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

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

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Hardly ever in modern history have undersized nations managed to negotiate more than interim cease-fires or armistices with one another. More frequently, and however unwillingly, these minor actors have accepted the initiatives of great powers.

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Culture Matters

The Real Obstacles to Latin American Development

Oscar Arias

Nearly two centuries after the countries of Latin America gained their independence from Spain and Portugal, not one of them is truly developed. Where have they gone wrong? Why have countries in other regions, once far behind, managed to achieve relatively quickly results that Latin American countries have aspired to for so long?

Many in the region respond to such questions with conspiracy theories or self-pitying excuses. They blame the Spanish empire, for making off with the region's riches in the past, or the American empire, which supposedly continues to bleed it dry today. They say that international financial institutions have schemed to hold the region back, that globalization was deliberately designed to keep it in the shadows. In short, they place the blame for underdevelopment anywhere but on Latin America itself.

The truth is that so much time has passed since independence that Latin Americans have lost the right to use others as the excuse for their own failures. Various outside powers have indeed affected the region's fate. But that is true for every region of the world. The countries of Latin America are not the only ones to have faced an uphill battle in history. Latin American nations began this race with conditions equal to, or even better than, those prevailing elsewhere. They—we—are the ones who fell behind.

When Harvard University opened its doors in 1636, there were already well-established universities in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. In 1820, the GDP of Latin America as a whole was 12.5 percent greater than that of the United States. Today, with a population of about 560 million—some 250 million more than the United States—the region has a GDP that is only 29 percent of its northern neighbor's. Latin America won its independence 150 years before countries such as South Korea and Singapore did; today, despite their past as exploited colonies and their lack of significant natural resources, those countries' per capita income is several times greater.

One consequence of Latin America's reluctance to face such comparisons squarely has been a disconnect between

Oscar Arias served as President of Costa Rica from 1986 to 1990 and 2006 to 2010. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.

discourse and reality. Tired of empty words and meaningless promises, people in the region are disillusioned with politics in general. Recognizing their own share of responsibility for the situation, however, could be the start of rewriting history. The key is accepting that four regional cultural traits are obstacles that need to be overcome for development to succeed: resistance to change, absence of confidence, fragile democratic norms, and a soft spot for militarism.

LOOKING BACKWARD

Latin Americans glorify their past so ceaselessly that they make it almost impossible to advocate change. Instead of a culture of improvement, they have promoted a culture of preservation of the status quo. Constant, patient reform—the only kind of reform compatible with democratic stability—is unsatisfying; the region accepts what exists, while occasionally pining for dramatic revolutions that promise abundant treasures only one insurrection away.

Such an attitude would be easier to understand in Canada or Norway, which have achieved enviable levels of human development. But what have Guatemala or Nicaragua to prize so highly in their pasts? In cases such as these, the conservative impulse probably springs not just from a desire to preserve the status quo but even more from a desire to protect established privileges and a general fear of the unknown. Latin Americans hold on tight even to pain and suffering, preferring a certain present to an uncertain future. Some of this is only natural, entirely human. But for us, the fear is paralyzing; it generates not only anxiety but also paralysis.

To make matters worse, the region's political leaders rarely have the patience or the skill to walk their people carefully through the processes of reform. In a democracy, a leader must be the head teacher, someone eager to respond to doubts and questions and explain the need for and the benefits of a new course. But too often in Latin America, leaders justify themselves with a simple "because I say so."

This dovetails neatly with the desire to protect established privileges—a phenomenon visible not only among the rich and powerful but throughout society. Teachers' unions decide for themselves how much teachers should work and what they should teach. Something similar happens with business owners and contractors in the private sector, who have provided low-quality services for decades with no fear of competition, thanks to sinecures and illicit transactions. And public officials are also immobile: the civil services reward those who do no more than sit at their desks and say no.

This attitude has many consequences, particularly when it comes to entrepreneurship. Latin America has vastly more controllers than entrepreneurs. The region is suspicious of new ideas and lacks effective mechanisms to support innovative projects. Someone seeking to start a new business must begin by wading through waves of bureaucracy and arbitrary requirements. Entrepreneurs get minimal praise or cultural reinforcement, little legal protection, and scarce academic support.

The region's universities, meanwhile, are not turning out the kinds of professionals that development demands. Latin America graduates six professionals in the social sciences for every two in engineering

and every one in the exact sciences. Visiting a Latin American university campus is like traveling to the past, to an era in which the Berlin Wall had yet to fall and Russia and China had yet to embrace capitalism. Instead of giving students practical tools—such as technological and language skills—to help them succeed in a globalized world, many schools devote themselves to teaching authors no one reads and repeating doctrines in which no one believes.

For development to occur, this has to change. Latin American countries must begin to reward innovators and creators. Their universities must reform their academic offerings and invest in science and technology. They must reduce burdensome regulations, attract investment, and promote the transfer of knowledge. In other words, they must understand that pragmatism is the new universal ideology—that, as Deng Xiaoping once said, it does not matter whether a cat is black or yellow, as long as it catches mice.

DEVELOPING TRUST

The second obstacle is the absence of confidence. No development project can prosper in a place where suspicion reigns, the success of others is viewed with misgiving, and creativity and drive are met with wariness. Latin Americans are among the most distrustful people in the world. The World Values Survey asks the question, "Can most people be trusted?" In the year 2000, 55–65 percent of those people surveyed in four Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden—said yes; only 16 percent of those people surveyed in Latin America did, and only three percent did in Brazil.

Latin Americans doubt the true intentions of all those who cross their paths, from politicians to friends. We believe that everyone has a secret agenda and that it is better not to get too involved in collective efforts. We are captives to a gigantic prisoner's dilemma in which each person contributes as little as possible to the common interest.

In a globalized world, however, trust is indispensable. The countries most ready to trust are the countries most ready to develop, because their citizens can base their actions on a reasonable expectation of how others will behave. Legal insecurity is a special problem. With alarming frequency, citizens of Latin American countries do not know what the legal consequences of their actions will be or how the state will react to their projects. In some countries, businesses are expropriated without any justification, permits are revoked because of political pressure, judicial verdicts fly in the face of the law, and the legal situation is so volatile that it impedes the attainment of long-term goals. As former Ecuadorian President Osvaldo Hurtado recently noted in *The American Interest*,

> Latin Americans do not trust legal institutions and actors . . . whether government courts or private lawyers. Indeed, the deep-rooted, centuries-old custom of flouting the law has been a more powerful influence on the continent than the countless laws passed over the centuries to regulate economic, social and political relations. Latin American legislatures have probably passed more laws over the past 175 years than their counterparts anywhere on the planet, yet never have so many laws been ignored by so many for so long.

It has been said that legal security is the protection of trust. For economic development to succeed, Latin Americans

must be able to trust their states to act reasonably and predictably. They must be able to anticipate the legal consequences of their actions. And they must be able to trust that others, too, will act in accordance with the rules of the game.

COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY

The third obstacle blocking development is the fragility of the Latin American commitment to democracy. To be sure, with the sole exception of Cuba, by some measures the region would be counted as entirely democratic today. After centuries of civil wars, coups, and dictatorships, democracy has indeed made remarkable strides in recent decades. But the truth is that its victory is incomplete. Despite carefully crafted constitutions, grand proclamations, and high-minded treaties, Latin America still has a soft spot for authoritarianism.

Fidel and Raúl Castro in Cuba behave like traditional Latin American caudillos—but so do Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, who have used democratic processes and structures to subvert their countries' own democratic systems. Once elected, they interpreted their mandates as carte blanche to do whatever they wanted, including persecuting their opponents, shackling the media, and trying to twist the system so as to stay in power at all costs. Too many of their countries' citizens, meanwhile, are content to allow these leaders to proceed, perhaps seeing their messianism and demagoguery as the exit from the prevailing regional labyrinth of underdevelopment.

If Latin American democracies do not live up to their political and economic promise, if their citizens' hopes remain a dream deferred, then authoritarianism

will rise again. The way to prevent that is to show the public that democracy works, that it truly can build more prosperous and equitable societies. Moving beyond political sclerosis, becoming more responsive to citizens' demands, and generating fiscal resources by taxing the wealthy are all essential steps to take in moving toward a true culture of liberty and progress.

A CULTURE OF PEACE

Increasing public income is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Those funds must also be spent wisely, to promote human development. Latin American countries have spent a lot in the past, running up immense debts, but they have often squandered their resources on inappropriate priorities. They have lavished on their armies the money that they should have lavished on their children.

Aside from Colombia, no country in Latin America faces an ongoing or imminent armed conflict. And yet each year, the region spends $60 billion on arms and soldiers—double what it spent just five years ago. Why? Who is going to attack whom? The enemies of the people in the region are hunger, ignorance, inequality, disease, crime, and environmental degradation. They are internal, and they can be defeated only through smart public policy, not a new arms race.

Costa Rica was the first country in history to abolish its army and declare peace with the world. Its children have never known military service. They have never seen the shadow of an armored helicopter or the tracks of a tank. And since the abolition of its armed forces 62 years ago, Costa Rica has never suffered a coup. I would like to think that all of Latin America might follow in Costa Rica's footsteps, but I know that this utopia will not be possible in my lifetime. I also know, however, that a responsible and gradual reduction of military spending is not only possible but also imperative. We owe it to the victims of dictatorships, who during the twentieth century wrote with their own blood the saddest pages in Latin American history. We owe it to the survivors of oppression and torture. We owe it to those who saw their worst fears realized in the presence of a soldier.

Abandoning this martial culture is also essential because the increased presence of soldiers in our towns and cities promotes a combative attitude that does not favor development. It suggests that problems are best solved by fighting an enemy, rather than building in solidarity with friends and neighbors. It teaches that conquests are attained with weapons, shouts, and threats, as opposed to words, respect, and tolerance. The militarism of the region's culture is a regressive and destructive force, one that needs to be replaced with a culture of peace.

Latin Americans must look in the mirror and confront the reality that many of our problems lie not in our stars but in ourselves. We must lose our fear of change. We must embrace entrepreneurship. We must learn to trust. We must strengthen our commitment to democracy and the rule of law. And we must abandon the military practices that continue to rub salt into the wounds of our past. Only then will the region finally attain the development it has so long sought.

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Throughout her career, Kathryn Wightman-Beaven has always been engaged in making a difference. As a project leader for PricewaterhouseCoopers, she worked closely with UNHCR to support the education of refugees in Eastern Chad. Working at the intersection of the public-private sectors for the last two decades, she decided to return to school to further hone her skills and take on new challenges in Asia. She chose to pursue her passion for effecting social change at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKY School) at the National University of Singapore (NUS), ranked number 3 in Asia.

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Less Than Zero

Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble

Josef Joffe and James W. Davis

Once again, a global movement is afoot to free the world of nuclear weapons. Unlike the Easter marches of the 1950s and 1960s or the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s, however, this time around, the policy elites themselves are leading the charge. The list of supporters of Global Zero, the new campaign's flagship organization, reads like a *Who's Who* of international strategy: from Zbigniew Brzezinski and Lawrence Eagleburger to Strobe Talbott and Philip Zelikow, from Carl Bildt and Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Igor Ivanov and David Owen.

In April 2009, moreover, U.S. President Barack Obama aligned himself with the cause, declaring global disarmament a top priority. Two months later, Vice President Joe Biden stymied a Pentagon plan for a new generation of warheads as a threat to the administration's credibility. And the consensus runs from the White House to City Hall: last June, cheering "U.S. participation in [the] global elimination of nuclear weapons," the U.S. Conference of Mayors called on Congress to "terminate funding for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex."

Global Zero calls for "the phased, verified elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide" on the grounds that this is "the only way to eliminate the nuclear threat—including proliferation and nuclear terrorism." All previous such attempts at nuclear disarmament have failed, grabbing headlines for a while but then waning as strategic logic and state interest prevail. And a similar fate is almost certain for Global Zero, for similar reasons. So why not just sit back and let the pantomime play out once more, as the nobly expressed intentions of the good and the great founder on the hard realities of world politics? Because words have consequences. The calls for disarmament have started to spread from op-ed pages to cabinet rooms and are being invoked to legitimate shortsighted and ultimately dangerous positions on nuclear

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Josef Joffe is Editor of *Die Zeit*, a Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and Abramowitz Fellow in International Relations at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. James W. Davis is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for Security Economics and Technology at the University of St.Gallen.

policy and strategy on both sides of the Atlantic. The intellectual coalition behind Global Zero is unprecedented and needs to be engaged head-on, even if the movement's practical prospects are dim.

The proponents of Global Zero are rightly worried by the renewed spread of nuclear weapons, which had appeared to be halted for a quarter century after India's nuclear test in 1974. Proliferation was even reversed during these years, as Sweden, Brazil, and Argentina shelved their ambitions and South Africa gave up its small cache of primitive bombs. But just because Global Zero emerged as a response to a real problem does not mean its own program is unproblematic. The world has changed radically since the Cold War, when the combined arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union peaked at an estimated 75,000 warheads, but strategic logic has not. This means that the Global Zero program rests on three fallacies—those of premise, process, and purpose.

IT'S NOT US, IT'S THEM

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1970 enshrined a deal in which the five original nuclear powers promised to reduce their nuclear arsenals in exchange for a pledge by the nonnuclear states to refrain from acquiring them. But the premise that the have-nots will arm because the haves have not disarmed does not hold. It reflects neither history nor present-day realities. The truth is that the decision-making of aspiring nuclear powers is only remotely related, if it is related at all, to the strategic choices of the existing nuclear powers and that the two top nuclear powers have indeed cut back, with little effect on proliferation.

Competitive proliferation does explain the choices of the original five proliferators. The United States went nuclear because it thought Nazi Germany was working on the bomb, and the Soviet Union went nuclear because the United States had done so. France and the United Kingdom wanted their own deterrents against the Soviet Union, as well as the shiny badge of great-power status that nuclear weapons were thought to confer. China then explicitly invoked the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons to justify its own decision to go nuclear.

After China's decision, however, the "bad example" theory of proliferation explains only part of the story at best. India, the next official nuclear power, was surely eyeing Beijing. But the Indian nuclear effort was not mere competitive emulation of China's nuclear status; it was also designed to offset China's conventional military superiority. Second, it was driven by concerns over India's rivalry with Pakistan, with which India had fought three wars since 1947. A similar regional military calculus lay behind Pakistan's decision to go nuclear in 1998. Israel may have been practicing "proportional deterrence" against the Soviet Union during the Yom Kippur War—hence then Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan's purported quip that "it is just as far from Tel Aviv to Moscow as from Moscow to Tel Aviv"—but the principal purpose of Israel's bomb was to neutralize the Arabs' superior strength on the conventional battlefield.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq was staring firmly at Iran when it embarked on its nuclear weapons program. The shah laid the groundwork for an Iranian program by ordering four German nuclear power reactors

in 1975—with an eye on his neighbors, especially Iraq. Nuclear weapons offered Iran a nice shortcut to regional primacy, which is the most important reason the shah's successors in the Islamic Republic have continued his efforts—to dominate the Arab states, deter (or destroy) Israel, and devalue the conventional superiority of the United States.

Did Pyongyang reach for the bomb because Moscow and Washington had thousands of them? More likely, dreams of intimidating local rivals such as South Korea and Japan came first and foremost. Then, North Korea learned an interesting lesson: the mere process of proliferation was laden with wondrous profits. A reactor here and a fizzled nuclear explosion there paid huge dividends, and North Korea, as a nuclear "rogue state," garnered the solicitous attention of many other powers. Washington's bribes of oil and food deliveries were flanked by its offers of civilian nuclear assistance; never has nuisance value been parlayed so profitably into political and economic gain.

The main focus of all proliferators since China, in short, has been regional. As the Duelfer report, based on the debriefing of captured Iraqi officials following the Iraq war by the Iraq Survey Group, revealed, Saddam had not armed against Israel, let alone against any of the official nuclear powers: "Saddam's rationale for the possession of [weapons of mass destruction] derived from a need for survival and domination . . . particularly regarding Iran."

The idea that nonnuclear powers arm because the existing nuclear powers do not disarm is contradicted by the actual history of the superpower arms competition. If there is any correlation between the behavior of the haves and that of the have-nots, it is in the reverse direction. By a rough count, including both deployed and undeployed warheads, the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has dropped from a peak of well over 30,000 warheads in the mid-1960s to about 10,000 today. Russia's arsenal has climbed down even faster, from about 45,000 in 1990 to about 14,000 today.

If the "good example" theory were correct, such massive cuts—about 70 percent of the total number of warheads—should have started turning Iran and North Korea into nuclear pacifists, which they have not. Libya did have a change of heart at the end of 2003. It was not because of great-power disarmament but rather the reverse: fear of a United States emboldened by easy victory against Saddam. The same apprehension led Iran to suspend weaponization in 2003, according to the United States' fabled 2007 National Intelligence Estimate. Iran's nuclear weapons program then appears to have resumed as the Bush administration began to slide the military option off the table, while also constraining Israel's options by denying it the United States' biggest bunker busters, and then accelerated as the Obama administration practically cleared the table while failing to corral Russia and China into serious sanctions.

The lesson is a familiar one: hard power—or, more accurately, hard power combined with a reputation for the will to use it—is a more efficient deproliferator than disarmament. Great-power virtue makes for good words, but truly effective proselytizing, as missionaries know, requires the fear of God.

Because nuclear weapons serve many purposes, they are often simply too useful to forego. They are good for blackmail (North Korea), they intimidate the enemy

next door (India and Pakistan), they deliver the ultimate life insurance (Israel), they devalue conventional superiority (every case), and they support hegemonic ambitions, whether regional or global. Regardless of whether the haves disarm, therefore, such weapons will still be in demand. Unless the United States manages to extend deterrence as credibly to Egypt and Saudi Arabia as it did to Japan and West Germany, those countries may well counter an Iranian bomb with ones of their own. And why not? After all, which nuclear power was ever invaded by a mighty outsider?

Given nuclear logic and history, it is hard to be sanguine about a plan to convert the wayward by way of example. But what about a regime with teeth, such as that proposed by Global Zero—with obligatory monitoring, including unannounced on-site inspections? Let us assume an agency that could identify nuclear facilities, although neither India nor Pakistan had problems concealing theirs. Who would enforce the regime, and how, once the great powers had let go of their mightiest weapons?

GETTING THERE IS HALF THE HORROR

Proponents of Global Zero believe that peril comes from numbers. Cut stockpiles, they reason, and make the world a safer place. Alas, sheer numbers are not the most critical item in the nuclear age. Stability now plays the starring role—and stability is a function of incentives, not simply numbers. As Bernard Brodie, Thomas Schelling, Kenneth Waltz, Henry Kissinger, and other theorists of nuclear strategy have noted, stability is produced by the knowledge that no nuclear power can use its weapons against another without provoking its own demise. The key to this situation is secure second-strike capabilities. Nothing instills caution more reliably than the certainty of devastation on the rebound; fear of a disarming first strike by one's enemy, in contrast, fuels the temptation to preempt in a crisis. This is why classical arms control was designed to reduce not the size of arsenals but the risks of crisis instability.

Stability did not require the obsessive accumulation of nuclear weapons to the insane levels of the height of the Cold War. But neither does it allow for zero. So what is enough? Global Zero proposes a phased approach. In the first stage (2010–13), the United States and Russia are to come down to 1,000 warheads each. In the second phase (2014–18), they are to cut that number in half, provided lesser players freeze their stockpiles. In the third phase (2019–23), all nuclear weapons will be negotiated down to zero. And in the final stage (2024–30), nuclear warheads will be phased out completely.

These calculations include Israel, which would be left contending with several hundred million Arabs and Iranians absent a nuclear shield. A denuclearized Pakistan would confront more than a billion Indians. Japan and Taiwan—if it still exists as a separate polity—would face China without the nuclear umbrella the United States once extended. In other words, what started out as an almost scholastic question of nuclear numbers would quickly turn into a very practical question of geopolitics. Within a couple of decades, the power map of the world would be completely redrawn, as old-fashioned metrics such as population size, territorial extent, and conventional military strength once again dominated

strategic calculations, with dire consequences for the United States and the West as a whole.

Of course, such factors would not matter if nuclear disarmament ushered in perpetual peace. But such a heaven did not exist before nuclear weapons were deployed, so why should it exist once they are removed? The peace that disarmament advocates take for granted has been the product of the very arsenals they want to eliminate. The correlation between nuclear weapons and great-power peace is perfect—65 years, the longest such period in world history. Conversely, with the nuclear threat lifted, conventional war among the great powers might no longer look so terrifying. If the last rung on the escalation ladder is gone, stepping onto the first one might not lead straight to Armageddon.

But surely, it must be possible to safely bring down the number of weapons, given how even today's arsenals still constitute massive global overkill? At first glance, gradualism does seem sensible. But behind the process of disarmament lurks the ugly face of dread. As a state's stocks of nuclear weapons dwindle, its vulnerability to an enemy's disabling first strike rises—along with its fear that such a strike might actually occur. It is easier to destroy ten missiles than one thousand. Small arsenals, in Schelling's words, put a "premium on haste," which undermines crisis stability. The structural incentive to go first, he notes, "is undoubtedly the greatest piece of mischief that can be introduced into military forces, and the greatest source of danger that peace will explode into all out war." By contrast, large and diverse forces reduce the rewards of haste. Hence, there is safety—mutual safety—in numbers.

What about incremental disarmament—a variant of gradualism that the Global Zero co-coordinator Bruce Blair and his colleagues recently described in these pages ("Smaller and Safer," September/October 2010)—which includes confidence-building measures such as lowering the alert status of nuclear forces, removing target coordinates from guidance systems, and separating warheads from launchers? Inserting such circuit breakers, the argument runs, would introduce a salutary delay between crisis and launch, giving negotiations a chance to resolve the crisis short of war.

Making military mobilizations cumbersome, however, is hardly a guarantee of crisis stability. The intersection of great-power rivalries with complex and staged mobilization schedules helped trigger World War I rather than prevent it. High-readiness forces would have kept the "guns of August" from going off. And Israel's lack of military readiness prior to the Yom Kippur War created an opening for an Egyptian attack rather than incentives for a mutual stand-down.

Measures that buy time for a crisis to play out slowly can sharpen the dilemma between lashing out and hanging back. Nervousness can blanket calm; when tensions are high, states will be tempted to raise the alert status of their nuclear forces by reassembling launchers and warheads and retargeting their missiles. Such moves by country A might sober up country B, signaling how high the stakes are for A. But these moves might also increase B's sense of vulnerability, prompting an even higher level of readiness on its end. If the upward spiral continues, either state or both of them might conclude that war has already begun, leaving no choice but preemption or humiliating concession.

Blair and his colleagues argue that such a vicious cycle need not arise. "A lower level of launch readiness" flanked by "much deeper cuts," they write, would make for "uncertainty and incomplete knowledge" and so render policymakers risk averse in a crisis. Uncertainty might well instill caution. But it could just as well breed the opposite. Which nation has ever started a war on the basis of certainty about its own and its enemy's capabilities, actual and potential? Would Germany and Japan have taken on the Soviet Union and the United States if they had known in 1941 what these unready giants would throw back at them from 1942 to 1945? What stops the would-be aggressor is the certainty of unacceptable damage, even if it follows a sudden first strike.

Preemption, the worst enemy of stability, might actually be easier in a world filled with confidence-building measures, as Schelling has pointed out. Today's retaliatory forces are hardened or hidden under the sea. Now think of a world replete with circuit breakers—with missiles in one place, warheads in another. Instead of having to take out hardened silos or elusive submarines, a state could resort to simpler means of preemption, attacking or sabotaging the logistical chain between its enemy's launchers and its warheads or the storage sites where its weapons are kept.

One of the oldest paradoxes of the nuclear age is that loaded and ready weapons induce caution while also carrying risks. Forty years of arms control have managed to preserve the caution while reducing the risks through innumerable fail-safe devices. Trading the residual risks for a return to vicious cycles of suspicion, fear, and possible preemption does not seem like a good bargain.

GENIE OUT OF A BOTTLE

But assume, for the sake of argument, that all the practical obstacles to the implementation of Global Zero were whisked away—that one could bring all the relevant states on board, construct a disarmament regime with teeth, identify all nuclear facilities, monitor them carefully, and police all violations effectively. Would Global Zero serve its intended purpose? Would a world free of nuclear weapons actually be happier and safer?

No—for a reason so simple that one hesitates to belabor it. Even if states were willing to destroy their nuclear weapons, they could not destroy the knowledge, technology, and materials that lie behind them. It was in a global-zero world, after all, that nuclear weapons were invented by the United States, starting in 1939, when it was still a nonbelligerent. The implications are not heartening. Were Global Zero to achieve its goals, former nuclear powers would inevitably keep mobilization bases at a high state of readiness to guard against a nuclear breakout by others, since the acquisition of only a few bombs would offer a deadly advantage to whichever state rearmed first. The result would be a world, as Schelling has observed,

> in which the United States, Russia, Israel, China and half a dozen or a dozen other countries would have hair-trigger mobilization plans to rebuild nuclear weapons and mobilize or commandeer delivery systems, and would have prepared targets to preempt other nations' nuclear facilities. . . . Every crisis would be a nuclear crisis, any war could become a nuclear war. The urge to preempt would dominate; whoever gets the first few weapons will coerce or preempt. It would be a nervous world.

Make that a dangerous world, if one thinks in terms of stability rather than numbers.

So is there nothing that can be done to improve the current situation, no way for the size of existing arsenals to be reduced? Of course there is. The key, however, is to focus not on the weapons themselves but on crisis stability. Traditional arms control—not at all the same thing as disarmament of the Global Zero variety—has emphasized just such concerns, and helped usher in a world where the nuclear weapons of the great powers, once a terrifying presence at center stage of international politics, have safely receded into the wings.

Such advances are real and valuable in and of themselves. Unfortunately, they have not and will not resolve all problems of the nuclear age. The proliferation of nuclear weapons to states such as North Korea and Iran or to nonstate actors such as al Qaeda follow a logic that has little to do with great-power arms control. If such states cannot be disarmed, they must be deterred. But how can nuclear weapons be deterred unless with nuclear weapons? Here is where the idealism of Global Zero becomes not merely irrelevant but possibly tragic, obstructing the sensible policies required to maintain a credible modern deterrent.

Despite his occasional flights of rhetoric, Obama appears to have accepted the strategic logic of maintaining a credible deterrent. In May 2010, his administration outlined plans to spend $80 billion over ten years to modernize the U.S. deterrent and to sustain appropriate research and production facilities. Whether a bow to nuclear realism or a bone thrown to hawkish senators skeptical of ratifying the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, this was a sensible step. It should be complemented by other measures designed to address real threats such as al Qaeda, which cannot be countered by nuclear deterrence because it offers neither counterforce nor countervalue targets for retaliation.

So the goal should be to craft a different global zero: a regime that would allow zero fissionable material and weapons technology to pass into the wrong hands, especially into those of Terror International. This is the most pressing threat in a world where the risk of great-power violence has faded. It also comes with the promise of real achievement, as Global Zero does not.

The Time for Urge

Cutting corners: Have modern corporations learned the lesson?

Commodity Purchasing vs. Business Continuity

It seems that the panic of September 2008 and downfall of some of the world's biggest corporate names would be something that we will never forget in our lives. The entire global economy was on its knees, largely because a handful of people acted irresponsibly, fueled by skewed incentives that did not take into account long term risks. ***Cutting corners to make a small short term profit while risking the future of an entire enterprise: that would never again happen in the modern corporation.*** Even before, our parents, teachers, professors and mentors have all told us not to do it. In his 1954 classic, *The Practice of Management,* Peter Drucker told managers to do the right thing and to focus on quality of people for the long run, not the quick buck.

And yet, have corporations learned the lesson?

In a constant rush for earnings, many corporations are focusing on efficiency and savings. This work, often done by procurement and global sourcing units, is laudable. Many purchases in today's economy can be made on a commodity basis — the most cost effective offer can and should prevail. Unfortunately, it's not always so simple — the total relevant cost cannot always be expressed in terms of purchase price. Just as was the case with sophisticated financial instruments, sometimes there are additional risks to consider. Thus, the most sophisticated procurement departments look at total quality and value when they source.

Security and safety are enterprise critical: these are areas where a wrong decision in selecting your partner can be catastrophic. Your security executives, directors, managers, and team are among the most valuable people in the organization. They work hard to diligently protect the people, assets and resources of your enterprise. Behind the scenes they ensure business continuity, preventing millions or billions of dollars in potential losses from business interruption. They have to worry about both the routine and the unpredictable — your corporation can be a target for a common criminal, a fervent terrorist avowed on havoc, cybercrime or global espionage.

Keeping your company secure is about preserving the reputation and legacy of the top management. Day to day management of security is often delegated by necessity, and sometimes senior executives know very little about what is going on in their security organization. And yet, in the end, it is always the senior management that is ultimately responsible; indeed, senior management has a fiduciary responsibility to do everything necessary to protect the corporation against security threats, such as terrorist attacks, that can be foreseeable. Failure to do what is right can, therefore, result not just in bad publicity but also in personal liability.

Just one incident — a terrorist attack, a manufacturing plant exploding or a disgruntled worker going on a shooting rampage — can cripple the legacy of an executive in a split second. And it's a split second that cannot be undone.

And yet, even if it is composed of the best people, your security team may not be given enough clout to effectively protect your corporation. Indeed, intricacies of the modern organization, driven by short term departmental incentives that do not fully take into account long term enterprise risks, can hinder making the right choices about security.

Given its critical nature for most companies, procurement departments should not be expected to treat security service as a simple commodity, to be sourced at the lowest cost. The security provider selection is about choosing your security experts and professionals who develop and execute your security contingency plans, protect your global data centers, and control ingress and egress to your headquarters, production facilities and other business infrastructure. It's about those last lines of defense for your company against an impending disaster and the corresponding business continuity interruption. The better your defenses, the less likely the perpetrators — be they potential terrorists or common criminals — are to select your company as a target. And the less likely they are to succeed if they target you.

Who secures your facilities, what experience do they bring with them, how do they think, how well they are trained, motivated and engaged in their jobs — all of these things matter. Consider an unattended package or an unusual machinery noise. Will they have the proper site-specific experience, knowledge and commitment to instinctively act and prevent disaster at a moment's notice?

We founded Guardsmark, one of the world's largest security services companies, over forty-six years ago, for the purpose of giving value to our customers. In our business, value is excellent service and cutting edge expertise for the companies that we protect. Who are Guardsmark's customers? They are the smartest, most sophisticated and toughest organizations. The executives in these corporations understand the importance of security and, more importantly, the consequences of security failure.

If you yourself had to make the decision, would you entrust the lives and property of your enterprise to inexperienced, poorly trained and undermanaged minimum wage workers? Would you cut corners?

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ncy Is Now®

By underestimating the importance of the security services purchase, many corporations are doing just that — cutting corners and trading short term savings for long term exposure to catastrophic risk. Without proper incentives and a green light from the senior executives to make the selection based on total quality and value, your corporation could be selecting the lowest bid providers, even against recommendations of your security managers.

Though this is a difficult time for many companies, this also may be the most dangerous time in the history of our lives. The threat of al Qaeda infiltration has not gone away, indeed there is evidence that terrorists are working hard to prepare for new deadly attacks. And other threats — whether they are cybercrime, espionage, loss of proprietary and intellectual property, workplace violence, and even common crime — are on the rise in this challenging economic climate. In short, this is not a time for mediocrity or complacency.

We urge you today to think a few minutes more about your company's security operations and about how your organization manages them. Give your security managers and procurement department the green light from you to look at ensured excellence from your security partner. That is the only way to protect your enterprise, as well as your own liability and reputation. Once something happens, and you have to look shareholders or fellow employees and their families in the eye to explain why your company had cut corners, it will be too late.

Ira A. Lipman
Founder and Chairman
Guardsmark, LLC



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Ira A. Lipman
Founder and Chairman

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Enforcing the Peace

How the Great Powers Can Resolve the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse

Howard M. Sachar

In late August and September 2010, when direct negotiations seemed at last on the verge of replacing proximity talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians, speculation ran high in the Obama administration that face-to-face meetings between the two negotiating teams, hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, could at last produce an accord of enduring substance. Among several veterans of Middle East diplomacy, Martin Indyk, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, was explicit in his optimism that the breakthrough moment was at hand, writing in *The New York Times* that "the negotiating environment is better suited to peacemaking today than it has been at any point in the last decade." In view of Israel's on-and-off settlement construction in the West Bank, however, and the frequent postponements of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, it is fair to ask if such optimism is really warranted.

Indeed, it is worth recalling that hardly ever in modern history have undersized nations whose relations with their neighbors have been drenched in rancor and blood managed to negotiate successfully more than interim cease-fires or armistices with one another. More frequently, and however unwillingly, these minor actors have accepted the initiatives of great powers with vested interests in acting as their protégés' advocates and guarantors and in constraining small states' irredentist and territorial ambitions.

For precedent, one may hark back to the sequence of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century great-power conclaves—of London, Paris, and Berlin, among others—that established the independence or guaranteed the security of countries as diverse as Greece (1829), Serbia (1856), and Bulgaria and Romania (1878), or to the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which sculpted an aggregation of European successor states and Middle Eastern mandates from the debris of the prewar empires. Similarly, in the wake of World War II, the United Nations selectively acknowledged or postponed the demands of postimperial claimants to diplomatic recognition.

Which of this fractious heterogeneity of races and cultures, of ethnic and religious communities, ever negotiated their sovereignties or autonomies or their respective territorial or economic claims among

Howard M. Sachar is Professor Emeritus of Modern History and International Affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of *A History of Israel* and other books on the Middle East.

themselves? Marinated as they were in an immemorial folklore of historical grievances, suspicions, and insecurities, and suffering from chronic diplomatic ineptitude, these and other political neophytes virtually ensured that their sporadic bilateral negotiations at best remained unproductive and at worst became inflammatory. From beginning to end, client governments were dependent on great-power patronage and protection.

A LITANY OF FAILURES

The contemporary Middle East is a case study of the dysfunctionalism of small-power diplomacy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Egypt's president, Anwar al-Sadat, and Lebanon's president-elect, Bashir Gemayel, ventured to negotiate peace agreements with Israel, both men paid for their initiatives with their lives. Gemayel's effort did not so much as leave the ground; Sadat's treaty with the Israelis soon languished, resulting in a cold peace after his assassination. Nevertheless, in 1991, with the end of the first Gulf War and the waning of the Cold War, the United States and Russia jointly and audaciously undertook the even more formidable task of sponsoring a series of new Arab-Israeli conferences in Madrid and Washington. After three years of intense, if intermittent, negotiations, the meetings did indeed produce a peace treaty, albeit of less than epic proportions, between Israel and Jordan. Since the turn of the century, however, potential Israeli-Jordanian water-reclamation projects, and even private business relationships, have gone the way of once-touted Israeli-Egyptian joint energy projects. They have all but expired. Tourism between these signatory nations has devolved into a one-way traffic—essentially from Israel to the resort hotels of the Sinai Peninsula and the Nabataean stone palaces of Petra, in Jordan. Israeli ambassadors in Cairo and Amman have been reduced to lepers in their own offices.

The sources of this barely camouflaged Arab quarantine are not arcane. Neither do they relate exclusively to issues affecting the welfare of the signatory nations themselves. Rather, Arab-Israeli negotiations continue to be crippled, if not stillborn, as a result of the single most toxic issue between the Arab states and Israel—the status of Palestine. All efforts to eradicate the poisonous standoff between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams, or to mediate between them "just," "viable," and "defensible" shares of the Holy Land, have foundered. With these failures, opportunities have similarly lapsed for Israeli diplomatic breakthroughs not only in the Arab world but increasingly also in the broader Muslim world—even as far afield as Indonesia.

Central among these doomed ventures was the widely heralded Rabin-Peres-Arafat Declaration of Principles. Signed in Oslo in 1993, the document anticipated the evolution of a self-governing Palestinian Authority and eventually a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. That manifestly has not occurred. Rather, the prospects of such a state have been subsisting on life support since the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and have become even more tenuous since the death of Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat in 2004. The political triumph of Hamas in Gaza in 2006, less than a year after Israel's withdrawal from that beleaguered coastal enclave, all but buried initial expectations of a sovereign Palestinian state living at peace alongside Israel.

Indeed, from the onset of the twenty-first century until today, Oslo's Declaration of Principles has functioned less as an Arab and Israeli commitment to Palestinian self-government and economic development than as a deceptive veneer for ongoing guerrilla assaults against Israeli civilian targets, the entrenchment of Iran's surrogate Hezbollah army on the Israeli-Lebanese frontier, and a proliferation of Jewish settlements constructed in the name of the "historic Land of Israel." Inducements for Jewish colonization—in the form of cheap, government-subsidized mortgages proffered by successive Israeli governments—have deliberately enlarged these settlements, which now threaten to encircle Arab-inhabited East Jerusalem and logistically fracture the future Palestinian state.

Like Israel's tenuous armistices and frozen peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the malaise of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy is not cloaked in obscurity. It has lacked the indispensable catalyst of great-power enforcement.

THE LESSONS OF 1919

The question arises, then, do great powers have a celestial dispensation not only to propose but also to impose their own diplomatic templates on the world's smaller nations? The argument against great-power enforcement was the cri de coeur loosed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference by the incipient European "successor states," among them the Baltic republics, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, that emerged after the prewar empires crumbled. And in response to their anguished collective protest—the so-called revolt of the small powers—French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson responded essentially with one voice. Echoing their predecessors at earlier diplomatic conclaves, the "Big Three" reminded these supplicants that it was their irredentism that had drawn the great powers into the suicidal Armageddon of 1914–18. This time, the Allies would not hesitate to perform their own territorial surgery on central and eastern Europe's fulminant regional animosities.

As for the Middle East, the very notion of Palestinian or Jewish statehood would have been unthinkable had it been made dependent on an accommodation between the Arabs and the Jews alone. After World War I, it was the joint diplomatic initiative of the victorious Allied powers that formulated the essential geopolitical contours both of the Arab mandates and of the Jewish national home. After World War II, it was the UN General Assembly, following the lead of the United States and the Soviet Union, that sanctioned the partition of Palestine into sovereign Arab and Jewish states. No one has contended that these awards, of either 1919–20 or 1947–48, begot an idyll of justice and comity, or even a guidebook for arm's-length cooperation between the Arabs and the Jews. Yet over the ensuing decades, the great powers' conceptual framework has managed to survive a chain reaction of regional challenges and wars, and within the Holy Land's ethnographic lineament, two national organisms, one de jure (Israel), the other de facto (Palestine), have been accorded near-parallel international recognition.

Indeed, they have been accorded a great deal more than recognition. Without an ongoing infusion of U.S. loans and grants, German financial reparations, and semi-official integration into the European Common Market, Israel early on would

have foundered in bankruptcy. During the most virulent period of the Cold War, Israel's armed forces would have been hard-pressed to resist a tightening Soviet ring of Arab proxies had they been denied access to French and U.S. military equipment. Similarly, from 1974 on, without a U.S. commitment of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to both countries, Egypt and Israel would have remained locked in a tense confrontation on the sands of the Sinai Peninsula. During the late 1990s and the early years of this century, had Arafat not been assured of the European Union's virtually open-ended transfusion of financial largess, the Palestinian Authority would have lapsed even sooner into the archetypal Middle Eastern morass of corruption and political segmentation.

Altogether, the United States and Europe have more than paid their dues in their respective commitments to Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. And it is specifically these benefactors that now face critical dangers to their own economic, political, and strategic interests should the Arab-Israeli conflict, like the perennial Balkan threat to the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires before 1914, continue to metastasize at its own genetic pace. Each Arab-Israeli war—in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2001–2, 2006, and 2008–9—has brought with it major risks, from great-power confrontation to blocked international waterways, large-scale oil stoppages, political assassinations, institutionalized terrorism, and, most recently, the introduction of some 40,000 Iranian extended-range ballistic weapons into the Israeli-Lebanese frontier zone.

POWER RULES

For more than a decade, even before the recent eruptions of intensified border violence, technocrats representing the Quartet—the European Union, Russia, the United States, and the UN—have been engaged in refining a blueprint for an Israel territorially augmented by limited and reciprocal security-border adjustments and a state of Palestine demographically configured to encompass a near totality of the Palestinian territories' current Arab inhabitants, with guaranteed contiguity for its population centers and a protected overland trade and travel route between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But with so-called proximity talks and even face-to-face discussions endlessly collapsing in a lethal series of cross-border Arab rocket attacks and Israeli military retaliation, the great powers themselves at long last are faced with the challenge of borrowing from historical precedent and operating not as mediators but as principals.

Will they accept that challenge? More specifically, will U.S. President Barack Obama grasp the opportunity to jump-start a reasonable version of the Quartet's master plan for the Holy Land? It is a formulation, after all, that reflects the weight not only of its sponsors' best collective judgment and self-interests but also of their untapped collective powers of enforcement, including the selective bestowal or withdrawal of diplomatic, economic, or military support.

Precedents for such enforcement are not lacking. In 1956, President Dwight Eisenhower exerted the U.S. government's economic power, as well as his own considerable personal prestige, to reverse the clumsy French-British-Israeli Suez adventure. In 1973, on behalf of the Nixon administration, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger masterminded an emergency U.S. airlift of weapons to Israel to reverse

the momentum of the Egyptian-Syrian Yom Kippur offensive. In 1991, in the aftermath of the first Gulf War, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker persuaded President George H. W. Bush to withhold a $100 million loan to Israel for "new immigrant" housing—fungible money manifestly intended for new Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Skeptics may inquire whether an Israeli-Palestinian accord fashioned on the basis of great-power rewards or deprivations could survive the Palestinian leadership's vulnerability to Syrian and Iranian intimidation or the Israeli administration's vulnerability to the rightist majority in its own current governing coalition. For even if both parties, storming and raging, were chivvied into signing a treaty of mutual accommodation, could the agreement be translated into functional operation except under sustained U.S. and European incentives or penalties?

In fact, the query should be reversed. Without great-power diplomatic benediction and financial life support, would there ever have been a State of Israel or an embryonic Palestinian state in the making? Similarly, without the application of an unrelenting great-power agenda, could the Israelis or the Palestinians accept a formula that each side until now has rejected as politically unpalatable?

Finally, another issue may be added to Washington's list of diplomatic and political challenges. Will a U.S. president risk alienating the so-called Jewish vote by adopting a policy of firm evenhandedness in the Middle East—one that confronts Israeli territorial aggressiveness no less than Arab guerrilla terrorism? Actually, during the past 30 years, a verifiable shift in perspective toward Israel's West Bank settlements has been developing not only within the liberal West but also within the American Jewish community. The executives of mainstream American Jewish organizations, who tend to pander to their constituencies' reflexive insecurities, remain oblivious to the mounting evidence that those constituencies—younger and more sophisticated than their forebears—have moved on.

With the exception of a small (if clamorous) minority of Revisionist Zionists, whose version of the Holy Land is apocalyptic, American Jewry has been wedded to the principle of religious and ethnic freedom, participated in the vanguard of the civil rights movement, and has pleaded the overseas causes of such minorities as the Kosovar Muslims—and, increasingly, the Palestinians—with all the urgency characteristic of a minority people uneasy at the palpable international isolation of its much-loved surrogate homeland and ethnic status symbol. Any president or legislator who ignores the depth of this unease—the visceral yearning of both the Israeli and the American Jewish "silent majority" for an evenhanded settlement imposed by Israel's greatest Western supporter—could justly be characterized as a political Rip Van Winkle.

The international climate has also changed. A looming Iranian ballistic missile capability, together with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's evident determination to build nuclear weapons, has eclipsed even the threat once posed to Israel by Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt or Nikita Khrushchev's Soviet Union. As a result, a unique convergence of European, Russian, and U.S. interests has opened up a level playing field for great-power diplomacy and great-power closure. If ever there were a propitious moment for the Obama administration to lead the Quartet in initiating and enforcing that closure, it is now.

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A New Gold Standard

The monetary system that once gave the "Gold Standard" its name is now history, but the phrase itself still retains its luster as the ultimate measure of worth or value.

In today's knowledge-driven, global marketplace, true worth derives from concentrations of innovative thinking, entrepreneurial drive and well-educated workers. These elements forge the new "Gold Standard" by which regional economic clusters are measured. As these clusters grow and create wealth, they generate a kind of economic gravity, attracting like-minded innovators and investors, thereby creating more social and financial capital.

Universities are the wellsprings of these essential economic assets. To keep pace with the ever-shifting world economy, higher education must continually establish new performance standards for excellence.

Measuring Higher Education Excellence in the 21st Century

Unfortunately, performance metrics for universities now are based on how many students an institution excludes and how much it spends. The University of Akron, instead, calls for a new Gold Standard of university performance, a fresh and definitive approach that is appropriate to our times.

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- how much value we add in enabling the success of our students;
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From this foundation, we optimize outcomes for our students and our communities by enhancing our institution's relevance, connectivity and productivity. We engage partners in industry, academia and government; create innovative collaborations that spark innovation; and produce more graduates ready to compete in our knowledge economy.

Through these strategies, we leverage the region's unique strengths and foster educational, economic, social, cultural and intellectual vitality. And, in so doing, we forge a new Gold Standard for a truly excellent university for 21st century America.

Dr. Luis M. Proenza
President
The University of Akron

The University of Akron

Creating a New Gold Standard of University Performance.

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Sudan's Secession Crisis

Can the South Part From the North Without War?

Andrew S. Natsios and Michael Abramowitz

Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the 2005 deal that ended the lengthy civil war between the north and the south of Sudan, voters in the south are supposed to vote on January 9, 2011, to decide whether their region should secede and form the world's newest country. The civil war, which lasted 22 years and during which an estimated 2.5 million southerners died, was fought over several issues: the central government's long-standing neglect of Sudan's periphery; the excessive concentration of jobs, wealth, and public services in the region known as the Arab triangle, along the northern part of the Nile River valley; the government's brutal attempts to impose Arab culture and Islam on the south, where Christianity and traditional religions prevail; its persistent refusal to grant the south any autonomy (except for a brief period in the 1970s); and its exploitation of the south's resources, particularly its oil, to fill government coffers. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed by Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, and John Garang, the leader of the southern rebellion, who was killed in a helicopter crash soon after the deal, was intended to correct some of these problems. It gave the south its own semiautonomous government and an independent standing army and required the upcoming referendum on secession. But now Khartoum's stalling tactics are threatening to delay the vote, with potentially disastrous consequences.

During a visit to southern Sudan in late September and early October, we met nearly 100 people, including the south's president, Salva Kiir Mayardit, and vice president, Riek Machar, civil-society groups, church leaders, international humanitarian workers, UN officials, and many others. We traveled outside Juba

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Andrew S. Natsios, U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan in 2006–7, is Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, and the author of the forthcoming book *Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Michael Abramowitz, a former *Washington Post* reporter and national editor, is Director of the Committee on Conscience at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.

to the southern cities of Malakal and Rumbek but were denied permission to travel to the north. In the course of our conversations, we came to see clearly that Garang's vision of a unified, democratic Sudan died with him. Given the depredations and atrocities that the southern Sudanese have suffered for two centuries at the hands of the northern Arabs, getting southerners to vote for unity would have been difficult even with Garang in power. One cause of the ongoing tensions is the condescending attitudes of some Arab elites in Khartoum: they continue to refer to the southerners as *a'bid*, the Arabic term for low-caste black slaves. For them, the south's revolt during the civil war was no liberation struggle; it was an uprising of slaves that needed to be crushed. Now, these northerners cannot abide dealing with southerners as equals. The southerners, for their part, wish to be rid of the Arabs and Islamism once and for all.

In the fall, as the date of the referendum neared, international observers and southern officials reported that Khartoum was redeploying its army, with newly purchased heavy weaponry, along the disputed north-south border. In response to the north's muscle-flexing, the southern government, which is based in the city of Juba, sent the toughest units in its own armed forces, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and also equipped them with new heavy weaponry. The south's leaders threatened to issue a unilateral declaration of independence if the north manipulated or canceled the vote. They also privately warned that if the north attempted to occupy the oil fields in the south—where 80 percent of the country's known oil reserves are located—they would destroy the country's oil infrastructure. And they have the troops and the weapons to do so. If Khartoum thinks it can protect Sudan's oil infrastructure, it should reflect on the failure of the U.S. military to protect Iraq's during its occupation of that country.

Some balloting will likely take place in early 2011, but if the north tries to manipulate the referendum or postpone it by more than a few weeks, the south could erupt. Stonewalling might even precipitate war—and perhaps a war even bloodier than the north-south conflict or the rebellion in Darfur, where the government troops' scorched-earth tactics left a lasting imprint of misery, displacement, ongoing violence, and atrocities. On the other hand, the path to a peaceful partition as provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is full of dangers, not all of which are adequately recognized in the West. The peace deal calls for a six-month period of transition after the scheduled date for the referendum, during which the north and the south are supposed to work out any remaining details about their split. According to many people we spoke to in the south, it is during this time that the threat of violence will be the greatest—either because the vote has been held, in which case the international community is likely to turn its focus elsewhere, or because the vote has been delayed by the north's dilatory tactics and violence has broken out.

