HKU PRESS
香港大學出版社

Merchants of War and Peace

British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War

Song-Chuan Chen

Merchants of War and Peace

Merchants of War and Peace

British Knowledge of China in the Making of the Opium War

Song-Chuan Chen

HKU PRESS
香港大學出版社

Hong Kong University Press
The University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
www.hkupress.org

ISBN 978-988-8390-56-4 (*Hardback*)

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed and bound by China Translation & Printing Services Ltd. in Hong Kong, China

To my parents

獻給我的父母：陳雄飛　王鳳英

Contents

Prologue

The Opium War's first shots were fired on 4 September 1839 by the British navy under orders from Captain Charles Elliot directed at three Qing imperial warships in Kowloon Bay, Hong Kong. With a desire to explain himself, Elliot reported the encounter to Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston:

> I opened fire from the pinnace, the cutter, and the other vessel, upon the three junks. It was answered both from them and the battery, with a spirit not at all unexpected by me, for I have already had experience that the Chinese are much under-rated in that respect. After a fire of almost half-an-hour against this vastly superior force, we hauled off from the failure of our ammunition; for I already said, anticipating no serious results, we had not come in prepared for them.[1]

The confiscation in March that year by Commissioner Lin of opium smuggled into China by British merchants had created a tense atmosphere, and this partly explains why the underprepared Elliot fired at the Qing warships.

But was this really the first shot? Historians who have taken the exchange of fire as the war's starting point have tended to argue that the opium smuggling trade was the cause and the confiscation the trigger.[2] Another group of historians who argue that the war's purpose was to defend British national honour or to expand British trade have dated the war's starting point as June 1840, when British expedition troops arrived in Chinese waters.[3]

However, though a captain on the frontier may give the order and a soldier of an expeditionary force load and fire the cannon, a war does not necessarily start with military action. Given that this was the very first war between China and a European country, one may well ask where the idea came from of waging a war against a country that was more than 5,000 miles away and about which most Britons knew very little. Who made the decision and who was to benefit from the war? Perhaps more importantly, how did the decision makers justify the acts of aggression and violence?

The short answer is that Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston was the key politician behind the war decision made in a cabinet meeting on 1 October 1839. But how did Palmerston come to make the recommendation? He was yet to receive Elliot's report

when the cabinet met that day, and prior to 1837 he had seen China as a faraway country of negligible interest. His idea of engaging with China through war came from a group of British merchants trading in the Chinese port of Canton.

Having sustained extensive contact with the Chinese and knowing Qing China far better than any other Europeans, British merchants in Canton in the decade prior to the Opium War fought a fierce war of words among themselves on the question of whether to ask their government to take military action against China. A group of them then went back to Britain in 1835 and again in 1839 to campaign publicly and to lobby politicians. These merchants made politicians in London see the benefits of military action; together they started the war.

To wage a war, one had first to justify it. The war did not begin with soldiers and captains, but with the merchants, and it commenced with a clash over British knowledge of China. This book documents the development of the war arguments in Canton and London, and charts how the merchants and politicians came to believe they had a just war on their hands.



Map of the Pearl River Delta in the 1830s.

1
Introduction

> We say, and we say boldly: as History it will be matter of surprise and doubt, that England—the great—the powerful—jealous of her own honor and watchful of her national rights should thus, in the height of her power and greatness, have tamely submitted to wrong, to insult, to indignity, to oppression, from a government and a people, such as this, whom the earliest exhibition of force and firmness would have brought to reason and submission . . . ! We say without fear of contradiction: AS HISTORY IT WILL NOT BE BELIEVED.[1]

Thus concluded an editorial printed on 1 November 1831 in the English biweekly newspaper *Canton Register*. The *Register* was published in the Chinese port city of Canton (known in Chinese as Guangzhou) for the consumption of the foreign trading community there and those in other Asian ports. Its owner was the British—to be precise Scottish—merchant James Matheson. And it was one of the five English-language printing presses of the port.

Starting with the news that the British government in India was to send the warship HMS *Challenger* to China delivering a letter to the Canton authorities requesting redress for an 'insult' that happened in May that year, the editorial was implicit in advocating a war against China.

Just what was this 'insult' that so incensed the British community? In May, the Qing governor of Canton, Zhu Guizhen, came to the English Factory in the foreign trading quarters, known as the Thirteen Factories, he ordered the uncovering of a portrait on a wall in the main hall. Upon learning that it was a portrait of the British king George IV, Zhu then turned the back of his chair towards it. Zhu's action was regarded by the British merchants trading in the port as an insult to the king and by extension to British national honour. They believed that an insult such as this merited war.

Belligerent language, such as 'exhibition of force and firmness', started to appear in the *Register* in 1830. By late 1834, arguments for a war against China were commonplace and could be found in most issues of the *Register* until history's first war between China and a European country—the First Opium War—broke out in 1839.

This book is about the history of this war argument and about how the argument created a new British knowledge of China. The book brings into focus the role of private merchants (British traders in the East other than the staff of the East India Company [EIC]) and their interactions with the Qing government. I argue that the merchants' new conception of China—a China to be engaged with through war—developed in Canton during the 1830s in their print-based public sphere and was primal in starting the war.

Prime movers

One driving force behind the war argument was the merchants' confidence in the British Empire. In the early nineteenth century, the idea of Britain as a mighty nation was at its zenith as a result of its victory in the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 in particular and imperial expansion worldwide in general. The patriotic pride of the British community exemplified this imperial confidence. Waterloo Dinner, for instance, was held by the British private merchants in Canton in 1830, to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the British victory. At the dinner party they ate, drank, sang, and toasted to British navy, the king, and the heroes of that battle.[2]

Believing Britain to be 'the most powerful nation in the world', some British private merchants considered China's trade restrictions, which confined all European trade to the port of Canton, as an insult to Britain's 'national honour'.[3] The advance of British rule in India and other places in Asia led the merchants to believe the British government would intervene in China to restore British national honour. There was an 'imperial state of mind' emerging in Canton.[4]

The merchants hoped that war would, more importantly, force the Chinese to the negotiating table and gain for the British unrestricted access to the Chinese market.[5] The *Register* invited its readers to imagine the following: 'How vast field would this Empire, under a freer system of intercourse afford for the consumption of the produce of British skill and industry!'[6]

Trade was considered a matter of national interest, as the British identified their country as a nation of trade as early as the fifteenth century.[7] The doctrine of free trade, which was fast becoming the dominant political-economic ideology in Britain in the 1830s, gave this centuries-old trade argument new momentum. The private merchants of Canton greeted this with enthusiasm. They believed that a war to secure extensive trade privileges in China was in the British national interest and reflected the cold calculations of free trade: the more Britain traded with China, the richer the British would become.

The war discourse thus boiled down to two main arguments: expanding national interest and restoring national honour. The group of British private merchants who argued for war were known in the port as the Warlike party, and they used the

Register as their mouthpiece. Behind their rhetoric of national honour and national interest was the profit motive and the desire to trade in conditions under which the merchants believed themselves entitled by right of being British.

After the desire for war took root, the Warlike party went back to London in 1835 to lobby. They succeeded in 1839 in swaying the British government to act. This book considers the war argument initiated in Canton to be the key cause of the First Opium War. It was neither the infamous opium smuggling per se nor the defence of British national honour nor the cultural conflict between 'progressive' Britain and 'backward' China, which, as the main explanations of the war's origin, have hitherto dominated the historiography.[8] These narratives took the national honour argument for granted and marginalized the importance of the private merchants' lobbying and the image of China they created through their public campaign for a war. By bringing the focus back to the process of war lobbying and the local dynamics of interactions in Canton where the war argument was first developed, this book attempts to show that the Warlike party was the driving force behind the war.

Before the 1830s, the British acquired their conceptual framework of China mainly through the writings of Jesuit missionaries from continental Europe, which depicted China as a peaceable country to be admired and imitated. The view of China that developed in the Canton port in the 1830s displaced the Jesuits' imagined geography of the Peking court, where the Jesuits had served the Ming and Qing imperial governments between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries. The contrast between the conceptualization of China by the Jesuits and the Canton British private merchants' community resulted in a paradigm shift in British perceptions.[9] The Warlike party accentuated a new British idea of China based on its argument for war and its need to justify the conflict both before and after. At the heart of their new vision was the idea that China was in isolation and had to be opened up by the British through war.

Nobody in London or in the West had the means in the 1830s to know China better than the private merchants in Canton. Not only were they—along with the Protestant missionaries and a few EIC staff—the major producers of British knowledge about China, but they comprised the only group of people at the time to have relatively accurate military intelligence of the Qing. Both James Matheson (1796–1878) and his business partner William Jardine (1784–1843)—the two leading figures of the Warlike party—traded in China for more than twenty years, longer than most EIC staff, and had superior knowledge of China's eastern coast and military strength. They regularly sent ships up the coast to sell opium. Their ship captains engaged in skirmishes with Chinese water forces (*shuishi*), and accounts of such trips and their observations on the Chinese military were regularly published in the *Register*.[10]

With this new knowledge, they were able to make informed judgements, and this made a difference in the war decision. They met with Foreign Secretary Lord

Palmerston (Henry John Temple, 1784–1865) at least four times and finally won his support in late 1839.[11] They supplied him with a war strategy—the 'Jardine plan'—and, crucially, with intelligence of the weakness of the Chinese military defences, suggesting that the war was easily winnable. This assessment, moreover, provided the government with an attractive solution to the domestic political crisis that the government was facing. Britain fought and won the First Opium War according to the plan supplied by the merchants, prompting Palmerston, famously, to express his thanks to William Jardine for the 'assistance and information . . . so handsomely afforded'.[12] The Treaty of Nanking, signed after the war in 1842, fulfilled in every clause the demands that the merchants had discussed extensively in their maritime public sphere in Canton.

Scholars have made note of Jardine's war lobbying but regarded it solely as his personal position, marginal to the outbreak of war. Historical treatment of the merchants' lobbying has been patchy.[13] This book is the first full investigation of the First Opium War's history in this context of how the Warlike party developed the war argument in the environment of Canton, produced new British knowledge of China, and lobbied successfully for the war. It shows that the new British knowledge of China was the result of a combination of the Warlike party members' trading experiences in Canton, their faith in the ideology of free trade, their hopes for new trade relations, and their confidence in the expansionist British Empire.[14] The making of the new British knowledge about China and the waging of the First Opium War were intrinsically and deeply intertwined. And considering that the new knowledge would become a frame of reference for learning about China that lasted until the 1970s, the history documented in this book is central to the understanding of Sino-Western historical encounters.

The story of the Warlike party captures only half of the history of the war's origins. Another group of British private merchants in Canton, dubbed by their opponents the Pacific party, opposed the war. The Pacific party resolutely refrained from publishing polemic arguments against China in their newspaper, the *Canton Press* (1835–1844).[15] The *Press* advocated peaceful engagement with China and saw the sovereign nation as within its rights to develop its own trade policies. They believed that the merchants should submit to the Canton regulations when trading in China. The justification for war—that is, their new knowledge of China—was particularly important to the Warlike party's endeavour when facing opposition from the Pacific party. The Pacific merchants' history—although limited in scope due to absence of archival materials—is told for the first time in this book.

In Britain, the anti-war campaign between 1839 and 1843 was even stronger. The London newspapers successfully gave the war its infamous name—the Opium War, which has been used ever since. From the anti-war movement's perspective, the war

was not inevitable, as some scholars have argued.[16] The history of this movement serves as a reminder that the war was wilfully mobilized, strongly opposed, and could have been stopped. Chapter 7 of this book is devoted to documenting, for the first time as well, the history of opposition to the war.

To drive home the history of the war's origins, this book also re-examines the First Opium War in the Chinese context. It explains how the Canton one-port system of trade caused the Warlike party to believe there was no choice but to advocate a war.

The one-port system was established by the Qing Empire in the late 1750s to allow China's European trade to take place at the same time as addressing dynastic state security concerns. The Qing's chief enemies were domestic rebels, and the court feared above all the joining of forces between foreign forces and Chinese rebels in a quest to overthrow the dynasty, as had happened to every major Chinese dynasty. The Qing court's fear was exploited by the 'Canton lobby'—a group of Canton merchants and Qing officials—who sought to monopolize China's European trade by winning imperial sanctions to protect Canton's privileges. The lobby succeeded in 1757. The result was the Canton one-port system of trade. After its establishment, the Qing dynasty enjoyed both the perceived state security and the revenue of port duties generated by the Canton monopoly. Officials in charge of the port also profited from their positions, and a few Chinese merchants earned tremendous wealth.

The Canton system that controlled the European trade determined how the Qing understood Europeans. Ideas, especially Confucian concepts, were drawn on to justify the trade monopoly and the confinement of Europeans to Canton, as a means to ideologically shore up the one-port system. It was the institution of the Canton one-port system—not China's 'all under heaven' (*tianxia*) ideology nor the tributary system, as scholars have wrongly argued, that dictated the Qing's relations with and knowledge of Europeans, especially the British.[17]

A new system of Chinese knowledge about the Qing Empire's relations with Europeans originated in Canton—knowledge making became entangled in profit making on the Chinese side. And, disastrously, the Canton system spawned an institutional inertia which made it impossible for the Qing to adequately comprehend and respond to the fast-changing new global order in the century after the 1750s, during which the British Empire came to dominate the globalizing maritime world of the East.

Thus, this book documents how, in the setting of China's one-port system of trade in Canton, the Warlike party developed an argument for a war against China. With perseverance and the favourable development of events, they successfully persuaded the British state to wage the First Opium War. The Warlike party's argument was opposed by the Pacific party in Canton, and their lobbying faced an anti-war movement in London. Before Britain could start a war, the Warlike party had to first fight a

war of words in both Canton and London's print-based public spheres for justification and persuasion. The waging of the war dictated the making of British knowledge about China.

The Warlike party's war

The First Opium War is a well-studied topic with various theories of its cause. To W. A. P. Martin, F. L. Hawks Pott, H. B. Morse, Gerald S. Graham, and John King Fairbank, the war originated from China's lagging behind the progressive world. Thus, the war intended to *open up* this insular and benighted China.[18] This theory falls squarely within the knowledge of China created by the Warlike party in Canton in the larger context of the binary of progressive West and backwardness of the rest—the modernistic argument. Their narration of history is one sided in favour of the modernist argument, reducing the history of the Opium War to a footnote of the narrative of the march of civilization, or modernization.

Glenn Melancon and Harry G. Gelber made the same mistake of taking Warlike party's argument at face value. They contended that defending British national honour was the reason for war.[19] This book deconstructs the national honour argument by showing that the motive behind the rhetoric was profit making and imperial confidence. Maurice Collis, Tan Chung, Hsin-pao Chang, Peter Ward Fay, Jack Beeching, Frank Sanello and W. Travis Hanes III, and Julia Lovell have stressed the role of the opium trade in starting the war.[20] This book sees the opium trade, in line with the arguments of other scholars, as a trigger, not the war's origin.[21]

Other historians, like George Marion, Michael Greenberg, John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Victor Purcell, D. C. M. Platt, and P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, have argued that the purpose of the war was to expand British trade.[22] 'Trade expansion' was in actuality the Warlike party's 'national interest'. The change from trade as a national interest in 1830s Canton to the economic theory of trade expansion in the 1950s to 1980s represented a change from a first-person narrative to a third-person narrative. This book demonstrates that the war was started by the Warlike party out of their *wish* to expand trade rather than trade expansion itself. The agent—the Warlike part—that brought about the war vanished in the disinterested third-person narrative of economic expansion theory.

Recent scholarship examining the cause of the war has explored narratives more diverse than the viewpoints provided by the Warlike party of Canton. James Polachek has explained how the Qing Empire's scholar-officials fought an 'inner opium war' in the Qing court during the 1830s over the policies of banning or legalizing the opium trade, which represented a proxy war and power struggle between two factions with different governance philosophies. Commissioner Lin (Lin Zexu, 1785–1850), who was dispatched to Canton to confiscate opium in early 1839, belonged to the

hardliners who wanted a stricter prohibition on opium trade. Their policy caused a crisis.[23] This book will show how the hardliners' policy played into the hands of the Warlike party in Canton and helped create the conditions for war.

Melancon's findings on the role of late 1830s British party politics have been the most valuable discovery recently, though he did not make this point his main argument. He contended that the ruling party, the Whigs, were not in the majority and every policy decision was a tightrope walk that had to balance the demands of the opposition Tories, who were connected to the landed class, and the Radicals, who represented the interests of the new industrial cities in the north. The Whig government had been subject to and narrowly survived a motion of no confidence by the Tory opposition in 1838 and 1839. The vote of no confidence was getting closer to toppling the government. In this hostile political climate, the Whigs needed the Radicals' support, and when the Radicals came to lobby for a war the government considered it convenient to oblige. These findings dovetail with this book's major argument that the war idea started in Canton. The Radicals, who represented the interests of manufacturers in the north of England and who in turn were the Warlike party's allies, together successfully lobbied to start the war. The political climate in London at the crucial moment eased the last mile of the Warlike party's quest.

