Strategic Culture and Ways of War

Lawrence Sondhaus

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Over the past three decades, the concept of strategic culture has gradually gained support within the ranks of political scientists studying international relations, but it remains controversial and has attracted few followers outside of political science. During the same period the related but much older concept of national ways of warfare has gained general acceptance among military historians and analysts, but in a literature developed in isolation from the discourse on strategic culture. As an integrating survey and synopsis of these two bodies of literature, this book sets out to overcome the barriers between them and to open the debate by drawing on relevant studies from the fields of anthropology, sociology, and geography. It opens with a preliminary discussion of the central idea – primarily in its relationship to realist or neorealist theory – then proceeds with a geographical survey of the literature in chapters on Europe, the Americas, and Asia and Africa, before closing with a discussion of definitions of strategic culture.

This book will be of much interest to students and researchers in political science, international relations, political and military history as well as strategic studies.

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Preface

Over the past three decades, the concept of strategic culture has gradually gained support within the ranks of political scientists studying international relations, but it remains controversial for those seeking a general or universal understanding of such subjects and has attracted few followers outside of political science. During the same period the related but much older concept of national ways of warfare likewise has become generally accepted among military historians and military analysts, but in a literature developed in isolation from the discourse on strategic culture, just as the scholarship on strategic culture rarely makes reference to the works on ways of warfare. This study will provide a much needed survey and synopsis of both these bodies of literature. As a work written by a historian, it reflects a historian's sensibilities. In approaching matters of theory, I take my lead from Jeremy Black, who has cautioned scholars to avoid "an overly-fixed use of the concept of strategic culture, a concept that depends for its applicability on a degree of flexibility" (Black 2004a: 1227, 2004b: 142). Thus, rather than stake out a definition at the start, then muster the evidence that supports it, I have structured the study to open with a preliminary discussion of the central idea – primarily in its relationship to realist or neorealist theory – then proceed with a geographical survey of the literature in chapters on Europe, the Americas, and Asia and Africa, and close with the discussion of definitions.

As a survey of the existing literature on strategic culture, written primarily by political scientists, and national ways of warfare, written primarily by historians and military writers, this book has as one of its central goals exposing scholars and analysts in different disciplines to each other's work, or prompting them to read works they otherwise would not have considered relevant to their own studies. In some cases, the barriers I hope to overcome are within the disciplines themselves. For example, as I prepared the section on the United States, the historically grounded works of political scientist Walter Russell Mead stood out as having a particular relevance, yet they have not been widely read or cited by political scientists engaged in the debate over strategic culture, much less by historians pondering the American way of war. While the vast majority of the literature discussed in the survey that follows comes from the disciplines of political science and history, important or promising studies from the other social sciences have been included where appropriate, from the classic works of geographer Paul Vidal

de la Blache and, more recently, anthropologist Emilio Willems, to the current scholarship of sociologist Miguel Angel Centeno.

Studies of this nature pose a daunting task for the author. Most academics remain securely within their own discipline or subdiscipline because venturing out entails risks. But in adding to my discussion the works and ideas of scholars in disciplines other than my own, I hope to have contributed to the ambitious goal of breaking down the barriers to our better understanding of state behavior in the international arena. Readers of drafts of this manuscript have been struck by my willingness to cite and quote junior scholars throughout the text, and by the absence of some of the more established names in the citations. I have not hesitated to highlight the work of junior scholars when, in my judgment, it includes significant insights or original analysis, and have made no special effort to include discussion of standard works in international relations or foreign policy that are not really concerned with strategic culture or national ways of warfare. I am certain reviewers will point out important works I have neglected to discuss, or raise issues or questions I have failed to address adequately. I welcome such criticism. This study is speculative in some areas and deliberately provocative in others. The geographical chapters are uneven in content in large measure because they reflect the strengths and weaknesses of the body of work already in print. In areas where my survey has revealed inadequacies in the literature, I have said so as plainly as possible, in the hope of calling attention to opportunities for future scholarship.

Proponents of realist explanations doubtless will find this book irritating, as it is riddled with examples of instances, past and present, in which cultural explanations rather than realist theory better explain state behavior. To the extent that I am a historian crossing over into the domain of political scientists, my role model is Paul Schroeder, whose article "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory" pulled no punches (Schroeder 1994). I have also highlighted, where applicable, the mountain of criticism that political scientists themselves have heaped upon their own realist colleagues. Writing seven years after Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik posed the question "Is anybody still a realist?" (Legro and Moravcsik 1999), at times I have felt as though I were beating the proverbial dead horse, but to the extent that neorealism remains alive (if not entirely well) and clearly continues to influence the mentality of policymaking elites, in the United States if not in all countries, I believe the exercise is worthwhile. Proponents of liberal theory and "soft power" arguments likewise will be disappointed with this book, as my own sensibilities and reading of history make it difficult for me to take their arguments seriously.

While I have made every effort to include discussion of the most recently published books and articles on strategic culture and ways of war, production deadlines made it impossible for me to give full consideration to all of the works that appeared in 2005, especially those published during or after the summer months. Of these, the most likely to have an impact on the future discourse include Theo Farrell's *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict* (Farrell 2005a) and, among the country-specific works, Isabel Hull's *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Hull 2005).

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A number of friends have provided valuable criticism of the ideas and opinions expressed in this book, in particular my colleagues in the Institute for the Study of War and Diplomacy at the University of Indianapolis. I am especially grateful to my colleague Milind Thakar for his comments on the section of chapter four pertaining to India. Rashed Uz Zaman, doctoral student at the University of Reading, likewise provided valuable advice on sources related to India. I would also like to thank Charles Ingrao of Purdue University, former editor of the *Austrian History Yearbook*, for commissioning my first publication on this subject, an article on the strategic culture of the Habsburg army (Sondhaus 2001b), and Andrew Humphrys, Routledge's editor for military and strategic studies, for placing the present work in the series Cass Military Studies. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the graduate students in my spring 2004 colloquium "Strategic Culture and Ways of War," who served as the initial trial audience for this project, and to those in the spring 2006 offering of the same course, whose readings included the near-finished product. I dedicate this book to them, in the hope that I have done something to broaden their understanding of warfare and international relations.

1 The evolution of an idea

The concept of national "ways of war" dates from the 1930s, when former British army officer Basil H. Liddell Hart theorized that there was such a thing as a traditional "British Way in Warfare." The concept of "strategic culture" dates from the 1970s, when American political scientist Jack Snyder introduced it to explain the strategy of the Soviet Union, after concluding that the Soviets did not behave according to rational choice theory. Starting with Liddell Hart, historians and military writers produced the literature on national ways of warfare independent of political scientists. Likewise, Snyder's initial piece and subsequent works on strategic culture preoccupied political scientists but were largely ignored by military historians. By the turn of the century, however, cross-disciplinary reading had begun to breach the wall between the two mutually exclusive bodies of scholarship (e.g. Macmillan 1995). Scholars in either discipline bothering to read the works of the other have recognized the obvious: that the concepts are complimentary inasmuch as a country's way of war may be viewed as both a subset and a product of its overall strategic culture (McInnes 1996: 3).

Liddell Hart, gassed at the Somme in 1916 as a twenty-one year old lieutenant, as early as 1924 published an article titled "The Napoleonic Fallacy" (an idea he carried on later as "the Clausewitzian fallacy"), in which he criticized the notion of "waging absolute war . . . against the enemy's main force" (Danchev 1999: 317). He became an advocate of an "indirect approach," equated it with Britain's traditional approach to armed conflict, and characterized the bloody debacle on the Western Front of 1914–18 as an aberration resulting from his country's departure from its own way of war. Liddell Hart first floated this broader thesis in 1927, then in book form in 1929, and finally under the title *The British Way in Warfare* in 1932 (Liddell Hart 1932; Danchev 1999: 313). In his memoirs Liddell Hart recalled that the book's "later chapters dealt with the development and potentialities of mechanized forces as a more promising alternative in the future to such stagnant yet costly warfare" as the British had experienced in the trenches of the First World War (Liddell Hart 1965: 1: 222–3). At the time he considered this (rather than the historical overview, confined to the opening chapter) to be the most important part of the book, and so did his readers. Indeed, while his advocacy of mechanized warfare served as a recurring theme of his interwar writings, he never dedicated a monograph to any other country's way of war. Political

scientist John Mearsheimer later noted that "the faith in the navy" reflected in this book "stands in sharp contrast to his serious reservations about naval power expressed elsewhere." Because Liddell Hart "exhibited little interest in naval power during the latter half of the 1930s," Mearsheimer concluded that "the British way in warfare was a short-lived idea, lasting from around 1931 to 1933" (Mearsheimer 1988: 93). Alex Danchev offers an alternative explanation for Liddell Hart's failure to follow through on the idea in his other works: as a professional writer who spent money freely, Liddell Hart wrote for the marketplace and wasted no time on projects that would not sell (Danchev 1999: 314). In any event, as much as the German Blitzkrieg and the advent of mechanized warfare made Liddell Hart's earlier works seem prophetic, in the British context the clear parallels between the author's "indirect approach" and Winston Churchill's strategic preferences during the Second World War sealed his reputation as an influential strategist. *The British Way in Warfare* appeared in a revised edition in 1941, then in a widely read paperback edition the following year. It came out in yet another revised edition as late as 1967, three years before his death. Thus, while the prolific author never addressed national ways of warfare in any of his other books, his well-known work on Britain served as a model for others (Danchev 1999: 313).

Shortly after Liddell Hart's death, American military historian Russell Weigley produced *The American Way of War*, offering a comprehensive analysis of the United States's approach to armed conflict from the American Revolution to the Vietnam War. Weigley attributed to George Washington an early American tradition of fighting a defensive war of "attrition," which eventually gave way to the war of "annihilation" favored by Ulysses S. Grant and, ultimately, by American strategists in the Second World War (Weigley 1973). Weigley's thesis dominated the study of American military history for the subsequent generation. Aside from an edited volume on Chinese ways of warfare (Kierman and Fairbank 1974) and a monograph on the Soviet way of warfare (Baxter 1986), during the next quarter-century the literature on national ways of war remained focused primarily on reevaluating the British experience (Howard 1984; French 1990; Strachan 1994; Freedman 1995; Macmillan 1995). Finally, at the turn of the century, a wide range of books, articles, and papers ascribed ways of war to Germany (Showalter 2000), South Africa (Jordaan 2000), Russia (Harrison 2001), India (Bakshi 2002), the Arab states (Layton 2003), and to Europe collectively (Everts *et al*. 2004).

The regional or transnational nature of the latter two approaches paled in significance to the widely read works of classicist Victor Davis Hanson, whose *The Western Way of War* (1989) argued that a Western tradition of warfare, reflecting democratic values and the primacy of the citizen-soldier, may be traced back to conflicts among the Greek city-states. Hanson saw in ancient Greek warfare the roots of modern Western preferences to establish ground rules for a "fair" fight and to avoid protracted wars. Warfare among the ancient Greeks, like wars between modern Western states, featured generally symmetrical forces seeking to deliver knockout blows against their opponents in decisive battles or campaigns. Hanson concluded that the same tendencies have led to Western impotence in the face of the asymmetrical challenges of guerrilla warfare and terrorism

(Hanson 1989: 4–14). Hanson further articulated his concept of a Western way of war in his subsequent *Soul of Battle* (Hanson 1999) and *Carnage and Culture* (Hanson 2001) but did not go unchallenged. John Lynn's *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* offered perhaps the harshest critique, calling Hanson's notion of a continuously identifiable Western way of war spanning two and a half millennia a "fantasy" (Lynn 2003: 25).

In contrast to the concept of national or culturally determined ways of warfare, the concept of strategic culture has a much shorter but even more hotly contested history, ever since Snyder first proposed it in the Rand Corporation report *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*. Snyder defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation" (Snyder 1977: 8). He argued that "Soviet strategic thought and behavior" stemmed from "a distinctively Soviet strategic culture." Unable to reconcile Kremlin decision-making with rational choice theory, he concluded that the Soviet Union's distinctive history, political institutions, and strategic situation "combined to produce a unique mix of strategic beliefs and a unique pattern of strategic behavior based on those beliefs" (Snyder 1977: 38). Specific to the subtitle of his report, Snyder countered the assumption – then common among American strategists, influenced by game theory – that the Soviets were likely to be tempted by circumstances into launching a limited nuclear war. Snyder argued that their strategic culture all but precluded such a course; indeed, he considered the United States more likely than the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons in a limited or tactical way.

Snyder's broad definition of strategic culture, further qualified by his assertion that "the content of a strategic culture is not cast in concrete for all time" (Snyder 1977: 40), soon frustrated many of his fellow political scientists. Indeed, at the time, in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War, mainstream opinion advocated a realist approach as the surest way for military powers to avoid such debacles in the future. In *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, Ken Booth lamented that "the fog of culture has interfered with the theory and practice of strategy" (Booth 1979: 9). He appealed to the next generation of strategists to be more conscious of the manner in which their own cultural context influenced their thinking. Acknowledging that "an observer cannot completely eradicate his own cultural conditioning, and the structure of ideas and values which it passes on to him," Booth held up "cultural relativism" as the ideal, advocating a "scientific detachment" on the part of the analyst. He concluded that "better strategy requires that ethnocentrism and incuriosity be replaced by sophisticated realism and strategic relativism" (Booth 1979: 16, 181).

At the same time, Kenneth Waltz recast and reinvigorated realist theory in his *Theory of International Relations*, a work which would remain influential into the twenty-first century. Waltz's neorealism paid even less attention to national identity than did traditional realism, viewing states as unitary, undifferentiated actors whose behavior (in particular the "self-help" tendency to form and re-form balances of power) is shaped by the constraints of the system in which they

operate (Waltz 1979). While it was clear from the start that the historical record did not support Waltz's theory, in particular in the matter of balancing, most scholars retained their faith in neorealism and sought to plug the gaps with complementary arguments. The most important work of this genre, Stephen Walt's *The Origins of Alliances*, explained away the tendency of some states toward "bandwagoning" (joining the stronger state or alliance) rather than balancing (bolstering the weaker state or alliance) without jettisoning Waltz's fundamental assumptions (Walt 1987). Neither Waltz nor Booth addressed the arguments of Snyder, just twenty-six at the time of his Rand publication and not yet the prominent political scientist he would soon become. But against the realist mainstream, his concept of strategic culture soon gained an influential proponent in Colin Gray. A dual citizen of Britain and the United States whose career eventually included academic appointments and think-tank positions in those countries as well as in Canada, Gray served after the election of Ronald Reagan on the President's General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. Like many other foreign policy advisors in the Reagan administration, he rejected the assumptions underlying the US-Soviet détente of the 1970s. He adapted Snyder's concept in observing that the United States, too, had a distinctive strategic culture, and in arguing that a fundamental assumption of American nuclear strategy at that time – that no one could win a nuclear war – was "peculiarly American" and not shared by the Soviets, who had never sincerely embraced the notion of mutual assured destruction or MAD (Snyder 1977: 38–9; Gray 1981; A.I. Johnston 1995b: 36–9).

Reshaping American nuclear strategy following the collapse of détente, the Reagan administration embraced the ideas of Gray and like-minded scholars, proposing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or "Star Wars") in violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty of 1972. Snyder subsequently "distanced himself" from those using the concept of strategic culture to justify such a shift in policy (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 36n). In his book *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914*, he deliberately did not use the term "strategic culture" (Snyder 1984). In a contribution to Carl G. Jacobsen's edited volume *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* titled "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," Snyder argued that his original notion of strategic culture had not been so broad, and had since been conflated with political culture or even national culture in general. He had intended for strategic culture to explain the persistence of a distinctive strategic approach in the face of "changes in the circumstances that gave rise to it, through processes of socialization and institutionalization and through the role of strategic concepts in legitimating these social arrangements." Thus, attributes should be explained in terms of strategic culture only "when a distinctive approach to strategy becomes ingrained in training, institutions, and force posture," in other words, when "the strategic culture has taken on a life of its own, distinct from the social interests that helped give rise to it." He concluded that "culture, including strategic culture, is an explanation to be used only when all else fails" (Snyder 1990: 4, 7).

Snyder did not specifically address Gray's early work on strategic culture but dismissed it, by implication, in his contention that "the one contribution that has

demonstrated its enduring value is Ken Booth's general warning about the dangers and ubiquity of ethnocentrism in strategic thought" (Snyder 1990: 3). During the same years when Snyder distanced himself from the notion of strategic culture, Booth embraced it enthusiastically. In his own contribution to Jacobsen's volume, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Confirmed," Booth defined strategic culture as "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, customs, achievement and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force." The self-styled "empirical realist" cited a number of reasons for the importance of studying strategic culture: as an antidote to ethnocentrism in general; as a tool for understanding the actions of another country on "its own terms;" for the way in which it employs history to better understand "the motivations, self-image, and behavioral patterns of others;" as a brake on the tendency to compartmentalize a country's domestic policy from its foreign policy; for its value in "threat perception and threat assessment;" and finally, as a means for understanding what appears to be irrational state behavior (Booth 1990: 121, 125–6). Echoing post-modernist historians – quite a feat, for a political scientist – Booth contended that "in the strategic domain, as in others, we live in a 'created world'. Strategic realities are therefore in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated" (Booth 1990: 124). Booth at the same time acknowledged and rejected Snyder's explanation of how narrow he had originally intended the concept of strategic culture to be. In any event, the broader concept had prevailed and "the conceptual accident which led to the coining of the phrase is one for which the strategic community is deeply in Jack Snyder's debt" (Booth 1990: 122). A year later, Yitzhak Klein's "A Theory of Strategic Culture" proposed a narrower definition – "the set of attitudes and beliefs held by a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it" – but his motion died for lack of a second (Y. Klein 1991: 5).

Gray subsequently defended himself, as well as his peers in what came to be known as the "first generation" of strategic culture advocates, by pointing to the clear shortcomings of rational choice theory and game theory in predicting Soviet behavior: "All that we intended was to remind our readers and official clients that there was a notably Soviet-Russian dimension to the Cold War foe; we were not competing with some black-boxed superpower A or B that was beyond culture" (Gray 1999a: 134, 1999b: 55). Resisting appeals from some political scientists for a narrower definition of strategic culture, Gray defended the breadth reflected in Snyder's original concept. He contended that "all dimensions of strategy are cultural," and that strategic culture serves as a pervasive "guide to action," from the realm of grand strategy down to battlefield decision-making. Strategic culture "expresses comparative advantage" in that it naturally emphasizes what a country has done well, and a country's occasional departures from its own strategic culture (even those as significant as Britain's conduct in the First World War or the United States's involvement in Vietnam) do not make the overall concept any less valid (Gray 1999a: 136–51). Gray even went so far as to accept as "plausible" Hanson's notion of a Western way of war (Gray 1999a: 293). In his own account

of the origins of the strategic culture concept, Gray highlighted the influence of political scientist Bernard Brodie's *War and Politics*, which argued that "good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology" (Brodie 1973: 332; Gray 1999a: 131). Inspired by Brodie, "in the mid-1970s a small number of strategic theorists came to believe that strategic ideas and some strategic behavior were much more the product of an educational process of social construction" (Gray 1999a: 131). Snyder was among that group; indeed, Brodie's *War and Politics* contains at least an embryonic suggestion of the cultural and institutional explanation of Soviet strategy which Snyder embraced and elaborated upon in his seminal work of 1977 (Brodie 1973: 332–4). Gray initially acknowledged no debt to military writers or historians for their work on national ways of war, but years later, in his definitive *Modern Strategy* (1999), he discussed and cited their body of literature along with that of the political scientists.

The first major work on ways of war by a political scientist, Michael W. Doyle's *Ways of War and Peace*, ironically addressed the topic without reference to the work of the military historians. Doyle instead produced a survey of international relations theory pertaining to questions of war and peace, subdivided by the philosophical perspectives of realism, liberalism, and socialism, the "three classic choices whose competition shaped the twentieth century" and "the predominant sets of alternatives for secular politics in the modern world" (Doyle 1997: 26, 36). By Doyle's definition the liberal worldview, in which the state is not a single rational actor but "a coalition or conglomerate of . . . interests" in which "domestic values and institutions shape foreign policy" (Doyle 1997: 19–20), is the most compatible with the concepts of strategic culture and national ways of war. Doyle made no attempt to address the culturalist challenge but affirmed that, in the twilight of the twentieth century, the realists still held sway. In his view, "most international relations scholars are either self-identified or readily identifiable realists" (Doyle 1997: 41), predisposed to embrace rational choice theory and the notion that states are rational actors in the international arena – and thus to reject culturally or historically based explanations of international state behavior.

Historian Paul Schroeder entered the fray in 1994 with his provocative article "Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory." As the historian (apart from Paul Kennedy) most widely read by turn-of-the-century political scientists specializing in international relations, Schroeder offered "a historian's view of the neo-realist historical world" constructed by Waltz and others. He offered a systematic analysis of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the First World War, the Second World War, and alleged instances of balancing against Louis XIV's France and Victorian Britain, in each case concluding that historical reality does not support neorealist theory. He concluded that genuine balancing has rarely occurred, and that among the alternative strategies states have pursued, bandwagoning has been the most common – indeed, far more common than Stephen Walt had suggested. Yet Schroeder also criticized Walt for defining bandwagoning in such a way that "makes it virtually impossible to distinguish between balancing and bandwagoning . . . since any bandwagoning state is likely to claim that it is actually balancing against a threatening enemy." He characterizes

neorealist theory as "simple, parsimonious, and elegant," but "for the historian at least, unhistorical, unusable, and wrong" (Schroeder 1994: 119, 129). Nevertheless, most political scientists remained faithful to realist theory, and most of those who wavered were drawn to liberal rather than cultural explanations. In the introduction to his edited volume *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Peter Katzenstein noted that "in the first half of the 1990s North American scholarship on the theory of international relations was preoccupied with the issue of whether variants of realism or liberalism offered a superior way of explaining the world." He marveled at the ease with which realist or neorealist theory had remained dominant, even though it had "woefully fallen short in explaining an important revolution in world politics," the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the years 1989–91 (Katzenstein 1996: xi–xii). But just three years later, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik posed the question "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" They argued that "the theoretical core of the realist approach has been undermined by its own defenders . . . who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent, and less distinctive to realism" (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 6). The end of the Cold War cast doubt on realist theory for more reasons than just its failure to predict or explain the collapse of communism. In their paper "Domestic and International Influences on Foreign Policy: A Comparative Perspective," Ryan Beasley and Michael Snarr speculated that the cultural argument provided the most plausible explanation for the apparent "post-Cold War identity crisis" still being experienced by several states a decade after the great change:

> Clearly, if identity and culture are repositories of state interests, they are not likely to change as abruptly as objective interests. Indeed, this might account for a post-Cold War identity crisis, as states' objective conditions and interests face rapid changes while their Cold War or pre-Cold War identities linger.
>
> (Beasley and Snarr 2002: 331)

Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War world cultural explanations remained problematic for most international relations scholars. Alastair Iain Johnston lamented the "great deal of confusion over what it is that strategic culture is supposed to explain, how it is supposed to explain it, and how much it does explain" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 63). He identified three "generations" of writers in the first two decades of the literature on strategic culture. In his opinion, the "first generation," including Gray, Snyder, Carnes Lord, and David R. Jones, defined strategic culture in terms broad enough to make it practically meaningless, oversimplifying often complex domestic influences on foreign policy and failing to acknowledge the factor of instrumentality – that leaders could consciously cite strategic culture to justify their decisions (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 36–9; cf. Gray 1981; Lord 1985; Jones 1990). The "second generation," active from the mid-1980s to early 1990s, focused on the issue of instrumentality. While conceding that

strategic culture differs from state to state and has relevance as a socializing factor for decision-making elites, writers of the "second generation" such as Bradley Klein and Robin Luckham concluded that the self-interest of decision-makers, rather than strategic culture, is what shapes and limits strategic choice (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 39–41; cf. B. Klein 1988; Luckham 1984). Johnston, who broke with the neorealists in explaining China's tradition of realpolitik in terms of "cultural realism" rather than realist theory (A.I. Johnston 1995a; 1996), placed himself in the "third generation" of strategic culture literature, with writers including Elizabeth Kier and Jeffrey Legro. According to the "third generation," in order to be useful a theory must be falsifiable, and in order to be falsifiable strategic culture had to be more narrowly defined, specifically to omit behavior from the independent variable. In Johnston's more limited definition, "strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols . . . which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 46).

While conceding that strategic culture could "help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice," he was particularly critical of Gray and the "first generation" of strategic culture proponents whose elaborations on Snyder's work led to "the deterministic leap of logic made in the Reagan administration that centuries of Russian insecurity and autocracy necessitated the American development of war-fighting and war-winning strategic capabilities" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 64).

Gray included a rebuttal to Johnston in his book *Modern Strategy*, in which he dismissed the notion that culture, strategic or otherwise, could somehow be detached from behavior, since culture, by definition, encompasses both ideas and behavior. "Anyone who seeks a falsifiable theory of strategic culture (as does Johnston) commits the same error as the doctor who sees people as having entirely separable bodies and minds." He rejected Johnston's call for a narrower definition of strategic culture, observing that "a definition driven by the needs of theory-building rather than by the nature of the subject is unusually likely to lead scholars astray." Gray refused to accept a realist-versus-culturalist dichotomy and reminded the realist mainstream of international relations scholars "that 'realist' analysis and policy is undertaken by particularly encultured people and organizations. Perhaps the point is too obvious to notice." Acknowledging the criticism that state behavior in the international arena has a wide variety of causes, Gray concluded that the true utility of strategic culture lies in how it can help us understand observed behavior in the present rather than to predict future behavior (Gray 1999a: 132–3, 135–6). Johnston's brief response article, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray" (1999), shed no new light on their debate. He linked Gray's argument that behavior cannot be detached from culture for purposes of analysis to his conceptualization of strategic culture in "ethno-national" terms, reminiscent of "the old, discredited, essentializing national character

studies of the past." Johnston contended that Gray's concept of strategic culture denied that within a country there could be "contested strategic cultures or . . . crossnational or transnational strategic cultures." He failed to explain why the acknowledgment of the existence of competing strategic cultures or traditions within the same country necessarily depended upon acceptance of a falsifiable theory of strategic culture, merely arguing that if "ethno-territorial entities called 'countries' are essentialized, there can be . . . no need to even ask whether behavior is independent or not of strategic culture" (A.I. Johnston 1999: 522–3).

In his article "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Strategic Culture," Rajesh Basrur sided with Johnston against Gray in lamenting that "first-generation approaches remain popular," underscoring their "lack of theoretical rigor in demonstrating the linkage between identified cultural traits and actual behavior." Writing at the end of a decade that featured a burgeoning literature on Indian strategic culture and ways of warfare, he could point to plenty of unfortunate examples of simplistic stereotyping of "the alleged effects of culture on Indian thinking." As a solution he proposed a far more limited definition of strategic culture tailored specifically to the nuclear age, consisting of ideational, praxological, and structural elements. In his model, the ideational includes a country's "basic assumptions and beliefs" about the international environment as well as its "operational level" doctrine. The praxological "consists of repetitive patterns of action over time," a key marker echoing Snyder's original strategic culture concept. The structural behavioral elements are conceptualized in a three-dimensional "structural frame" measuring a country's degree of "restraint [or] precipitateness" in times of crisis, its level of "tolerance for ambiguity," and its attitude toward arms limitations regimes. Basrur considered strategic culture to be dynamic rather than static, serving "as an intermediate structure that moulds the responses of the state to both external and internal stimuli." Thus he viewed his limited cultural approach as complimentary to, rather than in opposition to, realist theory (Basrur 2001: 183–5, 196).

Forrest Morgan numbers among those professing admiration for the more "analytical" approach of Johnston and other authors of the "third generation," and criticizing the "descriptive" nature of much of the rest of the literature on strategic culture. But in his book *Compellence and the Strategic Culture of Imperial Japan*, Morgan pointed out that Johnston's work "shared . . . a methodological shortcoming . . . with all other strategic culture work done to date," in that he "fashioned strategic culture as an independent variable." Morgan asserted that standard scientific methodology "cannot yield reliable results in a study of culture's effects on behavior . . . because culture does not act independently." He argued that strategic culture conditions, rather than determines, the behavior of decision-makers. Thus Morgan called for those employing the cultural approach to focus on the manner in which elements of strategic culture "intervene in the decision-making process as political elites respond to the world around them" (Morgan 2003: 8). Similar to Basrur's view of strategic culture as an "intermediate structure," Morgan's solution was to treat it as an "intervening variable . . . between stimuli arriving from the strategic environment and

the state's responses to those stimuli" (Morgan 2003: 31). His criticisms notwithstanding, Morgan considered culture to be central to understanding why active coercion or compellence works or fails with different countries in different situations.

Advocates of the cultural approach have also had to defend themselves against the charge that dramatic change in the behavior of some countries undermines the validity of the concept of strategic culture. In Katzenstein's 1996 anthology, Thomas Berger cited the examples of Germany and Japan in theorizing that only a "major external shock" would shake them from their post-1945 cultures of anti-militarism – the same sort of shock as the total and utter defeat in the Second World War that had ended their pre-1945 militaristic cultures (Berger 1996: 318; cf. Berger 1998: 209–10). The challenge of explaining the reunified Germany's post-Cold War behavior led Kerry Longhurst to articulate a more refined theory in which a strategic culture consists of three components: underlying "foundational elements," observable "regulatory practices," and the "security policy standpoints" that govern the translation of the core elements into practice. In *Germany and the Use of Force*, Longhurst concluded that "the existence and functioning of the three components mean that a strategic culture is in a continual state of self-evaluation." Change is not only possible, but constant, yet most changes in a strategic culture are "fine-tuning" rather than "fundamental" (Longhurst 2004: 17–18). The challenge of determining whether an apparent cultural change is fine-tuning or fundamental remains problematic, and serves as an example of the difficulties encountered by those who would endow strategic culture with predictive power. For instance, in their coauthored contribution to Katzenstein's volume, Jeffrey Legro and Paul Kowert placed Berger's example of Germany and Japan in the same category with the observation that Iraq's defeat in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 had changed the pan-Arab strategic culture of many Middle East states, making it possible for their governments to ally openly with the United States without offending the Arab nationalist sensibilities of their people (Kowert and Legro 1996: 473). But within a few years of the book's appearance, it had become clear that the apparent fundamental change in the strategic culture of the Arab states had been a tactical fine-tuning, and certainly not on the order of magnitude of the changes Germany and Japan had experienced after 1945. For reasons largely unforeseen as of 1996 – the popularity of al Qaeda and widespread Islamist sentiments among their people – the same regimes that had once distanced themselves from the United States on pan-Arab grounds once again sought to minimize their American connection.

Ever since Gray boldly embraced the cultural explanation in the wake of Booth's *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, he and other writers employing the concepts of strategic culture and national ways of war have risked being linked to the simplistic ethnic stereotyping of years past. In part to insulate themselves from such charges (or to avoid taking sides in the realist-versus-culturalist debate), some have embraced the less highly charged rubric of organizational culture. Elizabeth Kier, claimed by Johnston as a fellow member of the "third generation,"

nevertheless found it most expedient to disavow participation in the debate altogether. In her article "Culture and Military Doctrine: France Between the Wars," she contended that her work, despite addressing many of the same questions, was not "an argument about strategic culture" but about organizational culture in the military context, a culture that "is not equivalent to the national character" (Kier 1995: 67, 70; cf. Kier 1997). In a similar vein, Jeffrey Legro, author of "Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II," argued that military organizational culture, rather than a broader strategic culture, shaped national ways of war. In the case of his topic, "the organizational culture approach argues that both Germany and Britain had 'ways of war' that worked to suppress inadvertent escalation" (Legro 1994: 133; cf. Legro 1995).

Political scientists are not alone in doubting whether strategic culture provides a useful framework of analysis. Jeremy Black, the present era's most prolific writer of military history, ranks with John Lynn among the most steadfast critics of Hanson's Western way of war and, in general, is skeptical of the utility of the concepts of national ways of war and strategic culture. In his book *Rethinking Military History*, Black cautioned that "it is all too easy to reify national attitudes and policies, to make them appear clearer, coherent, and more obviously based on readily-agreed national interests than is . . . the case." Black attacks the problem from the opposite flank as Johnston's "third generation" and, indeed, sees an even greater danger in their quest for a more narrowly defined, falsifiable theory of strategic culture. In his view, such theories "assert a false coherence in order to provide clear building blocks for analytical purposes" (Black 2004b: 142). Rather than reject the notion of strategic culture completely, Black cautioned scholars to avoid "an overly-fixed use of the concept of strategic culture, a concept that depends for its applicability on a degree of flexibility" (Black 2004a: 1227, b: 142). While Black thus concurred with Gray in his rejection of a narrow definition of strategic culture and of falsifiability as a litmus test of utility, he shared the concern of Johnston's "third generation" that strategic culture can too easily be misused to provide overly simple explanations for complex processes and policies.

Another leading military historian, Geoffrey Parker, used the term strategic culture in *The Grand Strategy of Philip II*, but with a unique definition disconnected from the debate up to that point. According to Parker, "the same three considerations shaped strategic culture in the sixteenth century as in the twentieth": command and control, communications and intelligence, and the "assumptions that inform its strategic vision and influence the selection of its strategic priorities" (Parker 1998: 12). His definition of the determinants of strategic culture reflected his own view that culture includes operational behavior, and represented an attempt to link the concept to the recent decades of military literature on operations, which focused first on command and control (C2); then on command, control, and intelligence (C2I); then command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I), the terminology used by Parker, common to the discourse on operations as of the mid-1980s. By the mid-1990s the concept had evolved further into command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance (C4ISR). In any event, just as Parker did not ground his own definition in the literature on strategic culture, authors writing after his work appeared in 1998 did not embrace his definition or build upon his effort to integrate the literature on operations and strategic culture.

In their article "Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defense," Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka lamented the persistence of the debate over whether culture includes behavior. Notwithstanding Brodie's often-cited admonition from 1973, they contended that scholars writing about strategic culture had read too little anthropology or sociology, and as a result employed "a reified concept of culture that is outdated elsewhere in the social sciences" (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 5–23). In his 1999 rebuttal to Johnston, Gray quite correctly made the "too obvious" observation that "analysis and policy is undertaken by particularly encultured people and organizations" (Gray 1999a: 135). Indeed, his assertion that "all dimensions of strategy are cultural" has been maddening to his critics precisely because it is so difficult to refute. Assumptions about strategic culture and national ways of war can, indeed, lead decision-makers down dangerous paths; nevertheless, amid the ongoing debates over the definition and utility of such concepts, in the early years of the twenty-first century political scientists and historians have not hesitated to continue to employ them. Examples include changes in the policies of the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focusing on the emergence of a "new American way of war;" of whether India, an emerging superpower, has an identifiable strategic culture or way of war; and of the prospects for Latin American states to develop military cultures compatible with democratic systems of governance. Analyses of the European Union's quest for a common defense policy likewise have focused on the prospects for a supranational European strategic culture, especially since 2003, when EU secretary general Javier Solana secured the European Council's adoption of a European security strategy employing the term "strategic culture," its first use in a formal policy statement of a country or international organization (European Council 2003: 11). Commenting on this development, Stine Heiselberg observed that because "theorists within the cultural approach have focused on cases where a strategic culture already exists and have argued for its importance in explaining outcomes," they have all but ignored "the formative period where the seeds for strategic culture are sown" (Heiselberg 2003: 8). He thus highlighted the importance of understanding the history of how strategic cultures have emerged in the past to the European Union's quest for a European strategic culture in the present and future. As more scholars appreciate this point, the line dividing the work of historians and political scientists will continue to blur.

Finally, any author undertaking the task of writing a book on strategic culture and ways of war at this point in time must acknowledge that the finished product will bear the marks of "tentative scholarship," to borrow a label applied recently by Black. The cases discussed in the chapters that follow focus on the largest or most militarily significant states, along with a few others for which some cultural explanation has been proposed, because the research required to produce a truly

global account with any claim to accuracy, as Black has observed, "has simply not been tackled for most of the world" (Black 2004a: 1227). Yet even though significant gaps remain in the literature, it is a burgeoning literature including an increasing number and variety of monographs, anthologies, journal articles, and papers. Just as Gray has concluded that, for the political scientist, the true utility of strategic culture lies in how it can help us understand observed behavior in the present (rather than to predict future behavior), for the historian of war and diplomacy such concepts offer a useful framework for understanding the recent as well as the more distant past. The time has come to survey the landscape of what has been done thus far and see what emerges in the way of a synthesis.

2 Europe

Europe's history of interstate relations, from the Peace of Westphalia (1648) onward, has shaped the norms of international relations in the modern world. The interactions among the leading European powers in the early modern period have provided much of the evidence cited in support of realist theory, in particular its emphasis on the tendency of states to "form and re-form balances of power" (Doyle 1997: 135). Yet from Liddell Hart's British way in warfare to Snyder's Soviet strategic culture, case studies from Europe have provided some of the most persuasive examples of nationally specific approaches to warfare. While the influence of the European state system on the behavior of its members throughout modern history cannot be denied, a survey of the individual cases of the traditional great powers of Europe, as well as some of the continent's lesser states, calls into question the assertion that these states have behaved consistently as rational "functionally similar units" in the Hobbesian realist sense. In the case of Europe, the argument may be made that the system has tempered, rather than shaped, the behavior of its member states, each of which has preserved its own traditions and tendencies – its own cultural approach – in the use of force in the international arena.

Britain

Since Liddell Hart's *The British Way in Warfare* first appeared in 1932, more books and articles on national ways of war and strategic culture have been devoted to the study of Britain than to any other country. While a significant number of strategists in other countries, most notably the United States, may question the relevance of history (especially of the distant past) to present and future strategic realities, in Britain the norm has been to take it for granted. As Alan Macmillan has noted, "the British take considerable interest in their own past and the distinctiveness of their historical experience" (Macmillan 1995: 37).

For all its significance to the idea of a British way of war, and to national ways of war in general, Liddell Hart's original work on the subject included just one chapter – a mere 29 pages – on "the Historic Strategy of Britain" (Liddell Hart 1932: 13–41). Even in this chapter, he devoted several pages to a recapitulation of his earlier critiques of Napoleon, Karl von Clausewitz's interpretation of

Napoleon, and Marshal Ferdinand Foch's assimilation of Clausewitz into French (and, by extension, 1914–18 allied) strategic thought. In his overview of past English/British warmaking, Liddell Hart emphasized "our essentially businesslike tradition" and "Britain's distinction to excel in . . . economy of force" (Liddell Hart 1932: 37–41). Highlighting the commercial and maritime roots of the country's strategic interests, and the limited nature of its continental goals and interests, he cited examples from the strategies pursued by Elizabeth I, Oliver Cromwell, Charles II, William III, the Duke of Marlborough, and William Pitt the Elder, overcoming challenges first from Spain, then the Netherlands, and finally France. He noted that Marlborough, whose continental victories were Britain's greatest before those of the Duke of Wellington, achieved his triumphs with "a very limited force" from Britain supplemented by large numbers of allied troops (Liddell Hart 1932: 31). Liddell Hart argued that, throughout the early modern period, the more England/Britain committed to the continent, the less it achieved. He also attributed Britain's loss of the War for American Independence to its "deep-land strategy, committing land forces far into the interior" of the rebellious colonies. Inland campaigns of generals Sir John Burgoyne and Lord Cornwallis led to the disastrous surrenders at Saratoga (1777) and Yorktown (1781), the former prompting France and others to recognize the United States and send aid, the latter effectively ending the war on land and ensuring American independence. During the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, Britain returned to its "traditional grand strategy" with "renewed success" in a protracted campaign that was essentially naval. "Wellington's actual battles played but a small and infrequent part in the process." Indeed, his campaigns on land were little more than "an extension of our seapower" (Liddell Hart 1932: 35–6). Wellington, like Marlborough a century before, won his battles with relatively small numbers of British troops supplemented by continental allies; Liddell Hart noted that allies provided most of the manpower for Wellington's army at Waterloo (1815). In contrast, during the First World War Britain departed from its traditional way of war by "raising a huge army and employing the bulk of it for direct action in the main theatre of war." Meanwhile, the navy played a role much more in line with British tradition, and much more decisive in forcing an end to the war, imposing a devastating blockade which, by 1918, "made a continuance of the struggle impossible" for the German army and home front (Liddell Hart 1932: 37–8). Liddell Hart condemned the overall British approach to the First World War as "a policy foreign to our traditions," and called for a return to the traditional policy which "has had a longer run on the world's stage than any other, and a uniquely successful run" (Liddell Hart 1932: 15).

From the start Liddell Hart had his critics, and he remains controversial to this day. Most recently, Elizabeth Kier has argued that Liddell Hart's British way of warfare had more to do with contemporary interwar politics and the army's organizational culture than with long-term British traditions. Keen to avoid at all costs another continental war on the model of 1914–18, the British army of the 1920s and 1930s "adopted a [defensive] doctrine that went against its bureaucratic interest." Army leaders, like their navy and air force counterparts, submitted

modest budget requests (seeking a level of funding that would make a future continental commitment moot) and had to be pushed by civilian politicians to ask for more. But many politicians, Conservative as well as Labour, also wanted to avoid another continental war, at least on the scale of 1914–18, and used Liddell Hart's arguments to support their case (Kier 1997: 92–105, 109–10, 116–20). Standing on history and tradition, they could label their opponents as wrong-headed or ill-informed – the worst sort of example of the reification problem that Jeremy Black has warned against (Black 2004b: 142).

The most comprehensive critique of Liddell Hart's British way of warfare appeared just two years after his death, when Michael Howard published *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (1972). Just as the experience of the First World War had influenced Liddell Hart, the ongoing Cold War and Britain's commitment to the defense of Western Europe shaped Howard's views. While Liddell Hart championed the effectiveness of sea power and peripheral amphibious operations, denying the need (or desirability) of more substantial commitments to the European mainland, Howard emphasized that "our security remains involved with that of our continental neighbors, for the dominance of the European landmass by an alien and hostile power would make almost impossible the maintenance of our national independence" (Howard 1972: 9–10; Macmillan 1995: 34–5). Howard acknowledged that English/British strategists had specifically equated naval supremacy with the national interest as early as the Elizabethan period, but alongside, not in opposition to, an appreciation for the country's interests on the European continent. Foremost among the latter, from the early modern period to the twentieth century England/Britain consistently sought to keep a strong, potentially hostile power from controlling the Low Countries. In pursuit of this goal, its leaders repeatedly formed alliances with continental powers and dispatched troops of their own to fight on the continent. Thus, "command of the seas and the maintenance of a European balance were in fact, not alternative policies . . . but interdependent" (Howard 1972: 52). In Howard's view, Liddell Hart misrepresented Britain's continental commitment of 1914–18 as an aberration. Far from being a departure from the country's traditional way of warfare, the underlying continental strategic interest in the First World War was no different than it had been in the earlier centuries, or later, in the Second World War. While the navy could shield Britain from invasion, buy time for recovery from setbacks suffered by the army, and in general provide the country's leaders with a greater variety of strategic options, acting on its own it could not bring victory (Howard 1984: 189, 193; Macmillan 1995: 35).

