

Left & Right

*The Psychological Significance
of a Political Distinction*

John T. Jost

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even when it felt as if no one else did, especially:*

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Preface

My earliest memories of an ideological nature were sitting on my father's shoulders, shouting "Power to the People" at a presidential campaign rally for George McGovern and Sargent Shriver in 1972. It was a chant I soon shared, in modified form, back in the attic with my stuffed animals: "Power to the Animals!" Those were the days of President Nixon and the Watergate scandal, which cast a pall over everything in American life. A year or two later, my preschool teachers scuttled our class to the local office of the Environmental Protection Agency, where we lined up with hundreds of other kids to shake President Gerald Ford's hand. At dinner that night my parents asked me what the experience was like. I regaled them with a single line: "He smiled a crooked smile." In retrospect, I realize that all of that was probably Nixon's fault (Ford's awkward smile and my skeptical assessment of it).

Growing up in Cincinnati in the 1970s and 1980s was, politically speaking, very normal and at the same time rather strange. The surrounding area was extremely conservative; the county prosecutor/sheriff was always shutting down art exhibitions—like that of Robert Mapplethorpe—in the most dramatic, pious fashion, and my house was only 10 minutes from the red state of Kentucky. The Ohio suburbs housed wealthy private schools (one of which I attended, for a time), vast country clubs, and golf courses—and what seemed like a never-ending supply of spoiled rich kids in polo shirts tooling around recklessly in their parents' BMWs. As far as I can tell, Cincinnati was one of the first cities in the U.S. to name a public venue after Ronald Reagan (a highway, as it turned out).

Within the narrow limits of the city itself, however, things were quite different. The downtown area, called Over-the-Rhine, was extremely poor at the time and only African Americans lived there. (This has changed since then.) I grew up in Clifton, a liberal, semi-artsy enclave near the University of Cincinnati, only a mile or two from Over-the-Rhine. I graduated from Walnut Hills High School, and the fathers of two of my closest friends were

liberal Democrats who were both elected mayor of Cincinnati: Tom Brush and David Mann, who also served in the US Congress. A third, Jerry Springer, once held a neighborhood fundraiser in my family's living room.

Thanks to social media, I stay in touch with many people from my hometown, and the overwhelming majority (especially those who moved away) are quite progressive now, but a few are rabid right-wingers. More often than not, one can find us online fanning the flames of ideological conflict, especially during the 2020 presidential campaign. Very little good comes of it, of course. At least we can agree on Skyline Chili and the Cincinnati Reds, although both present gastrointestinal challenges.

I attended Duke University in the 1980s, where the most visible dominant majority—tossing Frisbees on grassy quads with beers invariably in their other hands—were fraternity brothers and sorority sisters, old money Southern conservatives and wannabe capitalists from the Northeast. I tried, largely in vain, to make friends there, but over time I gravitated toward the subterranean group of progressive activists inspired by a late philosophy professor named Rick Roderick. (His lectures are available on YouTube.) Together we marched for unions and economic justice, against South African Apartheid and the proliferation of homelessness in the United States and the problem of sexual assault on campus, and to increase the racial diversity of the faculty. The Frisbee crowd thought we were ridiculously self-righteous, and we thought they were selfish and entitled.

One of the most profound intellectual influences on me at Duke was a professor of personality and clinical psychology named Irving Alexander. He introduced me to the work of Silvan Tomkins, including then-unpublished manuscripts, on the left-right dimension as a basic dimension of human personality. Tomkins had been Alexander's mentor, and the two remained the best of friends. When, a few years later, Alexander (1995: 105) wrote a section introduction for a compilation of Tomkins's writings, he noted that Tomkins "preferred the left, was plagued by the right, and struggled with the incompatibility endlessly." Already, by age 21, I could relate.

For Tomkins (1987: 173), the left-right conflict was a fundamental, age-old one that is "a sublimated derivative of social stratification and exploitation." This is because social systems based on stratification and exploitation—as most societies throughout human history have been—always have both defenders and challengers. According to Tomkins,

normative, right-wing ideologies are “defensive ideologies [that] vary as a function of the nature of the society they defend” and “place the blame for [problems in society] squarely upon those who suffer and complain,” like “the welfare ‘cheats’ who are to blame for their own problems” (176). By contrast, humanistic, left-wing ideologies “place the blame for the problematic on the established normative authority, which must then change itself or be changed by those who suffer” (177). Left-right differences, from this perspective, may be understood in part as divergent motives to maintain and justify (vs. challenge and improve upon) the societal status quo (Jost, 2020).

For graduate school in social psychology I chose Yale University and was very fortunate to have had that choice. Almost all of the doctoral students I knew there were liberal-lefties, and I learned a ton from them. We supported the cafeteria workers and secretaries and physical plant operators and the working class in New Haven, and we campaigned for years to unionize the graduate students in solidarity. With respect to a bargaining unit for graduate students, the faculty were split—often along left-right ideological lines. Meanwhile, many of the undergraduates appeared eager to fill William F. Buckley Jr.’s wingtips.

While at Yale, I attended weekly research meetings on political psychology led by the late Bob Abelson, Assaad Azzi, and Donald Green at the Institution for Social and Policy Studies (ISPS). Other participants included legendary figures such as Leonard Doob, Robert E. Lane, and Bruce Russett. The conversations were fascinating, and I was thrilled to be a fly on the wall (the annoying kind who would occasionally and impulsively blurt out semirelevant associations). I was in graduate school when it first dawned on me that most political scientists are committed to the view that ordinary citizens are not at all politically interested or ideologically motivated.

This idea seemed very strange to me then and still does, almost like psychologists insisting that human beings are just not *psychological* creatures.¹ Perhaps it is already clear from this preface that their view was incompatible with my life experiences. Over time, I have come to worry that this may be one of those unfortunate cases in which academics have come to prize disciplinary bromides and the overly clever use of quantitative methods to defend whatever is the opposite of common sense. In social psychology, the closest equivalent is the “power of the situation,”

a cherished professional doctrine that is sometimes taken to mean that the immediate situation is the only meaningful influence on human behavior, and that there is no such thing as stable personality traits or deep-seated motives. At one point I believed something like that, but I no longer do. And I wonder: is it possible that some scholars of American politics are overly invested in an image of the two-party system—in which decent, busy, reasonable, pragmatic citizens on “both sides” are more or less faithfully represented by elites who are more knowledgeable and sophisticated than they are—as a truly legitimate, truly democratic one?

My first tenure-track job was at the Graduate School of Business (GSB) at Stanford University, where I rubbed shoulders with Nobel Prize winners and close contenders, some Democrats and some Republicans. The MBA culture reminded me of the Frisbee types at Duke, but there were also some students, often minority students, who were committed to bringing principles of management and marketing to the world of nonprofits and social innovation. Naturally, they were my favorites. But very few people in the GSB ever seriously questioned whether unfettered capitalism was the way to go, even as a scientific consensus around anthropogenic climate change began to emerge. My bleeding-heart liberalism did not go over too well.

I soon repaired to Greenwich Village and the streets that once housed Emma Goldman, Paul Robeson, Dorothy Day, Allen Ginsburg, Bob Dylan, John Lennon, and other giants of critical perspicacity. Since moving to NYU in 2003, the students I have had the pleasure of working with—including the ones to whom this book is dedicated—sustained my confidence that an analysis of political ideology through the lens of motivated social cognition was important and potentially useful to science and society.

At some point, and I cannot remember how or why, I stumbled upon an English translation of Norberto Bobbio’s (1996) little book, *Left & Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction*, which sold over 200,000 copies in Italy in its first year of publication. I found the book so inspiring that I shifted my entire research agenda for several years. Its influence is apparent even in the title of this book.

When people say that academics live an ideologically monastic existence—and that people like me have never met a real conservative—I have to laugh. It is true that my grandfather, who worked as a draughtsman for

Kodak and Xerox, was a member of the left-leaning Catholic Worker's Movement and a pro-Black civil rights activist in Rochester, New York. It is also the case that my parents met at a civil rights meeting in 1963 and that one of the only things they shared deeply was liberal-leftist ideology. But in my family I also have prudent, upstanding moderates who vote Republican sometimes—as well as anti-abortion activists and conspiracy-minded right-wing nut jobs addicted to Fox News and Daily Wire. After all, we are Americans.

In Cincinnati; Durham; New Haven; Washington, DC; Santa Barbara; Palo Alto; San Francisco; Boston; New York; Easton, PA; and many other places, I have encountered and befriended leftists and rightists and a lot of people who seem not to care much about politics, although they always have opinions in the end. The same is true of people I have met in London, Bologna, Zurich, Paris, and Budapest, among other places. Of course, I would not say that the leftists in all those places are the same, nor are the rightists. But I do see some important family resemblances, in Wittgenstein's sense of the term. This book reflects my sustained attempt over the past 20 years to understand and describe the language games and forms of life that help to flesh out the nature of those ideological categories.

¹ Of course, this could mean many things: that most people are not self-consciously psychologically minded; that they actively avoid thinking introspectively about the psychological causes of their own behavior; that they lack a sophisticated psychological vocabulary or a scientific understanding of the subject matter; that their behavior is not subject to the laws of scientific psychology, and so on. Some of these statements would be easier to defend than others, but I have yet to meet a psychologist—even a hard-core “situationist”—who would claim that people are non-psychological in anything like the way in which many political scientists claim that people are non-ideological.

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PART I

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN HISTORICAL
AND SCIENTIFIC CONTEXT

1

A Psychological Approach to the Study of Political Ideology

The history of the continuing conflict between left and right—and its always tentative and changing, yet always advancing resolutions—is in many ways the history of the development of civilized man.

Silvan Tomkins (1965: 27)

Why Study Political Ideology?

The left-right dimension, which is ubiquitous in Western political life, has ancient origins pertaining to Indo-European concepts of handedness. Right-handedness has long been associated with dominance and the powerful normative influence of the majority, whereas left-handedness has been associated with the vulnerability of minority deviance (McManus, 2002). More than a century ago Robert Hertz (1909: 89) noted that “the right hand is the symbol and model of all aristocracy, the left hand of all common people.”

According to the French Canadian political scientist Jean Antoine Laponce (1981: 10), the right in Medieval Europe was considered the “side of God,” and it was “universally associated with the notion of privilege, dominance, and sacredness” as well as “liking for or acceptance of social and religious hierarchies.” By contrast, the “gauche,” “sinister” left was associated with the “equalization of conditions through the challenge of God and prince.” People who root for the underdog are, at least temperamentally speaking, on the left. Those who admire the powerful and wish that longstanding cultural traditions were more universally accepted and respected are generally on the right. If you can ask only one question about a person’s politics, the one you should ask, in one way or another, is whether their sympathies are with the left or the right.

Strangely, however, sociologists and political scientists often resist or avoid the most important orienting concept in all of Western politics. Edward A. Shils (1954: 27–28), for instance, mocked the left-right distinction as “rickety,” “spurious,” and “obsolete.” Decades later, Christopher Lasch (1991: 21) declared that “old political ideologies have exhausted their capacity either to explain events or to inspire men and women to constructive action.” Shils and Lasch are by no means the only skeptics when it comes to the left-right dimension of ideology, as we will see in the next chapter.

Many take inspiration from Philip Converse’s (1964) conclusion—based on an analysis of US public opinion data from the 1950s—that most people are woefully innocent (or ignorant) of political ideology. For instance, political scientists Donald Kinder and Nathan Kalmoe (2017) insist that most Americans are “neither liberal nor conservative” and that, when it comes to politics, they are “little more than casual spectators.” Their characterization is condescending, but more important than that, I think it is wrong, or at least exaggerated to the point of unhelpfulness:

Parochial in interest, modest in intellect, and burdened by the demands and obligations of everyday life, most citizens lack the wherewithal and motivation to grasp political matters in a deep way. People are busy with more pressing things; politics is complicated and far away. Ideology is not for them. (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017: 3)

Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels (2016: 12) draw on the same body of research to arrive at a similarly bleak assessment of the ideological “capacity” of ordinary citizens:

Most democratic citizens are uninterested in politics, poorly informed, and unwilling or unable to convey coherent policy preferences. . . . Converse’s argument is, if anything, even better supported a half century later than it was when he wrote. A vast amount of supporting evidence has been added to his dispiriting comparison of actual human political cognition with the expectations derived from the folk theory of democracy. Well-informed citizens, too, have come in for their share of criticism, since their well-organized “ideological” thinking often turns out to be just a rather mechanical reflection of what their favorite group and party leaders have instructed them to think.

And yet, like a phoenix rising from the ashes, the left-right ideological distinction simply will not die. This is because it continues to operate as “a powerful summary tool” (Campbell et al., 1960) that offers “an economical mode of discourse” (Tedin, 1987) and reflects the “core currency of political exchange” (Noël & Thérien, 2008).

There are some social scientists—such as Cochrane (2015), Freire (2015), and Hibbing et al. (2014)—who share Mair’s (2007) sense that the left-right distinction remains “a powerful device in both national and cross-national explanations of political behavior, both at mass and elite levels,” and is “unchallenged by any potentially competing set of referents” (217–218). I agree with them. Ronald Inglehart (1990: 292–293), who sought to develop a potential alternative to the left-right conception in terms of materialist vs. post-materialist values, likewise felt compelled to acknowledge that

the Left-Right dimension, as a political concept, is a higher-level abstraction used to summarize one’s stand on the important political issues of the day. It serves the function of organizing and simplifying a complex political reality, providing an overall orientation toward a potentially limitless number of issues, political parties, and social groups. The pervasiveness of the Left-Right concept through the years in Western political discourse testifies to its usefulness.

I would go even further: *if the left-right distinction did not exist, scholars of ideology would need to invent its equivalent.*

This is because ideological worldviews help citizens to integrate a very wide range of direct and indirect reactions to the social world, some of which are manifestly political and others of which are not, into patterns that mesh with their own personalities—broadly construed to include cognitive, affective, and motivational structures—as well as lifestyles. In this sense, ideology reflects and contributes to relatively stable, but by no means perfectly stable or consistent, preferences that may be either dormant or highly active. This is not to say that the structural-organizational effects of ideology are socially desirable or even logically coherent. Ideology leads many people astray. It often courts confusion and misunderstanding, as theorists in the Marxian tradition would be quick to point out (e.g., Larrain, 1983), rather than sophistication and knowledge.

On this issue, the ambidextrous conclusion reached by the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* remains apt: “on one hand, liberalism and conservatism are relatively organized and measurable patterns of current politico-economic thought; and on the other hand, within each of these broad patterns there is considerable subpatterning, inconsistency, and simple ignorance.” Their bottom line strikes me as right: “To ignore either the relative generality, or the relative inconsistency would . . . lead to serious misunderstanding of the problem” (Adorno et al., 1950: 175–176). For too long, it seems to me that prominent social scientists have committed

the former infraction. Focusing on *psychological* rather than *logical* consistency may help to restore some balance—and to foster a more realistic sense of ordinary citizens’ strengths and weaknesses in the political domain, recognizing that ideology contributes to both.

In psychology, there has been a virtual explosion of research on political ideology over the last 15 years or so. [Table 1.1](#) displays the results of a *PsycInfo* search on the keywords “political ideology.” Of the 1,318 books, articles, and dissertations on the topic that have appeared since 1935, 72% of them came out between 2005 and 2019. These works show that leftists and rightists diverge from one another in terms of (a) personality characteristics, (b) cognitive processing styles, (c) motivational interests and concerns, (d) the prioritization of personal values, and (e) neurological structures and physiological functions. This book summarizes and integrates these and related areas of research and underscores the major conclusions that have emerged from recent studies in political psychology.

Table 1.1 Results of a PsycInfo Search on “Political Ideology” (1935–2019)

Decade	Number of references
1935–1944	3
1945–1954	8
1955–1964	8
1965–1974	29
1975–1984	65
1985–1994	92
1995–2004	161
2005–2014	488
2015–2019*	464*

* A PsycInfo search on the keywords of “political ideology” was conducted on July 13, 2019, roughly halfway through the year of 2019 and slightly less than halfway through the decade of 2015–2024. The trends reveal a striking uptick in psychological research on the topic of political ideology since at least 2005.

Although some political scientists continue to claim that, when it comes to American citizens, ideology is, quite simply, “not for them” (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017: 3), extensive research programs in political psychology reveal that people who identify themselves as liberal or conservative differ in a multiplicity of meaningful, informative ways. They differ, as I have just noted, in terms of personality, cognitive style, motivational interests, moral values, and physiological characteristics. These differences contribute to the admittedly subjective impression that I and many others hold, namely that *ideology is everywhere*.

Consistent with this impression, research demonstrates that left-right ideological differences permeate the recesses of private—as well as public—life, including romantic interests and dating behavior (Eastwick et al., 2009; Klofstad et al., 2012), aesthetic tastes, entertainment and leisure activities, and consumption preferences (Carney et al., 2008; DellaPosta et al., 2015; Mutz & Rao, 2018; Rogers, 2020; Xu et al., 2013; Xu & Peterson, 2017). How could all of these myriad differences merely be a “mechanical reflection” of what citizens’ “favorite group and party leaders have instructed them to think,” as Achen and Bartels (2016: 12) suggest? Even corporations and consumer products are now perceived as having ideological orientations: consumers believe that Whole Foods, MTV, and Amazon are liberal-Democratic companies, whereas Chick-Fil-A, Wells Fargo, and Hilton are conservative-Republican companies (Global Strategy Group, 2014).

People may not be unflaggingly consistent or loyal to the left or right—and many combine disparate ideological elements when it comes to developing their own worldviews—but I will argue that they do exhibit clearly interpretable preferences of an ideological nature. After all, the fact that some people are bisexual (or ambidextrous) hardly negates the existence of sexual orientation (or handedness). Some ideological preferences—on the part of elites and ordinary citizens—may be understood as overtly political or “manifest” and others as “pre-political” or “latent,” as the political scientist Robert E. Lane (1962, 1969) noted. If this is so, and I believe it is, we would do well to heed Norberto Bobbio’s (1996: 3) insightful observation:

“Left” and “right” are not just ideologies . . . they indicate opposing programs in relation to many problems whose solution is part of everyday political activity. These contrasts concern not only ideas, but also interests and judgments on which direction society should be moving in; they exist in all societies, and it is not apparent how they could disappear.

Historical and Conceptual Considerations

The concept of ideology originated in the late 18th century and was used by Antoine Destutt de Tracy, a French Enlightenment philosopher, to capture the “science of ideas,” a discipline that we would now call the “sociology of knowledge” (Lefebvre, 1968). The concept was later adopted by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1846/1970) in *The German Ideology* and used in two

different senses, both of which are still in circulation today: (a) a relatively neutral sense in which ideology refers to any abstract or symbolic meaning system used to describe or explain social, economic, or political realities and (b) a more pejorative sense in which the term denotes a web of justifications or rationalizations that are distorted, contrary to reality, and subject to *false consciousness*. The second usage is more restrictive than the first in that it excludes scientific belief systems, among other things, from being considered ideologies.

Over the years, philosophers and social scientists have often diverged over the question of whether to embrace a critical, even judgmental tone in analyzing ideologies or, alternatively, to adopt a more “value-neutral” posture (Larrain, 1983). The more critical tradition descends from the writings of Marx and Engels, who characterized ideology as a potentially dangerous form of illusion and mystification that serves to conceal and maintain exploitative social relations, in some cases promoting false consciousness, that is, “systematically distorted beliefs about the social order and [citizens’] own place in it that work systematically against their interests” (Lukes, 2011: 28). Ideology, on this conception, “is an inverted, truncated, distorted reflection of reality” (Lefebvre, 1968: 64). The philosopher Peter Railton (2003: 367) recounts:

Marx spoke of ideologies as standing things on their heads: representing the particular as general, the local as universal, the contingent as necessary, the profane as sacred, the effect as cause.

In the early 20th century, Karl Mannheim (1936: 55) depicted certain ideologies as “more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation.” Likewise, Erich Fromm (1962) cross-pollinated Marxian social theory and Freudian psychology in an effort to liberate subjects of political and religious ideologies from “the chains of illusion.” As one of the last members of the Frankfurt School, Jürgen Habermas (1989) treated ideology as a form of “systematically distorted communication,” and this characterization persists in certain circles of linguistics and social criticism.

However, most empirical research in sociology, psychology, and political science reflects—self-consciously or otherwise—an ostensibly value-neutral conception. In this tradition, ideology refers more or less indiscriminately to any *belief system*, that is, to any “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of

constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse, 1964: 206). Thus, ideology is treated as a “relatively benign organizing device” (Knight, 2006: 622), and its cognitive function of structuring political knowledge and expertise is emphasized.

As we will see in [Chapter 2](#), this emphasis has led a great many political scientists to argue that members of the public should be considered “ideological” only to the extent that they hold attitudes that are stable, logical, coherent, consistent, and relatively sophisticated or knowledgeable (Achen & Bartels, 2016; G. Bishop, 2005; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; Zaller, 1992). Other approaches, including the psychological approach we develop throughout this book, put quite a bit more conceptual space between constructs of ideology and political sophistication, leading to the conclusion that *ideology can easily lead people astray, epistemically speaking*.

Unfortunately, insights that emerge from critical and value-neutral inquiries are juxtaposed and often assumed to be incompatible with one another. Scholars from the two traditions rarely, if ever, communicate with one another. Mainstream researchers are professionally rewarded for making a show of steering clear of normative questions, but they never actually succeed in doing so, for it would be impossible to do so. Choosing the middle of the road is, after all, still a choice. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have been banished from mainstream social science for so long that they are prone to dismiss the empirical grapes as oppressively sour.

At the end of the day, critical and social scientific approaches are not and should not be considered to be mutually exclusive. The same belief systems can simultaneously serve multiple psychological functions, some of which are helpful and constructive and others of which are unhelpful and destructive in normative terms. That is, a given ideological position can reflect genuine—and in some cases even highly accurate or at least reasonable, if not entirely rational—attempts to understand, interpret, and organize information about the political world, as well as conscious or unconscious tendencies to rationalize the way things are or, alternatively, the desire for things to be different. In this book, I summarize research bearing on a wide range of psychological variables—some of which would be expected to increase or decrease ideological coherence, stability, and sophistication, whereas others would be expected to increase or decrease ideological distortion, rationalization, and mystification.

Before we can set the stage for a psychological approach to the study of political ideology and foreshadow the chapters to come, however, more conceptual analysis is required. Let us start by considering recent and contemporary definitions of the concept of political ideology before turning to historical, philosophical, and empirical considerations about the emergence and persistence of the left-right ideological dimension. At that point we will be in a better position to understand the ways in which a psychological approach is useful, if not necessary, when it comes to making progress on longstanding social scientific questions about the role of ideology in human affairs.

Definitions of Ideology and Related Concepts

Ideology has been dubbed “the most elusive concept in the whole of social science” (McLellan, 1986: 1), and its practitioners have been accused, with more than a little justice, of “semantic promiscuity” (Gerring, 1997: 957). At least one writer has defended the bedlam: “the term ‘ideology’ has a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with each other. To try to compress this wealth of meaning into a single comprehensive definition would thus be unhelpful even if it were possible” (Eagleton, 1991: 1).

Given the controversies that inevitably swarm the topic, it seems wise to begin with a definition that is concrete, unified, manageable, and, if at all possible, unobjectionable. One good candidate is the textbook definition offered by Robert Erikson and Kent Tedin (2019: 68), namely a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved.” This definition is useful but sparse, mainly because it says nothing about who holds the relevant “set of beliefs” and why—that is, where the beliefs come from and what functions they serve for their adherents. The definitions collected in [Box 1.1](#) are compatible with the generic textbook definition, but they elaborate on functional and other aspects of the concept.

Box 1.1 Several Definitions of Political Ideology in the Social Scientific Literature

- “The term ideology is used . . . to stand for an organization of opinions, attitudes, and values—a way of thinking about man and

society. We may speak of an individual's total ideology or of his ideology with respect to different areas of social life: politics, economics, religion, minority groups, and so forth." (Adorno et al., 1950: 2)

- " 'Ideology' refers to more than doctrine. It links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by doing so, lends a more honorable and dignified complexion to social conduct . . . From another vantage point, ideology may be viewed as a cloak for shabby motives and appearances." (Apter, 1964: 16)
- "An *ideology* is an organization of beliefs and attitudes—religious, political, or philosophical in nature—that is more or less institutionalized or shared with others, deriving from external authority." (Rokeach, 1968: 123–124)
- " 'Ideology' refers to patterns or *gestalts* of attitudes." (Billig, 1984: 446)
- "Ideologies are broad and general, pervade wide areas of belief and behavior, and give core meaning to many issues of human concern. They unify thought and action." (Kerlinger, 1984: 13)
- "The term 'political ideology' is normally defined as an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals of society and how they should be achieved. An ideology has two distinct and at least analytically separate components—affect and cognition." (Tedin, 1987: 65)
- "[An ideology is] a set of ideas, beliefs, opinions, and values that (1) exhibit a recurring pattern, (2) are held by significant groups, (3) compete over providing and controlling plans for public policy, and (4) do so with the aim of justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements and processes of a political community." (Freedman, 2003: 32)

One thing that is striking is that all of these definitions—even those written by nonpsychologists—are psychological in nature. They conceptualize ideology as a belief system of the individual that is typically shared with an identifiable social group and that organizes, motivates, and gives meaning to political behavior, broadly construed. This is encouraging, for it means that a psychological approach should be useful—and perhaps

indispensable—for understanding the vicissitudes of ideology, defined in these ways.

Some, but not all, of the definitions presented in [Box 1.1](#) underscore the fact that political ideologies may differ in terms of whether they are aimed at “justifying, contesting or changing the social and political arrangements,” as Michael Freeden (2003: 32) put it. This makes psychological approaches relevant in yet another sense. It suggests that research programs focused on processes of social identification, social dominance, and system justification are all potentially relevant for understanding political ideology, because they seek to explain how and why individuals and groups differ in terms of their support for—vs. opposition to—the existing structure of intergroup relations and the social order as a whole (Jost & Sidanius, 2004).

The definitions listed in [Box 1.1](#) make clear that there are many possible ideologies, not just ideologies of the left, right, and center (Freeden, 2003; Vincent, 2010). Nevertheless, a great many prominent examples of political ideologies—such as anarchism, communism, socialism, liberalism, libertarianism, conservatism, and fascism—*can* be placed on a left-right dimension, even if there is some variability in where they are placed (depending upon, among other things, who is doing the placing and when and where). These specific ideologies also differ in terms of whether they address psychological needs for predictability and control through *internal* sources, by placing extreme confidence in the power of individual freedom and personal choice, or *external* sources, such as God or the government or the invisible hand of the marketplace (see Kay & Eibach, 2013).

Matters are made more complicated by the fact that in the United States—but not in some other countries, such as Australia—the term *liberal* is used to refer to ideological positions that are left of center. A less ambiguous term would be *progressive*, because it clearly contrasts with *conservative* preferences, which are generally taken to be right of center. However, for historical reasons, scholars of American politics typically use the term liberal rather than progressive—although activists on the left often prefer the latter term. To be clear, I do not see the liberal-conservative dimension as *qualitatively* different from the left-right dimension (Caprara, 2020). Rather, in this book I will treat the liberal-conservative spectrum in the United States as simply a truncated version of the broader left-right spectrum. The liberal-conservative dimension, unlike the left-right dimension, excludes socialism and communism on the left and fascism on

the right, because for the most part these ideologies have not attracted much popular support in US history.

This raises another conceptual issue, which is that left and right are, like East and West, *relative* concepts. That is, left-right comparisons are useful for making observations within a given society, but they are not as useful for making absolute judgments. It is possible, for instance, that a center-right voter in France is to the left of a liberal voter in the United States, at least on some issues, such as nationalized health care. It would therefore be confusing and probably unhelpful to discuss their similarities and dissimilarities in left-right terms, just as it would be confusing to refer to New York City as an Eastern city and, in the same conversation, to refer to Paris as a Western city. It makes much more sense to compare center-left and center-right voters in France to one another, and such a comparison would correspond in a meaningful, if not perfect, way to comparison between liberal and conservative voters in the United States.

In this book, I focus on the ideological distinction between left and right—or, again, in the context of US politics, between liberalism and conservatism—and its psychological underpinnings. This is my focus not because I assume that *all* political attitudes can be neatly reduced to their address on a single bipolar dimension, although many can be. It is because, as I have already noted, the left-right distinction has been the most useful, popular, and parsimonious way of classifying political ideology in the Western world for over 200 years and counting. In this I have been encouraged by many prominent writers, including Seymour Lipset (1960), Milton Rokeach (1960), Robert E. Lane (1962, 1969), Sylvan Tomkins (1963, 1965), Glenn Wilson (1973), Jean Antoine Laponce (1981), Jim Sidanius (1985), Ronald Inglehart (1990), Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1990), Norberto Bobbio (1996), Peter Mair (2007), Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien (2008), André Freire (2015), and Christopher Cochrane (2015).

Returning to the point made earlier, I argue that the left-right (or liberal-conservative) distinction is especially helpful for distinguishing between those who are motivated to defend and justify vs. criticize and challenge the societal status quo—that is, existing social, economic, and political institutions and arrangements, along with their attendant degrees of hierarchy, which are legitimized, to varying degrees, by the status quo. I refer to this as the dimension of system justification motivation (Jost, 2020).

To understand how and why the left is typically associated with challenging the status quo and the right is typically associated with defending it, it is useful to revisit the historical context in which the left-right spatial metaphor was developed.

A Brief History of the Left-Right Distinction

Modern usage of the left-right metaphor in politics originated with the seating arrangements of the Legislative Assembly at the time of the French Revolution, which lasted from 1789 to 1799 (Bobbio, 1996; Laponce, 1981). The Feuillants, who supported *L'Ancien Régime*, sat on the right side of the chamber, whereas the Montagnards, who opposed the regime and sympathized with the revolutionaries, sat on the left.

Subsequently, the right-wing label came to represent political views that are conservative, supportive of the status quo, and hierarchical in nature. It was once epitomized by counter-Enlightenment figures such as Joseph de Maistre, Johann Herder, and Edmund Burke. Burke's legacy is probably the most significant one in the Anglo-American tradition. It was Burke's philosophical conservatism that led him to condemn the "spirit of innovation" and to urge his British compatriots to "look backward to [the authority of] their ancestors" rather than turning to revolution (Pocock, 1987; Viereck, 1956; White, 1950).

In previous centuries, then, conservatives were strenuous defenders of the church, the Crown, and the aristocracy, whereas liberals, progressives, and radicals challenged the supremacy of those groups and institutions. Today, conservatives still venerate religious traditions and authorities more than progressives do, and they also hold more favorable attitudes toward economic elites and the capitalist system in general. Nearly every form of conservatism involves "piety to the established order" and "respect [for] existing natural hierarchy and inequality of society" (Vincent, 2010: 74).

Left-wing views, on the other hand, came to be associated with progressive social change and egalitarian ideals, as in the liberal traditions of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Paine, and others, or the more radical socialist tradition of Karl Marx (Bobbio, 1996; Laponce, 1981; Viereck, 1956). Those on the left decried the "wisdom-of-our-ancestors fallacy" that they perceived in the thinking of their adversaries. Marx, for instance, believed that the revolution the world

needed “cannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future,” and only after stripping away “all superstition in regard to the past.”

In the aftermath of the French Revolution, leftists and rightists differed not only in their degree of enthusiasm (or lack of enthusiasm) for Enlightenment ideals such as *liberté*, *fraternité*, and *égalité* but also in their more general attitudes toward the past, present, and future (Nisbet, 1986/2017). Burke, for instance, exclaimed, “Thank God we are not enlightened!” and regarded established customs as sacred. Marx, on the other hand, valued scientific progress and declared ominously, “The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”¹

For better or worse, the major tenets of left and right survived the transatlantic crossing, although Americans settled on the terms *liberal* and *conservative*, as I have already noted. Thus, Angus Campbell and other authors of *The American Voter* (1960: 111) characterized conservatives as “reluctant to disturb the existing order of relationships,” as compared with liberals, who see “room for improvement in the product of social and political process through change in these relationships.” Sixty years after the publication of this groundbreaking work in political science—and some 220 years after the end of the French Revolution—the song remains very much the same. As Erikson and Tedin (2019: 69) put it, “Conservatives venerate tradition, order, and authority; liberals believe planned change brings the possibility of improvement.”

Two Core Dimensions of Left-Right Ideology

Drawing on historical and philosophical sources including those cited previously, my collaborators and I have proposed that there are two core axiological dimensions that separate left and right in the political sphere. They are (a) advocating vs. resisting social change and (b) rejecting vs. accepting social, economic, and political forms of inequality. These two core dimensions feature prominently in classic and contemporary analyses of political ideology. For instance, in the 1954 and 1962 editions of the *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Seymour Lipset and his colleagues wrote: “By left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change

toward equality” (1135). Remarkably, this description is as apt today as it was nearly 70 years ago, as can be seen by comparing it to several other more recent definitions in [Box 1.2](#). Moral conflict between the left and right very often comes down to the problem of incompatibility between equality and tradition (see Scheffler, 2010).

Of course, some ideological differences between leftists and rightists (or liberals and conservatives) are historically and/or culturally specific. My colleagues and I refer to these as *peripheral* issues to the extent that they are tangential to fundamental left-right disagreements over equality and tradition. The two core dimensions, we find, are more stable and enduring, and they provide motivational as well as cognitive structure to ideological preferences over longer periods of time.

Box 1.2 Characterizations of the Left-Right (or Liberal-Conservative) Dimension of Political Ideology in Terms of Advocacy vs. Resistance to Social Change and Rejection vs. Acceptance of Inequality

- “By left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall mean supporting a traditional more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change toward equality.” (Lipset et al., 1954/1962: 1135)
- “Right wing has been defined basically in terms of preservatism; the left wing in terms of innovation. More particularly, the preservatism of the right wing has to do with maintaining or narrowing lines of power and privilege; the innovation of the left wing has to do with broadening lines of power and privilege.” (Lipset & Raab, 1978: 19)
- “Politicians and the policies they espouse [are] . . . described as liberal if they seek to advance such ideas as equality, aid to the disadvantaged, tolerance of dissenters, and social reform; and as conservative if they place particular emphasis on order, stability, the needs of business, differential economic rewards, and defense of the status quo.” (McClosky & Zaller, 1984: 189)
- “The core meaning of the Left-Right dimension, we believe, is whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction. Typically, the Left (or, in America, the liberal side)

supports change, while the Right opposes it. It is also important to specify the direction of desired change. While conservative movements may be content to defend the status quo, reactionary ones seek change in the direction of greater *inequality* between classes, nationalities, or other groups.” (Inglehart, 1990: 293)

- “Conservatives consider people inherently unequal and worthy of unequal rewards; liberals are egalitarian. Conservatives venerate tradition, order, and authority; liberals believe planned change brings the possibility of improvement.” (Erikson & Tedin, 2019: 69)

In the Western world (at least), the two core dimensions of advocacy vs. resistance to social change and rejection vs. acceptance of inequality are intertwined for historical reasons. Since the Middle Ages, if not long before, “traditional” arrangements have been extremely hierarchical (i.e., unequal in social, economic, and political terms), and European societies and their colonies have been moving in the direction of greater equality. Thus, “progress” has more often than not been associated with increased egalitarianism, whereas resistance to change has more often than not been associated with the maintenance of hierarchical forms of social organization. As Noël and Thérien (2008: 17) observed:

Liberal democracies were built in opposition to older, hierarchical orders, in the name of equality and individual rights. The shift in perspective was huge and difficult, because up to then inequality had been understood as the natural order of things. The family, the Church, social classes, even the animal kingdom were seen as hierarchies designed by God.

Due to the success of liberal-democratic social movements following the French Revolution, as well as other historical events, Western societies became more egalitarian in terms of human rights and liberties, economic distribution, and the dispersion of political power. In some cases, social and economic equality increased gradually, and in others it occurred rapidly because of revolutionary events, which were typically resisted or strenuously opposed by conservatives in the mold of Edmund Burke and those identified with the political right.

The Functional Perspective in Social Psychology

A primary goal of this book is to advance a general social scientific understanding of why, in contemporary societies, some individuals and social groups are drawn to conservative, rightist belief systems that emphasize tradition and hierarchy, whereas others are drawn to liberal, leftist belief systems that emphasize progress and equality. To address this issue, my collaborators and I have developed a detailed theoretical model of political ideology as motivated social cognition, the specifics of which will be elaborated in subsequent chapters.

For now, it is enough to note that our approach belongs to an intellectual genealogy of “functional” perspectives in social psychology, which assume that *people hold the attitudes they do because they resonate with underlying needs, interests, and goals* (Allport, 1954; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kelman, 1961; Lane, 1969; M. B. Smith et al., 1956; Tomkins, 1963, 1965). Or, in the language of Adorno and colleagues (1950: 2), a “structural unity” exists between psychological needs and ideological manifestations of those needs, so that “ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual’s needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated.”

Adopting a functional perspective is crucial, because it means that we should expect some degree of ideological consistency or congruency in the belief (and motivational and action) systems of individuals and groups to arise—not from logical sophistication or political knowledge, which is where many political scientists appear to have been looking for it, but from other psychological needs, goals, tendencies, and structures. As Lane (1969: 2) pointed out, belief “is inevitably an interaction between self and world.”

Our theoretical model is inspired by Max Weber’s account of *elective affinities*—the “selective process” by which “ideas and their publics” are bound together through forces of mutual attraction (Gerth & Mills, 1948/1970: 63). The most important point here is that people may be seduced by certain beliefs, opinions, and values because of social psychological forces that are not necessarily salient or obvious or even accessible to them. Psychological factors help to explain not only the presence of individual differences in the specific contents of ideological preferences (whether latent or manifest) but also why some people are more

eager than others to acquire certain types of political experiences in the first place.

If left-right (or liberal-conservative) ideology has *psychological* meaning and significance, then a fortiori it also has some degree of *political* meaning and significance. This is because the left-right distinction is first and foremost a political distinction, and it is relevant to political attitudes and behavior, even if it is by no means the only factor that is relevant to political attitudes and behavior. According to Lane (1969: 38), “ideologies are indeed the springs of action, the levers whereby ideas prompt movements.” But, as I have already noted, this idea—that the left-right distinction has political significance for ordinary citizens—is something that a number of social scientists have resisted, often very strenuously. I believe that *the time has come to give the study of ideology another chance, treating it as a psychological variable, among other things, and not necessarily as a coherent or satisfying philosophical doctrine.*

The Chapters to Come

In the next chapter I will expand upon some of the arguments I have introduced in this chapter. In particular, I revisit four major claims made by defenders of the *end of ideology* thesis in the second half of the 20th century, namely that (a) ordinary citizens’ political attitudes lack the kind of stability, consistency, and constraint that ideology requires; (b) ideological constructs such as liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance; (c) there are no major differences in substantive content between liberal and conservative points of view; and (d) there are few important differences in the psychological styles or processes that underlie liberal and conservative orientations. I argue, in contradiction to the “end-of-ideologists,” that the left-right dimension remains a pervasive, parsimonious, and useful means of organizing thoughts, feelings, and behaviors for ordinary citizens and social scientists alike.

[Chapter 2](#) is based on an article I published in *American Psychologist* that was itself based on an invited address I delivered in the Presidential Symposium of the 2006 annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) in Palm Springs, California. The talk was described years later in *New York Magazine* (Issenberg, 2012), and the article has received more than 1,500 academic citations. The ideas

developed in this chapter have been well received in psychology for the most part, but they were disputed vociferously and even sarcastically by Kinder and Kalmoe (2017). It is not clear to me that these authors understood my major thesis, and if they did, they did not respond to it fairly. *I am not arguing that ordinary citizens are competent as amateur political scientists; I am arguing that they have clear preferences and predilections that have a psychological basis and that may be understood fruitfully in left-right terms.* This chapter updates my original arguments in light of current political realities and more (much more) recent findings in psychology and political science, which I use in part to rebut some of the criticisms by Kinder and Kalmoe.

[Chapter 3](#) elaborates on Max Weber’s concept of “elective affinities” to describe the ways in which *people and ideas meet in the middle*. The chapter is based in part on two extensive literature reviews that I carried out with Chris Federico and Jaime Napier, though I have now replaced many of the older and more numerous citations with summary sources of recent vintage to make the chapter more current and more readable. We argue that ideological outcomes are invariably *the joint product of “top down” processes such as institutional agenda setting and elite-level communication and “bottom up” cognitive, affective, and motivational processes*. I am not convinced by Malka and Soto’s (2015) distinction between “menu dependent” and “menu independent” options. You cannot eat in a restaurant without offerings made by the chef, and you will not eat there unless you find something appetizing.

[Chapter 4](#) is based on an article entitled “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition,” which I published in collaboration with Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank Sulloway in *Psychological Bulletin*. The article received a shockingly intense amount of media attention when it first came out, in large part because it was perceived as controversial by some readers and, sadly, a number of nonreaders who simply objected to the title. To my amazement, this article has now been cited over 4,500 times; it has been cited more than once a day for each of the last four years—more than 15 years after its initial publication. Because the original work was extremely long and contained a huge number of references, I have sought to put together for this volume a more streamlined, accessible, and updated version that I hope will appeal to a broader, less citation-minded audience.

[Chapter 5](#) draws on three distinctive but concurrent, convergent research programs inspired by the ideas summarized in [Chapter 4](#). Taken in conjunction, these research programs cover both situational and dispositional factors linked to political orientation. One is derived from research conducted with Sam Gosling and Dana Carney on personality differences between liberals and conservatives in terms of the “Big Five” dimensions of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional stability—as well as their behavioral manifestations and the “things they leave behind,” such as personal belongings, room decorations, and the like. A second research program is based on a longitudinal study I carried out with a clinical psychologist, George Bonanno, on changes in social, personal, and political attitudes over time in a small but precious sample of high-exposure survivors of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The third research program, which involved Brian Nosek and Sam Gosling, highlights liberal-conservative differences in implicit evaluative associations as well as explicit attitudes and behaviors.

Whereas some of the earlier chapters in this book focus largely, but by no means exclusively, on the psychological predicament of political conservatives, [Chapter 6](#) focuses squarely on the predicament of liberals. It is an updated, expanded version of a popular article I wrote in collaboration with Orsolya Hunyady—a practicing psychoanalyst and my long-time spouse—for *Democracy* magazine online. We were asked by Michael Tomasky to write on the topic of “Mass Psychology in the Age of Trump” and to focus especially on the question of why Donald Trump, even more than George W. Bush and other Republicans in recent years, made “liberals’ heads explode.” We argued that a sincere commitment to liberal values makes it supremely depressing, terrifying, enraging, and anxiety-provoking to encounter, day in and day out, true authoritarian ugliness. We also suggested that many liberals suffer intrapersonal and interpersonal conflicts about whether or not to tolerate the attitudes and behaviors of friends, neighbors, and coworkers who are blatantly intolerant.

In [Chapter 7](#), I summarize the most recent evidence bearing on hypotheses developed in the preceding chapters concerning the theory of political ideology as motivated social cognition. I note that political psychologists are now in possession of a database that is much larger and more useful than the database that existed in 2003, when many of the ideas described in [Chapter 4](#) were developed. On the basis of newer meta-analytic

syntheses performed in collaboration with Chadly Stern, Joanna Sterling, and Nicholas Rule, I conclude that many empirical observations made earlier have been sustained, while others have not. I also encourage political psychologists not to shy away from exploring cognitive and motivational differences between leftists and rightists, although many are pressured to do so, for reasons akin to political correctness and threatened accusations of “liberal bias,” a charge that so many journalists and academics face these days. On the contrary, I maintain that understanding ideological differences is essential to the study of political psychology, much as recognizing and appreciating cross-cultural differences is essential to the study of cultural psychology. This chapter is based in part on a special address I gave in Warsaw, Poland, when I was president of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP). An article based on the address was published in 2017 in the society’s flagship journal, *Political Psychology*.

[Chapter 8](#) takes stock of one of the newest and most exciting—and, to some, alarming—areas of political psychology, namely political neuroscience (also referred to as “neuropolitics”). It is based in part on a much longer review article that I wrote with H. Hannah Nam, David Amodio, and Jay Van Bavel for the inaugural issue of *Advances in Political Psychology*, as well as empirical studies that we have published in *Nature Neuroscience*, *Nature Human Behaviour*, and *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*. It is a forward-looking piece in which we express cautious optimism about the prospects of using neuroscientific—and, indeed, other physiological—methods to illuminate classic and contemporary questions about social and political attitudes and behavior, including questions about the dimensional structure and cognitive-motivational functions of political ideology.

My hope is that, when these chapters are processed in connection with one another—and in relatively close spatial and temporal proximity—the reader will discern a coherent, sensible, viable, and valuable approach to the study of political ideology. I would be pleased if others, including philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, social theorists, and other interested parties, found something here that is edifying in terms of making sense of existing evidence and also fruitful in terms of inspiring new work in the future. And if the framework developed here can help us to navigate the daunting political circumstances and ideological landmines that we face

in contemporary Western societies today—especially when it comes to the resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism—so much the better.

¹ In *Conservatism: Dream and Reality*, Robert Nisbet (1986/2017: 101) wrote: “Liberals and socialists could look to the imaginings of the future for inspiration. Conservatives, knowing well the appeal of tradition, the depth in the human mind of nostalgia, and the universal human dread of the ordeal of change, the challenge of the new, have rested their indictment of the present frankly and unabashedly on models supplied directly by the past.” Or, as Michael Oakeshott (1962/1991: 156) noted: “Change is a threat to identity, and every change is an emblem of extinction.” Thus, resistance to change is a key aspect of conservative psychology, as we will see in subsequent chapters.

2

The End of the End of Ideology

Ideology and factual truth can, of course, be miles apart.

Agnes Heller (1989: 261)

The end of ideology was declared more than a generation ago by sociologists and political scientists who—after the titanic struggle between the ideological extremes of fascism and communism in the middle of the 20th century—were more than glad to see it go. The work of Edward Shils, Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell, Seymour Lipset, and Philip Converse was extremely influential in the social and behavioral sciences, including psychology. The general thesis was that in the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War, both the right and the left had been equally discredited and that “a kind of exhaustion of political ideas” had taken place in the West (Lane, 1962: 15). Ideological distinctions, it was suggested, were devoid of social and psychological significance for most people, especially in the United States. The end-of-ideologists were so successful that even now, more than 60 years later, my students often ask me whether ideological constructs such as left and right are relevant, meaningful, and useful. This chapter summarizes my main reasons for answering them in the affirmative.

The End-of-Ideology Claims and Their Effect on Psychology

There were four related claims that were taken to support the end-of-ideology conclusion, and in conjunction they have cast a long shadow over political psychology. The first has arguably had the greatest impact within psychology, and it grew out of Philip Converse’s (1964) famous argument that ordinary citizens’ political attitudes lack the kind of logical consistency and internal coherence that would be expected if they were neatly organized

according to ideological schemata. A second and related claim is that most people are unmoved by ideological appeals and that abstract credos associated with liberalism and conservatism lack motivational potency and behavioral significance. The third claim is that there are really no substantive differences in terms of philosophical or ideological content between liberal and conservative points of view. A fourth claim, which first emerged as a criticism of Adorno and colleagues' (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality*, is that there are no fundamental psychological differences between proponents of left-wing and right-wing ideologies.

The deadening impact of these conclusions on the study of ideology in social, personality, and political psychology can hardly be exaggerated. As shown in [Table 1.1](#), there were only 5.2 articles, books, and dissertations per year on the topic of political ideology listed in PsycInfo between 1935 and 2004 ($n = 366$). Since 2005, by comparison, there have been 74.2 per year ($n = 1,113$). The longstanding assumption that people are fundamentally nonideological may be finally losing its grip on psychology.

In many ways, psychologists were well primed to accept the end-of-ideology thesis, because it coincided with crises of theoretical and methodological confidence surrounding disciplinary staples such as personality, attitudes, and human nature. One of my mentors, Bill McGuire (1999: 343), for instance, observed:

This end-of-ideology conclusion by survey researchers is in agreement with the recent emphasis by basic researchers on situational rather than dispositional determination of behavior, on the separate storage of affect and information about topics of meaning, on one's dependence on self-observation of one's external behavior to ascertain one's own beliefs, and on the experiencing of affective reaction to a topic even before one recognizes what the topic is.

One consequence of psychologists' acceptance of the thesis that ordinary citizens were nonideological was that once-promising research programs on individual differences in political orientation and the effects of societal threat on authoritarianism languished for three or four decades (Adorno et al., 1950; Brown, 1965; DiRenzo, 1974; McClosky, 1958; Rokeach, 1960; Sniderman & Citrin, 1971; Tomkins, 1963, 1965; Wilson, 1973). As a result, fairly little scientific progress on the subject occurred in psychology during this period. Fortunately, many of the same ideas cropped up again in largely autonomous research programs years later, but it took another decade or more for the insights from these isolated studies to achieve integration (Altemeyer, 1998, 2006; Caprara & Vecchione, 2017; Duckitt, 2001; Jost,

Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a, 2003b; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Tetlock, 2007).

The thesis of this chapter is that the demise of ideology, much like the rumored demise of personality and attitudes, was declared prematurely, or rather unnecessarily. I believe that recent developments in psychological research and the world of politics provide ample grounds for revisiting the strong claims made by those who would deny that ideology is a meaningful force in people's lives. I find it doubtful that there ever was a truly nonideological era in American (or modern European) politics, but even casual observers of today's headlines, newscasts, and late-night talk shows cannot escape the feeling that ideology is everywhere.¹ Consider, for example, this smattering of *New York Times* headlines:

- “White House Hosts Conservative Internet Activists at a ‘Social Media Summit’ ”
- “Tensions between Pelosi and Progressive Democrats of ‘the Squad’ Burst into Flame”
- “Trump Saw Opportunity in Speech on Environment. Critics Saw a ‘ “1984” Moment’ ”
- “Principal Who Tried to Stay ‘Politically Neutral’ about Holocaust Is Removed”
- “Pastor’s Exit Exposes Cultural Rifts at a Leading Liberal Church”
- “Claims that Obama ‘Yanked’ Citizenship Question from Census Are False”
- “Greek Elections: Prime Minister Loses Re-Election to Center Right”
- “U.K. Parliament Backs Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion Rights in Northern Ireland”
- “A Political Murder and Far-Right Terrorism: Germany’s New Hateful Reality”
- “After a Police Shooting, Ethiopian Israelis Seek a ‘Black Lives Matter’ Reckoning”
- “Buddhists Go to Battle: When Nationalism Overrides Pacifism”
- “Hong Kong Protesters Are Fueled by a Broader Demand: More Democracy”

These headlines, which were drawn from a single, unexceptional week (July 8–14, 2019), illustrate that political ideology and its effects are experienced daily, not only in the United States but all over the world.

These days, everything seems to be ideologically fraught, from plastic straws to the coronavirus pandemic:

The subject of the latest fight Mr. Trump and his team want to stir up? Plastic straws. Over the weekend, the Trump campaign launched a new fund-raising effort: “Make Straws Great Again.”

“Liberal paper straws don’t work,” wrote the campaign. “STAND WITH PRESIDENT TRUMP and buy your pack of recyclable straws today.” A pack of 10 BPA-free, recyclable red straws, laser-engraved with “TRUMP,” sells for \$15. Mr. Trump’s campaign manager tweeted today that more than 140,000 straws had been sold, raising \$200,000 for the campaign. This is exactly the kind of fight Mr. Trump loves to stir up: mocking liberals, questioning climate change and turning relatively minor issues into partisan battles.²

Americans who now find themselves politically divided over seemingly everything are now forming two very different views of another major issue: the dangers of the new coronavirus.

Democrats are about twice as likely as Republicans to say the coronavirus poses an imminent threat to the United States, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll conducted this week.

And more Democrats than Republicans say they are taking steps to be prepared, including washing their hands more often or limiting their travel plans.

Poll respondents who described themselves as Republicans and did not see the coronavirus as a threat said it still felt remote because cases had not been detected close to home and their friends and neighbors did not seem to be worried, either.³

Wear a mask? You’re a liberal snowflake controlled by big government. Want to reopen restaurants? You’re a greedy conservative willing to sacrifice Grandma for the economy.

It took less than two months for the coronavirus pandemic to become just the latest battle in the culture wars.

With the country still in the firm grip of the coronavirus pandemic, conservatives are on social media and Fox News stoking protests that argue masks, stay-at-home orders and social distancing violate constitutional rights and are causing unacceptable harm to the economy.

Liberals, at the same time, say personal liberties must be sacrificed for public health, even as millions file for unemployment and more than a quarter of the work force is jobless in some states.⁴

If ideology is beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens, one has to ask—about plastic straws and face masks and much else besides—why is it so easy to pick a political fight about things that need not be politicized at all? Is it really true that there is no appetite for ideology in the general public?

What Is the Role of Ideology in Political Judgment?

As I noted in the first chapter, there are two major conceptions of ideology that are usually taken to be incompatible. According to the first, which has pervaded the social and behavioral sciences since at least the early 1960s, ideological belief systems are characterized by stability, consistency, logic, and political sophistication. On the second, more Marxian conception,

ideology need not possess any of these features; instead, it acquires a more motivational flavor and reflects a basic orientation for or against the existing social system. Specifically, ideology is a system-serving illusion—“the way a system . . . or even a whole society . . . rationalizes itself” (Knight, 2006: 619)—or, conversely, the inspirational basis for revolutionary activity.

In light of the second conception, it is ironic that many observers have interpreted empirical evidence of the flawed and fragmented nature of people’s political attitudes and beliefs as indicating that ideology does not exist. In some intellectual traditions, including Marxism, feminism, and postcolonial and critical theory, certain forms of distortion and irrationality (e.g., in the service of justifying the societal status quo) would suggest the *influence* of ideology rather than its absence.

The first conception of ideology as a “relatively benign ‘organizing device’ ” (Knight, 2006: 622) led, at least for a time, to a dead end in social scientific scholarship. By equating ideology with political sophistication, researchers were obliged to interpret evidence of attitudinal and behavioral inconsistency as indicating that most citizens lacked ideological capacity and conviction (Achen & Bartels, 2016; Bishop, 2005; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017; McGuire, 1999). But this conclusion is much too extreme. At least one political scientist concurs:

Political scientists tend to misunderstand ideology, treating it as something that is esoteric, issue-based, and primarily economic (e.g., socialism or capitalism). One scholar [Converse] even went so far as to posit that people cannot have ideologies unless they are able to provide a sophisticated definition of what it means to be a liberal or a conservative. Psychologists (and laypeople) are more likely to view ideology as a subterranean aspect of life orientations that extends well beyond politics. (Hibbing, 2020: 89)

In contrast to the ideo-skeptics, I argue throughout this book that ordinary citizens generally do think, feel, and behave in ideologically interpretable ways, but not necessarily in logical, rational, or epistemically defensible ways, or even in *self-consciously* ideological ways. As Aaron Kay and Richard Eibach (2013: 571) put it:

Everyday ideologies are often “scavenger ideologies” (Mosse, 1995) in the sense that people sample ideas from a variety of sources to support their political goals or fulfill their psychological needs. These sampled ideological fragments are brought together not because they logically cohere, indeed they often do not, but rather because they commonly contribute to meeting the individual’s psychological needs or justifying his or her political goals.

According to this view, which the authors aptly characterize as *functionalist*, people have ideological inclinations, much as they have psychological inclinations—whether they understand them deeply or not, and whether experts are impressed by their sophistication or not.

From a functionalist perspective, it is encouraging that research interest in the second, more critical conception of ideology as a motivated, system-serving belief system may be increasing, at least in some circles. Theories of system justification and social dominance, for example, both address “the manner in which consensually endorsed system-justifying ideologies (or legitimizing myths) contribute to the stability of oppressive and hierarchically organized social relations among groups” (Jost & Sidanius, 2004: 11). This focus re-establishes contact with critical socialist, feminist, and decolonial traditions in which ideology is yoked to specific social systems, either as an affirmation of the status quo (a “conservative” or “reactionary” ideology) or in opposition to it (a “progressive” or “revolutionary” ideology). As we saw in the preceding chapter, these two opposing political stances have been aligned historically with the right and left, respectively.

The possibility we explore in this book is that social representations such as liberalism and conservatism acquire the coherence and structure they do have from the interaction of (a) psychological needs, motives, interests, and tastes that vary across persons and situations and (b) features of elite communication that constitute the “ideological menu.” This implies that political belief systems should be understood as social and psychological products, rather than purely logical or philosophical forms. We should strive to understand as precisely as possible, in scientific terms, the dynamic social, cognitive, and motivational processes that give rise to specific ideological outcomes, including preferences for leftist or rightist solutions to social problems.

Defining Ideology Away?

According to Nathan Kalmoe (2020: 3), “the core dispute” between “minimalists” (like him) and “maximalists” (like me) is “over the *proportion* of citizens with *meaningful* political ideology.” I disagree with this way of putting it, not only because the question of proportions is not an especially interesting one, but also because the answer to that question depends entirely

upon one's definition of political ideology (and, indeed, what constitutes *meaningfulness*). It is clear that he and I are working with quite different definitions. For him, ideology is akin to logical consistency and political sophistication; for me, it is not.

Although much of the debate about whether ordinary citizens are ideological hinges on conceptual matters, there are clearly important empirical issues for psychologists and other social scientists to investigate. In this book I focus on the characteristics and consequences of political ideology (rather than, say, religious or scientific ideologies), in part because it is politics that has provided the subject matter for end-of-ideology pronouncements. No one claims, for instance, that religion is dead or that people are irreligious because they are ignorant or confused about what the Bible (or the Torah or the Koran) really says. Nor would it be sensible to conclude that science is irrelevant to human affairs—or that science is “not for them”—because most people cannot explain how gravity or the human pancreas (or, more to the point, global warming or coronavirus) works.

As noted in the previous chapter, political scientists have consistently distanced themselves from the concept of false consciousness and the critical origins of the study of ideology more generally, which might otherwise be useful for understanding what Myrdal (1969) referred to as “opportunistic” forms of political ignorance. Following Converse (1964), political scientists have conceptualized ideology as a stable and coherent (or constrained) belief system within the mind of an individual. Defining ideology as an internally consistent belief system presumably made it easier to study in a value-neutral way, but—as I will show—it also made it less likely that ordinary people would pass stringent tests for demonstrating ideological capacity.

Every definition of an ideological belief system, including those listed in [Box 1.1](#), carries with it certain assumptions about cognitive organization, affective and motivational qualities, and capacity for instigating action. These assumptions may or may not be reasonable, but they show that the debate about whether ordinary people possess ideology is in part a question about whether they satisfy the various criteria proposed by the experts.

This is demonstrated most readily by considering a definition that is an extreme but revealing example. Shils (1968b: 66) defined ideology in an especially narrow way, listing nine criteria for distinguishing ideology from related concepts such as outlooks, creeds, and intellectual movements. Ideology, according to Shils, requires

(a) explicitness of formulation; (b) intended systemic integration around a particular moral or cognitive belief; (c) acknowledged affinity with other past and contemporaneous patterns; (d) closure to novel elements or variations; (e) imperativeness of manifestation in conduct; (f) accompanying affect; (g) consensus demanded of those who accept them; (h) authoritativeness of promulgation; and (i) association with a corporate body intended to realize the pattern of beliefs.⁵

With criteria as numerous and strict as these, it is little wonder that so many authors have concluded that the general population is not up to the task of being “ideological.” Ideology was, quite literally, defined away by the end-of-ideologists. Whether people stopped being ideological in *any* meaningful or interesting way, however, is quite a different matter.

Not everyone was persuaded by the ideo-skeptics. Robert E. Lane (1962: 16) noted that people may possess “latent” if not “forensic” ideologies, and Fred Kerlinger (1967: 119) insisted that “the man-in-the-street *does* have attitudes.” Bill Dember (1974: 166) argued that ideology is “the most potent form of ideation” and that it makes “ordinary motives look pale and insignificant.” The sociologist C. Wright Mills (1960/1968) had little patience for the end-of-ideologists, whom he dubbed “dead-enders.” He wrote, with evident exasperation: “It is a kindergarten fact that any political reflection that is of possible political significance is *ideological*: in its terms policies, institutions, men of power are criticized or approved” (130).⁶

For the purposes of this chapter, let us return to Tedin’s (1987) more modest definition of political ideology (from [Box 1.1](#)) as “an interrelated set of attitudes and values” that possesses cognitive, affective, and motivational elements. On this view, ideology helps to explain why people do what they do and why they do it; ideology organizes their values and beliefs and leads to political behavior. Such a definition, while broad, has the advantage of paralleling ordinary and professional usage in psychology, sociology, and political science, and it gives ordinary citizens a reasonable chance of empirically satisfying the criteria for being ideological. Kerlinger (1984: 217) put the point well:

Whether conservatism and liberalism are typical conceptual tools for the man-in-the-street is not the central point. For the scientist, too, liberalism and conservatism are abstractions like any other abstract concepts he [or she] works with: introversion, intelligence, radicalism, achievement, political development and the like. To be sure, most people don’t recognize their abstract nature and certainly don’t use them as social scientists do. Nevertheless, they are quite familiar with their behavioral and environmental manifestations.

Without assuming that people consciously or fully appreciate the meaning and significance of political ideology, we may—following Kerlinger, Lane, Mills, and others—take seriously the empirical possibility that it is indeed a factor in their everyday lives.

Core and Peripheral Features of Liberalism and Conservatism

Most, but not all, treatments of political ideology have focused on the left-right (or liberal-conservative) distinction. As recounted in the first chapter, political uses of the spatial metaphor of left and right originate with 18th century seating arrangements in the French Parliament, and it is a metaphor that applies far better to modern (i.e., postscientific Enlightenment) history than to earlier periods. Although the left-right distinction is by no means airtight, it has been the single most useful and parsimonious way of classifying political attitudes in the West for over 200 years. Comparative scholars note that the distinction has found resonance in a very wide range of national and cultural contexts (Cochrane, 2015; Freire, 2015; Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990; Inglehart, 1990; Mair, 2007; Noël & Thérien, 2008).

Nevertheless, because some of the issues and opinions that have been referred to as liberal and leftist or conservative and rightist have changed over the years and from place to place, it is useful to distinguish between core (relatively stable) and peripheral (more malleable) aspects of ideological belief systems. In the previous chapter we introduced the two core dimensions of left-right ideology, namely (a) advocacy vs. resistance to social change and (b) rejection vs. acceptance of inequality. One of the key functions of political ideology is to bring these two dimensions together into a causal narrative or “theory” that guides political action: either one advocates for social change to bring about increased equality or one defends existing forms of hierarchy to maintain the status quo. It remains speculative but potentially of interest to note that in this way the motivational sequence concerning the desire for change/stability and equality/inequality may be reversed for leftists and rightists.

When considering whether ideology exists and whether it possesses cognitive organization, motivational significance, philosophical content, and psychological specificity, I will focus on core rather than peripheral issues (such as attitudes concerning the size of government,⁷ gun control,

environmental issues, and so on). Before revisiting the end-of-ideology claims in detail, it is worth noting some of the ways in which a psychological approach may depart from paradigmatic approaches in sociology and political science. By making interdisciplinary differences in emphasis salient, I hope to show that a cognitive-motivational analysis of political ideology can usefully supplement—not supplant—the valuable demographic, historical, and institutional analyses offered by experts in other fields.

A Cognitive-Motivational Analysis of Political Ideology

Consistent with the functional perspective in social psychology described in [Chapter 1](#), many psychologists follow Adorno et al. (1950: 2) in supposing that “ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual’s needs and the degree to which these needs are being satisfied or frustrated.” This formulation suggests the potential relevance of a wide range of dispositional (personality) and situational (contextual/environmental) variables that are capable of affecting one’s underlying psychological needs and therefore one’s political orientation. Our analysis implies that human beings will always crave some form of ideology, that is, some way of imbuing social and political life with predictability, meaning, and inspiration. At the same time, the overall approach is *dynamic* and *motivational* and can therefore explain “liberal shifts” and “conservative shifts” within individuals and populations as a function of socially mediated changes in cognitive-motivational needs, including needs to regulate uncertainty, threat, and relational discord.

Psychologists may explore features of ideology that are either overlooked or seen as out of bounds by sociologists and political scientists. This is because scholarship in political sociology during the era of “ideological innocence” was largely descriptive in nature, focusing on the question of whether political elites and their followers “possess” ideology and, if so, how much ideological consistency—or stability or constraint—is present. The emphasis, in other words, has been on how to define ideology in operational terms and how to count up the number of people who have it (e.g., Kalmoe, 2020). Beyond demographic (especially race/ethnicity, sex/gender, and socioeconomic status/social class) and institutional factors (e.g., media coverage, campaign advertising, and the contours of partisan

competition), there has been little sustained attempt to try to explain why specific individuals (or groups or societies) gravitate toward ideas of the left, right, and center. It is often assumed that people hold the beliefs they do simply because of their parents, their political party, or their position in society, and that it is rare for citizens to examine or alter those beliefs in response to external events—even dramatic events such as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Bishop, 2005).

To some laypersons and even some political scientists, it may seem heretical to suggest that political opinions arise from psychological needs, interests, goals, and motives, for it could mean that such opinions are irrational, capricious, or even “pathological.” George Will (2003), for instance, responded very defensively to an academic article entitled “Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition”:

“Motivated social cognition” refers to the “motivational underpinnings” of ideas, the “situational as well as dispositional variables” that foster particular beliefs. Notice: situations and dispositions—not reasons. Professors have reasons for their beliefs. Other people, particularly conservatives, have social and psychological explanations for their beliefs. “Motivated cognition” involves ways of seeing and reasoning about the world that are unreasonable because they arise from emotional, psychological needs.

There is a common misunderstanding of the discipline of psychology itself that lurks in the assumption that analyzing the motivational processes underlying specific belief formation and maintenance is tantamount to exposing it as invalid or unreasonable.

Social psychologists assume that nearly *every* belief—whether objectively valid or invalid—is at least partially motivated by subjective considerations such as epistemic needs for certainty and coherence, existential needs for safety and security, and relational needs for affiliation and social identification. In personal, political, religious, scientific, and many other domains, what we believe is an intricate mix of what we—along with our friends and other people we value and respect (Higgins, 2019)—*want* to believe and what we feel *justified* in believing, given the evidence that is accessible and available to us (Kunda, 1990).

Of course, people can be extremely defensive when it comes to having their own beliefs explained in psychological terms. Perhaps no one wants to know *why* they believe the things they do. As the philosopher Peter Railton (2003: 363) has pointed out, the kind of “unmasking explanation” involved

in ideological critique is inherently destabilizing, in that it threatens to undermine one's moral commitment to the belief system in question.

It is important, in any case, to bear in mind that “the interests a given ideology serves need not be interests of all those who hold the ideology” and that ideological “analysis is not to be confused with the sort of cynicism that attributes everything to self-interest” (Railton, 2003: 359). Much evidence suggests that people are motivated to engage in system justification—defined as the tendency to defend, bolster, and rationalize the societal status quo—even when social change would be preferable from the standpoint of individual or collective self-interest (Jost, 2020). System justification motivation thus introduces a conservative “bias” that is counterintuitive to many political sociologists, including Seymour Lipset (1960: 128), who wrote: “Conservatism is especially vulnerable in a political democracy since, as Abraham Lincoln said, there are always more poor people than well-to-do ones, and promises to redistribute wealth are difficult to rebut.”

Lipset was right that the poor have always outnumbered the rich. Nevertheless, self-identified conservatives have outnumbered liberals in the United States for more than a century (Bishop, 2005; Knight, 1990) and in every American National Election Study between 1972 and 2016, even during periods of successful Democratic leadership. From 2008 to 2016, for instance, the years that bookended the two-term presidency of Barack Obama, the ratio of self-identified conservatives (respondents choosing “slightly conservative,” “conservative,” or “extremely conservative”) to liberals (those choosing “slightly liberal,” “liberal,” or “extremely liberal”) ranged from 1.28 to 1.36. The fact of the matter is that serious efforts to redistribute wealth have been few and far between over the past several decades (McCarty et al., 2016), and they have been remarkably easy to defeat. In part, this is because poor people are only slightly more likely than the wealthy to oppose income inequality and to support redistributive economic policies from which they would benefit (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Graetz & Shapiro, 2005; Hochschild, 1981; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

Inspecting the results of multiple regression models reported by McCall (2013: 132–133), the standardized effect (beta) of family income on acceptance of inequality is only .02 to .03 in the General Social Survey (aggregating across data from 1987 to 2010). By comparison, the standardized effect of political ideology is much larger, on the order of .46,

even after adjusting for Democratic vs. Republican partisanship. Ideology matters, and when it conflicts with self-interest, it pays to bet on ideology.

The idea that ideological preferences may derive from the psychological needs and characteristics of individuals—and not just because of their demographic characteristics—is one that has not been seriously considered by sociologists and political scientists, in part because they have not taken seriously the notion that individuals have genuine ideological preferences at all. A prominent example is the book entitled *Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public*, in which Kinder and Kalmoe (2017: 3–7) state:

When all the evidence is considered and all the counterarguments assessed, Converse's claim of ideological innocence, taken on its own terms, stands up. . . . The ideological battles under way among American political elites show up as scattered skirmishes in the general public, if they show up at all. . . . Genuine ideological identification—an abiding dispositional commitment to an ideological point of view—turns out to be rare. Real liberals and real conservatives are found in impressive numbers only among the comparatively few who are deeply and seriously engaged in political life.