Viewed as a whole, the Opium War historiography proves that the war would not have happened without a combination of factors with coterminous timing. Although the victory of the moral hardliners in the Qing court was the force behind the opium confiscation, it took a fight between two political factions in London to turn the war argument first developed in Canton into a political decision of the British state. It was pure coincidence that the opium crisis occurred in Canton just as the political crisis in London was unfolding. The Warlike party and northern manufacturers had a shared British identity as 'shopkeepers' who desired trade expansion, and this on top of personal connections between the two groups contributed to the northern manufacturers' decision to assist in lobbying for a war to open up the Chinese market. For the Radical MPs who supported their cause, lobbying for the war was a political obligation to their constituents, and it afforded a window of opportunity to punch above their weight.

A combination of factors on both the Chinese and British sides provided the necessary conditions but were not causes of the war. The Qing government did not want a war. The hardliners of the Chinese scholar-officials wanted to root out the opium trade and stop the resulting outflow of silver from the country. Their uncompromising stand against the opium traders set the conditions for the British to declare war. The British government in London did not plan to initiate an invasion of China. Rather, it was reactively responding to the crisis in Canton whipped up by the Warlike party, their merchant allies in Britain, and the Radicals in Parliament, although the British government did use the crisis to its advantage. Both the British and Chinese states

were engaged in power struggles at home that made them susceptible to becoming involved in a war. But the initiation came from neither of the two governments.

The origin of the war was provided by the Warlike party of Canton. Its members presented war arguments and lobbied for war, and their opium trade ultimately led to it. The war was fought on behalf of their interests, and it was won based on the intelligence they supplied. The treaty signed after the war addressed their demands in every clause. The Warlike party played its role at every turn. Its wishes, knowledge, initiative, and determination led to the war being waged. The rest of the conditions, coincidences, and accidents helped create the circumstances that led to the war.

With regard to the traditions of empire studies, this book makes a case that actors on the periphery greatly affected the fate of the metropolis and the empire.[24] To the studies on British perception of China, this book shows how Canton became a key site for the production of British knowledge about China which proves to be decisive in Sino-Western relations.[25]

Chapter previews

The British community in Canton was rather small in number, considering its role in history. There were 66 white British in 1833 and 86 in 1835. The end of the EIC monopoly in 1834 brought about an influx of 'private merchants' to China, and by 1837 the white British numbered 158, just over half of the Canton foreign community's 307 members. The Parsee (Persian merchants of South Asia), who numbered 62 in 1837, were considered British subjects, and some were supporters of the Warlike party during the 1839 lobbying, but not in 1835. The third-biggest group in 1837 were the Americans, who numbered 44, followed by the Portuguese at 28. Those from other European nations like France and Prussia comprised single-digit numbers by the 1837 count.[26] The British private merchants considered themselves learned people animated by Enlightenment ideals. They were multifaceted and achieved a great deal as individuals and as a community.

Chapter 2, 'The Warlike and Pacific Parties', explores how the British community in Canton used its newspapers to debate the subjects of China, Britain, and free trade. The Warlike party gradually settled on a new understanding of China centred on a war discourse, while the Pacific party condemned the arguments for war.

A third force was at play in the British maritime public sphere in Canton, an inadvertent participant that was neither anti-war nor pro-war: the Canton system, which is examined in detail in Chapter 3, 'Breaking the Soft Border'. More than the physical border of the Thirteen Factories, the Canton system was mostly a 'soft border' made of a series of rules and regulations that constrained British merchants' activities in China and restricted their interaction with Qing subjects. Soft borders here were figurative borderlines on the maritime frontier that cut through transnational networks

of information and interaction. By preventing interaction other than what was necessary for trade, the Qing believed that they had successfully prevented the possibility of foreigners joining forces with Chinese rebels. However, the Warlike party saw it as necessary to start a war to abolish the system that confined British trade expansion and was perceived in its very existence as an insult to the British Empire.

Chapter 4, 'Intellectual Artillery', explains how the Warlike party launched an informational war to penetrate the soft borders that constrained flows of information and interaction. Their efforts concentrated on the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China, with the objective of spreading knowledge about the European world to the Chinese. They prepared, as they termed it, 'intellectual artillery' in the form of Chinese-language publications, especially material related to world geography, to distribute among the Chinese to inform them of the extent of British power in the hope that it would lead China to 'open up' from the inside. In establishing the society, the Warlike party conceived the metaphor of a war of information, which contributed to the developing conceptualization of a literal war against China in the years before actual military action.

Chapter 5, 'A War of Words over "Barbarian"', assesses a decade-long debate that occurred within the British community in Canton over how best to translate the word *yi* (夷)—as either 'barbarian' or 'stranger'. The dispute first raged in the *Register* for more than two years, beginning in 1828, and played a key role in igniting the war argument in 1830. The community agreed that it meant 'barbarian', representing a Chinese conception of foreigners as uncivilized savages. The translation was in wide circulation after the 1835 war lobbying campaign in London and formed an integral part of the pro-war argument. However, by 1837 the Canton community belatedly retracted their earlier translation, arguing that *yi* was best rendered into English as 'stranger'.

On top of debating and deciding the meaning of a Chinese word, the Warlike party believed it had the right to petition both the Chinese and British governments to have its voice heard and to obtain the 'justice' it deserved. In this spirit, which seemed to be a product of Enlightenment but was actually imperialism, the party engaged the Chinese government and went to London to lobby for war in 1835 and 1839, as described in Chapter 6, 'Reasoning Britain into a War'.

However, the Warlike party did not get its way entirely. Chapter 7, 'The Regret of a Nation', documents how the British public opposed the war. Christian morality empowered the anti-war movements in Britain as the protesters felt ashamed that the war, as they understood it, had been launched to force opium on the Chinese. Their view of the war would prevail in the second half of the nineteenth century. After 1860, British parliamentarians more often than not condemned the war, blaming it both for the disastrous Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and the rising tide of Chinese nationalism, and many regretted that the Opium War was ever waged. The concluding chapter

theorizes how the Canton system and the First Opium War created different kind of 'profit orders' for the Chinese and the British and how the war represents a clash of the two orders.

In the Chinese setting of the 1830s' Canton port, the British merchants argued over the question of Britain's relations with China: to engage them with war or peace. The Warlike party's case won out. Their war argument soon gave national importance to the opium crisis of 1839, played a central role in London's political crisis of the fight between the Whigs and Tories, and then swayed Britain into taking military action.

2
The Warlike and Pacific Parties

During the 1830s, the British community in Canton was divided into the 'Warlike party' and 'Pacific party'. One trader who went by the pseudonym of Crito belonged to the latter. In early 1836, he attacked the Warlike party that gathered under the *Canton Register*:

> With respect to the warlike party, its views of its leaders as with those of most other parties, are probably partly ambitions and partly founded upon real but mistaken ideas of public advantage;—for commerce must ever be most benefited in Asia, as it is now admitted to be in Europe, by peace.—Some of the minor advocates of the party suffer themselves to be led like a celebrated blind traveller, to the edge of a precipice where they indulge their imaginations in exaggerated prospects and excited feelings, whilst the more clear sighted are contemplating the abyss below.[1]

Crito's anti-war position was informed in equal parts by the principle of peaceful interaction and a fear that a war would put the Canton trade in an even worse situation. Some British private merchants of Canton, especially those in the Pacific party, were unsure whether Britain could win a war should one break out.

Upon reading this passage, which was published in the *Canton Press*, the *Register* replied that it was not a warlike party, and struck back at the Pacific party that gathered under the *Press*:

> And shall those be termed *pacific* who would purchase the profits of a trade at a sacrifice of every national honour and individual feeling?—Such "reverential submission" being the surest means to induce further insult, obloquy, and ill-treatment.[2]

Exchanges of this kind between the two rival newspapers—and by proxy the two parties—were typical in 1830s Canton. The two-party division, according to Crito, started in 1830 due in great part to the community, especially the Warlike party members, who were agitated by several incidents that occurred in Canton that year and the following year.[3] The war idea was voiced during this time and was opposed

by many. But by the winter of 1834, after the Napier Affair, the Warlike party was firm in its position for a war against China.

Between 1830 and 1835, before the *Press* was established, pro-war and anti-war arguments shared the same platform in the *Register*. After its inception, the *Press* became the forum for pacific arguments, and the two-party division became more palpable and polemical. To be sure, the two 'parties' should be considered as two groups of like-minded people rather than organized associations, and their division a spectrum rather than a polarization. Some members changed their minds along the way. Some believed that Britain needed only to take possession of a Chinese island or port as a colony for trade. Some argued that a display of the British naval force without actually attacking would be enough to persuade Qing China to respect British merchants and improve trading conditions. The polemical debates held in the Canton public sphere were, nonetheless, realpolitik in the sense that the Warlike party lobbied for the war in London in 1835, and later in 1839 with success.

This chapter expounds on the two parties' arguments. The first two sections explain how private merchants came to domination in the Canton port, how their public sphere in Canton worked, and how it was connected to the rest of British maritime public sphere. How the ideology of free trade played a role in the Warlike party's war argument and how the party took the trouble attempting to impart free trade ideas to the Chinese are then examined, before concluding on the Pacific party's perceptions of China.

The rise of British private merchants

The trade volume of the British private merchants in Canton overtook that of the EIC in the late 1820s. This economic power together with the expectation that the EIC's monopoly would not be renewed made the private merchants the major players in the port even before the monopoly ended in early 1834. The division into the Warlike and Pacific parties in the first two years involved EIC staff in Canton, but their role in the rivalry soon diminished as its business wound down.

Before 1834, the main trading activity of private merchants was the 'country trade', or maritime trade, between Asian ports, while the EIC had a monopoly over transcontinental trade to Europe. The weekly Price Current of the *Register* listed the goods that the merchants had shipped to Canton for Chinese consumption, including amber, betel nuts, birds' nests, copper, cotton, ginseng crude, Patna opium, Benares opium, Malwa opium, Turkey opium, Malay pepper, Indian sandalwood, sapanwood, sealskins, sea otter skins, and others. The Chinese goods they exported to other Asian ports included bamboo canes, brass leaf, glass beads, white lead, rhubarb, raw silk, row sugar, vermilion, Bohea tea, Congo tea, Pekoe tea, Ankoi tea, Hyson tea, and Twankay tea.[4]

Under the EIC's monopoly structure, the private merchants had to be daring and creative in carving out their trades and profits. The first generation, which came to China in the last three decades of the eighteenth century, pioneered various new trade items in the Chinese market, such as highly decorated clocks and Alaskan fur.[5] The second generation, who were mostly responsible for creating the new British knowledge of China, came to Canton in the 1810s through 1820s. They not only took over the Asian country trade from the Asian traders but also expanded trade to New South Wales and Western Australia, and revitalized trade and instituted regular shipping with South America to sell Chinese goods and obtain silver.[6] With their profit-driven trading efforts, they brought new energy to the old routes and established world connections that had not previously existed. In this way, they were truly disciples of Adam Smith.

One example of their new energy in the Asian maritime trade was the introduction of the agency system, a capitalist formulation empowered by the separation of capital from management that increased the mobility and hence volume of trade. The agents acted as brokers rather than investing money directly as the EIC and the previous generation of private merchants had done. They sat in Canton gathering market information and wrote to their clients in Calcutta, Bombay, other port cities and later London, reporting on the markets and giving purchasing and shipping advice. With branch offices in other ports, the agency system was a complex network of investment and profit making.[7]

Gathering market information in the agency system became more important. For instance, the Indian cotton trade depended on the Chinese market for nankeen (a yellowish cotton cloth). However, foreign traders had to rely on second-hand information from Hong merchants, and by the time information about the nankeen market reached Canton from inland, sales of Indian cotton in the Canton market had often already collapsed.[8] In part, the private merchants advocated extensive access to China because it would have made the Chinese domestic markets observable to the British.

The revitalized Asian ocean trade helped make Canton the centre of wealth generation. This together with EIC and American trade created wealthy individuals, including Howqua (Wu Bingjian, 1769–1843), who was allegedly the richest merchant at the time; his near equal Puan Khequa (Pan Youdu 1755–1820); the Forbeses, a prominent Boston family of which the former US secretary of state John Forbes Kerry (b. 1943) is a member; and American railway entrepreneur John Cleve Green (1800–1875), who in 1839 took his 'ample fortune' of $7 million from Canton back to America and, with further investment in the railway, became a philanthropist and a major benefactor of Princeton University and New York University.[9] Along with these individuals, the Qing and British governments in India and London benefited either directly or indirectly from the thriving maritime trade, especially on taxation of the three major commodities of silk, tea, and opium.

The best known of those who made their fortunes in Canton's maritime trade were two Scots: James Matheson and William Jardine. With the money he made in Canton, Jardine bought a townhouse on Upper Belgrave Street, an affluent part of London, and acquired the Lanrick Castle estate in Perthshire, Scotland, as his country house. When he left Canton in early 1839, Jardine was no longer the same farmer's son who had earned a medical degree before coming to the East, first as a surgeon on board the EIC ship the *Brunswick*. Matheson, the son of a Scottish captain, used his Canton fortune to buy, in 1844 for £190,000, the Isle of Lewis—the largest of the Western Isles off the western coast of mainland Scotland—and spent an additional £60,000 to build Lews Castle on it.[10] The wealth the two men had accumulated elevated their social status, which, in turn, allowed them to join British high society: two Scottish Victorian gentlemen made in Canton. The social status and connections were their means of access to the power centre in London for their war lobbying in 1835 and 1839.

The single most important commodity fuelling this moneymaking machine for British private merchants like Jardine and Matheson was opium. The EIC monopolized the opium plantations and trade in India, which was the main source of China's opium imports. However, it did not want to be involved in a trade banned by the Chinese authorities. The private merchants seized the opportunity, shipping opium from India to China, and by the late 1820s the opium trade flourished to the extent that it altered the balance of trade in Canton. In terms of China's currency flow for imports and exports, 'between 1829 and 1840 only $7⅓ million of silver was imported, while nearly $56 million of treasure—dollars, sycee and gold—was sent out of the country'.[11] China's silver was flowing out quickly, mainly for the purchase of opium. In 1830, imports to Canton totalled $20,364,600, with more than half ($11,243,496) coming from the opium trade. 'In the last decade before 1842, opium alone constituted about two thirds of the value of all British imports into China.'[12] Opium probably represented the largest commerce of any single commodity at the time. As one British merchant described it, 'Opium is like gold, I can sell it any time.' Jardine, Matheson & Co. was the most successful of the country traders, and in 1834 was involved in one-third of the Canton opium trade.[13]

Opium created enormous problems for the Qing government. They first banned it in the 1720s to no avail. The trade and consumption prevailed. By 1820, the Qing started to take the matter more seriously than before. The major campaign to drive out the opium trade that year brought the Qing to confront foreign opium smugglers for the first time. As a result, the trade was driven out of the upper Canton estuary to Lintin Island. But the anti-opium import campaign stopped there, and the business thrived from the Lintin anchorage.[14] British private merchants and other European traders moored their ships at Lintin as floating depots to receive the opium brought in by clippers from India. The opium was then transferred into Chinese crab boats

that came with payment receipts obtained at the Thirteen Factories in Canton and was loaded, too, onto ships owned by British private merchants heading to China's eastern coasts for sale. The floating depots of Lintin were also involved in smuggling other goods to evade the port tax.[15]

The private merchants saw Lintin as a form of 'free trade'. In an article accusing the EIC of showing no resistance to China's constraints, the *Register* made the following claim: 'Let us cherish our Lintin trade, and endeavour to multiply *Lintins* along the whole extent of the Chinese coast.'[16] The private merchants, especially the Warlike party, understood 'free trade' to be literally trade wherever they wanted.

Lintin was, in fact, the maritime frontier of the Qing and had an air of lawlessness. The private merchants saw there how China's underworld society operated its opium-smuggling business and how the Qing's lower officials colluded in the opium trade. This Lintin outlaw position played a part in shaping how the Warlike party perceived the Chinese legal system and how it understood Chinese-Western relations. In experiencing the Chinese bureaucratic system as corrupt and the law as unworthy of observation and respect, based on what they saw in Lintin, the Warlike party felt a moral justice in their opium trade and campaign for war. By characterizing the Chinese as unjust, they could consider their smuggling business good and rightfully advocate war against them. In contrast, the members of the Pacific party honestly considered themselves opium smugglers.

But they were not merely opium traders. The Canton British community saw themselves as cultured people with high-society aspirations. Jardine famously had only one chair in his office for himself, as he did not want to spend his days chatting away with idle visitors. He enjoyed work and worked long hours. Both Jardine and Matheson received an education from what is now Edinburgh University at a time when the Scottish Enlightenment was flourishing.[17] Their stationary supplier in London regularly sent them the latest newspapers, journals, and books. In the 1820s and 1830s, the private merchants made extensive use of a library located in the EIC's English Factory. The articles they supplied to their newspapers and letters they wrote to their friends and business partners indicated that they were observant, cultivated, worldly, and tuned in to politics and world affairs. When news of the South American revolutions reached Canton during the 1820s, the merchants sympathized with the revolutionaries and believed liberty and democracy would win the day.[18]

When they were financially established, they saw themselves as philanthropists. In the 1830s, they initiated or financed several charitable organizations in Canton, including the Ophthalmic Hospital (1828), the Morrison Education Society (1836), the Medical Missionary Society (1838), and funds for orphans and widows of European traders in the East.[19] They established a seamen's hospital in Canton's Whampoa seaport for thousands of foreign sailors during one trading season in the 1830s, a form of welfare that the EIC had failed to provide. In their newspapers, they

appealed for donations for a similar hospital in London and asked the Chinese Hong merchants and Parsee for disaster relief after floods in China and Scotland.[20]

If there was a golden opportunity to make money in Canton, it was carved out by the private merchants, a group of self-made people who deeply believed in their abilities. This attitude characterized their commercial activities, charitable work, and engagement with and understanding of the Qing government, and it was the driving force behind their desire to reconstruct a new Britain-China trade relationship that would suit their needs, following the inspiration of Smithian theory. The print-based maritime public sphere was a means for them to discover the common desire to abolish the Canton system and for the formation of the Warlike party.