In his most direct criticism of Liddell Hart, Howard remarked that in advocating "flexible strategies," he failed to consider that "such flexibility depended for its success on a continental ally being prepared to accept the sufferings which the British could avoid" (Howard 1972: 58; Macmillan 1995: 34). But the Second World War undermined this aspect of Howard's argument, demonstrating that Britain, indeed, could find allies willing to bear losses on the continent that the British themselves would not have accepted. After six years of fighting, Britain

emerged as one of the principal victors while sustaining less than half the casualties it had suffered in the four years of the First World War. The Soviet Union endured horrific casualties from 1941–45 as Britain's continental ally in the defeat of Nazi Germany, but the United States also did its part to help limit British losses. The Americans first indulged Churchill's preference for peripheral operations in the years 1942–44, following Britain's lead while sacrificing more of the manpower in Northwest Africa, Sicily, and the invasion of Italy, then took the heavier losses between D-Day and V-E Day on the revived Western Front of 1944–45. In its approach to the war against Germany, the United States (if not the Soviet Union) consciously acknowledged the sacrifices Britain had made in the first two years of the war. The air war also reflected the American willingness to take losses the British would not have taken; in the years 1942–45 American air forces shouldered the more costly burden of daylight bombing, while the British bombed mostly at night.

Elaborating upon the work of Howard, Macmillan has identified the "dialectic, or debate, between the maritime strategy and the continental commitment" as the defining characteristic of British strategic culture, and one reflected in the post-1945 debate over Britain's role in Europe and, eventually, the European Union (Macmillan 1995: 35). Ultimately the maritime-versus-continental dichotomy evolved into an Atlanticist-versus-Europeanist debate, as Britain wrestled with the dilemma of how to maintain the close Anglo-American strategic relationship developed during the Second World War while also integrating its armed forces into a European defense structure not involving the United States. In the last years of the war Winston Churchill hoped Britain would retain its Big Three status alongside the United States and Soviet Union into the postwar era, an unrealistic goal given Britain's economic exhaustion, growing dependence upon the United States, and overall weak position *vis-à-vis* both the Americans and Soviets. Yet after the British electorate rejected Churchill's Conservative Party in the summer of 1945, Clement Attlee and the Labour Party embraced elements of his dream of postwar great-power status, even as they hastened to grant independence to India and dismantle the empire Churchill considered indispensable to that status. Long before the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, the Attlee government concluded that Britain must possess its own nuclear weapons. The opposition Conservatives concurred, and the project came to fruition in 1952, a year after Churchill's return to power, when Britain tested its first atomic bomb. Scholars do not agree over the primary motive behind the British quest for an independent nuclear deterrent. While Macmillan contends that Britain developed its bomb in order to "ensure equal status and fair treatment" by the United States, Alister Miskimmon has characterized it as emblematic of a commitment to, rather than a desire for independence from, the American-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Macmillan 1995: 36; Miskimmon 2004: 277).

Regardless of the primary motive, Britain's nuclear deterrent gave it a distinction subsequently achieved by France (1960) and China (1964) and coveted by others aspiring to great-power status thereafter. It was the most visible, and most expensive, element of the British quest to maintain a semblance of great power status

in the postwar world, to "punch above its weight," as Peter Mangold has noted, not unlike a light heavyweight boxer seeking to compete with the heavyweights (Mangold 2001: 173; Miskimmon 2004: 276). Nuclear weapons also ensured for Britain the status of most significant partner to the United States within NATO, an alliance ideal from the British perspective in that it served the Atlantic as well as the European interest. Successive British governments sought to deepen the Anglo-American strategic relationship by building upon the intelligence cooperation the two countries had forged during the Second World War, and by aiming for the highest possible degree of interoperability between the British armed forces and their American counterparts (Miskimmon 2004: 277). Indeed, Lawrence Freedman contends that, since 1945, Britain's highest strategic priority has been maintaining its relevance as an ally to the United States. "If there has been a British approach to warfare for the past 60 years, it has been to gear military capabilities to the level that is necessary to gain an entrée into Washington's decision-making processes" (Freedman 2004: 20).

Britain's post-1945 policy of retaining some of the trappings of independent great-power status while remaining clearly aligned with the United States reflected the essence of what Macmillan characterizes as the "British political culture" and the "traditional British decision-making style," manifested, in turn, in Britain's strategic culture. Features include a preference for gradual instead of abrupt changes, for "continuity and tradition over innovation and grand designs," and a premium on pragmatism and flexibility, tempered by caution (Macmillan 1995: 36). During the Cold War departures from this course were rare, and aside from the embarrassing fiasco of the abortive Anglo-French intervention in Egypt during the Suez Crisis of 1956, none of great significance. After 1956 the most ambitious independent operation by British armed forces came in 1982, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher resolved to reconquer the Falkland Islands after they had been forcibly seized by Argentina. The brief, victorious campaign – undertaken with the approval of, and intelligence support from, the United States – demonstrated the determination of Thatcher's Conservative government to defend Britain's interests and few remaining overseas possessions (although, being a realist, she also set in motion the process by which Hong Kong would be returned to China in 1997). While victory in the Falklands improved British morale and Thatcher's popularity, the makeshift nature of the forces deployed in the campaign (especially the navy, reduced dramatically since the 1950s and configured primarily for anti-Soviet NATO operations in the northeast Atlantic) reflected just how far Britain had fallen.

Miskimmon agrees with Macmillan's appraisal of the traits embodied in Britain's strategic culture, and finds evidence of their continuation under the Labour government of Tony Blair, whose election in 1997 ended eighteen years of Conservative rule spanning the end of the Cold War. Because of Britain's past as the world's leading colonial and maritime power, its public and political leadership (and, of course, the leaders of its armed forces) have a stronger "sense of [international] responsibility and global outlook" than any other Europeans. The post-Cold War transformation of the armed forces has occurred faster and,

arguably, more effectively in Britain than anywhere else. A professional force of 315,000, whose land, sea, and air components for the most part had been tied to roles in NATO's northwest flank, by 2004 had been reconfigured to a more versatile 210,000, much of which could be deployed worldwide on relatively short notice. The process involved the elimination or amalgamation of several army regiments (a further reorganization announced in December 2004 claimed seven, including the venerable Royal Scots) but had few opponents aside from veterans groups and a relative handful of politicians who supported them (Miskimmon 2004: 279, 281–2; BBC December 16, 2004). During the same years, the British navy enhanced its amphibious capability with a new helicopter carrier completed in 1998 and 6 new dock landing ships to be completed in the years 2003–10, while maintaining an undersea force spearheaded by 4 large ballistic missile submarines (armed with American Trident II missiles). As of 2005, future projects included two 60,000-ton aircraft carriers, which would revive a capacity for large-deck carrier operations abandoned in the late 1970s (Sondhaus 2002: 324).

Toward what end has Britain reshaped its armed forces? How do these changes reflect its strategic culture, and what are the implications for the British way of warfare? In the military/strategic sense, the end of the Cold War and the growing cohesion of the European Union posed greater challenges for Britain than for any other Western European state. For four decades Britain could pursue both its Atlantic and European goals by being a good ally within the NATO context; by the mid-1990s, as many Europeans questioned NATO's future, the newly reunified Germany cast its lot with France and the continent, and pressure mounted for Britain to do likewise. In his response, Blair kept faith with British tradition by keeping his options open, a course reflected in the flexible force that emerged from the material transformation of the British armed forces. In the landmark St Malo agreement of December 1998, Britain embraced France's view that Europe should have its own capability to intervene militarily in crises in or near Europe, in exchange for France conceding that the European Union should not have its own military infrastructure mirroring NATO (Freedman 2004: 20–1). Blair also deepened Britain's commitment to the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) by pledging one-quarter of the manpower needed for the proposed European Rapid Reaction Force: 12,500 troops (of the total 50,000–60,000) plus 18 ships and 72 combat planes (Miskimmon 2004: 286, 289). While Miskimmon considers St Malo "a definitive change . . . in British strategic culture," the same expeditionary capability that allowed Blair to make his commitments to the ESDP also reinforced the Anglo-American connection in that it enabled Britain to join the United States in an active interventionist policy, first in Kosovo (1999), then in Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Blair couched his own corollary to President George W. Bush's quest to spread democracy in terms of promoting "social democratic values," principled rhetoric that his greatest domestic critics – backbenchers in his own Labour party – would find more difficult to dispute (Miskimmon 2004: 282, 286).

In contrast to his Conservative predecessors, Margaret Thatcher and John Major, Blair has viewed Europe not as a strategic problem but a strategic solution,

in that European organizations of which Britain was a part could be used to further British goals. Especially in the military/strategic realm, Britain found that it could influence Europe rather than become entangled on the continent against its will. Blair's creative strategic outlook enabled Britain to weather the storm of uncertainty over the future of NATO and continue to enjoy the best of both worlds, rejecting the either/or mentality of many of his European allies by embracing Europe while also maintaining his Atlantic ties to the United States. By transforming Britain's military capabilities – indeed, becoming a model for other European powers to follow – Blair made Britain indispensable to the ESDP and thus could follow the United States into the Iraq war of 2003, a conflict deeply unpopular on the continent, without fear of seriously damaging his country's relations with its European partners. In maintaining the balancing act, Britain did not hesitate to use its influence on behalf of NATO and against the creation of duplicate military institutions under the European Union, for example, opposing the proposal for a separate EU military planning center, advanced by France and Germany (and endorsed by Belgium and Luxembourg) shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Miskimmon 2004: 286, 289). Thus, halfway through the first decade of the twenty-first century, the traditional creative tension between the maritime strategy and the continental commitment, between preserving the Atlantic ties while nurturing the European, continued to provide a unique vitality to Britain's strategic culture and planning for future warfare.

France

Geography has given France a set of strategic problems almost opposite those of Britain. For the French, being strong on the continent has always been a necessity, not an option; seeking to be a power on the world stage, while not fundamental to the country's security or survival, has always been a temptation. In the early modern period France had the largest population of any European state west of Russia, but its quest for colonies and naval power stretched its resources to the limit. The fate of Louis XIV's grand design served as an example that France could not go it alone, and his successors during the eighteenth century always fought their continental wars in league with at least one major ally in order to remain in the game at sea and in the colonies. In the wake of the French Revolution, Napoleon made the continent a clear strategic priority, selling Louisiana to the United States and letting rebellious Haiti go free, but he, too, ultimately could not resist spending large sums on a navy that, at its peak, remained clearly inferior to its British counterpart. For almost a century after 1815 France remained the world's second naval and colonial power, and repeatedly embraced technology as the means to narrow its naval gap with Britain. The French navy introduced a succession of innovations before the British – steam-powered warships, steamers with screw propellers, shell guns, armored warships, torpedo boats, and submarines – only to have the British use their superior industrial base to outproduce them in each case. Finally, the rise of Imperial Germany compelled the traditional rivals to become allies. France gave up hope of maintaining first-rate sea power, and was surpassed

in naval strength by Germany, the United States, and Japan during the decade before the First World War. The postwar Washington Naval Treaty (1922) allowed France a navy the size of Italy's, just 30 percent as large as the leading sea powers, Britain and the United States (Sondhaus 2002: 97–8, 2004: 49–62).

While no French leader has ever questioned the primacy of the army in the country's defense establishment, the nature and doctrine of the army has remained hotly contested for much of the past two centuries. Dating back to the levee en masse of 1793, when the First Republic adopted a universal service liability in order to withstand invasion by a coalition including most of the other European powers, the French Left favored a conscript army and viewed a professional army as a threat to liberty. The latter characterization – born in revolutionary contempt for the old royal army, which had doubled as a domestic police force for the absolutist regime – persisted well into the twentieth century. When conscripted mass armies became the norm for nineteenth-century Europe (Britain excepted), French conservatives and most military leaders favored a longer term of active duty and a greater reliance upon a larger cadre of professional soldiers, while the Left always favored a shorter term of active duty and greater reliance upon reserves summoned to the colors in wartime. The conservatives generally prevailed from the Bourbon Restoration (1815–30) through the Second Empire (1852–70), but after the forces of Prussia/Germany crushed the army of Napoleon III at Sedan in 1870, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction. The Third Republic (1870–1940) had the dubious distinction of being born, and eventually dying, with German troops on French soil. In the autumn of 1870 the republic's founders resolved not to sue for peace, and resorted to a levee en masse on the model of 1793 in the hope of turning the tide. But since the Napoleonic era, warfare had become sufficiently more complicated to doom the effort. Enthusiasm and sheer numbers no longer sufficed against a better trained and (in this case) technologically superior foe. While France's militia army fought well enough on the defensive, it could not sustain even the most modest offensive and thus failed to expel the invader. The republic sued for peace early in 1871, ceding Alsace – Lorraine to the newly unified German Empire (Cox 1994: 19, 27, 45, 121–2, 188).

To understand the development of French strategic culture after the defeat of 1870–71, one must understand the French conceptualization of their own geography and of geography in general. Led by Paul Vidal de la Blache (1845–1918), a "French school of geography" developed from the 1870s which formed the foundation for the modern sub-discipline of human geography. Vidal and his followers espoused a "possibilism" emphasizing the potential rather than the inevitable, and thus stood in sharp contrast to the sweeping determinism of British and German geographers such as H.J. Mackinder (1861–1947) and Karl Haushofer (1869–1946). Reflecting a geography grounded in a study of history rather than in the natural sciences (and thus not heavily tainted by the Darwinism then in vogue), the French school considered language and biology (or "race") as important factors but not the only factors determining national identity; civic values and cultural identity mattered as well, and arguably even more. Focusing, not surprisingly, on Alsace–Lorraine, Vidal and his followers thus could explain

how the people of these predominantly German-speaking provinces annexed to France under the Old Regime could legitimately belong to France. Alsatians and Lorrainers had developed a genuine French identity, a process accelerated by the revolution of 1789, which transformed their local social and economic structures and awakened within them the spirit of liberty. Vidal's belief in the possibility of this sort of civic assimilation had repercussions far beyond Alsace–Lorraine, in time as well as in space. Isolated in Europe by the diplomacy of Otto von Bismarck, France after 1871 had no hope of reacquiring the lost provinces anytime soon and sought to recover its national pride in overseas empire-building. The "civilizing mission" that gave French colonialism its unique character owed much of its intellectual underpinning to Vidal and his protégés, whose "possibilism" could explain and legitimize cultural imperialism. The legacy may be seen in the political and cultural life of present-day francophone Africa, as well as at home, in contemporary France's effort to assimilate its large Arab minority. Vidal's geography also included the geopolitical concept of "natural frontiers," physical limits within which a state could consolidate its control over conquered peoples via civic assimilation. This concept could be used to legitimize the historical French quest for an eastern boundary on the Rhine, achieved only temporarily by Napoleon. Thus, in the wake of the humiliation of 1870–71, Vidal laid the foundation for a strain of French strategic culture that, in the French view, involved the defense of land and liberty or spreading the benefits of French civic culture, but that critics saw as aggressive and imperialist (Vidal de la Blache 1922; Church 1951; Tatham 1951; Colson 1992; Heffernan 2001).

In the debate over the nature of the army, defeat in the Franco-Prussian War provided both the Left and conservatives with grist for the mill. The army embraced an offensive strategy that could only be executed by professional soldiers or long-service conscripts, motivated, as Jack Snyder has concluded, by "the need to forestall civilian desires for an army that would rely heavily on reservists." France's international isolation ended in the early 1890s, when it concluded an alliance with Russia, but strained civil–military relations suffered anew during and after the divisive Dreyfus Affair (1894–1906), when the army leadership joined political conservatives, anti-semites, and the Catholic Church in supporting false charges against Captain Alfred Dreyfus for a treasonous breach in intelligence. Amid the furor, the "self-protective ideology of the offensive" took on an even greater importance for the army (Snyder 1984: 201–2). The exoneration of Dreyfus, hailed by the Left as a victory for democracy, discredited the army leadership and led to a backlash of discrimination against conservative and "conspicuously Catholic" officers. A deliberate effort to "republicanize" the army included the commissioning of more officers from the ranks, the democratization of admissions to military academies, and a softening of military justice. The Left also insisted upon a reduction in the active duty obligation for conscripts to just two years (it had been fixed at five years in 1872 and shorted to three in 1889), weakening the country's military readiness at a time when France had the lowest rate of population growth among the great powers of Europe (Porch 1981: 54–133 *passim*; Snyder 1984: 60–76).

Growing tensions with Germany sparked the so-called Nationalist Revival of 1911–14, during which political leaders reversed the recent decline and, in 1913, restored the three-year term of active duty. The Left acquiesced in the increase in recognition of the demographic reality that the German population outnumbered the French by a ratio of 7:4. The French army, like every other, had its offensive war plans in 1914, which Liddell Hart attributed to Karl von Clausewitz's vision of Napoleonic warfare as assimilated by France's leading prewar strategist, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. He considered Foch primarily responsible for "the fallacy of French strategy" – insistence upon taking the offensive against a superior foe, when a defensive posture, followed by a decisive counterattack against the invading Germans, would have made much more sense (Liddell Hart 1932: 17–22; cf. Liddell Hart 1931). Snyder has concluded that "the French chose the least rational strategy" among the leading continental powers. General Joseph Joffre, Foch, and other conservative officers restored to prominence in 1911 favored an offensive strategy that would be best executed by the professional army they preferred, even though it made little sense for the army they actually had at their disposal (Snyder 1984: 16, 104). But Douglas Porch sees the greater influence coming from the Left, owing to its "sentimental adherence to the offensive tactics of the Revolutionary armies with no attempt to adapt the theory to modern warfare." In any event, "the ever-growing strength of the German army, rather than introduce a sobering note of reality, simply increased the atmosphere of fantasy" in French military thought (Porch 1981: 214, 231). Indeed, given the manpower advantage of its opponent and the general staff's conviction that reserve units could not sustain an attack, France's faith in the offensive was clearly less realistic than anyone else's. To make matters worse, the army leadership's contempt for its own reserves caused them to underestimate the number of reserve divisions Germany would use in its initial attack, with near fatal results. The final version of Germany's Schlieffen Plan called for 76 divisions to attack France via Belgium; of these, 32 were reserves. The French general staff's bleakest estimates forecast an invasion by 65 German divisions, including 23 of reserves (Snyder 1984: 53, 100).

During the First World War France suffered nearly 5 million casualties, half of them in the first 15 months of the war, greater losses (as a percentage of total male population) than any other combatant. Victory brought the return of Alsace–Lorraine but not the long-term security France had hoped for. In the interwar period the ideological differences over the nature and doctrine of the army returned and even worsened. The Left persisted in advocating a shorter term of active duty and greater reliance on reserves, and in 1928 succeeded in cutting the service term to a single year. Under the reform the French army would retain a professional cadre of 106,000 men – barely more than the 100,000 allowed Germany under the Versailles Treaty. After the conscription law of 1928 guaranteed an ill-trained force, the French general staff finally abandoned its offensive doctrine (already discredited by the bloodletting of 1914–18) in favor of the defensive strategy embodied in the line of state-of-the-art fortifications along the Franco-German border named after war minister André Maginot, begun in 1930.

While Bruno Colson places this development within the context of a defensive tradition dating back to the fortresses built by Sébastien de Vauban under the Old Regime, Elizabeth Kier has disputed the inevitability of such an outcome and attributed it to the army's organizational culture. Interwar France had the money and the military–industrial complex to build a different kind of army with a different kind of doctrine, but the predominantly conservative army officer corps refused to believe that short-term conscripts or reserves could support an offensive strategy, and persisted in this belief despite evidence to the contrary (e.g. a German army in which 40 percent of the divisions were reserves nearly reached Paris in 1914). Thus, according to Kier, "the French were trapped: the Left would not accept a professional army and the army could not imagine an offensive doctrine without one" (Colson 1992; Kier 1997: 56–68, 70–3, 83).

The new defensive doctrine did not serve the interests of French grand strategy, which after 1919 had attempted to replace Imperial Russia as the eastern counterweight to Germany in the balance of power by forming alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Thanks to Vidal's influence on French strategic culture, at the Paris Peace Conference France had been more enthusiastic than Britain about the creation, restoration, or enlargement of such states, all of which contained significant ethnic minorities that would test the notion of civic assimilation, some of which (e.g. Czechoslovakia *vis-à-vis* Germany, and Yugoslavia *vis-à-vis* Italy) had a border that reflected a "natural frontier" but made little sense ethnically. Yet after 1928 France had no doctrine, strategy, or contingency plan of how to defend any of these allies in case they were threatened by an aggressor.

The revival of the German threat after the establishment of the Nazi dictatorship in 1933 did nothing to dispel the long-standing dispute over the nature and doctrine of the French army. Colonel Charles de Gaulle proposed supplementing the existing short-service force with a professional core of seven armored divisions manned by 100,000 troops on a six-year term of service, but the Left feared such a force would march on Paris and topple the republic. A more modest proposal to restore the two-year term of active service likewise aroused suspicion; Socialist leader Leon Blum, premier from 1936–38, called it "a danger for republican liberties" (quoted in Kier 1997: 62). The French army's crushing defeat at the hands of the German Blitzkrieg of 1940 would vindicate De Gaulle's appeal for a mobile tank-centered force, but as France's prewar political polarization worsened, the fears of the Left were not entirely unfounded: De Gaulle conceded, at least privately, that a professional army would serve the need for "domestic order" (Kier 1997: 80–2). In any event, the strategic outlook adopted by interwar France contradicts realist theory in a number of ways: the army did not conform to the assumption that all armed forces are predisposed to favor offensive strategies; the realities of the international system had little effect on strategic choices France made; and domestic politics and organizational culture clearly mattered a great deal (Kier 1995: 93).

Bruno Colson has defined three hallmarks of post-1945 French strategic culture: independence, the maintenance of great-power status, and universalism

(Colson 1992). De Gaulle personified these goals. Establishing the Free French in the wake of France's humiliation of 1940, he devoted the rest of his life to restoring the image and status of his country. As provisional president of France (1944–46), he secured a permanent seat and veto on the United Nations Security Council and a French zone of occupation in postwar Germany, then reasserted control over France's overseas colonies. Because the constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946–58) did not have the strong presidency De Gaulle wanted for himself, he retired from public life; in his absence, the country's leaders continued to pursue the same general goals, leading the way in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1952) and European Economic Community (1958), while initiating the development of an independent French nuclear deterrent. But their quest to maintain the overseas empire came unraveled with defeat in Indochina (1954), and the onset of the bloody war for Algerian independence. The goal of creating a European Defense Community failed in 1954 largely because France lacked the self-confidence to agree to a rearmed West Germany after Britain opted out of the organization. Thereafter, NATO filled the void by becoming a great deal more than the paper organization established in 1949, developing a military structure, headquartered in Paris but under permanent American leadership, within which West Germany rearmed.

The ongoing crisis over Algeria enabled De Gaulle to return to power as president of the Fifth Republic (1958–69). While he soon cut his losses in the colonies, letting most of the remaining French possessions go in 1960, followed by Algeria in 1962, he redoubled his country's quest for independence and great-power status in all other areas. The enduring legacies of the defeat of 1870 included the realization that France needed allies, but as Colson has noted, the French have never functioned well within an alliance they did not lead (Colson 1992). Coming to power months after the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), De Gaulle sought to make the EEC an instrument for French economic domination over Western Europe; when the British reconsidered their initial decision not to join, De Gaulle used France's veto to keep them out. Within three months of returning to the presidency he also demanded that France have equality with Britain and the United States within NATO, suggesting a rotating leadership among the three powers. When both Britain and the United States rejected the idea, France's relations with the alliance began to deteriorate; in 1966 De Gaulle withdrew his armed forces from participation in NATO and ordered all foreign forces off French soil. Meanwhile, in 1960, the nuclear project he inherited from the Fourth Republic came to fruition in the testing of the first French atomic bomb. Three years later, when Britain joined the United States and the Soviet Union in signing the nuclear Test Ban Treaty, France declined to join in. Long after De Gaulle's death, the French maintained their right to open-air testing of nuclear devices (conducted in the South Pacific), and did not sign the Test Ban Treaty until 1996. De Gaulle also initiated a modest naval revival; eventually France joined the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain in commissioning nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (four, by the turn of the century) and had the only navy other than the American with a nuclear-powered aircraft

carrier, appropriately named *Charles De Gaulle*, commissioned in 2001 (Sondhaus 2002: 325). Within Western Europe, De Gaulle's France adopted a confident stance *vis-à-vis* West Germany, signing a friendship treaty in 1963 and initiating a tradition of bilateral contact that survives to this day. In the Cold War, he sought to make France a third force between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the former colonies (excepting Indochina and Algeria) which had not had to fight for their freedom, he succeeded in maintaining a high degree of French influence. True to the values of Vidalist geography, most of francophone Africa retained defense and economic ties to France, and continued to use the French franc as their currency until the introduction of the euro in 1998.

After France freed its last major colonial possessions, then withdrew from active participation in NATO, the army stationed the vast majority of its troops in France. In the Foreign Legion (established 1831) the army had a unique adjunct to its conscript force, whose operational losses would not cause political difficulties at home. From the late 1960s onward the Foreign Legion saw action most frequently in Chad but also in the former Belgian colonies of Zaire and Rwanda. While De Gaulle, ever since the interwar years, had advocated a more flexible army, as president he did little to improve the expeditionary capability of the regular forces, which languished while France's nuclear deterrent became the centerpiece of national defense. Colson places this development within the defensive tradition of French strategic culture, even equating De Gaulle's nuclear *force de frappe* with Vauban's fortresses of the early modern period. Notwithstanding its considerable cost, the nuclear weapons program enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the public, which considered it the key to the country avoiding future humiliations along the lines of 1940. Indeed, among the major countries of Western Europe, France alone did not have a significant anti-nuclear movement during the later years of the Cold War. Eventually, however, De Gaulle's successors faced the consequences of France having relied too heavily on its nuclear deterrent for defense and international influence during the Cold War. After joining the international coalition against Iraq in 1990, France had difficulty assembling a force to participate in the campaign to eject Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. The same was true in the mid-1990s, when the army faced the challenge of peacemaking/peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. In order to remain a factor in the international arena, France had to reconfigure its armed forces to participate in such missions. Socialist leader François Mitterrand did little to address the problem in the twilight of his long presidency (1981–95), but his successor, Jacques Chirac, took on the controversial issue of abolishing conscription and establishing a professional army (Colson 1992; Kramer 2002: 62–3).

Conscription had become deeply unpopular in postwar France, especially during the war in Algeria (1954–62), but after 1958 De Gaulle faced the traditional objections to a professional army and acquiesced in the continuation of a short-service conscript force. In 1970, the year after he left office, the national assembly reaffirmed the one-year term of active duty. The end of the Cold War brought its reduction, in 1992, to ten months. After his election to the presidency in 1995, Jacques Chirac announced the transition to a professional army as part

of a transformation of the armed forces following the general post-Cold War British model. The last conscripts completed their terms of service in 2002. By then, Chirac had come close to achieving a public and political consensus behind the change, owing to the clear incompatibility between a short-service conscript force and the demands of rapid deployment for interventions abroad and peacekeeping operations. But in a last gasp of the age-old heated debate, the conservative president's main opposition came from French communists and some socialists "who regard[ed] the professional army as a mercenary one or who continue[d] to consider conscription as an opportunity for education in citizenship" (Ajangiz 2005).

While De Gaulle did not attempt to change the conscript army, as a soldier-turned-politician he was uniquely placed to confront the issue of the role of the armed forces in French politics. He returned to power in 1958 amid threats of a military coup against the Fourth Republic, whose leaders were wavering in their commitment to continue the war in Algeria. Hailed at the time by conservative generals and Algeria's French minority as the savior of the nation, De Gaulle proved to be too much of a realist to persevere in the fight to keep Algeria under French rule. In 1961, after a wide majority of French voters supported his decision to grant self-determination to the Algerians, four generals who had supported him three years earlier launched a coup in Algiers in opposition to his policy. Loyal forces crushed the coup in a matter of days, and Algeria became independent the following year. By silencing the remaining political soldiers early in the Fifth Republic, De Gaulle became France's last political soldier. He established a tradition of policymaking limited to the president, the premier, the foreign minister, and their civilian advisors, which deliberately excluded military leaders from discussion of "political questions" (Kramer 2002: 60). Confirmation that France had turned a corner in civil–military relations came in 1968, when the military did not intervene in the domestic turbulence of that year, although some feared it would (Black 2004b: 145).

Bruno Colson has identified "universalism" as a hallmark of French strategic culture: the sense of a "universal vocation" dating back to the revolution of 1789 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, under which France feels a special mission to promote and defend human rights. Under De Gaulle and his successors, France has articulated its "universal vocation" within the context of the United Nations (Colson 1992). Other than in francophone Africa, where the Vidalist sense of cultural mission, in some cases combined with a significant economic stake, has led it to act repeatedly without UN approval (most recently in Ivory Coast in 2004), France has refused to participate in military operations not sanctioned by the UN and has considered such operations illegitimate. Principles aside, French respect for the UN has much to do with the fact that within the UN, France still matters. Its status as a veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council makes France a great power within the context of the UN, regardless of how weak it may be by any other measure. Thus France contributed troops to military operations in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001 – campaigns pursued with UN approval – but not in Iraq in 2003, which did not have the UN's blessing. The idealistic goals of French "universalism" were not

incompatible with George W. Bush's quest to spread democracy or Tony Blair's articulation of "social democratic values" in foreign policy, but French strategic culture dictated that its "universalism" could coincide with its American and British counterparts to justify interventions only on a case by case basis, and only if ratified by the UN.

The resolution of the age-old controversy over conscription and the broader nature and doctrine of the French army has left French strategic culture with no equivalent to the creative tension generated in Britain by the ongoing Atlanticist-versus-Europeanist debate. The early twenty-first century found France remarkably unified in its self-perception and international outlook. The French, like the Americans, tended to believe sincerely in the coincidence of their own national interests and the overall common good. The same held true for the French approach to the further integration of the European Union, and the quest for a common defense and foreign policy for the European Union. Indeed, Colson has argued that French strategic culture is destined "to become the crucible of a European strategic culture." Whether in the civic assimilation/civic integration concept of Vidal's geography or in the tripartite goals of independence, "universalism," and maintenance of influence on the world stage, the European Union's aspirations for Europe coincide with France's aspirations for France (Colson 1992). The greatest danger to France achieving its goals in Europe are the French themselves, who must overcome the contrarian impulse (normally directed against the United States) which the French public directed against the proposed EU constitution in May 2005, rejecting it by a 55 percent majority.

Russia

Ever since the publication of Snyder's pathbreaking *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* in 1977, the literature on Russia's strategic culture and way of war has focused primarily on the behavior of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and particularly on Soviet nuclear strategy. Remarkably, few authors have recognized the obvious continuity between the Soviet Union's experiences of foreign invasion, expansionist tendencies, and sense of communist mission, and Imperial Russia's earlier, longer history of invasion, expansion, and sense of Orthodox Christian and/or pan-Slav mission. Almost alone among political scientists, David Jones has acknowledged that the Soviet Union's communist ideology and strategy was "grafted to and merged with . . . the strategic realities of the Russian empire." Thus the Soviet Union pursued the inherited goal of "preserving the multinational Eurasian imperium" conquered by the tsars, alongside the Marxist–Leninist goal of defending and promoting communism (Jones 1990: 35).

Jones has linked Russia's expansionist tradition to its lack of natural geographic defenses except in the Arctic north. Russia historically responded to enemies by seeking to drive them farther from its ethnic Russian core territory, and conquered more territory in the process (Jones 1990: 38). Thus, long before the Bolshevik Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union, Russian

strategic culture equated security with expansion. Anthropologist Emilio Willems has traced these tendencies to the Grand Duchy of Moscow and the onset of its counterattack against the Mongols (1380). According to Willems, Russia's military traditions and approach to war have reflected a blending of Mongol and European influences, the latter becoming more pronounced during and after the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725). On the question of expansionism, Willems observes that "long before Peter's reign, the dividing line between defense and aggression had become blurred. After all, was there a more effective way of preventing further aggression than bringing the actual or potential invaders under permanent control?" (Willems 1986: 162–3).

During the century after the death of Peter the Great, the guards regiments he created played the decisive role in the numerous succession crises that plagued the Romanov dynasty. Guards officers routinely facilitated palace coups, most dramatically in 1762 (replacing Peter III with his wife Catherine) and in 1801 (replacing Paul with his son Alexander I), when reigning tsars were murdered in the process. Willems considers such plotting as evidence of a lack of integration among the monarchy, nobility, and officer corps that stood in sharp contrast to the situation in Prussia/Germany (Willems 1986: 168). Reviewing the same history, Jones minimizes the repeated meddling of the military elite between 1725 and 1825, observing that only the failed Decembrist Revolt of the latter year "sought a change of system [away from royal absolutism] rather than of rulers." On this basis, and the less disputable evidence from the Soviet period, he concludes that "the Russian military has never sought to compete with its rulers." While Jones agrees with Willems that the tsarist regime failed "to establish a tight relationship of loyalty with the nobility and military leadership," he argues nevertheless that "social mobility" within the officer corps ensured a high degree of "civil–military integration" in imperial times, owing to the practice of ennobling common officers (and giving higher titles to those already within the nobility). Jones sees a parallel between this enhancement of status via noble titles in the early modern period and officers bonding with the Soviet regime via membership in the Communist Party after 1917 (Jones 1990: 42). In any event, Nicholas I (reigned 1825–55) solved the problem of the meddlesome guards regiments for the duration of the imperial period. Coming to power in the wake of the Decembrist Revolt, this younger brother of Alexander I – groomed for a military career rather than the throne – purged the officer corps of elements disloyal to him. From then until the First World War, no tsar had reason to doubt the Russian army. Nevertheless, in the late imperial period army leaders resented the use of their forces for internal police duty, and after 1914, the woeful wartime leadership of the last Romanov, Nicholas II, caused key senior officers to waver in their support for the monarchy. Their failure to rally around the tsar during the February Revolution of 1917 prompted his abdication (Fuller 1985; Reese 2002: 75).

Few historians give high marks to the Russian army for its opening strategy and subsequent performance in the First World War, yet Jack Snyder rates Russia's behavior in the summer of 1914 as more rational than that of France or Germany. Though it continued to lag far behind the other great powers in its level of

industrialization, Russia in the immediate prewar years had recovered rapidly from its defeat in the Far East at the hands of Japan (1904–05). Furthermore, its alliance with France had grown stronger, and it became increasingly clear that in case of war, Germany would focus on France first and try to hold East Prussia with token forces. Over the past quarter-century Russian war planners had wavered between two scenarios for fighting the Central Powers: invading Germany and holding against Austria–Hungary, or invading Austria–Hungary and holding against Germany. The latter option enjoyed greater political popularity, owing to pan-Slav hatred of the Habsburg empire and the greater likelihood of success against the weaker of the two Central Powers. The former option, favored by the general staff in St Petersburg, would allow the Russians to take advantage of a weak German eastern front early in the war and perhaps save their French allies in the process. Each had a reasonable chance of succeeding, at least in the first weeks of fighting. Unfortunately for Russia, Nicholas II was a weak commander-in-chief, unable to function as the "authoritative arbiter" between the factions of officers promoting the two alternatives. A compromise solution let both have their way: in August 1914 the Russian army attacked both Germany and Austria–Hungary. Even then, as Snyder has observed, "the error lay not in the decision to attack but in the decision to attack too soon with too weak a force." Russia mobilized far faster than anyone expected (disrupting the calculations of Germany's Schlieffen Plan) and enjoyed local superiority against Germany as well as Austria–Hungary, but not overwhelming superiority in either case. Underestimating likely logistical problems, the Russians prevailed anyway against the Austro-Hungarian army, pushing as far west as Cracow before their offensive fizzled, but at the Battle of Tannenberg (August 27–30, 1914) they failed disastrously against the Germans (Snyder 1984: 17, 160, 178, 196, 204–5). Even in defeat, the Russians put enough pressure on the Germans in the east to save the French in the west, stalemating both fronts. The deadlock in the east did not last long, however, as a spring 1915 offensive by the Central Powers pushed the Russians out of Poland. Counterattacks in 1916 and 1917 (the latter under the Provisional Government established after the abdication of Nicholas II) focused on the Austro-Hungarian sector of the front but succeeded only temporarily and generated enormous casualties, paving the way for the Bolshevik Revolution. As Richard Harrison has concluded, ultimately "Russia's traditional advantages in space and mass proved useless against modern weapons" (Harrison 2001: 4).

After seizing power in the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks won the Russian Civil War (1918–21), retained control over most of the non-Russian territory of the former empire, and established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922). Roughly 90 percent of the officers in the Red Army that secured the victory for Vladimir Lenin's new regime were promoted from the ranks, but to lead them commissar for war Leon Trotsky relied heavily upon former tsarist officers. Styled "military specialists" to avoid offending revolutionary sensibilities, they held one-third of the higher command positions at the end of the civil war and, despite retirements, over 10 percent as late as 1928 (Harrison 2001: 81–4, 122). While Harrison credits these officers with passing on at least

some of the Imperial Russian military heritage to the Red Army, Roger Reese gives low marks to their professionalism and competence. By the time of the February Revolution some 90 percent of the old army's officers were recalled reservists, hastily trained wartime volunteers, or soldiers promoted from the ranks; thus, relatively few of Trotsky's "military specialists" had been professional officers in the prewar army (Reese 2002: 75–7).

Lenin's affinity for Clausewitz has been well documented (Tucker 1975: 188; Volkogonov 1994: 21), and according to Harrison, "Soviet military theory in the 1920s . . . expressed itself forcefully in favor of the decisive offensive operation, aimed at the destruction or capture of the enemy army in the quickest and most violent manner possible" (Harrison 2001: 152). Such thinking inspired the Red Army's invasion of Poland in 1920, but exhausted Soviet forces soon succumbed to a Polish counterattack that drove them back behind their starting lines and forced the compromise Soviet-Polish peace of 1921. All ideological and doctrinal rhetoric aside, Soviet forces never again attempted such a "revolutionary war," and the military establishment under communism adopted a strategic outlook just as conservative as its imperial predecessor (Jones 1990: 43; Harrison 2001: 118).

In Reese's view, Lenin and Trotsky considered the army "an armed extension of the Party" (Reese 2002: 78). From the start they established unquestioned civilian political control over the military. Nevertheless, throughout the interwar years the party naturally distrusted the army, the only force within the Soviet Union capable of overthrowing the dictatorship. When Lenin's death (1924) touched off a power struggle between Trotsky and Joseph Stalin, the distrust took on a fateful personal dimension. Accused by his critics of "Bonapartism," Trotsky lost his commissar's post, his citizenship, and eventually his life. Some 22,000 army officers, including hundreds of senior officers who owed their initial commissions to Trotsky, subsequently died as a result of Stalin's purge of the armed forces in 1937–38 (Reese 2002: 97). Initially the effect of this and the broader purge of the 1930s negated any strategic advantage generated by Stalin's crash course of industrialization. By 1935 the armed forces had twice as many rifles, ten times as many light machine guns, twice as many artillery pieces, and over four times as many aircraft as in 1928. Most remarkably, over the same seven-year period the number of tanks increased from less than 100 to more than 7,600. Embracing the French revolutionary ideal of the "nation in arms," the Soviet Union had a short-service conscript force with an extensive reserve obligation, but after the civil war (when the Red Army had a peak strength of almost 6 million men) only a fraction of those liable for duty actually served. After taking power Stalin added a further challenge to the goal of a better equipped force by retaining more of those liable for duty, expanding the standing peacetime army from 600,000 in the mid-1920s to 1.5 million in 1938 (Harrison 2001: 121, 134, 171, 173).

The newly expanded Soviet industrial base had no chance of keeping pace with Stalin's dramatic prewar expansion of the standing force (to 4.2 million in early 1941) and, as Harrison has observed, "the German invasion in June 1941 caught the Red Army in an exposed state of technical makeover" (Harrison 2001: 229). Embarrassed in the brief Winter War against Finland (1939–40), the seriously

weakened Soviet army suffered catastrophic losses at the hands of the invading Germans in the Second World War before turning the tide on the strength of its human and industrial resources. Though viewed from the Cold War perspective as "spreading communism," the Soviet counteroffensive into central Europe (1943–45) and the belated drive against Japan through Manchuria into northern Korea (August 1945) were very much in the Russian tradition of pushing back enemies, then securing the traversed territory as a buffer zone. The Soviet Union gained relatively little territory after 1945 (in every case, recovering land that Russia had lost when defeated in 1905 and 1918) and instead entrusted the conquered zone to satellite communist regimes. Estimates vary significantly, but most sources agree that the Soviet Union lost between 25 and 27 million dead in 1941–45, roughly one-eighth of its population, including 6 to 8 million military dead, about one-quarter of those mobilized. Snyder has concluded that the degree of Soviet suffering during the Second World War gave the country a more elastic notion of "unacceptable damage to the homeland" compared to the United States, leading to later speculation (once both countries had nuclear weapons) that the Soviet Union would be more likely to risk a nuclear exchange because it would be more likely to be able to endure the ensuing destruction (Snyder 1977: 28).

During the war Stalin revived traditional military ranks and insignia, and temporarily suspended the system of political commissars (normally assigned to all units to provide ideological indoctrination and to ensure loyalty of officers). Stalin, himself not an ethnic Russian, appealed to Russian nationalism and even enlisted the aid of the Orthodox Church to rally the home front and bolster the army's morale. But the fate of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the army's greatest hero of the victory over Nazi Germany, confirmed the persistence of party-military tension in general and Stalin's paranoia in particular. The postwar years witnessed Zhukov's demotion to a regional command in Odessa, while postwar accounts credited the party and the people with achieving victory, downplaying the role of the military and its leaders. Nikita Khrushchev, Stalin's successor as general secretary of the Communist Party (1953–64), made Zhukov defense minister and relied on his support to survive an intra-party political crisis in 1957, then rewarded him with accusations of "Bonapartism" and an early retirement. Differences in strategic outlook and threat assessment further divided the dictator from his generals, who seem to have been relieved when the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) set in motion the chain of events that led to his ouster. According to Snyder, military leaders did not share Khrushchev's pre-1962 assessment that war was unlikely, that the Soviet Union was more secure than ever, and that preemptive nuclear strikes offered no advantage to either side in the Cold War (Snyder 1977: 26).