The authors go on to interpret Robert E. Lane's conclusion that ordinary citizens possess "latent" but not "forensic" ideology as congenial to the Converse line of interpretation (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017: 125–126), but this is misleading at best.

Lane's books, including *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (1962), provided in-depth qualitative analyses of ideological distortions, justifications, rationalizations, and excuses made frequently by ordinary citizens. Lane explored "the working (and lower middle) class defenses of the present order" and concluded not that such people were ignorant or innocent of ideological processes, but that their defenses were "well organized and solidly built":

By and large, these people believe that the field is open, merit will tell. They may then deprecate the importance of class, limit their perspectives, accept their situation reluctantly or with satisfaction. They may see the benefits of society flowing to their own class, however they define it. They tend to believe that each person's status is in some way deserved.

And, in another book entitled *Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind* (1969: 38), Lane wrote:

Contrary to popular belief, it is, I think, easier for most men to believe that their positions are somehow “just” or merited than otherwise. It saves them what they most dread, an obligation to attack the foundations of the system, to alienate themselves from the values of the society, to cut themselves off from the nourishing flow of sentiment and solidarity which pours from the established religious and secular authorities.

In Lane’s view, people may not wield ideology in a self-serving or group-serving manner, but they wield it nonetheless. Many ordinary citizens are system-justifiers (Jost, 2020)—not simply “a bunch of ignoramuses,” as Whitney and Wartella (1989: 9) put it.

Revisiting the Claims of Ideological Innocence

Ideo-skeptics advanced four major claims that are in need of reappraisal. They argued that ideologies such as liberalism and conservatism lack (a) cognitive structure, (b) motivational potency, (c) substantive political or philosophical contents, and (d) characteristic psychological profiles. I will consider each of these claims separately and suggest that, whether or not they were defensible in the 1950s—the context in which they were initially developed—they are not defensible in the current political climate. To develop this argument, I will draw on data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and from other experimental and survey studies conducted largely by psychologists. The bulk of evidence reveals that ideology—like language, sex, religion, and science—is very much a part of most people’s lives, even if very few citizens would be considered expert in any of these fields.

Do People Possess Coherent Ideological Belief Systems?

Building upon his earlier collaborative work in *The American Voter*, Converse (1964) argued to great effect that the vast majority of the American population would be hard-pressed to articulate coherent ideological principles. Although his point was quite different—and, indeed, more specific—than the broader historical theses concerning the decline of ideology in the West advanced by Aron (1968), D. Bell (1960), Lipset (1960), and Shils (1968a), it was assimilated into the end-of-ideology framework. McGuire (1999: 357), for instance, wrote: “The interdisciplinary researchers in this political attitudes [era of the 1960s and 1970s] were not doctrinaire about their own theoretical explanations, nor did they impute

highly organized thought systems to the public (Converse, 1964), as befits an ‘end-of-ideology’ era . . . even if it now appears that ideology was not dead but hiding out in Paris and Frankfurt.”

Converse drew on US public opinion data from the 1950s to argue that only a small and highly sophisticated layer of the populace was able or willing to resolve obvious inconsistencies among political beliefs or to organize beliefs consistently according to philosophical definitions of left and right. This statement had an extraordinary degree of impact, not only in social science, but also in popular culture. An article in *The New Yorker* magazine in 2004 declared:

Converse’s conclusions are still the bones at which the science of voting behavior picks. . . . Converse claimed that only around ten per cent of the public has what can be called, even generously, a political belief system. . . . He concluded that “very substantial portions of the public” hold opinions that are essentially meaningless—off-the-top-of-the-head responses to questions they have never thought about, derived from no underlying set of principles. These people might as well base their political choices on the weather. And, in fact, many of them do.

There is still widespread acceptance of what Converse (2000: 331) felt was the “pithiest truth” about the information level of the electorate, namely that “the mean level is very low but the variance is very high.” Furthermore, Converse pointed out that a sizeable minority of citizens either cannot or will not locate themselves on a single bipolar liberalism-conservatism dimension.

Although ANES respondents are always free to ignore any question that they prefer not to answer, the researchers who administer the survey have for years explicitly offered respondents two additional ways of evading the ideological self-placement item (but not other items in the survey). Rather than choosing a number on the 7-point scale ranging from “Extremely liberal” to “Extremely conservative,” respondents are given the alternative options of choosing either “Don’t know” or “Haven’t thought much about it.” When all three opportunities to avoid the question are provided, very few respondents (less than 1% between 2008 and 2016) choose “Don’t know” or simply refuse to answer the question. However, a considerable proportion (sometimes as much as a third) report that they “Haven’t thought much about it.” Unfortunately, it is ambiguous as to what is meant by “much,” and no one knows whether their ideological self-placements would have proved meaningful even if they had not thought “much” about them. Presumably, some respondents are simply taking the easy way out or, for this item only, shamed into admitting that they “Haven’t thought much about it.”

Regardless, the percentage of respondents who state that they “Haven’t thought much about it” has been declining over time, with only 9.4% of the respondents selecting this option in 2012. According to McCarty et al. (2016: 77), more than half of ANES respondents since 2000 believe that they are “ideological” (i.e., either liberal or conservative), and another 20% or so believe that they are ideologically “moderate.” As we will see in [Table 2.2](#), these self-designations are very strong predictors of voting behavior.

Another indication that ideology now plays a bigger role in American politics is that the correlation between ideological self-placement and partisan identification (e.g., Democratic vs. Republican) has been rising steadily over the years (Abramowitz, 2010; Mason, 2015, Figure 1). According to Lupton et al. (2017: 6), the correlation swelled from .40 in 1988 to .60 in 2012. Their analyses reveal that the increased correspondence between ideology and partisanship is due to a strengthening of commitment and conflict over two core values, namely egalitarianism and traditionalism. These results, among others, illustrate the power of ideology—even when it is measured with just a single self-placement item—to predict the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of ordinary citizens.

Some claim that ideological identification is merely “tribal” and devoid of any specific content. On the contrary, my colleagues and I find that ideological self-placement is strongly predictive of opinions on a wide range of social and economic issues. In 2016, Flávio Azevedo and I administered three ideological self-placement items (one that was very general in terms of overall liberalism-conservatism, one that referred to social and cultural issues, and one that referred to economic issues) to a nationally representative survey of American adults ($N = 1,500$) and a large replication sample ($N = 2,119$). In addition to these measures of symbolic ideology, we also administered five complete scales that had been previously validated to measure operational ideology, that is, opinions on specific social and economic issues (Azevedo et al., 2019, Samples 1 and 2).⁸

Results are summarized in [Table 2.1](#). Ideological self-placement in general was strongly correlated with scores on all five of the scales we used to measure operational ideology in both samples. People who identified as more conservative in general endorsed more conservative opinions, with correlations ranging from .64 to .76. They endorsed more conservative opinions on both social issues (with correlations ranging from .53 to .68) and economic issues (with correlations ranging from .51 to .70). People who

identified themselves as more socially conservative scored higher on all five subscales used to measure the social dimension of ideology, with correlations ranging from .62 to .75. Those who identified as more economically conservative scored higher on all five subscales used to measure the economic dimension of ideology, with correlations ranging from .57 to .70. In fact, every single measure of ideological self-placement was significantly correlated with every single measure of operational ideology at $p < .001$, as can be seen by inspecting the table.

Table 2.1 Correlations between Ideological Self-Placement and Attitudes about Social and Economic Issues in a Nationally Representative Survey of Americans (Sample 1) and a Replication Sample of Convenience (Sample 2)

	Measures of Ideological Self-Placement (Symbolic)						Ideological Measure (Operational)
	Overall		Economic		Social		
Sample	1	2	1	2	1	2	
Issue-Based Ideology (Total Scale Scores)	0.72	0.76	0.70	0.73	0.72	0.75	Zell & Bernstein (2014)
	0.72	0.72	0.68	0.68	0.71	0.72	Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom (2009)
	0.72	0.73	0.65	0.67	0.75	0.76	Henningham (1997)
	0.70	0.70	0.66	0.67	0.70	0.72	Feldman & Johnston (2014)
	0.64	0.64	0.61	0.61	0.65	0.62	Everett (2013)
Issue-Based Economic Ideology (Subscale Scores)	0.59	0.70	0.66	0.70	0.54	0.62	Zell & Bernstein (2014)
	0.57	0.61	0.59	0.60	0.51	0.55	Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom (2009)
	0.52	0.61	0.57	0.62	0.48	0.55	Henningham (1997)
	0.60	0.64	0.63	0.65	0.53	0.57	Feldman & Johnston (2014)
	0.51	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.47	0.49	Everett (2013)
Issue-Based Social Ideology (Subscale Scores)	0.67	0.67	0.57	0.59	0.73	0.73	Zell & Bernstein (2014)
	0.68	0.68	0.62	0.62	0.71	0.71	Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom (2009)
	0.68	0.67	0.57	0.58	0.74	0.75	Henningham (1997)
	0.58	0.53	0.46	0.46	0.66	0.65	Feldman & Johnston (2014)
	0.62	0.60	0.55	0.56	0.65	0.62	Everett (2013)

Note: For Sample 1, $N = 1,500$, and for Sample 2, $N = 2,119$. All correlations in this table are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Correlations are shown in boldface when symbolic and operational measures of ideology are matched in terms of domain specificity.

Source: Azevedo et al. (2019).

The picture that emerges here is hardly one of ideological innocence, ignorance, or incoherence. We see no evidence that respondents' ideological identifications were randomly generated, meaningless forms of generic group memberships that held no substantive ideological significance. On the

contrary, self-identified liberals consistently endorsed liberal, left-leaning social and economic attitudes, and self-identified conservatives consistently endorsed conservative, right-leaning social and economic attitudes.

As Kent Tedin (1987) pointed out years ago, Converse's conclusions concerning the lack of ideological constraint among ordinary citizens were drawn on the basis of survey data collected during one of the least politically charged periods in modern American history.⁹ But there was always something paradoxical about touting the end of ideology in a decade that witnessed McCarthyism and the "Red Scare," a war in Korea to stop the threat of communism, conflict over racial desegregation in American schools, the Hungarian uprising against the Soviet Union, and many other ideologically charged events (Aron, 1968). The 1960s would soon find Americans and others grappling with political assassinations and a number of polarizing social, economic, and foreign policy issues, as well as student protests and race riots. The 1970s would bring an escalation of the Vietnam War (and its opposition), the Watergate scandal and impeachment of Richard Nixon, the rise of feminism and gay rights movements, and many other events of genuine ideological significance.

The 1980s, of course, saw the rise of neoliberal capitalism under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the demise of the Soviet Union, and growing opposition to the Apartheid system in South Africa. By comparison, the 1990s may seem to have been less overtly ideological in the United States—but only if one sets aside the resurgence of conservative talk radio following the repeal of the Fairness Doctrine, the ascendancy of Fox News, and Newt Gingrich's insurgency against the Clinton administration, followed by congressional impeachment along partisan lines. In the new century we have witnessed strong ideological responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; polarizing reactions to the Iraq War and the Obama, Bush, and Trump presidencies; the rise and fall of the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movements; bitter struggles over Supreme Court nominations, immigration restrictions, abortion rights, racial profiling, electoral outcomes, and the Black Lives Matter movement; and too many controversies to count over scientific, environmental, and economic policies.

A strong majority of the American public knows whether they usually prefer ideas of the left, right, or center. Converse was right that citizens are far from completely consistent or loyal, but their political attitudes are

meaningful and interpretable. According to data from the ANES, over two-thirds of respondents since 1972 and over three-fourths since 1996 can and do place themselves on a bipolar liberalism-conservatism scale. In other studies my colleagues and I have conducted, more than 90% of college students voluntarily locate themselves on a liberalism-conservatism scale, even when they are provided explicitly with options such as “Don’t know” and “Haven’t thought much about it.” Most of the available evidence indicates that people who place themselves on such a scale do so with a reasonable—but by no means perfect—degree of accuracy, stability, and coherence. Factors such as education, expertise, personal involvement, and political sophistication are all known to increase the degree of ideological coherence (Erikson & Tedin, 2019; Goren, 2013; Prior, 2019).

We also see that individuals’ belief systems are more tightly constrained around abstract (vs. concrete) values and core (vs. peripheral) issues that separate right from left (Caprara & Vecchione, 2017; Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2013; Heath et al., 1994; Jacoby, 2014; Lupton et al., 2017; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985, 1993). This body of research confirms that the political attitudes of ordinary citizens are most tightly organized around two core dimensions in particular: (a) traditionalism vs. resistance to social change and (b) acceptance vs. rejection of egalitarianism in social, economic, and political domains.

Disentangling Ideology from Political Sophistication

Perhaps the biggest problem with using Converse’s work to support the conclusion that ordinary citizens are fundamentally nonideological was underscored by Kerlinger (1984: 218), who observed that the “denial of the attitude structure of mass publics was backed by research that could not bear the full weight of the conclusions drawn.” The fact is that people can be both highly ideological and generally uninformed, as Achen (1975) pointed out, but this possibility has still not been sufficiently addressed in the political science literature. Too many social scientists have made the unwarranted assumption that a lack of political sophistication in the general public counts as evidence for the *irrelevance* of left and right.

It does not follow that when citizens struggle to articulate a sophisticated, coherent ideology, they must be incapable of using ideology with either sophistication or coherence. Very few speakers can state precisely the grammatical and syntactical rules they obey when speaking their native

languages, and yet they use language proficiently, albeit imperfectly. As far as I know, linguists have yet to declare the general public illiterate.

One of the most notable features of ideology, from a psychological perspective, is that it breeds distortion, oversimplification, and selective processing of information at least as much as it breeds sophistication. A wealth of experimental evidence illustrates the biasing role of ideological and other forms of rationalization with respect to cognitive processes such as attention, information processing, encoding, and memory recall (e.g., Flynn et al., 2017; Jost, 2020; Kahan, 2016a; Lodge & Taber, 2013).

There is also anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that ideological conviction is associated with decreased rather than increased political sophistication and knowledge in the general population, at least among conservatives. According to Nielsen Ratings, approximately 2.5 million people watched right-wing Fox programming nightly during prime time in 2018.¹⁰ Roughly half of survey respondents who consider themselves to be “consistent conservatives” choose Fox as their main source “for news about government and politics.” However, studies show that these viewers, while politically engaged, are significantly less informed than others about important political issues (Brock et al., 2012). In one survey, Fox viewers performed worse on tests of political knowledge than viewers of 30 other programs; the best-informed viewers were those who watched *Last Week Tonight with John Oliver*, a left-leaning cable news satire (Poundstone, 2016).

In 2004, George W. Bush supporters were more likely than John Kerry supporters to believe falsely that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction; intelligence experts believed Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction; Iraq provided assistance to Al Qaeda; the 9/11 Commission concluded that Iraq provided assistance to Al Qaeda; world opinion supported the American invasion of Iraq; world opinion favored Bush’s re-election; Islamic opinion welcomed American efforts to fight terrorism; and Bush supported (rather than opposed) the Kyoto agreement on global warming and US participation in the International Criminal Court (Kull et al., 2003). In 2008, John McCain supporters were more likely than Barack Obama supporters to believe falsely that Obama was a Muslim and that he was not a natural-born citizen (Weeks & Garrett, 2014). According to the results of a Pew Survey, 34% of conservative Republicans believed that Obama was a Muslim as late as July of 2012 (after he had been president for

three and a half years). According to an Economist/YouGov Poll, Donald Trump supporters were more likely than Hillary Clinton supporters in 2016 to believe falsely that President Obama was born in Kenya; childhood vaccines have been shown to cause autism; the proportion of uninsured Americans decreased (rather than increased) following passage of the Affordable Care Act; and millions of fraudulent votes were cast in favor of Clinton in the presidential election.

The main point here is not that conservatives are necessarily more “ideological” than liberals, although there is evidence from the United States, at least, that they are more ideologically driven than liberals (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2015). Nor is it likely that conservatives are alone in holding self-deceptive beliefs, but they do score higher than liberals on measures of gullibility, “bullshit receptivity,” and self-deceptive enhancement (Gligorić et al., 2020; Jost et al., 2010; Pfattheicher & Schindler, 2016; Sterling et al., 2016; Wojcik et al., 2015). Consistent with these discoveries of a political psychological nature, research in communication finds that conservative media sources and social networks are more likely than those of liberals to include rumor, misinformation, “fake news,” and conspiratorial thinking (e.g., Benkler et al., 2017; Grinberg et al., 2019; Marwick & Lewis, 2017; J. M. Miller et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2021; Vosoughi et al., 2018).

The broader point is that ideology plays an important role in *distorting* as well as organizing information. This is at odds with the view that ideology is “an altogether good thing. If Americans approached the political world with an ideology in mind, they would see that world clearly, understand it well, and form opinions and make decisions that faithfully reflect their core beliefs” (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017: 13). The most significant criticism of Converse’s legacy, then, may be conceptual rather than empirical in nature: by equating ideology with internal consistency and internal consistency with political sophistication, he and his adherents may have mischaracterized the functions of ideology in people’s lives altogether.

Do Ideological Belief Systems Motivate People to Act?

A second major claim advanced by the end-of-ideologists was that ideology had lost its capacity to inspire collective action (Bell, 1960; Shils, 1958) or, as Lane (1962: 15) summarized the point, “the transformation of broadly conceived political ideas into social action is no longer the center of an

exciting struggle.” This was widely regarded as a positive societal development by end-of-ideology proponents, who celebrated the decline of Marxist ideas in the West (Aron, 1968; Bell, 1960, 1988; Fukuyama, 1992/2006). Shils (1958: 456) too was heartened by the spirit of moderation he saw in the nascent conservative movement:

The conservative revival, though genuine, is moderate. People take Burke in their stride. They have become “natural Burkeans” without making a noise about it. The *National Review*, despite its clamor, is isolated and unnoticed, and the effort to create a “conservative ideology” which would stand for more than moderation, reasonableness, and prudence has not been successful.

The end-of-ideologists heralded the “passing of fanaticism” and christened a new era of politics that would be steered not by ideological enthusiasts but by pragmatic moderates. In this respect and others, one could argue—with the benefit of hindsight, of course—that they succumbed to wishful thinking.

The stunning organizational success of the conservative movement is one of the most significant events in American political history over the last 40–50 years, but it would stretch credulity to claim that it has been a “revolt of the moderates.” There are many factors that help to explain how conservatives once inspired by fringe activists such as William F. Buckley, Milton Friedman, and Barry Goldwater managed to reach what David Brooks referred to as the “The Promised Land” of mainstream governance. These include (a) the mass defection of White southerners from the Democratic to the Republican Party following liberal civil rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s; (b) the development of a strong coalition involving economic conservatives and religious fundamentalists beginning in the 1970s; (c) the powerful emergence of right-wing think tanks and media conglomerates, including Fox News and Christian-conservative talk radio networks; and (d) extremely well-funded social movements to undermine the credibility of climate scientists and thwart liberal causes, as in the case of the Tea Party, which formed in 2009 to oppose President Obama’s initiatives on affordable health care, among other things.

There have been scores of extraordinarily popular conservative radio and television personalities—including Rush Limbaugh, Michael Savage, Sean Hannity, Laura Ingraham, Mark Levin, Glenn Beck, Michael Medved, and Alex Jones, to name but a few—and their popularity is hardly attributable to the quietude, moderation, reasonableness, or prudence that Shils saw in their predecessors. The conservative movement has turned out to be more self-consciously ideological than political scientists appear to have anticipated.

To put it bluntly, right-wingers have found ways of capitalizing on ideological passions that—according to end-of-ideologists—simply did not exist.

Radio talk shows by Glenn Beck and Mark Levin have drawn more than 10 million listeners per week, and Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity surpassed 15 million listeners per week. Although liberals and progressives may still be trailing in the culture war, the battle was eventually joined by media celebrities such as Michael Moore, Bill Maher, Jon Stewart, Stephen Colbert, Rachel Maddow, John Oliver, Noah Trevor, and others; they appear to draw inspiration from Saul Alinsky's motto that "ridicule is man's most potent weapon." Converse and many others have long assumed that most citizens care little about political affairs, but this assumption does not fit the current climate. According to the Gallup Polling Organization, 77% of US adults in 2016 reported that they were following politics either "somewhat" or "very closely." Over 160 million Americans voted in the 2020 presidential contest, more than in any previous election.

According to many public opinion polls, the nation has been increasingly divided along ideological lines for the last 20 years or so, as shown in Pew Survey Results from 2017, among other sources. Strangely, Kinder and Kalmoe (2017: 217) dismissed the growing evidence of polarization altogether, writing:

Jost (2006) claims that "public opinion polls show the nation to be sharply divided along ideological lines." No, they don't. They show the opposite. Jost points to increasing polarization between red states and blue states as providing "vivid evidence that ideology exists and matters." He is mistaken. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2011) show that Americans living in red states and Americans living in blue states are not so different from one another on matters of politics; that on ideological identification in particular, they are practically indistinguishable; and that the evidence of increasing polarization is negligible.

Here the authors simply *assert* that Fiorina and colleagues have settled the matter while ignoring extensive evidence not only from the Pew Survey but also many other analyses of public opinion made by reputable political scientists who detect high levels of ideological polarization among "ordinary" liberals and conservatives in the United States (inter alia, Abramowitz, 2010; Lupton et al., 2017; Mason, 2015; McCarty et al., 2016).

For instance, S. W. Webster and Abramowitz (2017) conclude that "rank-and-file Democrats and Republicans in the electorate are . . . further apart than at any time since the ANES began asking respondents to place themselves" on the ideological self-placement scale and that between 1972

and 2012 “the distance between supporters of the two parties more than doubled” (625–626). Those who simply deny that ideological polarization has increased are hardly in a position to recognize another important observation, namely that polarization has been asymmetrical, with conservatives becoming more ideologically zealous than liberals in recent decades (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2015; Lupton et al., 2017; McCarty et al., 2016; S. W. Webster & Abramowitz, 2017).

The argument that most of the American population is impervious to the liberal-conservative distinction may have never been on very solid empirical ground, but it seems increasingly untenable in the current political climate, in which formerly latent ideological conflicts are now more self-consciously enacted. The fact that most people and regions are shades of “purple” rather than purely “red” or “blue” does not mean that the citizenry is nonideological. What it means, once again, is that people are capable of warming to ideas of the left, right, or center, depending upon their psychological needs and social circumstances. Furthermore, the claim that parties matter a great deal but ideology does not ignores the *raison d’être* of political parties in the first place, which is to advance the beliefs, opinions, and values of a given social group, class, or constituency—that is, to develop and enact an ideological agenda, to “play politics,” just as the *raison d’être* of a baseball team is to play baseball.

Still, the question of whether ideological commitments motivate important behavioral outcomes such as voting is one that has haunted researchers in the era of ideo-skepticism. Luttbeg and Gant (1985: 91), for example, found reason to “call into question the very notion that an ideology structured in liberal/conservative terms is necessary to linking public preferences to government action.” Similarly, Tedin (1987: 63–64) examined the data from the 1972 election and was unimpressed by the motivational potency of ideology. At issue is whether people know enough and care enough about ideological labels such as liberalism and conservatism to use them reliably in making political decisions.

In [Table 2.2](#), I have compiled the percentages of ANES respondents placing themselves at each point on an ideological scale who voted for each of the major Democratic and Republican presidential candidates between 1972 and 2016. The weighted averages, collapsing across 12 election cycles and over 17,000 respondents, are illustrated in [Figure 2.1](#); the pattern could hardly be described as random or meaningless. On the contrary, the effects

of liberalism and conservatism on voting decisions are powerful. Nearly 80% of respondents who described themselves as “liberal” or “extremely liberal” reported voting for Democratic candidates, and over 75% of respondents who described themselves as “conservative” or “extremely conservative” voted for Republican candidates.




Figure 2.1 Effects of ideological self-placement on voting behavior, 1972–2016.

Note: Data are weighted average percentages of American National Election Study respondents placing themselves at each point on an ideological scale voting for Democratic and Republican presidential candidates, aggregated across presidential election years between 1972 and 2016 (total $N = 17,733$). Labels for the liberal-conservative self-placement scale were as follows: 1 = Extremely liberal; 2 = Liberal; 3 = Slightly liberal; 4 = Moderate/middle of the road; 5 = Slightly conservative; 6 = Conservative; and 7 = Extremely conservative.

Source: American National Election Studies.

Table 2.2 Percentage of Respondents Placing Themselves at Each Point on an Ideological Scale Who Voted for Democratic and Republican Candidates in US Presidential Elections, 1972–2016

	Extremely Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conservative	Conservative	Extremely Conservative
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1972							
McGovern	83%	83%	56%	31%	15%	10%	5%
Nixon	17%	17%	44%	68%	84%	89%	90%
1976							
Carter	82%	81%	69%	51%	25%	19%	14%
Ford	12%	15%	24%	46%	70%	78%	81%
1980							
Carter	71%	71%	49%	35%	27%	15%	27%
Reagan	7%	6%	33%	54%	62%	81%	73%
1984							
Mondale	91%	73%	66%	44%	22%	14%	23%
Reagan	9%	25%	32%	54%	76%	86%	77%
1988							
Dukakis	90%	86%	75%	51%	33%	14%	17%
G. H. W. Bush	5%	11%	23%	48%	67%	86%	80%
1992							
B. Clinton	86%	82%	60%	51%	30%	15%	29%
G. H. W. Bush	0%	3%	17%	29%	46%	64%	65%
1996							
B. Clinton	64%	92%	82%	58%	32%	16%	27%
Dole	0%	1%	9%	30%	56%	80%	70%
2000							
Gore	70%	84%	75%	61%	33%	13%	9%
G. W. Bush	0%	12%	17%	37%	62%	86%	87%
2004							
Kerry	89%	92%	85%	54%	26%	11%	7%
G. W. Bush	0%	6%	13%	42%	70%	87%	93%
2008							
Obama	79%	75%	57%	46%	28%	15%	17%
McCain	1%	3%	14%	18%	39%	60%	47%
2012							
Obama	58%	73%	61%	42%	23%	9%	9%
Romney	1%	3%	6%	19%	42%	63%	58%
2016							
H. Clinton	70%	69%	55%	32%	16%	6%	4%
D. Trump	3%	1%	8%	22%	40%	64%	67%
Unweighted Average, 1972–2004							
Democratic	77.8%	80.1%	65.8%	46.3%	25.8%	13.1%	15.7%
Republican	4.5%	8.6%	20.0%	38.9%	59.5%	77.0%	74.0%

Note: This table omits those respondents who refused to answer the ideological self- placement item or chose “Don’t know” or “Haven’t thought much about it.”

Source: American National Election Studies.

Cross-cultural examinations by Caprara et al. (2017) demonstrate that ideological self-placement—unlike Democratic vs. Republican Party identification, which is specific to the US—is a powerful predictor of voting behavior in a great many contexts around the world. Liberal-conservative identification was correlated with voting for the Tory Party in the United Kingdom at $r = .42$ and with voting for the Republican Party in the United States at $.54$. Left-right self-placement was strongly and significantly correlated with voting for parties on the right, with r 's ranging from $.39$ to $.80$ (median correlation = $.61$), in 12 other countries: Australia, Chile, Brazil, Finland, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, and Turkey. Symbolic ideology was a statistically significant but weak predictor of voting behavior in Japan ($r = .16$, $p < .01$), and it was unrelated to voting behavior in only one of the countries investigated (Ukraine).

Are There Differences in Content between Liberalism and Conservatism?

One of the assumptions of the end-of-ideologists and their followers was that the substantive ideological differences between the left and the right were few and far between (Aron, 1968; Giddens, 1998; Lasch, 1991; Shils, 1954, 1968a). Lipset (1960: 404–405) recounted a 1955 conference in Milan that had disappointed its politically heterogeneous audience by degenerating into a hopeless consensus:

The socialists no longer advocated socialism; they were as concerned as the conservatives with the danger of an all-powerful state. The ideological issues dividing left and right had been reduced to a little more or a little less government ownership and economic planning. No one seemed to believe that it really made much difference which political party controlled the domestic policies of individual nations.

An essential part of the end-of-ideology thesis was that everything of value in Marxism had already been incorporated into Western democratic societies, and that there was no continuing need for leftist economic or cultural critique (Bell, 1960, 1988). Aron (1968: 31), for example, argued that “Western ‘capitalist’ society today comprises a multitude of socialist institutions,” and Shils (1958: 456) claimed that the “more valid aspirations of the older humanitarian elements which were absorbed into Marxism have been more or less fulfilled in capitalist countries.” Lipset (1960: 406) went even further, celebrating the fact that “the fundamental political problems of

the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have achieved industrial and political citizenship; the conservatives have accepted the welfare state.”

In the five or six decades since these statements were made, one need only point to a few well-known facts about political economy to cast doubt on the notion that the left and right have resolved their economic and other disputes. In 1980, when Ronald Reagan was elected president, corporate CEOs earned approximately 40 times the salary of the average worker; recent estimates by the Economic Policy Institute place the figure at 270 to 1. The richest 1% of the world’s population now owns more than half of the total financial wealth in the world. In 2016, the richest 1% of Americans owned 29% (over \$25 trillion) of household wealth, more than the entire middle class; the top 20% held 77% of the total household wealth. At the same time, more than 40 million Americans live below the poverty line.

By nearly every metric, income inequality has increased sharply in recent decades in those countries that have most aggressively pursued neoliberal (i.e., free market, pro-capitalist) economic policies, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand (Piketty, 2014). Larry Bartels (2016) demonstrated that economic inequality has risen more sharply under Republican than Democratic presidents. These statistics and many more cast doubt on the claim that conservative politicians and their voters—or the leaders of Western capitalist institutions—have internalized fundamental socialist principles, as the end-of-ideologists claimed.

The notion that “conservatives have accepted the welfare state” is especially hard to swallow, given how strenuously conservative—and, in some cases, nominally liberal—governments have worked to reduce or eliminate welfare and social services, albeit with mixed success. For instance, Paul Pierson (1994: 1) wrote:

In many countries a conservative resurgence accompanied the economic turmoil of the late 1970s. Conservative parties gained strength, and within these parties leadership shifted to those most critical of the postwar consensus on social and economic policy. These newly ascendant conservatives viewed the welfare state as a large part of the problem. They argued that social programs generated massive inefficiencies, and that financing them required incentive-sapping levels of taxation and inflationary budget deficits. In short, conservatives viewed retrenchment not as a necessary evil but as a necessary good.

Welfare reform was a major objective of Newt Gingrich’s “Republican Revolution” of 1994 and the “Contract with America” that followed. In

2005, President Bush conducted a speaking tour (called “60 Stops in 60 Days”) in a vain attempt to persuade the public to privatize the social security system established by Franklin D. Roosevelt 70 years earlier. Democrats and Republicans today diverge considerably when it comes to supporting social welfare policies (e.g., Lupton et al., 2017).

Studies in psychology and political science show that there are substantial differences in the beliefs, opinions, and values of self-identified liberals and conservatives. The largest and most consistent ideological differences, as we have already noted, pertain to core issues of tradition and equality (Azevedo et al., 2019; Carmines & Layman, 1997; Clifford et al., 2015; Eagly et al., 2004; Evans et al., 1996; Federico et al., 2014; Jacoby, 2014; Lupton et al., 2017; McCann, 1997; Rathbun, 2007; Schwartz et al., 2010; Swedlow & Wyckoff, 2009; S. W. Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). For example, conservatives hold more favorable attitudes than liberals toward traditional cultural and “family values,” including religious forms of morality, whereas liberals place a higher priority on achieving social and economic equality through policies such as welfare, income redistribution, social security, expanded health care provisions, affirmative action, and equal rights legislation.

Conservatives express more favorable attitudes than liberals toward groups that uphold the traditional status quo, serve social control functions, and are pro-capitalist, such as White men, Christians, members of the military, police officers, and businesspeople. On the other hand, liberals express more favorable attitudes toward groups that question the status quo and support egalitarian reforms, such as radical students, feminists, civil rights leaders, atheists, and members of disadvantaged minority groups (Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2013; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008; Kteily et al., 2019). Liberals are significantly less likely than conservatives to exhibit implicit and explicit forms of prejudice directed at racial and ethnic minorities, women, sexual minorities, and other disadvantaged groups (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Jost, 2020; Nosek et al., 2009; Sidanius et al., 1996).

Although a full consideration of core and peripheral differences between belief systems commonly held on the left and right is beyond the scope of this chapter, even a cursory glance at the public opinion research cited earlier provides reason enough to reject the notion that there are no substantive political or philosophical differences between citizens who are identified—

by themselves or others—as liberal and conservative (see also Azevedo et al., 2019).

However, it was not so long ago that the president of the American Political Science Association, Aaron Wildavsky (1989: 3), used his convention address to critique the bipolar conception of ideology:

The left-right distinction is beset with contradictions. Hierarchical cultures favor social conservatism, giving government the right to intervene in matters of personal morality. Thus egalitarians may support intervention in the economy to reduce economic differences but not intervention in social life to maintain inequality. . . . A division of the world into left and right that is equally inapplicable to the past and to the present deserves to be discarded. Efforts to read back the left-right distinction in U.S. history, for instance, succeed only in making a hash of it. In the early days of the republic egalitarians pursued their objectives through severe restrictions on central government because they then regarded the center as monarchical, that is, hierarchical. Nowadays, after decades of dispute and struggle, they regard the federal government as a potential source for increasing equality. *Their egalitarian objectives remain constant*, but their beliefs about what will be efficacious instruments of policy vary according to the conditions of the times. (emphasis added)

Wildavsky's confusion may have been more apparent than real, for he answered his own question about what leftists want, namely *social and economic equality*, rather than governmental intervention, which is a peripheral issue. No doubt left-leaning egalitarians are sensitive to pragmatic considerations and that enthusiasm for governmental intervention depends crucially upon the consequences of that intervention. The idea that liberals are motivated by a desire for “big government” for its own sake (or that conservatives are consistently against it; see Morisi et al., 2019) is a rhetorical fiction of the right, and it seems to me that leftists have lost considerable political ground by failing to dispel the claim.

Wildavsky (1989: 33–34) also disputed the notion that left-right differences have anything to do with support for social change:

The division of the political universe into liberals and conservatives, when based on innate tendencies toward change, is bound to be misleading because historical context alters whatever the various political cultures wish to preserve. . . . In a rich analysis of differences and similarities among left-wing and right-wing activists, McClosky and Chong conclude that “thus, paradoxically, despite its patriotic fervour, spokesmen of the radical right are profoundly antagonistic to the status quo” (1985, pp. 346–7). It is paradoxical if conservatism is identified with resistance to change but not if *desire for change depends on perceived distance from desired behavior*. . . . What kind of changes we want depends not nearly so much on our predispositions toward change per se, as if the destination did not matter, but on the gap between desired and actual power relationships.

Here Wildavsky caricatures the longstanding notion, which can be traced to Edmund Burke, if not earlier, that conservatism is associated with the desire to maintain or preserve the status quo. Of course, it would be absurd to suggest that liberals are *always* in favor of change—“as if the destination did not matter”—or that conservatives are *always* against it.¹¹ But no one, to my knowledge, has argued this. It should be enough for us to grant that the “desire for change depends on perceived distance from desired behavior” and observe that the preferred degree of equality (or inequality) in society constitutes a major—if not the major—determinant of whether specific changes are desired by the left, right, or center.

Wildavsky’s (1989) analysis—like that of Greenberg and Jonas (2003: 377), who wrote that “it is clear from records of history and current political events that conservatives often want change”—obscures the fact that many of the “changes” preferred by right-wing conservatives are either incremental, and therefore best understood as attempts to forestall the demand for more radical changes, or retrograde (or perhaps “restorative”) in nature. As Seymour Lipset and Earl Raab (1978) observed, “The political program of conservatism . . . may indeed change adaptively from time to time,” but it “is the axis of preservatism which most essentially and invariably distinguishes ‘Left Wing’ from ‘Right Wing’ ” (19–20).

Conservatives in the United States today threaten to roll back the social welfare system developed during the New Deal and Great Society periods, undermine the separation of church and state, overturn or erode abortion protections sanctioned by the *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision, reduce or eliminate affirmative action programs and economic redistribution policies, seek to repeal and replace the Affordable Health Care Act, return immigrants to their countries of origin, and so on. In addition to flouting philosophical disputes originating with Burke, Marx, and their contemporaries over the pace of social change, the position taken by Wildavsky (1989) and Greenberg and Jonas (2003) that liberals and conservatives are equally desirous of social change ignores a veritable mountain of psychological evidence documenting differences in the degree of openness to novelty, innovation, stimulation, excitement, diversity, and change in general, which I will lay out in subsequent chapters.

Are There Differences in Psychological Processes Underlying Liberalism and Conservatism?

Adorno and colleagues' (1950) *The Authoritarian Personality* is one of the most influential—and also one of the most badly caricatured—books in the history of social science. One website claims that Adorno and colleagues “attacked the ‘authoritarian character’ of the American nuclear family, the ‘problem’ of the American people’s belief in a transcendent monotheistic God, the underlying ‘fascist’ character of all forms of American patriotism, and American culture’s excessive reliance on science, reason, and ‘abstract ideas.’” Another lists it as one of the “most harmful” books of the last two centuries. Martin Roiser and Carla Willig (2002: 89) noted that even in academic circles “*The Authoritarian Personality* has been the victim of several determined attempts at psychological and political assassinations.” Soon after the book’s publication, Shils (1954: 31) accused the authors of a “narrowness of political imagination” and for “holding fast to a deforming intellectual tradition.” Martin (2001) pronounced it “the most deeply flawed work of prominence in political psychology” (1) and argued for a “categorical dismissal” of it (24).

The methodological problems associated with research on authoritarianism as a personality syndrome—including the problem of acquiescence and other response biases—were serious, but they were addressed in subsequent decades. There have also been recurrent theoretical and ideological critiques of the book’s central thesis, which is that character rigidity and feelings of threat contribute to the adoption of intolerant, right-wing opinions that were dubbed “pseudo-conservative.” Critics often claim that liberals and leftists can be every bit as dogmatic and rigid as conservatives and rightists.

Historical examples have been offered to suggest that there are no important or enduring psychological differences between the left and right. Shils (1954) and Eysenck (1999), for example, emphasized that left-wing extremists (i.e., communists), especially in the Soviet Union, resembled right-wing extremists in Germany and Italy (i.e., fascists) in certain respects (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity and tough-mindedness, respectively). Others point out, quite correctly, that left-wing social movements have sometimes embraced authoritarian themes and methods, especially in Latin America. But these historical observations do not establish that liberal-leftists and conservative-rightists in democratic societies are equally dogmatic, rigid,

and closed-minded in the general population (adjusting for ideological extremity). The psychological evidence suggests that they are not, as we will see in the chapters to come.

There are signs that Adorno and colleagues' (1950) work may be gaining renewed appreciation in the current political climate (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; MacWilliams, 2016; Pettigrew, 2017; Sunstein, 2018; Womick et al., 2019). From *The New Yorker* again:

With the election of Donald Trump, the latent threat of American authoritarianism is on the verge of being realized, its characteristics already mapped by latter-day sociologists who have updated Adorno's "F-scale" for fascist tendencies.

What Adorno identified as the erasure of the "borderline between culture and empirical reality" is endemic on social media. The failure of Facebook to halt the proliferation of fake news during the campaign season should have surprised no one; the local hirelings of logic are too enamored of their algorithms—and of the revenue they generate—to intervene. From the start, Silicon Valley monopolies have taken a hands-off, ideologically vacant attitude toward the upwelling of ugliness on the Internet.

Key ideas from the theory of right-wing authoritarianism have resurfaced in contemporary accounts of the "culture wars." George Lakoff (1996), for instance, analyzed differences in political metaphors and observed that whereas conservatives adhere to a "strict father" model of moral discipline, liberals prefer a "nurturing parent" frame. Wayne Baker (2005) noted that "absolutism" accompanied the rise in popularity of American conservatism. And in an article published in *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Alan Wolfe (2005) wrote:

When I attended graduate school in the 1960s, *The Authoritarian Personality* was treated as a social-science version of the Edsel, a case study of how to do everything wrong. . . . Yet, despite its flaws, *The Authoritarian Personality* deserves a re-evaluation. In many ways, it is more relevant now than it was in 1950. . . . Many of the prominent politicians successful in today's conservative political environment adhere to a distinct style of politics that the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* anticipated.

John Dean (2006: xxxix), the former Nixon attorney turned whistleblower, similarly concluded, "Conservatism has been co-opted by authoritarians, a most dangerous type of political animal." Such concerns have only accelerated in the era of Trump (Dean & Altemeyer, 2020). Rather than responding in kind, liberals have generally eschewed dogmatic reactions to 9/11, the coronavirus pandemic, and their political consequences. All of this is consistent with the notion that there are indeed significant differences of cognitive and motivational style that characterize people who are drawn to

liberal vs. conservative belief systems, much as Adorno and his colleagues supposed.

There is by now sufficient evidence to conclude that Adorno et al. (1950) were correct that conservatives are, on average, more authoritarian, dogmatic, rigid, and closed-minded than liberals (Nilsson & Jost, 2020a). We will delve much more deeply into the evidence in subsequent chapters. For now, suffice it to say that meta-analytic reviews of dozens of studies based on thousands of participants around the world reveal a clear tendency for conservatives to score higher on measures of perceptual and cognitive rigidity, dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, personal needs for order, structure, and closure and to be lower in openness to experience, integrative complexity, and cognitive reflection in comparison with liberals and moderates. Several studies, which we take up in [Chapter 4](#), find that in a variety of aesthetic domains, conservatism is associated with preferences for relatively simple, unambiguous, and familiar stimuli, whether they are paintings, poems, or songs.

There are other psychological differences between liberals and conservatives as well. Conservatives are, on average, more likely than liberals to perceive the world as a dangerous place and to fear crime, terrorism, and, at least in some cases, death and disease (Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017). As Adorno and colleagues (1950) noted long ago, conservatives express more prejudice than liberals toward members of deviant or stigmatized groups, and this is due, in part, to cognitive rigidity, stereotypical thinking, and feelings of threat (e.g., Hodson & Busseri, 2012).

What about authoritarianism of the left? Are extremists of the left and right equally likely to be closed-minded? Some studies, especially those comparing multiple political parties in Europe, allow researchers to pit the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis against the extremity hypothesis that increased dogmatism/rigidity should be associated with increased ideological extremity in both directions (left and right). The available data, which we summarize in [Chapter 4](#), provide consistent support for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, no support for the extremity hypothesis in isolation, and some support for the notion that both effects are present in combination (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b).

Still, Luke Conway and colleagues (2018) claim to have finally captured what Altemeyer once dubbed the “Loch Ness Monster,” namely the left-wing authoritarian in North America. Unfortunately, there are serious

conceptual and methodological problems with Conway's research program, including the fact that many of their questionnaire items are double-barreled and confounded with liberal attitudinal contents (Nilsson & Jost, 2020a).

In research with Benjamin Saunders, Mark Hoffarth, and others, we have observed that people who scored higher on the Conway scale were indeed more likely to be liberal. However, they expressed *less* rather than more authoritarianism on a childrearing measure; they were *less* intolerant of ambiguity than people who scored lower on the scale; and they were *no higher* in the need for order or dogmatism than people who scored lower on the scale (Hoffarth et al., 2020; Saunders et al., 2020). We also administered a different left-wing authoritarianism scale developed by Alain Van Hiel and colleagues (2006) and found that it was associated with dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and authoritarian attitudes about childrearing—but it was more strongly associated with *conservatism* than liberalism. Thus, Conway and colleagues' (2018) scale may tap into liberal concerns, but it appears to have little or nothing to do with authoritarianism per se, whereas Van Hiel and colleagues' (2006) scale may tap into authoritarianism, but it has little or nothing to do with liberalism.

Much evidence, which is covered in [Chapters 4 and 7](#), upholds the Adorno et al. (1950) rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis and contradicts persistent claims that liberals and conservatives are *equally* rigid and dogmatic (see also Zmigrod et al., 2021). The important point is not that Adorno and colleagues bested their critics. It is that psychologists are finally returning to the kinds of questions about ideological asymmetry raised by *The Authoritarian Personality* after years of neglect during the era of ideo-skepticism (see [Table 1.1](#)).

To the extent that sociologists and political scientists remain reluctant to take the left-right dimension of ideology seriously, there are clear opportunities for psychologists not only to describe ideological differences in theory but also to explain them in practice. Psychologists have already made good progress in identifying a set of situational and dispositional factors that are linked to the cognitive and motivational underpinnings of political ideology. We will describe this progress in considerable detail in the coming chapters. For now, it is enough to note that there is an emerging psychological paradigm that has already begun to shed light on why ideology—and perhaps ideological conflict—will always be with us.

Concluding Remarks

The late Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio (1996) pointed out that it was at one time or another in the political interest of nearly everyone to deny the enduring relevance of ideology, insofar as “undermining the left/right distinction becomes an obvious expedient for hiding one’s own weakness” (14). In other words, blurring ideological boundaries is a convenient rhetorical strategy that a sidelined minority party can use to refashion its image. During the 2000 US presidential campaign, for instance, third-party candidate Ralph Nader claimed that “setting aside posturing, there are very few major differences between the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates.” His remarks were widely criticized in the wake of 9/11, the Bush presidency, the military occupation of Iraq, the use of “enhanced interrogation” techniques such as torture, and so on. During the 2016 primary election campaign, the democratic socialist Bernie Sanders likewise suggested that there were few differences between the corporatist wing of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, but such arguments lost much of their persuasiveness as the Trump presidency wore on, an issue we will turn to in [Chapter 6](#).

The end-of-ideology thesis was popular with neoconservatives such as Bell, Shils, and Francis Fukuyama. Their work helped to marginalize the radical left and give rightists a fresh start. Dinesh D’Souza wielded an end-of-ideology excuse to distance conservative policies from unpopular legacies such as racism. Soon thereafter, it was liberal leftists who, following the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe, relinquished their support for robust social welfare programs and professed the need for a “third way” to defeat the heirs of Thatcher and Reagan (Giddens, 1998). The strategy worked for Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Barack Obama, but—arguably, at least—at the cost of taking historically leftist concerns about exploitation and economic inequality off the political table.

Henri Lefebvre (1968) was among the first to diagnose the short-sighted, obfuscatory, and (ironically) ideological nature of the end-of-ideology thesis (see also MacIntyre, 1978; Mills, 1960/1968). He noted that “extreme ideologizing is accompanied by a certain conviction that the ‘end of ideology’ has been reached” and predicted that “ideology is not so easily eliminated; to the contrary, it is marked by sudden flare-ups and makes surprising comebacks” (87). The psychological evidence gathered together in this book suggests that Lefebvre was right. There is a degree of division in

the United States and elsewhere that would have been unfathomable to the end-of-ideologists—and that is still unfathomable to social scientists who assume that ideology is forever beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens.

It is probably no coincidence that the ideological struggle was renewed by the right rather than the left (Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2015). Tedin (1987) presented data from 1980 showing that more than three times as many conservatives as liberals satisfied Converse's criteria for being true ideologues. And, as we have already noted, a large body of evidence favors the asymmetrical rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis over the symmetrical ideologue-as-extremist hypothesis. Research covered in this book finds that conservatives are generally more prone to closed-minded, dogmatic, and authoritarian solutions. Liberals, on the other hand, may be too quick to defy authority, flout conventions, and slay the sacred cows of others. At other times, however, liberals may be “too broad-minded to take [their] own side in a quarrel,” as the poet Robert Frost put it. There are almost surely necessary, self-correcting historical swings in both left-wing and right-wing directions, as Tomkins (1965) noted in the epigraph for the first chapter of this book. The future of humanity may well depend upon each side's ability to learn from and avoid repeating its past mistakes.

My own conclusion dovetails with that of Lane (1962, 1969) and Kerlinger (1984), which is that ordinary people by no means pass the strictest tests imaginable for ideological sophistication. Nevertheless, most of them do think, feel, and behave in ideologically meaningful and interpretable terms. Millions of Americans seek out ideologically charged talk radio, televised news programs, and political websites. At least three-quarters of US voters locate their political attitudes on a bipolar liberalism-conservatism dimension, and these attitudes reliably predict voting intentions and other important outcomes, including beliefs, opinions, values, traits, and behaviors. Many other discoveries concerning the causes and consequences of left-right ideological differences await us, but only if we accept that the differences exist and that they can be studied with the tools of social science.

In looking back on the end-of-ideology thesis that he helped to promulgate, Shils (1968b) himself admitted that “the potentiality for ideology seems to be a permanent part of the human constitution” (75). It is fortuitous, then, that psychologists, at least, are returning to the topic after years of neglect. There are many important questions for which we lack

solid empirical answers, in large part because of pronouncements about “ideological innocence” in the mass public.¹² In this chapter, I have taken a distinctively psychological approach to political ideology, highlighting the motivational underpinnings of liberalism on the left and conservatism on the right. Similarly fruitful analyses of religious and other cultural belief systems have been undertaken as well (see Jost, 2020). Because ideologies and other belief systems grow out of an attempt to satisfy the epistemic, existential, and relational needs of the human species, it may be ascertained that ideology is a natural aspect of psychological functioning and will always be around in one form or another.

Core ideological beliefs about equality (vs. hierarchy) and tradition (vs. social change) possess relatively stable dispositional and situational antecedents, and they exert at least some degree of influence or constraint over the individual’s other thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. There is reason to assume that throughout the course of evolution, human beings have required and will continue to require the characteristics that are associated with the left as well as the right. We need tradition, order, structure, closure, discipline, and conscientiousness, to be sure. But if the human race is to continue to survive new challenges, we will just as surely need creativity, curiosity, tolerance, empathy, compassion, and open-mindedness.

1 A Google search on “ideology” as a keyword produced 140 million hits in March of 2021. There were 224 million hits in response to “conservative” and 342 million hits in response to “liberal.”

2 From “On politics with Lisa Lerer,” Evening Edition, *New York Times*, July 22, 2019.

3 From “Americans divided on party lines over risk from coronavirus: Reuters/Ipsos poll,” *Reuters*, March 6, 2020.

4 From “On politics with Lisa Lerer,” *New York Times*, May 7, 2020.

5 Shils (1968b: 67–68) also suggested that all ideologies “passionately oppose the productions of the cultural institutions of the central institutional system,” but this definition seems unnecessarily restrictive in yet another way. It arbitrarily exempts belief systems that are mainstream, that are centrist, and that “affirm the existing order” from being considered *ideological*. In this way he excludes altogether the possibility of system-justifying ideologies (Jost, 2020). Shils’s treatment of ideology also obscures the fact that end-of-ideology claims are themselves at least partly ideological—and that they serve the political interests of some constituencies better than others (Billig, 1984; Bobbio, 1996; Lefebvre, 1968; MacIntyre, 1978; Mills, 1960/1968).

6 Here Mills (1960/1968) introduces an evaluative dimension to ideological thinking that is overlooked in many of the definitions that stress only cognitive organization (internal coherence). I agree that evaluation is indeed central to how ordinary people typically use ideological constructs. By focusing on the evaluation of “policies, institutions, men of power,” Mills’s account anticipates the distinction between system-justifying and system-challenging ideologies (Jost, 2020).

7 Although many people assume that preferences for “small government” are integral to the conservative worldview, such preferences appear to be highly selective and contextualized, at least in the US context: conservatives oppose governmental spending and oversight when a Democratic president is in office but not when a Republican president is in office (Morisi et al., 2019).

8 Unfortunately, this practice of administering complete instruments is extremely rare in research on public opinion, because it is financially costly to include such a large number of items. However, doing this enabled us to capitalize on the positive psychometric properties of the scales and to generalize our results beyond just one or two operational instruments. Thus, we were not forced to rely upon a smattering of individual items, as in many other national surveys.

9 According to Jewitt and Goren (2016), politically involved citizens “caught up to” political elites in terms of ideological consistency and structure by around 1992.

10 Approximately 1.8 million watched MSNBC nightly during prime time in 2018, up 12% from the previous year.

11 As Burke wrote famously, “A state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservatism.” According to Viereck (1956: 12), “The Burkean . . . does come to terms with the reality of inevitable change. But he does so without the liberal’s optimism and faith in progress” (see also Nisbet, 1986/2017; Oakeshott, 1962/1991, as quoted in the previous chapter).

12 Before moving on to the next chapter, there is one more observation to be made about Converse’s (1964) argument. I have long found it bizarre that the author offered the case of Nazi voters in 1933 as an instance of “nonideological” voters swamping the political process. This move illustrates perfectly the problem of equating ideological thinking with logic, sophistication, and knowledge. Some ideologies, it must be recognized, are the very opposite of “benign organizing devices.” Their function is to distort, obscure, and misrepresent reality and to cultivate a spirit of cynical indifference to the facts as they are—and, above all, to motivate political action, even deeply destructive action. In such situations, the effects of ideology are indistinguishable from those of propaganda.

3

Elective Affinities

The Intersection of “Top Down” and “Bottom Up” Processes

Every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition.

John Zaller (1992: 6)

Ideology, I have said, may be treated psychologically as an interrelated set of socially shared beliefs, opinions, and values with cognitive, affective, and motivational properties. The study of ideology, understood in this way, must proceed on two levels of analysis or interpretation that are ultimately in need of reconciliation or integration: an analysis in terms of *content* and an analysis in terms of *function*. Ideology may be thought of as having both a *discursive* (socially constructed) superstructure and a *functional* (or motivational) substructure.

The discursive superstructure refers to the network of socially constructed beliefs, attitudes, and values bound up with a particular ideological position at a particular time and place. Defined in this way, the discursive superstructure consists of *social representations* (Moscovici, 1988) that guide political judgment in a *top-down* schematic fashion; it is usually transmitted from political elites to the public at large. The functional substructure refers to the ensemble of social and psychological needs, goals, and motives that drive the political interests of ordinary citizens in a *bottom-up* fashion and that are served by the discursive contents of ideology (or not). [Figure 3.1](#) provides a schematic illustration of our theoretical model of the motivational substructure, discursive superstructure, and downstream consequences of political ideology. The mutual or interactive relationship between top-down and bottom-up processes is usefully characterized by the metaphor of *elective affinities*, a concept we turn to now.




Figure 3.1 Schematic illustration of a theoretical model of the motivational substructure, discursive superstructure, and downstream consequences of political ideology.

Source: Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009).

The Concept of “Elective Affinities”

In *Elective Affinities*, an Enlightenment-era novel by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1809/1966: 39–44), the reader is invited to consider parallels between the law-governed manner in which chemical elements combine and separate and the forces of attraction and repulsion in human relationships. In an early passage foreshadowing clandestine affairs, one of the major characters, who has been boning up on chemistry textbooks, explains his fascination with the chemical reaction: “It really looks as though one relation

had been deliberately chosen in preference to another,” so much so that “we believe these elements capable of exercising some sort of willpower and selection, and feel perfectly justified using the term ‘elective affinities’!”

The great sociologist Max Weber, whose vast erudition certainly extended to the novels of Goethe, picked the concept of “elective affinity” (*Wahlverwandtschaft*) to characterize the link between *ideas* (or belief systems) and *interests* (or needs), that is, the “selective process” by which “ideas and their publics . . . find their affinities” (Gerth & Mills, 1948/1970: 63). The guiding theoretical assumption is that

ideas, selected and reinterpreted from the original doctrine, do gain an affinity with the interests of certain members of special strata; if they do not gain such an affinity, they are abandoned. (Gerth & Mills, 1948/1970: 63)

From this perspective, people may be said to “choose” ideas, but there is also an important and reciprocal sense in which *ideas choose people*.

It is important to point out that when we hypothesize an elective affinity between, say, epistemic needs for order, structure, and closure and political conservatism, *we are not saying that such relationships hold always or forever*, as some critics would imply. On the contrary, just as introducing a new chemical element can dissolve previously existing chemical bonds and introducing a new romantic rival can divide partners who were previously inseparable, bringing in an additional political or psychological factor can produce new and different combinations. For instance, there may be a relatively domain-general preference for liberals to be more exploratory and less risk averse than conservatives (Shook & Fazio, 2009) that is disrupted by bringing in other attitudinal elements, such as the stock market, which is more appealing to conservatives than liberals (Fiagbenu et al., 2020; see also Ruisch, Shook, & Fazio, 2020). Likewise, conservatives may be more sensitive than liberals to pathogen threats that are not especially politicized, such as the Ebola outbreak of 2014 (Beall et al., 2016)—and yet downplay such threats when they are encouraged to do so by prominent political leaders, such as President Trump during the COVID-19 crisis (O’Shea et al., 2021).

The metaphor of *elective affinities* is a promising one for conceiving of the forces of mutual attraction that exist between the structure and contents of belief systems and the underlying needs, motives, and interests of individuals and groups who subscribe to them. These forces of attraction—which are also the subject matter of Silvan Tomkins’s concept of *ideo-*

affective resonances, Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus*, and Stuart Hall's *tendential alignments*—are the focus of this chapter. In rendering a social psychological analysis of this subject matter, we identify a set of epistemic, existential, and relational motives that help to explain why certain people—once they are exposed to certain political ideas—“stick” with those ideas and the ideas stick with them, unless other key elements are brought into the situation.

This overall approach is again broadly consistent with that of Robert E. Lane (1969: 19), who regarded human needs as the “energizing sources of political thought.” It is also reminiscent of even earlier accounts, including those of Erich Fromm (1941), Talcott Parsons (1951), Herbert McClosky (1958), Silvan Tomkins (1963), and T. W. Adorno et al. (1950), who set out to discover the underlying personality needs and structures that give rise to “ideological receptivity” or “ideology in readiness.” It is noteworthy that each of these models assumed, as I do, that ideological outcomes result from an *interactive* combination of top-down socialization processes and bottom-up psychological predispositions.

Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Approaches to the Study of Political Ideology

Historically, political scientists have focused on what we refer to as top-down processes such as political leadership and party politics (Zaller, 1992), that is, the ways in which attitudes are “organized into coherent structures by political elites for consumption by the public” (Feldman, 1988: 417). Psychologists, as we have seen, are more likely than political scientists to consider bottom-up cognitive and motivational processes that lead people to seek out and cocreate belief systems that possess some degree of coherence and structure. We propose that by integrating complementary insights concerning top-down (institutional and organizational) and bottom-up (social and psychological) processes, it may be possible to reconcile seemingly contradictory positions and findings concerning the nature of political ideology.

From the Top Down: Elite Construction and Dissemination of the Discursive Superstructure

Political elites such as elected officials, party leaders, and media representatives impose structure by simplifying the political environment. They can also strongly influence the specific contents of a political ideology, that is, its discursive superstructure. One well-known example from American politics is the role that Lyndon Johnson, among others, played in urging supporters of the Democratic Party to embrace progressive civil rights legislation to support the integration of racial and ethnic minorities in the mid-1960s. Another example is the relatively strong influence that politicians, journalists, and other intellectuals exert over the public's degree of acceptance of their nation's involvement in war. More generally, television news and other mass media play an agenda-setting role, leading citizens to reshuffle their political priorities (Iyengar & Kinder, 2010). With respect to these cases and others, Zaller (1992: 11) concluded that "exposure to elite discourse appears to promote support for the ideas carried in it."

The Communication Process

The socially shared contents of the discursive superstructure reflect the specific bundling of beliefs, opinions, and values that results from communicative and strategic forms of interaction between partisan leaders and their followers (Hinich & Munger, 1994; Zaller, 1992). This is the sense in which, as Paul Sniderman and John Bullock (2004: 351) put it, "political institutions do the heavy lifting." Most likely, this allows a relatively small and unrepresentative group of elite political operatives to wield a disproportionate amount of influence, as commentators within and without the critical Marxian tradition have long pointed out.

In contemporary US society there are elites on the left as well as the right, and presumably both are capable of shaping the discursive superstructure, at least to some degree (Hinich & Munger, 1994). Consequently, the ideological bundles or packages that are socially constructed by elites come to anchor the opposing poles on a left-right continuum in any given political context. This lays out the available options on an *ideological menu* from which members of the mass public are then able to make their selections (Sniderman & Bullock, 2004).¹ The specific contents associated with various ideological positions are thereby approached or avoided by members of the mass public who are exposed to elite communication and receptive to it

(Zaller, 1992). This raises the question of how successful political elites are when it comes to spreading their ideologically driven messages to the public at large.

The Moderating Role of Citizens' Cognitive Abilities and Motivation

Following the groundbreaking work of Campbell et al. (1960) and Converse (1964), an enormous number of studies have established that some citizens are more able and/or willing than others to learn “what goes with what,” that is, to acquire the specific contents of the discursive superstructure as defined by political elites (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). It is certainly true that most citizens do not acquire the contents of various ideologies in all of their glorious detail (Achen & Bartels, 2016). However, this should not be taken to indicate that people are utterly devoid of ideological commitment or understanding. As Lane (1962: 15–16) observed, “The common man has a set of emotionally charged political beliefs” that “embrace central values and institutions” and are “rationalizations of interests (sometimes not his own)” that “serve as moral justifications for daily acts and beliefs.” It is in this sense that most people possess latent if not forensic ideologies. As noted in the previous chapter, it is also important to keep in mind that ignorance and confusion can sometimes indicate the presence of ideology rather than its absence.

Major factors governing the mass acquisition of specific ideological contents include attention to and comprehension of information flowing from political elites (McGuire, 1999; Zaller, 1992). Highly engaged political “experts”—those possessing well-developed political schemas that can be used to assimilate new information—are most likely to receive, process, and use such information (Erikson & Tedin, 2019). Motivation matters as well as cognitive abilities. Individuals with a high *need to evaluate*—that is, a chronic tendency to form opinions and judge things as either good or bad—are especially likely to acquire and use discursive ideological content (Federico & Schneider, 2007), as are those who, for whatever reason, are politically engaged (Prior, 2019).

But even citizens who are relatively uninterested or uninformed about politics absorb a good deal of information from the social environment, as we discovered from analyzing responses to a panel survey of 3,500 US adults fielded by YouGov in 2016 (Azevedo et al., 2019, Sample 3).² My colleagues and I compared responses to a single left-right ideological self-

placement item to opinions on two issues, one social and one economic, for respondents who were low vs. high in political sophistication. The social issue pertained to immigration, with respondents locating themselves on a scale that was labeled at the extremes from “Deport all illegal immigrants” to providing an “Eventual path to citizenship.” The economic issue pertained to the question of taxation, with respondents locating themselves on response scales ranging from “Less progressive tax system” and “Lower tax rates on wealthy” to “More progressive tax system” and “Raise tax rates on wealthy.” We measured political sophistication with three knowledge questions about whether rates of workers’ earnings, health insurance numbers, and illegal immigration had increased or decreased between 2008 and 2016.

The research question we investigated was whether people who were relatively low in political sophistication failed to understand “what goes with what” and therefore lacked ideological structure or constraint, as political scientists in the tradition of Converse (1964) have long argued. We saw no evidence of cluelessness. On the contrary, even respondents who were low in political sophistication used ideological terms appropriately and accurately. As shown in [Table 3.1](#), their ideological self-placement scores were correlated with operational measures of social and economic conservatism at very respectable levels ranging from .43 to .51. Their social and economic attitudes were also significantly correlated ($r = .37$), demonstrating left-right structural organization. The corresponding correlations were slightly higher for respondents who were high in sophistication, but even those who were low in sophistication clearly understood the difference between left and right in both social and economic domains.

Table 3.1 Correlations between Social and Economic Dimensions of Ideology (and Overall Ideological Self-Placement) for US Respondents Who Were Classified as Low and High in Political Sophistication (YouGov, 2016)

Variable	1	2	3
1. Overall ideological self-placement (symbolic)	–	.47*** (1,646)	.56*** (1,644)
2. Social conservatism (operational)	.43*** (1,833)	–	.47*** (1,646)
3. Economic conservatism (operational)	.51*** (1,831)	.37*** (1,833)	–

Note: Correlations for respondents classified as high in political sophistication on the basis of a median split are above the diagonal (upper triangle), and correlations for respondents classified as low in political sophistication are below the diagonal (bottom triangle). All correlations in this table are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Pairwise sample sizes (ns) are shown in parentheses below correlations.

*** $p < .001$.

Source: Azevedo et al. (2019, Sample 3).

We obtained even more impressive results in the United Kingdom, where we analyzed data from YouGov’s 2014–2015 panel survey of 3,848 social media users in England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.³ As before, we compared responses to a single left-right ideological self-placement item to opinions on two issues, one social and one economic, for respondents who were low vs. high in political sophistication. The social issue again pertained to immigration, with respondents placing themselves on a response scale ranging from “Legal immigration to Britain should increase a lot” to “Legal immigration to Britain should decrease a lot.” The economic issue pertained to social spending and taxation, with respondents placing themselves on scales ranging from “Social spending should be increased even if that means higher taxes” to “Taxes should be cut even if that means lower social spending.” We measured political sophistication with three knowledge questions about rates of unemployment and immigration in the United Kingdom, the political situation in Greece, and Islamic extremist control of territory in the Middle East.

As shown in Table 3.2, ideological self-placement scores were very strongly correlated with operational measures of social and economic conservatism at levels ranging from .59 to .68 among respondents who were relatively low in political sophistication. Their social and economic attitudes were also highly correlated at $r = .56$, demonstrating a high degree of left-right structural organization. The picture that emerges from these surveys conducted in the United States and the United Kingdom is hardly one of ideological incoherence, ignorance, or innocence—even among respondents

who were relatively *low* in political knowledge or sophistication. No doubt political elites are partially responsible for the strategic bundling of issues in left-right terms. Still, it must be said that their efforts appear to be highly successful. In itself, this suggests some degree of ideological preparedness on the parts of citizens themselves. The vicissitudes of left and right seem much easier for people to learn than, say, Latin or epidemiology or the violin.

Table 3.2 Correlations between Social and Economic Dimensions of Ideology (and Overall Ideological Self-Placement) for UK Respondents Who Were Classified as Low and High in Political Sophistication (YouGov, 2014–2015)

Variable	1	2	3
1. Overall ideological self-placement (symbolic)	–	.57*** (1,191)	.72*** (1,187)
2. Social conservatism (operational)	.59*** (1,384)	–	.49*** (1,418)
3. Economic conservatism (operational)	.68*** (1,375)	.56*** (1,703)	–

Note: Correlations for respondents classified as high in political sophistication on the basis of a median split are above the diagonal (upper triangle), and correlations for respondents classified as low in political sophistication are below the diagonal (bottom triangle). All correlations in this table are statistically significant at $p < .001$. Pairwise sample sizes (*ns*) are shown in parentheses below correlations.

*** $p < .001$.

Source: Azevedo et al. (2019, Sample 4).

From the Bottom Up: Psychological Origins of the Motivational Substructure

Political scientists often assume that the dispositional characteristics of ordinary citizens affect their ability and motivation to understand and absorb ideological messages, but the focus has almost always been on levels of political involvement, sophistication, and expertise (Erikson & Tedin, 2019; Prior, 2019; Zaller, 1992). A psychological approach suggests that a much wider variety of personality and individual difference variables should affect not only one's degree of exposure to mass media but also one's ideological responses to that exposure. Without incorporating a wide range of psychological factors, it is impossible to answer Sniderman and Bullock's (2004: 353) thorny question: "Why are some disposed to a liberal or broadly left political outlook while others are disposed to a conservative or broadly right orientation?"

A longitudinal study by Jack and Jeanne Block (2006) revealed that many of the personality differences between liberals and conservatives that appear in adulthood are already present when children are in nursery school, long before they are capable of defining themselves in terms of political orientation. Specifically, 3-year-old children who identified themselves as more liberal at age 23 were rated by their preschool teachers as more self-reliant, energetic, emotionally expressive, gregarious, impulsive, resilient, and dominating, and as more likely to develop close relationships. By contrast, children who later identified as more conservative were seen by their preschool teachers as more rigid, inhibited, fearful, indecisive, vulnerable, overcontrolled, and more likely to feel easily victimized and offended.

Although these findings were based on a small and very unrepresentative sample, they should not be dismissed out of hand, because they are consistent with the results of (a) research in behavioral genetics indicating that there are heritable aspects of political ideology (Alford et al., 2005; Bouchard et al., 2003; Hatemi et al., 2011; Kandler et al., 2012), (b) other studies of parenting behavior and childhood development carried out with larger samples in more diverse social contexts (e.g., Fraley et al., 2012; Guidetti et al., 2017; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2014; Tagar et al., 2014; Wegemer & Vandell, 2020), and (c) dozens of, if not more, studies of adults, which are summarized in the next chapter. Taken as a whole, the literature suggests that there are at least three major classes of psychological variables that make up the motivational substructure of political ideology, namely *epistemic*, *existential*, and *relational* motives.