Canton in the British maritime public sphere

In the Thirteen Factories, where the regular trade took place, as the merchants were confined there while in China, the space provided them with an unusual abundance of opportunities to interact with one another and helped the face-to-face public sphere to thrive. The most evident public space was located at No. 3, the Imperial Hong. Here, Markwick & Lane rented a corner to sell European goods and nautical instruments to the foreigners in Canton.[21] At this shop, one could buy *Horsburgh's Charts* (maritime charts compiled by Captain James Horsburgh [1762–1836]) and books such as *Statement of the British Trade* and *The Chinese Commercial Guide*. The *Canton Register* sold for fifty cents, and *Price Current and Commercial Remark* could be purchased for twenty-five cents. There was also a *Canton Register* box at the shop for the convenience of readers who wanted to leave letters for the editor.

A subscription list for charitable appeal on behalf of the Hospital for Sick and Diseased Seamen in London was placed in the shop. After the end of the EIC in 1834, a post office was set up in the shop, where incoming ships would deliver their letter bags and individuals would call to collect mail. Markwick & Lane ran a hotel where Canton foreign community's public meetings were held. They also catered for parties and great dinners for the community.[22] The British in Canton had plenty of formal gatherings such as meetings, dinners, and parties at which they could further exchange their ideas. The funeral of Lord John William Napier (1786–1834) afforded such an occasion.

Napier was sent to Canton as superintendent of trade representing the British Foreign Office in 1834, after the EIC monopoly trade had wound down. He arrived at Macao on 15 July and went to Canton soon after, requesting direct communication with the governor-general, rather than through the Hong merchants as the Canton system stipulated. This meant that he asked to be recognized not as a foreign head merchant (*taipan*) but as a British state representative, a new situation that the conservative Qing bureaucrats refused to accept. The Canton authorities asked Napier to

leave Canton, as he had not applied for a passport to enter in the first place. During the standoff, Napier happened to take sick and was moved to Macao, where he died of fever on 11 October, ninety-five days after his arrival.[23]

Napier's death grieved the Warlike party, which had hoped that his appointment would change the trading conditions in China. Key Warlike party members Jardine and Matheson were especially dismayed. Two months before Napier's arrival, they had sent out cruising boats daily to look out for his ships. Upon landing, Napier was received into a house in Macao fitted up for him by Jardine and Matheson, leaving the welcoming party of the EIC staff empty handed and their preparation for Napier in vain.[24]

The Warlike party believed that Napier would not have deteriorated so rapidly had the Chinese allowed him to go down to Macao via direct river routes instead of the inner river routes that prolonged his journey. The *Register* published the order of procession for the funeral, along with the sermon and obituary. As if this was not enough an expression of their feelings, outlining the pages of the *Register* in bold black as a sign of mourning for two issues, the Warlike party used a tradition invented in 1817 for the death of a royal family member to honour Napier.[25] The funeral of Protestant missionary Robert Morrison, who had overworked as a translator and interpreter during the standoff, had been held one month earlier and now made Napier's funeral even more poignant.[26] Because Napier had been a representative of the British Crown, his death and 'ill treatment' by the Qing authorities became the centrepiece of the Warlike party's petition for war in December 1834.

In the petition, the Warlike party described the Qing's treatment of Lord Napier as an 'insult offered to your Majesty's flag'. The word 'insult' was used seven times, accompanied by other related words such as 'injuries', 'indignities', and 'degrading'. The petitioners asked for 'two frigates, and three or four armed vessels of light draft, together with a steam vessel, all fully manned . . . in the name of your Majesty, ample reparation for the insults offered'.[27] This was the first war petition sent out from Canton, and it was written with an air of funerary gravity. James Matheson would carry the war petition to London and accompany Lady Napier and her two daughters home. He would stay in Britain between 1835 and 1837 to campaign and lobby for war.

In more cheerful times for the Canton foreign community, a Waterloo Dinner was held for every member of the foreign community in Canton in 1830 on the fifteenth anniversary of that decisive battle. King George IV's birthday and Queen Victoria's coronation and birthday were also events meriting celebration dinners.[28] Among the most important days on the calendar was St Andrew's Day, honouring the Scottish patron saint.

A great number of Scottish merchants traded in the East during the nineteenth century, and St Andrew's Day marked an important occasion for expressing their

Scottishness.[29] Jardine served as patron of the celebration in Canton. During the dinners, sets of silver plates bearing his coat of arms (despite his humble background) were used and admired by the merchants and captains who attended. The celebrations lasted from evening until dawn. Around sixty guests attended in 1834 and 1835, and by 1837 more than one hundred people were present. At the dinner they toasted St Andrew first, followed by the king, queen, royal family, and navy. The guests sang between each toast, culminating in the national anthem 'God Save the King' (or 'Queen').[30] The public space created by these dinners offered ample opportunity for exchange of opinions, and the members of the community bonded through the endless toasts. Their spirits rose along with their glasses to a crescendo of patriotic fervour, adding an emotional dimension to this British maritime public sphere in a foreign land.

The personal interactions in the Canton port were further developed by the English-language print media there, including the *Canton Register* (1827–1846), the *Canton Press* (1835–1844), and the *Chinese Repository* (1832–1851), as well as the short-lived *Canton Miscellany* (1831–1832) and the *Chinese Courier and Canton Gazette* (1831–1833), which facilitated written interactions that widened participation in terms of both time and space.[31] Via print and face-to-face interactions, the British community of Canton extensively discussed public matters related to the affairs of the merchants' living quarters, the community, the Chinese authorities who held jurisdiction, the port, and the happenings in other Asian trading ports and Great Britain. It was in this Canton maritime public sphere of personal interaction and of print press that the warlike and pacific arguments were exchanged.

Canton's English print-based public sphere needs to be understood in the larger context of British imperial informal networks in the East. British merchants at other Asian port cities, too, printed English newspapers (usually weekly or biweekly). The first English newspaper east of the Ganges was the *Prince of Wales' Island Gazette* (1805–1827), published in Penang, and the earliest and most seminal English newspaper in India was the *Calcutta Gazette* (1784–1899).[32] There was at least one newspaper in every Eastern port with a sizable British merchant community. The newspapers were often named after the port: the *Sydney Gazette*, the *Hobart Town Courier* (Sydney), *Perth Gazette*, *Western Australian Journal* (Perth), *Singapore Chronicle*, *Singapore Free Press*, *Malacca Observer and Chinese Chronicle*, *Penang Register & Miscellany*, *Calcutta Courier*, *Bengal Hurkaru* (Calcutta), *Bombay Gazette*, *Sandwich Island Gazette and Journal of Commerce*, and *Hawaiian Spectator*.

Apart from commercial information, the newspapers published news and other information related to the port and Great Britain in general. Along with the goods that travelled trading routes in and out of Canton, the newspapers and journals of the ports were circulated and British knowledge of China exchanged. The Canton newspapers often quoted or summarized news printed by their fellow editors in

other ports. The editors of the *Register* made announcements such as the following: 'We are indebted to a friend for the perusals of a file of the Australian newspaper, lately received by the *Prince Regent*, New South Wales.'[33] The same applied to editors in other ports. Quoting the *Register*, the editor of the *Hobart Town Courier* wrote, 'By the favour of Captain Harper of the ship *Ephemina*, we have the *Canton Register*.'[34]

The metropolis of London was the centre of maritime information circulation. The *Canton Register* frequently quoted news items from the *Times*, *Morning Herald*, *Evening Mail*, *Quarterly Review*, *Penny Magazine*, *Oriental Herald*, *Asiatic Journal*, and others.[35] Fleet Street of London, where English newspapers had their headquarters, likewise paid the Canton print media particular attention, especially on occasions such as the end of the EIC's charter, the Napier Affair, and the First Opium War. The Asiatic societies in Britain represented a strong point of intersection between the public spheres of London and the Eastern ports. The *Asiatic Journal* published Intelligence and Register columns from Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Ceylon, Penang, Singapore, Malacca, Netherlands India, Siam, China, Cochin-China, Australia, Polynesia, Mauritius, St Helena, the Isle of France, and the Cape of Good Hope.[36]

The merchants at the Eastern ports read and quoted one another's news indirectly from London newspapers and journals if they had not already printed it. Along the coastal lines of the formal and informal British Empire that stretched from Canton to London, the literal connections between the ports formed an English corridor of information circulation creating a sense of an 'imagined community' of the British for their readers.[37]

Private letters also travelled on trading ships between Eastern port cities and beyond. Everyone knew some people at the other ports, and the family-business nature of the country trade added reasons for letter exchange. Jardine and Matheson had at least eight nephews between them stationed at trading ports outside Canton.[38] The private letters sent between ports were another source of news for the presses, through which information and knowledge circulated from private individuals into the public sphere at great distances.

The warlike and pacific ideas travelled via letters. During the Napier Affair, for instance, Matheson related the following to his friend and business partner John Purvis (1799–1872) in Singapore: 'It were too much to expect that they [the Chinese] will not require a further demonstration of force on a larger scale before being brought to their senses.'[39]

The peregrinations of personnel further transferred information between ports, as individuals talked about the news and ideas they had acquired when they arrived in Canton and at other ports. Ship captains were a regular presence at the dinner parties and were well respected. They were a source of authoritative information, as they had access to the upper echelon of society in the East when they called at ports.

Missionaries also sent their publications and correspondence via trading ships. The *Indo China Gleaner* (1817–1822), printed in Malacca, carried information from Amboina, Batavia, Bellary, Calcutta, China, the Cape of Good Hope, Madras, Malacca, and other places where Protestant missionaries were stationed.[40] With their literary skills, missionaries proved especially helpful. Robert Morrison helped edit the *Register* for about two years.[41] Based in Canton and Macao, Morrison also supplied articles to the *Malacca Observer and Chinese Chronicle* (1826–1829), which was printed by the press he had set up at the Anglo-Chinese College in Malacca.[42] The *Chinese Repository* began as a missionary journal and soon turned into a specialist journal for East and South East Asia, covering subjects as diverse as history, culture, and botany and devoting itself to issues of concern to the maritime public, such as opium and free trade. The circulation of the *Repository* in the coastal cities indicated the scope of the maritime public sphere: in August 1836, subscription numbers reached 200 in China, 15 in Manila, 13 in the Sandwich Islands, 18 in Singapore, 6 in Malacca, 6 in Penang, 21 in Batavia, 4 in Siam, 6 in Sydney, 3 in Burma, 7 in Bengal, 2 in Ceylon, 11 in Bombay, and 4 in Cape Town, for a total of 550. The rest came from the West, including 5 in Hamburg, 40 in England, and 154 in America.[43] Missionaries eagerly participated in knowledge making and circulation, not only to spread Christianity but also to serve the feverish demand for information among the Europeans in the East and back in the West.

The idea of starting a war against China was initiated in the Canton British maritime public sphere, and it immediately attracted pacific arguments from the community. The arguments then circulated in the Asian port cities before finding their way to London to influence policymaking there.

The disturbance of 1830 and 1831

To a great extent, the print media–based British maritime public sphere in Asia behaved like a local British newspaper such as those found in Leeds, Edinburgh, Bath, or Darlington.[44] Just as these newspapers carried news items for their towns and cities, Asian port newspapers focused on indigenous issues and governments in which the traders usually had a direct interest. This played into the creation of an illusion that the foreign land the British lived on was part of British territory. Taking a British perspective in judging China, articles in the *Register* often adopted a narrative standpoint that British ways—be they related to governing, Christian moral values, social formation, the legal system, free trade, or others—had a universal claim. The informal empire was at work in that the imperial ideology or universal claim of British ways expanded its boundaries before the formal empire—the state—moved in.

The *Register*, with the Warlike party behind it, saw their defiance against the authorities, that is, both the British and Chinese governments, as part of their right

of being free-born Englishmen. They were proud that the *Register* was an independent medium, as it meant they were independent of the British authorities in Asia, including the EIC and Foreign Office. In 1827, the British India government issued 'a Government Circular, strictly forbidding all officers of the Government service, of what rank so ever, at Penang, Malacca, or Singapore, from affording any information to the newspapers relative to any acts or resolutions of the Indian Government'.[45] The *Register* picked up this report, which was first introduced by the *Singapore Chronicle*, and offered the following comment: 'The Censorship of the Press has been on various occasions exercised in India in the most arbitrary manner; we have a very recent instance before us in the fate of the *Calcutta Chronicle*.' The editor assured the readers that the *Register* would 'advocate the most perfect liberty of discussion, on all subjects calculated to instruct or amuse'.[46]

In publishing this item in the second issue of the *Register*, Alexander Matheson (1805–1886), who was in charge of the publication told his uncle James Matheson, who was on a business trip in Macao, that the 'offensive paragraph will, I have not the smallest doubt, give notoriety to the paper, and gain it many subscribers in India'.[47] This was typical of the Warlike party's ways: they were not afraid of controversy but rather used it to their advantage. In this instance, the concepts of the free-born Englishman's freedom of speech became entangled in commercial gains. In the discourse of 'freedom' the confinement of China's trade to one port under the Canton system seemed especially restrictive. The conflation made the Canton community especially agitated in the years of 1830 and 1831.

The roots of this agitation went back to 1828, when the EIC began improving the quay in front of the British Factories and the surrounding area. Because the landing spot in the Pearl River was becoming shallow, the EIC Select Committee, who collectively represented the company and before 1834 Britain, requested extending the quay farther into the water. The district magistrate of Panyu, where the Thirteen Factories were located, disallowed this project and sent in workers to dredge the river instead. Unsatisfied with this work, the EIC made its request again. The quay extension was completed after Governor-General Li Hongbin (1767–1848) intervened.

The next year the British expressed a wish to build walls to separate the quay from the Chinese landing spot beside it. Although this request was disallowed, the west-facing wall was built. When the Canton authorities came to investigate, they did not destroy the wall but prohibited the building of the other two walls facing east and south, as they would have protruded into the waterway. On the night of 3 March 1830, the Select Committee brought in more than one hundred sailors and soldiers to build another section of wall and fill up the low-lying land in front of the factory. The Hong merchants who acted as go-betweens for the foreign merchants and the Qing official reported this and the authorities ordered its destruction, but the order was not carried out.

The following year, upon returning to the court at Peking in April 1831 after visiting Canton, Executive Assistant Supervising Censor Shao Zhenghu reported to the Daoguang emperor that the foreigners in Canton were unruly. The construction of the quay and the flattened ground were identified among the eight major violations that foreigners had committed. A month later a reprimanding edict arrived in Canton, prompting Governor Zhu Guizhen and Custom Commissioner Zhongxiang to visit the Thirteen Factories. They ordered the destruction of the walls and the removal of the filled earth. It was on this occasion, upon entering the English Factory, that the governor ordered a portrait uncovered, and found it to be a portrait of King George IV (r. 1820–1830). Governor Zhu then ordered the back of his chair to be turned to it.[48]

As it was not the trading season at the time, the Select Committee and the rest of the EIC staff were in Macao. And the more sympathetic Governor-General Li happened to be away from Canton. When the EIC staff learned of the destruction of the walls and the intrusion into the factory, Secretary to the Select Committee Hugh Hamilton Lindsay (1802–1881) was sent to Canton. He delivered a message that threatened to suspend trade in August when the new season started if a satisfactory explanation from the Canton authorities was not forthcoming. Lindsay then presented the keys of their factory to the Canton authorities, stating the following: 'We have no means at present of protecting our property against aggression, and we therefore abandon it.'[49]

By this time, Governor-General Li had arrived back in Canton and directed the Hong merchants to return the remonstrance and the keys. The *Register* described this move as 'offensive'.[50] Lindsay then drew up a Chinese placard to be disseminated among the Chinese to stir up Chinese public opinion and catch the attention of the authorities.[51] Twenty-one private merchants headed by Jardine and Matheson signed a resolution in support of Lindsay's action. They argued that Governor Zhu's actions at the factory constituted a 'gratuitous insult offered to the picture of the King of England' and resulted in a 'national injury'.[52]

This played into the controversy of October 1830, when one Mrs Baynes, wife of Chief Superintendent of the Select Committee William Baynes, ignored the rule that no Western women were allowed to visit Canton.[53] The Canton authorities threatened to use force to expel Mrs Baynes. Guns, cannon, and soldiers were brought from the ships anchored in the Whampoa seaport to guard against the Canton authorities' search of the factories. Chinese Hong merchant Xie Wu (Woo-Yay) was jailed for sending a sedan chair for Mrs Baynes to use while travelling from the landing quay to the English Factory.[54] The EIC staff made great efforts to rescue him to no avail. Xie died in custody before his exile to the frontier town of Yili. The hostilities ended only when Mrs Baynes left Canton.[55] These disturbances prompted the Canton authorities to introduce new and tighter regulations.[56]

The quay and Mrs Baynes incidents, the death of Xie Wu, the new regulations, the *Register*'s reports and comments, the Chinese placards, the English version of their remonstrance to the Canton authorities, and the edicts issued by the Canton authorities that were translated by the *Register* gave readers in Canton plenty to discuss.[57] The whole saga remained a popular topic of conversation in 1831 and 1832 and continued to resound over the following years.[58]

The war argument flared up during the disturbances; so did the pacific argument. One reader using the pseudonym A British Merchant commented that the 'indignities offered to the British flag in this country are little known and would not readily be believed. . . . What has been gained by this concession, so derogatory to British feelings?' He also implied elsewhere that war was an option.[59] In the next issue of the *Register*, 'An Englishman' 'in the hope of drawing the attention of the English public' commented that war was unnecessary and would damage commerce. He proposed instead 'to seize and fortify one of the numerous barren islets on the coast, as a safe depot for her commerce; protected by a small Naval force'.[60] These two remarks elicited strong comments from a reader known as Veritas, who argued that the British behaved badly in China, that the conditions here were good for them and that the British had 'no claim whatever on the Chinese Government'.[61] This criticism of the belligerence was in turn repudiated by a 'Fair Play', who asked, 'Since England rose into a great and powerful nation, has she yielded to indignity and insult as she has done here?' He then linked the EIC tea trade with national honour, saying, 'We have a right to insist that the trade shall not be, as now, purchased at the high price of national disgrace'.[62]

The comments were written with the expectation that they would be read, quoted, and discussed, as indeed they were not only in Canton and elsewhere in Asia but also in London.[63] The readers knew their comments would contribute to the formation of British domestic opinion of China. Some used this channel to promote war, and others felt obliged to stamp out the fire.

