 393–394.
29. Cities were divided into mahallas and harahs with 60 to 100 houses in each. Mahallas or harahs were then further divided into villages.
30. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 389, 415; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 41–42.
31. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 408; *al-Hilal*, 5: 1896–1897, pp. 275, 76.
32. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 58–59; *al-Hilal*, 5: 1896–1897, pp. 275, 76; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 408–409.
33. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 416; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 66–67.
34. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 416; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 66–67.
35. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 382, 390; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 42–44; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 153, April 28, 1879; *al-Hilal*, 5: 1896–1897, pp. 276–277.
36. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 392; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 153, April 28, 1879; Young, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 42–44.
37. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 409–10, Vol. 2, p. 5; `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 43; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 153, April 28, 1879; *al-Hilal*, 5: 1896–1897, p. 277.
38. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 43; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 153, April 28, 1879; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 391.
39. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 43; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 173–174, 391, 18; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 153, April 28, 1879.
40. FO 195/1153, Jago to Jocelyn, Damascus, 4 March 1877; FO 195/1306, Jago to Layard, Damascus, 10 February 1880; FO 195/1480, Dickson to Syndham, Damascus, 16 December 1884.

41. FO 195/1263, Jago to Layard, Damascus, 6 June 1879.
42. FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 3 April 1909.
43. AAE 16, Guillois to Ribot, Damascus, 12 February 1891; Yusuf al-Hakim mentioned that the wilaya law of 1864 reduced the influence of the feudal lords and local nobles. (See al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, pp. 49–50).
44. FO 195/1765, Eyres to Ford, Damascus, 16 June 1892; AAE 17, Guillois to Hanotaux (annexe), Damascus, 6 August 1895.
45. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 316; David Kushner, Ali Ekrem Bey: Governor of Jerusalem 1906–1908, *IJMES* 28(1996)349–362.
46. `Awad, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 317.

Chapter 6 Education and Intellectual Life

1. al-Bustani, al-Bustani Encyclopedia *op. cit.*, V1, p. 35; al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, p. 60.
2. `Awad, *al-Idarah*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 166–68; Nawful, *al-Dustur*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 156–57.
3. *al-Jinan*, 8: 1877, pp. 416–17; Mitri Qindalaft, “al-Qawl al-Haqq fi Suriyya wa-Dimashq”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 4: 1878 (pp. 304–06), pp. 304–05; FO 195/1514, Dickson to White, Damascus, 12 November 1885.
4. Qur'an schools were called katatib (pl. of kutab, lowest primary school). The term maktab (pl. makatib) meant a regular primary or secondary school, while the term madrasa was reserved to a school of higher learning where Muslim theology and jurisprudence were taught.
5. FO 195/1262, Jago to Malet, Damascus, 2 March 1879; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 138, 7 March 1879; *ibid.*, No. 207, 3 November 1879; N.Qasatili, *al-Rawda* *op. cit.*, pp. 119–20; *Salnameh Wilayat Suriyya*, 1298/1880, pp. 125–28.
6. FO 424/106, Layard to Salisbury, Constantinople, 10 April 1880.
7. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 251, 24 April 1880; Jiri Zaydan, *Tarikh Adab al-Lugha al-‘Arabiyya*, Vol. 4, (Cairo, 1911–1914), p. 132; Habib Zayyat, *Khaza'in al-Kutub fi Dimashq wa-Dawahiha*, (Egypt, 1902), p. 5.

8. *Salnama Wilayat Suriyya*, 1298/1880, p. 139; Nu'man Qasatili, "Jughrafiyat Jabal Nables wa-'Awa'id Ahlih", in *al-Jinan*, 11: 1880, pp. 717–24; Shahin Makarius, "al-Ma'arif fi Suriyya", in *al-Muqtataf*, 7: 1883, (p. 385, 465, 529), p. 531.
9. FO 195/1262, AAE 13, Gilbert to Lacour, Damascus, 13 August 1883; AAE 14, Gilbert to Ferry, Damascus, 18 January 1885.
10. al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, No. 895, 1 Rabi' 1, 1300/1882; FO 195/1448, Block to charge d'affaires, Damascus, 3 June 1883; *al-Jinan*, 14: 1883, p. 732.
11. AAE 13, Gilbert to Lacour, Damascus, 7 October 1883; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 619, 1 November 1883; *ibid.*, No. 622, 12 November 1883; FO 195/1448, Block to Dufferin, Damascus, 5 November 1883.
12. `Abd al-Razaq, al-Baytar, *Hulyat al-Bashar*, (Damascus: 1961) Vol. 1, p. 139; *Suriyya*, No. 888, 10 Muharram, 1300/1882; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 550, 5 March 1883; *al-Jinan*, 13: 1883, p. 730–32.
13. *al-Bashir*, No. 1031, 24 September 1890; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1308, 9 February 1891; *al-Bashir*, No. 1029, 15 June 1892; *ibid.*, No. 1154, 5 December 1894.
14. *Suriyya*, No. 1046, 1 Jumada 1, 1303/1885; *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, No. 1432, 11 February 1886; AAE 15, Guillois to Ribot, Damascus, 25 April 1890.
15. *al-Bashir*, No. 1262, 29 December 1896; FO 195/2097, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 30 November 1901.
16. Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *al-Ta`alim Fi Filastin*, p. 43, 48.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 43–45.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
20. `Abd al-Karim al-Karmi, *Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi*, p. 12.
21. *Salnamat Wilayat Beirut* 1313/1895. p. 129.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
23. Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 159–61.
24. al-Dabbagh, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Ihsan al-Nimr, *Tarikh Jabal Nablus*, V3, P.123; AAE 17 Bertrand to Develle (annexe), Damascus, 10 October

1893; *al-Bashir*, No. 829, 5 August 1886; *al-Ahram*, No. 2591, 10 August 1886; Salma Qasatili, “Ta’lim al-Nisa’ fi Dimashq”, in *al-Lata’if*, 5: 1890, (pp. 257–65), p. 263.

