

**A BUDDHIST DOCTRINE
OF EXPERIENCE**

**A New Translation and Interpretation of the
Works of Vasubandhu the Yogācārin**

THOMAS A. KOCHUMUTTOM

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PREFACE

The name Vasubandhu has been associated generally with two significant events in the history of Buddhism : the composition of *Abhidharma-kośa* on the one hand, and the founding of the **Yogācāra** system on the other. More precisely, Vasubandhu is known as the author of *Abhidharma-kośa*, and also as the one who co-founded the **Yogācāra** system with his brother Asanga. **As** these two events—the composition of *Abhidharma-kośa* and the founding of the **Yogācāra system**—represent two different traditions within Buddhism, one begins to wonder if Vasubandhu the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* and Vasubandhu the co-founder of the **Yogācāra** system really are one and the same person. The traditional answer to this question has been that Vasubandhu the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* was later converted by his brother Asanga to the latter's **Yogācāra** line of thinking. That could very well be the case. But when it comes to deciding how to date Vasubandhu, the problem seems to reappear with a greater complexity. This is because the tradition gives as many as three dates for Vasubandhu : the year 1100 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha given in *The Life of Vasubandhu* by the historian **Paramārtha**, the Year 900 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha given in the commentary of *Madhyānta-vibhāga* by the same historian and the year 1000 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha given by the Chinese pilgrim **Hsüan-tsang**. Based on the very few historical clues available from various sources, and taking into account the different ways of reckoning the year of the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha, many scholars have tried to **reconcile** these three dates, and to arrive at a probable, if not definite, date for Vasubandhu. The dates so proposed range roughly from the early third century A.D. to the early sixth century A.D.¹ None

1. J. Takakusu in his 'The Date of Vasubandhu, the Great Buddhist Philosopher', *Indian Studies in Honour of Charles Rickwell Lanman*, (Cambridge Mass. : 1929), pp. 79-88, repeating 'A.D. 420-500' for the date of Vasubandhu which he had proposed as early as 1905, has summarised the findings of different scholars in the meantime.

of them, however, has been universally accepted, although many of the opinions would agree on the fifth century as an approximate period for the life and works of Vasubandhu.

Then in 1951 Professor E. Frauwallner proposed his new theory of 'two Vasubandhus' as a way out of the three conflicting dates mentioned above : the years 900, 1000, and 1100 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha.² His basic assumption is that the two dates given by Paramārtha, namely the years 900 and 1100 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha, refer to two different persons, namely Vasubandhu the elder and Vasubandhu the younger respectively. He then argues that the date given by the Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang, namely the year 1000 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha, is the same as the year 1100 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha given by Paramārtha, only they are arrived at by different ways of reckoning the date of the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha. Thus, for Professor Frauwallner, the traditionally given three dates can be reduced to two, namely 900 and 1000/1100 after the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddha, and these two dates, he further said, correspond respectively to a time prior to 400 A.D. and the period 400—500 A.D. His final conclusion, therefore, is that there have been two Vasubandhus, of whom the elder who lived prior to 400 A.D., co-founded the Yogācāra system with his brother Asaṅga, and the younger who lived between 400—500 A.D., wrote *Abhidharma-kośa*.

The above theory of 'two Vasubandhus', possible as it is, does not seem to have received much support from scholars. On the contrary, P. S. Jaini, for one, on the evidence of the manuscript of *Abhidharma-dīpa* (together with a commentary—the *Vibhāṣā-prabhā-vṛtti*), discovered in 1937, "throws some doubt on Professor Frauwallner's thesis and confirms the older and universal tradition about the conversion of the Kośakāra Vasubandhu to Mahāyāna,"³ Some of the recent studies,

notably those by Stefan Anacker⁴ and D.N.G. Macleod,⁵ also see little point in Frauwallner's theory of 'two Vasubandhus'. What is more, the latter himself is suggested to have later given up this theory.⁶

As far as the present work is concerned, as it is strictly a textual analysis, the questions of Vasubandhu's date and other biographical details are of little importance. I may, however, point out by way of a suggestion that an almost spontaneous transition from *Abhidharma-kośa* to the Yogācāra system is not altogether unwarranted. For instance, the theory of store consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) which is universally recognized as a basic innovation by the Yogācārin, is after all only the "christening" of the theory of the seeds (*bija*) in the *Abhidharma-kośa*. This latter theory has been given there in answer to questions such as : how are defilements associated with a previous moment of consciousness carried over to the next moment of consciousness ? How does a past deed produce its effect in the future ? How is it possible that a past experience can be recalled in the future ? In answering these questions, all of which concern the continuity between the past, present and future, Vasubandhu the author of *Abhidharma-kośa*, following the Sautrāntika point of view, drew on the imagery of the seed-fruit relationship, and said that the present and future are determined by the seeds left behind by the past : the seeds of the defilements associated with a previous moment of consciousness are carried over to the next moment of consciousness; the seeds of the past deeds produce their fruits in the future; and the seeds of the past experiences enable one to recall those experiences.' Then what the Yogācārin later called *ālaya-vijñāna*, is for all practical purposes just the collection of those seeds of the past determining the present and future behaviour of an

2. E. Frauwallner, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu* (Rome : Serie Orientale Roma, III, 1951).

3. P. S. Jaini, "On the Theory of Two Vasubandhus", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXI (1958), p. 49.

4. S. Anacker, "Vasubandhu : Three Aspects, A Study of a Buddhist Philosopher" (Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin), 1970.

5. D. N. G. Macleod, "A Study of Yogacara Thought : The Integral Philosophy of Buddhism" (Ph. D. Dicitration, University of Dundee), 1978

6. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 212 ff.

individual. In other words, the *ālaya-vijñāna* of the *Yogācārins* is in effect only a collective name for what was described in the *Abhidharma-kośa* as the seeds (*bijas*) of past experience. If so, it is not impossible that the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* himself worked out, on his own or in collaboration with others, the theory of *ālaya-vijñāna* and other allied theories of the *Yogācāra* system. This sounds still more plausible when one considers that already in writing his commentary on his own *Abhidharma-kośa* he had shown his openness to new doctrines and formulations : although he wrote *Abhidharma-kośa* from the *Vaibhāṣika* point of view, later finding the *Vaibhāṣika* position unacceptable he wrote his commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the same *Abhidharma-kośa* from the *Sautrāntika* point of view. A possible conversion of the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* to the *Yogācāra* line of thinking is further confirmed by the above mentioned manuscripts of *Abhidharma-dīpa* and the *Vibhāṣā-prabhārtti*, which, as P. S. Jaini has pointed out, criticize the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* for his leanings towards the *Sautrāntika* and *Mahāyāna* positions, and thus 'allude to the conversion of the *kośakāra* to *Mahāyāna Buddhism*'.⁸

So much, very briefly, for the personal identity of Vasubandhu. Now, coming to the scope of the present study, it proposes to analyse the following four texts : (i) *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya*, (ii) *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*, (iii) *Triṃśatikā* and (iv) *Viṃśatikā*. These four texts are definitely among the basic works in the *Yogācāra* tradition, and are generally attributed to Vasubandhu. Whether this Vasubandhu was himself the author of *Abhidharma-kośa* or not, is no concern of mine here. What is important for the present purpose is the fact that these four texts do have, besides a fairly uniform style of language, a single, consistent, underlying system of thought so that one can safely take them as belonging to a single author, who is traditionally called Vasubandhu. To avoid confusion one may call him Vasubandhu the *Yogācārin*. Moreover, when I refer to the *Yogācāra* system, I am thinking of it particularly as it is presented in those four texts, which may or may not correspond to the *Yogācāra* system as it is presented in the other works of

the same school. However, considering the very high degree of systematization and comprehensiveness of those texts, one may reasonably take them as representing the orthodox form of the *Yogācāra* system. What is significant about this particular set of texts is that it gives a complete picture of the *Yogācāra* system.

The present work consists mainly of a new translation and interpretation of the texts under reference. I have taken the utmost care to make the translation literal and uniform throughout. However, I am aware that there are some minor instances where I had to give up this rule of 'literalism' and uniformity, either for the sake of clarity or convenience. For example, the Sanskrit terms *ākāra*, *prakāra* and *bhūva* have all been translated by the single English term 'form'; similarly the single Sanskrit term *abhāva* has been translated differently as 'unreality' and 'non-existence'. But for these and similar minor instances, I have all through this work insisted on the rule of 'literalism' and uniformity, at the same time, however, trying to avoid clumsy or far-fetched English expressions and constructions. I hope to have succeeded in this attempt at least as far as the key terms and concepts are concerned. To help the reader I have always made a point of reproducing the original texts in transliteration, by way of footnotes, on the same pages as their translation occurs, even when it meant repeating some of the previous notes. Again, I have spared no efforts in giving the corresponding English or Sanskrit expressions, as the case may be, within brackets in the body of the work. All these devices are expected to help the reader locate the original passage or expression with the minimum possible effort. Further, for a continuous reading of the texts, I have added an appendix giving the complete translation of them at a stretch, at the same time referring back to the pages where the respective passages are interpreted and explained.

Incidentally, my translation, new as it is, is not the first for those texts. They have already been translated by others, and there exists at least one translation for each text. However, for one reason or another, my translation happens to be almost altogether different from those done previously. For one thing, I have been trying to look at those texts from a different

8. P. S. Jaini, op. cit., p. 51.

perspective : the previous translators have looked at them from the point of view of monistic idealism, while I have looked at them from the point of view of realistic pluralism. This, I think, is enough justification, too, for my new translation.