In the public sphere of Canton during the early 1830s, the war idea was still being formulated, as the community argued over Britain's China policy and the necessity of a war. There was no guarantee that the war argument would be welcome in London or have direct bearing on the British state's foreign policy for China. The pacific idea shadowed the war argument from the very moment of its inception. It was only after the Napier Affair in late 1834 that the Warlike party became resolute and took action to campaign and lobby for a war with China.

In the first three years of the 1830s, the Warlike party discovered the connection between Britain-China trade and Adam Smith's theory of free trade. It not only fused its war argument with Smithian theory but also sought to teach the Chinese the idea of free trade as the secret of national wealth, in the hope that China would willingly

open up to British trade and influence from the inside. They believed trade would benefit China as it has benefited Britain.

The Warlike party's free trade

In the early 1830s, political circles in London were deeply immersed in discussion of free trade, and it was promoted most fervently by none other than the politicians sitting on the Board of Trade.[64] Campaigns against the Corn Laws were working to convince the British nation that relaxing import restrictions would lower food prices, which in turn would enable manufacturers to cut workers' wages to increase productivity. The believers of free trade also claimed that it would raise the purchasing power of grain-exporting countries in Europe for the consumption of British products. Underlying the cry for a 'cheap loaf' was the economic tension between a rising manufacturing and export industry and a declining agricultural sector, which translated into a struggle for political power between the industrial middle class and the landed aristocracy. Richard Cobden (1804–1865) and John Bright (1811–1889) established the Anti-Corn Law League in London in 1836 and by 1838 were firmly rooted in Manchester, where the new industrial middle class believed they stood to gain from the abolition of the Corn Laws and the promotion of a free trade ethos.[65]

The free trade doctrine was also the force behind the abolition of the EIC's monopoly in both India and China, which had an immediate consequence for the political-economic structure of the Canton port. The northern manufacturers of Britain had tasted the fruit of free trade in selling their machine-made textile goods to Indian markets when the EIC's trade monopoly there was abolished, throwing open the Indian market in 1813. The Manchester Chamber of Commerce was the single most important force against the 1833 EIC charter renewal, which it saw as a battleground for expanding the textile trade into Chinese markets.[66]

While the EIC monopoly was under attack in London, the balance of economic power at Canton coincidentally tipped in favour of the private merchants in the late 1820s. The demise of the EIC enabled British private merchants to further expand their trade. In this air of change, the members of the Warlike party of Canton saw themselves more than before as free traders, as after 1834 they were operating under a free trade system without constrains of the EIC monopoly. They proudly included the words of Board of Trade president Charles Grant (1778–1866) as an epigraph for every issue of the *Register* beginning in January 1834:

> The free traders appear to cherish high notions of their claims and privileges. Under their auspices a free press is already maintained at Canton; and should their commerce continue to increase, their importance will rise also. They will regard themselves as the depositaries of the true principles of British commerce.[67]

The private merchants of Canton were not just calling themselves 'free traders' but were now known as that by others. And the *Canton Register* was considered an advocate of the 'true principle' of the British commercial spirit: free trade. This made the Warlike party think that they were recognized and promoting a good cause in China. The EIC's China monopoly was the enemy of the Canton traders' free trade before 1834. Thereafter, it was the Hong merchants who monopolized the trade on Chinese side and the Qing government who established the Canton one-port system of trade.

The free traders considered it their duty to change the conditions of Britain's China trade, and they wanted the British government to come to their aid in the crusade against enemies of free trade.[68] The *Register* printed the following after the last group of EIC staff departed Canton in April 1834 and the monopoly had formally ended:

> The departures for England in the last week have been many; and the Free trade has commenced with much spirit unsupported by any other aid than the skill and capital embarked in it, and unprotected by any resident British authority; but although we have every confidence in the final result of the new system, we would much rather have seen the British flag flying in Canton, and the free trade commenced under its shadow.[69]

Napier was the 'resident British authority' to arrive in July. He may have failed in his confrontation with the Chinese authorities and the Canton system, but the Warlike party stayed firm on its wish for extensive British free trade in China. Eleven days before Napier's untimely death, an article published on 30 September read as follows:

> The readiest and most eligible means of establishing and conducting an extended commerce with this empire is now—and will, for some time to come, be our principal object; *free trade to every port of China*, acknowledged and protected by the government—is the grand prize before us: This is obviously far paramount to any stinted privileges which we can aim at gaining in the single port of Canton. . . . Let us, then, take a short view of *the means* which the British nation has in its power for the attainment of so desirable and beneficial an end, as an open trade with all China.[70]

The 'means' of British governmental intervention that this article referred to was China's treatment of Napier. This was before his death. The Warlike party already believed that the exchange thus far warranted a war: 'Adequate cause has lately been given by the Canton government to the British nation to commence active hostilities against it.' The party wanted to use the case to urge the British government to send 'naval power' to 'cut off the internal and external supplies of the empire' and to display British military strength:

> A British representative may also be negotiating at Peking, or, at least, may arouse the attention of the Chinese court by such a *remonstrance* as also never before tingled in celestial ears. We think that by thus practicing on their fears—

> sometimes, perhaps, on their hopes—we may change the current of national feeling, which has been so long and so skilfully directed against us by the government, and attain a vantage ground of honor and respect in the opinion of the people and partially of the government that will induce the son of heaven to listen to our terms of international intercourse: for it appears, both from the obstinacy of the local and the ignorance of the Peking government, that nothing short of an exhibition of irresistible strength, and a fixed determination to use it (if required by further barbarous and misanthropic acts), will ever bring the emperor and his officers to a just sense of their relative position with the rest of mankind.[71]

This indirectly expressed bellicose outlook ended by asking the British government to demand a 'commercial treaty' from China. The groundwork of an argument for a war against China has been laid by this time. Ten days later, after Napier's death, the Warlike party poignantly drew up its petition. The grief over Napier's death, the sense of national indignation over China's treatment of Napier, and the desire for free trade congealed, and when they met the sense that Britain was the most powerful nation in the world, the war idea became even more assertive.[72]

The *Chinese Courier*, published by American William Wightman Wood, took the same position on free trade and on starting a war as the *Register*, although most American merchants in Canton disapproved of the war idea. In its first issue in July 1831, printed in the wake of the disturbed two years, an article entitled 'Free Trade to China' advanced the following argument: 'Treaties for the protection of the Foreign Trade are to be dictated to the "Son of Heaven" at the point of the bayonet.' The September issue claimed that 'nothing is to be gained from China but by force of arms'.[73] Although a missionary journal, the *Chinese Repository* advocated free trade on behalf of the merchants; its language was not as enthusiastic and colourful as that of the *Register* and the *Courier*.[74] While the *Repository* was ambiguous about the relationship between free trade and starting a war, the *Canton Press* clearly spelled out that it supported the free trade idea but opposed war arguments.[75]

In the language of free trade, the British merchants of Canton found the one-port system unjust, as it stifled not only British trade but also the opportunity for the Chinese people to progress. China came off as a backward country in this context, as it was not participating the 'great march of civilization'—the free trade of the British.

Teaching the Chinese free trade

In the years of disturbance in Canton between 1830 and 1831, the idea of imparting the free trade doctrine to the Chinese was first spelled out. This anticipated the Warlike party's more extensive efforts in teaching the Chinese how to understand the Europeans in the form of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China between 1834 and 1839. They believed transmitting free trade ideas would change the alleged Chinese attitude of aversion to commerce.

In its second issue of May 1831, the *Register* called for translations of 'the latest editions of Dr. Adam Smith's work on the wealth of nations, Malthus', M'Culloch's and Mill's principles, &c. of Political Economy'. 'In China,' the article argued, 'there is one prevailing sentiment throughout the nation which it would be necessary to obviate, viz: that a high regard for honor and morals is not compatible with the pursuit of wealth either individual or national.' The author drew attention to a piece of well-known passage by the Confucianist Mencius (372–289 BCE):

> The sacred language of Mung-tsze [Mencius], to King Hwuy, will rise up in the mind of every Chinese, against making the increase of wealth avowedly a national study. The said king accosted Mung-tsze thus: 'As you have come so far, I suppose you have some scheme for the profit of my country'. To which Mencius (as Mung-tsze has been latinized) answered, 'O king, why speak of profit, or increase of wealth; benevolence and justice are sufficient. Speak only of benevolence and justice, talk not of national wealth'. It seems indeed the universal belief of mankind, that virtue is more nearly related to poverty, than to riches. And the political economists of Europe would have made their lucubrations more palatable to the general taste, had they made moral considerations more prominent in their theories than they have done.[76]

This is asserting that an attitude towards commerce that emphasized the concepts of 'benevolence and justice' as Mencius did meant that the Chinese put Confucian morality above commerce. The author believed this should be changed, the sooner the better, and the ideas in *The Wealth of Nations* defined what true morality was for the Chinese.

The author then worried that, because the works of Adam Smith were 'peculiarly European', they would be 'unintelligible to Chinese readers' in translation: 'For example: the mercantile system of Europe; the corn laws; the tythes; the banking system; paper money; & c.' The article thus proposed 'a book written expressly for the purpose' instead of a direct translation.[77] A month later, a contest was advertised in the *Register* to achieve this aim:

> We are authorized to announce to Chinese Students generally, that a prize of Fifty Pounds sterling will be given for the best Essay, of about two hundred octavo pages, in the Chinese language, on Political Economy. The Essay to explain the more easily intelligible and practically useful doctrines of the science, in a manner calculated to carry conviction to the minds of Chinese readers; with reference to such of the writings of the Chinese sages, as tend to elucidate the subject, and avoiding the more abstruse doctrines, or doubtful questions on which the philosophers of the West are not agreed.[78]

To facilitate the work, Adam Smith's books and the newly published *A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical and Historical of Commerce and Commercial Navigation* (1832), by Ricardian School economist leader John Ramsey McCulloch (1789–1864), along with other books related to free trade were sent from London.[79]

In the years following the essay contest, articles and treatises on the subject of political economy were published in Chinese. Either Robert Morrison or his son John Robert Morrison wrote a treatise entitled *Zhiguo zhi yong dalüe* (A sketch on the practicalities of policymaking), and the Prussian missionary Karl Gützlaff (1803–1851) published a series of articles and a treatise named *Maoyi tongzhi* (General account on trade, 1840).[80]

It is likely that *Zhiguo* was polished by an able hand of the Chinese literati, as the Chinese theory of governing was heavily present in the text. In the first section, at the very beginning, the treatise talked about the importance of agricultural management to the welfare of the people (*min*)—note, not the 'nation'. The role of the benevolent monarch (*mingjun*) was to ensure that the agricultural processes of the country proceeded properly every year in accordance with nature. This typical Chinese agriculturalist statement was rather contrary to the free trade doctrine. It could have been the insertion of the polisher or functioned as a clever device that signified a familiar genre and created a foundation for the easier acceptance of Smithian political economy—precisely what was required of the *Register*'s prize essay.

The subsequent sections indeed argued about the free trade ideas. The section related to currency (*qian*) stated that the standardization of currency was the foundation of trade and that the benevolent monarch should take care to manage it. It then told a story about how the mining of silver and gold made Spain and Portugal rich, but that they had no talent and ability in governing (*wu caineng*). Meanwhile, Britain manufactured goods to trade for gold and silver, which it held in large supply. Thus, 'free' trade genuinely enriched the country.[81] The term *renyi zhi maoyi* rendered here was probably the closest direct translation of 'free trade'. Curiously, *renyi* translated back into English would be 'letting the will be'. This accorded much more freedom than the later standardized rendition of free trade as *ziyou maoyi* (auto-directed trade). The translation *renyi* corresponded to the Warlike party's understanding of free trade, which was to trade as they wished.

In another section, entitled 'Managing Production' (*huaji*), the treatise argued that every country had its appropriate specialization. For example, the Chinese were good at agricultural production, and the Western countries (*xiguo*) specialized in managing livestock. The world's construction made trade necessary. Farmers, artisans, and merchants were equally encouraged to prosper, as it would have great benefits to the nation and people.[82] This gave China one more reason to allow British extensive trade. The treatise also dealt with such topics as taxation, budgeting, and the military that all centred on the issue of free trade.

From late 1837 to late 1838, Gützlaff published a series of articles entitled 'Trade' (*tongshang* and *maoyi*) in the Chinese magazine *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* (Eastern Western monthly magazine, 1833–1838), which was first published by Gützlaff himself and later served as the official magazine to the Society for the

Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China.[83] Gützlaff's articles emphasized the argument that the nation became more prosperous as its trade became more widely practised, similar to that of Morrison's.[84]

In addition to the theoretical narrative, Gützlaff used fictional writing to spread the gospel of free trade. He created a Chinese protagonist called Lin Xing, an Amoy merchant who conducted trade between Canton and Singapore. The necessity and benefits of trade in the Smithian vein were revealed through Lin's eyes and his dialogue with friends, who included a Chinese customs official and foreign merchants in the Thirteen Factories.[85]

Some parts of the articles in the magazine were used in Gützlaff's more comprehensive introductory treatise, *Maoyi*.[86] The treatise, like Morrison's, was well polished, and especially compared with the composition of the articles published in the magazine. It also afforded a general survey of trading developments in Asian, European, African and American countries.[87] *Maoyi* told a more coherent story of free trade than did the articles in the magazine. Gützlaff explained that Western countries had come to find free trade a better system than others. This was done through the introduction of how the East India Companies of the Dutch and the British were developed, only later to prove a failure and be replaced by 'loose merchants' (*sanshang*, i.e., non-Company merchants)—the private merchants.[88] Gützlaff accentuated the role of private merchants in transforming the world. This was perhaps not far from how some of the British merchants saw their trade.

Because their Christianity connections, Gützlaff's and Morrison's treatises and articles involved copious references to the Christian God, in places where they saw appropriate—a common practice in missionaries' writings related to Western history and geography published in Chinese from the period. This was one of their means of accustoming the Chinese to their worldview: Western development was attributed to the power of almighty God. And this was their way of participating in the Asian maritime world of traders.[89]

Both Morrison and Gützlaff's treatises among other foreign Chinese publications were adopted by Wei Yuan (1794–1857), who published one of the earliest books to introduce the Western world when the First Opium War ended in 1842.[90] It is rather difficult to determine how the Chinese would have understood the abridged introductions to free trade. What clear is that these translated doctrines had little if any direct effect in terms of their aim of transforming China through Chinese publications. Two viewpoints give a glimpse into what the effort to teach free trade ideas, which the merchants pursued so energetically, meant to the Chinese readers.

What did the free trade economists in London think of trade in Canton? The private merchants eagerly sought their theories to pass on to the Chinese. But to their dismay, the most prominent contemporary proponent of free trade, John Ramsey McCulloch, viewed the Hong system of trade in Canton as no worse or better than

the trade conducted in New York and Liverpool. His *Dictionary* of 1832, of which the Canton community had at least two copies, contained the following section about trade in Canton:[91]

> Hong, or Security Merchants—It may be supposed, perhaps, from the previous statements, that difficulties are occasionally experienced before a hong merchant can be prevailed upon to become security for a ship; but such is not the case. None of them has *ever* evinced any hesitation in this respect. The Americans, who have had as many as forty ships in one year at Canton, have never met with a refusal. The captain of a merchant ship may resort to any hong merchant he pleases, and, by way of making him some return for his becoming security, he generally buys from him 100*l* or 200*l* worth of goods. Individuals are, however, at perfect liberty to deal with any hong merchant, whether he has secured their ship or not, or with any *outside merchant*; that is, *with any Chinese merchant not belonging to the hong*. So that, though there are only 10 hong merchants at Canton, there is, notwithstanding, quite as extensive a choice of merchants with whom to deal in that city, as in either Liverpool or New York.[92]

McCulloch's opinion of Canton demonstrates that although the British traders of Canton saw themselves as free traders working against the double monopolies of the EIC and Hong merchants at the Canton port and partly advocated a war against China on this ground, free trade economists did not think that the notorious Hong merchant system contradicted free trade. In *The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith regularly referred to China and considered it to be stagnating but not backward. He did not comment directly on the Canton port.[93] This indicates that Britain did not consider the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Canton system as an issue for British trade.