From the perspective of 1977, Snyder concluded that party–military relations had become closer under Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev (1964–82). His pioneering treatment of Soviet strategic culture focuses on the Brezhnev era, a time in which the political leadership, after the confusion of the Khrushchev years, seemed to have adopted a strategic outlook in harmony with that of Soviet military leaders. Snyder speculated that "the professional biases and bureaucratic interests

of the Soviet military" were "not conducive to the development of flexible-options thinking." Evidence pointed to a Soviet strategic-cultural preference for a "unilateral . . . unrestrained counterforce" at a time when the United States had embraced "mutual restraint and . . . deterrence." Under Khrushchev a critical subculture within the foreign ministry and various research institutes had opposed the "orthodox military viewpoint," but its influence apparently evaporated after 1964. Thus Snyder concluded that the "state of semipermanence" of the orthodox military viewpoint rose to "the level of culture rather than mere policy" (Snyder 1977: 38–9). Snyder rejected the assumption of American strategists, influenced by game theory, that the Soviets were more likely than the Americans to use nuclear weapons first – to be tempted by circumstances into initiating a limited nuclear war. To the contrary, owing to their overwhelming Cold War conventional force advantage in Europe, their dilemma did not concern first-use but second-use, in that the decision would be theirs whether to unleash a general nuclear war if the United States responded to a conventional Soviet operation with a limited nuclear strike. According to Snyder, the Soviet military assumed "the likelihood of automatic escalation to the intercontinental nuclear level" (Snyder 1977: 24).

From the perspective of 1990, Snyder cited the dramatic changes in Soviet strategy and policy then being implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev (1985–91) as reason to doubt the utility of cultural explanations (Snyder 1990: 4). Jones rejects the notion that Gorbachev's abandonment of long-held Soviet interests had somehow discredited strategic culture in general. To the extent that Snyder's initial work of 1977 had become irrelevant, Jones attributes the problem to his concentration on "nuclear strategic culture" which had "ignored other issues" (Jones 1990: 36). For example, unless one extrapolates a general doctrinal inflexibility from his analysis of Soviet nuclear thinking, Snyder provided no framework for understanding the Soviet Union's subsequent intervention in Afghanistan (1979–88). From a strategic-cultural perspective, the decision to invade Afghanistan may be explained in terms of the Russian tradition of seeking to neutralize a perceived threat (in this case, the Islamic fundamentalist threat to Soviet Central Asia) by extending control over it. According to Robert Cassidy, the Afghan war confirmed the depth of the Russian/Soviet strategic-cultural preference for "the big, conventional war paradigm." In an asymmetric conflict the Soviets attempted to fight a combined arms battle reminiscent of the Second World War, reflecting a way of war updated only to accommodate technological changes since 1945. Cassidy concludes that culture explains the Soviet defeat:

> Soviet military experts knew what to do to win in Afghanistan but did not do it because of a cultural reluctance. . . . There was no desire to change the doctrine, training, and organization of an army that was well adapted for a European war against its principal adversary, NATO's conventional forces.
>
> (Cassidy 2003: 9, 11–12)

As Peter Katzenstein has observed, the ensuing collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe caused a rise in the stock of cultural

explanations if for no other reason than realist theories had failed to forecast or explain the change (Katzenstein 1996: xi–xii). Realists also expected Russian nationalism would replace communism as the glue holding the Soviet Union together. In April 1990, former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted "a newly asserted political authoritarianism based increasingly less on ideology and more on Russian nationalism" (Brzezinski 1991: 520). Boris Yeltsin (president of Russia 1990–99) surprised the realists by recognizing the independence of the fourteen non-Russian republics as the Soviet Union collapsed. Thus the former Soviet Union avoided the sort of upheaval caused when Slobodan Milosevic tried to use Serbian nationalism to hold together multinational Yugoslavia after the collapse of communism there, but Yeltsin's war in Chechnya confirmed that there were definite limits to his willingness to cede non-Russian territory. According to Cassidy, the asymmetric conflict in Chechnya revealed that the ex-Soviet military leadership had learned nothing from its Afghan experience, or at least nothing apparent from its operational approach to the campaign, which still bore the marks of conventional combined arms doctrine. To make matters worse, Russia's post-Cold War economic problems and low public morale were reflected in the forces it deployed to crush the Chechen rebellion: "underpaid, poorly clothed, and uninformed about the purposes and goals of the operation" (Cassidy 2003: 29–30).

In the mid-1990s the bloodshed in Chechnya discredited Yeltsin abroad, as did the convoluted logic of his embrace of Milosevic and the Serbian cause in the Balkans. While the rhetoric of Yeltsin's Balkan policy harked back to the pan-Slavism of Imperial Russian foreign policy before 1914, his creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) reflected Russia's desire to maintain its traditional buffer zone against external threats. Between 1991 and 1993 all of the former non-Russian republics except the three Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) joined the CIS. As John Glenn has observed, Russia's post-Cold War device of referring to its fourteen newly independent neighbors as the "near abroad" acknowledges their independence while "suggesting these countries are not as foreign" as other foreign countries (Glenn 2004: 194). Russia's new "foreign policy concept" adopted in 1993 redefined the country as a regional power with the CIS as its sphere of influence. A new military doctrine promulgated later that year reflected the same view, for example asserting the right of Russia's armed forces to intervene unilaterally in other CIS states to protect ethnic Russian minorities (Heikka 2000). The CIS, envisaged as a sort of NATO and European Union for the republics of the former Soviet Union, instead became a weak umbrella organization under which a patchwork of more specific economic and defense agreements linked Russia with various combinations of the non-Russian republics. After Yeltsin gave way to Vladimir Putin in January 2000, Russia's influence in the "near abroad" continued to wane. By 2004 the three Baltic republics were members of both NATO and the European Union, while the United States had at least a small military presence in six CIS member states in Central Asia and the Caucasus, supporting its campaign against Islamic terrorism in the wake of the al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. Putin's acquiescence in the American military presence in the CIS states acknowledged the common Russian-American

interest in opposing radical Islam as well as Russia's inability to police the area on its own. Russia's conventional force, an important factor in the international balance throughout most of the Imperial and Soviet periods, by 2005 had been reduced to less than one million active troops – smaller than the force maintained by North Korea. The navy suffered an even more dramatic decline. Under the direction of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov (1956–85) it had challenged the US navy's command of the seas worldwide, but by the mid-1990s it languished in practical inactivity (Sondhaus 2002: 322, 329–32). Paul D'Anieri sees similarities between the foreign policies of Russia since 1991 and France since 1945, characterizing Russia as "Gaullist, in that it seeks to use foreign policy to prop up a self-image that is no longer supported by reality" (Aron 1998: 31; D'Anieri 2002: 108). Indeed, at the turn of the century Russia, like France, claimed a greater international influence than the quality and/or quantity of its armed might warranted. Unhappy with American global domination but unable to do much about it, both countries pretended that the post-Cold War world was multipolar and placed a special value on institutions such as the UN in which they enjoyed a status equal to the United States. And for Russia, as for France, the relative neglect of conventional forces by default made nuclear weapons more important. While Yeltsin and Putin honored and built upon Gorbachev's earlier commitment to nuclear arms reduction, under their leadership Russia continued to maintain a nuclear arsenal second only to that of the United States. Writing in 2004, Glenn speculated that, given the ongoing deterioration of its conventional forces, Russia's nuclear forces would take on a greater strategic importance in the future (Glenn 2004: 197).

Clearly, among the leading countries worldwide, Russia suffers the most from what Ryan Beasley and Michael Snarr have called the "post-Cold War identity crisis" (Beasley and Snarr 2002: 331). Seventy-four years of Soviet rule (1917–91) brought a conflation of Russian nationalism and communist internationalism, to the extent that the former no longer exists without at least some of the baggage of the latter. Exacerbating the problem, communist Russia (unlike Nazi Germany) did not end in a catastrophic defeat unequivocally discrediting the dictatorship. No formal process exposed the regime's criminal nature or tried the surviving perpetrators. Throughout the Yeltsin years a rump of the Communist Party remained the greatest parliamentary opposition, while countless former party bosses who disavowed communism profited handsomely from organized crime and a corrupt privatization of the economy. Meanwhile, public and political dismay over the collapse of Russia's international stature fueled a nostalgia for the Soviet Union for those in power as well as those who opposed them. In April 2005, on the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Putin called the breakup of the Soviet Union "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [twentieth] century." At the same time, Putin's most vocal domestic opponents, the National Bolshevik Front, embodied the conflation of right-wing Russian nationalism and nostalgia for communism, sporting flags and armbands of red-white-black Nazi style, only with a black hammer and sickle rather than a black swastika at the center (National Bolshevik Party 2005; Satter 2005).

In 1990 David Jones reached the following prescient conclusion: "If Russian military men themselves sense that their nation's military history differs

dramatically from that of others, and if they have expended considerable effort on defining the distinctive aspects of their military methods, the chances are that despite organizational parallels and practical similarities with foreign military establishments, their approach to both the basic issues of security policy and modes of military practice will reflect these convictions of distinctiveness. This . . . fact alone would justify the application of the concept of 'strategic culture' to the Great Russian state, be it the empire or [the] Soviet Union" (Jones 1990: 36–7). More than a decade after the collapse of Soviet Union, the case for the existence of a unique Russian strategic culture remains strong, as Russian leaders continue to voice sentiments and behave in ways explicable primarily in terms of their country's own national experience rather than some variety of realist or liberal theory.

Germany

Germany emerged as a unified nation-state much later than Britain, France, and Russia. Throughout the medieval and early modern periods, as Europe's other nation-states evolved under the guidance of hereditary royal dynasties, Germany remained a collection of over 300 territorial states and city-states under the Holy Roman Empire or First Reich (800–1806), loosely ruled by an elected monarchy. The northern German state of Brandenburg eventually inherited the Baltic territory of Prussia and evolved into the kingdom of Prussia (1701), becoming a great power in its own right. Anthropologist Emilio Willems has attributed the origins of Prussian/German militarism to the Teutonic Knights of the Middle Ages; over the centuries that followed, as Brandenburg–Prussia evolved, the close "integration of army, nobility, and monarchy" insulated the country from revolution the likes of which France experienced in 1789 or Russia in 1917 (Willems 1986: 15–18, 147, 201; cf. Citino 2005: 2–7). Eventually, Prussia served as the catalyst for German unification in a process guided by Otto von Bismarck, culminating in the creation of the Second Reich (1871–1918). From the onset of the expansion of Brandenburg– Prussia within Germany in the late 1600s and early 1700s down through the Second Reich and on to the Third, Prussian/German strategic culture reflected a faith in the legitimacy and efficacy of military force as a means of policy (Duffield 1999: 792). The German case poses problems for the culturalist approach for two reasons: as a continental power facing credible threats to its existence on more than one flank, Prussia/Germany pursued a realpolitik that makes its behavior in the three centuries preceding 1945 largely explicable through realist theory, and, after 1945, the German approach to the use of force broke decisively with the past, undergoing a sea change which (aside from that of post-1945 Japan) has been unique for a major state in modern times. Only since the reunification of Germany in 1990 has German behavior clearly not followed a path that the realists would have predicted; not surprisingly, the bulk of the scholarship on German strategic culture focuses on this recent period.

To the extent that traditional accounts of Prussian/German history offer a cultural explanation for the pre-1945 continuity of policy and outlook, it typically takes the form of an emphasis on the persistent influence of the Prussian Junker

nobility (e.g. Demeter 1965; Willems 1986). This explanation also fits comfortably within the *Sonderweg* thesis, debated since the 1980s, which argues that Germany's pre-industrial elites retained power into the modern era, setting the country on a "special path" leading to the Third Reich (Wehler 1985; Baldwin 1990). But Dennis Showalter has offered a better explanation for Prussian/German military behavior that fits the hard realism or realpolitik which so clearly shaped the actions of generations of Prussian/German leaders: "Prussian tradition and Prussian experience had little room for romantic-heroic approaches to war. The Junkers who dominated the officer corps were not gentleman farmers but hard-headed agribusinessmen." From the wars of soldier-king Frederick the Great (reigned 1740–86) to Bismarck's wars of German unification, Prussian leaders approached warfare in a utilitarian, rational mindset (Showalter 2000: 681). Showalter sees such nineteenth-century sensibilities reflected in the writings of Karl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). Clausewitz considered war "a rationally calculated extension of policy" (Showalter 2000: 682), in contrast to his most influential predecessor, Antoine Henri de Jomini, who in the Enlightenment tradition saw laws of nature at work in warfare.

The unraveling of Germany's position in Europe after Bismarck's retirement in 1890 caused observers then, and historians later, to contrast the brilliance of the old chancellor with the recklessness and/or incompetence of his successors. This view ignores Bismarck's central role in planting the seeds of the disaster of 1914–18, in the international arena as well as within Germany. In the wake of its defeat in 1870–71, France could not accept the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, and by taking this territory Bismarck created a permanent obstacle to peace and threat to German security. France alone could not defeat Germany, but in league with one or more allies it could; therefore, Bismarck had to construct an elaborate and often contradictory system of alliances in order to keep France isolated: the Triple Alliance, joining Germany with mutually hostile Austria–Hungary and Italy, and the shorter-lived Three Emperor's League, joining Germany with mutually hostile Austria–Hungary and Russia. Bismarck also took for granted the informal friendship of Britain, Germany's leading economic rival. Within Germany, Bismarck maintained his own position *vis-à-vis* Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the general staff (CGS) from 1857–88 and mastermind of Prussia's victorious campaigns against Austria (1866) and France, and other army leaders by encouraging divisions among the general staff, the war ministry, and the emperor's military cabinet. While Robert Foley blames the general staff for failing to communicate with the foreign office, Showalter holds Bismarck responsible for "the increasing separation of military planning from decision making" (Showalter 2000: 692; Foley 2005: 37). Over the quarter-century before the First World War, the German army completed its transformation from a deterrent force to a "doomsday machine." Under Moltke's successors, Alfred von Schlieffen (CGS 1891–1906) and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger (CGS 1906–14), his nephew, Germany's reliable allies were reduced to one – Austria-Hungary – while its war planning became increasingly divorced from reality, focusing on the material factors of "mobility, intelligence, and firepower"

(Showalter 2000: 698; cf. Bucholz 1991; Hull 2005). Showalter largely agrees with Snyder's earlier assessment of German war planning before 1914. It did not help matters that, for the Elder Moltke and his protégés, the wars of unification led to the conclusion "that the political problems of the German state could best be solved by decisive, preventive attacks." Then, under Schlieffen, "dogma replaced doctrine in German operational planning" (Snyder 1984: 203–4).

As the army of Imperial Germany prepared for the future, the pressures of modernization and rationalization clashed with the ideals of the officer corps. The constitution of 1871 fixed the size of the standing army at 1 percent of the population, but as the German population boomed the army did not attempt to maintain a force that large, choosing from among the annual cohort only the recruits it considered the most desirable. Volker Berghahn alleges that the army favored rural recruits over "the urban young who were suspected of Social Democratic sympathies" (Berghahn 1994: 93). Conspiracy theories aside, during the industrial revolution urban recruits typically were smaller and less healthy than rural recruits. While the general staff demanded a larger force (which would require a larger officer corps to command it), the war ministry and military cabinet resisted increasing the size of the officer corps on the grounds of professionalism as well as social exclusivity (Showalter 2000: 705–7). This debate continued into the 1890s, after Bismarck's retirement, as Germany became sidetracked by the quest to build a large navy. Under Bismarck, Germany had built a modest but respectable navy and, in 1884–85, established a colonial empire in Africa and the Pacific, but as late as 1889 the old chancellor had praised the British fleet as "the greatest factor for peace in Europe" (quoted in Beresford 1914: 2: 363). Just eight years later, the new state secretary in the Imperial Navy Office, Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz, persuaded Emperor William II that Britain was Germany's "most dangerous enemy . . . against which we most urgently require a certain measure of naval force as a political power factor" (quoted in J. Steinberg 1965: 126). Tirpitz made the rational calculation that Britain, entrenched in a decades-old Victorian "splendid isolation," would not take the necessary steps domestically and internationally to counter the challenge, but would instead come to some sort of accommodation with Germany. By 1905 Germany had become Britain's primary naval rival, thanks to navy laws passed by the Reichstag in 1898 and 1900 which expanded the German fleet to second-largest in the world. The strategy backfired, however, as Britain proved to have the political will to out-build Germany in the ensuing naval arms race, and the pragmatic sense to join its traditional rivals, France and Russia, in the Triple Entente, an unlikely alignment held together by a common fear of Germany. In 1911–12 naval expenditure accounted for over 35 percent of Germany's defense outlay. By then, it had become clear that Tirpitz had underestimated the British and, in the process, compromised German security. The navy's share of defense spending fell to just under 25 percent after the Reichstag, in 1913, funded a significant expansion of the army long favored by the general staff (Sondhaus 2004: 182). The Anglo-German naval arms race was not a direct cause of the First World War but certainly conditioned the British public and politicians to view Germany

as a threat and a likely enemy, making British intervention a certainty after German troops occupied Belgium in the first days of August 1914.

According to Snyder, Germany's strategic predicament in the years before 1914 encouraged "the preventive strain in [German] strategic thinking," prejudicing its military planners toward an offensive strategy even though "Germany's geopolitical circumstances offered a clear incentive neither for offense nor for defense (Snyder 1984: 16, 23). In the early 1890s, when the alliance of France with Russia established the first leg of the Triple Entente, the general staff under Schlieffen's direction began planning for a two-front war against those countries. The details of the Schlieffen Plan changed from year to year, but the underlying concept – requiring Germany to first attack France, the smaller but more formidable adversary, before turning to take on Russia, the larger but slower and weaker opponent – remained unchanged. Other constant features included the violation of Belgian neutrality to speed the German army on its way to Paris irrespective of the diplomatic consequences, the clearest and most fateful consequence of Bismarck's earlier policy of keeping the generals separated from the statesmen. Snyder notes that as a result of operating for years in relative isolation, "the general staff became intellectually and organizationally committed to Schlieffen's doctrine for a short, decisive war and to the war plan based on that doctrine" (Snyder 1984: 156; cf. Snyder 1984: 111–16; Ritter 1958; Zuber 1999: 262–305). Showalter offers a harsher assessment: "the decline of planning into dogma" prevented the general staff from recognizing that "a short war [was] at best improbable" (Showalter 2000: 708).

Holger Afflerbach has compared the German general staff of 1914 to "firemen longing for a big blaze to see how well the systems so long and carefully prepared actually worked" (quoted in Showalter 2000: 708). Once the Schlieffen Plan failed and the fighting on land stalemated, they offered German leaders no Plan B. Meanwhile, Britain's wartime naval blockade ultimately grew to become the leading cause of Germany's defeat. The German navy achieved a tactical victory over the British in the Battle of Jutland (1916), the only fleet-scale encounter of the war, but failed to break the blockade, and the quest to "blockade" the Western allies via submarine warfare only brought the United States into the war, sealing Germany's fate. For the sake of keeping the generals out of politics, Bismarck had created the context within which the German army developed a strategy divorced from reality; ironically, during the war his greatest nightmare came true, as the generals took over the country. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff practically ran Germany from 1916–18, foreshadowing the experience of the Second World War by mobilizing the home front while also setting an agenda for conquest in eastern Europe.

While defeat in 1945 would transform Germany's strategic culture completely, defeat in 1918 did not change it at all. Thomas Berger finds this difficult to explain, as he considers the loss in the First World War to be "of comparable magnitude" to the loss in the Second (Berger 1996: 331). Most historians would not agree. Post-1918 Germany endured severe restrictions on the size and capability of its armed forces, but could still have armed forces. It lost territory, but far less

than it would after 1945. It endured foreign occupation, but only on the west bank of the Rhine. Its civilian population had suffered under the wartime blockade, but almost none of the fighting had been on German soil and its cities and industrial base remained physically intact. It changed forms of government from monarchy to republic, but it remained a united nation-state. Most significantly, Hindenburg and Ludendorff masterfully dodged blame for the defeat in the last weeks of the war, handing over authority (and responsibility) to a coalition government of socialist, Catholic, and liberal parties which negotiated the armistice with the allies, then created the Weimar Republic. The victorious allies unwittingly sealed the fate of the republic at its birth by saddling the fledgling democracy with the burden of signing the Versailles Treaty and accepting German war guilt, further playing into the hands of the military leaders and right-wing demagogues who would seek to convince the public that the army had not really lost the war but somehow had been "stabbed in the back" by enemies on the home front.

The military provisions of the Versailles Treaty only increased the likelihood that Germany's strategic culture would not change. In the debate over the future of the German army among the Big Three of the Paris Peace Conference, Democrat Woodrow Wilson and Liberal David Lloyd George reflected the traditional liberal Anglo-American view that held conscription to be an undemocratic imposition on a civilian population and potentially a catalyst for popular militarism, while Radical Georges Clemenceau reflected the traditional ideology of the French Left in viewing a large conscript army as a check on undemocratic militarism. Bolstered by the commonsense argument that a smaller German army would be less dangerous than a larger one, the Anglo-American position carried the day, and the Weimar Republic was allowed a long-service professional force limited to 100,000 men – precisely the sort of army the French Left considered the greatest danger to a democratic state. History would prove them right. Ultimately the German army was the only force strong enough to stop Adolf Hitler from taking power, and after the Nazis established themselves as the leading party in Reichstag elections, few officers felt inclined to act; indeed, the same officer corps that later cited its oath to Hitler to justify its conduct during the Second World War in 1933 failed to honor its oath to defend the republic. In the winter of 1932–33 General Kurt von Schleicher assumed the chancellorship, but his last-ditch efforts to deny the post to Hitler ended in failure, and the following year his fellow officers acquiesced in his murder at the hands of the SS. The 100,000-man Reichswehr of the Weimar Republic became the catalyst for the Wehrmacht of Nazi Germany, the primary instrument of Hitler's quest to conquer all of Europe.

The conservative politicians who helped Hitler into power, like the generals who did nothing to stand in his way, erred grievously in thinking they could control him or somehow channel the Nazi movement to serve their own ends. While most German military leaders did not relish the thought of taking on the Western powers again, they supported Hitler's denunciation of the Versailles Treaty (1933) and rearmament program (from 1935), as well as his territorial ambitions in eastern Europe. After Hitler took personal command of the armed forces in 1938,

the general staff functioned as a body of technocrats, converting the dictator's strategic whims into operational realities. Officers who may have had doubts about him all along did not feel compelled to act against him until a few weeks after the Normandy invasion (the failed assassination attempt of July 20, 1944), when the war was clearly lost. Most remained loyal servants of the Nazi regime until the end. Jeffrey Legro's work on organizational culture includes the most interesting recent scholarship on cultural influences in military policy under the Third Reich. Legro blames the British RAF rather than Hermann Göring's Luftwaffe for the escalation of city-bombing, owing to an institutional faith in strategic bombing which its German counterpart lacked. In contrast, he attributes the escalation of submarine warfare at the onset of the Second World War to the culture of the German navy's undersea service, which in 1939 reverted immediately to the aggressive practices of the First World War, without higher orders, even though it was not in Germany's interest for it to do so (Legro 1995: 56–61, 142–3). In any event, whether under orders from above or not, German commanders who behaved aggressively were immune from Hitler's wrath even if they failed, because Hitler admired men who proposed radical or aggressive solutions to strategic and tactical problems. Thus the strategic culture of Nazi Germany reflected the Prussian/German tradition of considering force a legitimate and effective means of achieving policy goals, but placed no limits on the extent of its use of force – a lack of restraint reflected in particular in the no-holds-barred approach to the war on the eastern front.

For Germany, total and utter defeat in the Second World War provided a "major external shock" of the magnitude Berger has theorized is necessary to change a country's strategic culture (Berger 1996: 318). The defeated Germany had no armed forces, significantly less territory than its pre-1938 borders, ruined cities and industries, and no government. The victorious allies occupied the entire country and, when they could not agree upon its fate, divided it. Germans in general responded by rejecting warfare as no people had before, at least in any major nation-state in modern times. By the time West Germany rearmed in 1955, within the framework of NATO, the passage of a decade and the thorough discrediting of militarism left the government of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer with the burden of developing German armed forces from scratch, but the opportunity to do so unencumbered by the cultural baggage of the past. The new German strategic culture rejected national goals in favor of multilateral cooperation. As Berger has noted, Adenauer's own Christian Democratic Union, the mainstream conservative party in West Germany, was "deeply suspicious of the armed forces" and "determined to prevent the armed forces from playing the kind of political role they had before 1945" (Berger 1996: 331).

In her account of West German rearmament, Kerry Longhurst emphasizes that the new Bundeswehr had a clear defensive purpose and a clear enemy. It existed entirely within the Western alliance and could not operate independently; thus materially it served the national interest only in that it helped NATO deter a Soviet invasion from the east. Symbolically, however, rearmament constituted an important step in the restoration of German sovereignty. The narrowly defined strategic

role of the Bundeswehr reflected Adenauer's goal of integrating West Germany with the other Western democracies, and the building of a democratic army under the absolute control of civilian leaders served as further evidence of the Federal Republic's ability to function like any other democratic state. The federal constitution or Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*) prohibited German participation in "aggressive war." While the West German government allowed the United States to station nuclear weapons on its soil, it renounced the right to have such weapons itself. In contrast to the professional Reichswehr created after the First World War, the Bundeswehr was a short-service conscript army. Conscripts initially served one year on active duty (raised to 18 months in 1962, reduced to 15 months in 1972, restored to 18 months in 1986, and reduced again to 15 months in 1989). They were treated as citizen-soldiers and enjoyed the right to conscientious objection and alternative civilian service to the nation. A new moral "internal leadership" concept (*Innere Führung*) emphasized the soldier's individual rights and responsibilities. The Bundeswehr embraced the few German military traditions not tainted by Nazism, and highlighted the role of certain officers in the failed attempt to assassinate Hitler (July 20, 1944) as an example of "honor through conscience rather than honor through obedience" (Longhurst 2004: 28, 40; German Defense Ministry 2005a). Yet Adenauer failed in his quest to make the military and military service a normal part of life in West Germany. In the words of Longhurst, German leaders and the German public continued to exhibit "a certain nervousness about all things military," and the small minority of West Germans making a career in the military "suffered from continual low prestige" (Longhurst 1998: 2–5).

For West Germany, as for Britain, NATO served both the Atlantic and the European interest, affording the opportunity to foster a desired bilateral connection to the United States as well as multilateral ties to its continental neighbors. But the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany raised other countries' expectations of what Germany could and should do in the international arena. The leaders of the reunified Germany – the conservative Helmut Kohl, to 1998, and socialist Gerhard Schröder thereafter – found it increasingly difficult to operate within the limits of a strategic culture developed in the Adenauer era, yet few Germans wanted to abandon it. Indeed, as Longhurst has noted, "the strategic culture of the previous forty years [was] deemed highly successful, valid and still workable" (Longhurst 1998: 8). During the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Germany cited its own constitutional limits in refusing to send troops of its own to help eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. When Kohl's government contributed billions of dollars worth of money to support the US-led coalition that did the fighting (no small sacrifice, given the concurrent expense of integrating the former East Germany into the Federal Republic), it suffered embarrassment internationally for its "checkbook diplomacy" (Longhurst 1998: 5). The breakup of Yugoslavia posed a much more serious challenge to German strategic culture, as the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaigns of the 1990s raised moral issues that resonated with the German public. Being the destination of choice for Yugoslav refugees, Germany also had a practical interest in contributing to the stability of

the region. In 1994 the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the Bundeswehr could deploy outside of NATO's traditional geographic framework. In 1996, when Germany committed troops to a NATO peacekeeping force in Bosnia, Kohl's defense minister, Volker Rühe, cited a "growing consensus" among Germans "that it would be immoral not to help prevent new massacres" (VOA October 29, 1996). In 1999, the Luftwaffe's participation in the NATO bombing of Serbian targets during the Kosovo crisis marked the first time since the Second World War that German forces had engaged in combat. Schröder was able to make the deployment because German public and political opinion gave the moral imperative of joining a multilateral effort to stop the persecution of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo greater weight than the traditional post-1945 imperative of avoiding war (Longhurst 2004: 69–73).

The overall post-Cold War trend toward smaller, more capable, professional armies challenged a central premise of post-1945 German rearmament: the Bundeswehr had always been a short-service conscript force, with an emphasis on the citizen-soldier deliberately calculated to counter the problematic historical legacy of German military professionalism. But by clinging to the conscript army, Germany ran the risk of making itself irrelevant in operations where it would be expected to contribute more than just air forces or postwar peacekeepers. In 1996, after Chirac announced France's plans to abandon conscription in order to facilitate the post-Cold War transformation of its armed forces, Rühe reaffirmed Germany's commitment to conscription and argued that the country did not need an "intervention army" for "power projection" (quoted in Longhurst 1998: 8). Nevertheless, by then Germany already had taken the first steps toward a professional army, having announced in 1995 the creation of rapid deployment "crisis reaction" forces within the Bundeswehr, which by their nature required a cadre of well-trained professionals. Kohl suffered criticism for moving toward a mixed army of conscripts and professionals, but in 2000 the Schröder government announced a further reduction of the overall size of the Bundeswehr and increase in the professional component of what remained (Longhurst 2004: 98–124). At that stage, just 130,000 of the 320,000 troops were conscripts; the term of service, cut to 15 months in 1989, had been reduced again to 12 months in 1990 and 10 months in 1996. As of 2005 the Bundeswehr was down to 270,000 troops, barely one-fifth of which were conscripts, serving on a term of active duty further reduced (in 2002) to just 9 months. Amid public criticism at the often arbitrary standards under which an ever-smaller minority of those liable for service were actually compelled to serve, the Bundeswehr officially defended conscription on the grounds that it bridged the gap between the military and the civilian population and contributed to Germany's "internal unity" by integrating young men from the former East Germany with their peers from the rest of the country (German Defense Ministry 2005a,b; Longhurst 2004: 124–5).

In an interview during 2003 Schröder conceded that "the use of military force can, and sometimes even has to be the final instrument to underpin or secure the realization of political decisions" (quoted in Conrad 2004: 63). While not exactly a paraphrase of Clausewitz, his statement reflected a Clausewitzian realism about

the relationship of war to politics that previous chancellors of the Federal Republic would not have dared acknowledge publicly. But the previous year, political considerations in a general election year led Schröder to reemphasize the antiwar priority in German strategic culture, reversing the course he had followed for the past three years. As the United States increased pressure on Iraq to abide by a series of resolutions the UN had passed since 1991, Schröder used the issue of the upcoming war to energize his Social Democratic and Green party coalition for a come-from-behind victory to extend his chancellorship. In 2003 Germany joined France in opposing the US decision to invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein, and putting a decidedly anti-US twist on the ongoing development of the ESDP (Longhurst 2004: 88–96; cf. Dalgaard-Nielsen 2005). Schröder clearly felt more comfortable with Chirac's vision for the ESDP than with George W. Bush's more activist (post-11 September 2001) vision for NATO, because the former (and the European strategic culture that could emerge from it) happened to be more compatible with Germany's preferred mode of behavior (Conrad 2004: 55). The difficulties the United States and its allies experienced in their occupation of Iraq following the defeat of Saddam Hussein made it far less likely that Berlin would follow Washington again anytime soon. Schröder's defense minister, Peter Struck, even drew lessons from Iraq to argue against the creation of a completely professional Bundeswehr. Christoph Meyer has characterized Struck's remarks as indicative of a deep-seated fear of "a more activist, effective and indeed 'more dangerous' Bundeswehr becoming a 'state within the state' or more prone to torture prisoners" (Meyer 2004: 17).

As Berger has noted, Germany's behavior since 1990 has confirmed the durability of the cultural traits it developed after 1945. According to neorealist theory, a reunified Germany should have reacted to the post-Cold War situation by seeking to increase its military power. Instead, it did the opposite. Germany's actions have also run counter to the neorealist view that any state with such a prosperous economy would naturally seek to maximize its power through a stronger military. Post-reunification German policies have been less confounding to neoliberals, who, in Berger's opinion, view "German and Japanese antimilitarism . . . not [as] an aberration of the international norm but rather a harbinger of things to come," in a world in which economic competition will replace traditional political-military competition. Germany's willingness to give up the mark for the euro cannot be explained either by neorealism or neoliberalism, but is consistent with the culturalist explanation emphasizing the priority Germany now gives to multilaterial cooperation (Berger 1996: 320, 323–4; Duffield 1999: 766–8). Indeed, Germany's post-Cold War support for the expansion of NATO as well as the European Union, and for developing the ESDP, reflects the continued consistency of this trait, and there appears to be no danger of German strategic culture reverting to its old roots. Contemporary German strategic culture is controversial only to the extent that not all observers agree that its effects are positive. Given the problems created when a larger European state (e.g. France) has insisted upon pursuing its own national interests within NATO or the EEC/EC/EU, Germany's record of subordinating its own interests to the broader

interests of these groups appears admirable; at the same time, however, critics of Germany contend that its persistent policy of "self-restraint" has weakened both NATO and the ESDP (Conrad 2004: 57, 64). In military matters, Germany also actively sought to extend its policy of restraint to the European Union as a whole. As François Heisbourg has observed, the final text of the European Union's European Security Strategy (2003) featured much vaguer wording than the initial draft because "Germany in particular had stressed the need to soften the language" (Heisbourg 2004: 27–8).

Each member of the European Union has its own reasons for needing or wanting to be a part of Europe, reasons grounded in its national historical experience. Unlike Britain, France, and Russia (and the former great powers Spain, Sweden, and Austria, discussed in the following paragraphs), Germany has no history of employing military force in the service of some broader ideal or universal goal. More so than any other great power, Prussia/Germany fostered and institutionalized the attitude that its armed forces existed for the aggrandizement of the state. Thus, history has left Germans with a fear of themselves (or at least, of their own past militarism), for which supranational European structures now appear to be the most palatable antidote. The problem for Europe will be one of accommodating Germany's needs without compromising its broader goals and interests.

The rest of Europe

A look at Europe's strategic cultures and ways of warfare would not be complete without considering Spain, Sweden, and Austria, once-great powers that slipped to secondary or tertiary rank by the twentieth century. The House of Habsburg directed Spain (1516–1700) and Austria (1282–1918) to prominence largely by peaceful means, securing territory through diplomacy and dynastic marriages, but ultimately failed to preserve Spanish and Austrian interests via the use of force. Meanwhile Sweden lived and died by the sword during its far briefer reign as a genuine great power (1630–1721). Like Britain, France, and Russia, each had a strategic culture animated at one time or another by a sense of mission beyond a narrow national interest: for Spain, as defender and promoter of Catholic Christianity during the Reformation and subsequent wars of religion; for Sweden, as defender and promoter of Protestant Christianity during the same era; and for Austria, as defender of central European Christendom against the Ottoman Turks.

Spain achieved national unity in the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon to Isabella of Castile, and their subsequent expulsion of the last of the Arabs from the Iberian peninsula (1492). Their Habsburg grandson, Charles I (Holy Roman emperor as Charles V), inherited the Spanish throne in 1516 and reigned for forty years; his son, Philip II, succeeded him from 1556–98. Under Charles V and Philip II, Spain exploited the wealth of its growing colonial empire but ultimately squandered most of it in a failed effort to crush Protestant Christianity. Geoffrey Parker notes that Charles's "Political Testament" of 1548 implored Philip "to make the defense of the Catholic faith his primary responsibility" (Parker 1998: 77). Philip needed little encouragement. Throughout his reign he identified his

own cause, and that of Spain, with God's cause. The sweeping nature of Charles V's power, in Europe and in the colonies, encouraged dreams of a Catholic Christian "universal monarchy." Though Charles divided his domains and Philip's Austrian Habsburg uncle, Ferdinand, became the next Holy Roman emperor, Philip made his father's universalist vision the foundation of Spanish strategic culture. Ultimately Philip's uncompromising "messianic imperialism" did not serve Spain well, in no small measure because his faith led him to expect victory, by miracle if necessary, and caused him to undervalue proper planning (Parker 1998: 3–4, 108). Of Philip's ill-conceived fiascos the episode of the Spanish Armada (1588) ranks first, as it marked the end of Spain's brief period as the world's leading maritime power and the onset of the rise of England/Britain. By the time it passed from the Habsburgs to the Bourbons in 1700, Spain's decline was well underway. Charles and Philip established a pattern of Spanish behavior in the international arena that defies realist theory. Time and again Spanish leaders made decisions that did not serve their national interest. The problem worsened after the onset of Bourbon rule, as Spain became practically a satellite of France. Spain retained its mainland American empire for another century and most of its other colonial possessions until the Spanish-American War (1898), when defeat at the hands of the United States reduced it to a minor European power.

For Sweden, as for Spain, the Reformation and subsequent wars of religion helped shape the sense of national identity and strategic culture. Shortly after its establishment in 1521 upon the breakup of the Danish-dominated Nordic Union of Norway, Denmark, and Sweden, its founding king, Gustav I Vasa, embraced Lutheranism as the confession of the Swedish state church. Erik Ringmar characterizes the emergence of Gustav Vasa's grandson, Gustav II Adolf, as a leader of European Protestantism as the product of a rational choice process (Ringmar 1996: 10). In the winter of 1628–29, with the Habsburg-led Catholic armies on the verge of winning what would become the Thirty Years' War (1618–48), Gustav Adolf deliberated with his advisors and concluded that it would be better for Sweden to intervene in the war in the German states than wait for a Catholic offensive to come to Scandinavia. Swedish leaders believed that "the general intention of all Papists is to annihilate all Evangelicals," and interpreted Habsburg universalist rhetoric as a lust to create a single Catholic empire "over the whole world" (Ringmar 1996: 114). While the context of the time makes such fears understandable, Ringmar argues that Sweden did not face a credible invasion threat at the time and entered the Thirty Years' War in 1630 not as an act of self-defense but to legitimize its national identity as a leading Protestant European power (Ringmar 1996: 145–86). Though Gustav Adolf died in battle in 1632, Sweden's intervention proved decisive in forcing the stalemate that led to the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the end of Catholic-Protestant warfare, and the establishment of the modern European state system. Sweden, which already owned modern-day Finland, Estonia, and Latvia by the time Gustav Adolf came to the throne in 1611, eventually lost all of those territories to Imperial Russia. After suffering defeat at the hands of Peter the Great and his allies in the Great Northern

War (1700–21), the Swedes no longer ranked among the leading powers of Europe.

Unlike Spain and Sweden, Austria remained a great power throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. The state known after 1804 as the Austrian Empire included most of the southern German Catholic territories of the Holy Roman Empire or First Reich (800–1806) along with central European and Balkan lands liberated from the Ottoman Empire after the failed Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. The House of Habsburg, traditional elected rulers of the old Reich, served as the hereditary dynasty of Austria. Because the Austrian Empire (after 1867, the Dual Monarchy of Austria–Hungary) was a multinational empire rather than a nation-state, its early modern strategic culture, centered on the defense of the dynasty and its territories, endured into the modern era. When it came to the use of force, its leaders had a fundamentally different perspective from their counterparts in France, Prussia–Germany, and Russia, who had few reservations about the use of aggressive warfare to achieve national goals. Austria had been built primarily through dynastic inheritances and marriages, and its wars typically were fought in defense of possessions initially secured through such peaceful means. Surrounded by threats on all sides, Habsburg rulers tended to go to war only after the exhaustion of all peaceful alternatives; their generals were just as cautious and placed a premium on preserving the army to fight another day. This approach served the dynasty well until the strategic culture of Austria–Hungary changed dramatically thanks to the influence of Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf (CGS 1906–11 and 1912–17). Within an army that had not won a truly decisive victory in two centuries, Conrad's promotion of the cult of the offensive had an infectious appeal. The leading Habsburgs, Emperor Francis Joseph and Archduke Francis Ferdinand, endured Conrad's appeals for preventive wars against Serbia and Italy because he improved morale and succeeded in implementing a long-overdue modernization of the army. But the aggressive strategic culture he introduced, and the deliberate abandonment of the traditional Austrian way of warfare, proved fatal in the First World War. After exhausting his armies in ill-conceived offensives, midway through the war Conrad joined those who had lost faith in the future of the empire, recognizing that it would either be dismembered by the victorious Allies or swallowed up by a victorious Germany (Sondhaus 2001b: 225–34).

Beyond these three former great powers and the four present powers covered at greater length earlier in this chapter, relatively little work has been done on the strategic culture and national ways of warfare of other European countries, including states as significant as Italy and modern Spain. Among the minor powers of Europe the Scandinavian countries have received the greatest attention from scholars and analysts, with few exceptions (Ratchev 2001; Hyde-Price 2004; Osica 2004; Heikka 2005). After participating in the victorious anti-French coalition during the Napoleonic Wars, Sweden developed what Stine Heiselberg has called a "pacific culture" and tradition of neutrality, which twenty-first century Swedes credit with securing them from foreign attack or occupation in the years since 1815 (Heiselberg 2003: 15). Thus, preservation of Swedish freedom remained the

common denominator of the country's strategic culture while neutrality replaced Protestantism as the focal point, becoming, in Heiselberg's words, "a sacred cow difficult to sacrifice" (Heiselberg 2003: 16; cf. Åselius 2005). Norway, ruled by Sweden from 1815–1905 before becoming independent, likewise embraced neutrality only to have the policy discredited in the Second World War. Nina Graeger and Halvard Leira identify the occupation of Norway by Nazi Germany (1940–45) as the formative element in Norwegian strategic culture, leading during the Cold War to a focus on defending the homeland against Soviet invasion and active participation in supranational organizations such as the UN and NATO. For Norway, the evaporation of the home defense imperative after the collapse of the Soviet Union and NATO's subsequent adoption of broader operational parameters have led to "tension between global and local concerns" which "remains unresolved" (Graeger and Leira 2005). Having twice rejected opportunities for EC/EU membership (1973 and 1995), mostly because of the domestic clout of its fishing industry, Norway remains outside of the twenty-first century debate over an EU-based European defense structure. Denmark, like its Scandinavian neighbors, remained neutral in the First World War but shared with Norway the fate of Nazi German occupation (1940–45) and the postwar choice of membership in NATO. According to Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, Danish strategic culture during the Cold War centered around a paralyzing debate between "cosmopolitans" and "defensists" over the efficacy of military action. Post-Cold War Denmark has embraced a military "activism" and has had few reservations about pledging forces to operations under the auspices of either NATO or the European Union (Rasmussen 2005).