THE GREAT DIVIDE

Even though they signed the peace deal nearly six years ago, Khartoum and Juba only recently began serious negotiations over their divorce settlement. As we were writing this article last November, many of the thorniest questions were still unresolved. Where should the north-south border be

drawn? How will the citizenship of southerners living in the north and of Arabs living in the south be established? How should the dispute over the oil-rich area of Abyei, which straddles the current, tentative border, be settled? How should the country's debts be apportioned? How much oil revenue should Juba give Khartoum for the construction of the north's oil pipeline and port and the south's use of them? And how much water from the Nile River, which flows from the south, will the north (and Egypt) be allowed to use? To gauge the difficulty of working out any one of these matters, just consider the question of how oil revenues should be distributed. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the two sides were supposed to split the proceeds evenly. Will that arrangement continue even though the south, where most of the resources are, thinks that the north's leaders have cheated it out of billions of dollars?

The Bashir government believes that the way these issues are resolved will determine whether its party, the National Congress Party (NCP), remains in power. And the south's leaders are wary of compromising the long-term development of their region by granting the north too many concessions. Khartoum wants to negotiate the terms of any divorce before the referendum—one reason it is trying to delay the vote—but Juba is refusing to settle until after the ballot for fear that Khartoum might hold the vote hostage to these questions. With the parties' strategies clashing, negotiators are at an impasse. The south did win a symbolic victory last September, when during a high-level summit at the United Nations in New York virtually the entire international community lined up behind the south and insisted that the referendum be held on time. But the government in Khartoum is not budging, worried that it might be signing its own death warrant if it fulfills the final terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Some Sudan observers fear that if the south secedes, the world's newest country will be born a failed state. UN officials in the country distribute to visitors a fact sheet entitled "Scary Statistics" showing that southern Sudan's health and education indicators are extremely poor, even compared to other troubled states in Africa. But those who focus on such data overlook the fact that the south has effectively been a functioning state for the last five years and that it has made remarkable progress under very difficult circumstances. During our trip, we found Juba to be unexpectedly vibrant. Since 2005, the city's population has grown from roughly 100,000 to roughly 1.1 million (which is about 13 percent of the south's entire population). A dozen government ministries and offices and the University of Juba, which were wrecked by the war, have been rebuilt. Major city streets have been paved and are lined with a new electrical system, and 7,000 new businesses have been registered, including eight banks, seven water-bottling plants, and a brewery. There were only three hotels and two restaurants in 2007; there are now 175 small hotels and dozens of restaurants. Some 300,000 southerners have cell phones. There is a serious shortage of trained teachers, but encouragingly, school attendance has increased fourfold.

The south still faces serious challenges. In 2009, there was an upsurge of violence in the south, the root causes of which were historic rivalries among the region's 50 tribes. This fractiousness has long

been the south's greatest weakness, and successive governments in the north have exploited it, arming one tribe to attack another, in order to keep the south divided. But some international officials we met in Juba said that the latest bout of violence was due not to any shortcomings on the southern government's part but to failed harvests and the suspension of salaries to southern militias on the SPLA's payroll—itself the result of a large drop in oil revenues after the 2008 financial crisis. The government in Juba is already functioning as a state, and it is likely to continue to do so as long as a new war does not break out and its oil fields keep producing revenues.

That said, a new South Sudan would surely be a fragile state. Although the south's elite is very able and bright, it consists of a few hundred senior officials at most, and the large state bureaucracy beneath them is short on skills and managerial experience. The rural areas of the south know little of the prosperity now evident in Juba; whether a new state could spread these benefits more equitably will determine its viability over the long term. Opposition leaders in the south also complained to us that the SPLA used heavy-handed tactics to force some 20 independent tribal militias—the source of 80 percent of the violence in rural areas, according to a senior UN official—to give up their small arms.

Judging from our interviews, however, the south's ruling party, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, and Kiir, its leader, appear to be genuinely popular among the southern people. (Kiir won 93 percent of the vote when he was up for reelection as the south's president in April 2010.) Still, the south's leaders will have to be careful that their new country is launched on a genuinely open and democratic path. In the long run, they will also have to ensure that oil and mineral revenues do not corrupt their political culture or get misused, diverted, or distributed unevenly.

NORTHERN EXPOSURE

The north has its share of challenges, too. It already is a fragile state, and it may be approaching state failure. The NCP's traditional means of exercising control—brutally repressing the opposition, turning its adversaries against one another, using oil revenues to buy off opponents—no longer work. Khartoum has lost control of southern Sudan, faces nonstop rebellion in Darfur, and could soon confront uprisings in the Nuba Mountains, at the center of the country, and, in the east, from the Beja people of the Red Sea Province and the Funj people of Blue Nile, El Gezira, and Sennar Provinces. Bashir's NCP knows that its authority is slipping away; it is circling its tattered and rickety wagons to maintain state power in the Arab triangle, an area it believes is more secure and whose inhabitants it takes to be more loyal to Arab interests. During the past three years, the north's leaders have canceled large-scale development projects in the El Gezira and Sennar regions and moved their investments in dams, irrigation schemes, roads, and bridges to the Arab triangle. Now, many opponents of the Bashir government in the north fear that it will impose even more repressive measures and after the referendum abrogate the national constitution in order to prevent the dissolution of the country.

Khartoum is increasingly coming under pressure from all sides. Bashir has been indicted for genocide by the International Criminal Court for the atrocities committed

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in Darfur, and in the fall of 2010, he and his colleagues came under assault from politicians and the press for having ever agreed to hold the referendum on secession. When Bashir consented to peace with the south in 2005, he was acting under duress: the national army was losing the war to the rebels, casualties were rising, and the war had grown unpopular in the north—all of which was exacerbating the country's chronic economic problems. Bashir's government also feared the military power it saw the United States exercising in Afghanistan and Iraq. But a deal that may have made sense then appears now to have come at too high a cost, at least to some Arab nationalists and Islamist groups in Khartoum. If the south does secede, Khartoum will have to negotiate to get access to the region's natural wealth: not only its vast oil reserves but also mineral resources in the region—gold, diamonds, copper, and coltan—that have yet to be fully explored, the plentiful water from the Nile River watershed and the Sudd marshlands, the region's luxuriant soil, and its thousands of square miles of open range with the greatest concentration of cattle per capita in sub-Saharan Africa. A growing chorus of Bashir's opponents in Khartoum are asking what the north has received for making peace with the south.

In late 2010, newspapers in the north were making vitriolic attacks on the referendum. Some are allied with the Islamist Hassan al-Turabi, a former ally of Bashir's—Turabi helped Bashir seize power in a coup in 1989—who is now his archenemy. The Bashir government, which is already accustomed to repressing the regime's more liberal opponents, moved to close some of the newspapers. Concerned about Islamists, it reviews all the sermons prepared for Friday prayers in mosques looking for incendiary language.

The NCP is essentially worried that it could be deposed by political upheaval in Khartoum—for instance, a military coup, a conspiracy in the dreaded National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), a popular uprising, or the mobilization of a rebel movement from outside Khartoum—before, during, or after the referendum. The most likely beneficiary of any such coup would be Turabi or other Islamists. Turabi, who is in his late 70s, is the only opposition figure with both an extensive political organization, including networks of fanatically loyal followers in the military and security apparatus, and a serious grudge against Bashir and the NCP, which expelled him from the party, removed him as Speaker of the National Assembly in 1999, and has jailed him repeatedly for criticizing the regime. Until his falling-out with Bashir, Turabi had dominated the regime from behind the scenes. In his heyday, he brought Osama bin Laden to live and work in Sudan—the two are related by marriage—and invited numerous violent Islamist groups to locate their headquarters and training camps in the country. He supported multiple rebellions against moderate Arab regimes and even orchestrated the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1995. In his fiery sermons, Turabi has called for a worldwide Islamist revolution that would start in Sudan and spread throughout Africa. Were the government of Sudan to fall to him or one of the Islamist factions he has inspired, its first action would likely be to abrogate the north-south peace agreement; for them, the south would be an ideal base from which

to spread their Islamist movement to the rest of Africa.

The NCP is understandably nervous; the threat from Turabi and the Islamists is real. Turabi is suspected, for example, of plotting the overthrow of the government with Khalil Ibrahim, a rebel leader from Darfur. Ibrahim, once a radical follower of Turabi (whom he has called his godfather), has since tried to distance himself from him—Turabi is radioactive politically—but many Sudan watchers suspect that their friendship endures. In May 2008, Ibrahim led 130 heavily armed trucks with 2,000 troops across 700 miles of desert from the Chadian border all the way to Khartoum. Fighting its way through the city, the force made it as far as a bridge close to the presidential palace, where it was turned back by troops from the NISS. The northern army, which had been given orders to stop the rebels, refused to intervene. Many of the well-connected southerners to whom we spoke in the fall were certain that Turabi and Ibrahim had planned the attack on Khartoum together. Apparently, so was Bashir: he had Turabi arrested the day after the incident and publicly accused him of being involved. The attack was the first time in over three decades that street fighting had occurred in Khartoum, and it is the closest the Bashir government has come to being deposed during its reign of more than two decades.

The response by the government was swift and severe, according to human rights reports. It executed dozens of the rebel soldiers its troops had captured. It purged the army of hundreds of suspected Turabi loyalists and Darfur officers. (Historically, Darfur was the main recruitment ground for the Sudanese army, but by 2008, many Darfur soldiers had grown furious about the atrocities that Khartoum's forces had committed in their home province.) The government also began building a network of underground weapons caches and safe houses throughout Khartoum in order to defend the city street by street should another attack take place. It moved all but 4,000 of the most loyal soldiers out of the capital for fear of a coup. And Bashir placed the army under the effective control of the NISS.

The episode underscored the Byzantine nature of politics in the north, which are opaque even to longtime Sudan analysts. Bashir and his government could almost certainly be convicted of serious crimes, responsible as they are for massive suffering among civilians in the south and Darfur. Yet Bashir is also the man who signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and he may be one of the few politicians in Khartoum willing to fulfill its final provisions. It is theoretically possible that if he were suddenly to depart from the scene, he would be succeeded by a more humane, enlightened government; however, many observers we spoke to believe that a new regime would probably be worse. Even if a decent government were to take power instead, the centrifugal forces pulling Sudan apart today are accelerating at such a rapid rate that following the south's likely secession, the eventual dissolution of the remaining north Sudanese state might be inevitable.

ON THE BRINK

All-out war is, of course, the gravest danger facing Sudan, especially for civilians and ethnic groups such as the Beja, the Dinka, the Funj, the Nuba, and the Nuer, all of which have been targeted by Khartoum

and its allied militias in the past. It is unlikely, however, that either Bashir or Kiir would ignite a new conflict. Both are military officers who know the cost of war—unlike some of the militant Islamists who are demanding blood but have never heard a shot fired. Bashir might also fear that his army would not fight: Khartoum's soldiers have been demoralized by repeated purges, some have grudges against the government for its actions in Darfur, and many do not understand anymore why they are fighting.

The greater risk comes from rogue commanders. Under one scenario, Turabists in the army might try to depose Bashir and the NCP before, during, or soon after the referendum. This would almost certainly mean war. The south has a large standing army and will not tolerate any interference in its secession. On this question, all the tribes in the south are united; they have long sought independence from Khartoum. However unlikely it would be to attempt to invade the south with ground forces, a successor government in Khartoum might well use the country's new air force to bomb the region. The SPLA would probably be outgunned by the north's superior weapons, but its soldiers would be highly motivated: once more, they would be fighting to protect their families and their farms from the north's aggression.

War would also endanger the one million southerners who are still internally displaced around Khartoum and other northern cities—one and a half million have already returned to the south—as well as members of the Funj, the Nuba, and other African Muslim tribes who are similarly displaced. Since Sudan's independence from the United Kingdom in 1956, successive governments in the north have feared these people. When Garang returned to Khartoum after signing the peace agreement in 2005, he was greeted by a jubilant crowd of two, some say three, million people. After he died in a helicopter crash that summer, southerners who thought the accident was an assassination by the NISS rioted and burned down parts of the city. (No evidence incriminating the service has surfaced yet.) In both instances, the authorities lost control of Khartoum, and they remain terrified of the displaced population. Last fall, the minister of information and the minister of foreign affairs announced that if the south voted to secede, southerners living in Khartoum would lose their right to get a job, conduct financial transactions, obtain medicine, and even buy food. Bashir was quick to rebut these claims and said that the government would protect all southerners living in the north. But if war broke out and the southern army advanced toward Khartoum, the NISS might well begin targeting southerners living in the north. Northern officials have reportedly mapped out the locations of all the settlements of internally displaced people in Khartoum and bought hand guns for mass distribution to the Arab population.

MUTUAL ASSURED DEPENDENCE

Although the international community must continue to make clear to both the north and the south that resorting to violence or attacking civilians is unacceptable, its efforts to encourage a resolution of the impasse in Sudan will not be decisive: both sides know their own interests well and are skilled at negotiations. The southern Sudanese we spoke to dismissed as ineffectual the threat of applying new economic

sanctions against the north if it does not cooperate. They believe that Khartoum, regardless of who is in charge, will be deterred from aggression only by military force, either by the SPLA or by the U.S. Air Force. Inducements on the part of the Obama administration to encourage the north to compromise—for example, removing Sudan from the list of states sponsoring terrorism, normalizing diplomatic relations, lifting economic sanctions—would provide ammunition to Bashir against critics of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But because the Bashir government is fighting for its survival, any outside pressure short of military force is unlikely to change its fundamental calculations.

For all their differences, the north and the south will remain dependent on each other after the referendum, if only because both need oil revenues. And so one way to avert violence might be to encourage the two sides to cooperate in the name of their economic codependence. The vast majority of Sudan's oil reserves may be in the south, but most of the infrastructure necessary to export that oil—pipelines and a port—are in the north. Thus, without cooperation between the north and the south, oil revenues could quickly dry up for both. Any new pipeline running from the south through either Ethiopia or Kenya is a decade and billions of dollars away. Meanwhile, some energy experts predict that Sudan's oil production may peak and then decline over the next decade. (The government in Juba, 98 percent of whose revenue comes from oil, is now racing to get international mining companies into the south to explore its mineral resources and thus help the government diversify its sources of revenue.) If oil revenues precipitously decline because of a war or a political crisis between the north and the south, Khartoum and Juba would have to lay off their huge public-sector work forces, which would destabilize both governments over time. And thanks to corruption, the elites in both capitals have personally profited from the oil revenues. In other words, maintaining oil revenues is in the interests of many parties—and thus a powerful incentive to find a peaceful way out of the current impasse.

Given these stakes, the Sudanese, in both the north and the south, might very well manage on their own and do once more what they have done over the past six years: pull back from the brink of catastrophe, averting the worst violence, and patch together an inadequate but functional compromise that protects both parties' interests. Considering the circumstances today, Sudan could do a lot worse.

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

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Essays

Social media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world's political movements, just as most of the world's authoritarian governments are trying to limit access to them.

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The Political Power of Social Media

Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change

Clay Shirky

On January 17, 2001, during the impeachment trial of Philippine President Joseph Estrada, loyalists in the Philippine Congress voted to set aside key evidence against him. Less than two hours after the decision was announced, thousands of Filipinos, angry that their corrupt president might be let off the hook, converged on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major crossroads in Manila. The protest was arranged, in part, by forwarded text messages reading, "Go 2 EDSA. Wear blk." The crowd quickly swelled, and in the next few days, over a million people arrived, choking traffic in downtown Manila.

The public's ability to coordinate such a massive and rapid response—close to seven million text messages were sent that week—so alarmed the country's legislators that they reversed course and allowed the evidence to be presented. Estrada's fate was sealed; by January 20, he was gone. The event marked the first time that social media had helped force out a national leader. Estrada himself blamed "the text-messaging generation" for his downfall.

Since the rise of the Internet in the early 1990s, the world's networked population has grown from the low millions to the low billions. Over the same period, social media have become a fact of life for civil society worldwide, involving many actors—regular citizens, activists, nongovernmental organizations, telecommunications firms, software providers, governments. This raises an obvious question for the

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Clay Shirky is Professor of New Media at New York University and the author of *Cognitive Surplus: Creativity and Generosity in a Connected Age*.

U.S. government: How does the ubiquity of social media affect U.S. interests, and how should U.S. policy respond to it?

As the communications landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory, the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action. In the political arena, as the protests in Manila demonstrated, these increased freedoms can help loosely coordinated publics demand change.

The Philippine strategy has been adopted many times since. In some cases, the protesters ultimately succeeded, as in Spain in 2004, when demonstrations organized by text messaging led to the quick ouster of Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, who had inaccurately blamed the Madrid transit bombings on Basque separatists. The Communist Party lost power in Moldova in 2009 when massive protests coordinated in part by text message, Facebook, and Twitter broke out after an obviously fraudulent election. Around the world, the Catholic Church has faced lawsuits over its harboring of child rapists, a process that started when *The Boston Globe*'s 2002 exposé of sexual abuse in the church went viral online in a matter of hours.

There are, however, many examples of the activists failing, as in Belarus in March 2006, when street protests (arranged in part by e-mail) against President Aleksandr Lukashenko's alleged vote rigging swelled, then faltered, leaving Lukashenko more determined than ever to control social media. During the June 2009 uprising of the Green Movement in Iran, activists used every possible technological coordinating tool to protest the miscount of votes for Mir Hossein Mousavi but were ultimately brought to heel by a violent crackdown. The Red Shirt uprising in Thailand in 2010 followed a similar but quicker path: protesters savvy with social media occupied downtown Bangkok until the Thai government dispersed the protesters, killing dozens.

The use of social media tools—text messaging, e-mail, photo sharing, social networking, and the like—does not have a single preordained outcome. Therefore, attempts to outline their effects on political action are too often reduced to dueling anecdotes. If you regard the failure of the Belarusian protests to oust Lukashenko as paradigmatic, you will regard the Moldovan experience as an outlier, and vice versa. Empirical work on the subject is also hard to come by, in part because these tools are so new and

in part because relevant examples are so rare. The safest characterization of recent quantitative attempts to answer the question, Do digital tools enhance democracy? (such as those by Jacob Groshek and Philip Howard) is that these tools probably do not hurt in the short run and might help in the long run—and that they have the most dramatic effects in states where a public sphere already constrains the actions of the government.

Despite this mixed record, social media have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world's political movements, just as most of the world's authoritarian governments (and, alarmingly, an increasing number of democratic ones) are trying to limit access to it. In response, the U.S. State Department has committed itself to "Internet freedom" as a specific policy aim. Arguing for the right of people to use the Internet freely is an appropriate policy for the United States, both because it aligns with the strategic goal of strengthening civil society worldwide and because it resonates with American beliefs about freedom of expression. But attempts to yoke the idea of Internet freedom to short-term goals—particularly ones that are country-specific or are intended to help particular dissident groups or encourage regime change—are likely to be ineffective on average. And when they fail, the consequences can be serious.

Although the story of Estrada's ouster and other similar events have led observers to focus on the power of mass protests to topple governments, the potential of social media lies mainly in their support of civil society and the public sphere—change measured in years and decades rather than weeks or months. The U.S. government should maintain Internet freedom as a goal to be pursued in a principled and regime-neutral fashion, not as a tool for effecting immediate policy aims country by country. It should likewise assume that progress will be incremental and, unsurprisingly, slowest in the most authoritarian regimes.

THE PERILS OF INTERNET FREEDOM

In January 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined how the United States would promote Internet freedom abroad. She emphasized several kinds of freedom, including the freedom to access information (such as the ability to use Wikipedia and Google inside Iran), the freedom of ordinary citizens to produce their own public media (such as the rights of Burmese activists to blog), and the

freedom of citizens to converse with one another (such as the Chinese public's capacity to use instant messaging without interference).

Most notably, Clinton announced funding for the development of tools designed to reopen access to the Internet in countries that restrict it. This "instrumental" approach to Internet freedom concentrates on preventing states from censoring outside Web sites, such as Google, YouTube, or that of *The New York Times*. It focuses only secondarily on public speech by citizens and least of all on private or social uses of digital media. According to this vision, Washington can and should deliver rapid, directed responses to censorship by authoritarian regimes.

The instrumental view is politically appealing, action-oriented, and almost certainly wrong. It overestimates the value of broadcast media while underestimating the value of media that allow citizens to communicate privately among themselves. It overestimates the value of access to information, particularly information hosted in the West, while underestimating the value of tools for local coordination. And it overestimates the importance of computers while underestimating the importance of simpler tools, such as cell phones.

The instrumental approach can also be dangerous. Consider the debacle around the proposed censorship-circumvention software known as Haystack, which, according to its developer, was meant to be a "one-to-one match for how the [Iranian] regime implements censorship." The tool was widely praised in Washington; the U.S. government even granted it an export license. But the program was never carefully vetted, and when security experts examined it, it turned out that it not only failed at its goal of hiding messages from governments but also made it, in the words of one analyst, "possible for an adversary to specifically pinpoint individual users." In contrast, one of the most successful anti-censorship software programs, Freegate, has received little support from the United States, partly because of ordinary bureaucratic delays and partly because the U.S. government is wary of damaging U.S.-Chinese relations: the tool was originally created by Falun Gong, the spiritual movement that the Chinese government has called "an evil cult." The challenges of Freegate and Haystack demonstrate how difficult it is to weaponize social media to pursue country-specific and near-term policy goals.

New media conducive to fostering participation can indeed increase the freedoms Clinton outlined, just as the printing press, the postal

service, the telegraph, and the telephone did before. One complaint about the idea of new media as a political force is that most people simply use these tools for commerce, social life, or self-distraction, but this is common to all forms of media. Far more people in the 1500s were reading erotic novels than Martin Luther's "Ninety-five Theses," and far more people before the American Revolution were reading *Poor Richard's Almanack* than the work of the Committees of Correspondence. But those political works still had an enormous political effect.

Just as Luther adopted the newly practical printing press to protest against the Catholic Church, and the American revolutionaries synchronized their beliefs using the postal service that Benjamin Franklin had designed, today's dissident movements will use any means possible to frame their views and coordinate their actions; it would be impossible to describe the Moldovan Communist Party's loss of Parliament after the 2009 elections without discussing the use of cell phones and online tools by its opponents to mobilize. Authoritarian governments stifle communication among their citizens because they fear, correctly, that a better-coordinated populace would constrain their ability to act without oversight.

Despite this basic truth—that communicative freedom is good for political freedom—the instrumental mode of Internet statecraft is still problematic. It is difficult for outsiders to understand the local conditions of dissent. External support runs the risk of tainting even peaceful opposition as being directed by foreign elements. Dissidents can be exposed by the unintended effects of novel tools. A government's demands for Internet freedom abroad can vary from country to country, depending on the importance of the relationship, leading to cynicism about its motives.

The more promising way to think about social media is as long-term tools that can strengthen civil society and the public sphere. In contrast to the instrumental view of Internet freedom, this can be called the "environmental" view. According to this conception, positive changes in the life of a country, including pro-democratic regime change, follow, rather than precede, the development of a strong public sphere. This is not to say that popular movements will not successfully use these tools to discipline or even oust their governments, but rather that U.S. attempts to direct such uses are likely to do more harm than good. Considered in this light, Internet freedom is a long game, to be

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"emotional amoral egoism"

A Neurophilosophical Theory of Human Nature and its Universal Security Implications

by Nayef Al-Rodhan



Description:

The enduring assumption that human behaviour is governed by innate morality and reason is at odds with the persistence of human deprivation, injustice, brutality, inequality and conflict. This book offers a fresh look at human nature and universal security by proposing a new general theory of human nature, „emotional amoral egoism", and a specific theory of human motivation that draws on a wide range of philosophical, psychological and evolutionary approaches to human nature as well as neuroscientific research. It argues that human behaviour is governed primarily by emotional self-interest and that the human mind is a predisposed tabula rasa. The author argues that most human beings are innately neither moral nor immoral but rather amoral. Circumstances will determine the survival value of humankind's moral compass. This insight has profound implications for the re-ordering of governance mechanisms at all levels with a strong emphasis on the role of society and the global system. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the substrates of human nature and its universal security implications in relation to identity, conflict, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, morality and global governance.

AUTHOR INFORMATION:

Dr. Nayef Al-Rodhan is a Philosopher, Neuroscientist and Geostrategist. He is Senior Member of St. Antony's College at Oxford University, Oxford, United Kingdom and Senior Scholar in Geostrategy and Director of the Geopolitics of Globalisation and Transnational Security Programme at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland.

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THE THEATER OF COLLAPSE

ANY DISCUSSION of political action in repressive regimes must take into account the astonishing fall of communism in 1989 in eastern Europe and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Throughout the Cold War, the United States invested in a variety of communications tools, including broadcasting the Voice of America radio station, hosting an American pavilion in Moscow (home of the famous Nixon-Khrushchev "kitchen debate"), and smuggling Xerox machines behind the Iron Curtain to aid the underground press, or samizdat. Yet despite this emphasis on communications, the end of the Cold War was triggered not by a defiant uprising of Voice of America listeners but by economic change. As the price of oil fell while that of wheat spiked, the Soviet model of selling expensive oil to buy cheap wheat stopped working. As a result, the Kremlin was forced to secure loans from the West, loans that would have been put at risk had the government intervened militarily in the affairs of non-Russian states. In 1989, one could argue, the ability of citizens to communicate, considered against the background of macroeconomic forces, was largely irrelevant.

But why, then, did the states behind the Iron Curtain not just let their people starve? After all, the old saying that every country is three meals away from revolution turned out to be sadly incorrect in the twentieth century; it is possible for leaders to survive even when millions die. Stalin did it in the 1930s, Mao did it in the 1960s, and Kim Jong Il has done it more than once in the last two decades. But the difference between those cases and the 1989 revolutions was that the leaders of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the rest faced civil societies strong enough to resist. The weekly demonstrations in East Germany, the Charter 77 civic movement in Czechoslovakia, and the Solidarity movement in Poland all provided visible governments in waiting.

The ability of these groups to create and disseminate literature and political documents, even with simple photocopiers, provided a visible alternative to the communist regimes. For large groups of citizens in these countries, the political and, even more important, economic

bankruptcy of the government was no longer an open secret but a public fact. This made it difficult and then impossible for the regimes to order their troops to take on such large groups.

Thus, it was a shift in the balance of power between the state and civil society that led to the largely peaceful collapse of communist control. The state's ability to use violence had been weakened, and the civil society that would have borne the brunt of its violence had grown stronger. When civil society triumphed, many of the people who had articulated opposition to the communist regimes—such as Tadeusz Mazowiecki in Poland and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia—became the new political leaders of those countries. Communications tools during the Cold War did not cause governments to collapse, but they helped the people take power from the state when it was weak.

The idea that media, from the Voice of America to samizdat, play a supporting role in social change by strengthening the public sphere echoes the historical role of the printing press. As the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas argued in his 1962 book, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, the printing press helped democratize Europe by providing space for discussion and agreement among politically engaged citizens, often before the state had fully democratized, an argument extended by later scholars, such as Asa Briggs, Elizabeth Eisenstein, and Paul Starr.

Political freedom has to be accompanied by a civil society literate enough and densely connected enough to discuss the issues presented to the public. In a famous study of political opinion after the 1948 U.S. presidential election, the sociologists Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld discovered that mass media alone do not change people's minds; instead, there is a two-step process. Opinions are first transmitted by the media, and then they get echoed by friends, family members, and colleagues. It is in this second, social step that political opinions are formed. This is the step in which the Internet in general, and social media in particular, can make a difference. As with the printing press, the Internet spreads not just media consumption but media production as well—it allows people to privately and publicly articulate and debate a welter of conflicting views.

A slowly developing public sphere, where public opinion relies on both media and conversation, is the core of the environmental view of Internet freedom. As opposed to the self-aggrandizing view that the West holds the source code for democracy—and if it were only made accessible, the

remaining autocratic states would crumble—the environmental view assumes that little political change happens without the dissemination and adoption of ideas and opinions in the public sphere. Access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation. Moreover, a public sphere is more likely to emerge in a society as a result of people's dissatisfaction with matters of economics or day-to-day governance than from their embrace of abstract political ideals.

To take a contemporary example, the Chinese government today is in more danger of being forced to adopt democratic norms by middle-class members of the ethnic Han majority demanding less corrupt local governments than it is by Uighurs or Tibetans demanding autonomy. Similarly, the One Million Signatures Campaign, an Iranian women's rights movement that focuses on the repeal of laws inimical to women, has been more successful in liberalizing the behavior of the Iranian government than the more confrontational Green Movement.

For optimistic observers of public demonstrations, this is weak tea, but both the empirical and the theoretical work suggest that protests, when effective, are the end of a long process, rather than a replacement for it. Any real commitment by the United States to improving political freedom worldwide should concentrate on that process—which can only occur when there is a strong public sphere.

THE CONSERVATIVE DILEMMA

Disciplined and coordinated groups, whether businesses or governments, have always had an advantage over undisciplined ones: they have an easier time engaging in collective action because they have an orderly way of directing the action of their members. Social media can compensate for the disadvantages of undisciplined groups by reducing the costs of coordination. The anti-Estrada movement in the Philippines used the ease of sending and forwarding text messages to organize a massive group with no need (and no time) for standard managerial control. As a result, larger, looser groups can now take on some kinds of coordinated action, such as protest movements and public media campaigns, that were previously reserved for formal organizations. For political movements, one of the main forms of coordination is what the military calls "shared awareness," the ability of each member of a group to not only

understand the situation at hand but also understand that everyone else does, too. Social media increase shared awareness by propagating messages through social networks. The anti-Aznar protests in Spain gained momentum so quickly precisely because the millions of people spreading the message were not part of a hierarchical organization.

The Chinese anticorruption protests that broke out in the aftermath of the devastating May 2008 earthquake in Sichuan are another example of such ad hoc synchronization. The protesters were parents, particularly mothers, who had lost their only children in the collapse of shoddily built schools, the result of collusion between construction firms and the local government. Before the earthquake, corruption in the country's construction industry was an open secret. But when the schools collapsed, citizens began sharing documentation of the damage and of their protests through social media tools. The consequences of government corruption were made broadly visible, and it went from being an open secret to a public truth.

The Chinese government originally allowed reporting on the post-earthquake protests, but abruptly reversed itself in June. Security forces began arresting protesters and threatening journalists when it became clear that the protesters were demanding real local reform and not merely state reparations. From the government's perspective, the threat was not that citizens were aware of the corruption, which the state could do nothing about in the short run. Beijing was afraid of the possible effects if this awareness became shared: it would have to either enact reforms or respond in a way that would alarm more citizens. After all, the prevalence of camera phones has made it harder to carry out a widespread but undocumented crackdown.

This condition of shared awareness—which is increasingly evident in all modern states—creates what is commonly called "the dictator's dilemma" but that might more accurately be described by the phrase coined by the media theorist Briggs: "the conservative dilemma," so named because it applies not only to autocrats but also to democratic governments and to religious and business leaders. The dilemma is created by new media that increase public access to speech or assembly; with the spread of such media, whether photocopiers or Web browsers, a state accustomed to having a monopoly on public speech finds itself called to account for anomalies between its view of events and the public's. The two

responses to the conservative dilemma are censorship and propaganda. But neither of these is as effective a source of control as the enforced silence of the citizens. The state will censor critics or produce propaganda as it needs to, but both of those actions have higher costs than simply not having any critics to silence or reply to in the first place. But if a government were to shut down Internet access or ban cell phones, it would risk radicalizing otherwise pro-regime citizens or harming the economy.

The conservative dilemma exists in part because political speech and apolitical speech are not mutually exclusive. Many of the South Korean teenage girls who turned out in Seoul's Cheonggyecheon Park in 2008 to protest U.S. beef imports were radicalized in the discussion section of a Web site dedicated to Dong Bang Shin Ki, a South Korean boy band. DBSK is not a political group, and the protesters were not typical political actors. But that online community, with around 800,000 active members, amplified the second step of Katz and Lazarsfeld's two-step process by allowing members to form political opinions through conversation.

Popular culture also heightens the conservative dilemma by providing cover for more political uses of social media. Tools specifically designed for dissident use are politically easy for the state to shut down, whereas tools in broad use become much harder to censor without risking politicizing the larger group of otherwise apolitical actors. Ethan Zuckerman of Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society calls this "the cute cat theory of digital activism." Specific tools designed to defeat state censorship (such as proxy servers) can be shut down with little political penalty, but broader tools that the larger population uses to, say, share pictures of cute cats are harder to shut down.

For these reasons, it makes more sense to invest in social media as general, rather than specifically political, tools to promote self-governance. The norm of free speech is inherently political and far from universally shared. To the degree that the United States makes free speech a first-order goal, it should expect that goal to work relatively well in democratic countries that are allies, less well in undemocratic countries that are allies, and least of all in undemocratic countries that are not allies. But nearly every country in the world desires economic growth. Since governments jeopardize that growth when they ban technologies that can be used for both political and economic coordination, the United States should rely on countries' economic incentives to allow widespread media

use. In other words, the U.S. government should work for conditions that increase the conservative dilemma, appealing to states' self-interest rather than the contentious virtue of freedom, as a way to create or strengthen countries' public spheres.

SOCIAL MEDIA SKEPTICISM

THERE ARE, broadly speaking, two arguments against the idea that social media will make a difference in national politics. The first is that the tools are themselves ineffective, and the second is that they produce as much harm to democratization as good, because repressive governments are becoming better at using these tools to suppress dissent.

The critique of ineffectiveness, most recently offered by Malcolm Gladwell in *The New Yorker*, concentrates on examples of what has been termed "slacktivism," whereby casual participants seek social change through low-cost activities, such as joining Facebook's "Save Darfur" group, that are long on bumper-sticker sentiment and short on any useful action. The critique is correct but not central to the question of social media's power; the fact that barely committed actors cannot click their way to a better world does not mean that committed actors cannot use social media effectively. Recent protest movements—including a movement against fundamentalist vigilantes in India in 2009, the beef protests in South Korea in 2008, and protests against education laws in Chile in 2006—have used social media not as a replacement for real-world action but as a way to coordinate it. As a result, all of those protests exposed participants to the threat of violence, and in some cases its actual use. In fact, the adoption of these tools (especially cell phones) as a way to coordinate and document real-world action is so ubiquitous that it will probably be a part of all future political movements.

This obviously does not mean that every political movement that uses these tools will succeed, because the state has not lost the power to react. This points to the second, and much more serious, critique of social media as tools for political improvement—namely, that the state is gaining increasingly sophisticated means of monitoring, interdicting, or co-opting these tools. The use of social media, the scholars Rebecca MacKinnon of the New America Foundation and Evgeny Morozov of the Open Society Institute have argued, is just as likely to strengthen

authoritarian regimes as it is to weaken them. The Chinese government has spent considerable effort perfecting several systems for controlling political threats from social media. The least important of these is its censorship and surveillance program. Increasingly, the government recognizes that threats to its legitimacy are coming from inside the state and that blocking the Web site of *The New York Times* does little to prevent grieving mothers from airing their complaints about corruption.

The Chinese system has evolved from a relatively simple filter of incoming Internet traffic in the mid-1990s to a sophisticated operation that not only limits outside information but also uses arguments about nationalism and public morals to encourage operators of Chinese Web services to censor their users and users to censor themselves. Because its goal is to prevent information from having politically synchronizing effects, the state does not need to censor the Internet comprehensively; rather, it just needs to minimize access to information.

Authoritarian states are increasingly shutting down their communications grids to deny dissidents the ability to coordinate in real time and broadcast documentation of an event. This strategy also activates the conservative dilemma, creating a short-term risk of alerting the population at large to political conflict. When the government of Bahrain banned Google Earth after an annotated map of the royal family's annexation of public land began circulating, the effect was to alert far more Bahrainis to the offending map than knew about it originally. So widely did the news spread that the government relented and reopened access after four days.

Such shutdowns become more problematic for governments if they are long-lived. When antigovernment protesters occupied Bangkok in the summer of 2010, their physical presence disrupted Bangkok's shopping district, but the state's reaction, cutting off significant parts of the Thai telecommunications infrastructure, affected people far from the capital. The approach creates an additional dilemma for the state—there can be no modern economy without working phones—and so its ability to shut down communications over large areas or long periods is constrained.

In the most extreme cases, the use of social media tools is a matter of life and death, as with the proposed death sentence for the blogger Hossein Derakhshan in Iran (since commuted to 19 and a half years in prison) or the suspicious hanging death of Oleg Bebenin, the founder of the Belarusian opposition Web site Charter 97. Indeed, the best practical

reason to think that social media can help bring political change is that both dissidents and governments think they can. All over the world, activists believe in the utility of these tools and take steps to use them accordingly. And the governments they contend with think social media tools are powerful, too, and are willing to harass, arrest, exile, or kill users in response. One way the United States can heighten the conservative dilemma without running afoul of as many political complications is to demand the release of citizens imprisoned for using media in these ways. Anything that constrains the worst threats of violence by the state against citizens using these tools also increases the conservative dilemma.

LOOKING AT THE LONG RUN

To the degree that the United States pursues Internet freedom as a tool of statecraft, it should de-emphasize anti-censorship tools, particularly those aimed at specific regimes, and increase its support for local public speech and assembly more generally. Access to information is not unimportant, of course, but it is not the primary way social media constrain autocratic rulers or benefit citizens of a democracy. Direct, U.S. government–sponsored support for specific tools or campaigns targeted at specific regimes risk creating backlash that a more patient and global application of principles will not.

This entails reordering the State Department's Internet freedom goals. Securing the freedom of personal and social communication among a state's population should be the highest priority, closely followed by securing individual citizens' ability to speak in public. This reordering would reflect the reality that it is a strong civil society—one in which citizens have freedom of assembly—rather than access to Google or YouTube, that does the most to force governments to serve their citizens.

As a practical example of this, the United States should be at least as worried about Egypt's recent controls on the mandatory licensing of group-oriented text-messaging services as it is about Egypt's attempts to add new restrictions on press freedom. The freedom of assembly that such text-messaging services support is as central to American democratic ideals as is freedom of the press. Similarly, South Korea's requirement that citizens register with their real names for certain Internet services is an attempt to reduce their ability to surprise the state with the kind of

coordinated action that took place during the 2008 protest in Seoul. If the United States does not complain as directly about this policy as it does about Chinese censorship, it risks compromising its ability to argue for Internet freedom as a global ideal.

More difficult, but also essential, will be for the U.S. government to articulate a policy of engagement with the private companies and organizations that host the networked public sphere. Services based in the United States, such as Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and YouTube, and those based overseas, such as QQ (a Chinese instant-messaging service), WikiLeaks (a repository of leaked documents whose servers are in Sweden), Tuenti (a Spanish social network), and Naver (a Korean one), are among the sites used most for political speech, conversation, and coordination. And the world's wireless carriers transmit text messages, photos, and videos from cell phones through those sites. How much can these entities be expected to support freedom of speech and assembly for their users?

The issue here is analogous to the questions about freedom of speech in the United States in private but commercial environments, such as those regarding what kind of protests can be conducted in shopping malls. For good or ill, the platforms supporting the networked public sphere are privately held and run; Clinton committed the United States to working with those companies, but it is unlikely that without some legal framework, as exists for real-world speech and action, moral suasion will be enough to convince commercial actors to support freedom of speech and assembly.

It would be nice to have a flexible set of short-term digital tactics that could be used against different regimes at different times. But the requirements of real-world statecraft mean that what is desirable may not be likely. Activists in both repressive and democratic regimes will use the Internet and related tools to try to effect change in their countries, but Washington's ability to shape or target these changes is limited. Instead, Washington should adopt a more general approach, promoting freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly everywhere. And it should understand that progress will be slow. Only by switching from an instrumental to an environmental view of the effects of social media on the public sphere will the United States be able to take advantage of the long-term benefits these tools promise—even though that may mean accepting short-term disappointment.

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Plan B in Afghanistan

Why a De Facto Partition Is the Least Bad Option

Robert D. Blackwill

Current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan involves spending scores of billions of dollars and suffering several hundred allied deaths annually to prevent the Afghan Taliban from controlling the Afghan Pashtun homeland—with little end in sight. Those who ask for more time for the existing strategy to succeed often fail to spell out what they think the odds are that it will work in the next few years, what amount of casualties and resources they think the attempt is worth, and why. That calculus suggests that it is time to shift to Plan B.

The United States and its allies are not on course to defeating the Taliban militarily. There are now about 150,000 U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops in Afghanistan. This is 30,000 more troops than the Soviet Union deployed in the 1980s, but less than half the number required to have some chance of pacifying the country, according to standard counterinsurgency doctrine.

Nor, with an occupying army largely ignorant of local history, tribal structures, languages, customs, politics, and values, will the alliance win over large numbers of the Afghan Pashtuns, as counterinsurgency doctrine demands. In Sebastian Junger's phrase, the United States will not capture the "human terrain" of southern and eastern Afghanistan. In November, Afghan President Hamid Karzai told *The Washington Post*

Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as U.S. Ambassador to India in 2001–3 and as Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Planning in 2003–4.

that he wanted U.S. troops off the roads and out of Afghan homes and that the long-term presence of so many foreign soldiers would only worsen the war. "The time has come to reduce military operations," Karzai said. "The time has come to reduce the presence of, you know, boots in Afghanistan . . . to reduce the intrusiveness into the daily Afghan life." Such attitudes are common—and profoundly inconsistent with the counterinsurgency strategy of deploying soldiers in local communities.

The quality of governance emanating from Karzai's deeply corrupt government will not significantly improve, and without a comprehensive reform of the Afghan government, U.S. success is virtually impossible. As the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen stresses, "You are only as good as the government you are supporting." In that context, Dexter Filkins noted in *The New York Times* that "Afghanistan is now widely recognized as one of the world's premier gangster-states. Out of 180 countries, Transparency International ranks it, in terms of corruption, 179th, better only than Somalia."

The Afghan National Army will not be ready to hold its own with the Taliban or take over major combat missions from ISAF in southern and eastern Afghanistan in any realistic time frame. According to *The Economist*, "Less than 3% of recruits are from the troublesome Pushtun south, from where the Taliban draw most support. Few will sign up, fearing ruthless intimidation against government 'collaborators' and their families. As a result, northern officers who only speak Dari have to use translators when in the Pushtu-speaking south. Northern infantry are reluctant to go there at all." U.S. Marine Corps General James Conway told the press last August that the Afghan National Army would not be ready to take over security from U.S. troops in Afghanistan's Helmand and Kandahar Provinces for several years because of conditions on the ground.

The Pakistani military, driven by its perception of India as the enemy and its perceived requirement for strategic depth, will not end its support for and provision of sanctuary to its longtime Afghan Taliban proxies or accept a truly independent Afghanistan.

And public opinion in the United States and other allied countries, finally, is unlikely to permit the extension of the intervention for the length of time counterinsurgency doctrine says is required for success.

With all these individual elements of the United States' existing Afghanistan policy in serious trouble, optimism about the current

strategy's ability to meet its objectives reminds one of the White Queen's comment in *Through the Looking Glass*: "Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast." The time has come, therefore, to switch to the least bad alternative—acceptance of a de facto partition of the country.

U.S. President Barack Obama's repeated statements that the United States will be starting to end its combat role in Afghanistan soon have weakened U.S. diplomatic strength throughout the region. The administration should stop talking about exit strategies and instead commit the United States to a long-term combat role in Afghanistan of 35,000–50,000 troops.

At the same time, however, Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for the United States to continue paying. To be sure, the administration should not invite the Taliban to dominate the Afghan Pashtun homeland, nor explicitly seek to break up Afghanistan. Rather, the United States and its partners should simply stop dying in the south and the east and let the local "correlation of forces" there take its course—while deploying U.S. air power and Special Forces for the foreseeable future in support of the Afghan army and the government in Kabul, to ensure that the north and west of Afghanistan do not succumb to the Taliban as well.

In short, President Obama should announce that the United States and its Afghan and foreign partners will pursue a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy in Pashtun Afghanistan and a nation-building strategy in the rest of the country, committing to both policies for at least the next seven to ten years. Reluctantly accepting such a de facto partition would be a profoundly disappointing outcome to the United States' ten-year Afghan investment. But regrettably, it is now the best result that Washington can realistically and responsibly achieve.

WITHDRAW IN ORDER TO STAY

After so many years of faulty U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, there are no quick, easy, and cost-free ways to escape the current quagmire. Even with all its problems, a de facto partition offers the Obama administration the best available alternative to strategic defeat. Stressing that

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the United States will retain an active combat role in Afghanistan for years into the future and that it does not accept permanent Taliban control of the south, the United States and its allies would withdraw ground combat forces over several months from most of Pashtun Afghanistan, including Kandahar. ISAF would stop fighting in the mountains, valleys, and urban areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan (although it would continue to provide arms, aid, and intelligence to local tribal leaders there who want to resist). Washington would concentrate its efforts, meanwhile, on defending the areas in the north and west of Afghanistan not dominated by the Pashtuns, including Kabul.

The Afghan Taliban would be offered a modus vivendi in which each side agreed not to seek to enlarge the territory it controlled, so long as the Taliban stopped supporting terrorism—a proposal that they would probably reject. The United States would make clear that it would strike against any al Qaeda targets anywhere, any Taliban encroachments across the de facto partition line, and any sanctuaries along the Pakistani border. No terrorist safe havens would be exempt from intensified U.S. attacks on either side of the Durand Line.

Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of Afghanistan's south and east.

Washington would enlist Afghanistan's Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and supportive Pashtuns in this endeavor—as well as its NATO allies, Afghanistan's various neighbors, and hopefully the United Nations Security Council. The allies would continue to accelerate the training of the Afghan army. They would devote nation-building efforts to groups in Afghanistan's north and west that are willing to accept help and are not systematically coerced by the Taliban. And the time might eventually come when a much stronger Afghan National Army might be able, with help, to retake the south and the east.

As the policy analyst John Chipman has pointed out, "A containment and deterrence approach would be a strategy that was limited to dealing with the threat as originally defined by the coalition forces that intervened in Afghanistan. . . . It would replace the impression that an eventual drawdown of combat forces from Afghanistan would constitute victory for the enemy, with the reality of a strategy that could be maintained

for a longer period while meeting the principal security goal." In this respect, recent press reports that some U.S. forces will remain in Afghanistan until the end of 2014 are a welcome development.

Such a change in U.S. strategy would make clear to all that the United States, through its prolonged military presence in Afghanistan, intends to remain a power and influence in South and Central Asia for many years to come. It would dramatically reduce U.S. military casualties and thus minimize U.S. domestic political pressure for a hasty withdrawal. It would substantially lower U.S. expenditures on Afghanistan (now nearly $7 billion per month). It would increase the likelihood that NATO allies would continue their missions in Afghanistan over the long term. It would allow the U.S. Army and Marines to recover from years of fighting two ground wars. It would encourage most of Afghanistan's neighbors to support an acceptable stabilization of the country. It would reduce Islamabad's capacity to use the U.S. ground role in southern Afghanistan to extract tolerance from Washington regarding terrorism emanating from Pakistan. And it would allow the Obama administration to concentrate intensively on other important issues.

NO GOOD CHOICES

ACCEPTING A de facto partition of Afghanistan has enough downsides that choosing it makes sense only if the other options available are even worse. They are.

One alternative, for example, would be to stay the counterinsurgency course in Afghanistan no matter how long it takes, and perhaps even expand the existing commitment. This course would not make sense because U.S. interests in Afghanistan are not high enough to justify such an investment. The United States now deploys about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan, yet according to the CIA, there are now only 50 to 100 al Qaeda fighters there. That is between 1,000 and 2,000 soldiers and perhaps a billion dollars per terrorist each year—far beyond any reasonable expenditure of U.S. resources given the stakes involved. The original U.S. military objective in Afghanistan was to destroy al Qaeda, not to fight the Afghan Taliban, and that goal has largely been accomplished.

Another alternative would be for the United States to withdraw all its military forces from Afghanistan over the next year or two. But this

course would lead to the rapid resumption of an all-out Afghan civil war and then to a probable conquest of the entire country by the Taliban. It would draw Afghanistan's neighbors into the fighting, destabilizing the region and further souring relations between New Delhi and Islamabad. It would raise the odds of the Islamic radicalization of Pakistan, which would in turn call into question the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It would weaken, if not rupture, the budding U.S.-Indian strategic partnership, undermine NATO's future, and trigger a global outpouring of support for jihadist ideology and increased terrorism against liberal societies more broadly. And it would be seen around the world by friends and adversaries alike as a failure of international leadership and strategic resolve by an ever-weaker United States, with destructive aftershocks for many years to come.