As for the interpretation of the texts, as I have suggested above, it is an exploration into the possibility of looking at them from a perspective different from the traditionally accepted one. It has been the belief that the Yogācārins had broken away from the early Buddhist schools by replacing the latter's realistic pluralism with a monistic idealism. In contrast to this traditional belief, my contention is that the Yogācāra position need not be interpreted as a total rejection of the realistic pluralism of the early Buddhism. My conviction is that the Yogācāra metaphysics is basically the same as that of the early Buddhism. The same old categories are retained but, classified under new terms and concepts. Such new terms and concepts under which the Yogācārins have classified the old categories are mainly: *ālaya-vijñāna* (store-consciousness), *para-tantra-suabhāva* (other-dependent nature), *parikalpita-svabhāva* (imagined nature), *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva* (absolutely accomplished nature), *anabhilāpya* (ineffable), *abhūta-parikalpa* (imagination of the unreal), and *śūnyatā* (emptiness), this latter term being one that was borrowed from the Mādhyamikas, but reinterpreted.

My thesis, however, is much more modest than it might sound. My ultimate aim is not so much to convince the reader that the Yogācāra position is definitely realistic pluralism (although I have done my best to do so), as to point out that there is a real possibility of interpreting the Yogācāra writings, at least the ones I have analysed, in terms of realistic pluralism. It is an invitation to a re-evaluation of the traditional interpretation rather than a categorical rejection of it. All the same, in building up my arguments for a realistic pluralism in the Yogācāra writings, I have generally used confident expressions and a rather assertive tone. This is because, on the one hand, for my part I am convinced of my arguments, and, on the other, because I felt that to present an argument against a widely accepted position a convincing style of language was necessary.

An important suggestion of the present thesis for an historian of religion is that Buddhism, throughout its long history of deve-

lopment, has ever retained the original inspiration of its founder, the Buddha. The latter believed in a multiplicity of real, individual, beings, a belief that has never been seriously questioned by any of his followers. The different stages in the history of Buddhism mark, if anything, the different ways of looking at the same teaching of the Buddha. Consequently, the different schools within Buddhism distinguish from each other not so much in their philosophy as in their practices. If, for example, there has been a movement from the non-theistic Theravāda school of Buddhism to the theistic Mahāyāna school of the same, it is a change only in the religious practices, and not a change in the philosophical convictions. Therefore, I fully endorse the words of Dr. Walpola Rahula, "The great Buddhist doctors like Nāgārjuna, Asanga or Vasubandhu, as has been noted earlier, were not presenting a system of their own which could be called Nāgārjuna's or Asaṅga's or Vasubandhu's philosophy, but they were only explaining and interpreting anew, putting the old teaching found in the Canonical texts into new garb."⁹ One thing remarkable about the entire history of the Buddhist thought is that, at none of its stages, is any concept or term belonging to the former stages totally denied. The arrival of a new school is signalized almost always by the introduction of some new concepts and terms rather than by the denial of the old ones. The new concepts and terms are thus introduced as if they were the missing links in the original Buddhism, and, therefore, under the pretext of, or with the intention of, making explicit what was already implicit in it. The genius of each school then consists in fitting the new concepts and terms into the original scheme of thought by reinterpreting or readjusting it.

As for the procedure of my work, the first chapter is a general introduction to my line of interpretation of the texts. This is presented by way of stating my thesis and outlining the arguments for it in rather general terms. This chapter is intended to put the whole work into perspective.

Chapters II to V are translation along with my interpretation, respectively, of the four texts chosen for this study. Each of

9. Walpola Rahula, *Āton and the Taming of the Bull, Towards the Definition of Buddhist Thought*, (London : Gordon Fraser, 1978), p. 81.

these chapters includes translation of the complete text concerned and my interpretation of it. These chapters are meant to substantiate the 'thesis', and to elaborate the 'arguments', which were rather hypothetically stated in the first chapter.

The second chapter, "Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes", is the translation and the interpretation of the first chapter of *Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya* (A Commentary on the Verses on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes). This is a commentary (*bhāṣya*), unanimously attributed to Vasubandhu, on the verses (*kārikās*) on discrimination (*vibhāga*) between middle (*madhya*) and extremes (*anta*). The authorship of these verses is, however, disputed : according to some they belong to Vasubandhu's brother **Asaṅga**, and according to others they belong to Maitreya, whose historicity itself is again under dispute. Vasubandhu's commentary has a sub-commentary (*tīkā*) called *Āgama-anusāriṇī* by Sthiramati. All these three texts, *Kārikās*, *Bhāṣya* and *Tika*, have now been critically edited by Professor Ramchandra Pandeya (Delhi, Varanasi, Patna : Motilal Banarsidass, 1971). But before coming to this stage of being critically edited, these texts had a long history of discovery, restoration, and translation into Chinese, Japanese and Tibetan, details of which are given by Professor Ramchandra Pandeya in the introduction to his critical edition. The whole work has been divided into five chapters, of which the first has been translated into English by Th. Stecherbatsky (Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX, 1936) and by D.L. Friedmann (Amsterdam, 1937);¹⁰ and the third chapter of the *Kārikā* and *Bhāṣya* has been translated and annotated by Paul Wilfred O'Brien (Monumenta Nipponica, vols. IX and X, 1953-54). At any rate, *Madhyāntavibhāga*, including the *Kārikā*, *Bhāṣya* and *Tika*, is a very important work for any study of the *Yogācāra* system. First of all, it presents the whole system in all its aspects in a very organized form, and, secondly, it represents the ideas of the three official spokesmen of the system : **Asaṅga/Maitreya**, Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.

My study includes, besides general references appearing in the first chapter, the translation and my interpretation of the

first chapter of the *Kārikā* and *Bhāṣya*. I thought it better to limit myself to this one chapter for two reasons. First of all, as I have been concentrating on the theoretical side of the *Yogācāra* system, this is the only chapter that is directly concerned with my present study. Secondly, consideration of the space-limit would not allow me to add analysis of more sections. In fact, I have made a translation of the third chapter, too, which has indeed some theoretical implications. However, for want of space I decided not to include it in the present work. Instead, I contented myself by summarily referring to its central idea of 'basic truth of fact' (*mūla-tattva*) in the first chapter of this study (pp. 19-21).

My third chapter, "A Treatise on the Three Natures (*Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*)", is the translation and analysis of a small treatise consisting of thirty-eight stanzas, called *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*. A critical edition, that I know of this text, is by Sujitkumar Mukhopadhyaya (Calcutta, 1939), which gives also an English translation. The text had already been translated twice into Tibetan. The original Sanskrit text as well as the first Tibetan translation mentions Vasubandhu as the author of this text. But the second Tibetan translation is said to ascribe it to Nāgārjuna, which seems to be a mistake. In any case, judged from the undisputably *Yogācāra* contents of the text, it cannot possibly be a work of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the *Mādhyamika* school. That it belongs to the *Yogācāra* system of Vasubandhu is beyond dispute. Its style might appear a little different from the other works of Vasubandhu. If that can be ignored, one would reasonably say that this text forms an integral part of his independent works, with *Triṃśatikā* (A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas) and *Vimfatīkā* (A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas). That is, the three main areas, namely metaphysics, psychology and epistemology, which were all briefly discussed in *Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya*, are now discussed each in detail respectively in *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*, *Triṃśatikā* and *Vimfatīkā*.

The translation and interpretation of "A Treatise in Thirty Stanzas" (*Triṃśatikā*), which is, as suggested above, mainly an analysis of the psyche, are the contents of my fourth

10. I have not seen D. L. Friedmann's translation myself.

chapter. Together with *Vimśatikā* (A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas) it is often called *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi*. That Vasubandhu is its author, has never been questioned by anybody. This small treatise has been subsequently commented upon by as many as ten writers. The Chinese author Hsüan-tsang in his *Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun* (later translated into English by Wei Tat under the title *The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness*, (Hong Kong, 1973) is an exposition of *Trīṃśatikā* synthesizing all those ten commentaries on it. With regards to my interpretation, I have made frequent reference to Shīramati's commentary (*bhāṣya*) on this text.

The fifth chapter, "A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas (*Vimśatikā*)" is the translation and interpretation of *Vimśatikā*, which is for the most part a presentation of Vasubandhu's theory of knowledge. Like its sister-treatise *Trīṃśatikā*, this text, too, is unanimously ascribed to Vasubandhu. There is, further, an explanatory work, called *Vṛtti*, on it by Vasubandhu himself. Both *Vimśatikā* and *Vṛtti* have been translated from Chinese into English by C.H. Hamilton under the title *Wei Shih Er Shih Lun Or The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation only* (New Haven : American Oriental Society, 1938). The present chapter of my work contains the full translation of *Vimśatikā*, and interprets it following very closely Vasubandhu's own explanatory work, *Vṛtti*. The full translation of this latter work is, then, added in the appendix.