Epistemic Motives: Ideology Offers Certainty

Ideology, it has been suggested, “serves as a guide and compass through the thicket of political life” (Ball & Dagger, 1991: 1–2). That is, ideology addresses a number of cognitive or epistemic goals, such as interpretation, understanding, prediction, explanation, control, evaluation, and belief formation. We should not be surprised to learn, then, that psychological variables pertaining to the management of uncertainty predict both reliance on ideology in general and endorsement of specific policy positions, such as support for the Iraq War (Federico et al., 2005; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a). Studies conducted in many Western countries demonstrate that individuals who score higher on the need for cognitive closure scale,

which measures the motivation to “seize and freeze” on beliefs that offer simplicity, certainty, and clarity, are especially likely to hold conservative, rightist (as opposed to liberal, leftist) attitudes (Jost, 2017a).

People who score higher on personal needs to evaluate attitudinal objects—to render good/bad judgments on a wide range of stimuli—also tend to be more politically conservative (Bizer et al., 2004; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Ksiazkiewicz & Krueger, 2017). On the other hand, those who score higher on the need for cognition scale, which measures enjoyment of thinking, are more liberal (Hennes et al., 2012; Jost, 2017a; Sargent, 2004). These findings and others suggest that an elective affinity exists between epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty and political conservatism, although the direction of causality can only be established by experimental or longitudinal study designs. We will review studies of both types in later chapters.

The point is not that liberals and leftists lack the desire to reduce uncertainty or that they crave uncertainty for its own sake—although some, such as those who join anarchic social movements, might very well be attracted to uncertainty and even chaos. Presumably, most liberals are motivated to reduce uncertainty and threat, but their motivation is generally not as strong as that of conservatives. Overall, liberals are significantly more tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty than conservatives, as we will see in [Chapters 4 and 7](#).

Insofar as everyone—or nearly everyone—wants to attain some degree of certainty or epistemic closure, is it possible that conservatism possesses a psychological advantage over liberalism? Answering this question is difficult, but several lines of evidence suggest that this might be the case. If so, it may help to explain why, as we noted in the previous chapter, self-identified conservatives almost always outnumber self-identified liberals in the United States, and why for several decades there have been “a substantial number of conservative Democrats but almost no liberal Republicans” (Tedin, 1987: 87; see also Grossman & Hopkins, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2015).

Experiments by Linda Skitka and colleagues (2002) suggested that “the default attributional position is a conservative response,” insofar as liberals and conservatives were quicker to make individual (than system-level) attributions about the causes of poverty, unemployment, disease, and other negative outcomes—but only liberals corrected their initial response,

subsequently taking into account extenuating circumstances. When the experimenters introduced a mental distraction or “cognitive load” manipulation, making it difficult for people to engage in effortful correction processes, liberals were just as likely as conservatives to blame individuals for their plight (see also Stern et al., 2013). The authors concluded, “It is much easier to get a liberal to behave like a conservative than it is to get a conservative to behave like a liberal” (Skitka et al., 2002: 484).

Scott Eidelman and colleagues (2012) took this line of reasoning a step further, showing that everyday circumstances that increase cognitive load and/or the need for cognitive closure, such as time pressure and drinking alcohol, led people to express more conservative attitudes. This work is consistent with the idea that the conservative thinking style is simpler, more internally consistent, and less subject to ambiguity, in comparison with the liberal thinking style.

Yet another reason to suspect that conservatism enjoys a psychological advantage over liberalism comes from research on system justification theory, which suggests that most people—including liberals—are motivated to rationalize aspects of the status quo, that is, to inflate the favorability opinions about dominant institutions and authorities and to resist qualitative forms of social change (Jost, 2020). Rationalizing the status quo serves the palliative function of increasing positive affect, decreasing negative affect, and making people happier and more satisfied with the way things are, but it also undermines support for social progress and the redistribution of resources (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Napier & Jost, 2008b; Wakslak et al., 2007). At the same time, some people are strongly motivated by novelty, curiosity, sensation seeking, and openness to new experiences, and this apparently makes them more likely to embrace liberal and progressive opinions and causes (Carney et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2013; Xu & Peterson, 2017).

Existential Motives: Ideology Offers Security

According to terror management theory, which was inspired by the anthropological writings of Ernest Becker, the defense of cultural worldviews facilitates the denial of death (Pyszczynski et al., 2015). Ideology, from this perspective, enables people to transcend symbolically the existential angst that accompanies our awareness of death. The idea is that socially or culturally shared belief systems help people to keep the faith that

they are persons of worth in a meaningful, self-transcendent world, thereby providing self-esteem and a sense of security.

Numerous studies, which we will describe in subsequent chapters, suggest that existential motives to cope with anxiety and threat are disproportionately associated with politically conservative outcomes. For instance, experiments conducted during US presidential campaigns suggested that college students often favored Democratic candidates such as John Kerry in 2004, Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, and Hillary Clinton in 2016 under normal (or control) conditions, but they often showed preference reversals following reminders of death, thereby increasing their affinity for Republican candidates such as George W. Bush, John McCain, and Donald Trump (Cohen et al., 2005, 2017; Landau et al., 2004; Vail et al., 2009). There is a good deal of evidence, which we review in some detail in [Chapter 7](#), that circumstances that heighten mortality salience and anxiety precipitate *conservative shift* more readily than *liberal shift* (see also Burke et al., 2013).

Archival evidence likewise suggests that the appeal of authoritarian, conservative, and right-wing leaders and opinions is enhanced during periods of high social, economic, or political threat (e.g., D. W. Davis & Silver, 2004; Doty et al., 1991; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; McCann, 1997; Peterson et al., 1993; Sales, 1973; Willer, 2004). Presumably, this is because threat encourages people to embrace relatively simple yet cognitively rigid solutions to questions of security, such as border walls and restrictions on immigration and civil liberties, and these solutions resonate more with the right than the left. Dissertation research by Hulda Thórisdóttir demonstrated that exposure to threatening stimuli—such as frightening movie clips—elicited a temporary increase in motivated closed-mindedness and, relatedly, an affinity for identities and policies that were less liberal or more conservative (and more certainty-oriented; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011).

Relational Motives: Ideology Offers Solidarity

According to a vast literature on political socialization, ideological convictions are often transmitted from parents to children, especially when both parents have similar attitudes and discuss politics frequently, as long as bonds within the family are close (Sears & Brown, 2013). Peer and reference groups also exert a reasonably strong influence on left-right orientation. These social or relational influences on ideological outcomes are strongest in

late adolescence and early adulthood, that is, when issues of identity development are especially salient. The political orientations that are formed persist as long as one's social context does not change markedly.

Ideological transmission from parents to offspring and from peer to peer involves both active and passive forms of social learning. These processes are guided by relational motives for affiliation, social identification, and the desire for belongingness and a shared sense of reality (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Higgins, 2019; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). An experiment by Alison Ledgerwood, Curtis D. Hardin, and myself revealed that New York University students whose parents were ideologically discrepant scored higher on general and economic system justification after writing a personal essay about their more conservative (vs. liberal) parent (see [Figure 3.2](#)). This demonstrates that even an indirectly activated desire to bond with close others can exert ideological effects (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008).




Figure 3.2 Effects of indirectly activating one's relationship with a liberal (vs. conservative) parent on the endorsement of general and economic system justification.

Source: Jost, Ledgerwood, and Hardin (2008).

Focusing on relational motives reminds us that ideology is socially constructed and subjectively validated, and that interpersonal and intergroup factors determine whether or not the discursive superstructure developed by political elites becomes a shared social representation that successfully penetrates public consciousness. We know that important reference groups—such as those based on social class, political party, race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, sex, and gender identification—serve as orienting cues for citizens at every level of political sophistication (Campbell et al., 1960; Green et al., 2002; Mason, 2018).

Elective affinities may flow from symbolic processes of social identification as well as the realistic pursuit of group-based interests. Ideological outcomes are moderately correlated with indicators of personal and group self-interest. For example, low-income respondents tack slightly left on economic issues, whereas high-income respondents tack slightly right, all other things being equal (e.g., Gelman, 2009; McCarty et al., 2016; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016). However, the correlation is far from perfect; many people do not adopt self-interested positions. For some members of disadvantaged groups, for example, relational motives to express solidarity with their group may be trumped by system-justifying tendencies that serve epistemic or existential motives (Jost, 2020)—or even relational motives to affiliate with members of more advantaged out-groups (see Cheung & Hardin, 2010; Cheung et al., 2011).

It is also possible that—as we have seen with respect to epistemic and existential motives—some relational motives favor conservative, rightist outcomes in general. This would be consistent with the observation that conservatives are more likely than liberals to prioritize conformity, tradition, social order, and adherence to rules, norms, and social conventions—as well as the desire to share reality with like-minded others (see [Chapter 7](#), especially [Table 7.13](#)). There are two other reasons why relational motivation may increase one's affinity for political conservatism. First, it may be easier to establish common ground (or shared understanding) with respect to the established status quo, as opposed to the many counterfactual alternatives that are conceivable. Second, it may be more efficient to engage in mass communication through language that is clear, simple, and unambiguous—as opposed to nuanced, complex, and ambiguous.

Social and Political Consequences of Ideology

The focus of this chapter thus far has been on the individual's acquisition of the discursive contents of left-right ideology and the epistemic, existential, and relational motives that shape the acquisition process. But ideology would not be a very important phenomenon if it lacked social and political consequences. In contrast to the ideo-skeptics, I believe there is plenty of evidence that ideology has important ramifications for society. It exerts meaningful influences on how people think about and evaluate issues, candidates, and parties. It also predicts both implicit and explicit intergroup attitudes as well as opinions about the legitimacy of the overarching social system (see [Figure 2.1](#)). Let us now turn to some of the key findings in this area.

Effects on the Evaluations of Issues, Parties, Candidates, and Other Attitude Objects

Perhaps the most obvious effects of ideology are on political attitudes and behaviors such as voting. Americans who identify as “liberal” or “progressive” endorse issue positions that are recognized as left of center, evaluate liberal political figures more favorably, and vote for candidates of the left, whereas Americans who identify as “conservative” adopt positions that are right of center, evaluate conservative political figures more favorably, and vote for candidates on the right (see, *inter alia*, Abramowitz, 2010; Azevedo et al., 2017, 2019; Caprara et al., 2017; Cochrane, 2015; Conover & Feldman, 1981; Evans et al., 1996; Federico & Schneider, 2007; Jost, 2006; Kerlinger, 1984; Mason, 2018; Tedin, 1987; Zaller, 1992). As we saw in the last chapter, political ideology—along with political partisanship—is one of the strongest and most consistent predictors of vote choice, not only in the United States but also around the world.

At a higher level of abstraction, ideology also predicts citizens' general value orientations, with leftists prioritizing egalitarianism and openness to change more highly than rightists and rightists prioritizing conformity, security, and tradition more highly than leftists (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara & Vecchione, 2017; Caprara et al., 2017; Clifford et al., 2015; Federico et al., 2014; Feldman, 1988, 2003; Goren, 2013; Jacoby, 2014; Jost et al., 2016; Lupton et al., 2017; Schwartz et al., 2010; Swedlow & Wyckoff, 2009). Ideology also exerts meaningful effects on justice judgments and

attributions for social disparities, with conservatives stressing equity, ability, and personal deservingness and liberals stressing equality, need, and problems of structural discrimination (see Jost & Kay, 2010, for a review). Thus, very different research programs lead to the conclusion that political ideology is a robust predictor of attitudes, judgments, and behaviors—a conclusion to which we will return throughout the book

Effects on Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Attitudes

Political ideology is also strongly predictive of intergroup attitudes. Conservatives and rightists are more likely than liberals and leftists to express antipathy toward a wide variety of out-groups, especially low-status, disadvantaged, or stigmatized out-groups (e.g., see Whitley & Kite, 2009, for a review). The fact that conservatives hold less favorable attitudes than liberals toward groups that are victims of prejudice in society is not seriously disputed in social science research. However, the question of whether these differences are motivated by intergroup bias or differential commitments to principles of individualism, traditionalism, meritocracy, and other “conservative” values has been debated extensively (Sears et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 1996; Sniderman et al., 2000; Wallsten et al., 2017).

Ideological differences with respect to intergroup attitudes manifest themselves even on implicit or indirect measures, suggesting that they are not merely attributable to differences in self-presentation or socially desirable responding (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004; Essien et al., 2020; Hoffarth & Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2004; Nosek et al., 2009). Moreover, differences between liberals and conservatives are more pronounced among those with higher levels of education and political information, so the connection between conservatism and prejudice toward stigmatized groups is not confined to those who lack education or sophistication (Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Sidanius et al., 1996; Wallsten et al., 2017).

The effects of ideology on in-group/out-group evaluations depend upon relations of social status. Conservatism is associated with in-group favoritism for members of high-status groups, but it is often associated with *out-group* favoritism for members of low-status groups (e.g., Essien et al., 2020; Jost et al., 2004; Stern & Axt, 2019). For instance, conservatism is positively correlated with a pro-straight/anti-gay preference on implicit and explicit measures for members of sexual majority and minority groups alike (Hoffarth & Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2004). These findings show again that

conservatism is a system-justifying ideology that is linked to the perpetuation of the hierarchical social order among members of disadvantaged as well as advantaged groups (Jost, 2020).

Left-right differences in intergroup attitudes are readily interpretable in terms of our analysis of the functional substructure and the role of epistemic, existential, and relational motives. Social psychologists have long understood that people adopt stereotypes in part to conserve mental resources and impose order and structure on the social world (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Conservatives, as we have already suggested, possess heightened epistemic needs to avoid ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity and to maintain order, structure, and closure. (This research will be described in much more detail in [Chapters 4 and 7](#).) These motives, when combined with a tolerance—if not an outright preference (see Sidanius & Pratto, 2001)—for inequality, help to explain why conservatives are more likely than liberals to engage in stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Stern et al., 2015; Whitley & Kite, 2009). Conservatives are also more likely to feel that the use of racial and gender stereotypes is justified, apparently because they are more motivated to economize with respect to cognitive effort and to uphold group-based hierarchy (Stern & Axt, 2021).

All of these observations indicate that Adorno and colleagues (1950: 152) were on target when they noted a “psychological affinity between conservatism and ethnocentrism, liberalism and anti-ethnocentrism.” Political elites who are responsible for the contents of speeches and advertisements seem to be aware of these affinities, at least on some level. Conservative campaigns are much more likely than liberal campaigns to employ “dog whistle politics”: the fairly subtle use of racialized language and imagery to exploit Whites’ racial resentment of minorities (López, 2014). Racial cues linking minority groups to crime or welfare—as in Ronald Reagan’s speeches about “welfare queens,” George W. Bush’s infamous “Willy Horton ads,” and, less subtly, Donald Trump’s remarks about “Mexican rapists”—clearly benefit rightist candidates (López, 2014; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002).

Ideology as a System-Justifying Device

Ideology, on our view, is not *merely* a “benign organizing device” or a convenient shortcut for making heuristic judgments about political

candidates, parties, and issues. It is also a device for explaining and justifying the way things are—or, alternatively, how things should be different. Political ideologies often refer, directly or indirectly, to a given social system, either to affirm or oppose it. As noted previously, research on system justification theory suggests that most people—to varying degrees depending on chronic and temporary levels of epistemic, existential, and relational motivation—legitimize the status quo by drawing on social stereotypes and meritocratic belief systems, as well as some elements of conservative ideology (Jost, 2020).

In this way system justification theory connects two fundamental cognitive and motivational tendencies—*status quo bias* and *resistance to change*—to explain certain ideological outcomes. It also addresses Jennifer Hochschild’s (1981: 1) question of why “the dog doesn’t bark,” that is, why the United States “does not now have, and seldom ever has had, a political movement among the poor seeking greater economic equality.” Epistemic, existential, and relational needs to manage uncertainty, threat, and social discord may contribute to *working-class conservatism*, the oft-noted but seldom satisfactorily explained tendency for the working poor to stray from considerations of economic self-interest when it comes to choosing political candidates, parties, and policies (Houtman et al., 2012; Jost, 2017b; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lane, 1962; Lipset, 1960; Napier & Jost, 2008b; Parkin, 1967). System justification theory proposes that, to assuage underlying psychological needs, people are motivated—both consciously and nonconsciously—to defend, bolster, and rationalize aspects of the societal status quo, thereby embracing ideologies such as authoritarianism and conservatism that reinforce a subjective sense of order, security, and conformity (Jost, 2020).

A related supposition is that conservative, system-justifying belief systems serve the palliative function of alleviating discomfort associated with the awareness of injustice and capriciousness in the social world (Lane, 1962, 1969; Lerner, 1980; Major, 1994). The endorsement of system-justifying beliefs is associated with increased positive affect, decreased negative affect, and higher levels of personal satisfaction (Jost, 2020; Kluegel & Smith, 1986). To understand why conservatives and rightists consistently report being happier than liberals and leftists in public opinion polls, Jaime Napier and I homed in on beliefs about inequality. We discovered that the association between ideology and subjective well-being was attributable, in

part, to the fact that rightists are more likely than leftists to assume that economic inequality in society is fair, legitimate, and desirable (see also Bartels, 2016). Furthermore, we observed that as economic inequality in the United States has grown since the late 1970s (as measured by the *Gini coefficient*), so too has the “happiness gap” between liberals and conservatives (see [Figure 3.3](#)). It appears that rightist ideology, which seeks to provide moral and intellectual justification for inequality, provides a buffer against the negative hedonic consequences of inequality, not only in the United States but in other countries as well (Napier & Jost, 2008a).




Figure 3.3 Self-reported happiness among liberals and conservatives in the United States as a function of macroeconomic inequality.
Source: Napier and Jost (2008a).

Stuart Hall (1996: 30) raised the following question about Louis Althusser's functionalist approach to the topic of ideology: "If the function of ideology is to 'reproduce' capitalist social relations according to the 'requirements' of the system, how does one account for subversive ideas or ideological struggle?" This is an important question, and my answer is straightforward: system justification is merely one function served by ideology; it is by no means the *only* function. System-justifying belief systems, including meritocratic and other belief systems that justify the capitalist system, may be common and widespread, but they rarely diffuse or "work" completely, especially in large, complex societies. Processes of system justification, therefore, are rarely, if ever, total. This leaves some space for justice-related motives to work and for social change to occur. In addition to system justification, ideology also serves self- and group justification motives to legitimize the interests and esteem of the self and the in-group, respectively. No doubt it serves other functions as well (see Adorno et al., 1950; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Kay & Eibach, 2013; Kelman, 1961; M. B. Smith et al., 1956). Still, I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the ideological significance of the human tendency to make a virtue of necessity—not merely to tolerate but to celebrate the status quo, rationalizing whatever seems to be inevitable or inescapable (Jost, 2020). From this perspective, system justification motivation gives conservative ideology a considerable psychological advantage over its more critical, system-challenging rivals.

Concluding Remarks

The purpose of this chapter has been to flesh out some of the particulars of a psychological approach to the study of political ideology, as distinct from purely historical, philosophical, political, or sociological approaches. As illustrated in [Figure 3.1](#), one goal of our approach is to integrate insights gleaned from research programs operating at multiple levels of analysis. One limitation of much current thinking in political science is the assumption that ideological bundling by elites is largely arbitrary and ad hoc, designed merely to gain some short-term electoral advantage. An analysis in terms of elective affinities suggests that there must be psychological constraints on the types of beliefs, opinions, and values that can be bundled together and that are appealing to would-be voters on the left and right. This possibility

was raised in early discussions of mass belief systems, including that of Converse (1964). Unfortunately, it has been largely ignored in the intervening years in favor of research that focuses more or less exclusively on the role of political elites in constructing and spreading elements of the discursive superstructure. In this work it is largely assumed that ordinary citizens possess no ideologically relevant needs or demands of their own. To adopt an economic metaphor, research in political science has done a far better job of elucidating the supply side than the demand side of the market for ideology (see also Gries, Müller, & Jost, in press).

We have suggested that the metaphor of elective affinities, taken from the writings of Goethe and Weber, is an especially promising one because it aptly characterizes the forces of mutual attraction that bring people and ideas together. It highlights the fact that *every* ideological outcome arises from an interaction between top-down processes of socialization (including media exposure) and bottom-up processes of need fulfillment. Voters are not merely empty vessels waiting passively to be filled in by party leaders. Nor does it make sense to suggest that some political-psychological linkages arise from a process that is “menu independent,” as Malka and Soto (2015) proposed. The individual is not in a position to develop his or her belief system in a vacuum. “*Every* opinion,” as Zaller (1992) put it, “is a *marriage* of information and predisposition” (6, emphasis added)—a mutual attraction, an affinity, a coming together of persons and ideas. What we need to understand, then, is how and why certain ideologies, including ideologies of the left and right, ideologies of progress and tradition, and ideologies of equality and hierarchy, find resonance in the minds of some social actors but not others. The next chapter builds on the observations that have already been made and begins to answer these questions in more depth.

¹ The metaphor of ideological “menu dependence” is highly compatible with an analysis in terms of elective affinities, insofar as people must be exposed to a wide range of options to be able to select an ideology that matches their psychological and other dispositions. It follows that the effects of personality on political orientation should be much stronger in liberal-democratic nations that offer some variability in the ideological menu than in authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that forcefully restrict ideological alternatives.

² Respondents were matched to a sampling frame based on gender, age, race, education, party identification, ideology, and political interest. The frame was constructed through stratified sampling from the full 2010 American Community Survey (ACS) sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file). The total

sample was 44% male and 75% White/Caucasian, the median age was 52 years old, and the median level of education (24%) reported was “some college.”

3 The sample was 55% male, 52% reported 15 years or more of education, the median age was 48 years, household income was £34,200, and the median ideology was 5.2 (0–10 scale). Most respondents (84%) were from England, 5% were from Scotland, 9% were from Wales, and 1% were from Northern Ireland.

PART II

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES IN
PERSONALITY, COGNITIVE STYLE, AND
MOTIVATION

4

Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition

Conservatism is a demanding mistress and is giving me a migraine.

George Will (1998: 84)

For nearly a century, psychologists have been tracking the hypothesis that different psychological motives and tendencies underlie ideological differences between the left and the right. The practice of singling out political and economic conservatives—or, more precisely, “pseudo-conservatives”¹—for special study began, in many ways, with Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) landmark study of authoritarianism and the fascist potential in personality. An asymmetrical focus on right-wing authoritarianism has been criticized relentlessly on theoretical and methodological grounds, but it has withstood the tests of time and empirical scrutiny (Nilsson & Jost, 2020a).

Studies conducted from the 1950s on facilitate a sustained, albeit partial comparison of the cognitive styles and motivational needs of conservatives and other rightists with those of moderates, liberals, progressives, and radicals. A comprehensive review of the earliest studies, most of which were published between 1948 and 1956, was provided by Richard Christie and Peggy Cook (1958). This chapter focuses on the half century or so of research that followed their article, bringing us to the early 2000s. In addition to authoritarianism, we will see that there are less well-known sources of theory and research on individual differences associated with intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, uncertainty avoidance, need for cognitive closure, social dominance orientation, and system justification. Each of these psychological variables contributes to a deeper and more nuanced understanding of right-wing conservatism. In [Chapter 7](#) we will

consider more recent contributions to political psychology from roughly 2003 to 2017, incorporating several additional variables.

The study of authoritarianism and other personality theories of political attitudes has too often been dismissed a priori as an illegitimate value-laden attempt to correlate general psychological profiles with specific, ideological beliefs. The topic, like that of prejudice, is one that invites controversy, but this does not mean that researchers should shy away from it. On the contrary, it is an important and legitimate empirical issue as to whether there are demonstrable links (or, as we have said, *elective affinities*) between a clearly defined set of psychological needs, motives, and interests and the adoption of social, economic, and political attitudes that may be located on a left-right dimension.

The measurement of individual differences is an excellent starting point for understanding the psychological significance of the left-right distinction. At the same time, approaching ideology from the standpoint of personality theory alone is a mistake. The hypothesis that people adopt conservative—as opposed to liberal or progressive—ideologies in an effort to satisfy various social cognitive motives requires a novel theoretical perspective that overcomes two limitations of traditional research on the psychology of ideology.

First, too many measures of individual differences have conflated psychological and political variables in an attempt to measure a construct that is really a hybrid of the two. Glenn D. Wilson (1973: 4), for instance, offered an amalgamated definition of conservatism as “resistance to change and the tendency to prefer safe, traditional and conventional forms of institutions and behavior.” However, G. D. Wilson and Patterson’s (1968) original “Conservatism scale” (or “C-scale”)—which was one of the most popular psychological instruments used to measure conservatism in the 20th century—combined nonpolitical stimuli that were meant to elicit general attitudes concerning uncertainty tolerance (e.g., modern art, jazz music, horoscopes) and stimuli that have explicitly political referents (e.g., the death penalty, legalized abortion, socialism, religion). The fact that such a seemingly heterogeneous scale would exhibit reasonable psychometric properties with respect to reliability and validity hints that Wilson and his colleagues were detecting a bona fide connection between epistemic motivation and political ideology. Nevertheless, theoretical and empirical

efforts are generally hampered by the failure to distinguish clearly between psychological and political variables.

Second, treating liberalism-conservatism solely as an individual difference variable neglects growing evidence that situational factors shape the experience and expression of political ideology. If classic personality theories are correct in positing that character rigidity and motivational threat are related to the holding of rightist attitudes, then system instability and other highly threatening circumstances should also increase conservative or right-wing tendencies in the population as a whole. To stimulate innovative approaches to the study of *situations* as well as *dispositions*, it is helpful to cast a wide net in reviewing theories of motivated social cognition that are not conventionally regarded as political in nature. The idea is that ideological appetites are influenced by a multiplicity of psychological motives, including some that have not been considered by sociologists and political scientists.

Overview of This Chapter

A motivated social cognitive approach offers tremendous potential for unifying diverse theories and findings related to the psychological basis of left-right ideology—that is, theories and findings that link social and cognitive motives to the contents of specific political attitudes. The idea is to distill key insights from theories of personality and individual differences, theories of epistemic and existential motivation, and sociopolitical theories of ideology as individual and collective rationalization. After an eclectic review of historical perspectives, I will examine the balance of evidence for and against several variants of the hypothesis that people embrace political conservatism (at least in part) because it serves to reduce fear, anxiety, and uncertainty; avoid disruption, ambiguity, and personal and social change; and explain and justify inequality among groups and individuals.

Treating right-wing conservatism as a special case of motivated social cognition enables us to (a) go beyond traditional individual difference approaches; (b) maintain a clear conceptual distinction between psychological motives and ideological outcomes and explore relations between the two; (c) highlight situational (contextual) as well as dispositional (personality) variables that relate to ideology; (d) take into

account a wide variety of epistemic, existential, and ideologically defensive motivations; and (e) provide an integrative framework for understanding how these various motives work together to reduce and manage uncertainty, threat, and social deviance.

The Motivated Social Cognitive Perspective

To set the stage, the term *motivated social cognition* is used to refer to several key assumptions about the relationship between people's beliefs and their motivational underpinnings. In the post-Freudian world, the ancient dichotomy between reason and passion is blurred, and nearly everyone recognizes the possibility that people are capable of *believing what they want to believe*, within certain limits. Our first assumption, then, is that political ideologies—like virtually all other belief systems—are adopted in part because they fulfill some set of psychological needs. This does not mean that liberalism or conservatism is pathological or that such belief systems are necessarily false, irrational, or unprincipled.

From a social psychological perspective, most human beliefs are *subjectively* rational in the sense of being deduced either logically or psychologically from a set of premises to which believers subscribe (Kruglanski, 2018), and they are also at least partially responsive to reality constraints (Kunda, 1990) and the pressures of accountability (Lerner et al., 1998). Thus, any given individual's belief system may well be *principled* in the sense that it is consistent with and derived from other beliefs, values, assumptions, and observations. At the same time, adherence to principles of value and the rules of syllogistic reasoning do not occur in a motivational vacuum, but rather in a social and psychological context, the implications of which are not necessarily obvious or consciously accessible. Thus, political beliefs, opinions, and values may well be principled—and, indeed, reasonably accurate or at least well founded—while being motivationally fueled at the same time.

General Theoretical Assumptions

It is helpful to follow Arie Kruglanski (2004, 2012, 2018) in distinguishing between *directional* and *nondirectional* motives involved in belief formation. Directional motives reflect the desire to reach a specific

conclusion, such as the belief that the self is worthy or valuable, that conservative leaders are moral and trustworthy, that the economy will improve, or that one's position of privilege was earned. By contrast, nondirectional motives, such as the *need for cognition*, *need for accuracy*, and *fear of invalidity*, reflect desires to arrive at or maintain some solid belief or understanding, independent of its specific content.

Directional and nondirectional motives guide epistemic processes by influencing the extent of information processing, triggering selective exposure to or avoidance of information, and activating various modes of thinking. The possibility advanced in this chapter is that a kind of *matching process* takes place whereby people embrace belief systems—such as political conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and economic system justification—that resonate with their own psychological motives, including epistemic, existential, and relational needs for order, structure, closure, safety, security, and social belongingness. This matching process, from our theoretical perspective, is what brings about the elective affinities alluded to in previous chapters.

Years ago Milton Rokeach (1960: 127) proposed a similar argument concerning the match (or affinity) between cognitive structure and ideological content:

We thus see in the case of fascism that ideological content and structure support each other. There is no incompatibility between them and thus psychological conflict is not engendered or guilt feelings aroused. For this reason, authoritarian ideological structures may be psychologically more reconcilable—more easily “attachable”—to ideologies that are antidemocratic than to those that are democratic in content. If a person's underlying motivations are served by forming a closed belief system, then it is more than likely that his motivations can also be served by embracing an ideology that is blatantly anti-equalitarian. If this is so, it would account for the somewhat greater affinity we have observed between authoritarian belief structure and conservatism than between the same belief structure and liberalism.

Additional theoretical (or meta-theoretical) assumptions we make are that (a) the same motives may underlie different beliefs and (b) different motives may underlie the same belief. The need for self-enhancement, for example, could lead one to praise or criticize another person, by supporting a self-concept that is either generous or superior. Likewise, the belief that a friend, spouse, or family member is praiseworthy could arise not only from self-enhancement but also from needs for cognitive consistency, impression management, or judgmental accuracy. In the context of political ideology, this means that (a) a temporary motive—such as the desire to reduce

uncertainty or threat—could, in principle, lead someone to gravitate toward either liberal or conservative beliefs, depending upon other factors, such as his or her chronically accessible ideology, and (b) some individuals might adopt conservative beliefs out of a desire for certainty or order, whereas others might embrace similar beliefs to compensate for threats to self-esteem or to the legitimacy or stability of the status quo.

From this theoretical perspective, informational and motivational influences on belief formation are often compatible. In most cases both are necessary, and they work together in any clear instance of belief formation—although their functions in this process may be different. Information is treated subjectively as *evidence*, and it can lead more or less directly to belief formation, either consciously or nonconsciously. Information is conveyed through messages (including propositional statements or arguments), and it may be more readily assimilated when it is seen as consistent with prior beliefs. Belief assimilation may be rational or irrational, depending upon the quality of the prior beliefs (Baron & Jost, 2019). In some cases, information serves a rationalizing function when it comes to political reasoning (Lodge & Taber, 2013). The subjective weight of “evidence” is determined by factors such as perceptions of source expertise, credibility, and trustworthiness (McGuire, 1999), according to an identity-based process of referent informational influence (Turner, 1991). This helps to explain why parents and other authority figures are as effective as they are in socializing children.

Whether specific beliefs may be considered true or false in an objective sense may have relatively little to do with the individual’s subjective reasons for believing, especially when accuracy motivation is low. Arriving at desired conclusions may be treated as valid if and only if the evidence appears to support those conclusions (Kunda, 1990). Motives to reduce uncertainty, threat, or social deviance might lead one to adopt belief systems that are socially or economically conservative, but the extent to which those belief systems may be considered to be reasonable or accurate must be assessed independently of the motives that drive them. It does not follow from a motivated social cognitive analysis that any given belief system is false simply because it is motivated by psychological concerns.

A motivated social cognitive approach may be distinguished from several others. It departs, for instance, from “cold cognitive” approaches to the study of attitudes and social judgment, which discount motivational

explanations, focusing instead on information-processing limitations and heuristic mechanisms as determinants of social judgments. “Hot cognitive” approaches, by contrast, highlight the pervasive role that affect and motivation play in information processing, as well as the cognitive, goal-directed aspects of most motivational phenomena. Ideology is perhaps the quintessential example of hot cognition, in that people may be strongly motivated to perceive the world in ways that satisfy their needs, values, and interests (Abelson, 1995; Dember, 1974; Tomkins, 1995).

Distinguishing Motivated Social Cognition from Other Theories of Political Ideology

With regard to other theories of political ideology, a motivated social cognitive perspective may be distinguished from (a) a stable, individual differences approach; (b) a pure instrumental or self-interest theory of ideology; and (c) theories of modeling, imitation, or simple reinforcement. Our review of the literature confirms that there are indeed individual difference variables associated with political conservatism—including authoritarianism, intolerance of ambiguity, and need for cognitive closure. At the same time, there is considerable situational or contextual variability in the expression of ideological tendencies. Personality theories are extremely useful for identifying needs and motives that may be temporarily as well as chronically accessible. This way of thinking about personality—not as a static disposition but a dynamic structure of needs, goals, motives, and tendencies—opens the door to more contextualized theorizing about the psychological significance of the left-right dimension.

Work in sociology, political science, economics, and evolutionary psychology has often assumed that people adopt ideologies of the left and right out of self-interest. This account can easily explain working-class socialism and upper-class conservatism. We appreciate that self-interest is one of several motives that are capable of influencing political attitudes and behavior, but an analysis in terms of motivated social cognition requires us to revisit this issue. Several converging theories imply that motives to reduce uncertainty and threat may be associated with preferences for authoritarianism and conservatism, and these motives are often more pronounced among members of disadvantaged and low-status groups. As a result, those who are socially and economically disadvantaged might, for psychological reasons, embrace rightist ideology, at least under certain

circumstances (Carvacho et al., 2013; Houtman et al., 2012; Jost, 2017b; Napier & Jost, 2008b; Parkin, 1967). Those who are advantaged might embrace the same conservative or right-wing ideology for reasons of material self-interest and the desire to maintain their existing privileges (Lipset, 1960; McCarty et al., 2016; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016).

A motivated social cognitive perspective also deviates from theories of imitation and social learning, which might suggest that children merely adopt the attitudes and behaviors modeled by their parents. Correlations between the political attitudes of parents and their offspring are indeed statistically significant, but they leave most of the variance unexplained (e.g., Kandler et al., 2012). There can be little doubt that stable personal traits, rational self-interest, and social learning contribute to ideological preferences, but these preferences are affected by many social and psychological factors that vary as a function of persons, situations, and their interaction. A motivated social cognitive perspective is potentially useful for analyzing any coherent belief system, but here we focus on a specific set of epistemic, existential, and relational motives that help to explain when and why people are drawn to political ideologies of the left or right.

Conceptual Definitions of Conservative Ideology

Conservative ideology—like many other complex social representations—possesses a stable definitional core and a set of more malleable, historically changing peripheral associations (Abric, 2001). It is the ideological core of right-wing conservatism—more than its peripheral aspects (what Huntington, 1957, referred to as “secondary issues”)—that should be linked to specific social, cognitive, and motivational needs and tendencies.

Core Aspects of Conservative Ideology

Dictionary definitions of conservatism stress “the disposition and tendency to preserve what is established; opposition to change” and “the disposition in politics to maintain the existing order.” In *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Thorstein Veblen (1899/1912: 199) wrote:

The opposition of the [wealthy] class to changes in the cultural scheme is instinctive, and does not rest primarily on an interested calculation of material advantages; it is an instinctive revulsion at any departure from the accepted way of doing and of looking at things—a revulsion common to all men and only to be overcome by stress of circumstances. All change in habits of life and of thought is irksome.

Traditionalism and hostility to social innovation were also central to Karl Mannheim's (1936, 1999) analysis of conservatism, which focused on "a general psychological attitude which manifests itself in the individual as a clinging to old ways and expresses itself in a fear of innovation" (83).

In the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Rossiter (1968: 291) defined *situational conservatism* as "an attitude of opposition to disruptive change in the social, economic, legal, religious, political, or cultural order." He added:

The distinguishing mark of this conservatism, as indeed it is of any brand of conservatism, is the *fear of change*, which becomes transformed in the political arena into the fear of radicalism.

Jerry Z. Muller's (2001) definition of conservatism likewise stressed resistance to change and belief in the legitimacy of hierarchical traditions: "For conservatives, the historical survival of an institution or practice—be it marriage, monarchy, or the market—creates a *prima facie* case that it has served some need" (2625).

This general sentiment—a deep suspicion and distrust, if not fear, of dramatic social change—is present in countless treatments of conservative ideology from Burke to Buckley and Lincoln to Safire:

It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes. (Edmund Burke)

What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried? (Abraham Lincoln)

Conservatism proper is a legitimate, probably necessary, and certainly widespread attitude of opposition to drastic change. (Friedrich A. von Hayek)

[*National Review*] stands athwart history, yelling Stop. (William F. Buckley Jr.)

To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried. . . . Change is a threat to identity, and every change is an emblem of extinction. . . . Changes, then, have to be suffered. (Michael Oakeshott)

Conservatism's categorical imperative is: tradition. Its central principle is: "All improvements are for the worse." And: "Any change at any time for any reason is appalling." (George Will)

Conservatism is that system of ideas employed to justify an established order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being. . . . The essence of conservatism is the passionate affirmation of the value of existing institutions. (Samuel Huntington)

[A conservative is] a defender of a beneficial status quo who, when change becomes necessary in tested institutions or practices, prefers that it come slowly, in moderation, and preferably not resulting in centralization of government power. (William Safire)

Psychologists and other social scientists have likewise emphasized resistance to social change and defense of the status quo in their definitions of conservatism:

Conservatism has championed the status quo, religion, and tradition over science and humanitarianism. (Roger Brown)

Conservatism is a set of political, economic, religious, educational, and other social beliefs characterized by emphasis on the status quo and social stability, religion and morality, liberty and freedom, the natural inequality of men, the uncertainty of progress, and the weakness of human reason. (Fred Kerlinger)

Conservatives emphasize tradition and stability in preference to change. They advocate freedom, religion, and patriotism, and believe that there are differences among individual people that make them inherently unequal. (William Stone)

The conservative defends existing institutions because their very existence creates a presumption that they have served some useful function, because eliminating them may lead to harmful, unintended consequences, or because the veneration which attaches to institutions that have existed over time makes them potentially usable for new purposes. (Jerry Z. Muller)

Consistent with these accounts, Conover and Feldman (1981) observed that the primary basis for self-definitions of liberals and conservatives in the

U.S. had to do with acceptance of—vs. resistance to—social change.

A second core issue concerns preferences for hierarchy or inequality. As Giddens (1998: 40), following Bobbio (1996), wrote:

One major criterion continually reappears in distinguishing left from right: attitudes toward equality. The left favours greater equality, while the right sees society as inevitably hierarchical.

This characterization echoes a great many historical and philosophical treatments of the left-right distinction, as shown in [Chapter 1](#). In the context of American politics, political conservatism is associated with support for the capitalist economic system and opposition to equality, as Roger Brown (1965/2004: 43) noted:

The conservative right has believed in self-enrichment by personal exertion and in the rightness of the social and economic inequalities that follow from such individual competition: it has been opposed to such interferences with rugged individualism as social welfare legislation, state regulation of economic activity, and to the association of working men into labor unions.

Consistent with the foregoing conceptual analysis, instruments used to measure left-right attitudes (i.e., operational ideology) typically include items tapping into (a) advocacy vs. resistance to social change and (b) acceptance vs. rejection of inequality (see Azevedo et al., 2019; Everett, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Heath et al., 1994; Henningham, 1997; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Kirton, 1978; Knight, 1999; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001; G. D. Wilson & Patterson, 1968; Zell & Bernstein, 2014).

Relations between Resistance to Change and Acceptance of Inequality

Although the two core dimensions of right-wing conservatism—resistance to change and acceptance of inequality—are typically correlated with one another, they are conceptually distinguishable. There are historical counterexamples in which the two may have been negatively associated. In some cases, for instance, right-wing extremists have advocated for radical social change in the direction of decreased egalitarianism. However, what looks like a desire for change in these cases is probably better understood as reactionary—the nostalgic use (or abuse) of “an imaginatively transfigured conception of the past with which to criticize the present” (Muller, 2001: 2625; see also Lipset & Raab, 1978).

There have also been cases of left-wing ideologues who, once their power is firmly entrenched, as in the former Soviet Union, steadfastly

resisted change—allegedly in the name of egalitarianism (Martin et al., 1990). It is reasonable to hypothesize that some of these historical figures may be considered psychologically conservative—or, more precisely, system-justifying—in the context of the social systems they sought to defend and maintain. In some situations leftists may be rigid defenders of the status quo while centrists or rightists push for change. Thus, it stands to reason that historical and cultural variability in social systems would affect both the meaning of “conservative” ideology and the elective affinities between psychological and ideological variables. Clearly, one would observe different patterns in the United States (or the United Kingdom), compared to mainland China (or Cuba).

Despite these fairly dramatic examples, the two core aspects of conservative ideology should be linked, both logically and psychologically, for most Westerners. This is because “traditional” social arrangements throughout history have been far more hierarchical and less egalitarian than “nontraditional” arrangements. As noted in previous chapters, most (but not all) demands for progress and social change have been in the name of increased social, economic, and/or political equality. The French Revolution is the most obvious example, but it is by no means the only one. Consequently, resistance to social change has also meant opposition to equality, and maintenance of the status quo has entailed entrusting the present and future to the same hierarchical institutions and authorities that controlled the past.

These observations underscore the importance of investigating our hypotheses about elective affinities in as many different national and cultural contexts as possible, including cultures in which the societal status quo is (at least officially) egalitarian and/or leftist. For obvious reasons, little or no empirical data has been available from communist countries, although this may be changing, at least in the case of China. In our initial review of the evidence from 1958 to 2002, we made a special effort to include data from 12 different countries, including those with historical influences of socialism and/or communism, including Sweden, Germany, Poland, Italy, England, Canada, and Israel (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a). It may be surprising to some readers, but the results from these countries were quite similar in general to those obtained in countries with no real history of socialism or communism, such as the United States.

Peripheral Aspects of Conservative Ideology

Historically speaking, political conservatism has embodied many things, including the desire for social order and stability, preference for gradual—or evolutionary rather than revolutionary—social change, adherence to cultural and religious norms and traditions, deference to established authority figures, tolerance of social and economic inequality, and stigmatization of “deviant” minorities. Some of these are closely related to the two core aspects of ideology, but others may not be. The fact that conservatism has stood for so many different goals and permeated so many areas of life means that people who are motivated to uphold conservative ideals are sometimes confronted with perplexing dilemmas. Conservatism not only gives George Will a migraine from time to time, as the epigram for this chapter suggests, but also makes the concept a challenging one to define and study quantitatively with the methods of social science.

Matters are complicated by the fact that historical and cultural factors change the manifestations of conservatism. In the 1960s, conservatism in the United States entailed resistance to civil rights legislation and the Equal Rights Amendment as well as support for the Vietnam War. In the 1990s, conservatism in the 1990s had more to do with being “tough on crime” and spreading traditional religious values (A. S. Miller, 1994). In the early 21st century conservatism stands for many things in the United States, including staunch opposition to: abortion, progressive forms of taxation, governmental regulation of big business, universal health care, and permissive immigration policies. In the United Kingdom and Europe, social conservatives seek to maintain national borders and religious traditions, and economic conservatives (often called “neoliberals”) push economic austerity and reductions in public spending on education, health care, and social welfare programs (Monbiot, 2016; Muller, 2001). Although there is clearly historical and cultural variability in the meaning of conservatism, it is still useful to identify social and psychological variables that are correlated with core aspects of rightist (vs. leftist) political orientation.²

Operational Definitions of Conservative Ideology

The biggest challenge in summarizing the research literature from 1958 to 2002 was to distinguish clearly between psychological independent

variables and political dependent variables. Many scales have confounded the two types of variables, making it difficult to assess the hypothesis that specific psychological motives create an affinity for rightist (vs. leftist) attitudes. We focused on dependent variables that (a) were measures of social and political attitudes rather than general psychological orientations, (b) measured conservative or right-leaning attitudes rather than ideological extremity, (c) reflected as much methodological diversity as possible to maximize generalizability and applicability, and (d) in terms of face validity corresponded well to core and, to a lesser extent, peripheral aspects of conservatism, as outlined earlier. Based on these criteria, we identified studies involving 88 different samples from 12 different countries that administered direct measures of political identification, liberal-conservative (or left-right) attitudes, resistance to social change, and/or preference for inequality. Methodological properties of several of these scales were analyzed by Kathleen Knight (1999).

Measures Emphasizing Resistance to Change

Consistent with our bipartite conceptual definition of political conservatism, many studies have employed measures that emphasized resistance to social change. Wilson and Patterson's C-scale and Altemeyer's right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scale address several core and peripheral aspects of rightist ideology, but the primary focus of both is on resistance to change. The C-scale gauges the favorability of attitudes toward each of 50 items, including some that pertain to tradition and social change (e.g., the royal family, interracial marriage, and modern art) and others that pertain to hierarchy and/or equality (e.g., White superiority, socialism, female judges), and still others that are peripheral (at best) to the core meaning of rightist ideology (suicide, jazz music). At least three of Wilson's seven major dimensions of conservatism focus on stability vs. change (preference for conventional attitudes and institutions, religious dogmatism, and resistance to scientific progress), so it is best classified as a scale that focuses on resistance to social and political change.

Although the construct of authoritarianism was developed by Adorno and colleagues (1950) to predict attitudes toward disadvantaged minority groups (and therefore inequality), Altemeyer's (1998) scale emphasizes resistance to change. Items include "Authorities such as parents and our national leaders generally turn out to be right about things, and the radicals and

protestors are almost always wrong”; “Some young people get rebellious ideas, but as they get older they ought to become more mature and forget such things”; and “Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done.” Thus, the RWA scale largely taps into ideological commitments to tradition, authority, and adherence to conventional social norms—as opposed to social change, rebelliousness, and protest.

One or both of these two instruments (the C-scale and RWA scale) was administered to 31 (or 35%) of the 88 samples included in our review. Three other samples completed conceptually related measures of authoritarianism vs. rebelliousness, conservatism-radicalism, or authoritarian conservatism, bringing the total to 39% of the samples.

Measures Emphasizing Acceptance of Inequality

A number of additional instruments used to measure rightist orientation (the fascism scale [F-scale], social dominance orientation [SDO] scale, economic system justification [ESJ], and measures of general and economic conservatism) focus as much or more on attitudes toward inequality than on resistance to change. (However, as noted earlier, some degree of social, economic, and political inequality *is* the status quo in Western societies.) The F-scale measures right-wing derogation of low-status minority groups, and the SDO scale measures group-based dominance and generalized anti-egalitarianism (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Measures of economic conservatism and economic system justification tap into the belief that large differences in income are legitimate and desirable in society. The general C-scale developed by Sidanius (1978, 1985) focused on acceptance vs. rejection of proposed changes aimed at reducing inequality in society, such as increased taxation of the rich, income equality, assistance to the poor, racial equality, and the election of a woman as US president. These scales were administered to 26 (or 30%) of the samples included in our review.

Measures Emphasizing Political Identification and Issue-Based Conservatism

Some studies measured political orientation directly in terms of ideological self-placement, whereas others measured voting intentions or behaviors. Still others mentioned specific issue positions in the periphery but not

necessarily the core of conservatism, including attitudes toward criminal sentencing, capital punishment, funding for the police, and conversion to authoritarian churches. A political-economic conservatism scale used by Rokeach (1960) and Sidanius (1978) gauged opinions about governmental intervention in industry, labor, and the free market system. In total, these measures were administered to 37 (or 42%) of the samples in our review.

Theories Relating to the Psychology of Conservatism

The most general form of the hypothesis at hand is that there are observable empirical regularities that connect specific psychological motives and tendencies (as independent variables) to particular ideological or political contents (as dependent variables). Psychological variables that have been linked in theory to right-wing conservatism include fear and aggression; intolerance of ambiguity; rule-following and negative affect; uncertainty avoidance; personal needs for order, structure, and closure; death anxiety; group-based dominance; and system justification. It is useful to understand in some detail the theoretical contexts in which these variables emerged as predictors of left-right political orientation.

The theories may be classified into three very broad categories: (a) theories of personality and individual differences, (b) theories emphasizing the fulfillment of epistemic and existential needs, and (c) sociopolitical theories focusing on individual and collective processes of legitimation.

Personality and Individual Difference Theories

Right-Wing Authoritarianism

As intellectual descendants of the Frankfurt School, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* sought to blend Marxian theories of ideology and social structure with Freudian theories of motivation and personality development to explain the rise of fascism throughout Europe in the aftermath of World War I. Adorno and his psychological collaborators (1950) proposed that strict parenting styles aggravated by intense economic frustration led many Europeans to develop a worldview that was authoritarian or fascistic in nature. The guiding assumption was that the introjection of harsh parental discipline, which was itself triggered by status insecurity, created a wellspring of fear and anger that could not be

processed constructively. Hostility was then displaced onto socially sanctioned scapegoats, such as Jews, leftists, sexual minorities, and Roma people, who were blamed for the nation's ills.

Authoritarian attitudes, which appear to be exacerbated by highly threatening situations, combine the anxious veneration of authority figures and adherence to conventional norms with a vindictiveness toward deviants and social subordinates. Authoritarianism is sometimes taken to be synonymous with conservatism (Ray, 1973), but G. D. Wilson (1973) argued that conservatism was the general factor underlying all social attitudes and that authoritarianism was but one manifestation of the more general factor of conservatism.

An exhaustive effort to update theory and research on authoritarianism and to address various conceptual, methodological, ideological, and empirical objections was undertaken by Altemeyer (1981: 148). His account emphasized (a) "a high degree of submission to authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate"; (b) "a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities"; and (c) "a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society."

Scores on the RWA scale are correlated with a wide range of attitudes and behaviors associated with social, economic, and political conservatism as defined in society at the time. For example, in the United States RWA scores predict Republican (vs. Democratic) party affiliation; religious orthodoxy; opposition to women's reproductive rights; homophobia; pro-capitalist attitudes; anti-environmentalism; racial prejudice; severity of jury sentencing decisions; and acceptance of covert governmental activities such as warrantless surveillance, political harassment, and illegal drug raids (Altemeyer, 1981, 1998, 2006; Peterson et al., 1993). Studies of US and Canadian legislators revealed that conservatives scored higher than others on RWA and that

high RWA lawmakers score higher in prejudice, and wish they could pass laws limiting the freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, and other freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. They want to impose strict limitations on abortion, they favor capital punishment, and they oppose tougher gun control laws. Finally, politicians answer the RWA Scale with such extraordinary levels of internal consistency, it appears the scale provides our most powerful measure of the liberal-conservative dimension in politics. (Altemeyer 1998: 53)

Thus, a strong connection between RWA and conservatism has been observed in samples of political elites as well as ordinary citizens (see also Nilsson & Jost, 2020a).

Altemeyer's (1998) work is especially useful for identifying two major directions in which right-wing authoritarianism may lead. First, it may encourage hostility and discrimination against socially sanctioned scapegoats and devalued out-groups. Second, RWA may foster a submissive, deferential posture toward authorities, which makes those who score higher on RWA ideal candidates to follow the next Hitler or Mussolini. Thus, extreme right-wing attitudes are said to lock people into a "dominance-submissive authoritarian embrace" (Altemeyer, 1998: 47). The specific form that right-wing authoritarianism takes is assumed to depend upon the historical and cultural context and the specific motives elicited by that context. For instance, RWA may be associated with anti-Semitism in Europe but not in Israel, and it may be associated with anti-Arab prejudice in Israel but not in other Middle Eastern countries.

Intolerance of Ambiguity

Else Frenkel-Brunswik's (1948) groundbreaking work on intolerance of ambiguity played a significant role in the development of the theory of authoritarianism, but it was distinctive with regard to methodology and content. She proposed that intolerance of ambiguity was a general personality variable linked to prejudice and ideology. Individuals who are intolerant of ambiguity

are significantly more often given to dichotomous conceptions of the sex roles, of the parent-child relationship, and of interpersonal relationships in general. They are less permissive and lean toward rigid categorization of cultural norms. Power-weakness, cleanliness-dirtiness, morality-immorality, conformance-divergence are the dimensions through which people are seen. . . . There is sensitivity against qualified as contrasted with unqualified statements and against perceptual ambiguity; a disinclination to think in terms of probability; a comparative inability to abandon mental sets in intellectual tasks, such as in solving mathematical problems, after they have lost their appropriateness. (268)

Frenkel-Brunswik viewed ambiguity intolerance in Freudian terms as stemming from unresolved parental conflicts involving hostility and idealization tendencies. Stable individual differences in intolerance of ambiguity have been observed across several generations of researchers and participants, but theoretical explanations have changed somewhat. It is now

understood primarily as the tendency to experience ambiguity as aversive and potentially threatening.

Intolerance of ambiguity leads people to cling to the familiar, arrive at premature conclusions, and impose simplistic clichés and stereotypes. Furnham and Ribchester (1995: 180) identified the following consequences of ambiguity intolerance:

Resistance to reversal of apparent fluctuating stimuli, the early selection and maintenance of one solution in a perceptually ambiguous situation, inability to allow for the possibility of good and bad traits in the same person, acceptance of attitude statements representing a rigid, black-white view of life, seeking for certainty, a rigid dichotomizing into fixed categories, premature closure, and remaining closed to familiar characteristics of stimuli.

Work on intolerance of ambiguity linked psychodynamic aspects of personality to a wide range of perceptual, cognitive, motivational, social, and political processes. Arguably, it is this theoretical richness that accounts for longstanding interest in the concept.

Mental Rigidity, Dogmatism, and Closed-Mindedness

One of the most persistent criticisms of Adorno and colleagues' work on authoritarianism and the F-scale designed to measure fascistic potential was that it neglected left-wing authoritarianism. To address this concern, Rokeach (1960) developed a scale of dogmatism to provide a more balanced measure of authoritarianism. The scale included items tapping *double think*, defined as susceptibility to logically contradictory beliefs and the tendency to deny contradictions in one's belief system, as well as a strong orientation toward authority. Rokeach argued that dogmatism was indicative of closed-mindedness, which he contrasted with open-mindedness:

All belief-disbelief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets of motives at the same time: the need for a cognitive framework to know and to understand and the need to ward off threatening aspects of reality. To the extent that the cognitive need to know is predominant and the need to ward off threat is absent, open systems should result. . . . But as the need to ward off threat becomes stronger, the cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more closed belief systems. . . . If the closed or dogmatic mind is extremely resistant to change, it may be so not only because it allays anxiety but also because it satisfies the *need to know*. (67–68)

Thus, Rokeach's perspective, like theories of authoritarianism and intolerance of ambiguity, combined epistemic and existential motives, that is, needs to attain certainty and security, in seeking to explain social and

political attitudes. The influence of his work remains palpable in contemporary research on open-mindedness and cognitive complexity in political psychology.

The Theory of Ideo-Affective Polarity

Silvan Tomkins's (1963, 1965, 1987, 1995) theory of ideological polarity is one of the most creative and ambitious accounts of leftist vs. rightist thinking, but it has been lamentably underresearched. According to Tomkins, there are generalized motivational orientations or *ideo-affective postures* toward the world as a whole that correspond to either the left or the right. People attracted to the left pole embrace humanistic values; they believe that people are basically good and that the purpose of society is to facilitate personal growth and experience. By contrast, those attracted to the right are focused on normative concerns; they believe that people are essentially bad and that the function of society is to set limits and rules to minimize irresponsible behavior (Alexander, 1995). These inclinations are theorized to permeate nearly every domain of a person's life, including attitudes about art, music, science, food, sex, religion, and philosophy, so that "if one knows what an individual believes about the nature of literature, one would also know what he [or she] would believe about the nature of mathematics" (Tomkins, 1995: 117).

Tomkins theorized that ideo-affective postures are developed early on in the emotional lives of children, through the acquisition of personal scripts, which are affectively charged memories of social situations involving the self and meaningful others (Tomkins, 1987). For example, experiences in which a parent focused intently on the child and his or her inner life were expected to reinforce feelings of excitement, joy, surprise, distress, and shame, leading the child to gravitate toward the left, humanistic pole. By contrast, more critical, structured, disciplined parenting was thought to engender emotions such as anger and contempt, which would lead the child to gravitate toward the right, normative pole (see also Janoff-Bulman et al., 2014).

Much of the empirical research on this theory employed a "polarity scale" developed by Tomkins in the 1960s (later updated by Stone & Schaffner, 1988) to measure humanistic and normative orientations. More recent versions of the scale include five facets or subscales, which address attitudes about human nature, interpersonal treatment, affect, epistemology,

and political values (Nilsson, 2014). Sample items from each of these facets are reproduced in Table 4.1. Over the years, scores on the polarity scale have been found to predict beliefs about human nature, religiosity, and politics; attitudes about war and peace; reactions to presidential assassinations; and many other cognitive, affective, and motivational responses (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a).

Table 4.1 Sample Items from Humanistic and Normativistic Subscales Used in Research by Nilsson (2014) to Measure Left-Right Differences in Personality According to Silvan Tomkins's (1995) Theory of Ideological Polarity

Facet	Humanism/Left-Wing Pole	Normativism/Right-Wing Pole
Human nature	All persons are in themselves valuable. Human nature is basically good. People are basically kind and helpful.	The bad people in the world outnumber the good people. Human beings are basically evil. People are naturally unfriendly and unkind.
Interpersonal	Children must be loved so they can grow up to be fine adults. Human beings should be treated with respect at all times. Those who err should be forgiven.	Human beings should be loved only when they have acted so that they deserve to be loved. Some people respond only to punishment or the threat of punishment.
Attitude to affect	Feelings are the most important aspect of being human, because they give our lives meaning. You need to be open to your feelings so that you can learn from them and understand who you are.	Feelings must be controlled by reason, because they can make you do stupid things. You need to be wary of feelings, because they can hurt you and make you feel miserable.
Epistemology	Creativity and curiosity are the most important tools in the search for knowledge. The important thing in science is to strike out into the unknown—right or wrong.	The trouble with theorizing is that it leads people away from the facts and substitutes opinions for truth. The most important task for a scientist is to collect facts about reality through objective observation.
Political values	Promotion of the welfare of the people is the most important function of a government. It is necessary to break the laws and rules of society when these lead to unfair treatment of some people.	The maintenance of law and order is the most important duty of any government. For society to work, there must be clear and fixed rules, and punishment for transgressions.

In four convenience samples from the United States and Sweden, Artur Nilsson and I observed that, as Tomkins hypothesized, a normative orientation was robustly associated with self-identified conservatism in the United States and with right-wing orientation in Sweden. It was also associated with resistance to social change and acceptance of inequality;

RWA and SDO; system justification; and a lack of openness, emotionality, and honesty-humility (Nilsson & Jost, 2020b). Conversely, a humanistic orientation was associated with openness to change and preferences for equality as well as low levels of RWA, SDO, and system justification (see [Table 4.2](#)). Tomkins's theory was groundbreaking not only in its attempt to identify affective and motivational bases of ideology related to anger, contempt, and the desire for punishment but also in its suggestion that right-wing conservatives are especially driven to establish and follow rules and norms in a wide variety of domains both inside and outside of politics.

Table 4.2 Correlations between Humanism and Normativism and Various Measures of Ideology

Ideological Measures	Sample, Country (N)	Bivariate Correlations	
		Humanism	Normativism
Ideological self-placement (conservatism in US, rightist orientation in Sweden)	Sample 1, US (384)	-.29***	.37***
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.23***	.27***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	.05	.26***
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	-.34***	.47***
Resistance to change	Sample 1, US (384)	-.19**	.36***
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.10	.42***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	N/A	N/A
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	-.27***	.49***
Opposition to equality	Sample 1, US (384)	-.39***	.37***
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.61***	.23***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	N/A	N/A
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	-.57***	.41***
Right-wing authoritarianism	Sample 1, US (384)	-.36***	.42***
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.15**	.38***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	.03	.41***
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	N/A	N/A
Social dominance orientation	Sample 1, US (384)	-.54***	.43****
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.52***	.32***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	-.28***	.35***
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	N/A	N/A
General system justification	Sample 1, US (384)	-.10	.23**
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.07	.11*
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	N/A	N/A
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	-.25***	.40***
Economic system justification	Sample 1, US (384)	-.32***	.47***
	Sample 2, US (346)	-.29***	.38***
	Sample 3, Sweden (360)	N/A	N/A
	Sample 4, Sweden (332)	-.35***	.54***

* $p \leq .05$.** $p < .01$.*** $p < .001$.

N/A = Not administered.

Source: Nilsson and Jost (2020b).

A Dynamic Theory of Conservatism as Uncertainty Avoidance

Consistent with *The Authoritarian Personality* as well as Tomkins's emphasis on affective bases of ideology and Frenkel-Brunswik's research on intolerance of ambiguity, G. D. Wilson (1973) proposed a dynamic theory that treated political conservatism as the product of partially unconscious needs and motives concerning fear, anxiety, and threat. The central tenet of the theory is that "the common basis for all the various components of the conservative attitude syndrome is a *generalized susceptibility to experiencing threat or anxiety in the face of uncertainty*" (259). From this perspective, conservatism is multiply determined by genetic factors such as anxiety proneness, stimulus aversion, and low intelligence, as well as environmental factors such as parental coldness, low social class, and threatened self-esteem.

Wilson cited a great many possible sources of threat and uncertainty, including the fear of death and apprehension about such diverse stimuli as foreign people, political dissent, anarchy, novelty, ambiguity, complexity, and social change. Conservative responses to these stimuli were thought to draw on conventional thinking, moralistic judgment, religious dogmatism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism. With a few exceptions, this account of political conservatism as a motivated response to feelings of uncertainty and threat was nearly lost to political psychology for 30 years following the publication of an edited book by G. D. Wilson (1973). While Wilson's emphasis was squarely on individual differences arising from genetic and environmental influences, his theory identified the reduction of uncertainty and threat as dynamic motives for embracing conservative ideology. Our approach to political conservatism as motivated social cognition seeks to resurrect these fruitful notions and to expand and elaborate on the ways in which conservative and right-wing systems of thought are embraced to address the epistemic, existential, and relational needs of individuals and groups.

Theories of Epistemic and Existential Motivation

Let us turn now to two theories of epistemic and existential motivation, respectively, namely lay epistemic theory and terror management theory. Although both theories recognize and, at least in the first case, assess individual differences, neither individual differences nor their

developmental roots are emphasized. Rather, these theories, which are reminiscent of G. D. Wilson's (1973) theory of uncertainty avoidance in other ways, focus on the interaction of cognitive and motivational processes in producing ideological outcomes.

Lay Epistemic Theory

In an effort to unify cognitive and motivational accounts of human behavior, Kruglanski (2004, 2012, 2018) developed lay epistemic theory, which assumes that all beliefs are the product of a motivated informational search. Belief acquisition, according to this account, follows a two-step process of hypothesis generation and testing. Informational factors include the availability and accessibility of knowledge structures in memory that the individual may use to derive hypotheses and implications. These processes may be more or less effortful and labor-intensive, requiring cognitive capacity and epistemic motivation. A key motivational construct in the theory of lay epistemics is the *need for cognitive closure*, which refers to the desire for a firm conclusion—any conclusion—on a given topic, in contrast to uncertainty, confusion, and prolonged informational search.

Several factors may elicit the need for cognitive closure. These have to do with the perceived benefits of possessing (and costs of lacking) closure and vary as a function of the person, the situation, and the culture at large. Benefits of attaining closure include predictability and action orientation. Consistent with the notion that specific situations lead people to seek out closure, James E. Dittes (1961) demonstrated that failure-induced threat caused research participants to reach “impulsive closure” on an ambiguous task. The need for closure should also be elevated in any situation in which the importance of action looms large, as when one is under time pressure, mental fatigue, or alcohol intoxication, because such states render sustained information processing to be subjectively costly (Kruglanski, 2004, 2012).

Building on research focusing on uncertainty orientation and the personal need for structure, D. M. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed and validated an individual difference measure of the need for cognitive closure. This 42-item scale includes five factors or subscales: (a) preference for order and structure, (b) emotional discomfort associated with ambiguity, (c) impatience/impulsivity with regard to decision making, (d) desire for security and predictability, and (e) closed-mindedness. Sample items

include “I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success”; “I’d rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty”; “I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently”; “I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it”; and “I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.”

If the theory of lay epistemics is correct, there are situational and dispositional factors that foster a general cognitive-motivational orientation toward the social world that is either open and exploratory or closed and fixed. Whether evoked situationally or measured as a stable personality dimension, the need for closure produces the same consequences. Specifically, it leads people to “seize and freeze” on information that affords closure. Whether measured or manipulated, the need for closure is associated with social stereotyping, succumbing to primacy effects in impression formation, resisting persuasive influence, and rejecting opinion deviates (Kruglanski, 2012).

To understand the hypothesized relation between the need for cognitive closure and ideology, it is important to distinguish between psychological conservatism (resisting change in general) and political conservatism (resisting specific types of social change, such as increased egalitarianism). On one hand, the need for closure might be associated with adherence to the dominant ideology, whatever its contents. This means that increasing the need for closure in people for whom the most cognitively and culturally accessible belief systems are right-of-center would strengthen the connection between need for closure and rightist ideology. However, increasing the need for closure in people whose most accessible belief systems are left-of-center would strengthen the connection between need for closure and leftist ideology. In this sense, lay epistemic theory is consistent with Rokeach’s (1960) proposal that cognitive rigidity is not necessarily unique to right-wing conservatism.

On the other hand, individuals with a high (vs. low) need for cognitive closure are not indifferent to specific ideological contents. Beliefs that promise to enhance order, clarity, stability, organization, structure, and uniformity should be preferred by high need-for-closure individuals over beliefs that do not. To the extent that there is an elective affinity between the need for closure and specific elements of politically conservative ideology (such as the maintenance of social order and deference to existing authorities and hierarchical arrangements), then people who are chronically

or temporarily high on the need for closure should prefer rightist (vs. leftist) ideological outcomes, all other things being equal (see also Eidelman et al., 2012; Hansson et al., 1974).

Terror Management Theory

Another perspective, inspired by the writings of the cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker (1973), suggests that conservative worldviews might arise from motives to cope with existential crises inherent in the human experience. Terror management theory posits that cultures and the belief systems that sustain them serve to buffer anxiety arising from the fact that people, unlike other animals, are painfully aware of their own mortality (Pyszczynski et al., 2015). The basic idea is that cultural—including religious and political—worldviews provide people with the means to transcend death, albeit symbolically. Terror management theory hypothesizes that increasing mortality salience will—at a nonconscious level of awareness—trigger death-related anxiety, which will, in turn, motivate people to defend their cultural worldview and derogate alternative worldviews. However, it should be noted that this hypothesis has not fared well in planned scientific replications (Klein et al., 2019).

The potential relevance of terror management theory to the psychology of conservatism should be fairly apparent. When confronted with thoughts of their own mortality, people are hypothesized to react in a psychologically conservative manner by shunning outsiders and those who threaten the status of dominant cultural worldviews. It is also noteworthy that G. D. Wilson (1973) listed fear of death as one of the threatening factors that might be associated with political conservatism. However, Greenberg et al. (1992) argued against the notion that an elective affinity would exist between death anxiety and political conservatism. Although most of the effects of mortality salience in published research have had a politically conservative, intolerant, and/or system-justifying flavor, terror management theorists nevertheless suggest that thinking about death may lead people to defend “personalized versions of cultural worldviews,” which could be liberal and, perhaps paradoxically, tolerant rather than intolerant (Anson et al., 2009).

Theories of Individual and Collective Rationalization

The next set of theories differs somewhat from those discussed thus far. Whereas the preceding theories focus on the individual level of analysis and treat political ideology as a manifestation of epistemic and existential motivation, there are also sociopolitical theories that focus on the social system and the legitimizing functions that ideology fulfills. Theories of social dominance and system justification are useful not only for expanding the range of motives under consideration but also for clarifying the ways in which right-wing conservatism is related to racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism.

Social Dominance Theory

Unlike theories that explain ideological preferences in adulthood in terms of cognitive, affective, or motivational differences arising from parenting styles and other childhood experiences, social dominance theory emphasizes more distal evolutionary roots. According to social dominance theory, human societies minimize group conflict by developing belief systems that legitimize the hegemony of some groups over others (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). This is achieved through the promulgation of various *legitimizing myths*, such as (a) *paternalistic myths*, which suggest that dominant groups are needed to lead and take care of subordinate groups, who are incapable of taking care of themselves; (b) *reciprocal myths*, which suggest that a mutually beneficial relationship exists between dominant and subordinate groups; and (c) *sacred myths*, which suggest that positions of dominance and submission are determined by God. Ideological devices such as these are politically conservative in the sense that they maintain existing hierarchies of status, power, and wealth and oppose egalitarian forms of social change.