A third alternative would be to try to achieve stability in Afghanistan through negotiations with the Taliban. NATO could seek to entice the Afghan Taliban to stop fighting and enter into a coalition government in Kabul. As CIA Director Leon Panetta has said, however, so long as the Taliban think they are winning, they will remain intransigent: "We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce al-Qaeda, where they would really try to become part of that society. We have seen no evidence of that, and very frankly, my view is that, with regards to reconciliation, unless they're convinced the United States is going to win and that they are going to be defeated, I think it is very difficult to proceed with a reconciliation that is going to be meaningful." Despite the intensification of drone attacks, the United States cannot kill the Taliban into meaningful political compromise. As a senior Defense Department official told *The Washington Post* in late October, "The insurgency seems to be maintaining its resilience," adding that if there was a sign the momentum was shifting, he did not see it.

But what about the potential problems with the de facto partition option? If the Afghan Taliban were allowed to control the south and the east, would they not invite al Qaeda fighters back into the country and restore the pre-9/11 situation? Not necessarily. Last October, then National Security Adviser James Jones said that the U.S. government's maximum estimate was that al Qaeda had fewer than 100 members in Afghanistan, with no bases and "no ability to launch attacks on either

[the United States] or [its] allies." The Afghan Taliban may have learned their lesson about what happens when al Qaeda is allowed to run free.

If they did not, however, the United States could continue to attack al Qaeda targets on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, applying deadly pressure in ways that were not available before 9/11. The sky over Pashtun Afghanistan would be filled with Predators targeting not only terrorist activities but also, if necessary, the new Afghan Taliban government in all its dimensions. Taliban civil officials (governors, mayors, police chiefs, judges, tax collectors, and the like) would wake up every morning not knowing if they would survive the day in their offices, during routine outside activities, or in their homes at night. There would be no mountain caves in which they could hide and at the same time do their jobs. This should produce some degree of deterrence. And even if many of the roughly 300 al Qaeda fighters now in Pakistan did move a few score miles north across the border, it would not make much practical difference—surely not enough to justify an indefinite major ground war to prevent it.

The United States cannot kill the Taliban into meaningful political compromise.

What if the Afghan Taliban did not adhere to the rough boundaries of a de facto partition and sought to reconquer the entire country? They might well try, but they would be prevented from achieving their goal by the continued military might of ISAF and the growing capabilities of the Afghan National Army. Accepting a de facto partition would not lead to a civil war; such a conflict is already being fought. What partition would do is help stabilize the situation by making clear which side holds what territory.

What about the islands of non-Pashtun peoples in the south and the east, the women of those areas, and any Pashtun tribal forces that want to resist the Taliban—would not this course abandon them? Unfortunately, the answer is essentially yes. But this would be a tragic consequence of local realities that are impossible for outsiders to change in any reasonable time frame and with justifiable amounts of blood and treasure sacrificed. The United States and its allies did not go to war in Afghanistan to protect all segments of the local population there from medieval brutality, and they should not take on that decades-long task now.

Might this course lead to the emergence of an irredentist Pashtunistan and undermine the stability of Pakistan? Managing Islamabad's reaction to a de facto partition would be a daunting challenge, because such a course would indeed stoke Pashtun separatism on both sides of the Durand Line. But the Pakistani military is already contributing to such problems through its cross-border support for the Afghan Taliban, so in truth Islamabad has little grounds for complaint. If anything, the emergence of a clear division in Afghanistan might provide just the sort of shock the Pakistani military apparently needs in order to appreciate the dangers of the game it has been playing for decades.

Would this course lead to a proxy war in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan or destabilize the region more generally? At this point, intensified competition between New Delhi and Islamabad in Afghanistan is probable no matter what policy the United States pursues. But so long as Washington maintains a long-term military commitment there, India will not put troops on the ground, and so the possibility of a major or direct conflict between India and Pakistan will be reduced.

China, Iran, Russia, and Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, meanwhile, all have their own interests and perspectives, and none of them currently supports a de facto partition. But none of them wants to see the reemergence of a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan either, and so as current U.S. policy proves unsustainable, they should be open to other ways of heading off that worst-case scenario. Their self-interest should therefore lead them to consider seriously a plan such as the one laid out here (although bringing them on board would require sustained and artful U.S. regional diplomacy, which is now absent).

DYING FOR A MISTAKE

WHATEVER THEIR views on Afghanistan, many officials and pundits go analogy shopping to try to strengthen their cases, searching until they find ones that reinforce their preexisting policy inclinations. The truth, however, is that the differences between the current situation and other cases are so great that almost all such comparisons are unhelpful.

The analogy most commonly cited to justify the current Afghanistan strategy, for example, is the 2007 troop surge in Iraq, which is given credit for having created enough stability there to allow the United States to

start withdrawing its troops while avoiding defeat. Yet as James Dobbins, former U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan, has pointed out, replicating the sort of wholesale shift in loyalties seen among former insurgents in Iraq would be exceedingly difficult in Afghanistan. By 2007, the Sunni Arab minority in Iraq had been decisively beaten by the majority Shiite militias, and it was only after this defeat that the Sunni Arabs turned to U.S. forces for protection. The Taliban insurgency, in contrast, is rooted in Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, not its smallest.

These Pashtun insurgents, furthermore, have been winning their civil war for the last several years, not losing it. In Iraq, by 2007, al Qaeda had made itself unwelcome among its Sunni Arab allies through its indiscriminate violence and abusive behavior. In Afghanistan, al Qaeda is hardly present and certainly presents no comparable threat to the insurgent leadership or the Pashtun way of life. The Pashtun elders are a less influential set of interlocutors for the United States than the Iraqi sheiks, who proved able to bring almost all their adherents over with them when they decided to switch sides. In short, the surge in Iraq has little application to Afghanistan.

Changing policy so dramatically after a decadelong effort will be difficult. Explaining why a counterinsurgency strategy will not work within any acceptable time frame, acknowledging that many brave men and women have died for areas that will now be ceded to the enemy—these would be major political challenges for President Obama. Still, as painful as it would be, Western leaders would be strategically and morally deficient if they continued to pursue a strategy that has not worked in the past and is not going to work in the future.

Decades from now, historians will puzzle over why President Obama, despite his deep agonizing, as described in Bob Woodward's recent book on the war, accepted the deployment of 100,000 troops to Afghanistan nearly ten years after 9/11, and over why policymakers spoke as if the fate of the civilized world depended on the pacification of Kandahar and Marja. Henry Kissinger has observed that "for other nations, utopia is a blessed past never to be recovered; for Americans it is just beyond the horizon." Reluctantly accepting a de facto partition of Afghanistan is hardly a utopian outcome in Afghanistan. But it is better than all the alternatives.

Garuda Rising Anew

By Gita Wirjawan

It seems a distant memory that Indonesia was once predicted to implode. What was once a nation that dominated the international headlines because of its political strife, economic volatility, and ethnic conflicts has rebuilt itself into one of Southeast Asia's most dynamic economies and stable countries.

While Indonesia might still make prime-time news for outbreaks of violence, those isolated episodes have not shaken the commitment of its over 240 million citizens to uphold democratic government, advocate a market economy, and build a terror-free society.

In 2009, Indonesian civil society groups quickly denounced a bomb attack on a luxury hotel in the capital, Jakarta.

Today, there is no turning back on structural reform and vigilant and responsible citizenship.

Through policies aimed at making government more accessible, creating more value in the economy, and distributing wealth more equitably, Indonesia seems ready to assume a higher international profile, in both politics and business.

When observers comment on the dawn of an Asian century characterized by waking dragons and emerging tigers, they are remiss not to mention the *garuda*, the large mythical bird that serves as Indonesia's national symbol. These economies will not only lift the region back on its feet but will also spur rapid development and sweeping social change across Asia.

Indonesia is determined to achieve the potential befitting a country of its size and significance. It hopes to increase the value of its $700 billion economy to $1 trillion by 2014.

Gita Wirjawan, chairman of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board, speaks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland

Both the government and its citizens believe they have no more than 15 years before the momentum for accelerated change wanes, the natural resource base declines, and its population starts to age. By then, the window to become a great nation alongside China and India will regrettably fade.

Having weathered several crises and realizing the urgency of the task at hand, the government has adopted various policies and measures that hold up the country as a model of balanced and sustainable development not only for the region but also for the rest of the world.

As the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia engages in interfaith dialogue, cooperates with security agencies to help dismantle terrorist groups, and supports peace efforts in the Middle East.

The country, which is the world's third-largest carbon emitter, has pledged to reduce emissions by 26 percent by 2020 and has also announced a two-year moratorium on forest clearing, one of the biggest culprits driving climate change.

As a founding member and 2011 chair of ASEAN, Indonesia will play a critical role in regional integration by 2015 and will advise member states, based on experience, on transitioning to democracy and a market economy.

The country has also reaffirmed its commitment to monetary discipline and fiscal prudence in line with G20 objectives. In fact, Indonesia's inflation has been under control and its debt-to-GDP ratio has shrunk from 83 percent in 2001 to 26 percent 10 years later.

As a nation in which half of the population is under 30 years old, Indonesia has shifted the focus of its education away from an agriculture-based and large-scale industrial economy to knowledge-driven economy. Education spending makes up for 20 percent of the national budget, roughly $25 billion, the largest share given to any sector.

Reliant on private investment, Indonesia has targeted "smart capital" or long-term, value-additive investment that creates jobs, spreads growth, reduces poverty, and promotes environmental sustainability.

As an economy competing for foreign direct investment, Indonesia has redefined economic nationalism by raising productivity of its assets for maximum benefit to its people. As a result, the government has liberalized many sectors that were previously closed and restricted to international investors.

By 2025, much of the world's economic output and the resulting political clout are predicted to shift to Asia. Doomsday scenarios are now long forgotten, and Indonesia has become such a huge contributor to this change that many analysts foresee the country's inclusion in the so-called BRIC economies.

With all these major developments in Indonesia, the world could never have predicted that the *garuda* economy would have reached such heights while staying under the radar.

Gita Wirjawan is the Chairman of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board.

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PT Surya Semesta Internusa Tbk

Building a better Indonesia

"We provide you with an environment to make the best of your investment. Everything your business needs you will find right here.

For more than three decades, PT Surya Semesta Internusa Tbk has played a huge role in the development of Indonesia.

Over that period, the company diversified its activities into construction, building materials, property development, industrial estate development and hospitality – all in fulfillment of, in the words of President Director Johannes Suriadjaja, a "dream of becoming an investment company."

Currently focusing on hospitality, construction and industrial estate development, the company forged partnerships with luxury chains Sol Melia Hotels and Resorts of Spain and Banyan Tree Resorts of Singapore. But next year, the subsidiary Surya Internusa Group plans to open budget hotels to cater to a huge domestic market.

"In 2011, we will launch and manage our own brand. The target is to build 20 hotels in the next three years, each with about 125 to 150 rooms," he said.

Its foray into infrastructure is unsurprising because the company's history is deeply rooted in construction. In the 1970s, it was involved in infrastructural works, airports (Surabaya) and roads (Trans-Sumatra highway) before venturing into highrise developments.

"We want to be involved in the construction of civil works and private sector infrastructure. We gather experience so that when tenders become available on public sector works, we will be ready," Suriadjaja said.

Of the company's property portfolio, the largest is its Suryacipta City of Industry, a 1,400-hectare industrial estate located in Karawang, West Java, about 60 minutes away from Jakarta.

"The industrial park is doing very well now. Demand is high and we've begun to expand our site. If the economy keeps growing, within two years, we will be out of space and will need more land," said Suriadjaja.

"At Suryacipta City of Industry, we believe at the core of every business are people, products, and profits. Within an eco-friendly estate of over 1,400 hectares, we provide you with an environment to make the best of your investment. We invite you today to join a number of international manufacturing, electronics, food, and automotive companies that made Suryacipta their home. Tomorrow will not just be another day – it will be the day," he added.

www.suryainternusa.com

Indonesia becomes world's second-largest source of coal

"We are well known in terms of name and product. We have products that create less impact on the environment."

The last five years have presented unparalleled opportunities for foreign investors looking at Indonesia.

Between 2005 and 2010, the country's GDP grew at an average of 5.68 percent. The financial sector emerged from the recent global recession relatively unscathed, having learned its lesson from the 1997 Asian currency crisis.

Arutmin Chief Executive Faisal Firdaus

The manufacturing sector and fast– moving consumer goods sector continue to power the economy but natural resources and mining have become Indonesia's newest major engines of growth. In fact, Indonesia has become the world's second-largest exporter of coal, with companies such as Kaltim Prima, Adaro, and Arutmin leading the way.

Rapid growth has also brought with it growing pains. Especially in the major cities, Indonesia has not been able to cope with the rapidly growing number of new cars hitting the roads, resulting in day-long rush hour traffic.

Demand for energy is also at an all-time high.

The electrical power requirement of Indonesia is expected to grow by at least 10 percent annually over the next six years. Unless the country upgrades its plants and shifts to lower-cost coal and gas-powered plants, the country will not be able to keep pace with demands. Such shortages have already resulted in frequent rolling blackouts across the country.

So, the government recently implemented the "10,000 Megawatt" program, aimed at raising electricity production by 10,000 megawatts by 2013. This project will require at least 30 million tons of coal per year and the participation of the private sector to increase coal production.

"We will be supplying 50 percent of the coal needed to power these new plants," said Arutmin Chief Executive Faisal Firdaus.

Established by BHP Mineral Exploration Inc., Arutmin spent the first eight years on exploration. Growth was slow because the company began its production only in 1989. Then, in 2001, BHP let go of its holdings in Arutmin, which was then bought by Bumi Resources, the country's largest coal mining company.

The buy-out made Arutmin the third largest coal mining company in the country. It currently operates four mines and one coal terminal, all strategically located along the coast of South Kalimantan, which reduces transport costs and makes the coal more affordable to the end consumer.

Having separated mine sites is advantageous to a company like Arutmin as it looks towards expansion.

"With separated mine sites, we have the flexibility to expand without any disturbance to our neighboring operations. We don't have to worry about only using one method of transportation, or one way to load the barge. We can grow each site independently from the other," he said.

Since it produces high-end coal for more advanced markets like Japan and low-end coal for domestic and regional use, Arutmin has built a strong reputation for itself in the international coal market.

In 2010, Arutmin exported about 82 percent of its coal. Traditionally the main export market for the company was Japan, but today China has become its largest export market.

Since the company can produce high-end coal for more advanced markets like Japan, and low-end coal for domestic and regional use, Arutmin has been able to build a strong reputation and name for itself in the international coal market.

"We are well known in terms of name and product. We have very good quality in terms of low-ash and low-sulfur coal, so we have products that create less impact on the environment," explained Firdaus.

With a strong product line and a dedicated export market, the company is poised for rapid growth. Plans are already in place for the company to increase its output to 35 million tons per year in the next two years.

The company will also expand its product line.

"We have begun trial products with our upgraded brown coal (UBC) products in cooperation with Japan's Kobe Steel Ltd (Kobelco)," said Firdaus. The UBC Process raises the heat value of brown coal 1.5 times, to the same level as high-rank bituminous coal but has only one-third of the ash. It is also more efficient to store and ship, making upgraded coal a viable alternative to high-rank coal. Firdaus vows to make this product commercially available very soon.

Given the company's rapid growth and planned expansion, Firdaus stressed the importance of giving back to the local communities surrounding the mines.

Every year, Arutmin executives sit down with government representatives to plan their annual work program, including their contribution to the local societies, whether they be in healthcare, sports, culture or education.

"We start the process through 'social mapping' and develop shortterm and longterm plans for our community development program," Firdaus said.

"We maintain close relations with local leaders and chiefs of villages. We sit down with them, discuss their exact needs, and craft a yearly program for them. We work closely with the government and have received several recognitions regarding our work," he added.

Every year, the company gets recognized not only for its CSR work but also for its work with the environment.

It has received the Ministry of Environment's yearly award for Environmental Performance Rating Program (PROPER). And in 2009 and 2010, it received the "Green Award," which recognizes the company's commitment to the government's environmental standards. Of 50 coal mining and natural resource-related companies, only six have received the prestigious award.

www.arutmin.com

Domestic giants ready to take on the world

The Indonesian economy is largely domestic consumption driven, so our sensitivities to the global problems were somewhat minimized.

Indonesia's resilience to the 2008 global financial crisis was unsurprising. The country did learn its lesson well in the aftermath of the the 1997 Asian currency meltdown.

Over the past two years, Indonesia's plantation companies grew between five and ten percent, with crude palm oil (CPO), leading the way.

The country, in 2009, became the world's largest producer of CPO, with a total output of 19.4 million tons.

Whether upstream or downstream, Indonesian palm oil companies have made a strong effort to become environmentally certified.

Megasurya Mas, a maker of palm oil-based products, is the world's first palm oil derivative company to obtain a Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) certificate.

"I've always believed that this sustainability issue, the RSPO certification, is very important. It is not required by regulation to be RSPO-certified, but in places like Europe, if you are not RSPO-certified, people will not buy from you. Our goal is always to be the industry standard," said Managing Director Bahari Karim.

And in crisis, lies opportunity.

"Our turning point was the Asian currency crisis. A lot of companies in Indonesia folded up but we stuck with it. The change of our business model by producing more value added downstream products helped us survive the crisis," Bahari said.

The Indonesia banking sector has gone from Asia's weakest to one of its most robust, with strong balance sheets and a rapidly growing consumer sector with many new borrowers.

Between 30 to 35 percent of the population is in the middle income group and the country's GDP per capita has neared the $3000 mark associated with rising economies.

According to Eugene Keith Galbraith, president commissioner of PT Bank Central Asia Tbk (BCA), the only locally-controlled of the country's top private banks, " The Indonesian economy is largely domestic consumption driven, so our sensitivities to the global problems were somewhat minimized. Indonesia is a country which now has a very substantial self–ascribing middle class. It's not so much that it's growing. It's that it has become aware of itself and demand patterns have been changing."

BCA is the country's largest transactional bank, responsible for 30 to 40 percent of all payments in the local banking system.

"The bank was the first to introduce ATMs. We have always been in the forefront of commercial application of technologies. We are the first bank to use PCs and we are the only bank in the world with a satellite-based real-time network which links the whole country," Galbraith said.

Meanwhile, Indonesia's property sector has benefited from low interest rates and a more prosperous middle class.

President Director of Lippo Karawaci, Ketut Budi Wijaya, sees great potential in this.

"The middle income group has disposable income in excess of $5000. This is the income group that ranges from $5000 to $15,000 per annum. There are big windows opening to us as a first mover to take advantage of this consumer growth," says Wijaja.

Lippo Karawaci is one of the country's largest conglomerates and operates $3 billion in assets. Over the next 5 years, the company hopes to acquire $8 billion in assets.

"We benchmark ourselves in terms of performance, governance and best practices. For example, we are the only property company rated by 3 agencies, which are Moody's, Standard and Poors, and FitchRatings. S&P announced they were upgrading our rating one notch from 'B' to 'B+.' This is an appreciation not only of the company but also of Indonesia," Wijaya said.

"We really want to attract multinationals in order to bring international best practices into the organization," he added.

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Finish the Job

How the War in Afghanistan Can Be Won

Paul D. Miller

Pessimism abounds in Afghanistan. Violence, NATO casualties, corruption, drug production, and public disapproval in the United States are at record levels. Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani journalist and an expert on the region, declared the U.S. mission in Afghanistan a failure in his scathing 2008 book, *Descent Into Chaos*. Seth Jones, the leading U.S. scholar on the Taliban insurgency, has argued that the United States had an opening to make a difference in Afghanistan after 2001, but that it "squandered this extraordinary opportunity." U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attempted to manage expectations when he testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2009. "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose," he argued, "because nobody in the world has that kind of time, patience, and money." U.S. policymakers and the public increasingly doubt that the war can be won. These assessments are based on real and credible concerns about the rising insurgency, the drug trade, endemic corruption, and perennial government weakness.

Yet the stabilization and reconstruction effort in Afghanistan has gone better than is widely believed. The pessimists fail to understand how badly the Afghan state had failed in 2001 and thus are blind to how much it has improved in many areas—particularly in economic and political reconstruction. The pessimists are right to be worried

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Paul D. Miller is Assistant Professor of International Security Studies at the National Defense University. He served as Director for Afghanistan in the U.S. National Security Council under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, from September 2007 to September 2009. The views expressed here are his own.

about the rise of the Taliban insurgency and the weak rule of law, but they also tend to overstate the competence and scale of the insurgency.

Many analysts critical of the war effort have drawn misguided lessons from cartoonish and caricatured versions of Afghan history—comparing ISAF to the armies of Alexander the Great, William Elphinstone, or Boris Gromov—to conclude that the laws of history bar foreign militaries from accomplishing anything in the land of the Hindu Kush. They sound dire warnings about U.S. and NATO staying power after a nine-year-old war. But they are wrong on all counts. The insurgency did not pick up steam until late 2005, and ISAF, which started changing its posture and strategy in late 2006, arguably did not implement a coherent counterinsurgency campaign until 2009. It would be myopic and irresponsible to conclude that the international community should walk away from the mission due to a lack of adequate progress.

The greatest threat to long-term success in Afghanistan is not the Taliban, who are fairly weak compared to other insurgent movements around the world. It is the Afghan government's endemic weakness and the international community's failure to address it. Although the international community helped rebuild economic institutions and infrastructure and facilitated elections, it did not invest significantly in government ministries, the justice system, the army and the police, or local governance for the first five years of the intervention, which permitted the Taliban to regroup and challenge the nascent Afghan government.

If additional U.S. and NATO soldiers are matched by a comparable civilian surge, a continuing donor commitment, and a heightened focus on capacity development—increasing the capabilities and performance of civilian institutions of governance, including the ministries in Kabul, their provincial counterparts, and the legal system—the international community is likely to achieve its core goals and Afghanistan will have a genuine chance of becoming stable for the first time in a generation. Although serious challenges remain, victory is attainable—if the troops and their civilian counterparts are given time to complete their mission.

THE WORLD'S WORST COUNTRY

In 2001, Afghanistan was the world's most failed state. The security environment was anarchic, large-scale fighting against the Taliban and al Qaeda continued until March 2002, and following the fall of

the Taliban, 50,000–70,000 Northern Alliance militiamen became a poorly managed, largely unaccountable force deployed across the country. There was no professional army or police force, leaving warlords to wage mini wars against one another. The United Nations judged in early 2002 that "banditry continues as a lingering manifestation of the war economy." The drug trade, suppressed during the Taliban's last year in power, sprang back into existence as the poppy crop expanded almost tenfold—from 20,000 acres to 183,000 acres—between 2001 and 2002. The resurgence of opium production enriched a new set of elites and created a wealthy criminal class that was neither loyal to Kabul nor cooperative with international forces.

The security environment in 2001 and 2002 was chaotic largely because the Afghan state had ceased to function. The World Bank estimates that in 2000 the Afghan state was in the lowest percentile in all six areas of governance that the bank tracks: voice and accountability, the rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and political stability. At that time, the Taliban government collected less than one percent of GDP in revenue, compared to an average of 11 percent across South Asia and 26 percent worldwide. Consequently, the state had an annual budget of merely $27 million—roughly $1 per person. The Afghan government could not hire skilled workers to run public institutions; in 2001, there were only 1,417 government employees who had graduated from an institution of higher education. And most ministries and the justice sector had effectively ceased to function because they lacked the basic levels of staff, money, and equipment required to do anything. For most practical purposes, such as education, access to clean water, or the protection of property, there was no government.

With an anarchic security situation and a nonfunctional state, the Afghan economy had collapsed by the end of the Taliban's misrule. Afghans were the world's seventh-poorest people in 2001. The International Monetary Fund estimates that in 2002, GDP per capita was about $176 in current U.S. dollars: Afghans lived on about 48 cents per day, comparable to the poorest people in sub-Saharan Africa. Lacking a national currency, different factions issued their own bills for use within their fiefdoms. What little infrastructure the country once had was in ruins: little more than a tenth of the roads were paved, less than one-third of Afghans had access to sanitation, and only a fifth had clean water. Economic collapse led to a generation of lost human capital. A

third or less of Afghans could read and write, and only roughly a quarter of school-aged children were enrolled in the country's nearly defunct educational system. In a country of approximately 25 million people, there was just one TV station, eight airplanes, 60 trained pilots, and fewer than 50,000 passenger cars.

The humanitarian situation, in short, was catastrophic. Larry Goodson, professor of Middle East studies at the U.S. Army War College, has estimated that even before the civil war of the 1990s, 50 percent of all Afghans had been killed, wounded, or displaced by the Soviet invasion. There were at least 3.8 million Afghan refugees in neighboring countries and another 1.2 million internally displaced persons in Afghanistan in 2001. Within a year, almost two million refugees and more than 750,000 internally displaced persons had returned to their homes, overwhelming urban areas and creating massive, overcrowded slums. The devastation and neglect took its toll on the Afghan population. Only a third of Afghans survived to age 65. Afghans had the absolute shortest life expectancy and highest infant mortality in the world, according to the World Bank, at 42 years and 165 dead infants per 1,000 live births.

Somalia is often cited as the archetype of a failed state. It is not. Despite Somalia's infamous anarchy, Somalis are still relatively free from government oppression and have not experienced ethnic cleansing or genocide. The Afghans, by contrast, had the worst of all worlds under the Taliban. They had Somalian anarchy, Haitian poverty, Congolese institutions, Balkan fractiousness, and a North Korean–style government. In January 2001, *The Economist* awarded Afghanistan the title of the world's "worst country." Any judgments about the international community's success or failure in Afghanistan need to begin with this benchmark.

A DELICATE CONSTITUTION

The United Nations set about rebuilding the Afghan state immediately after the fall of the Taliban. Just one day after the liberation of Kabul in November, the Security Council outlined its vision for the next Afghan government. It should be "broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative," and "respect the human rights of all Afghan people." The UN, with U.S. help, convened a conference in Bonn, Germany, to select an interim administration and outline a process for reconstruction. The resulting Bonn agreement became a road map for establishing and

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COUNCIL *on* FOREIGN RELATIONS

"The United States cannot afford to continue down this costly path unless the potential for enduring progress remains in sight."

New Independent Task Force Report

U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan

Richard L . Armitage and Samuel R. Berger, Chairs
Daniel S. Markey, Project Director, CFR

A CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report chaired by former deputy secretary of state Richard L. Armitage and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger offers a qualified endorsement of the current approach to Afghanistan, but says that if the present strategy is judged not to be working, a shift to a more limited mission would be warranted. In Pakistan, it supports a long-term partnership if Pakistan takes action against all terrorist organizations based on its soil.

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legitimizing a new Afghan government. The UN endorsed the Bonn agreement, formed and authorized the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide security in the capital, and, in March 2002, created the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to coordinate international civilian assistance to Afghanistan.

A principal step in the Bonn process was the drafting and ratification of a new constitution, which UN advisers helped a commission of Afghans draft in 2003. The resulting document protects equal rights for men and women, individual liberty, freedom of expression and association, the right to vote and stand for office, property, and religious freedom. But the document also acknowledges Afghanistan's traditional sources of legitimacy. Article 1 establishes Afghanistan as an "Islamic Republic," Article 2 enshrines Islam as the state religion, Article 3 states that "no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan," and Article 62 requires that the president and the two vice presidents of Afghanistan be Muslims. Although the Afghan government's efforts to balance modern law with traditional customs have not always satisfied human rights activists, this constitution is nonetheless an unmitigated improvement over Taliban lawlessness and one of the most progressive constitutions in Central Asia or the Middle East.

The Afghan people's reaction to the constitution was overwhelmingly positive. One member of the *loya jirga* (grand council of elders) convened to ratify the document said after voting for its approval that it was "99 percent based on the will of the people." A group calling itself the National Democratic Front and claiming to represent 47 interest groups endorsed the new constitution, as did a tribal gathering in the borderlands of Paktia Province, illustrating the document's broad base of support among both urban politicos and rural dwellers. Qala-e Naw, a major radio station, rejoiced that Afghans would now enjoy the same rights as the rest of the world.

After the constitution was ratified, the international community funded and administered a voter registration drive and two elections: over eight million Afghans voted in the nation's first-ever presidential contest in October 2004, and 6.4 million voted for the nation's legislature in September 2005—Afghanistan's first freely elected legislature since 1973. In 2006, Freedom House upgraded the country to "partly free," and 76 percent of those Afghans surveyed said they were satisfied with democracy, according to the Asia Foundation. Afghans'

enthusiastic embrace of voting, representative institutions, and majority rule undermined the arguments of critics who claimed that democracy was an alien transplant doomed to fail in inhospitable Afghan soil. But the success of the Bonn process was not a foregone conclusion. Similar UN-sponsored processes in postconflict countries have collapsed and led to renewed violence, including in Angola and Liberia in the 1990s. It succeeded in Afghanistan because of strong international engagement and support at every stage of the process.

Afghans continue to face challenges in their effort to institutionalize a process of peaceful political competition. The 2009 and 2010 elections were notoriously marred by fraud and low turnout. But it is important to note that power brokers, accustomed to enforcing their writ undemocratically, decided to manipulate the electoral system to serve their own interests rather than ignore it altogether, because they recognized that Afghans now embrace the new democratic constitution as the basis for their state's legitimacy. The international community must pressure the Afghan government to crack down on corruption and develop robust political parties. But to declare total failure is to ignore Afghanistan's political transformation.

REBUILDING PROSPERITY

In response to the economic and humanitarian emergency in Afghanistan in 2001, the international community undertook one of the largest and most ambitious relief, reconstruction, and development efforts in the world—eventually committing a total of $18.4 billion in aid to economic reconstruction, economic development, and humanitarian relief between 2001 and 2009. The donors invested heavily in rebuilding the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank, the Treasury, and the Customs Department and helped phase out the old Afghan currency and launch a new one.

The result was an unheralded and dramatic success. Partly because of U.S. and international aid, Afghanistan experienced a post-Taliban economic boom. Real GDP grew by nearly 29 percent in 2002 alone—faster than West Germany in 1946—and averaged 15 percent annual licit growth from 2001 to 2006, making Afghanistan one of the fastest-growing economies in the world (it was still averaging 13.5 percent through 2009, after a drought in 2008). The pace of its growth was due in part to the low

base from which it had started, but the rapid pace itself was an important achievement. Afghanistan had not grown significantly in more than two decades; the economic boom signaled a new era in Afghan life.

Between 2001 and 2009, almost every indicator of human development showed measurable improvement. By late 2008, 80 percent of the population had access to basic health services, up from eight percent in 2001. Also by 2008, Afghan children were being immunized against diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) at the same rate as children in the rest of the world and at a higher rate than in the rest of South Asia. The infant mortality rate fell by a third, and life expectancy inched upward. After the fall of the Taliban, school enrollment skyrocketed from 1.1 million students in 2001 to 5.7 million students in 2008—a third of whom were girls—promising to double or triple Afghanistan's literacy rate in a decade.

Meanwhile, infrastructure greatly improved with international help. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) built 1,600 miles of roads, and the international community rebuilt three-quarters of the main highway from Herat to Kabul. In total, almost 33 percent of all roads in the country were paved by 2008, up from 13.3 percent in 2001. By 2008, Afghanistan had caught up to its regional and income cohorts in access to telecommunications—an astonishing feat. The cell-phone industry, nonexistent before 2001, had nearly eight million subscribers by the end of 2008. At the same time, the construction sector tripled in size, donors spent $312 million on water projects, and the number of Afghans with access to water more than doubled, from 13 percent to 27 percent. And access to sanitation rose from 12 percent to perhaps 45 percent.

The impressive growth and improvement since 2001—stronger than in any postconflict state in which the UN has deployed a peace-building mission since the end of the Cold War—demonstrate that progress is achievable with robust resources and international attention. Aid dependency and a poorly diversified economy threaten Afghanistan's long-term economic stability, but the greater risk is that the country's recent progress will unravel unless security is greatly improved.

THE UN'S BLIND SPOT

After 2001, the international community's priority was to prevent the reemergence of the 1992–96 civil war between rival warlords in

control of ethnic militias. UN disarmament programs, coupled with the international community's forceful diplomacy, successfully contained fighting among the warlords and prevented the country from relapsing into civil war—an underrated achievement, especially considering the eruptions of violence during and after other international peace-building missions, such as in Angola in 1992 and 1998, Liberia throughout the 1990s, Cambodia in 1997, and Iraq in 2006–7. The UN secretary-general reported in August 2005 that "factional clashes—a prominent feature of insecurity three years ago—have become a localized issue and are no longer a threat to national security."

The international community's strategy in regard to the warlords had a flip side, however. Because the United States and the UN could not confront the warlords directly without risking violence, they had to coax them into giving up their weapons by promising them a place in the new Afghan political order. The warlords thus made a successful entry into Afghan politics as governors, legislators, and cabinet ministers without ever facing prosecution or even a truth commission for alleged war crimes. In hindsight, nearly all scholars and commentators condemn the international community for allowing the warlords to retain power. Yet these same critics often deride the reverse strategy of building up a central government at the expense of local power brokers. After the fall of the Taliban, the international community attempted to navigate between these competing imperatives—disarming the warlords without unleashing a backlash and building a central government while respecting local authority. The result has been imperfect but better than permitting the warlords to retain their conventional military power, on the one hand, or risking violence by attempting to put them on trial, on the other.

Despite its success against the warlords, the international community failed to train enough new Afghan security forces or successfully contain the residual Taliban threat between 2001 and 2006. Early efforts to train Afghan police and reform the security sector had not achieved notable results by 2006. Washington had spent $4.4 billion on security assistance and had trained 36,000 soldiers and a comparable number of police officers in the first five years—too few to provide effective security. The police, moreover, were widely reported to be corrupt and incompetent. At the same time, ISAF did not hold large swaths of territory or provide security to the vast majority of Afghans. Indeed, it did not have the mandate or the authorization to do so.

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2005 | Going for Growth

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ISAF was relatively small in size, it was initially confined to Kabul, and it was hampered by restrictive rules of engagement and national caveats limiting where the soldiers were permitted to deploy or what kinds of operations they were allowed to engage in. (In 2003, the peacekeeping force had only 5,500 troops assigned to it.) Then, in 2005, ISAF was authorized to operate in the country's northern and western provinces, but it still numbered fewer than 10,000 troops, or four soldiers for every 10,000 Afghans (compared to approximately 42 soldiers per 10,000 civilians in the relatively successful UN-British operation in Sierra Leone in 2002).

The net effect of the international community's light involvement in the security sector, combined with the lack of progress on governance, became evident with the rise of the Taliban insurgency, beginning in 2005. The Taliban and other insurgents had initiated sporadic, uncoordinated attacks against international military forces and the Afghan government in the years following the Taliban's fall from power. Yet they averaged only about four attacks per day nationwide in 2003 and five per day in 2004. In July 2005, Taliban militants assassinated the pro-Western head of the Kandahar Ulema Shura—a council of religious scholars—and then suicide-bombed his funeral, the boldest terrorist attack in the country since 2001. The funeral attack dramatized the Taliban's lethal reach and resilience, the Afghan government's weakness and inability to respond, and ISAF's absence. Following the sudden revelation of the militants' unexpected strength, violence grew markedly worse in the latter half of 2005, increasing to over eight attacks per day and killing 1,268 people. The militants began to make persistent and notable strides in the scope, scale, and sophistication of their attacks. The violence began to escalate dramatically each year thereafter, killing 3,154 people in 2006 and 5,818 in 2007. By late 2005, what had begun as an incoherent and decentralized campaign of violence had gelled into a cohesive insurgency dedicated to eroding Western political will and overthrowing the Afghan government.

The Taliban were able to regroup and launch an insurgency because, effectively, nothing stood in their way. The Afghan government was still unable to offer services or resolve disputes, and there were too few international soldiers to secure the whole country. The state's institutional capacity remained weak, the rule of law was nonexistent, and the security services were still embryonic. "Weak governance is a common precondition of insurgencies," writes Jones, the Afghanistan expert; "Afghan insurgent groups took advantage of this anarchic situation."

Development Indicators in Afghanistan



SOURCES: Central Statistics Organization of Afghanistan, World Bank, and World Health Organization.

Critics are right to argue that the rise of the insurgency is proof that the international state-building campaign had, as of 2006, failed to build a functioning Afghan state. But the intervention did not end in 2006. A U.S. National Security Council review of Afghan policy in late 2006 recognized the emerging challenges and called for substantially more security and development assistance. Following the review, U.S. funding for the Afghan security forces nearly quadrupled, from $1.9 billion in 2006 to $7.4 billion in 2007, and aggregate U.S. spending on security assistance increased fivefold. Starting in late 2007, entire district police units were sent to a training academy, and U.S. trainers were assigned to embed with each unit on graduation. In addition, the international community began experimenting with programs to enlist the aid of local, indigenous, and tribal security forces.

To staff the expanded training programs and provide security while the Afghan forces were coming up to speed, the United States more than quadrupled its military presence in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2010, from 22,100 troops to over 100,000—Washington's third-largest military deployment since Vietnam. Partner nations increased their troop deployments as well, from roughly 21,500 in early 2007 to 35,800 by the end of 2009. ISAF deployed nationwide in 2006, assuming responsibility for security assistance in the country's east and south for the first time. General Stanley McChrystal, who was then the commander of ISAF, also began in 2009 to change how U.S. and NATO troops were used. He sought

to make the entirety of ISAF a part of the training and mentoring of the Afghan army and police and to focus on protecting the Afghan population. The moves collectively represented a huge shift in emphasis from a "light footprint" counterterrorism mission to a more robust, if still partial, counterinsurgency campaign. As a result, the United States nearly tripled the size of the Afghan army in three years, increasing it from 36,000 soldiers in 2006 to almost 100,000 by the end of 2009. It brought the Afghan police force up to its authorized strength of 82,000 and made incremental progress toward improving its capabilities.

Rising violence and the persistence of a Taliban safe haven in Pakistan have bred pessimism about the war and created a mystique about the resilience of the insurgency. Violence has indeed continued to escalate—insurgents initiated an average of 19 attacks per day in 2007, almost 30 per day in 2008, and 52 per day from January to August of 2009—but the spike in violence is a predictable effect of sending more troops into battle; there are more targets for the insurgents to attack. What matters is not the scale of the violence but the outcome of the battle. While ISAF has made impressive strides in its practice of unconventional warfare, the Taliban have not. The Taliban are not invincible superwarriors hardened by millennia of fighting and xenophobia; indeed, they are hardly even very competent insurgents compared to Nepal's Maoists, Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, or Colombia's FARC. They continue to espouse an unpopular extremist ideology and murder large numbers of fellow Pashtun Muslims. Meanwhile, Washington's rumored recent expansion of its drone strikes will erode their safe haven in Pakistan. The single greatest resource the United States now needs is not more troops but more time.

THE GOVERNANCE VACUUM

IN ONE respect, the effort in Afghanistan has seriously faltered. The international community has largely stuck with a failing light-footprint approach toward Afghan governance and capacity development. Partly in reaction to the recent UN missions in Kosovo and East Timor, which were criticized for relying too heavily on experts from abroad, the UN secretary-general publicly and openly instructed UNAMA to "rely on as limited an international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible." UN officials never considered whether the Afghans, whose human capital had been destroyed by war and depleted by emigration, were able to do the job.

Donors similarly neglected governance programs. They pledged a total of $1.2 billion for Afghan governance and rule-of-law programs between 2001 and 2006, or about $200 million per year, and only disbursed about half that amount. A substantial amount of this was dedicated to the 2004 and 2005 elections, leaving just a few hundred million dollars to train civil servants, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers; rebuild government offices and courthouses; and pay the international advisers and consultants to ministers and other government officials. Considering that Afghanistan was the weakest state in the world in 2001, these funds did not come close to meeting its needs. The international community was effectively asking Afghans with no shoes to lift themselves up by their bootstraps.

For example, a proposed Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission was supposed to lead efforts to streamline the bureaucracy, introduce a new pay and grade system, develop merit-based hiring and promotion criteria, and establish a civil service training institute. For this ambitious agenda, the Asian Development Bank gave $2.2 million starting in 2003, and the UN Development Program gave $500,000. A 2007 USAID review of capacity-development efforts in Afghanistan concluded that "capacity building has not been a primary objective of USAID projects" and that "what has occurred has been more ad hoc and 'spotty' rather than systematic and strategic." The review could identify only four ministries out of 25 that were "considered reasonably competent to carry out their primary responsibilities." The Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, a nongovernmental organization, judged in late 2006 that public-administration reform had been "'cosmetic,' with superficial restructuring of ministries and an emphasis on higher pay rather than fundamental change." The Civil Service Commission did not open until January 2007, and after five years in power, the government could boast of only 7,500 civil servants hired under the new merit-based criteria in a government of 240,000 employees.

Similarly, the international community did not prioritize rebuilding the justice system or improving the rule of law. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and USAID did initiate a host of programs, but in practice they were too small to make a measurable difference in the worst justice system in the world. The Afghan government estimated that it would cost $600 million to implement its National Justice Sector Strategy, but donors had

disbursed just $38 million in aid to the justice sector by the end of 2006. The UN secretary-general wrote that same year that "with approximately 1,500 judges and 2,000 prosecutors in the judicial system, demand for training far outstrips supply."

As a result of these shortcomings, Afghanistan ranked second worst in the world for the rule of law in 2006, after Somalia, according to the World Bank's governance indicators. Without the rule of law, corruption predictably exploded as the economy grew. As the political scientist Samuel Huntington noted long ago, modernization without strong institutions almost always yields corruption, and Afghanistan was no exception.

Corruption was increasingly fueled by the drug trade. The poppy crop had soared to 408,000 acres in 2006 and 477,000 in 2007, and Afghanistan was producing 82 percent of the world's poppy and 93 percent of the world's heroin by 2007, making the drug trade worth $4 billion—equivalent to half of Afghanistan's licit GDP. Because the Afghan government lacked strong institutions and the ability to enforce the rule of law, Afghanistan was becoming a lawless and corrupt narcostate.

When the crisis in governance became apparent with the rise of the Taliban insurgency in 2005 and 2006, the international community moved to bolster its governance programs. In dollar terms, the international community roughly doubled its training efforts in the Afghan civil administration and justice sectors, to $688 million, over the next three years, still a paltry figure relative to Afghanistan's needs. In 2007, USAID started the Capacity Development Program, a $219 million, five-year project to strengthen Afghan institutions such as the Ministries of Finance and Education and the Civil Service Commission. The program was a big improvement but still small in absolute terms. U.S. spending on rule-of-law programs doubled from 2006 to 2007 and nearly doubled again in 2008. The United States also doubled its much more substantial investment in counternarcotics programs—to $3.3 billion. The increased focus on governance and the rule of law spurred some institutional innovations in the Afghan government, but they have, to date, failed to markedly improve the quality of governance. Afghan President Hamid Karzai named an entirely new slate of justices to the Supreme Court in late 2006. The new court established a Regulation of Judicial Conduct, and the new justices began inspection tours of provincial courts to ensure their compliance

with judicial standards. The Afghan government formed an anti-corruption unit in the attorney general's office in 2009 to investigate and prosecute cases of high-level corruption, but Afghanistan fell further on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, to 179th—second from the bottom—in 2009. According to a survey conducted by ABC News, the BBC, and the German television station ARD, the number of Afghans who believed the government was doing an excellent or good job fell from 80 percent in 2005 to 49 percent in 2008—most likely because their great expectations of 2001 remained unfulfilled.

The international community paid an enormous opportunity cost by failing to play a greater role and provide sufficient resources from the start. Most observers of Afghan governance focus on Karzai's policies, behavior, and fitness for office. But any other Afghan president would face a nearly insurmountable challenge trying to enact policy through an institutional apparatus that, for all intents and purposes, does not function. Others have focused on how centralized or decentralized, institutionalized or tribalized, the Afghan government should be. But that argument is moot. The international community's interest is in making governance effective, whatever it looks like, and that is what the international community failed to invest in building after 2001.

THE ROAD TO VICTORY

THE UNITED STATES is not yet winning the war in Afghanistan, but it is not losing as swiftly or as thoroughly as the current crisis of confidence would suggest. Although Afghanistan remains poor, violent, and poorly governed, it is richer, freer, and safer than it has been in a generation. The security situation is a major challenge, but the United States and its allies have moved since 2006 to adopt a much more aggressive military posture in response—and with the funding to match it.

The application of increased military resources and a coherent strategy almost certainly will have an effect on the Afghan battlefield if given enough time to succeed and backed by a complimentary civilian strategy. In particular, U.S. President Barack Obama should show the same flexibility toward his announced July 2011 withdrawal date that

he showed toward his initial timeline for withdrawal from Iraq. He wisely announced that the withdrawal will only "begin" in July 2011, leaving open the door for a gradual and phased withdrawal. He should seize on that to give ISAF the time it needs, now that it finally, for the first time in nine years, has adequate resources.

The single greatest strategic threat is the weakness of the Afghan government. Efforts in recent years to increase the size and scope of governance-assistance efforts are a welcome gesture, but they are not enough. The Obama administration should push for a dramatically more ambitious capacity-development program, starting with a much larger civilian presence in the Afghan bureaucracy and court system. Washington should also recognize that it can choose to withdraw from Afghanistan quickly at high risk or slowly at low risk. The programs, budgets, and strategies that are now finally in place have only been operating for a few years; it is unlikely that there will be dramatic progress by July 2011. The Obama administration has calculated that some degree of withdrawal is necessary to pressure the Afghan government, but it should be wary lest a precipitous withdrawal lead to panic in Afghanistan, undoing a decade of careful gains.

If the international community had withdrawn from Afghanistan shortly after the initial round of elections in 2004–5, as it did in Cambodia, Haiti, and Liberia in the 1990s, the intervention would have failed. Governance had not improved, and most important, war had resumed. Remarkably, the international community did not seize on the completion of the Bonn process as a chance to declare victory and withdraw. Reflecting a realism and resilience evident in other recent operations—such as in Sierra Leone in 2002 and Iraq in 2007—international actors recognized the emerging problems and attempted a midcourse correction. They did so in part because prior experiences in Afghanistan had demonstrated that success was possible. The same knowledge should help the United States and its partners overcome the current crisis of confidence.

The Afghan mission is still plagued with difficulties, in particular endemically weak institutions and a poor governance-assistance effort. But recent history has shown that, contrary to popular belief, outsiders can make a positive difference in Afghanistan if given the right time, resources, and leadership.

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The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran

The Limits of Containment

Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery

What to do about Iran's nuclear program is one of the most vexing foreign policy challenges confronting the Obama administration. This debate is increasingly characterized both by growing pessimism about whether the international community's diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions can prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and by guarded optimism that the consequences a nuclear-armed Iran are manageable. Writing in these pages last spring, James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, both of the Council on Foreign Relations, maintained that the United States could contain Iran even if it developed a nuclear arsenal by establishing clear "redlines" that Tehran would not be allowed to cross without risking some type of retaliation. For example, if Iran used its nuclear weapons, transferred them to a third party, invaded its neighbors, or increased its support for terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, the United States would be compelled to respond, although the measures it chose to adopt would not be specified in advance. This argument reflects the public position of many senior U.S. and European officials, as well as a number of prominent academics and defense intellectuals.

Eric S. Edelman is a Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; he was U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in 2005–9. Andrew F. Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Evan Braden Montgomery is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Yet this view is far too sanguine. Above all, it rests on the questionable assumptions that possessing nuclear weapons induces caution and restraint, that other nations in the Middle East would balance against Iran rather than bandwagon with it, that a nuclear-armed Iran would respect new redlines even though a conventionally armed Iran has failed to comply with similar warnings, and that further proliferation in the region could be avoided. It seems more likely that Iran would become increasingly aggressive once it acquired a nuclear capability, that the United States' allies in the Middle East would feel greatly threatened and so would increasingly accommodate Tehran, that the United States' ability to promote and defend its interests in the region would be diminished, and that further nuclear proliferation, with all the dangers that entails, would occur. The greatest concern in the near term would be that an unstable Iranian-Israeli nuclear contest could emerge, with a significant risk that either side would launch a first strike on the other despite the enormous risks and costs involved. Over the longer term, Saudi Arabia and other states in the Middle East might pursue their own nuclear capabilities, raising the possibility of a highly unstable regional nuclear arms race.

Furthermore, the strategy that appears to be emerging as the default solution to these troubling outcomes—a combination of deterrence and extended deterrence—has serious drawbacks, and these are often downplayed or, worse, ignored. The conventional wisdom holds that U.S. security commitments can keep Iran in check, prevent U.S. allies in the Middle East from accommodating Tehran, and dissuade them from pursuing nuclear weapons. Yet both the willingness and the ability of the United States to defend its partners in the region against a nuclear-armed Iran are questionable. The United States was able to deter a nuclear-armed Soviet Union during the Cold War, but the foundations of its security arrangements then—formal treaty guarantees and large U.S. military deployments on the territory of its allies—are unlikely to materialize again soon. Although members of the Obama administration have stated that no option, including military force, should be taken off the table, they have done little to create a credible military option that would discourage Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons or contain it if diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, or redlines fail to yield the desired results and Iran obtains nuclear weapons. By deploying additional U.S. air and naval forces in the Middle East, the United States could bolster its diplomatic efforts with coercive leverage, lay the foundation for

an extended deterrence regime, and give itself the means to use force if a military campaign turns out to be the least bad option.