The sixth and final chapter, "Idealism or Realism ?", is a re-statement and re-examination of the thesis that was proposed in the first chapter, "A General Statement of the Thesis and Arguments". This is done mainly by asking myself, 'what might have led the traditional interpreters to take Vasubandhu's system for a monistic idealism ?'. In answer to this question I have analyzed certain terms, phrases and texts which on the face of it might sound idealistic, but on deeper analysis prove otherwise : such are the cases, for example, of the terms or phrases like *vijñapti-mātra*, *vijñāna-pariṇāma*, *abhūtaparikalpa*, and the apparently idealistic tone of the text, *Vimśatikā*. I have also discussed some points to which the traditional interpreters seem to have paid very little attention, such as Vasubandhu's clear

distinction between the ineffable (*anabhilāpya*) and the imagined (*parikalpita*) nature of things, and his understanding of emptiness (*śūnyatā*). This final chapter has been so designed that it may also bring together all the central terms and concepts of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra system, such as *vijñapti-mātratā*, *vijñāna-pariṇāma*, *ālaya-vijñāna*, *abhūta-parikalpa*, *para-tantra-svabhāva*, *parikalpita-svabhāva*, *parniṣpanna-svabhāva*, *anabhilāpya*, *śūnyatā*, *grāhya-grāhaka-vikalpa* and *lokottara-jñāna*. Thus it also provides a complete picture of the theoretical framework of Vasubandhu's Yogācāra system.

I may add a word about the phrase 'realistic pluralism', which I have used to describe Vasubandhu's system of thought. I am well aware that it is too vague a phrase for this purpose. As a matter of fact Vasubandhu's understanding of reality defies all descriptions, because for him reality is ineffable (*anabhidpya*). Therefore Vasubandhu himself would not have any label put on his view of reality. Hence my choice of the phrase 'realistic pluralism' means only that it is the nearest possible description I can find for Vasubandhu's system of thought.

Finally, this study could be further pursued by comparing Vasubandhu's system with some relevant systems in the Western tradition. For example, one could make a fruitful comparison between Kant's distinction between the 'noumenon' and the 'phenomenon' on the one hand, and Vasubandhu's distinction between the 'ineffable' and the 'saṃsāric' on the other, and between Descartes' theory of 'transcendental dream' and that of Vasubandhu. However, to make such comparisons was not within the scope of the present study, and therefore I have contented myself with occasional references to Kant's distinction between the 'noumenon' and the 'phenomenon'.

This study under the title, *Vasubandhu the Yogācārin : A New Translation and Interpretation of Some of His Basic Works*, was originally submitted in 1978 to the University of Lancaster, U.K., in fulfilment of the requirements for my degree of Doctor of Philosophy. I should like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who, at different times and in various ways, have helped me in preparing this work. My very special thanks are due to

Professor Ninian Smart, and Dr. Andrew Rawlinson, for their guidance. It has been very kind of them to spend so much time going through the manuscripts, and giving me very helpful suggestions and comments. Above all, the encouragement I received from them throughout this work has been most valuable.

ABBREVIATIONS

- MY.** *Madhyānta-vibhāga* (which includes *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā*, *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya* and *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya-tikā*)
- MVK.** *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā*
- MVKB.** *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya*
- MVKBT.** *Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya-tikā*
- TSN.** *Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa*
- Triṃś.** *Triṃśatikā*
- Viṃś.** *Viṃśatikā*
- Viṃś. VL.** *Viṃśatikā-vṛtti*

can properly be called Nāgārjuna's or Asanga's or Vasubandhu's philosophy. It can only be said that they are Nāgārjuna's or Asanga's or Vasubandhu's explanations, arguments and theories, postulated to prove and establish the Canonical teaching of *śūnyatā*, *cittamcitra* or *naircitmya*. If any difference of opinion existed between them, these arise only with regard to the arguments and theories designed to establish the old fundamental Canonical teaching, but not with regard to the teaching itself.¹

Consequently he would not consider the Yogācāra system to be an idealism: any more than the early Buddhism is. If so, the answer to the question whether the Yogācāra system is an idealism or realism; would depend upon whether the early Buddhism was an idealism or realism.

1. Walpola Rahula, *Zen and the Taming of the Bull, Towards the Definition of Buddhist Thought*, (London : Gordon Fraser, 1978), pp. 82-83.

2. In fact he has clearly objected to comparing it to Berkeley's idealism. (Ibid. pp. 83-84).

APPENDIX I
THE VERSES ON
DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN MIDDLE AND EXTREMES
AND
VASUBANDHU'S COMMENTARY ON THEM

A CHAPTER ON DEFINITIONS

[27]* Having paid homage to the founder of this science,
Son of the well-gone,
And also to its expositor for people like me,
May I now endeavour to analyse its meaning.

[28] 1 The definition,
The coverings,
The truth,
Meditation of the opposite,
Its stages,
Attainment of results,
And the pre-eminence of the path.

These are the seven topics discussed in this science. They are namely the coverings, the truth, meditation of the opposite, stages of that meditation, attainment of results, and, seventhly, the pre-eminence of the path. There, beginning with the definitions, [the text] says :

[29] 2. There exists the imagination of the unreal,
There is no pair,
But there is emptiness,
Even in this there is that.

*The numbers in square brackets refer to pages above where the respective stanzas and passages are analysed.

There, the imagination of the unreal means the discrimination between the graspable and the grasper. The pair is the graspable and the grasper. Emptiness means that state of the imagination of the unreal which is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper. Even in this [emptiness] there is that, namely, the imagination of the unreal. Thus, when something is absent in a receptacle, then one, seeing that receptacle as devoid of that thing, perceives that receptacle as it is, and recognizes that receptacle, which is left over, as it is, namely as something truly existing here. Thus, the definition of emptiness is shown to imply no contradiction.

3. Neither void nor non-void :

[41] So is everything described,
That indeed is the middle path,
For there is existence as well as non-existence,
And again existence.

On account of the existence of emptiness, on the one hand, and that of the imagination of the unreal, on the other, it is not void. And on account of the non-existence of the pair of graspable and grasper, it is not non-void, either. This description applies to everything, whether conditioned or unconditioned. The term 'conditioned' goes for what is called the imagination of the unreal, while the term 'unconditioned' goes for what is called the emptiness. That indeed is the middle path, for, on the one hand, there is the existence of emptiness within the imagination of the unreal, and, on the other, the existence of the imagination of the unreal within the emptiness. It is therefore neither exclusively void nor exclusively non-void. This reading is thus in accordance with the scriptures such as *Prajñā-pāramitā*, [where it is said] : "all this is neither void nor non-void".

Thus having stated the positive and negative definition of the imagination of the unreal, now the [author] gives its own-definition :

4. Under the appearance of things inanimate,
[46] Living beings, self and representations of consciousness,
Is born the consciousness.

There is nothing as its [i.e. consciousness's] object,
And thus that object being absent
That [consciousness], too, is non-existent.

In the form of colour etc. the consciousness appears as inanimate things, and in that of five senses it appears as living beings. These five senses refer to one's own as well as other's streams of existence. The appearance of consciousness as self is the same as defiled thought, because it is associated with self-delusion etc. The representations of consciousness are otherwise called the sixfold consciousness. The appearance of inanimate things as well as of living beings are devoid of form; likewise the appearances of self and representations of consciousness are not in the way they appear to be. This is why it is said that there is indeed nothing as its [i.e. consciousness's] object. That is, the four kinds of graspables—namely, (i) colour etc., (ii) the five senses, (iii) thought, and (iv) the sixfold consciousness—are absent. Thus the graspable being absent, the grasper, namely the consciousness, too, is non-existent.

5. Therefore its being the imagination of the unreal
[55] Remains established,
For it is not so,
It is not altogether absent, either.

For its existence is not the way it appears to be. It is not totally absent, either, because there is the production of illusion only, for

From its cessation results liberation.

For otherwise there would be neither bondage nor liberation, which would imply the denial of the facts of defilement and purity.

Thus having stated the own-definition of the imagination of the unreal, now [the author] states its inclusive definition. It shows how, there being only the imagination of the unreal, there could be the inclusion of the three natures.

6. The imagined, the other-dependent,
[58] And the absolutely accomplished,
Are derived [respectively] from

The objects, the imagination of the unreal,
And the absence of the pair.

The object is the imagined nature, the imagination of the unreal is the other-dependent nature, and the absence of the graspable-grasper duality is the absolutely accomplished nature.

Now is shown a definition which can be used as an instrument in comprehending the negative definition of the same imagination of the unreal :

7. Depending upon perception
[61] There arises non-perception,
And depending upon non-perception
There arises non-perception.

Depending upon the perception that there are only representations of consciousness, there arises the non-perception of knowable things. Depending upon the non-perception of knowable things, there arises the non-perception of the mere representations of consciousness, too. Thus one understands the negative definition of graspable and grasper.

8. Therefore it remains established
[62] That perception has the same nature
As non-perception.

Because, there being no perceivable things, there is no possibility of having perception either.

Therefore the sameness
Of non-perception and perception
Should be recognized.

Because perception as such is not obtained. Though not having the own-nature of perception, still it is called perception because there are the appearances of unreal objects.

Now follows the classification-definition of the same imagination of the unreal :

9. The imagination of the unreal
[64] Is *citta* as well as *caittas*,
Belonging to all three worlds.

[The three worlds refer to] the distinction between the worlds of passion, forms, and formless beings.

Now follows the synonym-definition :

There, perception of objects is consciousness,
And perception of their qualities is mental factors.

Consciousness is perception of just the objects. The mental factors, namely, feeling etc., are the perception of the qualities of the same objects.

The next verse states the function-definition :

10. One is the source-consciousness,
[66] And the other is the enjoyment-consciousness.
There, the mental factors are
Enjoyment, determination and motivation.