This theory holds that, because of biological and cultural factors, there are important individual differences in social dominance orientation (SDO). Items from an SDO scale developed by Felicia Pratto and colleagues (1994) include the following: “Some people are just more worthy than others”; “It is not a problem if some people have more of a chance in life”; and “This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are.” Thus, the scale measures individual differences in the desire to preserve the hegemony of high-status groups such as men (vs. women),

Whites (vs. Blacks and other minorities), and upper-class elites (vs. the working class).

Correlations between SDO and measures of political and economic conservatism average approximately .30 in a wide variety of national and cultural contexts, demonstrating convergent and discriminant validity. Scores on the scale have been found to correlate with Republican partisanship, nationalism, cultural elitism, anti-Black racism, sexism, RWA, and the belief in a just world (Pratto et al., 1994; see also Kugler et al., 2014). SDO is strongly correlated with economic and gender-specific system justification and, to a lesser extent, general system justification (Jost, 2020: 301). SDO predicts policy attitudes that are supportive of law and order, military spending, and capital punishment, as well as attitudes that are unsupportive of women's rights, racial equality, affirmative action, gay and lesbian rights, and environmental action. Social dominance theory implies that maintaining or increasing the degree of group-based hierarchy in society is motivationally appealing under some circumstances—such as when one belongs to a high-status group (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).

Altemeyer (1998: 87) contrasted the motivational bases of RWA and SDO (see also Duckitt, 2001). He argued that RWA accounts for passive forms of submission to authoritarian leaders—including the tendency to “trust unworthy people who tell them what they want to hear,” whereas SDO accounts for active efforts to punish or humiliate derogated out-group members and the desire to “become the alpha animal”:

Right-wing authoritarians, who do *not* score high on [personal power, meanness, or dominance], seem to be highly prejudiced mainly because they were raised to travel in tight, ethnocentric circles; and they fear that authority and conventions are crumbling so quickly that civilization will collapse and they will be eaten in the resulting jungle. In contrast, High SDO's *already* see life as “dog eat dog” and—compared with most people—are determined to do the eating. (Altemeyer 1998: 75)

The point is that RWA and SDO—which are modestly correlated at approximately .20—may be driven by somewhat different concerns, but they are both powerfully motivated ideologies. Together, they account for both halves of the “dominance-submissive authoritarian embrace” and more than half of the statistical variance in prejudice and ethnocentrism (Altemeyer 1998: 47). The most inexorable right-wingers are those motivated simultaneously by fear and aggression (Dean, 2006).

System Justification Theory

Longstanding personality theories about the functions of ideology, such as theories of authoritarianism, dogmatism, and anxiety reduction, stress ego-defensive (or self-justifying) functions of right-wing conservatism, including efforts to satisfy individual needs for certainty, security, and self-esteem. While ego justification motives may help to explain the psychological appeal of conservatism in cases of self-interest (e.g., upper-class conservatism), there are also group- and system-justifying motives that contribute to the popularity of rightist ideologies. According to social dominance theory, legitimizing myths serve the group-justifying function of advancing the hegemonic interests of dominant or high-status group members (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). Presumably this idea is consistent with theories of social identification and social representation as well (Moscovici, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In a complementary manner, system justification theory focuses on the motivated tendency for people to do cognitive and ideological work on behalf of the overarching social system, thereby perpetuating the status quo and preserving inequality, in some cases even when they fail to benefit in material terms from the status quo (Jost, 2020).

One of the central goals of system justification theory is to understand how and why people rationalize the existing social system, especially when their support appears to conflict with other important motives to maintain or enhance self-esteem and group standing. The theory draws partially on Marxian and feminist accounts of false consciousness as well as sociological theories of legitimation to explain the widespread acceptance of conservative ideas and practices (Jost, 2020). It also draws on ideas from cognitive dissonance theory and just world theory to argue that people are motivated to perceive existing social arrangements as fair, legitimate, justifiable, rational, and perhaps even natural and inevitable (see also Lane, 1962, 1969).

A system justification perspective is well suited to address relatively puzzling cases of conservatism and right-wing allegiance among low-status groups, such as women and members of the working class (Carvacho et al., 2013; Cassese & Barnes, 2019; Hochschild, 1981; Houtman et al., 2012; Jost, 2017b; Kluegel & Smith, 1986; Lane, 1962; Parkin, 1967). To the extent that nearly everyone is motivated, to some degree, to explain and justify the status quo in such a way that it is perceived as fair, legitimate,

and desirable, the psychological appeal of political conservatism should cut across social classes. This is consistent with Rossiter's (1968: 291) conclusion that "Situational conservatism is not confined to the well-placed and well-to-do. Persons at all levels of being and possessing may lament change in the status quo."

According to system justification theory, people are often motivated to defend the existing social system against threats to its legitimacy or stability. If there is a defensive motivation associated with system justification, it should be more pronounced under circumstances that challenge or threaten the status quo. Thus, situations of crisis or instability in society should, all other things being equal, precipitate conservative, system-justifying shifts to the political right, but only as long as the crisis situation falls short of toppling the existing regime and establishing a new status quo for people to begin justifying (Jost, 2020).

A Theoretical Integration of Epistemic, Existential, and Ideological Motives

Although it is useful to distinguish among specific hypotheses for the purposes of assessing cumulative evidence for each, one of the advantages of a motivated social cognition perspective is that it integrates work on seemingly unrelated tendencies. There are several different epistemic variables (dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive complexity, closed-mindedness, uncertainty avoidance, and personal needs for order, structure, and closure), existential variables (self-esteem, fear of loss, death anxiety, threat reduction), and sociopolitical variables (socioeconomic self-interest, group-based dominance, and system justification) that may contribute to left-right ideological preferences. In one way or another, each of these processes reflects an attempt to manage uncertainty, threat, and/or social relations.

These attempts, in turn, are linked to the two core dimensions of value that separate left from right—advocacy vs. resistance to social change and rejection vs. acceptance of inequality. Uncertainty reduction is served by resistance to social change, because social change—by its very nature—upsets established realities and entails unpredictability. Epistemic motivation leads people to seek out certainty, predictability, and control; it helps to overcome fear of the unknown. The attainment of certainty is

facilitated by hierarchical arrangements, including trust of epistemic authorities—such as politicians, journalists, teachers, scientists, or religious leaders—whose expertise provides an efficient source of cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004).

Experiments show that when people crave certainty and structure—as when their cognitive resources are depleted or their sense of personal control is threatened—they tend to prefer hierarchical over egalitarian arrangements (Friesen et al., 2014; Shepherd & Kay, 2012; Van Berkel et al., 2015). This is probably because vertical social structures are more efficient than horizontal social structures. There is a reason, for instance, that the military does not follow an egalitarian model of social relations. Taking orders from one's superiors is not only easier but also faster than thinking for oneself. All other things being equal, psychological needs to reduce uncertainty should lead people to resist change and accept inequality.

Existential motives also contribute to a preference for what is familiar and therefore safe. Uncertainty-related threats elicit psychological reactions that are similar to those elicited by mortality-related threats (Dechesne et al., 2000; McGregor et al., 2001). Epistemic and existential needs to maintain a subjective sense of certainty and security are associated with the belief in a just world and processes of system justification (Hennes et al., 2012; Jost, 2020; Lerner, 1980). Authoritarianism, as noted previously, is linked to rigid and dogmatic thinking styles and heightened sensitivity to potential dangers. Some of the most enduring targets of right-wing hostility are foreigners and immigrants, who are often experienced as both unfamiliar and threatening to the status quo (Hibbing, 2020).

Threat reduction may be both a cause and a consequence of endorsing inequality. To the extent that inequality (and resource scarcity) breeds social competition, struggles for dominance, and intergroup conflict, it contributes to violent strife, which is likely to provoke and exacerbate feelings of fear and anger. These emotions, in turn, may be allayed by embracing an ethos of conflict and a single-minded determination to confront one's foes—whether real or imaginary—and defending hierarchical arrangements as appropriate and perhaps even necessary (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001).

In summary, then, we hypothesize that there is an elective affinity between (a) psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat, on one hand, and (b) core aspects of right-wing conservatism, namely resistance to

social change and legitimation of inequality, on the other hand. Although there are many other motives that could, in principle, lead individuals to adopt liberal or conservative beliefs, opinions, and values, the core aspects of right-wing conservatism should be especially appealing to people who are temporarily or chronically motivated to reduce uncertainty and/or threat. Let us now turn to a review of the early evidence bearing on these propositions.

Early Evidence Linking Epistemic, Existential, and Ideological Motives to Right-Wing Conservatism

Here we summarize empirical evidence that accumulated from roughly 1958 to 2002 for and against the hypotheses that right-wing conservatism would be significantly associated with (a) cognitive rigidity and closed-mindedness, including (1) increased dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity, (2) decreased cognitive complexity, (3) decreased openness to new experiences, (4) uncertainty avoidance, (5) personal needs for order and structure, and (6) need for cognitive closure; (b) decreased self-esteem; (c) fear, anger, and aggression; (d) pessimism, disgust, and contempt; (e) fear of loss; (f) death anxiety; (g) threat arising from social and economic deprivation; and (h) threat to the stability of the social system. The remainder of this chapter describes the results of an integrative, meta-analytic review of early work on epistemic, existential, and ideological motives underlying left-right orientation. In [Chapter 7](#) we will consider more recent evidence.

The data for our initial review came from 38 journal articles, one monograph, seven chapters from books or annual volumes, and two conference papers involving 88 different samples investigated between 1958 and 2002. Some of the data were derived from archival sources, including speeches and interviews given by politicians as well as opinions and verdicts rendered by judges, whereas others were taken from experimental, field, or survey studies. The total number of research participants and individual cases, which included high school and university students, adult extension students, teachers in training, family members, professionals, politicians, judges, political activists, and religious ministers, was 22,818. Data came from 12 different countries, with 59 of the samples (67% of the total) coming from the United States. The remaining samples

were from England (8), New Zealand (4), Australia (3), Poland (3), Sweden (2), Germany (2), Scotland (2), Israel (2), Italy (1), Canada (1), and South Africa (1).

Epistemic Motives

By far the most convincing research on left-right psychological differences pertains to epistemic motives related to cognitive rigidity and closed-mindedness. The idea that conservatives are less flexible in their thinking than others originated with work on authoritarianism, intolerance of ambiguity, and dogmatism, and it played a crucial role in G. D. Wilson's (1973) dynamic theory of conservatism as uncertainty avoidance. Research on cognitive sophistication and integrative complexity provides some of the soundest evidence linking epistemic motivation to political ideology. Studies of personal needs for order, structure, and cognitive closure help to complete the picture.

Dogmatism

A longstanding controversy in political psychology is whether intolerance, closed-mindedness, and cognitive simplicity are associated more with rightist than leftist political attitudes. An early and persistent criticism of work on authoritarianism, as noted earlier, was that in its zeal to identify right-wing dogmatism, this work failed to recognize the extent of dogmatism of the left. Over the years, there have been numerous backers of both the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis and the more symmetrical extremist-as-ideologue hypothesis. William F. Stone (1980) concluded that there was virtually no evidence for the syndrome of left-wing authoritarianism in North America and that authoritarian rigidity and closed-mindedness were consistently associated with conservative—rather than liberal or progressive—thinking styles. This position was echoed by Altemeyer (1998), Billig (1984), and many others, including (most recently) Nilsson and Jost (2020a).

This is not to suggest that cognitive rigidity among leftists *never* occurs. Even when researchers have observed an uptick in dogmatism among extreme leftists (in comparison with centrists), however, the highest dogmatism scores are almost always observed for extreme rightists (Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003b). Rokeach's dogmatism scale, which was widely

administered in the late 20th century, contains such ideologically neutral items as “A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived”; “Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct”; and “To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.” Because these items measure very general epistemic attitudes rather than specific political opinions, dogmatism is included in our review as a psychological variable predicting political contents rather than as a political dependent variable.

Although it is measured in an ideologically neutral way, dogmatism has been found to correlate consistently with authoritarianism, political-economic conservatism, and the holding of right-wing attitudes. Thus, research on dogmatism provides more support for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis than for any of the alternative hypotheses. In responding to critiques of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Altemeyer (1998: 71) concluded:

I have yet to find a single “socialist/Communist type” who scores highly (in absolute terms) on the [Left Wing Authoritarianism] Scale. Shils may have been right about his era, but the “authoritarian on the left” has been as scarce as hens’ teeth in my samples.

As shown in [Table 4.3](#), early studies of dogmatism were no more successful than studies of authoritarianism in identifying a syndrome of left-wing rigidity. This has not deterred researchers from doggedly pursuing the phenomenon anyway, with equivocal results at best (e.g., Conway et al., 2016, 2018; Van Hiel et al., 2006; but see Hoffarth et al., 2020; Nilsson & Jost, 2020a; Saunders et al., 2020). Following Rokeach’s lead, psychologists have brought a wide variety of methods to bear on the general question of whether rightists are more closed-minded than leftists and centrists.

Table 4.3 Correlations between Dogmatism/Intolerance of Ambiguity and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Dogmatism	Authoritarianism (<i>F</i> -scale)	.82***	2.87	Pettigrew (1958)	49 female University of North Carolina undergraduates, US
		.56*	1.35	Rokeach (1960)	13 members of the student Communist Society at University College, London, England ^a
	Political-economic conservatism	.13	0.26	Rokeach (1960)	202 Michigan State University undergraduates, US
		.11	0.22	Rokeach (1960)	207 NYU, Brooklyn College undergraduates, US
		.20*	0.41	Rokeach (1960)	153 Michigan State University undergraduates, US
		.28***	0.58	Rokeach (1960)	186 Michigan State University undergraduates, US
	Authoritarianism-rebelliousness	.48***	1.09	Kohn (1974)	62 University of Reading students, England
	Conservatism-radicalism	.20***	0.41	Smithers & Loble (1978)	295 University of Bradford students, England
	C-scale	.58***	1.42	Webster & Stewart (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	93 Protestant ministers, New Zealand
	C-scale (short form)	.44***	0.98	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.47***	1.06	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England
Category width	Authoritarianism (<i>F</i> -scale)	.03	0.06	Pettigrew (1958)	49 female University of North Carolina undergraduates, US
Inflexibility	C-scale (short form)	.59***	1.46	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.54***	1.28	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Intolerance of ambiguity	C-scale (short form)	.59***	1.46	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.59***	1.46	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England
	Authoritarianism-rebelliousness	.67***	1.81	Kohn (1974)	62 University of Reading undergraduates, England
	General conservatism	.27**	0.56	Sidanius (1978)	192 high school students, Sweden
	Political-economic conservatism	.06	0.12	Sidanius (1978)	192 high school students, Sweden (same sample)
	Right-wing political orientation	.41***	0.89	Fibert & Ressler (1998)	159 students at Ben-Gurion University, Israel
Mean effect		.38***	0.83		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 2,173
Weighted mean effect		.34***	0.73		
Confidence interval (95%)		[.30, .37]			

Note: Average correlations for this and all subsequent tables in this chapter are based on Fisher's *z* conversions. When multiple tests were computed on the same samples in this and all subsequent tables, the sample is counted only once in the calculation of total (unique) *N*, mean effect sizes (weighted and nonweighted), and overall significance levels. Multiple effect sizes drawn from the same sample were averaged prior to inclusion in calculations of overall average effect sizes, so that each sample was counted only once. C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; NYU = New York University.

^a Rokeach (1960: 88, 121) also reported correlations between dogmatism and the *F*-scale ranging from .54 to .77 for multiple large samples drawn from England, New York, and Ohio, but the samples could not be matched to the correlation coefficients based on his descriptions.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Intolerance of Ambiguity

Research on tolerance of ambiguity waxed and waned from the 1940s to the late 1970s, and it employed a wide range of measurement techniques during this period. Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) used case study material obtained in interviews. Block and Block (1951) measured it by counting the number of trials a participant took to establish a perceptual norm in the autokinetic

paradigm. Questionnaire instruments have also been developed over the decades (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995).

Intolerance of ambiguity is positively correlated with authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, as initially hypothesized by Frenkel-Brunswik (1948, 1949). A handful of early studies, summarized in [Table 4.3](#), found that it was also associated with political conservatism. A study of Israeli university students by Fibert and Ressler (1998) demonstrated that intolerance of ambiguity was significantly higher among moderate and extreme right-wing students, as compared with moderate and extreme left-wing students. Our review of the early evidence suggested that there was a relatively strong connection between dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity, on one hand, and various measures of political conservatism, on the other. The weighted mean effect size (r), aggregated across 20 tests of the hypothesis conducted in five different countries involving over 2,000 participants, was .38 ($p < .0001$; see [Table 4.3](#)).

Integrative Complexity

There is a sizeable, methodologically sophisticated body of work that addresses left-right differences in cognitive complexity. Content-analytic techniques are often used to gauge integrative complexity, which refers to the extent of differentiation among multiple perspectives or dimensions along with the higher-order integration (or synthesis) of these differentiated components. Whereas the earliest studies assessing dogmatism and cognitive rigidity sampled ordinary citizens, Philip Tetlock's (1983, 1984) archival research used speeches and interviews to analyze the thinking styles of political elites.

Findings on cognitive complexity are sometimes taken to support Shils's (1954) assertion that leftists and rightists are more simplistic and dogmatic than centrists, and some do suggest that extreme leftists exhibit less complexity than moderate leftists. However, the evidence as a whole clearly shows that conservative ideologues exhibit less cognitive complexity than their liberal or moderate counterparts (see [Table 4.4](#)). A study of speeches given by US senators in 1975 and 1976, for instance, revealed that politicians whose voting records were classified as liberal or moderate expressed more integrative complexity than those with conservative voting records, even after adjusting for party affiliation (Tetlock, 1983). Very similar results were obtained in an investigation of US Supreme Court

justices (Tetlock et al., 1985). In another study involving British Members of Parliament, Tetlock (1984) reported a negative correlation between integrative complexity and political conservatism ($r = -.30$, $p < .01$). The most cognitively complex politicians were moderate socialists, who scored higher on complexity than extreme socialists, moderate conservatives, and extreme conservatives.

Table 4.4 Correlations between Integrative Complexity and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Integrative complexity	Conservative voting record	-.44**	-.98	Tetlock (1983)	Speeches from 45 senators, US
	Conservative political party and orientation	-.30**	-.63	Tetlock (1984)	Interviews with 87 members of the House of Commons, England
	Conservative voting record and orientation	-.61***	-1.54	Tetlock et al. (1984), Sample 1	Speeches from 35 senators, 82nd Congress, US
		-.38*	-.82		Speeches from 35 senators, 83rd Congress, US (same sample)
		-.45**	-1.01	Tetlock et al. (1984), Sample 2	Speeches from 45 senators, 94th Congress, US
		-.46**	-1.04		Speeches from 45 senators, 96th Congress, US (same sample)
		.00	.00		Speeches from 45 senators, 97th Congress, US (same sample)
		.00	.00		Speeches from 45 senators, 97th Congress, US (same sample)
	Conservative voting record (civil liberties)	-.47**	-1.06	Tetlock et al. (1985)	Opinions from 23 Supreme Court justices, US
	Conservative voting record (economic issues)	-.48**	-1.09	Tetlock et al. (1985)	Opinions from 23 Supreme Court justices, US (same sample)
	Conservative voting record and orientation	.19	.39	Gruenfeld (1995), Sample 1	16 Supreme Court justices, US
		.13	.26	Gruenfeld (1995), Sample 2	32 Supreme Court opinions, US
		.00	.00	Gruenfeld (1995), Sample 3	24 Supreme Court cases, US
		.00	.00	Gruenfeld (1995), Sample 3	24 Supreme Court cases, US
Cognitive flexibility (measure 1)	General conservatism	-.19**	-.39	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students in Stockholm, Sweden
Cognitive flexibility (measure 2)		-.16	-.32	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students in Stockholm, Sweden (same sample)

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Cognitive flexibility (measure 3)		-.11	-.22	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students in Stockholm, Sweden (same sample)
Cognitive complexity (measure 1)		-.11	-.22	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students in Stockholm, Sweden (same sample)
Cognitive complexity (measure 2)		-.01	-.02	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students in Stockholm, Sweden (same sample)
Cognitive complexity (ordination)	C-scale	-.23	-.47	Hinze et al. (1997)	84 undergraduates from the University of North Texas, US
Cognitive complexity (functionally independent constructs)		.00	.00	Hinze et al. (1997)	84 undergraduates from the University of North Texas, US (same sample)
Attributional complexity	RWA	-.17**	-0.35	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada
	SDO	.19***	-0.39	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada (same sample)
Mean effect size		-.20***	-0.43		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 879
Weighted mean effect size		-.20***	-0.41		
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.13, -.26]			

Note: In some cases, Tetlock et al. (1984) and Gruenfeld (1995) merely indicated that null results were obtained without reporting inferential statistics, so we made the conservative assumption that $r = 0$. C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Tetlock and colleagues (1984) analyzed speeches from five US congressional sessions and discovered that liberals and moderates scored higher than conservatives in integrative complexity in all three Congresses controlled by Democrats. No ideological differences were observed in one

of two Republican-controlled Congresses. In the other, moderates were higher in complexity than conservatives, and liberals did not differ from the other two groups. The authors concluded that their findings lent “indirect support to the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis” and that a “general trait interpretation of integrative complexity appears to apply more readily to conservatives than to liberals and moderates” (987).

In direct contrast to Shils (1954), Sidanius (1985: 638) hypothesized that because of greater political interest and commitment, extremists of the left and right would “display greater cognitive complexity, flexibility, and tolerance of ambiguity than political ‘moderates.’ ” In the United States and Sweden he found that extremists were indeed more likely than moderates to exhibit political interest, cognitive complexity, and self-confidence, and to engage in effortful information searches (Sidanius, 1978, 1984, 1985, 1988). However, in at least two of these studies, cognitive flexibility was negatively associated with conservatism.³ With regard to social issues pertaining to race and immigration, it was even clearer that cognitive complexity was negatively related to conservatism (Sidanius, 1985). Overall, we obtained a weighted mean effect size (r) of $-.20$ ($p < .0001$) for 21 tests of the relation between integrative complexity and right-wing conservatism, assessed in four different national contexts (see [Table 4.4](#)).

Openness to New Experiences

According to G. D. Wilson’s (1973) dynamic theory, conservatives should be less inclined than liberals to seek out strong external stimulation and arousal. In fact, early studies found that conservatism was negatively associated with sensation seeking in general (see [Table 4.5](#)). One article, for instance, reported a correlation of $-.38$ between scores on an “Experience Inventory Scale” (including subscales of aesthetic sensitivity, openness to theoretical or hypothetical ideas, indulgence in fantasy, and openness to unconventional views of reality) and scores on Wilson and Patterson’s C-scale. Conservatives were also less likely than liberals to volunteer for psychology experiments that mentioned themes related to openness (e.g., aesthetic interest, fantasy production, and sexual behavior) but not decision making and humor. Other studies found that conservatives were less likely than liberals to value broad-mindedness, imagination, and “having an exciting life” (Feather, 1979, 1984).

Table 4.5 Correlations between Openness to Experience and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
General sensation seeking	Authoritarianism (<i>F</i> -scale)	-.45**	-1.01	Kish & Donnenwerth (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	42 adult extension students, US
General sensation seeking (short form)	C-scale	-.33**	-0.70	Kish (in G. D. Wilson, 1973), Sample 1	186 undergraduates, US
General sensation seeking	C-scale	-.54**	-1.28	Kish (in G. D. Wilson, 1973), Sample 2	51 adult extension students in social work, US
		-.48**	-1.09	Glasgow et al. (1985)	42 undergraduates from the University of Nevada-Reno, US
"Experience" inventory		-.38**	-0.82	Joe et al. (1977), Sample 1	124 undergraduates, US
Willingness to volunteer for experiments requiring "open-mindedness"		-.15*	-0.30	Joe et al. (1977), Sample 2	205 undergraduates, US
Valuing broad-mindedness		-.39***	-0.85	Feather (1979), Sample 1	558 family members (14 and older), Adelaide, Australia
		-.43***	-0.95	Feather (1979), Sample 2	358 undergraduate students and their family members (14 and older), Flinders University, Australia
		-.34***	-0.72	Feather (1984)	124 students from Flinders University, Australia
Valuing imaginativeness		-.32***	-0.68	Feather (1979), Sample 1	558 family members (14 and older), Adelaide, Australia
		-.44***	-0.98	Feather (1979), Sample 2	358 undergraduate students and their family members (14 and older), Flinders University, Australia

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Valuing an "exciting life"		-.50***	-1.15	Feather (1984)	124 students from Flinders University, Australia
		-.27***	-0.56	Feather (1979), Sample 1	558 family members (14 and older), Adelaide, Australia
		-.31***	-0.65	Feather (1979), Sample 2	358 undergraduate students and their family members (14 and older), Flinders University, Australia
Openness to experience ("Big Five")		-.25**	-0.52	Feather (1984)	126 students from Flinders University, Australia
	SDO	-.28**	-0.58	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 9	97 undergraduates from San Jose State University, US
	ESJ	-.19***	-0.39	Jost & Thompson (2000)	393 undergraduates from University of Maryland, US
	RWA	-.36***	-0.77	Peterson et al. (1997), Sample 1	198 undergraduates from the University of New Hampshire, US
		-.33***	-0.70	Peterson et al. (1997), Sample 2	157 parents of undergraduates from the University of New Hampshire, US
		-.31*	-0.65	Peterson & Lane (2001)	69 students from the University of New Hampshire, US
		-.42***	-0.93	Peterson & Lane (2001)	69 students from the University of New Hampshire, US (same sample)
Mean effect size		-.35***	-0.77		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 2,606
Weighted mean effect size		-.32***	-0.68		
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.28, -.35]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation; ESJ = economic system justification.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Pratto and colleagues (1994) observed that openness to experience was negatively correlated with SDO ($r = -.28, p < .01$). Erik Thompson and I administered the Big Five inventory along with a measure of economic system justification to a sample of 393 students at the University of Maryland and saw that it was associated with lower levels of openness to experience ($r = -.19, p < .001$). Peterson and Lane (2001) found that openness to experience was negatively correlated with RWA scores in a sample of college students that they followed for four years. Correlational results from 21 tests conducted in the United States and Australia (see [Table 4.5](#)) provided consistent evidence that people who were more politically conservative were less open to new and stimulating experiences in general (weighted mean $r = -.32, p < .0001$).

Uncertainty Avoidance

The crux of G. D. Wilson's theory, as noted earlier, is that the experience of uncertainty is aversive to conservatives. Consistent with this notion, G. D. Wilson and colleagues (1973) found that conservatives exhibited stronger preferences for simple (vs. complex) paintings and weaker preferences for representational (vs. abstract) paintings, in comparison with liberals (see [Table 4.6](#)). Conservatives also preferred simple over complex poems, unambiguous over ambiguous literary texts, and familiar over unfamiliar pieces of music.⁴ In quite diverse research contexts, then, early evidence from three countries suggested that conservatives were more motivated than liberals to eschew ambiguity, novelty, and uncertainty (weighted mean $r = -.27, p < .0001$).

Table 4.6 Correlations between Uncertainty Tolerance and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Preference for complex paintings	C-scale	-.56**	-1.35	G. D. Wilson et al. (1973)	30 adults aged 23–34, US
Preference for abstract paintings		-.14	-0.28	G. D. Wilson et al. (1973)	30 adults aged 23–34, US (same sample)
Preference for complex poems		-.31*	-0.65	Gillies & Campbell (1985)	34 undergraduates from Glasgow University, Scotland
Preference for modern over traditional poems		.04	0.08	Gillies & Campbell (1985)	34 undergraduates from Glasgow University, Scotland (same sample)
Preference for unfamiliar music		-.30*	-0.63	Glasgow et al. (1985)	42 undergraduates from University of Nevada-Reno, US
Preference for complex music		-.24	-0.49	Glasgow et al. (1985)	42 undergraduates from University of Nevada-Reno, US (same sample)
Preference for ambiguous literary texts		-.40* ^b	-0.87	McAllister & Anderson (1991)	24 adults aged 18–46, Scotland
Comfort with job insecurity	Authoritarian conservatism	-.22**	-0.45	Atieh et al. (1987)	155 graduate and undergraduate students, US
Preference for task variety		-.16*	-0.32	Atieh et al. (1987)	155 graduate and undergraduate students, US (same sample)
Readiness to change at work		-.33***	-0.70	Fay & Frese (2000)	478 adults aged 20–67, East Germany
Acceptance of new technology		-.23***	-0.47	Fay & Frese (2000)	478 adults aged 20–67, East Germany (same sample)
Interest in work innovation		-.42***	-0.93	Fay & Frese (2000)	478 adults aged 20–67, East Germany (same sample)
Attempts at innovation		-.21*	-0.43	Fay & Frese (2000)	478 adults aged 20–67, East Germany (same sample)
Mean effect size		-.28***	-0.58		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 763
Weighted mean effect size		-.27***	-0.57		
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.21, -.34]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Personal Needs for Order, Structure, and Closure

Theories of authoritarianism, dogmatism, and uncertainty avoidance all imply that political conservatives should possess heightened epistemic needs for order and structure. Early research was consistent with these expectations (see [Table 4.7](#)). For example, one study obtained a correlation of .24 between the *need for order* and scores on the C-scale. Another found that conservative adolescents were more likely to describe themselves as neat, orderly, and organized than were liberal adolescents (Eisenberg-Berg & Mussen, 1980). Research by Altemeyer (1998) turned up a correlation of .34 between scores on the *personal need for structure* scale and RWA. This evidence is consistent not only with research on dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, and uncertainty avoidance but also with the notion that authoritarian conservatives crave order and structure, endorsing a range of preferences for such things as firm parental discipline, core educational curricula, comprehensive drug testing, and AIDS quarantines (Peterson et al., 1993).

Table 4.7 Correlations between Needs for Order/Structure/Closure and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Need for order	C-scale	.24*	0.49	Webster & Stewart (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	93 Protestant ministers, New Zealand
Personal need for structure	RWA	.34***	0.72	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada
	SDO	.06	0.12	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada (same sample)
Need for cognitive closure	Authoritarianism (<i>F</i> -scale)	.27**	0.56	D. M. Webster & Kruglanski (1994)	97 undergraduates from the University of Maryland, US
	Right-wing political party and orientation	.29**	0.61	Kemmelmeier (1997)	93 undergraduates from the University of Mannheim, Germany
	Political orientation	.23***	0.48	Chirumbolo (2002)	178 undergraduates and working adults, Italy
	Authoritarianism (<i>F</i> -scale)	.46***	1.04	Chirumbolo (2002)	178 undergraduates and working adults, Italy (same sample)
	Self-reported conservatism	.21***	0.43	Jost et al. (1999), Sample 1	613 undergraduates from the University of Maryland, US
	Self-reported conservatism	.26***	0.54	Jost et al. (1999), Sample 2	733 undergraduates from the University of Maryland, US
	Support for the death penalty	.47*	1.06	Jost et al. (1999), Sample 3	19 undergraduates from University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), US
	Religious and nationalist right-wing beliefs	.27*	0.56	Golec (2001), Sample 1	119 adults, aged 18–30, Poland
		.31**	0.65	Golec (2001), Sample 2	126 Warsaw social psychology students, Poland
		.82***	2.87	Golec (2001), Sample 3	122 student political activists, Poland

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
	Economic right-wing beliefs	-.22*	-0.45	Golec (2001), Sample 1	120 adults, aged 18–30, Poland
		-.26**	-0.54	Golec (2001), Sample 2	120 Warsaw School of Advanced Social Psychology students, Poland
		.61***	1.54	Golec (2001), Sample 3	122 student political activists, Poland
	Conservative self-placement (economic issues)	-.13	-0.26	Golec (2001), Sample 1	119 adults, aged 18–30, Poland
		.72***	2.08	Golec (2001), Sample 3	106 student political activists, Poland
	Conservative self-placement (social issues)	.07	0.14	Golec (2001), Sample 1	120 adults, aged 18–30, Poland
		.70***	1.96	Golec (2001), Sample 3	109 student political activists, Poland
Mean effect size		.30***	0.64		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 2,548
Weighted mean effect size		.26***	0.54		
Confidence interval (95%)		[.22, .29]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

A more specific account of motivated closed-mindedness exists in studies of *impulsive closure* and *need for cognitive closure*. The idea, again, is that there is an elective affinity between (content-free) epistemic motives to make decisions that are quick, firm, and final and (content-laden) political attitudes associated with the right. In developing an individual difference scale of the need for closure (NFC), D. M. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) noted a correlation of .27 between NFC and authoritarianism. In two large samples of undergraduates at the University of Maryland, we administered the NFC scale and a measure of ideological self-placement, with several other questionnaires separating the two measures (Jost et al., 1999). Modest positive correlations were obtained between NFC and self-identified conservatism in both samples, $r(613) = .21$ and $r(733) = .26$.

In Germany Markus Kemmelmeier (1997) observed that NFC scores increased in a steady, monotonic fashion as one moved from left to right in terms of political partisanship. Democratic socialists scored lower on NFC than did members of the Green Party, who scored lower than members of the Social Democratic Party, who scored lower than members of the Free Democratic Party, who scored lower than members of the right-wing Christian Democratic Party. Parallel results were obtained in Italy (Chirumbolo, 2002) and, more recently, Hungary (Jost & Kende, 2020). In none of these studies was there any evidence that ideological extremists of the left were as cognitively rigid as extremists of the right, although this is often taken for granted in popular culture and academic writing.

My colleagues and I hypothesized that people who scored high on NFC would be especially likely to endorse the death penalty, insofar as it represents a resolution that is unambiguous, permanent, and final (Jost et al., 1999). Indeed, we obtained an overall correlation of .47 ($p < .05$) between NFC and support for capital punishment. In terms of specific facets or subscales, the strongest predictors were *discomfort with ambiguity* ($r = .66, p < .01$) and *preference for order* ($r = .55, p < .02$). It is little wonder that death penalty advocates, who are disproportionately right of center, argue that state-sanctioned executions are desirable because they allow families of victims and others to experience “closure.”

Research conducted in Poland shortly after the transition from socialism to capitalism addressed the distinctive possibilities that (a) NFC would be associated with the preservation of the traditional status quo and, at the same time, (b) there would be an elective affinity between NFC and right-leaning ideological preferences, all other things being equal. In two studies involving Polish citizens and students of various colleges and universities, Agnieszka Golec de Zavala reported that NFC was positively correlated with religious and nationalist conservatism, but it was negatively correlated with economic conservatism, presumably because of the country’s socialist legacy (Golec, 2001). However, when she examined youth affiliates of various political parties, extremely strong associations between NFC and right-wing orientation were observed. In a study involving 122 respondents, NFC was correlated not only with religious and nationalist conservatism ($r = .82$) but also with social conservatism ($r = .70$) and even economic (free-market) conservatism ($r = .72$). Aggregating across 20 tests of the hypothesis in six different national contexts, clear support was obtained for

the prediction that the need for nonspecific epistemic closure would be associated with right-wing conservatism, all other things being equal (weighted mean $r = .26$, $p < .0001$).

Existential Motives

Threats to Self-Esteem

According to theories of authoritarianism and uncertainty avoidance, low self-esteem—whether measured or manipulated—should be associated with political conservatism. Although threats to self-esteem had been found to evoke impulsive closure, racial prejudice, and out-group derogation, very few studies between 1958 and 2002 explored the relationship between self-esteem and political orientation (but see Sniderman & Citrin, 1971). G. D. Wilson (1973) appears to have relied on a single study in which self-esteem correlated negatively at $-.51$ with scores on the C-scale in a sample of continuing education students in New Zealand.

A pair of experiments in the early 1970s suggested that failure experiences could cause people to respond in a more authoritarian manner (Sales & Friend, 1973). Receiving false feedback about poor performance on an anagram task led people to score higher on a balanced version of the F-scale (compared to a pre-experimental control condition). Receiving success feedback, on the other hand, led people to score lower on authoritarianism. Although the effect sizes were small and the results were presented too ambiguously to include in our meta-analysis, these experiments did suggest that situational factors could shift ideological outcomes. In my own dissertation research, I conducted a pilot study in which 133 Yale University undergraduates were led to believe that alumni from their school were either more or less socioeconomically successful than alumni from Stanford University. Although this was intended as a manipulation of group status rather than self-esteem, I did observe that students assigned to the low-socioeconomic-status (SES) condition exhibited significantly higher scores on the RWA scale, in comparison with those assigned to the high-SES condition, $F(1, 132) = 3.91$, $p < 0.05$.

In any case, unambiguously supportive evidence for the self-esteem hypothesis has been hard to come by. Our review, which aggregated effect sizes across 17 tests of the hypothesis involving a total of 1,558 participants from three different countries, led to the conclusion that there was indeed a

relationship between self-esteem and conservatism, but that it was weak in magnitude (weighted mean $r = -.09$, $p < .001$; see [Table 4.8](#)), especially in comparison with our other findings.

Table 4.8 Correlations between Self-Esteem and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Self-esteem	C-scale	-.51**	-1.19	Boshier (1969)	40 adult education students, New Zealand
Self-acceptance		-.13	-0.26	Boshier (1969)	40 adult education students, New Zealand (same sample)
Self/ideal discrepancy		-.30*	-0.63	Boshier (1969)	40 adult education students, New Zealand (same sample)
Ego defensiveness		.15	0.30	G. D. Wilson (1973)	91 undergraduates from California State University, Los Angeles, US
Rosenberg self-esteem	SDO	-.09	-0.18	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 1	98 undergraduates from University of California, Berkeley, US
		-.18*	-0.37	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 2	403 undergraduates from San Jose State University, US
		.09	0.18	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 3a	80 undergraduates from Stanford University, US
		.01	0.02	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 3b	57 undergraduates from Stanford University, US (subset of Sample 3a)
		.16	0.32	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 4	90 undergraduates from Stanford University, US
		-.23**	-0.47	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 5	144 undergraduates from San Jose State University, US
		-.01	-0.02	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 6	48 undergraduates from Stanford University, US
		-.29**	-0.61	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 8	115 undergraduates from Stanford University, US
		-.14*	-0.28	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 9	95 undergraduates from San Jose State University, US
	RWA	.01	0.02	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada
	SDO	.07	0.14	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada (same sample)
Collective self-esteem	RWA	.04	0.08	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada (same sample)

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
	SDO	-.08*	0.16	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada (same sample) Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 1,558
Mean effect size		-.07**	-0.14		
Weighted mean effect size		-.09***	-0.17		
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.04, -.13]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Source: Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003b).

Subsequent work by Aleksandra Cichocka and her colleagues (2017) suggested that the association between self-esteem and left-right political orientation may be fairly complicated. After adjusting statistically for secure (or healthy, genuine) self-esteem, they discovered that a residual form of insecure, defensive self-esteem—that is, individual narcissism—was associated with SDO (adjusting for RWA) but not with RWA (adjusting for SDO). This implies that insecure self-esteem may be more closely related to tolerance of inequality than resistance to social change per se. There is also evidence that collective narcissism—defined as an insecure, defensive desire for the in-group to be positively valued by others—predicts right-wing ideological preferences (Golec de Zavala et al, 2009).

Fear, Anger, and Aggression

Although there has been more research on cognitive than affective or emotional processes, it is a persistent claim that conservatives are more likely than liberals to be motivated by fear, anger, and contempt (e.g., Alexander, 1995; Jost, Stern, et al., 2017; Milburn & Conrad, 2016; Tomkins, 1995). Classic and contemporary theories of authoritarianism, for instance, hypothesized that conservatives would be highly punitive toward socially sanctioned scapegoats through displacement of repressed fear and hostility. Altemeyer (1998: 52) observed:

First, High RWA's are scared. They see the world as a dangerous place, as society teeters on the brink of self-destruction from evil and violence. This fear appears to instigate aggression in them. Second, right-wing authoritarians tend to be highly self-righteous. They think themselves much more moral and upstanding than others—a self-perception considerably aided by self-deception, their religious training, and some very efficient guilt evaporators (such as going to confession). This self-righteousness disinhibits their aggressive impulses and releases them to act out their fear-induced hostilities.

Consistent with the notion that authoritarian conservatives perceive the world as especially threatening, Altemeyer observed a strong correlation of .49 between perceptions of a dangerous world and RWA in a sample of 354 students from the University of Manitoba. John Duckitt (2001) replicated this finding with several samples in New Zealand and South Africa and also obtained significant correlations between perceptions of a dangerous world and SDO (see [Table 4.9](#)).

Table 4.9 Correlations between Fear of Threat or Loss and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics	
Feeling that life is changing for the worse	C-scale	.22*	0.45	Nias (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	214 adults, England	
Neuroticism	C-scale	.08	0.16	Nias (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	214 adults, England (same sample)	
		.03	0.06	G. D. Wilson (1973)	97 student teachers aged 18–34, England	
	SDO	−.02	−0.4	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 7	224 undergraduates from Stanford University, US	
		.13	0.26	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 9	97 undergraduates from San Jose State University, US	
		−.08	−0.16	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 11	100 undergraduates from Stanford University, US	
	ESJ	.21*	0.43	Pratto et al. (1994), Sample 12	139 undergraduates from Stanford University, US	
		−.02	−0.04	Jost & Thompson (2000)	395 undergraduates from University of Maryland, US	
		RWA	.15*	0.30	Peterson et al. (1997), Sample 1	198 undergraduates from the University of New Hampshire, US
			−.09	−0.18	Peterson et al. (1997), Sample 2	157 parents of undergraduates from the University of New Hampshire, US
			.20	0.41	Peterson & Lane (2001)	69 senior undergraduates from the University of New Hampshire, US
Perception of a “dangerous world”	RWA	.49***	1.12	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of Manitoba, Canada	
		.45***	1.01	Duckitt (2001), Sample 2	484 Auckland University students, New Zealand	
		.54***	1.28	Duckitt (2001), Sample 3	381 Auckland University students, New Zealand	
		.45***	1.01	Duckitt (2001), Sample 4	233 White Afrikaans students, South Africa	
	SDO	.00	0.00	Altemeyer (1998)	354 undergraduates from the University of	

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.15**	0.30	Duckitt (2001), Sample 2	Manitoba, Canada 484 Auckland University students, New Zealand
		.21***	0.43	Duckitt (2001), Sample 3	381 Auckland University students, New Zealand
		.29***	0.61	Duckitt (2001), Sample 4	233 White Afrikaans students, South Africa
Response facilitation to danger words	RWA	.26	0.54	Lavine et al. (2002), Sample 1	94 undergraduates from the SUNY Stony Brook, US
Response facilitation to threatening words	RWA	.17	0.35	Lavine et al. (2002), Sample 2	91 undergraduates from SUNY Stony Brook, US
Persuasive impact of threatening messages	RWA	.30*	0.63	Lavine et al. (1999)	44 voting eligible undergraduates from the University of Minnesota, US
Mean effect size		.16***	0.33		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 3,371
Weighted mean effect size		.18***	0.38		
Confidence interval (95%)		[.15, .22]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; ESJ = economic system justification; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation; SUNY = State University of New York.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Clever studies by Howard Lavine and colleagues (2002) used reaction time indicators to gauge authoritarians' automatic vigilance for words that were pretested to be either high or low in threat and danger. In one experiment, high (vs. low) authoritarians responded faster to threatening words (e.g., *cancer*, *mugger*, *poison*) but not other words on a lexical decision task. In another experiment, participants were primed with words that could be interpreted as threat related or not (e.g., *arms*) and then exposed to target words that either completed the threatening prime-target association (*weapons*) or not (*legs*). High authoritarians responded more quickly than low authoritarians to threatening word pairs but not to the other word pairs. Our review of early research conducted in five different

countries involving 22 tests of the hypothesis suggested that fear and threat were indeed related to right-wing conservatism (weighted mean $r = .18$, $p < .0001$). The correlation was higher after excluding studies in which neuroticism, which has more to do with emotional lability than feelings of fear per se, was used as the measure of threat (weighted mean $r = .30$, $p < .0001$).

Recent evidence from France revealed that fear and anger both played significant roles in support for right-wing authoritarianism and the far right National Front party following the terrorist attacks of November of 2015. As shown in [Table 4.10](#), fear and anger were strongly correlated with one another, and both were correlated with authoritarianism and right-wing ideological self-placement (Jost, 2019a). Analyses conducted by Pavlos Vasilopoulos confirmed that self-reported fear was positively associated with support for the National Front in 2015, and it was also associated with support for Marine Le Pen in 2017 and the far right “Alternative for Deutschland” (AfD) Party in Germany in 2017 (see [Figure 4.1](#)).

Table 4.10 Correlations among Fear, Anger, Authoritarianism, and Ideological Self-Placement

	Left-Right Orientation	Authoritarianism	Fear
Left-right orientation	—		
Authoritarianism	0.2284 (22,777)	—	
Fear	0.1038 (22,777)	0.1748 (24,325)	—
Anger	0.2552 (22,777)	0.2377 (24,325)	0.4712 (24,325)

Note: Entries are zero-order correlations. (Number of observations are included in parentheses.) All correlations in this table are statistically significant at $p < .00001$.

Source: This table is from Jost (2019a) based on data from the French Election Study (*Enquête Électorale Française*), a nationally representative panel study that included 24,369 respondents surveyed by Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) between November 2015 and June 2017.






Figure 4.1 Effect of fear on support for right-wing extremism in France and Germany (2015–2017). (a) Probability of voting for the National Front (France, 2015). (b) Probability of voting for Marine Le Pen (France, 2017). (c) Probability of voting for the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) Party (Germany, 2017).

Note: Panel (a) is based on results of the French Election Study (*Enquête Électorale Française*), a nationally representative panel study that included 24,369 respondents surveyed by Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) between November 2015 and June 2017. Panel (b) is based on Wave 13 of the French Election Study during the first round of the 2017 French presidential election ($N = 6,935$); it depicts the results of a model predicting the probability of voting for Marine Le Pen after adjusting for age, gender, education, authoritarianism, and left-right placement. In (a) and (b) the measure of fear was a composite based on how anxious and frightened respondents felt “thinking about the political situation in France” (on a scale that was recoded to range from 0 to 1). Panel (c) is based on a YouGov survey conducted in Germany prior to the 2017 federal elections ($N = 644$); it is based on a model predicting the probability of voting for the AfD after adjusting for age, gender, education, authoritarianism, and left-right placement. The measure of fear was a composite based on how anxious and frightened respondents felt “thinking about the political situation in Germany” (on a scale that was recoded to range from 0 to 1).

Source: This figure is from Jost (2019a) based on analyses conducted by Pavlos Vasilopoulos.

Pessimism, Disgust, and Contempt

The political commentator George Will (1998: 21) once joked that his “gloomy temperament received its conservative warp from early and prolonged exposure to the Chicago Cubs,” a major league baseball team that went more than a century between World Series championships. Pessimism, Will argued, is an essential characteristic of the conservative temperament: “Conservatives know the world is a dark and forbidding place where most new knowledge is false, most improvements are for the worse” (p. 21). Psychologists too have explored differences between the left and right in terms of optimism-pessimism and related affective dimensions.

Tomkins (1963), for instance, proposed that rightists were not only more prone to fear and anger than leftists, as the evidence from France and Germany indicated, but also to pessimism, disgust, and contempt. Consistent with polarity theory, one study of “political imagination” found that people projected different emotions onto Republican and Democratic candidates. Specifically, people associated conservative leaders with expressions of anger, contempt, and excitement, and they associated liberal leaders with shame, distress, and joy. However, these results may have more to do with political stereotypes than with genuine emotional differences between liberals and conservatives in general.

To explain why conservative ideology would be associated with fear, anger, contempt, and other negative emotions, psychologists have often

pointed to parenting styles (e.g., Janoff-Bulman et al., 2014). The idea that strict discipline produces children who come to hold right-wing attitudes is shared by theories of authoritarianism, ideo-affective polarity, and uncertainty avoidance, among others. Dependable research linking parental behavior to the political attitudes of their children is scant (but see Peterson et al., 1997), for the reason that it would require 20 or more years of continuous snooping to do it well. There are shortcomings associated with retrospective self-report measures and reliance on childhood memories, and even under the best of circumstances it is impossible to draw causal conclusions on the basis of correlational data. In any case, Altemeyer (1988) obtained weak correlations between individuals' recall of their own parents' levels of anger and discipline, on one hand, and their own RWA scores, on the other. Correlations between the RWA scores of parents and offspring in these studies hovered around .40, with neither parent being more influential than the other.

Meg Rohan and Mark Zanna (1998) argued that conservative parents would be more demanding and punitive while stressing instrumental concerns to "have good manners" and "be neat and clean," whereas liberal parents would be more likely to use warmth while stressing values to "be considerate of others." Differences in parenting styles such as these could, at least in principle, account for the observation that conservative parents in Sweden were not as close to their children as liberal parents were (Sidanius & Ekehammar, 1979). However, much more research is needed before concluding that conservatives are more pessimistic or contemptuous than liberals and moderates or that their negative emotions are linked to childhood experiences with parental aggression.

There has been a mini-explosion of research in recent years on the relationship between the emotion of disgust and political ideology. Numerous studies reported that, as Tomkins anticipated, conservatives scored higher than liberals on both direct and indirect measures of disgust sensitivity, including pathogen avoidance (e.g., Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar et al., 2012; O'Shea et al., 2021). At the same time there have also been notable failures to replicate this basic effect (Tybur et al., 2010). A meta-analysis of 24 studies concluded that fear of contamination and disgust sensitivity were indeed associated with political conservatism, RWA, SDO, religious fundamentalism, and ethnocentrism, with overall effect size estimates ranging from $r = .24$ to $.31$

(Terrizzi Jr. et al., 2013). Disgust and fear of contamination are thought to play a significant role in opposition to immigration, especially among citizens who are otherwise fairly liberal (Aarøe et al., 2017).

Recent work by Ruisch, Anderson, Inbar, and Pizarro (2020) suggests that low-level physiological markers of taste sensitivity and taste bud density, which are genetically heritable to a very high degree, are associated with disgust reactions and political conservatism. The authors conclude by proposing that an elective affinity exists between physiological sensitivity to disgust and political conservatism: “individual differences in taste sensitivity may serve as a biological predisposition that can lead an individual toward adopting one political ideology over another” (11).

Fear and Prevention of Loss

To the extent that conservatives are especially sensitive to the possibilities of loss—and this is one reason they wish to maintain the status quo—it follows that they should be more motivated by negatively framed outcomes (potential losses) than positively framed outcomes (potential gains). This is consistent with Tomkins’s (1963, 1965) theory of ideo-affective polarity, which suggested that pessimism was more characteristic of right-wing personalities, whereas optimism was more characteristic of left-wing personalities. Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (2009) made a similar argument based on the distinction between approach and avoidance motivation:

Conservatism is avoidance based; it is focused on preventing negative outcomes (e.g., societal losses) and seeks to regulate society via inhibition (restraints) in the interests of social order. Liberalism is approach based; it is focused on advancing positive outcomes (e.g., societal gains) and seeks to regulate society via activation (interventions) in the interests of social justice. (120)

At least one study found that authoritarian conservatives were more persuaded by negatively framed than positively framed messages. Shortly before the 1996 presidential election, Lavine and colleagues (1999) presented people who scored high and low on RWA with arguments that stressed either the potential rewards of voting (“a way to express and live in accordance with important values”) or the costs of not voting (“not voting allows others to take away your right to express your values”). High authoritarians were influenced more by threatening than reward-focused messages, whereas low authoritarians were slightly more influenced by

reward-focused than threatening messages. Importantly, these persuasive effects carried over into behavioral intentions and actual voting behaviors.

Fear of Death

A fairly straightforward implication of theories of uncertainty avoidance and terror management is that the salience of one's own mortality should elicit ideological defensiveness and psychological, if not political, conservatism. High-profile terrorist attacks such as those of September 11, 2001, should therefore simultaneously increase the cognitive accessibility of death and the appeal of conservative ideology, all other things being equal. Consistent with this notion, G. D. Wilson (1973) obtained a correlation of .54 between scores on a fear-of-death scale and scores on the C-scale.

Early work on terror management theory suggested that priming thoughts of death led people to defend culturally established norms and practices more intensely than they did under other circumstances. Increased mortality salience, for instance, was linked to the endorsement of system-justifying stereotypes and liking for stereotype-consistent female and minority group members (Schimel et al., 1999). Mortality salience has also been found to evoke hostility toward those who violate cultural values, although, again, there have been repeated failures to replicate this basic effect (Klein et al., 2019).

In one early study with potential relevance for political ideology, municipal judges were found to set much higher bond assessments for prostitutes following a mortality salience manipulation as compared with a control condition (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Although careful experiments are needed on a much wider range of political variables, it is at least conceivable that conservatives' preferences for tradition, law and order, and strict forms of discipline (including capital punishment) are connected to underlying feelings of anxiety, fear, and/or threat, including concerns about death. Our review of the research literature from 1958 to 2002 turned up only eight relatively clear-cut tests of the death anxiety hypothesis (and seven of them focused on reactions to criminals), and the mean-weighted effect size was very strong ($r = .50$, $p < .0001$; see [Table 4.11](#)).

Table 4.11 Correlations between Mortality Salience and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Fear of death	General conservatism	.54**	1.28	Nash (cited in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	74 undergraduates from California State University, Los Angeles, US
Mortality salience	Bond-setting for prostitutes	.44*	0.97	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 1	22 municipal court judges, US
		.40*	0.87	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 2	78 undergraduates, US
		.65***	1.71	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 3	32 undergraduates, US
		.77***	2.41	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 4	83 undergraduates, US
		.45**	1.01	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 5	36 undergraduates, US
		.56***	1.35	Rosenblatt et al. (1989), Sample 6	34 undergraduates, US
	Severity of criminal punishment	.23*	0.46	Florian et al. (2001)	120 undergraduates from Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Mean effect size		.52***	1.26		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 479
Weighted mean effect size		.50***	1.20		
Confidence interval (95%)		[.43, .57]			

* $p < .05$.** $p < .01$.*** $p < .001$.

Threat to the Stability of the Social System

Although most contemporary research on authoritarianism in psychology has focused on individual differences, the idea that system-level threats increased the mass appeal of RWA was a major part of the original theory (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). For example, Wilhelm Reich (1942/1976) observed that as the German economy fell precipitously between 1929 and 1932, the number of votes for

the Nazi party rose from 800,000 to 17 million. Of course, history teaches us that people do not *always* move to the right in response to societal crisis. In the United States, for instance, the Great Depression ultimately produced a liberal shift and the establishment of a progressive social welfare system. Presumably, this is attributable in large part to the strong and skillful leadership of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who wisely framed the need for “social security” in terms that assuaged rather than aggravated—or exploited—feelings of threat.

The possibility remains, in any case, that major threats to the stability of the social system, such as those precipitated by terrorist attacks, stock market crashes, and life-threatening pandemics, may increase right-wing conservatism, at least under certain circumstances. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the *New York Times* reported significant increases in right-wing populism in Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland. Right-wing parties were already on the rise in Austria, Hungary, Italy, and the United States, where President George W. Bush’s popularity skyrocketed within a few days of the attacks and remained high for months (Bishop, 2005).

There is archival research suggesting that during times of societal threat, people are more likely to turn to authoritarian leaders and institutions for order, stability, and security. Stephen Sales (1972), for instance, observed that during the years of the Depression, Americans were more likely to join authoritarian churches and less likely to join nonauthoritarian churches, compared to the preceding decade. Likewise, years of heavy unemployment in the 1960s were accompanied by higher-than-usual conversion rates for authoritarian churches. During better economic times, the opposite pattern was observed.

Sales (1973) culled together disparate evidence suggesting that economic crises are also accompanied by cultural trends that celebrate authoritarian themes of power, toughness, cynicism, superstition, submission, and aggression. For instance, prevalent themes in literature and popular culture were judged to be more conservative and authoritarian during the Depression than before it. Furthermore, city budgets allocated more money to police departments (relative to fire departments), although crime actually fell during the 1930s. Doty and colleagues (1991) failed to replicate these differences in budgetary priorities when comparing different high- and low-threat periods, but they did observe that conservative incumbents in the

House of Representatives lost 2.4 percentage points and liberal incumbents gained 7.8 percentage points in low-threat (vs. high-threat) periods.

Stewart McCann (1997) recruited history professors to rate the degree to which social, economic, and political circumstances were “threatening to the American established order” in every US presidential election year from 1788 to 1992. He concluded that during high-threat periods, presidential candidates who were higher on power motivation, forcefulness, and strength were elected by larger margins of victory than during low-threat periods. For nine tests of our hypothesis—all conducted in the United States but across quite different historical time periods—there was strong support for the notion that threats to the stability of the social system were associated with an increase in authoritarian conservatism (weighted mean $r = .47$, $p < .0001$; see [Table 4.12](#)). These findings are broadly consistent with Huntington’s (1957: 460–461) observation that “When the foundations of society are threatened, the conservative ideology reminds men of the necessity of some institutions and desirability of the existing ones.”

Table 4.12 Correlations between System Instability/Threat and Political Conservatism

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Correlation	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Economic threat	Conversion to authoritarian churches	.49*** ^a	1.12	Sales (1972)	6,887 adults joining 4 churches between 1920 and 1939, US
	Conversion to nonauthoritarian churches	-.44*** ^a	-0.98	Sales (1972)	3,601 adults joining 4 churches between 1920 and 1939, US
	City budget for police vs. fire departments	.51*	1.19	Sales (1973), Study 1	Annual Pittsburgh city budget for 20 years (1920–1939), US
		.77***	2.41	Sales (1973), Study 1	Annual New York city budget for 20 years (1920–1939), US
Societal threat (late 1960s)	City budget for police vs. fire departments	.92***	4.69	Sales (1973), Study 2	State and local budget expenditures (1967–1969 vs. 1959–1964), US
		.78*	2.49	Sales (1973), Study 2	City government expenditures (1967–1969 vs. 1959–1964), US
	Victory margins for conservative vs. liberal incumbents	.29*	0.61	Doty et al. (1991) ^b	60 incumbent candidates for the US House of Representatives
Social, economic, and political threat	Power, forcefulness, and strength of winning presidential candidate	.40*	0.87	McCann (1997)	33 winning presidential candidates (1824–1964), US
	Presidential strength-conservatism	.49**	1.12	McCann (1997)	33 winning presidential candidates (1824–1964), US (same sample)
Mean effect size		.64***	1.81		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 10,639 (approximate, includes people and years)
Weighted mean effect size		.47***	1.08		
Confidence interval (95%)		[.46, .49]			

^a Correlations are unweighted means aggregated across several different churches.

^b Doty et al. (1991) also attempted to replicate Sales's (1973) analyses regarding police and fire department budgets but reported only that there was no trend with a categorical analysis (without

providing significance levels). They did, however, report a $-.72$ year-by-year correlation with their threat index but express concerns about the validity of such an analytic approach.

* $p < .05$.

** $p < .01$.

*** $p < .001$.

Summary of the Early Evidence

Our review of the evidence from 1958 to 2002 indicated that an individual's location on the left-right dimension of political ideology could be reliably predicted on the basis of social cognitive motives pertaining to the reduction of uncertainty and threat. Nearly all of the specific hypotheses were corroborated. In terms of statistical conventions for classifying effect sizes, one would conclude that moderate effect sizes (with absolute values of weighted mean r s ranging from $.18$ to $.27$) were obtained for variables of uncertainty avoidance; integrative complexity; personal needs for order, structure, and closure; and sensitivity to threat. Even stronger effect sizes were obtained for dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, openness to new experiences, mortality salience, and exposure to system instability or threat (with weighted mean r s ranging from $.32$ to $.50$).

Despite the evidence we brought to bear on these issues, Greenberg and Jonas (2003: 378) rejected the matching hypothesis, claiming: "Need for closure, terror management, uncertainty reduction, prevention focus, and system justification are all best served by embracing and rigidly adhering to and defending *whatever the prevailing ideology is in one's socio-cultural environment*" (emphasis added). It is certainly possible that motives to reduce uncertainty and threat could lead to increased acceptance of culturally available (dominant) ideologies; indeed, this acceptance of the status quo is part of what is meant by psychological conservatism (and system justification). However, the evidence does not warrant acceptance of this availability hypothesis to the exclusion of the matching hypothesis that, all other things being equal, there is a stronger affinity between rightist ideology and psychological needs to reduce uncertainty and threat.

Directly Pitting the Rigidity-of-the-Right Hypothesis against the Ideological Extremity Hypothesis

It is worth taking a closer look at specific studies that enable us to pit some version of the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis against the ideological

extremity hypothesis favored by Greenberg and Jonas (2003). We identified 13 studies published prior to 2003 that allowed for a direct test between competing hypotheses (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b; see [Table 4.13](#)). The linear, asymmetrical pattern of results that is suggested by the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis is illustrated in [Figure 4.2\(a\)](#). The quadratic, symmetrical pattern derived from the extremity hypothesis is illustrated in [Figure 4.2\(b\)](#). A third pattern of results in which both effects are present in combination is illustrated in [Figure 4.2\(c\)](#).

Table 4.13 Summary of Early Research Pitting Directional and Nondirectional Hypotheses

<i>Studies supporting the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis only (see Figure 4.1(a))</i>		
Study	Country of Sample	Psychological Variable
Barker (1963)	US	Dogmatism
Kohn (1974)	England	Intolerance of ambiguity
Sidanius (1978)	Sweden	Intolerance of ambiguity
Sidanius (1985)	Sweden	Cognitive complexity
Kemmelmeier (1997)	Germany	Need for cognitive closure
Fibert & Ressler (1998)	Israel	Intolerance of ambiguity
Chirumbolo (2002)	Italy	Need for cognitive closure
<i>Studies supporting the ideological extremity hypothesis only (see Figure 4.1(b))</i>		
Study	Country of Sample	Psychological Variable
(None)		
<i>Studies supporting both the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis and the ideological extremity hypothesis (see Figure 4.1(c))</i>		
Study	Country of Sample	Psychological Variable
Smithers & Loblely (1978)	England	Dogmatism
Tetlock (1983)	US	Integrative complexity
Tetlock (1984)	England	Integrative complexity
Tetlock et al. (1984)	US	Integrative complexity
Tetlock et al. (1985)	US	Integrative complexity
McClosky & Chong (1985)	US	Intolerance of ambiguity

Source: Jost et al. (2003b).






Figure 4.2 Patterns of results predicted by competing hypotheses. (a) The rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. (b) The ideological extremity hypothesis. (c) Integration of both (a) and (b) hypotheses (independent, additive effects).

Source: Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003b).

Although significance tests were not reported in all cases, means from 7 of the 13 studies conform to the linear pattern illustrated in [Figure 4.2\(a\)](#). In his dissertation research Edwin Barker (1963) surveyed student activists in Ohio and found that organized rightists scored significantly higher in dogmatism ($M = 150.9$) than did nonorganized students ($M = 139.2$), who scored (nonsignificantly) higher than did organized leftists ($M = 135.8$). Paul Kohn (1974) followed student groups in Britain and found that Conservatives scored significantly higher than Socialists and Liberals and marginally higher than Labour Party supporters on intolerance of ambiguity.

Studies by Sidanius (1978) in Sweden and Fibert and Ressler (1998) in Israel also investigated relations between political ideology and intolerance of ambiguity. In both studies significant linear effects were observed, and so were quadratic effects in the direction that was *opposite* to the extremity hypothesis: intolerance of ambiguity *decreased* slightly between the center right and the far right. Sidanius (1985) obtained comparable effects for the association between ideology and cognitive complexity.

Studies conducted in Italy and Germany focused on ideological differences in need for cognitive closure, and both yielded evidence of a significant linear effect and no evidence of a quadratic trend (Chirumbolo, 2002; Kemmelmeier, 1997). Thus, the bulk of evidence reviewed thus far clearly supports the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Confidence is strengthened by the fact that similar results were obtained in six different countries and on such convergent measures as dogmatism, intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognitive closure, and integrative complexity.

By contrast, *no studies provided exclusive support for the ideological extremity hypothesis* taken up by Greenberg and Jonas (2003). Probably the strongest evidence for this position comes from a paper by Herbert McClosky and Dennis Chong (1985) in which descriptive (but not inferential) results from US surveys conducted in 1958 and 1976/1977 were reported. For several items tapping intolerance of ambiguity and psychological rigidity, a preponderance of respondents classified as high came from the far left and far right groups, as compared with moderates. In all cases graphically summarized by McClosky and Chong, however, the

percentage of high scorers from the far right group (63% and 81% for intolerance of ambiguity in 1958 and 1977, respectively, and 39% for rigidity) exceeded the percentage of high scorers from the far left (49%, 75%, and 33%, respectively). Although they did not report full data for center left and center right groups, a footnote stated that “liberals are considerably more tolerant of ambiguity than conservatives” (350). Putting these two pieces of information together, it seems that the McClosky and Chong data would more closely resemble the combined pattern depicted in [Figure 4.2\(c\)](#) than that depicted in [Figure 4.2\(b\)](#).

Five other studies provide evidence consistent with *both* the rigidity-of-the-right and ideological extremity hypotheses, as illustrated in [Figure 4.2\(c\)](#). Smithers and Loble’s (1978: 135) study of dogmatism in Great Britain produced a pattern of results in which “the V-shaped curve did include more of the conservative end of the scale.” Tetlock (1983) observed that moderates in the US Senate scored nonsignificantly higher on integrative complexity ($M = 2.51$) than liberals ($M = 2.38$) but that both groups scored significantly higher than conservatives ($M = 1.79$). Very similar results were obtained in a study of US Supreme Court justices’ opinions on both economic issues and civil liberties (Tetlock et al., 1985).

As mentioned previously, Tetlock’s (1984) study of members of the British House of Commons revealed that the most integratively complex politicians were moderate socialists, who scored significantly higher than extreme socialists, moderate conservatives, and extreme conservatives (who scored lowest in complexity). Finally, Tetlock et al. (1984) noted considerable variation from one congressional session to the next, but averaging across the five sessions he examined, it was clear that conservatives scored considerably lower on integrative complexity ($M = 1.67$) than liberals ($M = 2.33$), who scored slightly lower than moderates ($M = 2.41$). Thus, six of the studies provided partial evidence for the ideological extremity hypothesis. At the same time, *all 13 studies provided at least some evidence for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis*.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has focused on the possibility that several specific motives pertaining to the reduction of uncertainty and threat are associated with an affinity for right-wing conservatism. An analysis in terms of motivated

social cognition helps to integrate seemingly disparate hypotheses derived from early research in personality and social psychology. Aggregating the results across dozens of studies, we see that there is a moderate to strong association between an interrelated set of epistemic, existential, and ideological motives, on one hand, and preferences for conservative, rightist ideology, on the other. The motives discussed in this chapter are tied theoretically to one or both of the two core dimensions that separate left from right, namely, advocacy vs. resistance to social change and rejection vs. acceptance of inequality. According to our theory of motivated social cognition, quests for order, certainty, security, stability, and conformity are psychologically linked to the maintenance of tradition and hierarchy.

At the same time, the socially constructed nature of human belief systems makes it unlikely that a complete explanation of ideological preferences could ever be provided in terms of a single motivational profile, even a multifaceted profile such as the one we are proposing. Ideologies, like other social representations (Moscovici, 1988), may be thought of as possessing a relatively stable core and a more malleable periphery (Abric, 2001), and elements of each may be driven by distinct motivational concerns. The most that can be reasonably expected of a psychological analysis of ideology is that it partially illuminates the processes whereby individuals and social groups are attracted to—or repelled by—the left or right pole, understood in terms of core dimensions of value such as advocating vs. resisting social change and rejecting vs. accepting inequality. Peripheral aspects of ideological differences are by definition highly protean and determined by shifting historical and cultural factors.

It is often taken for granted that in American politics conservatives are for law and order but not gun control, against welfare but generous to corporations, protective of longstanding cultural traditions but unsupportive of contemporary art and music, wary of big government but eager to strengthen the military and police and to weaken the separation of church and state. They are ostensibly committed to individualism and personal freedom but often opposed to extending rights and liberties to disadvantaged minorities, especially sexual minorities and others who blur traditional boundaries. There is no obvious philosophical thread that runs through these diverse positions—nor through their liberal or progressive counterparts—and there is no logical principle that renders them all

internally consistent. It is plausible that their co-occurrence is better explained by psychological than political theory.

That is, conservative beliefs, opinions, and values may acquire ideological coherence to the extent that they assuage feelings of uncertainty and threat by resisting demands for social change and increased egalitarianism while pursuing continuity with long-established traditions and legitimizing hierarchical forms of authority and social organization. Social, cognitive, and motivational factors may also explain why extreme right-wing movements have often been obsessed with purity, cleanliness, hygiene, structure, and order (cf. Haidt, 2012)—things that otherwise appear to have little to do with political philosophy per se—and why religious fundamentalism is so attractive to right-wing parties and their followers in just about every nation stretching from North America to the Middle East.