IRAN, ISRAEL, AND THE BOMB

Given Israel's status as an assumed but undeclared nuclear weapons state, the most immediate consequence of Iran's crossing the nuclear threshold would be the emergence of an unstable bipolar nuclear competition in the Middle East. Given Israel's enormous quantitative and qualitative advantage in nuclear weapons—its arsenal is estimated to consist of anywhere from 100 to more than 200 warheads, possibly including thermonuclear weapons—Tehran might fear a disarming preventive or preemptive strike. During a crisis, then, the Iranian leadership might face a "use them or lose them" dilemma with respect to its nuclear weapons and resolve it by attacking first.

For their part, Israeli leaders might also be willing to strike first, despite the enormous risks. Israel's small size means that even a few nuclear detonations on its soil would be devastating; Iran's former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was exaggerating only slightly when he claimed that "even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything." Iran's nuclear arsenal is likely to be small at first and perhaps vulnerable to a preventive attack. Moreover, even if current and future Israeli missile defenses could not stop a full-scale premeditated attack by ballistic missiles, they might be effective against any retaliation Iran might launch if it were hit first. And the willingness to execute a preventive or preemptive strike when confronting a serious threat is a deeply ingrained element of Israel's strategic culture, as Israel demonstrated in its attacks against Egypt in 1956 and 1967, against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981, and against a suspected Syrian nuclear site in 2007. On the one occasion that Israel absorbed the first blow, in 1973, it came perilously close to defeat. In short, the early stages of an Iranian-Israeli nuclear competition would be unstable.

Even if Iran and Israel managed to avoid a direct conflict, Iran's nuclear weapons would remain a persistent source of instability in the Middle East. Tehran would almost certainly attempt to expand the size of its arsenal to enhance the survivability of its nuclear weapons. To that end, it would have a strong incentive to adopt the North Korean model of proliferation: negotiating with the international community

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while continuing to expand its stockpile. Tehran could also deflect international pressure to disarm by offering to relinquish its arsenal if Israel did so as well, exploiting the desire of U.S. President Barack Obama and other Western leaders to make progress toward a world without nuclear weapons. As Iran's arsenal became larger and its fear of retaliation declined, however, it might be increasingly willing to engage in more subtle but still dangerous forms of aggression, including heightened support for terrorist groups or coercive diplomacy.

Meanwhile, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Israel might face internal and external pressures to abandon its posture of nuclear opacity, that is, its policy of refusing to confirm or deny that it has nuclear weapons. Internal pressure would come from those who believe that declaring Israel's arsenal is necessary to deter an attack by Iran. External pressure would come from those who view an Israeli declaration as the first step toward regional nuclear disarmament. But if Israel did abandon its policy of nuclear opacity, cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be far more difficult, and a containment strategy against Iran would thus be more challenging to implement. Such a disclosure might also encourage other states in the region to pursue their own nuclear weapons programs. Although most of Israel's neighbors have been willing to accept its undeclared nuclear weapons program so far, the combination of a nuclear-armed Iran and an openly nuclear-armed Israel could alter their calculations—due to a heightened sense of threat, a desire for prestige, domestic pressure, or all three.

FROM ISLAMABAD TO RIYADH

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates—all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power

reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The NPT does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and difficult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states' access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade.

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the CSS-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively.

There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This "Islamabad option" could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not

only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own.

Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India.

The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan's weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India's reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT.

N-PLAYER COMPETITION

Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-

Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack.

More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning" of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their

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governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

INCREDIBLE DETERRENTS

If Iran did acquire nuclear weapons, would a containment strategy preserve stability in the Middle East? Some analysts, including Lindsay and Takeyh, argue that although Iran can be aggressive at times, it also regulates its behavior to avoid provoking retaliation. Since the regime is sensitive to costs, the logic goes, it recognizes the dangers of escalation; hence, containment would work. Other analysts argue that Iran's antagonism toward the United States and Israel is so strong and so central to its leaders' legitimacy that Tehran will become more hostile once it has a nuclear arsenal, regardless of the consequences.

The truth probably lies somewhere in between. Tehran may not be irrationally aggressive, but its leadership structure and decision-making

are opaque. Its rhetoric toward the United States, Israel, and the Arab nations is often inflammatory. And its hostile behavior—including its support for proxies such as Hezbollah, its efforts to subvert its neighbors, and its provocative naval maneuvers in the Persian Gulf—could easily trigger a crisis. In short, it is unclear how a nuclear-armed Iran would weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of brinkmanship and escalation and therefore how easily it could be deterred from attacking the United States' interests or partners in the Middle East.

One of the most important elements of a U.S. containment strategy would be extended deterrence, that is, discouraging Iran from attacking states in the Middle East. Over the past several years, it has become popular in policy circles to think that containing a nuclear-armed Iran, stabilizing relations between Iran and Israel, and preventing additional proliferation will require expanding U.S. security commitments to several U.S. allies and partners in the Middle East. In July 2009, for example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that the United States would extend "a defense umbrella over the region" in order to prevent Iran from continuing to pursue nuclear weapons, to deter Iranian aggression if Tehran does acquire nuclear weapons, and also, presumably, to dissuade U.S. allies and partners from pursuing nuclear weapons as well.

At first blush, a policy of extended deterrence might appear to be a sensible and effective approach. It played an important role in deterring a Soviet attack on the West and limiting nuclear proliferation during the Cold War. Seeking a nuclear-armed patron is an attractive option for states that are insecure but unwilling or unable to accept the burdens and risks of pursuing their own nuclear programs. In addition, the United States already has a strong foundation of alliances and security partnerships, including its long-standing "special relationship" with Israel; its close ties to Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates; and Turkey's membership in NATO. And it has unique capabilities that states in the region will almost certainly want to see used on their behalf, including ballistic missile defenses (which could be used to counter Iran's principal delivery methods) and early warning systems (which are particularly important given the short flight times of any missiles that might be launched from Iran toward its neighbors).

Yet a strategy rooted in extended deterrence could prove far more challenging and far less effective than most analysts and policymakers recognize. Its proponents tend to draw heavily on the experience of

the Cold War, but this parallel oversimplifies the problems that the United States would face if nuclear proliferation occurred in the Middle East. Throughout the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, the United States and the allies under its nuclear umbrella were not only aligned against a single overriding threat; they also had few serious security challenges among themselves, particularly as the rivalry between France and Germany dissipated in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, most Middle Eastern states view Iran as a threat, but their own relations remain tense, and in some cases even hostile. These cross-cutting rivalries could complicate U.S. efforts to establish an effective extended deterrence regime in the region, particularly if Washington pledged to defend both Israel and several Arab states.

During the Cold War, the United States deployed several hundred thousand troops to Western Europe, to democratic nations that faced an authoritarian Soviet Union threatening to dominate all of Europe. The U.S.-Soviet competition was a struggle for global dominance, U.S. allies were culturally and politically far more similar to the United States than its current security partners in the Middle East, and both the United States' treaty commitments and its forward-based forces were clear indicators of its willingness to defend its allies. Nevertheless, doubts persisted about whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union to stave off a military defeat in Europe. And if the United States' allies then were never truly convinced that it would risk New York to save Bonn, London, or Paris, then why would U.S. allies in the Middle East today believe that it would risk New York to defend Cairo, Dubai, or Riyadh once Tehran acquired the means to target the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons? Tehran could have such a capability shortly after developing nuclear weapons if it relied on unconventional means of delivery, such as transport inside a cargo ship rather than intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress might be reluctant to formally endorse a pledge to defend Arab nations, in particular given the resentment toward the United States that exists in many of these countries. Even informal public guarantees could generate significant opposition in Congress. And private commitments are unlikely to be effective, because unlike with public declarations, Washington

would not be putting its reputation on the line. Another difference between the Soviet Union and a nuclear-armed Iran is that in most instances with Iran, the United States would not have the option of using significant forward-based forces as a tripwire and so would lack a way to signal its willingness to retaliate after any attack against its partners in the Middle East. Many of those governments would not welcome the presence of U.S. troops because they are reluctant to be perceived by their domestic audiences as U.S. protectorates unable to defend themselves.

ACCEPTING THE UNACCEPTABLE

Other serious questions surround the credibility of a U.S. extended deterrence regime. First and foremost, Washington would be issuing a guarantee despite having failed to halt Iran's nuclear program—after three successive U.S. presidents declared that a nuclear-armed Iran would be a major threat to U.S. security and to stability in the Middle East. Managing the balance of terror during the Cold War may have required "thinking the unthinkable," but for many, the United States' failure to halt Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability would be "accepting the unacceptable." If the United States cannot prevent a conventionally armed Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, its partners in the Middle East will almost certainly question its willingness to stand up to a nuclear-armed Iran.

Moreover, if the United States fulfills its obligations under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the plans in the Nuclear Posture Review to further reduce its nuclear force and refrain from developing any new warheads, its nuclear arsenal will be shrinking just as its security commitments are expanding substantially. The United States has traditionally adapted the size and the composition of its nuclear arsenal according to the Soviet Union's (and later Russia's) force. Now, however, it must be able to deter attacks against its territory by several countries: Russia, still, as well as China, North Korea, and perhaps soon Iran. And it must also deter attacks against the many states under its nuclear umbrella, including the more than two dozen NATO members in Europe and its allies in Asia, such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. As the U.S. arsenal decreases, Washington will have fewer weapons to support these commitments, which will raise questions about its ability and its

willingness to defend its allies and its partners if they are threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran. Because the United States has thus far chosen not to design a new generation of nuclear weapons, its remaining inventory will consist primarily of high-yield warheads designed to target large cities and civilian populations. This may create the perception among both its allies and its adversaries that the United States is self-deterred—that it will not be willing to employ nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack on one of its partners because of the enormous collateral damage and high number of civilian casualties that would result.

The United States does have significant ballistic missile defense capabilities, which could strengthen extended deterrence by countering Iran's most likely nuclear delivery systems. Yet when other requirements are taken into account, in particular the need to protect the United States' allies and bases in Europe and Asia, it is unlikely that sufficient ground- and sea-based systems will be available to defend against a threat to U.S. partners in the Middle East. This problem will only become worse as Tehran's ballistic missile inventory grows over time. Iran will eventually be able to overwhelm U.S. missile defenses with salvos of conventionally armed missiles. Because existing defense systems cannot discriminate between nuclear and nonnuclear warheads, such attacks could exhaust the missile defenses of the United States and its allies, leaving those countries vulnerable to follow-on attacks with nuclear weapons. Missile defense systems cost far more than offensive ballistic missiles, and so building more of the former to keep pace with Iran as it builds more of the latter would place the United States at the wrong end of the cost equation—at a time when fewer resources are likely to be available to the Pentagon.

The danger posed by Iran's ballistic missiles creates further doubts about the credibility of any U.S. security guarantees. Would the United States be willing to exhaust its missile defenses to protect Egypt, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia from an Iranian missile attack, even though this would leave Israel vulnerable to a follow-on strike? Would the countries of the Middle East trust the United States to use all of its missile interceptors to defend them, knowing that it would be extremely reluctant to leave Israel, its closest ally in the region, unprotected? Would it rush additional sea-based missile defenses to the region during a crisis, aware that doing so might trigger a preemptive attack by Iran (which may choose to strike before its adversaries become less

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vulnerable) or a U.S. ally (which might assume that the United States will help intercept an Iranian retaliatory strike)?

Finally, the United States would confront a fundamental dilemma as it attempted to contain a nuclear-armed Iran: the Iranian actions that are the easiest to deter, namely, a deliberate conventional or nuclear attack, are the least likely forms of Iranian aggression, whereas Iran's most likely forms of aggression, in particular support for terrorism and subversion, are the most difficult to deter. Middle Eastern states take these lower-level threats very seriously, but because such threats are difficult to attribute and inflict less damage than a nuclear or a conventional attack, any promise the United States makes to retaliate forcefully, with nuclear weapons or not, is unlikely to be viewed as credible, either in Tehran or among U.S. allies.

In sum, any U.S. effort to implement an extended deterrence regime in the Middle East in order to contain a nuclear Iran and stem proliferation in the region would face very serious challenges. Given the magnitude of those challenges, the United States must redouble its efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons while also taking steps that will bolster its credibility if containment becomes necessary because Iran has acquired nuclear weapons.

WHAT TO DO?

NOT SURPRISINGLY, when it comes to addressing the dangers posed by Iran's nuclear program, there simply are no good options. Thus far, diplomacy and economic sanctions only seem to have hardened Iran's resolve to develop a nuclear capability. Although clandestine efforts to disrupt Iran's nuclear program might delay its progress, they are unlikely to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. An Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear infrastructure might set the program back but, given Israel's limited long-range strike capability, only for a short period of time. Even though the United States could bring more capabilities to bear, and a U.S. military campaign against Iran's nuclear program might stand a greater chance of retarding its progress, the operational military challenges would be daunting. Moreover, an attack could backfire: it might enhance popular support for a regime that has grown increasingly unpopular at home, further strengthen Iran's determination to go nuclear, and trigger a costly retaliation against the

United States and U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yet the alternative—trying to deter a nuclear-armed Iran from aggressive behavior against the United States, its allies, or its interests in the region—would almost certainly be prohibitively expensive, difficult to implement successfully, and challenging to sustain over time.

What, then, should the United States do? At present, the best strategy is a three-track approach that brings diplomacy and sanctions, clandestine action, and the threat of military force into alignment. First, the United States should continue to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran, both to raise the costs of Iran's pursuing a nuclear weapons capability and to further isolate the country from the international community, its leaders from the Iranian people, and hard-liners within the government from their more pragmatic colleagues. Although these policies have enjoyed only limited success to this point, given the regime's opaque politics, it is possible that they are generating greater costs in Tehran than is apparent. Moreover, a durable resolution to this dispute may rest on the possibility, however small, that a significant portion of the Iranian public, as well as the Iranian elite, will conclude that the game is not worth the candle. If the United States and the international community can delay Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, the cumulative effect of sanctions and isolation—and Tehran's knowledge that Iran will remain a pariah state until it abandons its nuclear ambitions—could have that effect. At a minimum, continuing to employ diplomatic and economic tools would demonstrate that the United States prefers a nonmilitary approach to the problem, which could help dampen criticism if more forceful measures ever proved necessary.

Second, recent press reports suggest that several states might be trying to sabotage Iran's nuclear program. If so, and if they are successful, the moves would buy additional time for diplomacy to work, for effective military options to be developed, and for steps to be taken that could reduce U.S. vulnerability to any Iranian retaliation. Sabotage could be particularly important if Tehran chooses to pursue a "nuclear breakout" strategy: deferring weaponization until it has enough fissile material for at least a handful of warheads. In fact, this may be Iran's most likely strategy: not only would it discourage a preventive attack by exploiting the ambiguity that currently surrounds Iran's nuclear program; it would also provide Iran with a more robust deterrent

when it crossed the nuclear threshold. But because Iran would need a significant quantity of fissile material before it could build and test its arsenal, hindering its ability to produce enriched uranium would present it with a difficult dilemma: build a very small number of weapons quickly even though they might be vulnerable to attack or wait until a larger inventory can be produced at once. If Tehran chose the latter option, the United States could gain considerably more time to stop Iran's progress or prepare for a nuclear-armed Iran.

Third, the United States should bolster its military capabilities in and around the Persian Gulf and deploy there additional B-2 stealth bombers; stockpiles of precision-guided munitions; electronic warfare systems; undersea strike assets, such as guided missile submarines; sea-based missile defense platforms; and possibly a second aircraft carrier strike group. Along with the U.S. forces already stationed in the region, these added capabilities would strengthen the Obama administration's current diplomatic efforts and expand Washington's options for countering the Iranian nuclear program if diplomacy fails. Extra forces would complement diplomacy with added coercive pressure. To date, public statements by senior U.S. military and civilian officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have come very close to taking the military option off the table, citing the difficulties of an attack and the dangers of retaliation. If Iran's leaders conclude that the United States cannot or will not use force against their nuclear program, they will have fewer incentives to forgo nuclear weapons.

At the same time, a more robust U.S. military posture would demonstrate that the benefits Iran might have anticipated from its nuclear weapons program—driving the United States out of the region and weakening its local alliances—are unlikely to materialize. It would also go some way toward reassuring U.S. allies and security partners that Washington is committed to their defense. Even if the Obama administration concludes that a nuclear-armed Iran can be deterred and additional proliferation in the Middle East can be avoided, or if efforts to prevent Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold fail, the United States must still take steps now to mitigate the credibility problems that will almost certainly arise if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons and so containment becomes necessary. Finally, additional U.S. forces would place the United States in a better position

to execute a military strike on short notice if Washington determined that an attack could set back Iran's nuclear program for at least several years, if not more, and that the potential costs of an Iranian retaliation were tolerable.

Although finding a peaceful way to preclude Iran from getting nuclear weapons is obviously desirable, Washington will likely have to decide between two unattractive options: pursuing a military strike to prevent Iran from going nuclear or implementing a containment strategy to live with a nuclear Iran. The resort to force is always risky, and it would be particularly so in this case because a substantial number of U.S. troops are deployed near Iran. Whether force should be used will depend on the answers to three difficult questions: How close is Iran to achieving a nuclear weapons capability? Would an attack be effective? How might Iran retaliate, and what costs would the United States and its allies and partners suffer as a result? The risks of war must be weighed against the likelihood that containment could preserve regional stability and avert further proliferation, the demands of implementing and sustaining a containment strategy, and the inevitable reduction in the United States' ability to defend vital interests elsewhere.

The consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran are grave, and the challenges of a containment strategy rooted in extended deterrence are hardly trivial. The military option should not be dismissed because of the appealing but flawed notion that containment is a relatively easy or low-risk solution to a very difficult problem. Instead, containment could require a far larger military presence than the United States has traditionally maintained in the Middle East, particularly in the form air and naval forces, as well as major investments in expensive capabilities, such as missile defenses, a modernized nuclear arsenal with more low-yield weapons, agile diplomacy to create and preserve cohesion among diverse allies, and far tougher economic sanctions than have heretofore been possible. Understanding and addressing these requirements will be crucial if the United States decides to attempt to contain a nuclear-armed Iran, either because it assesses the costs and difficulties of prevention as too high or because Iran crosses the nuclear threshold faster than expected and no better options remain.

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The Good News About Gas

The Natural Gas Revolution and Its Consequences

John Deutch

Good news about energy is rare. Energy use and its cost are rising worldwide, most countries remain dependent on oil imports, and little progress has been made toward curbing climate change. So the world should take notice of the recent dramatic increase in estimates of unconventional sources of natural gas in North America and elsewhere, perhaps the greatest shift in energy-reserve estimates in the last half century. In the past few years, thanks to technological advances, vast amounts of natural gas—particularly gas trapped in underground shale basins—have become economically viable.

This development is an unmitigated boon for consumers interested in affordable energy, environmentalists looking for energy sources that emit less carbon dioxide than either oil or coal, and governments that hope to reduce the political and market power of today's major oil- and gas-producing countries. The prospects for a greatly increased global supply of natural gas have dramatic implications for both international energy markets and the energy policies of individual nations. Over time, natural gas use will expand into the power sector and may then displace oil in the transportation and chemical sectors.

John Deutch is Institute Professor of Chemistry at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former U.S. Undersecretary of Energy, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence. He is a present and past adviser to several energy companies and was a participant in the 2010 MIT study "The Future of Natural Gas." The views expressed here are his own.

As more natural gas becomes available and more of it is traded, the regional gas markets that exist today may well merge into a more integrated and open international gas market with a single price.

Countries that import natural gas should anticipate more competing sources of it, which will lower prices and reduce concerns about the security of the gas supply. No longer, it seems, will the world be dependent on a few nations—Iran, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan—that control the bulk of conventional natural gas reserves. Countries that produce natural gas will need to adjust to lower revenues from natural gas exports; for some of them, the adjustment may be quite severe and potentially destabilizing. As gas acts as a substitute for oil, demand for oil will fall, putting downward pressure on oil prices. This will lessen, but certainly not eliminate, the geopolitical influence that major oil-exporting countries enjoy today. It is perhaps a permissible exaggeration to claim a natural gas revolution. But like all revolutions, whether and to what extent the benefits are realized will depend on how rapidly the economic and political systems adapt to the change.

THE SHALE GAS BOOM

MOST NATURAL gas is extracted from so-called conventional deposits, usually from gas fields or oil reservoirs, and is typically found in highly porous rocks, such as sandstone. Producers need only to tap into the natural pressure of the reservoirs to release this trapped gas. "Unconventional deposits," in contrast, traditionally refers to either tight gas, which is found in relatively impermeable rock formations that release gas slowly; coal-bed methane, which has been absorbed into coal seams; or shale gas, which exists in fine-grained sedimentary rock. (Methane hydrate, a crystalline solid found on the ocean floor and in the Arctic, is another type, but it is even more difficult to extract.) Unconventional gas is technically difficult to recover, but once extracted, it is identical to conventional natural gas. It can be distributed by pipelines or condensed into liquefied natural gas (LNG) and exported internationally.

Just a few years ago, the U.S. oil and gas industry was concerned about the depletion of conventional natural gas reserves in the United States. Most experts believed that North America would soon have to become

a net importer of natural gas, in the form of LNG carried by massive refrigerated tankers. Twelve LNG regasification facilities, which gasify the LNG into natural gas suitable for pipelines, were constructed and put into operation in the United States (as well as two in Mexico and one in Canada), mostly in the last decade. Believing that natural gas prices would rise, U.S. gas producers also began exploiting unconventional sources.

To nearly everyone's surprise, unconventional gas turned out to be much more promising than expected. Beginning in 2008, experience in the field made the gas industry realize that shale gas was a large and economically feasible source of domestic supply. Today, all three types of unconventional gas are significant sources of supply in the United States, but shale gas attracts the most attention, since its potential resource base is believed to be especially massive.

Two technological advances made shale gas economically feasible to produce: horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (or "fracking"). To extract the gas, workers must drill down until they hit a thin layer of shale, 1,000 to 12,000 feet underground, and then steer the drilling horizontally for several thousand more feet. Fracking fluid—water, sand, and chemical additives—is injected into the layer at high pressure, perforating the formation and opening tiny cracks in the shale, thus allowing the trapped gas to escape.

The new technologies that made this procedure possible drove down dramatically the cost of producing shale gas. Today, although the average cost of production depends on many factors and varies from region to region, it tends to range from $2 to $3 per thousand cubic feet of gas—around one-half to one-third the production cost associated with new conventional gas wells in North America. And given that much is left to be understood about the character of this resource and how to produce it most efficiently, operating experience and additional technical advances are likely to drive the costs of production down even further.

With such low production costs for shale gas, the United States' enormous quantities of natural gas in shale deposits have become commercially recoverable. The country's regions of possible reserves, or "plays," as they are called in the industry, extend across the United States and include the Marcellus play in New York and Pennsylvania,

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Great Minds of the Western Intellectual Tradition

SOCRATES * PLATO * ARISTOTLE * CICERO * PAUL * AUGUSTINE * AQUINAS * LUTHER * CALVIN * MACHIAVELLI * KANT * ERASMUS * GALILEO * BACON * DESCARTES * HOBBES * SPINOZA * PASCAL * NEWTON * LOCKE * MONTESQUIEU * BERKELEY * HUME * SMITH * ROUSSEAU * MORE * BURKE * MILL * KIERKEGAARD * NIETZSCHE * FREUD * HEGEL * MARX * HUSSERL * DEWEY * HEIDEGGER

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Ever since the dawn of civilization, certain crucial questions have preoccupied thoughtful people: What is the purpose of life? What is the best kind of life? Who or what is God? How can we tell truth from falsehood? What is the essence of justice? When is it legitimate for one person to have power over others? Can these questions even be answered?

You too must have asked yourself questions like these. Perhaps you once vowed that some day you would work your way through the works of the greatest thinkers and find your own answers. But that would take years of intense reading and study, accompanied by complete withdrawal from active life.

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The Enlightenment and Its Critics

PART V: (Lectures 49–60)
The Age of Ideology

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the Barnett and Haynesville plays in Texas, and the Bakken play in Montana and North Dakota.

It is not yet clear exactly how large North America's shale gas reserves are. Canada is beginning to explore its shale gas resources, but as yet there is little activity in Mexico. Estimates of U.S. shale gas reserves, meanwhile, keep increasing. In 2007, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that out of the United States' approximately 250 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, there were 22 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves of all types of unconventional gas. ("Proven" means that geological and engineering data suggest that, with a reasonable degree of certainty, the reserves are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions.) In 2008, as expanding exploration and production field activity provided new data, the estimate jumped to 33 trillion cubic feet. Future estimates of proven unconventional gas reserves in the United States will almost certainly continue to increase. As for the total technically recoverable shale gas reserves in the United States (natural gas that could be recovered in the future using today's technology without considering economic constraints), estimates fall in the range of 600 to 700 trillion cubic feet, out of a total 2,500 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas from all sources.

Companies have been quick to take note of shale gas' potential. In just one year, shale gas production in the United States doubled, from about five percent of total U.S. natural gas production in 2007 to about ten percent in 2008. This caused the price of natural gas in North America to collapse; by 2009, it was down to about $4 per thousand cubic feet. It no longer made economic sense to import LNG, and the utilization of U.S. LNG regasification terminals fell from over 50 percent of capacity in 2005 to only 11 percent in 2009.

Current U.S. shale gas production, at about ten billion cubic feet per day, makes up 20 percent of total U.S. natural gas production. Major oil companies in the United States (such as ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips) and abroad (such as Statoil, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, and Reliance Industries) are aggressively acquiring shale gas acreage in North America. The 2010 MIT study "The Future of Natural Gas" estimates that compared with today, shale gas production from five major plays in the United States will double by 2015 and triple by 2030.

But the rate at which shale gas production will increase depends on several factors, including how successfully the industry meets the environmental challenges of production. In the United States, the greatest threat to robust expansion is concerns about fracking. The process, which involves dozens of trucks, is by no means a gentle operation. Communities are especially concerned about the fracking fluid—that it uses too much water (a typical well may require 3–4 million gallons), that it will not be cleaned up, that it contaminates drinking water, and that the chemicals used in it have not been publicly disclosed. U.S. states are beginning to regulate fracking, but it is difficult to design a regulatory structure that works for both small and large companies. If the industry is to avoid onerous regulation, it should establish safety and environmental standards on its own.

Still, the conclusion is clear: North America has sufficient natural gas that can be produced at reasonable cost to meet its needs for the foreseeable future. In fact, far from needing to import natural gas, as was previously expected, North America may well become an exporter of gas to the rest of the world.

Many other countries could benefit from this bounty, too. There are no reliable estimates about the size of the economically recoverable shale resource base worldwide, but shale deposits are found all over the globe. And they are not geologically or geographically correlated with conventional oil and gas deposits. Already, companies are developing shale gas operations in Australia, China, Germany, India, Poland, Romania, and Russia; for the moment, the shale-rich regions of Africa and Latin America remain untouched.

A MORE UNIFIED MARKET

This natural gas boom will have important consequences for the international natural gas trade. Today, the world is essentially divided into three natural gas markets: North America, Asia, and Europe. Historically, supply and demand have balanced in each of these markets separately, leading to different natural gas prices, trade patterns, and political tensions between suppliers, who wield their resources as a political tool, and consumers, who worry about the cost and security of this supply. In this respect, natural gas is unlike oil, which

is traded at the same price everywhere. The difference is due to the relatively high cost of transporting natural gas long distances; gas pipelines are more expensive than oil tankers. To be sure, the three natural gas markets are not completely independent. LNG is gradually eroding price differences between the Atlantic and the Pacific basins; tankers can be diverted from one destination to another depending on prices. But for the most part, the prices are determined in each of these markets separately.

In the North American market, demand is essentially satisfied by domestic production, and the price of natural gas is set by its value as a fuel in the power sector, where it competes with coal. In the Asian market, where most natural gas is imported, it competes against oil for electricity generation or for industrial use. Suppliers sell their natural gas there at prices set by the value of the gas relative to the so-called Japanese crude cocktail, a weighted average of oil imports to Japan, the region's benchmark. In the European market, 50 percent of the natural gas is produced within Europe; 30 percent is imported by pipeline from Russia, Algeria, and Libya; and 20 percent is imported as LNG. So Europe's market is an intermediate position between North America (where there is ample regional production) and Asia (where consumers are pressed by suppliers to pay oil-linked prices for natural gas imports). Because these three regional markets largely function separately, gas

prices vary greatly between the regions, and each experiences significant price fluctuations.

Two developments are likely to disrupt this global disequilibrium in gas prices. First, the LNG trade should expand substantially as countries with huge conventional gas reserves, such as Nigeria, Qatar, Russia, and Trinidad and Tobago, seek to bring their gas to market. The projected annual capacity of liquefaction facilities is estimated to grow from about 280 billion cubic feet in 2008 to over 400 billion cubic feet in 2015 (when it will supply about 15 percent of total consumption). In time, this LNG trade will lead to a global market for natural gas similar to that for oil. As gas is increasingly traded globally by pipeline or tanker, it will become impossible for prices in the three regional markets to differ widely. If trade is freely permitted, a difference between $4 per thousand cubic feet in New York and $10 per thousand cubic feet in Tokyo, for example, simply cannot survive.

In the United States, oil is three times as costly as natural gas for a given amount of energy.

The second change is the recent and rapid development of cheap unconventional gas resources. Unconventional gas production, coupled with increased interregional natural gas pipeline capacity and expanded LNG liquefaction facilities, will make it progressively more difficult to continue linking gas prices to oil prices. Since natural gas is cheaper than oil on an equivalent energy basis (meaning the price per BTU is lower), over time, natural gas will begin to replace oil, first in the power sector and then in the industrial and transportation sectors.

Many countries, such as the United States, do not use appreciable amounts of oil in the power sector. In these places, the most likely use for newfound gas in the near term is electricity generation, since power plants that burn natural gas are an economically competitive substitute for those that burn coal. Especially promising are "natural gas combined cycle" plants, which are less capital-intensive and more efficient than other sources of power. These plants also emit less carbon dioxide—compared with coal plants, they produce less than one-half as much per kilowatt-hour of electricity.

The consequences that cheaper natural gas will have for renewable energy are more complex. On the one hand, since today it is more

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expensive to generate electricity from wind, geothermal, or solar power, natural gas will be a competitor to renewable energy. On the other hand, cheap electricity from natural gas will make hybrid power plants—which generate electricity from intermittent wind or solar electricity as well as from natural gas—more attractive.

In the longer term, natural gas could substitute for gasoline or diesel in vehicles (most likely in the form of compressed natural gas). Yet in the United States, where less than one-tenth of one percent of natural gas is used for transportation, there are several barriers to the widespread adoption of such cars: there is no easily accessible natural gas fueling infrastructure, retrofitting existing internal combustion engines is expensive, and no one knows if natural gas will remain so much cheaper than oil as to make investments in vehicles powered by natural gas profitable.

But for the moment, natural gas has economics on its side. In the United States today, oil is three times as costly as natural gas for a given amount of energy ($12 per million BTUs, compared with $4 per million BTUs), and that is almost double the ratio that has prevailed over the past 20 years. Such a differential is a powerful economic incentive to develop new technology to substitute natural gas for gasoline used in the transportation sector. It could also spur development of new processes in the chemical sector, where natural gas could replace oil in the production of polymers, plastics, and other petrochemicals.

WINNERS AND LOSERS

THE RADICAL increase in the global supply of natural gas will require governments to make significant adjustments to their policies. But the effects will not be uniform. Countries that export large amounts of natural gas will suffer from lower than expected revenues and a reduced ability to use energy as a tool of foreign policy. Countries that import natural gas will benefit from the worldwide increase in reserves and production because prices will be lower than previously anticipated. And since there will be more sources of supply, these countries' concerns about the security of supply will be dampened.

For years, major natural gas holders—such as Australia, Bolivia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States—anticipated a future of high, oil-linked gas prices. They invested in expensive LNG

liquefaction facilities and pipeline projects. But now, these countries are facing a reduction of the value of the resource in the ground. A dramatic increase in the global availability of unconventional gas and lower natural gas prices could put these and other planned investments under water, although the effect will not be immediate because of long-term contracts. For producers, shutting down these export facilities is not an economical choice, once the investment has been made.

In the long run, however, investors have an enormous economic incentive to develop technologies that will exploit the price difference between natural gas and oil. For example, the industry is sure to consider new uses for natural gas that were previously uneconomical, including gas-to-liquid conversion processes such as producing methanol from natural gas.

The United States, for its part, will need to reexamine its domestic policy. Because of the anticipated increase in natural gas use, the United States should encourage technology that improves the efficiency of using natural gas, better defines and characterizes all types of natural gas reserves, and reduces the environmental burden of production. Policies designed to stimulate the domestic supply of natural gas should be reconsidered. This includes the federal loan guarantee that Congress approved in 2004 for a proposed pipeline to transport Alaskan gas to the lower 48 states, since these states now have lower-cost sources of gas readily available. Having made little progress on climate-change legislation, Congress should also recognize that natural gas offers an opportunity to reduce carbon emissions.

U.S. foreign policy must be adjusted as well. A transparent global gas market would be beneficial to Washington and its allies because it would lead to the economically efficient use of resources and prevent major exporters from exploiting their resources for political gain. So the United States should join other countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the new major gas-importing countries (most important, China and India) in an effort to encourage open markets and to avoid long-term bilateral arrangements. And although doing so will be politically contentious, the United States should refrain from erecting barriers to the natural gas trade, by imposing either import or export duties. If it adopts protectionist measures, other countries will be encouraged to do so, too.

The Good News About Gas

For Russia, the world's largest holder of natural gas, the impending lower gas prices and availability of natural gas elsewhere present many challenges, even though the country likely has plenty of shale gas. Russia should anticipate a drop in the significant revenue it currently receives from gas exports to Europe, under contracts that are not the result of an open bidding process and are linked to oil prices. As unconventional gas becomes available in Europe, consuming countries will insist on an open market with competition from diverse suppliers to meet demand. The Russian government needs revenue from natural gas exports to modernize the aging production and distribution network of its state-controlled gas company, Gazprom (at the very least to stop its pipelines from leaking methane, a powerful greenhouse gas). It also needs revenue to fund massive initiatives already under way, such as the Sakhalin Island oil and gas project, which includes liquefaction plants intended to ship LNG to Japan and other Asian markets.

Europe should see its security concerns about dependence on Russian gas imports subside.

As the second-largest holder of natural gas, Iran will be affected, too. But because sanctions have largely kept the country from developing its huge natural gas reserves, it will suffer only a paper loss; if Iran manages to export its gas in the future, it will receive less revenue than previously thought. Saudi Arabia, another major gas producer, is in a more fortunate position since it has long favored the conversion of natural gas to liquid products in its domestic chemical industry rather than exporting its gas as LNG. This now appears to have been a wise choice.

Gas importers, by contrast, stand to gain from the increased availability of natural gas. Europe, with significant but as yet unproven shale gas prospects, should see its security concerns about dependence on Russian gas imports subside—especially concerns in Germany, which gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Over the past five years, disputes between Russia and Ukraine over gas have led to periodic cutoffs of gas to Europe. Europe can look forward to a more open market, one with competition among widespread gas production in Europe, LNG imports, and piped gas from Russia and North Africa.

In Asia, countries that consume natural gas will find it cheaper to do so. The developed Asian states—Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are large importers of natural gas and have long paid oil-linked prices for it. They can anticipate more favorable terms from Australian, Middle Eastern, and Russian suppliers when existing contracts expire. China and India, rapidly growing Asian economies that are becoming the largest global gas consumers, should especially welcome the greater availability of natural gas. For them, it presents an opportunity to replace aging and inefficient coal-fired power plants and reduce their carbon dioxide emissions.

The news for Asian natural gas exporters is not as good. Most of the natural gas traded in Asia is in the form of LNG. Asia has over 60 LNG regasification facilities planned or in operation, and significant investments have been made in liquefaction terminals in Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. As elsewhere, in Asia, producers supplying LNG should anticipate earning less when natural gas prices fall as they delink from oil prices. In some cases, the drop in gas prices may mean that certain projects will no longer make economic sense. Energy companies in Australia, for example, may need to reassess their ambitious Gorgon conventional gas project, which is intended to extract gas from far offshore and export it as LNG, and their similarly ambitious coal-bed methane projects.

THE LONG VIEW

In addition to affecting natural gas markets, the increased supply of natural gas will dramatically change the outlook for oil markets. As natural gas edges out oil in the power, transportation, and chemical sectors, oil prices will fall and the price disparity between oil and gas will close.

The major oil-producing countries, of course, will need to readjust their expectations. Most of them operate through national oil companies that serve their government's political and economic interests. The newfound natural gas reserves, dispersed around the world, will reduce the market power these companies have enjoyed. There will be difficult negotiations between natural gas suppliers and consumers over new contract terms. Accordingly, past concerns that the Gas

Exporting Countries Forum, an OPEC-like cartel formed by major natural gas producers, could control supplies and prices of gas the way oil producers have with oil appear far less serious. International oil companies caught with major investments in the exploration and production of natural gas in the Arctic and deep offshore are quickly shifting their exploration and production activities to shale and other forms of unconventional gas that are cheaper to produce.

Nobody knows how significant this prospective shift from oil to natural gas might become. But two points deserve emphasis. First, although the explosion of shale gas production will lead to gas substituting for oil and erode the market and political power of today's major oil- and gas-exporting countries, this market penetration will not be so large that the security concerns of the United States and other oil importers about dependence on foreign oil will disappear. And second, in the long run, the world will need to transition from fossil fuels to carbon-free sources of energy, such as wind, solar, geothermal, and nuclear energy. In this sense, shale gas is a way station en route to a new energy future—not a permanent solution to the problem.

None of these changes will occur rapidly. There are significant uncertainties about how much shale gas around the world can be produced economically, the environmental implications of widespread production, and the economics of substituting natural gas for other sources. The large investments required for natural gas exploration, production, and distribution depend on financing supported by long-term contracts. Established industry practices change slowly. There will continue to be fierce competition over pipeline routes, LNG projects, and supply contracts—which means that there will continue to be difficult commercial, financing, and political negotiations between supplier and consuming nations. The countries and international oil companies that are large producers of conventional natural gas will resist delinking the price of the gas they sell from the price of oil.

But at the end of the day, economic reality should prevail, and a global market for gas will develop just as it did for oil. Eventually, there will be a transparent and integrated global gas market with diverse supplies that is governed by economic considerations and is free of subsidies. And gas consumers everywhere will be better off.

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A Third Way to Palestine

Fayyadism and Its Discontents

Robert M. Danin

This past September, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sat down in Washington to dine with U.S. President Barack Obama, a barely noticed event took place in Ramallah. With little fanfare, the 13th Palestinian Authority (PA) government, headed by Salam Fayyad, issued its one-year countdown to independence. This brief and understated document is likely to prove far more significant for the future of Palestine than the White House dinner and reflects nothing short of a revolutionary new approach to Palestinian statehood.

For nearly a century, "armed struggle" was the dominant leitmotif of the Palestinian nationalist movement. This strategy was supplemented and ostensibly replaced by peace negotiations after the Oslo accords of 1993. The newest approach, adopted by Prime Minister Fayyad, a U.S.-educated former International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist, signifies the rise of a third and highly pragmatic form of Palestinian nationalism. Fayyad's strategy is one of self-reliance and self-empowerment; his focus is on providing good government, economic opportunity, and law and

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Robert M. Danin is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He headed the Jerusalem mission of Quartet Representative Tony Blair from April 2008 to June 2010 and served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and Director for the Levant and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from 2003 to 2005.

order for the Palestinians—and security for Israel by extension—and so removing whatever pretexts may exist for Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. Fayyad's aim is to make the process of institution building transformative for Palestinians, thereby instilling a sense that statehood is inevitable. Elegant in its simplicity and seemingly unassailable in its reasonableness, this third way—dubbed "Fayyadism" by some Western observers—has nevertheless precipitated serious opposition. Some Palestinians fear Fayyad is only making life better under Israel's occupation, Israelis accuse him of becoming increasingly confrontational, and a growing number of international democracy advocates blame him for Palestinian political paralysis.

Although Fayyadism is not a replacement for a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has become an indispensible component of any future talks. Improving conditions on the ground and giving people a greater stake in running their own lives demonstrate to Palestinians that the peaceful path pays dividends. Fayyadism empowers Palestinian leaders to convince their constituents that it is worthwhile to make the painful compromises that will be necessary for a genuine settlement to be reached. At the same time, more widespread recognition of Palestinian performance on the ground in the realms of security, economic growth, and administration will instill confidence among Israelis that they can hand over control of the occupied territories to a reliable Palestinian partner. Skeptical Israelis tend to wonder: Is Fayyad a partner or an opponent? The reality is that as a Palestinian nationalist, he is both—although not an enemy.

Should peace negotiations break down, as they have so often in the past, then the Fayyadist enterprise can provide an important safety net for the Palestinians and the Israelis: it can help prevent a complete breakdown in Israeli-Palestinian relations and a possible cascade into violence, as occurred in 2000, when peace talks broke down and there was nothing else in place to revive them. Such a safety net can help keep hope—and people—alive.

THE STRUGGLE WITHOUT

Since 1948, the Palestinian nationalist movement has largely been dominated by the "outsiders"—Palestinians exiled in the Arab world and beyond.

Robert M. Danin

The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in Cairo by the Arab states in 1964 as an umbrella organization for the various Palestinian nationalist groups. Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement soon came to dominate the PLO; its primary objective was to reverse the creation of the Jewish state and return Palestinian refugees to the homes they lost in 1948 by means of armed struggle and terrorism. Some of those Palestinians who had taken refuge from Israel in the West Bank and Gaza used those Palestinian territories, then administered by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, to launch guerrilla raids into Israel.

With Israel's lightning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, the West Bank and Gaza came under Israel's control. Still, the center of Palestinian political gravity remained with the PLO leaders in exile. These "outsiders" tended to be more absolutist in their objectives, given that they had already paid the price of defeat by Israel, whereas the "insiders"—those Palestinians residing in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem—struggled to protect their homes and patrimony under Israeli occupation.

Insiders launched the first intifada, or uprising, in late 1987, thereby taking the lead in intra-Palestinian politics. The uprising was initiated by a loose coalition associated with Fatah and other nationalist groups, alongside a new Palestinian organization: Hamas. Founded in Gaza, Hamas emerged as an Islamist alternative to Fatah and the PLO and challenged the PLO's exclusive leadership claims inside the occupied territories. Although the PLO leadership based in Tunisia eventually caught up and secured its political primacy, the center of gravity within Palestinian politics had fundamentally shifted to the insiders.

Their first success was in forcing Jordanian King Hussein to relinquish Jordanian claims to the West Bank. The outsiders and their absolutist approach were further weakened when the PLO backed Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. After the 1993 Oslo accords, the PLO moved toward conciliation and recognized Israel and its right to exist. Israel, in turn, recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat returned from exile, and the PLO outsiders and insiders were suddenly and uneasily reunited in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas remained largely outside Palestinian politics as an Islamist social movement with a small, and violent, terrorist wing.

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The Oslo accords and the self-rule they initiated by creating the PA were meant to end the era of armed struggle and terrorism. Negotiations with Israel and the establishment of Palestinian institutions, so the logic went, would lead to a final peace accord between Israel and the PLO. For a time, it seemed to be working. Israel granted the Palestinians limited control over portions of the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas was weak, and the two sides attempted to negotiate a final settlement to end the conflict. But that hope was short-lived. Rather than serving to build confidence, the post-Oslo period only increased bitterness and mistrust. Palestinians either engaged in or turned a blind eye to terrorism, and incitement to violence continued. Meanwhile, Israel continued to expand the West Bank settlements and failed to carry out previously negotiated troop redeployments from the West Bank.

Fayyad replaced reform and minor technocratic goals with bold, revolutionary aspirations.

By the autumn of 2000, the road to peace no longer seemed so clear. The first intifada, in 1987, had been waged largely with stones and Molotov cocktails; the second one, which began in September 2000, relied on higher-tech weapons and, increasingly, suicide terrorist attacks. Palestinian security officers who until then had worked closely with their Israeli counterparts turned their weapons on the Israelis. Israel, in turn, attacked PA institutions and reoccupied some parts of the West Bank from which it had earlier withdrawn. Oslo seemed to be unraveling. Armed struggle, it turned out, had not been abandoned after all; Arafat had simply chosen to harness violence to supplement negotiations.

During the second intifada, the nationalist Fatah camp was outflanked by Hamas' more militant approach and its absolute rejection of Israel. Ultimately, Israel succeeded militarily in bringing the second intifada to a halt, largely by reoccupying the West Bank and then building a separation barrier to keep Palestinians out of Israel. Yet this did not kill the resistance impulse. Its mantle had been largely taken up by Hamas; other religious militant groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and radical elements in Fatah, such as the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, all of whom continued to reject the principle of nonviolence, even though by 2003 Israel had severely limited those Palestinians' ability to conduct terrorist attacks.

Arafat died in November 2004; two months later, Abbas was elected as the second PA president. Abbas' victory ushered in a new era, with a clear Palestinian commitment to peaceful negotiations. Israelis welcomed his unambiguous renunciation of all violence, but Abbas' approach was not universally embraced by all Palestinians. Some had lost faith in the Oslo-era paradigm of negotiations as the path to statehood. Abbas' party, Fatah, lost the January 2006 parliamentary elections to Hamas by a slim margin in what was largely a protest vote against Fatah corruption and sclerosis. Hamas formed a new PA government and took power for the first time. Subsequent outside efforts to moderate the organization, such as the February 2007 Mecca accord, which produced a Hamas-Fatah unity government, failed to convince Hamas to renounce violence and terrorism.

THE LONELY REFORMER

Under the Hamas-Fatah unity government, intra-Palestinian tensions mounted over who retained control of the security forces, eventually leading Hamas to go on the offensive in Gaza. After its fighters violently took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and ejected the Fatah-dominated PA security forces, Abbas dissolved the national unity government and appointed the PA's long-standing finance minister, Fayyad, an independent and an insider from the West Bank, to form a new PA government. The PA retained control of the West Bank, and Hamas became the de facto authority in Gaza, even though the PA still continues to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of employees there. The PA, severely wounded by Israel during the second intifada and then by Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections, was now placed in the hands of a little-known political independent.

As Arafat's finance minister, Fayyad had won domestic and international acclaim for introducing transparency and accountability to the PA. With Fayyad at the helm, the PA initially set forth an extremely modest reform and development agenda. The goal was to provide basic services and pay the salaries of civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza while encouraging fiscal discipline. The PA's systematic two-year development plan, presented at an international donors'

conference for the Palestinian territories held in December 2007 in Paris, called on Israel, the Palestinians, and the international community to work together to create an environment conducive to Palestinian reform. It was, in short, a plan for good governance and improving the investment climate. The international community pledged more than $7.7 billion, although some Arab states have yet to make good on their promises.

In early 2008, Israel and Fayyad's PA government agreed to work to improve living conditions in the West Bank. A new Palestinian effort, encouraged by the United States and Tony Blair, the official envoy of the Quartet (the European Union, the UN, the United States, and Russia), aimed to bring about rapid change and to increase PA control on the ground. Slowly, over the next year, Israel allowed PA forces to deploy and retake control of limited areas, and then increasingly more West Bank towns, using newly trained officers. This approach was also meant to help generate support for the PA and the peace negotiations then under way between President Abbas and then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

The PA also intensified its economic efforts with hundreds of development projects supported by the international community. At the Quartet's prodding, some Israeli physical barriers to movement—both within the West Bank and between it and Israel—were eased or removed beginning in the second half of 2008 and then more seriously in 2009, precipitating a much-hoped-for economic boost by allowing trade to flourish. Palestinian forces deployed professionally and effectively, retaking areas that had descended into chaos and militia control. This joint approach was quietly expanded to other parts of the West Bank, with similarly encouraging results. The city of Nablus and its environs, which had been a hotbed of some of the worst intifada violence and terrorism, became increasingly prosperous and safe. Yet Fayyad was and still remains frustrated by Israel's frequent military incursions into Palestinian population centers, which undermine PA credibility and the growing sense that Palestinians are regaining control of their own lives. The Palestinians were indeed beginning to prosper. But without there being a real sense of retaking control, the economic benefit could not translate into political recognition of that change.