25. Interview with Hasan al-Karmi, June 2003; Ihsan al-Nimr, *Tarikh Jabal Nablus*, vol. 3, p. 124; al-Karmi, *op. cit.*, p. 22; *Suriyya*, No. 995, 6 Rabi’ 2, 1302/1884; *ibid.*, No. 1088, 13 Rabi’ 1, 1304/1886; M. al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, *Tarikh al-Urdunn fi al-Qarn al’Ishrin*, 1st ed., (1959), p. 12; *al-Mahabba*, 8: 1906, No. 385, p. 637.
26. Interview with Hasan al-Karmi, June 2003.
27. al-Dabbagh *op. cit.*, pp. 71–72; Nawfal, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, p. 161.
28. *Suriyya*, No. 1035, 12 Safar 1303/1885; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 810, 26 November 1885; *al-Bashir*, No. 1415, 18 December 1899; *al-Muqattam*, No. 5175, 7 April 1906.
29. Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib (ed.), *al-Daktur Salah al-Din al-Qasimi, 1305–1334*, (Cairo, 1959), p. 21; Interview with Hasan al-Karmi, June 2003.
30. Bayan al-Hut., *Filastin; al-Qadiyya wa al-Sha`ab*, p. 201–206, Kurd ‘Ali, “‘Umm an Dimashq”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 27: 1902, (pp. 9–16) p. 11.
31. *al-Bashir*, No. 1098, 20 January 1892; AAE 17, Bertrand to Develle (annexe), Damascus, 10 October 1893; *al-Bashir*, No. 1308, 15 November 1897.
32. *al-Bashir*, No. 1404, 2 October 1899; Kurd ‘Ali, “‘Ummran Dimashq”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 27: 1902, (p. 9–16) p. 11.
33. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 5919, 16 January 1909; *al-Ni'ma*, 1: 1909, p. 379 (citing a report by Bishop Zakariyya of Nablus and Balqa describing schools there).
34. *al-Muqattam*, No. 2074, 16 January 1896; al-Bustani, *op. cit.*, pp. 36–38; Kurd ‘Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 3, pp. 122–23.
35. Jacob Yehoshua., *Tarikh al-Sahafa al-‘Arabiyya fi Filastin fi al-‘Ahad al-‘Utmani 1908–1918*, (Jerusalem: 1973) p. 12.
36. *al-Manar*, 12: 1909, p. 312; *al-Muqattam*, No. 115, 15 July 1889.
37. al-Dabagh, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

38. Cheikho, "Tarihk Fann al-Tiba'a fi al-Mashriq", in *al-Mashriq*, 4: 1901, (pp. 877–81) pp. 878–79; Khalil Sabat, *Tarihk Fann al-Tiba'a fi al-Sharq al-'Arabi*, (Cairo, 1958), pp. 102–04; Tawfiq Birru, *al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya fi al-Qarn al-Tasi' 'Ashar*, (Damascus, 1965), p. 128.
39. Yusuf Khouri, *al-Sahafa al-'Arabiyya fi Filastin 1876–1948*. (Beirut: 1975) p. 41.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 42–44.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 106–110, and p. 128.
42. AAE 11 Guys to Decazes, Damascus, and 20 June 1877. The Syrian deputies Khalil Ghanim and Diya al-Khalidi were severe critics of the Ottoman government. Both were among the ten deputies ordered to leave Istanbul within 24 hours before Sultan `Abd al-Hamid suspended the Ottoman Parliament. See *al-Bashir*, No. 391, 8 March 1878.
43. al-Bustani, *op. cit.*, p. 32; see also *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 113, 27 December 1878; *al-Jinan*, 10: 1879, p. 202.
44. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 140, 13 March 1879; *al-Jinan*, 10: 1879, "Hurriyyat al-Matbuat", pp. 361–62.
45. Khouri, *al-Sahafa al-'Arabiyya*. p. 58.
46. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1208, 17 February 1890; *al-Muqattam*, No. 410, 4 July 1890; *al-Manar*, 11: 1908, "al-Suhuf fi al-Bilad al-'Uthmaniyya", (pp. 634–36), p. 636; *al-Muqtabas*, 4: 1909, "al-Sihafa al-'Uthmaniyya", (pp.410–413).
47. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 5784, 8 August 1908; al-Bustani, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–33; Kurd `Ali, Vol. 1, p. 51; al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, pp. 61–62.
48. al-Muqattam, No. 2074, 17 January 1896; al-Bustani, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30.
49. A. Vambéry, "personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court", in *The Nineteenth Century*, 6: 1909, (part II, pp. 69–88).
50. FO 195/2277, Devey to Barclay, Damascus, 2 July 1908; *al-Manar*, 12: 1909, "Fitan Ramadan fi Dimashq al-Sham", p. 720; al-Bustani, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

51. *al-Manar*, 8: 1905, p. 347; A. Vambéry, *op. cit.*, 6: 1909, (part III, pp. 69–88).
52. Khouri, *al-Sahafa al-`Arabiyya*. p. 61; al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, p. 60; Kurd `Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 6, p. 415; Kurd `Ali *Mudhakkirat*, Vol. 1, p. 61; Kurd `Ali, “Halatuna al-`Ilmiyya wa al-Ijtima’iyya”, in *al-Muqtabas*, 2: 1907–08, (pp. 617–23), p.621.
53. Khouri, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
54. FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 2 January 1909. Khalil Sabat, *Tarihk Fann al-Tiba'a fi al-Sharq al-`Arabi*, pp. 103.
55. Y`aqub al-`Awadat. *Min `Alam al-Fikr wa al-Adab fi Filastin*. (Amman, Jordanian Press, 1987). p.221, 447 and 632.
56. Rafiq al-Tamimi and Muhammad Bahjat. *Beirut Vilayeti* (Beirut Province, The Southern Part).Beirut. 1916. pp197.
57. Tamimi and Bahjat. *Beirut Vilayeti*, pp. 198,199.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 200.
59. *Ibid.*, pp.201.
60. *Ibid*, pp.202.
61. *Ibid.*, pp. 203, 204.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 206.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 208.
64. Interview with Muhammad Mustafa al-Tayeh, August 1999. Mr. Tayeh was the first among the nine graduates of Khadouri Agricultural Station and College in 1931–1932 class.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, p. 196.
67. Interview with Hassan al-Karmi, July 2003.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*
71. Interview with Ibrahim `Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj Ibrahim. January 2004.