Did the Chinese put 'morals' and 'honour' above commerce? In the *Register* article that called for translating the political economy, the author also noted the following, 'Mung-tsze [Mencius], more than two thousand years ago, stated very distinctly Adam Smith's discovery—the division of labour the cause of productive power & c.' It referred to a section of the *Mencius* in a new 1828 translation by Protestant missionary David Collie.[94] The account was about Mencius meeting Chin Seang. Chin was at first a Confucianist like Mencius but abandoned the philosophy to follow Heu Hing (372–289 BCE) in practising the doctrines of the legendary agricultural sage Shennong. Heu Hing and his disciples were given a piece of land by the prince of Tang (reign 326–? BCE) on which to live and work. However, Heu Hing was not fully satisfied with the prince as a virtuous ruler in the manner of Shennong's teaching. Upon Mencius's arrival at Tang, Chin Seang discussed this issue with Mencius:

> Chin Seang having waited upon Mencius said to him, speaking the words of Heu Hing, the Prince of Tang really wishes to be a virtuous Prince, but he has not heard the doctrine of good government. A truly virtuous Prince will plough

> along with his people and while he rules will cook his own food. Tang has its royal granaries and treasuries while the people are oppressed in order to make the ruler easy and comfortable. How can this be deemed virtue!
>
> Mencius replied, does Heu Tsze [Heu Hing] sow the grain which he eats? Yes. Does Heu Tsze weave cloth and then wear it? No. Heu Tsze wears coarse hair cloth. Does Heu Tsze wear a cap? Yes. What sort of cap? A coarse cap. Does he make it himself? No. He gives grain in exchange for it. Why does he not make it himself? It would be injurious to his farming. Does Heu Tsze use earthen ware in cooking his victuals, or iron utensils in tilling his farm? Yes. Does he make them himself? No. He gives grain in barter for them.
>
> Exchanging grain for these tools does no injury to the potter, and how can the potter's exchanging these implements for grain bear hard upon the husbandman? . . . O then (said Mencius) are the government of the Empire and the labor of the husbandman the only employments that may be united? There are the proper employments of men of superior rank, and the appropriate labors of those in inferior stations. Were every man to do all kinds of work, it would be necessary that he should first make his implements, and then use them; thus all men would constantly crowd the roads. Hence, it has been said (by the ancients) that some labor with their minds, and some with bodily strength. Those who labor with their strength, are ruled by men. Those who are governed by others, support (or feed) others. Those who govern others, are fed by others. This is a general rule under the whole heavens.[95]

This passage reveals that Confucian learning argued non-anecdotally that trade was necessary for a society to function. The *Register*, Morrison, and Gützlaff quoted this dialogue and other related paragraphs of the passage from the *Mencius* several times in their respective articles and treatises.[96] To them, it narrated the Chinese view of commerce, to which they could anchor arguments for free trade. Where then was the alleged Chinese mentality of aversion to commerce? Arguments like those of Mencius were available more than 2,000 years before the private merchants arrived in China and could be found in one of the four classic texts that every educated person memorized and was tested on during their upbringing and in the Civil Service Examination. What was the significance of these Chinese writings to the project of imparting the free trade doctrine to the Chinese? Were the Chinese more concerned about 'morality' and 'honour'? The textual references they implemented should have given them an indication that the restriction of trade to Canton and their wishes to expand into Chinese market were far more complicated than simply asking the Chinese to adopt free trade. The next chapter will explain how Canton Chinese merchants' desire for a monopoly on European trade and the Qing's dynastic state security considerations played major roles in the establishment of the Canton one-port system. Nevertheless, the Canton British merchants' assertion of China's anti-commerce attitude lasted as an image of China for more than a century after the British had won the war.

The Pacific party's China

The Pacific party's fight with the Warlike party had within it an element of personal quarrel. It began with Jardine withholding correspondence that contained information related to the failure of a firm in Calcutta, which caused the Dents to suffer financially.[97] Dent & Co. was the second-biggest Canton firm and the chief rival of Jardine, Matheson & Co. None of the family or staff members of Dent & Co. signed the war petition of December 1834, nor did they sign a petition in December 1830 that was drawn up in the wake of the decade-long failure of the cotton trade, imploring the British government to negotiate with the Chinese to improve their trade conditions in Canton. However, the Dents had signed a petition to the Qing authorities on the same issue fourteen months earlier.[98] It was around the early 1830s that they fell out with Jardine, Matheson & Co. The fight between the two firms coincided with the inception of the war argument in the Canton community and dramatized the war-or-peace dispute.

After the *Press*'s publication in 1835, the rivalry between the two firms escalated into a bitter fight between the two newspapers. The *Press* seemed to play up its pacific attitude to antagonize Jardine, Matheson, and warlike merchants associated with them. The two newspapers fought each other over almost every issue until the eve of the war. Their antagonism was so fierce that the use of a single word could become a point of dispute. At the height of their war of words in 1836, the *Press*, which published on Saturdays, left column space vacant until the last minute to respond to points made by the *Register*, which was usually published on Tuesdays.[99] The pacific agenda that the *Press* adopted even made the *Register* suggest that the *Press* was 'representing through Howqua's dollars' and that this explained its friendliness towards the Chinese.[100]

Personal rivalry apart, the Warlike and Pacific parties had disparate images of China, for instance, in their respective newspaper reports on an incident in December 1835, when a boat belonging to the British merchants travelling between Macao and Canton was seized by Chinese customs guards for alleged smuggling. The *Register* asked, 'How much longer shall the glorious flags of Europe and America be lowered to the many coloured frippery-drapery of China?' Having seen the *Register* report, which was published nine days earlier, the *Press* consciously decided to focus on the issue of an unjustified 'ransom' (or bail sum) paid to the Canton authorities.[101] The *Press* did not link the case to a general narrative of national hostility like the *Register*. Rather, its viewpoint focused on the justice of governing.

The *Singapore Chronicle* (1824–1837) often debated the *Register*, and, before the *Press* was published, it actively offered a platform for Canton residents who were unsatisfied with the *Register*'s war position and wished to have their voices heard elsewhere in Asia.[102] In his letter to John Purvis in Singapore, Matheson told his version

of the Napier Affair to forestall the *Singapore Chronicle*'s possible publication of Napier's transactions in Canton, which would put the Warlike party at a disadvantage. Being well-connected and respected in the free trade port, Purvis was told to show his letter to a 'George', who Matheson knew had connections with the newspaper. Matheson urged that if 'it should be possible by any means to prevent their publication, it would be still better than having to contradict them afterwards'.[103] The rivalry in Canton was played out not just in Singapore but in public spheres of other Asian ports. When the *Press* began publishing in 1835, the *Calcutta Courier* commented as follows:

> Party feeling has unfortunately run so high of late in the little society of outside barbarians [Canton], that no editor could escape the infection, and it has long been very evident that the *Register* does yield to a bias and represents only the views and feelings of one portion of that Society. We at a distance shall now benefit by hearing both sides of the question in matters of local interest.[104]

This gives an indication that some British merchants in other Asian port cities were disinterested in the war argument and believed other opinions were missing from the *Register*'s reports. Thus the *Press* was welcomed by them.

In its manifesto, the *Press* outlined its aims of 'diffusing truth' and being an 'upright journalist'. Making concessions to the affections of 'sweet home', the *Press* avowed, 'We shall not be swayed by any affected sensibility, by any tenderness for individual national feeing, from a candid discussion of subjects, in which the honour and reputation of a country may be involved.' The intention to be an 'objective journalist' was further pronounced in an epigraph quoted from Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) that served as a heading in every issue:[105]

> If by the liberty of the press were understood merely the liberty of discussing the propriety of public measures and political opinions, let us have as much of it as you please: but if it means the liberty of affronting, calumniating, and defaming one another, I, for my part, own myself willing to part with my share of it whenever our legislators shall please so to alter the law, and shall cheerfully consent to exchange my liberty of abusing others for the privilege of not being abused myself.[106]

This epigraph was in sharp contrast to the *Register*'s, which displayed the paper's chauvinistic attitude and pride in being the bearer of free trade to China. The *Press*'s epigraph was about justice and morality, and it indicated the paper's far softer tone in discussing intercourse with China in both its editorial commentary and letters to the editor. The *Press* used phrases such as 'cultivating a friendly feeling', 'encourage these exchanges of banquets among foreign merchants and Hong merchants', and 'we shall take care to promote that good understanding which may eventually soften the restrictions'.[107]

Contrary to the *Register*'s constant depictions of the mandarins in Canton as corrupt and incompetent, when Governor-General Lu Kun finished his term in office in Canton (1832–1835), the *Press* described him as having 'a great deal of political skill and an unshaken adherence to the established and before recognised customs of his country'. It praised District Judge Fooyun's (Fu Yuan) job of suppressing piracy along the routes of foreign ships to Canton, and commented that 'they never move or meddle in political strife.'[108]

The *Press* also expressed an opposing opinion to the *Register* when Chief Superintendent of British Trade in China Charles Elliot (1801–1875), who was the third successor to Napier, left Canton for good in 1837: 'We see no reason to assume that the Chinese are our enemies, nor can we at all understand how their treatment has wounded the honour of the British as to call for bloody retribution.'[109]

The *Press* hardly focused on the argument of 'national honour' and 'national interest'—which were the thrust of Warlike party's ideas. There was war language in one issue but 'the Editorship of the *Canton Press* was changed very soon after'.[110] This one mention prompted the *Register* to accuse the *Press* of being hypocritical in attacking its war position. The *Press* responded as follows:

> We declare candidly that we are not *independent* as the Canton Register avers to be, but that it is laid down as a rule, *sine qua non*, by our principal supporters and friends, that this paper shall advocate none but pacific measures to be adopted for the purpose of gaining a more genial and dignified station among the Chinese, and that the progress commerce is making is an agency quite sufficient to effect this ultimately and effectively.[111]

The Pacific party gathered under the *Press* believed in a laissez-faire approach and the power of commerce, behaving, it could be argued, as a more genuine disciple of Adam Smith than did the Warlike party. The Pacific party actively wanted peace, and the argument it developed in the *Press* was rather popular. The *Press* was welcomed by other English newspapers in Asia and had a higher circulation than the *Register*. A survey conducted by the *Chinese Repository* shows that in 1836 the circulations of the *Register* and *Press* were 280 and 325 copies per week, respectively.[112] These figures include subscriptions outside Canton and must be interpreted with caution given the polemical situation in Canton. However, they show that the Pacific party attracted a slim majority of readers over the Warlike party.

The *Press* disagreed with the war petition of December 1834 and questioned its legitimacy in representing Canton's British community. The petition gathered thirty-five signatures of 'native British *residents* in China', the total numbers of which in Canton that year was eighty-six. The ninety-one names on the war petition included the thirty-five signatures in addition to twenty-nine 'commanders of British ships', twenty-five 'transient British merchants, supercargoes and pursers of ships' and two 'merchants of Singapore'. The *Press* believed these groups of British had no right to

sign a petition related to the British residential trader of Canton. It also argued that none of the sixty-three Parsees, who were also 'British subjects' and were residential traders, 'put their names to such a petition'. Based on this, the *Press* claimed that the war petition was not the majority opinion of the British in Canton.[113]

The *Press* then dampened enthusiasm for the war petition by posing the following questions: 'What are petitions of merchants? What do they avail? And who of the ministry care a straw about them?'[114] They pointed out the superfluous aspects of the merchants' patriotism and their rhetoric of national honour, and gave away what they saw as the real intention of the petition:

> From the King in Council, down to the drones of the Foreign office, all know what a petition from a few British subjects residing in a foreign state means; they know that it means nothing more than a mercenary design on the credulity of the Foreign secretary, in the shape of, and dressed up, in the specious language of individuals aiming at acquiring something, for their shew of sensitiveness for the *honour* and *dignity* of their king and country.[115]

In general, the Pacific party believed that China had the right to conduct its own policy as it wished, and that the British who traded in Canton should submit to the rules of the Chinese. Thus, the *Press* disagreed with the *Register* on the issue that the Chinese authorities maltreated foreigners. One reader with the pseudonym A Citizen of the World wrote the following in the *Press*:

> As for Commercial grievances we have none, literally none, and if any how do we meet them? Are we not smugglers on a large scale? Deceive ourselves as we please, we are smugglers.[116]

This candid admission contrasted sharply with the Lintin smuggler's identity of the Warlike party. The Pacific party were honest about the unofficial trade and did not try as the Warlike party did to tarnish China's image in order to justify the opium trade.

Could personal rivalry and differences of opinion push the argument as far as this? It seems the Pacific party—as represented by the words of A Citizen of the World—was appalled by the Warlike party's insincerity in conducting the illicit trade while at the same time wanting to start a war. A Citizen of the World further condemned the Warlike party:

> We Britains are an unruly set, we cannot content ourselves with reforming our own institutions, but we must need have a touch at all others in China. A tho' in almost utter ignorance of the character, habits and genius of the people, we have determined that we ought to regulate the wheels of Government in Canton, instead of contenting ourselves with the good the Gods provide us. We wish to force a Chinese Provincial Government to recognize an authority previous to such being accredited by the Imperial Government; wish to force on them notions of our own as to commercial intercourse, to set aside very thing which has been the customary mode of action amongst them; and because forsooth

> they would not recognize an authority possessing no defined political character armed with no powers, producing no credentials, we are to order our frigates in to the heart of the Commercial resort for shipping knowing that the Chinese do not permit their Bogue Forts to be passed by armed vessels, and because the Forts resisted the Passage, we are to invade their Coasts, threaten with war, destroy their Commercial shipping, and oh! horrible to mention, indict as badly written and nonsensical a petition to the King in Council as ever spoiled pen, ink and paper. I advert to this recent operation as evincing the spirit under which British Merchants conduct their affairs, and engender the hatred and suspicion of the country in which they are permitted to reside.[117]

In the *Press*'s arguments, one senses that the Chinese political system and customs were understood and accepted, which was rarely seen in the *Register*, especially after the Napier Affair. With the promise of objectivity, the *Press* in another article linked China's 'policy of non-intercourse' with British expansion in the East, presenting a sympathetic view of Canton's one-port system:

> The Chinese government cannot but be aware of the rapid strides the English power is making in India so as even already to press upon the frontiers of the Empire and it is probable that the only cause of its having hitherto escaped losing any part of its territory has been the foreign policy the government has ever pursued, and comparing the success they have met with, to the fate of so many powerful Indian monarchies. Now totally annihilated and merged in the British empire we must not be astonished to find the Court at Peking resolved not to deviate from a line of policy which has been hitherto so eminently successful.[118]

The *Press* was able to see the Canton system and restrictions on foreigners from the perspective of China's foreign policy. It also understood the Qing authorities' concern for maritime border defence in relation to their trade policy in the presence of British encroachment in the East.

In fact, the *Register* was aware of the political climate in the region and published a few articles related to Qing China's concerns over the presence of foreigners in Asia. However, it either could not or refused to tune in to this information and understand China in the way the *Press* did. The overall perspective of the Warlike party was informed by the national strength of Britain in the post-Napoleonic era and excited by the arguments of free trade. Thus, they argued that British traders were suffering in China at the hands of a tyrannical Chinese government and connected this to the discourse of British national honour and national interests. These constituted good reasons for the British nation, or empire, to intervene, which was what the party wanted and what coloured their representation of China.

The Americans in the port also factored in to the war-or-peace argument of Canton. The *Press* praised their 'tranquil mode of business' as most of the American merchants believed that they should follow China's laws when they were in Canton.[119] After seeing a pamphlet published in London in 1830 that in his opinion distorted

the case of Francis Terranova, an American merchant published his account. Terranova was an Italian sailor on board an American ship who accidentally killed a Chinese woman and was sentenced to strangulation in 1821.[120] The American disagreed with what he saw as the British using the case to demonize the Chinese and accusing Americans of submitting to the alleged Chinese tyrannical legal system:

> The American Government requires of us to submit peaceably to the laws of the country we may visit, hence we consider ourselves bound to obey the laws of China—other foreigners may take a different view of their resistance—we do not question the propriety of their conduct—we all know the terms on which we are admitted to trade—and know the dangerous footing on which we stand here—whether our construction is right or wrong—so far as we are concerned, is a question for ourselves alone.[121]

The American's attitude infuriated Jardine. He expressed his fury in a letter to a friend, and the *Register* printed aggressive language against the American merchants in China.[122]

In sum, the thriving Asian maritime trade in Canton enabled British private merchants to gain economic power: the success of the country trade and the trade in opium in particular funded the cultural and political activities of the private merchants for both the Warlike and Pacific parties. For Jardine and Matheson, the core members of the Warlike party, financial strength lifted their social status and allowed them to maintain their connections, run their newspapers, and hold their grand dinners of celebration. It gave them an edge to fight the battle of ideas in the British maritime public sphere in Canton, to express their British imperial identity, and to solicit the intervention of the home state, calling on their nation to behave like an assertive empire. However, being British meant precisely the opposite for the Pacific party in terms of respecting the rights of the local authorities and being sympathetic to the Qing state's security fears. The warlike and pacific arguments came out of this contradictory perception of China and expressions of British identity.