Conclusion: a European strategic culture?

In December 2003 the European Council approved the policy paper *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, submitted earlier in the year by the European Union's secretary general, Javier Solana, which called for the European Union "to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention." The paper defined the potential instruments of intervention as "including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities" (European Council 2003: 11). Solana, who had served as foreign minister of Spain (1992–95) and secretary general of NATO (1995–99) before assuming his post with the European Union, thus formally introduced the term "strategic culture" into the discourse on a common European defense and foreign policy.

In adopting the European Security Strategy, the European Council accepted the assertion that a successful common policy would require a common culture to guide it, and fueled a nascent debate over the likelihood of EU members ever developing a European strategic culture. Most scholars have been skeptical of the prospects. As early as 1995, Alan Macmillan predicted that "incompatibilities in strategic cultural outlooks will militate against attempts to create the European defense identity" (Macmillan 1995: 37). Writing in 2001, Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards foreshadowed the position adopted by the European Council

two years later in concluding that a common defense policy required a common strategic culture. They doubted that the European Union could develop "serious capabilities" in the military realm without it. Somewhat less pessimistic than Macmillan and later commentators, they suggested that the efforts of EU members in peacekeeping, reconstruction, and development efforts (especially in the Balkans during the 1990s) formed the basis for "a unique, 'gendarmerie'-style EU strategic culture." Such a policing, nurturing role would involve the European Union having a military capability that does not compete with NATO "in scope or style" (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 587–8, 603).

Cornish and Edwards attach great significance to Solano's move from NATO to the European Union in 1999, arguing that it helped bridge the gap between the two organizations and gave the European Union a key leader with experience in military matters (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 591). They were also among the first to cite the importance of the NATO air campaign against the Serbs during the Kosovo crisis (1999) in accelerating movement toward a common military capability with the European Union. In a crisis in Europe involving operations adjacent to the territory of EU members, the United States provided most of the intelligence, most of the logistical and communication capacity, and flew 60 percent of all sorties (80 percent, for those in which bombs were dropped or missiles fired). Responding to this sobering example of European military weakness, at Helsinki in December 1999 the European Council agreed that, by 2003, the European Union would have the ability to deploy 60,000 troops on 60 days notice and maintain the force in the field for one year (Cornish and Edwards 2001: 588–9). In his analysis of the Kosovo crisis, Stine Heiselberg sees evidence of a common culture in the reaction of all members against "European and Western values being violated," a reaction all the more significant because "in the traditional sense as defined by the neorealists," the crisis did not pose a threat to any EU member (Heiselberg 2003: 11, 13, 35). Florentino Portero considers Kosovo a unifying conflict for the European states in that American domination of the air campaign led to "bitterness, as our own limitations were exposed." It also sparked fears of US hegemony and a desire among Europeans to "control . . . their own destiny" (Portero 2003: 2–3, 5).

Heiselberg, Portero, and others writing after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 tend to place those events on a par with Kosovo as "formative experiences" for a European strategic culture. According to Heiselberg, in Europe the attacks of September 11 had the opposite effect as the Kosovo crisis, producing a wide variety of interpretations and reactions as to the significance of the event. To Portero, September 11 exposed fundamental differences between Europeans and Americans in the areas of threat perception and risk tolerance. He considers the "Atlantic strategic culture" underpinning NATO to be "broken" after September 11, with no comparable alternative in sight. (Heiselberg 2003: 36; Portero 2003: 5). Michael O'Hanlon has noted that, as the United States prepared to invade Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks, "many European allies stressed that they were willing to do much more in Afghanistan than they were ultimately asked to undertake." But the United States "politely declined most

offers of aid," preferring to run its own campaign with a freedom of action unencumbered by the sensibilities of its NATO allies or other potential partners (O'Hanlon 2004: 44–5). As in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Afghanistan the United States valued European participation primarily for peacekeeping and reconstruction after the military campaign, reinforcing a post-Cold War division of labor in which the United States "cooks dinner" and the Europeans "do the dishes" (O'Hanlon 2004: 41). François Heisbourg makes the same point as O'Hanlon, albeit more graphically: the US "kicks in doors," after which the European Union "cleans the house" (Heisbourg 2004: 37).

According to Christoph Meyer, the US-led invasion of Iraq rather than the terrorist attacks of September 11 derailed the progress toward a joint European understanding on the use of force begun during the Kosovo crisis, as Britain joined a minority of EU members, many of them recent additions, in George W. Bush's "coalition of the willing" (Meyer 2004: 19). Ironically, during 2003 the fifteen EU members met their 1999 goal of being able to deploy 60,000 troops, as roughly that number were on active duty beyond their collective borders (90,000, if one counts the British deployment to Iraq), but most of the troops deployed were not engaged in common EU-sanctioned endeavors (Grant 2004: 61–2). In explaining why a European strategic culture "remains a distant hope," Alister Miskimmon echoes Portero in blaming "America's 'divide and conquer' tactics." Because so many of the new members added to the European Union in the expansion of 2004 were former communist countries from eastern Europe "with strong affinities to NATO and the security relationship with the USA," Miskimmon considers the 25-member European Union to be much less likely to achieve a common strategic culture than the former 15-member European Union (Miskimmon 2004: 298–9).

While Per Martin Martinsen has credited Javier Solana with "mould[ing] a strategic culture according to his own logic" since his arrival at the European Union in 1999 (Martinsen 2004: 66), Heiselberg and Portero reflect the majority view that Europe has yet to achieve a common strategic culture of any sort. Indeed, Heiselberg contends that, in matters of defense and security, EU members have little in common except the belief that "war should be avoided, and the European values should be defended." Considering evidence from three different cases – "activist" Britain, "pacifist" Sweden, and "defensive" Germany – Heiselberg predicts that even when all EU members agree that "values are being violated," their own national strategic cultures will make it difficult to agree to a common response. Per Martin Martinsen draws similar conclusions, expanding upon Heisenberg's cases to define three types of EU states, with Germany in a category of its own, France joining Britain as activist examples, and fellow neutral Austria joining Sweden among those envisaging EU military activity being limited to "conducting UN-mandated crisis management operations" (Heiselberg 2003: 36; Portero 2003: 3; Martinsen 2004: 64). Sten Rynning likewise considers consensus improbable but from an institutional governance perspective, arguing that an organization such as the European Union cannot be capable of decisive military action. Rynning concludes that "the EU does not have the potential to construct

a strong strategic culture," and that Europe will matter militarily only to the extent that ad hoc groups of EU members choose to intervene with armed force in future crises (Rynning 2003). Meyer concurs, citing "the strong role of national parliaments and the UN" as impediments to the rapid and timely deployment of troops in a crisis. He, too, predicts a future of "intra-European coalitions of the willing, of countries with very similar strategic cultures and political objectives" taking military action, but views this scenario in a very negative light because such actions would be "considered illegitimate by a large number of member states" of the European Union (Meyer 2004: 3, 19). Cornish and Edwards, optimistic about the prospects of a common EU strategic culture as of 2001, acknowledged these and other problems in their mixed "progress report" four years later (Cornish and Edwards 2005: 801–20).

In his contribution to the edited volume *A European Way of War*, published by the London-based Centre for European Reform, Lawrence Freedman strikes a pessimistic note on several key points. Aside from France, the EU members that want "Europeanization" of their armed forces also have "a deep reluctance to use military force" (Freedman 2004: 16). Those most open to the use of force tend to want to preserve a greater degree of national freedom of action. The EU countries may have shown, during 2003, that they could deploy 60,000 troops beyond their own borders, but the European Rapid Reaction Force remained untested, compromised by the reality that "only Britain has any serious, if modest, transport capability." Indeed, even for the deployment of a small number of its troops to Afghanistan, Germany had to contract with Ukraine for the use of its large Soviet-era transport aircraft. Just as several European navies, after 2000, began developing amphibious transport capabilities, Europe's Airbus began work on a military transport version of its A400, but the first of these aircraft were not expected to be delivered until 2009 (Sondhaus 2002: 324–8; Freedman 2004: 21). Friedman believes that "the EU would produce a dysfunctional military doctrine, if it tried to create one," but argues against emulating the United States, because the anti-insurgent phase of the American war in Iraq "illustrated the extent to which the US has a dysfunctional military doctrine," at least in the sort of asymmetrical warfare that armed forces are most likely to face in the twenty-first century (Freedman 2004: 13). While allowing for the lower level of volatility in the Basra area than in most of the rest of Iraq, Freedman credits the British with managing counterinsurgency better than the Americans in 2003–04 "by understanding the importance of separating the insurgents and the local population," a lesson that they and other Europeans have derived from "the tradition of imperial policing, but also because of their more recent and extensive experience of peacekeeping." Freedman theorizes that a future European way of war would incorporate such expertise with an operational capability centered around "a modest number of high quality aircraft" and "well-trained professional forces" (Freedman 2004: 24–5).

In 2003, the total defense spending of the twenty-five countries that would belong to the European Union as of the following year stood at $220 billion, just over half of the American outlay of nearly $400 billion and more than double the combined outlay of Russia and China, which together spent just over $100 billion

(Everts and Keohane 2004: 3; Shah 2004). Nevertheless, either within NATO or the European Union, in ad hoc coalitions or as individual states, in the post-Cold War world the countries of Europe have had difficulty making their military forces matter in the broader scheme of things. Agreement on the production or specifications of materiel should be far easier to achieve than consensus on how to actually use forces in common, and yet a variety of projects to co-produce warships, tanks, aircraft, and missiles – some during the last decades of the Cold War, others since 1991 – have suffered from the non-participation of one or more of the leading European states, and from delays which in some cases have rendered a weapons system obsolete by the time of its deployment (Grant 2004: 62). As François Heisbourg has observed, the European Union has had difficulty even in exploiting its "supposed comparative advantages," in particular its program of foreign aid, in order to "enhance its strategic influence and effectiveness" in the world. In 2002 the European Union gave $36 billion worth of external assistance, the United States $13 billion, and yet the European Union's aid included no security-spending component even though the European Security Strategy states that "security is the first condition for development" (Heisbourg 2004: 34).

Amid their difficulties in articulating a common purpose and acting upon it, the countries of the European Union remain in a strategic position all too similar to the one they occupied during the Cold War, caught between dependence upon the United States under the umbrella of NATO and accommodation with their enigmatic European neighbor, Russia. According to neorealist theory, the states of post-Cold War Europe should band together to balance the power of the United States. But to the extent that they (or at least those willing to follow the lead of France and Germany) have done so, with the goal of "debilitating the United States," as Robert Kagan has argued, their failure at the same time to replace diminished American military power "with their own" risks "a diminution of the total amount of power that the liberal democratic world can bring to bear in its defense." According to liberal theory, the desire for security over conflict should naturally strengthen international institutions such as the European Union, including in the military realm, but Kagan speculates that "in their passion for international legal order" too many Europeans have lost sight of "the other liberal principles" that they value and the need to have the means to defend them (Kagan 2004: 108). The failure of EU members to develop a common strategic culture and way of war despite all of the advantages it would offer them further reinforces the argument that that national strategic cultures and ways of war indeed exist and are enduring in nature.

3 The Americas

During the first great age of European imperialism (1492–1763), the European impulse to conquer the Americas evolved from the initial Renaissance–Reformation motives grounded in missionary Christianity and the quest for wealth to a competition for empire among the nation-states of Europe. In the era of the American wars for independence (1775–1824) almost all American mainland territories south of Canada became independent of Europe, and in the Monroe Doctrine (1823) the United States assumed the role of their self-appointed protector against European reconquest. Initially a rhetorical stand by an emerging power, the Monroe Doctrine assumed real significance with the growth of American military might. Dramatic developments in the 1860s saw the unity of the United States preserved, the last European attempts at reconquest in Latin America defeated, and Canada granted self-government within the British Empire. While so many aspects of life in the Americas bore the stamp of Europe – the languages, religion, culture, political concepts, and economic organization – their intrastate relationships did not. The independent American states did not form competing alliances within a balance of power along Westphalian lines, as realist theory would have predicted. Instead, the post-colonial strategic history of the Western Hemisphere witnessed a gradual process by which the other countries of North and South America came to terms with the hegemony of the United States. By the early 1900s Canada had accepted that the United States, not Britain, was the guarantor of its security; US relations with Latin America were far stormier, but ultimately the result was the same. After two world wars and the onset of the Cold War, resistance to American hegemony became unthinkable. With various degrees of enthusiasm and reluctance – reflected in their own strategic cultures – the other American states formally joined the US bandwagon, Latin America through the Rio Treaty (1947) and Canada in the establishment of NATO (1949). Only Fidel Castro's Cuba dared align itself with the Cold War enemies of the United States.

The United States

Russell Weigley's *The American Way of War* remains the point of departure for discussions of US military strategy from independence through the Vietnam War.

Weigley is best known for his thesis that the Union victory in the American Civil War gave birth to a "strategy of annihilation" that became the preferred American way of war, as reflected most clearly in the American approach to fighting the Second World War eighty years later. But Weigley starts his work with an analysis of the War for Independence, in which he postulates two competing early American ways of warfare: George Washington's "strategy of attrition," a defensive approach followed in the New England and Middle Atlantic states from the failed invasion of Canada in the winter of 1775–76 to the British defeat at Yorktown in 1781, and Nathaniel Greene's "strategy of partisan war," waged successfully against the army of Lord Cornwallis in the southern states in 1780–81, prior to Cornwallis's entrapment and defeat at Yorktown. Washington embraced attrition against his personal inclinations, as the weakness of the original American government and the indifference or hostility of most Americans toward the fight for independence gave him little choice. He believed that in a protracted struggle the British would tire of the war faster than the Americans and that foreign powers might be induced to intervene in the fight, and he proved to be right on both accounts (Weigley 1973: 3, 5, 8). In contrast to Washington's focus on creating an army, then keeping the core of it alive as a focal point of resistance, Greene dispersed his regular forces and coordinated their activities with those of "partisan raiders." In modern times it would become the classic approach of the weak against the strong, but for the United States the episode represents a dead end, as the country's "rapid rise from poverty of resources to plenty cut short any further American evolution of Greene's type of strategy" (Weigley 1973: 29, 36). Jeremy Black highlights the point that, in the end, the United States gained its independence without creating a large standing army or (except for 1780–81 in the south) resorting to a socially divisive guerrilla war; either development would have resulted in "a very different American public culture." In his book *America as a Military Power: From the American Revolution to the Civil War*, Black also highlights George Washington's role in establishing the American tradition of subordinating the armed forces to civilian authority (Black 2002: 37, 184).

To many leaders of the new American republic, standing military forces endangered domestic liberty more than they safeguarded it. The army did not suffer as dramatically as the navy (which was disbanded at the end of the War for Independence and not reconstituted for over a decade), but the regulars-versus-militia debate went unresolved for years to come. The regular army remained very small, supplemented by a very large militia: at the start of the War of 1812, it numbered just 6,700, while 527,000 militiamen served at least a month during the years 1812–15. The greatest American land victory of the war, Andrew Jackson's defeat of the British at New Orleans in January 1815, was achieved by a militia army (Weigley 1973: 54–5; Coffman 1986: 40). Within the regular army, Winfield Scott emerged as the leader after distinguishing himself in the failed 1814 invasion of Canada. As commanding general (1841–61) he led the US army to victory in the Mexican–American War of 1846–48. According to Weigley, Scott's march on Mexico City in 1847 "permitted him to wage limited war in the pre-Napoleonic, eighteenth-century style most congenial to him" (Weigley 1973: 71–2).

In harmony with Scott's sensibilities, early US scholarship on strategy reflected the influence of Jomini and the Enlightenment, in part because an English translation of Clausewitz did not appear until 1873. Henry Halleck (1846) and Dennis Hart Mahan (1847), instructors at the US Military Academy (founded 1802) and the first American officers to produce texts on strategy, both saw the mission of the US military as primarily defensive. Both also valued and respected fixed fortifications, but Weigley considers Mahan to have been "more directly Napoleonic and less ambiguous in its endorsement of offensive war." In any event, at the onset of the American Civil War most US officers were driven by a desire "to emulate the great Napoleon" in decisive, offensive warfare (Weigley 1973: 80–9).

In his account of the Civil War, Weigley highlights the respective "strategies of annihilation" of Robert E. Lee's Confederate army and Ulysses S. Grant's Union army. The Confederacy's position bore significant similarities to the American revolutionary cause *vis-à-vis* Britain, and its President, Jefferson Davis, preferred a defensive strategy after George Washington's example. The states loyal to the Union were home to most of the country's industry and population. Of its 23 million citizens the Union mobilized 2.1 million troops, with as many as 1 million serving at a time; of its 5.5 million white citizens the Confederacy with great difficulty mobilized 900,000 troops, with as many as 600,000 serving at a time. Despite these disadvantages, during his years as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia (1862–65) Lee repeatedly pursued offensive strategies, successfully enough, initially, to overcome Davis's sensibilities. With Napoleonic bravado Lee repeatedly spoke of his desire to "destroy" the Union's Army of the Potomac, a much larger and better equipped (if not better led) force. But after taking 23,000 casualties in his invasion of the north that ended at Gettysburg (July 1863), Lee's army was no longer capable of offensive action (Weigley 1973: 92, 114, 117–18, 129–30). Weigley concludes that "Lee was too Napoleonic. Like Napoleon himself, with his passion for the strategy of annihilation and the climactic, decisive battle as its expression, he destroyed in the end not the enemy armies, but his own" (Weigley 1973: 127). Grant likewise favored an aggressive, offensive strategy. In his western campaigns of 1862–63, his armies routinely took heavier casualties than they inflicted in winning victories such as Vicksburg (July 1863). After being brought east to face Lee in the campaigns of 1864–65, Grant again did not hesitate to take losses, his armies averaging casualties of 3:2 *vis-à-vis* those of Lee's forces. But Grant merely played to his strength, as the Union army could afford such losses more than the Confederates could afford theirs. In Weigley's words, Grant pursued "the object of destroying the enemy armies by clinging to them and not letting go" (Weigley 1973: 140–4). Meanwhile, fellow Union general William Tecumseh Sherman focused on "attacking the enemy's resources and will" in his destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas, an approach some future observers considered "preferable to Grant's method of destroying the enemy armies by direct means, a process almost certain to cost heavy casualties among one's own soldiers." While Grant's bloody frontal assaults against Lee's earthworks at Cold Harbor and Petersburg foreshadowed the action on the Western Front of the First World War, Sherman's march reflected an

"indirect approach" to defeating the Confederate army and, as such, came to be cited by Liddell Hart as an example of his preferred way of war. Liddell Hart's 1929 biography of Sherman ignited a twentieth-century fascination with him, which Weigley argues "rose especially high . . . when a new technology of war, offered by . . . the airplane and the tank, seemed to promise new ways of invoking Sherman's strategy" (Liddell Hart 1929; Weigley 1973: 152).

Weigley sees in the American Civil War the roots of the preferred way of war for the United States in all subsequent conflicts (or at least until his book appeared, at the end of the Vietnam War). After 1870, Clausewitz grew in popularity as the world's armies sought to emulate the Germans rather than the French, and American readers interpreted Clausewitz as justifying Grant's strategy of 1864–65 (Weigley 1973: 210–11). The mass army conscripted and sent to France after the United States entered the First World War in 1917 fought no differently than its European counterparts, and suffered accordingly. Of the two million Americans sent to Europe 300,000 were killed or wounded, 120,000 of them in the last 47 days of the war, during the Meuse–Argonne offensive (Weigley 1973: 203). But Weigley points to the relative brevity of the American involvement in the war, and the absence of an American "Verdun or Passchendaele," as reasons why postwar American strategists were less likely than their British or German counterparts "to look for ways to avoid repetition of the deadlock in the trenches." While Liddell Hart, in the 1920s, began promoting the "indirect approach," American strategist W.K. Naylor "reaffirmed the Grantian convictions that the objective of warfare is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces" (Weigley 1973: 219–20). In the Second World War, at least in the European theater, the American way of war reflected "the doctrines to which the American army had consistently adhered since the time of U. S. Grant." Overall US troop strength peaked in May 1945 at 8.3 million men, enough "boots on the ground," to use the jargon of a future era, to get the job done (Weigley 1973: 317). In the final campaign of 1944–45 against Nazi Germany, from Normandy to the Elbe, American strategy emphasized mass as well as speed and accepted high casualties. Dwight D. Eisenhower's goal "was to overrun the country as rapidly as possible" in order to forestall "last-ditch fanatical resistance." But Weigley concedes that the strategy of "mass and concentration" worked as well as it did only because of "the hard fighting of the Russians," who then demanded parity with the Americans in the postwar world (Weigley 1973: 353, 359).

The naval counterpart of the US army's "strategy of annihilation" had its roots in the sea power theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan, son of Dennis Hart Mahan, whose *The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1660–1783* (1890) and subsequent works highlighted past examples of decisive fleet-scale action as the model for future naval combat. Blockades, coastal and river operations – ironically, the focus of Mahan's first book (1883), on Union navy operations during the Civil War – received short shrift in a strategic vision in which the goal of command of the sea could be achieved only through the destruction of the enemy's fleet (Weigley 1973: 173, 175; cf. Mahan 1883, 1890). Mahan's works provided the theoretical underpinning for the construction of a modern world-class American

navy centered around a fleet of battleships. The effort marked a departure for a country that, since independence, traditionally had maintained the smallest possible navy, with few or none of the largest ship types, embracing new technology less and later than other navies, whose greatest naval accomplishment to date – the successful blockade, coastal and river operations of the Civil War – went largely unappreciated at the time and has gone largely unacknowledged since (Weigley 1973: 93, 136; cf. Sondhaus 2004: 107–40). According to Weigley, Mahan's works "appear[ed] at precisely the appropriate moment . . . when the strategic problems of the United States were changing" from defending the continent to "the projection of American interests overseas." Mahan's fame overshadowed the main weaknesses of his vision of future naval warfare: he played down amphibious operations "because they suggested too much that sea power was linked in mutual dependence with land power," and he advocated a blue-water battle fleet strategy that would be decisive only against states truly dependent upon the sea (e.g. only Britain and Japan, among the great powers of the early twentieth century). Even as they read his books, his fellow officers (in the United States and in other countries) doubted the relevance of eighteenth-century examples to their own era. Nevertheless, in the United States "the navy had to pay homage to Mahan because its public and political image depended on him" (Weigley 1973: 189–91). Weigley highlights the irony that "alone among the great navies of the world, the United States Navy entered World War II having never fought a fleet action . . . for the fulfillment of Mahan's strategic principles, for the destruction of an enemy battle fleet and the establishment of undisputed control of the sea." Just as the army, having not suffered as its leading counterparts had in the First World War, approached the Second still believing in the "strategy of annihilation," the navy retained its faith in the decisive nature of something it had never experienced, battleship-on-battleship combat (Weigley 1973: 293). Some instances of such combat did occur in the Pacific theater of the war, but the United States ultimately achieved its Mahanian command of the sea *vis-à-vis* Japan with carrier-based naval aviation, superior logistics, and successful amphibious operations – all largely improvised during the war – and a ruthless campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare (Weigley 1973: 265, 311).

In analyzing the air power component of the "strategy of annihilation," Weigley links the strategic bombing campaign of the Second World War to its less technologically sophisticated precursor of 1864–65. During the interwar years, aerial bombardment "seemed to promise new ways of invoking Sherman's strategy," and the subsequent wartime bombing of civilian and economic targets "extend[ed] the reach of war even farther and more terribly than Sherman had done" (Weigley 1973: 152, 359). Like his counterparts Giulio Douhet in Italy and Sir Hugh Trenchard in Britain, General William "Billy" Mitchell advocated air power as the solution to avoiding a repetition of the trench warfare of the First World War. Nevertheless, Mitchell, an army officer (as the United States did not have an independent air force until 1947), initially focused his campaign for air power against the navy, in postwar publicity stunts in which his bombers sank defenseless captured German warships. But the War Department as well as the Navy Department

soon tired of his harsh and at times reckless criticism, which led to his court martial and resignation from the service in 1926. Advocates of air power came to view Mitchell as part-prophet, part-martyr, but Weigley points out that "there were two Billy Mitchells, the Mitchell of 1917–26, whose theories were closely tied to technology and to tactical as well as strategic knowledge, and the post-1926 apostle of the war of swift decision against the enemy's vital centers." His later admirers defended the "first" Mitchell and ignored the second. Indeed, the post-1926 Mitchell, like Douhet in Italy, speculated openly that modern urban areas were "extremely brittle" targets and their destruction the key to victory (Weigley 1973: 236–7). According to Weigley, at least in theory the US Army Air Force (AAF) did not believe in "terror bombing of civilian populations," in contrast to Britain's Royal Air Force (RAF), yet during the Second World War the AAF did it all the same, and "with astonishingly few regrets" against Japan. In offering their own, more comprehensive vision of the "annihilation" of an enemy, Mitchell and all other bombing advocates rejected the notion "that the initial objective of their strategy must be to destroy the enemy armed forces" (Weigley 1973: 334, 354, 363). In any event, in modern American military history, Mitchell ranks as the most significant and influential "outside-the-box" thinker, and his mixed legacy remains with us in the twenty-first century, in the US susceptibility to a bombing-as-panacea mentality as well as in the messy moral dilemmas associated with non-military targeting.

Owing to the severity of the conventional bombing of Japanese cities, dropping the first atomic bombs on Japan "seem[ed] at the time a mere extension of a strategy already in use," according to Weigley, but "by carrying a strategy of annihilation to the literalness of absurdity, the atomic bomb also represented a strategic revolution" not immediately appreciated (Weigley 1973: 365). The Korean War (1950–53), the first major shooting conflict of the Cold War, bore the same characteristics as later conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan: one of the two superpowers was involved with its own troops, the other indirectly involved, by supporting its adversary; and both sides had access, directly or indirectly, to nuclear weapons, but did not use them. President Harry Truman and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed General Douglas MacArthur's plans to widen the war in response to China's intervention in it, in Weigley's view not because they disagreed with MacArthur's "penchant for a strategy of annihilation," but out of a sense that such Asian conflicts were peripheral to what they perceived to be a Europe-centered standoff with the Soviet Union (Weigley 1973: 394). While Weigley makes this observation in discussing the American way of war, the Truman administration's approach to Korea spoke volumes about the state of American strategic culture at the time. Shu Guang Zhang sees the Korean War as a clear example of American ethnocentrism at work, as "American officials demonstrated a strong tendency to see 'the others' through their own myths and values. While the Chinese took special pride in their moral superiority, American strategists emphasized US technological superiority." Zhang concludes that "the conviction of US invincibility on the basis of American technological superiority misled American strategists," who "hardly paid attention to the strategy and

tactics of the Chinese Communist force." Even after Mao Zedong's writings came out in new English-language editions in 1954, the US military showed a "lack of interest in understanding a non-Western military philosophy or the tactics of an irregular army," as reflected in the subsequent mishandling of Vietnam (S.G. Zhang 1995: 260–1).

Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration reacted to the standoff in Korea with a new strategy calling for nuclear "massive retaliation" in a wide variety of scenarios. "Massive retaliation" met Eisenhower's requirement of "a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost" financially, but it failed because, within the Cold War context, the proposition that the United States would use nuclear weapons other than as a last resort simply lacked credibility. Proponents of the strategy found that within the United States, and among US allies, there was little sentiment for deliberately escalating non-nuclear conflicts to the nuclear level. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles faced this reality during the Dienbienphu crisis in 1954, when the US Congress, the French government, and other US allies refused to support his trial balloon of a "nuclear intervention" to save the French from collapse in Indochina (Weigley 1973: 399, 404–5). As a presidential candidate, John F. Kennedy wrote a response to Liddell Hart's *Deterrent or Defense* (1960) for the *Saturday Review*, agreeing with the aging strategist's criticism of "massive retaliation." In 1961 the Kennedy administration introduced the concept of "flexible response," emphasizing a second-strike retaliatory capability without renouncing the first-strike option. Above all Kennedy wanted "usable military power" and a wide variety of tools in the American arsenal, to employ when appropriate. His fascination with unconventional warfare led to the creation of the US Special Forces (Kennedy 1960; Weigley 1973: 438–49, 456–8; Liddell Hart 1960).

Reflecting back on nearly thirty years of the nuclear age, as the United States abandoned its war in Vietnam (1965–73), Weigley characterized the Indochina debacle as "a bitter denouement to the long search for a restoration of the use of combat in the service of policy." He concluded, prematurely as it turned out, that "the history of usable combat may at last be reaching its end" (Weigley 1973: 467, 477). While such observations quickly became dated, and Weigley declined to update *The American Way of War* by adding post-Vietnam chapters, it remained the standard work on the subject at the turn of the century, remarkably immune to criticism. Indeed, Brian Linn's article "*The American Way of War* Revisited," published in 2002, offered the first systematic reevaluation of Weigley's book. Linn points out that the "strategy of annihilation" Weigley projects onto all of American military history from the Civil War onward really only fits the last years of the Civil War (1864–65) and the Second World War (1943–45). Between those climactic campaigns, "improvisation and practicality" more than "a commitment to annihilation" characterized the American way of war. A number of smaller or briefer wars and interventions (including the Spanish–American War of 1898, the Philippine War of 1900–04, and the First World War from 1917–18) simply do not fit Weigley's annihilation model, which cannot accommodate "a war of limited aims" (Linn 2002: 502–3; cf. Boot 2002). Linn also points out that, after Weigley introduces the annihilation-versus-attrition model in his contrast of

Washington and Greene, he "confuses definitions of both throughout the book" (Linn 2002: 502). Weigley composed a response to Linn shortly before his death, conceding the validity of these criticisms and arguing that he should have used the term "strategy of erosion" rather than annihilation or attrition. "To do so would have avoided, for example, the confusion inherent in arguing that . . . Grant in his 1864–5 campaign carried out a strategy of annihilation by means of attrition." He also regretted that his work had been cited to defend the "continued American military propensity to require the application of overwhelming force as the only acceptable American way of war," and to justify inaction in situations where "geography or political pressures militated against overwhelming force." Weigley concluded that *The American Way of War* would have been more balanced, and more accurate, had he included discussion of "the American tradition of maneuver warfare" (Weigley 2002: 531–2).

The "continued propensity" to which Weigley refers was reflected most clearly in what came to be known as the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, after Caspar Weinberger, secretary of defense under Reagan, and Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first Bush administration. In their article "The Promise of Decisive Action," Michael Noonan and John Hillen characterize the doctrine as a reaction to the failure of "limited war theory as applied in Vietnam," first articulated by Weinberger in 1984. Under the new doctrine, the United States would go to war only with "clear objectives, the necessary means to achieve those goals decisively, and the support of the American people." The Weinberger–Powell Doctrine gained widespread popularity within the US military establishment because it reestablished the centrality of "the decisive battle and operational victory," but since most international conflicts were not clear-cut enough to meet the doctrine's criteria, critics considered it a "prescription for inaction," made worse by "a heightened sensitivity about military casualties" on the part of military leaders (such as Powell) and political leaders whose formative experiences included the Vietnam War (Noonan and Hillen 2002: 232–3). According to James Kurth, the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine limited the United States to country-versus-country, army-versus-army warfare in which overwhelming force would carry the day. "Wars to advance peripheral, imperial interests and wars against insurgent forces were violations of the American way of war" (Kurth 2004). Noonan and Hillen call the Clinton presidency (1993–2001) "the era of precision strikes," after the administration's penchant for using air strikes and/or cruise missile attacks against the Serbs in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), against Iraq (1998), and against al Qaeda in Afghanistan (1998) and Somalia (1998) (Noonan and Hillen 2002: 233–4). While they suggest that Clinton abandoned the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine this was not the case; indeed, a corollary doctrine of precision strikes was perhaps inevitable because of the broad range of situations that arose calling for some sort of American military action but not rising to the level of a war permissible under Weinberger–Powell. As reflected in the resort to precision strikes and continued aversion to taking casualties, the Clinton years reinforced the centrality of technology in the thinking of the American military. Amid talk of "transformation" and a "revolution in military affairs" based on the

latest enhancements in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR), most books and articles reflecting upon the American way of war devoted far more space to the discussion of technological capabilities than to ideas (e.g. Cornell 1996; G. Friedman and M. Friedman, 1996; Hoffman 1996; Sapolsky and Shapiro 1996; Stanley-Mitchell 2001).

George W. Bush's Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, took office in 2001 with a mandate from the president to overturn the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force and transform the United States army into a smaller, lighter, faster service which, thanks to technology, could accomplish more with less in future wars. The transformation had just begun when the United States intervened against the Taliban government of Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks of September 11, providing what some observers considered a laboratory for the new American way of war. In his last publication, Weigley commented that "Afghanistan offers hopeful indications" of an abandonment of the requirement of overwhelming force (Weigley 2002: 532). The army bore the brunt of criticism as the transformation began, because it would have to change the most, but the anxiety affected the Marine Corps as well, owing to concerns that if the army became more like the Marines – the traditional rapid deployment force, already lighter and faster – there would be no need for a separate Marine Corps. Of all the services, however, the US navy felt hardest pressed to make a case for its role in the war on terror. From ballistic missile submarines to aircraft carriers and their battle groups, the ship types that formed the basis of the Cold War fleet suddenly seemed to have little relevance. But as Rear Admiral William Gortney later remarked in reference to his service as commander of a carrier air wing in the Afghan campaign, his pilots "spent four and a half months, 24 hours a day, providing airborne artillery for the troops in Afghanistan," a landlocked country whose southern border is more than 300 miles from the Arabian Sea (Kreisher 2002: 73). It would hardly serve the strategic interests of the United States to allow such a capability to deteriorate.

As early as December 2001 George W. Bush touted the combination of "real-time intelligence, local allied forces, Special Forces, and precision air power" as the key to success against the Taliban, and remarked that "the conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums" (quoted in Noonan and Hillen 2002: 235). The initial defeats of the Taliban in Afghanistan (2002) and Saddam Hussein's dictatorship in Iraq (2003) came easily enough, but US and allied troops sustained most of their casualties in asymmetric warfare while propping up the regimes established in their place. In the wake of this development, the reconfiguration of the US armed forces to meet the challenges of asymmetric warfare has had its critics. In his article "Competing Visions for the U.S. Military," Laurent Guy highlights the risk of changes inspired by the US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as enhancing Special Forces and, for occupation duty, civil affairs units, at the expense of the "real fighting punch" of artillery and armored units. Convinced that "asymmetric reforms prime the military for the wrong wars," he cautions against the United States adopting an "empire-management" posture,

citing the example of Britain, which in the Victorian age allowed its armed forces to become an "imperial constabulary" and, by the eve of the First World War, had lost its comparative military advantage over the other European powers and was unable to regain it. By narrowing its margin of superiority *vis-à-vis* conventionally competent potential adversaries, the United States risks not only losing a future great-power military conflict but in the meantime also compromises its domination of the world, admittedly a multifaceted domination but one with a foundation of superior military power. Guy further cautions that enhancing the "post-invasion capabilities" of the US armed forces will only make it more likely that American political leaders will "misuse" them in risky adventures (Guy 2004: 710–14; cf. Farrell 2005b: 3–18).

Few authors have echoed Guy's caution; indeed, most have continued to promote a technology-driven new American way of war, just as they did in the 1990s, only drawing upon the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq to support their case. Examples include the Defense Department's Director of the Office of Force Transformation, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, and Thomas Barnett, arguing in 2003, on the eve of the US invasion of Iraq, for precisely the type of transformed military that Guy warns against, emphasizing Special Forces and "capabilities for nation building and constabulary operations" (Cebrowski and Barnett 2003: 42–3). Max Boot, writing in the wake of Iraq's military defeat but before the predominantly Sunni Muslim insurgency flared up, points to the apparent victory as an example of a new American way of war based upon "speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise . . . spurred by advances in information technology" (Boot 2003). In contrast, Antulio Echevarria's *Toward an American Way of War* laments that the "polyglot of information-centric theories" merely "center on 'taking down' an opponent quickly." Acknowledging the difficulty that the United States has in "finding ways to apply military force in pursuit of broader political aims," he goes so far as to argue that these and earlier theories (including Weigley's) describe a "way of battle" rather than a "way of war" (Echevarria 2004: 16; cf. Lock-Pullan 2005).

The American tendency to focus on the practice of war rather than the broader conceptualization of it thus colors the literature on the American way of war. It also helps explain the dearth of scholarship on American strategic culture. The first book or article to bear that specific title, "first generation" scholar Carnes Lord's "American Strategic Culture," focuses on the extent to which US strategy has been "rooted in liberal democracy" and thus also limited by its requirements. In particular, Lord criticizes "the growing civilianization of the military profession and its overconcentration on management and administration," which he traces to Robert McNamara's years as secretary of defense (1961–68). Commenting on the general public and political volatility of a democracy, Lord concludes that American strategic culture may be "peculiarly unstable, that it tends to oscillate between extremes, and that such oscillation is in fact characteristic of it" (Lord 1985: 269, 286, 288). In the "second generation" of the literature, Bradley Klein's "Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics" argues that "American strategic culture can best be understood in terms of power projection." For Cold War America, this entailed

"the ability to deliver enormous destructive power abroad . . . while enabling a populace to remain thoroughly, indeed morally, convinced of its overwhelmingly defensive nature." To Klein, the primary strategic goal of the United States during the Cold War was "to preserve . . . a multilateral world order of free trade under American patronage and to fend off any possible socialist incursions into this system" (B. Klein 1988: 136, 144). Authors of the "third generation" addressing American strategic culture include Andrew M. Johnston, who posed the question "Does America have a Strategic Culture?" Johnston rejects Weigley's thesis, dismissing the notion that the United States is "culturally disposed toward absolutism" in the use of force in any unique way. He doubts that the "experience of total war" could be "culturally formative . . . while the equally long American tradition of limited interventions was not." Johnston also cautions that the repetition of "this cultural narrative" could "construct our identity and limit our options" (A.M. Johnston 1998). His remarks further underscore the extent to which conceptualization of American strategic culture has been based upon the conceptualization of the American way of war, rather than vice-versa.

A clearer understanding of the cultural influence on the use of military force in American history will emerge not from a study grounded in the analysis of America's wars, but from a study of the history, institutions, and politics of the United States since its independence, with respect to the maintenance of its armed forces and its attitudes toward the use of force in the international arena. In this regard, the works of Walter Russell Mead have much to offer. A critic of the ahistorical nature of modern American foreign policy, Mead alleges that "only in the United States can there be found a wholesale and casual dismissal of the continuities that have shaped our foreign policy in the past." In his book *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World*, he singles out for special criticism President Richard Nixon and secretaries of state George Shultz and James Baker, for their apparent ignorance of, or disregard of, the history of American foreign policy before 1945. As an antidote, Mead suggests as a framework of analysis the existence of four historically grounded American perspectives of the United States and its role in the world, perspectives that are or have been held not just by the country's leaders but by the population as a whole, grounded in the ideals of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, and Woodrow Wilson. The Hamiltonians, like the first US secretary of the treasury, view close cooperation between the federal government and business interests as the foundation of a strong foreign policy, and place the highest priority on "the nation's need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms." The Jeffersonians, in contrast, have a firm domestic focus and reject adventurism in foreign policy, believing the United States "should be less concerned about spreading democracy abroad than about safeguarding it at home." The Jacksonians consider it the federal government's duty to provide for "the physical security and the economic well-being of the American people." They do not advocate aggressive military solutions but believe the United States should respond forcefully when attacked. The Wilsonians, in contrast, consider it the duty of the United States – and also a crucial American strategic interest – to

advance "American democratic and social values" in the interest of peace and justice worldwide, preferably by peaceful means but, paradoxically, by force if necessary (Mead 2002: xvii, 6). While Mead does not use the term "strategic culture" or address the arguments of those who have, inasmuch as his four American perspectives of foreign policy can be understood as subcultures within an American strategic culture, his insights certainly are worth adding to the debate.

In the early American republic, Hamilton's followers failed in their bid to create a closer federal union with stronger central institutions, but in subsequent decades their basic foreign policy principles were embraced by the Whig and Republican parties and became the dominant school of thought for much of American history. Mead argues that "the zenith of Hamiltonian power" extended from the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 to the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, during which time only two Democrats managed to be elected president. While Mead associates Hamiltonianism with the Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans, his category includes a handful of Democrats, most notably Cordell Hull, secretary of state under Franklin Roosevelt. More recent Hamiltonians include President George Bush, but no military leaders. According to Mead, the Hamiltonians have always recognized the need for "a competent military" under firm civilian control, but as economic nationalists the fundamentally non-military nature of their ultimate goals has made the armed forces less relevant to them. The Hamiltonians considered Britain the role model for the United States, yet in their view the "special relationship" between the two countries has always been fundamentally economic rather than ideological. They were America's first internationalists and, before the emergence of the Wilsonians, the only American internationalists, but on selfish rather than idealistic grounds. Indeed, Hamiltonians became internationalists because they recognized that their brand of American economic nationalism could succeed only within a stable international order (one shaped by the United States, once the United States had the power and influence to do so). After helping orchestrate the creation of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, at the end of the twentieth-century Hamiltonians served as architects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Mead 2002: 93, 100, 102, 104, 109, 114–19, 131, 244–5, 270–1).

Mead depicts the Jeffersonians as the most antimilitary and isolationist of the four perspectives, owing to their conviction that strong standing armed forces and an active foreign policy endangered "republican liberty." Early Jeffersonians in Congress almost annually tried to abolish the United States Military Academy (ironically so, since it was founded during Jefferson's presidency, in 1802) but reserved their greatest criticism for the navy, believing that the mere presence of American warships overseas increased the likelihood of conflict with other countries. Jeffersonians have always detested war, not on humanitarian or moral grounds but on political grounds, because of the burden of debt that wars generate. In 1821 secretary of state and future president John Quincy Adams reflected the Jeffersonian view in his remark that the United States will always sympathize with the cause of liberty abroad but should not go "in search of monsters to destroy." In their desire to avoid international conflict, Jeffersonians traditionally

defined American interests "as narrowly as possible" and, even then, were "slow to react to provocations." Mead's list of twentieth-century Jeffersonians include secretary of state and three-time Democratic presidential nominee William Jennings Bryan, President Jimmy Carter, and Carter's secretary of state Cyrus Vance. Military Jeffersonians, understandably few in number, include Smedley Butler, a prominent US Marine Corps officer during the heyday of American gunboat diplomacy (1898–1931), and more recently, Colin Powell. Butler's famous anti-Hamiltonian remark about having spent his military career serving as "a gangster for capitalism," according to Mead, "was widely quoted by Jeffersonian opponents of the Vietnam War." Mead considers the War Powers Act of 1973, passed by Congress in reaction to the conduct of the war in Vietnam by presidents of both parties, "a classically Jeffersonian gesture." In the years since then, such insistence upon formal congressional support for the deployment of American troops abroad has divided Jeffersonians (otherwise sympathetic with efforts to preserve peace) from Wilsonians on the issue of US participation in international organizations that might require participation in military actions (Mead 2002: 186, 189, 191–5, 250, 307).