The store-consciousness being the source of other consciousnesses is called the source-consciousness. The active consciousness, which has the latter as its source, is called the **enjoyment-consciousness**. Enjoyment refers to feeling etc., determination to concept, and motivation to the conditioning forces such as volition, attention etc., of consciousness.

[The next two verses] state the defilement-definition :

11. The world is oppressed / defiled
[68] (1) By being concealed,
(2) By being raised,
(3) By being led,
(4) By being seized,
(5) By being completed,
(6) By being trebly determined,
(7) By enjoying,
(8) By being attracted,

12. (9) By being bound,
[68] (10) By being orientated, and
(11-12) By being subjected to suffering.

There, (1) 'by being concealed' means 'by being impeded by ignorance from seeing things as they are', (2) 'by being raised'

means 'by the installation of the impressions of deeds on consciousness by the conditioning forces', (3) 'by being led' means 'by being taken by consciousness to the place of re-birth', (4) 'by being seized' means '[by being seized] by the *nāma* and *rūpa* of egohood', (5) 'by being completed' means '[by being completed] by the six organs', (6) 'by being trebly determined' means '[by being trebly determined] by contact', (7) 'by enjoying' means 'by feeling', (8) 'by being attracted' means '[by being attracted] by the desire for a new existence, the seeds of which have already been sown by previous deeds', (9) 'by being bound' means '[by being bound] by the inclinations towards sense-pleasure etc., which are conducive to a new birth of the consciousness', (10) 'by being orientated' means 'by making the deeds of former existence tend to manifest their matured fruits in a new existence', (11-12) 'by being subjected to suffering' means '[by being subjected] to birth, old age, and death'. By all these is the world oppressed/ defiled.

This [list of]

The oppressives / defilements,
 All proceeding from the imagination of the unreal,
 Could be classified
 Either into three groups,
 Or into two groups,
 Or into seven groups.

The classification of the oppressives/defilements into three groups is as follows : (1) oppressive oppressors, namely ignorance, desire and inclinations; (2) deed-oppressives, namely conditioning forces and existence/birth; (3) birth oppressives, namely the remaining members.

The classification of the oppressives/defilements into two groups is as follows : (1) causal oppressives/defilements which include the groups of oppressive oppressors, and deed-oppressives; (2) resultant oppressives which are the same as the birth-oppressives.

The classification of the oppressives/defilements into seven groups refer to the seven kinds of causes such as, (1) cause of error, namely ignorance, (2) cause of sowing of seeds, namely

conditioning forces, (3) cause of direction, namely consciousness, (4) cause of seizure, namely *nāma* and *rūpa* and the six bases, (5) cause of enjoyment, namely contact and feeling, (6) cause of attraction, namely desire, inclinations and existences/birth, and (7) cause of unrest, namely birth, old age and death.

All these oppressives/defilements operate due to the imagination of the unreal.

The ninefold definition, giving the summary-meaning of the imagination of the unreal, has [now] been explained. Those definitions are, namely, positive definition, negative definition, own-definition, inclusive definition, instrumental definition, classification definition, synonym-definition, activity-definition and defilement-definition.

Thus having explained the imagination of the unreal, the author now shows how the emptiness should be understood :

13. About the emptiness

[72] One should summarily know
 Its definition,
 Its synonyms along with their meaning,
 Its classification,
 And the reason for its classification.

How the definition of the emptiness is to be understood ?

14. The negation of the pair

[73] Is indeed the assertion of such negation;
 This is the definition of the emptiness.

There is the negation of the pair of the graspable and grasper. The definition of emptiness, then, is the assertion of that negation. Thus, it is shown how the emptiness is to be defined in negative terms. And, what those negative terms are, [is further stated] :

It is neither [total] assertion,
 Nor [total] negation.

Why not [total] assertion ? Because there is the negation of the pair of subject and object. Why not [total] negation ? Because there is the assertion of the negation of that pair. This

indeed is the definition of the emptiness. Therefore, with reference to the imagination of the unreal, the emptiness is :

Neither different from the imagination of the unreal,
Nor identical with the imagination of the unreal.

If different, it would imply that the 'universal' [*dharmatā*] is other than the particular things [*dharmas*], which is unacceptable. For example, 'impermanence' is not other than the impermanent things, and the state of suffering is not other than suffering itself. If identical, there would be no place for purifying knowledge, nor would there be the commonplace knowledge. Thus is shown a definition which states that emptiness is that which is free from being different from thatness.

How is the synonym [of emptiness] to be understood ?

15. Suchness, the extreme limit of existence,
[75] The uncaused, absoluteness,
The source-reality :
These are **summarily** the synonyms of emptiness.

How is the meaning of these synonyms to be understood ?

16. The synonyms respectively mean that the emptiness is
[75] Never otherwise,
Never falsified,
Never admitting a cause,
The object intuited by sages,
And that it is
The source of the powers of the sages.

The emptiness is called suchness, in the sense that it is never otherwise, and insofar as it remains ever the same way. It is called the extreme **limit** of existence in the sense that it is never falsified, because it is never an object of doubt. It is **called** the uncaused, because it does not admit for itself any cause, for it is far from having any cause whatsoever. It is **called** the **absoluteness**/the ultimate object, because it is the object of the knowledge of the sages, meaning that it is the object of the

ultimate knowledge. It is called the source-reality, because it is the source of the powers to the sages, meaning that the powers of the sages have their origin depending upon it : here the term *dhātu* is used in the sense of *hetu*, indeed.

How is the classification of the emptiness to be understood ?

- [76] 17. It is defiled and purified;

So is its classification. In what condition is it defiled, and in what condition is it purified ?

It is with and without impurities.

When it is with impurities, then it is defiled, and when it is rid of the impurities, then it is purified. Getting rid of the impurities once associated with it, implies that it is changing in character. How is it then that it is still not impermanent ? Because its

Purity is understood
As the purity of elemental water,
Gold and space.

[The purity of the emptiness is recovered] by shaking off the accidental impurities, which does not mean a change in its own-nature.

Here is another classification according to which there are sixteen kinds of emptiness: (1) emptiness of internal [elements], (2) emptiness of external [elements], (3) emptiness of internal as well as external [elements], (4) emptiness of the great, (5) emptiness of emptiness, (6) emptiness of the absolute object, (7) emptiness of the conditioned [elements], (8) emptiness of the unconditioned [elements], (9) emptiness of the ultimate [element], (10) emptiness of the eternal [element], (11) emptiness of the unforseen [element], (12) emptiness of nature, (13) emptiness of defining marks, (14) emptiness of every power, (15) emptiness of negation, (16) emptiness of negation as own-nature.

All those kinds of emptiness should be briefly understood :

18. There is the emptiness of the enjoyer,
[79] Emptiness of the enjoyed,

Emptiness of the body of the enjoyer and enjoyed,
 Emptiness of the basic thing,
 Emptiness of that by which it
 [i.e. the emptiness of enjoyer etc.] is perceived,
 Emptiness of the way in which it is perceived,
 and
 Emptiness of that for which it is perceived.

Here, the emptiness of the enjoyer means the emptiness of the internal senses etc., the emptiness of the enjoyed means the emptiness of the external elements, the emptiness of their bodies, namely the *śarīras* which are the basis of both the enjoyer and the enjoyed, means the emptiness of the internal and the external elements. The basic thing means the universe which is the basis of the enjoyer, the enjoyed and their bodies. Its emptiness is called the emptiness of the great because of the vastness of the universe. The emptiness of the internal senses etc., is perceived by the knowledge of emptiness, whose emptiness is called the emptiness of emptiness. The emptiness of internal senses is perceived as the absolute object, whose emptiness is called the emptiness of the absolute object. The emptiness of that for which the Bodhisattva attains the emptiness of the internal senses etc., is the final kind of emptiness.

For what, indeed, is the emptiness of the internal senses etc. attained ?

[80] 19. For the attainment of the twofold prosperity,
 [namely], the conditioned as well as the unconditioned
 fortune,
 For the everlasting benefit of the living beings,
 [namely], for the ultimate benefit of the living beings,
 And for not leaving the *samsāra*,

[that is, otherwise], not seeing the emptiness of the eternal *samsāra*, one, being depressed, would rather leave the world.

For the non-cessation of fortune,

Even in the absolute state of *nirvāṇa* there is something that one does not give up, the emptiness of which is called the emptiness of the unforsaken.

[81] 20. For the purity of the lineage,
 Lineage means nature, for it belongs to one's
 own nature.
 For attaining the defining marks,

[that is], for attaining the marks that are characteristic of
 great men.

And, for the purity of the powers of enlightenment,
 Does the Bodhisattva attain the emptiness of
 internal senses etc.

[namely], for the purity of the powers such as strength,
 fearlessness, special endowments etc. Thus, indeed, the fact of
 the fourteen kinds of emptiness should be known.

What other kinds of emptiness are still there ?

[82] 21. The negation of *pudgala* and *dharmas*
 Is indeed one kind of emptiness there,
 The existence of that negation in it [i.e. in the
 enjoyer etc.]
 Is another kind of emptiness.

The negation of *pudgala* and *dharmas* is one emptiness. Another
 kind of emptiness is the existence of that negation in the above
 said enjoyer etc. These two kinds of emptiness are explained at
 the end in order to make the definition of the emptiness clear :
 in order to avoid the exaggeration of *pudgala* and *dharmas* the
 emptiness is explained, on the one hand, as the negation of
pudgala and *dharmas*, and in order to avoid the underestimation
 of their negation the emptiness is explained, on the other hand,
 as having the negation of *pudgala* and *dharmas* for its own-nature.
 This is how the classification of emptiness is to be understood.