3
Breaking the Soft Border

The foreign merchants' living and trading quarter—the Thirteen Factories lying on a bank of the Pearl River outside the walled city of Canton—was surrounded by railings, gates, and guards, to ensure that foreigners would not leave it without a good reason and that ordinary Chinese would not enter it.[1] Records show that these physical borders were more than porous, but they were not the most important boundary that the Qing dynasty bureaucrats devised to contain Europeans in China. Soft borders—a series of rules and regulations, and political controls imposed on both Europeans and Chinese that greatly limited their communication and interaction—were the major line of defence.

The Canton system referred to soft borders more than physical borders. Soft borders cut through transnational information and interaction networks that the Qing saw as undesirable to their dynastic state security. As soft borders, the Canton system enabled the Qing to allow foreigners to enter while checking foreign interactions with Qing subjects, thus controlling foreign influences in China.

This Canton system of regulations included making Canton the only port for Europeans, allowing trade through primarily the Hong merchants to limit contact, creating rules for Europeans leaving China or going to Macao after the trading season to reduce their time in China, excluding Western women from Canton to prevent foreigners from settling down, forbidding the learning of the Chinese language and the selling of Chinese books to Europeans so that they would not know China.[2]

As the Canton system attained its complete shape in the 1830s, a big portion of British merchants' print media coverage concerning China—and the main subject of British merchants' petitions, pamphleteering, and lobbying in London—was the campaign to abolish it. As the Warlike party wished, the system was abolished after the war. Article V of the Treaty of Nanking that concluded the war ended the role of the Hong merchants who played a key role in the system's implementation. Article II stipulated the opening up of four additional ports under new conditions, finishing off the Canton one-port system that for eighty-five years governed the Qing's relations with European merchants:

> Article II. His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British Subjects, with their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purposes of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint, at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai.
>
> Article V. The Government of China having compelled the British Merchants trading at Canton to deal exclusively with certain Chinese Merchants, called Hong Merchants (or Cohong), who had been licensed by the Chinese Government for that purpose, the Emperor of China agrees to abolish that practice in future at all Ports where British Merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please.[3]

The Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was founded by an ethnic minority—the Manchus—from the north-east part of China, who ruled over the Han majority in China proper after ousting the Ming dynasty in 1644. In the century that followed, the Qing expanded into the north-west and south-west, creating a vast empire in the eastern part of the Eurasian landmass.[4] The century-long experience of empire building coloured how the Manchus viewed their maritime defence, especially in facing a perceived threat from Europeans conspiring with Han domestic rebels to overthrow their dynasty. At the same time the coastal Chinese merchants, officials in the port cities and in the court at Beijing wanted to trade with the Europeans to reap the benefits of commerce. As a mechanism for controlling European trade and merchants, the Canton system addressed the Qing's needs for both maritime trade and maritime frontier defence. This chapter explains how the Canton system was first officially established in the 1750s, how it came to be the way it was in the 1830s, and how the British merchants in Canton made the system a target for war, so a treaty could abolish it.

The Canton lobby

The Canton one-port system came into existence thanks to vigorous lobbying by the Canton Chinese merchants working together with provincial and court officials between 1755 and 1759. The impact of the lobby on the Canton system was far greater than historiography has heretofore revealed.[5] And the crucial fact that has been overlooked is how the Canton lobby won over the Qianlong emperor, which determined how the system was run, how it drew justification for trade monopoly, and, most importantly, how the system dictated Qing China's knowledge of Europeans.

Prior to the official Canton system of 1757, the Qing's maritime trade was relatively open to Europeans. When they first conquered China proper, the Qing dynasty imposed a policy of clearing the coast by moving people inland, in order to isolate loyalists of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), who occupied part of China's southern coast and Taiwan and used these as bases to resist the Qing.[6] The Qing conquest of Taiwan in 1683, in effect, eliminated the Ming loyalists. In the same year, in response

to a request from provincial officials, who were speaking for the Chinese local merchants, the Qing opened four ports: Canton, Amoy, Ningbo, and Shanghai. By 1685, officials of the ports were collecting taxes on behalf of the court.[7] Located in the low country along the south-eastern and southern coasts, the four ports were de facto free trade ports and were 'like a magnet to European and local enterprise'.[8] Because the locals wanted to trade, this laissez-faire policy was a means for the Qing to achieve 'the traditional policy of promoting the livelihood of the people, in this case the coastal people'.[9]

Of the four ports opened after 1683, Canton stood out. Both the British and the French—the two major groups of European traders in China at this time—preferred Canton and stayed on there while European trade at the other three ports dwindled away.[10] This means that a market-induced trading preference allowed Canton to gain a trade monopoly. The local officials and merchants knew that this did not guarantee Canton's control of the trade until it won a political sanction from the court. The opportunity afforded itself by the mid-century, as the EIC believed its trade was suffering from the market-induced Canton monopoly and decided to re-enter Ningbo.

In the 1755 season, two EIC ships sailed to Ningbo's seaport, Dinghai. The first ship was spotted by the Chinese water forces on 2 June and the second on 8 July.[11] The arrival of the British was the prelude to a fight between Ningbo and Canton for the right to trade with Europeans. What happened in the following four years was to determine the fate of the two ports and the structure through which the British and the Chinese would encounter each other in the next eight decades.

Upon receiving the report of British ships coming to Dinghai, the governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang, Ke'erjishan (d. 1757), and governor of Zhejiang Zhou Renji (1695?–1763) were ready to facilitate trade. They sent the British up to Ningbo and made arrangements for hosting them while calling in Chinese merchants to prepare for trading. In their memorials to the court about the arrangement, they used the discourse that the British merchants came from afar to admire the culture (*muhua yuanlai*), and trading with them was to implement the policy of 'cherishing man from afar' (*tixu*, *rouyuan*) with the hope that the court would allow Ningbo to keep the trade.[12]

The Qianlong emperor initially did not object to reopening trade at Ningbo. His main concern was that the ships had forty-eight sailors without the Manchu-male style hair queue, which the Han Chinese wore to symbolize their submission to the dynasty. Qianlong was quickly reassured that they were Europeans from Macao. With the help of this welcoming policy, the EIC successfully traded at Ningbo that year and again the following year when they returned.[13]

Officials and merchants of Canton were alarmed by this development. The governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, Yang Yingju (1696–1766), informed the court that the number of European ships arriving in Canton in 1755 was twenty-two,

a reduction from twenty-seven in 1754 and twenty-six in 1753. He argued that the reduction was the reason there was a shortage of 29,000 taels of port revenue sent to Beijing that year.[14] Yang did not mention in the memorial that the previous four years, between 1749 and 1752, the figures were twenty-one, eighteen, twenty-five, and twenty-two, respectively.[15] When taking the longer view, the ship numbers, in reality, had not significantly dropped. Yang was the key figure in the Canton lobby who sought to ensure Canton's monopoly of the European trade, and he allegedly spent 20,000 taels on lobbying. In return, he probably received several times this sum from the Canton Chinese merchants.[16]

It seems that, before Yang's memorial had arrived at the court in the summer of 1756, the Canton lobby had already obtained from the court some ambiguous prohibition of European trade in Ningbo.[17] Also, at this point, Governor Zhou of Zhejiang was dismissed and punished. His punishment was to serve on a postal station in the north-west frontier. The exact reason for his dismissal is unclear, but the Canton lobby appeared to have played a part behind the scenes.[18]

The commander in chief (*tidu*) of Zhejiang, Wu Jinsheng, whose responsibilities included the maritime defence of Dinghai and Ningbo, echoed the governor-general and the governor in favour of trade in Ningbo in his 1755 memorial to the court.[19] But in his 11 July 1756 memorial, Wu was seen to be against European trade in Ningbo. Stressing the importance of maritime defence, Wu argued that the Qing did not need another Macao, where Portuguese encroachment had started with trading activities: the perception being that the permanent European population living in China was the result of uncontrolled trade.[20] Wu's change of opinion was rather abrupt; possibly, he received a bribe from the Canton lobby.

Wu's opinion of Macao was quoted by the Grand Council's grand secretary Fuhuan (1720–1770), who was the key person in the court supporting the Canton lobby. In a court letter dated 4 August to Governor-General Ke'erjishan and the new governor of Zhejiang, Yang Tingzhang (1689–1772), Fuhuan urged caution in dealing with the British coming to their jurisdiction to trade.[21] To further intimidate the Ningbo interest, Fuhuan obtained an order from the emperor to arrest the Cantonese comprador Liang Guofu for his alleged crime of enticing (*gouyin*) the British to Ningbo. Fuhuan specifically requested that Liang be transported to Beijing for trial instead of being dealt with locally in Ningbo.[22]

In another court letter dated 2 November, Fuhuan, on behalf of the emperor, ordered the respective governors-general of the two regions, Ke'erjishan and Yang Yingju, to discuss increasing the goods duty at Ningbo. This was to implement a seemingly clever scheme of using duty increase at Ningbo to drive the Europeans back to Canton. The logic behind the tax increase hinged on the fact that a good portion of export goods, like silk and tea, were produced in the Jiangnan region. Ningbo was closer to Jiangnan than was Canton, so the transport costs and transport

duty were lower for goods arriving at Ningbo and, thus, cheaper for Europeans to buy. This was presented to the emperor as Ningbo's unfair advantage over Canton, and the increase of goods duty addressed the injustice.

The implementation of this policy made things worse for Ningbo than what the order from the court allowed. The list of goods earmarked for duty increases involved not only 184 items for export but also 529 for import which were not granted the rights of increase; the majority of them were to be charged at a duty of 150 per cent more than that of Canton.[23] The emperor probably did not know these details but knew only he had brought fairness to his empire.

The duty increase, however, did not deter the British in the slightest; they arrived in Ningbo the following year on 13 July 1757. The EIC supercargo James Flint (fl. 1720–1770), speaking Chinese, told the officials of Ningbo that the British would pay the duty rather than go to Canton. The profit margin made it still worthwhile. The Qianlong emperor, upon reading this, wrote with vermilion ink on the memorial: 'Tell Yang Yingju to deal with.'[24] This meant that Yang, who was the major link between the local level and the court for the Canton lobby, was to be named governor-general of Fujian and Zhejiang—sending the wolf to the sheep. Yang arrived in Ningbo on 25 November and six days later submitted to the court a memorial suggesting that on top of the port duty, Ningbo was to increase the port tax (a lump sum tax on a ship) making it equal to that of Canton, thus further increasing the total cost of calling at Ningbo.[25]

Yang continued to play the emperor's game of fairness. He wrote to Qianlong that allowing European trade at Ningbo would damage the livelihoods of the Cantonese, who had a long tradition of maritime trade with Europeans. He then pointed out that for coastal defence, Canton's geography of intricate waterways surrounded by steep hills was superior to Ningbo's, which openly faced the sea. In reply, the Qianlong emperor commented that he agreed with the livelihood argument: the Cantonese deserved justice.[26] The emperor did not respond directly to the maritime defence concern of this memorial. He was, nevertheless, by now most amenable and ready to issue an outright prohibition of trade at Ningbo.

The final verdict came on 20 December 1757, when court letters were sent to Canton and Ningbo ordering that Europeans (*xiyangren*, 'west ocean'; note: not *yi*) were allowed to trade only in Canton. The reasons stated on the edict were protection of the Cantonese livelihoods and Canton's superior maritime defence.[27] Even though only two British ships went to Ningbo in 1755 and again in 1756, the Canton lobby knew that to protect their trade monopoly they had to kill Ningbo's European trade before it took root.

The one-port policy of December 1757 was announced in February 1758 to the European merchants in Canton, including James Flint. Dutch merchants were told to make this new policy known to the Dutch East India Company and other European

merchants in Batavia, and the same order was given to the Chinese merchants trading with that port.[28]

The British did not call at Ningbo in the 1758 season.[29] But in June 1759 James Flint again called at Ningbo. The port was well prepared for his arrival and immediately sent him off. While leaving, Flint handed a letter to the water-forces officer. It accused Canton's customs commissioner, Li Yongbiao, of corruption and listed other grievances the British merchants suffered in Canton.[30] Flint then sailed north to Tianjin, seventy miles from Beijing, to present the same petition, hoping it would reach the emperor since this port was closer to Beijing and free of the Canton vested interests.[31]

Flint had submitted a similar petition to the Ningbo authorities when the British first re-entered Ningbo in 1755.[32] When asked by the court about this, then-governor-general Yang of Guangdong and Guangxi dismissed the grievances, saying they were invented by the British for the sake of lower prices at Ningbo.[33] In 1759's case, Ningbo officials, who were now part of the Canton lobby, submitted a memorial with the petition attached, saying the allegations were fabricated. However, the emperor was not convinced by the lobby this time and ordered an immediate investigation. Consequently, Commissioner Li was dismissed, along with staff from his office, other minor officials, and port functionaries. In total, more than one hundred people in Canton were punished for corruption: some were sent into exile, and some suffered severe physical punishment.[34]

After punishing the corrupt officials and port functionaries, the court wanted to make an example of Flint for disobeying the edict of 1757. They turned their attention to Flint's Chinese petition. Flint claimed that it was written on board a ship by a Fujian merchant, Lin Huai of Batavia.[35] Canton Chinese merchants pointed out the writers were Anhui tea merchant, Wang Shengyi and his son, but the Wangs had absconded.[36] In the end, the authorities arrested Liu Yabian, an associate of Flint's in Canton. Liu's punishment was to be beaten to death for treason.[37] Flint was then convicted and put under house arrest in Macao for three years for conspiring with the treacherous Liu.[38] The Flint incident became a showcase for the Qing court to demonstrate to Chinese and foreign merchants and officials that European trade was to be confined to Canton only, as ordered in 1757.

Astonishingly, the grievances Flint presented in 1755 and then again in 1759 were the same issues the British private merchants would complain about in the 1830s. These included the high port tax and the various charges paid from the moment a ship was received by the water pilots to the point it re-entered the high sea. The charges encompassed payments to guards along the Pearl River waterway leading up to Canton's seaport, Whampoa, payments to water police, payments to the linguists who acted as interpreters and helped other port matters, and payments to the staff of the custom offices. When travelling between Canton and Macao, the merchants were required to pay various fees along the way. And there were duties levied on

personal items, alcohol, and food they brought to China. The port functionaries of Canton received meagre salaries and relied on payments collected directly from the Europeans.

The most serious problem to the British was the Hong merchants' debt. Already, in the 1755 petition, Flint complained that Hong merchant Li Guanghua owed the EIC 60,000 taels. By 1759, Li's debt was reduced to 50,000, but both he and his oldest son were dead by then (the exact circumstances are unknown). Li's second son was in Fujian, and the third son, who was about 16 years old, said he knew nothing about the business because he was busy studying for the Civil Service Examination. Flint complained that Li's debt was due to extortion by the officials: the Hong merchants were expected to present various gifts and donations, and were asked to make contributions for events, like the emperor's birthday, or projects linked to natural disasters, like repairing the Yellow River dykes. The Hongs were therefore often short of cash and easily bankrupt.[39]

The similarity of these complaints in the 1750s to the ones presented in the 1830s hints at the establishment of a 'Canton system' of trade long before the one-port system was politically sanctioned in 1757, and this was the very reason that the EIC re-entered Ningbo port.[40] The 1757 edict reaffirmed Canton's exclusive right of European trade. The punishment of Commissioner Li and other port functionaries in 1759 did not address the underlying issues of the Canton trade but, on the contrary, added another layer of imperial sanction to the now politically established Canton monopoly.

After 1759, the vested interests held on more firmly than ever to the Canton port. The high officials, Chinese merchants, and port functionaries all derived income from the Canton European trade. The court, too, enjoyed a portion of the tax revenue, half of which went into the imperial household's treasury. The exact distribution of the profits from the trade is yet to be properly studied, but it is clear that even with the Chinese vested interests in place, the Canton trade was still profitable enough for the Europeans to come back for the following eight decades. It seems the growth of the tea trade sustained the Canton port; as the private merchants in the 1830s rightly pointed out, the EIC put up with the restrictions of Canton—that the EIC themselves had complained about since 1755—for the sake of the tea trade.[41]

The Qianlong emperor was passionate for the Legalist school's way of ruling—a Chinese political philosophy that put emphasis on employing ruling techniques to achieve the concentration of power on the emperor. The seemingly astute policies of using taxation to control behaviour presented by the Canton lobby were designed to please the emperor, and the lobby was duly rewarded with the imperial-sanctioned monopoly. Legalism taught the emperor to nip an 'evil' in the bud, and he had a suspicious mind, setting out to find the 'evil' person who had brought the Europeans

to Ningbo and to find the Chinese who had written the petition for Flint. The arrest and trial of Liang by Fuhuan in 1757 and the punishment of Flint and Liu satisfied Qianlong's legalist outlook. But Qianlong did not fully trust the Canton lobby—as legalism would tell him not to trust anyone—and that is why he ordered investigation of the grievances presented by Flint. The investigation might enhance his imperial authority but was far from satisfying the British who believed their China trade was in disarray and the problem was on the Qing government side.

In the meantime, the discourse about maritime frontier defence to which Governor-General Yang and others drew the emperor's attention was precisely what the Qing dynasty, being a land empire, feared. The combination of an emperor admiring legalism and the resourceful Canton lobby created a course of policy making that locked the Canton trade to the discourse of coastal frontier defence.