Mead rates the Jacksonian perspective as the most popular among the American public, a populist-nationalist "folk culture" in that it reflects the sensibilities of the common man dating back to the Scots-Irish frontiersmen of the early American republic, whose first champion was Andrew Jackson. Mead goes so far as to call Jackson's victory over the British at New Orleans (1815), his springboard to national fame and, ultimately, the presidency, "perhaps the most decisive battle in the shaping of the modern world between Trafalgar and Stalingrad." Jacksonians historically have not supported a particular type of armed forces; while Jackson himself struck a blow for proponents of a militia army by leading such a force to victory at New Orleans, modern-day Jacksonians, the staunchest of Cold Warriors, supported a massive peacetime military establishment. They are united more by principle: the United States should not seek war but, if attacked, should respond forcefully and decisively. Jacksonians reject limited war and favor any strategy that promises victory with the fewest American losses, but are willing to accept greater losses for the sake of a quicker victory. They have a Hobbesian Realist view of the international arena and are skeptical about international organizations and the possibility of world peace. They believe the United States should act in defense of its own interests rather than for humanitarian reasons, yet they embrace their causes with a strong moral conviction. Mead argues that the apparent inconsistencies in the positions taken by Jacksonians become clearer once one appreciates that a concept of honor underpins their perspective. "Honorable enemies fight a clean fight and are entitled to be opposed in the same way; dishonorable enemies fight dirty wars and in that case rules don't apply." Jacksonians supported US intervention in the First World War not out of belief in the righteousness of the Allied cause, but because German unrestricted submarine warfare had killed Americans. Likewise, they supported the Second World War because of Pearl Harbor, not the broader threat the Axis powers posed to the world in general. Initially skeptical about the Cold War, they

became its most tenacious supporters once they were persuaded that the Soviet Union posed a real danger to the United States. They supported George Bush in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91 not for the sake of Kuwait's freedom from Iraq, but because of the strategic significance of US access to the oil of the Middle East. Jacksonians considered both sides in the American Civil War "honorable," and viewed the Germans of the Second World War (whose atrocities were almost all directed against non-Anglo-Americans) as honorable opponents. In contrast, the Japanese were viewed as dishonorable opponents, deserving the destructive war that culminated in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Jacksonians have considered all practicioners of asymmetrical warfare, from the Native Americans of Jackson's own time to modern-day terrorists, dishonorable and deserving of no quarter. The importance they attach to honor divides Jacksonians from followers of the other three perspectives, especially Jeffersonians, with whom they share little aside from their common skepticism of international organizations. Hamiltonians and Wilsonians have always been able to count upon Jacksonians to question or resist any political, military, or economic international agreements they may propose. Jacksonians also cause problems for US policy because, just as they are slow to embrace a cause, they are equally reluctant to abandon one even as international circumstances change. Thus, after the Cold War, they remained suspicious of Russia, China, and Vietnam; once persuaded that Iraq posed threat to the United States, they did not have to be persuaded a second time. Mead's list of twentieth-century Jacksonians includes generals George Patton and Douglas MacArthur, and among prominent turn-of-the-century politicians, Senator John McCain. Presidents successful at "winning the trust of Jacksonian America," whether they were Jacksonian or not, include Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan (Mead 2002: 88, 223, 245–7, 250, 252, 254–5, 259–62, 330).

Like Jacksonians, Wilsonians appear to be a bundle of contradictions, but Mead explains that the humanitarian impulse guides these idealistic internationalists in much the same way that the concept of honor guides the Jacksonians. His proto-Wilsonians include anti-slavery activist Frederick Douglass and American Red Cross founder Clara Barton. In the tradition of Wilson himself, the Wilsonians place a high premium on avoiding war but consider democracy the solution to the world's problems and its advancement America's leading strategic interest, indeed, something worth fighting for. The same Wilsonians who detest war on humanitarian grounds will resort to it for humanitarian reasons, in particular to stop the brutalization of a civilian population by an oppressor. They have a strong faith in international organizations such as Wilson's own brainchild, the League of Nations, and its successor, the United Nations. Wilsonians differ from other Americans in that they see no particular threat to American sovereignty in "support for international police forces, law courts, and other instruments of coercion." After being "Cold War doves," in the 1990s Wilsonians pushed for and won American military involvement in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). But Mead points out that these interventions were the exceptions to a general reluctance of

the American public "to follow the Wilsonian lead into one humanitarian war after another." While present-day Wilsonians are "nonsectarian," Mead argues that their sensibilities, like those of Wilson himself, are grounded in a distinctly Protestant Christian moral tradition. For example, Mead attributes American anti-colonialism (which caused the United States to pressure its allies to free their colonies, after the Second World War if not after the First) not to the United States's own origins as a collection of colonies but to the public and political influence of American missionaries working in non-Western colonial settings. Since the First World War, most liberal Democrats have been Wilsonians, but Mead identifies Wilsonians in the Republican party as well, labeling the neoconservatives of the late twentieth century as "Right Wilsonians" (Mead 2002: 93, 164–7, 170, 289–90). NATO does not fit easily into Mead's "four subcultures" approach to understanding the history of American strategy, but as an alliance for the defense of Western democracy it could be labeled Wilsonian, even though it was a product of the Cold War, during which Wilsonians were America's "doves." Mead comes closest to associating NATO with Wilsonianism in characterizing the alliance's "far sighted" eastward expansion of the 1990s as "perhaps the most significant accomplishment" of the clearly Wilsonian Clinton administration (Mead 2004: 43, 155). Mead does not specifically categorize any American military leaders as Wilsonian, but candidates for the Wilsonian label from the armed forces might include Eisenhower (during the Second World War and as first NATO commander, if not as president) and, more recently, Wesley Clark, NATO commander during the Kosovo campaign of 1999.

No discussion of the United States's post-1945 strategic culture and way of war would be complete without reference to NATO, history's longest-running multi-member alliance. In his contribution to Katzenstein's 1996 volume, Thomas Risse-Kappen argues that "it is hard to reconcile Waltzian realism with the history of NATO," and concludes that the creation of NATO is better explained by the liberal theory of international relations, in which liberal states are predisposed to trust other liberal states and to distrust non-liberal states (Risse-Kappen 1996: 359, 367). Writing after the US invasion of Iraq placed an unprecedented strain on its relationships with some of its NATO allies, Florentino Portero highlighted internal problems of the alliance that dated from its founding. According to Portero, NATO "was born as a result of an unequal relationship" between an all-powerful United States and a helpless, devastated Western Europe. NATO was far from a congenial league of like-minded liberal states. The alliance required a subservience to US strategy and policy that was "an unpleasant experience" for its other members, many of which were liberal states after 1945 only as a consequence of the United States being "in a position to impose its own values" in Western Europe. Portero points out that, in the Europe of 1939, "a large majority advocated authoritarian or totalitarian alternatives" and "the number of democrats . . . was very low." In the postwar years, under the veneer of Western solidarity, an "authoritarian Right" and a "revolutionary Left" both rejected American liberalism, and their descendants continue to do so in the early twenty-first century. Portero cites evidence that "anti-globalizers are often reconverted

left-wingers," robbed of their own Marxist dreams by the overall failure of communism, but still eager to oppose liberalism (Portero 2003: 1–2, 6). Other European observers cite very different reasons for the internal weakening of NATO. Rob de Wijk and Peter van Ham contend that demographic changes within the United States, in particular immigration from Asia and Latin America, have weakened the American "affinity" for Europe. Echoing neoliberal thinking, they believe transatlantic connections in trade and finance have eclipsed NATO as the primary bond between Europe and the United States (de Wijk and van Ham 2005: 10–11). But Jeremy Black cites more concrete, military reasons for problems within NATO. By the onset of the twenty-first century the technology-driven American way of war had given the United States a tremendous edge not just over its potential enemies but over its allies as well. Indeed, the gap had become great enough to "challenge the inter-operability that is necessary in joint and coalition operations" (Black 2004b: 141). Yet Black argues that the same American obsession with technology ensures a role for its less able allies, because it has caused the United States to spend less money on its manpower than on its machines, leaving the American military with a standing force too small to fulfill its growing list of post-Cold War missions. "This makes the contribution of allies more useful, especially for deterrent garrison functions, and for peacekeeping and counter-insurgency goals." Thus, paradoxically, "the gap in capability encourages cooperation, indeed requires it," in order for the United States to play its dominant role in the world (Black 2004b: 149).

Mead's *Special Providence*, published after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 but written beforehand, includes a reflection on the first months of George W. Bush's foreign policy, depicting an administration divided internally between ambitious Jacksonians and circumspect Jeffersonians, the latter led by Secretary of State Colin Powell. Mead's *Power, Terror, Peace, and War*, published in 2004, revises the picture to include Jacksonians and neoconservative "Right Wilsonians" (recast as "Revival Wilsonians") with no mention of a Jeffersonian faction or of Powell, a sad commentary on how marginalized the secretary of state had become even before his resignation at the end of Bush's first term. Jacksonians supported the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and replace the regime of Saddam Hussein but were less enthusiastic about the costly project of reinventing Iraq as the cornerstone of a Wilsonian quest to bring democracy to the Middle East. As Mead points out, "Wilsonians often write checks that Jacksonians do not want to cash." In particular, "Jacksonians do not like nation-building and they do not like spending money or losing soldiers in foreign countries." Alone among Jacksonian presidents, George W. Bush has included Wilsonians in his policymaking circle and thus has tensions within his administration that, in the past, typically have ensued when a conservative Republican (Jacksonian) administration has followed a liberal Democratic (Wilsonian) one. Mead acknowledges that after September 11, the international community in general, and Europeans in particular, had difficulty understanding the "sudden reappearance" of "the Jacksonian element in our national character," but he concludes that, faced with a credible terrorist threat, "the United States cannot suppress its Jacksonian instincts" (Mead 2002: 306–9,

2004: 109, 130–1, 153–4). Indeed, Mead's four subcultures provide a framework for understanding the military actions of the United States inasmuch as they illuminate its foreign policy. While the focus on the technology-driven American way of war can make it appear that the United States acts or fails to act mostly because it has or lacks the means to do so, analysis of the interplay between the Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian traditions holds the promise of a deeper understanding of why American leaders choose to use force in the first place.

Canada

By the time it became a self-governing dominion of the British Empire in 1867, Canada (or, on its behalf, Britain) had resolved its territorial disputes with the United States. Failed American attempts to invade Canada during the American Revolution and the War of 1812 had been followed by a serious war scare during the American Civil War, but thereafter, Canada's periodic unease about its stronger and vastly more populous southern neighbor stemmed from economic, social, or cultural concerns rather than a military threat. In the history of nation-states no other two countries have shared a border so long that has remained undefended on either side for so many years. Canada and the United States first fought as allies in 1917, after the American intervention in the First World War, but since then they have shared the experiences of the Second World War, Korean War, and Persian Gulf War, plus post-Cold War interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. They have been joined formally in NATO since 1949, and in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) since 1958.

Reflecting upon Mead's four subcultures of American foreign policy, David Haglund has noted the strain that the "Jacksonian ascendancy" under George W. Bush has placed on US–Canada relations, because "alone of the four policy orientations" of the United States, "Jacksonianism happens to be . . . the one that has historically found little resonance in Canada's own strategic culture." Haglund lampoons the obsessive manner in which a wide range of Canadian scholars and analysts have focused on the question of whether the neighbors are "on a path of convergence or divergence" (with divergence being the more popular interpretation from the Canadian perspective), but concedes that Bush's Jacksonian behavior has caused a genuine divergence between the two countries in foreign policy (Haglund 2004b: 34–7). In explaining why Jacksonianism never developed north of the border, Haglund acknowledges that, like the United States, Canada had its Scots-Irish frontiersmen, but points out that the "Jacksonian symbolism . . . of the American victory at the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815" naturally could never "have much appeal to Canadians." He could have added that Jackson's near-genocidal approach to native American populations had no Canadian equivalent, nor does the traditional American arms-bearing culture still cherished by Jacksonian America today. Indeed, the Canadian notion of the relationship of the state to the individual allows little room for the Jacksonian impulse. The Jacksonian paradigm is so alien to Canadian sensibilities that, if asked for a preference among the US foreign policy paradigms, Haglund contends the

Canadian response would be "just about anything other than Jacksonianism would work for us" (Haglund 2004b: 39–40).

But Haglund sees evidence of each of Mead's other three subcultures of American foreign policy in the Canadian experience. He argues that Hamiltonianism has been present in Canadian history ever since 1867, in the quest "to find for Canada a place in a rules-based international system within which the country's commercial and other economic interests could flourish." Examples include the National Policy of the first Canadian head of government, John Alexander Macdonald (prime minister 1867–73, 1878–91), emphasizing protectionism, immigration, and railroad construction, and, more recently, in the US–Canada free trade agreement that Brian Mulroney (prime minister 1984–93) signed with Ronald Reagan in 1987. Haglund sees a thread of Wilsonianism in Canada's "fondness for multilateral institutions" and firm belief in liberal democracy. His Canadian Wilsonians include Lester Pearson (prime minister 1963–68) and Lloyd Axworthy (foreign minister 1996–2000). But Haglund makes a case for Jeffersonian domination of Canadian policy, as reflected in the "meanness of spirit and . . . hypocrisy" of Canada's "limited liability" approach to its alliance obligations. He argues that Canadians play the role of loyal allies but with little genuine enthusiasm, placing clear boundaries on their commitments. Canada's Jeffersonians include its longest-serving head of government, Mackenzie King (prime minister 1921–30, 1935–48), as well as its two most recent longest-serving Liberal party leaders, Pierre Trudeau (prime minister 1968–79, 1980–84) and Jean Chrétien (prime minister 1993–2003) (Haglund 2004b: 39–40).

In a commentary on Canada's participation in NATO's Kosovo campaign, Douglas Bland observes that Canada has "two ways of warfare," one reflecting how Canadians perceive themselves, and another reflecting the reality of Canada's relative military weight in the international arena. The domestic political and public myth focuses on Canadians as "peacekeepers," as "helpful fixers" who deploy troops for the common good rather than for selfish national interests. As foreign minister, Axworthy went so far as to call Canada "a global power" based upon its credibility as "an honest broker" and international moral leader. But because "sophisticated and expensive weapons" are not needed for peacekeeping, politicians and the public have had difficulty supporting levels of funding for the Canadian Forces sufficient to safeguard the country's "essential national interest," which is "to remain relevant to the United States and the Western alliance." Indeed, at least one of its leaders acknowledged Canada's dependence upon the United States for its security well before the decline of Britain: Wilfrid Laurier (prime minister 1896–1910) admitted that "the Monroe Doctrine protects us from enemy aggression." Bland comments that "no prime minister has been as forthright, at least in public, but they all welcome Uncle Sam's defense." Few have openly complained about Canada's geostrategic lot. One who did – Trudeau, who in 1968 complained that Canada had no foreign policy or defense policy independent of NATO – could do little to change it. Canada, like the rest of America's NATO allies, did not support the US war in Vietnam, but subsequently, from the Persian Gulf War to Afghanistan, returned to its earlier practice of "lending

troops" to endeavors which others (usually Americans) control. Echoing Haglund's characterization of a Jeffersonian Canada with a "limited liability" approach to its alliance obligations, Bland agrees that Canada has typically contributed "just enough military power . . . to provide concrete evidence of [its] fidelity," but suggests that it could do little else, given the domestic understanding of the role of its armed forces and their consequent chronic underfunding. Bland points out the irony that during the Cold War, Canadian troops developed the reputation for being such good peacekeepers precisely because Canada, as a member of NATO, had "well-equipped units, trained to fight wars," thus far more competent than the troops from neutral or Third World countries which accounted for most other UN peacekeepers. Bland concludes that the Canadians will continue to be "strategic followers, not strategic leaders," operating within a "realist paradigm." While he does not use the term, his Canada fits the model of the "dependent ally," whose fidelity to a powerful friend allows it to claim the protection of that friend for itself (Bland 1999: 18–21).

In the summer of 2004 the Canadian Institute of International Affairs devoted an entire issue of its *International Journal* to Canada's grand strategy and strategic culture. Haglund's contribution, "What good is strategic culture?" discusses the general concept of strategic culture and its applicability to Canada (Haglund 2004a). David Dewitt's "National defence vs. foreign affairs: Culture clash in Canada's international security policy?" examines the dissonance in Canadian strategic culture resulting from the differing perspectives of the foreign affairs and defense departments on key questions (Dewitt 2004). In their essay "An emerging strategic counterculture? Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canadian intellectuals and the revision of Liberal defence policy concerning NATO (1968–69)," Michel Fortman and Martin Larose discuss Trudeau's attempt to introduce a "counterculture" in Canada and NATO during the Vietnam War (Fortman and Larose 2004). William Hogg's contribution "Plus ça change: Continuity, change and culture in foreign policy white papers" examines the evolution of Canada's strategic culture as reflected in official White Papers (Hogg 2004). In a similar vein, Kim Richard Nossal's "Defending the 'realm': Canadian strategic culture revisited" traces the changing view of what Canada should defend, a view that has always included interests or commitments beyond mere territorial defense (Nossal 2004). Finally, in their article "A 'Distinct Strategy'? The use of Canadian strategic culture by the sovereigntist movement in Québec, 1968–1996," Stéphane Roussel and Charles-Alexandre Théorêt argue that Quebec's quest for greater autonomy paradoxically has confirmed rather than challenged traditional Canadian strategic culture (Roussel and Théorêt 2004). Along with the works of Haglund and Bland discussed previously, these articles provide a solid foundation for all future studies of strategic culture and ways of war as they apply to Canada.

Latin America

Sociologist Miguel Angel Centeno has observed that "war has warranted little attention" from scholars of and from Latin America, because of its relative lack

of importance since the mainland Spanish-American colonies and Portuguese Brazil secured their freedom in the Wars for Independence of the years 1810–24 (Centeno 2002: 10). Aside from Brazil's participation in the two world wars and Argentina's defeat at the hands of Britain in the Falklands War of 1982, the leading powers of Latin America have not gone to war for well over a century. More than eighty years have passed since the region's last significant, protracted intrastate conflict (the Chaco War of 1932–35, between Paraguay and Bolivia). As a consequence, there is no literature on national ways of warfare for the individual countries of Latin America, and the few works concerning culture and the behavior of armed forces focus on civil–military relations, in particular the manner in which the region's armies have adapted to the democratization trend of the past quarter-century. Even in the publications sponsored by the armed forces, few articles have discussed strategy on any level. Centeno's analysis of over a century of Latin American military journals from 8 countries reveals that in 7 countries, organization or training has accounted for the most articles, followed by either technical/technological topics or historical/scholarly topics. Less than 1 percent of titles concerned strategy (Centeno 2002: 78–9).

Centeno's *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* provides valuable insights into the unique history of armed conflict in Latin America since independence. Though wary of "culturally deterministic arguments," he admits that "the general political culture of Latin America is not peaceful." But the region's "political violence has occurred largely within rather than between states," and of the relatively few intrastate conflicts, most have been limited wars. While realist theory would predict a competition among Latin American nation-states for advantage within an anarchic environment, Centeno cites the general lack of competition and acceptance of international borders within a relatively secure regional environment, guaranteed first by the Pax Britannica, then by the Pax Americana, in the latter case more formally after the Rio Treaty led to the establishment of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948. In contrast to widely held stereotypes, Latin American countries have had "comparatively low levels of militarization," largely because they have not had to defend themselves against extra-regional threats (Centeno 2002: 16–17, 20, 23, 71, 74). Indeed, ever since the successful conclusion of the Wars for Independence, with few exceptions they have maintained only as much armed force as needed to ensure their national security. This traditional tendency has been even more pronounced for the region's navies than for its armies (Sondhaus 2001a: 15, 2004: 106, 142, 169).

Centeno turns to history to explain the extraordinary character of the Latin American state system. In departing from the American mainland, Spain left behind "fragments of empire," in most cases corresponding to former colonial administrative units, rather than states with any sense of nationhood. Independence brought the destruction of the colonial administration and, in most areas, the traditional authority of the Church, creating a power vacuum. Only Brazil avoided this fate, by remaining a monarchy under the Portuguese royal dynasty for much of the nineteenth century, and withstanding serious regional rebellions which could have created several Portuguese-speaking Latin American

states. Yet despite its unique transition to independence and its tremendous size and population, Brazil enjoyed no great advantage over its neighbors. Unlike Europe and Asia, where older and newer states have always coexisted at various stages of development, in Latin America (as in Africa, a century and a half later) all states achieved their independence within the same decade or so, leaving none with a significant developmental advantage over the others. Thus, Centeno concludes that few Latin American countries could "challenge the geopolitical status quo" or "expand beyond their previously assigned zones of influence." Even those that wished to do so lacked "the organizational or ideological capacity" to wage war for very long, if at all, because their "societies were not geared toward the logistical and cultural transformations required by international conflict." At least in the first decades of independence, the white elites of most Latin American countries were divided over the structure of government (centralist versus federalist) and the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church (secularist versus clerical). At the same time, racial discrimination divided the elite from the mixed-race and indigenous or African peoples who accounted for most Latin Americans. Most states asserted their authority over their own populations only with great difficulty. Few of the founders of the Latin American republics emulated George Washington's example of retiring to allow a peaceful transition to an elected successor, instead establishing the tradition of the caudillo, the (usually military) strongman serving as dictatorial president. Centeno calls the caudillos "products of the failure to institutionalize political authority" (Centeno 2002: 9, 25, 51–2, 62–6).

Demonstrating what Centeno labels "a correlation between greater state capacity and likelihood of war," in the nineteenth century the most aggressive countries in the region, Chile and Paraguay, also were the most successful in developing some sense of nationhood and common identity. Centeno refers to Chile as the "Prussia of Latin America," a state which first demonstrated its relative military prowess in defeating Peru and Bolivia in the War of 1836–39, before sealing its reputation in an even more decisive victory over the same two countries in the War of the Pacific (1879–84), securing the mineral wealth of the Atacama Desert, where the borders of the three countries had been ill-defined. Meanwhile, in the La Plata basin, the ambitions of Paraguay, under the dictatorship of Francisco Solano López, aroused the ire of its neighbors, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, leading to the continent's bloodiest war (1864–70). The so-called Triple Alliance ultimately crushed Paraguay but paid a high price for victory owing to "López's ability to mobilize the entire society in a defensive struggle," a rare feat in a region where squabbling elites, racial and class divisions, and administrative chaos were the norm. Paraguay paid for its tenacity with a "demographic disaster" that Centeno cites as the most obvious exception to the Latin American tradition of limited war (Centeno 2002: 24, 37, 56, 66).

Centeno characterizes the War of the Triple Alliance as an important formative experience for the modern armed forces of Argentina and Brazil, as it was the last protracted war either country would fight. The War of the Pacific later served a similar function for the military in Chile, Peru, and Bolivia. For the population as a whole in the latter three countries, the bitter contest of 1879–84 "continues to

play a large role in their respective nationalisms." The countries that lost the most in these wars, Paraguay and Bolivia, ultimately turned on each other along their ill-defined border in the Chaco, a region coveted by the Bolivians (who had lost their foothold on the Pacific to Chile) for its access to the La Plata river system, and by both countries for its potential oil reserves. Their "low-intensity conflict" in the Chaco during the early 1900s boiled over into full-scale war in 1932–35. In the last major armed conflict in Latin America, Paraguay reprised its remarkable mobilization of the 1860s, expanding its army twenty-fold in order to rout Bolivia. According to Centeno, within Paraguay the victory resulted in "a civil–military alliance" that paved the way for the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89), whose baptism of fire came as a junior officer in the Chaco War (Centeno 2002: 56–9). Bolivia's loss of its Pacific province and the Chaco rate as the most significant territorial changes within Latin America since independence (if one discounts the breakup of the temporary postindependence combinations of the five Hispanic Central American states in a single confederation and present-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama in New Granada). The only loss of Latin American territory to outside conquest came in the Mexican–American War (1846–48), which Centeno calls "the most important of the conflicts fought by a Latin American country . . . in terms of geography and global historical impact." The Mexican defeat gave the United States possession of territory that would become its six southwestern states, including Texas and California, lands rich in resources that would enhance American power in the future. Against the United States and later, in 1862–67, against France's attempt to make Mexico its satellite empire under the ill-fated Maximilian, the Mexican resistance suffered from a lack of internal unity or ability to support a war effort. Centeno concludes that Mexico's armies "were never logistically complex" because it "was never able to muster enough authority or will to field anything approaching a modern army" (Centeno 2002: 59, 61).

Two decades after the defeat and execution of Maximilian, Mexico's longest-serving dictator, Porfirio Diaz (president 1876–80, 1884–1911), initiated a campaign to incorporate the country's Aztec past into a new nationalism. Centeno has observed that "only Mexico and, to a much lesser extent, Peru, have attempted the strategy of using the Indian past to create a sense of nation." In the Peruvian case, as early as the 1860s the navy honored heroic Inca warriors by naming its first ironclads after them (Sondhaus 2001a: 99; Centeno 2002: 194, 196). Such gestures did little to change the reality that indigenous peoples remained at the bottom of Latin American society, along with former African slaves, in a social hierarchy featuring whites at the top and mixed-race populations in the middle. With some local variations, the traditional structure of Latin American armed forces mirrored that of society, with whites dominating the officer corps, mixed-race men not likely to rise above the ranks of the noncommissioned officers, and non-whites most likely to be common soldiers. Especially in Argentina but also in Brazil and Chile, the government valued its conscripted army "as a school for the nation," a device for integrating the masses of European immigrants (many of them not of Iberian origin) who began arriving

late in the nineteenth century. This development coincided with a decline in interest in military careers on the part of the traditional white elites, making the officer corps predominantly middle class and open to relative newcomers. As a result, in all three countries immigrants and their sons were able to rise to prominence within the military. In Argentina they accounted for half of the generals by 1946, and non-Hispanic surnames may be found among the Latin American military dictators of the twentieth century (e.g. Leopoldo Galtieri of Argentina, Ernesto Giesel of Brazil, Augusto Pinochet of Chile, Alfredo Stroesser of Paraguay). Meanwhile, in Mexico and Peru – countries less open to European immigration during the same decades – the same opening led to greater racial diversity within the officer corps, while the military as a whole, and especially the army, became "a mechanism for social mobility from the lower working class." Centeno comments on the loose enforcement of universal service laws and observes that "class background is a significant predictor of likelihood of service." Most Latin American countries have had universal service laws for most of their history but, owing to the relatively small numbers of men kept under arms during peacetime, especially amid the regional population boom of the twentieth century most men liable for military service were not called (Centeno 2002: 248–9, 253, 256, 260).

As an example of how Latin American governments deliberately have kept their armed forces small, Centeno cites the case of Chile in the 1980s, which had just 57,000 men in its army during a time of tension with traditional rival Peru, despite being under the Pinochet dictatorship with no civilian political authority to limit military spending (Centeno 2002: 96). Scott Tollefson reaches a similar conclusion about military self-restraint in his study of Brazil, noting that even during the most recent period of military rule (1964–85), the armed forces showed remarkable deference to the civilian bureaucracy and "allowed the civilians . . . to take the lead in formulating foreign policy" (Tollefson 2002: 293). In his analysis of armed forces and democratic transitions in Latin America, Ángel Pérez observes that after the return to democracy in Brazil (1985) and Chile (1990), in both countries "the prerogatives of the military" remained extraordinarily high, in contrast to Argentina (1983) and Uruguay (1985), where they were "very limited." For Latin America in general, Pérez considers the tradition of military involvement in domestic politics to be part of the strategic culture, and one not likely to change as long as so many states in the region need to deploy their armed forces to crack down on drug traffickers and regional or ideological guerrilla movements. Three Latin American states have resolved the problem of the military's role in politics by abolishing their armed forces altogether – Costa Rica (1948), Panama (1994), and Haiti (1995), the latter two after US military interventions overthrew their military dictatorships (Pérez 2005: 5–6).

While US efforts to link NAFTA, Central America, and South America in a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) remained a dream as the twenty-first century dawned, Tollefson argues that, at least for Brazil, the "growing complexity" of regional intrastate relationships "has lowered the relative importance of security issues" in a manner "consistent with theories on interdependence."

But significant obstacles remain in the path of the fulfillment of the neoliberal vision for Latin America. Pérez, less optimistic than Tollefson, points to simmering border disputes between Ecuador and Peru as well as Colombia and Venezuela, and does not think it out of the question that "a latent rivalry" between Argentina and Brazil could revive. Tollefson himself concedes a point on the fragility of peace in the region by raising Brazil's concerns of "the perceived militarization of the Colombian conflict by the United States" (Tollefson 2002: 294; Pérez 2005: 6). From the American strategic perspective it might make sense to combat the chronic problems of insurgency and drug trafficking in Colombia by enhancing the capabilities of the Colombian armed forces, but such measures, if taken too far, risk touching off a regional arms race in which Colombia's neighbors seek to counter its new military strength. Another potential conflict continues to simmer in the Atacama Desert, where Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Peru, still have not accepted their defeat at the hands of Chile in the War of the Pacific. Landlocked Bolivia has repeatedly pressed Chile to return at least part of its lost coastal province, after 1945 using the UN and the OAS to air its grievances. As of 2005 the two countries had not had diplomatic relations since 1962 (aside from a brief rapprochement in the years 1975–78), and Bolivia continued to commemorate the anniversary of Chile's occupation of the last of its coastal ports, Calama (March 23, 1879), as its annual "Day of the Sea (*Día del Mar*)." The turn-of-the-century discovery of natural gas deposits worth billions of dollars in southern Bolivia made the dispute more than just symbolic, because the natural gas could only be exploited for export if a pipeline were built to the Pacific coast. More Bolivians favored a longer pipeline across southern Peru than a shorter one across northern Chile, even though the latter made far more economic sense. In 2002 Bolivia insisted that any pipeline deal with Chile would have to include the creation of a coastal "extraterritorial enclave" under Bolivian control, a demand which Chile could never accept (Lifsher 2002; *Wall Street Journal* 2002: A6). Meanwhile, Peru, which recovered some of its lost territory from Chile in a 1929 border adjustment, still considered Chile its principal maritime rival when it finally rebuilt its navy in the last decades of the twentieth century. The Peruvian turret ship *Huáscar*, captured by Chile in 1879 and converted to a Chilean national memorial after leaving service in 1898, became the world's only contested museum ship. As late as 1999 President Alberto Fujimori demanded its return to Peru (*El Mercurio* 1999: C2).

According to Centeno, Bolivia and Peru rate only better than Colombia in Latin America's chronic problem areas of the institutionalization of political authority, operation of an effective administration, and integration of the population under a national identity. In these areas Chile gets the highest marks, followed by Argentina and Uruguay, with Mexico and Brazil somewhere "in the middle," having their share of problems yet certainly better off than the three Andean failures (Centeno 2002: 10–11). But the unique case of Cuba under the dictatorship of Fidel Castro (since 1959) poses a problem for Centeno's regional comparisons. "Cuba is the exception that proves the rule," because under communism "it has achieved a permanent mobilization of society that is alien to the Latin American

political tradition." Cuba also deviated from the Latin American norm by fighting "on behalf of an abstract principle," from its sponsorship of Marxist revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America to its support for Marxist causes in sub-Saharan Africa as a Cold War surrogate of the Soviet Union. Centeno concludes that "the conflict with the United States" is essential to "the political project of the Cuban Revolution" (Centeno 2002: 52–3, 99). During the Cold War, Castro's policy of permanent hostility toward the United States left Cuba with no real option other than to become a "dependent ally" of the Soviet Union. The survival of his regime for so long into the post-Cold War era defied all predictions and underscored the extent to which the last and longest-reigning caudillo perhaps most effectively embodied the elements of ruthlessness and popularity common to all successful Latin American dictators.

Conclusion

In the literature on ways of warfare, the United States has been the subject of more books and articles than any other country. Much work remains to be done on American strategic culture, but Mead's four subcultures (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian) offer a framework for understanding the context for American military activity otherwise inadequately explained in terms of technological capability. Indeed, at least one scholar has applied the same framework to his analysis of Canada's strategic culture. As we have seen, the situation for Latin America is far more complex, but the common set of circumstances affecting the strategic culture of Latin American countries includes the lack of concern about (and thus, lack of armament against) extra-regional threats, the traditional perception that enemies to the nation are internal, and the tendency for countries to maintain only as much armed force as needed to ensure a minimal level of national security. Latin America poses special problems for the theory of strategic culture and efforts to explain national approaches to warfare in cultural terms, owing to the absence of intrastate armed conflict for most of the region since the nineteenth century. For countries such as Chile or Mexico that have seen well over a hundred years pass since their last war against another country, the past national experience with warfare can have nothing more than a symbolic significance for the nation or its armed forces in the present or future. Yet every nation-state has a strategic culture, whether it has an identifiable way of warfare or not, and in this area Latin America offers considerable opportunity for future scholarship.

4 Asia and Africa

A look at the scholarship on strategic culture and ways of warfare in Asia and Africa, especially the works authored by Asians and Africans themselves, underscores the extent to which the Westphalian norms of international relations are Western constructs, laden with Western assumptions about the nature of interactions among states. Indeed, the validity of realist theories that endow an international system created and imposed upon the world by the West with the power to condition the actions of all states, Western as well as non-Western, appears more problematic the more one examines the strategic behavior manifested in the regions and leading powers of Asia and Africa. In the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region, and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as in the leading Asian powers, India, China, and Japan, the more plausible explanations are those that leave room for the values, sensibilities, and traditions – the cultural components – of the regions and states in question.

The Middle East

The Middle East includes a number of examples of states whose behavior in the international arena cannot be fully understood without recourse to cultural explanations. As the dominant power in the Middle East throughout the early modern period and into the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire pursued a general course of realpolitik but with certain idiosyncracies (e.g. a reluctance to conclude alliances) that deviate from realist theory. The role of the military as the primary agent and supporter of Westernization during the last century of the empire's existence and throughout the history of the modern Turkish republic adds a unique element to the Turkish case. In the literature on the Arab states the most contentious issue is whether there has been a single Arab strategic culture and way of war or multiple cultures (Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi, and so forth). In any event, the supranational forces of Arab nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism have caused the Arab states to behave in ways often contrary to individual state interests and thus best explained in cultural terms. Beyond the Arab world but within the realm of Islam, the same may be said for Iran and Pakistan. Of course the state of Israel must be central to any discussion of the Middle East, and Israel has perhaps the clearest, most distinctive strategic culture and way of war of any country on earth.

Owing to its position as the early modern era's dominant power in southeastern Europe as well as north Africa and southwest Asia, the Ottoman Empire had the distinction of being the first non-Western member of the Westphalian system, informally at the start, then formally from the time of the Crimean War onward. According to Ali Karaosmanoglu, Turkey has had "a relatively consistent security culture of realpolitik," manifested first in the offensive stance of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, then in the defensive posture that remains characteristic of Turkey's policies today. The transformation from offensive to defensive began after the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), which confirmed Austria's reconquest of Hungary from the Turks. Thereafter Ottoman leaders sought security in playing the European powers against one another, a policy that preserved the empire's independence even as it steadily lost territory. The Turks formed alliances only reluctantly and on an ad hoc basis until 1952, when modern Turkey joined NATO (Karaosmanoglu 2000: 200–2). Karaosmanoglu points out that "Westernization has left its imprint on the national security culture" of Turkey but also led to an "identity problem," beginning in early modern times when the Ottoman Empire controlled much of southeastern Europe but was not really a "European" state, and still apparent early in the twenty-first century when Turkey's process of Westernization remained "unfinished" pending the approval of its application for EU membership. Throughout the nineteenth century the armed forces functioned as the principal agent of Turkey's Westernization, culminating in the involvement of junior officers in the Young Turk revolution of 1908. Former Young Turk Mustafa Kemal Ataturk built upon his fame as a successful Ottoman commander in the First World War to serve as founding president of the republic from 1923 to 1938 (Karaosmanoglu 2000: 205–6). In its ongoing political role the army shares general cultural similarities with some of its Latin American counterparts, who have considered it their mission to guard against internal threats to the existing national order (in the case of Turkey, to Ataturk's vision of a secular unitary Turkish nation-state). The armed forces have not been unpopular in this role, as the primary domestic threats in their view – Islamist parties and Kurdish terrorist Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) – are also considered the primary threats by a majority of the public. The unique dilemma for the Turkish military has been that the Westernization in which it has invested so much historically can only be consolidated by a democratization (thorough enough to satisfy the European Union) requiring it to withdraw completely from domestic politics (Karaosmanoglu 2000: 213–16).

The Young Turk goal of transforming the multinational Ottoman Empire into a secular, unitary, Westernized, Turkish nation-state ultimately could only be achieved in the truncated Turkey that emerged in the 1920s, and even then, only after the expulsion or suppression of Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish populations living within its reduced borders. In the meantime, the Young Turk program had broader consequences throughout the Middle East, in particular as a spark for pan-Arabism. As Michael Barnett has observed, "an Arab political identity and loyalty" emerged in the era of the First World War in reaction against the Young Turk vision for the Ottoman Empire. The process accelerated after the war, in

response to the emergence of Zionism, with its goal of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, and disappointment over the mandate system of the 1919 peace settlement, which placed most of the former Ottoman Arab lands under British and French colonial control (Barnett 1996: 413). Pan-Arabism compromised the integrity of the Arab monarchies established under British sponsorship (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Kuwait) and the Arab republics established under the French (Syria and Lebanon), all of which achieved independence by the late 1940s. According to Barnett, from the start Arab leaders faced the paradox that "their authority and legitimacy derived not from these fictitious territories created by the West but from the Arab nation," and yet Pan-Arab nationalism undermined their authority and legitimacy. Thus "cultural capital, not military capabilities" became "the currency of power in Arab politics." States that spent it wisely enhanced their influence within the Arab world, regardless of their material strength (Barnett 1996: 404–5).

In 1950, following the creation of the State of Israel and their own defeat in the first Arab-Israeli war (1948–49), Arab League members signed a "Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation," pledging to pursue common military and foreign policies. Rather than form the basis of a common strategic culture, the agreement "had very little practical effect," as Barnett has noted. Following the overthrow of King Farouk of Egypt in 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of the Egyptian republic and the first Arab leader to actively pursue a pan-Arab agenda. Keen to add substance to talk of Arab unity, he proposed the creation of a joint Arab army similar to the European army then under discussion as part of the European Defense Community. Only Syria "concurred with Nasser's brand of Arabism" but, in Barnett's analysis, his popularity throughout the Middle East compelled other heads of state to follow his lead "rather than risk a decline in regional standing or a domestic backlash" (Barnett 1996: 414–16, 419–20). Nasser's successful defiance of Britain and France during the Suez Crisis and Arab-Israeli war of 1956 caused his stock to rise further, and two years later Syria joined Egypt in the United Arab Republic (UAR). The threat posed to the rest of the region by the UAR "derived not from the combined aggregate military power of the two states but from their making good on Arabism's pledge and challenging other Arab leaders to do the same" (Barnett 1996: 404). Nasser remained a popular figure throughout the Arab world until his death in 1970, despite the collapse of the UAR in 1961 and the failure of his leadership in the disastrous Arab-Israeli war of 1967. The Arab coalition registered its only success (a temporary one, at that) under his successor, Anwar Sadat, when Egypt struck the first blow in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.

Scholars and analysts have long sought to explain the consistent operational failure of Arab armed forces in modern warfare, and in particular when confronting the Israelis. Kenneth Pollack, in *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991*, dismisses some explanations (cowardice, insufficient unit cohesion, inadequate logistics) altogether, and plays down others (weak "generalship," morale problems, poor training) as being of secondary importance. He concludes that the "consistent and crippling problems for Arab forces" have come in the

areas of tactical leadership, information management, and the maintenance and handling of weapons systems (Pollack 2002: 573–4). Rigid command hierarchies combined with a strong cultural deference to authority to limit the ability of frontline commanders to respond to situations on the spot or keep senior commanders in touch with frontline realities. Such a command structure and culture made it impossible for the Arabs to keep up with the Israelis in the fast-paced "maneuver warfare" of 1956 and subsequent conflicts. Further problems stemmed from an exaggerated cultural premium on avoidance of shame, which resulted in frontline commanders routinely lying to their superiors about the realities they faced. Pollack cites as "a constant among Arab armed forces" the "consistently exaggerated and even falsified reporting by military personnel to higher echelons" (Pollack 2002: 561). The lone significant success of an Arab army in all the Arab-Israeli wars was Egypt's crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 and initial surprise breakthrough into the Israeli-occupied western Sinai. As John Lynn points out in *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, things went well for the Egyptian forces as long as they followed their meticulously prepared plan, designed to play to their own strengths, but as soon as they had to fight a war of maneuver in the Sinai, "there was no script to guide them and the old problems resurfaced." Disaster struck and the Israelis quickly retook the initiative. Nevertheless, they learned that "if they fought on their own terms, the Egyptians could win a set-piece battle; their honor had been restored." According to Lynn, the Egyptian war plan of 1973 provides a "compelling argument for a cultural approach" to the study of that campaign (Lynn 2003: 310–11, 313).

Satisfied that he had, indeed, restored Egypt's honor in the 1973 war, Sadat renounced ties to the Soviet Union forged under Nasser and made peace with Israel in a process sponsored by the United States. In 1979 Egypt became the first Arab state to extend diplomatic recognition to Israel and in exchange regained the Sinai Peninsula (lost in 1967). Sadat soon paid for his peacemaking efforts, as some of his own troops killed him during a military review in 1981. The Egyptian-Israeli peace held, however, and the following year Egypt remained neutral as Israel defeated Syria and overran much of Lebanon in the last conventional Arab-Israeli war. In recognizing Israel in exchange for recovering the Sinai, Egypt behaved in its own rational self-interest. As the most populous Arab nation, it had provided most of the troops and suffered most of the casualties in the first four Arab-Israeli wars, in the process gaining nothing tangible for itself. Under Sadat and his successor, Hosni Mubarak, Egypt remained a formidable regional military power but forfeited its position of leadership in the Arab world, confirming Barnett's thesis that Arab nationalist credentials mattered more than military might in determining influence in the region.