How is the reason [for such a classification] to be
 understood ?

[84] 22. If it were not ever defiled,
 Then all living beings would be ever liberated ;
 If it were not ever purified,
 Then all efforts for liberation would be futile.

If the emptiness of elements would not be defiled by the accidental and secondary defilements, even when no remedy is applied, then, since there are no defilements whatsoever, all living beings would become liberated without any effort at all. Again, if it would not become purified, even when some remedy is applied, then the efforts towards liberation would prove fruitless.

However,

23. It is neither defiled nor undefiled,

[85] Also, it is neither purified nor unpurified;

How is it that it is neither defiled nor unpurified? It is so by its very nature,

Because of the shining nature of *citta*;

How is it neither undefiled nor purified:

Because of the accidental character of the defilements.

Thus, the above-mentioned classification of emptiness into defiled and purified is justified.

There, the summary-meaning of emptiness is to be understood under two heads: one, the definition [of emptiness], and the other, the establishment [of the same definition]. There, definition is again, twofold: positive and negative. The positive definition is likewise twofold: one, [the assertion that emptiness is] neither assertion nor negation; two, [the assertion that emptiness is] that which is free from being different from thatness. By the establishment [of definition] is to be understood the establishment of synonyms of emptiness etc. There, by the fourfold introduction of the emptiness the following four definitions of it are intended: its own-definition, operative-definition, defilement-purity-definition and rationality-definition; these definitions help one respectively to get rid of uncertainty, fear, indolence and doubt.

APPENDIX II

A TREATISE ON THE THREE NATURES

1. The imagined,
[92] The other-dependent,
The absolutely accomplished:
These are the three natures,
Which should be thoroughly known by the wise.
2. That which appears is the other-dependent,
[93] For it depends on causal conditions;
The form in which it appears is the imagined,
For it is merely an imagination.
3. The perpetual absence of the form
[93] In which the other-dependent appears,
Is to be understood as
The absolutely accomplished nature,
For it is never otherwise.
4. What is it that appears?
[93] It is the imagination of the non-existent.
How does it appear?
In the form of duality.
What will result from its non-existence?
There will be the state of non-duality.
5. What is meant by the imagination of the non-existent?
[93] It is thought,
For by it [the subject-object duality] is imagined.
The form in which it imagines a thing
Never at all exists as such.

6. The *citta* takes on two modes, as cause and effect,
 [94] It is then respectively called
 The store-consciousness and the active consciousness,
 The latter being seven-fold.
7. The first is called *citta*, meaning 'collected',
 [94] Because in it are collected the seeds
 Of defilements and habits;
 The second, however, is called *citta*,
 Because it acts in diverse ways.
8. Collectively [i.e. as a collection of **store-consciousness** and seven active **consciousnesses**]
 [95] It is the imagination of the unreal forms [of
 subjectivity and objectivity];
 That, too, is said to be **three-fold**:
 Maturing, caused and phenomenal.
9. Of them, the first, [namely the maturing one],
 [95] Is the basic consciousness,
 Because its nature is to become matured;
 The others, [namely the caused and the phenomenal ones],
 Are the active consciousness,
 For, the latter for its reality, depends
 On the knowledge of the perceived-perceiver
 distinction.
10. The profundity of the three natures
 [98] Is indeed recognized, because
 The defiled and the pure are each
 Existent as well as non-existent,
 Dual as well as unitary;
 Also because
 The three natures are not mutually different
 In definition.

11. The imagined nature is said
 [99] To be defined both as existent and as non-existent,
 For on the one hand it is grasped as existent,
 While, on the other,
 It is totally non-existent.
12. The other-dependent nature is said
 [99] To be defined both as existent and as non-existent,
 For, it exists as an illusion,
 It does not exist, though, in the form in which it
 appears.
13. The absolutely accomplished nature is said
 [100] To be defined both as existent and as non-existent,
 For, it exists as a state of non-duality,
 It is also the non-existence of duality.
14. The nature that is imagined by the ignorant is
 said
 [100] To be both dual and unitary,
 For, as it is imagined
 A thing has two forms,
 But as those two forms do not exist,
 It is unitary.
15. The otherdependent nature is said
 [101] To be dual as well as unitary,
 For, it appears in dual form,
 While it **has** an illusory unity as well.
16. The absolutely accomplished nature is said
 [101] To be dual as well as unitary,
 For, on the one hand,
 It is by nature the absence of duality,
 And, on the other hand,
 It is in the nature of unity without duality.

17. What is to be known as being defined
 [102] As defilement are the imagined and the other-
 dependent natures,
 While the absolutely accomplished nature
 Is recognized as the definition of purity.
18. The absolutely accomplished nature
 [104] Is to be understood
 As not different in definition from the imagined
 nature,
 For, the latter being in the nature of unreal
 duality,
 Is by nature the absence of that duality.
19. The imagined nature, too,
 [105] Is to be understood
 As not different in definition from the absolutely
 accomplished one,
 For, the latter being in the nature of non-duality,
 Is by nature the absence of duality.
20. The absolutely accomplished nature
 [105] Is to be understood
 As not different in definition from the other-
 dependent nature,
 For, the latter being non-existent in the form in
 which it appears,
 Is by nature the non-existence of that form.
21. The other-dependent nature, too,
 [106] Is to be understood
 As not different in definition from the absolutely
 accomplished one,
 For, the former being in the nature of non-
 existent duality,
 Is by nature non-existent in the form in which it
 appears.
22. For the sake of proficiency
 [107] A particular order of the natures
 Is recommended, which takes into account

- The conventions [about them], and
 How one understands them.
23. The imagined nature is essentially of conven-
 tional values,
 [108] The other, [namely the other-dependent nature],
 Is essentially that which brings about such con-
 ventional values,
 And the third, [namely the absolutely accom-
 plished nature],
 Is the nature freed of all conventional values.
24. First, the other-dependent nature,
 [109] Which is essentially the absence of duality
 Is understood;
 Then, the unreal duality,
 Namely the duality that is mere imagination,
 Is understood.
25. Then is understood
 [110] The absolutely accomplished nature,
 Which is positively the absence of duality,
 For, that very nature is then said
 To be both existing and non-existing.
26. All these three natures
 [111] Depend for their definition
 On [the concept of] non-duality;
 For, [with reference to the imagined nature],
 There is the unreality of duality,
 [With reference to the other-dependent nature],
 It is not in the dual form in which it appears,
 And, [with reference to the absolutely accom-
 plished nature],
 It is by its very nature the absence of that
 duality.
27. It is like the magical power,
 [112] Which by the working of incantations
 Appears in the nature of an elephant;

There is altogether no elephant at all
But only its form.

- [113] 28. The elephant stands for the imagined nature,
Its form for the other-dependent nature,
And, that which remains when the elephant has
been negated,
Stands for the absolutely accomplished nature.
- [113] 29. So, the imagination of the unreal
By the working of the basic thought
Appears in the nature of duality;
There is altogether no duality at all,
But only its form.
- [114] 30. The basic consciousness is like the incantations,
Suchness is like the piece of wood,
The [subject-object] discrimination is **like the**
form of the elephant
And the duality is like the elephant.
- [119] 31. In comprehending the truth of things
All three definitions have to be taken together,
[Although methods of] knowledge, rejection and
attainment
Are to be employed respectively.
- [120] 32. There, knowledge is non-perception,
Rejection/destruction is non-appearance,
Attainment, effected by perception.
Is direct realization.
- [121] 33. By the non-perception of duality
The form of duality disappears;
The non-duality resulting from its disappearance
Is then attained.
- [122] 34. It is just as the case of magic,
In which the non-perception of the elephant,

The disappearance of its form, and the perception
of the piece of wood,
Take place all at once.

- [123] 35. The attainment of liberation becomes effortless
By getting rid of misunderstanding,
Intellectually seeing the meaninglessness,
And following the threefold knowledge.
- [124] 36. Through the perception
That there is only thought,
There arises the non-perception of knowable
things;
Through the non-perception of knowable things,
There arises the non-perception of thought, too.
- [125] 37. From the non-perception of duality
There arises the perception of the essence of
reality;
From the perception of the essence of reality
There arises the perception of unlimitedness.
- [125] 38. The wise man, having perceived the **unlimited-**
ness,
And seeing the meaning of oneself and others,
Attains the unsurpassed **enlightenment**,
Which is in the nature of the three bodies.

APPENDIX III

A TREATISE IN THIRTY STANZAS

- [128] 1. Various indeed are the usages
Of the terms *ātman* and *dharma* :
They [all] refer
To the transformations of consciousness;
Threefold is such transformation :
- [134] 2. They are, namely,
Maturing, thinking, and representation of
consciousness of object.
There the maturing [consciousness]
Is otherwise called the store-consciousness,
Which carries the seeds of all [past experiences] .
- [135] 3. It has [within itself]
The representations of consciousness
Of unknown objects and places;
It is always associated with
Touch, attentiveness, knowledge,
Conception and volition.
- [135] 4. The feeling therein is that of indifference;
It [i.e. the store-consciousness] is unobscured
and undefined;
Similarly indifferent are touch etc.,
And it [i.e. the store-consciousness] is like a
torrent of water;
- [135] 5. And it ceases to exist at the attainment of
arhattva.
The consciousness called *manas*
Has the store-consciousness for its support and
object.
It is essentially an act of thinking.