A THIRD PATH

In August 2009, strengthened by a cabinet reshuffle, Fayyad adopted a more radical and audacious program. It aimed at nothing short of ending the occupation and achieving statehood within two years. Fayyad enumerated, ministry by ministry, the steps the government would take to prepare the Palestinian territories for that goal.

By announcing an ambitious two-year deadline for statehood, Fayyad reintroduced the timeline that had fallen by the wayside. The Oslo accords had aimed to reach a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 1999; once that deadline lapsed, the Palestinians lost confidence in the idea of independence. The Quartet's 2003 "road map" had set 2005 as the date for Palestinian statehood, although by then, the Palestinians believed it would never happen. By setting his own goal, Fayyad sought to motivate his constituents and signal to Israel that the Palestinians were unhappy with the sense of drift. The year of decision would be 2011.

Fayyad replaced reform and minor technocratic goals with bold, revolutionary aspirations. As he put it in the PA government's August 2009 program, he sought "to complete the process of building institutions of the independent State of Palestine in order to establish a *de facto* state apparatus within the next two years." The PA pledged to finalize the creation of central and local institutions, upgrade the delivery of government services, and launch infrastructure projects. Fayyad also issued a bold call for self-reliance: "Hard work, coupled with faith in our ability to create new realities on the ground, will clear our path to freedom. Through our strength of will and building on the foundations of our achievements we can end the occupation and establish the independent and sovereign state of Palestine." This marked a dramatic departure both from the old model of armed struggle and from the modest goals Fayyad had articulated just 18 months earlier, which focused on working with Israel to create conditions conducive to reform.

Fayyadism represents, above all, a fundamental attitudinal shift. Its emphasis on self-reliance is a conscious effort to change the role of the Palestinians in their narrative from that of victims to that of agents of their own fate. It is a vision for the future and an implicit critique

of the Palestinian national movement's long-standing fixation on the past. It strives to replace cynicism and hopelessness, rampant among Palestinians, who have repeatedly seen their dreams squelched, with reasons for hope. The process itself is transformational: as the situation on the ground improves and the PA delivers increasing economic prosperity and security for the Palestinians and, ultimately, for Israel, the PA will provide a sense of possibility where one has been sorely lacking. Finally, Fayyadism repudiates the use of violence—a tactic that was long central to Palestinian nationalism and still has widespread resonance in Palestinian society.

This approach has the power to change the way that Israelis regard their Palestinian neighbors. In the past two years, the Israeli security establishment has dramatically shifted its view of Palestinian institutions and capabilities. When Fayyad first embarked on his reforms, most Israeli experts deemed his plans unrealistic. Yet slowly, grudgingly, and with increased respect, key Israelis from the military and intelligence services have recognized that the Palestinians are functioning effectively in the realms of governance, economic development, and, most important to Israel, security.

Since 2007, the West Bank economy has taken off. Official IMF figures place growth in the West Bank at 8.5 percent for 2009, with the first part of 2010 registering over 11 percent growth. Government spending has remained within budgetary targets, and improved tax collection rates have resulted in higher than projected domestic tax revenues. Indeed, in the first half of 2010, tax revenues were 15 percent above budgetary projections. Unemployment, close to 20 percent in 2008, has been reduced by nearly a third. More than 120 schools were built over the past two years, 1,100 miles of road laid, and 900 miles of new water networks established. In the past year alone, 11 new health clinics were built and 30 more were expanded in the West Bank.

To even the casual observer, it is clear that the PA's efforts over the past two years have had a dramatic effect in the West Bank. Ramallah is booming. Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, and other cities that were once no-go areas are now safe and bustling at all hours. Renegade militiamen no longer walk the streets with impunity; they have either been imprisoned, been driven underground, or been granted amnesty as a result of a 2007 deal with Israel. Now, uniformed Palestinian police

officers keep the peace, with six battalions recently trained by U.S. forces deployed throughout the West Bank. Such actions were prescribed by the road map, which outlined the path to a two-state solution.

The Palestinian security services under Arafat had become so unwieldy, with more than a dozen competing armed organizations, that a dramatic reform effort was necessary to make them efficient and accountable. Thus, the road map explicitly called on the PA to rebuild and consolidate the Palestinian forces, with U.S. assistance, into three main bodies reporting to a newly empowered interior minister. Providing law and order, dismantling terrorist organizations, and cooperating with Israel were all identified and endorsed by the international community as steps required for real progress toward Palestinian statehood.

The Israelis should suspend their ambivalence about Fayyad; he and Abbas are the best Palestinian partners they are ever likely to find.

Fayyad's goal was to create the necessary conditions so that the Palestinians would be prepared for de facto statehood by 2011. From an economic and institutional standpoint, that goal has already been achieved, at least according to the World Bank. Its most recent monitoring report of Palestinian institutions concluded in September 2010 that "if the PA maintains its current performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future."

Not surprisingly, Fayyad's efforts have generated public support and boosted his job-approval ratings. This is due partly to his tireless approach of taking his campaign to the streets and to areas of the West Bank that other politicians avoid—a strategy that has generated support among the politically unaffiliated majority, who see the dominant Fatah Party as hopelessly corrupt and Hamas' vision as frighteningly reactionary. Yet Fayyad has not translated this support into any meaningful political organization. He remains genuinely politically independent, with no formal political base or organizational structure. Hence, one of Fayyadism's greatest challenges lies in translating this one-man phenomenon into something more systematic than just the vision Fayyad espouses.

IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL INDEPENDENCE COME?

WITH SUCH a bold departure from past traditions, it is no surprise that Fayyadism has generated a significant backlash from within the Palestinian polity and even from some supporters of the Palestinian cause abroad. By attempting to build institutions of a state while under occupation, cooperating with the Israelis, and behaving as if Palestine were a state, Fayyad is seen by many as having abandoned the traditional liberation theology of the Palestinian national movement. Moreover, by establishing an alternative basis for legitimacy—competence and results—in a society in which legitimacy has traditionally derived from leadership in the armed struggle, Fayyad is asking the public to take a leap of faith. Many fear that in doing so, he is ceding sacred ground to Hamas. It is not yet obvious to many Palestinians that competent institutions will help them achieve statehood.

Fayyad's critics fear that although he has embarked on a noble venture, his approach is naive and potentially politically suicidal. They argue that by focusing on changes on the ground, Fayyad is ignoring the fundamental nature of the occupation, which they say must be addressed at a political level. They fear that however good his intentions, the reformist project will fail because they believe the overwhelming weight of Israel's occupation will never allow the Palestinians to succeed. Improving conditions in the West Bank, they argue, is a palliative remedy that serves Israeli interests by lightening the burden of Israel's military occupation. Yet Fayyad seeks to move away from the zero-sum thinking that suggests that anything that could possibly benefit the Palestinians should be bad for Israel, and vice versa. Instead, he argues that improving the lives and security of Palestinians also serves to build trust and cooperation with the country he seeks as a future Palestine's peaceful neighbor.

A second criticism leveled at Fayyad is that rather than supporting President Abbas in political negotiations, Fayyad is undermining the PA's effort to secure the entirety of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They fear that Fayyad is setting up the PA to accept Phase 2 of the road map, which calls for a Palestinian state with provisional borders, the final disposition of which would be negotiated between the embryonic Palestinian state and Israel. Many

Palestinians worry that Israel might then simply recognize Palestine in the 40 percent of the West Bank that currently falls outside of exclusive Israeli jurisdiction. The existential dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians could then be rendered a territorial dispute, leaving Israel with the upper hand. At that point, critics argue, the international community would lose interest and declare the dispute largely resolved, with some territorial claims outstanding. This concern is largely unfounded, however, given that Fayyad has repeatedly and unequivocally argued that Palestine must include the entirety of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, with the 1967 armistice line as its border.

Fayyad's approach also challenges some of the deeply entrenched corruption that remains in Palestinian society. For a small yet influential group of Palestinians, Fayyad's reforms pose a direct threat. By instituting a transparent and accountable salary-payment mechanism in the Finance Ministry during Arafat's rule, Fayyad opened the taps for significantly greater foreign financial support to the Palestinians, but in doing so, he also robbed some of the traditional business elites of the money that allowed them to maintain their patronage networks. As prime minister, Fayyad has resisted relinquishing control over the Finance Ministry, lest it become a source of funding for unauthorized party activity. This has pitted him against some of the Fatah stalwarts, already resentful of Fayyad for his popularity and independence, who are keen to gain access to the PA coffers. So strong are the vested interests of some within Fatah that they would rather see Fayyad fail, and the Palestinian enterprise suffer, than see him succeed and endanger their long-standing economic interests.

Hamas leaders are also opposed to Fayyad, and not only because the PA refuses to grant them a seat in the government so long as Hamas occupies Gaza and refuses to surrender to the PA's monopoly of force. For years, Hamas actually respected Fayyad's willingness to challenge Fatah corruption and quietly backed his clean-government approach. This dovetailed well with Hamas' early efforts to challenge corruption—at least when they were in the opposition. But now, Fayyad is working to ensure that there is only one security force deployed on the West Bank's streets—the PA's—and to prevent all forms of violence. Consequently, Hamas has become an opponent.

The PA security services have been accused of heavy-handedness in their treatment of Hamas in the West Bank. After the death of an incarcerated suspected Hamas member in June 2009, the PA took steps to avoid future similar incidents, such as issuing orders forbidding physical and psychological punishment and disciplining the officers involved in the affair. In September 2009, Fayyad ordered security commanders to halt the mistreatment of prisoners; 43 officers were demoted, jailed, or fired for abusing prisoners. Hamas legislators and human rights researchers confirmed that the PA forces ceased torturing prisoners. Al-Haq, one of the leading Palestinian human rights organizations, wrote to Fayyad in February of last year and noted his "honest approach toward establishing legitimacy and the rule of law." Fayyad's most recent government guidelines contain extensive plans for strengthening the justice system, including building a penal system that "unfailingly respects human rights," upgrading law enforcement capacity, and encouraging civil society to publicly report on the performance of public institutions in relation to human rights.

Fayyad has also been criticized for the lack of effective checks and balances in Palestinian governing institutions. This critique is valid but misplaced. The blame rests not with the Fayyad administration but with the dysfunctional status quo, brought about largely by Hamas' violent takeover of Gaza, in which the PA was violently driven out. Indeed, today a quorum cannot convene for the Palestinian Legislative Council. Nor does there seem to be a great impetus for this to happen, either from Hamas, which enjoys the monopoly it exercises over Gaza, or within Fatah, which only has minority status within the PLC. The Fatah-Hamas stalemate can only be resolved in one of three ways: through true reconciliation, such as by means of the effort sponsored by Egypt over the past few years; through new elections that produce a decisive victory that the other cannot ignore; or by one side's ousting the other and taking control of the territory it currently does not govern.

THE ROAD TO STATEHOOD

FAYYADISM ASPIRES to bring the PA to the gates of statehood, but it does not clearly articulate how the Palestinians will then cross that

threshold. Ideally, negotiations with Israel will hasten that outcome. Fayyad's focus is on preparing the groundwork so that all obstacles to independence are removed.

However much progress has been made, the Fayyadist experiment could still unravel. The bolt from the blue remains one of the defining hallmarks of the Holy Land, and any number of sudden or undesirable developments could end the Fayyadist experiment. Unanticipated violence, precipitated by dashed political expectations, could reverse many of the gains, just as the eruption of the second intifada did in 2000. Conversely, Fayyadism's success could precipitate violence by renegade Palestinians or Israelis who seek to foil Fayyad's aspirations. His efforts could also be undermined by political developments, such as a radical shakeup that ends the uneasy political marriage between Abbas and his prime minister, a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement that renders Fayyadism a casualty, or Israeli reluctance to cede greater control to the PA. Fayyadism is a bicycle that must either pedal on or fall over from a lack of forward momentum.

The political divide between the physically disconnected West Bank and Gaza also must be bridged if Palestinian statehood is to be realized. Unless Hamas lays down its weapons or relinquishes absolute control of Gaza, a unified Palestinian state is not likely. Israel's attempts to isolate Gaza and squeeze it materially have not produced a popular uprising against Hamas rule, nor will it. Hamas' military lock on Gaza is too strong, despite its lack of real popular support there (polls consistently show Hamas' popularity ratings in Gaza to be between 20 percent and 25 percent). And as the 2009 Operation Cast Lead demonstrated, although Israel is willing to use devastating firepower to weaken Hamas, it is not willing—nor is Egypt—to use military force to completely extricate Hamas from Gaza. Instead, a general consensus exists that Palestinian political reconciliation is the only option. Yet Hamas is comfortably entrenched in Gaza, as is the PA in the West Bank, and neither is willing to make the fundamental concessions required for real unity.

The stronger the Fayyad government becomes, and the more it delivers results to the people, the better placed the PA will be to extract concessions from Hamas, especially if the only thing holding up an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is Hamas' political opposition.

PA leaders calculate that progress in the negotiations and ultimately a credible peace deal with Israel could be put to a popular referendum, thereby placing Hamas in the unenviable position of becoming the spoiler of Palestinian statehood; Hamas wants to ensure that a deal is not reached so that it will not be placed in that position.

The only other alternative would be a three-state solution—a Hamas-controlled state in Gaza, a Fatah-controlled state in the West Bank, and Israel sandwiched in between. Indeed, there are some Israelis and even some Palestinians who see merit to such an outcome. Fayyad, however, has categorically rejected three states as an unacceptable solution, arguing that if the political split between the West Bank and Gaza is not resolved, then there cannot be a Palestinian state.

FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION

IN THE meantime, much more can be done—by the Palestinians, by Israel, and by the international community—to strengthen the Fayyadist endeavor. For its part, Israel should suspend its ambivalence about Fayyad and recognize that this is a historic opportunity—he and Abbas are the best Palestinian partners Israel is ever likely to find. This partnership does not require affection, just a businesslike calculation of self-interest.

For a long time, Israelis in the national security establishment dismissed Fayyad as affable but not strong and were therefore reluctant to do anything to help him. Now, they recognize the seriousness and strength of his efforts but are not quite sure how to react. Fayyad has taken steps in the past few years that have made him increasingly suspect in the eyes of Israelis. He has appealed to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to block Israel's membership in the body, waged a campaign to boycott goods produced in Israeli settlements, written letters to members of the European Union urging them not to upgrade the EU's relationship with Israel under the European Neighborhood Policy, and participated in the weekly peaceful demonstrations against the barrier Israel has erected to separate it from the Palestinians.

Israel's concern is understandable, given that Fayyad is asking the Israelis to entrust him with more power. Some of the steps that

Fayyad has taken to confront Israel internationally may actually be politically counterproductive, in that they push away some of the very Israelis he seeks to engage. Although he has tried to rectify this by explaining his approach directly to Israeli audiences, his message has not resonated widely in Israel. Those who understand his need to balance domestic political concerns with cooperation with Israel have not been very vocal. But the Israelis should recognize that Fayyad's commitment to nonviolence is unequivocal and that he has taken political and personal risks at home to pursue peaceful reconciliation.

Israel can help Fayyad with security, especially in the West Bank areas in which Palestinians are still prevented from exercising control. Ultimately, for Fayyad to convince the Israelis that a Palestinian state is an asset and not a threat, he will need to demonstrate that the Palestinians can deliver effective security throughout the West Bank and are able to prevent Hamas from taking over. At the moment, the PA is still prevented from operating in vast areas of the West Bank, and the Israel Defense Forces still conduct visible operations in areas that previous agreements gave over to Palestinian control. These incursions, more than any other Israeli action, discredit Fayyad and the PA in the eyes of Palestinians and undermine the motivation of the Palestinian security services. Greater coordination between Israel and the PA could help minimize or eliminate these incursions and allow the Palestinians to expand their operations effectively into West Bank territory today controlled by Israel. This would be consistent with the IDF's recurrent pledge that the more the Palestinians do in terms of security in the West Bank, the less Israel will do.

Second, Israel needs the PA to play a role within "Area C"—the 60 percent of contiguous West Bank territory still under exclusive Israeli control. PA efforts there are critical for sustainable economic development and for private-sector investment. To date, Palestinian construction and development is forbidden by Israel in 70 percent of Area C, and in the remaining 30 percent, it is nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain the required permission to build or repair infrastructure.

Israel should allow the PA to implement development projects and access its land and resources. In addition, Israel should reinstate the moratorium on demolishing Palestinian structures that it adopted for

five months in 2008 and halt further expropriations of land in these areas. Including Palestinians in planning and zoning in Area C, especially in Palestinian-populated areas, and facilitating access to the Jordan Valley would send a powerful signal that Israel is serious about its commitment to a two-state solution. It is also one of the most important steps Israel can take to allow the Palestinians to create a sense of a state in the making.

All of this will require greater Palestinian operational coordination with Israel to supplement the political negotiations. To date, that coordination has been insufficient. Israel and the PA meet on an ad hoc basis or through third parties. Left to their own devices, Israel and the PA will not likely establish the necessary coordination mechanisms. Thus, the international community needs to make the issues pertaining to Area C and security cooperation part of ongoing high-level negotiations or establish a systematic and ongoing trilateral mechanism to bring together the Palestinian prime minister and the Israeli defense minister, given that the Israeli military still exercises jurisdiction over the occupied territories.

Although the international community has played an important role in providing financial support to the PA, it has not always put its mouth where its money is. The United States, as the overseer of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, has tended to focus its high-level attention on negotiations, while leaving subordinates to do the important work on the ground to support Palestinian state building. Focusing more political attention on the ground-up approach would help strengthen Fayyad's position among Palestinians, encourage Israel to invest more political capital in the state-building effort, and ultimately increase the chances that final-status negotiations will succeed.

Fayyadism alone will not resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only an agreement accepted by the Israelis and the Palestinians can do that. But Fayyadism is helping support that effort and preparing the groundwork for peace and Palestinian statehood in a way that negotiations alone or armed struggle never could.

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Small Arms, Big Problems

The Fallout of the Global Gun Trade

C. J. Chivers

In late 2001, in the early days of the war in Afghanistan, Western military planners worried about two types of dated weapons that were the legacies of the Soviet-Afghan war: shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles and land mines. The United States had provided anti-Soviet forces with Stinger missiles in the 1980s, and the prospect that the Taliban or al Qaeda might have retained these weapons fueled fears that they would use them against Western military aircraft or, more menacingly, against commercial passenger jets worldwide. Land mines inspired a different but just as persistent unease: even after U.S. and Afghan forces chased the Taliban from Kabul, how could a country said to be littered with millions of mines develop at any kind of hopeful pace?

More than nine years on, there is now a much clearer picture of which equipment from past wars endangers the region's long-term security and threatens both troops on the ground and civilians beyond the Afghan frontier. The largest threat comes not from missiles or mines but from excess stocks of surplus infantry rifles and machine guns. These familiar weapons—durable, reusable, portable, inexpensive, and effective—have claimed more lives than the weapons the West once feared most in Afghanistan. They have qualities that make them a greater long-term menace than either Stinger missiles or land mines. And yet their very familiarity has kept them out of many policy discussions about how to alleviate the violence and criminality that undermine not just Afghanistan but also life in many of the world's perennial conflict zones.

C. J. Chivers is a Senior Writer for *The New York Times* and the author of *The Gun*.

For a glimpse of how surplus military arms compromise security in Afghanistan—as they do elsewhere—one need look no further than the results of a highly publicized U.S.-led military offensive in 2010. Last February, in Helmand Province, a U.S. Marine Corps rifle company and an Afghan National Army platoon landed in northern Marja, a stronghold of Taliban insurgents and Afghan drug barons. The helicopters set down in darkness and then lifted away. By midday, the U.S. and Afghan soldiers were tied up in a series of rolling gunfights in the cluster of villages on the steppe. This particular rifle company, Kilo Company of the Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, was a single piece in one of the largest offensive operations of the war, a brigade-sized assault to sweep and clear a warren of irrigation canals and farming villages that the Taliban used as a safe haven and then to prepare Marja for the Afghan government to establish a presence and roll back the opium trade.

That was the plan. But even after two Marine Corps battalions settled into the farmland, backed by U.S. air support and the most modern equipment available to any of the world's militaries, the resistance in Marja continued. In the months since, Marja has settled into a grinding small-unit contest that, as the first winter after the offensive began draws near, shows little sign of ending. Its insurgents, like those in much of rural Afghanistan, appear prepared for a protracted fight. The question for U.S. military planners, then, is how these fighters have managed to sustain themselves against highly trained Western forces on what, by any measure, is a tiny patch of ground.

GUNS, GRUNTS, AND STEEL

Part of the answer was clear from the first days of the campaign: the abundance of surplus infantry arms available on the ground. As the marines fought through ambushes and searched Afghan homes, they began to capture—rifle by rifle and cartridge by cartridge—some of the weapons used by their adversaries. These arms caches told something essential to understanding how many modern wars are fought and how relatively low-tech, low-budget irregular forces remain viable and effective. The rifles and machine guns seized by U.S. forces fit into two main categories: older bolt-action infantry arms (dominated by the Lee-Enfield line, of British provenance, and, to a lesser extent, Soviet

Mosin-Nagants, manufactured before the Cold War) and newer, but still dated, automatic rifles. The automatics were the Kalashnikov assault rifle and its cousin, the Kalashnikov medium machine gun, or PKM.

As the marines learned their new ground in Marja, they soon discovered that among the Afghans firing at them was a set of reasonably well-trained snipers, who would take disciplined, long-range shots from concealment on the other side of irrigation canals. Although not as effective as professional snipers of conventional armies, they were a menace. They pinned down patrols, and at times their bullets struck Afghan soldiers or U.S. marines.

Early on in the campaign, Kilo Company came across a find that shed light on what sort of ammunition these snipers were using. The marines discovered a bandoleer containing rifle ammunition that few of them had ever seen before but that has been part of the Afghan martial culture for decades: a soiled assortment of Mark VII .303 cartridges, formerly the standard rifle cartridge of the British Empire. Each of these cartridges was slightly more than three inches long. Their markings revealed that they had been manufactured in the 1940s, almost certainly making the ammunition much older than anyone directly involved in the Marja fight. Each bullet was wrapped in a steel jacket, a result of the decision in World War II to conserve stocks of British alloys needed for other war materials (before the war, bullets were typically jacketed in copper-nickel alloy). Almost 70 years later, these British cartridges, the refuse of a bygone war, remained in the field. Before long, the marines were capturing the rifles that had fired them: Lee-Enfield bolt-action rifles, carried by British troops since the colonial era and replaced after World War II.

Afghanistan and the Lee-Enfield have intertwined histories. These stalwart British rifles were manufactured by the millions in the United Kingdom, Canada, India, and Pakistan. They are well made, powerful, very accurate, simple in construction, and outfitted with a smooth and sturdy trigger appreciated by generations of riflemen. Bolt-action rifles fire a single shot for each trigger squeeze. To prepare the rifle for the next shot, the shooter must reload manually, an action performed by withdrawing the bolt and then returning it to its place, the motion of which slides a fresh cartridge into place from a magazine that protrudes from the rifle's underside. They are, in short, a firearm to be used methodically—long-barreled killing tools that possess a

capacity for medium- and long-range precision. They were one of the standard arms soldiers carried on the battlefield for several decades, including throughout World War I and World War II.

In time, however, the world's militaries decided that the qualities of the Lee-Enfield and its ilk were not quite what they wanted. During the Cold War, they were abruptly displaced by the development of Eastern bloc assault rifles, which can fire either automatically (like a machine gun) or semiautomatically (one shot for each depression of the trigger). The armies of the Warsaw Pact fielded the Kalashnikov line throughout the 1950s and 1960s, prompting the United States in the mid-1960s to produce its own assault rifle, the M-16. Soon, other NATO militaries followed with a suite of European automatics. Bolt-action rifles and their ammunition became surplus as standard arms—excess weapons no longer needed by the armies that had once carried them. Since then they have moved about Asia and Africa through arms markets and government sales. (The distribution of the rifles often represented a form of Cold War black art—as when, in the 1980s, the CIA and Pakistani intelligence passed Lee-Enfields to anti-Soviet mujahideen in Afghanistan.) And now, two decades later, Lee-Enfields were in Marja, put to service as sniper rifles by local fighters trying to frustrate yet another military campaign to subdue an Afghan insurgency.

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A Lee-Enfield rifle captured by U.S. marines in Marja in early 2010

The Lee-Enfields were, however, only a small part of the arms story on the ground in Marja. The marines gathered many more rifles of a class more commonly associated with the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan: automatic Kalashnikovs, many of them knockoffs of the original AK-47. The AK-47 was born in the 1940s in the secretive Soviet arms-design system—the result of the military-industrial might of Stalin's Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War harnessed to make weapons for the Cold War. Shorter and lighter than the Lee-Enfield and its cousins, the Kalashnikov is a compact, versatile, durable, and easy-to-use automatic weapon, assembled in quantities that no firearm before it had ever known.

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In Marja—just as it has been across Afghanistan since at least the mid-1980s—the Kalashnikov is the principal insurgent firearm. The Kalashnikov is not a miracle gun, as it is often portrayed. But it is very good at what it was designed to do. Unlike the Lee-Enfield, it does not readily lend itself to precision fire. It has a shorter effective range, and in Afghanistan, insurgents commonly fire the Kalashnikov in long, cracking bursts, using it to harass and suppress marine patrols. In Afghanistan, Western troops face its gunfire, and gunfire from the PKM—the larger machine gun that also bears the Kalashnikov name—every day. But the Kalashnikov's effect is larger than the damage it inflicts on NATO troops—the Eastern bloc's excess arms are especially devastating against the Afghan soldiers who the United States hopes will soon take over the fight. With their stocks removed, they are readily concealable arms, and at short ranges, they are ferocious, making them particularly effective against Afghan government troops, who often lack sufficient armor and mingle with little discipline in villages and bazaars, where they are vulnerable to ambushes at short range.

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An original AK-47, manufactured in the Soviet Union in 1953 and carried last summer by an Afghan police officer in Kandahar

The Afghan security forces carry Kalasnhnikovs, too. And because the Taliban's Kalashnikovs fire the same ammunition as the Afghan government's Kalashnikovs, the country's insurgents have access to a copious local supply of fresh U.S.-procured ammunition, which leaks through many channels from government custody to the Taliban's hands. Thus equipped, Kalashnikov-toting Taliban fighters have proved to be an intractable feature of the Afghan war—guerrillas and sometimes terrorists armed with the discarded weapons of old governments and cartridges that have escaped the custody of the latest administration in Kabul. These militants are the backbone of the war, the defenders of the booming heroin trade, and the fighting force of a shadow government with influence over much of the countryside.

GUN-BARREL DIPLOMACY

WHAT THE marines were seeing in Marja were the artifacts and effects of a phenomenon known as the arms cascade. As a modern military force either accumulates far more small arms than it needs or updates and replaces its obsolete models, its government passes much of its old stock on to the global arms market.

The world's conventional militaries have upgraded their small arms several times in the past century. If there is any lesson about these cycles of replacement, it is this: as one class of weapon unseats another, displacing it from government arsenals, or as excess guns are deemed unnecessary for national security, the supposedly retired weapons often do not retire at all. They are recycled—sold off or given to new owners—and find new uses outside of state hands. Sometimes these new uses and users are largely harmless, such as when military rifles are sold to Western collectors.

It is one matter for many thousands of rifles to be legally exported from old arsenals by dealers who market them to lawful collectors, often after modifying the weapons to comply with relevant national laws. In the United States, for example, each license required to import military rifles undergoes a federal review, and imported assault rifles are typically modified so that they cannot be fired automatically. Yet it is entirely another matter for such weapons to be shipped en masse to conflict zones, where they are often hastily handed out with little accountability or control, even when issued by governments—such as the United States—that portray themselves as well organized and upstanding.

The workings of international arms transfers can be difficult to trace. Several international agreements have committed nations to monitoring the trade in military small arms and to requiring licenses—essentially permits—for the export of arms beyond their borders. But even with legal transfers, governments usually consider the details of their contracts with arms dealers and their reviews of license applications for transfers between third parties to be closed to public view. And illegal dealers use subterfuge—offshore shell companies, faked end-user certificates, false customs declarations, and shady transport aviation firms—to operate outside of official view. But the weapons themselves turn up, and sometimes, in particular cases, they can be traced back to their source, or at least to an intermediate handler.

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The history of the vz. 58, a Czechoslovak-made assault rifle, provides some examples of how the trade—both legal and illegal—works in practice. In the mid-1950s, soon after the formation of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow ordered the armies of its vassal states in Eastern Europe to standardize their military equipment and make their arms compatible with the equipment of the Soviet army. Within a few years, several arms plants in Eastern Europe had begun manufacturing local variants of the Kalashnikov assault rifle; meanwhile, munitions factories had retooled to produce the 7.62 x 39mm ammunition fired by these rifles. Czechoslovakia, however, was the exception: it was the sole Warsaw Pact member that received permission from the Soviet Union to field its own assault rifle, the vz. 58.

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Afghan boys in Uruzgan Province with a Czechoslovak-made vz. 58 rifle in 2007

This decision would soon make the vz. 58 an important rifle for tracking how weapons move around the globe. Why? The vz. 58 was manufactured in only one country—and, in fact, in only one particular factory in the town of Uherský Brod—which makes it an ideal marker, much like a radioactive isotope in nuclear medicine, for observing how weapons move. The spread of the vz. 58 is largely explained by the shifting size of Czech forces in the twentieth century. During the Cold War, the Czechoslovak military and security agencies had more than 200,000 troops, many of them armed with vz. 58 rifles, with extra guns stored in reserve. After the Warsaw Pact dissolved and Czechoslovakia split in two, the state security apparatus contracted to a fraction of its Cold War size. The vz. 58s that filled armories quickly became surplus. A cascade began. How many rifles ultimately made their way out of state hands is not known. But this much is clear: they moved quickly. As a relatively unknown rifle with little reputation as a combat weapon, the vz. 58 entered the market at remarkably low prices. Some arms dealers say these rifles have been sold in bulk from Prague for less than $25 each; there are credible indications that when these guns are purchased in very large quantities—10,000 or more at a time—they are sold for less than $15 apiece. Before

long, the vz. 58 was turning up in African conflicts—it was a staple of fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire) in the 1990s and is sometimes seen being carried by child soldiers there and elsewhere throughout Africa.

The image of a child soldier with a vz. 58 is especially evocative of the comprehensive effects of military small arms on conflict zones. This is because it is not what these weapons do to the militaries of powerful governments that causes the greatest and longest-lasting harm but rather their impact on the vulnerable and their role in making it possible for militias, militant groups, and criminal gangs to field well-equipped combatants. When readily available to irregular forces, surplus military small arms can make unstable regions more volatile and less economically sound, increase the expenses and dangers of military campaigns or aid and relief missions, enable crime and human rights abuses, dissuade governments from providing services, and increase human suffering. This is true whether the armed bands are in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in and near the Horn of Africa, in southern Iraq, or along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Entire regions of the world, flooded with the excess stocks of government arsenals, have become simmering conflict zones and areas out of any government's control. These are places where even the world's best military forces operate with difficulty and local populations suffer from the presence of armed and lawless groups.

At least two full cycles of the arms cascade were evident in the weapons the marines found in Marja. Lee-Enfields became widely available to guerrillas after World War I, when militaries contracted from their wartime size, and then again midway through the Cold War, as Western militaries began using assault rifles instead of bolt-action rifles. Kalashnikovs are a more recent example of the cascade, although they have now been around long enough that rifles from more than one generation of production are found side by side on the battlefield. Some of the date stamps on the assault rifles recovered from the Taliban have shown them to have been made in the 1950s and early 1960s—a generation of the Kalashnikov line that the Soviet army replaced in the mid-1970s with a new variant that fired a smaller, faster round. The early models continued to be manufactured for stockpile and sale throughout the Cold War years, and these weapons—many of which were effectively surplus from the moment of their

birth—had also found their way to the Taliban (some of the Taliban's weapons in Marja bore date stamps from the 1970s).

The date stamps point to an essential means of understanding this aspect of the trade in military small arms and the trade's potential for unintended and lingering effects: the weapons' durability. The mainstream military rifles of the twentieth century—whether Lee-Enfields manufactured in the Long Branch Arsenal in Toronto or reverse-engineered AKMs from the communist Chinese Factory 626 in Bei'an—were exceptionally well made. An infantry rifle can survive many decades in the field. They can survive so long, in fact, that no one knows how long they take to die, if only because many of the original items are still being used by guerillas. And they show no sign of breaking down. One of the Lee-Enfields captured by the marines in Marja bore a date stamp from 1915. This was a rifle that was manufactured as Kitchener's Army was massing for service on the western front, using ammunition made for service against the Third Reich, and now firing on U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

A RIFLE'S SECOND LIFE

In the Cold War, arms transfers were often a way for the superpowers to buy loyalty and prop up proxy regimes or to arm those groups that opposed the proxies of their adversaries. Although the strategic competition of the Cold War era is past, no one should assume that arms cascades have stopped, or will stop anytime soon.

In the conventional narrative, the excess weapons of the Cold War have spread from former Warsaw Pact and Soviet arsenals to conflict zones worldwide through shadowy networks and opaque deals. This realm is dominated by outsized characters such as Leonid Minin—a Ukranian Israeli weapons trafficker who was arrested by Italian authorities in 2000—and his peers, who broker sales between guerrilla leaders in Africa and corrupt officials and merchants in eastern Europe and Russia. As payments arrive in offshore accounts, these dealers move the weapons on small cargo planes willing to fly contraband.

This conception is, of course, all true. But it is only a partial view. The United States and other NATO countries are also busy participants in the trade, often using some of the same middlemen and chartered

planes. At times, these tactics for moving weapons have been deliberate, as when, for example, Washington choreographed and underwrote the arming of the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war.

But official inattention and outright incompetence also play a role in small-arms proliferation. Since 2001, for example, the United States has openly purchased tens of thousands of former Eastern bloc small arms for redistribution to government forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. What has happened to those weapons? Here, too, the vz. 58 can serve as a useful guide. Not long after the government of Hamid Karzai was first established in Kabul, the Czech Republic, looking to prove itself as a reliable partner of the United States and Europe, donated thousands of vz. 58s to equip the Afghan security forces. The Pentagon, unaware that vz. 58s are not Kalashnikovs, accepted and distributed the donated Czech rifles only to find out that the Afghans were dissatisfied with the vz. 58s. (The Czech rifles have parts and magazines incompatible with a Kalashnikov, work differently, and, in the eyes of many Afghans, are both more prone to jamming and difficult to disassemble and clean.) In recent years, these unwanted Czech rifles have mostly been replaced, one for one, through additional purchases and transfers. The Pentagon is now in the process of buying new U.S.-made M-16s for the Afghan army, which is "retiring" many of its Kalashnikovs by passing them on to the Afghan police, who will then shelve more of their vz. 58s. The Afghan police force and the Pentagon have also replaced other vz. 58s with surplus Hungarian Kalashnikovs, either purchased by the Pentagon or donated by Budapest.

C. J. CHIVERS

Ammunition for Lee-Enfield and Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifles used by Taliban snipers in Marja in 2010

If this sounds complicated, it only gets more so. Because the Pentagon issued vz. 58s and older Kalashnikovs to Afghan forces without recording their serial numbers in a database—and because of the widespread desertion of Afghan troops—no one knows how many of these weapons remain in government custody. Thousands of vz. 58s have been taken out

of service, and those not lost or stolen now are, at least officially, in the hands of the Afghan government—a worrying state of affairs given the history of arms trafficking and corruption in the region. Had the Czechs not rushed to pass their surplus on to Afghanistan, through a Pentagon bureaucracy that belatedly learned the weapons were not even wanted, these guns would be far more secure today and less likely to circulate in future conflict zones. The vz. 58's travels to the region show that even legal, well-intentioned arms transfers can go awry.

The worldwide spread of excess arms has been furthered by a process that was, at least on paper, intended to lead to greater security and interdependence: the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe after the Soviet collapse. As NATO has taken on new members, its existing member states have encouraged and assisted these new NATO nations, or prospective nations, to adopt NATO-standard weapons. The thinking is rooted not just in profit motives but also in sound logistics: members of the alliance should have weapons and munitions compatible with those of their allies. Such coordination eases logistics and allows troops from varied nations to work alongside one another more readily. But this process has a side effect. It effectively renders entire armories of assault rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers obsolete, and potentially available for sale. Even apart from the question of conversion, the reduction in the size of standing armies from Cold War days to the present has left many states—Albania and Ukraine are prime examples—with bunkers crammed with weapons and munitions for which their governments have little use, beyond converting them into cash.

Ukraine alone claims to have several million small arms in storehouses. Several years ago, the United States and other NATO governments signed agreements with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense to destroy a portion of the excess weapons. But these destruction programs largely stalled a few years into the Iraq war: Ukrainian officials realized that the United States was simultaneously shopping for excess small arms for Afghan and Iraqi security forces and thereby driving up market prices. One official involved in the program summed up the prevailing mood: Why should Ukraine destroy weapons for which there was still a legal market, sanctioned by none other than the United States? For governments with large excess arms, destroying the stock was made to feel like burning cash.

FUELING THE FOREVER WAR

NEITHER THE characteristics nor the distribution of automatic arms are the sources of modern war. If there were no military rifles—or if they were only held by organized armies—militants and rebels would still find ways to fight. But even if an abundance of highly effective, easy-to-use, and exceptionally durable infantry arms do not cause wars, they are the fuel that keeps wars hot. The mass distribution of modern military arms and the availability of surplus standardized ammunition have made many insurgencies harder to unravel and helped place whole swaths of many countries outside any government's control, at least not without great risk and expense.

The U.S. military and NATO are confronting these hard facts in Afghanistan, a nation that several governments over many decades have helped arm to the point of saturation. Afghanistan today would be less dangerous for almost all involved—civilians, government officials, nongovernment organizations, journalists, Afghan military and police forces, and Western troops—if the refuse of former empires and the handouts of current governments were not so widely present in the field. More than two decades after the end of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, there has never been a successful, comprehensive military small-arms disarmament program in the country; instead, more guns keep flowing in.

In many ways, it is too late. The time when the Afghan countryside might be stable and secure is long off, and the day when surplus rifles and machine guns will be less of an influence on the country's social and security fabric is almost unimaginable. As the experience of the marines in Marja has shown, once long-lasting military weapons are loose in the field, they are extraordinarily difficult and expensive to collect. The questions of today, then, are really about the wars of tomorrow. Will policymakers and military planners, who together determine the ultimate fates of surplus arms, take steps to prevent further leakage, transfers, and sales from government armories? If not, many regions will likely remain as they are—in a state of near-perennial conflict. And when wars erupt and the arms show up, the Marjas of tomorrow may be as intractable and bloody as Marja is today.

Why Moscow Says No

A Question of Russian Interests, Not Psychology

Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman

Russia's international behavior during the last decade has puzzled many U.S. observers. As seen from Washington, the greatest challenges of the moment—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change—are global ones that threaten all states. The United States has been trying to organize multilateral responses. Yet the Kremlin has proved singularly unhelpful. For years, Russian negotiators have stalled efforts to compel Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons programs. Meanwhile, Moscow has applied economic and diplomatic pressure to keep nearby states from joining NATO or letting U.S. troops use their bases to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan. And in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and effectively detached two mountain enclaves from its territory.

More recently, some have seen hints of a thaw in U.S.-Russian relations. Last June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev chatted over hamburgers in Washington and announced that their countries' relationship had been "reset." Moscow signed a new treaty to replace the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and backed a UN resolution tightening sanctions on Iran.

Andrei Shleifer is Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Daniel Treisman is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna. He is the author of *The Return: Russia's Journey From Gorbachev to Medvedev*.

But in other ways, the Kremlin continues to disappoint. Russia only agreed to sanctions against Iran that allowed Russia to continue selling the country nuclear power stations and, apparently, developing its oil and gas sectors. Closer to home, Russia has conducted military exercises simulating an invasion of Poland and has deployed advanced antiaircraft missiles in Abkhazia.

THE RUSSIAN SUPEREGO

To EXPLAIN such behavior, U.S. officials and commentators typically appeal to psychology. The Russians, they say, are acting out of injured pride. Impulsive, emotionally unstable, and often paranoid, the Russians are lashing out at their neighbors in an attempt to cauterize the wounds of recent history and rekindle their lost sense of grandeur.

Although Washington's psychologists all attribute Russia's conduct to its leaders' complexes, they differ in their exact diagnoses. Some see Russia's resistance to U.S. policies as childish rebellion. In the 1990s, when Russian officials expressed virulent opposition to NATO's expansion and outrage at its bombing of Serbia, some in Washington took their reactions as symptoms of hysteria. In 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin reminded U.S. President Bill Clinton that "NATO was created in Cold War times" and warned that extending it into central Europe would "sow the seeds of distrust." One White House aide later wrote that this comment had "rattled [Clinton's] confidence in Yeltsin's emotional, physical, and political stability." Over the decade, U.S. officials spent hours trying to soothe Russian nerves and persuade their counterparts that U.S. policies were actually in Russia's interest. Among themselves, some called this "administering the spinach treatment."

Others attribute Russia's recalcitrance to a wounded ego. As Richard Burt, a former U.S. arms control negotiator, put it in 2006, political reform in Russia was unlikely to succeed because of the country's "sense of humiliation and loss stemming from the end of the Cold War." The August 2008 war in Georgia seemed to confirm this suspicion: a commentator in *Time* blamed Russia's invasion on its leaders' "brewing rage at their lost grandeur," and *Newsweek* wrote of their obsession with "getting respect."

Another common diagnosis is paranoia. In this view, Russia could not feel legitimately threatened by the advance of NATO toward its

borders, the placing of antimissile batteries in eastern Europe, or the hostility of some of its neighbors. Rather, the Russian leadership, in reacting negatively to Georgia's and Ukraine's "color revolutions," was giving in to a "paranoid, aggressive impulse," as then U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said. Or, as the Bulgarian political analyst Ivan Krastev wrote in the spring of 2008, months before the Georgia war, "To understand why the Kremlin acts the way it does, one must first recognize how haunted it is by uncertainty and paranoia."

Finally, the coolness among Russian leaders toward U.S. projects is sometimes seen as resulting from a "Cold War mentality," or an inability to discard outdated modes of thinking. Before a 2009 summit in Moscow, Obama complained that Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin still had "one foot in the old ways of doing business."

Each of these diagnoses implies a particular treatment. If Russia's problem is childishness or confusion, U.S. officials should repeat their positions calmly but firmly as often as necessary, explaining how these also benefit Russia. For emotional instability, the prescription is psychotherapy: Clinton urged aides to help Yeltsin "absorb" or "internalize" NATO enlargement as an unavoidable reality that he would "just have to get used to and learn to live with." For a damaged ego, some propose a regimen of ostentatious displays of respect, whereas others suggest threatening to withhold the status symbols Kremlin officials supposedly cherish. If Russia's leaders are paranoid and irrationally aggressive, Washington should arm their potential victims. Last, if the Kremlin's statesmen are wedded to antagonistic, Cold War ways of thinking, U.S. officials should place their bets on the younger generation—hence the talk of Washington supporting the more congenial Medvedev instead of Putin.

Russia has been in geopolitical retreat over the last 20 years.

Over the last 20 years, the United States has repeatedly tried the psychological approach to Russia policy in different variations. There is no evidence that this has helped Washington achieve its objectives. Rather, it has irritated and antagonized Russian leaders without making their behavior any more amenable to U.S. goals. This approach is based on a deep misunderstanding of Russian motivations. Of course, the country's leaders would like to be treated with respect. It is also true that many

Russian citizens feel diminished by the fall in their country's status and that the Kremlin's rhetoric often speaks to this frustration. However, the real reason the United States finds Russia so uncooperative lies not in psychology but in objective calculations of national interest.

WHAT MATTERS TO MOSCOW

Today, Russia and the United States share few interests and even fewer priorities. Where their interests do overlap, Russian leaders often doubt the efficacy of U.S. strategy. Moreover, there is an imbalance: whereas the United States, as a global superpower, needs Russia's help in addressing many issues, Russia needs the United States for relatively little. Russia's main demand is entirely negative: that Washington stop expanding NATO and emboldening anti-Russian governments and nongovernmental organizations on its periphery.

Russian foreign policy under Putin and Medvedev has been shaped by three objectives: boosting economic growth, fostering friendly regimes in other former Soviet states, and preventing terrorism at home. As the Russian leadership sees it, success in each area is critical to retaining power and domestic support.

Economic growth comes first. The Kremlin understands that power in today's world rests on economic might. As Putin noted back in February 2000, "There can be no superpower where weakness and poverty reign." At home, Russia's rulers know that they owe their popularity to the economy's remarkable revival. GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity, increased from under $7,000 in 1999 to almost $16,000 in 2008 (around that of Ireland in 1987 or Portugal in 1989).

Oil and gas played a major role in this boom. Today, hydrocarbons fund about one-third of the Russian government's budget. Although both Putin and Medvedev have spoken of economic modernization and diversification, they realize that at least for the next decade, the country's prosperity will depend on securing stable markets and relatively high prices for its oil and gas. Given recent history, they must be terrified that should these conditions change, not just the country's prosperity but also their own political survival would be at stake. Although the plunge in oil prices in the early 1980s was not the only reason the Soviet Union collapsed a few years later, it was

important. Later, after oil prices sank to $9 a barrel in June 1998, Russia defaulted on its debt, finishing off the reputation of Yeltsin's reformers.

It is no surprise, then, that Russia's reliance on fuel exports shapes how its leaders view the world. Most of the country's oil and gas exports go to Europe. Overall, imports from Russia accounted for only about 18 percent of energy consumption in the EU in 2007 (when comprehensive data were last available). But some individual countries are much more dependent. Whereas in 2007 France and Germany received 14 percent and 36 percent of their gas from Russia, respectively, the corresponding figures were higher for countries further to the east: 48 percent for Poland, 92 percent for Bulgaria, and 100 percent for the three Baltic states. Some believe that this trade exposes these nations to political pressure from the Kremlin. In 2008, then British Prime Minister Gordon Brown warned that Europe risked being caught in "an energy stranglehold" by states such as Russia.

Yet when examined closely, it is Russia's dependence on the European market—and not the other way around—that is most striking. Europe, including the Baltic states, is the destination for about 67 percent of Russia's gas exports (other former Soviet countries buy the other 33 percent). Similarly, as of 2007, 69 percent of Russia's oil exports flowed to Europe. Given the extent to which Russia's income and budget depend on this trade, losing its European clients would be a calamity.

The Kremlin has been understandably unenthusiastic about projects to build competing pipelines to supply Europe with gas from Central Asia. The Nabucco pipeline, which is supported by the EU and the United States, is designed to carry Azerbaijani (and perhaps one day Iranian) gas through Turkey and eastern Europe to Austria. Moscow sees it as a serious threat to its prosperity. Russia's state-controlled gas company, Gazprom, has maneuvered to prevent Nabucco from being built, buying up the gas that it would transport and planning the rival South Stream pipeline, which is to run across many of the same countries.

Energy also colors Russia's complicated relationship with China and the Central Asian countries. China's growth promises to provide an expanded market for Russian mineral exports. Yet so far, China has played Moscow off against Central Asian petroleum producers, exploiting competition to get the best deals. Although Russia is not happy to be undercut by its southern neighbors, it nevertheless prefers that they sell

to Asia rather than compete with Gazprom for the European energy market. Still, as Europe's demand for Russian energy falls in coming years, Chinese orders will be critical to pick up the slack. Recognizing this, Medvedev met with Chinese President Hu Jintao no fewer than five times in the last year, signing a flurry of new deals in September 2010.

In Russia's energy politics, national priorities are interwoven with the parochial interests of top officials, who serve on the boards of the country's major corporations and would like to see their companies dominate markets and obtain assets abroad—not to mention materially benefit their friends in management. Indeed, corruption appears to be a major issue in Russia's energy sector. According to the liberal Putin critics Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Gazprom's pipeline construction costs have been so high—$3 million per kilometer, compared to a world average of $1.0–$1.5 million—that managerial incompetence alone cannot explain the overruns.

Clearly, the interests of Kremlin insiders and those of ordinary Russians do not always coincide. But that does not mean that Moscow's energy

policy is a mere outgrowth of corruption. Russia's dependence on fuel exports to Europe would be just as great even with a team of committed democrats and scrupulous public servants running the Kremlin. Russian democrats, too, would prefer that Bulgarians bought their gas from Gazprom rather than its competitors and that Belarusians and Estonians paid the same high prices that are charged to Germans and Italians.

Recently, Russia's gas industry has been knocked off balance by an even more alarming development. Global production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has taken off, boosting gas supplies just as the financial crisis shrank demand. At the same time, new prospects for the extraction of gas trapped in shale deposits have raised the possibility that Europe will itself soon produce all the gas it needs. A central pillar of Russia's political economy suddenly looks rickety.