Before 1757, Europeans had been viewed with suspicion, but after 1757, along with suspicion, fear of their potential role in domestic unrest was built into the institutions of the Qing bureaucracy. The Canton port became the mechanism for balancing coastal frontier defence and the livelihoods of Cantonese, while European merchants were to be dealt with in the Canton port only—all sealed by imperial sanction. Behind these were the profit-making motives of the Canton Chinese merchants and the Qing high and local officials. A Qing's profit and state security order was enshrined in the port Canton.

Canton system and Chinese knowledge of Europeans

For the sake of monopolizing the trade—that is, for profits—the Canton lobby whipped up the fear of foreigners conspiring with domestic rebels to overthrow the empire. They could achieve this because the domestic political circumstances of Qing China and the perceived threat of the European presence in Asia created a general attitude of the Qing towards Westerners in the mid-eighteenth century that saw them more as foes than as friends. This determined the circumstances in which the British returning to Ningbo in 1755–1759.

But things were relatively better before the 1720s. During the Kangxi emperor's reign (1654–1722) and earlier in the seventeenth century, Jesuits could live and preach in the empire. With the help of natives, they published in Chinese new knowledge from the West on subjects such as world geography, mathematics, and astronomy.[42] The Kangxi emperor himself was greatly interested and had Jesuit missionaries brought to the court to teach him. A mathematics desk, a whole set of learning tools, and geometry models were made to assist his studies of Western knowledge.[43] Kangxi commented in a routine memorial in 1718 reporting the arrival of Western merchants in Macao that 'if the Westerners have any kind of knowledge or know medicines, they

must be immediately directed to the capital'.[44] This was a continuation of the relatively welcoming policy of the later Ming, when the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610) mingled with the literati, although not without controversy.[45]

In the first few decades after the ports reopened in 1683, every European ship coming to Canton would receive presents from the emperor, including 'two cows, eight sacks of wheat flour, and eight crocks of Chinese wine'.[46] The Hong merchants also extended friendship when the first Cohong (Gonghang, 'association of merchants') was set up in 1720. The third rule of the Cohong was 'Foreign and Chinese must be on an equal footing'.[47] In these early days, Western merchants were received by the Qing political establishment with a degree of hospitality.

Lurking beneath the opening of the ports and hosting of missionaries, however, was a concern about Western encroachment upon South and South East Asia. Growing British control of India, Nepal, and Burma in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was only the newest in an escalating series of conquests witnessed by the Qing. As early as 1603, the Spanish massacre of Chinese in the Philippines was known to the Ming court, who expressed their concern to the Spanish authorities there.[48] The Qing court received repeated reports about conflicts between their subjects and the Europeans in South East Asia. In 1741, for instance, acting governor-general Qingfu (in office 1741–1743), reported to Qianlong a massacre in which nearly ten thousand Chinese in Batavia had been killed by the Dutch the year before. Even though the Qing court did not act on their behalf and conversely blamed those massacred for having left China, the news would not have created a favourable perception of Europeans.[49]

The Chinese 'Rites Controversy' also played a role in the development of Qing China's perception of Europeans. The controversy was a bitter dispute within the Catholic Church in the early eighteenth century, in which the pope deemed Chinese folk religion to be incompatible with Christianity. He forbade Chinese Christians to practise ancestor worship, a ruling that had the potential to jeopardize the Confucian ideological system upon which the Qing's legitimacy relied. Because of this, in the last years of his reign, Kangxi became suspicious of the motives of the missionaries in his court. Under his son, the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1722–1735), Christianity and missionaries were banned.[50] Thereafter, throughout the eighteenth century, wave after wave of persecutions of missionaries and their Chinese converts occurred. The situation was especially severe for Chinese converts in the 1750s.[51] When the Manchu noble clan Sunu were discovered to be Christian converts, the Qing court was greatly apprehensive.[52] Westerners were seen as a threat to dynastic security. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for European merchants to gain favour from the Qing court.

The years 1755–1759 were especially bad for the British to call at Ningbo. Cao Wen made an argument that the Qing's campaign against the Mongolian Zunghar Khanate

in the north-west was well under way in these years. The lower Yangzi region, which included the Ningbo area, was the major tax base that financed the campaign, so the stability of the region to ensure a steady flow of funds to Beijing and from there to the north-west frontier was crucial.[53] It was poor timing on the part of the EIC to arrive at Ningbo in these years. This was one key issue that Qianlong would have had in mind in December 1757 that would favour the Canton lobby.

In dealing with Europeans, the 1757 ban and the Flint incident in 1759 set a precedent—a hugely important ingredient in the decision making of the Qing bureaucracy. From the mid-eighteenth century, a clear tradition was established in which Western merchants were dealt with only in the ports of Canton and Macao. In addition to the ban on Christianity, the tight regulations of the Canton system functioned to cut off the Europeans from domestic informational networks and, thus, contain a potential threat.

The development of the Canton system, during the later Qianlong and Jiaqing (r. 1796–1820) periods, occurred during a time of rampant rebellion. Rapid population growth and a recessionary economy were not in the dynasty's favour, and in troubled times the lurking question of the Manchu's alien status in China would surface. The rebellions reached their peak all over the empire in the early nineteenth century.[54] The Qing's institutionalized understanding of the Europeans in 1757—as a threat to coastal defence—now compelled the bureaucrats to view Europeans seriously as potential allies of domestic rebels, even though at this time there was no sign of this actually happening.

This explains why the Canton system placed such tight restrictions on contact between Qing subjects and Westerners. It was not simply that their policies were directed by Confucianism to view foreigners as barbarians unworthy of contact, as has been argued by scholars.[55] On the contrary, the designation of Europeans as *yi* (barbarians, strangers) was a result of this changing domestic climate and the perception of European merchants that had developed since 1757. Earlier, during the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods, the neutral term *xiyang* (western ocean) had been more commonly used than *yi* to name things and people Western.[56]

From the second half of the eighteenth century until the eve of the First Opium War, the policy of containing the Europeans developed into a set of sophisticated regulations for ever-tighter control. The introduction and three major revisions of regulations at the port all followed incidents with the British that prompted the Qing court and its representative in Canton to tighten their grip. After Flint, Liu Yabian, Commissioner Li, and others were punished in 1759, Governor-General Li Shiyao (in office 1758–1761) introduced the first official regulations in Canton: The Rules for Guarding against Foreigners (*fangfan waiyi guitiao*). The five rules laid the foundation of the institutionalized Canton system, comprising stipulations that foreigners (1) could come to Canton only during the trading season, (2) could live only in the

Thirteen Factories while in Canton, (3) could not lend money to Chinese or hire Chinese servants, (4) could not hire Chinese to deliver letters, and (5) must have Chinese military personnel stationed near their ships in harbour. The first four rules were to be enforced by Hong merchants and linguists, and if anything went wrong, they were the first to be punished.[57] Parts of the rules were already in place before 1757, and they came from the experience of governing the port and from an understanding of what could go wrong based on decades' experience of contact. The prohibition on lending money was a response to Flint's petition on Li Guanghua's debt to the EIC.

The first revision came in 1809 after the British had occupied Macao the year before, during the Napoleonic Wars, allegedly in order to be one step ahead of a possible French occupation.[58] A new rule was added to prevent warships coming to Canton as had happened in 1808.[59]

In 1831, the Rules for Guarding against Foreigners (*fangfan yiren zhangcheng*) were introduced after Mrs Baynes openly came to Canton, and guns and cannons were brought to the Thirteen Factories during the standoff. Three new prohibitions were added officially forbidding (1) foreign females from coming to Canton, (2) all foreigners from using sedan chairs (a symbol of status that was used by Mrs Baynes), and (3) taking guns and cannons into the Thirteen Factories.[60] The reason for the regulations forbidding Western women in Canton and for asking merchants to leave in the off season was to prevent them from settling down. The authorities did not want Canton to become another Macao, as was clearly spelled out in 1756 by Commander Wu of Ningbo.

The third revision happened after the Napier Affair of 1834. Governor-General Lu Kun repeated the major points of previous regulations and took into account that the EIC had, by then, been dissolved. The new regulations allowed private merchants to choose their own security merchants instead of rotating the duty, as in the days of the company.[61] This was to recognize that the private merchants being the major traders of the port by now were individual merchants and that the old rotation system that was designed for the EIC could no longer work.

The Canton system developed as the dynasty responded to domestic and foreign circumstances and to new situations in Canton. There was little sign of Confucianism. Weng Eang Cheong argued that in the making of foreign policy during this period Chinese ways of viewing foreigners—in contrast to Manchu ways—came to dominate. Europeans were again regarded as tribute bearers unlike the laissez-faire attitude of the early Qing, which departed from the Ming's tributary system. Cheong saw the developments of the Canton one-port trade as part of this 'return to orthodoxy'.[62]

There is a flaw in Cheong's attempt to link the Canton system to the tributary system of trade, which subjected the opening of frontier trade to tributes paid in the court. No records indicate that the Canton system was subject to the tributary system. Not a single European country was required to pay tribute in the court before

coming to trade in Canton. Only when Europeans pursued privileges by using the established tributary channels of interaction in trying to establish formal interstate relations were they required to perform Chinese tributary rituals. The best-known example is the 1793 Macartney embassy, which came to Beijing on behalf of the East India Company to ask for extensive rights to trade. Its members were then subject to tributary ceremonies and required to perform rituals such as the kowtow. The Macartney embassy and the Amherst embassy of 1816—the second British attempt to establish relations—were received by the Qing bureaucrats as tributaries, but the Qing did not require them in return for allowing trade to continue in Canton. Apart from this, the British never once paid tribute to the Qing court. Yet the trade carried on, even after the two embassies ended on bad terms.

It was not Confucianism nor the tributary system but rather dynastic state security that was the overriding driver of policy on the maritime frontier of Canton after it was institutionalized in 1757. The success of the Canton lobby unwittingly brought the Qing court to assert itself firmly in the Canton trade, establishing centralized control of the port for its own security—a price the Canton lobby paid for evoking the imperial authority. The state security policies developed into the soft borders of the Canton system drawing on Confucianism to shore up ideological control. That in turn developed into a system of Chinese knowledge of Europeans and how to deal with them. The Canton system drew on Confucianism for its justification of monopoly and state security, not the other way around.

A mutual responsibility system

The Canton system was first and foremost part of the Qing's domestic bureaucracy. The local bureaucratic structure at Canton included the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi (*Liangguang zongdu*), the governor of Guangdong (*Guangdong xunfu*), the commissioner of customs (*Yue Haiguan jiandu*—called Hoppo by the British merchants)—the military general of Guangdong (*Guangdong jiangjun*), and other minor civil and military officials, such as the magistrates of the areas Guangzhoufu, Nanhai, Panyu, and Xiangshan.[63] Led by the governor-general, the Canton authorities controlled the foreigners and the foreign trade on behalf of the court. Except for the commissioner of customs, the governing of foreigners was only part of their routine work; their main duty was to rule the Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces for the Qing dynasty.[64] The top Canton authorities would report to the emperor and his court both as a matter of routine and, especially, when incidents occurred, when new regulations needed to be introduced, and on other matters which they deemed important and which might threaten their careers.

From the late eighteenth century, the Canton authorities became less directly involved with foreigners. The Hong merchants (*hangshang*), who were licensed,

gradually assumed a full mediating role.[65] These merchants, numbering five at their least numerous and twenty-five at their most, formed themselves into a guild-like association, the Cohong, with a head merchant (*zongshang*), and dealt with European merchants. They were responsible to the Canton authorities.[66] The most powerful Hong merchant, usually the richest, would assume the role of *zongshang*. In the early nineteenth century, Poankeequa served the Qing in that capacity; in the 1820s and 1830s, Howqua took the role.[67]

When European merchants' ships came to Canton, they needed the Hong merchants to secure their entry. In this capacity, the merchants were also known as 'security merchants' (*baoshang*). This practice started as early as the 1720s.[68] The name *baoshang*, emphasizing their security role, was more often used in official communications when foreigners were in trouble and the Hong merchants were required to take responsibility.[69] Paul van Dyke, among other scholars, has noted the importance of the Hong merchants acting as providers of security in guaranteeing the proper behaviour of the European merchants, in addition to their commercial activity.[70] However, after 1757, and especially in the nineteenth century, the priorities of the Canton system were gradually reversed: the system became primarily a security system for the Qing dynasty and secondarily, a commercial system for trade with Europeans. The Hong merchants themselves came into the business for trade, but to the Qing authorities they were part of the security apparatus.

Linguists (*tongshi*), who were also licensed and communicated mainly through Pidgin, helped to pay port duties, obtained the 'Grand Chop' (port clearance certificates) when leaving, and dealt with other port matters.[71] Another group of Chinese, the compradors, were licensed to supply provisions to the merchants and their clerks living in the Thirteen Factories as well as to sailors on the ships anchored in Whampoa. And they together with domestic servants could carry out front-line surveillance of the Thirteen Factories when this service was demanded by the Qing. When Europeans were unruly, the Qing authorities would drive the compradors and domestic servants out of the factories, if they had not already abandoned their positions, to deprive the foreigners of food and service.[72]

The Hong merchants were responsible for collecting port tax (a responsibility they shared with the linguists) and for overseeing the linguists, compradors, domestic servants of the Thirteen Factories, and other port functionaries. The Hong merchants were the key people in the Qing's control of Canton, and they bore the brunt of bureaucratic power when things went wrong. When Qing officials needed to communicate with foreigners, they turned to the Hong merchants; when foreign merchants had problems, they too came first to the Hong merchants. They were especially sought after if foreigners, whether clerks or sailors, were involved in quarrels or suspicious deaths and other crimes. The British private merchants in the 1830s articulated the effects in their newspaper: 'If a foreigner takes a walk and is being insulted by natives

[and] a fray occurs, the security-merchant is forthwith punished or fined, for not keeping the said foreigners under control.'[73]

Some of the Hong merchants had official titles, but these were obtained through purchasing degrees, not because of their service as mediators. They were not officially part of the Qing bureaucracy, and their services to the Canton authorities were rewarded with a monopoly (or, at least, a priority) on trade, especially on the major commodity, tea.[74]

The time during which the Hong merchants became the major mediator between the two sides coincided with the East India Company changing its trading practices. Before 1775 the EIC trade in China followed the supercargo system, in which each ship's supercargo (a trade agent) took charge of his own trade. A council was ordered by the Court of Directors in London to be officially formed in 1775, and by 1786 the council was replaced by a Select Committee.[75] This was because the tea trade, by now, had become an important source of income for the EIC. The volume of trade in Canton was developed to the extent that credit played a bigger role in financing the tea trade.[76] Management in China was required, and a continuous business relationship developed that was more akin to a modern business company than the previous one-off transactions each season. The Hong merchants assumed an ever more important role partly as the counterpart of the managers of the EIC.

The firm grasp on the Canton port by the bureaucracy also ensured the steady flow of customs revenue from Canton directly to the court.[77] This responsibility was borne by the commissioner of customs in particular and other top mandarins in general.[78]

In these ways, the Canton system displayed the hallmarks of the Qing domestic neighbourhood administrative system, the 'mutual responsibility system' (*baojia*), in the joint management of both social stability and taxation. The character *bao* (meaning 'to guarantee, to ensure, to protect') features in both *baojia* and *baoshang* (security merchants).

The *baojia* system originated from twelfth-century local militia, although the concept may be much older. During the Qing, every one hundred households were organized as one *jia* under a chief, and every ten *jia* were grouped into one *bao* under a headman. Within these units, members were supposedly 'held responsible for the lawful behaviour of all members' including paying tax.[79]

Locking together the *baojia* and the Canton system were the Chinese who participated in the trade as linguists, compradors, and functionaries; these needed co-insurance (*ganjie*) either by the headman of their *baojia* or the head of their clan—clans had significant overlap with the *baojia* system. For instance, in the records of 1744 and 1809, the pilots (*yinshui*), who helped the ships to navigate through the treacherous Canton estuary, were asked to obtain a warrant granted by the head of their *baojia*.[80]

Interestingly, the *baojia* was rigorously reinforced in the year 1757 when Canton was designated as the only port for Europeans, after the Qianlong emperor commented

on a rebellion case in which ten rebels were still at large after a decade of pursuit. He said that the rebels were not caught because the *baojia* was not working properly.[81] Whether the *baojia* ever functioned as tightly as it was supposed to throughout the Qing period remains to be clarified.[82] It is quite possible, however, that the Canton system was the most successfully implemented *baojia* system in the entire Qing Empire, because for more than eight decades it was effective in maintaining order, containing Westerners within the port of Canton and bringing regular tariff revenue to the court.[83]

As counterparts on the foreign side, the consuls of each nation were regarded as the heads in charge of their countrymen. In the 1830s, there were consuls from the United States, Prussia, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands, plus the chief superintendent of the EIC—or, after 1834, the superintendent of trade. The consuls were actually merchants representing their own nation or others' nations in ambiguous capacity.[84] They were in any case regarded by the Qing as merely merchants. Foreigners knew how the system worked and complained about it: 'In cases of difficulty, the Chinese government usually look to the consuls as the "headmen" of the respective nations to which they belong; but it does not recognize in them any authority or rank that can give them equality with even the lowest officers of the celestial empire.'[85] In other words, the consuls had responsibility for their fellow countrymen but no rights. In fact, they were regarded like headmen in the *baojia* system in that they were expected to show moral leadership by winning respect from their countrymen in Canton and exercising control over them.