- [136] 6. It is always associated with four defilements,
Which are themselves obscured and undefined;
Those four defilements are, namely,
Belief in self, ignorance about self,
Pride in self, and love of self.
- [136] 7. It [i.e. the consciousness called *manas*] is
associated
Also with others like touch etc.,
Which are all of the same nature
As the region in which one is born.
It does not belong to one in the state of farhatship;
Nor does it operate
In the state of suppressed consciousness,
Nor in the supra-mundane path.
- [137] 8. It [i.e. the above described] is the second
transformation [of consciousness].
The third transformation of consciousness
Is the same as the perception of the sixfold object;
It could be good or bad or indifferent in
character.
- [138] 9. It is associated with three kinds of mental factors:
Universal, specific and good;
It is associated, similarly,
With **primary** as well as secondary defilements;
It is subject to three kinds of feelings, too.
- [138] 10. Of those associates the first, [namely the
universal]
ones,
Are touch etc.,
[The second, namely] the specific ones,
Are desire, resolve and memory.
Together with concentration and knowledge.
Faith, sense of shame, fear of censure,
- [138] 11. The triad of non-covetousness etc., courage,
Composure, equanimity along with alertness,

- And harmlessness are [the third, namely] the good ones.
The defilements are passionate attachment, Grudge, stupidity,
- [139] 12. Pride, [false] views, and doubt.
Anger, hatred,
Hypocrisy, envy, jealousy, spite along with deceit,
- [139] 13. Dishonesty, arrogance,
Harmfulness, shamelessness, defiance of censure,
Sluggishness, conceit, unbelief, indolence,
Carelessness, bad memory,
- [139] 14. Distraction of mind,
Thoughtlessness, remorse, sleepiness,
Reasoning and deliberation,
Are the secondary defilements.
The latter two couples, [namely
Remorse and sleepiness, reasoning and
deliberation],
Can be of two kinds, [namely defiled and unde-
filed] .
- [139] 15. Depending on the conditions available
The five sense-consciousnesses,
Together or separately,
Originate on the root-consciousness,
Just as waves originate on water.
- [139] 16. The thought-consciousness, however,
Manifests itself at all times,
Except for those [i] who are born
Into the region where the beings are in a state of
unconsciousness,
[ii] Who have entered either of the two trances,
In which there is no operation of consciousness,
[iii] Who are unconscious by reason
Of sleepiness or faint.

- [146] 17. This [threefold] transformation of consciousness
Is just the distinction [between subject and
object];
What is thus distinguished,
Does not exist as [subject and object].
Therefore this is all mere representation of con-
sciousness.
- [147] 18. The consciousness contains all seeds;
Its such and such transformations
Proceed by mutual influence,
On account of which such and such [subject-
object] discriminations arise.
- [150] 19. Once the previous stage of maturation
Has been exhausted,
The impressions of deeds
Along with those of the two-fold grasping
Engender the next stage of maturation.
- [151] 20. The subject-matter that is liable
To subject-object distinction
By whatsoever sort of subject-object discrimi-
nation,
Is all just imagined nature;
It does not exist.
- [153] 21. The otherdependent nature, however,
Is the act of graspable-grasper discrimination;
It depends for its origin on conditions.
The absolutely accomplished nature
Is the latter's [i.e. the other-dependent nature's]
Perpetual devoidness of the former [i.e. the
imagined nature].
- [155] 22. For that reason, indeed,
It is said to be **neither** different,
Nor nondifferent
From the other-dependent nature.
It is like impermanence etc.

- As long as this absolutely accomplished nature
Is not seen,
That other-dependent nature, too,
Is not seen.
23. Corresponding to the three-fold nature
[157] **There** is also a three-fold naturelessness;
Referring to this fact it has been said
That there is the naturelessness of all elements.
24. The first nature is natureless by its very
[157] definition,
The second nature, again, does not come into
being by itself,
And this constitutes thesecond kind of **natureless-**
ness.
25. **That from** which all elements have their ultimate
[157] reality,
Is the third naturelessness,
It is also called suchness,
Because it remains always as such;
That is itself the state in which one realizes the
meaning
Of mere representation of consciousness, too.
26. As long as consciousness does not abide
[158] In the realization [that the subject-object designa-
tions]
Are mere representations of consciousness,
The attachment to the twofold grasping
Will not **cease** to operate.
27. One does not abide in the realization
[159] Of mere representations of consciousness
Just on account of the [theoretical] perception
That all this is mere representation of conscious-
ness,
If one places [=sees] something before oneself.
28. One does abide in the realization
[159] Of mere [representation of] **consciousness**

- When one does not perceive also a supporting
consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent,
There cannot either be the grasping of that,
[Namely, the grasping of the supporting con-
sciousness].
29. That indeed is the supramundane knowledge
[160] When one has no mind that knows,
And no object for its support;
It follows the revulsion of basis
Through the twofold removal of wickedness;
30. That itself is the pure source-reality,
[160] **Incomprehensible**, auspicious, and unchangeable;
Being delightful, it is the emancipated body,
Which is also called the truth [-body] of the
great sage.

IV

A TREATISE IN TWENTY STANZAS AND ITS
EXPLANATION

In the *Mahāyāna* system it has been established that those belonging to the three worlds are mere representations of consciousness. This is clear from the aphorism, 'Oh ! Jinaputra, those belonging to the three worlds are mere mind'. The terms mind [*citta*], thought-consciousness, [*mano-vijñāna*] and representation of consciousness [*viññapti*] are synonyms. Here mind should be understood along with its associates [samprayoga]. The term 'mere' indicates the exclusion of the [external] objects.

1. It is all mere representation of consciousness,
[166] Because there is the appearance of non-existent
objects.
Just as a man with a cataract
Sees hairs, moons etc.,
Which do not exist in reality.

Here it is asked,

2. If the representations of consciousness
[167] Are without [extra-mental] objects,
Then there would be no determination [of
experience] with regard to space and time,
Nor would there be indeterminacy of it with
regard to streams [i.e. individuals]
Nor would there be determination of actions
prompted [by a particular experience].

What is being said ? If a representation of colour etc. arises without the corresponding external objects like colour etc., then the former is not determined by the latter. Why is it, then, that

a representation of colour etc. does not arise everywhere, but only in some particular places ? Even then it does not always occur, but only sometimes. Again, it occurs to the streams of all present in those places and at those times, not just to the stream of a single person. The latter, for example, is the case with regard to the appearance of hair etc., which occurs only to the streams of the cataract-ridden people, not of others. Why is it, again, that the hairs, flies, etc. seen by the cataract-ridden people do not function as hair etc., while those seen by others do ? Food, drink, clothes, poison, weapons etc., seen in a dream do not function as food etc., while those seen in a waking state do. The city of Gandharva does not function as a city, while other [cities] do. Therefore in the absence of [external] objects it does not make any sense to speak of the spatio-temporal determination [of experience], the indeterminacy of streams [to which their representations of consciousness occur], and the fixed ways of their functioning. This objection does not hold, because

3. Determination of space etc., is obtained
[167] Just as [in] the case of a dream;

The term *svapna-vat* in the stanza means *svapna-iva*, both meaning "just as [in] the case of a dream". How ? In a dream, without [corresponding external] objects, things like flies, gardens, ladies and men, are seen. They are not seen everywhere, but only in some particular places [for example where the dreamer sleeps]; even in those places they are not seen always, but only sometimes [for example, only when one dreams]. Thus the spatio-temporal determinations are obtained even when there are no corresponding external objects.

Again, indeterminacy [of experience] with regards to streams [i.e. individuals] is obtained
Just as [in] the case [of the experience] of
ghosts :

In this line, the term "obtained" [*siddha*] is understood [from the previous line]; and the term *preta-vat* means *preta-iva*, [both meaning "just as in the case of the experience of ghosts"]. How is the analogy obtained ?

All of them [i.e. the ghosts] have the same vision of pus-river etc.

'Pus-river' means 'a river full of pus', just as 'ghee-jug' would mean 'a jug full of ghee'. The ghosts having the same kind of matured [seeds of] deeds see, all of them, the pus-river, and not just one of them. "Etc." means that, similar to the river full of pus, there are also rivers full of urine, excrement etc., and places inhabited by people carrying spears and swords, all of which are seen by the ghosts. Thus, the indeterminacy of streams to which the representations of consciousness occur is obtained even when there are not [corresponding external] objects.

4. Determined actions [resulting from experience]
[168] Are obtained as those [obtained] by a dreamer.

The term 'obtained' [siddha] is understood from the previous stanza. For instance, a dreamer experiences the discharge of semen, although in a dream there is no [sexual] union of two persons. Thus, indeed, the fourfold factor, namely the spatio-temporal determination etc., is obtained in different instances.

Again, all those [four factors are obtained]
As in the case of hells;

The term 'obtained' [siddha] is understood from the previous line. *Naraka-vat* means *narakeṣu iva*, [both meaning "as in the case of hells"]. How are [the four factors] obtained [in the case of hells] ?

There all [its inhabitants without exception]
Behold the infernal guards etc.,
And experience the torments by them.