Russia's second major interest is the friendliness of governments in neighboring states. It has particular sensitivities associated with the 16 million ethnic Russians who remain in the post-Soviet "near abroad." In cases of perceived discrimination—for example, when Estonia instituted a language exam in the early 1990s that made it hard for local Russians to acquire citizenship—Kremlin leaders face public pressure to speak out (although not to take military action). On a larger scale, Moscow strongly opposes further enlargement of NATO to the east. This is hardly surprising: no state would welcome the extension of a historically hostile military alliance up to its borders, no matter how often that alliance said its intentions were peaceable.

Yet some see a more sinister design in the Kremlin's foreign policy: to reimpose Russian hegemony over the former Soviet states, and perhaps an even greater portion of eastern Europe, by means of economic and military pressure. It is impossible, without reading Putin's mind, to completely rule out such a possibility. However, there is little evidence for such an expansionist plan.

In most regards, Russia has been in geopolitical retreat over the last 20 years. Rather than enlarging its presence abroad, it has been demilitarizing and withdrawing troops back into its borders. In the 1990s, Russian forces left eastern Europe and the Baltic states, and total forces under Moscow's command fell from 3.4 million soldiers to around one million. Since then, Russia has abandoned bases in Cuba and Vietnam and cut its troop levels in former Soviet countries. In the years before the 2008 war

in Georgia, Putin closed three military bases there and reduced the number of Russian soldiers in the country from 5,000 to about 1,000, according to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

A regime truly committed to expansion would have behaved quite differently. It would have stirred up Russian nationalists in border regions of the Baltic states, eastern Ukraine, or the Crimea and sent in Russian troops to help them. In Georgia, a revisionist Russia would have annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia long ago, before Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili embarked on his military buildup after taking power in 2004. To many in the West, Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia seemed to prove the Kremlin's land hunger. But Kremlin leaders bent on expansion would surely have ordered troops all the way to Tbilisi to depose Saakashvili and install a more congenial government. At the least, Russian forces would have taken control of the oil and gas pipelines that cross Georgia. In fact, they left those pipelines alone and quickly withdrew to the mountains.

> Russia's policies have been purposeful, cautious, and—even when misguided—reasonably consistent.

Moscow's recent efforts to influence its neighbors have not been very successful. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a regional coordinating body that is said to be an instrument of Russian domination, is falling apart—only six of 11 presidents bothered to attend the last meeting, which lasted all of 30 minutes. Not even Aleksandr Lukashenko, the dictator of Belarus, who is supposedly dependent on Moscow, would agree to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Kyrgyzstan, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev broke a promise to Moscow to close the U.S. air base there. (Few tears were shed in Moscow when protesters ousted Bakiyev some months later, but—to the Kremlin's irritation—Lukashenko promptly invited him to Minsk.)

Has the dependence on Russian gas given Moscow political leverage over countries to the west? There is little sign of this. One might expect the most dependent countries to be the most deferential. In fact, it is precisely these states—the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland—that have persistently sought to tweak the bear's nose. Within just a few years, countries reliant on Russia for much or all of their oil and gas have joined NATO, invited in U.S. antimissile batteries, and criticized

Russian policies. It has been the less dependent western Europeans in Germany and Italy who have proved more sympathetic to the Kremlin, by, for example, showing little enthusiasm for the rapid admission of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO.

Some see Gazprom's periodic attempts to raise the gas prices paid by Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries as political intimidation. Although there have been political undertones to some of these disagreements, the fact remains that for years Russia has sold gas to countries it considers hostile for a fraction of the price it has charged countries in western Europe. In 2005, Russia sold gas to the Orange Revolutionaries of Ukraine for $52 per thousand cubic meters (TCM), compared to the $197 per TCM it charged Germany. Transport costs might explain part of the difference—but Russia continued until recently to supply gas to the Baltic states for far less ($90–$95 per TCM) than it charged neighboring Finland ($148 per TCM).

Why Russia sold gas at such a discount to countries in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is not entirely clear. Gazprom's motives may have included rational price discrimination: a smart monopolist considers different clients' ability to pay. In the early 1990s, Gazprom sharply raised prices for the Baltic states, then lowered them again when demand fell by two-thirds. In part, Gazprom hoped to exchange low prices for equity in pipelines and distribution systems to lock in future demand. Russian leaders may have thought that cheap gas would improve relations with the favored countries or at least avoid explosive fights. Considering how little Russia got for its price concessions, the Kremlin's rethinking of this policy should astonish no one.

In fact, the lesson of recent gas wars is nearly the opposite of that derived by most commentators. Rather than demonstrating political leverage, Moscow's shutoffs to Ukraine showed how little clout the Kremlin actually wielded. Disrupting supplies to its high-paying western European customers could only be an act of desperation—after all, Moscow's continued sales to Europe, a market it very much needs, depend on Europe's confidence in Russia's ability to deliver uninterrupted gas flows. That the Kremlin had to shoot itself in the foot to get Kiev's attention reveals the limits of its blackmail potential.

Russia's third central goal is preventing terrorism at home. This is not the place to review the dismal history of Russian military efforts in

Chechnya; suffice it to say that today Russia faces a serious terrorist threat from Islamic fundamentalists based in the North Caucasus. The Kremlin is determined to limit external support for these groups, a concern that influences its policies in Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia.

That the Kremlin's policies are purposeful does not mean that they are always intelligently conceived and executed. On the economic front, the government pours billions of dollars into projects that seem doomed—trying to boost stock prices with state purchases, for instance, or bailing out the decrepit car manufacturer AvtoVAZ. Moscow's latest investments in high technology might yield something of value; more likely, they will spawn a new generation of white elephants. So far, the Kremlin has shrunk from implementing the measures most likely to actually promote rapid growth—reforms of law enforcement and the judiciary and curbs on corruption. In relations with the West, Russian officials sometimes seem determined to add fuel to the fire of Russophobia. If, as many believe, the poisoning of the Putin critic Aleksandr Litvinenko in London in 2006 was ordered by the Kremlin, it is hard to see what benefit Moscow could have derived from the killing that would have outweighed the risk of harm to Russia's global image and relations with the United Kingdom.

In Russia, as elsewhere, policies are made by personalities. Putin strikes observers as intensely competitive, and he has at times yielded to frustration—for instance, when in 2009 he said that Russia would only join the World Trade Organization (WTO) together with Belarus and Kazakhstan (he later backtracked). But such cases are the exception. For the most part, Russia's policies have been purposeful, cautious, and—even when misguided—reasonably consistent. The question, then, is whether the purposes behind these policies lend themselves to practical cooperation with the United States.

UNALIGNED OBJECTIVES

The United States conceives its role as one of global leadership, and the challenges, as seen from Washington, are daunting. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, Islamic insurgents threaten to take power and offer safe haven to terrorists. Preventing nuclear proliferation has never been harder, as Iran nears bomb-making potential and North Korea

refuses to disarm (more broadly, Obama has called for a nuclear-free world). Other U.S. priorities include combating climate change, ensuring secure energy supplies, and sustaining global economic recovery.

Because of Russia's geographic location, nuclear status, historical relationships with key countries, UN Security Council veto, and role as a major energy exporter and as commander of the largest military in Europe, Moscow could either assist or complicate the pursuit of U.S. objectives. Until recently, to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO forces had had to ship most of their supplies north from Pakistan via the Khyber Pass. But this route had trouble handling the volume of material, and convoys traveling through it were often ambushed. Russia's agreement in 2008 to allow NATO to transport material south on its railways or through its airspace provided a much-needed alternative.

Moscow could also play a positive role in the effort to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions. Over the years, Russian nuclear scientists have developed close contacts with their Iranian counterparts; these relationships could help at the margins in negotiating compromises. More important, Russia's acquiescence in the UN Security Council is necessary for any further sanctions or to legitimize other applications of pressure. (In June, Russia agreed to a new set of sanctions, but only ones that seemingly protected its commercial interests in the country.)

Moscow's vote in the UN Security Council is also crucial for any coordinated action on containing North Korea's nuclear program. More broadly, further nuclear disarmament agreements are, of course, impossible without Russia's participation. No plan to combat climate change can ignore the pollution Russian industry produces. Finally, although this is far less significant, Russia's dollar reserves and U.S. Treasury bond holdings give Moscow at least some marginal potential to affect the dollar's value.

But does Russia need Washington's help to achieve its key goals? The short answer is no. As a consumer of Russian energy, the United States is inconsequential: during the last five years, the United States bought only two to four percent of Russia's crude oil exports and almost none of its gas. Indeed, U.S. and Russian energy interests mostly conflict. The mining of shale gas in the United States freed up LNG shipments to Europe, depressing prices. Washington, eager to wean its European partners from dependence on Russia, favors construction

of rival pipelines such as Nabucco. And in the long term, U.S. efforts to reduce domestic demand for fossil fuels would lower the global price of oil, on which Moscow is dependent.

More generally, Russia and the United States share few economic interests. In 1995, six percent of Russia's exports went to the United States; by 2009, the figure was three percent—less than Russia exported to Poland. Meanwhile, the United States supplies just five percent of Russia's imports. The U.S. share of capital flows to Russia is also insignificant. In 1995, 28 percent of all inflows of foreign investment to Russia came from the United States; by 2010, this share was just 2.5 percent. By then, the stock of Russian investment in the U.S. economy was larger than that of U.S. investment in Russia.

Russia's economic disengagement from the United States has coincided with its growing ties to Europe and China. In 2009, Europe accounted for 52 percent of Russia's exports and 45 percent of its imports; another 14 percent of its imports came from China, up from two percent in 1995. Although Russian exports to China currently make up less than six percent of the total, this number will rise as China's hunger for raw materials grows. Europe's share of foreign investment in Russia increased from 41 percent in 1995 to 71 percent in 2010, although much of this is Russian wealth repatriated from Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.

As part of its modernization push, Moscow would certainly welcome more U.S. private investment. On a visit to the United States in 2010, Medvedev made a point of visiting MIT and Silicon Valley. But partnerships with U.S. firms are by no means essential, and for now, high-tech ventures with western Europe are likely to matter more. In 2009, 61 percent of Russia's commercial agreements to import high-tech equipment and services were with partners in the EU (compared to 11 percent with U.S. companies). In the short run, Russian growth will depend more on copying and applying U.S. innovations than on collaborating with U.S. scientists to create new ones.

In areas in which the United States can help Russia, such as in backing its bid to enter the WTO, Russia's interests are mixed. WTO membership would benefit certain sectors, such as nonferrous metals, while hurting others, such as automobiles. Thus, although Russia would likely enjoy overall gains, some in Moscow remain ambivalent.

On Russia's second central objective—promoting friendly regimes in its vicinity—the Kremlin does not expect U.S. help. It would merely like the United States to stop meddling in ways it considers unconstructive. Yet Washington sees Moscow's attempts to influence the foreign policies and domestic politics of its neighbors as violations of their sovereignty. In response, the United States helped finance color revolutions that brought anti-Moscow leaders to power in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan and has pressed for Georgia's and Ukraine's rapid admission to NATO. Although such efforts have slowed under Obama, Washington remains committed to eventual NATO membership for Tbilisi and Kiev, and the U.S. military continues to conduct joint exercises with regimes Moscow deems inimical, such as Georgia's. On the issue of Russia's near abroad, then, Washington and Moscow hold diametrically opposed views, and cooperation is not in the cards.

Finally, distrust and divergent approaches limit the space for collaboration in Russia's fight against Islamic terrorism. Although neither Washington nor Moscow wants to see jihadists strengthened in the North Caucasus, their views of the underlying problem differ so greatly that discussions produce mostly irritation. Where many in Washington see resistance fueled by rampant abuses of human rights by local officials, the Kremlin sees a "war on terror." Putin does not understand why the United Kingdom and the United States granted political asylum to Akhmed Zakayev and Ilyas Akhmadov, two Chechen leaders whom he considers to be emissaries of a terrorist movement.

With very few exceptions, Russia does not need or want help from Washington in achieving its main objectives. What it would value is for the United States to stop interfering in its neighborhood, militarizing the border states, and attempting to undermine Russia's position in energy markets.

RATIONAL AMBIVALENCE

NONETHELESS, RUSSIA might still hope that the United States succeeds in its global endeavors. For example, the Kremlin has no desire to see Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban. A victory for radical Islamists there could embolden insurgencies throughout Central Asia and invigorate the North Caucasus' terrorist networks. Yet Russian

officials are unsure that NATO can defeat the Taliban or at least impose a stable settlement. Looking ahead to the situation after U.S. troops leave, the Kremlin does not want to take positions now that will make it impossible to deal with Kabul's future rulers. Moscow also knows that some level of tension keeps its southern neighbors in line. When they feel threatened by the Taliban, Central Asia's leaders are more ready to cooperate in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and to welcome Russia's military presence in the region. At the same time, Moscow is concerned about the recent flood of Afghan heroin across its borders; opium production has doubled since the NATO invasion. And polls show that Russia's public is far less happy than Putin and Medvedev about assisting NATO in Afghanistan.

Iran evokes another set of complicated calculations. Moscow would prefer that Tehran not develop nuclear weapons. Yet many Russian officials doubt that even the toughest economic sanctions—fully backed by Russia—would prevent this outcome. Meanwhile, Russia has economic interests in Iran that it would be costly to jeopardize. Its exports to the country have grown from $250 million in 1995 to $3.3 billion in 2008. Moscow hopes for contracts to build additional nuclear power stations, develop oil and gas fields, and supply Iran with modern weapons. It also is loath to give Tehran's radicals any excuses for stirring up trouble in the North Caucasus.

A resolution of the conflict between Tehran and Washington would threaten Russia's commercial and strategic interests. Western investment would likely pour into the Iranian oil and gas sectors, competing with Russian multinationals. The lifting of sanctions and the lowering of tensions would depress petroleum prices; new pipelines might be built to carry Iranian gas to Europe. In many ways, the current stalemate serves the Kremlin's purposes. And on the question of North Korea's nuclear program, Russia would like to see Pyongyang disarm but doubts that even its strong support for sanctions would have much of an effect. At the same time, it worries that any military escalation or a collapse of the regime in Pyongyang could send refugees flooding into Russia's Far East.

The New START treaty mostly ratified cuts in the Russian nuclear arsenal that were occurring anyway as the weapons aged. Further reductions are not so clearly in Russia's interest; as antimissile systems

become more accurate and powerful, Moscow will need to maintain enough missiles and warheads to remain sure of a second-strike capability. On climate change, the Kremlin recognizes that global warming would impose huge costs, causing floods and destroying infrastructure. Still, how the expense of cutting pollution should be shared among the major industrial and industrializing countries remains contentious. Like other countries, Russia has a powerful pro-carbon lobby.

LIMITED BUT CONSTRUCTIVE

WASHINGTON SHOULD not expect much help from Moscow, not because Kremlin officials are overwhelmed by wounded pride and paranoia but because Washington's priorities are not their priorities—and may not be in their interest at all.

The parallel with U.S.-Chinese relations is instructive. In dealing with Beijing, U.S. policymakers perceive conflicts of interest for what they are. They do not feel compelled to patronize and psychoanalyze their Chinese counterparts. It is hard to imagine a U.S. president on the eve of a Beijing summit berating President Hu for his obsolete Marxist mentality and promising to build up Premier Wen Jiabao as a counterweight.

If divergent interests make a close relationship between Moscow and Washington unlikely in the next few years, there are grounds for greater optimism in the long run. As its interactions with the United States have shrunk, Russia has been gradually integrating into Europe, both economically and culturally. Because these changes are slow and not particularly dramatic, they have gone largely unnoticed. As it develops further, Russia will become even more European—without losing its distinct identity. In 2008, Russians made 39 times as many trips to western Europe and 19 times as many trips to China as they did to the United States. Of the 41,000 Russian students who studied abroad in 2008, 20,000 were at institutions in Europe; only 5,000 were in the United States. Meanwhile, in 2009, Russians were more likely to buy property in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Germany, Spain, and the Czech Republic than in the United States.

Although Russians do not necessarily consider themselves European yet, their attitudes are changing. Asked in April 2010 which countries Russia should cooperate with most in its foreign policy, 50 percent of those Russians surveyed said those in western Europe, even more than said Belarus, Ukraine, and the countries of the CIS (30 percent said the United States). A majority—53 percent—said in 2009 that they would favor Russia joining the EU if given the chance.

These trends are likely to continue. Even if Russia's average growth rate slows to just over four percent, as the World Bank forecasts, in ten years Russia will have broken into the income range of western Europe's poorer countries. As the country develops, its middle class will continue to expand and integrate into Europe. At some point—although when exactly is impossible to predict—there will be a political turnover, a liberalization of institutions, and a serious effort to control corruption. Even as Russia's trade with China increases, its cultural identity will become more solidly rooted in the West. Eventually, although not soon, the idea of Russia joining the EU may become a serious one.

In the meantime, relations with Europe—especially eastern Europe—will involve conflict as well as cooperation. Russia's integration with Europe

will create reciprocal vulnerability and is likely to motivate a struggle over who will gain most from trade. The energy market is the most obvious example. It is possible that clashes of economic interests will ignite a political crisis that will impede Russia's Europeanization. More likely, such conflicts will be managed successfully.

Even if Russia and the United States do not develop a close partnership in the next decade, relations can still be constructive. A narrow relationship does not need to be a bad one, and Russia's rhetoric over the past year suggests that both Putin and Medvedev would like the tone to improve. The main prerequisite is, paradoxically, that the two sides recognize the limits of their shared interests. If those in Washington expect too much, frustrated hopes will once again lead to suspicion, new forays into psychoanalysis, and counterproductive overreactions.

Apart from the occasional outburst of patronizing rhetoric, the Obama administration has treated Russia with pragmatism over the last two years. This has paid off in limited but worthwhile progress: the New START treaty, the deal permitting NATO shipments to Afghanistan across Russian territory, and the Russian vote in the UN Security Council for sanctions against Iran.

Such pragmatism means accepting that the United States can do little to further Russia's democratization. Continued growth and integration into Europe—although providing no guarantee—represent the best hope for political reform. The more that the Russian elite is bound to Europe—through tourism, education, business partnerships, and social contact—the greater its stake in maintaining cordial relations. For the EU's part, relaxing visa requirements for Russians to travel to Europe would accelerate the process. Pragmatism also means that Washington will need to let Europe take the lead in defining its own relationship with Russia.

Such recognition should not be unwelcome for an overstretched superpower such as the United States. Rather than seeking to cure Russia, the United States will need to deal with Russia—much as it deals with China, India, and many other states. The good news is that on matters that are genuinely of mutual interest, Russia is ready to deal.

A Leaner and Meaner Defense

How to Cut the Pentagon's Budget While Improving Its Performance

Gordon Adams and Matthew Leatherman

The United States faces a watershed moment: it must decide whether to increase its already massive debt in order to continue being the world's sheriff or restrain its military missions and focus on economic recovery. Military power has dominated the United States' global engagement over the last decade, but it is now clear that the country overreached. Americans are questioning whether pursuing a defense strategy focused on counterinsurgency and nation building, supported by a defense budget that is growing continuously, makes sense at a time of severe economic and fiscal challenges. As the Obama administration enters the second half of its term and a new Congress assembles, the U.S. government must make difficult choices about which defense missions to undertake, exercise restraint in defense planning and budgeting, and bring tough management practices to the Pentagon.

U.S. military missions and the defense budget that supports them have grown without discipline over the past decade, largely as a consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Various administrations and Congresses have neglected the imperative of setting priorities. This has allowed the Department of Defense to undertake an ever-growing array of tasks, adding to traditional missions, such as conventional and nuclear deterrence, sea-lane patrol, and disaster relief, a suite of new ones: nation

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Gordon Adams is a Professor in the U.S. Foreign Policy Program at the School of International Service at American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. Matthew Leatherman is a Research Associate for the Stimson Center's Budgeting for Foreign Affairs and Defense Program and a regular contributor to its blog, *The Will and the Wallet*.

building, stabilizing fragile states, counterinsurgency, and strengthening the security capacities of other countries. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review reinforced this trend by overstating the world's dangers and advocating the elimination of all possible risks. The U.S. government's ambitions now outstrip its capacities at home and its welcome abroad.

The national defense budget accounts for 56 percent of all U.S. federal discretionary spending. Defense is now one of the country's "Big Four" accounts, consuming roughly the same share of federal spending as do each of Social Security, income-based entitlements (such as welfare), and the total nondefense discretionary budget. And the United States is expected to spend over $700 billion on national defense in 2011—twice as much as it spent in 2001, more in real dollars than for any year since the end of World War II, and as much as is spent by the rest of the world's militaries combined.

Defense missions have expanded and spending has soared even though the United States has never been more secure militarily. It has no close competitor, a strategic nuclear exchange is highly improbable, major conventional combat on land is unlikely, and it maintains significant dominance at sea. Al Qaeda and its allies remain active, but their capacity to launch attacks and their support base in Afghanistan have eroded. The U.S. deployment in Iraq, now less than one-third the size that it was at its peak, is scheduled to end in December 2011, and President Barack Obama has said that U.S. forces in Afghanistan will start leaving in July.

Meanwhile, economic and fiscal challenges are center stage. As Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in August, "The single biggest threat to our national security is our debt." Overcoming that threat will require making tough choices to control all federal revenues and spending, including national defense costs.

The Congressional Budget Office currently projects that between fiscal years (FY) 2012 and 2018, the U.S. government will spend over $5.54 trillion on defense. In addition to any reductions stemming from the United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq, gradual cuts could lower the defense budget over those seven years by more than $788 billion, to about $4.75 trillion—a reduction of more than 14 percent. This would involve reducing the active-duty force by 275,000 troops, to 1.21 million (yielding $166 billion in savings); cutting programs that are redundant, underperforming, or linked to low-priority missions ($354 billion in savings); restraining military compensation, health-care,

and retirement costs ($148 billion in savings); and reforming the intelligence community ($120 billion in savings).

Even with these reductions, and after adjusting for inflation, U.S. defense spending in FY 2018 would be well above the Cold War average. The United States would remain the world's dominant military power and as able as it is today to deploy its military force globally, fight al Qaeda, respond to present and future security challenges, and act as a peacekeeper and a major deterrent force. Befitting its priority missions, the U.S. military would have fewer ground troops, continuing air superiority, a large naval capability, and a force more focused overall on combat—and it would better ensure the security of the United States. And by choosing to undertake only tailored missions and to fund them with disciplined budgets, the Pentagon would also be contributing vitally to the country's broader fiscal health.

MISSIONS: IMPOSSIBLE

DEFENSE SECRETARY Robert Gates has proposed eliminating the Joint Forces Command and two Pentagon bureaucracies (the Business Transformation Agency and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration), canceling several military hardware programs, and reforming the defense contracting process. Efficiency gains such as these are always helpful. But Gates also argued last August that "the task before us is not to reduce the department's topline budget; rather, it is significantly to reduce its excess overhead costs and apply the savings to force structure and modernization." In other words, instead of contributing to a disciplined and well-planned reduction of the United States' debt, Gates wants to keep existing funds in the Pentagon and maintain both the military's current size and most of the Pentagon's planned investment programs. The FY 2011 budget, which is still pending before Congress, proposes to increase the defense budget, despite its already historic level, and Gates has widely advertised that he hopes to achieve one percent real growth in the defense budget in the years after FY 2011.

More effort will be necessary to discipline defense missions and reduce the Pentagon's spending. The last substantial drawdown, which started with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and proceeded through the end of the Cold War, is a clear historical

precedent: it proves that major reductions are possible and can make the force even stronger. At the same time as other cuts were being made across the national budget, between FY 1989 and FY 1998, the Department of Defense decreased its total budget by 28 percent in constant dollars (this included a 50 percent reduction in funds for the procurement of military hardware). The number of civilians employed by the Department of Defense fell from 1.13 million to 747,000, and the Pentagon reduced active-duty troops from 2.2 million to 1.47 million. And this reduced force was still able to help bring peace to the Balkans in the 1990s, topple the Taliban in 2001, and overrun the Iraqi military in 2003.

Reducing the deficit and controlling debt today will require the U.S. government to make similarly tough calls—and start setting priorities among missions rather than simply layering on additional missions, as proposed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Spending less on defense means doing fewer things, and that means making firm choices in precisely the areas that Gates has said he wants to protect from budget cutbacks, including the size of the military itself. Force size drives the defense budget: it has a direct impact on the cost of operations, investment in hardware, and the cost of payroll. Thus, budget discipline requires mission discipline. Not all tasks are equal; some are more critical or more urgent, or demand more forces. A sober evaluation of missions' relative importance would lead to a smaller and more focused military, with budget savings as a result. Dismantling al Qaeda's core, including capturing or killing its leaders, should be the top priority. But this will require far fewer forces than the global campaign against terrorism; it will primarily require special operators such as the Army Rangers, Delta Force, the Special Forces, and the Navy SEALs, of which there are already enough for the mission. In addition, many aspects of the fight against al Qaeda, such as homeland security and law enforcement, fall on the civilian side of the U.S. government. Rather than increasing the military's size, it will be important to invest both in other countries' development (in order to assist them with building governance institutions) and in law enforcement efforts to prosecute terrorists and control U.S. borders (in order to increase the United States' resiliency).

Cybersecurity is another critical priority. Controlling information and communications networks enables the military's missions, both offensive and defensive. As Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn wrote in these pages last fall, describing a breach of the U.S. Central

Command's systems by an infected flash drive, this challenge is very real. At the same time, the Department of Defense's activities surely include plans to observe, redirect, or even disable its adversaries' communications. Yet although this mission is crucial, the threat to which it responds is not existential, its ambit is focused, and it does not require significant forces—much like the mission to dismantle the al Qaeda network. As the RAND cybersecurity expert Martin Libicki put it last October, "almost 99.9 percent of that stuff [cyberattacks] is just espionage going back and forth." And when it comes to the country's civilian infrastructure, the private sector, and especially industry, is most responsible for securing its networks, both for its own sake and for that of the public. This is especially true with respect to cyber-espionage because industry is very experienced in defending its trade secrets. In the less frequent instances of outright cyberwar, it falls largely on the civilian institutions of government, such as the Department of Homeland Security, to ensure protection. Preventing and preparing for such attacks will require the Pentagon to concentrate its investment more narrowly—according to the military-specific mission of Cyber Command—and transition much of the cyber-protection currently executed by the National Security Agency to the Department of Homeland Security.

Meanwhile, several threats to which the U.S. military has traditionally devoted considerable resources are now less likely to occur than in the past or would be less consequential if they did. The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented level of security to the United States. Since then, both nuclear and large-scale conventional combat have become improbable dangers. Spending in these areas should be sufficient to hedge against risk, but they should not drive the budget.

Some people point to China as a successor to the Soviet Union and cite it as a reason why preventing and preparing for nuclear or large-scale conventional war should remain priority missions. They highlight the risk of a U.S.-Chinese conflict over Taiwan or the possibility that China will deny the U.S. military access to the western Pacific. Of course, China is a rising power that is making increasingly substantial investments in defense. But it is important not to overreact to this fact. Focusing on China's military capabilities ought not replace a broader strategy. As the United States determines how to engage China and how to protect its interests in Asia generally, it must balance the diplomatic, economic, and financial, as well as the military, elements of its policy. Most defense

analysts estimate that China's military investments and capabilities are decades behind those of the United States, and there is very little evidence that China seeks a conventional conflict with the United States. There is substantial evidence that China's economic and financial policy is a more urgent problem for the United States, but one of the best ways for the United States to respond to that is to get its fiscal house in order.

The prospect of a major war with other states is even less plausible. Defense planning scenarios in the 1990s were built around the possibility of two conflicts. The one involving Iraq is now off the table. A conflict with North Korea was the second, but although that country's military is numerically impressive, South Korea's state-of-the-art armed forces can manage that challenge without needing the assistance of U.S. troops. The United States can now limit its contribution to strategic nuclear deterrence, air support, and offshore naval balancing in the region. The prospect of a conventional war with Iran is not credible. Iran's vast size, to say nothing of the probability that the population would be hostile to any U.S. presence there, means that anything more than U.S. air strikes and Special Forces operations targeting Iranian nuclear capabilities is unlikely.

Given the stakes, some hedging for these exceedingly low-probability risks is reasonable. But even a smaller U.S. force and budget than today's would be ample because many of these risks are less likely than ever and the United States' allies now enjoy unprecedented military and strategic advantages. The most vexing missions are those at the heart of the Quadrennial Defense Review: counterinsurgency, nation building, and the building of other countries' security sectors, among others. And these, alongside competition with China, are motivating Gates and other planners at the Pentagon, despite Gates' acknowledgment in this magazine last spring that "the United States is unlikely to repeat a mission on the scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraq anytime soon—that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire." Such planned missions are based on a misguided premise: that the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq foreshadow the need for a large U.S. military force to increasingly intervene in failing states teeming with insurgents and terrorists. But Gates' effort to nonetheless tailor U.S. military capabilities to such tasks suggests that there is still significant support for them in the Pentagon. According to General George Casey, the army chief of staff, for example, the United States is in an "era of persistent conflict." Yet the

United States is very unlikely to embark on another regime-change and nation-building mission in the next decade—nor should it. Indeed, in the wake of its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the demand for the United States to act as global policeman will decline.

Pakistan is often cited as a state that might require such an intervention. Clearly, it is the case that Gates had in mind when he worried about "a nuclear-armed state [that] could collapse into chaos and criminality." But even if Pakistan collapsed, the U.S. government would probably not send in massive forces for fear of facing widespread popular opposition and an armed resistance in the more remote parts of the country. More likely, the U.S. government would resort to air power and Special Forces in order to secure Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is clear that U.S. forces are not suited to lengthy occupations, especially when they involve a stabilization mission, governance reform, and economic development.

TOOTH AND TAIL

Setting priorities will make it possible to reduce the size of the U.S. military while retaining a sufficiently large and superior force for critical missions. Eliminating counterinsurgency, stabilization, and nation building as first-order tasks would allow for cuts in the number of ground forces. In particular, the buildup in ground troops that President George W. Bush announced in his 2007 State of the Union address—an addition of 92,000 soldiers and marines for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—could be reversed.

Moreover, a revised assessment of the United States' needs in terms of nuclear deterrence and conventional warfare would allow for an additional drawdown of permanently stationed U.S. forces. In Europe, where the chances of a military conflict continue to decrease—and where military planners are consequently reducing and restructuring their forces—the U.S. presence could shrink by 50,000, from approximately 70,000 down to 20,000 troops. Deployments in Asia could be halved, from 60,000 to 30,000, to refocus the United States' presence in the region on its comparative advantage: strategic nuclear deterrence and naval operations. These changes would also rebalance the United States' permanent deployments overseas toward Asia, where war, although still very unlikely, is more possible than in Europe. The

United States' air and naval forces in Asia would be largely unaffected, leaving ample capacity to counter any threat from China or North Korea as well as guarantee the United States' access to the Pacific and reassure U.S. allies that it will continue to play an important military role in the region.

U.S. forces could be trimmed even further by reducing the size of the military's "tail," or overhead, relative to its "tooth," or combat forces. According to a report by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company last spring, the U.S. military's tooth-to-tail ratio is more skewed toward the tail than are these ratios for the militaries of nearly all other industrialized countries. In an October 2008 study, the Defense Business Board found that 42 percent of the Pentagon's budget goes to overhead—including training, departmental management, and the general health program for service members and their families. These tasks are the primary duties of roughly 35 percent of the active-duty force, or approximately 500,000 people. A July 2010 study by the Defense Business Board found that 560,000 troops have never been deployed, despite the demand of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This overhead must be streamlined. Some 100,000 active-duty forces should be cut from the back office across the services. This is a conservative estimate of the number of positions that could be cut through attrition alone over five years. The vacancies created would not need to be filled again by civilians or contractors because if missions were prioritized, the Pentagon's overall personnel needs would shrink. These cuts should come on top of the several thousand positions that will be saved by closing the Joint Forces Command. Together with the reduction of the 92,000 ground troops that were added for the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 80,000 troops to be withdrawn from Europe and Asia, the total cuts would amount to about 275,000 fewer personnel, or a 19 percent reduction in the force's total size. The cuts would take place gradually over a five-year period, starting in FY 2012, and would leave the United States with a total force of 1.21 million and one rebalanced toward combat. With roughly $1.2 billion saved annually for every 10,000 forces cut, and the 275,000 troop reduction implemented over five years, total savings would amount to $166 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

THE RIGHT STUFF

SETTING PRIORITIES would also help the Pentagon make better investment decisions. Emphasis should be placed on spending that supports priority missions and that is adapted to the specific tasks that U.S. forces are likely to undertake in carrying out those missions. For example, cargo aircraft and sealift capabilities make rapid deployment possible, which can justify having a smaller permanent force overseas. Increased investments in unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance, missile strikes, and support for ground forces would advance multiple missions, from conventional deterrence to modern special operations, and thereby decrease the need for high-cost fighter jets. Additionally, investments in hardware should be assessed according to whether they create excess capability, are too costly for the capability they deliver, and perform as expected.

With these criteria in mind, five major investment programs currently under way should be cut, curtailed, or delayed. They are excessive both because the mission that justifies them, conventional war, is extremely improbable and because the United States' existing capabilities for waging such a war are already significantly superior to those available to its potential adversaries. Moreover, the production lines for current-generation programs remain open, which means that more equipment could always be acquired later should it become necessary.

The F-35 Lightning II program, which is expected to cost a total of $260 billion starting FY 2012, well exceeds current and foreseeable needs. According to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, the military's current fourth-generation fighters—the F-15, the F-16, and the F-18—are superior to Chinese and Russian aircraft, and they are less expensive than the F-35. The V-22 Osprey, a tilt-rotor aircraft designed to fly like a plane and take off and land like a helicopter, offers new and attractive capabilities, but its cost per unit has ballooned well beyond expectations, and its performance in Afghanistan and Iraq has been disappointing. Rather than spend an additional $18 billion on the V-22 starting in FY 2012, as planned, refocusing on more affordable and effective helicopter programs that already exist would be an adequate and more fiscally disciplined alternative. The blimp-carried cruise missile surveillance system known as JLENS, for which $6 billion is slated for when production starts in FY 2012, should not be pursued, because the

United States is very unlikely to face a cruise missile attack and has numerous other well-performing surveillance options at its disposal. The Medium Extended Air Defense System, due to enter service in FY 2018, is designed to intercept shorter-range missiles. Developed in cooperation with Germany and Italy, the program persists because it symbolizes successful interstate relations. Yet it is redundant with the Patriot system and, by the army's own accounting, does "not address current and emerging threats." That assessment makes the program's total price tag starting FY 2012—$28 billion—completely unaffordable. The Marine Corps' program for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, which is designed for amphibious assault, should also be terminated. Costs per unit have grown by 177 percent since 2000, to $24 million. The vehicle's performance record is questionable, and in any case, no amphibious landing has been executed under combat circumstances in decades.

Two other investment programs need to be reconsidered. Plans to add 42 vessels to the existing fleet of next-generation attack submarines—at a cost of $2.76 billion each starting in FY 2012—would provide excess capability. Deferring the purchase of seven of those ships until the mid-2020s would more adequately reflect the exceedingly low likelihood that the United States will need to engage in all-out submarine warfare over the next two decades. Even more extravagant is the program for ballistic missile defense. Projected costs for the program between FY 2012 and FY 2015 are $29 billion, and the program has already cost over $130 billion since it began in the 1980s. Reducing this funding by half would incentivize the Missile Defense Agency to concentrate on more effective and cheaper technologies, which could function as a hedge against any threat of a ballistic missile attack in the near term. Foremost among those technologies is the Aegis system mounted on U.S. Navy destroyers.

Based on figures in the Pentagon's *Selected Acquisition Report* for the fall of 2009 and other government analyses of recent budgets, canceling the five hardware-purchase programs, deferring the construction of some submarines, and reducing funding for ballistic missile defense research would yield $164 billion in savings between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

Yet discipline in the Department of Defense's investment budgets will need to go deeper; major investment programs such as these account for less than half of the total defense procurement budget each year. The remainder of defense procurement—for example, for transportation and construction equipment; such items as radios, rifles, and night-vision

goggles; and some services contracting—is rarely subjected to close scrutiny even though it consumes 60 percent of the procurement budget. The amount of spending on this category of investments closely mirrors the size of the force. Consistent with the proposed 19 percent reduction in the force's size, funding for minor procurement of this kind should be cut by $103 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

The budget for research and development (R & D), which has grown in real terms by 60 percent since 2001, should also be reduced. There is no obviously "right" level of funding for R & D, but with the current overall U.S. military R & D investment exceeding China's entire defense budget for 2009, it would be safe to cut it, too, by 19 percent between FY 2012 and FY 2018. Such a reduction would yield roughly $87 billion in savings while keeping the United States' level of military R & D far above that of any other country. This cut, in addition to the other proposed reductions in total defense investments, would generate savings of $354 billion.

PAID AS YOU GO

The Department of Defense has struggled for years to control its budgets for pay and health-care and retirement benefits as the real cost of these expenses has grown and the population eligible for them has expanded. Congress has exacerbated the problem by continually increasing existing benefits and creating new ones. As Gates himself has pointed out, these expenses are now "eating the Defense Department alive." Yet reining them in has proved to be a political third rail. Congress has already received and rejected proposals for such cuts, but that does not change the fact that the country's important obligation to its military personnel needs to be balanced with fiscal discipline. The newly elected members of Congress campaigned on their resolve to tackle unrealistic entitlements for civilians, and their zeal might extend to equally unrealistic military benefits.

The U.S. military's pay system has become increasingly disconnected from its primary purpose: developing a compensation system that produces the mix of personnel that can get the work done most effectively. By this standard, the key indicator of the adequacy of military pay is whether recruitment and retention targets are being met, particularly for tasks requiring critical skills. The Congressional Budget Office has

determined that overall military pay, including cash and in-kind compensation, presently exceeds compensation for comparable work by civilians by at least 11 percent. This is the result of the Pentagon's long-standing tradition of maintaining morale by paying members of equal rank and grade roughly the same, irrespective of the demand for particular skills, as well as of Congress' routine practice of authorizing pay increases above those requested by the Pentagon.

A much more refined pay model is needed, one that replaces across-the-board pay raises with a more tailored approach that would allow supply and demand to generate the right combination of needed specialties and skills. This would involve much greater use of targeted bonuses and special pay for key required specializations or jobs, such as assignments to hazardous stations and language or technological skills. Importantly, current pay increases based on promotions or longevity would not be affected, nor would the special compensation given to combat troops for hazardous duties. Across-the-board pay increases should be suspended as military forces are reduced and reorganized according to the cuts suggested here. This adjustment could take two years or more, at which point the general pay increase question could be revisited. This could save roughly $40 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

Likewise, the Department of Defense's health-care system, TRICARE, badly needs discipline. Defense health-system costs have grown from $19 billion in FY 2001 to over $50 billion in FY 2010. The pool of eligible personnel has expanded since Congress created TRICARE in 1995: TRICARE Reserve Select was introduced for reservists and their dependents, and TRICARE for Life was added for Medicare-eligible retirees and their dependents.

There are two types of retirees in the TRICARE system: those who are eligible for Medicare and those who are not, typically because they remain in the work force and have not reached the age of eligibility for Medicare. TRICARE was founded with the expectation that beneficiaries who have not yet reached the age of eligibility for Medicare would pay approximately 27 percent of the overall cost of the program through enrollment fees and copays. But the premiums and the cost-sharing system have not changed since then. This has attracted a large number of military retirees still in the work force to TRICARE and away from alternative, civilian health-care plans. Now,

only 11 percent of the program's costs are covered by beneficiaries not yet eligible for Medicare.

This must be corrected. Retirees who are eligible for Medicare and their dependents should share in the costs of TRICARE. For other retired beneficiaries, the enrollment fees and copays should be increased to 27 percent of costs, as was intended when the program was created. According to figures from the Congressional Budget Office, such changes could save $48 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

Finally, the military's retirement program should be revised. It is an unfair system for those employees who leave the service before 20 years, the term after which they become eligible for the program. And it frustrates Pentagon managers, who could more easily encourage departures to match the military's personnel needs if a retirement option before 20 years of service were available. The system should be revised wholesale, using the civilian Federal Employees Retirement System as a model. FERS benefits become vested after five years, the program includes Social Security and a defined benefit plan, and employee contributions are matched by the employer. Eligibility for a full pension should be delayed until the retirement age set by Social Security, but a one-time lump-sum payment to ease the transition to civilian life should be provided to service members whenever they leave the service. Personnel who already have over 15 years of service at the time of the transition to the new system should be exempt from it. An analysis of similar proposals developed by the Department of Defense suggests that $60 billion could be saved between FY 2012 and FY 2018 from such a reform. Foregoing across-the-board military pay increases for two years, modernizing the TRICARE cost-sharing system for working military retirees, and reforming the military retirement savings plan could generate $148 billion in savings between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

SMART MONEY

FUNDING FOR intelligence, 80 percent of which falls under the responsibility of the secretary of defense, should also be reconsidered. In 2004, Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to provide a stronger central direction for the intelligence community's 16 other agencies and impose budgetary discipline on them. Intelligence activities, programs, and agencies have expanded rapidly

since 2001 and at a significantly increased cost. According to James Clapper, the director of national intelligence, the intelligence budget for FY 2010 exceeded $80 billion. Size may now be the intelligence community's most significant problem.

Duplication in information technology, security procedures, human resource systems, and purchasing could be eliminated and overall management simplified. More savings still could be found by decreasing spending on government satellite imagery, which duplicates commercially available imagery, and by no longer vacuuming up more intelligence signals than are needed or can be processed. Helping the policymakers across the government who consume intelligence better communicate their needs to intelligence providers would also eliminate a sizable amount of unused analysis and the costs of generating it. Analysts with considerable internal management experience in the intelligence community think it reasonable to assume that such initiatives could save U.S. taxpayers $120 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018.

Defense missions, plans, and budgets have been largely exempt from scrutiny over the last decade. Yet the lessons of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the necessity for internal management discipline at the Pentagon, and the United States' severe fiscal problems all point to the need to make fundamental choices about national security priorities and the funds that support them. These proposals would save $788 billion between FY 2012 and FY 2018 and yet would leave in place a U.S. military fully ready to fulfill the priority missions it should conduct after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded. Should the cuts be implemented, the remaining U.S. military force would still be superior to any other in technology and capability. It would be the only force capable of patrolling the world's oceans, deploying hundreds of thousands of ground forces anywhere on the planet, dominating airspace, and managing intelligence and logistics worldwide. These reductions would result not only in a more focused and more efficient U.S. military capability but also in a defense budget that, although still very large, would help solve the United States' fiscal problems.

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American Politics and the Second Gilded Age

Robert C. Lieberman

Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. BY JACOB S. HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON. Simon & Schuster, 2010, 368 pp. $27.00.

The U.S. economy appears to be coming apart at the seams. Unemployment remains at nearly ten percent, the highest level in almost 30 years; foreclosures have forced millions of Americans out of their homes; and real incomes have fallen faster and further than at any time since the Great Depression. Many of those laid off fear that the jobs they have lost—the secure, often unionized, industrial jobs that provided wealth, security, and opportunity—will never return. They are probably right.

And yet a curious thing has happened in the midst of all this misery. The wealthiest Americans, among them presumably the very titans of global finance whose misadventures brought about the financial meltdown, got richer. And not just a little bit richer; a lot richer. In 2009, the average income of the top five percent of earners went up, while on average everyone else's income went down. This was not an anomaly but rather a continuation of a 40-year trend of ballooning incomes at the very top and stagnant incomes in the middle and at the bottom. The share of total income going to the top one percent has increased from roughly eight percent in the 1960s to more than 20 percent today.

This is what the political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson call the "winner-take-all economy." It is not a picture of a healthy society. Such a level of economic inequality, not seen in the United States since the eve of the Great Depression, bespeaks a political economy in which the financial rewards are increasingly concentrated among a tiny elite and whose risks are borne by an increasingly exposed and unprotected middle class. Income inequality in the United States is higher than in any other advanced industrial democracy and by conventional measures comparable to that in

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN is Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at Columbia University and the author of *Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State*.

countries such as Ghana, Nicaragua, and Turkmenistan. It breeds political polarization, mistrust, and resentment between the haves and the have-nots and tends to distort the workings of a democratic political system in which money increasingly confers political voice and power.

It is generally presumed that economic forces alone are responsible for this astonishing concentration of wealth. Technological changes, particularly the information revolution, have transformed the economy, making workers more productive and placing a premium on intellectual, rather than manual, labor. Simultaneously, the rise of global markets—itself accelerated by information technology—has hollowed out the once dominant U.S. manufacturing sector and reoriented the U.S. economy toward the service sector. The service economy also rewards the educated, with high-paying professional jobs in finance, health care, and information technology. At the low end, however, jobs in the service economy are concentrated in retail sales and entertainment, where salaries are low, unions are weak, and workers are expendable.

Champions of globalization portray these developments as the natural consequences of market forces, which they believe are not only benevolent (because they increase aggregate wealth through trade and make all kinds of goods cheaper to consume) but also unstoppable. Skeptics of globalization, on the other hand, emphasize the distributional consequences of these trends, which tend to confer tremendous benefits on a highly educated and highly skilled elite while leaving other workers behind. But neither side in this debate has bothered to question Washington's primary role in creating the growing inequality in the United States.

IT'S THE GOVERNMENT, STUPID

Hacker and Pierson refreshingly break free from the conceit that skyrocketing inequality is a natural consequence of market forces and argue instead that it is the result of public policies that have concentrated and amplified the effects of the economic transformation and directed its gains exclusively toward the wealthy. Since the late 1970s, a number of important policy changes have tilted the economic playing field toward the rich. Congress has cut tax rates on high incomes repeatedly and has relaxed the tax treatment of capital gains and other investment income, resulting in windfall profits for the wealthiest Americans.

Labor policies have made it harder for unions to organize workers and provide a countervailing force to the growing power of business; corporate governance policies have enabled corporations to lavish extravagant pay on their top executives regardless of their companies' performance; and the deregulation of financial markets has allowed banks and other financial institutions to create ever more Byzantine financial instruments that further enrich wealthy managers and investors while exposing homeowners and pensioners to ruinous risks.

In some cases, these policy changes originated on Capitol Hill: the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush tax cuts, for example, and the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, a repeal that dismantled the firewall between banks and investment companies and allowed the creation of powerful and reckless financial behemoths such as Citigroup, were approved by Congress, generally with bipartisan support. However, other policy shifts occurred gradually and imperceptibly.

Hacker and Pierson's second important point is that major policy shifts do not

always happen in such obvious ways. Many of the policies that have facilitated the winner-take-all economy have just as often come about as a result of what Hacker and Pierson call "drift," which occurs when an enacted policy fails to keep up with changing circumstances and then falls short of, or even subverts, its intended goal. The American system of separated powers—with its convoluted procedures and bizarre rules, such as vetoes and the filibuster—is especially conducive to drift, particularly compared to more streamlined parliamentary systems in other countries that afford majorities relatively unimpeded dominance over the policymaking process. Policies in the United States, once made, tend to be hard to overturn or even to modify.

Sometimes drift occurs through simple neglect or inertia. An example is the phenomenon known as "bracket creep," the process by which prior to the indexing introduced in 1981, inflation pushed incomes into higher tax brackets. But Hacker and Pierson particularly zero in on instances of intentional policy drift, when policymakers deliberately sidestepped or resisted available policy alternatives that might have reduced inequality. Allowing corporate executives to be compensated with stock options is one such case; stock-option compensation tends to bend incentives toward the short-term maximization of share prices rather than planning for long-term growth. Consequently, such compensation has allowed top managers to capture jaw-dropping gains despite their companies' often dismal performances. The long-term cost of corporate failure is borne not by CEOs and their executive minions, of course, but by rank-and-file employees, who get laid off when companies need to cut costs and whose pension investments are wiped out when companies' stocks sink.

In the 1990s, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, which regulates accounting practices, noticed this practice, correctly predicted the damage it would do to the economy, and then sought to curtail it. But Congress, spurred on by the lobbying efforts of major corporations, stopped the FASB in its tracks. As a result, Americans spent the 1990s and the first decade of this century living under 1970s accounting rules, which allowed top executives to more or less help themselves and, through the mutual back-scratching habits of corporate boards, help one another.

Similarly, labor law has failed to keep up with the times. Policymakers have repeatedly failed to enact reforms that would have accommodated new union-organizing techniques and empowered unions to counter the growing power of business to resist labor's demands. In this realm, the United States is running a twenty-first-century economy under 1940s rules. A clearheaded understanding of the power of drift in policymaking puts the Republican congressional minority during President Barack Obama's first two years in a fresh light. Obsessive obstructionism is not just a symptom of general crabbiness; it is a shrewd and sensible part of a larger strategy to enrich corporations while gutting long-standing protections for the middle class.