72. Interviews with; Sa`adeh al-Jalad, Muhammad Mustafa al-Tayeh, Dr. Fathi Omar, Hilmi Hanun, and Jallal al-B`aba`a. Summer 1993.

Chapter 7 Taxes and Finances

1. Stanford Shaw, "The Nineteenth –Century Ottoman Tax Reforms and Revenue System" *IJMES* 6/4, pp. 65–67.(1975); FO 195/2056, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 24 April 1899; Amir `Ali al-Husni, *Tarikh Suriyya al-Iqtisadi*, (Dimashq,1923), p. 330–31; `Arif al-`Arif, *al-Mufasal fi Tarikh al-Quds*, Maktabat al-Muhtaseb, Jerusalem, 1975. p.395–96.
2. Samuel Bergheim: "Land Tenure in Palestine", *PEFQS* 1894. pp198.
3. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, p.200,253;AAE 15, Geofroy to Ribot, Damascus25 April 1890; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther (report on agriculture), Damascus, 18 March 1901.
4. James Finn, *Stirring Times, Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856*. Vol. 2, pp. 24; AAE (NS104), Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 26 April 1897; FO 195/2056, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 24 April 1899; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther (report on agriculture), Damascus, 18 March 1909.
5. Shaw, "*The Nineteenth –Century*", pp. 68; FO 195/1648, Dickson to White, Damascus, 26 August 1889; FO 195/2056, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 24 April 1899.
6. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1064, 28 May 1888; *ibid.*, No. 1118, 3 December 1888; *al-Bashir*, No. 962, 23 March 1889.
7. Scholch, *op. cit.*, pp. 293.
8. Interviews with: Hasan al-Karmi, summer 2003, Muhammad Mustafa al-Tayeh, summer 1999, Helmi Hanun, summer 1999, Hafiz Dawud Tuqan, summer 2003, Amin Salah Amin, summer 2003.
9. Scholch, *Palestine in Transformation*, pp.294;FO 195/1306, Jago to Layard, Damascus, 6 February 1880. FO 195/1480, Dickson to Dufferin, Damascus, 17 April 1884; *Ibid.*, 195/292, Finn to Canning, No 20, Jerusalem 22 May1849.

- Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform*, pp. 159; FO 195/1480, Dickson to charge
10. Duaffaire, Damascus, 16 December 1884; *al-Ahram*, No. 4126, 21 September 1891.
 11. Scholch, *Palestine in Transformation*, pp.303.
 12. *Ibid*, pp. 300; AAE (NS104), Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 26 April 1897.
 13. `Awad, *op. cit.*, pp.216; FO 195/2024, Richards to O'Conor, Damascus, 29 November 1898; FO 195/2056, Richards to O'Conor, Damascus, 24 April 1899.
 14. Salnameh Wilayat Suriyya 1303/1885, pp.201; Salnama Wilayat Beirut. 1310/1894, pp. 480.
 15. `Adel Mann`a, *Tarikh Filastin fi Awakhir al-`Ahd al-`Uthmani*, Institute of Palestine Studies. (Beirut, Lebanon) 1999,pp.207; AAE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 18 March 1909.; See also al-Husni, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–31.
 16. *al-Ahram*, No. 4126, 21 September 1891; *ibid.*, No. 6004, 20 December 1897.
 17. Scholch, *op. cit.*, p. 301; AAE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889.
 18. *Ibid.*, 302; FO 195/2190, Meshafa to O'Conor, Damascus, 13 June 1905; AAE (NS109), Bertrand to Rouvier, Damascus, 27 June 1905.
 19. Scholch, *op,cit.*, p.293.
 20. FO 195/2190, Meshafa to O'Conor, Damascus, 13 June 1905; AAE (NS109), Bertrand to Rouvier, Damascus, 27 June 1905.
 21. FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 18 March 1909.
 22. al-`Aref, *op. cit.*, pp. 492; Kurd Ali, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, pp. 237; AAE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 18 March 1909; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, pp. 330–31.
 23. al-`Aref, *Tarikh Beer al-Sab`a wa Qabailha*.3ed addition, (Maktabat Madbuli, Cairo), 1999. pp. 127; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Conor, Damascus, 3 November 1903; Young, *op. cit.*, Vol. 5, p. 292; *A Handbook*, p. 247.