Some readers might worry that inappropriate, value-laden preferences are being attached to one end of the psychological/ideological spectrum. To be clear, in this chapter we have not argued that it is inherently desirable to be tolerant of uncertainty or ambiguity, low on the need for cognitive closure, or even high in cognitive complexity. In many situations, including the context of electoral politics, liberal characteristics may become serious liabilities, as critics of “squishy,” “wishy-washy,” “flip-flopping,” “egg-headed” liberals know all too well. When a leader expresses intolerance of ambiguity, threat vigilance, the need for cognitive closure, and a disdain for cognitive complexity, he or she might be experienced as authentic, determined, decisive, and loyal. Governing mass societies is presumably easier and more successful when the chief executive wields simple and unambiguous rhetoric, eschews equivocation, and acts in a clear-cut, strong-willed manner.

For a variety of psychological reasons, then, conservative and rightist ideology may have more consistent appeal than liberal and leftist ideology, especially in times of societal crisis, instability, and unpredictability. As Frank Parkin (1967: 282) observed many years ago, conservatives have a built-in political advantage because they are seen as “the political guardians” of “the dominant institutional orders and central values of the society.” Progressive ideology, by contrast, is a form of “political deviance.” The psychological advantages of conservatism may add a practical—as well as a theoretical—justification for focusing especially on

the motives of right-wing conservatives in this chapter. At a time when communism and left-wing extremism have been disappearing from the planet, right-wing extremism is, it seems, on the march again.

¹ Adorno and colleagues (1950) argued that “pseudo-conservatives” failed to uphold defensible conservative principles associated with individualism, meritocracy, equal opportunity, economic competition, and patriotism. Instead, they were said to behave hypocritically. According to the authors, they “emphasize competitiveness as a value, yet they support the concentration of economic power in big business” and “emphasize economic mobility and the ‘Horatio Alger’ myth, yet they support numerous forms of discrimination that put severe limitations on the mobility of large sections of the population” (182).

² We are not assuming that the psychological variables we emphasize are the only ones associated with left-right ideological differences. Some people may adopt leftist or rightist beliefs for reasons having little or nothing to do with resistance to change or tolerance of inequality. They may be motivated, for instance, by perceived self-interest or the desire to share common ground with parents, friends, co-workers, or trusted religious figures (e.g., Cheung et al., 2011; Higgins, 2019; Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008).

³ These articles did not provide sufficient statistical information to estimate a quadratic effect. Nevertheless, inspection of the means reported in these studies suggested that the overall trend was linear rather than curvilinear, with liberals exhibiting the highest levels of integrative complexity and cognitive flexibility.

⁴ Research on enjoyment of humor suggests that conservatives are less likely than liberals to appreciate irony, possibly because of differences in cognitive style (Young et al., 2019).

5

The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives

Dispositional and Situational Factors

The individual's pattern of thought, whatever its content, reflects his [or her] personality and is not merely an aggregate of opinions picked up helter-skelter from the ideological environment.

Adorno et al. (1950: 176)

Ideology, it has been said, is like halitosis—something other people have (Eagleton, 1991: 2). Many of us believe that our adversaries are afflicted with ideological “bias,” but we find it difficult to see our own moral and political convictions as springing from anything other than good sense. Even those who acknowledge holding political or religious beliefs that might be deemed ideological may be reluctant to embrace a psychological explanation for those beliefs. This difficulty confronted William James (1902) when he took on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* and found it prudent to offer this warning:

When I handle [religious phenomena] biologically and psychologically as if they were mere curious facts of individual history, some of you may think it a degradation of so sublime a subject, and may even suspect me, until my purpose gets more fully expressed, of deliberately seeking to discredit the religious side of life. (14–15)

More than a century later, the scientific study of political and religious ideologies is no less controversial—or promising—than it was in the time of William James. It is a field of inquiry to which some seem to object on principle, perhaps because they mistakenly assume that the job of the psychologist is to study abnormal or pathological aspects of human behavior.

In this chapter we dig deeper into the argument that social, economic, and political attitudes may be structured in terms of left and right for reasons that are largely psychological in nature. We begin by reviewing research programs on individual differences in implicit and explicit attitudes before moving on to consider broader dispositional tendencies that may underlie

ideological preferences. Next, we examine situational or contextual variables that are capable of inducing either liberal or conservative shifts in public opinion. When we study the lives of individuals in some detail, we see that ideology very often does play a meaningful role in their public and private lives.

Left-Right Differences in Implicit Preferences

There is much evidence—which we have summarized in preceding chapters—that liberals and conservatives differ in their explicit attitudes or opinions concerning the importance of hierarchy and tradition versus equality and social change. Research suggests these differences emerge even when attitudes are measured using implicit or indirect methods. This is important because it suggests either that left-right proclivities stem from basic, underlying preferences that are prepolitical in nature or, alternatively, that the adoption of specific ideologies leads people to internalize a host of extremely general attitudes concerning stability vs. change and hierarchy vs. equality.

In five related studies (with *Ns* ranging from 1,348 to 1,629) Brian Nosek and I assessed implicit attitudes using the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is an indirect measure of preferences based on an analysis of response latencies (or reaction times). Participants were recruited and randomly assigned to studies through the research site for Project Implicit, where they reported their political orientation on a 7-point scale ranging from “strongly liberal” to “strongly conservative” (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). We examined respondents’ implicit and explicit preferences for values such as *tradition* vs. *progress*, *conformity* vs. *rebelliousness*, *order* vs. *chaos*, *stability* vs. *flexibility*, and *traditional values* vs. *feminism* (see [Table 5.1](#)).

Table 5.1 Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: Means and Simultaneous Prediction of Political Ideology for Five Value Comparisons

Value comparison	Implicit Attitude			Explicit Attitude			Simultaneous Regression Predicting Political Ideology			
	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>ES</i> (<i>d</i>)	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>ES</i> (<i>d</i>)	Implicit (β)	Explicit (β)	<i>R</i> ²
Order-Chaos	1,629	.70	.44	1.60	1.74	1.41	1.23	.124	.131	4.5%
Conforming-Rebellious	1,411	.51	.51	1.00	-.10	1.70	-.06	.093	.322	13.5%
Stable-Flexible	1,348	.01	.51	.02	-.74	1.69	-.44	.190	.131	6.9%
Tradition-Progress	1,592	-.24	.48	-.50	-.72	1.69	-.43	.115	.234	9.1%
Traditional Values-Feminism	1,403	-.28	.51	-.55	-.75	1.98	-.38	.228	.509	46.0%

Note: Implicit = Implicit Association Test (IAT); Explicit = 7-point self-reported preference item from “strongly prefer A to B” to “strongly prefer B to A.” Positive means for IAT and self-report indicate a preference for the first concept compared to the second. Effect size is Cohen’s *d* reflecting discrepancy from no preference. Simultaneous regressions include both implicit and explicit attitudes predicting self-reported political orientation. All beta-weights for simultaneous regressions were significant ($p < .01$).

Source: Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008).

As illustrated in [Figure 5.1](#), participants on average showed strong implicit preferences for *order* over *chaos* (Cohen’s $d = 1.60$) and for *conforming* over *rebellious* ($d = 1.00$), but the magnitude of these preferences increased with participants’ degree of self-reported conservatism ($r [1480] = .17$ and $r [1216] = .21$, respectively). Furthermore, liberals tended to show implicit preferences for *flexible* over *stable* and *progress* over *tradition*, whereas conservatives tended to show weaker or opposite preferences. Linear effects were again observed ($r [1164] = .23$ and $r [1458] = .22$, respectively), with strong liberals exhibiting the most pro-*flexible* and pro-*progress* preferences ($ds = -.20, -.77$), and strong conservatives showing pro-*stable* and pro-*tradition* preferences ($ds = .33, .17$).




Figure 5.1 Implicit preferences for five values pertaining to tradition vs. social change as a function of ideological self-placement.

Note: Mean Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects are shown for each level of a 7-point ideological self-placement scale for five attitudinal topics. Values are Cohen's *ds* with positive values indicating the preference for the first listed category compared to the second. *Source:* Jost, Nosek & Gosling (2008).

The largest difference between liberals and conservatives emerged for the comparison that included both of the core dimensions of resistance to social change and acceptance of inequality, namely *traditional values* vs. *feminism* ($r [1216] = .55$). Whereas conservatives, especially strong conservatives ($d = .84$), implicitly favored *traditional values*, liberals, especially strong liberals ($d = -1.16$), implicitly favored *feminism*. In all five studies, both implicit and explicit preferences uniquely predicted political orientation in a simultaneous regression (see [Table 5.1](#)). That is, implicit preferences

accounted for significant variance in political orientation even after adjusting for the effects of explicit, self-reported preferences.

Furthermore, data based on many thousands of online respondents show that although people in general have implicit preferences for higher-status groups over lower-status groups, such as *straight* over *gay*, *White* over *Black*, *light skin* over *dark skin*, and “*others*” over *Arabs*, liberals show more egalitarian preferences than conservatives do (see [Figure 5.2](#)). A review of results based on very large datasets (*Ns* 28,816 to 732,881) concluded that conservatives possess consistently stronger implicit and explicit preferences than do liberals for each of these higher-status (vs. lower-status) groups (η^2_p range = .006 to .126; Nosek et al., 2007).




Figure 5.2 Implicit preferences for five social group contrasts as a function of ideological self-placement.

Note: Mean Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects are shown for each level of a 7-point ideological self-placement scale for five social group contrasts. Values are Cohen's *ds* with positive values indicating the preference for the first listed category compared to the second. *Source:* Jost, Nosek & Gosling (2008).

The fact that political orientation—even when measured with just a single ideological self-placement item—correlates with a variety of implicit and explicit preferences suggests once again that respondents' cognitive-motivational systems are more ideologically structured than previous generations of social scientists assumed. That is, ideological differences between liberals (or leftists) and conservatives (or rightists) are psychologically as well as politically meaningful. The data on implicit

preferences are consistent with our claim that trade-offs concerning tradition vs. social change and equality vs. hierarchy are at the heart of ideological differences between the left and the right. As the famous curmudgeon Ambrose Bierce observed more than a century ago, a conservative is “enamored of existing evils, as distinguished from the Liberal, who wishes to replace them with others.”

Political Conservatism as a System-Justifying Ideology

To the extent that political conservatives are motivated, at least in part, by desires to maintain the societal status quo, resist activist efforts to change it, and legitimize the existing degree of social and economic inequality in society, they should exhibit stronger system justification tendencies in general (Jost, 2020). The point here is not that liberals and moderates lack system justification motivation—they too prefer to think favorably about their nation and most of its institutions (e.g., marriage, the nuclear family, business, government, and the capitalist system). However, all other things being equal, people who are drawn to conservative (vs. liberal) ideologies would be expected to endorse system-justifying attitudes more enthusiastically.¹

We examined this hypothesis in 26 samples of introductory psychology students at New York University (NYU) between the years of 2004 and 2016 (Jost, Langer, et al., 2017). Over 10,000 students from these years reported their political orientation on a scale ranging from -5 (“Extremely Liberal”) to 5 (“Extremely Conservative”). In 24 of the 26 samples, participants also completed Jost and Thompson’s (2000) 17-item economic system justification scale ($N = 9,761$), and in 23 samples, they completed Kay and Jost’s (2003) 8-item general system justification scale ($N = 9,487$). Results summarized in [Table 5.2](#) confirmed that political conservatism was positively and significantly correlated with system justification. With respect to economic system justification, correlations ranged from $.32$ to $.53$ (weighted average $r = .43$), and with respect to general system justification, correlations ranged from $.17$ to $.46$ (weighted average $r = .34$).

Table 5.2 Bivariate Correlations (and Sample Sizes) between Ideological Self-Placement (Political Conservatism) and System Justification (2004–2016)

Semester and Year	Economic System Justification	General System Justification
Spring 2004	0.414 (338)	N/A
Fall 2004	0.413 (502)	N/A
Spring 2005	0.322 (382)	N/A
Fall 2005	0.422 (419)	0.461 (419)
Spring 2006	0.472 (407)	0.429 (407)
Fall 2006	0.360 (490)	0.419 (490)
Spring 2007	0.426 (376)	0.393 (376)
Fall 2007	0.399 (513)	0.455 (513)
Spring 2008	0.431 (435)	0.413 (435)
Fall 2008	0.427 (489)	0.334 (489)
Spring 2009	0.385 (204)	0.379 (204)
Fall 2009	N/A	0.232 (501)
Spring 2010	N/A	0.317 (446)
Fall 2010	0.449 (470)	0.377 (470)
Spring 2011	0.408 (443)	0.216 (443)
Fall 2011	0.486 (478)	0.334 (478)
Spring 2012	0.456 (405)	0.295 (406)
Fall 2012	0.495 (482)	0.288 (482)
Spring 2013	0.398 (376)	0.174 (376)
Fall 2013	0.416 (395)	0.258 (395)
Spring 2014	0.447 (401)	0.248 (401)
Fall 2014	0.438 (297)	0.366 (297)
Spring 2015	0.424 (362)	0.281 (361)
Fall 2015	0.465 (431)	0.313 (432)
Spring 2016	0.401 (369)	0.356 (369)
Fall 2016	0.529 (297)	0.380 (297)
Range	0.322–0.529	0.174–0.461
Unweighted average	0.426	0.338
Weighted average	0.429	0.335
Total N	9,761	9,487

Note: There were 10,710 participants who completed the ideological self-placement item (54% White/Caucasian, 29.6% Asian/Asian American; 67.5% female, 32.5% male, excluding missing data). Of these participants, 9,761 also completed the economic system justification scale, and 9,487 also completed the general system justification scale. Economic and general system justification are scored so that higher numbers indicate greater system justification. Ideological self-placement is scored so that higher numbers indicate greater conservatism (in general). Numerical entries are zero-order, bivariate correlation coefficients (with sample sizes in parentheses). All correlations are statistically significant, $p < .001$ (two-tailed). N/A = not administered.
Source: Jost, Langer, et al. (2017a).

Shortly before the 2016 US presidential election, we administered measures of ideology and system justification to a nationally representative sample of 1,500 Americans (Azevedo et al., 2017). In accordance with the findings from NYU, we observed that respondents who identified as more rightist (vs. leftist), more socially and economically conservative (vs.

liberal), more aligned with the Republican (vs. Democratic) Party, and more (vs. less) religious scored higher on general and economic system justification (see Table 5.3). Both forms of system justification were associated with retrospective reports of having voted for Republican presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012. Economic—but not general—system justification was strongly associated with a preference for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in 2016. Consistent with self-interest, income and education were positively, albeit modestly, correlated with general and economic system justification. Additional analyses confirmed that economic system justification was strongly associated with intentions to vote for Trump over Clinton at all levels of income and education.

Table 5.3 Bivariate Correlations between System Justification and Political Preferences and Demographic Variables in a Nationally Representative Sample of US Adults (August–September 2016)

	Economic System Justification	General System Justification
General conservatism (self-reported)	.528***	.148***
Social conservatism (self-reported)	.475***	.102***
Economic conservatism (self-reported)	.570***	.167***
Political partisanship	.511***	.109***
Religiosity	.195***	.114***
Income	.195***	.208***
Education	.099**	.124***
Retrospective vote 2008	.498***	.121***
Retrospective vote 2012	.524***	.133***
Liking for Trump	.408***	.095***
Liking for Clinton	–.395***	.068**
Voting intention 2016	.487***	.014

Note: Entries are zero-order, bivariate correlation coefficients ($N = 1,500$). Ideological variables scored so that higher numbers indicate greater conservatism. Economic and general system justification are scored so that higher numbers indicate greater system justification. Retrospective voting variables (for 2008 and 2012) are scored so that higher numbers indicate preference for the Republican candidate (McCain and Romney, respectively) over the Democratic candidate (Obama in both cases). Likewise, voting intention 2016 is scored so that higher numbers indicate a preference for Trump over Clinton.

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Jost, Langer, et al. (2017a).

These patterns are by no means confined to the United States. System justification is almost always positively associated with the endorsement of politically conservative or right-wing ideologies (Jost, 2020: 296–300). This is consistent with the notion that conservatism is an ideology that seeks to

maintain the societal status quo and that rightists, more than leftists, perceive existing social and economic inequalities as legitimate, necessary, and desirable. As shown in Table 5.4, we observe positive correlations (typically .3 or higher) between system justification and right-wing conservatism not only in the United States and the United Kingdom but also in Sweden, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lebanon, New Zealand, and Argentina.²

Table 5.4 Weighted Mean Correlations between System Justification and Political Orientation (Left-Right or Liberal-Conservative) in 12 Countries

Country (Number of Studies)	System Justification Measure(s)	Sample Characteristics	Weighted Mean Correlation
Argentina (2)	Economic	Convenience samples	.414
Finland (1)	General	University students	.440
France (1)	General	Nationally representative	-.170
Germany (1)	General	Nationally representative	.086
Hungary (4)	General, Economic	National sample	.306
Latvia (1)	General	Convenience sample	.228
Lebanon (1)	General	Nationally representative	.318
New Zealand (6)	General, Economic, Gender, Ethnic	Nationally representative	.366
Poland (2)	General	Nationally representative	.088
Sweden (4)	General, Economic	Convenience samples	.451
United Kingdom (2)	General	National, convenience samples	.372
United States (8)	General, Economic, Gender	Nationally representative, convenience samples	.379

Note: All weighted mean correlations in this table are statistically significant at $p < .001$, except for the case of Germany, where $p = .018$.

Source: For more details about the original studies, see Jost (2020, Table 12.2: 296–300).

Why would some individuals in these societies show stronger implicit and explicit preferences for social change, egalitarianism, and system criticism, while others prefer tradition, hierarchy, and system justification? One answer comes from personality psychology. There are general differences between liberals and conservatives on self-report measures of personality traits that have been observed in many Western countries. In addition, my colleagues and I have found that left-right differences emerge on a wide range of much more subtle attitudinal and behavioral outcomes, lending further support to the conclusion that ideology is an important factor in people's everyday lives.

Personality and Politics: Historical Background

Early accounts of personality differences between leftists and rightists focused largely on issues that would come to define the syndrome of authoritarianism. Roger Brown (1965: 478) famously recounted the work of Nazi psychologist Erich Jaensch in the 1930s, who proposed one of the first distinctions between two personality types with clear political significance. The J-type, according to Jaensch, was predisposed to make a good Nazi: “J made definite, unambiguous perceptual judgments and persisted in them. . . . [H]e would recognize that human behavior is fixed by blood, soil, and national tradition . . . would be tough, masculine, firm; a man you could rely on.” By contrast, the S-type was someone of racially mixed heredity and included Jews, “Parisians,” East Asians, and Communists. As Brown observed:

The S-Type [described a] synaesthetic: one who enjoys concomitant sensation, a subjective experience from another sense than the one being stimulated, as in color hearing. Synaesthesia, which we are likely to regard as a poet’s gift, seemed to Jaensch to be a kind of perceptual slovenliness, the qualities of one sense carelessly mixed with those of another . . . characterized by ambiguous and indefinite judgments and to be lacking in perseverance. . . . The S would be a man with so-called “Liberal” views; one who would think of environment and education as the determinants of behavior; one who takes a childish wanton pleasure in being eccentric, S would say “individualistic.” (477)

Adorno and colleagues (1950) absorbed at least a few elements of Jaensch’s description but regarded the aggressive J-type as a societal menace, an authoritarian, a potential fascist—hardly a cultural ideal. The right-wing personality type was recast as rigid, conventional, intolerant, xenophobic, and obedient to authority figures. Brown (1965: 478) noted that “What Jaensch called ‘stability’ we called ‘rigidity’ and the flaccidity and eccentricity of Jaensch’s despised S-Type were for us the flexibility and individualism of the democratic equalitarian.” It is remarkable that such diametrically opposed theorists as Jaensch and Adorno would advance parallel personality theories linking general psychological traits to specific ideological belief systems, but this is only one of many historical volleys in the longstanding effort to capture connections between personality and political orientation.

Members of the Frankfurt School—including Adorno, Reich, Fromm, Horkheimer, and Habermas—were influenced by both Marx and Freud, as we noted in previous chapters. From Marx they inherited the notion that

ideology is derived from economic class interests and material conditions of the capitalist system. But to really understand the dialectical relationship between the individual and society and the allure of political and religious ideologies, these theorists needed a psychology. What was available to them at the time was psychoanalysis, and so members of the Frankfurt School turned to Sigmund Freud's writings on character structure. Freud (1959/1991: 21–26) identified one character structure that seemed especially germane:

The people I am about to describe are noteworthy for a regular combination of the three following characteristics. They are especially *orderly*, *parsimonious*, and *obstinate*. . . . "Orderly" covers the notion of bodily cleanliness, as well as of conscientiousness in carrying out small duties and trustworthiness. . . . Parsimony may appear in the exaggerated form of avarice; and obstinacy can go over into defiance, to which rage and revengefulness are easily joined. . . . [I]t seems to me incontestable that all three in some way belong together. (emphasis added)

Freud (1930/1961: 40–44) referred to the person with this particular constellation of traits—orderliness, parsimony, and obstinacy—as the *anal character*, but one need not retain his scatological terminology to appreciate that these characteristics may co-occur. In the 1930s Robert Sears, the father of political psychologist David Sears, observed in a sample of 37 fraternity brothers that peer ratings of a given individual's degree of orderliness, stinginess (parsimony), and obstinacy were significantly intercorrelated at .36 or higher (Hilgard, 1952: 15–16).

Erich Fromm (1947) built on Freud's conception of the anal character. He dubbed it the *hoarding orientation* and suggested that it was "conservative, less interested in ruthless acquisition than in methodical economic pursuits, based on sound principles and on the preservation of what had been acquired" (81). He described the hoarding character in detail:

This orientation makes people have little faith in anything new they might get from the outside world; their security is based upon hoarding and saving, while spending is felt to be a threat. . . . Their miserliness refers to money and material things as well as to feelings and thoughts. . . . The hoarding person often shows a particular kind of faithfulness toward people and even toward memories. . . . They know everything but are sterile and incapable of productive thinking. . . . One can recognize these people too by facial expressions and gestures. Theirs is the tight-lipped mouth; their gestures are characteristic of the withdrawn attitude. . . . Another characteristic element in this attitude is pedantic orderliness. . . . [H]is orderliness is sterile and rigid. He cannot endure things out of place and will automatically rearrange them. . . . His compulsive cleanliness is another expression of his need to undo contact with the outside world. (65–66)

Although this description seems highly pejorative, Fromm also mentioned positive traits—such as being careful, reserved, practical, methodical, orderly, loyal, and tenacious—along with negative traits, such as being anxious, suspicious, stubborn, cold, stingy, obsessional, and unimaginative.

The few studies of personality and ideology that were carried out between 1955 and 1980 built on the earlier work on authoritarianism but sometimes incorporated additional traits as well. Daryl Bem (1970: 19–21) described unpublished research exploring Fromm’s later (1964) ideas, including the theory that leftists were more “life-loving” (or *biophilous*), whereas rightists were “mechanistic” (or *necrophilous*):

A person with intense love of life is attracted to that which is alive, which grows, which is free and unpredictable. He has an aversion to violence and all that destroys life . . . dislikes sterile and rigid order . . . rejects being mechanized, becoming a lifeless part of machine-like organization. He enjoys life in all its manifestations in contrast to mere excitement or thrills. He believes in molding and influencing by love, reason and example rather than by force. . . . At the other pole, there are individuals attracted to that which is rigidly ordered, mechanical, and unalive. These people do not like anything free and uncontrolled. They feel that people must be regulated within well-oiled machines. (Maccoby, quoted in Bem, 1970: 20)

Questionnaire research suggested that supporters of liberal and leftist candidates in the 1968 presidential primaries scored nearer to the life-loving end of the scale, whereas supporters of conservative and rightist candidates scored nearer to the mechanistic pole. Fromm’s account is noteworthy not only for its originality and the fact that it received some support in the late 1960s but also because some of the traits he identified (e.g., an attraction to unpredictable, unconstrained life experiences vs. self-control, orderliness, and mechanistic coordination) re-emerged in other accounts, including Silvan Tomkins’s (1995) theory of ideological polarity, which we discussed in the previous chapter.

To recount: Tomkins proposed that people adopt ideo-affective postures toward the world that are either leftist (stressing humanism and freedom) or rightist (focusing on rule following and normative concerns). Those who are drawn to the left believe that people are basically good and that society should foster human creativity and experience. Those who are drawn to the right, on the other hand, believe that people are inherently flawed and that society should make and enforce rules to prevent irresponsible behavior. These differences have important implications for emotions and their control:

The left-wing theorist stresses the toxicity of affect control and inhibition, and it therefore becomes a special case of the principle of minimizing negative affect that such control should be kept to a minimum. . . . He is likely to stress the value both to the individual and to society of an openness and tolerance for intrusions of the irrational, of the Dionysian. . . . The right-wing ideologist sets himself sternly against such intrusions and argues for the importance of controlling affects in the interest of morality, achievement, piety. . . . [H]e is for some norm, which may require heroic mobilization of affect and energy to achieve or which may require unrelenting hostility against those who challenge the good. (Tomkins, 1963: 407)

Like Fromm, Tomkins saw advantages to both leftist and rightist personality styles. Whereas the former was linked to humanism, creativity, openness, enthusiasm, excitement, and emotional expression, the latter was linked to norm attainment, conscientiousness, and morality. As we have already seen, early studies showed that liberals were higher in sensation seeking and imaginativeness, whereas conservatives were higher in self-control and orderliness (G. D. Wilson, 1973).

One limitation of research on personality and political orientation in the 20th century is that it was not especially systematic, coordinated, or cumulative. Each investigator proffered a new distinction or way of characterizing leftists and rightists without developing a shared framework for interpreting and integrating theories and findings. To overcome this limitation, Dana Carney, Sam Gosling, and I drew heavily upon the “Big Five” model of personality traits (Carney et al., 2008).

Dispositional Factors: Openness, Conscientiousness, and Political Orientation

To distill a manageable set of personality characteristics that might help to distinguish between leftists and rightists, we began by listing characteristics that figured most prominently in psychological accounts going back to 1930 (see [Table 5.5](#)). To organize the list into thematic categories, we applied the Big Five framework, which provides a descriptive taxonomy for classifying and measuring distinct, relatively nonoverlapping personality dimensions (e.g., see Caprara & Vecchione, 2017). For each of the traits (or clusters of traits) listed in [Table 5.5](#), we sought to determine which of the five basic dimensions best captured the essence of the trait. The result was a remarkable consensus over nearly a century—across multiple languages and cultures—that the two traits most related to left-right political orientation were *openness to new experiences*, often theorized to be higher among

liberal-leftists, and *conscientiousness*, sometimes theorized to be higher among conservative-rightists. The other three dimensions, namely extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, have occasionally been linked to ideology, but references to these have been much less frequent and consistent.

Table 5.5 Personality Characteristics (and Their “Big Five” Classifications) Hypothesized to Be Correlated with Liberal (or Leftist) and Conservative (or Rightist) Political Orientation

Liberal/Leftist	Conservative/Rightist
Slovenly, ambiguous, indifferent ¹ (C–)	Definite, persistent, tenacious ^{1, 2, 5} (C+)
Eccentric, sensitive, individualistic ^{1, 3} (O+)	Tough, masculine, firm ^{1, 2, 3, 18} (C+, A–)
Open, tolerant, flexible ^{2, 3, 9, 20} (O+)	Reliable, trustworthy, faithful, loyal ^{1, 4, 5} (C+, A+)
Life-loving, free, unpredictable ^{7, 8} (O+, C–, E+)	Stable, consistent ^{1, 2} (C+, N–)
Creative, imaginative, curious ^{9, 10, 11, 20} (O+)	Rigid, intolerant ^{2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 15, 18, 20, 22} (O–, A–)
Expressive, enthusiastic ^{9, 22} (O+, E+)	Conventional, ordinary ^{2, 3, 5, 18} (O–, C+)
Excited, sensation seeking ^{9, 10, 11, 20} (O+, E+)	Obedient, conformist ^{2, 3, 18} (O–, C+, A+)
Desiring novelty, diversity ^{9, 20} (O+)	Fearful, threatened ^{2, 15, 18, 20, 22} (N+)
Uncontrolled, impulsive ^{9, 12, 13, 22} (C–, E+)	Xenophobic, prejudiced ^{2, 3, 15, 18, 19} (O–, A–)
Complex, nuanced ^{16, 17, 18, 20, 21} (O+)	Orderly, organized ^{4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 20} (C+)
Open-minded ^{20, 21} (O+)	Parsimonious, thrifty, stingy ^{4, 5} (C+)
Open to experience ^{10, 11, 20, 23, 24, 25} (O+)	Clean, sterile ^{4, 5, 7, 8} (C+)
	Obstinate, stubborn ^{4, 5} (O–, C+, A–)
	Aggressive, angry, vengeful ^{2, 3, 4, 15} (A–)
	Careful, practical, methodical ⁵ (O–, C+)
	Withdrawn, reserved ^{5, 9} (E–)
	Stern, cold, mechanical ^{5, 7, 8, 9} (O–, E–, A–)
	Anxious, suspicious, obsessive ^{5, 6, 15} (N+)
	Self-controlled ^{7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14} (C+)
	Restrained, inhibited ^{7, 8, 9, 22} (O–, C+, E–)
	Concerned with rules, norms ^{7, 8, 9} (C+)
	Moralistic ^{9, 15, 18, 28} (O–, C+)
	Simple, decisive ^{19, 20, 21} (O–, C+)
	Closed-minded ^{20, 21} (O–)
	Conscientious ^{25, 26, 27} (C+)

Note: O = Openness to Experience; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; N = Neuroticism; + = High; – = Low.

Original Sources: ¹ Jaensch (1938); ² Adorno et al. (1950); ³ Brown (1965); ⁴ Freud (1959/1991); ⁵ Fromm (1947); ⁶ Kline & Cooper (1984); ⁷ Maccoby (1968); ⁸ Bem (1970); ⁹ Tomkins (1963); ¹⁰ Levin & Schalmo (1974); ¹¹ Feather (1984); ¹² Milbrath (1962); ¹³ St. Angelo & Dyson (1968); ¹⁴ Costantini & Craik (1980); ¹⁵ G. D. Wilson (1973); ¹⁶ Tetlock (1983, 1984); ¹⁷ Sidanius (1985); ¹⁸ Altemeyer (1998); ¹⁹ Van Hiel et al. (2004); ²⁰ Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003a, 2003b); ²¹ Kruglanski (2004); ²² Block & Block (2006); ²³ McCrae (1996); ²⁴ Barnea & Schwartz (1998); ²⁵ Gosling et al. (2003); ²⁶ Caprara et al. (1999); ²⁷ Rentfrow et al. (2009); ²⁸ Haidt & Hersh (2001).

Source: Carney et al. (2008).

In several US samples we inspected correlations between ideological self-placement and scores on Big Five personality dimensions, focusing especially on openness and conscientiousness. We also sought to ensure that these personality differences were genuine and not merely the result of

divergent self-presentational strategies. This was also important because some of the hypothesized differences, including orderliness, cleanliness, and organization, would be especially likely to emerge in private, nonreactive settings. Therefore, we went beyond traditional self-report methods of personality assessment to explore more subtle, unobtrusive differences in nonverbal behavior, consumer preferences, leisure activities, and personal possessions in living and working spaces (Carney et al., 2008).

Our first goal was to obtain general personality profiles of liberals and conservatives to assess the validity of the theoretical speculations adumbrated in Table 5.5. We hypothesized that liberals would score higher than conservatives on openness to new experiences, whereas conservatives would score higher on conscientiousness. Personality profiles were gathered for six convenience samples (total $N = 19,784$). Samples 1 through 4 were recruited from the University of Texas at Austin (64% female, 36% male; 60% European American, 23% Asian American, and 12% Latino). Sample 5 consisted of more than 17,000 online respondents who completed personality instruments in exchange for direct feedback between 2001 and 2004 (68% female, 32% male; 72% European American, 8% Asian American, 7% African American, 7% Latino, and 1% Native American). Sample 6 was composed of undergraduates at the University of Texas at Austin who participated in exchange for course credit (69% female, 31% male; 54% European American, 20% Asian American, 5% African American, 15% Latino, and 6% “other”).

Sample 1 completed the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R), which contains 240 items, whereas Samples 2, 3, 4, and 5 completed the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI), and Sample 6 completed the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), which includes 2 items tapping each of the Big Five constructs. In Samples 1 through 5, political orientation was assessed using a single ideological self-placement item, and in Sample 6 we administered three ideological self-placement items on scales ranging from 1 (“extremely liberal”) to 5 (“extremely conservative”): (a) “Overall, where would you place yourself on the following scale of liberalism-conservatism?” ($M = 3.01$, $SD = 1.01$); (b) “In terms of social and cultural issues (e.g., abortion, separation of church and state, affirmative action), where would you place yourself on the following scale?” ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.28$); and (c) “In terms of economic issues (e.g., taxation, welfare, privatization of social security), where would you place yourself on the

following scale?” ($M = 3.19$, $SD = 1.04$). Reliability for the composite variable was high ($\alpha = .83$).

We conducted simultaneous regression analyses in which the five personality factors were used to predict participants’ political orientation. Prior to analysis, all variables were transformed to range from 0 to 1 so that the unstandardized regression coefficients would be directly comparable and easily interpretable. Table 5.6 summarizes the results of these analyses.

Table 5.6 Results of Multiple Regression Models: Associations between Big Five Personality Dimensions and Political Ideology

Study	N	Personality Instrument	Political Measure	Unique Association with Liberalism-Conservatism				
				O	C	E	A	N
Study 1	85	NEO-PI-R	ISP	−1.03*** (.26)	.14 (.28)	.29 (.28)	.12 (.29)	−.18 (.25)
Study 2	79	BFI	ISP	−.13 (.21)	.31 (.25)	.13 (.18)	−.03 (.23)	−.01 (.21)
Study 3	155	BFI	ISP	−.66*** (.16)	−.04 (.16)	.04 (.12)	.25 (.15)	.05 (.12)
Study 4	1,826	BFI	ISP	−.43*** (.05)	.11* (.05)	−.02 (.04)	.12** (.05)	−.13*** (.04)
Study 5	17,103	BFI	ISP	−.52*** (.02)	.15*** (.02)	.02 (.01)	.05** (.02)	−.03* (.01)
Study 6	536	TUPI	Composite measure (3 items)	−.24** (.09)	.18* (.07)	.20** (.07)	.08 (.09)	.11 (.07)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b) from multiple regressions in which each of the Big Five scores were entered as simultaneous predictors (with standard errors listed in parentheses). Prior to analysis, all variables were transformed to a 0 to 1 scale by anchoring all variables at zero and dividing each scale by its maximum possible value. ISP = ideological self-placement (with higher scores indicating greater self-identified conservatism).

O = Openness to Experience; C = Conscientiousness; E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; and N = Neuroticism.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Carney et al. (2008).

In Study 1, the five personality factors were significant predictors of ideology, $R = .46$, $F(5, 84) = 4.25$, $p < .01$, and accounted for 21% of the variance. The only significant unique predictor of ideology was openness to new experiences. Because participants in this study completed the NEO-PI-R, which measures six specific facets of each of the Big Five factors, we were able to examine relations between personality and ideology in finer detail. Liberals scored higher than conservatives on all of the openness facets, in terms of *values* ($\beta = -.48$, $t[83] = -4.97$, $p < .001$), *aesthetics* ($\beta =$

$-.32, t [84] = -3.05, p < .003$), *actions* ($\beta = -.27, t [84] = -2.56, p < .02$), *ideas* ($\beta = -.24, t [84] = -2.22, p < .03$), *feelings* ($\beta = -.24, t [84] = -2.27, p < .03$), and, to a marginal extent, *fantasy* ($\beta = -.19, t [84] = -1.79, p < .08$). Liberals also scored higher than conservatives on the *tender-mindedness* facet of the agreeableness subscale ($\beta = -.27, t [84] = -2.54, p < .02$). Conservatives scored higher than liberals on two of the conscientiousness facets, namely *achievement striving* ($\beta = .24, t [84] = 2.26, p < .03$) and *order* ($\beta = .21, t [84] = 1.94, p < .06$).

Study 2 was the only one in which no significant differences were observed. In Study 3, the five personality factors accounted for a significant amount of the variance (13%) in political orientation, $R = .35, F (5, 154) = 4.25, p < .001$. As in Study 1, openness emerged as the only significant predictor in the simultaneous regression model (see [Table 5.6](#)).

With respect to Study 4, based on the largest university sample, the five personality factors were all significant predictors of ideological self-placement, $R = .25, F (5, 1824) = 24.42, p < .001$; they accounted for 6% of the variance. Openness was again the largest unique predictor, with liberals scoring higher. In this sample, conservatives scored slightly higher on conscientiousness and agreeableness and lower on neuroticism (or emotional instability).

For the large online sample, the overall model was statistically significant, $R = .28, F (5, 17097) = 282.37, p < .001$, and accounted for 8% of the variance in ideology. Openness was the largest unique predictor, with liberals again scoring higher. Conscientiousness was the second largest unique predictor, with conservatives scoring higher. Two other personality factors were statistically significant predictors of ideology, but they accounted for a negligible amount of variance. Conservatives scored slightly higher on agreeableness and slightly lower on neuroticism.

The sample size for Study 5 allowed us to incorporate demographic variables. We conducted a stepwise regression model with sex of participant, race/ethnicity (coded as White vs. non-White), and socioeconomic status (SES) entered in Step 1 to determine whether the effects of the five personality factors used to predict ideology in Step 2 would be altered after adjusting for demographic variables. Race/ethnicity and SES were significant predictors of ideology in Step 1, indicating that European Americans and higher-SES individuals were more conservative than members of ethnic minority and lower-SES groups ($\beta = .07, t [5557] = 5.43$,

$p < .001$; $\beta = .04$, $t [5557] = 2.90$, $p < .01$, respectively). Importantly, none of the effects of personality were substantially altered by including demographic variables in the model.

In Study 6, the overall model was statistically significant, $R = .20$, $F (5, 476) = 3.89$, $p < .005$, and accounted for 3% of the variance in the composite measure of ideology. As before, openness was positively associated with liberalism, and conscientiousness was positively associated with conservatism. In this sample, conservatives also scored higher on extraversion and slightly lower on neuroticism. There was some evidence that personality differences were more clearly associated with social than economic attitudes.

We conducted an internal meta-analysis to estimate the overall effect sizes. Results are illustrated in [Figure 5.3](#). Combining participants from all six samples, we observed that the weighted mean effect size for the association between openness and liberalism was $r = -.25$, which was significantly different from zero ($Z = 11.30$, $p < .001$). The weighted mean effect size for the association between conscientiousness and conservatism was substantially weaker but still significant at $r = .07$ ($Z = 3.13$, $p < .05$). Agreeableness, extraversion, and neuroticism were not consistent predictors of political orientation, contrary to the suppositions of Jaensch (1938) and G. D. Wilson (1973).




Figure 5.3 Associations between Big Five personality scores and ideological self-placement: a meta-analytic summary of six studies.

Note: Effect size estimates are weighted mean correlations (r s), aggregating results across six studies (total $N = 19,331$). Each “Big Five” dimension was correlated with ideological self-placement as measured using a single-item 5-point ideological self-placement scale, with higher numbers indicating more conservatism and lower numbers indicating more liberalism. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed). *Source:* The figure is adopted from Jost (2006) and based on data from Carney et al. (2008).

Although these initial studies were based on convenience samples, the same pattern of results has been replicated many times in larger and more diverse samples, including nationally representative samples (Caprara & Vecchione, 2017; Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak, 2010). Chris Sibley and colleagues (2012) meta-analyzed 73 studies of personality and political orientation based on data from more than 70,000 research participants. Although most of the studies were conducted in North America and Western Europe, others were conducted in Poland, Turkey, Israel, and New Zealand. Their meta-analysis confirmed the robustness of our original observations:

openness to new experiences predicts a liberal/leftist orientation, whereas conscientiousness predicts a conservative/rightist orientation.

Other research suggested that one facet of agreeableness, namely compassion, predicted liberalism, whereas a different facet, politeness, predicted conservatism (Hirsh et al., 2010). No consistent ideological differences have been observed with respect to specific facets of extraversion or neuroticism. Some researchers prefer the HEXACO model, which specifies six—rather than five—major factors of personality, and they find that liberals and leftists score higher than conservatives and rightists on the trait of honesty-humility (e.g., Leone et al., 2012).

Taken as a whole, the evidence confirms that Fromm, Adorno and his colleagues, Tomkins, Wilson, and others correctly perceived certain correspondences between personality and ideology when they proposed that leftists were more motivated by creativity, curiosity, and openness to new experiences, whereas rightists were more orderly, parsimonious, rigid, and motivated by self-control, norm attainment, and rule following. To an impressive extent, the results are consistent with the list of traits in [Table 5.5](#), most of which pertained to either openness or conscientiousness. However, there is little evidence that any of the other three Big Five dimensions are strongly or consistently related to left-right ideology.

The Things They Leave Behind: Evidence of Behavioral Residue

Despite the consistency of findings based on Big Five research, there are limitations to what can be gleaned from self-report measures of personality, and this type of research says little about how dispositional differences between liberals and conservatives play out in daily life. It is useful to be able to describe liberals as relatively high on openness but low on conscientiousness and conservatives as high on conscientiousness but low on openness. But what are the behavioral implications of these differences? Can we be sure that they reflect something more than self-presentational strategies?

To address questions such as these, Sam Gosling, Dana Carney, and I conducted a follow-up study in which we focused on behavioral residue, that is, the things that people leave behind in the physical spaces they occupy, such as bedrooms and offices (Carney et al., 2008). It was designed to move beyond explicit, self-report measures of personality and to deepen our understanding of the similarities and differences in the private as well as

public lives of liberals and conservatives. The study was at one point featured on the ABC news show *Nightline*.

As noted in [Chapter 4](#), liberals are higher than conservatives on sensation seeking and aesthetic curiosity—traits that are linked to experiential openness. To the extent that people manipulate their living and work environments to regulate their arousal levels, more liberal stimulus seekers ought to prefer bright, cheerful, colorful styles of décor. We therefore hypothesized that the rooms of liberals would exhibit more cues associated with openness, including style, color, and distinctiveness, and they would contain a greater number and diversity of books, music, travel documents, and art supplies. Conversely, we expected that rooms of conservatives would exhibit more cues associated with conscientiousness, such as neatness, organization, conventional forms of decoration, and a larger number of items such as calendars and cleaning supplies.

“Bedroom volunteers” were 76 students at the University of California at Berkeley with a mean age of 21.9 years (68% female, 32% male). The two largest ethnic groups represented were Asian Americans (40.5%) and European Americans (36.5%); the remaining 23% identified with other racial/ethnic groups. Personal living spaces included rented rooms in private houses, apartments, dormitories, co-ops, and Greek-system housing. “Office volunteers” were 94 employees with an average age of 37 years (59% female, 41% male; 85% European American). They worked in one of five types of offices, including a real estate agency, advertising agency, architectural firm, business school, and retail bank.

Teams of research assistants coded a wide range of environmental attributes using the Personal Living Space Cue Inventory (PLSCI), the first part of which includes 43 global descriptors on which coders make ratings on attributes such as well lit vs. dark, and the second part of which includes 385 specific content items such as “ironing board.” Occupants’ photographs and other identifying information were covered before coders entered the rooms, and coders were not permitted to communicate while making the global ratings. However, they were permitted to communicate with each other while coding specific PLSCI items to point out things that other coders might miss.

As shown in [Table 5.7](#), the bedrooms of conservatives included more organizational items, including event calendars and postage stamps. They also contained more conventional decorations and items, including sports

paraphernalia, flags of various types, and US flags in particular, as well as alcohol bottles and containers. Conservative bedrooms were somewhat neater, cleaner, fresher, better organized, and well lit. They were also more likely to contain household cleaning and mending accessories such as laundry baskets, irons and ironing boards, and string or thread. These observations echo Freudian ideas that preoccupations with cleanliness, hygiene, and order are stronger on the political right. Conservatives' office spaces were also more conventional, less stylish, and less comfortable, in comparison with liberals' office spaces.

Table 5.7 Associations between the Ideological Self-Placement of the Occupant and Room Cues in Bedrooms and Office Spaces

	Associations with Liberalism-Conservatism			
	Bedrooms		Offices	
	β	b (SE)	β	b (SE)
Sports-related décor	.34**	.23 (.07)	n/a	n/a
Event calendar	.31**	.27 (.10)	n/a	n/a
Postage stamps	.30**	.29 (.11)	n/a	n/a
Presence of string/thread	.29*	.33 (.12)	n/a	n/a
Iron and/or ironing board	.28*	.20 (.08)	n/a	n/a
Laundry basket	.25*	.11 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Conventional (vs. unconventional)	n/a	n/a	.25*	.02 (.01)
Any type of flag (including USA flags)	.23*	.22 (.11)	n/a	n/a
Alcohol bottles/containers	.23*	.22 (.11)	n/a	n/a
American flag	.21 ⁺	.28 (.15)	n/a	n/a
Well lit (vs. dark)	.20 ⁺	.27 (.15)	.10	.03 (.03)
Fresh (vs. stale)	.17	.27 (.18)	-.22 ⁺	-.08 (.05)
Neat (vs. messy)	.16	.14 (.11)	.02	.003 (.02)
Clean (vs. dirty)	.15	.19 (.15)	.14	.03 (.03)
Modern (vs. old-fashioned)	.15	.33 (.26)	-.27*	-.10 (.04)
Colorful (vs. gloomy)	.12	.15 (.15)	-.21 ⁺	-.07 (.04)
Stylish (vs. unstylish)	.06	.10 (.21)	-.32**	-.09 (.03)
Comfortable (vs. uncomfortable)	-.01	-.01 (.22)	-.24*	-.11 (.05)
Organized (vs. disorganized) music	-.10	-.11 (.13)	-.07	-.01 (.05)
Cluttered (vs. uncluttered)	-.11	-.14 (.14)	.13	.02 (.02)
Distinctive (vs. ordinary)	-.11	-.19 (.19)	-.39***	-.16 (.05)
Full (vs. empty)	-.15	-.27 (.20)	.19	.04 (.02)
Varied (vs. homogenous) music	-.19	-.23 (.16)	.18	.004 (.01)
Books about travel	-.21 ⁺	-.10 (.06)	n/a	n/a
Classic rock music	-.22 ⁺	-.11 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Modern rock music	-.22 ⁺	-.10 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Reggae music	-.22 ⁺	-.18 (.09)	n/a	n/a
Collections (stamps, action figurines, etc.)	-.22 ⁺	-.09 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Cultural memorabilia (vacation souvenirs)	-.22 ⁺	-.13 (.07)	n/a	n/a
Tickets for/from travel	-.22 ⁺	-.21 (.11)	n/a	n/a
Many (vs. few) music compact discs (CDs)	-.23*	-.28 (.14)	-.31*	-.24 (.09)
Books about ethnic topics	-.24*	-.13 (.06)	n/a	n/a
Folk music	-.24*	-.12 (.06)	n/a	n/a
Tape dispenser	-.24*	-.12 (.06)	n/a	n/a
Movie tickets	-.25*	-.17 (.08)	n/a	n/a
Books about feminist topics	-.25*	-.24 (.11)	n/a	n/a
Books about music	-.25*	-.22 (.10)	n/a	n/a
Oldies music	-.25*	-.22 (.10)	n/a	n/a
Maps of foreign countries	-.25*	-.14 (.06)	n/a	n/a
Many (vs. few) books	-.25*	-.27 (.12)	-.11	-.02 (.02)
Many (vs. few) items of stationery	-.26*	-.27 (.12)	-.18	-.10 (.07)
World music	-.26*	-.13 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Art supplies	-.27*	-.12 (.05)	n/a	n/a
Variety of music	-.27*	-.34 (.14)	n/a	n/a

	Associations with Liberalism-Conservatism			
	Bedrooms		Offices	
	β	$b (SE)$	β	$b (SE)$
Varied (vs. homogenous) books	-.34**	-.40 (.13)	-.29 ⁺	-.09 (.05)

Note: $N = 76$ for all bedroom cues except for varied (vs. homogenous) books ($n = 73$), organized (vs. disorganized) music ($n = 67$), and varied (vs. homogenous) music ($n = 62$). $N = 68$ for all office cues except for varied (vs. homogenous) books ($n = 42$). It should be noted that because of the fairly large number of statistical tests conducted, it is possible that some of the significant findings were obtained by chance. In all, 3.1 significant results would be expected by chance alone (62 comparisons at an alpha level of .05). This analysis yielded 29 significant results and another 12 that were of marginal significance. n/a = not applicable.

⁺ $p < .09$,

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Carney et al. (2008).

The bedrooms of liberals revealed that their occupants were higher on openness to new experiences. They contained a significantly greater number and variety of books, including books about travel, ethnic issues, feminism, and music, as well as a greater amount and variety of music, including world music, folk music, classic and modern rock, and “oldies.” Liberal bedrooms also contained more art supplies, stationery, movie tickets, and items related to travel, such as foreign maps, books about travel, and cultural memorabilia. Offices and workspaces used by liberals were judged by the coders as being more distinctive, colorful, and “fresh,” and as containing more music and a greater variety of books.

In studies employing very different methods of observation, then, we see that personality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant. Many observations made by psychologists and others over several decades about the ways in which personality traits are linked to political orientation fared surprisingly well (see [Table 5.5](#)). The evidence indicates that liberals tend to be more open, tolerant, creative, curious, expressive, enthusiastic, and drawn to novelty and diversity, in comparison with conservatives, who tend to be more conventional, orderly, organized, neat, clean, withdrawn, and reserved.

Everyday Preferences and Personal Activities

In further pursuit of the idea that left-right ideological differences are psychologically meaningful, we investigated the relationship between ideology and personal preferences and activities in two samples of

undergraduates at the University of Texas (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Data were collected in 2000 and 2004 as part of a broader study of lifestyle activities, preferences, attitudes, and values. Participants answered three items that were used to determine political orientation, including a liberal-conservative self-placement item and items tapping attitudes toward Democrats (reverse-scored) and Republicans ($\alpha = .84$ and $.91$ in 2000 and 2004, respectively).

Again we focused on stimuli that were linked to openness and conscientiousness, such as artistic and creative endeavors and conventional adherence to social norms, as well as traditionalism, resistance to social change, acceptance of inequality, and system justification. Results summarized in [Tables 5.8](#) and [5.9](#) demonstrate that ideology was indeed significantly correlated with these variables. For instance, liberalism was positively associated with an appreciation of novel and different experiences—including foreign food, film, and travel—as well as reflective forms of artistic expression, such as poetry and jazz. Liberals were also more favorably disposed toward libertarians, atheists, street people, countercultural forms of physical expression (tattoos), and pleasure seeking (e.g., sex, erotica, and recreational drugs).

Table 5.8 Lifestyle Correlates of Ideological Self-Placement

Openness, Tolerance, and Sensation-Seeking	Correlation with Liberalism-Conservatism	
	2000 (<i>N</i> = 609)	2004 (<i>N</i> = 762)
Liberals were more favorable toward . . .		
Atheists	-.22***	n/a
Poetry	-.17***	n/a
Asian food	-.15***	n/a
Jazz	-.14***	n/a
Street people	-.12**	n/a
Libertarians	n/a	-.33***
Tattoos	n/a	-.21***
Foreign films	n/a	-.18***
Different foods	n/a	-.17***
Erotica	n/a	-.15***
Big cities	n/a	-.11**
Recreational drugs	n/a	-.10**
Sex	n/a	-.09*
Foreign travel	n/a	-.08*

Conventionalism, Traditionalism, and Adherence to Social Norms

Conservatives were more favorable toward . . .		
Fraternities/sororities	.27***	.27***
Religious people	.24***	n/a
SUVs	.23***	.33***
Christians	.22***	n/a
High school	.17***	n/a
Fishing	.17***	n/a
Alcohol	.15***	n/a
The idea of getting married	.14***	n/a
Their childhood	.14***	.13***
Watching TV	.13**	.09*
The idea of having children	.10*	n/a
Prayer	n/a	.41***
Newspaper subscriptions	n/a	.17***
Their father	n/a	.16***
Sports	n/a	.16***
Brand logos	n/a	.13***

Note: Entries are zero-order correlation coefficients. n/a = not administered.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008)

Table 5.9 Attitudinal Correlates of Ideological Self-Placement

Social Change and Egalitarianism	Correlation with Liberalism-Conservatism	
	2000 (N = 609)	2004 (N = 762)
Liberals were more favorable toward . . .		
Remedying social injustices	-.18***	n/a
Gay unions	n/a	-.48***
Welfare	n/a	-.38***
Universal health care	n/a	-.34***
Feminists	n/a	-.30***
Environmentalists	n/a	-.30***
Vegetarians	n/a	-.25***
Affirmative action	n/a	-.23***
System Justification		
Conservatives were more favorable toward . . .		
Big corporations	.29***	.33***
The idea of women staying at home	.26***	n/a
The rich	.20***	n/a
Marriage	.18***	n/a
God	.17***	n/a
Politicians	.11**	n/a
Government	.10*	.34***
Police	.08*	.17***
Military	n/a	.41***
The state they live in	n/a	.38***
Most Americans	n/a	.26***
The American flag	n/a	.23***

Note: Entries are zero-order correlation coefficients. n/a = not administered.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Jost, Nosek, and Gosling (2008).

Other studies have found that the relationship between openness and liberalism is mediated by cultural exposure, such that individuals who are higher in openness read more books, articles, and newspapers and watch a greater number and variety of films and videos, and these forms of cultural exposure foster a more liberal ideology (Xu et al., 2013). Liberals also expose themselves to a wider range of musical styles and to books and movies that may be considered “dark” or “alternative,” such as science fiction, horror movies, and cult films, whereas conservatives prefer more conventional forms of entertainment, such as soap operas, westerns, romances, game shows, reality television, cop shows, war movies, action adventures, and sporting events (Xu & Peterson, 2017; see also Rogers, 2020).

All of this is consistent with the observation that the preferences and tastes of conservatives are more conventional than those of liberals. At the University of Texas, we found that conservatives expressed more favorable attitudes toward fraternities and sororities as well as the ideas of getting married and having children. In general, conservative students opted for more mainstream activities—including sports, fishing, reading the newspaper, and watching TV—and expressed more approval of their fathers, in comparison with their liberal counterparts. Conservatism was also associated with increased commitment to religious traditions such as prayer (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).

Liberals were also more likely to endorse egalitarian causes, such as same-sex marriage, welfare provisions, and universal health care; hold favorable attitudes about system-challenging activists such as feminists and environmentalists; and express concern about social injustice. Conservatives, on the other hand, were more positive about rich people and the idea of women staying at home. As expected, conservatives were also more approving than liberals of a wide range of institutions, authorities, and symbols associated with the preservation of the status quo, including the military, police, government, politicians, big corporations, and the American flag. These findings provide additional evidence that an elective affinity exists between political conservatism and system justification tendencies (Jost, 2020).

Most, but perhaps not all, of the differences we have observed can be understood in terms of two basic personality dimensions identified in research on the Big Five, namely openness to new experiences and conscientiousness (see also Caprara & Vecchione, 2017; Gerber et al., 2010; Mondak, 2010; Sibley et al., 2012). Importantly, personality differences between liberals and conservatives are manifested not only on self-report measures but also on unobtrusive, nonverbal measures of behavior (Carney et al., 2008; Rogers, 2020; Xu & Peterson, 2017; Xu et al., 2013). Thus, psychological differences between liberals and conservatives do not appear to be the superficial result of self-presentational strategies. This does not mean, however, that ideology is unaffected by situational variables. On the contrary, there is a good deal of research suggesting that contextual factors such as threat—and its alleviation—can and do produce ideological shifts, as we will see next.

Situational Factors: Predicting Shifts in Political Orientation

It is important to keep in mind that not all psychological concomitants of political ideology are dispositional in nature. Scholars have identified a number of situational or contextual factors that are capable of bringing about ideological shifts in either a liberal or conservative direction. Consistent with the notion that it may be easier to make a liberal more conservative than to make a conservative more liberal, there has been more systematic research on the former possibility than the latter. Nevertheless, there are some environmental factors that seem to be capable of triggering liberal shifts, at least under some circumstances.

Contextual Triggers of Liberal Shift

Social scientific research has long suggested that experiences such as education and travel—which presumably increase openness to new experiences by rendering uncertainty less aversive and the unfamiliar less threatening—may increase the affinity for liberal, progressive, and egalitarian ideas (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Lipset, 1982). This is consistent with our observations that liberals expressed more interest in foreign culture and travel (see [Table 5.8](#)) and that the bedrooms of liberals contained more travel tickets, books on travel, and international maps ([Table 5.7](#)).

There is informal evidence that holding an occupation that requires understanding and appreciating multiple, potentially conflicting arguments and sources of evidence contributes to liberal shift. Seymour Lipset (1982) studied the political opinions of experienced academics and found that strong liberal sympathies prevailed, an observation that has been made—and, in certain circles, lamented—many times since then. A more dramatic example comes from studies of US Supreme Court justices over the past several decades, many of whom—like John Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy—adopted increasingly liberal stances after becoming high-court justices, despite having been nominated by Republican presidents. The explanation for the shift offered by legal scholars Jon Hanson and Adam Benforado (2006) was that “The job of judging, unlike most occupations, strongly encourages individuals to see sides of an issue that are otherwise easily ignored. And the information that emerges may help explain why juridical drift is so often leftward.”

Although education, travel, and occupational demands are very expensive “interventions,” there is experimental evidence that temporary liberal shifts may be effected by fairly minimal changes in the immediate situation. A pair of experiments conducted by Christopher Bryan and colleagues (2009) found that asking Stanford University students to reflect upon the ways in which luck, good fortune, and the social support of others played a crucial role in their academic success led the students to embrace more liberal opinions, in comparison with students who were asked to ponder the role of meritocratic factors such as hard work and self-discipline. In another research program, reading about social injustices—such as cases of corporate misconduct or circumstances in which young children have been denied health insurance coverage or safe drinking water—was found to increase support for liberal policies designed to address these injustices (Eadeh & Chang, 2020).

Some studies use framing techniques to increase the palatability of liberal ideas among conservative audiences. For instance, Matthew Feinberg and Robb Willer (2013) exposed conservatives to disgusting and threatening images about the effects of pollution, and this led them to express more support for pro-environmental initiatives. The same researchers also found that US conservatives could be persuaded to be more open to (a) President Obama’s Affordable Health Care Act by implying that it would reduce the number of “unclean, infected, and diseased Americans” and (b) same-sex marriage by describing same-sex couples in system-justifying terms such as “proud and patriotic Americans” (Feinberg & Willer, 2015).

Experiments by Jaime Napier and her colleagues (2018) demonstrated that alleviating the sense of threat among Republicans—by asking them to fantasize that they possessed a “superpower” that rendered them invulnerable to physical harm—decreased their levels of social conservatism. Thinking about a different superpower, the ability to fly, did not have the same effect. The authors proposed that “Just as threat can turn liberals into conservatives, safety can turn conservatives into liberals—at least while those feelings of threat or safety last” (193). In another line of work, Luguri et al. (2012) induced conservatives to adopt a highly abstract (vs. concrete) mindset, and this had the effect of increasing their tolerance for groups perceived as deviating from Judeo-Christian values, such as gay men, lesbians, atheists, and Muslims.

Joris Lammers and Matt Baldwin (2018) of the University of Cologne in Germany demonstrated that appealing to conservatives' feelings of nostalgia by using past-focused temporal communication could lead them to embrace more liberal policy outcomes. In one experiment, resistance to pro-diversity social messages was attenuated by exposing conservatives to an open-minded Superman comic strip from the 1940s. In another, a persuasive appeal to return "to the old days, where people may have owned hunting rifles and pistols, but no one had assault rifles," made conservatives more open to gun control. Additional experiments demonstrated that nostalgia could be used to undermine support for right-wing rhetoric—but only when the past was characterized as more civil than the present (Lammers & Baldwin, 2020). These studies are intriguing and valuable, but questions can be raised about whether they actually bring about ideological shifts or merely create the impression that liberal policy solutions are not so liberal after all.

Contextual Triggers of Conservative Shift

External circumstances can also lead people to become more politically conservative than they otherwise would be. For instance, insecurity about parenthood—taking on the huge responsibility of protecting vulnerable youngsters—as well as exposure to rapid social change and prospects of social decline (the feeling that "things are going to hell in a hand basket") can lead people to move toward conservatism and away from liberalism (Eibach & Libby, 2009).

Highly threatening events such as terrorist attacks, economic crises, demographic shifts, and pandemic diseases heighten epistemic and existential needs to manage uncertainty and threat and may produce a conservative shift in much, but not all, of the population. Psychological research confirmed what many observers of US public opinion noticed in the aftermath of 9/11, namely that intense threats to one's own mortality and to the stability of the social system increased the appeal of conservative leaders and opinions. In 2004, the comedian Dennis Miller captured the psychology of conservative shift aptly in various media appearances: "I'll be honest with you, 9 / 11 changed me. I'm shocked it didn't change everybody as much as it changed me. . . In dangerous times, I think this country has to cover its ass. . . As far as homeland protection, I am to the right. . . If some psycho from another country wants to blow up [a gay] wedding, I expect my government

to kill him pre-emptively. I guess that makes me a right-wing fanatic, and I'm more than happy to bask in that assignation.”

In experimental studies, reminders of terrorist attacks and mortality salience apparently caused many liberal college students to switch their support to President George W. Bush (Cohen et al., 2005; Landau et al., 2004). In another research program, increasing the salience of terrorism led research participants in Germany to embrace more conservative, system-justifying attitudes (Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). These findings are consistent with evidence of rightward shifts in public opinion following terrorist attacks in Madrid, Spain, in 2004 (Echebarria & Fernandez, 2006); London, England, in 2005 (Van de Vyver et al., 2016); and Paris, France, in 2015 (Jost, 2019a; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019; see [Figure 4.1](#)). We will return to this issue in [Chapter 7](#).

A Longitudinal Study of High-Exposure Survivors of the World Trade Center Attacks

To explore the dynamics of conservative shift more deeply, George Bonanno, a clinical psychologist at Columbia University, and I followed a small but important group of people whose lives were upended by the events of September 11, 2001. By following proximal survivors of the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks in New York City for a period of 18 months, we were able to assess their political attitudes—including political orientation, party identification, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), and self-reported change in liberalism-conservatism following 9/11—in light of trauma exposure and patterns of coping and adjustment over time. We investigated whether exposure to traumatic stress on the morning of 9/11—as well as intensified trauma symptoms in its aftermath—would be associated with conservative shift on the part of WTC survivors, or whether these factors would have no consistent effect on political attitudes or lead people to cling more strongly to their own prior ideological commitments (Bonanno & Jost, 2006).

We also explored how embracing conservatism might be associated with survivors' levels of psychological adjustment in the months following the attacks. One possibility, consistent with Adorno and colleagues' (1950) theory of the authoritarian personality, was that right-wing reactions would not resolve underlying emotional conflict and could in fact hinder healthy adaptation by perseverating on the desire for vengeance and violent solutions to the threat of terrorism. Feelings of hatred and desire for revenge are often

associated with psychiatric symptoms in populations exposed to war and ethnic atrocities. Thoughts of revenge in response to crime and even environmental disasters—in which there is no clearly identifiable perpetrator—are known to predict symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

We measured political orientation, RWA, and self-reported change in political orientation in a sample of 45 high-exposure survivors of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. They were 18 men and 27 women (82% European American, 11% Asian American, 2% African American) who ranged in age from 23 to 59 years ($M = 39.16$, $SD = 11.03$) and whose annual incomes averaged over \$70,000 per year. Most worked in office jobs, including finance, research, support staff, and sales. At the time the first plane struck the WTC, a quarter of the sample was inside one of the two WTC towers, another 40% was within four blocks of the WTC, and the rest were at least four blocks away. More than half of the sample witnessed people jumping from the WTC towers, and 84% observed dead bodies at some point during the attack.

By conducting a longitudinal study, we were able to obtain data bearing on two sets of empirical associations, namely (a) the effects of trauma and threat (measured at wave 1) on ideology and perceived changes in ideology (measured at wave 2) and (b) the effects of ideology (and perceived changes in ideology that occurred in the 18 months following 9/11) on coping responses and mental health symptoms (measured at wave 2). To explore how ideology was related to patterns of long-term adjustment, we mapped two prototypical symptom trajectories observed in the aftermath of traumatic experiences. Participants exhibiting the worst outcome, characterized by elevated levels of depression and PTSD symptoms at each assessment, were categorized as having a *chronic symptom trajectory*. By contrast, participants who showed healthy adjustment, with few signs of depression or PTSD at either assessment, were categorized as having a *resilient outcome trajectory*. We also considered a range of personal reactions to 9/11, including the desire for revenge, militarism and patriotism, religiosity, and cynicism. We were especially interested in two indicators of positive coping, namely the use of humor and posttraumatic growth, which involves personal development and the perception that new interests and opportunities can come from experiences of trauma.

We also administered six items ($\alpha = .76$) from the RWA scale: (a) “What our country *really* needs, instead of more ‘civil rights,’ is a good dose of law

and order”; (b) “Some of the worst people in our country nowadays are those who do not respect our flag, our leaders, and the normal way things are supposed to be done”; (c) “We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the lifeblood of progressive change” (reverse-scored); (d) “People should pay *less* attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral” (reverse-scored); (e) “The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back on our true path”; and (f) “It is wonderful that young people can protest anything they don’t like, and act however they wish nowadays” (reverse-scored). Self-identified conservatism and RWA were very highly intercorrelated in this sample ($r = .70, n = 45, p < .001$).

We hypothesized that people who had been in or near the WTC on 9/11 would report increased conservatism in the 18 months following the terrorist attack, regardless of their partisan identification. This hypothesis was supported. For the sample as a whole, almost three times as many respondents ($n = 17$ or 38%) indicated that since 9/11 they had grown “more conservative” than “more liberal” ($n = 6$ or 13% of the sample), $\chi^2 = 5.26, df = 1, p < .03$. The remaining 49% reported that their attitudes had not changed since 9/11.

More Democrats (35% vs. 23%), more Independents (50% vs. 0%), and more Republicans (50% vs. 0%) reported conservative than liberal shifts. We also parsed the data according to self-reported voting behavior in previous presidential elections. Self-reported conservative shifts following 9/11 were more common than liberal shifts even among people who voted for Bill Clinton in 1992 (32% vs. 16%) and 1996 (34% vs. 16%) and Al Gore in 2000 (40% vs. 12%). Thus, conservative shift occurred in Democrats as well as Republicans.

To maximize statistical power, we collapsed self-reported changes in ideology (with three levels) into a single binary variable, contrasting participants who became more conservative ($n = 17$) with those who either remained the same or became more liberal ($n = 28$). This allowed us to gauge the presence or absence of perceived conservative shift. We saw no evidence that embracing conservatism played a constructive role in coping and adjustment.

On the contrary, right-wing orientation was linked to PTSD. Symptoms of PTSD measured seven months after the terrorist attacks were significantly correlated with RWA ($r = .46, p < .001$), conservatism ($r = .29, p < .05$), and the perception of having experienced a conservative shift ($r = .25, p < .05$) at 18 months. A year and a half after 9/11, PTSD remained a significant correlate of RWA ($r = .38, p < .01$), conservatism ($r = .29, p < .05$), and perceived conservative shift ($r = .32, p < .05$). Depression measured at seven months was also strongly correlated with RWA ($r = .46, p < .001$), conservatism ($r = .29, p < .05$), and perceived conservative shift ($r = .28, p < .05$) at 18 months. When measured at 18 months, depression was no longer associated with conservatism, but it was still associated with RWA ($r = .26, p < .05$) and conservative shift ($r = .31, p < .05$). These findings are consistent with the notion that some people embrace authoritarian solutions to cope with severe distress and feelings of threat, but this coping style is not beneficial in terms of mental health.

When we compared participants who exhibited a chronically distressed symptom trajectory (based on depression and PTSD symptoms) with other participants, we observed that they scored significantly higher on RWA, $t(42) = 2.04, p < .05$, and were more likely to have experienced conservative shift, $t(42) = 2.59, p < .05$. Because conservative shift was defined as a categorical variable, we also conducted a contingency analysis and found that conservative shift was indeed more prevalent among those who were chronically distressed, $\chi^2(1) = 6.28, n = 45, p < .01$.

Paralleling the results for self-reported symptoms, individuals who scored higher on RWA and conservatism were perceived to be less well adjusted by their friends and family members. That is, high RWA scorers were seen as less healthy by their friends and family members in general, even before 9/11 ($r = -.28, p < .05$), and they were seen as faring more poorly in the seven months after 9/11 ($r = -.28, p < .05$). Participants categorized by friends and relatives as exhibiting a chronically distressed trajectory were more likely than other participants to report having experienced a conservative shift, $t(31) = 3.11, p < .01$.

Desire for revenge was associated with conservatism and conservative shift. Participants who said they would feel better if the US military found Bin Laden scored higher on RWA ($r = .33, p < .05$) and were more likely to report a conservative shift ($r = .55, p < .001$). Those who stated that they would “kill Bin Laden myself if [I] could” were more likely to experience

conservative shift ($r = .43, p < .01$). Participants who believed that their support for the military had increased since 9/11 scored higher on RWA ($r = .46, p < .001$), conservatism ($r = .38, p < .01$), and conservative shift ($r = .48, p < .001$). Increased patriotism in the wake of 9/11 was significantly associated with RWA ($r = .42, p < .01$), conservatism ($r = .35, p < .01$), and conservative shift ($r = .42, p < .01$). Finally, participants who felt that the accidental bombing of civilian women and children would be “an unfortunate but acceptable risk in the war on terrorism” scored higher on RWA ($r = .44, p < .01$), conservatism ($r = .45, p < .01$), and conservative shift ($r = .39, p < .01$).