Egypt's loss of influence created a vacuum in the Arab world soon filled by Iraq. Like Egypt, Iraq passed under British control following the eclipse of Ottoman Turkish power, then was ruled by a weak Arab monarchy installed by the British, then finally by an Arab nationalist republic, in Iraq's case following a bloody coup in 1958. A decade later the Ba'ath Party seized power in Iraq, and in 1979 Saddam Hussein began a twenty-four year reign as party leader and

president of the republic. Discussing Iraq's strategic culture as of 1999 in *Iraq and the War of Sanctions*, Anthony Cordesman observed that "Saddam's views currently are Iraq's 'strategic culture'," and warned readers of the limitations of the concept when applied to dictatorships: "as the fall of other dictatorships has shown, leaders are not peoples, and strategic cultures can change rapidly with the regime" (Cordesman 1999: 10). But Cordesman's work also emphasizes two common elements of Iraq's pre-Saddam and Saddam-era strategic culture that he feels likely will also be manifested in the defense and foreign policy of its eventual post-Saddam government: border disputes with neighbors and a deep hostility toward the West. From the time its borders were first drawn in the 1920s, as a British mandate under the 1919 peace settlement, Iraq has not accepted its own borders and has had territorial disputes with most of its neighbors. Meanwhile, in Iraq, as in several other former colonial territories, anti-British sentiment gave way to anti-US sentiment during the Cold War, after the United States emerged as the clear leader of the West. Iraq's anti-Western sentiments were reflected in its close relationship with the Soviet Union, from a 1959 arms deal until Mikhail Gorbachev abandoned Saddam Hussein thirty years later. Iraq's most important border disputes involved its narrow outlet to the Persian Gulf at the mouths of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, as reflected in failed attempts to annex Kuwait (1961 and 1990–91) and, in a protracted war with Iran (1980–88), failure to achieve a border readjustment (Cordesman 1999: 11–13, 18–19).

Saddam Hussein came to power the same year that Shi'ite fundamentalists loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew an old nemesis of Iraq, the pro-US shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. When he seizing the opportunity to invade a weakened Iran the following year, most Arab states rallied behind him, fearful that an Iranian-style Islamist fervor would undermine their own regimes. The United States, estranged from Iran over the Teheran embassy hostage crisis of 1979–81, also supported Iraq. These friends abandoned Saddam Hussein when he attempted to annex Kuwait, a fellow Arab state, in 1990. In the subsequent Persian Gulf War, Egypt and Syria joined Saudi Arabia in a US-led, UN-approved coalition to restore Kuwait's independence. Saddam Hussein tried to break the coalition against him by baiting Israel to join in the war, but the Israelis showed uncharacteristic restraint in not taking the bait even as his Scud missile attacks struck Israeli cities. The Scud attacks, though applauded by most ordinary citizens (if not by most governments) throughout the Muslim world, failed to shake the unity of his opponents. In Cordesman's opinion, owing to the experience gained in the Iran–Iraq War, the Iraqi army "was the most effective and experienced force in the Gulf region" (Cordesman 1999: 16). Yet when the moment of truth came, it proved to be just as inept in battle as the Egyptian and other Arab armies had been in their earlier wars against Israel, for the same reasons: poor leadership, tactical inflexibility, and information management problems that made it impossible for the Iraqis to launch a war of maneuver or respond to one launched against them (Lynn 2003: 291). A well-planned coalition air campaign targeting the Iraq air force, air defense systems, and command and control infrastructure only made these problems worse, and in the end coalition forces routed the Iraqi army in just four days.

Defeat in 1991 ended Saddam Hussein's bid to fill the role once played by Nasser, but did not end his regime in Iraq, which limped along, evading and defying postwar UN sanctions, for another twelve years. A much smaller US-led coalition, this time without UN approval, invaded Iraq in 2003 on the pretext that Saddam Hussein had remained active in his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (which subsequently were not found). Iraq's much-diminished armed forces offered little resistance and Saddam Hussein was overthrown within three weeks, though postwar attempts to bring democracy to the country were foiled by an insurgency that dragged on for years. Among those analyzing the campaign, Bernard Loo has expressed reservations about "cultural explanations of general Arab strategic behavior" but concedes that in attempting to make sense out of Iraqi behavior before and during the US-led invasion of Iraq war in 2003, such explanations "have some resonance." The stereotypical "tendency towards bluff and bravado was manifested in bizarre Iraqi statements that appeared to bear no correspondence with the reality of the war." Loo also raises the possibility that Western attempts to deal with Saddam Hussein between the wars of 1991 and 2003 were doomed to fail owing to the "cross-cultural confusion" that so often has plagued relations between the West and the Arab world. "Western-based deterrence strategies" only work when all parties share the same general values and sensibilities, and this is not the case with the Western powers and the Arab states. Practical difficulties compound this fundamental disconnection; the case may be made that, with Iraq, "problems in communicating and deciphering deterrent messages" further complicated relations (Loo 2003).

Michael Barnett considers Saddam Hussein the gravedigger of Arab nationalism, as his attempt to conquer Kuwait prompted other Arab leaders to follow Egypt's example of more than a decade before, and put "state interests" ahead of "the Arab national interest." Under this "emerging statism," Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the smaller Persian Gulf states no longer feared "offending Arabist sympathies" and deepened their security ties with the United States (Barnett 1996: 428, 430). While Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro – like Barnett, writing in 1996 – placed this transformation in Arab sensibilities on a par with the post-1945 sea change in German and Japanese strategic culture (Kowert and Legro 1996: 473), within a few years it became apparent that the shift amounted to what Kerry Longhurst has called "fine-tuning" rather than "fundamental" change. Rising Islamist sentiments throughout the Arab world, in some cases inspired by the actions of Osama bin Laden and the terrorist network al Qaeda, prompted the same regimes once again to distance themselves from the United States, only now on religious rather than pan-Arab grounds.

For Arab nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists alike, the state of Israel has been a central issue ever since its founding in 1948, and Arab hostility toward Israel and its supporters (chiefly the United States) a constant feature of Middle East politics. After failing to destroy the new state of Israel in the initial Arab-Israeli war of 1948–49, for thirty years no Arab state recognized Israel or acknowledged its right to exist, and the anti-Israeli cause became the primary rallying point for the Arab world. Such hostility left Israel in the worst security

situation of any state on earth, and it responded by developing arguably the world's clearest, most distinctive strategic culture. Laura Drake has identified three key elements of the Israeli approach to war: the justifiability of preemptive strikes, the efficacy of "excessive retaliation," and the maintenance of a "last-resort" nuclear deterrent while denying Muslim neighbors a nuclear capability of their own. Israel has embraced preemptive or preventive warfare out of a fear that, if it waits to be attacked first, it could be "overrun . . . before it has had time to put its overwhelmingly stronger military forces into action." Egypt's surprise attack during Yom Kippur in the fourth Arab-Israeli war (1973), though quickly repulsed, took a "huge psychological toll" on the Israelis and reinforced their belief in striking first when they perceived that danger loomed, as they had in 1956 and 1967, and would again in the last conventional Arab-Israeli war (1982) against Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Israel adopted the policy of retaliating "in a multiple of the force of the original enemy attack" in response to asymmetrical attacks of the sort favored by Palestinian terrorist groups. According to Drake, Israeli military doctrine places a high deterrence value on the inflicting of "unacceptable levels of destruction" on the attackers or those who harbor them. Finally, Israel's last line of defense is its nuclear capability, universally assumed to exist but acknowledged only indirectly, in the country's refusal to sign the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1981 Israel used an air strike to destroy Iraq's nuclear facilities at Tuwaitha (Drake 2002: 199–201).

While Israel's response to security threats bears the marks of a hard realism, the unique historical background of the Jewish state underpins its strategic culture and at times causes Israel to behave in ways not fully explicable unless one considers the cultural dimension. Within the European context, Jews endured centuries of oppression, culminating in the genocide of the Holocaust, rarely resisting their oppressors with force. The modern Jewish state must hark back to antiquity for most of its martial heroes, in addition to lionizing the relatively small number of Jews who resorted to arms to resist the Holocaust. A past full of persecution understandably leaves Israelis sensitive to threats to their existence or survival, and ready to use the force at their disposal to punish or deter their enemies. But the use of preemptive strikes and excessive retaliation have caused problems for Israel, arguably worsening its security dilemma by diminishing sympathy for Israel from abroad and, closer to home, creating more enemies or deepening the enmity of existing enemies.

From the time of its founding, Israel has had a universal service obligation with a small standing army backed by large numbers of reserves. In a nation founded on secular Zionist principles but populated by a diverse pool of immigrants, including religious as well as secular Jews, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) has served a central role in the assimilation of newcomers. Ironically, as Elizabeth Kier has noted, the IDF shares with the German armies of 1871–1945 the combination of "a highly offensive doctrine" and dependence upon reserves performing as well as regular troops. The IDF's first peacetime maneuvers, in 1950 and 1951, dispelled doubts about whether the system would work (Kier 1997: 80). According to Drake, the organization of the IDF has reinforced its preference for

preemptive or preventive warfare. Because it has relied so heavily upon reserves, and even at the turn of the century could not fully mobilize in less than 72 hours, the risk would be unacceptably high for Israel in any war begun at a time of the enemy's choosing. For Israel, as for Germany earlier, the success of a cadre-and-reserve system depends upon superior training and superior materiel. The latter would be beyond the reach of a country of Israel's size and resources without significant financial support from the United States (Drake 2002: 200–1). To preserve such support Israel has responded to pressure (however inconsistent) from the United States to build upon the model of the 1979 accord with Egypt by concluding peace agreements with other Arab states and the stateless Palestinians. IDF leaders tend to view such agreements with skepticism, as they involve exchanging tangible security advantages gained through war for the intangible advantages of normalized relations with Arab governments. To implement the accord with Egypt, the IDF conducted a forced evacuation of a small number of Jewish settlements from the Sinai; the next such situation arose in 2005, when the IDF undertook a similar operation to make good on an Israeli pledge to leave the Gaza Strip to the Palestinians. Because the peace process in general, and the Jewish settlement of Arab lands occupied in 1967 in particular, tended to divide the Israelis in general on liberal-versus-conservative and secular-versus-religious lines, within the IDF conservative religious officers and soldiers were less likely to support such evacuations. Prior to the Gaza evacuation the IDF conducted an extensive campaign to explain the policy to the troops in order to ensure that they would do their duty – an extraordinary measure for a country with a tradition of democratic government (Leggett 2005).

Aside from Israel's initiation of hostilities in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967, and 1982, its greatest exercise in preemption came in its 1981 air strike against Iraq's nuclear facilities. As of 2004–05 there was widespread speculation that a similar operation would follow if Iran ever came close to developing nuclear weapons of its own (e.g. G. Steinberg 2004). The Islamic Republic of Iran's aggressive pursuit of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear as well as chemical and biological – reflected a dramatic reversal of the Ayatollah Khomeini's initial policies after assuming power. Indeed, the best example of the extent to which Iran's religious leaders and religious principles have had a direct impact on the country's military affairs is Khomeini's suspension of all Iranian chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs in 1979, based upon the Koran's teachings against poisoning. According to Anthony Cain, author of *Iran's Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, the Ayatollah did not change his mind until after Iranian troops sustained significant casualties from Iraqi chemical attacks and "the international community failed to take action to condemn or curb Iraq's use of such weapons." The circumstances under which Iran began to use its own chemical weapons serves as an example of how "a fundamentally secular decision based upon military effectiveness calculations had to pass through the filter of Islamic law to acquire the mantle of legitimacy." From that point onward, Cain concludes, "the republic's leaders relied upon the new religious precedent to justify future nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons

proliferation." After the Persian Gulf War, the problems encountered by the United States and UN in verifying that Iraq no longer had weapons of mass destruction only served to reinforce Iran's conviction that it needed such weapons to ensure its own security (Cain 2002: 5, 9, 13–14).

According to Cain, by the time the Iran–Iraq War ended in a stalemate in 1988, Iranians considered themselves "martyrs in a global conflict between Islam and the rest of the world" (Cain 2002: 14). Forged in war, Khomeini's Islamic Republic of Iran emerged with a unique theocratic character reflected in the internal "dualism" of its political and military structures. Since the Ayatollah's death in 1989, the actions of Iran's elected government have been subject to review by a Shi'a Muslim cleric designated as his successor, aided by a sort of clerical supreme court endowed with absolute power. Thus religious leaders have the constitutional authority to overturn laws, nullify elections, and disqualify candidates for office, in addition to sweeping censorship power that allows them to control all media. The Iranian military structure mirrors this "dualism" in the political structure. Under Khomeini the regular armed forces were purged of officers loyal to the deposed Shah but preserved to coexist in a parallel structure with the new Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Constitutionally the regular armed forces still have the mission of defending the state, while the IRGC serves as defender of the Islamic revolution within the state and its promoter beyond Iran. The IRGC grew to include 350,000 troops late in the Iran–Iraq War; in 1986 it also added air and naval units. In the war against Iraq, IRGC field units functioned alongside regular army units in much the same way that the Waffen-SS and Wehrmacht coexisted in the armed forces of Nazi Germany. Cain has observed that the regular armed forces "act in reserve capacities" while the IRGC are considered the elite troops (Cain 2002: 5–6). While he concedes the direct influence of Iran's "peculiar brand of Islamic fundamentalism" on its military and foreign policies, Cain concludes that Iran is "more akin to a rational state actor" than "an irrational and unpredictable religiously fanatic state." Since the end of the Iran–Iraq War, "the Iranians appear to prefer to act covertly through surrogates to advance their Islamist agenda abroad" and have chosen to protect Iran itself "by adopting a strategic defensive posture." Cain considers Iran unlikely to use chemical or biological weapons, conventionally or through the terrorist groups it supports, unless it feels the need to retaliate against offensive or punitive measures undertaken by the West (Cain 2002: 16–17).

Because the deposed Shah of Iran had harked back to the country's ancient Persian heritage in the trappings and symbolism of his regime, such allusions were forbidden after the revolution of 1979; in any event, it would have been out of character for the new republic to promote any tradition or identity not rooted in Islam. Iran's neighbor to the east, Pakistan, likewise has no identity other than that inherent in its Islamic character. Ahmad Faruqui contends that "Pakistanis regard themselves as heirs to the Mughals," the Muslim emperors who governed much of India from 1526 until the onset of British rule (Faruqui 2003: 2), but the Mughal Empire, like every other significant regime in South Asia before 1947, accepted the cultural and religious diversity of the subcontinent and certainly

never sought to create a distinctively Muslim state. Indeed, no such state existed in South Asia before the partition of British India in 1947, and the reason Pakistan had to be created, according to its founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was to give the Muslims of India a state of their own. While Pakistan properly belongs in a discussion of South Asia rather than the Middle East, it has been a factor in the latter through its involvement in Afghanistan and, since 1998, as the first Muslim country to acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons. Pakistan, like Iran, became an ally of the United States early in the Cold War, and also faced a wave of revolutionary religious fundamentalism; indeed, its own Islamic student radicals overran the US embassy in Islamabad shortly after their Iranian counterparts seized the US embassy in Teheran. But in Pakistan the army (which has governed the country for over half of its existence) prevented a revolutionary theocracy from being established, and thereafter its leaders succeeded in the remarkable balancing act of appeasing Pakistani Islamists while remaining a valued ally of the United States. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–88) the Pakistani regime pleased both the Islamists and the United States by facilitating the infiltration of Islamic fundamentalists from throughout the Middle East to support the Afghan resistance against the Soviets. After the United States lost interest in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan supported the establishment of the Taliban regime there, which, in turn, hosted Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, moves popular with the Islamists. As a consequence, after September 11, 2001 the Pakistani military government again faced the dilemma of how to please both the United States and its own Islamist elements.

Faruqui's *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* criticizes Pakistan for initiating four unsuccessful wars with India (1947–48, 1965, 1971, and 1999), the costs of which have retarded the country's economic development. Faruqui sees the military domination of Pakistani politics creating a vicious cycle in which the military has prevented the development of democracy in Pakistan, then has failed to learn from its defeats because of the lack of open debate and accountability one would find in a democratic system. According to Faruqui, too often the Pakistani military has placed its own institutional interests above the best interests of the country (Faruqui 2003: 35, 44, 131–63). Sumit Ganguly's review article "Pakistan's Slide into Misery" reflects similar views, condemning a military establishment that "has seemed intent only on maintaining its own prospects and prerogatives." He traces the problem to the failure of the country's founder, Jinnah, to acknowledge the diversity of India's Muslim communities before 1947 and to integrate these groups after independence. "This neglect resulted in serious political disorder" and brought an early end to democratic government, with the first of several military coups coming in 1958. The military took the lead in marketing Pakistan as a loyal Cold War ally of the United States, taking full advantage first of the non-aligned status of India, then of India's tilt toward the Soviet Union, to sustain itself and the country as a whole on "substantial military and economic assistance." Among Pakistan's general-presidents, Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, whose presidency (1977–88) coincided with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, receives Ganguly's harshest

criticism. In order to placate the Islamists, Zia laid the foundation for many of Pakistan's future problems, creating "a separate Islamic court system" and a network of religious schools (*madrassas*) largely "funded by Saudi Arabia," which introduced the extreme Islam of Wahhabism into the country. He also advanced the careers of a number of Islamists within the officer corps, all the while earning high marks from the United States for being a cooperative ally. Ganguly concludes that "the strategic culture of Pakistan's military has not changed" since Zia's downfall (Ganguly 2002). But the presidency of Zia, of course, personifies the miracle of Pakistan, the domestic and international balancing act by which a deeply divided country, by many measures a failed state, has managed to maintain generally friendly relations with the United States, other Muslim countries, and China as well, develop nuclear weapons, and repeatedly take the initiative in warfare against its much larger neighbor, India.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, followed by wars in Afghanistan (from 2001) and Iraq (from 2003) in which resistance movements or insurgencies employed terrorist methods against US forces and their allies deployed in those countries, inspired a number of authors to argue that terrorism now constituted the Muslim or Arab way of warfare. Typical of the genre, Australian officer Peter Layton, whose country suffered more losses than any other in the Bali bombing of October 2002, subsequently described "The New Arab Way of War" as a campaign against Western civilians by Arab "assassins." His sweeping references to "the Arab combat style," "the Arab method," and "the Arab system," provide a strong example of what Jeremy Black has condemned as the "cultural or geographical reification of what is a more widespread military practice." While Layton correctly observes that "Middle Eastern societies" have adopted asymmetrical or terrorist methods because they "cannot win symmetrical conflict involving Western militaries," Black argues that there is nothing culturally Arab or Muslim about these methods. Instead, he emphasizes the acultural universality of a weaker power responding to the overwhelming force of a stronger power by "developing an anti-strategy, anti-operational method, anti-tactics, and anti-weaponry, designed to counter and lessen, if not nullify, the advantages of the stronger" (Layton 2003: 62–5; Black 2004a: 1227). Black believes the Arab states have been subjected to a particularly egregious group stereotyping, and not just for terrorism. He criticizes Lynn and Pollack for their analyses of the conventional campaigns of the Arab states, concluding that they "are wrong to treat Arab militaries as a group, as there were major variations between the Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis. . . ." Lynn does not escape Black's criticism even though he expresses his own reservations about the extent of Pollack's generalizations, in part to justify his own focus on Egypt (Lynn 2003: 313; Black 2004a: 1226–7).

Such criticisms aside, the Middle East clearly is a region where the concept of strategic culture has much to offer in helping to explain state behavior. Even the Middle Eastern states that generally follow a realist course – Turkey, Israel, and Iran – do so with a heavy dose of cultural idiosyncracy, while for the Arab states, it is difficult to make sense out of their policies without considering cultural factors: the pan-Arab sentiments that caused Arab states to rally first behind

Nasser, then behind Saddam Hussein, or the Islamist sentiments that cause them, if not to support al Qaeda, at least to distance themselves from the enemies of al Qaeda. If survival is always a state's first priority, as Kenneth Waltz contends, such behavior, obviously linked to regime-survival (rather than state survival or the best interests of the state) cannot be explained by realist theory. It may be understood in terms of bandwagoning but only if we conceptualize the Arab states as fatalistic passengers aboard a suicidal bandwagon, with Nasser, Saddam Hussein, and Osama bin Laden in turn occupying the driver's seat.

India

As the twentieth century drew to a close, scholars and analysts began to debate whether India, as an emerging superpower, had an identifiable strategic culture or way of war. The Republic of India that emerged in 1947, at the end of the colonial era, could claim as its heritage a Hindu civilization dating to ancient times, but India's long history of political disunity as well as ethnic and religious diversity – a diversity persisting even after the separation of Pakistan – raises questions about the propriety of invoking national traditions or cultural explanations in discussions of modern Indian strategic behavior. At the turn of the century, of India's population of just over one billion, 80 percent were Hindu and 40 percent claimed Hindi as their first language, but the country recognized 21 other official languages and its religious minorities included a Muslim population of 138 million, approaching the entire population of Pakistan. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons authors began to explain India's policies in cultural terms. Proponents of an Indian national revival, self-conscious about the apparent lack of an Indian strategic culture, tried hard to find evidence of one, while other writers, less passionately, resorted to cultural arguments to explain why India had not behaved according to realist theory in its gradual, seemingly reluctant road to nuclear superpower status, from its first nuclear detonation in 1974 through the development of a nuclear weapons program and missile program to its formal emergence as a nuclear power in a series of tests in 1998. The implications of India's nuclear status for its own armed forces, the South Asian region, and the international arena as a whole have been the subject of a great deal of speculation since the 1998 tests. It is not surprising, therefore, that most scholarship on Indian strategic culture focuses on this recent development and its significance.

George Tanham sparked the debate in his provocative 1992 article "Indian Strategic Culture," which argues that India has no "tradition of strategic thinking." Instead he attributes India's strategy as of the end of the Cold War to factors such as its geographic circumstances, traditional social hierarchy, and fragile national identity. While the geography of the South Asian subcontinent placed limits on the possibility of expansion, the Hindu caste system bred a conservative outlook and a history of disunity had left India with a weak sense of nationhood. Tanham blames India's Hindu traditions for its "non-aggressive" and "defensive" posture as well as its failure to develop a coherent military doctrine, asserting, provocatively, that its leaders believed "if the future is unknown and unknowable, why

plan?" He did predict, accurately, that the Indian middle class would "inspire and support a national resurgence" in the post-Cold War era (Tanham 1992: 129–42). Tanham elaborated upon these ideas in his essay "Indian Strategic Thought," published in 1996 in a volume he co-edited with Indian political scientists Kanti Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo, once again attributing to Hinduism India's "passivity in military affairs" and "absence of strategic thinking," and to geography India's "lack of an expansionist military tradition." History, geography, and above all culture have combined to keep India "on the strategic defensive" against its principal rivals, Pakistan and China (Tanham 1996: 72–8, 81–2).

In the same 1996 volume, Tanham's co-editor Kanti Bajpai responded with by agreeing that "India lacks a tradition of strategic thinking" but only when compared to Europe. He contends that "Europe is the exception historically" because "conditions in Europe produced a tradition of strategic thinking unmatched anywhere in the world." Bajpai explains that neither Pakistan nor China has posed a threat to India's existence sufficient to generate a richer body of strategic thought, "Pakistan being too modest an adversary and China too physically remote for total war" (Bajpai 1996: 141–3). In the same volume, Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu rebuts the same point by suggesting that the roots of Indian strategic thinking date to ancient times. Sidhu refers to the *Mahabharata* epic as well as the *Arthasastra*, the latter attributed to the ancient statesman Kautilya. He challenges the stereotype of a Hindu pacifist India, providing evidence that even Gandhi at times had a realist outlook. He also disputes Tanham's assertion that India owes its modern-day unity and outlook to the legacy of British rule, arguing instead that "in India, the evolution of a nation state and the creation of nationhood was interrupted by British colonization" (Sidhu 1996: 175–8).

The sharpest rebuttal to Tanham's work came from Indian army brigadier G.D. Bakshi, who dedicated his book *The Indian Art of War: The Mahabharata Paradigm* "to George Tanham, in the hope that he will now see the outlines of a historic Indian strategic culture" (Bakshi 2002: dedication page). While Sidhu hints at an Indian strategic culture or art of war of ancient vintage, Bakshi's somewhat idiosyncratic work sets out to prove the point. Of the two great epics of Indian mythology, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*, Bakshi considers the latter to be "the primal source book of Indian military thought." Attributed to Krishna Dvaipayana Vyasa, the *Mahabharata* originated at the end of the Early Vedic Age, probably no later than 900 BCE, and existed in oral form for more than a millennium until a standard Sanskrit written version emerged late in the fourth century. The *Mahabharata* includes a classic "brains" versus "brawn" struggle, in which the wily Krishna and the Pandavas ultimately prevail by employing covert, "psychological," or asymmetrical methods at key moments against their more conventional and chivalrous opponents. Bakshi sees a lasting relevance in the strategic value judgments reflected in the work. In the *Mahabharata* "war is clearly viewed as a last resort," and the epic includes the Dharma Yudha or just war concept, with the Pandavas reflecting a "very conscious concern . . . to be seen as the upholders of Dharma or justice" as they pursue their war. But the covert methods (Kuta Yudha) employed by the Pandavas "were despised by 'honorable'

Indian soldiers of the *Mahabharata* period" even though they resulted in victory. According to Bakshi, contemporary Indian soldiers "still tend to despise these methods as unethical or unsoldierly," a point of view "reinforced by our British military heritage" from the colonial era. Thus the indecisive "attrition-oriented military paradigm" reflected in the conventional approach of the losing side in the *Mahabharata* became India's preferred way of war, employed by soldiers who valued "direct force on force engagements and chivalry" (Bakshi 2002: 12, 61–3, 112, 127, 132, 134). In arguing that the *Mahabharata* "provides a very deep psychological insight into the makings of the Indian military mind," Bakshi attributes to the epic "the major flaw in the Indian military makeup," which he identifies as "its chivalry and reliance upon the direct as opposed to the indirect approach in military strategy. The flaw is with us to this day" (Bakshi 2002: 15).

In contrast to traditional China, which did not hold its soldiers in very high regard, in traditional Indian society the martial Kshatriya caste ranked second only to the intellectuals and priests of the Brahmin caste. Bakshi considers the *Mahabharata* to be the foundation of the conventional, chivalric martial values of the Kshatriyas, while the more pragmatic or realistic martial values of the Brahmins were reflected in the *Arthasastra*, attributed to the statesman Kautilya and written no earlier than the late fourth-century BCE, in the wake of Alexander the Great's abortive invasion of the Punjab between 327 and 324 BCE (Bakshi 2002: 36, 113). The Brahmin Kautilya served as advisor to Chandragupta Maurya, who during the decade of the 320s made the state of Maghada the catalyst for the Mauryan Empire, which under his son and grandson expanded to include almost all of India. A.J. Hilali has noted the importance assigned to "the reign of the first three Mauryan kings" once Indian nationalists of the late nineteenth century began investigating the past "for examples of Indian unity" (Hilali 2001: 742). The Mauryan Empire came to be considered the first unification of India, and some of its symbols were later adopted by the Republic of India, including the 24-spoked *chakra* (wheel) of Chandragupta's grandson, Ashoka, which appears at the center of the modern Indian flag. In his role as Chandragupta's mentor, Kautilya is revered both as architect of the Mauryan Empire and as the source of the Brahmin philosophy of statecraft.

Marcus Kim has compared the *Arthasastra* to Machiavelli's *The Prince*, in that it articulates a realist vision of "successful governance and government" in a hostile or anarchic world. Kautilya emphasized material strength over spiritual virtue and held that the primary goal of a ruler should be "to provide security and social well-being for society as a whole," employing whatever means were necessary to achieve that goal. Kim concludes that "Indian political rationalism is essentially an indigenous construct" derived from the *Arthasastra*, and not a modern Western import. "The roots of India's strategic thought lie in its ancient history," and with the Mauryan Empire "the collective 'Indian' identity started to emerge" (Kim 2004: 82, 90, 92, 99). Kautilya's *mandala* occupied a central place in Mauryan strategic thought: the conceptualization of other states in terms of concentric circles surrounding one's own, in which the closest circle of neighbors are likely enemies, the next circle friends, and so forth. Sidhu considers the *mandala*

a prime example of Kautilya's realism but cautions against applying it directly to modern India's defense and foreign policies (Sidhu 1996: 175–6). Varun Sahni, skeptical of the utility of cultural explanations, goes even farther, arguing that the central idea of the *mandala* is not "distinctly Indian" at all. Indeed, "this strategic notion forms the bedrock of how most large countries view their place in the world" (Sahni 1996: 161). The historical role of Kautilya's realism remains much less controversial than its contemporary relevance. Specific actions attributed to Kautilya's advice include deterring Alexander from following up on his initial success in the Punjab in 327 BCE by playing upon the Greek army's fear of war elephants, exaggerating the number in the elephant corps of the Maghada forces in a clever disinformation campaign that compelled Alexander to withdraw his war-weary army from India before it fought another major action. Bakshi attributes the military victories of Chandragupta and his successors to Kautilya's rejection of the *Mahabharata*'s conventional, chivalric Indian way of war; he "changed the emphasis . . . from attrition to physical and psychological mobility." He laments that "the Kautilyan interlude" lasted only a century and "was followed by a gradual regression to the primal attrition paradigm of the *Mahabharata*" (Bakshi 2002: 12–13, 119).

Kim traces another important element of Indian strategic culture, cultural pacifism, to the third Mauryan ruler, Ashoka, who embraced Buddhism after his bloody conquest of Kalinga (modern-day Orissa) on India's east coast in 261 BCE. While Buddhism all but disappeared in India after spreading to East and Southeast Asia, Kim considers the Buddhist conceptualization of Dharma relevant "to modern Indian politics" because "it strongly influenced Mahatma Gandhi" (Kim 2004: 82). At the time, the effects were much clearer, as Ashoka foreswore further warfare. The Mauryan Empire came unraveled in the half-century after his death in 238 BCE and a Hindu-dominated government would not rule over so much of India again until after 1947. It would be problematic to assert that after the reign of Ashoka pacifism became the dominant strategic value of India's Hindu majority. The extension of Muslim domination over most of the subcontinent (usually dated from the establishment of the Delhi sultanate in 1193, consolidated in the Mughal Empire after 1526) faced fierce military resistance at least from the Rajputs, the Hindu Kshatriya warriors of Rajasthan in northwest-central India. The Muslim victory over the Rajputs at Tarain (1192) made possible the creation of the Delhi sultanate, and Babur's triumph over the Rajputs at Khanua (1527) confirmed Mughal control at least over northern India. Over the decades that followed some Rajputs were co-opted by the Mughals, and those who continued to resist typically perished in suicidal uprisings against India's new masters (Keay 2000: 235–8, 313–15; Lal 2003: 42; Eraly 2004: 24–7). But Kim points out that, on a broader level, during centuries of Muslim domination "there was hardly any cultural resistance to the foreign political rule from Hindu society" (Kim 2004: 83).

The ancient roots of Gandhi's pacifist convictions are clear enough, and on the eve of independence his pragmatic protégé, the Republic of India's first prime minister, Jawarhalal Nehru, paid homage to Kautilya in his book *The Discovery*

of India (Nehru 1946: 117). Nevertheless, controversies surrounding ancient texts such as the *Mahabharata* and the *Arthasastra* cast doubt over claims that they have had anything approaching a consistent influence on strategic thinking throughout Indian history. In justifying his skepticism of any purported strategic culture or way of warfare of ancient vintage, Jeremy Black has emphasized "the problems faced in establishing the textual history of particular works and the details of their writers" (Black 2004a: 1229). While he makes this remark in reference to ancient Chinese texts (see discussion of China on pages 98–105), the point is perhaps more valid for similar works from India. In dating the *Mahabharata* scholars disagree over as many as five centuries, and in any event the epic existed as an oral tradition for at least twelve centuries before the first standard written version appeared. The *Arthasastra* was unknown in modern times until rediscovered by an Indian scholar in 1904; there is reason to believe that it dates from 320 to 300 BCE, but some scholars place it 400–600 years later, between the first and third centuries (Kim 2004: 89–90). While proponents of an Indian strategic culture and way of war emphasize India's cultural continuity and play down its fragmented political history, Black contends that for much of its past "India was a geographical rather than a cultural abstraction," within which the component states had their own unique military cultures and did not subscribe to overarching "Indian military values" (Black 2004a: 1227).

Black cites the Maratha Confederacy of the early modern period as an example of this phenomenon, highlighting Randolf Cooper's *The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy* (Cooper 2003; Black 2004a: 1227). The Marathas, a Hindu people, established a confederacy centered on their western home state of Maharashtra which eventually stretched from coast to coast across central India, challenging the Delhi-based Mughal Empire as well as the designs of the British East India Company (EIC). From 1784 to 1803 Maratha leaders of the Sindia clan served as regents of the Mughal emperor and, according to Cooper, "held greater political legitimacy than the British in North India" until Britain's victory over Maratha forces in the Battle of Delhi (1803) made the Mughal emperor a ward of the British rather than the Marathas (Cooper 2003: 75, 209). Cooper seeks to dispel myths about the Marathas, in particular their famous leader Shivaji Bhonsle (1627–80), whom Indian nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s romanticized as a "guerrilla." Shivaji actually commanded regular formations of infantry and artillery which were as competent as their European contemporaries. He even had a navy operating in the Arabian Sea, manned in part by Portuguese mercenaries (Cooper 2003: 23, 27, 31). While the Maratha people and their leaders were Hindu, Cooper rejects the notion "that the Maratha military forces . . . were 'Hindu' armies," based on evidence that Maratha troops also included "Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians," with some of the latter being European mercenaries (Cooper 2003: 3, 22). And they certainly were not fighting for a broader Hindu or Indian cause. Central to Cooper's argument is his depiction of a Maratha military culture that arose "well before European contact" but adapted to a specific early modern context in which the Mughals, the British EIC, other foreign actors,

and local warlords vied for control over parts of India. The Marathas were serious about warfare but, as realists, placed a premium on "cost effectiveness in terms of resource expenditure," both human and material. Their culture "did not necessarily endorse dying for a transitory political cause" (Cooper 2003: 57–8). In comparing the Marathas to their warrior predecessors, the chivalrous Rajputs, Abraham Eraly endorses this view of their essential pragmatism, observing that "for the Rajput, war was an end in itself; for the Maratha it was only a means. Rajputs played the game, Marathas played to win" (Eraly 2004: 435). Ultimately the British played the game better than the Marathas; their victory in 1803 came not through superior technology, training, or tactics, but because the EIC had the financial resources to persuade a number of professional soldiers, including most of the European mercenaries, to abandon Maratha service during the course of the decisive campaign. Cooper compares this development to "American military operations in Afghanistan" against the Taliban government in 2001–02, which "featured the purchase of regional commanders, as local bodies of troops were bought out of service for an agreeable price" (Cooper 2003: 312).

Despite his rejection of the manner in which some Indian nationalists have depicted the Marathas, Cooper concedes that they were "the last indigenous South Asian power" strong enough to stop or reverse the British takeover of India (Cooper 2003: 3). As soldiers within the early modern context, he gives them high marks particularly for their use of the muzzle-loading smoothbore artillery of the age, in particular "their willingness to carry heavy artillery into the field and use it in an anti-personnel context" (Cooper 2003: 59). Such an approach would be condemned by Bakshi as falling under the conventional Indian "attrition paradigm," but the Maratha way of war clearly had dominant realistic or pragmatic overtones reminiscent of "the Kautilyan interlude" he so admires. In any event, Cooper's study of the Marathas serves as an example of how, within India's fragmented history, military developments usually are more plausibly explained within the context of their own place and time, rather than in terms of the values and practices inherent in some overarching meta-narrative.

The British served the cause of Indian nationalism by providing a single, clearly alien adversary against which disparate elements of a fragmented society could rally. As leader of the last decades of the anti-colonial struggle, Gandhi (1869–1948) shaped the policies followed by the Republic of India after his death. Kim links his "ideas of self-rule" to India's non-alignment policy, and his belief in ahimsa (non-violence) to India's "defensive attitude toward war." The spirit of Gandhi's economic resistance to British rule also carried through in post-1947 India's "desire for economic and technological self-reliance" (Kim 2004: 97). But Kim disputes the characterization of Gandhi as a pacifist in the purest sense, quoting the Mahatma as saying "I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honor than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her dishonor" (quoted in Kim 2004: 93). Rajesh Basrur points out that while Gandhi thus accepted the existence of armed forces to defend the nation and did not advocate total disarmament, he "rejected nuclear weapons and deterrence outright as immoral" (Basrur 2001: 185–6). Long after

his death, the unequivocal nature of his position on the matter would be problematic for Indian strategists.

India became independent two years into the nuclear age, but until the very end of Nehru's long tenure as prime minister (1947–64) international circumstances allowed him to condemn nuclear weapons while not categorically ruling out the possibility of his own country acquiring them. Amitabh Mattoo dispels the image of Nehru as a "woolly-headed idealist," praising his strategy of non-alignment gave India "considerable leverage" and "international influence" during the early years of the Cold War. He concedes, however, that Nehru made mistakes, and in particular "did not accurately gauge . . . Chinese intentions" (Mattoo 1996: 204). India's defeat at the hands of China in the border war of 1962 prompted a reevaluation of Nehru's strategy. As Hilali has noted, the exposure of India's military weakness brought a decline in its influence throughout Asia and Africa. Nehru died in office in 1964, and later the same year China's successful atomic bomb test raised the question of whether India had to respond with a nuclear program of its own in order to ensure its future security. Nehru's Congress Party remained in power long after his death, providing continuity as Indian policy slowly evolved. Lal Bahadur Shastri, serving as prime minister (1964–66) between Nehru and his daughter Indira Gandhi, in 1965 took an initial tentative step by authorizing a process designed to lead to an underground nuclear test. Meanwhile, arms deals with the Soviet Union improved the Indian air force and navy, while the creation of mountain divisions strengthened the army's position in the Himalayas (Basrur 2001: 186; Hilali 2001: 739; Kim 2004: 85). The army also streamlined its logistics after the 1962 defeat, breaking with the tradition of what Bakshi calls a "lopsided . . . teeth-to-tail ratio" reflected historically in the massive supply train of the Mughal army and, in the more distant past, in the "elaborate logistical infrastructure" of the armed forces in the *Mahabharata* epic (Bakshi 2002: 121).

Basrur contends that realist theory does not explain India's continued reluctance to develop nuclear weapons in the wake of China's nuclear test in 1964, at a time when "the constraints imposed by the non-proliferation regime were yet to become potent" (Basrur 2001: 188). Under Indira Gandhi, India finally tested its first nuclear device in 1974, but she refused to proceed with a nuclear weapons program and followed her father's lead in rejecting the concept of nuclear deterrence. Returning to office after three years out of power (1977–80), she indirectly improved India's future nuclear strike capability by initiating a missile program. It fell to her son, Rajiv Gandhi (prime minister 1984–89), to finally approve a nuclear weapons program in 1988, but only after the UN did not act upon his appeal for "universal and total nuclear disarmament." Basrur observes that under five subsequent prime ministers (1989–98) reflecting a variety of political views, "India's nuclear policy continued to be characterized by restraint" while its missile technology improved in the face of post-Cold War "non-proliferation pressures," the increase of Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan, and the decrease of Soviet/Russian aid to India (Basrur 2001: 186–7). Deepa Ollapally concludes that "strategic culture is an important explanation of how

decision-making on India's nuclear policy evolved" during these years of "non-decision," in which Indian leaders placed a premium on "keeping all options open" (Ollapally 2001: 929).

Dinshaw Mistry highlights the role of the UN's Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in inadvertently pushing India (and consequently, Pakistan) to conduct nuclear weapons tests. Building upon the earlier Non-Proliferation Treaty, the UN General Assembly approved the CTBT with the stipulation that all 44 countries possessing either nuclear weapons, nuclear power reactors, or conducting nuclear research had to sign and ratify it in order for it to go into force. In September and October 1996, 41 of the countries signed the treaty; only India, Pakistan, and North Korea did not (Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization 2005). Prior to its decision not to sign the CTBT, India had tried to link the new treaty to a commitment of nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-armed powers, but to no avail. "New Delhi then remained outside the treaty in 1996, and this paved the way for its nuclear breakout in 1998" (Mistry 2003: 117–19). The episode served as a sobering example of the unintended consequences of international regimes (Saksena 2001).

In May 1998, shortly after coming to power, a coalition government led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee's nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ordered nuclear weapons tests and promulgated an embryonic Indian nuclear doctrine embracing deterrence but including a no first use pledge. At the time, India's move met with widespread international condemnation, as a provocation to which Pakistan felt compelled to respond with its own round of nuclear tests, but afterward, scholars and analysts disagreed over whether the tests marked a departure from or evolution in India's nuclear strategic culture. While Kim characterizes the "symbolic show of force" as a "rejection of the long-standing policy of nuclear restraint," Basrur points out that the actions taken by Vajpayee built upon, rather than broke from, the course Rajiv Gandhi set a decade earlier when India first began to develop nuclear weapons (Basrur 2001: 188; Kim 2004: 97–8). Ollapally cites a subsequent (1999) report by India's national security advisory board indicating its conclusion that "the former ambiguous stance" simply had outlived its usefulness (Ollapally 2001: 935). On the occasion of India's nuclear tests Vajpayee's foreign minister, fellow BJP member Jaswant Singh, issued a statement acknowledging the cultural underpinning of the decision and of strategy in general:

> The integrating roles of civilization, culture, and faith sustain a nation's strategic sense and enable it either to grow and meet the challenge of altering circumstances, or to fail. Strategic thought will be absent, or irrelevant, if it be not accompanied by a sense of high nationalism.
>
> (quoted in Kim 2004: 76)

Shortly thereafter, the foreign minister published *Defending India*, a book written, for the most part, before the BJP government entered office. As a prelude to chapters advocating a thorough reexamination of India's foreign, defense, and economic policies, Singh opens with an extensive chapter on India's strategic culture in which he criticizes Nehru (and, by implication, the Congress Party) for

failing to provide the country with "a stable security environment, or even secure frontiers." Instead, Nehru established a tradition of a "hesitant and tentative" foreign policy, characteristics "born of his search for the idealistically moral" (Singh 1999: 39, 43). Singh's lengthy enumeration of the "negative attributes" of Indian strategic culture formed under Nehru includes "veneration of the received wisdom; an absence of iconoclastic questioning; a still continuing lack of institutional framework for policy formulation; lack of a sense of history and geography; an absence of sufficient commitment to territorial impregnability; and a tendency to remain static in yesterday's doctrines" (Singh 1999: 58).