- Al-`Aref, *Tarikh*, p162; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, 24. Damascus, 3 November 1903; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 16 November 1903.
25. Zuhayr Ghanayim, *Liwa `Akka fi `Ahd al-Tanzimat al-`Uthmaniya, 1864–1918*. Institute of Palestine Studies, (Beirut, Lebanon), 1999. pp. 498; FO 195/2097, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 6 April 1901.
26. *al-Bashir*, No. 790, 5 November 1885. Ibid., No 1710, 17 July 1905.
27. *Ibid.*, No. 934, 4 September 1888. Ibid., No 1878, 5 October 1908. 28-*al-Itihad al-`Uthmani*, No 392, 4 January 1909; AAE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889.
28. *al-Bashir*, No 2078 13 October, 1911.
29. *Filastin*, No 169, 7 September 1912; AAE (NS109), Bertrand to Rouvier (annexe), Damascus, 27 June 1905.
30. *Salnameh Wilayat Suriyya*, 1888 p.128.
31. *Salnameh Wilayat Suriyya*, 1888 AAE (NS109), Bertrand to Rouvier (annexe), Damascus, 27 June 1905.
32. Nu`aman Qasatili, *al-Rawda al-Ghanna' fi Diashq al-Fayha'* (Beirut, 1879), pp. 129–30. Qasatili reported the official budget. The revenue amounted to 67,541,936 qursh, and the expenses 34,958,933 qursh.
33. Qasatili, *op. cit.*, p. 131; FO 195/2312, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 14 September 1909.
34. AAE 14, Guillois to Goblet, Damascus, 11 August 1888.
35. FO 195/1306, Jago to Layard, Damascus, 10 February 1888.
36. FO 195/1801, Eyres to Nicolson, Damascus, 7 October 1893; FO 195/1801, Eyres to Nicolson, Damascus, 11 October 1893.
37. `Awad, *op. cit.*, pp. 226; FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, Damascus, 1 February 1896; AAE 18 Guillois to Berthelot, Damascus, 12 March 1896.
38. al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, pp. 69; AAE 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 19 June 1896; FO Eyres to Herbert, Damascus, 19 June 1896.
39. FO 195/1940, Eyres to Currie, Damascus, 1 February 1896; AAE 18, Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 29 October 1896.

40. AAE 18, Guillois to Berthelot, Damascus, 12 March 1896; FO 195/2122, Richards to O'Connor, 13 November 1902.
41. al-Hakim, *Suriyya*, pp. 34–35.
42. FO 195/1984, Richards to Currie, Damascus, 3 February 1897.
43. FO 195/2122, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 2 December 1902; AAE (NS108), Savoye to Delcasse, Damascus 3 December 1902.

Chapter 8 Public Health, Agriculture, and Trade

1. FO 195/1448 Block to Wyndham, Damascus, 28 July 1883; *al-Bashir*, No. 820, 27 May 1886 (citing *Suriyya*); *al-Ahram*, No. 5743, 11 February 1897; FO 195/2097, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 6 April 1901.
2. *al-Ahram*, No. 5743, 11 February 1897; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 14 January 1903; al-Husni *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 277.
3. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 5806, 4 September 1908; *al-Ahram*, No. 9294, 10 October 1908.
4. Tamimi and Bahjat, *Beirut*, Vol. 1, pp. 195.
5. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 669, 24 April 1884; *al-Ahram*, No. 5743, 11 February 1897.
6. FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 2 December 1903; *al-Mahabba*, 5: 1903, No. 227, p. 450.
7. FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 6 March 1903; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 25 March 1903.
8. FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 2 December 1903.
9. *Suriyya*, No. 1064, 8 Ramadan 1303/1885; *al-Mahabba*, 8: 1906, No. 390, p.715.
10. FO 195/2122, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 30 December 1902; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 25 February 1903.
11. *al-Jinan*, No 13: 1882, p. 35.
12. FO 195/1448 Block to Wyndham, Damascus, 15 August 1883; FO 195/2122, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 4 November 1902.

13. FO/1727, Meshaga to White, Damascus, 20 October 1891; *al-Ahram*, No. 4150, 19 October 1891; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 9 February 1903; *al-Ahram*, No. 7715, 7 August 1903.
14. Burton, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–81 (footnote); *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 807, 16 November 1885.
15. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 807, 16 November 1885; *al-Bashir*, No. 857, 17 February 1886; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 858, 13 May 1886; *al-Bashir*, No. 857, 17 February 1887.
16. *Suriyya*, No. 1053, 20 Jumada 2, 1303/1885; *al-Bashir*, No. 800, 14 January 1886; *ibid.*, No. 820, 27 May 1886.
17. *al-Mahabba*, 2: 1900, No. 60, p. 953; Kurd 'Ali, "Ummran Dimashq", in *al-Muqtataf*, 27: 1602 (pp. 9–16), p. 13.
18. *al-Muqattam*, No. 5175, 7 April 1906; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 277.
19. *al-Ahram*, No. 6512, 22 August 1899; *al-Muqattam*, No. 5175, 7 April 1906; Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 6, p. 164.
20. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, pp, 194.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 195.
22. *al-Ahram*, No. 6649, 2 February 1900; *al-Mahabba*, 5: 1903, No. 220, p.352; Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 6, p. 104.
23. *al-Muqattam*, No. 4443, 5 November 2006 1903; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 10 December 1903; *al-Mahabba*, 6: 1904 No. 260, pp. 261–62; *ibid.*, 8: 1906, No. 371, p. 411; Delcasse, Damascus, 25 February 1904.
24. Justin McCarthy, *The population of Palestine: population history and statistics of the late Ottoman period and the Mandate*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).PP. 32.
25. *al-Mahabba*, 5: 1903 No. 211, p. 226; FO 195/2144, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 29 April 1903; FO 195/2144, Monahan to O'Connor, Damascus, 3 October 1903; *al-Ahram*, No. 8478, 8 February 1906. FO 195/2217, Devey to O'Connor, Damascus, 28 October 1906; *al-Bashir*, No. 1787, 7 January 1907.
26. *al-Bashir*, No. 1866, 13 July 1908; FO 195/2277, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 14 September 1908; al-Husni *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 277.