The dramatic growth of inequality, then, is the result not of the "natural" workings of the market but of four decades' worth of deliberate political choices. Hacker and Pierson amass a great deal of evidence for this proposition, which leads them to the crux of their argument: that not just the U.S. economy but also the entire U.S. political system has devolved into a winner-take-all

sport. They portray American politics not as a democratic game of majority rule but rather as a field of "organized combat"—a struggle to the death among competing organized groups seeking to influence the policymaking process. Moreover, they suggest, business and the wealthy have all but vanquished the middle class and have thus been able to dominate policymaking for the better part of 40 years with little opposition.

THE BUSINESS BACKLASH

In pursuing this argument, Hacker and Pierson revive the old academic tradition of pluralism to shine a bright light on some of the pathologies of American politics. The contemporary study of American politics emerged from pluralism, the post–World War II view that in the shadow of the two totalitarianisms of midcentury Europe—communism and fascism—democracy could be rendered stable and progressive through a politics of mutual accommodation among relatively evenly matched groups. Rather than titanic conflict between workers and capitalists, so the argument went, pluralist democracy would produce solid incremental policy changes that would inch American society forward toward security and affluence. The dramatic and decidedly nonincremental events of the 1960s and 1970s—the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and broader cultural upheaval—punctured this view.

Critics of pluralism began to note its limitations, emphasizing the primacy of individual motivations rather than group affiliations. Since then, the study of American politics has largely turned away from questions of organized interests and their role in policymaking and has focused instead on the ways in which individual attitudes and behavior combine to produce policy. Yet if one assumes that people vote based on their economic interests and that election outcomes influence policy through something like majority rule, how can one account for a generation of policies that promoted the interests of the wealthy few at the direct expense of everybody else?

Another critique of pluralism is that it underestimated the lopsidedness of political organization. As the great political scientist E. E. Schattschneider wrote in 1960, "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." Schattschneider, it turned out, did not know the half of it. To most observers, the 1960s seemed the height of American liberalism, and the decade's policy developments—upgrading the basic New Deal package of social protection and labor rights to include extensive protection of civil rights and civil liberties and additional benefits such as limited health insurance—seemed to bear out this view. But to business elites, the 1960s marked the nadir of their influence in American society, and they did not react passively. The era saw the stirrings of a conservative counterrevolution marked by ideological, political, and organizational developments, and particularly by the political awakening of business.

American conservatives, increasingly empowered by effective organization and lavish funding from their patrons in the business community, began to actively resist the politics of pluralist accommodation. Rather than accepting the basic contours of the New Deal and the Great Society and seeking to adjust them step by incremental step, conservatives assumed a newly confrontational posture and turned their efforts toward dismantling the legacies of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson.

The economic crisis of the 1970s, which

heralded the end of a generation of U.S. economic dominance, helped their cause by laying bare the limitations of the New Deal order. The country's economic and social policy regime—which relied heavily on the private provision of important social protections, such as pensions and health insurance—may have been adequate for a globally dominant industrial economy that generated 30 years of widely shared growth and stable employment for millions of industrial workers. But in the 1970s, it began to prove thoroughly inadequate for an era of globalization, deindustrialization, and economic dislocation, as displaced workers found themselves unable to rely on the government for economic protection. This, in Hacker and Pierson's parlance, was policy drift on a massive scale.

Ascendant conservatives seized on this state of affairs to argue that the whole New Deal edifice of social protection, financial regulation, progressive taxation, and civil rights should be dismantled rather than reinforced. Beginning with the Carter administration, the expanding business lobby successfully defeated proposal after reform proposal and aggressively promoted an opening round of tax cuts and deregulation—mere down payments on the frenzy to come.

CURING THE DISEASE

If there is a flaw in their telling of this grim tale, it is that Hacker and Pierson perhaps underestimate the actual discontent of the American middle class over the period they discuss. In the 1960s and 1970s, Americans came increasingly to distrust their government, and not without reason. Their leaders had led them into a distant war that proved unwinnable and tore the country apart; a criminally corrupt president was exposed and forced to resign; cities were going up in flames, exposing the deep racial rift that remained in American society despite the triumphs of the civil rights movement. Democrats and Republicans began to diverge on racial issues. The Republicans became the party not only of the wealthy but also of the whites (no Democrat since Johnson has received a majority of the white vote in a presidential election).

Even in the age of Obama, racial inequality remains an acute and intractable problem, and the forces of racial resentment, mingled with legitimate discontent over the government's abandonment of the middle class, infect American politics down to the present day (as the Tea Party movement's more lurid fulminations suggest). So by the late 1970s, dissatisfaction with the state of the government, politics, and policy was rampant across the board, among the wealthy and the middle class alike, and the conditions were ripe for a turn against the political status quo. Conservatives, on behalf of the wealthy, were ready with ideas and organization to seize the moment. Progressives and the middle class were not, and so began the spiral toward the winner-take-all game that Hacker and Pierson describe.

Like many social critics, Hacker and Pierson are long on diagnosis and rather short on treatment. Not surprisingly, they emphasize rebuilding the organizational capacity of the middle and working classes as the place to start repairing the infrastructure of American politics, neither a terribly precise prescription nor a route to a quick cure. But if they are right—and theirs is a compelling case—the task of restoring some sense of proportion and balance to the winner-take-all political economy is essential if the American body politic is to recover from its current diseased condition.

Review Essay

West Is Best?

Why Civilizations Rise and Fall

Timur Kuran

Why the West Rules—For Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future. BY IAN MORRIS. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010, 750 pp. $35.00.

In the 1940s, Joseph Needham, a British academic, began cataloging China's achievements in science and technology in an effort to understand why they were inferior to the West's. In his 40 years of study, he found that even though China may have seemed behind in such achievements at the moment, it had led the world in science a millennium before. He concluded that Confucianism and Taoism made a Chinese scientific revolution less likely because they allowed for only slow, incremental innovation, rather than overnight breakthroughs. Still, he recognized that this was only a partial explanation. Religions are not fixed, and if China's loss of scientific leadership stemmed from its religious attitudes, then what could account for the emergence and persistence of those attitudes?

Although Needham failed to resolve this great mystery, he made it impossible for other historians to continue to ignore questions about why some societies pull ahead and some fall behind. At a time when most Western, and even many non-Western, intellectuals believed in the intrinsic superiority of the West, Needham showed that both China's apparent shortcomings and the prevailing Western supremacy needed a historical explanation. His agenda became known as "the Needham question."

Broader analogues to the Needham question exist around the world. In the Middle Ages, the Middle East was at the forefront of optics, metallurgy, and mathematics. Its largest cities, libraries, and marketplaces dwarfed those in Europe. Subsequently, over the next half millennium,

TIMUR KURAN is Professor of Economics and Political Science and Gorter Family Professor of Islamic Studies at Duke University.

the Middle East slipped behind Europe in many realms, including science and medicine, finance and business, and literacy and living standards. But just as Confucianism and Taoism could not explain China's failures, Islam, often blamed for the Middle East's shortcomings, raises more questions than it answers. If Islam's supposedly retrograde system of beliefs explains the Middle East's recent failures, what accounts for its earlier successes?

ACCIDENTALLY SUPERIOR

Students of civilizational development have tended to approach disparities between the development of regions in two ways. The first, called "long-term lock-in," asserts that some essential advantage, such as a location with an abundance of natural resources, efficient governance, or values conducive to innovation, makes a civilization fundamentally and inevitably superior. For example, in explaining the rise of Europe, some scholars argue that the rise of Christianity under the political control of the Roman Empire prepared the West for modernization and ultimately the Industrial Revolution, which reinforced its superiority.

The second approach identifies some short-term accident as the cause of a temporary gap or reversal of fortune. When Christopher Columbus set sail for India and found a continent blocking the way, so goes a popular short-term accident theory, he initiated a string of events that accelerated the West's economic development and allowed the West to dominate the world. Another such theory holds that the Middle East was developmentally handicapped because of the devastation the Black Death wrought in the fourteenth century.

In *Why the West Rules—For Now*, the classicist Ian Morris blends these two approaches. He finds that historical accidents affected the relative performance of the East and the West, sometimes for millennia. At the same time, he invariably sees geography as the principal determinant of performance trends. The taming of nature started in the West, he argues, because it had more plants and animals conducive to domestication. And Westerners initiated the global explorations that expanded the known world because it was easier for them to cross the Atlantic than for Easterners to cross the Pacific. Yet the advantages of geography have not made the West permanently superior. Every dominant civilization sooner or later reaches the limits of its capabilities, Morris argues. As its progress slows, other civilizations may catch up and leap ahead.

Morris gives the term "the West" an elastic and curiously broad meaning. The West, he writes, first included those societies that originated in the "Hilly Flanks," an arc-shaped area now split among Israel, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, where the domestication of plants and animals began around 9500 BC; over time, it expanded to include the Mediterranean basin, Europe, the Americas, and Australia. "The East" initially consisted of societies that originated in the area between China's Yellow and Yangtze rivers, where the domestication process started around 7500 BC; later, it also came to include the countries between Japan and Indochina. For Morris, then, what is now called the Middle East has always been part of the West. Of course, the Middle East eventually fell behind, and much of it was colonized by Europe, making its trajectory more like that of the East. If the purpose

of this book is to explore "why the West rules," surely this poses a major problem—one that it neglects to confront.

Having defined "the East" and "the West"—however problematically—Morris turns to comparing the relative development of the two civilizations across the centuries. He uses his own index of social development to quantify social progress. The index takes into account energy capture, or the amount of calories the typical individual consumes per day; urbanization, a proxy for organizational capability, as determined by the size of the largest city; war-making capability, measured by the quality and quantity of weapons systems; and information technology, based on how easily people can communicate. In terms of his index, Morris finds that the West led the East continuously from 14,000 BC, when the earliest known pottery was produced, to around AD 541, when the East jumped ahead. By 1100, the East's score was about 40 percent higher than the West's. The gap narrowed thereafter, and the West regained the lead around 1773—a lead it has maintained since. Some may criticize Morris' index as simplistic, and much of his data for premodern times are based on guesswork. Nonetheless, he manages to capture something real about the relative performances of the East and the West.

THE GOOD NEW DAYS

Early in the book, Morris notes that only the latest reversal, when the West started to pull ahead, allowed one side to colonize and subjugate the other. This point fades from view as he turns to interpreting historical events. But it is no small matter. Until the 1700s, the East and the West remained politically independent of each other, regardless of which side was ahead, and neither side enjoyed unchallenged military supremacy. The last reversal, moreover, had another unique trait: self-reinforcing growth. In both regions, the level of development had been constrained for millennia by the limitations of agrarian life. Since 1700, when world trade fell under European control, the West has developed at a dramatically accelerating rate. Today, its development, as measured by Morris, is over 20 times as high as its 1700 level. The East, with some lag, has also developed to unprecedented heights: Morris calculates its level of development to be about 13 times as high as its record level before 1700.

Modern growth is not a replay, or even a faster version, of earlier episodes. The organizational and technological innovations that are driving modern growth are continually evolving, keeping societies and the global political and economic order perpetually in flux. In turn, societies must continuously adjust their economic expectations, relationships, and routines. In Morris' telling, the difference between premodern and modern life is lost. Someone born in the age of Julius Caesar would have understood daily life in 1700. A person born in 1700 would find daily life in 2011—with its skyscrapers, air travel, computers, banks, cars—bewildering.

The lack of a unifying theory to explain why the present growth spurt is so different is the book's key shortcoming. According to Morris, whereas geography defines opportunities, sociology and human motivations determine how those opportunities are exploited. But the sociological side of the book's narrative is weak. Morris describes history as the formation and fall of dynasties, political centralization and

decentralization, spurts of creativity followed by inertia, and the evolution of beliefs. Yet he does not weave these stories together within an overarching theory of history. Once geography has defined opportunities, history is just "one damned thing after another"—to use Arnold Toynbee's characterization of inadequately theorized historical narratives.

By itself, of course, the lucky geography of the West and the resources it generated through global exploration cannot explain the explosive growth of modern times. Morris' index has the East ahead of the West until the eve of the Industrial Revolution. But for centuries, Europe had been building a new type of economic infrastructure, based on impersonal exchange and a commercial life dominated by large, durable, and structurally complex profit-making enterprises. Those are the developments that fueled Europe's global exploration in the first place and prepared the ground for the Industrial Revolution. They also set the stage for the West's colonial empires. In fact, the roots of the West's economic modernization stretch back to the beginning of the second millennium, when, according to Morris' development index, China under the Song dynasty led the world. It is then that Italian families in the West started forming private medieval "supercompanies," or firms that pooled the resources for dozens of investors over generations, to conduct finance and trade. These enterprises enabled private capital pooling and accumulation on an unprecedented scale.

As they grew, these supercompanies faced coordination, communication, and enforcement problems, which induced experimentation with ever more complex organizational structures and business techniques. By the sixteenth century, profit-making European enterprises were already using a corporate form of organization. Comparably complex private enterprises could be found nowhere else, not even in the rest of what Morris defines as the West. Thus, by the time Europe started benefiting from the resources of its colonies and its own conveniently located coal deposits, it already had the economic infrastructure necessary for mass production, industrialization, and mass transportation. Geographic advantages were not enough to propel Europe forward; the institutions invented in the West were necessary to exploit those advantages.

INFERTILE EAST

The regions that failed to keep up with Europe could not match the West's economic infrastructure. Most important, they failed to develop institutions for pooling labor and capital on a large scale and to develop sustainable organizations capable of reallocating resources efficiently. In the Middle East, religion, and culture more broadly, mattered, but not for the cosmological reasons that Needham might have thought. Rather than Islam's supposed conservatism, lack of curiosity about the natural world, or unwillingness to learn from foreigners, it was Islam's inheritance and marriage rules that created the stumbling block. These rules fragmented capital, blocking the establishment of large and durable private enterprises. Meanwhile, in South Asia, Hinduism hindered large-scale, impersonal cooperation by encouraging families to hold capital within family enterprises.

Some believe that China, India, and the Middle East would have eventually industrialized on their own if the West

had not done so first and colonized them. Morris is skeptical: "Even though Eastern and Western development scores were neck-and-neck until 1800, there are few signs that the East, if left alone, was moving toward industrialization fast enough to have begun its own takeoff during the nineteenth century." That is true. Yet having ignored economic institutions, Morris is not able to justify his claim, exposing the inadequacy of his index as a measure of development. If by 1800, Europe had already developed all the key components of the modern economy and China had not, the two regions could not have been equal in any meaningful sense. The problem here lies in Morris' use of city size as a proxy for organizational capacity. Lagos is now about as large as New York, but the organizational capabilities of Nigeria and the United States obviously differ. Nigeria is not yet ready to put a man on the moon, for example. A more refined measure of organizational capacity—one that accounted for the organizational options available to private commercial enterprises—would have shown Europe to be in the lead centuries earlier.

As it happened, modern economic institutions failed to emerge organically in the East. After colonization, Eastern leaders tried to overcome this deficiency by adopting Western institutions so as to achieve, in short order, the transformation that Europe went through over an entire millennium. Still today, the reforms remain incomplete. For modern economic organizations to work well, a country needs to have developed a host of complementary institutions, such as fair courts, norms of impersonal exchange, and trust in organizations. These are hard to transplant. In most parts of the East, they are still developing and spreading slowly.

FOR NOW?

As the book's title suggests, Morris' purpose is not only to interpret the past but also to identify what the future holds for the East-West development gap. By extrapolating from present trends, Morris predicts that, according to his index, the East will probably have regained the lead over the West by 2103. If China's output, war-making capacity, informational capacity, and per capita energy use keep growing faster that the West's, the East's Morris score will be higher within a few generations.

Although it is possible that China, India, and the Middle East will catch up economically, this conclusion does not follow from the book's core arguments. Those regions will catch up when the economic institutions that were responsible for putting Europe ahead really take root. There are reasons to be skeptical: centuries of poorly organized private sectors have left civil societies weak throughout the East and democratic institutions fragile. In the absence of a stable democratic system based on political checks and balances, incentives to make long-term investments in new businesses and the freedom to innovate are limited. There is no guarantee that China and the Middle East will develop healthy democracies anytime soon, and both may face long periods of political turbulence. For all its present challenges, the West may continue ruling in the twenty-second century.

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Review Essay

The Softer Side of War

Exploring the Influence of Culture on Military Doctrine

Peter R. Mansoor

The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the U.S., and Israel. BY DIMA ADAMSKY. Stanford University Press, 2010, 248 pp. $25.95.

Beer, Bacon, and Bullets: Culture in Coalition Warfare From Gallipoli to Iraq. BY GAL LUFT. BookSurge, 2010, 326 pp. $18.99.

When U.S. forces invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. military was not particularly concerned about the impact of culture on its operations. U.S. leaders believed that the assault would play out as a high-tech conventional conflict and would be followed by a stabilization effort only slightly more difficult than the one U.S. troops had encountered in Kosovo a few years before. As the commander of the U.S. Army's First Brigade, First Armored Division, in Baghdad during the first crucial year after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, I quickly discovered not only that this assumption was incorrect but also that sectarian and ethnic identities, the role of tribes in Iraqi society, and the U.S. Army's own internal culture would weigh heavily on the course of the conflict, influence our approach to waging the war, and impact our interactions with our coalition allies.

Subsequently, U.S. forces adjusted their procedures to take cultural factors into account. Troops became more sensitive to issues of honor and the treatment of women during routine security operations. Commanders learned the significance of sectarian and ethnic identities as civil strife began to tear at the fabric of Iraqi society. Perhaps most important, Iraqi tribes—

PETER R. MANSOOR, a retired Colonel in the U.S. Army, is Raymond E. Mason, Jr., Chair in Military History at the Ohio State University. He served as a Brigade Commander in Iraq in 2003–4 and as Executive Officer to General David Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force–Iraq, in 2007–8.

ignored by the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the war—became a major ally in the battle against al Qaeda in Iraq beginning in 2006. By the beginning of the surge in early 2007, the military had undergone a renaissance in its ability to connect with the Iraqi people, an adaptation that greatly assisted its ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. The creation of the Sons of Iraq program, which brought more than 100,000 largely Sunni Iraqi tribesmen and former insurgents into alliance with coalition and Iraqi forces in 2007 and 2008, would have been inconceivable absent that transformation.

The need for reconsidering culture's impact on warfare should not have come as a surprise. Culture's relationship to armed conflict has been an important focus in war studies in the post–Cold War period. *The Culture of Military Innovation*, by Dima Adamsky, and *Beer, Bacon, and Bullets*, by Gal Luft, both claim that culture plays a critical role in influencing the conduct of war. Adamsky explores strategic culture and its effect on military organizations, and Luft examines how culture impacts militaries operating together in coalition warfare. They both compellingly argue that policymakers and military leaders must either understand culture's impact on military matters or face the regrettable consequences of their ignorance.

APPROACHING TECHNOLOGY

In *The Culture of Military Innovation*, Adamsky, a fellow at the National Security Studies Program at Harvard, argues that strategic culture has a significant impact on internal military innovation and doctrine. By "strategic culture," Adamsky means shared beliefs and behaviors among militaries—derived from common experiences and historical narratives—that shape identities, influence relationships, and affect the manner in which armed forces define and achieve their security objectives. Adamsky analyzes the strategic cultures of the Russian, U.S., and Israeli militaries to explain why the information- and precision-based revolution in military affairs (RMA)—the marriage of precision-guided munitions and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems in warfare—developed uniquely in each of the three countries, yielding different solutions to similar operational challenges.

Adamsky argues, for example, that a nation's strategic culture plays a major role in how its military leaders process information and develop new theories of warfare. Technological changes do not revolutionize warfare by themselves; this happens, according to Adamsky, only after militaries create new organizational structures to integrate the technology into new doctrine. Culture, Adamsky contends, affects how such structures and doctrines are created.

The Soviet military was the first to foresee the transformative impact of the information technology revolution on war. Soviet military leaders in the 1970s theorized about the implications of precision-guided munitions and classified them as part of an emerging "military-technical revolution." Russian strategic culture, which, according to Adamsky, inclines toward a holistic examination of issues and therefore tends to promote the big picture over technical details, undoubtedly helped Soviet military leaders conceptualize new operational methods based on precision-guided munitions; improved command-and-control capabilities; and advanced intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance systems, despite the fact that the Soviet Union lacked the capability to produce the needed armaments to realize those methods in practice.

The Soviets were more successful than the U.S. and Israeli militaries in conceiving the military-technical revolution because they placed the emerging technology firmly within the context of Soviet deep battle theory, in which the Red Army executed incursions by armored forces, supported by airpower, deep into enemy rear positions to disrupt command and control, hamper logistics, and destroy enemy forces in massive encirclements. The Red Army implemented this innovative operational theory of war in the drive to Berlin from 1943 to 1945, the greatest land campaign in the history of war. Deep battle theory gave Soviet military leaders a historical and cultural lens through which to examine the application of new technologies on the modern battlefield, which facilitated their ability to incorporate precision-guided munitions and advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems into a new operational theory of warfare in the 1970s.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military, which had pioneered much of the research into precision-guided munitions, failed to look beyond the technological implementation and tactical integration of the new weapons to their more important operational and strategic implications. U.S. military doctrine in the 1970s emphasized engaging enemy forces on the frontlines rather than in depth and ignored the broader implications of new weapons (such as laser-guided munitions) that were just coming into service. Only later did American military leaders understand that the new weapons would allow U.S. forces to disrupt enemy formations in depth, thereby extending the battlefield in time and space. For Adamsky, the culprit is strategic culture: the U.S. military's penchant for using massive firepower to annihilate its enemies stood in the way of its ability to think more holistically about the art of operations. This infatuation with technology for technology's sake resulted in a focus on tactical details rather than strategic and operational design, a flaw in American military thinking dating back to World War II.

The U.S. military only came to understand the revolutionary potential of its new weapons after the Gulf War, an engagement in which a relatively small number of precision-guided munitions and stealth platforms inflicted the majority of the damage on Iraqi forces. By then, ironically, the information- and precision-based RMA was already largely consummated, and its implications had become clear to even the most casual observers. As Adamsky notes, the U.S. military's technological determinism endured through the 1990s, a cultural bias that I experienced before and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

STRATEGY, PAST AND FUTURE

Like the U.S. military, Adamsky writes, the Israel Defense Forces were quick to adopt precision weaponry and advanced command-and-control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems but slow to change their doctrine to account for them. The Israeli military's strategic culture aimed to win wars rapidly by offensive maneuver, an outlook shaped by its short clashes in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. The IDF has had much more difficulty waging extended conflicts, such

as the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal in the late 1960s, the two Palestinian intifadas, and the war in Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. Much like the United States, Israel has viewed technology as a panacea to solve its strategic dilemmas and has failed to develop viable operational concepts to fight protracted battles against unconventional enemies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. The pressing realities of a nation under siege have caused Israeli military leaders to focus on immediate problems rather than long-term strategic thinking. Their traditional reliance on improvisation, along with their reticence to create doctrine, made it difficult for the IDF to grasp RMA concepts.

Without a solid grounding in military theory and history, Adamsky contends, the IDF officer corps became thoroughly bewildered by reforms in the early years of this century. A group of innovation-minded RMA advocates, supported by a series of Israeli army chiefs of staff, beginning with Moshe Yaalon in 2002 and culminating with Dan Halutz in 2005, used postmodern language and theories disconnected from Israeli military traditions to incorporate new concepts, such as effects-based operations (targeting components of a military system to disrupt the enemy, rather than destroying enemy forces for the sake of attrition) and systemic operational design (applying systems theory to translate strategic direction into combat designs), into Israeli military thinking. The resulting confusion contributed to increased casualties during the 2006 war in Lebanon, not to mention Hezbollah's strategic victory. Leaping into the future without a grounding in the past led to serious consequences for the IDF, which is still recovering today.

EDUCATION IN THE FRAY

Adamsky argues that differences in strategic culture also manifest themselves in national approaches to intellectual creativity and different levels of receptiveness to formal (classroom) versus experiential (field) learning. He states that societies with logical-analytic (inductive) cognitive styles—in his view, most Western societies—have a more difficult time recognizing emerging discontinuities in warfare than societies with holistic-dialectical (deductive) modes of reasoning, among which Adamsky lists Asian, Latin American, and Russian societies. By "discontinuities in warfare," he means fundamental evolutions of militaries and their approaches to combat, often prompted by important technological innovations, such as the introduction of the machine gun, the tank, and aircraft in World War I, each of which altered military operations on all sides and changed the course of the war. Yet these technologies did not fundamentally reshape the battlefield until combatants understood their full potential and integrated them into new military doctrine and organizations.

Holistic-dialectical thought, according to Adamsky, is better suited to anticipating such discontinuities and so to developing new strategies to utilize them. Logical-analytic thought, meanwhile, lends itself to scientific experimentation and technological progress, but less so to incorporating that progress into broader strategic approaches. In Adamsky's view, then, societies based on holistic-dialectical thought should be better at creating new theories of war fighting. But his evidence for this assertion is based solely on the RMA example, which occurred in the late twentieth century. His theory cannot explain,

for example, why western European states (with supposedly inductive modes of reasoning) were the first to understand the revolutionary implications of gunpowder technology during the early modern era, rather than China or Japan (which exhibit, in Adamsky's view, deductive modes of reasoning).

Although this portion of his argument remains dubious, Adamsky is correct in noting that both the U.S. military and the IDF promote tactically competent problem solvers at the expense of cultivating military intellectuals. It is no wonder, then, that most RMA concepts originated in the Soviet Union or in civilian-run think tanks in the United States. Anti-intellectualism and an unwillingness to read and learn from history broadly characterize the officer corps of both the United States and Israel; U.S. and Israeli military leaders are far more likely to rely on personal experience than education in shaping their views of war. The lack of intellectual rigor in U.S. and Israeli professional military educational institutions is a symptom of this culture.

Adamsky admits that he is more interested in the process of doctrinal change than in the efficacy of the final result. But change for its own sake is not inherently beneficial. He stresses the need to recognize discontinuities in the ways and means of fighting so as to prepare for the next war rather than the last one. But a closer reading of the historical record shows that truly effective military innovation is thoroughly grounded in the past. Innovation that has not been tied to responding to a real enemy and a discrete set of military challenges has all too often caused armed forces to waste precious time and resources. By 2001, for example, the U.S. military was well on its way to perfecting an information- and precision-based RMA perfectly suited to fighting itself—a concept based on engaging a mirror-image enemy rather than a real one. Recognition of discontinuities is fine, provided it does not lead to a blind leap into the future without consideration of the past and the present.

By the beginning of the last decade, the U.S. military's long-standing reliance on technological solutions to tactical and operational challenges had left it with a dearth of strategic thinking. Its trust in the concept of rapid, decisive operations nearly led the United States and its allies to defeat in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the absence of an organizational culture that valued intellectual creativity, the twenty-first-century U.S. Army operated, conceptually speaking, much like the early-twentieth-century German army—a tactically brilliant force that lost two world wars because it failed to think strategically. "We hack a hole [in the front]," the German general Erich Ludendorff famously said of the 1918 spring offensives on the western front during World War I. "The rest comes on its own." Total German defeat followed after the tactical successes of the 1918 spring offensives fizzled and U.S. forces began to arrive in France in greater numbers. The blitz on Baghdad in the spring of 2003—with its emphasis on military success alone, absent a supportive political context both internationally and within Iraq—had an eerily similar strategic underpinning.

If anything, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that despite what Adamsky argues, the information- and precision-based RMA has not "completely changed the combat environment." These campaigns, as well as Israel's ill-fated incursion into Lebanon in 2006, have illustrated

the fallacies inherent in the effects-based approach to military operations, with its emphasis on precision targeting of enemy systems at the expense of a fuller understanding of the nature of the battle. This "high-tech, low [troop] numbers" operational approach has neither been validated by these wars nor proved suitable to counterinsurgency campaigns. The Red Army did not lose in Afghanistan in the 1980s because of its inability "to cope with the military-technological realities brought about by the MTR [military-technical revolution]," as Adamsky claims, but because it could not wage and win an old-fashioned counterinsurgency struggle against the mujahideen, who were supported by a coalition of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.

Despite the fact that the information- and precision-based RMA has not completely revolutionized all warfare, Adamsky properly recognizes strategic culture as a major factor in military innovation. The U.S. military eventually learned valuable lessons regarding counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq, lessons it put to good use in 2007 and 2008 when its strategic approach started to prioritize protecting the Iraqi people over targeting insurgent and terrorist operatives. U.S. military doctrine now clearly recognizes the need for organizational learning in counterinsurgency warfare, although it remains to be seen whether this new openness to adaptation will endure.

COMPLEXITIES OF COOPERATION

Just as culture affects how a given military organization conducts its internal affairs, it also influences its external relations with allies. In *Beer, Bacon, and Bullets*, Luft, a veteran of the IDF, describes how cultural

variances among militaries can inhibit the effectiveness of coalitions during war. The subject is far from esoteric, for recent conflicts such as the Gulf War and the wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq have all required significant collaboration between allied forces, and coalition warfare will continue to be the norm in the twenty-first century.

To answer how militaries from different nations and societies cooperate, Luft analyzes five instances in which Western armies operated in close alliance with non-Western allies. He first explores the German-Ottoman alliance during World War I, arguing that a shortage of cultural awareness and understanding severely weakened the coalition. The German military mission, staffed with a largely homogenous Prussian officer corps that lacked exposure to other peoples, alienated its Turkish allies through an attitude of cultural superiority and heavy-handed treatment. Kaiser Wilhelm II's misunderstanding of Islam led him to encourage the Turkish elite to call for a jihad against Christians, with the aim of energizing the Ottoman war effort against France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The declaration had little of the intended effect, but instead spurred massive religious persecution within the Ottoman Empire and atrocities against Christian Armenians and Syrians. The lesson here, according to Luft, is simple—leaders should be wary of trying to manipulate cultural sensitivities that they do not fully understand.

Luft's next case, the United Kingdom's alliance with Japan during World War I, is an example of a successful partnership based on shared cultural understanding. British military leaders, who had inherited from their country's imperial experience a long tradition of cross-cultural communication, were well equipped to coordinate operations with their Japanese allies against German forces on the Shandong Peninsula in 1914. The Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Mitsuomi Kamio, spoke excellent English and cooperated closely with his British counterpart, the gracious brigadier general Nathaniel Barnardiston. Mutual respect at the top produced good relations, which was especially important since British troops served under Japanese command.

As both this example and the rest of Luft's book make clear, to understand foreign militaries, one needs to view them through the prism of their cultures, not one's own. Luft's account of the ties between U.S. forces and the Nationalist Chinese army during World War II is a case in point. Padding unit counts with extra "ghost" soldiers who do not in fact exist, demanding kickbacks for services, and even selling intelligence to the enemy were commonplace in the Chinese army and often undermined its combat performance. American officers in China balked at the corruption and refused to play along, leading to a great deal of friction between the allies and, ultimately, a failure to defeat the Imperial Japanese Army on the Asian mainland.

Senior military officials need to work with their foreign counterparts rather than attempt to impose their ways on them by fiat. The Gulf War proved that militaries of radically different cultures can work well together. The coalition commander, U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, diligently tried to comply with the cultural values of his Saudi hosts by ordering his troops to refrain from consuming alcohol

or viewing pornography, from holding public religious services, and from fraternizing with the locals. The Americans' respect for cultural, ethnic, and racial diversity went a long way toward limiting potential sources of friction. For their part, the Saudis relaxed a few of their more stringent laws to accommodate the coalition's military needs: for example, they allowed female soldiers to drive military vehicles on Saudi roads. Military training and education also played a role in bettering relations between the allies. The Saudi military commander, General Khaled bin Sultan, had attended the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Air War College.

My experience in Iraq bore out the lessons that Luft highlights. U.S. military relations with such coalition partners as the Polish contingent were vastly improved by a common professional military education, shared training experiences in Europe, and a standardized NATO doctrine. The chief of staff of the Polish brigade in Karbala, with which my brigade collaborated in combat operations in the spring of 2004, was a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. His ability to understand U.S. military operations went a long way toward smoothing relations between our forces. Likewise, Australian and British military officers integrated seamlessly into the Multi-National Force–Iraq headquarters. As the U.S. military will undoubtedly fight alongside allies in the future, enhancing opportunities for the professional military education of U.S. officers in foreign schools and of foreign officers in U.S. military institutions is a crucial low-cost, high-payoff activity.

THE CULTURE CHARGE

Culture is undoubtedly a key determinant in the evolution of military affairs. It underpins military effectiveness and the ability to create operational doctrine, and it is also a major factor in managing relations between allies. Culture is also important because it helps explain the worldview and motivations of one's potential adversaries. As the two decades since the end of the Cold War have shown, military and political leaders ignore the impact of culture on military affairs at their peril. The U.S. military should enhance the education of its midgrade and senior leaders accordingly and take intellectual capability into greater account in promotion decisions. As the U.S. military selects its next generation of senior leaders, it would do well to keep in mind T. E. Lawrence's contention that "irregular war is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." Embracing that concept is a cultural shift worth contemplating.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Women and States: Norms and Hierarchies in International Society. BY ANN E. TOWNS. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 260 pp. $85.00 (paper, $33.00).

Ever since the suffrage movement in the early twentieth century, governments around the world have enacted far-reaching reforms that have brought women into political life—as voters, officials, and politicians. This fascinating book explores the logic of these historic changes, focusing on three advancements: women's suffrage, government bureaus mandated to address women's issues, and, more recently, gender quotas for national legislatures. In detailed empirical chapters, Towns untangles the complex ways in which states have adopted new practices. They have done so in "waves" of legislation among "clusters" of states. Women's suffrage, for example, first broke through in small western U.S. states and then spread to the rest of North America and western Europe; this was followed by movements in eastern Europe and Latin America, which then moved into Africa and Asia after states in those regions gained national independence. These patterns, Towns argues, reveal much about how states compare, rank, and compete with one another and how sudden shifts in notions of legitimacy can trigger transnational social movements.

Great Powers and Strategic Stability in the Twenty-first Century: Competing Visions of World Order. EDITED BY GRAEME P. HERD. Routledge, 2010, 256 pp. $125.00.

There is widespread agreement that the world is moving from unipolarity to a multipolar system, in which a handful of great powers will hold sway. What is debated is whether this return to multipolarity will be peaceful. This collection of essays does not give a clear answer, but the authors do provide a useful survey of the geopolitical landscape. Several of them explore the security threats and functional challenges that will be the focus of great-power politics in the years to come, including terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and energy security. Others look at the grand strategies of rising powers such as China, India, and Russia. The volume highlights the tension at the heart of twenty-first-century-style multipolarity. On the one hand, power and authority will be more decentralized and the inevitable struggles for influence between the United States and emerging non-Western powers will make cooperation more difficult. On

the other hand, the challenges that the great powers will confront in the coming decades will be problems of interdependence, such as the environment and weapons proliferation, and so will require intensified cooperation.

The New Dynamics of Multilateralism: Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance. EDITED BY JAMES P. MULDOON, JR., JOANN FAGOT AVIEL, RICHARD REITANO, AND EARL SULLIVAN. Westview Press, 2010, 320 pp. $37.00.

More than ever before, states conduct their business—economic, political, security—in or around multilateral forums. Institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and NATO are not only locations where states can negotiate but also repositories of widely shared rules and norms. Drawing on the views of scholars and practitioners, this study tracks the way multilateralism has moved beyond the state system to include nonstate actors and an expanding array of issues. Several of the chapters outline the deep shifts in thinking about anarchy and order, arguing that multilateralism is increasingly a value-laden norm about the virtues of rule-based global governance. Other chapters look at the actual operation of multilateral systems of rules, as states grapple with rogue regimes, nuclear proliferation, economic crises, and human rights abuses. The book's most interesting theme is that multilateralism—as a form of organization—has evolved from its origins as a set of principles for the conduct of diplomacy among sovereign states into a set of tools used to gain some control over a dangerously ungovernable world that exists beyond the state system.

In War's Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy. EDITED BY ELIZABETH KIER AND RONALD R. KREBS. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 326 pp. $95.00 (paper, $29.99).

The most profound effects of war are often felt far from the battlefield. In the mobilization for war and in its aftermath, states have expanded government powers, extended voting rights, reorganized political coalitions, and in many other ways transformed the very character of the state. This groundbreaking book brings together distinguished academics who explore the ways that the wars of the last two centuries have affected democracy. Scholars have long noted that major wars tend to cause states to expand political participation—that the demands of raising mass armies during World War I and World War II, for example, resulted in new voting rights and social welfare provisions. Some authors here confirm this view, but the book as a whole tends to find more complex and uncertain linkages between war and democracy. One author shows that the conscription of mass citizen armies leads to more political participation within warring societies, whereas voluntary professional armies tend to have the opposite effect. Another finds that the growth of intrusive policing authority and government secrecy is tied more to domestic threats to political order than to international conflict. Several chapters focus on the bigger picture—whether war has an impact on the very emergence of democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder find no direct causal connection, but others see instances in which defeat bolstered democratic forces. Miguel Centeno raises perhaps the most ominous point: that the new type of war—the "war on terror"—

has none of the democracy-enhancing effects of the mass-army sort. Instead, it reinforces the segregation of the military from the rest of society and undermines civil liberties.

The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security, and International Law. BY MICHAEL J. GLENNON. Stanford University Press, 2010, 224 pp. $40.00.

Glennon has long been an eloquent critic of traditional approaches to international law derived from idealistic, universalistic, and moralistic tenets. About the legality of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, he has advanced a decidedly skeptical view of international law. In this landmark book, Glennon lays out his alternative take. As he sees it, international law is simply what states make of it, and it matters only to the extent that states want it to. Whereas law within states is ultimately upheld through coercion, international law is based on consent: states must choose to abide by the strictures and obligations of international law, and they can just as easily withdraw their consent. In Glennon's hands, international law is shorn of its transcendent characteristics and becomes more like the run-of-the-mill rules and agreements that make up international relations. Indeed, when Glennon turns to the thorny question of law and the use of force, his discussion will look familiar to political scientists who study international institutions, legitimacy, power, and the rational choices of states. In the end, Glennon argues that since the United States is a party to more treaties than any other state, it has a special stake in the continuity and stability of international agreements—a view the traditional international legal thinkers would surely affirm as well.

The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010. BY JOHN M. OWEN IV. Princeton University Press, 2010, 320 pp. $29.95.

Drawing masterfully on 500 years of international history, Owen reminds readers that the use of military force to change, construct, or preserve foreign regimes is hardly a new phenomenon. By his count, there have been 209 such attempts since 1500. A majority of these had an ideological agenda. Between 1510 and 1700, Catholic and Protestant rulers in central and western Europe used force to aid coreligionists in other countries. Efforts to spread republican regimes, constitutional monarchies, and absolute monarchies were common in Europe and the Americas between 1770 and 1870, whereas most regime-promotion attempts in the twentieth century sought to defend or defeat communism, liberalism, or fascism. Another such struggle continues today in the Muslim world, with secularism arrayed against Islamism. Owen explains that in periods of intensified ideological contestation, rulers have generally believed that "birds of a feather" lend one another legitimacy and adopt more consonant foreign policies. He also argues that forcible regime promotion has been an opportunistic strategic weapon—directed chiefly at unstable or defeated states—rather than a principled end in itself. The practice, moreover, reinforces the perception that alien ideologies are monolithic and dangerous, creating vicious circles of polarization and interventionism. The historical narratives Owen employs to test this theory are nuanced, illuminating, and a joy to read.

PETER LIBERMAN

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking. BY HOWARD DAVIES AND DAVID GREEN. Princeton University Press, 2010, 320 pp. $35.00.

Davies and Green, two seasoned veterans of the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England, review the 2007–8 financial crisis—and its antecedents—for lessons in how central banks should be organized, what responsibilities they should be given, and how they should pursue those responsibilities. Not surprisingly, they find that central banks should assume more responsibility for the stability of the financial system, and they are inclined to favor inflation targeting as one method of their doing so. Discussing at length the merits and difficulties involved when central banks adopt a more supervisory role, the book contains noteworthy chapters on the special problems of central banking within Europe and in emerging-market countries, where financial systems are less well developed. Disappointingly, the authors devote little space to the challenges that large and potentially volatile international movements of capital pose for central banks.

Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration From India. BY DEVESH KAPUR. Princeton University Press, 2010, 344 pp. $35.00.

At the beginning of this century, an estimated 175 million people, nearly three percent of the world's population, lived outside their countries of birth, and this number has grown every year. This richly detailed study of Indian emigration reveals how this movement of people affects the countries left behind, with a special focus on the diverse impacts of the Indian diaspora—an estimated 20 million people—on the politics, economics, social attitudes, foreign policy, and modernization of India. The rapid growth of remittances from Indian emigrants now exceeds official foreign assistance to the country. But Indian emigrants also send (through letters) or bring (through visits) new attitudes and new ideas based on their international exposure. Some provide overseas anchors for Indian exports or investments; others return to start businesses in India, drawing not only on their experience abroad but at least as much on the self-confidence they have gained through success. Another benefit: emigration by Indian elites, the author argues, helps stabilize India's democracy by giving the disgruntled the option of exit.

Food Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know. BY ROBERT PAARLBERG. Oxford University Press, 2010, 240 pp. $74.00 (paper, $16.95).

Going well beyond its title, *Food Politics* addresses key questions about agriculture, including consumers' concerns about food safety, producers' concerns about prices and volatility, and taxpayers' concerns about subsidies. Paarlberg organizes his material around a long list of questions about food policies and practices, such as "Are genetically engineered foods safe?" "Why did food prices rise in 2008?" and "How do farm subsidies shape international agricultural

trade?" His answers to these and many other questions are accessible and nuanced.

Globalization at Risk: Challenges to Finance and Trade. BY GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER AND KATI SUOMINEN. Yale University Press, 2010, 336 pp. $27.50.

The economists Hufbauer and Suominen make accessible much scholarly research on the economic effects of globalization in its various dimensions: trade, finance, foreign direct investment, and migration. They find that the balance of evidence strongly supports the claim that globalization has significantly raised standards of living for ordinary people around the world. But globalization, they emphasize, is not automatic; it needs to be nurtured continuously. Reversal is all too possible, especially given the widespread distress and political recrimination that have followed the recent global economic recession. Hufbauer and Suominen identify sources of emerging frictions, such as uncoordinated national climate-change measures, which complicate international trade, and state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds, which complicate international investment. They also recommend policies to maintain globalization, some aimed specifically at the United States (introducing portable health insurance, extending unemployment benefits) and others that require international collaboration (agreeing on new trade rules, enacting greater financial regulation). The book contains many substantive and highly informative footnotes, too, which are worth reading apart from the text.

The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. BY DANI RODRIK. Norton, 2011, 288 pp. $26.95.

In this cogent, well-written book, Rodrik, a Harvard economist, critiques unalloyed globalization enthusiasts, taking aim at their desire to fully liberalize foreign trade and capital movements. While acknowledging that extensive engagement with the world economy can produce higher material standards of living, he worries that the unintended side effects may create unwanted and even unnecessary social distress. He is also offended by the empirical casualness of the arguments sometimes advanced in support of liberalization. There are in fact many paths to development, he argues, and democratic societies should be free to exercise their collective preferences without having the institutional and policy preferences of outsiders thrust upon them. (Nondemocracies should not necessarily be given the same latitude.) Unfortunately, Rodrik does not apply the same scrutiny to how decisions are actually made in democracies—through, for example, the manipulation of public opinion by elites—that he does to the arguments concerning different paths to development.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. BY GIDEON ROSE. Simon & Schuster, 2010, 432 pp. $27.00.

The past decade has provided painful confirmation of the truism that it is easier to start wars than conclude them. The U.S. engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have lasted longer than each of the two world wars, and neither promises anything as satisfying as a clear-cut victory. The

classic conclusion of a war, with the enemy surrendering in the wake of the unequivocal defeat of its forces, appears to have given way to messier outcomes, dependent on managing complex political processes. Except that, as Rose points out in his review of 100 years of American experience, successfully ending wars has always involved far more than military victory. Starting with World War I and ending with the Iraq war (and with clear implications for the war in Afghanistan), Rose shows how confused political leaders often are about exactly what they are trying to achieve in the coming peace. This can create the conditions for future wars; there had to be two against Germany and two against Iraq. He also shows how leaders tend to correct for the mistakes of the previous war; in the Gulf War, for example, the goal was to avoid another Vietnam. As Rose is the new editor of this magazine, it is comforting to note that he writes extremely well and knows how to hold a reader's interest while never losing sight of his serious purpose.

Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict. EDITED BY PETER ANDREAS AND KELLY M. GREENHILL. Cornell University Press, 2010, 288 pp. $65.00 (paper, $24.95).

It is nearly impossible to obtain reliable statistics about the human costs of conflict. Yet claims about casualties, in particular, are commonly used to demonstrate the inhumanity of belligerents or the urgent need for international action. Something expressed mathematically sounds more scientific than thoughts expressed in mere words. Andreas and Greenhill's book is not the first to warn of the misuse of statistics of conflict—and given the deep-rooted nature of the tendency it addresses, it will not be the last—but it does so comprehensively. The chapters forensically reconstruct the micropolitics of the production of seemingly trustworthy numbers about drug and human trafficking, atrocities, and casualties. When governments are being urged to act (as in Kosovo), the dark numbers get inflated; when they resist action (as in Darfur), they get deflated. The editors argue against the knee-jerk dismissal of all statistical claims, concluding instead that, as human constructs, these claims deserve careful scrutiny.

The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics. BY MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ. Princeton University Press, 2010, 286 pp. $75.00 (paper, $26.95).

Horowitz has written a scholarly analysis of why some governments enthusiastically embrace military innovations while others miss out. He identifies two main factors that determine a state's capacity to upgrade: the ability to afford the improvements and the organizational capital to adopt them. Both factors are normally important, but their relevance can vary. To become a nuclear power requires a considerable financial outlay but not much organizational change. Aircraft carrier warfare is both expensive and organizationally demanding. Adopting suicide bombing is a cheap tactic for a terrorist group but requires major organizational changes. Horowitz has successfully built on existing theories of organizational change and military innovation, but he might have made more of strategic considerations, which provide the impetus to spend both financial and organizational capital. His consideration of suicide bombing as a military innovation

is imaginative, but his suggestion that the Catholic Provisional Irish Republican Army, which had to beware of Protestant paramilitaries, somehow missed a trick by not adopting this tactic betrays a gap in his research. The book also suffers from the curse of American political science in its occasional use of complex statistics to make unremarkable points.

The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War From Antiquity to the Present. BY BEATRICE HEUSER. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 592 pp. $99.00 (paper, $37.99).

The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society From Machiavelli to Clausewitz. BY BEATRICE HEUSER. Praeger, 2010, 232 pp. $49.95.

Heuser's history of strategic theory and practice demonstrates extraordinary range, erudition, intelligence, and insight. She appears to have read everything, in many languages, about attempts to apply armed force effectively. *The Evolution of Strategy* will be the first port of call for those wanting to check up on the development of land strategy in the eighteenth century, maritime strategy in the nineteenth century, nuclear strategy in the twentieth century, or counterinsurgency strategy in the twenty-first century. She charts the continuing quest for reliable, even scientific, principles to guide the conduct of war and notes recurring themes, such as attempts to bridge the gap between war and ethics and the problems of translating battlefield victories into lasting peace. The book's great strength lies in the breadth of its author's reading. By paying attention not only to the broader political and cultural context but also to the writings of practitioners and some of the more secondary theorists, Heuser is able to show which ideas took root and why.

In addition to old favorites such as Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Heuser likes to draw on less familiar figures, such as the pre-Napoleonic Enlightenment thinker Comte de Guibert. In her companion volume, *The Strategy Makers*, she provides extracts from the works of these forgotten men who shaped thinking about war from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century and whose work still resonates today.

The United States

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Obama's Wars. BY BOB WOODWARD. Simon & Schuster, 2010, 464 pp. $30.00.

Another president, another war, another fly-on-the-wall account by Woodward. A British politician once said that conducting foreign relations in a democracy is like playing bridge with a crowd of people behind you loudly discussing your hand and making suggestions about what cards to play. Public curiosity is certainly served by books of this kind; what is less certain is that the public interest benefits when the inner war councils of a serving U.S. president, complete with the hesitations and mental reservations that accompany any strategic discussion, are served out before an audience that necessarily includes U.S. enemies. Regardless, Woodward, as usual, has produced a riveting and at times revelatory read. Much attention has been paid to the book's insight into civil-military relations; some readers will be more interested in what can be learned about the quality of strategic thought in the White House and the Pentagon. The specter that haunts the war in Afghanistan

is similar to the one that stalked Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam. Is this a war that an administration feels it cannot lose but does not know how to win? The answer to that cannot be determined from this book; one wishes the Taliban and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence were blessed with Bob Woodwards of their own to give clues about how the current Afghan war will unfold.