The sight of the infernal guards in hells experienced by the hell-inhabitants is obtained with spatio-temporal determinations, indeed. "Etc." includes similar sights of dogs, birds, iron-balls and mountains coming in and going out. They are the experiences equally of all the inhabitants of hells, not merely of one. Similarly, the torments [inflicted] by the infernal guards are

also experienced by all the inhabitants. All these experiences are obtained **inspite** of the fact that in reality there are no infernal guards etc. [If, therefore, all the inhabitants of hells have similar experiences], it is owing to their own matured [seeds of] deeds of the same kind. Thus in places other than hells, too, the four factors, namely spatio-temporal determinations etc., should be understood as obtained.

Why is it, again, that the beings like the infernal guards, dogs, and birds, are said to be non-existent [in hells]? [This is] because they do not fit in with the context. They cannot possibly be some of the hell-inhabitants, [who are condemned to hell], for it would mean that they, too, are experiencing the sufferings of hell. It cannot also be the case that the beings in hells torture each other, for then it will be impossible to determine **which** of them are hell-inhabitants, and which are infernal guards. Nor is it possible for them to torture each other, because being of equal strength of action, stature and valour they cannot frighten each other. [If the infernal guards etc. were real beings in hell], they would **themselves** be unable to bear the heat of the flaming iron-like ground. How then would they torture others? Or supposing that they are not some of those hell-inhabitants, [who are condemned to hell], why should they, then, be born there?

How indeed are the animals born in heaven? The animals, ghosts, infernal guards etc. are also born in hells, in the same manner.

5. Animals are born in heaven;
[169] However, they are not similarly born in hell,
Nor are the infernal guards born in hell,
For they do not experience the sufferings of hell.

The animals born in heaven enjoy there the pleasures accruing from the deeds due to which they are born there. Thus they are enjoyers of the pleasure of that world. But as for the infernal guards etc., they do not experience the infernal sufferings. Therefore, neither the birth of animals nor of infernal guards in hell does make sense.

[It may then be **argued** that] due to the deeds of the hell-inhabitants, some special beings are born there—beings which are **endowed** with such colour, figure, size and strength that they

get the title of infernal guards etc. In order to generate fear in others these beings transform themselves so that they seem to perform actions such as [extraordinary] manual gestures etc. They also take on the appearances of ram-mountains rushing in and out, and of thorns turning up and down in an iron forest.

It is not that they [i.e. the infernal guards etc.] are not born at all [in the manner described above]. [However],

6. If the birth of [special] beings
 [169] Can be thus recognized [as issuing]
 From their [i.e. the hell-inhabitants'] deeds,
 Why not then recognize
 The transformation of their consciousness ?

That is, why not recognize the transformation of consciousness itself as issuing from their deeds? Why should again [special] beings be imagined to be born? Moreover,

7. An impression of deed is imagined to be in one
 place,
 [170] And its fruit in another place !
 Why not instead recognize [the fruit]
 In the same place as the impression ?

The birth of [special] beings, and their transformation, is imagined [to take place] due to the deed of the hell-inhabitants. The impression of [that] deed is embedded in their stream of consciousness, not elsewhere. Why not then recognize that its [i.e. the impression's] fruit being a similar transformation of consciousness, is in the same place as the impression [itself]?

[It may be argued that] the **fruit** has been [rightly] imagined to exist where the impression does not. For what reason? For reason of the Scriptures. If it were consciousness itself that appears as colour etc., then there would not be things like colour etc. In that case the existence of the bases [of knowledge] such as colour etc., would not have been stated by the Lord. This is no reason. Because,

8. It was with a hidden meaning
 [171] That the existence of the bases of knowledge

Such as colour etc. was stated
 [By the Buddha] to his disciples,
 Just as [the existence of] beings
 [Apparently] born by metamorphosis
 [Was stated by him].

It has been stated by the Lord to the effect that there are beings apparently born by metamorphosis. However, his hidden meaning is that there is an unbroken continuity of the stream of mind. This is confirmed by the saying, "There is no being, neither *ātman* nor dharmas; they are all caused [i.e. accidental]." Similarly, what has been stated by the Lord to his disciples, who were listening to his instructions, about the existence of the bases [of knowledge] such as colour etc., also has rather a hidden meaning. What is that hidden meaning?

9. What the sage spoke of as the two bases of knowledge
 [171] Are (i) the own-seed
 From which a representation of consciousness
 develops,
 And (ii) the form in which that representation
 appears.

What is being said? A representation of consciousness appears as colour. [This representation of consciousness] arises from its own duly matured seed. This seed, and the form in which it appears [namely the form of colour], are respectively what the Lord spoke of as the [two] bases, namely, eye and colour, of the same representation of consciousness. Similarly indeed, [another] representation of consciousness appears as an object of touch. [This representation of consciousness] arises from its own duly matured seed. This seed, and the form in which it appears, are respectively what the Lord spoke of as the [two] bases, namely sense of touch, and object of touch. This is the hidden meaning [mentioned in this stanza]. What, again, is the use of thus instructing with a hidden meaning?

10. By this one is definitely initiated
 [172] Into the theory of the non-substantiality of self
 [*puḍgalā*],

Being thus instructed, the disciples get initiated into the theory of the non-substantiality of self [*puḍgala-nairātmya*]. The eightfold consciousness works on the assumption of the pair of subject and object. But, knowing that there is neither a perceiver, nor a thinker, the disciples come to understand the instruction about the non-substantiality of self, and thus they get initiated into the theory of the non-substantiality of self.

On the other hand, again,
By this instruction one is initiated
Into the non-substantiality of objects [dharmas] :

Starting with the phrase "on the other hand [*anyathā*]," the stanza further says how, by the instruction about mere representation of consciousness, one is initiated into the theory of the non-substantiality of objects [dharmas]. How? Namely, knowing that mere representations of consciousness produce the appearance of objects like colour etc., and that there are no objects like colour etc. as such. If, therefore, there is no object at all, then there would not be even that mere representation of consciousness. Therefore, how could [the theory of mere representation of consciousness itself] be established? The initiation into the theory of the non-substantiality of dharmas does not at all mean that there are no *dharmas* altogether. On the contrary

[The self and the objects are non-substantial]
With regard to their imagined nature.

The ignorant people imagine that *dharmas* are in the nature of being graspable and grasper etc. The non-substantiality of the dharmas is with regard to this imagined nature, not with regard to the ineffable nature, which is the object [of the knowledge] of the enlightened ones. Similarly, a representation of consciousness is non-substantial with regard to the nature imagined by another representation of consciousness. This is how one is initiated into the theory of the non-substantiality of the representation of consciousness; and it is through this initiation, which establishes the doctrine of mere representation of consciousness, that one is initiated into the theory of the non-substantiality of all *dharmas*, not through the denial of their [i.e. *dharmas*'] existence.

Otherwise a representation of consciousness would have an object which would be other than the representation of consciousness itself, and thus, the representation of consciousness having objects, the theory of mere representation would not be obtained.

How again is one to understand that the existence of the bases, [of knowledge] such as colour etc., was stated by the Lord with this hidden meaning, and that there are no such things that would become separate objects of the representations of consciousness of colour etc.? Because,

11. The object is experienced
[175] Neither as a single entity,
Nor as many discrete atoms,
Nor as an aggregate of atoms,
Because not a single atom is obtained in experience at all.

What is being said? The bases of knowledge like colour etc. supposedly become separately, the objects of the representations of consciousness of colour etc. Do they do so as one single entity, like the colour-whole suggested by the *Vaiśeṣikas*? or as many atomic entities? or as aggregated atoms? As objects [of knowledge] they are not a single entity, because never does one grasp [=know] a colour-whole as different from [its] parts. Nor are they many atomic entities, because one does not ever grasp the atoms separately. Nor are they an aggregated object of [knowledge], because not even a single atom is obtained [in experience]. Why?

12. One atom joined at once to six other atoms
[176] Must have six parts,

If six sides of an atom are joined at once by six [other] atoms, then it is proved that an atom has six parts, because one atom's place cannot be another's.

On the other hand, if they are said
To occupy the same place,

Then their aggregate would mean
Nothing more than a single atom.

[Let one suppose] that the place of a single atom becomes the place of six atoms [at once]. Then all of them having the same place, the whole aggregate [of them] would be nothing more than a single atom, and there being no mutual distinction [between those seven atoms] there would not be any aggregate [of them], either, to be seen. In fact the atoms do not join [to each other] at all, for they have no parts. The Kāśmīra Vai-bhāṣikas [say] that there is no problem of atoms joining [to each other], because it is the aggregates [of atoms] that join to each other. To them it should be said, namely, that an aggregate of atoms is not something different from them [i.e. from the constituent atoms].

13. As there is no joining of atoms,
[177] Whose joining can be attributed on their aggregates?
The term 'joining' [*samyoga*] is understood [from the context].
There can be no joining of atoms,
Not because they have no parts.

Otherwise the aggregates [of atoms] would join [to each other]. Therefore it should not be said that, it is because they [=atoms] do not have parts that there is no joining of them. For, there is no joining of even the aggregates of atoms, which do have parts. Therefore, not even a single atom is obtained [in experience]. Whether the joining of an atom is recognized or not,

14. That which has different parts
[178] Cannot make a unity,

[This is] another [problem] indeed. If an atom has different parts such as an upper part and a lower part, then how can such an atom still have unity?

[On the contrary, if it has no parts,]
How come it is subject to shadow and concealment?