27. al-Husni *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 281.
28. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, pp. 196.
29. *Ibid.*, 197.
30. *Ibid.*, 198.
31. *Ibid.*, 199–200.
32. *al-Mahabba*, 9: 1907, No. 429, p. 490.
33. Kurd ‘Ali, “Ummran Dimashq”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 27: 1902 (pp. 235–46), p. 236; ‘Abd al-Qadir al-‘Azmi, “Tarqiyat al-Zira'a”, in *al-Mahar*, 1: 1899, No. 47, p. 372.
34. *Lubnan*, No. 132, 6 April 1896; *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, No. 1468, 21 October 1896; AAE (NS105), Lancy to Hanotaux, Damascus, 3 September 1897; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–29.
35. AAE (CC6), Gilbert to Waddington, Damascus, 10 April 1897.
36. Salim Asfar, “al-Zira'a al-Suriyya”, in *al-Mashriq*, 2: 1889 (pp. 168–72), p. 169, 172.
37. *al-Bashir*, No. 965, 20 April 1889; *ibid.*, No. 972, 28 June 1889; *al-Muqattam*, No. 4005, 2 June 1902.
38. *Suriyya*, No. 903, 27 Rabi' 2, 1300/1882; *ibid.*, No. 970, 24 Ramadan 1301/1883; *ibid.*, No. 1054, 27 Jumada 2, 1303/1885; *al-Ahram*, No. 2553, 26 June 1996.
39. according to Hassan al-Karmi, *mudd* in greater Syria equals 18 liters.
40. AAE 15, Guillois to Ribot, Damascus, 25 April 1890.
41. *Suriyya*, No. 903, 27 Rabi' 2, 1300/1882; AAE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889; AAE 15, Guillois to Ribot, Damascus, 25 April 1890; *op. cit.*, pp. 280–81; Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–33.
42. Issawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 286–87 (citing Weakley); Asfar, “al-Zira'a al-Suriyya”, in *al-Mashriq*, 2: 1889 (pp. 168–72), p. 172.
43. Scholch, *op. cit.*, p. 109, 110.
44. *al-Bashir*, No 777, August 6, 1885; *al-Ithad*, No 172, April 15, 1909. FO 195/2217, Devey to O'Connor, Damascus, 16 January 1908.
45. Scholch, *op. cit.*, pp. 112.

46. Zvi Alexander, *The Ottoman Field Post Offices in Palestine(1914–1918): The Alexander Collection*. (London, (OPAL) The Oriental Philatelic Association of London, 2000); Scholch, *op. cit.*, pp. 115.
47. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, pp.193.
48. Ibid., 194.
49. *Nablus Sijil* No 31, case number 51, April 21, 1895.
50. Interviews with Hilmi Hanun (summer 1995), Taher `Awad (summer 1992), S`aadah Jalad(summer 1992), Muhammad Taieh (summer 1995), Kamel al-Sukhun (summer 2003)and Hassan al-Karmi (summer 2003).
51. Interviews with Hilmi Hanun and Muhammad Taieh (summer 1995) Kamel al-Sukhun and Hassan al-Karmi (summer 2003).
52. Beshara Doumani, *Rediscovering Palestine: Merchants and Peasants in Jabal Nablus*. University of California Press, 1995. pp143–144.
53. Ibn Battuta, *Rihlat Ibn Battuta: Tuhfat al-Nudhar*, vol. 2 (Dar al-Kutub al-`Almiyya, Beirut 1992), p. 81.
54. Shaykh al-Rabwa Shams al-Dien Muhammad al-Ansari, *Nukhbat al-Dhhr fi `Ajaib al-Bar wa al-Bahar*. vol. 1 (Petersburg, The Imperial academy Press, 1895). pp. 286.
55. Mary Eliza Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine*, Kegan Paul International (June 1989). pp. 217.
56. Yusuf Haykal, *Ayam al-Seba*, Dar al-Jalil, Amman (1988) pp. 91; Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, pp. 201.
57. Interview with Hassan al-Karmi, summer 2003.
58. William M. Thomson, *Lebanon, Damascus, and Beyond Jordan* (New York, 1886), p. 293, 412; *al-Hilal*, 22: 1913–14, p. 677.
59. Ma'oz, *op cit.*, p. 197; see also al-Husni *op. cit.*, pp. 219–20.
60. *al-Bashir*, No. 975, 3 August 1889; al-Husni *op. cit.*, pp. 219–20; Kurd `Ali, “Ummran Dimashq”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 27: 1902, pp. 235–46.
61. Himadeh, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
62. al-Husni, *op. cit.*, p. 325; in 1902 the British consul put the number of textile works in to Damascus between two and three thousand. *FO* 195/2122, Monahan to O'Conor, 10 July 1902.

63. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 412; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, pp. 323–24; *al-Bashir*, No. 975, 3 August 1889.
64. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 3671, 18 March 1901; *al-Bashir*, No. 1481, 23 March 1901; *ibid.*, No. 1536, 14 April 1902; FO 195/2122, Monahan to O'Connor, Damascus, 10 July 1902.
65. FO 78/3016, report by Jago on Persian trade, Damascus, 6 November 1879; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 965, 16 June 1887.
66. Interview with Hassan al-Karmi, summer 2003.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Abdul Qader Rihawi, *Islamic Architecture in Syria*, Damascus, Dar al-Thaqafa (1979) pp. 206.
69. Ahmad al-Shuqayri, *Arb`aun `Aaman* (Dar al-Nahar, Beirut, 1969). pp. 24–25; Interview with Hassan al-Karmi, summer 2003.
70. Ihsan al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, al-`Aumal Press, Nablus(1975)pp. 134; interview with Hassan al-Karmi, summer 2003.

Chapter 9 Communications and Transportation

1. 'Abd al-Rahman Sami, *Safar al-Salam fi Bilad al-Sham* (Egypt, 1892), pp. 32–33; Eluthere Elefteriades, *Les Chemins de Fer en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut, 1944), p. 39; Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 17; Karl Baedeker, Baedeker, *Historical Palestine: Handbook for Travelers* (1985 ed.), p. 11.
2. Baedeker, *op. cit.*, p.13.
3. *al-Bashir*, No. 448, 11 April 1879; AAE (CC6), Gilbert to Waddington, Damascus, 11 May 1879; AAE 22, Delaporte to Waddington, Beirut, 19 June 1879; *al-Jinan*, 11: 1880, pp. 198–200.
4. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 190, 4 September 1879; *al-Muqattam*, No. 347, 19 April 1890.
5. *al-Jinan*, 10: 1879, pp. 330–31; AAE (CC6), Gilbert to Waddington, Damascus, 11 May 1879; AAE 22, Delaporte to Waddington, Beirut, 19 June 1879.