In addition to its border war with China in 1962, by the end of the twentieth century India had fought four wars against Pakistan. After brief, indecisive conflicts in 1947–48 and 1965, India intervened militarily in a crisis in East Pakistan in 1971 and facilitated that territory's declaration of independence as Bangladesh. Bakshi sees India's conventional "attrition paradigm" of warfare applying to all four Indo-Pakistani wars but singles out the 1971 conflict as modern India's clearest, closest reflection of the traditional values in its strategic culture and way of war. India "took bold risks and . . . won a tremendous victory," but only after "the whole world was convinced of the justice and righteousness of the Indian cause." Facing a flood of refugees fleeing East Pakistan over a period of eight months, India built international goodwill by exercising restraint and waiting for Pakistan to make the first move militarily (Bakshi 2002: 134–5). The fourth Indo-Pakistani war, fought in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, began when Pakistani army and Mujaheddin infiltrators crossed the Line of Control (truce line) dividing the disputed territory, and ended after a robust Indian military response (including the Indian navy's largest-ever exercises in the Arabian Sea astride Pakistan's line of oil supply from the Persian Gulf) combined with international pressure to compel Pakistan to back down. The war broke out just twelve months after the two South Asian powers publicly acknowledged their nuclear weapons capabilities in their respective tests of 1998 and, according to Basrur, serves as "a classic case of restrained low-intensity conflict between nuclear adversaries." India ultimately sent 730,000 troops to the Kashmir region, but total combat deaths on both sides during the ten weeks of fighting totaled less than 1,300 (Global Security 1999; Basrur 2001: 195).

According to Basrur, the nuclear strategy of India has "stayed within the neorealist framework" in that its ultimate goal is "to ensure security through the possession of military capability in an anarchic self-help system." Under his rather limited definition of strategic culture (see Chapter 1 of this volume), "strategic culture facilitates arms control and . . . the building of stable strategic relationships" (Basrur 2001: 195–6). Kim, in contrast, has raised the question of whether nuclear weapons really will "induce stability and security" in the South Asian subcontinent owing to "the fear of nuclear retaliation," as Kenneth Waltz and the neorealists argue. He cites Stephen P. Cohen in concluding that India wanted to become a nuclear power for cultural reasons, including prestige factors and a desire for national greatness (Cohen 2000: 17–20; Kim 2004: 76). Regardless of whether India's motives reflect rational security choices or an increasingly self-confident nationalism, it is difficult to dispute Basrur's contention that the country's nuclear policy reflects a "nuclear minimalism."

India's leaders clearly have a "very limited" view of the positive security value of nuclear weapons, conceptualize nuclear weapons in political rather than military-technological terms, and show great restraint in dealing with all questions related to their nuclear weapons program (Basrur 2001: 184). Changes in leaders and parties in power have done nothing to disrupt the relative continuity of Indian nuclear policy. India's parliament, "atomic energy technocrats," public opinion, relative technological weakness, and relative poverty also have had little impact. To Basrur, this continuity provides evidence of "the significance of strategic culture" (Basrur 2001: 189–90). Regardless of whether one accepts the assertions of Bakshi regarding a way of war within the context of India's strategic culture, authors with viewpoints as different as Bakshi or Kim, who hark back to antiquity, and Basrur, who considers the context of the nuclear age only, accept the role of cultural factors in Indian strategy.

China

China, unlike India, has been a political as well as a cultural and geographic entity ever since ancient times. Just as the leaders of the Russian and Soviet armed forces have argued consistently for the uniqueness of their country's military history, doctrine, and methods, Chinese leaders and the Chinese academics and analysts who study them typically assert that "a distinctive traditional Chinese philosophy" dating back to antiquity shapes their country's approach to international relations, including its attitude toward warfare (Scobell 2002: 1). The most influential ancient Chinese military text, *The Art of War* by Sun Zi (Sun Tzu), dates from the first decades of the Warring States period (403–221 BCE), a protracted time of internal division and unrest immediately preceding national unification under the Qin dynasty, and an era which produced a rich literature on strategy and tactics (Fairbank 1974: 4). Historian Shu Guang Zhang contends that Mao Zedong was "truly obsessed" with instances from ancient Chinese warfare in which a weaker army had defeated a stronger one. His favorite examples went back as far as the Battle of Chenggao in 203 BCE (S.G. Zhang 1995: 28–9, 1999: 29–50). The unmistakable continuity in China's strategic outlook and behavior throughout the imperial period and into the communist era strengthens the case for a unique Chinese strategic culture. Successive Chinese regimes have embraced a realpolitik which, on a superficial level, may be explained by realist theory, but the nuances of Chinese policy and the perspective from which China views the rest of the world are better understood from a culturalist perspective.

In his contribution to the edited volume *Chinese Ways in Warfare*, John King Fairbank questions "China's alleged uniqueness" but proceeds to identify "specific habits of mind and action" that reflect the traditional view of Chinese attitudes toward the use of force: "a tendency to disesteem heroism and violence" and to emphasize the civilian over the military; a preference for defensive, attritional warfare over offensive warfare with the goal of annihilating the enemy; and a conceptualization of warfare as limited and punitive rather than global and expansionist (Fairbank 1974: 25–6). In his works on Traditional (1995)

and Communist (1996) China, Alastair Iain Johnston rejects this traditional conventional wisdom, citing evidence of the country's consistent realpolitik, but argues that "cultural realism" rather than realist theory offers the best explanation for Chinese strategic preferences and behavior (A.I. Johnston 1995a, 1996). Johnston postulates the existence of two competing strategic cultures to explain the record of Chinese behavior in light of China's purported cultural values. The Confucian–Mencian strategic culture, based upon the philosophy of Confucius (551–479 BCE), to some extent filtered through his interpreter Mencius (390?–305? BCE), reflects idealistic pacific and defensive sentiments, while the parabellum or realpolitik strategic culture views the world in realistic terms and considers the offensive use of force not only legitimate but desirable. Johnston dismisses the Confucian–Mencian strategic culture following a detailed analysis of the *Seven Military Classics*, compiled in 1083 under the Song dynasty and used as the basis for Chinese state military examinations as late as the Qing dynasty (1644–1911). In Johnston's estimation, 6 of the 7 classic texts reflect the parabellum or realpolitik strategic culture, just one the Confucian–Mencian. He concludes that by the time of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) reference to Confucian–Mencian principles in strategic texts had been reduced to "a linguistic custom" of no real significance (A.I. Johnston 1995a: 46, 143–54, 253). On the basis of such persuasive arguments Johnston's view has come to dominate the field, but dissenters remain. In response to Johnston and Shu Guang Zhang, Tiejun Zhang echoes Fairbank's earlier works in arguing that Confucian beliefs indeed had a strong influence on traditional Chinese strategic culture. From the birth of the Chinese Empire (221 BCE) to its defeat in the Opium War (1839–42), China was a self-sufficient continental power facing no serious threats from the outside. Such conditions afforded China the luxury of a strategy driven by a "cultural moralism" rather than Johnston's "cultural realism" (T. Zhang 2002: 73–4).

Some scholars, mindful of the diversity of China's historical experiences, geography, and ethnicity, naturally question any culturalist explanation rooted in ancient times as being just as implausible as Victor Davis Hanson's notion of a consistent Western way of war. Jeremy Black points to "the problems faced in establishing the textual history of particular works and the details of their writers, especially . . . those from China," as well as "the typicality of what survives and the questionable nature of the relationship between literature and practice." In particular, Black questions "discussion of the Chinese way of war as if there was only one" (Black 2004a: 1229). Andrew Scobell has argued for the continuing relevance of the parallel defensive "Confucian–Mencian" tradition in China's strategic culture, alongside the offensive realpolitik that Johnston attributes to cultural realism. According to Scobell, the Chinese tend to view their own strategic culture in Confucian terms, but their actual "cult of defense" stems from the dialectic interaction between the defensive and offensive traditions, with the former often being used to justify the latter. While many leaders of regimes over the centuries have rationalized offensive behavior in defensive terms, some more hypocritically than others, the Chinese have an especially strong conviction in the purity of their own motives and their own past conduct. The Great Wall, by far

the largest protective fortification ever constructed by any civilization, remains a powerful symbol of a Chinese defensive mentality. Chinese scholars are also fond of contrasting the benign nature of the fifteenth-century voyages of Ming China's Zheng He, who did not attempt to conquer or colonize the South Asian and East African coasts he visited, with the aggressive nature of the European imperialism that started just decades later. Yet while Chinese leaders "believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist," as Scobell observes, "they are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when confronting crises" (Scobell 2002: 4). Indeed, the gap between self-perception and the perception of outsiders appears greater in the case of China than with any other country.

Alone among scholars focusing on Chinese strategic culture, Tiejun Zhang argues that there is little continuity between the strategic thought of Traditional and Communist China. While he concedes that contemporary Chinese strategic culture reflects "certain elements of its traditional counterpart," he argues that "fundamental changes in international and domestic circumstances" have left Chinese strategy driven by a "defensive realism" in which material considerations matter more than "cultural and ideational preferences" (T. Zhang 2002: 73). But Johnston's arguments are more persuasive. After establishing the durability of Traditional China's strategic culture "across different structural contexts," Johnston demonstrates its continuation into the communist era in the thinking of Mao Zedong (A.I. Johnston 1996: 217). Mao's theory of contradictions, grounded in traditional Chinese dualism as well as in Marxist–Leninist thought, presupposed continuous conflict. Mao did not think conflict begged solution, and instead saw conflict itself as the solution. Thus in the Maoist dialectic, contradictions led to conflicts which produced new contradictions that would lead to new conflicts (A.I. Johnston 1996: 229–30). Johnston joins Shu Guang Zhang and a host of other authors in repeating some of Mao's most Clausewitzian quotes, such as "politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed" (S.G. Zhang 1995: 13, 1996: 230). But Johnston points to evidence suggesting that Mao read Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) and ancient Chinese strategic texts before his first exposure to Marx or Lenin or Clausewitz. Johnston concludes that Traditional Chinese thought, Marxism–Leninism, and Clausewitz provided "a mutual reinforcement of the hard realpolitik tendencies in his strategic thought," tendencies that reflected the strategic outlook of countless Chinese leaders before him (A.I. Johnston 1996: 246, 248).

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) established the Red Army in 1927, at the onset of its long-armed struggle against the Nationalist government of China. It was renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1945. Having created the army over two decades before it gained control of the state, the CCP never had to fear the PLA as an autonomous player or potential rival; indeed, they shared the same leadership, including Mao himself. Before he established himself as an undisputed political and military leader of the CCP during the Long March of 1934–35, Mao served both as a field commander and as the Chinese equivalent of a high-level Soviet army political commissar. Throughout, he emphasized the importance of political indoctrination within the army (S.G. Zhang 1995: 14–15).

Mao built upon a Chinese just war theory dating back to Confucius, which defined an unjust war as one waged by oppressors, and a just war as one fought by the oppressed against their oppressors. Alongside the foreign imperialists long identified as China's oppressors, he included all oppressors of peasants and workers. He considered all strategies and tactics morally legitimate within the context of a just war (Scobell 2002: 10–11; A.I. Johnston 1996: 232). Mao's central concepts included an "absolute flexibility" deeply rooted in the Chinese tradition and emphasized by Sun Zi in his classic *The Art of War*. But Mao did not accept the wisdom of Sun Zi in its entirety. Guo Huaruo, Communist China's foremost interpreter of Sun Zi, persuaded Mao that the "minimal violence" axiom articulated in *The Art of War* "was un-Marxist, since class enemies could not be credibly defeated without the application of violence" (A.I. Johnston 1996: 238–9, 247). In any event, in keeping with Chinese tradition, Mao believed the use of force, offensive or defensive, should always be characterized as "active defense" for domestic and international political reasons. While Johnston considers "active defense" little more than a propaganda ruse, Scobell believes it has "real significance" as a strategic concept in that the blurring of the line between offense and defense serves the tradition of "absolute flexibility" (A.I. Johnston 1996: 249; Scobell 2002: 8).

Johnston and Scobell cite data showing that the communist regime in China employed military force in 8 of 11 crises it faced between its establishment in 1949 and 1985, much more than any other country in that time frame. All of these involved conflicts along China's borders and reflected what Johnston has called a "historical sensitivity" in matters related to territorial integrity (A.I. Johnston 1996: 252; Scobell 2002: 12–14). Each also involved a limited use of force, "to achieve specific political goals," as Scobell has observed, or "to send a warning or a message of deterrence or compellance" rather than "to achieve a resounding military victory." China takes risks, but they are "calculated risks" (Scobell 2002: 22–3). Shu Guang Zhang agrees that "the Chinese regard the use, not merely the demonstration, of force as an important means of crisis management." His analysis of a series of Sino-American confrontations – the endgame of the civil war in 1949, the Korean war of 1950–53, the crisis caused by the French collapse in Indochina in 1954, the first Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954–55, and the second Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958 – bears out this point. To Zhang, China's intervention in Korea and brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait crises "reflected this Chinese calculation that short-term belligerency would serve as a means of general deterrence" (S.G. Zhang 1992: 280). Mao's early successes vindicated his strategy: within a span of five years, he drove the Nationalists out of mainland China, preserved communist North Korea through intervention in the Korean War, and deterred the United States (with the sobering example of the Korean War) from sending troops to aid the French in Indochina (A.I. Johnston 1996: 245).

Mao proclaimed the armistice ending the Korean War "a great victory," and the Chinese people received it as such. By fighting the United States to a stalemate, China broke a string of defeats at the hands of major Western countries that dated from the First Opium War (1839–42) against Britain. Shu Guang Zhang

emphasizes the role of the war in bolstering the credibility of China's posture against colonialism, prestige among Asian nations, and relevance in the eyes of the Soviet Union (S.G. Zhang 1995: 248–9). Zhang concludes that the series of crises pitting Communist China against the United States in the years 1949–58 confirm Ken Booth's argument about ethnocentrism and strategy, as each side clearly attempted to understand the other on its own terms and rarely guessed right. "Culture-bound" Chinese and Americans fundamentally misunderstood each other's interests and threat perceptions. Differences in decision-making, communication, crisis behavior, and cost-benefit analyses compounded their errors (S.G. Zhang 1992: 271–83).

Shortly after driving the Nationalists from the mainland in 1949, Mao observed that "we must build a powerful navy to defend China's coast and effectively prohibit imperialist invasion" (quoted in S.G. Zhang 1992: 68). But as Johnston has observed, naval weakness was a liability that could not be overcome "in the short run," and thus was responsible for the "one instance in which China did not resort to force immediately in the face of threat to a high-value territorial security issue," the deployment of the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in June 1950 to block Mao from invading Taiwan (A.I. Johnston 1996: 258). In the long run Communist China would lack the confidence to pursue its strategic goals aggressively only at sea, where its circumspect approach may be explained both in terms of realism and of Johnston's cultural realpolitik. Early in the twenty-first century it appeared likely that the Chinese would follow Admiral Gorshkov's Soviet Cold War strategy of not seeking a Mahanian "command of the sea" but to have a navy strong enough to deny it to the United States, though not worldwide (the Soviet goal) but only in the waters off East Asia. This relatively modest, achievable objective – increasingly more achievable, given the shortsightedness of post-Cold War American policies regarding naval construction – sustained a Chinese naval buildup that would otherwise seem pointless. In any event, it remains to be seen if Chinese strategists can overcome the traditional notion that all things maritime are somehow un-Chinese. Scobell sees evidence of this prejudice in the geopolitical views of the leading military scholar, Peng Huaidong, who contends that "China possesses a 'continental culture' that stresses 'moral self-cultivation', while most Western countries have 'maritime cultures' that stress 'courage, strength, and technology' " (Scobell 2002: 17).

China's navy did not experience significant growth before Mao's death in 1976, owing to the failure of the Great Leap Forward, his industrialization program of the late 1950s, and the subsequent turmoil of his Cultural Revolution. Industrialization and economic growth finally came when Deng Xiaoping, Communist China's leading figure from 1981 to 1997, allowed capitalism in the economy while maintaining the CCP's political monopoly. All branches of the Chinese armed forces benefited as Deng "placed more emphasis on technical competence than on ideological commitment," according to Brian Ripley. Departing from convictions held dear by Mao since the 1930s, the officer corps of the PLA became distinctly less political, instead aspiring to the professionalism of its counterparts in developed countries. Ripley interprets "the PLA's initial

reluctance to use lethal force against the Tiananmen Square demonstrators" in 1989 as evidence of this trend, which Deng arrested only after disciplining some officers "for perceived disloyalty to the party" (Ripley 2002: 131). Scobell concludes that Deng's modernization of the armed forces did not change China's strategic culture or cause it to "become more bellicose or aggressive," even though "the war-fighting capabilities of the People's Liberation Army have improved" since the 1980s (Scobell 2002: v).

Mao, Deng, and other political authorities of their generation who also held direct military command personified the close connection between the party and the armed forces. But according to Ripley, by the turn of the century the PLA leadership had "emerged as a more independent voice in establishing security policy," owing to the trend toward professionalism under Deng and the generational change which left the PLA with no surviving senior officers who could "trace their roots to the revolutionary struggle" of the years before 1949, when political leaders and military commanders were one and the same. But the strategic principles guiding the PLA still reflect Chinese tradition as filtered through the works of Mao. Indeed, Ripley notes that "the PLA is more likely to take a hard line on issues such as Taiwan or other territorial disputes" (Ripley 2002: 132). Regarding Taiwan, where the Nationalist Chinese regime established itself after 1949 under US protection, Scobell notes that "no compromise is possible" because "national unification is a core value in China's national security calculus" deeply rooted in its experience of over a century (1839–1949) of division and domination by foreigners. The issue of Taiwan is uniquely non-negotiable for a Communist Chinese leadership that is otherwise very pragmatic (Scobell 2002: 11). According to Zhang, China would not consider an invasion of Taiwan to be "an international conflict" because, ever since 1949, it has viewed the Taiwan question as an unfinished aspect of the Chinese Civil War. During the 1950s responsibility for matters related to Taiwan rested with the East China Military Command rather than the foreign ministry, reflecting Beijing's perception that Taiwan was a military problem, not a diplomatic issue (S.G. Zhang 1992: 269).

Although the United States and Communist China have fought each other only in Korea, from the start the status of Taiwan has been the central issue in Chinese-American relations. The establishment of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington in the 1970s made the American relationship to the Nationalist government of Taiwan far more ambiguous before, but the United States remains committed to preventing China from taking Taiwan by force. At least since the era of Deng Xiaoping, China has viewed the United States as both a model and a threat, though Scobell specifies that it is a "broader security threat" rather than a "direct military threat" because, since the 1970s, the American strategy has been to "undermine China through peaceful evolution" (Scobell 2002: 16) by integrating China into the world economy and making its trade with the United States so valuable that it could not be jeopardized for the sake of seizing Taiwan. Any admiration post-Mao Chinese leaders and scholars may have for the United States remains tempered by a strong measure of contempt, an attitude that extends to the West in general. Their general tendency is to view China's own behavior as

ethical, pacific, and human-centered, against an American strategic culture and Western way of war that is realist, expansionist, and driven by technology (Scobell 2002: 17). Indeed, Mao's own faith in the human versus the technological colored his initial reaction to the invention of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, touching off the Cold War nuclear arms race just weeks before Mao's forces won the Chinese Civil War. Having secured control over mainland China with a low-tech peasant army, Mao at first dismissed the significance of nuclear weapons but, according to Zhang, he gradually came round to the view that "the atomic bomb was a real tiger" and the United States might use it against China. China started developing its own nuclear weapons in 1955. The following year Mao justified the decision to fellow CCP leaders by pointing out that China needed "atomic bombs" to avoid being "bullied by others" (S.G. Zhang 1992: 281). China joined the ranks of the world's nuclear powers when it detonated its first test bomb in 1964. That year, the Chinese became the first to pledge "no first use" of nuclear weapons, a commitment in keeping with the philosophical principles underpinning their strategy (Scobell 2002: 9).

In the post-Cold War world, China's relationship with Japan ranks second in significance only to its relationship with the United States. Like the United States, Japan has served as a model for China but is also considered a threat. After Cold War détente facilitated the establishment of diplomatic relations, from Mao's death through the 1980s Chinese leaders valued the Japanese example in economic development. But according to Scobell, this temporary warming of ties did little to overcome the traditional Chinese view that holds Japan's Shinto religious beliefs to be "primitive," its bushido martial values "barbaric," and its "philosophical tradition" weak or shallow. Furthermore, Japan's record of brutality in its occupation of the most heavily populated areas of China during the Second World War has left a lasting impact on Sino-Japanese relations. China does not believe that Japan's post-1945 pacifist strategic culture is either sincere or irreversible. In their strategic considerations, PLA leaders view the Japanese Self Defense Forces at face value, as a formidable potential enemy (Scobell 2002: 14–16). In April 2005 an outbreak of anti-Japanese violence in Chinese cities confirmed the enduring relevance of old animosities, as demonstrators protested the Japanese government's approval of textbooks downplaying the wartime record of atrocities in China. In response, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi contended that "Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility," reiterating the apology offered by a predecessor amid great fanfare a decade earlier, on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the conflict (BBC April 22, 2005).

Among the authors whose works have dealt with China's strategic culture and ways of war, Johnston is perhaps better known for his role in the overall discourse on strategic culture: his identification of three "generations" in the literature, placing himself in the third; his insistence that a theory of strategic culture must be narrow enough to be falsifiable in order to be useful; and his vigorous disagreements with Colin Gray and "first generation" advocates of a broader definition of strategic culture. In articulating his "cultural realist" explanation for

China's parabellum or realpolitik tradition, Johnston concedes the existence of a Confucian–Mencian tradition but makes a case for its "irrelevance" in modern times (A.I. Johnston 1995a: 253). But in dismissing the elements of Chinese strategic culture that clearly appeal to that tradition, such as the "active defense" concept, as little more than a smokescreen for China's realpolitik, Johnston's analysis is much more realist than culturalist. In contrast, Scobell's argument for a dialectic interaction between the defensive and offensive traditions, in which the former is frequently used to justify the latter, holds greater promise. Scobell, along with Zhang, has contributed significantly to the understanding of how the Chinese view themselves and others, an area in which the realists, and to a great degree Johnston as well, have little to offer.

Japan

Japan, like Germany, poses problems for the culturalist approach because, after 1945, the Japanese attitude toward the use of force broke decisively with the past, undergoing a sea change which (aside from that of Germany) has been unique for a major state in modern times. While the collapse of the Soviet Union improved Japan's security situation, unlike Germany it still faced other credible threats (from China as well as North Korea) dating from the Cold War, and thus did not enjoy the same freedom to reassert itself as a great power. Nevertheless, Japan, like Germany, has followed a course that realist theories would not have predicted, especially since the end of the Cold War, and this recent period has attracted most of the attention in the literature on Japanese strategic culture. The main exception to this rule is the work of Forrest Morgan, focusing on the period of history in which Japan ruled an overseas empire (1894–1945).

For Japan in Asia, as for Britain in Europe, geography traditionally afforded the luxury of a degree of choice in whether to become involved in continental affairs. But the Korea Strait, 100 miles across, is almost five times wider than the English Channel at Dover–Calais and, in pre-modern times, afforded the Japanese a degree of security from continental threats that the British never enjoyed. And while the British Isles, over the centuries, faced a host of potential conquerors from the European mainland to the south (and others from Scandinavia, during the Middle Ages), Japan had to contend only with Korea and China, neither of which had a formidable fleet. Thus, before the onset of European contact in the sixteenth century, the Japanese under normal circumstances faced no seaborne security threats and also had no significant overseas trade. After their conquest by the Mongols, China and Korea joined forces to invade Japan in 1274 and again in 1281, but Japanese defensive preparations combined with timely typhoons (the legendary *kamikaze* or "divine wind") to foil both attempts. Japan's only invasion of the mainland, Hideyoshi Toyotomi's assault on Korea (1592–98), likewise failed miserably (Evans and Peattie 1997: 1–4; Morgan 2003: 45–7).

Unlike China, where all-powerful emperors ruled under the "Mandate of Heaven," which could be lost – hence the occasional changes in dynasty – in Japan descendants of the original chiefs of the Yamato clan constituted the

imperial family from the third century onward. The emperor had the status of god-on-earth in traditional Shinto belief but, during the ninth and tenth centuries, ceased to have any political significance. An increasingly turbulent domestic scene degenerated into civil war, from which the Minamoto clan emerged victorious. In 1185 the head of the Minamoto established himself as the first shogun, principal warlord in a feudal system dominated by samurai warriors and governed by martial values. For nearly 700 years thereafter, the shoguns served as *de facto* rulers of the country. The land-bound system had a maritime feature in that some clans maintained naval forces on Japan's narrow Inland Sea, separating the main island of Honshu from the islands of Shikoku and Kyushu. Cultural and philosophical influences from China included Buddhism, Confucianism, and the military writings of Sun Zi, absorbed during the sixth and seventh centuries, but as in modern times, the Japanese managed to learn and borrow from others while preserving the essence of their own culture and values. Admiral Chosei Ogasawara, Japan's leading naval historian of the early 1900s, asserted that a blend of medieval clan naval tactics, the ideas of Sun Zi, and tactics learned from the Koreans and Portuguese formed something like a Japanese way of naval warfare, but historians David Evans and Mark Peattie dismiss claims to "a uniquely Japanese naval doctrine" of such vintage, centuries before Japan had a "formally organized navy" (Evans and Peattie 1997: 2, 543n2; Morgan 2003: 38–48).

According to Morgan, an "extreme political and social rigidity" characterized the Tokugawa shogunate (1603–1868), which reacted to the threat posed by increasing numbers of European merchants and missionaries by closing Japan to the outside world for 250 years. In 1853 a United States naval mission under Commodore Matthew C. Perry forced Japan to end its isolation. European powers, exploiting China in the wake of the First Opium War (1839–42), soon turned their attention to Japan as well. Fifteen years of increasing foreign exploitation led to the overthrow of the shogunate by a group of reform-minded samurai led by the Satsuma and Choshu domains. Taking power in the name of the Meiji emperor, the leaders of the "Meiji Restoration" returned Japan to its tradition of learning and borrowing from outsiders. They sought the best foreign training and advice in establishing domestic industries and modern national armed forces. The Meiji Constitution of 1889 incorporated several features copied from the constitution of Bismarck's Second Reich, empowering the emperor (or in this case, the coalition of prominent families whose members governed in his name) to conduct foreign policy and direct the armed forces while limiting the powers of the legislature (Morgan 2003: 49–57).

Yuri Kase has noted the "independent and powerful role played by the military within the Japanese state" from the Meiji Restoration through the Second World War (Kase 2004: 130). Because the emperor, to whom they were constitutionally responsible, remained largely a figurehead, "Japan's two armed forces were essentially accountable to no one," as Evans and Peattie have observed, aside from the annual deliberations over their budgets (Evans and Peattie 1997: 26). According to Naoko Sajima, the pervasive militarism apparent in the Japan of the 1920s–1945 lacked deep historical roots. Traditionally the warrior class made up only around

10 percent of the population, and the warrior ethos had been limited to that class. But after the Meiji Restoration "the warrior's behavior was introduced to the public at large" through conscription (Sajima 1999: 78). Indeed, the army and navy became the focal point of a modern nationalism rooted in Japan's "ancient" bushido martial values. Bushido has been used as a cultural explanation for Japanese military behavior during the Second World War – including the army's atrocities in China and other occupied countries, the kamikaze pilots of 1944–45, the suicidal fight-to-the-death mentality, and the brutal treatment of prisoners of war – but Evans and Peattie are among the authors acknowledging the manufactured nature of this tradition. "The ethical and psychological content of the Japanese martial tradition" represented "a selective borrowing . . . of samurai values from the Tokugawa period." They conclude that bushido represented "the attempt to instill values useful to the military of a modern nation-state" but "had almost nothing to do with medieval Japanese warfare" (Evans and Peattie 1997: 543n4). Morgan agrees that bushido became codified under the Tokugawa, combining selected concepts from Confucianism with Japanese warrior traditions that had evolved since the initial Minamoto shogunate. It became elevated to "a national ethos" of patriotic self-sacrifice after the Meiji Restoration. He attributes to this feudal legacy modern Japan's "context-dependent moral framework" and tendency to marginalize "universal values such as truth or justice" (Morgan 2003: 50–1, 59–60, 64).

The power of Japan's army and navy was checked most significantly because they checked each other. After Japan emerged as a great power via its victories over China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05) and alliance with Britain (1902), the army advocated a "northern" strategy of expansion into the Asian mainland via Korea and Manchuria, while the navy countered with a "southern" strategy of expansion via Taiwan into Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (Evans and Peattie 1997: 23, 50, 148). Intervening in the First World War via their British connection, the Japanese made further territorial acquisitions on the mainland and in the Pacific islands, fueling the ambitions of both services. In the interwar years the only voices of reason came from the so-called treaty faction within the navy, which accepted the Washington (1922) and London (1930) treaties acknowledging Japan as the world's third naval power, with a strength equal to 60 percent of the British and American navies (the 5:5:3 ratio). The anti-British, anti-American "fleet faction," in contrast, rejected the international regime of naval arms limits. In 1932, the year after Japan took Manchuria from China, ultranationalist groups assassinated the liberal prime minister and other leading moderates. Other assassinations and attempts marred the years that followed. While it remains unclear whether hard-liners in the armed forces formally directed these groups, their actions sufficed to eliminate or intimidate moderates and establish a *de facto* military dictatorship. Initially fronted by pliable civilian politicians, the dictatorship's cabinets ultimately were led by military men, most notably General Hideki Tojo (prime minister, 1941–44). Army leaders struck a bargain with the navy's dominant "fleet faction" to expand the Japanese empire in the Pacific as well as on the Asian mainland. With few exceptions, the navy reflected the same

ultranationalist extremism that dominated the army and led Japan to disaster in the Second World War (Sondhaus 2004: 218–20).

In his analysis of Japan's strategic culture during the country's period as an imperial power (1894–1945), Morgan demonstrates the extent to which the framework and ethos of bushido and the web of traditions surrounding it shaped the behavior of Japanese leaders, raising the question of whether they were "entangled in the very strings they used to manipulate their subjects" (Morgan 2003: 69). Within the imperial government, as within any present-day Japanese corporation, the decision-making process took the form of an upward spiral, with trial balloons floating to the top and successful policies gradually gaining acceptance by consensus. Ministers never presented a policy to the emperor unless it had already gone through this process, making his approval a foregone conclusion. Thus while the Meiji Constitution empowered the emperor to veto policies, "social custom prohibited it" (Morgan 2003: 62–3, 172). This decision-making process reflected Japan's core value of preserving internal harmony, in the service of its more important core value of preserving the dignity of the emperor as the symbol of the nation and its aspirations to great-power status. At the same time, Japan's warrior values placed a premium on individual courage, loyal service, the avoidance of shame, and a stoic acceptance of one's fate, while borrowed Confucian concepts included a respect for hierarchy, proper behavior, and contextual morality. All of these combined to make Japan persistent in its policies, extraordinarily resistant to coercion, and often duplicitous in the eyes of other countries, but also slow to react to opportunities as well as to threats (Morgan 2003: 66–8).

During its half-century as an imperial power Japan backed down under pressure only once, at the end of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), when Russia, France, and Germany compelled Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula (with Port Arthur) to China. In Morgan's analysis, Japan's strategic culture allowed this retreat because victory in the war (irrespective of territorial gain) had achieved the goal of establishing Japan as the leading power of Asia, surpassing China, and because at the time, the country clearly ranked behind the three coercing powers internationally. Thus, Japan could give up its conquests at their insistence without losing face (Morgan 2003: 111–13). In contrast, when the United States responded to Japan's annexation of Manchuria (1931), invasion of the rest of China (1937), and occupation of French Indochina (1940) by imposing a crippling oil embargo in July 1941, the Japanese refused to be coerced into giving up their conquests. According to Morgan, some of the same elements of Japan's strategic culture by then worked against succumbing to outside pressure. Most Japanese leaders perceived their country to be the equal of the other great powers, and in their eyes, relinquishing "righteous" conquests on the Asian mainland would involve a shameful loss of face, a blow to national and imperial dignity that would demote Japan to "a third-rate country." The only other alternatives were to do nothing as the embargo gradually weakened Japan, or to attack the United States without warning, in the belief that only by gaining a great advantage early would there be any hope for an acceptable outcome. In the autumn of 1941 the ministers in Tojo's government "agreed that war was the only reasonable

alternative." The fateful decision represented a leap of faith: harking back to medieval Japan's legendary repulse of two Mongol invasions, "Japanese leaders believed that when all seemed hopeless, the sacred virtue of the emperor would carry the day" (Morgan 2003: 158, 173–4). Finally, Morgan uses strategic culture to explain why Japan resisted the Allied demand for unconditional surrender even as defeat became certain and over 60 Japanese cities were being destroyed by incendiary bombing. He cites the perceived need to act out Japanese warrior values in defense of the country's core values, and above all to continue fighting until an honorable way out presented itself. Morgan concludes that it was the combination of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9) and the declaration of war by the Soviet Union in-between (August 8) that put Hirohito in the position to get his own senior officers to agree to surrender, and to get their troops in the field to acquiesce in the decision. The first atomic bomb persuaded the emperor that the war must end, the intervention of the Soviet Union dashed hopes that the Soviets could be used to mediate a compromise peace with the United States, and the rapid collapse of the Japanese army in Manchuria in the face of the Soviet invasion discouraged advocates of a last stand against the anticipated American invasion of the Japanese home islands (Morgan 2003: 235–8). While Japan's course of action in 1895 and 1945 may be explained as rational decisions (albeit made quite belated, in the latter case), its determination not to back down in 1941 – after the United States had adopted a policy punishing Japan for its past conquests, that would soon prevent it from conquering more – clearly did not result from a sober cost-benefit analysis. Morgan believes that strategic culture "colored Tokyo's worldview in all three cases . . . impacting both the quality and the timing of Japanese responses to coercive threat." He concludes that "any future coercive strategy should be built on a thorough understanding of the opponent's strategic culture" (Morgan 2003: 270).

For Japan, as for Germany, catastrophic defeat in the Second World War provided a "major external shock" of the magnitude Thomas Berger has theorized as necessary to change a country's strategic culture (Berger 1996: 318). While the Japanese military dictatorship, like the Nazi German regime, espoused a radical racial nationalism harking back to the country's earlier history, as Kase points out it differed from its Axis partner in that "policy had been dictated from above by a military that was controlled by a traditional elite," in contrast to Nazism's character as "a mass movement in support of a political party" (Kase 2004: 130). Sajima echoes this view, arguing that the militarism of "the Meiji authoritarian state" was an exception in the history of Japan, and with its disappearance, Japanese militarism likewise disappeared (Sajima 1999: 88). Hitler had achieved power via election campaigns in which a near-majority of Germans had endorsed his policies at the polls, over other alternatives. In contrast, the Japanese public had much less directly endorsed the policies of a dictatorship dominated by the unelected leaders of their armed forces. Whereas German military commanders accounted for a small minority of the indicted and convicted war criminals in Allied postwar processes focusing on the Nazi party, in Japan the armed forces quite correctly bore the brunt of the blame for their country's actions. More than

117,000 military men were banned from participation in postwar Japanese politics, a development Berger contends "helped to further stigmatize the armed forces" in the eyes of the Japanese people (Berger 1998: 27). Indeed, after 1945, "the popular mood was one of disillusionment with nationalist ambitions and a rejection of the prewar military ethos" (Berger 1996: 330). But not all military men came away looking so bad. The United States's decision to preserve the monarchy after 1945 – despite its earlier refusal to do so, as a condition of Japan's surrender – gave the Tokyo war crimes trials a very different character than their Nuremberg counterpart. The man constitutionally responsible for Japan's actions during the war was not prosecuted or called to give testimony, and Japanese military leaders placed on trial typically declined to implicate Emperor Hirohito even in their own defense, sacrificing themselves in a manner admired by the public (Berger 1998: 28).

In the postwar years, the Japanese Left stood alone in its willingness to acknowledge the country's record of aggression and atrocities, or at least the crimes committed against fellow Asians. The Left joined other Japanese in justifying actions against Westerners as a legitimate response to the earlier depredations of imperialism. The American use of atomic bombs to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki enabled all Japanese to consider themselves victims. The depiction of the war in Japanese school textbooks (an issue in Sino-Japanese relations as late as 2005) from the start was "sanitized," and as Berger points out, "pressure was brought to bear on the media by right-wing groups to avoid raising issues that might be interpreted as an affront to the emperor or the nation." Postwar Japanese historiography focused on the military's role in driving the country to war, "conveniently ignoring the role played by civilian leaders." While no former leader of Nazi Germany had a postwar political career, men who had held prominent positions in the Japanese dictatorship were able to have postwar political careers, provided that they were civilians. Nobosuke Kishi, who as Tojo's munitions minister had been the Albert Speer of Japan, in 1958 became prime minister (Berger 1998: 29–30).

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan's dominant political force from the mid-1950s to the early 1990s, likewise held the armed forces accountable and resolved not to allow the postwar Japanese military to have any voice in politics. The Self Defense Forces (SDF), created in 1954 after the Mutual Security Treaty made Japan a Cold War ally of the United States, from the start were under strict civilian control. Like the West German Bundeswehr, the SDF renounced deployments abroad and the right to have nuclear weapons (although in the Japanese case the latter declaration served as a symbolic moral statement underscoring the country's status as the only target of such weapons). While postwar Germans blamed the military professionalism of the interwar Reichswehr for its failure to save the Weimar Republic and embraced as a solution a conscript army integrated with the civilian population, postwar Japanese blamed conscription for their interwar "militarization of society" and turned to a professional military as a solution. Thus, as Berger notes, the personnel of the all-volunteer SDF by design were segregated from the rest of Japanese society (Berger 1996: 331–5).

Berger reflects the views of most analysts in dividing the political and intellectual leaders of postwar Japan into three identifiable camps: Left Idealists, Centrists, and Right Idealists (called Right Nationalists by Kase). The Left Idealists envisioned Japan as a neutral, demilitarized "peace nation" with a socialist economy. They rejected national traditions and felt some remorse for Japan's war crimes against fellow Asian (but not Western) opponents. They opposed the creation of the SDF, wanted it abolished, and did not want an alliance with the United States. The Centrists envisioned Japan as a "merchant nation" with a capitalist economy. They were ambivalent about their country's traditions yet all but rejected war guilt. They supported the alliance with the United States and the preservation of the all-volunteer SDF in its original form, with its original restrictions against deployment overseas and having nuclear weapons. They supported civilian control of the military. The Right Idealists cherished their country's traditions and rejected war guilt. Like the Centrists they were staunchly capitalist, but they supported the SDF on tactical political grounds, not out of enthusiasm for Japan's Cold War role as an ally of the United States. Supporting full sovereignty, they wanted no restrictions on what Japanese armed forces could do in the areas of overseas deployment and acquisition of nuclear weapons. They wanted a larger, conscripted army and did not consider civilian control essential. The evolution of postwar Japan's political party system by the mid-1950s left most Centrists and Right Idealists in the ruling LDP, where they formed competing factions, while the Left Idealists dominated the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), the primary opposition (Berger 1998: 56–64, 79; Kase 2004: 134). The Centrists, constituting a majority within the LDP, became the dominant force in Cold War Japan. Under their direction, Japan prospered as a "merchant nation" allied to the United States, and avoided thorny military questions by preserving the status quo. The SDF only gradually expanded its operational sphere, led by its naval component, the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF). In 1981 Japan defined a new defense perimeter extending 1,000 nautical miles from its home islands (Kase 2004: 143). Meanwhile, despite the LDP's capitalist convictions, the business community opposed the growth of Japan's defense industry, according to Berger out of "fear of a right-wing takeover" of some sort. The defense industry could have profited handsomely from the same export-oriented strategies pursued by the rest of Japanese industry (Berger 1998: 203–4).

Berger has identified the Centrists and Right Idealists as the factions in Japanese political and intellectual life most heavily invested in preserving Cold War "policies and patterns of behavior." Both sought to preserve the SDF in its original form and maintain the Mutual Security Treaty with the United States, while the Left Idealists argued that the end of the Cold War should bring the abolition of the SDF and an end to Japan's American alliance. The splintering of the LDP in the early 1990s and the formation of three new political parties soon complicated the situation (Berger 1998: 167, 171). Japan's heavy dependence upon oil from the Middle East gave it a significant stake in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, but its government came under criticism internationally for its decision to contribute billions of dollars, and no troops, to the coalition assembled by the

United States to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Ultimately, in April 1991, the SDF sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf; according to Akitoshi Miyashita, at the time two-thirds of Japanese public opinion supported the move, and three-quarters supported Japanese involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. In June 1992 the Japanese Diet passed a bill authorizing the SDF to send troops overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Deployments followed in Cambodia in 1993, Mozambique in 1993–95, Zaire in 1994, and the Israel-Syria border on the Golan Heights in 1996 (Miyashita 2002: 161–3).

While post-1945 Japanese antimilitarism originated in the context of defeat and occupation by the United States, Berger has noted that it gradually took on a life of its own "largely independent of American actions" (Berger 1998: 209). From its emergence as a modern nation-state in the 1860s through the Second World War, Japan, like Germany, institutionalized the notion that its armed forces existed for the aggrandizement of the state. While total defeat in 1945 discredited this concept of the military mission in both countries, Japanese politicians and the public in general have always been markedly less contrite than the Germans about their country's military past, and contemporary Japan has had no equivalent to the mistrust of self that hamstrings contemporary Germany's consideration of military questions. The relative lack of contrition has led Japan's regional neighbors, China in particular, to doubt the sincerity or irreversibility of Japanese antimilitarism. Kase has cited evidence indicating that, as of the late 1990s, a majority of Japanese valued the SDF more for its role in disaster response and disaster relief than as defender of Japan against external military threats (Kase 2004: 142), and thus did not perceive their armed forces to be being genuine armed forces at all. Such sentiments may be attributed to the depth of contemporary Japanese antimilitarism or, perhaps more accurately, to public ignorance of a professional, all-volunteer institution deliberately isolated from civilian society for over half a century. In any event, as long as Japan's Right Idealists continue to lend their support to the Centrist position that Japan's postwar strategic culture should change as little as possible, and to the extent that SDF participation in UN missions lends hope to the Left Idealist vision of Japan as a "peace nation," an uneasy consensus appears to have emerged.