If each atom did not have different parts, then how is it that at sunrise there is shadow in one place, and sunshine in another place? For, it [i.e. an atom] does not have an 'other' side where there would not be any sunshine. If, again, difference of sides is not recognized, how can there be concealment of one atom by another? No single atom has indeed an other side where the arrival of one [atom] would cause the obscuration of another. It amounts to saying that there being no obscuration [of any atom], an aggregate of atoms would not be anything more than a single atom, because all atoms would occupy the same place at once.

Why not, then, recognize that the shadow and concealment belong to the aggregate [of atoms], rather than to an atom. Is then the aggregate of atoms, to which they [i.e. shadow and concealment] would belong, recognized as different from those atoms? It is said.

It cannot be argued that they [i.e. shadow and concealment]
Belong to the aggregate of atoms,
Unless the aggregate is admitted to be
Different from atoms.

If the aggregate of atoms is not recognized as different from the atoms, they [i.e. shadow and concealment] cannot be obtained as belonging to the aggregate. No matter whether it is an atom or an aggregate, it is an induced imagination. What use, then, is this thought, if what is defined as colour etc. is not obtained? What indeed is their definition? It is, on the one hand, their being the object of eye etc., and, on the other, their being blue. That precisely is the [problem] to be solved. 'Blue', 'white' etc. are recognized as an object of eye etc. Is that [object] a single entity, or many entities? The impossibility of its being many entities has already been said.

15. [If it is assumed that the earth is] a single unit
[179] Then there would be no progressive movement,
Nor simultaneous grasping and non-grasping,

Nor would there be discrete states of many
[beings],

Nor would there be subtle and invisible [beings].

If the object of the eye etc. is imagined to be a single entity, rather than many discrete entities, then there would be no progressive walking, which means movement, on earth, for with just one step one will have covered the whole [earth]. Nor would there be the simultaneous grasping [=perception] of the front side [of one thing] and the non-grasping [non-perception] of [its] hind side. Nor would there be the occupation of different places by many discrete elephants, horses etc.; instead where one [animal] is, there can be also another. How then can their discreteness be recognized? How can there be one place reached by those two animals and yet another not reached by them—[or rather how can one establish it] on the basis of the perception of an empty space between those [two places, because there can be no such empty space].

If two things are distinguished only on the basis of definition, and not otherwise, then the tiny aquatic bacteria being equal in size with the huge animals, would not be invisible. Therefore, of necessity, the difference between atoms should be recognized. [But it has already been stated that] not a single [atom] is obtained in experience. That being unobtained, it becomes proved that colour etc. are not obtained as object of the eye etc., and that there is mere representation of consciousness.

Existence or non-existence [of something] is proved using the means of knowledge [*pramāna-vaśāt*]. Of all the means of knowledge sense-perception is the strongest one. If so, there being no object, how does one get the awareness such as 'this thing is being perceived by me' ?

16. Perception [can occur without extra-mental
object],

[182] Just as it happens in a dream etc.

The phrase 'without extra-mental object' [*vinā-āpi-arthena*] is understood from the above discussion.

At the time when that perception occurs,
The [corresponding external] object is not
found;

How can then one speak of its perception ?

At the time when in a dream one has the awareness that 'this is being perceived by me', that object is not really seen by one; because, on the one hand, that awareness is determined solely by the thought-consciousness, and on the other hand, at that time the eye-consciousness is obstructed; therefore how can that awareness be recognized as sense-perception at all? What is more, the respective colour or taste of a momentary object is definitely obstructed at that time.

Something not experienced before is not remembered by the thought-consciousness. Therefore, that vision [i.e. memory] should be traced to an experience. Thus, it is admitted that colour etc., become its [i.e. memory's] object.

It is not proved that a memory is of previously experienced object. Because,

17. It has [already] been said

[185] That there is a representation of consciousness,
Which appears as that, namely the respective
object;

It has already been said that even without a corresponding object, there arises a representation of consciousness, such as eye-consciousness etc., which appears as the respective object.

From it [i.e. from a representation of con-
sciousness]

Does the memory arise.

From a representation of consciousness arises a thought-representation of consciousness, which discriminates between the object such as colour etc., and the subject. The same thought-representation of consciousness, which has with it the memory associate, appears as memory. So an experience of an external object is not proved from the fact that a memory arises.

If in a waking state also a representation of consciousness were of an unreal object, as it is in a dream, then the common

man would naturally realize the absence of it [i.e. of an object]. But it is not so [i.e. the common man does not realize the absence of an object]. Therefore, all perceptions are not without objects, as a dream-perception is.

This argument does not make any point Because,

Those who are not awake
Do not realize that the objects they see in a
dream
Do not exist

Similarly. the common man fast asleep by the sleep of the habit of vainly discriminating between subject and object, as long as he is not awoken, sees, as if in a dream, unreal objects, and does not properly realize their absence. When, however, he is awoken through the acquisition of the supramundane knowledge, which, being non-discriminative, acts as a remedy to the habit of discriminating between subject and object, then, the previously acquired impure, mundane, knowledge being put down, he properly realizes the absence of object. Thus the dream-experience and the waking experience are similar.

If, therefore, the representations of consciousness, which appear as objects, arise out of the particular transformations of the stream of the respective beings, and not out of the particular external objects, then how is it obtained that a representation of consciousness is determined by contacts with bad or good friends, or by listening to right or wrong teachings, for there would be neither contacts with good or bad friends, nor their teaching.

18. The representations of consciousness
[189] Are determined by mutual influence
Of one individual on another.

The determination of a representation of consciousness of all beings is due to the mutual influence of the representations of consciousness of one individual on another's, as the case may be. The term *mithah* means *paraspara*, both meaning 'mutual'. Therefore, due to a particular representation of consciousness

of one stream [i.e. individual] there arises a particular representation of consciousness on another stream, not due to a particular external object.

If, a representation of consciousness in a waking state also were without an external object, as it is in a dream, why is it then that the good and bad actions of a dreamer and non-dreamer, do not have similar desirable or undesirable fruits in the future? Because

In a dream mind is overpowered by sleepiness,
And, therefore, fruits of the actions done in a
dream
Are not on a par with the fruits of those done in
a waking state.

This is the reason, not the presence of the external objects.

If it were all mere representation of consciousness, there would be no one's body nor word. How then could death happen to sheep etc. at the hands of butchers who have no body to move about? If it is said that the death of sheep etc. does not happen at their [i.e. the butchers'] hands, why are the butchers blamed for committing the sin of murder?

19. Death is a change of course caused by
[192] A particular mental representation of another
being,
Just as the loss of memory etc. of other beings
Are caused by the thought-power of demons etc.

Due to the thought-power of demons etc., changes like loss of memory, dream-vision and possession of evil spirits, occur in other beings; by the thought-power of a magician there occurs an increase of things; the king Sarana had dream-vision by the influence of Arya Mahakalyana; and, again, the defeat of Vemacitra was caused by the distress induced by the thought of the forest-sages. Similarly, by the influence of a particular representation of consciousness of some beings, there arises in other beings a certain change, which will stop the functioning of their vital organ. By this does death, which means the cutting off of the continuous stream of existence, take place.

20. Otherwise how can it be said that

[192] The Dandaka-forest was destroyed by the anger
of the sages ?

'Otherwise' means if death of other beings is not recognized as being caused by the influence of others' representation of consciousness'.

The householder Upala was asked by the Lord, who wanted to prove that mental torture is a great punishment, "Have you heard, householder, how the Dandaka-forest and the Kalinga-forest were evacuated, and made fit for sacrificial rites ?". It was then said by him in reply, "Oh ! Gautama, I have heard that it was by the mental rage of the sages."

Or, how could mental torture be considered
To be a great punishment ?

If it is imagined that the creatures living in those forests were destroyed by the suprahuman beings, who were pleased by the sages, and that therefore those creatures were killed not by the sages' mental rage, then how by that incident could it be proved that the mental torture is a punishment greater than bodily as well as oral tortures ? On the contrary it can be proved, by maintaining that the death of so many creatures happened solely due to the mental rage of the sages.

If it is all mere representation of consciousness, then do the knowers of other minds [really] know other minds or not ? [Whether they really know or not], what of it ? If they [really] do not know, how are they called knowers of other minds ? Therefore, they do know.

21. Knowledge of those,

[194] [Who claim] to know other minds,
Is unreal,
Just as one's knowledge of one's own mind
[Is unreal].

How that [i.e. knowledge of one's own mind] even is unreal ?

For, in the manner in which [the mind] is known
To the enlightened ones,
It is unknown [to ordinary men].

A mind is known to the enlightened ones in its ineffable nature. A mind, both [other's and one's own], is not known as it is to the ordinary men, because [for them], as [their habit of] discriminating between graspable and grasper is not yet destroyed, there is the false appearance [of subject-object distinction].

The theory of mere representation of consciousness being infinite, with incalculable divisions, deep and subtle,

22. This treatise on the theory
[195] Of mere representation of consciousness
Has been composed by me
According to my ability;
It is not possible, however, to discuss
This [theory] in all its aspects,

This [theory] cannot be discussed in all its implications by people like me, because it is beyond the limits of logic. To whom it is known in all its aspects, is being said,

It is known [only] to the enlightened ones.

It is indeed known in all its aspects to the enlightened Lords, for they no longer have any kind of impediment to the [real knowledge] of all knowable objects.

A Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on the Theory of
Mere Representation of Consciousness
Written by Master Vasubandhu