6. *al-Jinan*, 11: 1880, pp. 198–200; Zaydan, *op. cit.*, p. 260; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 272.
7. *Suriyya*, No. 874, 17 Ramadan 1299/1881; *ibid.*, No. 896, 8 Rabi 'l, 1300/1882; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 574, 28 May 1883; *al-Jinan*, 14: 1883, p. 732 *al-Muqattam*, No. 347, 19 April 1890.
8. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 2, 22 October 1877; *Suriyya*, No. 1074, 26 Dhi al-Qi'da 1303/1885.
9. *al-Ni-'ma*, 3: 1911, pp.588–89; AAE (CC6), Gilbert to Waddington, Damascus, 31 July 1879.
10. *Hadiqat al-Akhbar*, No. 1419, 12 November 1885.
11. *al-Muqattam*, No. 44, 20 April 1889; FO,AE 15, Guillois to Spuller, Damascus, 29 October 1889.
12. FO 195/2277, Devey to Barclay, Damascus, 2 July 1908.
13. al-'Allaf, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
14. Public cars in Lebanon still carry red license. This might have been carried over from the red-tailed donkeys.
15. al-'Allaf, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
16. *Suriyya*, No. 1062, 24 Sha'ban 1303/1885; *al-Bashir*, No. 1036, 3 August 1882.
17. Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 5, p. 216.
18. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 5323, 5 February 1907; *al-Bashir*, No. 1792, 11 February 1907; *Lubnan*, No. 693, 11 February 1907; *ibid.*, No. 695, 25 February 1907; FO 195/2245, Devey to O'Connor, Damascus, 11 February 1907.
19. FO 195/2217, Devey to O'Connor, Damascus, 5 December 1906.
20. -FO 195/2245, Devey to O'Connor, Damascus, 7 April 1907; AAE (NS 110), Edde to Pchon, Damascus, 10 April 1907.
21. Norman Collins and Anton Steichele, *The Ottoman Post and Telegraph Offices in Palestine.*: (London: Sahara Publication Ltd, 2000) p11.
22. Collins and Steichele, *op. cit.*, p.12.
23. *Ibid.*, p.13.

24. *Yaffa Sijil* # 24. p. 42 November 16, 1868.0.
25. Collins and Steichele, *op. cit.*, p.14.
26. Including what come to be Wilayat Beirut.
27. *Thamarat al-Funun*, No. 527, 20 April 1885.
28. *Suriyya*, No. 874, 17 Ramadan 1299/1881; *al-Jinan*, 11: 1880, pp. 198–200.
29. *al-Bashir*, No. 407, 28 June 1878; *al-Jawa'ib*, No. 931, 3 July 1878 (citing *Suriyya*); *al-Ahram*, No. 5689, 7 December 1896.
30. *al-Ahram*, No. 2810, 5 May 1887; *ibid.*, No. 4936, 6 June 1894; *ibid.*, No. 9106 29 February 1908; Kurd 'Ali, "'Ummran Dimanshq", in *al-Muqtataf*, 26: 1901 (pp. 793–99), p. 796.
31. *al-Ahram*, No. 6944, 18 January 1901; Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 5, p. 235.
32. Baedeker, *op. cit.* (1882 ed.), p. 44. The stations were Ba'labakk, Damascus, Hama, Hasbayya (established in 1879), Hims, Muzayrib, and Qatana.
33. Cuinet, *op. cit.*, p. 385.
34. See *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 125, 20 January 1879; see also *al-Jinan*, 10: 1879, pp.81–85, and pp.130–31.
35. Young *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, pp. 211–12; *al-Ahram*, No. 4203, 19 December 1891; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1373, 7 January 1892.
36. *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1602, 9 April 1894; AAE 17, Bertrand to Hanotaux, Damascus, 20 July 1894; *al-Bashir*, No. 1135, 25 July 1894; Ibrahim Aswad, *Dalil Lubnan* (B'abda, 1906), p. 500.
37. Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 5, p. 177; Cheikho, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
38. AAE 17, Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 3 August 1895; *Lisan al-Hal*, No. 1969, 5 August 1895; Aswad, *op. cit.*, p. 492; Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.
39. *lisan al-Hal*, 1582, 24 January 1894; Cheikho, *op. cit.*, p. 118; al-Husni, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–18; Rev. Alexis Malon, "Rihla ila Nahr al-Yarmuk", in *al-Mashriq*, 8: 1905 (pp. 521–25), p. 523.
40. *al-Bashir*, No. 1151, 14 November 1894.
41. *Ibid.*, No. 1178, 22 May 1895; *ibid.*, No. 1187; 24 July 1895.

42. Willaim Shorrock. "The Origin of the French Mandate in Syria: the Railroad Question 1901–1914" *IJMES*, Vol1, No 2 (Apr., 1970), pp, 134–36.
43. Ruth Kark", the Contribution of the Ottoman Regime to the Development of Jerusalem and Jaffa" In David Kushner, *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation*, Brill, Leiden, 1986. pp, 51.
44. AAE 17, Guillois to Hanotaux, Damascus, 15 May 1895.
45. Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, pp. 132–33.
46. Shorrock, *op. cit.*, pp.134.
47. FO 424/200, Richards to Bunsen (enclosure), Constantinople, 20 November 1900; FO 78/5071, Richards to Lansdowne, Damascus, 4 December 1900; *al-Bashir*, No. 1560, 22 September 1902.
48. The receipts for the years 1895–1898 were reported by Noel Verney and George Dambmann, *Les Puissances Etrangères dans le Levant en Syrie et en Palestine* (Paris, 1900), p. 245. The receipts for the year 1899 were approximately reported by Consul Richards to Ambassador Bunsen (Damascus, 22 October 1900), and enclosed in FO 424/200, No. 146, Constantinople, 20 November 1900. The receipts for the year 1900 were reported by *al-Bashir*, No. 1521, 30 December 1901 (cited a report by the manager of the Salonica railway). All other receipts (1900–13) were reported by Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
49. al-Husni, *op. cit.*, p. 240 (see the increasing receipts of railway in chapter nine). About the competition between the wagon road and the railway see FO 78/5071, Richards to Lansdowne, Damascus, and 4 December 1900.
50. Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, annexe No. 1, p. 409.
51. Sa'id B Himadeh, *Economic Organization of Syria* (Beirut, 1936), p. 181; Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 5, pp. 182–83; Aswad, *op. cit.*, p. 494; *al-Ni'ma*, 3: 1912, p. 999; al-Gazi, *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, p. 463, 466.
52. Paul Cotterell, *The Railways of Palestine and Israel*. Abingdon: 1984, Tourret Publishing, p. 97.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
54. *al-Ni'ma*, 3: 1912, pp. 999–1000.