With regard to religious attitudes, increased faith was positively associated with RWA ($r = .25, p < .05$), conservatism ($r = .27, p < .05$), and conservative shift ($r = .41, p < .01$). Interestingly, the tendency to doubt one’s faith after 9/11 was also associated with RWA ($r = .21, p < .10$), conservatism ($r = .24, p < .10$), and conservative shift ($r = .26, p < .05$), suggesting that a period of religious doubt may have preceded the trauma-related strengthening of faith.

Cynicism, measured in terms of increased awareness of the “dark side of human nature,” significantly predicted RWA ($r = .35, p < .01$), conservatism ($r = .34, p < .05$), and conservative shift ($r = .26, p < .05$). The use of humor as a way of coping with the tragedy was negatively associated with RWA ($r = -.25, p < .05$), conservatism ($r = -.22, p < .10$), and conservative shift ($r = -.34, p < .05$). Conservatism was positively correlated with the perception of new interests and opportunities in the aftermath of 9/11 at wave 1 ($r = .28, p < .05$) but not at wave 2. Conservative shift was positively correlated with the perception of new interests and opportunities at wave 1 ($r = .33, p < .05$) and wave 2 ($r = .28, p < .05$), and it was also positively correlated with personal growth at wave 2 ($r = .28, p < .05$).

Taken as a whole, these findings indicated that conservative, right-wing, and authoritarian responses were generally associated with maladaptive ways of responding to trauma. We obtained little or no evidence that “authoritarianism is good for you,” as Van Hiel and De Clercq (2009) provocatively claimed. However, the data from the WTC study cannot be used to draw causal conclusions. It is impossible to know whether severe emotional distress in this situation increased conservatism or increasing conservatism worsened distress—or both. In light of evidence that conservatism and religiosity are both associated with self-reported happiness

in the general population (Napier & Jost, 2008a), it seems more likely that distress fostered an affinity for conservatism than vice versa. Furthermore, the results of the WTC study are more consistent with the possibility that trauma-related experiences (measured during the first wave of data collection) contributed to conservative shift, rather than the other way around, insofar as the ideological variables were measured during the second wave.

Overall, the findings from our study of WTC survivors shed new light on the complex but intriguing set of correspondences—or elective affinities—between the psychological needs of the individual and the contents of specific belief systems. It would appear that ideological outcomes reflect, at least in part, an attempt to cope with the exigencies of life.

Ideology Is Dead, Long Live Ideology

For decades, political scientists have doubted that ideology is a meaningful force in people's lives. The kind of evidence brought together in this chapter and in the preceding chapters—including hundreds of studies in political psychology—is clearly at odds with the skeptical position. Ideology is not “out of reach,” as Kinder and Kalmoe (2017) claimed, for college students, office employees, Mechanical Turk workers, prospective voters, and survivors of terrorist attacks. On the contrary, it seems to be part of their public and private lives, in good times and bad.

A psychological approach to the study of ideology complements historical, philosophical, and sociological analyses of left and right as reflecting cultural developments and intellectual movements (Bobbio, 1996; Cochrane, 2015; Freedman, 2003; Lapointe, 1981; Noël & Thérien, 2008; Vincent, 2010). It also builds on—and goes beyond—the work of political scientists who for decades have stressed logical coherence, temporal stability, and political sophistication as defining characteristics of ideology.

Kathleen Knight (2006) posed two major questions concerning ideology, namely: “Is it a benign influence on democratic politics? And how far does it really penetrate into the public at large?” By returning to the key insight that ideology reflects social, cognitive, and motivational concerns and basic orientations pertaining to the management of uncertainty, threat, and social relations—as well as implicit and explicit attitudes toward existing and alternative social systems—psychologically minded researchers have

contributed insights that should be of use in answering Knight's questions and many others as well.

The obvious shortcoming of psychological research is that it is seldom, if ever, based upon nationally—let alone globally—representative samples. But this limitation should be weighed against a major problem with research on ideology in political science, which depends heavily upon cross-sectional correlational analyses from public opinion surveys that rely on tiny numbers of hand-picked items selected to be noncontroversial. Because of financial constraints, large public opinion surveys almost never include complete, well-validated instruments for measuring ideology, let alone the psychological processes we are seeking to analyze here (but see Azevedo et al., 2017, 2019, for a notable exception).

When we examine small samples of individuals in real depth, we see that the left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension of ideology aptly characterizes much of what people think about when it comes to society, economics, and politics, as Lane (1962, 1969) also discovered through his interviews. But the influence of ideology does not end there. It is connected to the ways we live, eat, drink, travel, educate ourselves, have sex, watch TV, decorate our walls, and clean our bodies and our homes, and on how we spend our free time and cope with personal disasters and collective crises (Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Carney et al., 2008; DellaPosta et al., 2015; Eastwick et al., 2009; Jost, 2017c; Klostad et al., 2012; Mutz & Rao, 2018; Rogers, 2020; Xu et al., 2013; Xu & Peterson, 2017). As a psychological orientation, ideology and its trappings are everywhere.

¹ Right-wing extremists often criticize the current state of affairs, but their ideological stake in *preservationism* means that the changes they favor are often reactionary or retrograde or restorative in nature, as Lipset and Raab (1978), among others, have argued. Left-wing extremists, such as Marxist revolutionaries, may engage in the ideological justification of an alternative, utopian society rather than the status quo.

² To date, the only country in which we have observed a negative correlation between system justification and conservatism is France (see [Table 5.4](#)). In this country, general system justification appears to be linked to liberal-socialist (rather than conservative-capitalist) attitudes—as well as low levels of authoritarianism and out-group hostility (Langer et al., 2020). Apparently, the Enlightenment ideals of “liberté, égalité, fraternité” are so enshrined in France that they now constitute the traditional status quo.

6

Authoritarian Aggression, Group-Based Dominance, and the Liberal Conundrum

A liberal is a man too broadminded to take his own side in a quarrel.

Robert Frost (quoted in Jacobs, 2014: 29)

Let us begin this chapter by acknowledging, perhaps belatedly, that there is something human and intrinsically valuable about the conservative impulse to preserve certain social, economic, and political legacies, independent of the other psychological concomitants of this impulse. As the late Marxist philosopher Gerald A. Cohen (2012: 144) pointed out, nearly all of us possess a natural bias in favor of existing value and often bemoan the fact that “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Nostalgia is by no means the exclusive province of the political right, even if that is where it is often celebrated most enthusiastically. When conservatives tout the importance of the nuclear family or longstanding cultural traditions or the US Constitution or the Western literary canon or baseball or Christmas or even American exceptionalism, they strike a chord that resonates with most if not all of us.

The understandable, even admirable reverence for tradition can, however, easily slip into much more dangerous forms of ideological calcification—such as authoritarianism, social dominance, and system justification—that wittingly or unwittingly prop up existing forms of exploitation and oppression and stifle opportunities for progress, equality, tolerance, diversity, and social change. Thus, Cohen was quick to add that he could never be a conservative about matters of social justice, because “conservatives like me want to conserve that which has intrinsic value, and injustice lacks intrinsic value—and has, indeed, intrinsic disvalue” (144). The challenge for all of us living in a liberal-democratic society is to distinguish clearly between elements of the status quo that possess intrinsic value and those that do not,

and to work to conserve the former without the latter. Of course, this is more easily said than done.

The Slippery Slope from Conservatism to Authoritarianism

More than any other political system, democracy has the inherent ability to actualize its own demise, as Plato observed long ago. By manipulating the democratic process, elites can limit the freedoms of individuals or social groups and put in place leaders who are not democratically inclined. In a very real and concrete sense, democracy depends upon ordinary citizens' capacities and motivations to absorb democratic values and tolerate those with quite different social, cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological backgrounds. These are precisely the values that those on the right have been attacking for years, and—as in previous historical eras—they have exploited the intuitive popularity of conservatism to do so.

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Adorno and colleagues (1950) observed a close connection between the holding of extremely conservative, system-justifying values and authoritarian tendencies. They took a multimethod approach, conducting structured interviews and administering questionnaires and projective tests to countless samples of US adults. Among other things, they discovered that people who agreed with statements like “America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society” and “Men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan, who overcome all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate” were also more likely to express prejudice, anti-Semitism, and anti-democratic sentiments. Conversely, liberals who felt that “Poverty could be almost entirely done away with if we made certain basic changes in our social and economic system” and “Labor unions should become stronger and have more influence generally” were less likely to exhibit authoritarian and ethnocentric tendencies.

Ever since the Democratic Party took a strong leadership role on the issue of civil rights for African Americans in the early and mid-1960s, authoritarianism has consistently predicted support for Republican presidential candidates. As shown in [Table 6.1](#), psychological studies have found that authoritarianism as a personality characteristic has been positively

correlated with support for Republican over Democratic presidential candidates in every US election since 1960, with the possible exception of 1992 (for which data are not readily available). An obvious limitation of these studies is that nearly all of them were based on small convenience samples such as college students. Still, the pattern is clear and remarkably consistent.

Table 6.1 Studies Finding that Authoritarianism Was Positively Correlated with Support for Republican (over Democratic) Presidential Candidates in US Elections from 1960 to 2016

Election Year	Democratic Candidate	Republican Candidate	Sample Citation(s)
1960	John F. Kennedy	Richard Nixon	Leventhal et al. (1964)
1964	Lyndon B. Johnson	Barry Goldwater	Higgins (1965)
1968	Robert Kennedy	Richard Nixon	Byrne & Przybyla (1980)
1972	George McGovern	Richard Nixon	D. J. Hanson & White (1973)
1976	Jimmy Carter/Gerald Ford ^a	Ronald Reagan/George Wallace ^a	Brant et al. (1978)
1980	Jimmy Carter	Ronald Reagan	Brant et al. (1980); Byrne & Przybyla (1980)
1984	Walter Mondale	Ronald Reagan	McCann & Stewin (1986)
1988	Michael Dukakis	George H. W. Bush	D. J. Hanson (1989)
1992 ^b	Bill Clinton	George H. W. Bush	
1996	Bill Clinton	Robert Dole	Kemmelmeier (2004)
2000	Al Gore	George W. Bush	Kemmelmeier (2004)
2004	John Kerry	George W. Bush	Crowson et al. (2006)
2008	Barack Obama	John McCain	Jost, West, & Gosling (2009)
2012	Barack Obama	Mitt Romney	Shook et al. (2017)
2016	Hillary Clinton	Donald Trump	Choma & Hanoach (2017); Knuckey & Hassan (2020); MacWilliams (2016); Womick et al. (2019)

^a For the 1976 election, Brant et al. (1978) made ideological comparisons rather than partisan comparisons, grouping supporters of Jimmy Carter (Democrat) and Gerald Ford (moderate Republican) together and comparing their authoritarianism scores to supporters of Ronald Reagan (conservative Republican) and George Wallace (conservative Democrat).

^b Although there are published studies that appear to have measured authoritarianism and presidential preferences in 1992, I was unable to find any that reported a correlation between authoritarianism and support for George H. W. Bush over Bill Clinton.

Social scientists have long realized that highly threatening historical periods are often accompanied by an increase in authoritarianism in the general population (e.g., Pettigrew, 2017). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, for instance, there was a predictable uptick in support for authoritarian conservatism, as well as a drop in commitment to democratic tolerance and the protection of civil liberties (Davis & Silver,

2004; see also Cohrs et al., 2005). Right-wing shifts have also occurred in response to bombing and terrorist attacks in Israel, in India, and throughout Europe, a phenomenon that we will explore more deeply in the next chapter.

In recent years, the fear of terrorism has broadened to encompass the so-called migrant crisis. And, although some may debate its true political significance, it stands to reason that economic anxiety has risen after four decades of flattened wages despite increased worker productivity under capitalist economic systems that have become ever more efficient at exploiting natural and human resources, including labor (Economic Policy Institute, 2019). Furthermore, many people are threatened by looming environmental catastrophes associated with anthropogenic climate change, even if these threats are not always acknowledged—or even consciously recognized.

At the time of writing it is still too early to tell whether the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, which has killed over 3.7 million people worldwide, will contribute to lasting shifts in authoritarian conservatism. It is noteworthy that within just a few weeks of the disease's spread, right-wing governments in Hungary, Israel, the United Kingdom, Chile, Bolivia, and many other countries moved to consolidate authoritarian power, limit democratic participation, and tighten borders (Gebrekidan, 2020). Experiments conducted in the United States and Poland revealed that increasing the psychological salience of COVID-19 led people in both countries to express more support for social conservatism and right-wing political candidates (Karwowski et al., 2020). Another research program, which focused on psychological conservatism (or system justification) rather than right-wing conservatism per se, found that during the first six months of 2020, the number of daily confirmed COVID-19 cases within a given country predicted increased approval of the current head of government in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but not in Brazil, Japan, or Mexico (Yam et al., 2020).

There are probably a variety of distal and proximal social and psychological causes, but citizens are bearing witness—all over the world—to the rebirth of extreme right-wing parties and governing coalitions. These movements promise a return to “traditional,” often religious values; a curtailing of the reproductive and other rights of women as well as sexual minorities; and a revival of nationalistic, ethnic-based pride and the

strengthening of national boundaries, along with a dismantling of the “administrative” welfare state and the imposition of “illiberal” reforms along with vindictive, sometimes cruel, immigration policies (e.g., Wahl, 2020).

Once in power, right-wing authoritarians flirt with and sometimes embrace totalitarian practices, such as intimidating and incarcerating protestors, journalists, academics, and any others whom they find potentially threatening or disruptive. With the support of “conservative” voters, illiberal governments have gained tremendous power in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and several other countries. Radical right-wing parties are resurgent in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The only truly comparable threat of left-wing authoritarianism today is in Venezuela. For decades the Western world, led by the United States, has been quicker and more efficient at isolating and ostracizing authoritarian governments on the left—while often cooperating with authoritarian governments on the right.

For all of these reasons, a deeper understanding of left-right ideology should be of paramount importance to anyone interested in the long-term preservation of liberal-democratic systems. And for this, a psychological analysis has much to offer. As the historian George Mosse (1995: 164) observed:

Racism possesses one great advantage over many other world views. Where they tended to leave room for a variety of interpretations, and even projected a certain vagueness which left room for differing interpretations, *racism leaves nothing to chance*. Racism is always focused. Whether it legitimises itself through science or through pseudo-historical scholarship, it does not tolerate what Ezra Pound once called an “Indeterminate Wobble.” That the *quest for certainty, clarity and decisiveness* preoccupied racist regimes in twentieth-century Europe is no coincidence. Adolf Hitler’s constant and unrelenting boast that *no ambiguities would be tolerated, that there must be certainty in all things*, while hardly describing his own inefficient government, was kept solely in the designation and extermination of the supposed racial enemy. The *need for a leader and the creation of racial elites* gives racism a further and even sharper focus. (emphasis added)

It is not possible to understand right-wing authoritarianism—and the ethnocentrism that accompanies it—as a political phenomenon without also understanding its considerable psychological appeal, which is by no means universal, but it is widespread. A great many people are intolerant of ambiguity, uncertainty, and unpredictability; they pine for order, clarity, and decisiveness and are eager to follow a strong, charismatic leader who promises those things.

Trump This: Authoritarianism by the Book

Even before Donald Trump was elected president, many observers worried openly that his campaign style signaled a sea change in American politics—a new danger that right-wing authoritarianism would finally triumph at home, as it has abroad (Kagan, 2016; Ross, 2016). Other Republicans over the years had been accused of “dog whistle politics” by using coded language to cue relatively subtle racial biases, but Trump’s comments seemed overtly racist and misogynistic (Shelton & Stasio, 2017). To some, these comments were taken as evidence of Trump’s authenticity—a breath of “fresh air,” a principled opposition to the excesses of political correctness (Hahl et al., 2018; Hibbing, 2020; Stanley, 2015). To others, it was shocking to witness a seemingly serious candidate for president wielding such crass language and justifying violence against ideological opponents (Sullivan, 2016). According to *Time* magazine, Trump said “he’d like to punch protesters in the face and offered to pay the legal fees of supporters who did.” His rallies were “punctuated by his roar—‘Get ’em out!’—when a dissenter starts chanting or raising a sign” (Berenson, 2016).

Among many other things, the situation threw into stark relief the fact that political scientists today are working with a weak and impoverished conception of authoritarianism—one that emphasizes little more than the acceptance of child-rearing values pertaining to obedience and conformity. Contemporary researchers frequently distance themselves from the work of Adorno and colleagues (1950), presumably because these authors, like Erich Fromm, (1941, 1947, 1962) were influenced by Marx and Freud, both of whom have fallen very much out of intellectual favor in the 21st century (e.g., see Taub, 2016). A few social scientists have backed off using the concept of authoritarianism altogether. Jonathan Haidt (2012) and his collaborators have put a positive spin on authoritarianism, arguing that in-group loyalty, obedience to authority, and the enforcement of purity sanctions are legitimate moral values that liberals ought to respect rather than suspect.¹

It is worth recalling that Adorno and his colleagues identified nine characteristics of the authoritarian syndrome, not just one or two or three (see also Brown, 1965/2004). They were (a) aggression against those who deviate from established norms, (b) submission to idealized moral authorities, (c) uncritical acceptance of conventional values, (d) mental

rigidity and a proclivity to engage in stereotypical thinking, (e) a preoccupation with toughness and power, (f) exaggerated sexual concerns, (g) a reluctance to engage in introspection, (h) a tendency to project undesirable traits onto others, and (i) destructiveness and cynicism about human nature. These characteristics provide an uncanny description of the behavior of Donald Trump as president. It is as if he was doing authoritarianism by the book, having intuited that red-meat Republicans would eat it up.

The focus of this chapter is on reactions to Donald Trump, but the broader psychological analysis applies to the effects of many other authoritarian demagogues on the right. In terms of personality characteristics and political goals and strategies, Trump has much in common with Viktor Orbán of Hungary (who has been described as the Trump of Europe), Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, and Matteo Salvini of Italy, among others. As we have already noted, right-wing authoritarianism appears to be gaining new ground all over the world. One reason to focus on Trump is to confront the distressing question raised by such diverse figures as Sinclair Lewis (1935), Christopher Hedges (2008), and Cass Sunstein (2018), namely whether it “it can happen here”—in the world’s self-proclaimed leading proponent of liberal democracy. The answer, sadly, is that of course it can (Churchwell, 2021).

Not only has Trump, as candidate and president, courted violence against detractors, but he has also demanded submission from many others, including Republican rivals like “Little Marco” Rubio during the primary debates, whom he belittled in various ways. An opinion columnist for the *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* wrote: “Trump really isn’t that interested in winning the support of fellow politicians. He is a bully, and what he craves is their submission. Once Chris Christie endorsed him, Trump took visible joy in treating the New Jersey governor as a personal lackey, publicly poking fun at his weight and telling him that he could no longer eat Oreo cookies. When Rick Perry endorsed Trump and offered himself as a potential vice president, Trump could barely contain his glee” (Bookman, 2016).

The very few “moral authorities” whom Trump has idealized are telling—and, from the standpoint of liberal-democratic values, disturbing. There are two that stand out. One is Fred Trump, Donald’s father, who was arrested under mysterious circumstances in 1927 during a violent demonstration by the Ku Klux Klan in Queens, New York. In the 1970s, the real estate

company owned by Fred and his son Donald were repeatedly charged with unlawful forms of racial discrimination, refusing to rent apartments to African Americans. The second moral authority idealized by Donald Trump was Roy Cohn, the controversial lawyer who worked closely with Senator Joseph McCarthy to prosecute Americans who were accused of having ties to leftist organizations in the 1950s. According to Jerrold Post and Stephanie Doucette (2019: 31), “Cohn was an important mentor for Trump, teaching him always to fight back, never to settle. Trump described Cohn as someone who could be ‘vicious’ for him and would ‘brutalize’ his opponents. Cohn became, in Trump’s words, ‘like a second father to him.’ ”

For years, Trump gleefully embraced conventional, superficial American values while stereotyping outgroups, especially foreigners and women, and attacking “liberal” norms of political correctness (Hibbing, 2020). For 19 years Trump owned the broadcast rights for the Miss USA beauty pageant and, before becoming president, he was best known to Americans for hosting a reality television show for 14 seasons. In both capacities he reveled in coarse materialism while diminishing the dignity of countless aspirants. This did not stop *The Apprentice* and *Celebrity Apprentice* from attracting many millions of viewers between 2003 and 2015. The fact that so many Americans felt they “knew” Trump and could relate to him from his TV appearances—that they formed a parasocial bond with him—may have helped his electoral popularity in 2016 (Gabriel et al., 2018).

Is Trump preoccupied with toughness and power? He announced a presidential endorsement from boxing champion (and convicted rapist) Mike Tyson as follows: “Iron Mike. You know, all the tough guys endorse me. . . . When I get endorsed by the tough ones, I like it, because you know what? We need toughness now. We need toughness.” In looking back on his childhood, Trump reminisced that “I wanted to be the toughest kid in the neighborhood and had a habit of mouthing off to everybody while backing down to no one. Honestly I was a bit of a troublemaker. My parents finally took me out of school and sent me upstate to the New York Military Academy. I had my share of run-ins there as well” (Post & Doucette, 2019: 27). By all accounts, Trump has been a bully since childhood.

Is Trump preoccupied with sexual concerns? How else can one understand bizarre comments about his own daughter’s figure and the menstrual cycles of female journalists—as well as the claim that Hillary Clinton was “schlonged” when she lost the Democratic nomination to Barack Obama in

2008? No one can forget his bragging about sexual assault to the host of *Access Hollywood* or the decidedly nonpresidential comments about penis size. When the leader of North Korea threatened that the “Nuclear Button is on his desk at all times,” Trump took to Twitter with a sexual reference: “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” During a press briefing on the coronavirus pandemic in early April of 2020—after 7,000 Americans had already died from the disease in just one month—President Trump made a tasteless joke that although he had not been involved with “scientific models,” he had been involved with fashion models.

Trump once insisted in an interview that “All of the women on *The Apprentice* flirted with me—consciously or unconsciously.” One need not be a psychoanalyst to see the defense mechanism of *projection* at work. When Trump and his followers shouted, “Lock Her Up!” they were ostensibly expressing the opinion that Hillary Clinton should be in prison. It now appears that Trump was the one who had committed a number of serious illegal offenses such as tax evasion, violation of campaign finance laws by making payments of hush money to women he had sexual relationships with, and, according to the Mueller Report, possibly even working directly or indirectly with Russia to gain unfair advantage during the 2016 election.

Trump’s cynicism and destructiveness are palpable. “The world is a pretty vicious place,” he told *Esquire* magazine in 2004, and he is determined to beat all of the “losers” out there. If he can humiliate them, so much the better. “When somebody hurts you, just go after them as viciously and as violently as you can,” he (or his ghostwriter) declared in *How to Get Rich*. According to Post and Doucette (2019), Trump’s leadership style is characterized by *destructive charisma*: “Unable to face his own inadequacies, [he] needs a target to blame and attack for his own inner weakness and inadequacies. And in his rhetoric for the working class the external sources or enemy he has focused on includes: globalization; immigration; and environmentalism” (124).

Trump exemplifies every single aspect of the so-called *authoritarian syndrome*²—but millions of others around the world do too. Regardless of whether President Trump suffered significant mental health problems—such as malignant narcissism, sociopathy, dementia, or some other personality disorder (Gartner, 2017; Marano, 2017; McAdams, 2016)—his behavior was crazy-making, especially for people with liberal or progressive worldviews.

He would tweet one thing, then the opposite. Policies affecting millions of people, especially immigrants and ethnic minorities, are dashed off on a whim, inspired by the latest rant on *Fox and Friends*. He pretends that the coronavirus is harmless, no worse than the flu, and that “it’s going to disappear.” He refuses to promise that he and his supporters will accept the results of the 2020 presidential election, and for months after it is clear that he lost his bid for re-election, he refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the outcome. The election was stolen, he claims. It was all “a big lie,” and he is a right-wing martyr who was stabbed in the back by establishment politicians (Churchwell, 2021).

Psychological Characteristics of Trump Supporters

Public opinion surveys showed that Trump supporters in 2016 differed from other voters—including other Republican voters—in terms of their affinity for right-wing authoritarianism, among other things (Choma & Hanoch, 2017; MacWilliams, 2016; Womick et al., 2019).³ According to Hibbing (2020: 132), 70% of Trump “venerators” (very strong supporters) felt that children should be raised to “follow authority rather than challenge it,” “respect elders rather than be independent,” and “have good manners rather than be curious.” More than 80% believed that the country “needs a mighty leader to keep us safe,” “aggressive action is needed to save our country” (145), “the country’s central goal should be strength,” and “if we are not vigilant we will be victims” (153). When asked to choose between security and democracy, 59% of Trump venerators chose security, while only 13% of liberals made the same choice (148).

During the 2016 campaign, my colleagues and I sought to determine which specific facets of authoritarianism—as well as social dominance orientation (SDO), which is defined as a preference for group-based hierarchy—were associated with support for Trump. As in previous elections (see [Table 6.1](#)), Republican voters scored higher than Democratic voters on authoritarianism as well as SDO. In addition, we observed that those who preferred Trump over other Republican primary candidates scored higher on *authoritarian aggression*—but not authoritarian submission or conventionalism (Womick et al., 2019). That is, Trump backers were more likely to believe that “What our country really needs is a strong, determined President which will crush the evil and set us in our right way again” and

“What our country needs instead of more ‘civil rights’ is a good stiff dose of law and order.” In four studies, graphically summarized in [Figure 6.1](#), we also found that Trump supporters scored higher than supporters of other Republican candidates on the *group-based dominance* facet of SDO. Thus, they were more likely to endorse statements such as “Some groups of people must be kept in their place” and “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.”




Figure 6.1 Mean differences between supporters of Donald Trump and supporters of other Republican candidates in terms of group-based dominance, a facet of social dominance orientation (SDO).
Source: Womick et al. (2019).

The dominant political cliché of our time is that *tribalism* has infected our politics. Of course, it is true that “us vs. them,” in-group vs. out-group dynamics are at work. But any analysis of American politics that focuses exclusively on the symmetrical role of partisan identification is doomed to superficiality. There are profound differences between liberal and conservative “tribes,” and psychological research shows very clearly that conservatives are more “tribal”—and aggressively so—than liberals. This became especially obvious during the Trump presidency. As the social psychologist Thomas Pettigrew (2017: 108–109) put it:

Trump’s speeches, studded with such absolutist terms as “losers” and “complete disasters,” are classic authoritarian statements. His clear distinction between groups on the top of society (Whites) and those “losers” and “bad hombres” on the bottom (immigrants, Blacks and Latinos) are classic social dominance statements.

Republicans began averaging higher on authoritarianism than Democrats before the rise of Trump (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). And the party began to learn how to appeal to this segment of the American electorate in various ways. The Republican Party’s opposition to virtually everything proposed by the African American President Obama helped. But it remained for Trump to break the unwritten rules of American politics and appeal directly and openly to authoritarians and those who score high on SDO.

In another, complementary line of research, my colleagues and I focused on the role of system justification—that is, whether one is prone to defend or challenge the status quo. According to the *Washington Post*, Trump’s election in 2016 was “a loud repudiation of the status quo.” Others felt, on the contrary, that it reflected conservative opposition to social change, as exemplified by the nostalgic slogan “Make America Great Again” (Grossmann & Thaler, 2018). In a nationally representative survey of 1,500 US adults, we observed that supporters of Trump and other Republican candidates scored significantly higher than supporters of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders on economic and gender-specific system justification. That is, they were more likely to agree that “Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements”; “Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame the system; they have only themselves to blame”; “In general, relations between men and women are fair”; and “The division of labor in families generally operates as it should” (Azevedo et al., 2017).

At the same time, Trump supporters scored *lower* than supporters of all other Republican candidates on general system justification—and, indeed, they scored lower than supporters of Hillary Clinton (but not Bernie Sanders). That is, Trump supporters were less likely than Clinton supporters to feel that “In general, the American system operates as it should” and “The United States is the best country in the world to live in.” When all of the system justification variables were included in the same statistical model, general system justification was negatively associated with support for Trump—and positively associated with support for Clinton. This was somewhat surprising, insofar as there is an elective affinity between political conservatism and system justification, as we have noted in previous chapters.

Taken as a whole, these findings, which are illustrated in [Figure 6.2](#), show that Trump supporters in 2016 clearly did reject the liberal “status quo” under President Obama (and Secretary of State Clinton) and may have perceived Obama’s presidency as threatening to the traditional American way. Nevertheless, they strongly justified economic and gender-based disparities in US society. In those two domains, they were defenders of the status quo, not challengers. Trump supporters may have been frustrated by the consequences of global competition under capitalism, but they showed no signs of blaming the free market system or the current state of gender inequality.




Figure 6.2 Mean scores on gender-specific, economic, and general system justification scales as a function of candidate preferences during the 2016 US presidential primary campaign.

Source: Azevedo et al. (2017).

Is it possible that—rather than facing up to the true sources of helplessness and frustration, which may be too overwhelming or painful to confront, and carefully analyzing the problems that afflict our economy and our families, which may be too complex to grasp—millions of voters decided to turn the country over to a crass billionaire, real estate mogul, country club owner, a deeply flawed man who touted himself as a hero, the only one who could save America? The absurd vaingloriousness of Trump’s rhetoric, his disdain for expert analysis, his indifference to scientific evidence and any facts that challenge his version of reality—all of it adds up to a kind of magical thinking on his part and that of his millions of followers. If he says it, it *becomes* true. According to Hibbing (2020: 23), “From the point of view of his followers Trump is not a liar, he is a bullshitter. His overstatements and embellishments do not bother them because he is doing what he can do to make America unified and secure. If what he says and tweets is not completely true, it should be.”

Trump supporters deeply admired his “bluster and swagger” (Hibbing, 2020: 14)—even with respect to life-and-death matters such as the coronavirus pandemic, which killed 400,000 Americans on his watch (Stone, 2021). If any part of the Trump fantasy clashes with reality, anxiety can be assuaged by externalizing the anger—blaming immigrants, foreigners, journalists, environmentalists, and, of course, liberals. Despite conservatives’ exaggerated emphasis on the importance of *personal responsibility*, for Trump and his supporters there is no admitting to his shortcomings, his failures, his tragic character flaws. It is always someone else’s fault. The previous administration deserves the blame; it is a “Chinese virus”; the liberal media is hyping the threat. Trump supporters can feel like “winners” by mimicking his empty, aggressive, reactionary rhetoric and simply not bothering with the rest.

Liberal Psychology in an Era of Authoritarian Aggression and Group-Based Dominance

Under the Trump presidency, US liberals experienced a slew of negative emotions—from dismay and despondency to bewilderment and unadulterated rage. The writer Katha Pollitt confessed that “I sometimes feel like I’m a different person now. I’m fidgety and irritable and have trouble

concentrating. . . . But the main difference is that I hate people now. Well, not all people, of course. Just people who voted for Trump. People who do their own ‘research’ on the Internet and discover there that President Obama is a Muslim and Michelle Obama is a man.” Likewise, Michelle Goldberg of the *New York Times* observed, “What now passes for ordinary would have once been inconceivable. The government is under the control of an erratic racist who engages in nuclear brinkmanship on Twitter. . . . It’s been a year, and sometimes I’m still poleaxed by grief at the destruction of our civic inheritance.” The next three years, for American liberals at least, were even worse.

A mad scientist could not have devised a villain more antithetical to the liberal worldview than Donald Trump—even a staunch conservative with a more disciplined commitment to right-wing ideals would be less infuriating. In the US context, Trump is seemingly unique in his capacity to provoke, upset, and irritate those with liberal sensibilities. No doubt this is part of his appeal to a certain segment of the population—the ones who have been told since the presidency of Richard Nixon that liberal elites were laughing at them. To Trump’s detractors, however, his “bullshit is indistinguishable from lies, and banter and puffery are not playful but extremely dangerous” (Hibbing, 2020: 23).

To transplant the anti-intellectual crudeness of Trump’s personality and the erratic nature of his behavior from *The Apprentice* to the West Wing—this was a special kind of affront to “blue America.” Trump felt vindicated by the mere fact of having been elected president—a point he brought up constantly in the first year of his tenure. Trump held more power than any single person in the country to influence the lives of millions, but he showed no signs of comprehending the significance or responsibility of this. Liberals were forced to reckon with the disturbing fact that half of their fellow citizens *wanted* to put him in office. Even worse, more than a third appeared willing to stand by him *no matter what*, even if—as he boasted during the campaign—he were to “stand in the middle of 5th Avenue and shoot somebody.” By the end of his presidency, someone in the US was dying from coronavirus every 26 seconds, in large part because he refused to take the problem seriously (Stone, 2021). The best thing one could say about Trump’s leadership during the pandemic is that it was erratic; no expert in epidemiology or public policy would give him passing marks. On a per capita basis, the US suffered greater loss of life than Mexico, Brazil,

Argentina, France, Germany, Spain, and most other Western nations (Stone, 2021). And yet many months into the crisis President Trump's national approval rating remained steady. Indeed, more Americans voted for him in 2020 than in 2016.

Many liberals were committed to "resistance," whatever that meant, but many others worried that the problem resides with *us*. Are we living in a liberal bubble? Perhaps we were not tolerant enough? Could it be that we have not listened carefully enough to our conservative neighbors or taken their "moral" concerns to heart? Is it our excessive "political correctness" that provoked their wrath? Are liberals overreacting and being hypocritical whenever they criticize conservatives? Do liberals not hold their own prejudices, after all?

Liberals face a conundrum that conservatives do not. On one hand, liberals are committed to understanding and empathizing with the people they disagree with and to resisting blanket condemnations of opposing views. This is consistent with liberal values, and it is as it should be. On the other hand, their moral code also obliges them to criticize and reject the tenets of authoritarian aggression and group-based dominance that often accompany illiberal views. It is a fine line, and not an especially easy one to walk.⁴ It is certainly not one that members of the alt-right or so-called White nationalists—or even Hibbing's (2020) *securitarians*—would ever contemplate walking.

The journalist Thomas Edsall probably spoke for many a conflicted liberal when he implored the members of his tribe to "take their fingers out of their ears"—as if conservatives' electoral and legislative success was attributable to their having listened intently to the needs and interests of their liberal counterparts. Or consider this complaint from Nicholas Kristof: "My Facebook followers have incredible compassion for war victims in South Sudan, for kids who have been trafficked, even for abused chickens, but no obvious empathy for conservative scholars facing discrimination." Edsall and Kristof write for the *New York Times*, which right-wingers regularly malign as a left-wing rag—and the aggressiveness of this charge may help to explain all the apron wringing by its staff writers.⁵

Other supposed liberals and ex-liberals hit the conservative think-tank circuit to trash "cultural Marxists" and secular humanities departments for the nation's woes. In a 2015 issue of *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, prominent liberal academics vowed to stamp out, not conservative

hegemony in politics or economy or society, but liberal hegemony in social science. What did Robert Frost say about liberals refusing to take their own side in a quarrel?

To put it in game-theoretic terms, liberals in the United States cannot help wanting to cooperate with conservatives, at least sometimes, whereas conservatives today always defect. President Obama's erstwhile desire for bipartisan compromise seems quaint in comparison with President Trump's complete and utter contempt for everyone who disagreed with him. How did we get here, and is there anything that can be done to end liberal misery in a conservative era? These are the questions taken up in the remainder of this chapter.

Even if we take for granted that some diversity of opinion is expected, useful, and healthy within a group of people who otherwise share an overarching value system, such as a commitment to democracy, the possibility arises that liberal responses are too fragmented, ramified, and idiosyncratic to form a coherent opposition to authoritarian aggression and the desire for group-based dominance. Is it even possible, in this day and age, to conjure up a strong, unified, stable, and coordinated voice on the liberal left? Or is there a sense in which liberals are perpetually engaged, unwittingly, in some sort of self-sabotage, holding themselves back from doing what it would take to triumph?

Let us focus on two distinct but related considerations. First, there is the philosophical nature of liberal ideology itself, which—because of its peculiar characteristics and internal contradictions—may contribute to the present situation in American politics. Second, there are psychological factors, the dispositional tendencies of those who are drawn to liberal ideology, which we have already discussed in previous chapters. These two elements are intimately related because, as we saw in [Chapter 2](#), there is a close and reciprocal connection—what Max Weber called an elective affinity—between psychological needs, on one hand, and the philosophical contents of an ideology, on the other.

The Inherent Conflict in Liberal Ideology

Liberalism as an ideology is, among other things, a system of values. Like other ideologies, it describes not just how things are, but also how things ought to be. It prescribes, in a general way, not simply how people should act if they want to do the right thing, but also the philosophical reasons or

justifications for acting that way. This can only be demonstrated by contrasting liberalism (on the left, as it is in the United States) with other ideologies, such as conservatism (on the right): these two ideologies exist in contradistinction to one another.

Although some might claim that political moderates are fundamentally nonideological (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017), this assumption strikes me as unwarranted and misguided. Most people espouse a mix of liberal and conservative beliefs, opinions, and values. As Walt Whitman said, we contain multitudes. This renders us conflicted, ambivalent—not indifferent. It is true, however, that every liberal idea exists in opposition to its conservative counterpart, and vice versa. Ideologies possess meaning—and the power of inspiration—only in relation to other ideologies. It follows that the limits or boundaries of any given belief system are defined by alternative, competing belief systems. An ideological struggle for legitimacy, therefore, is perforce a zero-sum game (Kelman, 2001), to the chagrin of many an open-minded liberal searching for some integrative compromise.

The distinctive contents of liberal-leftist ideology, as we saw in earlier chapters, are an avowed openness to social reform (or progress) and the advancement of social, economic, and political equality—in contradistinction to conservatism, which may be understood in terms of resistance to social change (or traditionalism) and acceptance of hierarchy. Ideological differences in these two axiological dimensions—whether one is driven to push for social change in the name of greater equality or to defend existing hierarchies and inequalities in the name of social stability or order—explain many of the key differences between liberal-leftists and conservative-rightists when it comes to public life.

If a conflict arises for liberals but not for conservatives, it is because liberalism prioritizes equality above all else—not only equality of opportunities but also equality of outcomes, including symbolic outcomes such as status, value, dignity, and respect. The liberal call for diversity—and, by extension, pluralism—is, among other things, a call to treat different *values* equally: to avoid elevating one over others in terms of status and respect. Unfortunately, this position can morph all too easily into a self-defeating form of moral relativism that leaves everything as it is.

The situation is not at all the same for conservatives, who are in the business of justifying unequal outcomes, that is, treating them as legitimate and desirable, on the assumption that inequality arises from a fair system,

procedure, or authority—such as capitalism, meritocratic principles, or the will of God. There is no conflict for conservatives to assume that they are in sole possession of the truth, or that there are perfectly legitimate reasons that they should trounce liberals in every single political contest. If they lose an election, it could be due to voter fraud or some other illegitimate cause. Liberals have a more serious problem, because their ideology professes a genuine commitment to respecting others' values—and treating them equally—because those values are held by people who can only be considered as equals.

This sets liberals up for a deeply conflicted relationship with conservatism. On some level, liberals wish to assert that conservative intuitions are equally acceptable, equally valuable, and equally valid, in comparison with their own intuitions (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012). But when it comes to the specific contents of conservative and right-wing opinions on affirmative action, universal health care, social security, economic justice, gun control, climate change, reproductive rights, and so on, anyone who is committed to liberal-leftist ideology is forced to conclude that conservatives are either unwilling or unable to do the right thing, precisely because they think so differently—and, indeed, *wrongly*—about such matters. Strictly speaking, this conflict is not resolvable without abandoning one's moral principles altogether, and so it manifests itself as ambivalence. This is the essence of the liberal conundrum.

On the question of whether “hate speech” should be allowed on college campuses or social media platforms, for instance, most liberals are of two minds. On one hand, it is impermissible to declare, simply and unequivocally, that certain kinds of speech—or ideas or values—should be prohibited. On the other hand, hate speech and its cousins seriously threaten liberal values, and, to the extent that these gain traction, they are capable of undermining liberal-democratic societies in their entirety. It has happened before and will almost surely happen again. What typically follows—for the liberal in such a quandary—is an obsessional effort to identify precisely what does and does not qualify as hate speech. This turns out to be an extraordinarily difficult task for liberals, of all people, to define in unambiguous, categorical terms and to lay down the law accordingly. One way in which liberals cope with the contradiction is to be permissive in theory, but to become more censorious when it comes to specific, deeply

problematic cases, without ever being able to resolve the inconsistency. The conflict is often kept outside of conscious awareness, so there is no personal obligation to recognize or resolve it.

Yet another manifestation of liberal ambivalence is to advocate, seemingly relentlessly, for increased open-mindedness (“we should leave our bubbles,” “we should watch Fox News to understand what conservatives are thinking,” “we should listen to them to figure out what we are missing or how we can communicate with them more effectively”), while slamming specific manifestations of authoritarian conservatism. Liberals strive to validate the needs and desires of the Trump voter without validating the vote itself. The situation must be to blame, not the people. And, of course, there is some truth to that.

In this way, liberals struggle—foolishly or valiantly, depending upon your point of view—to divorce Trump and his actions from the people who elevated him to power, from the people who continue to support him. In so doing they retain, at least in their own minds, the capacity to be empathetic while also being critical. It is a trick of the unconscious, the essence of compartmentalization. Liberals tell themselves repeatedly that Trump is not the same as his followers; his followers are not *all* like him. Do conservatives engage in similar contortions of a political psychological nature? No, because their philosophy does not require it, and their psychology does not suggest it.

Liberal philosophy self-consciously embraces value pluralism as part of a thoroughgoing commitment to equality, and therefore encourages attention to specific details. Nuance, respect for diversity, and the relativity of experience and judgment are all crucial elements of the liberal worldview. In the mind of the liberal-leftist, this is because reality is so complicated; it is nearly impossible to make wide, sweeping statements that are accurate. No one has “privileged access” to “The Truth” (with a “capital T,” as some say). Conservatives may be perfectly satisfied with confident overgeneralizations (Ruisch & Stern, 2021)—the kind that win elections—but liberals often seem more comfortable dissecting the particulars and deconstructing their own partiality and potential for bias.

For philosophical as well as psychological reasons, then, liberals face a conundrum that they are ill-equipped to resolve. If a conflict between tolerance and the *tolerance of intolerance* is unavoidable, and ultimately unresolvable, one can commit to one side only at the expense of the other. If

the liberal decides that openness and acceptance matter above all, that we should never treat anyone as “the other,” and that we must attend patiently to those with whom we disagree, this comes at the expense of leftist political goals, namely the single-minded pursuit of egalitarian opposition to the right-wing agenda. If, instead, the liberal decides that enough is enough, the time to fight is now, she is accused by fellow liberals (and, of course, conservatives) of being closed-minded, prejudiced, and intolerant—and, indeed, she may come to worry herself that this may be the case. Fifty years ago, Bob Dylan chastened himself for “Fearing not that I’d become my enemy in the instant that I preach.” Today many liberals behave as if they are paralyzed by such a fear. The liberal conundrum cannot really be solved, and in this way the suffering under Trump and his ilk is compounded and quite possibly prolonged.

The Psychology of Liberals

One hundred and eighty-one studies based on over 130,000 research participants reveal that, in comparison with political conservatives, liberals exhibit the following psychological characteristics: openness to new experiences, tolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty, cognitive flexibility and complexity, and need for cognition (or enjoyment of thinking). Liberals score lower than conservatives on measures of dogmatism and personal needs for order, structure, and cognitive closure; they are more comfortable with cognitive reflection. There are clearly epistemic virtues associated with a more “analytic” or “deliberative” thinking style: liberals are less likely than conservatives to exhibit self-deception, and they are less receptive to conspiracy theories and “pseudo-profound” bullshit. We will explore all of these results in greater detail in the next chapter.

But the prototypical liberal is also someone who exhibits the defense mechanism of intellectualization and may engage in compartmentalization and other forms of obsessional thinking, which divorce feeling from thought and action. In addition, the liberal-leftist wants, sometimes desperately, to maintain hope and trust in the positive aspects of humanity, even when it comes to those who are self-declared enemies of liberalism. She sees herself as driven by compassion and is uncomfortable (or ambivalent) about her own competitive and aggressive impulses. Progressives promote the ideal of cooperation, the metaphor of government-as-caretaker—in George Lakoff’s (2008) phrase, “the nurturant parent”—and a strong emphasis on equality

and acceptance of difference. Values such as care, cooperation, and nurturance can, to some degree, provide a psychological bulwark against feelings of guilt, anger, resentment, and helplessness. But doubling down on being generous, tolerant, and self-searching may also reflect a kind of reaction formation, a psychological defense.

Some liberal reactions to Trump's presidency that have taken the form of introspection or critical self-examination—something that authoritarian conservatives would never even consider—reflect a psychological discomfort with chastising “the other.” To be sure, rational analysis, self-questioning, and dedication to learning from the past are important prerequisites for sound democratic deliberation. And it is true that liberals in the United States have much to learn about the reasons for their electoral failures since the 1980s. At the same time, an inability or unwillingness to distinguish between important and unimportant details is unhelpful and, in the language of psychological attachment theory, *avoidant*. A woman registering voters for Jill Stein insists that Hillary Clinton is just as bad as Donald Trump and glides away, saying that it doesn't matter anyway, because Trump could never win the election. A supporter of Bernie Sanders claims that corporate Democrats like Joe Biden are every bit as harmful to American society as the authoritarian-in-chief and pledges to withhold his vote.

Conservatives often criticize liberals for being too idealistic—unrealistic about the selfish, dark side of human nature—as well as hypocritical and elitist, even as liberals alone take up the cause, if not the lifestyle, of the underdog. Much more than liberals, conservatives take the dark side for granted—and some justify it, advocating for the very things that elicit it: the relentless pursuit of self-interest, competition, power, greed, materialism, conformity, obedience, punishment, and ostracism. In the political sphere, conservative elites exhibit a willingness to bend or break the rules, to do whatever is necessary—or more precisely, possible (e.g., gerrymandering, voter suppression, procedural obstruction, legal maneuvering, and the deliberate spread of misinformation and conspiratorial thinking)—to win. Liberals may feel betrayed, but what do they do about it? What can they do—without turning into the enemy?

None of this is to suggest that there are no effective, creative, passionate, or courageous activists (or would-be activists) on the left who are capable of meeting the many challenges of our time. Roughly 6 million people around

the world, including 250,000 New Yorkers, participated in the Climate Strikes in September of 2019. Black Lives Matter has become one of the largest grassroots movements in American history. Some on the left described feeling energized by the shock of Trump's presidency, the Charlottesville riots, sexual harassment scandals, the Mueller Report, the impeachment cases against Trump, police violence against people of color, the rise of the Proud Boys, and many other events of recent years. Liberal-leftists resolved to take a stronger, more active political stance than ever before, but there are few signs of lasting success thus far, other than the election of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris in 2020 and—thanks in large part to the efforts of Stacey Abrams—the prospect of the deep Southern state of Georgia turning “blue.”

It is useful to keep in mind that, historically speaking, many of the things that Americans celebrate are, in fact, liberal or progressive victories over illiberal institutions and arrangements of the past. They are triumphs of freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice over the forces of tyranny, prejudice, staid tradition, and unjust authority. Leftists in the United States should be proud of their legacy, and they should own it. It is also important to recall that every one of those victories was hard fought: each took persistence, resilience, and an unwavering commitment to winning, and each was strenuously opposed by powerful, moneyed forces on the right.

It may turn out yet that the presidency of Donald Trump and its aftermath will mobilize liberals and progressives in ways that are innovative, far-reaching, and enduring. But it is part of the liberal conundrum to worry that whenever we take unilateral, decisive action, we are becoming *just like* conservatives: closed-minded, biased, intolerant, prejudiced, and so on. Every day of his presidency, even after he lost his bid for re-election, Trump gave people on the left innumerable reasons to be worried, upset, outraged, and contemptuous of what he was doing, how and why he was doing it, and what he represented. Feelings such as these are themselves a source of insecurity for liberals—and where threat resides, defenses arise. At an unconscious level, many liberals possess an inclination to turn inward—to a place of self-doubt, self-criticism, even self-recrimination. And this is precisely what hampers their ability to take effective—and, indeed, combative—measures to vanquish the right.

Theoretical Synthesis and the Current Historical Moment

The liberal conundrum cannot be resolved ideologically (philosophically) or personally (psychologically). We lash out at political opponents on social media platforms and regret it almost immediately. We attempt to maintain a sober, rational distance from our emotions, because we do not trust their epistemic value. Our adversaries, meanwhile, are all guts and glory, with no time for introspection, no appetite for deliberation, and no patience for us. Conservatives mock liberals' tentative, ambivalent entreaties, the half-hearted efforts to reach out, while liberals castigate one another for not being tolerant enough. Every now and again, frustration peaks, and rage boils over. The liberal-leftist unloads, finally, on the men in power—they are racists, sexual predators, liars, cheaters, plutocrats, criminals, climate arsonists. The assessment is not necessarily wrong, but it doesn't feel entirely right either, at least not for long. To the extent that "cancel culture" on the left is real, it springs from emotional impulses that are understandable, if not entirely laudable.

There is a certain continuity to liberal philosophy in Western political thought, and there is also something quite distinctive to what we, in the 21st century, might consider to be the liberal-left in the United States. Liberalism, like every other ideology, does not exist in a vacuum; it is inextricably yoked to its conservative counterpart. Conservatism in the United States has changed quite dramatically in recent decades (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016; Hacker & Pierson, 2006; Mann & Ornstein, 2012; McCarty et al., 2012). The effectiveness of the liberal agenda, therefore, does depend, in some sense, on how attuned it is to what is happening on the "other side" of the left-right divide and how well it responds. Ideological rigidity could very well undermine political success. But, at the same time, a lack of resolve or unity in opposition is perhaps even more self-defeating. President Biden has his work cut out for him when it comes to unifying the moderate and progressive wings of the Democratic Party. As we have already noted, conservatives are far more comfortable than liberals with the zero-sum nature of ideological competition: to win, it is necessary to delegitimize and ultimately conquer your opponents' ideological agenda.

Liberal-leftists would be better off owning the ideological conflict in this historical moment. Rather than playing out unresolvable internal struggles about how to tolerate the intolerable, those on the left should seek to become as fully aware of their conflicting tendencies as possible. The situation

requires a confrontation, a battle for America’s future, perhaps—a bitter ideological conflict that most liberals wish to avoid and that they will never be enthusiastic about. Those on the left must also face up to the fact that the powers that be will never side with them, at least not for long, and that is one reason liberal guilt is so misplaced: the left does not set the political landscape in the United States and almost never has. Throughout the Trump presidency, liberal-leftists were in the unenviable position of responding to whatever was taking place, always outside of their control. This is an unpleasant state for anyone to be in. But for those with liberal sensibilities to be put there by someone with the psychological and other attributes of Trump was an excruciating indignity, one that should not be forgotten.

Concluding Remarks

It is part of the postmodern predicament—ushered in by liberal-leftist hesitancy about whether universalizing and generalizing principles can provide a coherent basis for ethics and science, respectively—that no one recognizes the difference anymore between a perspective and a bias. Nothing is easier than discrediting a point of view, even one that is grounded firmly in reason and evidence, by pointing out that it is only one among many. In this way, one blurs the distinction between theory and dogma. A liberal who refuses to treat another’s perspective as equally deserving of respect and support is accused of being—and may even feel himself or herself to be—a hypocrite or worse, a bully.

Students of political psychology sometimes fret that *The Authoritarian Personality* is “biased” because it was sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith. These and many other allegations of “liberal bias” recur in online takedowns of one of the most ambitious and insightful works in the history of social science—and in bad-faith critiques of contemporary research in political psychology as well. It is part of the liberal conundrum to worry, perhaps obsessively, that one is being unfair to one’s adversaries and to take some conservatively motivated criticisms much more seriously than they should, according to the merits.

Box 6.1 Sarah Churchwell (2021) on “What we’ve seen over the last four years in the United States”

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Military attacking peaceful protestors |
|--|

- A private army paid for by the leader's enablers
- Paramilitaries mobilized by the leader
- Separatist flags, including the Confederate flag, Nazi flags, and the Thin Blue Line flag
- Delegitimization and demonization of political opposition
- Refusal of a peaceful transfer of power
- Attempt at overturning the election
- Attempt to co-opt the military
- Attacks on the free press and critics
- Concentration camps for migrant detainees
- Eugenicism, nativism, xenophobia
- Fetishized masculine strongman imagery
- Demagoguery and the cult of the leader
- Nostalgic agrarianism and the cult of tradition
- Hostilities to intellectualism and modernism
- Racialized sense of economic grievance
- Exclusionary defenses against contamination
- Counter-revolutionary corporatism
- Packing the courts with unqualified ideologues
- The "Big Lie," "Stab in the Back," and the seditious putsch of January 6, 2021

In the 1930s, American social scientists, including one of my mentors, Leonard W. Doob, were blacklisted from serving on government panels because they were classified as "prematurely anti-fascist." Nowadays, almost reflexively, we levy some version of this charge against ourselves—and our friends and colleagues. We worry that we are out of touch, living in a liberal bubble, drinking lattes, driving hybrid cars, and distorting the use of pronouns. Do we have enough conservative friends? Maybe we should listen to them more. Are we prejudiced if we dislike the idea of our son or daughter dating a right-winger? Has anyone ever seen a stalwart conservative wrestling with, let alone stymied by, questions such as these?

In a preface to *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Wilhelm Reich (1942/1976: xv) wrote that "'fascism' is only the organized political expression of the structure of the average man's character." As the historian Sarah Churchwell (2020) pointed out, the Ku Klux Klan described itself in 1926 as an organization that represented the "average citizen of the old

stock,” who had grown “increasingly uncomfortable and finally deeply distressed” as “the assurance for the future of our children dwindled” and “the control of much of our industry and commerce taken over by strangers, who stacked the cards of success and prosperity against us.” The fact that authoritarian inclinations are so mundane and quotidian means that they are a constant danger—and a constant source of stress and anxiety for the liberal-leftist. It would be foolish at this historical moment to suggest that fascism has come to America. It has not. But 74 million voters experienced four years of the Trump presidency and decided that they wanted more of the same.⁶ Many believe that Trump deserved to win, and actually won, the election in 2020. Hundreds, if not thousands, stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021 to overturn the result of the election, apparently egged on by the former president. This is an alarming state of affairs, and for many Americans, it felt as if we were much closer to a fascist takeover than we had imagined possible. The question, of course, is what to do next time around.

¹ For a conceptual and empirical critique of Haidt’s (2012) moral foundations theory, see Kugler et al. (2014).

² There have been disturbing but unproven media reports that Trump’s father was a supporter of the Ku Klux Klan; that neo-Nazis celebrated Trump’s election as well as the comments he made following the “alt-right” (White nationalist) march in Charlottesville, Virginia; and that years ago Trump received the gift of a collection of Adolf Hitler’s speeches, which he kept in his bedroom.

³ The political scientist John Hibbing (2020) prefers the term *securitarian*, but his analysis is highly reminiscent of the authoritarian personality. He writes: “Avid Trump supporters believe successful strategies for achieving their security goals will be furthered by a unified group of like-thinking, like-acting, and, if possible, like-appearing individuals who will fend off attacks in the first place and assist in active defense should deterrence fail. As such, they value patriotic displays, bonding exercises, unifying values, and those who risk their lives for the welfare of the in-group—military personnel and first responders. Like other nativists and nationalists, Trump supporters see no reason to be soft on immigration, defense, freeloaders, and law-and-order because softness only increases vulnerability” (13–14).

⁴ Sorensen (2018) observed that the “other-centric liberal” is forced to accept as legitimate the trappings of conservative intolerance *without actually believing in them*, “thereby avoiding inconsistency within [his or] her own belief system” (501).

⁵ A conservative columnist at the *New York Times* once confided in me that his superiors instructed him to *never* write critically of President George W. Bush, because “too many” other contributors to the editorial page were already doing so. Rather than practicing liberal bias, it would be more accurate to suggest that the mainstream media practices affirmative action for conservatives.

⁶ Churchwell (2021) compiled a list of 20 fascistic developments in the United States from 2017–2021 (see [Box 6.1](#)).

PART III

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

7

Ideological Asymmetries and the Essence of Political Psychology

The essence of the liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment.

Bertrand Russell (1950: 15)

In 2014, over 200,000 readers of *Time* magazine answered an online quiz composed of 12 nonpolitical items that purported to diagnose one's political orientation. Items included "I prefer cats to dogs" and "I prefer watching documentaries to action and adventure movies." These items, it turns out, are correlated—at least weakly—with self-reported political orientation as liberal or conservative. Unfortunately, the items for the quiz were selected purely because they happened to correlate with political orientation, not for any theoretically cogent reason. Although it was fun to learn that 200,000 people were curious about the connections between personality and political orientation, media gimmicks risk trivializing the study of ideology as a quirky curiosity rather than a meaningful dimension of life that is richly psychological as well as political—and that can be grasped and analyzed in scholarly, scientific terms.

Political psychologists are committed to the view that ideology can—and should—be understood in social scientific terms. This has been one of the major goals of the subfield since the 1940s and 1950s, as we have seen in earlier chapters. The guiding assumption is that beliefs, opinions, and values serve psychological needs or functions (M. B. Smith et al., 1956). There are predictable correspondences—or elective affinities—between our psychological states and the political attitudes we embrace. As Lionel Trilling (1950) put it in the preface to *The Liberal Imagination*: "certain sentiments consort only with certain ideas and not with others" (xvii). Human beings are not merely passive vessels of whatever beliefs to which

they happen to have been exposed. People are drawn to ideologies that match or resonate with their own needs, interests, and concerns, and they are repelled by those that flout them.

What psychological needs, in particular, do ideologies serve? If we define political ideology very broadly, as we did in the first chapter, as a socially shared system of beliefs “about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (Erikson & Tedin, 2019: 68), then we can say that ideology serves at least three classes of psychological needs or functions, namely: epistemic, existential, and relational. As we discussed in [Chapter 2](#), ideology offers a sense of certainty, predictability, and control; a sense of safety, security, and reassurance; and a sense of identity, social belongingness, and shared reality. Some ideologies appear to serve these needs more directly or more satisfactorily than others. Although they may promise things that they do not actually deliver, this is an important part of the story of why people are attracted to them.

Political Ideology as Motivated Social Cognition

According to the theory of political ideology as motivated social cognition, which we laid out in [Chapter 4](#), there is a correspondence (or elective affinity) between psychological needs to manage uncertainty and threat, on one hand, and core values of political conservatism, namely respect for tradition and hierarchy, on the other. Heightened epistemic motives to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity and attain a sense of order, structure, and closure may favor the adoption of conservative attitudes that serve to preserve the status quo, with its attendant degree of inequality. Existential motives to reduce threat and anxiety and attain a sense of safety and security may foster preferences for conservative-rightist over liberal-leftist solutions to social problems.

The substance and style of conservative ideology—which stresses the maintenance of that which is traditional and familiar and the legitimation of strict, hierarchical forms of social organization—offer a subjective sense of certainty, order, discipline, security, and conformity in a way that liberal ideology seldom does. There is a reason that the organizational structure of the military—as well as the police force and the prison system—is authoritarian-conservative rather than liberal-democratic. When efficiency, orderliness, and existential safety are prioritized above everything else, most

people have little appetite for the values of equality, tolerance, pluralism, power sharing, and democratic decision making.

There is a sense, therefore, in which liberal-democratic tolerance is a luxury—or, if you like, an accomplishment—that is possible only after basic survival needs have been fully satisfied, as in post-materialist societies that are affluent and secure (Welzel & Inglehart, 2005). Dedication to equality, diversity, and progress requires the toleration of uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity. When participants in the Occupy Wall Street movement insisted upon a leaderless horizontal structure, the inevitable result was a great cacophony of voices—equal time for one and all.

To explore elective affinities between psychological and ideological elements, my colleagues and I conducted a meta-analytic review of 88 studies carried out in 12 countries between 1958 and 2002 involving over 22,000 individual participants or cases. The results were summarized in [Chapter 4](#). Consistent with Bertrand Russell’s observation, we observed that epistemic motives associated with intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, cognitive rigidity, and personal needs for order, structure, and closure were positively associated with the endorsement of conservative, rightist points of view—and negatively associated with liberal, leftist points of view. Existential motives associated with death anxiety, perceptions of a dangerous world, and system-level threats were also positively associated with conservatism and negatively associated with liberalism.

For those worried about “liberal bias” in social science (Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012), it is worth pointing out that very few measures used in political psychology were constructed for the purpose of investigating ideological differences. Since the 1940s researchers have been developing and validating domain-general measures of intolerance of ambiguity, cognitive and perceptual rigidity, and needs for order, structure, and closure long before anyone thought to ask whether liberals and conservatives would fare differently on them.

Still, research on psychological differences between the left and right is inherently controversial, so it is hardly surprising that research on political conservatism as motivated social cognition was attacked by right-wing personalities such as Ann Coulter, Rush Limbaugh, Cal Thomas, and George Will. Ironically, these critics displayed many of the defensive, closed-minded, authoritarian traits they were so eager to repudiate. Jonah Goldberg, for instance, ranted and raged about psychological research in the *National*

Review online before wrapping up his remarks as follows: “I’ve put the shotgun down, and put my car keys back on the table.” He offered a “relaxation aid” to help conservatives cope with the disturbing results of our meta-analysis, namely a photograph from 1969 of police officers implementing then-Governor Ronald Reagan’s orders to teargas protestors at the University of California in Berkeley.

It is important to point out that the basic findings and conclusions presented in [Chapter 4](#) have been replicated, extended, qualified, and applied in many different ways. Researchers have worked out implications of the theory of political conservatism as motivated social cognition for understanding influences of genetic heritability and assortative mating on resistance to change, acceptance of inequality, and political orientation (Kandler et al., 2012; Ksiazkiewicz & Krueger, 2017; Ryan, 2021); parenting behavior, interpersonal attachment styles, and political socialization (Guidetti et al., 2017; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2014; Wegemer & Vandell, 2020); continuity between childhood temperament and ideology in adulthood (Block & Block, 2006; Fraley et al., 2012; Tagar et al., 2014); left-right differences in approach/avoidance and exploratory behavior in novel and potentially risky situations (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Shook & Fazio, 2009); perceptual vigilance with respect to negative and potentially threatening stimuli (Carraro et al., 2011; Fessler et al., 2017; Hibbing et al., 2014); patterns of verbal communication (Cichocka et al., 2016; Sterling et al., 2020); and even ideological differences in brain structures and functions, as we will see in the next chapter.

In sociology and political science, the theory of political ideology as motivated social cognition has been applied to such disciplinary staples as domestic and foreign policy, voting behavior, motivated reasoning, public opinion, social network structure, and terrorist activity (Barberá et al., 2015; Bartels, 2016; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Boutyline & Willer, 2017; Gambetta & Hertog, 2016; Goren, 2013; Gries, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017; Lupton et al., 2017; Meirick & Bessarabova, 2016; Mondak, 2010; Morisi et al., 2019; Rathbun, 2007, 2014; Schüller, 2015; Taber & Young, 2013; Yam et al., 2020). Research throughout the behavioral sciences has stoked popular interest in the subject matter of political psychology, as indicated by the number of trade books devoted to the topic in the last 15 years—many of which focus on social, cognitive, and motivational differences between leftists and rightists (Dean, 2006; Dean & Altemeyer, 2020; Haidt, 2012;

Hibbing, 2020; Lakoff, 2008; Mooney, 2012; Post & Doucette, 2019; Sunstein, 2018; Tuschman, 2013; Westen, 2007).

Research on political psychology, it should be acknowledged, has garnered some legitimate scientific criticism. Some of the more thoughtful questions about the psychology of left and right include the following: (a) Are leftists more rigid than rightists in Central and Eastern Europe because of the region's history of totalitarian socialism? (b) Could it be that needs to reduce uncertainty, threat, and social deviance contribute to a preference for authoritarianism—or ideological extremism in general—rather than conservatism per se? (c) Are liberals just as sensitive to threat as conservatives, but to different types of threats? (d) How different are social and economic dimensions of ideology? (e) How large are the effect sizes between psychological and ideological variables? (f) Are ideological differences confined to subjective, self-report measures that have little or no behavioral significance? (g) Aren't liberals just as biased as conservatives when it comes to motivated social cognition and just as prejudiced and intolerant too?

Obviously, there are innumerable psychological similarities between people on the left and right. No doubt most generic cognitive and motivational processes—including those associated with ideological extremity in general—apply to leftists as well as rightists. Nevertheless, as we saw in [Chapter 4](#), even when there is an uptick in cognitive rigidity or dogmatism on the far left, it is almost always smaller than the uptick on the far right, at least in Western societies. This is why it is more useful to think in terms of ideological asymmetries with respect to continuous dimensions rather than categorical—let alone essentialized—differences between liberals and conservatives. The hardware, so to speak, is the same, even if leftists and rightists are running very different software.

The bottom line, then, is that there are both ideological symmetries and asymmetries when it comes to motivated social cognition. But I would go a bit further: the asymmetries tell us more about the appeal of specific ideologies than the symmetries do and, therefore, about *political psychology*—as distinct from, say, social or cognitive or developmental psychology.

One of the explicit goals of the articles by Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003a, 2003b) was to stimulate more empirical research on the psychology of left and right. In that respect, subsequent developments have vastly exceeded expectations. For a variety of reasons, there have been far more

psychological studies on the topic in the last 20 years than in the preceding 50. To process the yield, Chadly Stern, Joanna Sterling, Nick Rule, and I conducted newer, more comprehensive meta-analytic reviews. We identified over 180 studies of epistemic motivation involving more than 130,000 individual participants (Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 2018) and nearly 100 studies of existential motivation involving 360,000 participants (Jost, Stern, et al., 2017). These databases were much, much larger than those utilized in previous meta-analyses by Burke et al. (2013); Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003a); Onraet et al. (2013); and Van Hiel et al. (2010). Considering these studies in depth helps to answer some of the questions and criticisms that have been raised in the literature. The more recent evidence is—in most but not all respects—consistent with our review of the early literature as summarized in [Chapter 4](#).

Ideological Asymmetries in Epistemic Motivation

Using a variety of online search methods, we obtained data from 181 distinct samples and 14 countries¹ and a total of 133,796 individual participants—roughly six times as many participants as in the 2003 meta-analysis (Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 2018). We conducted separate analyses of the relationship between ideology and each of nine categories of epistemic motivation, namely tolerance of ambiguity, cognitive rigidity, dogmatism, integrative complexity, personal needs for order and structure, need for cognitive closure, uncertainty tolerance, cognitive reflection, and need for cognition. Summary information about individual studies is provided for each category in [Tables 7.1 through 7.9](#).

Table 7.1 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Uncertainty Tolerance and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Comfort with uncertainty	C-scale	-.45**	-1.01	Block & Block (2006), Sample 1	46 boys from nursery schools in California, US
		-.49***	-1.12	Block & Block (2006), Sample 2	49 girls from nursery schools in California, US
Uncertainty tolerance	General conservatism	-.38***	-0.82	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 3	182 NYU students, US
		-.28**	-0.58	Caparos et al. (2015), Sample 2	84 French-speaking adults, Canada
Tolerance of insecurity and uncertainty	Right-wing identification	-.03***	-0.06	Malka et al. (2014)	73,048 adult residents of 51 countries
	Right-wing cultural composite	-.26***	-0.54		
	Right-wing economic composite	.09***	0.18		
Preference for complex paintings	C-scale	-.56**	-1.35	G. D. Wilson et al. (1973)	30 adults, US
Preference for complex poems		-.31	-0.65	Gillies & Campbell (1985)	34 Glasgow University students, Scotland
Preference for complex music		-.24	-0.49	Glasgow et al. (1985)	42 University of Nevada-Reno students, US
Comfort with job insecurity		-.22**	-0.45	Atieh et al. (1987)	155 graduate and undergraduate students, US
Preference for task variety		-.16*	-0.32		
Preference for companies without strong policies		-.18*	-0.37		
Preference for creativity		-.09	-0.18		
Preference for companies without strong moral values		-.16*	-0.32		
Preference for ambiguous literary texts		-.45*	-1.01	McAllister & Anderson (1991)	24 adults, Scotland

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Mean effect size		-.35		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 73,694	
Weighted mean effect size ^a		-.07***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.08, -.06]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; NYU = New York University.