Washington: A Life. BY RON CHERNOW. Penguin Press, 2010, 928 pp. $40.00.

Chernow, a distinguished historian, takes on the most important and most difficult subject in American biography: the life of the extraordinary Virginia colonial who, with his force of character, political skills, patriotic commitment, marmoreal propriety, and iron will, did more than any other person to establish the independence of the United States and make its republic work. From John Marshall onward, George Washington's biographers have usually failed. Washington was the nation's first performance artist: virtually his entire public life was a carefully constructed act, and writers have generally been unable to find the man behind the mask. Chernow's study of the young Washington, before the mask settled firmly into place, brings readers close to an insecure man fiercely determined to win honor and respect—traces of whom can still be seen beneath the general and the president. The attention Chernow pays to Washington's life as a slave owner is revelatory: the irresolvable moral and economic dilemmas of the institution gave Washington little satisfaction and no rest, and by setting out both what he did and what he did not do about it, the account offers a uniquely insightful view of the contradictions and human reality underneath that impressive façade.

Big Girls Don't Cry: The Election That Changed Everything for American Women. BY REBECCA TRAISTER. Free Press, 2010, 352 pp. $26.00.

While many Americans remember the 2008 presidential election as the triumph of an African American, a number of others remember it as the defeat of two powerful women: Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primaries and Sarah Palin in the general election. Traister, one of the most powerful voices in a new generation of American feminist writers, explores the conflicted terrain on which many left-liberal American women found themselves first angered by what appeared to be unfair and even sexist treatment of Clinton at the hands of the press compared to the much softer coverage of her male rival—and then feeling unaccustomed pangs of sympathy for Palin as much of the establishment press made her a figure of derision. Michelle Obama—yet another dynamic professional woman, caught up in the contradictory expectations that surround a First Lady—also, in Traister's view, had to navigate a treacherous path. Traister has a lot to say about what this series of events reveals about the state of American culture and American feminism, and her clear style and analytic bent make her both an entertaining and an enlightening guide. That Clinton, Palin, and Obama have all become more visible and more powerful since 2008 signifies something about the power and creativity of American women; Ginger Rogers is still dancing as deftly as Fred Astaire, and still doing it backward and in high heels.

Recent Books

At the Precipice: Americans North and South During the Secession Crisis. BY SHEARER DAVIS BOWMAN. University of North Carolina Press, 2010, 392 pp. $30.00.

The secession crisis that began 150 years ago with the election of President Abraham Lincoln and culminated in the American Civil War was not the first bitter struggle between the North and the South—but it was the only one to end in war rather than compromise. Bowman attempts to identify the ideological, political, and cultural forces that made the crisis of 1860 impossible to resolve peacefully. Taking the unconventional yet persuasive route of looking in depth at the lives and thoughts of a diverse group of influential people in the North and the South, Bowman demonstrates the degree to which each side had come to view the other as a conspiratorial, ruthless power that would not stop until it had subjugated its rival. The South viewed the Republicans' strategy of "containing" the "peculiar institution" as a plan for its ultimate extinction. Northerners, meanwhile, were leery of the South's desire to secure slavery's future by extending its reach into new territories in the tropics and ensuring the right of slaveholders to take their human property into federal territory. They saw this as a plan that would imperil the ability of Northern states to keep "the Slave Power" and even slavery itself at bay. Readers of *At the Precipice* are likely to come away feeling both that the Civil War was largely inevitable and that the instinct of U.S. politics to find compromise solutions is so strong that only a conflict as stark as the one between slavery and human freedom could overcome it.

Bob Dylan in America. BY SEAN WILENTZ. Doubleday, 2010, 400 pp. $28.95.

The distinguished Princeton historian Wilentz lives a double life: he is also a well-known commentator on the work of Bob Dylan and has been nominated for a Grammy for his liner notes on a Dylan album. In *Bob Dylan in America*, Wilentz brings his professional historical skills together with his appreciation for Dylan's work and for the rich American musical traditions from which it emerged. The result is a daring and unconventional book that does not always succeed—but that always provokes and challenges. It is both a deep historical exploration of American music, ranging from the Delta blues to Aaron Copland, and a close commentary on various aspects of Dylan's career. The essays on American music history are extraordinary for their depth and detail, but they often seem too far afield from Dylan's work to belong in the book. The material on Dylan himself is deeply felt and often powerfully presented, but there are times when the fan appears to beat out the historian. Nevertheless, readers (or listeners, as the audio edition of the book includes snippets of music to illustrate some of the arguments) will find their interest in American music and Dylan stimulated and enriched. Popular music is one of the United States' most distinctive and influential forms of expression; if more historians worked like Wilentz to integrate America's music into the American story, the national narrative might become richer, more comprehensive, and perhaps even a bit wiser.

Western Europe

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin. BY TIMOTHY SNYDER. Basic Books, 2010, 544 pp. $29.95.

This magisterial work chronicles in horrifying detail the mass murder of civilians by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany from 1930 to 1945 in the "bloodlands" that lay between them: Poland, the Baltic republics, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Snyder's account is engaging, encyclopedic—and controversial. Whereas many accord Hitler more blame than Stalin for such atrocities, Snyder treats the two as comparable. The numbers are similar. Hitler is customarily thought of as pioneering systematic extermination, but Stalin predates him by nearly a decade. German concentration camps are often referred to as a uniquely calculated, even "industrial," form of butchery. Yet camps account for only a few million of the 14 million deliberate and systematic civilian deaths carried out by the two countries. Most victims of both governments were shot or driven into the wilds to die of starvation and disease. Many still insist that Stalin, believing that communist transformation would falter in the face of opposition from national minorities and rich kulaks, espoused more pragmatic views than his maniacal German counterpart. Yet Hitler was just as results-oriented, believing that military victory and fascist rule would elude Germany unless minorities were eliminated. For Snyder, what mattered most in the end was the commonality that both leaders sacrificed millions to grandiose totalitarian projects.

A Journey: My Political Life. BY TONY BLAIR. Knopf, 2010, 700 pp. $35.00.

This book is nearly unique among modern political memoirs in that the author is said to have written it. The resulting prose is at best cloying and chatty, at worst cliché-ridden and convoluted. It recounts few political events that recent British memoirs have not already described. On Iraq it is evasive. Yet it is worth the read because it reveals, better than any book of its kind, how modern politics really works. To judge from Blair's frank and surprisingly cynical admissions, politicians are often ignorant, scared, and burdened by the past. Their environment is hostile, as illustrated by Blair's blunt asides on the small-mindedness of nongovernmental organizations, the hypocrisy of the Tory opposition, and the antagonistic incompetence of his buddy Gordon Brown. To achieve anything, leaders must corner electoral opponents with clever rhetoric that manipulates, even misleads, the public. In the end, many historically important matters are decided on little more than gut instinct and personal morality. No one can win at this game forever. This helps explain why a man who entered office with the reputation of being an instinctive politico, able to read the public mind with uncanny clarity, ended up—for all his achievements—a deeply disliked public figure.

Facts Are Subversive: Political Writing From a Decade Without a Name. BY TIMOTHY GARTON ASH. Yale University Press, 2010, 464 pp. $35.00.

Oxford's Garton Ash is no dusty don producing authoritative tomes grounded in archival sources, statistical charts, or

revisionist reinterpretations of the past. His virtues are journalistic—most notably, a brilliant eye for spotting a memorable detail in an exotic locale—yet his vision is broader than most reporters or columnists. He knows his history and literature, and he combines reportage with passionate political commitment. To be sure, these 48 short essays published over the last decade indulge some journalistic vices. They were written in the moment, and some have thus been overtaken by events: there are ruminations over the proper response to weapons that Iraq did not have, criticisms of an "Enlightenment fundamentalism" that Garton Ash now admits is illusory, and confident predictions about the spread of Ukraine's Orange Revolution that never came true. Moreover, the essays are selective, focusing on flashy subjects that make for engaging interviews: heroic revolutionaries, sordid politicians, and exotic nationalists. Economic interests and electoral calculation, the bland bread and butter of modern politics, play little role. Still, one would like to think this is how history is lived, and the result is engaging. These vignettes are highly recommended for those who cannot wait for the proverbial owl of Minerva to spread its wings.

The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment. EDITED BY RICHARD YOUNGS. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 216 pp. $60.00.

Some consider Europe's democracy-promotion policies to be a model for the world. Others consider the EU's efforts—and perhaps all such policies—ineffective. This slim volume is the newest among many assessments of Europe's attempts to promote good governance, human rights, and democracy. Even if the book lacks rigor in establishing comparative standards and metrics, it is informed by scholarly literature and provides useful case studies of EU efforts in Iraq, Morocco, Ukraine, and elsewhere. The result is sobering. Local domestic political structures, geostrategic concerns, and energy policy tightly constrain European policymakers. They have to be pragmatic, accepting the inherently limited and secondary role of any international intervention. Europe tends to compromise, the book suggests, by focusing on improving governance at the expense of improving democracy.

1939: Countdown to War. BY RICHARD OVERY. Viking, 2010, 176 pp. $25.95.

Overy argues that "nothing in history is inevitable"—not even the outbreak of World War II. This concise, clearheaded text seeks to prove the point by describing 11 days in 1939, from August 24, when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, to September 3, when France and the United Kingdom declared war on Germany. With events and information moving faster than they could be processed and decision-makers suffering from exhaustion and stress, both sides acted with "growing irrationality." Hitler believed the assurances of Joachim von Ribbentrop, his foreign minister, that the French and British were bluffing, and so expected to prevail quickly against the Poles alone. French and British leaders sought to redeem their "national honour" by extending a guarantee to Poland and deterring Hitler, and so gave little thought to how that guarantee might have to be honored in practice. Overy's narrow focus willfully obscures the legacy of World War I, Hitler's unbounded ambitions, the failed strategy of appeasement, and other complex causes

that perhaps made war inevitable. Still, it makes for provocative reading.

Italy Today: The Sick Man of Europe. EDITED BY ANDREA MAMMONE AND GIUSEPPE VELTRI. Routledge, 2010, 280 pp. $130.00.

The scandals, speeches, sex, and partisan scheming of Italian political life have always grabbed media attention. Yet the central question of Italian politics often goes unasked: How did the most successful country in postwar Europe become a basket case? In 1987, with much fanfare, Italy's per capita income overtook that of the United Kingdom; in 20 years, if current trends continue, it will be overtaken by Romania's. The interdisciplinary group of authors in this collection sets aside short-term factors and explores long-term structural reasons for *Italia malata* (ailing Italy). They offer new insights into well-known problems: the poor productivity of small firms, a lethargic legal system, weak universities, rampant corruption, the absence of meritocratic advancement, and the continued underdevelopment of the south. They also highlight problems known only to experts: little government support for families, the spread of organized crime outside of Naples and Sicily, low levels of social trust, and anti-immigrant sentiment.

Western Hemisphere

RICHARD FEINBERG

The New Brazil. BY RIORDAN ROETT. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 178 pp. $29.95.

For the corporate executive facing his or her first long flight to São Paulo, here is the perfect briefing book. A seasoned student of Brazilian politics, Roett swiftly and expertly reviews the country's Portuguese past, twentieth-century strife, and more recent triumphs. Without ignoring Brazil's many remaining challenges, Roett views the glass as more than half full. He is confident that the continental giant of 190 million citizens is finally on the path to democratic prosperity, regional leadership, and global influence. Especially admirable are Roett's assessments of the successful presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva; the four-page concluding chapter is a gem of tight historical interpretation. Roett is a fan of Brazilian foreign policy—"tough but pragmatic"—even as he criticizes Brazil's failed policies toward Honduras and Iran. But he probably underplays the anti-U.S. currents in the Brazilian Foreign Ministry and its tendency in international policy forums to prefer clever maneuvers to constructive contributions. In that immaturity, Brazil has company from China, India, and Russia, all emerging-market economies that must learn that with power comes responsibility.

Even Silence Has an End: My Six Years of Captivity in the Colombian Jungle. BY INGRID BETANCOURT. Penguin Press, 2010, 544 pp. $29.95.

In February 2002, Betancourt, a senator running for president of Colombia, was kidnapped by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC. A dual Colombian-French national, she is feted in France as a courageous activist who took great risks in the pursuit of peace but provokes controversy in Colombia. Was her kidnapping the result of her government's

purposeful security lapses or a consequence of her own reckless political grandstanding? In captivity, did Betancourt behave with undaunted dignity, as she asserts, or did she take advantage of her celebrity to gain privileged treatment, as other hostages have alleged? Surprisingly, in this memoir, her politics come off as somewhat superficial; her allegiances, unstable. Looking back on her six and a half years of torment, she makes a virtue of ambiguity: "I have become a complex being. . . . I am torn between opposing emotions. . . . I can accept my inconsistencies without worrying about other people." And her assertions, à la Nelson Mandela, that she has exorcised the urge for revenge and seeks only Christian love do not quite ring true. Nevertheless, the book succeeds as an intimate confessional memoir. It is a moving exploration of self-discipline and resilience on the part of captives and captors battling to survive, in body and soul, under the most extreme conditions.

The Eastern Stars: How Baseball Changed the Dominican Town of San Pedro de Macorís. BY MARK KURLANSKY. Riverhead Books, 2010, 288 pp. $25.95.

The author of charming, best-selling books on cod and salt, the incurably curious Kurlansky asks in this book, How is it that a small, impoverished Dominican town produced 79 Major League Baseball players between 1962 and 2008? (The list includes the Hall of Fame pitcher Juan Marichal, the slugger Sammy Sosa, and the rising star of the New York Yankees Robinson Cano.) The answer begins with sugar: the long off-season allowed plenty of time for sports, and the sugar mills sponsored baseball teams. The children could only afford baseballs made of rolled up socks, which have an uneven trajectory, a replacement that turned out to be excellent training for aspiring hitters. Then the Dominican Republic got its big break: the Cuban Revolution shut down the flow of Cuban players, driving baseball scouts to San Pedro de Macorís. Now, the industry tradition is deeply engrained: the Dominican Republic has a high-quality winter league, an organized array of baseball academies and stadiums, and leading baseball families (such as the Alous and the Canos). Today, Dominican players account for about one-quarter of all minor leaguers—and that excludes New Yorkers of Dominican origin, such as Alex Rodriguez.

Electing Chávez: The Business of Anti-neoliberal Politics in Venezuela. BY LESLIE C. GATES. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010, 216 pp. $24.95.

The firebrand Hugo Chávez was elected president of Venezuela in 1998, when oil prices were low and Venezuela's population was steeply rising. This meant that there were millions of dissatisfied and disorganized poor people—a ready constituency for an antiestablishment soldier like him. Gates argues that the business class threw more fuel into this volatile mixture, contributing to its own demise in two ways. First, business had become closely associated with ineffective governments widely perceived as corrupt, so voters rejected traditional candidates. (Gates does not judge whether these media-generated perceptions were accurate.) Second, "outlier" business owners, opportunistically seeking future access to a likely winner, betrayed their class and funded Chávez's campaign. So it not just the rejection of free-market "neoliberal" policies that elevated Chávez to power; it was also

popular perceptions of business corruption and internal divisions among the business elite.

"Cuba–Estados Unidos: Tan lejos, tan cerca." Special issue, *Temas*, April–September 2010, 230 pp. $30.00.

The appearance of this collection of essays in the prestigious Cuban quarterly *Temas* is itself a small signal that Havana is ready for modest steps toward rapprochement with Washington. The common message of the Cuban, U.S., and Canadian contributors is that both the United States and Cuba bear some responsibility for the decades of tensions and that although neither society is prepared for sudden full normalization, there is much room for mutually advantageous cooperation. Indeed, despite the hostile atmosphere, the two contending states' bureaucracies are already working together on a range of specific matters. The brilliant essay by *Temas* editor Rafael Hernández, although rooted in a historically informed pessimism, nevertheless proposes enhanced bilateral interactions that, he asserts, need not compromise Cuba's national sovereignty (read: the hegemony of the Cuban Communist Party), a theme echoed by the former senior diplomat Carlos Alzugaray Treto in another essay. Similarly, the economist Jorge Mario Sánchez Egozcue outlines an enticing agenda for future exchanges in the biotechnology, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Hal Klepak, a Canadian, persuasively argues that Washington's and Havana's security establishments—seeking regional stability—are agents driving bilateral détente. Harvard's Jorge Domínguez ponders the potential implications for Cuba's internal evolution. (An English translation of the collection is due shortly.)

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

The Return: Russia's Journey From Gorbachev to Medvedev. BY DANIEL TREISMAN. Free Press, 2011, 544 pp. $30.00.

The "return" of this book's title is of Russia and its people to the world. Treisman argues that in crossing the rocky road of the last 25 years, Russia has emerged from the hermitic life of socialism to join in the normal process of international politics and Russians have joined the modern scramble of global travel, communications, and consumption. In a breezy and elegant account of these years, he tackles big questions: Why did Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms fail? Why did the Soviet Union collapse? What accounts for the dramatic twists and turns marking Russian politics from Gorbachev to Dmitry Medvedev? The common thread running through the answers to all these questions is economic trends—particularly, economic decline. Economic changes, often affected by policy choices, eroded (or sometimes boosted) each regime's popular legitimacy and thus dictated the way each leader chose to play his hand. Other factors were also at work, including how the United States behaved toward Russia. All of this Treisman brings together by staying clear of abstractions and working with a rich assemblage of concrete, fascinating detail.

The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin. BY STEPHEN F. COHEN. Publishing Works, 2010, 224 pp. $22.95.

Most nonfiction books are written from a sense of intellectual challenge; this one is written as much from a sense of duty. Over more than 35 years, since he first met Nikolai Bukharin's widow, Anna Larina, Cohen has developed a deep relationship with the widows and offspring of many of the gulag's celebrated and uncelebrated victims. By interviewing them, reading their memoirs, and digging through secret police archives, he collected material for a book he first planned to write in 1983. It tells the story of how survivors experienced liberation, what happened when they reentered society, and how, with varying degrees of success, they came to terms with what they had suffered. Misery was common, but, as Cohen stresses, its meaning and effects varied widely from individual to individual. This is not the thick, detailed book he originally intended to write, and it is all the better for that. It is also all the better for the graceful, pellucid writing.

Building States and Markets After Communism: The Perils of Polarized Democracy. BY TIMOTHY FRYE. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 312 pp. $27.99.

Frye brings a particularly rigorous approach to explaining the speed and constancy of postsocialist economic reform and the creation of state institutions conducive to it. Count him among those who see the state—at least a state capable of efficient regulation—as crucial to the development of a proper market. Particularly in democratic and semidemocratic settings, he finds that the degree of partisan discord between the executive and legislative branches of government to be the decisive factor. Democratic states blessed with little partisanship make reforms more rapidly and consistently; as partisanship increases, reform suffers. Frye reaches this simple but original proposition through exceedingly painstaking argumentation—first by establishing a statistical correlation between political polarization and its seeming effects, next by using a survey of business attitudes in 23 countries to establish causal links, and then by rounding out the analysis with a finely textured comparison of outcomes in Bulgaria, Poland, Russia, and Uzbekistan.

Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic. BY JUDITH ARMATTA. Duke University Press, 2010, 576 pp. $39.95.

Armatta, a lawyer, journalist, human rights activist, and expert on the Balkans, sat through three years of excruciating testimony in The Hague for the first trial of a head of state since Admiral Karl Dönitz at Nuremburg—the trial of Slobodan Milosevic for 66 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. By her own confession, she was scarcely an impartial observer, having witnessed much of what served as the basis for the charges, but she provides more than a fair analysis of the proceedings' fumblings and ill-advised decisions. Hers is the front-row view of a first-rate court reporter, giving the reader a TiVo-like version, culled of dead space and repetition, that is still exhausting in its arduous pace and detail. Diligently, she watched and recorded as the court probed all three charges from Kosovo, back through the Croatian and Bosnian wars, tediously piling up the evidence as Milosevic bobbed and weaved. One comes away half heartened by the

effort to answer unspeakable cruelty and suffering with justice but, in a way, more saddened by Milosevic's slippery success in persuading his partisans and many of his countrymen that they, not he, were on trial, the victims of great power bullies. And then there is the whimper with which it was all ended, by a heart attack that left him prosecuted but unjudged.

Lonely Power. BY LILIA SHEVTSOVA. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, 394 pp. $49.95 (paper, $19.95).

Long one of Russia's premier political analysts, Shevtsova has grown sharper and more charged as Russia has edged deeper into the Putin era. The country's self-seeking power elite has "used the West in order to save an anti-Western system," and many in Russia and the West who should know better have either wittingly or unwittingly played along. She calls Russia's system "bureaucratic capitalism" spliced to "imitation democracy," created by "personalized power" in the Yeltsin era and taken to its warped extreme in Vladimir Putin's. She applies her sensitive fingertip feel less to the country's deadened political pulse than to the system's interior dynamic, which she fears is unpredictable and imperiled by a regime that generates self-serving ambitions while blocking essential answers. Most of all, however, the book is a poignant appeal to the policymakers and analysts who have, as the Russian expression goes, "looked through their fingers" as Russia has passed from one lost opportunity to another. She identifies with those experts who have been most critical of her country, but when it comes to action, she aligns herself with those who want to engage Russia and give it constructive options, provided strict conditions are attached.

Realism, Tolerance, and Liberalism in the Czech National Awakening: Legacies of the Bohemian Reformation. BY ZDENEK V. DAVID. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 504 pp. $70.00.

This book is a meticulous history; the footnotes are two-thirds the length of the text. In locating the wellsprings of modern national consciousness in the Czech Republic, and by extension its liberal political culture, David credits the ideas of the Bohemian Reformation in the fifteenth century, which were resuscitated and embraced during the Austro-Bohemian Catholic Enlightenment in the eigtheenth century. More precisely, he traces the intellectual impulses inspiring the "national awakening" in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century to the liberal, tolerant, and "nonaristocratic" thought characteristic of the Bohemian Catholic Church set up by the followers of the theologian Jan Hus in the sixteenth century. In a long-standing historical debate, David lines up against those who focus less on the lineage of ideas and more on linguistic-ethnic particularities and the sociology of identity associated with German Romanticism and idealism. But he is not only uncovering the roots of Czech political culture; he is also following an important stage in the development of analytic philosophy. Hence, the reader needs to be prepared to follow the fundamental philosophical quarrel that the early-nineteenth-century Czech scholar Bernhard Bolzano had with Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, and, above all, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

The Sixth Crisis: Iran, Israel, America, and the Rumors of War. BY DANA ALLIN AND STEVEN SIMON. Oxford University Press, 2010, 224 pp. $21.95.

As Iran, disclaiming an intention to build a bomb, seemingly moves toward a nuclear capability and Israel states that this will be unacceptable, the United States tries to halt Iran's nuclear program and forestall Israeli military action. This three-way confrontation is even more complicated. Any settlement or military action must involve other countries, including European states, Russia, China, and Arab states that fear Iran's expanding power but are reluctant to line up with Israel, which is seen as suffocating the Palestinians. In the midst of this ticking-bomb crisis, Allin and Simon have organized all these complexities and produced a readable, short book that fairly presents the positions of all involved, evokes the historical context, details the intertwining of domestic politics with the ongoing international crisis, and even takes on what might be dubbed "the psychology of leadership" in the final chapter, "Obama's Words." Not only is the book the best description available of "the sixth crisis" that Washington has faced in the Middle East since World War II; it also suggests a U.S. policy: given the likely failure to reach a negotiated settlement, a regional variant of the Cold War containment policy might be the best default position.

America's Misadventures in the Middle East. BY CHAS W. FREEMAN, JR. Just World Books, 2010, 232 pp. $22.95.

An award-winning career diplomat, Freeman was U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time of the Gulf War. Retiring from the Foreign Service in 1994, he remained no less involved in international affairs, being active in the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Middle East Policy Council, among others. A seemingly ideal candidate for a return to government service, Freeman was asked to serve as chair of the National Intelligence Council in early 2009 but faced a campaign that forced him to withdraw his name. From the charges against him and those making them, it is clear that he was deemed too close to Saudi Arabia and too far from Israel. This collection of 23 short papers and speeches produced from the late 1990s to 2010 puts the lie to such charges and demonstrates instead a broad-ranging critique of recent U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Freeman's is a foreign policy of national interests, not friends or favorites. He is prudent about seeking monsters to destroy (or bringing the blessings of democracy) and believes that any military intervention must have in place an adequate postconflict policy. He argues that an acceptable settlement between Israel and its Arab neighbors is a priority and that Washington needs to work with Arab states.

A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah's Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel. BY THANASSIS CAMBANIS. Free Press, 2010, 336 pp. $27.00.

In the summer of 2006, Israel launched a devastating incursion into Lebanon that badly mauled, but failed to knock out, Hezbollah. In the last days of 2008 and early 2009, Israel moved with equal fury against Hamas in Gaza, in a short war that Hezbollah opted to stay out of. Cambanis' intimate account of this recent history,

enhanced by stories of a handful of Hezbollah's true believers and sympathizers, paints a gripping portrait of this radical religio-political movement. In an often discursive, largely first-person narrative, Cambanis presents an impressive organization, bearing the awesome title "Party of God," that is virtually a state within the state of Lebanon. Hezbollah provides social services. Its leaders live modestly and level with their followers, thereby earning the group tactical flexibility. Hezbollah proudly acknowledges receiving support from Iran and Syria and would be weaker without it, but the group is too deeply rooted in Lebanon to be the tool of any outsider. Cambanis stresses equally Hezbollah's radical militancy, which makes a more accommodating arrangement within Lebanon or vis-à-vis Israel unlikely to emerge. Indeed, a depressing theme of *A Privilege to Die* is the way that less organized, less fervent, and more corrupt moderates have lost out to radicals since the 1970s.

The Israel-Palestine Conflict: Contested Histories. BY NEIL CAPLAN. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009, 336 pp. $94.95 (paper, $36.95).

For more than three decades, Caplan has been producing meticulous studies of different periods of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this book, he goes beyond the basic chronological narrative to analyze the self-images and images of the other that the Israelis and the Palestinians have brought to their long-standing confrontation. In such "contested histories," each party sees itself as an innocent victim; Israel views itself as the product of a noble national movement, whereas the Palestinians think of it as an egregious example of colonialism. After attemping to define the conflict—addressing "loaded terminology," periodization," and "core arguments"—Caplan recounts the confrontation from the rise of Zionism and the early stirrings of Arabism to today. He also discusses Israel's "new historians" and the understandably more muted historical revisionism from the Palestinian side—and reflects on the need to transcend "nationalist" history. A whopping 28-page bibliography and a chronology complete what is surely one of the most accessible, coherent, and balanced accounts available of this very contested history.

The Berlin–Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power. BY SEAN MCMEEKIN. Belknap Press, 2010, 496 pp. $29.95.

This is the story of Germany's plans to bring the Ottomans into World War I and then to play the jihad card against the Allies, which held most of the Muslim world in colonial thrall. It is good, old-fashioned history as biography. Kaiser Wilhelm II, the mercurial archaeologist Max von Oppenheim, and "the Three Pashas," Cemal, Enver, and Talat, loom large. But many others—friends, foes, and would-be Muslim recruits to jihad—are also well delineated. In telling the story of the Central Powers' less-than-successful recruitment of locals, from Libya to Arabia to Afghanistan, McMeekin demonstrates the fragility of this jihadist dream. And his accounts of the victory over the Allies at Gallipoli and the failure to complete the Berlin–Baghdad rail line nail down the greater importance of military skill and geopolitical givens in determining outcomes. A secondary theme is Germany's contradictory flirtation with Zionism,

which McMeekin returns to in his epilogue, "The Strange Death of German Zionism and the Nazi-Muslim Connection."

Asia and Pacific

ANDREW J. NATHAN

The ETIM: China's Islamic Militants and the Global Terrorist Threat. BY J. TODD REED AND DIANA RASCHKE. Praeger, 2010, 244 pp. $49.95.

The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. BY GARDNER BOVINGDON. Columbia University Press, 2010, 304 pp. $45.00.

Among the many Uighur organizations that the Chinese government labels as terrorist is one that the U.S. government placed on its own terrorist blacklist after 9/11: the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Some analysts viewed that listing as a grant of U.S. support for Chinese repression in exchange for help in the war on terrorism. The counterterrorism analysts Reed and Raschke review the open-source evidence (much of it from China) that they believe shows ETIM to be a true terrorist force, with an ideology that is both separatist and fundamentalist. They track its changing names, logos, and leaders and locate it in the context of other Uighur militant groups. They make a strong case that although it is small and has not accomplished much, the organization practices terror.

Reed and Raschke's findings do not contradict Bovingdon's broader study of Uighur-Han relations. Based on extensive fieldwork in Xinjiang, it shows how widespread Uighur resentment is rooted in the failure of China's institutions of national autonomy to provide any real self-rule. Most Uighurs practice a moderate form of Islam, are politically unorganized, and have not made any clear political demands. They resent the Hans' colonial-style disrespect of their culture and religion. Bovingdon observed many instances of "everyday resistance" in language, music, and street behavior. The violent incidents in the 1990s, he contends, were mostly small scale and often had local or personal motives. The authorities responded with arrests, imprisonments, and executions. Moscow had already ceased supporting Uighur unrest before the end of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the Soviet successor states in Central Asia lined up with China as well, since Uighurs are a minority for each of them, as they are for China. When Beijing intensified its repression of the Uighurs after Washington began its anti-terrorism campaign, open resistance declined even further. But as the violent protests of July 2009 revealed, the Uighur community is still angry.

Behind the Killing Fields: A Khmer Rouge Leader and One of His Victims. BY GINA CHON AND SAMBATH THET. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, 212 pp. $49.95.

This book recounts the never-before-told story of "Brother Number Two," Nuon Chea, who, at age 84, awaits trial for the crimes he committed during the Cambodian auto-genocide of the late 1970s. It details the growth and ideology of the Khmer Rouge movement, the dynamics among its leaders, and its tortured relations with Vietnam. Having spent six years conducting about a thousand hours of interviews, the authors have produced a rare look inside the psyche of a mass killer. They find a faithful son and loyal husband,

an idealist, ascetic, and moral purist who blames the Cambodian people for being too corrupted by imperialism and capitalism to implement the pure-minded plans of the *Angka* ("organization"). Nuon Chea insists that the two million who died were Vietnamese agents, exploiters, wreckers, enemies of the revolution, and hidden traitors—as well as a few killed by honest mistakes in the course of trying to renovate Khmer society and others who died because local cadres incorrectly implemented the leaders' guidelines. None of it was his fault. This important story—told with a restraint that makes it all the more effective—confirms the banality of evil.

When a Billion Chinese Jump: How China Will Save Mankind—or Destroy It. BY JONATHAN WATTS. Scribner, 2010, 448 pp. $17.00.

As *The Guardian*'s environmental correspondent in Asia, Watts has traveled all over China to report on the myriad ways in which development there is ruining the environment—through the accumulation of rubbish, the extermination of wildlife, the damming and diversion of rivers, the electrocution of fish, the confiscation and poisoning of farmland, the acidification of rain, and the dumping of wastewater into rivers and lakes. A lot of the dross dumped in China is effluent from factories producing for Western markets or garbage sent back from the West. Well-meaning government regulation is too weak to counter the pent-up lust for wealth. China may be ahead of the West when it comes to renewable energy and "green" buildings, but these advances are still in their nonage. By portraying the yin of pollution along with the yang of economic dynamism, the book renders a broad-gauge picture

of China today. The country contributes in many ways to global warming—through deforestation, overgrazing, wasteful consumption, and, of course, emitting carbon in the manufacturing process. The subtitle may exaggerate—China by itself will neither destroy mankind nor save it—but the book brings home how the environmental impact of China's growth affects everyone.

Changing Media, Changing China. EDITED BY SUSAN L. SHIRK. Oxford University Press, 2010, 288 pp. $99.00 (paper, $19.95).

The commercialization of media, the professionalization of journalism, and the rise of the Internet are usually seen as forces that challenge party control in China. But this collection of essays shows that they can also strengthen the regime. As media grow more diverse and professional, they provide a more credible channel for government propaganda. As they compete for audience attention by exposing selected scandals that are not placed off-limits by censors, they help the higher-level authorities rein in corrupt local officials. And by giving voice to citizens' concerns, they allow the government to respond before problems become acute. To be sure, these factors also raise the risk that fast-spreading news might provide a focal point for mass mobilization at a moment of crisis. But so far, the Internet police and Propaganda Department censors have managed to keep most citizens ignorant of topics that might inflame serious opposition. The Chinese and foreign contributors to this book provide a nuanced, clear analysis of the fluid relationship among the Communist Party, the media, and the public.

Nucleus and Nation: Scientists, International Networks, and Power in India. BY ROBERT S. ANDERSON. University of Chicago Press, 2010, 736 pp. $60.00.

Anderson explores the untold stories of the 30 or so key scientists behind the Indian nuclear program, from its roots in the formation of an Indian scientific community in the 1920s, through the exploration of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the late 1940s, to the decision to explore designing a bomb after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, and then to the first Indian explosion in 1974. The fruit of nearly 50 years of research and interviewing, the detailed narrative brings the men to life with personal details and a rich understanding of the historical and institutional context. The key figures are physicists such as Homi Bhabha, a multi-talented member of the extended Tata family and first chair of India's Atomic Energy Commission, and his successor, Vikram Sarabhai. Feuding and politicking as scientists do, this elite built up institutes, recruited young scientists, imported equipment and uranium, maintained ties with a global network of peers, and gained the support of wealthy businesspeople and political leaders, especially Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Most of the expertise, equipment, and material needed to build a bomb circulated more or less normally in the scientific community. Taking the next step required only a political decision: once made, cosmopolitan men carried out a nationalist project.

In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy. BY SAADIA M. PEKKANEN AND PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU. Stanford University Press, 2010, 408 pp. $55.00.

In a shift little noticed outside professional

military circles, in the last decade Japan has quietly developed a suite of cutting-edge military space technologies—rockets, satellites, and spacecraft—that were originally designed for commercial applications. The subject of this book is highly technical: the list of acronyms is 14 pages long, and some passages are hard going for a non-specialist. But the bottom line is clear enough: Japan's capabilities are widely underestimated, all the more so in space. The strategic logic for Japan's space program is obvious, with a growing naval, space, and nuclear power across the East China Sea and a second nuclear power even closer, on the Korean Peninsula. The emphasis of *In Defense of Japan*, however, is on the industries that pushed military applications when they could not make money from commercial projects. Today, in addition to ballistic missile defense capabilities developed in cooperation with the United States, Japan is working on reusable launch vehicles (that is, space planes); satellites that detect missiles and help with navigation, communication, and targeting; warhead reentry technologies that can advance the use of missiles in warfare; unmanned aerial vehicles; and technologies for "space situational awareness," which reveal a concern about possible future conflict in space. It is too soon to count Japan out in the arms race in Asia.

Living With the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China. BY BENJAMIN I. PAGE AND TAO XIE. Columbia University Press, 2010, 232 pp. $27.50.

Public opinion provides U.S. policymakers with what the scholar Daniel Yankelovich called the "boundaries of the permissible." Page and Xie argue that these boundaries—they call them "dikes"—help account for Washington's basically stable China policy from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama. Americans give primacy to security and then economic concerns, wanting to pursue goals related to human rights and democratic transformation only to the extent that doing so is not too costly. "Caricatures of an ignorant American public," Page and Xie conclude, ". . . have been grossly exaggerated." Indeed, Americans have generally articulated more stable and moderate policy-relevant views of China than has Washington discourse. The U.S. public has consistently supported engagement, economic cooperation, and leadership exchanges. Cooperative by inclination, Americans are paying close attention to whether or not China becomes more reassuring as its power grows. "Most Americans," Page and Xie write, "are prepared to live peacefully and cooperatively with the Chinese dragon." *Living With the Dragon* has multiple virtues: clearly stated conclusions, balance, voluminous data crisply presented, and policy relevance.

DAVID M. LAMPTON

Africa

NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live Aid. BY PETER GILL. Oxford University Press, 2010, 304 pp. $27.95.

Ethiopia's economy is one of the fastest growing in the world, even though Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Its strongman prime minister, Meles Zenawi, is a darling of the West, and his country is now one of the world's

largest recipients of aid, taking in some $3 billion a year. Gill, in his sympathetic account of Ethiopia's last three decades, largely ignores broad economic trends and rarely mentions statistics, instead structuring his narrative around the country's recurrent droughts and famines and the international community's efforts to help avert future catastrophes. He has crisscrossed the country since the mid-1980s, and his book includes compelling vignettes of Ethiopians doing their best to improve desperate conditions and of donor organizations grappling with the country's complexities. Gill's account of the Meles government is generally positive, although his tone is never explicitly judgmental. A thoughtful chapter on the failed elections of 2005 makes clear the repressive nature of the regime, but it also seems to take seriously the government's view of greater democratization as a dangerous frivolity.

Pirate State: Inside Somalia's Terrorism at Sea. BY PETER EICHSTAEDT. Lawrence Hill Books, 2010, 224 pp. $24.95.

In the aftermath of the collapse of Somalia's central government in the early 1990s, the country has been engulfed in economic decay, lawlessness, and violence, as warlords compete for control of the few remaining sources of revenue. For a long time, these developments remained a local story that did not interest the Western public, but the combination of rising Muslim fundamentalism in the area and the emergence of piracy in the busy shipping lanes of the Gulf of Aden changed that. The attempt by Somali pirates to highjack the U.S. ship the *Maersk Alabama* in 2009 was featured prominently on cable news and introduced the Somalia problem to the American public. Eichstaedt's book tries to respond to this new interest, with a breezy account that, despite its often melodramatic prose and occasional lack of careful analysis, is often informative. Somali fishermen, he argues, turned to piracy when they found foreign fleets taking advantage of Somalia's anarchy to fish directly off the coast. The fishermen reacted to the challenge by holding passing ships for ransom. A journalist, Eichstaedt is most readable when he describes the way piracy is organized. The loosely structured and ill-disciplined small networks of young men that initially characterized Somali piracy have been overtaken by Somali warlords, including members of the Islamic fundamentalist militia al Shabab.

Successes in African Agriculture: Lessons for the Future. EDITED BY STEVEN HAGGBLADE AND PETER B. R. HAZELL. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010, 464 pp. $90.00 (paper, $45.00).

Per capita food production has declined across Africa for most of the postcolonial period, and exporters of cash crops have lost market share to Asian producers. These failures matter because a majority of Africa's poor still derive their incomes from agriculture. As the editors of this collection of insightful essays note, foreign aid to African agriculture has been cut in half since the early 1990s, the victim of changing donor fashions, and African governments too often neglect the needs of small-scale agriculture. Given the pervasive sense of failure in the sector, the book's novel approach is to examine success stories—the introduction of improved varieties of cassava in central Africa and maize in southern and eastern Africa,

cotton production in Mali, and the horticultural export booms in Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya. In each case, the authors credit agricultural research, technological breakthroughs, and incentives that increased productivity. In a sense, these insights are nothing new, which raises the question of why funding for African agricultural research has remained so woefully inadequate.

Museveni's Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime. BY AILI MARI TRIPP. Lynne Rienner, 2010, 223 pp. $59.95 (paper, $22.00).

The Lord's Resistance Army: Myth and Reality. EDITED BY TIM ALLEN AND KOEN VLASSENROOT. Zed Books, 2010, 288 pp. $125.95 (paper, $35.95).

After he came to power in 1986, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was hailed by the Washington establishment as part of Africa's "new breed" of leaders for his ability to restore stability to Uganda and achieve both political liberalization and economic growth. But his reputation has slowly eroded. As Tripp makes clear in her thoughtful study of the regime, the real, if limited, democratic progress of the 1990s has stagnated and in some cases been reversed. The government has committed serious human rights abuses, intimidated the press and the opposition, and become increasingly corrupt. Her most interesting argument is that Uganda's economic success and increases in foreign aid lessened the incentives for the regime to implement the political reforms it had promised. Instead, like many other African governments, it has sustained itself in an uneasy equilibrium of semi-authoritarian rule—a hybrid that combines the trappings of democracy, such as regular multiparty elections and a tolerated opposition, with regular abuses of power to emasculate that opposition and ensure the regime's hold on power.

One of the privileged pillars of the current regime has been the national army, whose prominence the government justifies by pointing to international and domestic security threats. Museveni's repeated military interventions in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo have been well documented, but less understood is the government's decades-long campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda. Allen and Vlassenroot's collection demystifies the LRA by placing it squarely in the context of several decades of conflict in Uganda, Sudan, and Congo. Journalistic accounts of the LRA have typically highlighted its syncretic mixture of Christian ideology and native beliefs and its reliance on child soldiers, but this book examines the more prosaic reasons the LRA has sustained itself for so long. Several excellent chapters discuss the history of failed negotiations between the LRA and the Ugandan government and the latter's counterproductive strategy of repression. The book also contains some of the most detailed analysis available of the LRA's internal organization, recruitment process, and fighting tactics.

Letters to the Editor

Robert Pastor on Hamas, Terry Nelson on the war on drugs, Sanjay Basu and David Stuckler on HIV/AIDS, and Albert Muriuki on Kenya

TALKING TO HAMAS

To the Editor:

Daniel Byman ("How to Handle Hamas," September/October 2010) correctly argues that peace between Israel and the Palestinians via a two-state solution requires the involvement and acceptance of Hamas. However, he overstates the difficulty of securing Hamas' agreement to a cease-fire and understates the problem of gaining Israel's agreement. Moreover, although Byman acknowledges the importance of Palestinian reconciliation, he does not identify a key reason for its failure.

In June 2008, Hamas agreed to an Egyptian-mediated cease-fire with Israel. Hamas agreed to stop firing rockets into Israel, and Israel agreed not to intervene in Gaza and to gradually increase the number of trucks allowed into Gaza from 100 to 750 per day. Hamas stopped the rockets, although it took them a couple of weeks, and a few after that came from rogue elements. Israel limited the number of trucks to between 150 and 250 per day, and it stopped its incursions into Gaza until November 4. The assault that night and Israel's failure to open Gaza led Hamas to restart its rocket attacks, although Hamas conveyed a readiness to renew the cease-fire if Israel implemented the original agreement. Yet Israel never acknowledged there was a deal, and that remains the crux of the problem.

To assure that negotiations are conducted in the right climate, a cease-fire needs to be worked out with Hamas that can produce an agreed-on public text that would be monitored by the United Nations. Israel has been unwilling to do this for fear that it would strengthen Hamas. That is a legitimate concern, but the only way around it is to promote a Palestinian unity arrangement in which Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is recognized as the sole negotiator for the Palestinians.

That is possible only if the United States accepts a slight modification of the three "Quartet conditions," which were initially imposed to prevent Hamas from taking office after it won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Since then, Hamas has gone 90 percent of the distance toward meeting those conditions. It agreed to accept the first condition, on the recognition of Israel, but only after a final-status agreement incorporates it and it is approved by the Palestinian people in a referendum. It is ready to accept the second condition, on nonviolence in the form of a cease-fire, although it will not renounce violence as an option until the occupation ends. On the third condition, accepting previous agreements, the problem is that the Netanyahu government does not

accept the Oslo accords, but if both sides were to accept a final-status agreement, the new deal would supersede previous agreements.

If the United States accepted these changes, reconciliation would become easier, although still not easy, and Abbas could become a full negotiating partner, representing Gaza and the West Bank and Fatah and Hamas on a cease-fire and in final-status talks.

ROBERT PASTOR

Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University

LEGALIZE IT

To the Editor:

Robert Bonner writes that "destroying the drug cartels is not an impossible task" ("The New Cocaine Cowboys," July/August 2010). But he really should have written, "Destroying some drug cartels is not an impossible task."

U.S. and Mexican officials regularly succeed in busting individual cartel leaders, but as the 40-year history of the U.S.-led global "war on drugs" shows—as do my 30 years of experience working as an agent for the U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S. Customs Service, and the Department of Homeland Security—the illegal drug economy as a whole is unstoppable. Whenever the U.S. government does bust a cartel head, there is someone willing to take his place, and it is always going to be that way as long as people are willing to pay for illegal drugs.

Indeed, as one Mexican official told *The Economist* recently, "Until legalisation, the only thing you can do is make it someone else's problem." That is why Mexican President Felipe Calderón recently joined his predecessors Vicente Fox and Ernesto Zedillo in calling for a serious public debate on the merits of legalization. It is time to try something else.

TERRY NELSON

Granbury, Texas

THE CASE FOR TREATMENT

To the Editor:

In arguing that treating HIV/AIDS threatens U.S. foreign policy interests, Princeton Lyman and Stephen Wittels ("No Good Deed Goes Unpunished," July/August 2010) neglected medical data and repeated spurious arguments.

For example, they argue that the commitment to provide antiretroviral therapy "will become staggeringly large" as new infections outstrip deaths. This overlooks evidence that treating HIV/AIDS prevents new cases, because antiretroviral therapy reduces the infectiousness of the affected patients. In fact, thanks to antitretrovirals, the World Health Organization has forecast dramatic reductions in new infections. The alternative of education-based prevention programs, research suggests, fails to change most people's behavior.

The authors also claim that HIV/AIDS interventions divert funds from other public health programs, but as the researchers Alexander Irwin, Joyce Millen, and Dorothy Fallows have shown in their book *Global AIDS: Myths and Facts*, HIV/AIDS programs have used new funds rather than displacing existing ones. And these programs have provided spillover benefits—training new health-care workers and building primary-care infrastructure. The hospitals and health-care workers that antiretroviral programs have funded are now treating a multitude of other diseases; yet the rhetoric of HIV/AIDS competition is now closing general hospital doors in

Uganda and turning a chronic disease into a death sentence as patients are being cut off from care. Although transferring funds from disease-targeted programs to general health systems sounds reasonable in theory, in years past, Zambia's tuberculosis program collapsed after money was shifted to vague conferences and international consultant programs with no measurable outcomes; the same is now happening with its HIV/AIDS program.

The vast majority of available evidence shows that not treating HIV/AIDS is a greater threat to U.S. interests than maintaining the cost-effective provision of antiretrovirals.

SANJAY BASU

Department of Medicine, University of California, San Francisco

DAVID STUCKLER

Department of Sociology, University of Oxford

SECURING JUSTICE IN KENYA

To the Editor:

John Githongo's article "Fear and Loathing in Nairobi" (July/August 2010) failed to mention one institution that is keeping Kenya's elite in check: the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is trying to bring justice to millions of Kenyans affected by the postelection violence of 2007–8.

Unfortunately, Kenya's new constitution, approved by referendum in August, faces many obstacles to implementation—not least vested interests—and so politicians who face potential prosecution by the ICC still have the resources to stir their tribal bases and, through the Kenyan legislature, make it difficult for them and other suspects to be extradited to The Hague for trial.

The ICC needs to explain to Kenyans that suspects handed over to the court are still just that—suspects. And it needs to let the government and the people of Kenya know that the extradited suspects are innocent until proven guilty. The political elite needs some assurance that there is a possibility of some suspects' returning.

By passing "not guilty" judgments for some of the suspects, a high likelihood if the best global international law firms are hired, the ICC would prove to skeptical and fearful leaders across the continent that it is not an imperial body or a sneaky backdoor colonial agent. The innocent will have a fair hearing in its halls. This will counter arguments against the ICC by elites in Sudan, where over 300,000 souls still cry out for justice in Darfur.

The vibrant Kenyan media will be an important ally for the ICC in spreading this message across the country and beyond. Kenyan youth urgently need to understand and appreciate the value of the rule of law. For a country with severe corruption issues, this is a perfect opportunity to instill an enduring respect for the rule of law and discourage those who might otherwise engage in corrupt practices in the future.

ALBERT MURIUKI

Fellow, Columbia Law School; Advocate, High Court of Kenya; and former Presidency Intern, ICC

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The Sources of Soviet Conduct (July 1947)

By "X" (George F. Kennan)

Originally published under the pseudonym "X," Kennan argued that the United States should pursue a "doctrine of perpetual struggle" against communist ideology.

www.foreignaffairs.com/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct

The Unsolved Problems of European Defense (July 1962)

By Henry A. Kissinger

Kissinger urged NATO defense and foreign ministers to resolve the debate about the relative role of nuclear and conventional forces, as well as the relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of nuclear weapons.

www.foreignaffairs.com/the-unsolved-problems-of-european-defense

The Clash of Civilizations? (Summer 1993)

By Samuel P. Huntington

Huntington suggested that the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The world consists of civilizations that compete and collaborate but are defined by cultural unity.

www.foreignaffairs.com/the-clash-of-civilizations

The Tiananmen Papers (January/February 2001)

By Andrew Nathan

Hitherto secret documents reveal the inner workings of China's Communist Party leadership during the Tiananmen Square crisis of 1989. They detail what China's leaders knew at each stage of the events and who made the fateful decision to send in the troops.

www.foreignaffairs.com/readinglists/the-tiananmen-papers



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