55. Peter Mentzel, *Transportation, Technology and Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire, 1800–1923*. The society for the History of Technology and the American Historical Association, (Washington, D.C., 2006). pp. 49–50.
56. James Nicolson, *The Hejaz Railway*, Stacey International Publishers (October 30, 2005). P, 114.
57. *Ibid.*, p, 116.
58. Robert Turret, *Hedjaz Railway*, Turret Publishing (December 1989), p. 89–90.
59. Mentzel, *op. cit.*, p.52.
60. Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p.115.
61. Muhammad Bahjat and Muhammad Rafiq Tamimi, *Wilayat Beirut*, Vol. 2 (Beirut, 1336/1917), p. 141.
62. *al-Muqattam*, No. 5604, 2 Septembre 1907; Elefteriades, *op. cit*, p. 132; Charles-Eudes Bonin, “Les Chemins de Fer du Hedjaz”, in *Annales de Geographie*, 18: 1909 (pp. 416–32), pp. 420–21.
63. See *Thamarat al-Funun*, No. 460 and 460, 7 and 14 January 1884; *al-Ahram*, No. 1850, 24 January 1884; Elefteriades, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
64. Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali, “Sikkat al-Hijaz”, in *al-Muqtaf*, 29: 1904 (pp. 970–80), p. 972; *al-Ahram*, No. 9261, 2 September 1908.
65. Kurd 'Ali, *Khitat*, Vol. 5, pp.194–95.
66. Halim Dammus, “Al-Khatt al Hijazi”, in *al-Hilal*, 30: 1921–22 (pp. 333–39), p. 334; Young, *op. cit.*, Vol. 4, p. 244; Sa'id ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (Chairman), *Bayan Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘An al-Khatt al-Hadidi al-Hajjazi ila al-‘Alam al-Islami* (Damascus, 1931), p. 4.
67. Kurd ‘Ali, “Sikkat al-Hajjaz”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 29: 1904 (pp. 970–80), p. 970. And *Turkey in Asia*, No. 58 (London, 1920), p. 10.
68. In October 1904 onward Ottoman troops used the Hijaz railway as far as Ma'an on their way to Yemen. They disembarked at Ma'an and then crossed the distance on foot to ‘Aqaba, where they sailed to Hudayda in Yemen. See FO 195/2190, Richards to Townley, Damascus, 11 January 1905; FO 195/2190, Richards to Townley, Damascus, 18 March 1905.

- Muhammad Rif'at, *al-Tawjih al-Siyasi lil-Fikra al-'Arabiyya al-*
69. *Haditha* (Egypt, 1964), p. 90; Carl Brockelmann, *History of the Islamic Peoples*, Vol. 4, translated to Arabic by Nabih Faris and Munir Ba'labakki, 1st edn (Beirut, 1950), pp. 73–74.
70. Dammus, “al-Khatti al-Hijaz”, in *al-Hilal*, 30: 1921–22 (pp. 333–339), p. 333; see also Bonin, “Le Chemin de Fer Hedjaz”, in *Annales de Geopgraphie*, 18: 1909 (pp. 416–32), pp. 431–32.
71. FO195/2165, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 8 September 1904; Libbey and Hoskins, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (appendix 4, p. 325), p. 326; *al-Hilal*, 17: 1908–09, p. 578.
72. FO 195/2277, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 12 October 1908; Kurd 'Ali, “Sikkat al-Hijaz”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 29: 1904 (pp. 970–80), p.974; Rafiq al-'Azm, “al-Bilad al-'Arabiyya wa-al-Sikka al-Hijaziyya”, in *al-Manar*, 11: 1908 (pp. 765–70) p. 769; Ya'qub Sarruf, “Sikkat al-Hijaz”, in *al-Muqtataf*, 33: 1908 (pp. 809–12), p. 811.
73. al-Dabagh, *op. cit.*, vol. 7 p532.
74. Zuheir Ghanayim, *The Acre Province in the Age of Ottoman Tanzimat, 1864–1918*. (Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1999), p. 209.
75. *al-Ni'ma*, 3:1912, pp. 1008–1010; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 23 March 1909; Bonin, “Le Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz”, in *Annales de Geographie*, 18: 1909 (pp. 416–32), p. 431.
76. FO 195/2165, Richards to O'Connor, Damascus, 10 October 1904; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther, Damascus, 28 January 1909; FO 195/2311, Devey to Lowther (memorandum), Damascus, 23 March 1909; *al-Muqattam*, No. 6094, 16 April 1909.
77. Muhammad Izat Darwazeh, *Autobiography, 97 Years* (Damascus: Dar al-Gharab, 1993) vol. 1, p. 135, Yusuf Haykal, *Ayam al-Seba* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1988) p. 94, Ahmad Shuqayri *op. cit.*, p. 16, Ihsan al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Vol 3. p, 118.
78. al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 120.
79. Tamimi and Bahjat, *op. cit.*, pp. 191.
80. *Ibid.*, p, 193–194.