^a For all tables in this chapter, mean effect sizes were weighted using the inverse variance $1/(N - 3)$.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.2 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Intolerance of Ambiguity and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Intolerance of ambiguity	F-scale	.17	.35	Davids (1955)	20 male students, US
		.01	.02	French (1955)	100 members of air force, US
		.28**	.58	Vannoy (1965)	113 male introductory psychology students at the University of Illinois, US
		.26*	.53	Zacker (1973)	60 introductory psychology students, US
		.33***	.70	Rottenbacher de Rojas (2015)	279 individuals (18–35) on college campus, Peru
		.37***	.80	Fibert & Ressler (1998)	159 Ben-Gurion University students, Israel
	Authoritarianism	.57***	1.40	Kohn (1974)	62 University of Reading students, England
	C-scale (short form)	.59***	1.50	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.59***	1.50	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England
		.36***	.78	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.45***	1.00	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England
	C-scale (long form)	−.06	−.12	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.38***	.82		
	General conservatism	.27***	.56	Sidanius (1978)	192 high school students, Sweden
		.19***	.39	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern University freshmen, US
		.18**	.37	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern University students, US
		.30***	.63	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 3	182 NYU students, US
		.10	.20	Choma et al. (2012)	245 university students, Canada

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.51***	1.19	Lytwyn (2012)	88 Wesleyan University students, US
		.24**	.49	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.37**	.80	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Right-wing political orientation	.44***	.98	Fibert & Ressler (1998)	159 Ben-Gurion University students, Israel
	Left/right Ideology	.45***	1.00	Caparos et al. (2015)	84 French-speaking adults, Canada
	Social conservatism	.17**	.35	Choma et al. (2012)	245 university students, Canada
	Economic conservatism	.04	.08		
	General liberalism	.14*	.28		
	Social liberalism	.21***	.43		
	Economic liberalism	.13*	.26		
	Political-economic conservatism	.06	.12	Sidanius (1978)	192 high school students, Sweden
	SDO	.16**	.32	Rottenbacher de Rojas (2015)	279 individuals (18–35) on college campus, Peru
	Left/right party preference	.16	.32	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.32**	.68	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Left/right self-placement	.17	.35	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
Intolerance of ambiguous auditory stimuli Discomfort with ambiguity		.33***	.70	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	F-scale	.10	.20	Davids & Eriksen (1957)	48 enlisted men, US Navy
	RWA	.31***	.65	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
		.26***	.54	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern University freshmen, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.18**	.37	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern University students, US
	GSJ	-.16	-.32	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
	Conservative identification	.13	.26	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern University students, US
Sensitivity to deviance	General conservatism	.16*	.32	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 1A	179 adults, US
Sensitivity to ambiguity and deviance		.12**	.24	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 2A	729 adults, US
		.13*	.26	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 3	256 adults, US
		.11**	.22	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 4	800 adults, US
Mean effect size	.26			Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 5,996	
Weighted mean effect size		.20***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[.17, .22]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; GSJ = general system justification; NYU = New York University; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.3 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Need for Closure and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Need for closure	F-scale	.27**	0.55	D. M. Webster & Kruglanski (1994), Sample 2	97 University of Maryland students, US
		.46***	1.04	Chirumbolo (2002)	178 students and working adults, Italy
	RWA	.39***	0.85	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern University freshman, US
		.32***	0.68	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern University students, US
		.26***	0.53	Brandt & Crawford (2013)	416 MTurk workers, US
		.49***	1.12	Leone & Chirumbolo (2008)	267 adults, Italy
		.31***	0.65	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
		.34***	0.72	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 4	222 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.61***	1.54	Onraet et al. (2011), Sample 2	220 adults, Belgium
		.46***	1.04	Soenens et al. (2005)	393 psychology students, Belgium
		.28***	0.58	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 1	385 NYU psychology students, US
		.22***	0.45	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 2	352 MTurk workers, US
		.42***	0.93	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 3	332 Lund University students, Sweden
		.28***	0.58	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	670 individuals from the Minnesota Twin Registry, US
		.27***	0.56	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
		.47***	1.06	Johnston et al. (2015)	494 YouGov respondents (2010), US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.27***	0.56	Johnston & Wronski (2015)	1,190 YouGov respondents (2011), US
	Economic conservatism	.06	0.12		246 YouGov respondents (2011), US
		-.09*	0.18	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
		-.04	0.08	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	675 ANES respondents, US
		-.30***	0.63	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
		.22***	0.45	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 4	222 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Social conservatism	.18**	0.37	Johnston & Wronski (2015)	246 YouGov respondents (2011), US
		.27***	0.56	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
		.19***	0.39		
		.08*	0.16	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	675 ANES adults, US
	Personal conservatism	.62***	1.58	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
	SDO	.12*	0.24	Leone & Chirumbolo (2008)	267 adults, Italy
		.25***	0.52	Soenens et al. (2005)	393 psychology students, Belgium
		.16**	0.32	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 1	385 NYU psychology students, US
		-.06	0.12	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 2	352 MTurk workers, US
		.25***	0.52	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 3	332 Lund University students, Sweden
	G SJ	.14**	0.28	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 1	385 NYU psychology students, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.05	0.10	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 2	352 MTurk workers, US
		.17***	0.35	Schlenker et al. (2012)	416 University of Florida students, US
	Political orientation	.25***	0.52	Chirumbolo (2002)	178 students and working adults, Italy
	General conservatism	.21***	0.43	Jost et al. (1999), Sample 1	613 University of Maryland students, US
		.26***	0.54	Jost et al. (1999), Sample 2	733 University of Maryland students, US
		.18***	0.37	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.25***	0.52	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.24***	0.49	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.10***	0.20	S. E. Burke et al. (2015) and Phelan et al. (2015) ^a	3,874 medical students, US
		.18***	0.36	Brandt, Evans, & Crawford (2015), Sample 2	957 MTurk workers, US
		.24***	0.49		
		.14**	0.28	Brandt & Crawford (2013)	407 MTurk workers, US
		.02	0.04	Brandt, Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 1	237 Midwestern university students, US
		.12	0.25	Brandt Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 2	147 East Coast college students, US
		-.00	0.00	Brandt Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 4	326 MTurk workers, US
		.00	0.00	Brandt & Crawford (unpublished)	165 students, Netherlands
		.16*	0.33	Brandt & Reyna (2010)	207 introductory psychology students, US
		.19***	0.39	Schlenker et al. (2012)	416 University of Florida students, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.22*	0.45	Golec de Zavala et al. (2010), Sample 1	120 students, Poland
		.24***	0.49	Golec de Zavala et al. (2010), Sample 2	187 students, Poland
		.28***	0.58	Golec de Zavala & Van Bergh (2007)	189 adults, Poland
		.22**	0.45	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.52***	1.22	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.15***	0.30	Federico et al. (2012)	1,511 internet survey respondents, US
		.56***	1.35	Onraet et al. (2011), Sample 1	121 adults, Belgium
		.23***	0.47	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 1	385 NYU psychology students, US
		.13*	0.26	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 2	352 MTurk workers, US
		.18***	0.37	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 3	332 Lund University students, Sweden
		.13	0.26	Meirick & Bessarabova (2016)	189 MTurk workers, US
		.19***	0.39	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 1	320 adults, US
		.18**	0.37	Okimoto & Gromet (2016), Sample 3	256 adults, US
	Left/right party preference	.24**	0.49	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.35***	0.75	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.22***	0.45	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
		.34***	0.72	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 4	222 Flemish adults, Belgium

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
	Left/right self-placement	.22**	0.45	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.38***	0.82	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.26***	0.54	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
		.32***	0.68	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 4	222 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.44***	0.98	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
		.26***	0.54	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 4	222 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.18***	0.37	Brandt & Crawford (2013)	413 MTurk workers, US
		.19*	0.38	Brandt & Crawford (unpublished)	159 students, Netherlands
		.39***	0.85	Soenens et al. (2005)	393 Flemish students, Belgium
		.16***	0.32	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
	Support for conservative policies	.19**	0.39	Leone & Chirumbolo (2008)	267 adults, Italy
		.10*	0.21	Brandt & Crawford (2013)	411 MTurk workers, US
		.20*	0.41	Brandt & Crawford (unpublished)	161 students, Netherlands
	Right-wing economic orientation	-.33***	0.70	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, Poland
	Economic system justification	.20***	0.41	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 1	385 NYU psychology students, US
		.07	0.14	Nilsson & Jost (unpublished), Sample 2	352 MTurk workers, US
	Right-wing political party/orientation	.29**	0.61	Kemmelmeier (1997)	93 University of Mannheim students, Germany

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.24***	0.49	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 3	253 adults, US
	Conservative party identification	.08	0.16	Brandt, Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 1	238 Midwestern university students, US
		.11	0.21	Brandt, Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 2	147 East Coast college students, US
		-.09	0.19	Brandt Chambers, et al. (2015), Sample 3	323 MTurk workers, US
		.08	0.15	Brandt & Reyna (2010)	207 introductory psychology students, US
		.14***	0.28	Federico et al. (2012)	1,511 internet survey respondents, US
	Voting for right-wing parties	.22***	0.45	Chirumbolo et al. (2004)	234 psychology students, Italy
	C-scale	.20***	0.41	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	670 individuals from the Minnesota Twin Registry, US
		.23***	0.48	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	Ideological self-placement	.13**	0.26	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	
		.14***	0.28	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	Anti-egalitarianism	.00	0.00	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	
		.00	0.00	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	Latent liberalism/conservatism	-.06	-.11	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	675 ANES adults, US
	Latent issue preferences	-.00	-0.00		
Mean effect size		.23		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 18,829	
Weighted mean effect size		.19***			

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Confidence interval (95%)		[.18, .21]			

Note: GSJ = general system justification; ESJ = economic system justification; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; NYU = New York University; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

^a Data from Burke et al. (2015) and Phelan et al. (2015) come from the same students at separate time points, so these effects and the sample sizes were averaged.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.4 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Need for Structure and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Need for structure	General conservatism	-.02	-0.04	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 1	304 MTurk workers, US
		-.09	-0.18	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 2	218 MTurk workers, US
		.11	0.21	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 3	99 Elab workers, US
		.06	0.12	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 4	96 Elab workers, US
		.08	0.17	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 5	156 MTurk workers, US
		.10	0.19	Burke et al. (unpublished data), Sample 6	145 MTurk workers, US
		.55***	1.32	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 3	379 adults, Belgium
		.28*	0.58	Krosch et al. (2013), Sample 1	71 MTurk workers, US
		.17*	0.35	Cichocka et al. (2016), Sample 1	189 University of Warsaw students, Poland
		.10***	0.21	Burke & LaFrance (unpublished), Sample 1	1,913 online and Yale undergraduate participants, US
		.23***	0.47	Burke (unpublished), Sample 1	248 MTurk workers, US
		.11	0.21	Burke (unpublished), Sample 2	249 MTurk workers, US
		.21***	0.43	Burke (unpublished), Sample 3	357 MTurk workers, US
		.05	0.10	Burke (unpublished), Sample 4	297 MTurk workers, US
		.05	0.10	Burke (unpublished), Sample 5	251 MTurk workers, US
		.17**	0.35	Burke (unpublished),	294 MTurk workers, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
	Economic conservatism	.47***	1.06	Sample 6 Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 psychology students, Belgium
		-.05	-0.10	Cichocka et al. (2016), Sample 1	189 University of Warsaw students, Poland
		-.02	-0.04	Burke & LaFrance (unpublished), Sample 1	178 Yale students and residents, US
		.00	0.01	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
	Cultural/ social conservatism	.48***	1.09	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 1	399 students, Belgium
		.51***	1.19	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 2	330 students, Belgium
		.41***	0.90	Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 psychology students, Belgium
		.29***	0.60	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
		.11	0.23	Burke & LaFrance (unpublished), Sample 1	179 Yale students and residents, US
	RWA	.34***	0.72	Altemeyer (1998)	354 University of Manitoba students, Canada
		.59***	1.46	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 1	399 students, Belgium
		.55***	1.32	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 2	330 students, Belgium
		.68***	1.85	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 3	379 adults, Belgium
		.44***	0.98	Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 psychology students, Belgium
		.35***	0.75	Jugert et al. (2009), Sample 1	218 University of Auckland students, New Zealand
		.24***	0.49	Jugert et al. (2009), sample 2	259 online respondents, Germany
		.34***	0.72	Kimmelmeier (2010), Sample 1	142 university students, US
		.30**	0.63	Kimmelmeier (2010), Sample 2	98 introductory psychology students, US
	SDO	.06	0.12	Altemeyer (1998)	354 University of Manitoba students, Canada

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Preference for order	F-scale	.27***	0.56	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 1	399 students, Belgium
		.17**	0.35	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 2	330 students, Belgium
		.22***	0.45	Van Hiel et al. (2004), Sample 3	379 adults, Belgium
		.53***	1.25	Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 psychology students, Belgium
		.08	0.16	Krosch et al. (2013), Sample 1	71 MTurk workers, US
		.00	0.01	Burke & LaFrance (unpublished), Sample 1	179 Yale students and New Haven, CT residents, US
			0.30	Cohrs et al. (2005)	275 individuals, Germany
		.11	0.22	French (1955)	100 members of air force, US
		-.06	-0.12	Cichocka et al. (2016), Sample 1	189 University of Warsaw students, Poland
		.18	0.37		
		.05	0.10	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.15*	0.30	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.17*	0.35		
		.26***	0.54	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 1	161 University of Texas students, US
		.26**	0.54	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 2	108 Boston University students, US
		.18*	0.37	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 3	182 NYU students, US
Need for order	RWA	.27***	0.56	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.27***	0.56	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.29***	0.61	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
		.24*	0.49	Webster & Stewart (in G. D. Wilson, 1973)	93 Protestant ministers, New Zealand

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Implicit preference for order vs. chaos Preference for predictability	GSJ	−.03	−0.06	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
	General conservatism	.28***	0.58	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.46***	1.04	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Left/right party preference	.26**	0.54	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.36***	0.77	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
		.28***	0.58	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.29**	0.61	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Conservative vs. liberal	.17***	0.35	Jost, Nosek, & Gosling (2008)	1,480 website visitors
	RWA	.22***	0.45	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.19**	0.39	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
	Conservative political identification	.17*	0.35		
	General conservatism	.05	0.10	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.12	0.24	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.29***	0.61	Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 psychology students, Belgium
Need for predictability	SDO	.16**	0.32		
	Cultural conservatism	.22***	0.45		
	Economic conservatism	.00	0.00		
	General conservatism	.26**	0.54	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.45***	1.01	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Left/right party preference	.12	0.24	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.27**	0.56	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Left-right self-placement	.24**	0.49	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.17	0.35	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
Mean effect size		.20		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 11,703	
Weighted mean effect size		.18***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[.17, .20]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; GSJ = general system justification; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; NYU = New York University; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation; YouGov = <https://yougov.co.uk/>.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.5 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Cognitive and Integrative Complexity and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Integrative complexity	General conservatism	-.20***	-0.41	Brundidge et al. (2014)	528 political blog posts, US
		.12*	0.24	Conway et al. (2016), Study 2	346 University of Montana students, US
		-.08	-0.16	Conway et al. (2016), Study 2	511 University of Montana students, US
		.15*	0.30	Conway et al. (2016), Study 3	232 University of Montana students, US
		-.20**	-0.41	Conway et al. (2016), Study 3	209 University of Montana students, US
	Left-right ideology	-.12	-0.24	Van Hiel & Mervielde (2003)	203 adults, Belgium
	Conservative voting record	-.44**	-0.98	Tetlock (1983)	Speeches from 45 senators, US
	Conservative party/ orientation	-.30**	-0.63	Tetlock (1984)	Interviews with 87 members of the House of Commons, England
	Conservative voting record/ orientation	-.61***	-1.54	Tetlock et al. (1984), Sample 1	Speeches from 35 senators, 82nd Congress, US
		-.38*	-0.82	Tetlock et al. (1984), Sample 2	Speeches from 45 senators, 94th Congress, US
		-.45**	-1.01		Speeches from 45 senators, 96th Congress, US
		-.46**	-1.04		Speeches from 45 senators, 97th Congress, US
		.00	0.00	Gruenfeld (1995), Sample 1	16 Supreme Court justices
		.19	0.30		32 Supreme Court opinions
		.13	0.26		24 Supreme Court cases
		.00	0.00		

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Integrative complexity	Conservative voting record (civil liberties)	-.47*	-1.06	Tetlock et al. (1985)	Opinions from 23 Supreme Court justices
	Conservative voting record (economic)	-.48*	-1.09		
	F-scale	-.10	-0.2	Vannoy (1965)	113 male students, US
	F-scale	-.39***	-0.85	Rule & Hewitt (1970), Sample 1	91 male students
	F-scale	-.29**	-0.61	Rule & Hewitt (1970), Sample 2	113 female students
	F-scale	-.34***	-0.72	Schroder & Streufert (1962)	147 male high school students
Cognitive flexibility	F-scale	-.18*	-0.37	Streufert & Driver (1967)	124 male students
	General conservatism	-.19*	-0.39	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students, Sweden
Cognitive complexity	F-scale	-.16	-0.32		
		-.11	-0.22		
		-.45***	-1.01	Pyron (1966)	80 students, US
Cognitive complexity		-.20	-0.41	Vannoy (1965)	113 male students
	Political-economic conservatism	-.22	-0.45	Barron (1953)	40 male University of California students, US
		-.11	-0.22	Sidanius (1985)	134 high school students, Sweden
	C-scale	-.01	-0.02		
		-.23*	-0.47	Hinze et al. (1997)	84 University of North Texas students, US
Cognitive complexity	C-scale	.01	0.02		
	F-scale	-.08	-0.16	Stuart (1965), Sample 1	31 vocational students
		-.06	-0.12	Stuart (1965), Sample 2	42 liberal arts students
Rod-frame test	F-scale	-.45**	-1.01	Rudin & Stagner (1958)	34 psychology students, US
Embedded figures test	F-scale	-.20	-0.41		

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (r)	Cohen's d Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Brightness contrast test	F-scale	.05	0.10		
Analytical thinking	Social conservatism	-.29***	-0.61	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 1	218 University of Virginia students, US
		-.19***	-0.39	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 2	3,174 website visitors
Mean effect size		-.19		Total (unique) $N = 7,735$	
Weighted mean effect size		-.15***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.17, -.13]			

Note: ANES = American National Election Survey; C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; GSJ = general system justification; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; NYU = New York University; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation; YouGov = <https://yougov.co.uk/>.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.6 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Need for Cognition and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Need for cognition	RWA	-.09	-0.18	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		-.15*	-0.30	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		-.25**	-0.52	Tam et al. (2008), Sample 1	137 students, US
		-.21*	-0.43	Kemmelmeier (2010), Sample 1	142 students, US
		-.28***	-0.58	Benjamin (2014)	220 Oklahoma Panhandle State University students, US
	SDO	-.03	-0.06	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
		-.34**	-0.72	Tam et al. (2008), Sample 2	102 students, US
	Economic conservatism	-.04	-0.09	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
		-.19**	-0.39	Sterling et al. (2016)	198 MTurk workers, US
		-.03	-0.06	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 1	1,555 ANES respondents, US
	ESJ	.01	0.02	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	1,212 ANES respondents, US
		-.29***	-0.61	Hennes et al. (2012)	182 MTurk workers, US
		-.23**	-0.47	Sterling et al. (2016)	198 MTurk workers, US
	Free market ideology	-.15*	-0.30	Sterling et al. (2016)	198 MTurk workers, US
		-.06**	-0.12	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 1	1,555 ANES respondents, US
		-.07**	-0.14	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	1,212 ANES respondents, US
	Social conservatism	-.24***	-0.50	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
		-.04	-0.08	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
	Cultural conservatism	-.12	-0.24	Hennes et al. (2012)	182 MTurk workers, US
	GSI				

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		-.27*	-0.56	Stern et al. (2013), Sample 3	90 MTurk workers, US
	General conservatism	-.27***	-0.56	Sargent (2004), Sample 3	255 White college students, US
		-.08**	-0.16	Bizer et al. (2004), Sample 1	1,203 adults from California, Georgia, Illinois (1998 ANES), US
		-.03	-0.06	Bizer et al. (2004), Sample 2	1,807 adults (2000 ANES), US
		-.24**	-0.49	Hennes et al. (2012)	182 MTurk workers, US
		-.20**	-0.40	Stern & West (unpublished)	197 MTurk workers, US
		-.05	-0.10	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		-.01	-0.02	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
	Conservative identification C-scale	.02	0.04		
		-.25***	-0.52	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	670 individuals from Minnesota Twin Registry, US
		-.21***	-0.43	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	Ideological self-placement	-.12**	-0.24	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	
		-.16***	-0.32	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	RWA	-.29***	-0.61	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	
		-.33***	-0.70	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	
	Anti-egalitarianism	.04	0.08	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Monozygotic group	
		-.06	-0.12	Ksiazkiewicz et al. (2016), Dizygotic group	

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (r)	Cohen's d Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
	Latent liberalism/ conservatism	-.05*	-0.11	group Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 1	1,555 ANES respondents, US
		-.04	-0.08	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	1,212 ANES respondents, US
	Latent issue preferences	-.06*	-0.11	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 1	1,555 ANES respondents, US
		-.02	-0.04	Feldman & Johnston (2014), Sample 2	1,212 ANES respondents, US
Mean effect size		-.16		Total (unique) $N = 10,168$	
Weighted mean effect size		-.09***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[-.11, -.07]			

Note: ANES = American National Election Survey; C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; GSJ = general system justification; ESJ = economic system justification; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.7 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Cognitive Rigidity and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Rigidity	F-scale	-.06	-0.12	French (1955)	100 members of air force, US
		.33*	0.70	Neuringer (1964)	45 male hospitalized patients, US
		.76***	2.34	Kidd & Kidd (1972)	100 female students, US
		.53**	1.25	Hession & McCarthy (1975), Sample 1	23 graduate students, Ireland
		.14	0.28	Hession & McCarthy (1975), Sample 2	12 graduate students, Ireland
		.35***	0.75	Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	207 college students in New York City area, US
		.35***	0.75	Kemmelmeier (2007)	95 Department of Defense and Department of State employees, US
		.09	0.19	Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010), Sample 1	223 University of Massachusetts psychology students, US
		.11	0.22	Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010), Sample 2	78 University of Massachusetts psychology students, US
		.69***	1.91	Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	207 college students in New York City area, US
Inflexibility (Gough)	C-scale	.53***	1.25	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 participants from London and Oxford, England
Inflexibility (Gough-shortened scale)		.59***	1.46		
Goal-setting rigidity (set time condition)	F-scale	.12	0.24	Zelen (1955)	121 Iowa State University students, US
Goal-setting rigidity (increasing time condition)		.19*	0.39		
Goal-setting rigidity (random		.29**	0.61		

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
time condition)					
Global bias	General conservatism	.25*	0.52	Caparos et al. (2015), Sample 1	65 French-speaking participants, Canada
Global matches (Weak global display)		.28*	0.58		
Global matches (Strong global display)		-.02	-0.04		
PSE		.28*	0.58		
Breskin rigidity score	F-scale	.16	0.32	Caparos et al. (2015), Sample 2	84 French-speaking participants, Canada
Global matches		.27*	0.56		
Ebbinghaus illusion size		.15	0.30		
Category width scale		.03	0.06		
Mean effect size		0.32		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 1,839	49 female University of North Carolina students, US
Weighted mean effect size		0.38***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[.34, .42]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.8 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Dogmatism and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Dogmatism	F-scale	.82***	2.87	Pettigrew (1958)	49 female University of North Carolina students, US
		.56*	1.35	Rokeach (1960), Sample 1	13 members of the student Communist Society at University College, London
		.77***	2.41	Plant (1960), Sample 1	60 workers, England
		.62***	1.58	Plant (1960), Sample 2	80 students, England
		.75***	2.27	Plant (1960), Sample 3	1,007 male students, US
		.70***	1.96	Plant (1960), Sample 4	1,343 female students, US
		.23***	0.47	Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	207 students, US
		.67***	1.81	Rokeach (1956), Sample 1	202 Michigan State University students, US
		.58***	1.42	Rokeach (1956), Sample 2	207 students from New York City area, US
		.61***	1.54	Rokeach (1956), Sample 3	153 Michigan State University students, US
		.54***	1.28	Rokeach (1956), Sample 4	186 Michigan State University students, US
		.57***	1.39	Rokeach (1956), Sample 5	137 University College, London, and Birkbeck College psychology students, England
		.62***	1.58	Rokeach (1956), Sample 6	80 University College, London, and Birkbeck College psychology students, England
		.77***	2.41	Rokeach (1956), Sample 7	60 workers, England
		.65***	1.72	Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), Sample 1	537 Michigan State University students, US
		.70***	1.96	Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), Sample 2	371 Louisiana State University students, US
		.77***	2.44	Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966), Sample 3	331 adult part-time NYU students, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.53***	1.25	Pyron (1966)	80 Whitwater State undergraduate students, US
		.64***	1.67	Hession & McCarthy (1975), Group 1	23 graduate students, Ireland
		.53***	1.25	Hession & McCarthy (1975), Group 2	12 graduate students, Ireland
		.45***	1.01	Rule & Hewitt (1970), Sample 1	91 male students
		.56***	1.35	Rule & Hewitt (1970), Sample 2	113 female students
		.56***	1.35	Schroder & Streufert (1962)	147 male high school students, US
		.64***	1.67	Thompson & Michel (1972)	379 sociology students in two Texas universities, US
		.67***	1.81	Zippel & Norman (1966)	241 male students at the University of New Mexico, US
	RWA	.66***	1.76	Kahoe (1974)	188 students, US
		.45***	1.01	Kohn (1974)	62 University of Reading students, England
		.56***	1.35	Everett (2013)	319 MTurk workers, US
	C-scale	.58***	1.42	Webster & Stewart (1973)	93 Protestant ministers, New Zealand
	C-scale (Short form)	.44***	0.98	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
		.47***	1.06	Kirton (1978), Sample 2	276 adults, England
	C-scale (Long form)	.38***	0.82	Kirton (1978), Sample 1	286 adults, England
	General conservatism	.64***	1.67	Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	207 students, US
		.27**	0.56	Kemmelmeier (2007)	95 foreign policy officials, US
		.24***	0.49	Choma et al. (2012)	245 students, Canada
		.16*	0.32		
		.17***	0.35	Schlenker et al. (2012), Sample 1	416 University of Florida students, US
		.27**	0.56	Conway et al. (2016), Sample 1	111 University of Montana students, US
	Conservatism-radicalism	.20***	0.41	Smithers & Lobley (1978)	295 University of Bradford students, England

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Closed-mindedness	Cultural/ social conservatism	.50***	1.15	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
		.25***	0.52	Choma et al. (2012)	245 university students, Canada
	Political-economic conservatism	.19**	0.39	Everett (2013)	319 MTurk workers, US
		.44***	0.98		
		.13	0.26	Rokeach (1960), Sample 2	202 Michigan State University students, US
		.11	0.22	Rokeach (1960), Sample 3	207 NYU and Brooklyn College students, US
		.20*	0.41	Rokeach (1960), Sample 4	153 Michigan State University students, US
		.28***	0.58	Rokeach (1960), Sample 5	186 Michigan State University students, US
		.21***	0.42	Crowson (2009)	251 Midwestern adults, US
		.19**	0.39	Choma et al. (2012)	245 university students, Canada
		.04	0.08	Everett (2013)	319 MTurk workers, US
		.24***	0.49		
	Social and economic conservatism	.42***	0.93		
		SDO	.27***		
		GSJ	.16**		
	Fair market ideology	.21***	0.43		
		RWA	.33***		
	General conservatism	.37***	0.80	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.25***	0.52	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
				Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
		.24***	0.49	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 1	382 Southeastern university freshmen, US
		.35***	0.75	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
		.24*	0.21	Thórisdóttir & Jost (2011), Sample 3	71 NYU students, US
		.22**	0.45	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.04	0.08	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
		.45***	1.01	Jost et al. (2007), Sample 2	108 Boston University students, US
	F-scale	.10	0.20	D. M. Webster & Kruglanski (1994), Sample 2	157 University of Maryland students, US
	Left/right party preference	.24**	0.49	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.04	0.08	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Left/right self-placement	.25**	0.62	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers
		.21*	0.43	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 1	145 adults, Poland
		.06	0.12	Kossowska & Van Hiel (2003), Sample 2	100 Flemish adults, Belgium
	Conservative identification	.30***	0.62	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers, US
		.25***	0.52	Crowson et al. (2005), Sample 2	211 Southeastern university students, US
	GSJ	-.11***	-0.22	Kelemen et al. (2014)	1,000 adults, Hungary
Religious closed-mindedness	Left/right self-placement	.25**	0.52	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers, US
	Left/right party preference	.19*	0.39	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers, US
Political closed-mindedness	Left/right self-placement	.20*	0.41	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers, US
	Left/right party preference	.16	0.32	Price et al. (2015)	121 MTurk workers, US
Mean effect size (both tables)		.48		Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 12,002	
Weighted mean effect size		.51***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[.49, .52]			

Note: C-scale = Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale; GSJ = general system justification; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; NYU = New York University; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

Table 7.9 Effect Sizes, Summary Statistics, Source Articles, and Sample Characteristics for Studies Reporting Relationships between Cognitive Reflection and Political Ideology

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Cognitive reflection	General conservatism	-.09	-0.18	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 1	190 MTurk workers, US
		-.19***	-0.39	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 2	536 GfK participants, US
		-.18***	-0.37	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 3	730 MTurk workers, US
		-.11	-0.22	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 4	247 students, US
		-.02	-0.04	Kahan (2012)	1,750 adults, US
		.03	0.06		
	Conservative attitude index	-.37***	-0.80	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 1	190 MTurk workers, US
	Conservative issue preference	-.23***	-0.47	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 2	536 GfK participants, US
		-.21***	-0.43	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 3	730 MTurk workers, US
		-.16*	-0.32	Deppe et al. (2015), Sample 4	247 students, US
Analytic thinking	Social conservatism	-.29***	-0.61	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 1	218 University of Virginia students, US
		-.19***	-0.39	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 2	3,174 website visitors, US
		-.17***	-0.35	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
		-.16***	-0.32		
	Economic conservatism	-.04	-0.08	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 1	218 University of Virginia students, US
		-.04	-0.08	Talhelm et al. (2015), Sample 2	3,174 website visitors, US
		-.02	-.04	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
	Left/right self-placement	-.16**	-0.33	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 1	356 Doğuş University students, Turkey
		-.11**	-0.21	Yilmaz & Saribay (2016), Sample 2	750 Bogaziçi University students, Turkey
Correction of heuristics and biases	Personal conservatism	-.13***	-0.26		
	Economic conservatism	-.11	-0.22	Sterling et al. (2016)	198 MTurk workers, US

Psychological Variable	Political Variable	Effect Size (<i>r</i>)	Cohen's <i>d</i> Effect Size	Source	Sample Characteristics
Lack of faith in intuition	Free market ideology	−.26***	−0.54	Kimmelmeier (2010), Sample 1	142 students, US
	Social conservatism	−.18*	−0.36		
	Economic conservatism	−.11	−0.22		
	Free market ideology	−.20**	−0.41		
	Social conservatism	−.17*	−0.35		
	RWA	−.29***	−0.61		
Identity style (seek out information)	RWA	−.16**	−0.32	Duriez & Soenens (2006)	328 Flemish students, Belgium
Low experiential thinking	SDO	−.27***	−0.56	Cornelis & Van Hiel (2006)	418 students, Belgium
	RWA	.05	0.10		
	SDO	.08	0.16		
	Cultural conservatism	−.06	−0.12		
Rational thinking	Economic conservatism	.11*	0.22		
	RWA	−.14**	−0.28		
	SDO	−.10*	−0.20		
	Cultural conservatism	−.01	−0.02		
	Economic conservatism	−.03	−0.06	Total (unique) <i>N</i> = 9,041	
Mean effect size		−.16			
Weighted mean effect size		−.11***			
Confidence interval (95%)		[−.13, −.09]			

Note: Gfk = formerly Knowledge Networks; MTurk = Amazon's MTurk; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.

* $p < .05$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$.

The largest effect sizes were observed for *dogmatism and cognitive rigidity*. We identified 50 studies (carried out in seven different countries) investigating the hypothesis that dogmatism—which entails, among other things, the assumption that “To compromise with one’s political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side”—would be stronger on the right than the left. As shown in [Figure 7.1](#), this hypothesis was upheld in 45 of the 50 studies. There was not a single study in which

leftists scored higher than rightists in dogmatism. Overall, the unweighted ($r = .48$) and weighted ($r = .51$) average effect sizes were positive and quite large.





Figure 7.1 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political conservatism would be positively associated with dogmatism.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

We identified 16 studies investigating the hypothesis that conservatives would score higher than liberals on tests of *perceptual or cognitive rigidity*. Typically, these tasks measure objective behaviors such as the tendency to exclude nonprototypical examples from category classification. The hypothesis was clearly upheld in nine studies, and in six others the effect was nonsignificant but in the hypothesized direction (see [Figure 7.2](#)). Overall, the unweighted ($r = .32$) and weighted ($r = .38$) average effect sizes were fairly large and statistically significant. It is worth noting that similar patterns were subsequently observed in a rigorous, comprehensive analysis of ideological differences among 522 research participants who completed 37 domain-general (i.e., non-political) cognitive and perceptual tasks. The authors of that study concluded that “political and nationalistic conservatism is associated with reduced strategic information processing (reflecting variables associated with working memory capacity, planning, cognitive flexibility and other higher-order strategies)” and that “right-wing ideologies are frequently associated with reduced analytical thinking . . . and cognitive flexibility” (Zmigrod et al., 2021: 9).

Sample Effect Sizes Ordered by Magnitude





Figure 7.2 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political conservatism would be positively associated with cognitive and perceptual rigidity.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).





Figure 7.3 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political conservatism would be positively associated with personal needs for order and structure.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

Although in 2003 we had identified only a few studies focusing on *personal needs for order and structure*, there have now been 36 studies (conducted in six different countries) investigating the hypothesis that rightists would score higher than leftists on these needs. In 24 studies the hypothesis was upheld, and in 10 others the effect was nonsignificant but in the hypothesized direction (see [Figure 7.3](#)). Overall, the unweighted ($r = .20$) and weighted ($r = .18$) average effect sizes were positive and significant. Likewise, there have been 41 studies (conducted in eight different countries) investigating the hypothesis that rightists would score higher than leftists on the *need for cognitive closure*. The hypothesis was upheld in 32 studies, and in 7 others the effect was nonsignificant but in the hypothesized direction (see [Figure 7.4](#)). The unweighted ($r = .23$) and weighted ($r = .19$) average effect sizes were positive and significant. An additional 24 studies (conducted in eight different countries) investigated the hypothesis that rightists would be less *tolerant of ambiguity* than leftists. The hypothesis was upheld in 21 studies, and there were no studies in which rightists were more tolerant of ambiguity than leftists (see [Figure 7.5](#)). Once again, the unweighted ($r = .26$) and weighted ($r = .20$) average effect sizes were positive and significant.





Figure 7.4 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political conservatism would be positively associated with need for cognitive closure.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).





Figure 7.5 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political conservatism would be positively associated with intolerance for ambiguity.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

On the basis of 11 studies exploring ideological differences in *integrative complexity*—which is usually measured objectively in by coding the contents of speeches, legal decisions, and other texts—we concluded in [Chapter 4](#) that liberal-leftists scored higher than conservative-rightists on integrative complexity. However, this conclusion was challenged by Conway et al. (2016), who turned up null results in their research. There have now been 26 studies conducted in four different countries. None of these studies found that conservatives scored significantly higher than liberals in integrative complexity, but null results were obtained in half of the studies (see [Figure 7.6](#)). Overall, unweighted ($r = -.19$) and weighted ($r = -.15$) average effect sizes were negative and significant, revealing that liberals exhibited more integrative complexity than conservatives in general.

Sample Effect Sizes Ordered by Magnitude





Figure 7.6 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political liberalism would be positively associated with integrative complexity.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

An additional 10 studies investigated the hypothesis that *uncertainty tolerance*—which has been measured in a number of ways, including aesthetic preferences for complex art and poetry and disagreement with items such as “I can’t stand being taken by surprise”—would be greater among liberals than conservatives. The hypothesis was upheld in eight studies, and in the remaining two studies the effect was nonsignificant but in the hypothesized direction (see [Figure 7.7](#)). The unweighted ($r = -.35$) and weighted ($r = -.07$) average effect sizes were negative and statistically significant but varied dramatically in magnitude. The sample size for one study was enormous (accounting for 99% of the total [unique] N), but the psychometric properties of the scale used to gauge the “need for certainty and security” (a blend of epistemic and existential motives) were highly problematic.² As a result, this study diluted the weighted effect size to a disproportionate extent. When it was excluded from calculations, the unweighted ($r = -.35$) and weighted ($r = -.33$) average effect sizes were both very strong. Ideological differences in the tolerance of uncertainty, ambiguity, and complexity are potentially quite consequential, insofar as these variables predict consumer behavior (Farmer et al., 2020; Kim et al., 2018; Kock et al., 2019; Northey & Chan, 2020; B. J. Reich et al., 2018)—and presumably other actions as well.





Figure 7.7 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political liberalism would be positively associated with tolerance of uncertainty.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).





Figure 7.8 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political liberalism would be positively associated with need for cognition.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

To our knowledge, no studies prior to 2003 explored ideological differences in *need for cognition* (sometimes referred to as *enjoyment of thinking*). Since then, there have been at least 19 studies investigating the hypothesis that liberal-leftists would score higher than conservative-rightists on the need for cognition, measured with items such as “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.” The hypothesis was upheld in 14 studies, and in 5 other studies the effect was nonsignificant but in the expected direction (see [Figure 7.8](#)). Overall, the unweighted ($r = -.16$) and weighted ($r = -.09$) average effect sizes were negative and statistically significant but modest. In terms of dual process theories popularized by Daniel Kahneman (2011), the preponderance of evidence suggests that conservatives are more likely than liberals to engage in heuristic, intuitive, and stereotypical (“System 1”) thinking, whereas liberals are more likely than conservatives to engage in systematic, effortful, deliberative (“System 2”) thinking.

Dan Kahan (2016b: 5) discounted evidence derived from self-report measures of cognitive style and epistemic motivation, arguing that “defects in information processing are not open to introspective observation or control” and that there is “little reason to believe a person’s own perception of the quality of his reasoning is a valid measure of it.” He proposed that ideological differences should be assessed using “objective measures” of analytical reasoning, such as the “cognitive reflection test” (CRT). We identified 13 studies exploring ideological differences in *cognitive reflection* (or intuitive vs. analytic thinking), and 11 of them revealed that leftists scored higher in cognitive reflection than rightists (see [Figure 7.9](#)). Overall, the unweighted ($r = -.16$) and weighted ($r = -.11$) average effect sizes were negative and statistically significant, albeit modest. In a very large-scale study that was conducted after the publication of our meta-analysis, Gordon Pennycook and David Rand (2019) obtained a very similar result, namely a negative correlation of $r(12,042) = -.15$, $p < .001$ between social conservatism and cognitive reflection.³ The ideological asymmetry with respect to cognitive reflection has behavioral significance, insofar as people who are lower in cognitive reflection spread more misinformation on

Twitter, which may explain, at least in part, why conservatives spread more misinformation than liberals (Mosleh et al., 2021).





Figure 7.9 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that political liberalism would be positively associated with cognitive reflection.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Sterling, and Stern (2018).

Source: Jost (2017a).

There are other epistemic differences as well. Three studies based on very large samples (totaling 95,000 participants) revealed a significant correlation between conservatism and self-deception, measured with items such as “My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right,” and “The reason I vote is that my vote can make a difference” (Jost & Krochik, 2014; Jost et al., 2010; Wojcik et al., 2015). Two studies involving nearly 1,000 participants found that conservatives scored lower than liberals on intellectual humility measured both in general and with respect to politics in particular (Bowes et al., 2021, Table 2). Another research program demonstrated in 14 studies (total $N = 4,575$) that—independent of task performance—conservatives expressed more subjective confidence than liberals in their own decisions and judgments across a wide variety of nonpolitical, domain-general tasks (Ruisch & Stern, 2021).

Although it is assumed by many that economic conservatives are more accuracy driven than social conservatives, faith in the inherent goodness of capitalism may involve an element of self-deception (Jost, Blount, et al., 2003). In dissecting free market ideology, George Monbiot (2016) noted:

The words used . . . often conceal more than they elucidate. “The market” sounds like a natural system that might bear upon us equally, like gravity or atmospheric pressure. But it is fraught with power relations. What “the market wants” tends to mean what corporations and their bosses want.

Likewise, Anat Shenker-Orsorio (2012: 3) observed in the aftermath of the global recession precipitated by the 2008 collapse of the housing market bubble:

Minted experts responsible for national monetary and fiscal policies operating under the notion that regulating financial markets stunts growth could suddenly be exposed as delusional at best and possibly even merchants of deliberate misinformation. Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, a man so devoted to free-market orthodoxy that Milton Friedman and Ayn Rand would be proud to call them their love child, conceded his treasury theory didn’t quite hold. As reported in the *New York Times*, “A humbled Mr. Greenspan admitted that he had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of free markets.” Such are the perils of economy worship.

Consistent with the hypothesis that economic conservatism may be less grounded in rational thought than is frequently assumed, Joanna Sterling,

Gordon Pennycook, and I observed that individuals who endorsed laissez-faire, free market ideology were more susceptible to *pseudo-profound bullshit*. That is, they were more likely to endorse statements that were extremely vague or meaningless, such as “Consciousness is the growth of coherence, and of us,” and “Your movement transforms universal observations.” Those who endorsed free market ideology also scored lower on measures of verbal and fluid intelligence. There was some evidence that the relationship between economic ideology and bullshit receptivity was attributable, in part, to heuristic processing and low verbal intelligence (see [Figure 7.10](#)). Importantly, the positive association between free market ideology and bullshit receptivity has been replicated and extended in additional studies conducted in the United States, the Netherlands, and, to some extent, even Serbia (e.g., Evans et al., 2020; Gligorić et al., 2020).




Figure 7.10 Evidence that cognitive style and cognitive ability mediate the effect of endorsement of free market ideology on bullshit receptivity.

Note: Data are based on research by Sterling, Jost, and Pennycook (2016). All values are standardized coefficients. We estimated the indirect effect using PROCESS's Model 6 with 5,000 bootstraps and observed that the endorsement of free market ideology was associated with a failure to correct deliberative processing and that failure to correct deliberative processing was associated with greater bullshit receptivity. The endorsement of free market ideology was also associated with lower verbal intelligence, and lower verbal intelligence was associated with greater bullshit receptivity. After adjusting for the effects of deliberative processing and verbal intelligence, the relationship between free market ideology and bullshit receptivity no longer approached significance, $p = .64$. The 95% confidence intervals of the indirect effects of free market ideology through deliberative processing and verbal intelligence did not contain zero, [0.0001, 0.0036] and [0.0002, 0.0042], suggesting significant mediation at $\alpha = .05$.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Source: Jost (2017a).

Another study by Pfattheicher and Schindler (2016) yielded parallel results. Americans who identified as more conservative and reported liking three leading Republican presidential candidates (Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, and Marco Rubio) were more receptive to pseudo-profound bullshit than those who did not. The positive correlation between bullshit receptivity and

support for Trump (over Hillary Clinton in 2016 and Bernie Sanders in 2020) has also been replicated (Gligorić et al., 2020). In Sweden, bullshit receptivity was associated with social but not economic conservatism (Nilsson et al., 2019). In the US, it was found to be associated with both forms of conservatism (Evans et al., 2020).

Thus far, we have seen that an updated, much more comprehensive meta-analysis reproduces all of the effect sizes estimated in [Chapter 4](#) concerning ideological differences in epistemic motivation. It also shows that ideological asymmetries extend to new and additional variables, including cognitive reflection, self-deception, and bullshit receptivity. Aggregating across 181 studies involving over 130,000 research participants from 14 different countries, political conservatism was positively associated with intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognitive closure, personal needs for order and structure, cognitive rigidity, and dogmatism. Conversely, liberalism was associated with uncertainty tolerance, integrative complexity, cognitive reflection, and need for cognition. In all cases, average effect sizes attained statistical significance. Importantly, most, but not all, of these results were robust to concerns about publication bias or the “file drawer” problem (see Jost, Sterling, & Stern, 2018, for details).

These new findings answer a number of criticisms, including the skeptical suggestion that the model of political conservatism as motivated social cognition does not apply to Central or Eastern Europe, because of its history of communism. Several of the most recent studies were conducted in post-communist societies, and the results resemble those obtained in the West, much as McFarland and colleagues (1992) predicted they would over time. That is, personal needs for order, structure, and closure were associated with political conservatism and right-wing orientation in Hungary and Poland (see [Tables 7.3](#) and [7.4](#); see also Jost & Kende, 2020, for another demonstration).

The findings we have summarized are broadly consistent with the idea that epistemic motives may be more strongly linked to social than economic attitudes, but they are typically linked to both. Our review finds that in many cases dogmatism, personal needs for structure, heuristic thinking, bullshit receptivity, and low need for cognition were associated with economic—as well as social—conservatism and with ideological self-placement and issue-based conservatism as well as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) (see [Tables 7.4](#), [7.6](#), and [7.8](#)). Furthermore, this newer meta-analysis contradicts

the suggestion that the “true” effect sizes are weaker than we had concluded in 2003. What we actually see is that in several cases—such as perceptual/cognitive rigidity and dogmatism—the ideological asymmetries are even stronger than what had been estimated previously. On top of all this, behavioral evidence is emerging to suggest that closed-mindedness among rightists may hamper the ability to learn from informational feedback and engage in rational belief-updating (Sinclair et al., 2020).

The preponderance of evidence contradicts the claim that ideological differences in epistemic motivation are confined to subjective, self-report measures. On the contrary, there is a good deal of evidence based on objective, behavioral measures of cognitive style—not only with respect to cognitive reflection but also on domain-general tests of perceptual or cognitive rigidity—and the conclusions are virtually the same (see also Zmigrod et al., 2018, 2021). Studies conducted in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia have also found that leftists score consistently higher than rightists on various objective measures of cognitive ability and intelligence (e.g., E. Bell et al., 2020; Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Choma et al., 2019; Deary et al., 2008; Heaven et al., 2011; Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Onraet et al., 2015; Sterling et al., 2016). There are ideological asymmetries on many other behavioral outcomes as well, including exploratory and approach-oriented behavior, nonverbal gestures and room décor (as we saw in [Chapter 4](#)), perceptual attention to potentially threatening stimuli, language use, social media activity, and consumer behavior, as we have already seen. There are even physiological differences between liberals and conservatives, including differences in neurocognitive structures and functions pertaining to conflict monitoring and threat sensitivity, as we will see in the final chapter of this book.

Thus far, most of the results we have considered are correlational in nature. But it is worth emphasizing that in numerous experiments, epistemic needs to reduce uncertainty—or to attain cognitive closure—have been induced through distraction, cognitive load, time pressure, threat, or alcohol intoxication. These inductions have consistently been found to increase the individual’s affinity for hierarchy, order, and conservative, right-wing opinions and labels (Eidelman et al., 2012; Friesen et al., 2014; Hansson et al., 1974; Lammers & Proulx, 2013; Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010; Rutjens & Loseman, 2010; Skitka et al., 2002; Stern et al., 2013; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011; Van Berkel et al., 2015). Experiments of this kind are especially

valuable because they help to establish a causal link between epistemic motivation and specific political attitudes and orientations.

Ideological Asymmetries in Existential Motivation

In March 2015, Ipsos and Reuters asked a nationally representative sample of 2,809 Americans (1,083 Democrats, 1,059 Republicans, and 351 Independents) about potential threats to the United States. The results, which are summarized in [Tables 7.10 through 7.12](#), were striking in that Republicans were more likely than Democrats to regard roughly three-quarters (35 out of 46, or 76%) of the countries, organizations, leaders, and phenomena mentioned in the survey as highly threatening. For instance, Republicans were 20% more likely than Democrats to regard Iran as threatening; 17% more likely to regard Al Qaeda, China, and ISIS executioner “Jihadi John” as threatening; 16% more likely to regard North Korea’s Kim Jong-un as threatening; 31% more likely to regard illegal immigration as threatening; 28% more likely to regard Islam as threatening; and 16% more likely to regard gay rights as threatening.

Table 7.10 Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Who Perceived Each of the Following Countries and Organizations as Highly Threatening

Country/Organization	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
Democratic Party	8%	47%	+39%
Iran	50%	70%	+20%
Al Qaeda	61%	78%	+17%
China	28%	45%	+17%
Russia	39%	55%	+16%
Islamic State/ISIS	69%	84%	+15%
Yemen	26%	41%	+15%
Cuba	8%	20%	+12%
Syria	39%	51%	+12%
North Korea	53%	64%	+11%
Boko Haram	32%	41%	+9%
Saudi Arabia	26%	32%	+6%
NSA	17%	21%	+4%
Anonymous	16%	19%	+3%
CIA	14%	17%	+3%
Catholic Church	14%	10%	-4%
Israel	23%	16%	-7%
Republican Party	38%	7%	-31%
Total Average	31.2%	39.9%	+8.7%

Note: CIA = Central Intelligence Agency; NSA = National Security Agency. Data are based on the results of an IPSOS/Reuters Poll conducted in March 2015. Cell entries are percentages of Democratic and Republican respondents who responded with 4 or 5 on a scale ranging from 1 (*No threat*) to 5 (*Imminent threat*). Total *N* = 2,809.

Table 7.11 Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Who Perceived Each of the Following Leaders as Highly Threatening

Leader	Democrats	Republicans	Difference
President Obama	10%	52%	+42%
Iranian ayatollah	42%	66%	+24%
Al Qaeda leader	57%	75%	+18%
Russian president	39%	57%	+18%
Chinese president	24%	42%	+18%
ISIS executioner	51%	68%	+17%
North Korean leader	54%	70%	+16%
Cuban president	17%	26%	+9%
Syrian president	37%	45%	+8%
Pope Francis	9%	8%	-1%
Israeli prime minister	19%	12%	-7%
US Speaker Boehner	26%	9%	-17%
Total Average	32.1%	44.2%	+12.1%

Note: Data are based on the results of an IPSOS/Reuters Poll conducted in March 2015. Cell entries are percentages of Democratic and Republican respondents who responded with 4 or 5 on a scale ranging from 1 (*No threat*) to 5 (*Imminent threat*). Total *N* = 2,809.

Table 7.12 Percentage of Democrats and Republicans Who Perceived Each of the Following Phenomena as Highly Threatening

Phenomenon	Pct. of Democrats	Pct. of Republicans	Difference
Illegal immigration	36%	67%	+31%
Islam	30%	58%	+28%
Gay rights	15%	31%	+16%
Atheism	18%	33%	+15%
Drug trafficking	56%	68%	+12%
Terrorism	73%	85%	+12%
Cyber attacks	63%	74%	+11%
WMD proliferation	24%	34%	+10%
Collapse of nation-states	29%	34%	+5%
Organized crime	49%	53%	+4%
Judaism	12%	13%	+1%
Women's rights	12%	12%	0
Christianity	13%	8%	-5%
Sexism	34%	21%	-13%
Racism/bigotry	61%	41%	-20%
Climate change	55%	24%	-31%
Total Average	36.25%	41%	+4.75%

Note: WMD = weapons of mass destruction. Data are based on the results of an IPSOS/Reuters Poll conducted in March 2015. Cell entries are percentages of Democratic and Republican respondents who responded with 4 or 5 on a scale ranging from 1 (*No threat*) to 5 (*Imminent threat*). Total *N* = 2,809.

Some authors have argued that liberals and conservatives are equally “intolerant” of social groups that are assumed to be ideologically opposed to them (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2013; Duarte et al., 2015; see Badaan & Jost, 2020, for a critique of this view). In light of these claims, it is worth noting that Democrats were indeed more likely than Republicans to describe Christianity, the Catholic Church, and Pope Francis as threatening to the United States, but the differences between Democrats and Republicans with respect to these attitude objects were very small (ranging from 1% to 5%). By contrast, Republicans were 28% more likely than Democrats to describe Islam as threatening and 15% more likely to describe atheism as threatening. Forty-seven percent of Republicans regarded the Democratic Party as highly threatening, as compared with 38% of Democrats who regarded the Republican Party as highly threatening.

Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump exploited existential motives to garner political support. According to *The Atlantic* magazine: “Trump is a master of fear, invoking it in concrete and abstract ways, summoning and validating it. More than most politicians, he grasps and channels the fear coursing through the electorate. And if Trump still stands a chance to win in November, fear could be the key.” The study of

political psychology helps to explain why there seems to be an elective affinity—not only in the United States but also around the world—between needs to manage fear and threat, on one hand, and conservative ideology, on the other. What this work suggests is consistent with Richard Hofstadter's (1964) historical observations about *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* (see also van der Linden et al., 2021).

Since 2003 there has been such a dramatic increase in research on the psychological underpinnings of ideology that there are now more than 200 tests of the hypothesis—based on 134 different samples and 369,525 participants from 16 countries—that heightened existential motives are associated with conservative and rightist, as opposed to liberal and leftist, preferences (Jost, Stern, et al., 2017). This database is 16 times larger than those analyzed previously by Jost, Glaser, et al. (2003a) and Onraet et al. (2013). Although the association between self-reported fear of death and conservatism was not replicated,⁴ we did observe significant effects of mortality salience, subjective perceptions of threat, and exposure to objectively threatening circumstances on conservatism. Furthermore, these effects were not restricted to the social dimension of ideology, as some have claimed. When Sam Gosling administered questions about fear to a sample of more than 1,000 undergraduates at the University of Texas at Austin, for instance, he observed that fear of terrorism was correlated with economic ($r [1019] = .33$) as well as social ($r [1019] = .35$) and general ($r [1023] = .38$) conservatism (in all cases, $p < .001$).

In 2003, only two experiments had explored the effect of mortality salience on ideological outcomes, and in those cases the dependent variables were not overtly political (see [Chapter 4](#)). Since then, there have been at least 34 studies directly investigating the hypothesis that mortality salience would increase the psychological appeal of conservative leaders, opinions, and policies. There is clearly variability in effect sizes (see [Figure 7.11](#)), and certain moderating variables—such as whether or not research participants have been primed with the value of compassion—have been suggested in research on terror management theory. Still, the preponderance of evidence suggests that there is a small but statistically significant effect of mortality salience on conservative preferences. Overall, the unweighted ($r = .13$) and weighted ($r = .08$) average effect sizes were positive and significant.





Figure 7.11 Distribution of average effect sizes for experiments investigating the hypothesis that mortality salience would be positively associated with political conservatism.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Stern, et al. (2017).

Source: Jost (2017a).

We identified 62 studies conducted in 13 different countries investigating the hypothesis that subjective assessments of threat—such as perceptions of a dangerous world and perceptions of the world as a “competitive jungle”—would be associated with conservatism. In 52 of these studies, the hypothesis was upheld, often very strongly (see [Figure 7.12](#)). Subjective perceptions of threat were associated not only with RWA and SDO but also with economic system justification and ideological self-placement in general. The unweighted ($r = .29$) and weighted ($r = .12$) average effect sizes were positive and significant. According to other studies conducted after we completed our meta-analysis, conservatives are more apprehensive than liberals about such varied dangers as terrorism, environmental hazards, and hurricanes, which could lead them to be better prepared for such events (Fessler et al., 2017; Losee et al., 2020). And, as we saw in [Figure 4.1](#), self-reported fear and anxiety about “the political situation” was associated with support for the far right in nationally representative surveys conducted in France and Germany (Jost, 2019a).




Figure 7.12 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that subjective perceptions of threat would be positively associated with political conservatism.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Stern, et al. (2017).

Source: Jost (2017a).

We identified 34 studies investigating the hypothesis that exposure to objectively threatening circumstances—such as terrorist attacks (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009; Schüller, 2015) and information about seismic shifts in racial demography (Craig & Richeson, 2014)—would be associated with conservative shift. In 22 of these studies, the effect sizes were positive and statistically significant, and in no study was there a significant overall effect in the opposite direction (see [Figure 7.13](#)). According to analyses by Economou and Kollias (2015), right-wing shift occurred after all of the following events: the Air India airplane bombing (1985); French airline bombings in Nigeria (1989); car bombings in Mumbai, India (1993); the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (1995); bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998); terrorist attacks of September 11 on New York and Washington, DC (2001); the Moscow Theater hostage-taking crisis in Russia (2002); and train bombings in Madrid, Spain (2004) and London, England (2005). Aggregating across all of these studies, the unweighted ($r = .14$) and weighted ($r = .07$) average effect sizes showed that exposure to objectively threatening circumstances was associated with conservative preferences, although the effect size was modest.⁵





Figure 7.13 Distribution of average effect sizes for studies investigating the hypothesis that exposure to objectively threatening circumstances would be positively associated with political conservatism.

Note: Data are based on research by Jost, Stern, et al. (2017).

Source: Jost (2017a).

There were four studies that measured responses to threat at an aggregate level of analysis, as in cross-state comparisons or public opinion polls. Because some did not include information about sample sizes, it was not possible to calculate a weighted effect size. Nevertheless, the unweighted average effect size ($r = .48$) provided strong evidence that exposure to threat was associated with conservative shift in the general population. Overall, the results of our review highlight another important elective affinity concerning existential motivation: psychological reactions to fear and threat convey a small to moderate political advantage for conservative and right-leaning—as opposed to liberal and left-leaning—leaders, parties, policies, and ideas.

Ideological Asymmetries in Relational Motivation

For decades, fans of the right-wing talk show host Rush Limbaugh proudly dubbed themselves “ditto heads” to emphasize the unequivocal extent to which they shared their idol’s opinions. It would be hard to find a liberal-leftist counterpart in radio or television who has cultivated such a spirit of ideological conformity. On the contrary, leftists seem perpetually on the brink of splintering into factions and identity-based subgroups, as we suggested in the previous chapter, while those on the right pull off a stricter and more disciplined, uniform ideological agenda (see also Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).

A *New York Times* editorial juxtaposed Democrats’ anemic response in 2016 to Donald Trump’s apparent but contested victory in the Electoral College (despite losing the popular vote by nearly 3 million) and Republicans’ overpowering response to the possibility that Al Gore rather than George W. Bush would be declared the winner of Florida and therefore the presidency in 2000:

Since the election, top Democrats have been . . . involved largely in internecine warfare about how much to work with Mr. Trump. The Hillary Clinton campaign, trying to encourage a peaceful transition, has gone almost completely dark Contrast the Democrats' doing-nothingness to what we know the Republicans would have done. If Mr. Trump had lost the Electoral College while winning the popular vote, an army of Republican lawyers would have descended on the courts and local election officials. The best of the Republican establishment would have been filing lawsuits and infusing every public statement with a clear pronouncement that Donald Trump was the real winner.

Indeed, this is precisely what we witnessed in 2020, even after Trump lost *both* the Electoral College and the popular vote to Joe Biden. Weeks after the election, 64% of House Republicans signed onto a lawsuit asking the conservative-packed US Supreme Court to disregard the electoral returns and hand Trump another victory. According to a national public opinion poll conducted in early December of 2020, only 24% of rank-and-file Republicans trusted that the results of the election were accurate (Montanaro, 2020).

A number of converging research programs in political psychology find that conservatives place greater emphasis than liberals on conformity, tradition, loyalty, and group cohesion (e.g., see Jost, van der Linden, et al., 2018). Conservatives also possess a stronger desire to share reality with like-minded others and are more likely to feel it is important to “see the world in a similar way as people who generally share your beliefs do” (see [Table 7.13](#)). In one package of studies, Chadly Stern, Tessa West, Nick Rule, and I found that conservatives perceived more consensus within their ranks when making difficult interpersonal judgments. The desire to share reality mediated the effect of conservatism on perceived consensus, suggesting that wishful thinking (rather than accurate perception) may be at work (Stern, West, et al., 2014).

Table 7.13 Correlations between Political Conservatism and the Desire to Share Reality with Like-Minded Others

Study and Sample Size Followed by Ideological Variables	Desire to Share Reality
Stern, West, et al. (2014), Sample 1, $N = 107$ US adults	
Ideological self-placement (conservative orientation)	.27** ^a
Stern, West, et al. (2014), Sample 2, $N = 150$ US adults	
Ideological self-placement (conservative orientation)	.25**
Hennes et al. (2012), $N = 182$ US adults	
Ideological self-placement (conservative orientation)	.13*
General system justification	.19***
Economic system justification	.22**
Jost, Langer, et al. (2017), $N = 373$ university students in Argentina	
Ideological self-placement (right-wing orientation)	.19***
Economic system justification	.24***
Belief in a just world	.26***

Note: Numerical entries are zero-order (bivariate) correlation coefficients unless otherwise indicated. In the study by Hennes et al. (2012) there was no reliable correlation between the desire to share reality and two ideological outcomes, namely attitudes toward strict immigration policies and support for the Tea Party.

^a For Stern et al. (2014, Study 1) the numerical entry is a semipartial correlation (adjusting for a number of other variables included in a multivariate model).

* $p < .10$,

** $p < .01$,

*** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Jost, van der Linden, et al. (2018).

On several specific issues, conservatives exhibited the *truly false consensus effect* by assuming that like-minded others share their opinions more than is actually the case. Liberals, on the other hand, often display an *illusion of uniqueness*—assuming that like-minded others share their opinions less than is actually the case (Rabinowitz et al., 2016; Stern, West, & Schmitt, 2014). In other words, there seems to be an especially stark ideological asymmetry, possibly even a reversal, when it comes to relational motivation.

In a study led by Mitch Rabinowitz, we asked liberals and conservatives about their own beliefs—and the beliefs of other liberals and conservatives—concerning the harms and benefits of childhood vaccination. Although it is often assumed that liberals are more resistant than conservatives to childhood vaccination, liberals in this study were in fact more likely to endorse pro-vaccination statements and to regard them as facts rather than beliefs, in comparison with moderates and conservatives (Rabinowitz et al., 2016).

At the same time, liberals underestimated the extent to which others shared their own beliefs about childhood vaccination. They assumed that the

attitudes of the general public, other liberals, and conservatives were more divergent from their own (relatively favorable) attitudes than was actually the case (see [Figure 7.14](#)). Moderates (i.e., centrists) underestimated how similar their own attitudes were to those of the general population and to those of liberals, but they did not systematically distort the differences between their own attitudes and those of conservatives. In this case conservatives accurately perceived similarity between their own attitudes and those of the general population, but they slightly overestimated the extent to which other conservatives shared their own attitudes and underestimated the extent to which liberals did.




Figure 7.14 Ideological symmetries and asymmetries with respect to the accuracy of perceived similarity estimates concerning beliefs about childhood vaccination.

Note: Data are based on research by Rabinowitz et al. (2016). Positive numbers signify overestimation in perceived similarity between one's own attitudes and those ascribed to others, whereas negative numbers signify underestimation in perceived similarity between one's own attitudes and those ascribed to others. Accurate judgments are indistinguishable from zero.

Source: Jost (2017a).

There are two additional examples of relational asymmetries that are even more pertinent to the dynamics of public opinion and political communication. In one research program, undertaken in collaboration with Pablo Barberá, we explored the question of whether leftists and rightists would be equally likely to use social media to seek out like-minded others and to confirm their pre-existing beliefs and avoid contrary information. There are several generic psychological processes, such as social identification and cognitive dissonance reduction, that could produce ideological symmetries in selective exposure and in-group homogeneity, as Kahan (2016a, 2016b) has pointed out. However, we hypothesized that conservatives—because of heightened epistemic, existential, and relational needs—might be more likely than liberals to favor an “echo chamber” environment (Barberá et al., 2015).

To investigate this hypothesis, we computed the ideological positions of 3.8 million Twitter users based on the political accounts they followed. Then we compared the extent to which liberal and conservative social media users retweeted messages written by liberals vs. conservatives. We focused on 12 different topics, including some overtly political topics, some nonpolitical topics (such as sports), and some topics (such as a school shooting) that began as a nonpolitical topic but became politicized over time. As shown in [Figure 7.15](#), people were more likely to forward messages written by someone who shared their own ideology, but for 11 of the 12 issues we investigated, there was a statistically significant asymmetry: liberals were more likely to retweet messages by conservatives than conservatives were to retweet messages by liberals. In another large-scale study, Boutyline and Willer (2017) found that the online social networks of conservatives were more ideologically homogenous than those of liberals. Taken together, these studies imply that there may be meaningful left-right asymmetries when it comes to selective information exposure and the structure and function of online political networks (see also Garrett & Stroud, 2014; Meirick & Bessarabova, 2016; Nam et al., 2013; Vraga, 2015).




Figure 7.15 Evidence of ideological asymmetry in the rate of cross-ideological retweeting behavior concerning 12 different topics of communication.

Note: Each point in the figure corresponds to an exponentiated coefficient of a Poisson regression for each topic and ideological group. The lines indicate confidence intervals at the 99.9% level, some of which are invisible because of the very large sample size of tweets. The dashed vertical line corresponds to a value of 1, which would indicate identical retweeting rates for individuals of the same vs. different ideological orientations. In the statistical model, we adjusted for marginal rates of retweeting by liberals and conservatives and their likelihood of being retweeted.

Source: Barberá et al. (2015).

In yet another research program we focused on an ideological asymmetry in trust in government. This work addressed some of the themes raised by Marc Hetherington and Thomas Rudolph (2015) in *Why Washington Won't Work*. These authors argued that “people whose party is out of power have almost no trust in a government run by the other side” and that there is no longer any trust to be found “among the opposition,” that is, when one’s own preferred party is on the sidelines (1, 32). Insofar as democracy depends upon electoral losers’ willingness to accept the will of the majority and the legitimacy of governments “run by the other side,” Hetherington and Rudolph are highlighting a potentially serious problem. Furthermore, the

pattern they are describing would be consistent with much of what we know in social psychology about social identification and in-group bias. But what if the bias is not so symmetrical after all?

Davide Morisi, Vishal Singh, and I analyzed data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS) to determine whether citizens were more trusting of the government when their own party (vs. an opposing party) controlled the presidency, and, if so, whether an ideological asymmetry existed. As shown in [Figure 7.16](#), we observed that “trust in the federal government to do what is right” was indeed higher under a like-minded president, as Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) suggested. However, the effect was clearly stronger for conservatives than liberals. In the ANES data, conservatives trusted the government 7% more when the president was Republican (vs. Democratic). The difference for liberals, on the other hand, was only 1% when the president was Democratic (vs. Republican). According to the GSS data, liberals’ confidence in government increased by 10% under a like-minded president, whereas conservatives’ confidence increased by 16%. There was clear and consistent evidence of an ideological asymmetry in what we refer to as the “president in power” effect (Morisi et al., 2019).




Figure 7.16 Evidence of an ideological asymmetry in “trust in the federal government to do what is right” as a function of the president in power.

Note: Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS) cover the period from 1972 to 2016. For columns 1 and 2 values range from 0 (minimum trust) to 1 (maximum trust). Column 3 shows the average marginal effects of trust in government when the president in office holds a similar ideology to the respondent, compared to when the president holds a different ideology (value 0 on Y-axis), adjusting for demographic and other variables. Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Source: Morisi et al. (2019).

In political discourse, it is often taken for granted that conservatives adopt a principled stand for “small government” in general, but we should ask: how principled is this stand, really, if conservatives are much more enthusiastic about “small government” when there is a Democratic (vs. Republican) president in office? In the ANES data conservatives were 12%

more likely—and in the GSS data they were 6% more likely—to favor reductions in government services and spending and to oppose governmental intervention in the economy and other affairs when the government was headed by a Democrat (vs. Republican). Liberals’ attitudes about the size of government, by contrast, were unaffected by the president in power (see [Figure 7.17](#)).




Figure 7.17 Evidence of an ideological asymmetry in preferences for small government as a function of the president in power.

Note: Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) are pooled from 1990 to 2012. Data from the General Social Survey (GSS) are pooled from 1983 to 2014. For columns 1 and 2, values range from 0 (minimum preferred level of government involvement) to 1 (maximum preferred level of government involvement) on the small government index. Column 3 shows the average marginal effects of trust in government when the president in office holds a similar ideology to the respondent, compared to when the president holds a different ideology (value 0 on Y-axis), adjusting for demographic and other variables. Vertical bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.

Source: This figure is taken from an earlier, unpublished version of Morisi et al. (2019).

There are surely long-term implications for democratic functioning if one “side” is consistently more cooperative, while the other is more likely to defect, to return to the language of game theory. It is easy to see how ideological asymmetries in cooperative vs. competitive behavior could reflect and, indeed, exacerbate the liberal conundrum we discussed in the previous chapter. The storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021 by Trump supporters who sought to prevent Biden from becoming president is perhaps the most vivid example to date with respect to American politics. More generally, research in behavioral economics suggests that liberal-leftists in Italy, Germany, and the Netherlands tend to adopt prosocial, cooperative strategies in experimental games, whereas conservative-rightists are more likely to adopt individualistic and competitive strategies (Grünhage & Reuter, 2020; Van Lange et al., 2012). If ideological differences such as these turn out to be robust and generalizable to other real-world behaviors, it would be foolhardy for social scientists to continue ignoring them.