Even during the Cold War, Japan defied neorealist theory in not seeking to maximize its power through a stronger military even though it had a prosperous economy. Japan again confounded the neorealists at the end of the Cold War, when (like Germany) it sought to preserve the Cold War limits on its armed forces rather than seek to increase its military power (Berger 1996: 317–18, 320). Berger has noted that post-Cold War Japan, like post-Cold War Germany, has behaved "in precisely the opposite manner" predicted by realist theory, harboring no ambitions to military power of a magnitude comparable to its economic power. According to neoliberal theory, "systemic changes in the international environment" have made armed force less important, but this argument (which cites NATO and the European Union as factors restraining post-Cold War Germany) is less applicable in the Japanese case. After the end of the Cold War Japan still had only one alliance, with the United States alone rather than a group including

neighboring countries, and it belonged to no regional political-economic community that would offer particular advantages in exchange for surrendering some aspects of national sovereignty (Berger 1998: 202–3). While Japan's abrupt change of attitude toward the use of military force after the Second World War poses problems for the culturalist argument, the country has followed a course that the leading theoretical models would not have predicted – before 1945, as Morgan argues, as well as in the years since the end of the Cold War, as Berger and others contend. Evidence from both periods provides a strong case for the existence and relevance of a Japanese strategic culture.

Elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region

For the remaining states of the Asia-Pacific region, the scholarship on strategic culture and national ways of warfare varies considerably in quantity and in quality. South Korea and Australia have attracted more attention than the rest. For most of the states of the region – New Zealand, the remaining major island states Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and the mainland countries Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar – we are in debt to Ken Booth and Russell Trood for their edited volume *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (1999), for having filled what would otherwise be an unfortunate gap in the literature. While most of the essays in this book bear the marks of pioneering efforts, at least they provide an argument with which future scholars may disagree. In their approach they share the goal of the present volume in that they measure the strategic behavior of individual countries against the realist model in order to identify the instances in which culture appears to matter.

Fifty years after the armistice ending the Korean War (1950–53), South Korea faced arguably the worst security situation of any country on earth. Its communist neighbor, North Korea, remained the world's most rigid totalitarian state, had just developed its own nuclear weapons, and maintained a large conventional force on its side of the demilitarized 17th parallel, the last surviving fortified frontier of the Cold War. Kang Choi emphasizes the antiquity of Korean civilization, dating back five millennia, and the tradition of national unity, first achieved in 668, in explaining the Korean reluctance to accept the current division of the country as permanent. Korea's traditional strategic culture featured deference toward China and generosity toward less developed neighbors, Japan and "northern nomadic tribes" (Choi 1999: 95–6). Traditional Korean strategic thought reflected the general principles of Confucianism and the specific influence of the *Seven Military Classics* (compiled 1083), but according to Choi, Korea did not have a "strong militarist tradition." A constant and reasonable fear of provoking China led Korea to deemphasize military options in favor of diplomacy. Choi concludes that during the Cold War, "each Korean state found an external security guarantor of its own security" and because of the persistence of Cold War tensions on the Korean peninsula, "they remain dependent upon the big powers for their security" (Choi 1999: 100–1). Victor Cha agrees that Korea historically emphasized diplomacy over war for the sake of its own survival, but articulates

more clearly a Korean tradition of "realpolitik bilateralism" in which Korea has guaranteed its own security and enhanced its own power through "bilateralism with a great power." Thus Cha characterizes the post-1945 relationship between South Korea and the United States as the South's modern-day substitute for the traditional strategic relationship between the Korean kingdom and the Chinese empire. Against the so-called affluence argument, under which realists have cited South Korea as an example of a newly prosperous state seeking to enhance and diversify its military capabilities, Cha argues that the contemporary South Korean push for self-reliance and autonomy "will be bounded at the outer edges (on the Korean side) by the inclination for bilateralism over unilateralism," and "the partner of choice will remain the United States" (Cha 2001: 115–18). In his discussion of the Wilsonian missionary tendency in American behavior, Walter Russell Mead points out the striking success of (predominantly American) Christian missionaries in South Korea, where by 1995 roughly 40 percent of the population belonged to Christian denominations. Mead highlights two significant factors not mentioned at all by Choi and Cha: the role of Korean Christianity in preserving Korean nationalism during the years of Japanese domination, and its role in leading the pro-democracy movement of more recent times (Mead 2002: 156).

In a parallel to South Korea's "realpolitik bilateralism," Graeme Cheesman has characterized Australia's strategic identity as that of a "dependent ally," not unlike Canada, whose loyal support for "great and powerful friends" – first Britain, then the United States – allows it to claim the protection of those friends for itself. As a member of the British Empire and Commonwealth, Australia sent troops to support Britain in the Sudan (1885), the Boer War (1899–1902), the Boxer Rebellion (1900), and the First and Second World wars, then supported the United States and/or the cause of anti-communism in the Korean War, in Malaya (1948–60), in Borneo (1963–66), and in the Vietnam War. Australia was much keener than New Zealand to ally formally with the United States in the ANZUS Treaty (1951). It continued to support the United States after the Cold War, in the Persian Gulf War and, after the publication of Cheesman's piece, in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 (Cheesman 1999: 273, 276, 285). Stuart Poore has built upon Cheesman's work, explaining Australia's tradition of dependent behavior as the product of friction between its "European" identity and "Asian" geography. The exclusionary Immigration Restriction Bill of 1901 established an official "White Australia" policy that lasted over seventy years. Initial "yellow peril" fears of being swamped by Chinese immigrants gave way to fears of Japanese imperialism, then Cold War Asian communism (Poore 2004: 153–4). For Australia, as for India, China's first atomic bomb test (1964) led to serious discussion of a nuclear weapons program. Britain viewed the project with sympathy but the United States did not. Australia subsequently ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1973) and led the way in establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Poore 2004: 165–8). Poore sees a definite change in Australia's identity following the Vietnam War, when its "unequivocal support of US foreign policy" ended and it ceased to consider itself an "Anglo-American outpost." From the 1970s onward "economic imperatives" helped shape Australian strategy, as the new prosperity

of some East Asian countries made it important for Australia to have more positive relationships with them, including dropping the offensive restrictions against non-white immigration. Poore considers these changes evidence of "a new strategic culture" in which Australia has sought "to strengthen its security with other states in the region rather than against them" (Poore 2004: 159–60, 169).

While Poore believes that geography has finally trumped Australia's traditional strategic culture, Michael Evans sees a greater continuity persisting to the present day. Evans agrees with Cheesman's thesis concerning Australia's "dependent ally" identity but argues that "its dependency has always been clever, cynical, and calculated." He explains that Australia has operated on a "limited liability" concept, in the British tradition: it upholds its own values and supports its friends, but without exhausting its own people and economy. He cites as an example the very specific limit Australia set on its commitment to support the United States in Vietnam (just 7,000 troops as of 1967) (Evans 2005: 47, 57). Evans also focuses on the "dissonance" between Australia's strategic culture and its way of war. Australia considers itself a continent, not an island, and its peacetime strategies have focused on continental defense. The country lacks a strong maritime tradition, and the army has always dominated among the armed forces. Nevertheless, in wartime "the geographical ideal" of continental defense "has always been eclipsed by the political reality of non-territorial interests," the necessity to support the policy of Britain or the United States. Like Cheesman, Evans highlights the centrality of the "expeditionary" experience in Australian military history, but points out the complaints of Australian generals that "ground forces structured primarily for a strategy of continental defense" are expected to "accomplish complex offshore operations" (Evans 2005: 33, 38–9, 76, 105). In contrast to Poore, Evans does not think Australia's strategic culture changed fundamentally in the 1970s; indeed, the present fear of East Asian Islamic radicalism (which he considers part of the international phenomenon of "Islamo-fascism") evokes emotions similar to those stirred by earlier threats from the north, and has pushed Australia closer to the United States than it has been at any time since the Vietnam War. Uncertainty in Indonesia following the stability of the Suharto dictatorship (1967–98) prompted Australia's leading role in resolving the East Timor crisis (1999), after which it suffered terrorist attacks on its citizens in the Bali nightclub bombing of October 2002 and its embassy in Jakarta in September 2004 (Evans 2005: 48, 67). Evans concludes that "in Australia's case, it is culture, not geography, that is destiny" (Evans 2005: 105–6).

In contrast to Australia, New Zealand enjoys "a uniquely benign security environment," according to Ramesh Thakur (Thakur 1999: 316). The two countries shared a similar "expeditionary" experience with warfare under the British Empire and Commonwealth, in particular in the two world wars. Early in the Cold War they were linked formally to the United States in ANZUS, but at least for New Zealand the fear of Asian communism never had the same resonance as the fear of Japanese imperialism. Unlike Australia, New Zealand "was convinced of the folly" of the Vietnam War but participated for the sake of ANZUS. Thakur contends that New Zealand's Vietnam experience "led to a general disenchantment"

about the alliance with the United States and paved the way for a campaign of peace activism. "Visiting US warships were the most highly visible symbol of all that was believed to be wrong with the nuclear world and with ANZUS," and under a "nuclear-free law" passed in 1987, nuclear-powered and/or nuclear-armed warships were banned from visiting New Zealand. In the post-Cold War world, New Zealand has based its foreign policy on support for the UN rather than the United States, and the country's leaders, most notably David Lange (prime minister 1984–89), built upon anti-ANZUS sentiment to forge a unique "instinctively anti-military" nationalism (Thakur 1999: 301, 314–16). But Thakur contends that New Zealand has nothing to gain internationally by opposing the United States, and much to lose. While South Korea, Australia, Canada, and a host of other "dependent allies" of major powers have exploited these bilateral relationships to exert at least some influence in the international arena, a minor power with no such relationship runs the risk of "sliding into irrelevance" (Thakur 1999: 317).

The other island states among the minor Asia-Pacific powers have far more precarious security situations than New Zealand. Taiwan, home to the government of the Republic of China since 1949, remained under martial law until 1987 and only in 1991 abandoned its state of "national mobilization" against the "communist rebellion" on the mainland. Taiwan's government no longer actively claims to be the legitimate government of all of China, but China still considers Taiwan a rebellious province and has threatened war if it formally declares independence. Thus, in the view of C.L. Chiou, Taiwan's security hinges on a robust defense against China combined with a set of policies designed to preserve peace with China. Under the dictatorial presidencies of Chiang Kai-shek (died 1975) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (died 1988), exiles from the mainland dominated Taiwan and the armed forces played a central role. Since 1988, ethnic Taiwanese have enjoyed a greater role, and Taiwan has used its economic strength and ability to export investment capital to build relationships and enhance its security (Chiou 1999: 52, 55, 64–5).

Across the South China Sea, the Philippines claims to have had Asia's "first nationalist movement" (1872). After being granted independence by the United States in 1946, the Philippines allowed US bases on its soil until 1991. In the era of independence the most serious threats to Philippine security have been internal, from indigenous communists and, in Mindanao, Muslim separatists, most recently the radical Abu Sayyaf. According to Wilfrido Villacorta, because the Philippines did not win their independence in a revolutionary struggle against a colonial power, the country has less of a "martial tradition" than most of its regional neighbors and its armed forces enjoy less prestige. Nevertheless, as in other states whose primary security threats are internal, in the Philippines the army has played a significant role in politics, with generals or former generals either running the country or providing key support for civilian presidents (Villacorta 1999: 184–6, 192–3).

Like the Philippines, Indonesia's primary security concerns have been internal – from communists and from regional secession movements – and its military has played a central role in politics, but in the Indonesian case the army grew out of

the resistance movement against the Dutch attempt to reassert colonial rule after the Second World War (1945–49) and ranks as the most respected institution in society. From independence in 1949 through the defeat of the last major regional insurgencies in 1958, the army gained strength and cohesion while the leaders and parties of a democratic parliamentary system looked less competent by comparison (Anwar 1999: 199, 207). Resistance leader Sukarno, proclaimed president of Indonesia in 1945, served as dictator under the "Guided Democracy" established in 1959, sharing power with the army and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) until the latter attempted to seize power for itself in a coup. The army crushed the coup, unleashed a bloodbath against suspected PKI members, and facilitated a transition of power (1965–67) from Sukarno to General Suharto. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Sukarno's foreign policy was driven by his strong nationalism and ideological aversion to anything related to Western colonialism and imperialism," while Suharto's New Order regime (1967–98) viewed communism, internal and external, as the greatest threat and emphasized regional cooperation. Under Suharto "the army played the dominant role . . . assisted by civilian technocrats" (Anwar 1999: 207, 210–11). Throughout its history, Pancasila (the Five Principles) has served as the "state ideology" of Indonesia: "Belief in One God, Humanitarianism, Indonesian Unity, Democracy, and Social Justice." According to Anwar, Pancasila reflects a compromise between proponents of a secular state and Islamic state in a country where over 80 percent of the population are Muslims (Anwar 1999: 201–2). While Anwar did not foresee it, the restoration of democracy in 1998 emboldened radical Islamist elements within Indonesia, causing concern for its neighbors, Australia in particular.

Strategically Malaysia may be categorized as an island power even though it is connected to the Southeast Asian mainland by the narrow neck of the Malay Peninsula. Unlike Indonesia, a vast archipelago that had no common history before it became the Dutch East Indies, Malaysia claims as its pre-colonial precursor the Malacca Sultanate, which thrived for a century before the arrival of Portuguese conquerors in 1511 ushered in four and a half centuries of foreign rule. In accounting for the importance of this pre-colonial heritage to the modern Malaysian state, Chandran Jeshurun emphasizes "the legacy of literary and cultural uniqueness that has been credited to the Malacca Sultanate." Malaysia shares with Indonesia a predominantly Muslim character; according to Jeshurun, "Islam . . . reinforces the traditional Malay concepts of loyalty and a high sense of personal integrity." This, plus a "severe . . . social condemnation of cowardice" tended to make Malays good soldiers for their imperial masters, ultimately the British. A sense of "moral and religious rectitude" sustained Malays during the Japanese occupation of 1942–45 (Jeshurun 1999: 233). After the Second World War, a strong communist insurgency delayed the country's independence from Britain; the so-called Malayan Emergency (1948–60) finally eased enough by 1957 for self-rule to be granted. The country was re-launched in 1963 as Malaysia, including Britain's former possessions in northern Borneo as well as Malaya and Singapore, although the latter seceded in 1965. While relations with Indonesia were acrimonious especially during the Sukarno years, Malaysia's

armed forces have been geared toward guarding against internal threats, a legacy of the long "Emergency." Aside from the more general influences of Malay culture and Islam, the strategic culture of Malaysia bears the marks of the British colonial period; indeed, until the mid-1990s most Malaysian generals were Sandhurst graduates (Jeshurun 1999: 232, 234). Mohamed Mahathir (president 1981–2003) was the first to speak of a "Malaysian nation." Indeed, Jeshurun points out that "the vocabulary of Mahathir's strategic culture" was "distinctly original" and a clear break with the past (Jeshurun 1999: 233). Meanwhile, in the years since 1965 independent Singapore has prospered under the authoritarian regime of Lee Kuan Yew, architect of the city-state's concept of "Total Defense." According to Richard Deck, "Total Defense" includes a military doctrine centered on urban warfare but also encompasses "civil, economic, social, and psychological security" (Deck 1999: 247). Like Malaysia, Singapore is an ethnically mixed state including Malay, Indian, and Chinese populations; its armed forces, initially dominated by Indians and Malays, since the 1980s has been dominated by ethnic Chinese. Lee has been generally contemptuous of the West, but in 1990 (when the city's last foreign garrison, 700 New Zealanders, finally departed) Singapore signed a treaty with the United States giving the US navy docking rights, to make up for the impending loss of its base in the Philippines (Deck 1999: 257, 263–5). Singapore has no territorial disputes with its larger neighbors but, as an economic powerhouse which, like Taiwan, exports capital to less prosperous Asia-Pacific states, in Deck's opinion it "would certainly use force, if necessary, to protect its investments" in nearby territories of Malaysia and Indonesia (Deck 1999: 265).

On the mainland of Southeast Asia, the three largest states – Vietnam, Thailand, and Myanmar – historically have lived in the shadow of China. Like Korea, they have strategic cultures dominated by a single relationship with a much stronger neighbor, but not all have followed the Korean example of "realpolitik bilateralism." According to David Elliot, Vietnam traditionally has resisted the notion of such a relationship with China or anyone else. During its modern struggle for independence and unity (1945–75), the Vietnamese communist regime consciously sought the aid of both China and the Soviet Union to avoid becoming entirely dependent upon either of them, before tilting definitively toward the Soviets once victory had been achieved. Elliot calls the subsequent Soviet-Vietnamese alliance of 1978–91 "Vietnam's only significant alliance relationship" (Elliot 1999: 135–6). Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam's leading concerns have stemmed from its security situation *vis-à-vis* China, its economic dependence on Taiwan – by the late 1990s Vietnam's "leading source of investment" – and its inability to defend its potentially lucrative offshore oil reserves (Elliot 1999: 141–2). According to Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Thailand has forged a pragmatic strategic culture influenced by Buddhist principles. In contrast to Vietnam, Thailand has typically accommodated threatening great powers as necessary in order to preserve its independence, most recently by collaborating with Japan during the Second World War (Satha-Anand 1999: 147–8). Thanks largely to this pragmatism, Thailand – alone among the lands of Southeast Asia – never

succumbed to Western colonial rule. Myanmar likewise has shown deference to China, from its ninth-century origins as an independent kingdom until its annexation by Britain in the 1820s, then again from independence in 1948 to the present. But in contrast to its eastern neighbors, Myanmar traditionally has tried to deal with its security dilemma by isolating itself as much as possible (Than 1999: 166, 173). Tin Maung Maung Than points out other unique aspects of Myanmar's strategic traditions, including a traditional way of war in which infantry, cavalry, and elephants were employed in a manner similar to concurrent practices in India to the west (Than 1999: 172). Within each of the three largest Southeast Asian states, the armed forces command a great deal of respect. Myanmar's modern army evolved from popular resistance movements against the British and Japanese, and has stepped in to govern the country from 1962 to 1974 and again since 1988 (Than 1999: 168–9). In Vietnam, the modern army's victorious 30-year struggle against the French and Americans has done much to reverse a Chinese-style cultural tradition of civilian domination over a low-prestige military (Elliot 1999: 137). Finally, in Thailand, the prestige of the armed forces is reflected in the central role of the royal military academy (founded 1887) in educating the country's generals and statesmen. The army played a leading role in compelling the royal dynasty to become a constitutional monarchy (1932) and has intervened in political life at key moments since then, but unlike its counterpart in Myanmar it prefers not to rule the country itself (Satha-Anand 1999: 154). For example, in the case of the last Thai army coup of the twentieth century (in 1991), the generals returned the country to civilian rule after just seventeen months (Faruqui 2003: 19).

Sub-Saharan Africa

Among the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria ranks as the most populous and rivals South Africa for the honor of being the wealthiest and most militarily significant. Nigeria also accounts for the majority of the sparse literature on strategic culture in the sub-Saharan region. More recent scholarship depends to some extent on the pathbreaking work of Ade Adefuye, *Culture and Foreign Policy: The Nigerian Example*. Adefuye does not use the term strategic culture but his account shares many characteristics of the broader literature on the subject, reflecting the influence of anthropology and history as well as political science (Adefuye 1992). In acknowledging the importance of Adefuye's work, David Francis points out that because Nigeria and most other African countries achieved independence during the Cold War, until the 1990s outsiders typically analyzed its foreign and defense polices using "realist approaches" that fit the Cold War paradigm, ignoring "the domestic variable" (Francis 2004: 107).

Francis defines as the three sources of Nigerian strategic culture "its civil war history and experience; the significance of oil resources and geography; and the nature of the political establishment" (Francis 2004: 109). For the first seven years of its existence, Nigeria followed an "isolationist" foreign policy and showed little interest in having a strong military. The attempted secession of the

southeastern region of Biafra in 1967 triggered the development of more formidable armed forces and a more active international posture. Those supporting the Biafran rebels either directly or indirectly included the leading Western powers and neighboring African states with "largely homogeneous" populations such as Gabon and Ivory Coast; supporters of Nigeria included other ethnically heterogeneous African states, the Soviet Union, and communist China. After the civil war ended in the restoration of national unity, Nigeria remained less pro-Western than before and developed some domestic arms industries. Within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN, Nigeria promoted respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of all existing states, but eventually violated these principles by intervening repeatedly in smaller West African states, on the pretext that regional instability posed a threat to its own security. Francis concludes that "Nigerian pro-interventionism in West Africa is aimed at excluding the intrusive influence of France in the region," a legacy of the leading role of France and francophone African states in supporting the Biafran cause during the Nigerian civil war. He also sees parallels between Nigeria's regional "big brother" and "natural leadership" mentality and the historical attitude of the United States toward Latin America. Francis highlights the obvious fact that Nigeria's oil wealth and its importance as an oil supplier to the West have made possible its post-civil war military buildup and more assertive regional policy. Nigeria's economic clout has also made the West less critical of its political establishment, dominated by the predominantly Muslim Hausa and Fulani people of the northern region of the country. The north produces most civilian leaders and "the military academy at Kaduna has facilitated the preponderance of northerners in the Nigerian army," which ruled the country for 29 of the 33 years following its first coup in 1966 (Francis 2004: 110–21). In another recent work, Olufemi Babarinde and Stephen Wright highlight the themes of Nigerian "leadership and ambition," focusing on the country's relatively recent interventionist policy. Nigeria never deployed troops beyond its own borders before the 1990s, but ultimately it contributed the largest contingent to the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a peacekeeping force deployed to Sierra Leone from 1997 to 2000. Babarinde and Wright hold the Nigerian army at least partially accountable for the failure of ECOMOG and its replacement by a UN peacekeeping force, citing the alleged involvement of Nigerian officers in diamond and drug smuggling operations. They speculate that such corrupt behavior may do lasting harm to Nigeria's aspirations for West African leadership. In any event, the unpopularity of the deployment within Nigeria, which grew as the years passed, raises questions of whether the population will support the regional ambitions of its leaders (Babarinde and Wright 2002: 248).

Aside from Nigeria, South Africa in the post-apartheid era remains the only state with significant military capabilities and the natural and financial resources to sustain them. Born in the brutality of the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Union of South Africa became a dominion of the British Empire in 1910. It remained a member of the Commonwealth until 1961, when it quit and became a republic in response to criticism of the apartheid policy of racial separation.

The Afrikaaner-dominated National Party, the majority party within the whites-only electorate after 1948, justified apartheid in Cold War terms, exploiting to the fullest the communist connections of the African National Congress (ANC) and its leader, Nelson Mandela. National Party paranoia about the black/communist threat to white South Africa grew after the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule in neighboring Angola and Mozambique in 1974–75, when Soviet-backed Marxist regimes emerged in both countries. No objective observer, then or since, has believed that South Africa faced a genuine communist threat to its own security, yet in the 1970s it went to the extreme of developing its own nuclear weapons. Peter Liberman points out the uniqueness of the South African decision to develop nuclear weapons, since it did not face "nuclear coercion or conventional invasion threats" from other countries. Ultimately "international ostracism of South Africa because of its policy of apartheid . . . exacerbated its insecurity," and its National Party leaders reacted to Non-Proliferation pressures by becoming all the more determined to develop their own nuclear weapons. The program thus had unique South African origins and, a few short years later, uniquely South African reasons for its demise. The six nuclear bombs produced between 1979 and 1989 all were scrapped in 1990–91, after F.W. DeKlerk (president 1989–94) resolved to end apartheid, setting in motion the processes that led to the election of the ANC's Mandela as his successor (Liberman 2001: 45–86).

In 1994 the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) was created by merging the existing South African Defense Force (SADF) with two elements of the former armed resistance – the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) – as well as the token armed forces of four black "homelands" whose nominal independence had been recognized only by the former white South African regime. A former SADF general commanded the SANDF until 1998, after which veterans of Umkhonto we Sizwe held the top post. Under its new leadership the SANDF revised South African military doctrine to serve the policies of the ANC government. Evert Jordaan and Abel Esterhuyse have emphasized the significance of the concept of "non-offensive defense" in reshaping the SANDF and the new "South African way of war." First proposed in the 1950s as a possible organizing principle for the West German Bundeswehr, a "non-offensive defense" force in theory has a structure and armament designed to enable it to defend its own country without threatening others. Under this concept, the SANDF abandoned the SADF's tradition of a universal service liability (which had required two years of active duty for all white males) and adopted a structure including a small professional standing cadre and a large reserve incapable of rapid mobilization. After becoming the first nuclear state to destroy all of its own nuclear weapons, South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, eliminated its chemical and biological weapons, and cancelled a program to develop long-range missiles. Its new standing force included a disproportionate number of light infantry and was not concentrated along the country's frontiers. Thus, by the early twenty-first century the SANDF had limited its own power-projection capabilities and South Africa no longer posed a military threat to its poorer and weaker neighbors to the north.

Its structure and new ethos conformed to the wishes of the post-1994 black-majority government and the principles of the African Union (successor to the OAU) and the UN (Jordaan 2000; Jordaan and Esterhuyse 2004: 59–69). Like Nigeria, South Africa's relative size and wealth makes it a natural regional hegemon. Its post-apartheid government takes an active interest in the affairs of Africa as a whole and has maintained peacekeeping troops and "observers" far beyond its own borders – as of 2005, in the Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, and on the Ethiopia/Eritrea frontier (Lekota 2005). But post-apartheid South Africa, in some ways like post-Nazi Germany, has reacted against its own past history by consciously choosing to limit its own armed forces and assert its influence in more peaceful ways.

Conclusion

Much work remains to be done on Asian and African strategic cultures and ways of warfare. For these countries, more so than for Europe or the Americas, the end of the Cold War exposed the inadequacies of earlier analyses of state behavior. Indeed, it removed the structural framework through which Western analysts understood, or more often misunderstood, Asia and Africa. Cultural explanations have helped to fill the void, some based on the short-term modern contexts, others considering the impact of colonial-era and even pre-colonial factors. Such scholarship has revealed just how little the Western norms considered universal under realist theories matter in determining the actions of non-Western states. But aside from the work on India, China, Japan, and Australia, the literature remains thin, presenting a considerable opportunity for future researchers and analysts. This is especially true for the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and – surprisingly so, given their central significance in contemporary world affairs – the countries of the Arab world.

5 Definitions

The authors of the foundational works of the literature on national ways of warfare and strategic culture – Basil H. Liddell Hart and Jack Snyder, respectively – introduced these concepts in works written decades apart, for different audiences, inspired by different motives. In each case, the author subsequently wrote a great deal more without ever framing another book or article with the same concept. Liddell Hart left it to others to follow his *British Way in Warfare* with similar studies of other countries, while Snyder all but disavowed the study of strategic culture after disapproving of the direction in which others took his original idea. Nevertheless, the cultural revolution in strategic studies persisted, and though it has not toppled the existing paradigm in a manner analogous to a dramatic change in regime, à la France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, it has eaten away at it like a tenacious insurgency. The culturalists have been at it since the 1980s and still have not prevailed, but over the years they have helped sow doubt in the realist camp, aided in no small measure by the world-changing events circa 1989–91.

This book has been structured to place the survey of the existing literature before the discussion of definitions of strategic culture, in order to guard against the natural tendency to have a favored definition color our view of the literature throughout. Many, if not most, of the authors writing on the subject have offered their own definitions of strategic culture or have adopted (in whole or in part) one of the five that have been cited the most: those offered by Snyder (1977), Booth (1990), Johnston (1995), Gray (1999), and, most recently, Longhurst (2004). In the evolution of the literature, Gray is a member of the "first generation" and properly belongs earlier in the sequence, having offered at least a partial definition as early as 1986, but his most comprehensive definition dates from his response to Johnston in 1999. It is also his only attempt at a definition that offers all of the components to be addressed in this discussion: a definition proper, plus commentary on the durability or changeability of a strategic culture, its source and scope of representation within the community in question, and its role and/or impact on policymaking (see Table 5.1).

Snyder defined strategic culture as "the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy" (Snyder 1977: 8). Omitting the

Table 5.1 Strategic culture – definitions compared

Snyder – 1977	*Booth – 1990*	*Johnston – 1995*	*Gray – 1999*	*Longhurst – 2004*
"The sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy" (1977: 8).	"A nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force" (1990: 121).	"An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious" (1995b: 46).	"The persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a unique Historical experience" (1999a: 131)." Ideals… the evidence of ideas, and… behavior" (1999a: 132). "It is within us; we, our institutions, and our behavior, are in the context" (1999a: 133).	"A distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process" (2004: 17–18).
Durability/changeability: "Changes… will not occur as direct responses to the changing strategic environment but indirectly, in a way mediated by pre-existing	Durability/ changeability: "Outlast(s) all but major changes in military technology, domestic arrangements or the	Durability/ changeability: "Its evolution (even dissolution) over time can be traced, as long as one can observe whether successive	Durability/ changeability: "Can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated" (1999a: 131). "Adversity	Durability/ changeability: "Persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not permanent or static.

cultural beliefs" (1977: 38).	international environment" (1990: 121).	generations of decision-makers are socialized in and share the basic precepts of the strategic culture" (1995b: 49).	cannot cancel culture" (1999a: 143).	It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experiences" (2004: 17–18).
Source and scope of representation: "Members of a national strategic community" (1977: 8).	Source and scope of representation: "The most influential voices: the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion" (1990: 121).	Source and scope of representation: "Decision-makers." Animate "culture-bearing units such as strategists, military leaders and national security elites." (1995b: 49).	Source and scope of representation: "A particular geographically based security community" (1999a: 131).	Source and scope of representation: Elites and policymakers with a "collective" (2004: 17–18).
Role and/or impact: "Guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate" (1977: 9).	Role and/or impact: "Helps shape but does not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field." "Helps shape behavior on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil–military relations and strategic doctrine" (1990: 121).	Role and/or impact: "Limits in some way the options considered" [but this cannot be assumed – it must be demonstrated by measuring actions against a falsifiable theory] (1995b: 46).	Role and/or impact: "Finds expression in distinctively patterned styles of strategic behavior" (1999a: 133). "Is a guide to action" (1999a: 144). "Strategic behavior cannot be beyond culture" (1999a: 142).	Role and/or impact: Embodied or reflected in the observable "regulatory practices" of policy (2004: 48).

word "nuclear," specific to his RAND study on Soviet strategic culture, obviously gives this definition a potential general applicability. Booth subsequently offered an expanded definition: "a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force" (Booth 1990: 121). Booth thus retained Snyder's references to patterns of behavior and habits, substituted "values" and "attitudes" for "conditioned emotional responses," used the more general "nation" as opposed to "national strategic community," and broadened the focus from "nuclear strategy" to "the threat or use of force." Most significantly, Booth introduced the notion of "symbols" as components of strategic culture. Johnston expanded upon this concept by making symbols central to his own, much narrower definition: "An integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 46). In his quest for a falsifiable theory of strategic culture, Johnston jettisoned the laundry list of ideas, traditions, values, attitudes, habits, behavior, and achievements. The stipulation regarding "clothing . . . conceptions with . . . an aura of factuality" reflects the influence of the brief "second generation" of strategic culture authors, in particular Bradley Klein (B. Klein 1988: 136). Gray's subsequent rebuttal to Johnston, arguing for "Strategic Culture as Context," defined strategic culture as "the persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience." He also included "ideals . . . the evidence of ideas, and . . . behavior," concluding that strategic culture "is within us; we, our institutions, and our behavior, are in the context" (Gray 1999a: 131–3, 1999b: 51–3). Thus Gray restored the roster of ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits, and behavior included in Snyder's original definition or added by Booth, but his central argument (and the one he persisted in making) concerned the need to include behavior in any definition of strategic culture, reflecting his argument that behavior could not be separated from culture. Finally, Longhurst defined strategic culture as "a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process" (Longhurst 2004: 17–18; cf. Longhurst 2000a, 2000b: 301–10). Aside from the specific reference to attitudes, echoing Booth and Gray, she subsumed under "beliefs" most of the other elements on their respective lists of attributes. Where Snyder, Booth, and Gray used the more general term "behavior," Longhurst substituted the more specific "practices." Finally, like Gray, she included in her definition a reference to the origin of a strategic culture being both "unique" and "historical."

On the matter of the durability or changeability of a strategic culture, the five authors employed a variety of language to express the same fundamental view.

Snyder argued that a strategic culture would react to changes in the "strategic environment" but only "indirectly, in a way mediated by pre-existing cultural beliefs" (Snyder 1977: 38). Booth contended that it would endure "all but major changes in military technology, domestic arrangements or the international environment" (Booth 1990: 121). Johnston, reflecting his focus on developing a falsifiable theory, observed that "its evolution (even dissolution) over time can be traced, as long as one can observe whether successive generations of decision-makers are socialized in and share the basic precepts of the strategic culture" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 49). Gray noted that strategic culture "can change over time, as new experience is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated," but included the caveat that "adversity cannot cancel culture" (Gray 1999a: 131, 143). Longhurst highlighted the persistence of strategic culture, and its tendency "to outlast the era of its original inception" but without becoming "permanent or static." More specifically than Gray, she acknowledged the historical nature of a strategic culture "shaped and influenced by formative periods." She argued that it could change "either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective's experience," with some level of "fine-tuning" occurring constantly (Longhurst 2004: 17–18).

What sort of entities generate and sustain a strategic culture? On the question of the source and scope of representation, Snyder defined it as including the "members of a national strategic community" (Snyder 1977: 8). Booth contended that the group would include "the most influential voices" within a country, in particular "the political elite" and "the military establishment," but in some cases "public opinion" as a whole (Booth 1990: 121). Johnston's sources of strategic culture included a mixture of animate and inanimate "culture-bearing units," the former including "strategists, military leaders, and national security elites" (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 49). Gray echoed Snyder in identifying the key group as "a particular geographically based security community" (Gray 1999a: 131). Longhurst likewise acknowledged the centrality of elites and policymakers with a "collective," usually a nation-state (Longhurst 2004: 17–18).

Finally, regarding the role and/or impact of strategic culture on policymaking, Snyder contended that it "guides and circumscribes thought on strategic questions, influences the way strategic issues are formulated, and sets the vocabulary and conceptual parameters of strategic debate" (Snyder 1977: 9). Booth notes that it "helps shape but does not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field," and "helps shape behavior on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil–military relations and strategic doctrine." (Booth 1990: 121). Johnston conceded only that strategic culture "limits in some way the options considered," with the proviso that this cannot be assumed; it must be demonstrated by measuring the evidence against a falsifiable theory (A.I. Johnston 1995b: 46). Gray, in contrast, offered the general observations that "strategic behavior cannot be beyond culture," and that strategic culture "is a guide to action" which "finds expression in distinctively patterned styles of strategic behavior" (Gray 1999a: 133, 142, 144). In explaining the role and impact of strategic culture, Longhurst made her greatest contribution, arguing

that it is embodied or reflected in the observable "regulatory practices" of policy, the "regulatory practices" being one of three components of strategic culture, along with "foundational elements" and "security policy standpoints." She defined the foundational elements as "basic beliefs regarding the use of force that give a strategic culture its core characteristics." On the behavioral or outcome side, the regulatory practices "actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture's core to the external environment." Governing the translation of the foundational elements into strategic behavior, the security policy standpoints are "the contemporary, widely accepted interpretations as to how best core values are to be promoted through policy channels." Longhurst emphasized the dynamism of strategic cultures, concluding that "the existence and functioning of the three components mean that a strategic culture is in a continual state of self-evaluation" (Longhurst 2004: 17–18, 48).

Longhurst's security policy standpoints, which had no equivalent in the definitions offered by Booth or Gray, served a mediating role which echoed an important element in Snyder's original articulation of strategic culture: the notion that any changes would be "mediated by pre-existing cultural beliefs" (Snyder 1977: 38). Otherwise, her concept of strategic culture reflected the influence of Booth and Gray and also refined their concepts, not into the sort of falsifiable theory Johnston advocated but at least into something with a degree of structure and greater analytical utility. Indeed, among the options available (at least as of 2006) Longhurst's framework offered the only palatable solution to the 1990s standoff between "first generation" Gray and "third generation" Johnston. In contrast to Longhurst's strategic culture comprised of foundational elements, security policy standpoints, and regulatory practices, Johnston postulated a strategic culture consisting of "two key elements:" a "central paradigm" embodying threat perceptions and beliefs regarding the role and efficacy of warfare, and an "empirical footprint," a product of the central paradigm consisting of "a ranked set of grand strategic preferences" (A.I. Johnston 1995a: 248). While Longhurst accepts the historical foundation of strategic culture, Johnston's central paradigm could just as easily be philosophical or psychological. Throughout the decade after he first proposed it, Johnston's more "analytical" approach garnered much praise but few actual followers. The reaction of Forrest Morgan is typical: admiring Johnston for his more "analytical" and less "descriptive" approach to strategic culture, while rejecting his central argument that behavior can be separated from culture for purposes of analysis (Morgan 2003: 8). Rajesh Basrur numbers among the few whose work has emulated the rigorous methodology of Johnston, praising him and the "third generation" for having a vision of strategic culture "not as deeply rooted in distant political and social history." Basrur considered his own limited cultural approach as complimentary to, rather than in opposition to, realist theory (Basrur 2001: 182–3, 196). Johnston's own sentiments appear to lie in the same vein, as his quest for a falsifiable theory of strategic culture may be interpreted as an attempt to frame strategic culture in a manner acceptable to the traditional realist mainstream of political scientists. Among the leading theorists of strategic culture he was not alone in such sentiments, as Snyder himself eventually came

round to the view that "culture, including strategic culture, is an explanation to be used only when all else fails." Indeed, Snyder foreshadowed Johnston's subsequent quest for a falsifiable theory in his article "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," when he suggested that "structural, situational, or institutional explanations" enjoyed an advantage over cultural explanations because they yielded "sharper, more specific, more testable predictions" (Snyder 1990: 4–5).

Their respective attitudes toward the significance of history – or, at least, history predating relatively recent times – serves as a defining difference between Longhurst and Johnston. Even in his own very persuasive work on Chinese strategic culture, Johnston showed realist instincts in dismissing as a tactical smokescreen the elements of that culture, such as the "active defense" concept, that appeal to the Confucian-Mencian tradition, which he rejected as irrelevant in modern times (A.I. Johnston 1995a: 253). While Johnston has not gone out of his way to show disrespect to historians, his criticism of area studies specialists reflects sentiments that may help explain his attitude toward what history and historians have to offer: that they "make the . . . particularistic claim that only they truly understand their country of study because they know the language, the literature, the religion, the politics, and have a 'feel' for the people" (A.I. Johnston 1999: 523). Such views might resonate in the ranks of political scientists who do not think it is necessary for a scholar to be able to read the language of a country, or to have done research there, or at least to have visited the place in order to be considered an expert on it, but they are not very helpful to the effort to better understand why countries behave the way they do in the international arena with respect to the use of force, an effort in which political scientists have much to learn from historians, and vice-versa.

Colin Gray and other pioneers in the field have acknowledged their debt to Bernard Brodie, whose *War and Politics* included the argument that "good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology" (Brodie 1973: 332). To a historian, it seems incomprehensible that Brodie did not also emphasize the importance of "good history," especially given the tendency of political scientists to cite historical as well as contemporary examples in support of various theories of international relations. At least one keen observer, Bradley Klein, recognized early on that history, more so than anthropology or sociology, would form the basis of the culturalist case. Writing in 1988, he observed that "the point of the concept of strategic culture is to historicize what has lain implicit in realist theories of hegemony" (B. Klein 1988: 136). But in making such a statement Klein assumed a level of compatibility between realist theory and the historical record that does not exist, as Paul Schroeder, writing six years later, pointed out with devastating clarity. Indeed, Schroeder concluded that neorealism "leads scholars to overlook or explain away large bodies of inconvenient facts." Moreover, it reflects "an attitude toward history not uncommon among scholars of many kinds: an unconscious disdain for it, a disregard of its complexity and subtleties and the problems of doing it well or using it wisely; an unexamined assumption that its lessons and insights lie on the surface for anyone to pick up." Thus Schroeder sees at least some political scientists using history "like a looter at an

archeological site, indifferent to context and deeper meaning, concerned only with taking what can be immediately used or sold" (Schroeder 1994: 148). While our survey of the existing literature on strategic culture and ways of warfare for Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa by necessity has been superficial, one hopes that the insights gained reflect a thoughtful use of history rather than a looting that has yielded an odd assortment of convenient facts to support cultural explanations.

Historians will recognize, however, that there is a problem in grounding present and future studies of strategic culture and ways of warfare in the historical literature: roughly around the time the cultural turn began in strategic studies, the historical profession – traditionally positioned on the fence between the humanities and the social sciences – lurched decidedly away from the social sciences and toward the humanities, where it would share much less common ground with political science than ever before. By the 1980s the scholarship considered cutting-edge by the mainstream of academic historians reflected the influence of the latest work in literary criticism, linguistics, and philosophy. In 1999 the president of the American Historical Association, Robert Darnton, remarked that "after a century of grand theory, from Marxism and Social Darwinism to structuralism and postmodernism, most historians have abandoned the belief in general laws. We no longer search for grand designs and dialectics." Darnton did not explain the transformation in terms of a breach between history and the social sciences, arguing simply that historians had developed "a new appreciation of contingency, unforeseen consequences, improvisation, and negotiation as ingredients in the past" (Darnton 1999). To the extent that the latest historical literature will be relevant to the cultural turn in strategic studies, it will be the works of the ever-declining number of historians who continue to study war and politics, despite being increasingly marginalized within their own profession.

Our survey of the existing literature on strategic culture and ways of warfare for Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia has demonstrated, in particular, the importance of the concept of strategic culture to our understanding of those countries (including France, China, and the United States) which are culturally inclined to believe deeply in the purity or higher nature of their own motives and actions. Realist theory (or Johnston's cultural realism, in China's case) would explain away the evidence of such beliefs as mere rhetorical posturing, but clearly it is not. Encultured beliefs in the righteousness of one's own cause are the greatest obstacle to a harmonious world; to accept them as real (rather than dismiss them as a rhetorical cover for a rational reality) helps us better understand ourselves, our adversaries, and the world in general. Just as Robert McNamara once remarked that he and other policymakers in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had a "profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics" of Southeast Asia (McNamara and VanDeMark 1995: 322), recent experience has shown the extraordinary risks inherent in making policy without understanding the history and culture of others. A solution to the problem would require a much better educated foreign policy establishment in every country, and one more willing to study history and culture as well as contemporary politics as part of their training.

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