Conclusion

1. Bertha H. Vester. *Our Jerusalem: An American Family in the Holy City 1881–1949* (America and the Holy Land). New York City: Arno Press (June 1977) 3ed edition. p,159.
2. One source estimated that in 1852, there were around 1000 Ottoman soldiers in what today constitutes as north and central Palestine and only 160 of them stood ready for immediate use by the Ottoman ruler (Pasha) in Jerusalem. A. N. Poliak, *The History of Land Relations in Egypt, Syria and Palestine at the End of the Middle Ages and in Modern Times* (Jerusalem: Avar, 1940) p. 85–87. The small number of soldiers also gave the villagers the opportunity to avoid them when they were used for extractive purposes. At times, the soldiers sought shaykhs who had not delivered the collected taxes, and instead found the whole villages deserted. See R. A. Stewart Macalister and E.W.G. Masterman, “A History of the Doings of the Fellahin during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, From Native Sources, Part 1”, *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (October, 1905), 344.
3. George Robinson. *Village life in Palestine: a description of the religion, home life, manners, customs, characteristics and superstitions of the peasants of the Holy Land* (New York City; Longmans, Green, 1907.), p. 105. See also Sarhan, op. cit., p, 235.
4. Rev. F. A. Klien, “Life, Habits and Customs of the Fellahin of Palestine”, *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (April and October, 1881, and January, 1883), 110–18, 297–304, and 41–48.
5. James Finn, *Stirring Times*, Vol. II (London: Kegan Paul, 1878) pp. 193–210 and 286. The violence involved in village justice is described in P. J. Baldensperger, “Morals of the Fellahin”, *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (1897), 123–34.
6. The major split was between the factions called Quays and Yaman, which seemed to have no ideological or interest basis. See R. A. Stewart Macalister and E.W. G. Masterman, “A History of the Doings of the Fellahin during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century, From Native Sources, Part III”, *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (January, 1906), 33–50.

- Samuel Bergheim, "Land Tenure in Palestine", *Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly* (1894), 191–99; and A. Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952). Granott also discusses the intervillage warfare still in the first half of the nineteenth century.
8. Also, within the villages, fellahin continued to avoid Ottoman law courts to settle their disputes and to rely on village elders. Mrs. Finn, *Palestine Peasantry* (London: Marshall Brothers, 1923). P. 89. Though the political (and, often, economic) power of the shaykhs was broken, they remained strong socially. Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement 1918–1929* (London: Frank Class, 1974), p. 10. `Adel Manna`, *Tarikh Filstin fi Awakhir al-Ahad al-Uthmani*. (Beirut: Muassasat al-Derasat al-Filistiniya, 1999) pp. 105–106.
 9. On the attempts at internal reform (the Tanzimat) from the period after Mohammed `Ali's rule, see Moshe Ma'oz, *Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine 1840–1861* (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1968). P.107.
 10. Amin Abu Bakr. *Mulkiyyat al-Aradi fi Mutasarifiyya al-Quds, 1858–1918*(Amman: Shuman Foundation, 1996.p, 571.Hug tracts, such as the Marj Ibn `Amer (Jezreel Valley) which included 20 villages and 4,000 people, were sold in single transactions. Two-thirds of the purchase price went to the Ottoman intermediary who arranged the sale and one-third to Ottoman coffers. Poliak, *The History of Land Relations*, p. 86.
 11. The tithe was traditionally 10 percent. In 1886, it was raised to 11.5 percent and, in 1897, to 12.5 percent. Muhammad Majed al-Hazmawi. *Mulkiyyat al-Aradi fi Filastin 1914–1948*(Al-Aswar Association; Acre, 1998) p. 29.
 12. A.Granott, *The Land System in Palestine* (London,1952) p. 60. Also, see the Johnson-Crosbie Report: Government of Palestine, *Report of a committee on the Economic Conditions of Agriculturists in Palestine* (Jerusalem, 1930).
 13. `Abd al-Karim al-Karmi. *Biography of Shaykh Sa`id al-Karmi*. Letter dated on December 29, 1892 from the Governor of Wilayat Beirut to Tulkarm-Bani S`ab Qaimmaqam to establish Investigating Committee on High present rates. The head of this committee was Shaykh Sa`id

al-Karmi and Shaykh Qasim al-Jalad, Muhmoud Abu Shanab and Khalil Yusuf al-Khalil as a members.

14. Amin Abu Baker. *op. cit.*, p.103.
15. Some major families owned from 7,000 to 15,000 dunums each.
16. Scholch, *op. cit.*, p.135. There was a big increase in Arab cultivation of citrus, banana and other fruit for export. Whereas the average Jewish grove was 8.5 dunum, the average Arab grove was 11.5 acres. Groves demanded bigger investments than other crops and were thus planted by large landholders.
17. *Ibid.*, p138.
18. *Ibid.*, p, 113, Scholch and Mana`a indicate that the economic expansion could be seen in the increase in trade at Jaffa port. Later, World War I's high agricultural prices helped peasants eliminate their debt, but the period was also one of negative investment. Settlers emigrated, The Ottomans engaged in such practices as destruction of forests. These conditions probably led to more subsistence-oriented production by Palestinian farmers.
19. Justin McCarthy, *The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate* (New York City: Columbia University Press, October 15, 1990) p, 27–28.
20. *Ibid.*, p, 35–36. In 1875, there were four cities with more than 10,000 people: Jerusalem (40,000), Gaza (18,000), Hebron (17,600) and Nablus (15,000). By 1985, the number had grown to seven: Jerusalem (45,400), Nablus (21,000), Jaffa (18,700), Gaza (17,400), Hebron (14,200), Safed (12,900), and Acre (10,500).
21. Tamimi and Bahjat. *op. cit.*, p.199.
22. Collins and Steichele *op. cit.*, p.44.

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