Concluding Remarks

Some political psychologists, including those with strong political attitudes of their own, express discomfort with the idea that there are meaningful psychological differences between liberals and conservatives or, more broadly, leftists and rightists. This should be as perplexing as a cultural psychologist who is uncomfortable with the notion that there are meaningful cross-cultural differences in human behavior. Investigating the ways in which the individual’s goals and information processing styles lead him or her to be attracted to or repulsed by certain rhetorical and ideological offers—and the reciprocal ways in which immersion in certain political environments shapes the person’s motives and cognitions—should be our bread and butter. It is the very essence of political psychology.

More perplexing still, some critics express their objections in moralistic terms—as if there is something uncouth or unethical about studying ways in which people on the left and right differ with respect to, say, open-mindedness or threat sensitivity or prejudice—and that there is something noble about downplaying the differences. This state of affairs prompted Gordon Hodson (2014) to ask, “Is it impolite to discuss cognitive differences between liberals and conservatives?” Some social scientists imply that researchers who focus on ideological differences are biased, whereas those

who focus on similarities are not. This is clearly a fallacious form of reasoning. One can be biased against seeing differences that are truly there—as well as being biased in favor of seeing differences that are not there.

At the end of the day, any talk of bias in the absence of clear, normatively appropriate standards for assessing accuracy is incoherent (Baron & Jost, 2019). Unfortunately this is how too much of the discourse about “liberal bias” in social science and journalism has proceeded thus far: something may be dismissed as “biased” merely because conservatives do not like it. Matters are made more complicated by the fact that it is part of the job of social scientists to establish and defend objective standards for assessing accuracy and bias in human judgment and decision making in the first place.

One persistent objection to work in political psychology is that some descriptions of conservatives sound “worse” (or more pejorative) than descriptions of liberals. There are at least two problems with this objection. First, it is not the case that desires for order, structure, and closure are universally regarded as problematic. Nor does everyone assume that it is good to be open-minded, cognitively flexible, tolerant, or loyal to the opposition. Some, like the famous Christian author G. K. Chesterton, maintain that “Merely having an open mind is nothing. The object of opening the mind, as of opening the mouth, is to shut it again on something solid.” Others might suggest, quite appropriately, that if you are not afraid of death, then you are not paying attention.

A second response to the objection is “So what?” It is not the role of the social scientist to flatter people or to be equally flattering to the left and the right, although some have suggested that it is. It is not in the interest of society or the scientific community for authors and speakers to engage in self-censorship, although it is commonplace, especially when it comes to politically controversial subjects. In any case, the fact of the matter is that research psychologists developed most instruments for measuring epistemic, existential, and relational motives without any political interests and well before they were aware that ideological asymmetries existed with respect to these variables, as we noted previously. It would be a perverse, unscientific form of political correctness to demand that social scientists change the names of their variables to something more “neutral” the moment that differences between leftists and rightists are discovered.

If political psychologists have anything at all to contribute to the development of a good society—and I remain convinced that they do—it is

not Swiss-style neutrality (e.g., Baumeister, 2015; Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012; Pinker, 2015; Tetlock, 1994), as comfortable as that neutrality may be for people living in Switzerland. At least one social psychologist has urged his colleagues to abandon the study of prejudice and to undertake instead a value-neutral exploration of positive and negative attitudes (McCauley, 2015). The problem is that, as Elie Wiesel knew all too well, “Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.” According to Gunnar Myrdal (1969: 55), among others: “A ‘disinterested’ social science has never existed and, for logical reasons, can never exist.” Still, we can strive to be “honest brokers,” as Alice Eagly (2014) put it—to bring theory and evidence to bear on even the most difficult and controversial questions that bewilder and polarize our societies.

In a forward-thinking book published in 1939, Robert Lynd argued that the role of the social scientist was to be a “constructive troublemaker,” to “disconnect the habitual arrangements by which we manage to live along, and to demonstrate the possibility of change in more adequate directions” (338). No doubt there are many other roles that social scientists serve, but the importance of this one, it seems to me, is reaffirmed with each new day’s set of newspaper headlines. Of course, we have come to expect ideological resistance from certain quarters.

In some countries, liberal social scientists are threatened with the loss of their jobs or their freedoms simply for giving voice to their consciences or for criticizing the practices of their own governments. History teaches us that politically motivated attacks on intellectual freedom can happen almost anywhere. So let us roll up our sleeves, work together, and disagree about the facts and values if and when we must. At the same time, let us make sure that none of us gets into too much trouble while we are doing precisely what it is that we—as political psychologists and as active citizens in a liberal democracy—are supposed to be doing. Our future, quite literally, depends upon it.

¹ The countries were Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

² Malka and colleagues (2014) estimated needs for certainty and security on the basis of an *ad hoc* subset of five items that, according to the authors, “contrasted motivations for security, tradition, and conformity with motivations for self-direction and stimulation.” Interitem correlations and scale reliability for these five items were extremely low, and they appear to have been taken from five

different subscales of Shalom Schwartz's Value Priorities Scale, which typically uses 56 or 57 items to measure 10 value priorities that are theorized to differ substantially across individuals and cultures.

3 Pennycook and Rand (2019: 230) also reported a very small negative correlation between economic conservatism and cognitive reflection, but when they entered social and economic conservatism into a simultaneous regression, they observed that the association between social conservatism and cognitive reflection became even stronger ($\beta = -.26, p < .001$) and the association between economic conservatism and cognitive reflection became positive and significant ($\beta = .16, p < .001$).

4 A public opinion survey conducted in Australia in 2010 ($N = 1,573$) found that, in comparison with liberals, social conservatives were no more afraid of death in general, but they were more afraid of cemeteries, thunderstorms, sharp objects, crowds, and suffocation (Hatemi & McDermott, 2020, Table 1).

5 There is some research suggesting that, at least under certain circumstances, the spread of dangerous diseases can trigger conservative shift. This was observed, for instance, in the case of the Ebola outbreak in 2014 (Beall et al., 2016; Schaller et al., 2017). As we have already noted, there are signs that the COVID-19 pandemic, which remains ongoing at the time of writing, increased affinities for social conservatism in the United States and Poland (Karwowski et al., 2020) and support for national leaders around the world (Yam et al., 2020). Another study found that clinically significant levels of anxiety about coronavirus predicted satisfaction with President Trump (Lee et al., 2020). At the same time, the widespread perception that Trump severely mismanaged the crisis appears to have contributed to his failure to win re-election (Parker et al., 2020).

8

The Promise and Pitfalls of Political Neuroscience

The social sciences are intrinsically compatible with the natural sciences. The two great branches of learning will benefit to the extent that their modes of causal explanation are made consistent.

E. O. Wilson (1999: 205)

One of the most trenchant social and political psychologists of the 20th century, William J. McGuire (1999), observed that the “politics and psychology relationship has been lively and long-lasting as interdisciplinary affairs go, its longevity fostered by frequent shiftings of its popular topics, methods, and theories” (363). As in all sustainable relationships, psychology and political science have, for the most part, changed together rather than growing apart. Perhaps it was inevitable, then, that political scientists would come to share psychologists’ enthusiasm for the models and methods of neuroscience, including the use of electroencephalography (EEG), magnetic resonance imagery (MRI), and other measures of the central and peripheral nervous system.

Political neuroscience is an interdisciplinary venture that tackles questions of mutual interest to political scientists and psychologists by drawing, at least in part, on the theories, methods, and assumptions of biology, especially neuroscience. The application of neuroscience to political topics offers a powerful set of research methods that promises to help integrate multiple levels of analysis. Through techniques in neuroscience and behavioral genetics, it may be possible to analyze complex phenomena in terms of underlying constituent mechanisms and processes (Ahn et al., 2014; Alford et al., 2005; Amodio et al., 2007; Chawke & Kanai, 2016; Hatemi et al., 2011; Hibbing et al., 2014; Kandler et al., 2012; Krosch et al., 2021; Marcus, 2013; Nam et al., 2018, 2021; Ryan, 2021; Schreiber et al., 2013; Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012).

Budding enthusiasm for the use of neuroscientific methods to examine questions at the intersection of psychology and politics was obvious enough that several authors predicted the emergence of political neuroscience years before the first bona fide empirical publications appeared. The late John Cacioppo and Penny Visser (2003: 647), for instance, noted that “neuroscientists and political psychologists [were] not strange bedfellows,” nor were they “comrades in arms” and—consistent with E. O. Wilson’s views about consilience—anticipated that neuroscientific contributions would “build on rather than substitute for the extant theory and methods in political psychology.” So far, a truly collaborative stance between political psychology and neuroscience has characterized theoretical and empirical work. Consequently, the coming together of politics and neuroscience has been fruitful and mutually beneficial—contributing to established theories in social and political psychology and inspiring brand-new perspectives.

The use of neuroscientific methods brings with it clear advantages in terms of technical sophistication and reasonably precise, objective measurements that are less subject to social desirability and self-presentational biases, in comparison with methods of self-report used in public opinion surveys. Different techniques, it should be recognized, have their own strengths and weaknesses, and some methods are better suited for certain purposes than others. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been one of the most commonly used techniques in political neuroscience. It has high spatial resolution and is therefore well equipped to represent neural activity in localized brain regions: it is useful for addressing questions of the form *where in the brain is process X instantiated?*

However, the temporal resolution of fMRI is low, making it suboptimal when it comes to answering questions about the timing and sequence of processing stages. Another limitation is that the equipment is extraordinarily expensive and bulky, and research participants are required to immobilize themselves in a fairly loud, claustrophobic environment while their brains are being scanned. For many scientific purposes, EEG provides a much less expensive and more convenient option that delivers high temporal resolution (but low spatial resolution), making it especially useful for measuring the time course of a given psychological process (Amodio et al., 2007).

Our enthusiasm about the promise of political neuroscience should not be taken as Pollyannaish. We are certainly not recommending the indiscriminate use of neuroscientific methods to tackle complicated,

multifaceted questions about social and political behavior. Cognitive neuroscientists are quick to acknowledge that there are limits to what can be inferred about the mental states and processes of individuals solely on the basis of brain activity and/or anatomical structure, and political neuroscientists are also advised to proceed with caution (Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012).

Most studies to date have concentrated on *brain mapping*, that is, identifying correlations between neural functions (or region-specific activation) and political attitudes and behaviors. This is a necessary step in the research process, but there are significant problems arising from the process of reverse inference, concluding, for instance, that because a given brain region (e.g., the amygdala) is generally involved in a certain type of task or function (e.g., the processing of emotionally salient information) that its activation in a given instance must indicate the presence of a specific mental process (e.g., the experience of emotion). As cognitive neuroscientist Russell Poldrack (2008) has pointed out, the method of reverse inference provides tenuous evidence concerning the operation of specific mental processes “because of the fact that activation is rarely selective,” and “regions are often activated by a wide range of mental tasks” (224). The subfield of political neuroscience will have truly come of age when the knowledge gained from brain mapping studies is successfully parlayed into hypothesis-driven tests of behavioral as well as neurological outcomes specified by process-oriented theories in political psychology. Steps have been taken in this direction, but it is worth emphasizing that these are still very early days for political neuroscience—the “beginning of a beautiful friendship,” so to speak.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will focus on two areas of empirical inquiry in particular, namely (a) the nature of left-right differences in political orientation and (b) the dimensional structure of political attitudes. Both of these topics are well known to political scientists—and yet the potential application of neuroscientific methods breathes new life into each (Marcus, 2013; Ryan, 2021). We have little doubt that many other research areas await similarly promising renewals. Because the alliance between politics and neuroscience is so new, our review can afford to be brief and forward-looking but also reasonably comprehensive.

The Nature of Left-Right Differences in Political Orientation

As noted in the very first chapter of this book, the left-right distinction in politics has age-old origins in Western philosophy and theology. Ancient Greek philosophers debated ideological questions about human nature and society, including the ways in which power may be legitimately shared and resources fairly distributed, although they did not use the terms left and right to characterize various positions (Noël & Thérien, 2008; Raphael, 2001; Tarnopolsky, 2010). In this, the final chapter of the book, we propose, at least tentatively, that substantive philosophical disagreements over these and related issues may be linked not only to social and psychological factors but also to underlying differences in brain structure and function. Or, as Charles Taber and Everett Young (2013: 549) put it, “what we believe” is related to “how we think.” The relationship between content and process is one of elective affinity.

Resistance to Change, Acceptance of Inequality, and System Justification

Throughout the book, we have emphasized two major attitudinal dimensions that separate right from left, namely (a) resisting vs. advocating social change (i.e., maintaining vs. challenging tradition) and (b) accepting vs. rejecting inequality (i.e., maintaining vs. challenging hierarchical institutions and arrangements). Consistent with this bipartite conception, Inglehart (1990)—like many others cited in preceding chapters—boiled the left-right distinction down to “whether one supports or opposes social change in an egalitarian direction” (293). To vindicate and uphold the status quo, conservative-rightists are bound to defend existing social, economic, and political inequalities as legitimate, necessary, and desirable. On the other hand, to bring about a more equal state of affairs, liberal-leftists are obliged to criticize and transform the existing social system (Jost, 2020).

As we saw in [Chapter 5](#), ideological differences with respect to these two core values are observed not only on explicit self-report measures of attitudes (Clifford et al., 2015), but also on implicit or indirect measures of evaluation. According to studies employing the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which uses reaction time measures of automatic responding to gauge implicit attitudes, conservatives harbor preferences for stability, tradition,

order, and conformity, whereas liberals harbor preferences for flexibility, progress, equality, and diversity (see [Table 5.1](#) and [Figure 5.1](#)). An abundance of evidence from around the world using diverse methodological approaches leads inexorably to the conclusion that—in apparent contradiction to the assumptions of the end-of-ideologists—there are meaningful left-right differences in terms of the psychological characteristics as well as the political beliefs, opinions, and values of ordinary citizens.

Dozens, if not hundreds, of studies, which we have reviewed in earlier chapters, have established the following conclusions:

1. Political conservatism and rightist orientation are generally associated with higher scores on measures of general, economic, and political system justification (see [Chapter 5](#), especially [Tables 5.2 through 5.4](#)).
2. Resistance to change and acceptance of inequality are typically correlated with one another, and they are associated with system justification, political conservatism, and rightist orientation (see especially [Chapters 2, 4, and 5](#)).
3. Personal needs for order, structure, and cognitive closure are positively associated with resistance to change, acceptance of inequality, system justification, political conservatism, and rightist orientation (see [Chapters 4 and 7](#), especially [Figures 7.3 and 7.4](#)).
4. Situational activation of epistemic needs to reduce uncertainty or to attain a sense of control or closure tends to increase the appeal of system justification, political conservatism, and rightist orientation (see especially [Chapter 7](#)).
5. Personal concern for and sensitivity to dangerous and threatening stimuli are positively associated with resistance to change, acceptance of inequality, political conservatism, and rightist orientation (see [Chapters 4 and 7](#), especially [Figure 7.13](#)).
6. Situational activation of existential needs to manage fear and anxiety tends to increase the appeal of system justification, political conservatism, and rightist orientation (see [Chapters 4, 5, and 7](#), especially [Figures 4.1, 7.12, and 7.14](#)).
7. In terms of “Big Five” personality characteristics, openness to new experiences is positively associated with liberal-leftist orientation, whereas conscientiousness (especially the need for order) is positively associated with conservative-rightist orientation (see especially [Chapter 5](#)).
8. Childhood measures of intolerance of ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity as well as sensitivity to fear, threat, and danger predict conservative orientation later in life (see especially [Chapter 3](#)).
9. Political conservatives and rightists report being happier and more satisfied than liberals and leftists, and this effect is partially mediated by system justification and acceptance of inequality (see [Chapter 3](#), especially [Figure 3.3](#)).

Increasingly, researchers are turning to physiological methods, especially neuroscientific methods, to examine the cognitive and motivational bases of political ideology. Such work is especially valuable because it helps to illuminate the origins, manifestations, and consequences of ideological preferences as well as the specific processes by which ideology affects judgment and behavior.

To the extent that some neurocognitive mechanisms are automatic and therefore relatively impervious to conscious monitoring and control, research in political neuroscience also has the advantage of circumventing the limitations of self-report methods, including response biases associated with self-presentational and social desirability concerns. In some cases, there may be ideological differences at the level of cognitive or affective processing even in the absence of behavioral differences (Ahn et al., 2014; Schreiber et al., 2013). Our review of the literature echoes that of Taber and Young (2013: 541), who stated that “It is now clear that liberals and conservatives differ in terms of uncontrolled *physiological* responses to stimuli, brain function, and even static brain anatomy.” Political neuroscience has given researchers a new and unprecedented ability to observe underlying processes associated with ideological outcomes.

Differences in Brain Activity as a Function of Political Ideology

Based on the model of political ideology as motivated social cognition laid out in [Chapter 4](#), David Amodio, Sarah Master, Cindy Yee, and I hypothesized that liberals and conservatives would differ in terms of conflict monitoring, which is a neurocognitive process that detects discrepancies among potentially inconsistent response tendencies. The study was somewhat unique in that the primary research goal was not to identify neural substrates per se, but to leverage scientific knowledge about patterns of neural activity to investigate a novel hypothesis about left-right ideological differences in conflict monitoring (Amodio et al., 2007).

In the context of a “Go/No-Go task,” participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible to a frequently presented (Go) stimulus, so that “Go” responses became habitual. On a small proportion of trials, however, a “No-Go” stimulus appeared. For “No-Go” trials, participants were instructed to withhold their habitual responses. Conflict detection—the process of identifying a discrepancy between one’s intention and a prepotent response tendency evoked by laboratory tasks such as the Go/No-Go, Stroop, and Eriksen flanker tasks—is associated with brain activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).

We discovered that ideological self-placement was correlated with performance on the Go/No-Go task as well as concurrent patterns of brain activity, measured in terms of N2 and error-related negativity (ERN) amplitudes in a combined sample of New York University (NYU) and

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) undergraduates (see [Table 8.1](#)). Self-identified liberalism, which was strongly correlated with having voted for John Kerry over George W. Bush in the 2004 election, was associated with behavioral accuracy on No-Go trials, that is, the successful withholding of habitual responses. Liberals also exhibited larger ERN amplitudes, revealing more brain activity in the ACC on No-Go trials, even after adjusting for behavioral accuracy. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that left-right political orientation is linked to basic neurocognitive mechanisms implicated in the processing of new, unexpected, and potentially contradictory information. Studies like this may help to illuminate the nature of ideological differences in responding to uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity, order, structure, and closure, which we covered in [Chapters 4 and 7](#).

Table 8.1 Correlations between Political Ideology and Measures of Voting Behavior, Task Performance, and ACC Activation in the Context of a Go/No-Go Experiment

	Correlation with Political Ideology (Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement)
Self-reported voting behavior in 2004 (Bush vs. Kerry)	.79***
Accuracy on No-Go trials	-.30*
No-Go N2 amplitudes	-.41**
ERN amplitudes	-.59***
ERN amplitudes adjusting for accuracy	-.53***

Note: Data are based on research by Amodio et al. (2007). Political ideology was measured in terms of self-placement on a scale ranging from -5 (“extremely liberal”) to 5 (“extremely conservative”). For this table, the ERN and N2 amplitudes, both of which are negative-going waveforms, were reverse-scored, so that more positive values indicate greater ACC activity. Correlations are based on a sample size of 41 university students at UCLA and NYU, except for the correlation with voting behavior, which is based on only those 21 participants who reported voting in the 2004 presidential election. ERN = Error-related negativity.

* $p < .05$,
 ** $p < .01$,
 *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Source: Jost, Nam, et al. (2014).

Weissflog et al. (2013) replicated and extended the above results in a sample of undergraduates in Canada. As shown in [Table 8.2](#), they observed that self-identified liberalism and lower right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) scores were associated with greater ACC activity on No-Go trials, as measured in terms of N2 (and, less consistently, ERN) amplitudes. This whole line of work demonstrates that applying theory and methods from neuroscience can inspire political psychologists to explore novel hypotheses

—in this case, hypotheses concerning the relationship between ideology and self-regulation—that, until recently, were neither planned nor envisioned on the basis of behavioral research alone.

Table 8.2 Correlations between Political Ideology and Measures of Attitudes, Task Performance, and ACC Activation in the Context of a Go/No-Go Experiment

	Correlation with Political Ideology (Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement)
Egalitarianism	-.34*
Traditionalism (RWA)	.35*
Accuracy on No-Go trials	-.35*
No-Go N2 amplitudes	-.45**
ERN amplitudes	-.27 [†]
ERN amplitudes adjusting for accuracy	-.48 ^{a**}

Note: Data are based on research by Weissflog et al. (2013). Political ideology was measured in terms of self-placement on a scale ranging from -5 (“extremely liberal”) to 5 (“extremely conservative”). For this table, the ERN and N2 amplitudes, both of which are negative-going waveforms, were reverse-scored, so that more positive values indicate greater ACC activity. Correlations are based on a sample size of 34 university students in Canada. RWA = Right-wing authoritarianism; ERN = Error-related negativity.

^a Weissflog et al. (2013) did not report the correlation between ideological self-placement and ERN amplitudes adjusting for accuracy, presumably because it was nonsignificant, but they did report a significant correlation between RWA and ERN amplitudes adjusting for accuracy, so that is what is listed in the table.

[†] $p = .13$,

* $p < .06$,

** $p \leq .01$ (two-tailed).

To further probe ideological differences in attention and conflict monitoring, McLean et al. (2014) administered a *flanker task* that required participants to attend to a series of faces in the center of a computer display and to ignore potentially distracting stimuli (i.e., other faces, which were either congruent or incongruent with the target in terms of emotional expression). Consistent with the idea that conservatives are more vigilant than liberals when it comes to potential sources of threat in the environment, the study found that conservatives displayed enhanced sensitivity to angry (but not happy) faces, as indicated by reaction time measures of attentional narrowing.

To better understand the genetic and family transmission of political ideology, Tracy Dennis and colleagues (2015) investigated the relationship between parental political orientation and young children’s neural sensitivity to cognitive conflict, measured in terms of the N2 component. The EEG

activity of children between the ages of five and seven was recorded while they completed an age-appropriate flanker task. Consistent with the results of McLean et al. (2014), effects of ideology were observed only in the context of being presented with angry (or threatening) faces: conflict-related brain activity on these trials was larger among children of liberals than children of moderates or conservatives. This pattern of results conceptually replicated, in children, the effect of ideology on neurocognitive functioning documented in our study of adults (see [Table 8.1](#)). It suggests the possibility of cross-generational transmission of ideology in a manner that would be consistent with the theory of ideology as motivated social cognition.

Political Ideology and Hypodescent in Racial Classification

Following the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws and the gradual normalizing of Black-White relationships in the long and painful aftermath of slavery, the United States has moved closer to becoming a multiracial society. At the same time, mixed-race individuals—such as President Barack Obama—are often described in monoracial terms, with Black/White biracial people often categorized as Black rather than White. The tendency to categorize multiracial individuals according to their most socially subordinated group membership reflects the principle of *hypodescent* associated with the notorious *one-drop rule* in American history. Social psychological research confirms that the principle of hypodescent characterizes racial classification even today (Chen, 2019).

To the extent that conservative-rightists are more supportive of the traditional social order and more accepting of group-based inequality than liberal-leftists, a team of researchers led by Amy Krosch (2013) of Cornell University hypothesized that ideology would moderate racial categorization under conditions of ambiguity. In three studies, we observed that conservatives exhibited stronger reliance on the principle of hypodescent, using a more lenient threshold than liberals in categorizing mixed-race faces as Black (see [Figure 8.1](#)). Consistent with the notion that system justification motivation helps to explain this phenomenon, the relationship between ideology and racial categorization was (a) statistically mediated by differences in acceptance of inequality and (b) stronger when US participants believed that they were classifying American (system-relevant) than Canadian (system-irrelevant) faces.




Figure 8.1 Effects of political ideology on use of the principle of hypodescent when categorizing racially ambiguous faces.

Note: Data are based on research by Krosch et al. (2013). “PSE” refers to the “point of subjective equality,” defined as the point at which faces are equally likely to be categorized as Black or White. “Liberals” = two standard deviations below and “Conservatives” = two standard deviations above the grand mean for political ideology.

Source: Jost (2017a).

Krosch et al. (2021) conducted a follow-up study to explore whether these ideological differences were driven by the subjective categorization of mixed-race faces or more basic differences in the representation of objective visual features (i.e., “Blackness”). Forty-one White participants completed a self-report questionnaire assessing political ideology and, at a later date, a race categorization task while in an fMRI scanner. Consistent with previous research, brain activity in the amygdala and anterior insula was positively correlated with the objective Blackness of the faces. Importantly, however, individual differences in ideology moderated the relationship between the objective darkness of the faces and insula activity (see Figure 8.2). That is, more conservative (or less liberal) participants exhibited stronger bilateral insula activation in response to faces that were darker. In addition, the effect of ideology on racial categorization was statistically mediated by individual differences in insula sensitivity to ambiguity (see Figure 8.3).




Figure 8.2 Effects of political ideology on bilateral anterior insula sensitivity in response to increasing racial ambiguity of mixed-race faces.

Source: Krosch et al. (2021).




Figure 8.3 Effect of political ideology on the threshold for categorizing faces as “Black” (point of subjective equality) as statistically mediated by insula sensitivity in response to the racial ambiguity of mixed-race faces.

Note: Parameter estimates are standardized coefficients.

Source: Krosch et al. (2021).

This research program illustrates one way in which neuroimaging techniques may be used to isolate psychological mechanisms that may be difficult to tease apart at the level of judgment or behavior. It also helps to explain how, why, and when multiracial individuals are likely to be classified as members of their most subordinated racial group—a social psychological phenomenon that enhances vulnerability to discrimination and exacerbates existing inequalities.

Differences in Physiological Reactivity as a Function of Ideology

To explore the hypothesis that physiological responses to threat would be linked to political ideology, Douglas Oxley and colleagues (2008) conducted a study involving residents of Lincoln, Nebraska. In a prescreening session, adult participants were asked about their political preferences concerning military spending, gun control, the death penalty, school prayer, abortion, immigration, foreign aid, and same-sex marriage. In a separate session, the researchers measured the physiological responses of strong liberals and strong conservatives (inferred on the basis of the aforementioned preferences) to two different types of threatening stimuli. In one task, participants viewed threatening images (e.g., a bloody face, a spider, and a

maggot-infested wound) as well as neutral and positive images (e.g., a bowl of fruit, a cute rabbit, and a happy child). Results revealed that individuals who expressed more conservative preferences exhibited heightened skin conductance responses (SCRs)—an index of autonomic arousal—in response to negative (i.e., threatening and disgusting) images, in comparison with those who held more liberal positions. There were no ideological differences with respect to SCRs following exposure to neutral and positive images.

In a second task, Oxley et al. (2008) administered sudden, unexpected blasts of white noise and measured startle blink responses while participants focused on a fixation point on a computer monitor. More forceful contraction of eye muscles is taken to indicate a more fearful or defensive reaction to startling stimuli. Although participants in this study exhibited reflexive eye blinks in response to noise blasts in general, conservatives exhibited stronger blink amplitudes than liberals (after adjusting for demographic factors). Because amygdala activation accompanies the startle reflex in response to aversive stimuli, this work suggested that there may be left-right ideological differences in amygdala functioning. However, these results should be taken with a grain of salt, because other researchers have failed to replicate them in other contexts (Bakker et al., 2020; K. B. Smith & Warren, 2020).

In any case, a clear inference about the relationship between the amygdala and ideology cannot be drawn on the basis of Oxley and colleagues' (2008) study, because the startle response was assessed during unconstrained resting periods between trials—which is typically treated as a baseline measure—rather than when participants were processing emotionally salient stimuli. It was therefore ambiguous whether the physiological responses were caused by exposure to threatening or disgusting stimuli or to emotional negativity in general.

More recent studies conducted in France, which were based on larger samples and more extensive physiological measures, suggested that individuals who scored higher on RWA and social dominance orientation (SDO) exhibited lower tonic heart rate variability (HRV) at rest and while performing a stressful task, along with greater autonomic reactivity during stress and poorer autonomic recovery (Lepage et al., 2020). The authors noted that decreased HRV is typically associated with “hypoactive prefrontal regulation, hyperactive subcortical structures, maladaptive self-regulation, hyper-vigilance, decreased prosocial tendencies, defensiveness, impulsive

behaviors, and aggression” (1). They concluded that “one organizing element of the many psychological and physiological traits related to RWA and SDO may be hyper-vigilance to threat-related stimuli and dampened capacity to face stress” (12).

A study of risk-taking in the US suggested that Republicans showed a stronger amygdala response on trials in which they took risky gambles and won large rewards (vs. trials on which they chose safely and received small rewards), in comparison with Democrats (Schreiber et al., 2013). Another fMRI study found that economic conservatives who were led to anticipate receiving electric shocks under laboratory conditions exhibited more neural connectivity (compared to economic liberals) between the amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST), suggesting increased activation of neural threat circuitry (Pedersen et al., 2018). The authors noted that their physiological findings are in accordance with the behavioral evidence we reviewed in [Chapter 7](#) and proposed that “increased reactivity to potential threat in the amygdala and BNST may be an important neural correlate of the increased reactivity to threat that accompanies conservatism” (49).

As mentioned in [Chapter 4](#), left-right differences have also been observed with respect to sensitivity to disgust and pathogen avoidance. Disgust sensitivity—especially when it comes to cleanliness, hygiene, and purity concerns—appears to be correlated with the holding of more socially and politically conservative attitudes (Aarøe et al., 2017; Hodson & Costello, 2007; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar et al., 2012; O’Shea et al., 2021; Shook et al., 2017; Terrizzi Jr. et al., 2013; but see Tybur et al., 2010, for a dissenting opinion).

There may also be physiological differences in sensitivity to disgust as a function of ideology. Kevin B. Smith and his colleagues (2011a) measured the skin conductance of participants as they viewed disgusting images (e.g., feces, maggots, a bloody wound, and a mouthful of worms). They found that—after adjusting for demographic variables and self-reported disgust sensitivity—participants who exhibited higher skin conductance levels following exposure to disgusting images were more likely to oppose gay marriage and premarital sex. However, attitudes concerning other political issues were unrelated to skin conductance. Thus, this study provided some, albeit equivocal, evidence that heightened physiological arousal and sensitivity to disgusting—as well as threatening—stimuli is correlated with social conservatism. There is some evidence to suggest that enhanced

disgust sensitivity in conservatives may be connected to greater taste bud density and genetic markers of chemical sensitivity (Ruisch et al., 2020).

Differences in Brain Structure as a Function of Ideology and System Justification

Over the last decade, researchers have explored new possibilities that ideological differences are manifested in neuroanatomical structures and functions. In light of the behavioral evidence we have reviewed, Ryota Kanai and colleagues (2011) hypothesized that liberal-leftists and conservative-rightists would exhibit differences in gray matter volume with respect to the ACC and amygdala. In two samples of University College London (UCL) students, the team of researchers, which included the Academy Award–winning actor Colin Firth and the renowned neuroscientist Geraint Rees, observed that self-reported conservatism was indeed positively associated with right amygdala volume (see Table 8.3). This finding, which stunned many audiences, is consistent with earlier observations that (a) conservatism may be associated with stronger physiological responses to threat, and (b) amygdala volume may be associated with dispositional threat sensitivity (see van der Plas et al., 2010).

Table 8.3 Correlations between Political Ideology and Regional Brain (Gray Matter) Volume in the ACC, Right Amygdala, and Left Insula

	Correlation with Political Ideology (Liberal-Conservative Self-Placement)	
Brain Region	Study 1 (N = 90)	Study 2 (N = 28)
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)	−.27**	−.49**
Right amygdala	.23*	.38*
Left insula	.42†	.55**

Note: Data are based on research by Kanai et al. (2011). Political ideology was measured in terms of self-placement on a scale ranging from 1 (“very liberal”) to 5 (“very conservative”).

* $p < .05$, corrected for family-wise error (FWE);
** $p < .01$, corrected for family-wise error (FWE);
† $p < .001$, uncorrected and cluster size larger than 50 mm³.
Source: Jost, Nam, et al. (2014).

In addition, Kanai and colleagues discovered that liberalism was positively correlated with ACC volume, consistent with the functional differences observed by Amodio et al. (2007). In an exploratory analysis of the whole brain, the UCL researchers noted that conservatism was also

associated with larger gray matter volume in the left insula. This is broadly consistent with the evidence cited previously that conservatives are especially sensitive to disgust, insofar as the insula is known to play a key role in the experience of disgust (Wicker et al., 2003).

To understand more deeply why there might be left-right ideological differences in regional brain volume, H. Hannah Nam of Stony Brook University and I teamed up with Jay Van Bavel, Lisa Kaggen, and Daniel Campbell-Meiklejohn to investigate the correlation between individual differences in system justification and neuroanatomical structures in two US samples (Nam et al., 2018). As we saw in [Chapter 5](#), system justification is typically associated with right-wing conservatism, presumably because both are concerned with resistance to change, maintenance of the status quo, and the legitimization of inequality. Because the amygdala plays a pivotal role in the processing of information pertaining to uncertainty, threat, and other motivationally salient stimuli, we hypothesized that system justification, like political conservatism, would be positively associated with amygdala volume.

Structural brain scans of two samples in New York City revealed that individuals who scored higher on Kay and Jost's (2003) explicit measure of general system justification possessed more gray matter volume in the bilateral amygdalae, insula, and orbitofrontal cortex. Amygdala volume was correlated with general system justification at .29 in Sample 1 ($n = 46$, $p = .04$) and at .49 in Sample 2 ($n = 43$, $p < .001$), adjusting for age, sex, and overall brain volume (see [Figure 8.4](#)). These results provide further confirmation that ideology appears to be linked to specific brain structures as well as functions—and that the amygdala is implicated in the desire to maintain the status quo (Nam et al., 2018).





Figure 8.4 Associations between gray matter volume in the bilateral amygdalae and system justification in Sample 1 (top) and Sample 2 (bottom). (a) Multislice coronal heat maps show gray matter volume differences in the bilateral amygdalae correlated with system justification ($t > 3.0$, $p_{FWE-corr.} < .05$ in both samples). The amygdala effect is observed in the overlapping region between bilateral amygdala masks and system justification statistical map. (b) Glass brain image of whole brain analysis (coronal cross-section) suggests specificity of system justification effect in regions including the bilateral amygdalae ($p < .001$, minimum cluster of 20 voxels). (c) System justification was positively associated with larger gray matter volume in the bilateral amygdalae, $r(46) = .29$, $p = .04$ in Sample 1 and $r(43) = .49$, $p = .001$ in Sample 2. Amygdala volume was computed as the average of left and right amygdalae, adjusting for age, sex, and overall brain volume, and standardized such that 0 indicates average volume with changes in one-standard-deviation increments.
Source: Nam et al. (2018).

We also discovered in a subsample of first year NYU undergraduates that having more amygdala volume was associated with a decreased likelihood of participating in system-challenging protest movements such as Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter (as well as demonstrations against sexual assault and anthropogenic climate change) up to three years later (see [Figure 8.5](#)). This finding, too, is consistent with the hypothesis that the amygdala plays a motivational role when it comes to defending vs. challenging the societal status quo.




Figure 8.5 Associations between gray matter volume in the bilateral amygdalae and likelihood of participating in a political protest over a three-year period.

Note: Participants' likelihood of participating in a political protest during college in a subsample of students ($n = 20$) as predicted by bilateral amygdala gray matter volume (standardized and adjusted for age, sex, and global brain volume) three years earlier, $b = -4.03$, $SE = 1.81$, Wald $X^2(1) = 4.93$, $p = .03$, 95% CI (e^b): $\{.001, .624\}$.

Source: Nam et al. (2018).

Differences in Resting State Connectivity as a Function of Ideology

If left-right ideological differences are attached to fundamental cognitive and motivational orientations, there is reason to suppose that they might also be reflected in the intrinsic functional architecture of the brain. Building on the

evidence described previously, which suggested that liberals exhibited more gray matter volume and conflict-related processing in the ACC (Amodio et al., 2007; Kanai et al., 2011), Cox et al. (2012) explored the relationship between ideology and intrinsic functional connectivity—the interrelations among different brain regions when people are at rest—using the ACC as a seed region. Results indicated that a more liberal orientation was positively associated with intrinsic functional connectivity between the dorsal ACC and the right insula and putamen—part of a network of regions that process emotionally significant stimuli. Although these findings were preliminary, they are consistent with the idea that liberals possess a tighter integration of neurocognitive systems involved in conflict monitoring and cognitive control (see also Newman & Sargent, 2020).

In another study Democrats exhibited greater resting-state connectivity than Republicans with respect to the so-called *human mirror neuron system*, which is a neural network linked to social and emotional abilities, including empathy (Newman-Norlund et al., 2013). This observation is congruent with behavioral evidence that liberal-leftists experience more empathy for a greater number and variety of people (including strangers and foreigners), in comparison with conservative-rightists (Hasson et al., 2018; Waytz et al., 2019). The convergence of evidence from neuroscientific and behavioral research suggests that there may be important and underappreciated ideological asymmetries in emotional reactivity, self-regulation, and perspective taking.

It is important to point out, however, that in all of the neuroscientific studies we have reviewed thus far, the causal direction is ambiguous. There is, in other words, a *chicken-and-egg problem* in political neuroscience. Differences in brain structure and function could play a role in the development of ideological differences between liberals and conservatives as well as low and high system-justifiers, but it is also possible that embracing certain belief systems alters neural processing. Much as research in cognitive neuroscience has revealed that learning how to juggle or meditate or speak a foreign language changes the structural organization of specific brain regions, it is possible that exposing oneself regularly to Fox News and the Breitbart News Network—or, alternatively, to MSNBC and National Public Radio—affects brain structure and function.

The Dimensional Structure of Political Attitudes

Consistent with my conceptual treatment of ideology, a diverse set of scholars has maintained that the “pervasiveness of the Left-Right concept through the years in Western political discourse testifies to its usefulness” (Inglehart, 1990: 293), that it is “a powerful device” that remains “unchallenged by any potentially competing set of referents” (Mair, 2007: 217–218), and that left-right differences “exist in all societies, and it is not apparent how they could disappear” (Bobbio, 1996: 3). In the same spirit, I argued in the first few chapters of this book that if the left-right distinction did not exist, scholars of ideology would need to invent its equivalent. I have proposed that left-right ideological polarity is structured by two major axiological dimensions that are correlated for historical reasons, namely advocacy vs. resistance to social change, and rejection vs. acceptance of social, economic, and political forms of inequality.

Others have argued, in contrast, that two or more structurally independent dimensions are necessary to represent ideological space (e.g., Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka & Soto, 2015). According to one proposal, liberalism and conservatism do not signify opposite poles on a continuum but are instead largely orthogonal dimensions, so that people embrace liberal attitudes without necessarily being opposed to conservative attitudes and vice versa (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Kerlinger, 1984). This is not what research from my laboratory suggests, and it is at odds with an observation made by Evan Heit and Stephen Nicholson (2010: 1510): When US participants were asked to estimate how liberal and how conservative (in separate questions) a list of politicians were, the correlation between the two ratings was an astonishing $-.97$. Contrary to the notion that liberalism and conservatism are mentally represented as independent dimensions, Heit and Nicholson concluded that, subjectively speaking, “Liberal is the opposite of conservative” (1513).

The most popular multidimensional scheme is one that treats social (or cultural) and economic attitudes as functionally independent. Thus, several research programs measure social and economic dimensions of ideology separately and treat them very differently, psychologically speaking (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Johnston et al., 2017; Malka & Soto, 2015). I worry that this constitutes a failure to carve nature at its joints. A hard and fast distinction between social and economic issues does not make sense, philosophically, psychologically, or in evolutionary terms. Economics *is*

social: the distribution of material resources between self and others or among various groups or social categories is an inherently and unavoidably social activity. Likewise, social distinctions have economic consequences: attitudes pertaining to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and so on have very clear and obvious financial implications.

To my mind, the distinction between social and economic attitudes is in some ways parallel to—but less precise than—the distinction between resistance to social change and acceptance of inequality, which I have emphasized throughout this book. Resistance to change (or traditionalism) corresponds reasonably well to what scholars often mean by social and cultural conservatism, but attitudes about hierarchy and equality very clearly apply to social, economic, and political domains. It can hardly be doubted that many cases of conservative resistance to egalitarian social change have involved a refusal to “share the wealth” with groups that had been deprived historically in economic (and political) terms. The common psychological denominator of system justification and the motivated defense of existing forms of inequality may help to explain why, for instance, anti-Black racism is correlated with support for free market capitalism (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016) and “social” and “economic” forms of conservatism are highly correlated in contemporary neoliberal societies (Azevedo et al., 2019; see [Tables 2.1](#), [3.1](#), and [3.2](#)).

Nevertheless, some authors have gone so far as to suggest that for ordinary citizens—who are usually assumed to be very low in terms of political information, knowledge, and sophistication (Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017)—social and economic attitudes are dissociated (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka & Soto, 2015) and driven by qualitatively different psychological concerns (Johnston et al., 2017; Malka et al., 2014; Weeden & Kurzban, 2016). In this spirit, Stanley Feldman (2003) wrote that “a unidimensional model of ideology is a poor description of political attitudes for the overwhelming proportion of people everywhere” (477). Assessments such as this are often used to bolster conclusions about the ideological innocence (or ignorance) of ordinary citizens, as we saw in [Chapter 2](#).

I see several limitations of the research used to back up these very strong conclusions about the supposed orthogonality of social and economic dimensions of ideology. To begin with, the studies by Feldman and Johnston (2014) focused on responses to just three questions about social issues (abortion, gay adoption, and women’s role in business and government) and

four questions about economic issues (governmental spending on welfare, social services, health insurance, and federal assistance to the poor) in three waves of the American National Election Studies (2000, 2004, and 2006, with data from the last two years combined). The authors acknowledged that they excluded questions about race, immigration, and foreign policy, at least some of which would have tapped into both social and economic concerns, thereby increasing overall ideological structure and coherence. But even with these methodological exclusions and inherent limitations arising from the use of very short opinion scales, Feldman and Johnston reported that social and economic dimensions were significantly intercorrelated at .21 in 2000 and .36 in 2004/2006. Indeed, the two dimensions were significantly correlated even for those respondents who were classified as lowest in terms of political sophistication. This work hardly provides overwhelming evidence that social and economic attitudes are structurally or functionally independent.

Ariel Malka and his colleagues (2014) reported the results of aggregate analyses involving respondents from 51 heterogeneous countries, using ad hoc scales constructed from a panoply of items administered during the 2009 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS). These scales exhibited extremely poor psychometric properties, as noted in [Chapter 7](#). For example, the authors reported that “In the full sample, the five-item right-wing cultural attitudes scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of .54 and mean interitem correlation of .19; the three-item right-wing economic attitudes scale had an alpha of only .17 and a mean interitem correlation of .06” (1036). Consequently, Malka et al. presented “the results of analyses using both the attitude composites (for illustrative purposes) and individual attitude items as outcome variables” (1036). This study was based purely on patterns of correlations involving individual items and unreliable scales that were not designed for the purposes to which they were put. Nonetheless, findings from this problematic study have been used repeatedly to justify very strong claims about the structural and functional independence of social and economic dimensions of ideology (e.g., Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020; Malka & Soto, 2015).

Flávio Azevedo and I inspected correlations between social and economic dimensions of ideology—measured in both symbolic and operational terms—in a nationally representative sample of Americans and a convenience sample for the sake of replication, as discussed in [Chapters 2](#) and [3](#). We

observed, first, that social and economic dimensions of ideological self-placement were highly intercorrelated in both samples (with r s ranging from .72 to .74), and this was true of respondents who were low as well as high in terms of political sophistication (see [Table 3.1](#)). For respondents who were low in sophistication, social and economic dimensions were correlated at .71 in both samples, and for respondents who were high in sophistication, the correlations were .73 in Sample 1 and .76 in Sample 2. The percentage of shared variance between symbolic measures of “social” and “economic” conservatism was roughly 50% (Azevedo et al., 2019).

We also inspected correlations between social and economic attitudes using five complete, well-validated scales designed to measure operational ideology, namely Henningham (1997); Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom (2009); Everett (2013); Feldman and Johnston (2014); and Zell and Bernstein (2014). For all five of the scales, social and economic dimensions of ideology were strongly correlated in both samples (with r s ranging from .40 to .69; see [Table 2.1](#)). Regardless of how they were measured, social and economic dimensions were significantly correlated in both samples for respondents who were low in sophistication (with r s ranging from .31 to .60) as well as high (with r s ranging from .50 to .77). The percentage of shared variance between operational measures of social and economic conservatism varied from roughly 10% to 36% for respondents who were low in sophistication and between 25% and 60% for respondents high in sophistication. When we administered Feldman and Johnston’s (2014) scale, we obtained correlations between social and economic dimensions that were substantially higher ($r = .40$ and $.42$ in Samples 1 and 2, respectively) than in the ANES data they analyzed. Of the dozens of comparisons shown in [Table 2.1](#), every single one was statistically significant at $p < .001$ and of at least moderate magnitude. *There was no evidence whatsoever that social and economic attitudes were unrelated for any group of respondents or for any of the five scales used to measure operational ideology.*

While it may be possible—and, in some cases, useful—to distinguish between multiple ideological dimensions, it is important not to exaggerate the extent to which social and economic attitudes are structurally independent of one another. From a psychological perspective, it seems likely that there would be social, cognitive, and motivational functions—such as the reduction of informational complexity, coordination of shared political activities, and inspiration based on core values such as equality and

tradition—that would produce a simpler, more parsimonious dimensional structure, especially, but by no means exclusively, for citizens who are knowledgeable about and engaged in political matters. A neuroscientific approach may be useful for understanding how, why, and when the human brain reduces complex information that, at least in theory, could be represented in multidimensional issue space but instead favors a single dimension of classification and judgment, such as the left-right dimension in politics.

A Neuroscientific Investigation of a Multidimensional Model of Political Attitudes

To our knowledge, there has been only one neuroscientific study bearing on the dimensional structure of political attitudes thus far, but it is a good bet that others will follow. Giovanna Zamboni and colleagues (2009) used a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique to classify distinct elements of political opinion. In the first phase of their research program, they asked volunteers to read a long list of political statements and, over several sessions, rate the extent to which each statement was similar to every other statement. A statistical procedure generated three independent dimensions on which opinions were judged: (a) emphasizing the role of the individual (e.g., “Everybody should prioritize his or her own interest over society’s”) vs. society (“Citizens should vote based on collective interest”); (b) liberal (e.g., “Gays and lesbians should be able to get legally married”) vs. conservative attitudes (“Everybody should oppose teaching evolutionary theory”); and (c) political moderation (e.g., “The government should protect freedom of speech”) vs. extremity (“People should use violence to pursue political goals”). In a second phase, the investigators asked a different set of participants to rate their levels of agreement or disagreement with the same statements while their brains were scanned. The goal was to try to isolate the neural correlates of thinking about specific types of political ideas, independent of participants’ own ideological inclinations.

Although this study was inherently exploratory, Zamboni and her colleagues observed some potentially interesting things. The processing of statements prioritizing individual concerns was accompanied by heightened activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a region of the brain linked to self-reflection and evaluative processes. The processing of statements prioritizing prosocial concerns was accompanied by activity in

the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), a region linked to thinking about the mental states of others, as well as activity in the temporoparietal junction, a region associated with perspective taking. The processing of conservative statements was associated with activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), a region linked to withdrawal motivation and response inhibition. The authors speculated that this may have been due to the liberal skew of their sample, but they did not explore the role of participant ideology in modulating neurocognitive responses to any of the political statements.

Finally, the processing of moderate (vs. extreme) statements was accompanied by activity in the ventral striatum and the posterior cingulate/precuneus. Given that the ventral striatum is implicated in reward processing, Zamboni and colleagues surmised that moderate statements were more socially acceptable—and less emotionally evocative—than extreme statements. These effects, therefore, may not be unique to the ideological domain.

The take-home message from this study was that different brain regions were activated when participants ruminated about each of the three different types of political statements. The authors interpreted this as evidence for a multidimensional conception of ideology. Although the results were interesting and provocative, this study should be treated as preliminary—largely because the procedure assumed a multidimensional solution *ex ante*, and the dimensions were identified on the basis of a purely inductive approach that depends heavily on the specific items that were administered. Nevertheless, this work shows how cognitive-neuroscientific approaches are potentially useful for determining whether—and for whom—ideological space is represented in terms of unidimensional vs. multidimensional schemes.

Does the Cognitive System Prefer Single, Contrasting Dimensional Schemes?

For decades, cognitive psychology experiments have demonstrated that when people categorize stimuli that differ in terms of two or more underlying dimensions—such as social vs. economic dimensions of ideology—they tend to converge on a single dimension and use it as the basis for categorization (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999). Imposing a unidimensional structure simplifies the decision-making task because people find it much

easier to learn, remember, and utilize unidimensional than multidimensional classification schemes (Shepard et al., 1961). According to Tyler Davis and Bradley Love (2010), “human category formation relies on contrastive learning mechanisms,” and contrasts—such as that between the left and right—may “lead to caricatures that people should find easier to process and more compelling than true categories” (234).

In some situations, oversimplification compromises judgmental accuracy (Ashby et al., 1999), but this is not always the case. Returning to the context of political judgment, Kato and Okada (2011) found that at least one of the two major dimensions recovered through multidimensional scaling of expert judgments of policy positions was correlated with left-right ideological positioning in 9 of the 13 countries they investigated. An intriguing nuance is that different perceivers, including expert perceivers, may develop somewhat different unidimensional rules for making left-right classifications, depending on which values or characteristics they weigh most heavily (see Benoit & Laver, 2006).

In conclusion, it is possible that the universe of political issues and opinions can only be represented faithfully, that is, accurately and objectively, in multidimensional space (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). At the same time, for both cognitive and motivational reasons, individuals have a relatively strong preference for using (a) single rather than multiple dimensions of judgment and (b) contrasting over orthogonal methods of categorization. More research is needed on the dimensional structure of ideology, and neuroscientific methods should prove especially useful. Computational models that illuminate the psychological processes underlying human category formation may help researchers to develop laboratory interventions that promote alternative, multidimensional conceptualizations of political categories (Love et al., 2004). In addition, multivoxel pattern analysis, when applied to fMRI data, could help researchers to identify patterns of similarity and regularity in the neural processing of various category exemplars, thereby elucidating the objective dimensionality of such representations (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2008).

Limitations of the Brain-Mapping Approach

The application of neuroscientific theories, methods, and assumptions to the subject matter of political science has already yielded novel insights and hypotheses that would have been difficult, if not impossible, to imagine by

considering only behavioral research (e.g., Amodio et al., 2007; Hibbing et al., 2014; Kanai et al., 2011; Lakoff, 2008; Marcus, 2013; Newman-Norlund et al., 2013; Pederson et al., 2018; Ryan, 2021; Schreiber et al., 2013; K. B. Smith et al., 2011a, 2011b; Taber & Young, 2013; Theodoridis & Nelson, 2012; Westen, 2007; Zamboni et al., 2019). At the same time, the first generation of research in political neuroscience has been largely exploratory, focusing on which brain regions are associated with specific types of political cognition or behavior. The brain-mapping approach is intuitively appealing and potentially illuminating, but it is also inherently limited. Conclusions drawn purely on the basis of brain mapping studies are speculative and subject to multiple explanations. Thus, Cacioppo and colleagues (2003) warned would-be political neuroscientists: “one cannot assume that changes in brain activity are a direct, invariant measure of the neural instantiation of the investigator’s favorite construct or that the contemporary neurobiological theory regarding the function of a specific brain structure or system is everlasting” (653).

To take just one example, we know that the insula is typically activated by disgust-inducing images, but the insula is a fairly large, densely interconnected brain region that is also involved in functions that are unrelated to disgust. Therefore, the observation that insula activation occurs following exposure to a given stimulus does not necessarily mean that people are experiencing disgust when confronted with it. Similarly, regions such as the ACC and PFC are often triggered by tasks that require planned motor responses—that is to say, many, many tasks.

In political neuroscience these problems may be compounded because most studies do not require participants to perform specific tasks, but they do involve some kind of behavior, even if it is only viewing candidate images or reporting political attitudes. This makes it especially difficult to interpret frontal cortical activations, because brain activity could reflect anticipated actions—such as thinking about voting in the next election—that are not part of the experiment itself. Future research in political neuroscience should make better use of precise experimental paradigms that are useful for assessing functional hypotheses about specific patterns of localized brain activity. Still, researchers must bear in mind that any mental or physical event—even resting or relaxing—will elicit brain activity of some kind.

It is impossible to avoid the problem of reverse inference entirely if one wishes to interpret patterns of brain activation at all. However, it is necessary

to treat such interpretations as tentative and subject to revision. It should go without saying, perhaps, that any behavior as complex and multiply determined as deciding whom to vote for or participating in a demonstration will be the product of multiple neural systems operating in concert. To establish sound theoretical (and meta-theoretical) foundations for the interpretation of brain-behavior correlations, we recommend that political neuroscientists adhere as scrupulously as possible to a method that we have referred to as *iterative cross-examination* across levels of analysis (Jost, Nam, et al., 2014).

Iterative Cross-Examination of Neural and Behavioral Interpretations

The best antidote to the problem of reverse inference, we think, is to adopt an iterative method involving sequential research stages in which interpretations of neural and behavioral processes are cross-examined. The idea is that investigators use theory and methods at the behavioral level of analysis to check on the validity of interpretations arising from neural observations and vice versa.

For instance, one might begin by hypothesizing that strong partisans would exhibit negative reactions to the faces of politicians representing an opposing party. This hypothesis would presumably lead the researcher to expect an increase in amygdala and/or insula activity following the visual presentation of out-party (but not in-party) candidates. Let us now suppose that the neuroimaging study produces the hypothesized pattern of insula activation but no evidence of increased amygdala activity. Using reverse inference, the researcher might suppose that participants in this situation experienced disgust or pain—but not fear.

However, because the insula is implicated in a great variety of tasks and functions, follow-up research is required to tease apart the alternative explanations at the level of observable behavior. Feelings of disgust, pain, and fear should be directly measured, rather than simply inferred on the basis of patterns of brain activation. Experimental manipulations of psychological processes may provide converging evidence. In this example, the behavioral evidence may reinforce the disgust interpretation or call it into question—or suggest other mediating or moderating variables that might be tested using neuroscientific and/or behavioral methods.

Over time, this approach will enable researchers to assess the quality of inductive insights made on the basis of reverse inferences from brain activity by designing and implementing careful behavioral research to investigate specific hypotheses and mechanisms. In this way, researchers proceed iteratively, drawing on behavioral evidence to constrain neuroscientific interpretations and neuroscientific evidence to constrain behavioral interpretations. The result is a decidedly anti-reductionistic approach to science in which behavioral and physiological methods and interpretations are treated as equally and mutually informative.

Tackling the “Chicken-and-Egg Problem” in Political Neuroscience

Through focused testing of process-oriented hypotheses at multiple levels of analysis, the iterative method of cross-examination can help researchers to move beyond brain-behavior correlations and to finally tackle the chicken-and-egg problem in political neuroscience. As already noted, it is impossible to know on the basis of existing research whether (a) individual differences in brain structure and function affect social and political behavior and/or (b) the adoption of social and political attitudes and behaviors leads people to think in certain ways, causing our brains to process information differently. The most common view is that physiological and psychological characteristics—including personality traits—are genetically heritable, stable over time, and difficult to change, and that therefore they shape political dispositions, rather than the other way around (Hibbing et al., 2014; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; K. B. Smith et al., 2011b). This assumption has led many people to conclude, erroneously, that social and political outcomes—such as racism and ideological orientations—must be “hard-wired” and immutable.

We conjecture that neurocognitive structures and functions are yoked to social and psychological processes that unfold over time and that reflect and give rise to the expression of political behavior. This is consistent with the interactionist, elective affinities model developed throughout this book. Thus, my colleagues and I favor a dynamic, recursive theoretical framework in which the connections between psychophysiological functioning and political outcomes are treated as bidirectional rather than unidirectional (Jost, Nam, et al., 2014).

Political ideology, on this view, is the product of an elective affinity—or mutual attraction—between the discursive, socially constructed elements of belief systems and the psychological needs, motives, interests, and concerns of those who are drawn to them. Not only do people choose ideas but also ideas choose people. Therefore, we are less dismissive than other researchers of the possibility that “political attitudes would shift a person’s general emotional dispositions” (Inbar et al., 2009a: 10). We would hypothesize that certain ideological representations could indeed affect the individual’s psychological and physiological characteristics if they are encountered frequently enough and ultimately embraced.

Investigating possibilities such as this one—and tackling the chicken-and-egg problem—will require the use of multiple, innovative research methods that isolate causal mechanisms. These include experimental methods, such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which involves the safe and local application of small magnetic fields to activate or deactivate specific cortical regions, thereby enabling investigators to draw causal inferences about the impact of localized brain functions on behavioral outcomes (Chawke & Kanai, 2016). Because TMS relies on weak magnetic fields, however, its application is presently confined to outer cortical regions and cannot be used to isolate structures that are more deeply embedded inside the human brain, such as the amygdala.

Studies involving pharmacological interventions—such as the administration of neuromodulators—can be used to examine chronic or temporary deficits in subcortical as well as cortical regions. This method would also help to isolate causal mechanisms and suggest nonobvious methods of intervention. For instance, Terbeck et al. (2012) reported that a dose of propranolol, a beta-blocker medication that dampens amygdala activity, reduced implicit racial bias. Given existing research in political psychology, one cannot help but wonder if this intervention would also increase people’s affinity for liberal or progressive ideas.

Another option is to focus on patients with brain lesions caused by various forms of neuropathology or surgical treatments of brain tumors and epilepsy. Lesion studies provide insight into whether a specific brain region may play a critical role in certain behavioral outcomes. For example, damage to the amygdala is associated with reduced experiences of fear, and damage to the vmPFC is associated with higher levels of RWA (Asp et al., 2012), whereas

damage to the dlPFC is associated with religious fundamentalism (Zhong et al., 2017).

H. Hannah Nam, Jay Van Bavel, Michael Meager, and I compared the ideological self-placements of patients in New York City with primary damage in the frontal lobe ($n = 18$) or the anterior temporal lobe ($n = 26$) to a matched group of healthy control subjects ($n = 18$). We found that patients with frontal lesions expressed more conservative—or less liberal—attitudes than patients with anterior temporal lobe lesions or no lesions, two groups that did not differ from one another (see [Figure 8.6](#)). Additionally, the extent of damage in the dlPFC—but not amygdala—was associated with increased political conservatism (see [Figure 8.7](#)). These findings were robust to various model specifications that adjusted for demographic, mood, and affect-related variables. The results of this study suggest, albeit tentatively, that the prefrontal cortex may play a meaningful role in the promotion of liberal ideology.




Figure 8.6 Ideological self-placement as a function of localized brain lesions.

Note: Higher values with respect to political orientation indicate greater self-reported conservatism, and lower scores indicate greater liberalism. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals ($*p < .05$, $^{\dagger}p < .10$). Patients with damage to their frontal cortex reported more conservatism than ATL patients and matched healthy control participants. ATL = anterior temporal lobe (includes amygdala damage).
Source: Nam et al. (2021).




Figure 8.7 Ideological self-placement as a function of the percentage of damage in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and amygdala brain regions.

Note: Error bands represent 95% confidence intervals. dlPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Source: Nam et al. (2021).

Prospective, longitudinal methods have much to offer political neuroscientists as well—especially if researchers are able to monitor changes in brain structure and activity over time as a function of intervening experiences. Studies of nonhuman animals demonstrate that the brain can change drastically in response to training and experience. Increasingly, this appears to be true of humans as well. For instance, compassion training has been found to alter neural responses in the ACC and anterior insula—brain regions that are associated with empathy in response to the pain of others (Klimecki et al., 2013).

In terms of structural changes, one famous study in cognitive neuroscience demonstrated that people who completed a lengthy training program to drive taxicabs in London exhibited increased gray matter volume in the posterior hippocampus, along with significant changes in memory capacity. Changes in brain structure have also been documented in response to exercise, academic instruction, second-language acquisition, musical training, golfing, and juggling. At this point in time, one can only guess about the neurological consequences of consuming a steady diet of right-wing or left-wing media over a period of years, but the best scientific evidence suggests that repeated experiences are capable of altering the structure and function of specific regions of the human brain.

Concluding Remarks

These are still very early days for the study of political neuroscience. At the same time, there is enough theoretical, methodological, and empirical convergence to be bullish about prospects for future research. We share Taber and Young's (2013) enthusiasm: "The explosion of findings in automaticity and brain-imaging research relevant to opinion formation represents a strong step in the direction of explaining what we believe with how we think" (549). This aptly characterizes research on the two major topics we have focused on in this chapter, namely (a) the nature of left-right (or liberal-conservative) differences in political ideology and how these differences might manifest themselves in terms of brain structure and function, especially with respect to the ACC, amygdala, and insula, and (b) the dimensional structure of political attitudes and the extent to which research in cognitive neuroscience can shed light on the question of whether people prefer single, contrasting dimensional schemes over more complex,

multidimensional schemes. In other words, the methods of political neuroscience hold tremendous potential for shedding much-needed light on how, why, and when people represent ideological space in left-right terms and place themselves and their beliefs, opinions, and values in that space. Fortunately, there is also a well-developed theoretical framework in political psychology to guide this research agenda for years to come.

Epilogue

The Values of a Political Psychologist

Truth has a well-known liberal bias.

Stephen Colbert (Speech at the White House Correspondents' Dinner, 2006)

The author of the first textbook on social psychology, the celebrated William McDougall (1920/2015), who served on the faculties of Oxford, Harvard, and Duke University, once wrote that “We may fairly ascribe the incapacity of the Negro race to form a nation to the lack of men endowed with the qualities of great leaders, even more than to the lower level of average capacity” (203). A century later, most social scientists have acquired a deep commitment to liberal-democratic tolerance and egalitarian values that McDougall and his contemporaries could not have grasped and that, indeed, exceeds that of the general population today. This is not to be taken lightly, let alone squandered or resented. It is something that should make social scientists, including political psychologists, extremely proud.

After the tragic horrors of World War II, the leaders of social psychology—including Kurt Lewin and Gordon Allport—expressed “a deep concern with human injustice, especially the evil of ethnic prejudice” (M. B. Smith, 1969: 4). In this they were opposed, often staunchly, by those who identified with the causes of political conservatism. It is worth remembering, for instance, that Gunnar Myrdal, author of *An American Dilemma*—a treatise on racial prejudice cited approvingly in the Supreme Court’s *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling that formally ended racial segregation in the schools—was denounced by a senator from Mississippi and in numerous Southern newspapers as a member of the “international Communist conspiracy.” Allport (1954) himself found it necessary to point out that prejudice was not “the invention of liberal intellectuals” and that it “is simply an aspect of mental life that can be studied as objectively as any other” (516). These days, many on the right wish to toss out three decades

of scientific research on implicit prejudice as nothing more than ideological bias (see Jost, 2019b).

It may help to gain proper perspective on the whole issue of ideological bias to realize that mainstream psychologists have been criticized not only for being “too liberal” (Baumeister, 2015; Duarte et al., 2015; Haidt, 2012; McCauley, 2015; Pinker, 2015; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994) but also for hewing too closely to an ideological agenda that is either timidly centrist (Stone, 1980) or conservative and defensive of the status quo (Fine, 2012; Fox, 1999; King et al., 2018; Parker, 2007; Prilleltensky, 1994; Sampson, 1983). These latter critiques, it seems to me, have more substance than the former: there are system-justifying biases in academic psychology, as in every other profession. Every liberal social scientist I know engages in self-censorship for fear of being criticized or discredited. Some have faced politically motivated harassment, intimidation, and even death threats.

In the long run, ideological critiques have had little lasting impact on scientific practice, and this is probably for the best. Thus far, the attacks on “liberal bias” have produced no genuine empirical discoveries and have obfuscated many issues, including the role of political ideology in moral reasoning (see Kugler et al., 2014). It does not help that some of the critiques are philosophically incoherent, as when detractors declare that it is impossible for human beings to conduct science without allowing their personal values to influence the process, while at the same time attacking individual scientists for failing to do that which they have declared impossible (e.g., Tetlock, 1994). The idea that social science will necessarily benefit from an infusion of conservative and right-wing voices to counter the effects of liberal and left-wing voices, which Duarte et al. (2015) take to be obviously true, seems grossly naïve, as if a cacophony of ideological “biases” will magically cancel each other out. The scientific community does not move closer to the truth by diluting better observations with worse ones.

Of course, it is obvious that human beings are potentially susceptible to a variety of biases, and that *all human knowledge is knowledge from some perspective*, as McGuire (1999) stressed. At the same time, there is no appealing alternative to relying on scientific methods, which are themselves fallible and always under refinement, to do the very best we can to arrive at a reasonably objective understanding of the facts as they are. As Myrdal (1969: 40) put it, “Facts kick”: “Even if one begins with views distorted

opportunistically on a particular problem, the pursuit of social research itself will gradually correct these views.”

Yes, as social scientists we should do everything we can to rise above our own limitations and shortcomings. At the same time, we must always keep in mind that the duty of the social scientist is to the fact of the matter—not to the political center, the meaning of which is always historically and culturally relative anyway. Nor is it the duty of the social scientist to reflect majority opinion in society. We are not running for office. Science is only useful for society when it leads the way and challenges common sense, not when it follows orders, drags its feet, or seeks only to defend itself. To contribute successfully to the betterment of society, social scientists are obliged to drop pieties that serve no greater cause than that of moral or political relativism. As a purely logical matter, some political beliefs must be closer to the truth than others (Baron & Jost, 2019).

It is often asserted—without any real evidence—that ideological diversity is necessarily beneficial to the advancement of science (e.g., Duarte et al., 2015), but this can easily be shown to be false. It is untenable, for instance, to claim that social science, which is entrusted with the study of racism, would be better off in any ethical or epistemological sense if our professional societies contained more White supremacists. No one who thinks deeply about the problem believes that ideological diversity *in and of itself* is necessarily good for science, as if more—and more varied—belief systems are better. If they did, they would not be pushing for academia to embrace moderate conservatism, which is ubiquitous in North American and European societies. They would be reaching out instead to fascists and communists, for these are the truly rare “voices” in academia and society.

If, like me, you do not wish to see social scientific debates devolve into shouting matches between the far right and the far left, *you do not actually believe that ideological diversity is inherently (or necessarily) good for science*. One can only hope that journalism in the United States is finally abandoning the absurd practice of *both-sideology*, which elevates extreme, often implausible views to mainstream news coverage in a misguided bid for “fairness” and “balance”—as if the truth must occupy the midpoint between two (non-randomly chosen) poles. As all of us try to come to terms with the damage done by the Trump presidency and the resurgence of right-wing authoritarianism around the world, now is hardly the time to cultivate a relativistic ethos in social science.

Another problem is that allegations of ideological bias are nonsensical in the absence of clear standards for establishing accuracy. The fact that social scientists are more liberal than the average American is, in itself, meaningless. According to a YouGov survey in 2015, 41% of Americans believe that humans and dinosaurs coexisted at one time in history. Anthropologists and evolutionary biologists would strenuously disagree. Does that make them “biased” against the average American?

Social scientists know much more than ordinary citizens about the causes of poverty, inequality, prejudice, discrimination, and social injustice. This is why popular conservative ideas about the causes of racial, gender, and economic inequality, for instance, to say nothing of climate change, gain very little traction in the academic marketplace of ideas, even if they find resonance in the culture at large. Every ideology is, at the end of the day, a theory about social and political realities—and some theories must be more accurate than others. Most social scientists today are missing the kind of wisdom expressed by Silvan Tomkins (1963) when he noted that “Science will never be free of ideology, though yesterday’s ideology is today’s fact or fiction” (389).

At the end of the day, I concur with Lewin, Myrdal, Allport, Tomkins, and M. Brewster Smith (1969) in *Social Psychology and Human Values*. Smith pointed out that social psychology “is inextricably concerned with human values” because it “must grapple with human experience in society” (2). He also warned of “the danger of a social psychology that is artificially divorced from human values” and called instead for “the development of a science of social man that begins to do justice to his humanity—a science of man that is for man, too” (11). This means recognizing and addressing problems such as global warming, increasing economic disparities under capitalism, racial injustice in the criminal justice system, discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, and sexual orientation—and many other quandaries that self-identified conservatives are reluctant to acknowledge, let alone solve. The duty of the social scientist is to the truth when it comes to human thriving, not to the middle of the road, not to some image of Swiss-style neutrality, and certainly not to the far right, which is increasingly emboldened in the United States and throughout the world.

The present is crying out for ethical leadership. But ethical leadership is not about trafficking in both-sideology, claiming that there are “good people on both sides”—as President Trump declared in the violent aftermath of the

“Unite the Right” demonstration in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017. Nor is it about tolerating intolerance. There is no justification for pandering to powerful interests or seeking merely to placate those who control institutional pursestrings. Ethical leadership is about taking the right stand at the right time—equipped with knowledge and the willingness to speak truth to power. What will historians 50 or 100 years from now say about the stands that social scientists, including political psychologists, are—or are not—taking today? That is the question that concerns me the most.

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