Thus, the way the system worked was that the Canton authorities were the first circle of the mutual responsibility system for the imperial court. They controlled the second circle, the Hong merchants, who in turn were in charge of the port functionaries and the heads of the foreign merchants. The foreign headmen comprised the last circle and were delegated the task of restraining their merchants, clerks, and sailors. Through the mutual responsibility system that linked all functionaries of the port and foreigners to the Hong merchants, the Qing controlled the Canton port.

Foreign headmen

In addition to being aware of the encroachment of Europeans in Asia, Qing officials had a grasp of European politics enough to devise a policy for dealing with Europeans. In a memorial of 1755, the governor-general of the Guangdong and Guangxi reported to the emperor that France and England were two big countries of the outer ocean who constantly engaged in battle.[86] In 1809, the English were seen as aggressive and the French as their only equal.[87] By 1830, the British were identified by Canton officials in memorials to the court as 'arrogant in their mightiness and wealth' (*zishi*

fuqiang).[88] Information was not detailed and systematic, but it reflected the contours of the situation, and the British were recognized as an important people.

The Canton authorities could see that the British had the largest trade volumes and numbers of clerks in the port. Thus, the EIC's chief superintendent was regarded by the Canton authorities as headman for all foreigners. They had to control him in order to control the Canton trade and foreign community. Because of this recognition some of the company chiefs had direct access to the Canton authorities. When Thomas George Staunton (1781–1859) held the position, he was able to negotiate with the Qing authorities in fluent Mandarin Chinese in the absence of the Hong merchants and linguists. Staunton had been on intimate terms with a Mongolian Qing high official called Song Yun 松筠 (1752–1835), a friendship first established when he came as a 12-year-old child with his father in the 1793 Macartney embassy, but their connection was later broken by the court's intervention.[89]

As early as 1830, when the Hong merchants realized the possibility of the EIC's China trade monopoly coming to an end, they petitioned the governor-general to issue an edict to urge the EIC chief superintendent to write letters to his king asking for a new headman to be sent to Canton. The Hong merchants spelled out clearly in their letter to the governor-general the importance of the headman:

> At present, the last division of the said nation's Company's ships is about to leave the port and return home. We, prostrate, beg that you will condescend to confer an edict, enjoining the said nation's Chief, Marjoribanks, early to send a letter home, to communicate it to the said nation's King; that if hereafter, the said nation's Company be dissolved, will there, as heretofore, be appointed a chief to come to Canton, to have the general management of the affairs of the said nation's foreign merchants and ships, which come to Canton. If no such Chief comes to Canton, there will be no *concentrated responsibility*; and since, if the said nation's country ships and merchants come to Canton to trade, the ships being many, and the men not few, in the event of any silly foolish, ignorant opposition to, and violation of the commands of Government after all, *who will be responsible*? The Celestial Empire's laws and regulations are awfully strict, and will not admit of the least infraction. The said nation must be ordered to make previous and safe arrangements; then hereafter, public affairs will *have a head to revert to*, and responsibility will not fall upon bystanders. Thus, it may be hoped, the commerce of the foreign merchants may go on tranquilly, and when the time comes to act, excuses be prevented.[90]

This communication shows clearly the principles of the *baojia* underlying the Canton system. The Hong merchants knew that in order for the system to function they needed 'concentrated responsibility' and 'a head to refer to'.

While waiting for the new superintendent of trade, Lord Napier, to arrive, the governor-general Lu Kun, through the Hong merchants, asked the former chief superintendent John Francis Davis (1795–1890) about the situation. Davis ended the last

letter of the EIC to the Qing authorities by taking the opportunity to present the same grievances that Flint had petitioned and to ask for rights for his fellow countrymen.[91]

When Lord Napier arrived, he demanded to be recognized as a representative of the British Crown, which, in 1834, challenged the well-established Canton system. The authorities refused this sudden change. Twelve days after his death, the Hong merchants sent a letter to the British merchants with an order from Lu Kun saying, 'You should send a letter to your country, calling for the appointment of a trading *taipan*, acquainted with affairs, to come to Canton to have the general direction. It is unnecessary to appoint a Barbarian Eye to come to Canton.'[92] They wanted trade to continue smoothly with a *taipan* (chief superintendent of the Select Committee) like the EIC had placed in charge of the British merchants, their clerks, and sailors—in effect, the foreign community. They did not need a 'barbarian eye' (*yimu*, a foreign headman) with political connections who did not fit into the established system.

After the Napier Affair, uncertainty towards the position of the British headman lasted for more than two years. In seeing this, then-governor-general Deng Tingzhen (in office 1835–1840) reported to the court, arguing that the chief superintendent of trade, Captain Charles Elliot, was a very quiet and peaceable man. He assured the Daoguang emperor that although his office was not similar to that of the former trading chief, they differed only in name, not in reality. And in all cases the foreigners could be controlled by a foreigner, to which office and duty he was to be strictly confined and not be allowed to intermeddle in other matters.[93] The governor-general wanted to bypass Elliot's status as a representative of the British Crown and to regard him simply as the headman of the merchants. The key thing for the governor-general and for the court was that the foreigners could be controlled by a foreigner. The court agreed, and Elliot came to Canton to assume his role, to the delight of the *Register*, which said that the 'British Flag is again flying in Canton; may the Foreign Trade find its protection under its shadow'.[94]

After coming to Canton, Elliot functioned and was treated as a headman. On 20 August 1837, two lascars (South Asian sailors) were involved in a quarrel with a Chinese. Together with two other lascars, who were also on the scene, they were arrested. After a preliminary hearing with Elliot in the *gongsuo* (the common office of the Hong merchants) in the presence of the Hong merchants, the lascars were handed over to Elliot and locked in a godown in the English Factory.[95] It is notable that the hearing was not held in the magistrate's office, where Chinese criminal cases were heard, and that the lascars were remanded to Elliot. Elliot, in this case, had some rights as a headman. Yet these rights were not extraterritorial jurisdiction, which was how Europeans at this time would have understood the case. Instead, Elliot acted as the headman in the Canton system. To the Qing authorities and to the system, a foreign headman governing his community was the best way to maintain order and

tranquillity. The mature Canton system kept the trade and kept foreigners within the system; the soft borders kept out undesirable political connections.

Outwitted on the maritime frontier

One other way to bring the foreigners on the maritime frontier under control was to stop trade. It worked nearly every time, partly because by the late eighteenth century the Qing court took security as their priority and were less afraid of losing trade than the foreign and local merchants were.

The most dramatic instance of stopping trade was during the Napier Affair, when the foreign community at first stood behind Napier but quickly turned against him when trade was stopped. Gravely ill, Napier left Canton for Macao because of the pressure on the foreign merchants from the Canton authorities, who were determined to assert their authority by stopping trade, and because of pressure from the foreigners themselves for trade to be resumed, so that they could purchase and ship goods before the monsoon winds turned northwards.[96]

The wedge driven between Napier and his compatriots worked for the Canton authorities in forcing him to leave. There was more to come. One of the oldest deceptions, *kurouji* (having oneself tortured to win the confidence of the enemy), was intertwined with the *baojia* system to form the soft borders of Canton. In 1838, when the authorities wished the hospital ship for seamen at Whampoa to depart in order to prevent contact between Westerners and the ordinary Chinese who would go there to seek medical help, they sent a 'security merchant and linguist to say they dread torture and banishment if the Hospital-ship is not removed!'[97] The security merchants and linguists were responsible for foreigners and hence were punishable when things did not proceed in rightful order. Given the close relationship and a certain sympathy and interest among foreign merchants, security merchants, and linguists, the strategy was to elicit a sense of guilt rather than challenge directly so that the foreigners would move the ship willingly. The ship was duly removed.

The records show many examples of security merchants, linguists, and compradors being punished first rather than foreigners. Such punishable incidents included foreign women appearing in Canton, foreigners presenting a petition at the city gate, and foreigners not going to Macao or not leaving China in the off season.[98] Perhaps the most astonishing instance of the *kurouji* strategy occurred during the campaign to drive out the opium trade. Before Commissioner Lin Zexu arrived in Canton to implement the ban on opium imports, the Canton authorities came to the square in front of the Thirteen Factories and set up a beheading stage in December 1838. A Chinese opium smuggler was brought on and—watched by all eyes, foreign and Chinese—was beheaded.[99] If one thinks in terms of Chinese collective identity, this

action of beheading demonstrated hurting oneself in order to manipulate the enemy into intended action. The mandarins knew how to put on a show to establish the kind of order they wanted.

Being aware to a great extent of the Qing authorities' strategies, the British in Canton were not passively fooled. They also played the game of stopping trade to force the Canton authorities into negotiation, but it worked for them only occasionally.[100] A more systematic strategy was setting up the Chamber of Commerce as the counterpart of the Hong merchants. Napier was subject to the Canton system, which meant that all his communications had to go through the Hong merchants before reaching the Canton officials. Napier did not like this, nor did the Warlike party, who had invested much hope in him to change the terms of interaction. Napier, in August 1834, ordered the formation of a Chamber of Commerce, which would act as the intermediary between him and the Hong merchants.[101] In this way, Napier would not be treated as a *taipan*, and the equality between nations and the honour of the British flag, as they perceived it, would function for the British in China. The Chamber of Commerce did not work as they wished, however, because the Pacific party was displeased by the way the Chamber was controlled by the Warlike party and allied with the Parsees to boycott it.[102]

The idea of a counterpart to the Hong merchants was fulfilled when the General Chamber of Commerce came into being more than a year after Napier's death. The rivalry between the two groups of British merchants was not going to end here, as they continued fighting up to the eve of war and, after that, to the establishment of the Hongkong Bank in the 1860s in Hong Kong. But, somehow, they both joined the General Chamber of Commerce. This time all foreigners, including Americans and other Europeans, were brought under one organization. Clear rules and regulations for conducting trade and interaction with the Chinese were set up.[103] The General Chamber of Commerce would end, together with the Canton system, when the First Opium War began in 1839.

The Hong merchants, on the other side, soon adapted to the new mode of contact. It could not have been more convenient for them, for the foreigners had now organized themselves into one entity.[104] The *Canton Press* recorded an exchange between the two sides during the anti-opium campaign of 1837:

> The three senior Hong merchants called on the committee of the [General] Chamber of Commerce on Saturday last, expressing their regret at the practice of Opium smuggling at Whampoa and Canton, and beseeching the Committee to use their influence to put a stop to it, since not only the whole foreign trade, but also themselves personally, might, if this smuggling were discovered, be great sufferers. The answer of the committee was that they could not interfere in matters which belonged exclusively to the Chinese Government; if the latter wishes to enforce its laws it must take its own measures. The Chamber did not feel itself authorized to interfere.[105]

The Hong merchants thought the General Chamber of Commerce had responsibility over all foreign matters in the same way that the Canton system empowered and regulated Hong merchants, but the chamber did not function in this way and had chosen not to intervene. In this exchange, the Hong merchants again used their own possible punishment as an argument to persuade the foreigners to cooperate, but it did not work. The foreign merchants, under the lead of the British private merchants, had become increasingly assertive about their position in China and would no longer be outwitted by the Canton system. Hong merchants had played their part in the system, acting as a soft control on the foreigners in exchange for profits, but from now on it would be the British who outwitted the Qing. The Canton system could cope neither with the opium smuggling problem nor the growing ambitions of the British, nor indeed with other Western forces: technology, the modern military, institutions, and social formations that had been developing over the preceding three centuries and that were now to be unleashed on the Qing Empire.

Understanding the frontier

The British merchants in Canton were fully aware of how the Qing perceived them. As early as 1754, the understanding was this: 'It is written in the *Chinese books*, that *Europeans* are a *warlike boisterous people*, who always seek to invade the *eastern countries*, where they come to trade.' This sentence had been written down and kept in the office of the English Factory for the EIC's staff to consult. In 1835, it was published by the private merchants in the Canton English newspapers.[106] The merchants also knew that the Chinese were aware of the EIC's taking possession of India—an action which put the Qing especially on guard towards the British—and that the Indian and Burmese wars of 1835 had heightened their suspicions.[107] The British government in London was equally aware of the Qing's concerns. The Whig president of the Board of Control, Charles Grant, said in 1833 that the Chinese 'had heard of the Company's victories in many parts of India, and to a people so sensitive as they were as to the approach of any foreign power to their territory, such matters were great cause of jealousy'.[108]

Before Napier's departure for China, he was told by Prime Minister Lord Grey (1764–1845), 'You are aware of the jealous and suspicious character of the Chinese people and government. Nothing must be done to shock their prejudices and excite their fears.'[109] The British government did not want Napier to disrupt the mode of trade in Canton as it was, even though the EIC monopoly has ended. The British private merchants in China in the 1830s had more precise knowledge of how the Qing perceived foreign trade: 'If the Chinese open all their ports to British enterprise, it is generally said the whole fabric of ancient institutions will be overturned; a rebellion will be the immediate consequence.'[110]

Knowing this, the British wanted to reassure the Qing that they were by no means interested in acquiring Chinese territory. The Macartney embassy of 1793 and that of Macartney's predecessor, Charles Cathcart, were specially instructed to communicate to the Chinese that 'our view is purely commercial, having not even a wish for Territory'.[111] The merchants and missionaries at Canton in the 1830s, too, tried more than once to explain to the Chinese—in Chinese—that there was nothing to be feared from the British and that the British now were by no means interested in conquest.

Commerce was what British wanted. The famous voyage of the *Lord Amherst* along the eastern coast of China in 1832 was ordered by the EIC's superintendent at the time, Charles Marjoribanks, in order to locate further opportunities for trade; this venture was carried out by the supercargo Hugh Hamilton Lindsay and the Protestant Prussian missionary Karl Gützlaff, to the great satisfaction of the Canton foreign community. Both Lindsay and Marjoribanks had a forward attitude, though Lindsay belonged to the Warlike party. Marjoribanks wrote a pamphlet, *Brief Account of the English Character*, which was translated into Chinese by Robert Morrison. Five hundred copies of the translated pamphlet, entitled *Dayingguo renshi lüeshuo*, were distributed together with missionary tracts on the voyage.[112] In the pamphlet, Marjoribanks assured the Chinese, 'The government of so great an Empire has no thirst for conquest. Its great object and aim is to preserve its subjects in a condition of happiness and tranquillity.'[113] During the voyage, the British discovered that the desire of the coastal Chinese peoples to trade in the maritime world was as strong as the wishes of the British to expand their trade into China. This confirmed to the Warlike party that the Han Chinese were being repressed by the Manchus and that they would join the British to rebel once war started.[114]

As the ship went up the coast noting opportunities and distributing tracts, the Chinese version of Marjoribanks's pamphlet was received by the governor of Shandong, Na'erjing'e, and then presented to the Grand Council, whence it reached the Daoguang emperor.[115] The emperor's comment was that, in his opinion, the printing style was obviously and definitely that of inland China. How could the Europeans have had access to Chinese printing? And how incompetent his officials were, who commented that the pamphlet was merely 'likely' to have been printed in inland China.[116] The emperor understood that the tight security system for containing the foreigners had been broken; the Chinese printing was the evidence. It did not appear that the emperor or the court was interested at all in what the Canton British wanted to communicate. After all, the Canton system, by now, had taught the Qing to think about Europeans only in terms of the Canton system and the potential threat to state security.

That foreigners had access to a Chinese printing facility inside Canton city meant that suspicion fell also upon Qing subjects. There were traitors (*hanjian*) helping the British! The designation of traitor established another soft border by distinguishing

those who helped foreigners from other Qing subjects. The Canton system dictated that the Qing perceive any unauthorized contact with foreigners only as treachery. The British were eager to enter China and were able to pay sufficiently well to purchase the services of Qing subjects, despite the risk of punishment.

In November 1828, the staff of the EIC in Canton filed a petition to the governor saying that a letter belonging to British merchants and carried by a Chinese from Macao to Canton had been confiscated by the river police of Panyu. The governor replied, 'Fearing that he was a traitorous Chinese, conspiring to create disturbance, he was detained for trial.'[117] Controlling the delivery of letters was a way of controlling information and preventing Qing subjects from establishing contact with foreigners, pre-empting the possibility of them joining forces. This was one of the five rules set out at the beginning of the Canton system. The letter was returned for it proved to be harmless. New rules were introduced that stipulated only compradors were allowed to carry letters for foreigners; foreigners were not allowed to engage outside men to carry them, 'lest they create disturbance'.[118] The changes mitigated the 1759 rule that forbade any Chinese from carrying letters for foreigners and may temporarily have mollified the British. But it did not in the slightest dampen their enthusiasm to completely overhaul the terms on which they traded with the Chinese. On the surface, on the institutional level, and in the regulations, the Canton system still appeared to work well, reinforcing old regulations and introducing new ones. But, in practice, the system could not contain the merchants any longer.

Other informational control measures forbade foreigners to bring books out of China, learn Chinese, and circulate their publications among the Chinese. The weight of control was on the Chinese side, for any Chinese found selling books to foreigners, teaching Chinese, or engaging in similar actions would be designated a *hanjian* and punished, in cases beheaded.[119] The reality was that these regulations created a lucrative business for daring adventurers. The number of foreigners learning Chinese in the 1830s was increasing. At least five people—Robert Morrison, Karl Gützlaff, John Robert Morrison, Elijah Coleman Bridgman, and Robert Thom—could speak and write Chinese. Books, pamphlets, and Christian tracts in Chinese were distributed on several occasions, as they were during the 1832 voyage. When Robert Morrison returned to London on furlough in 1823, he carried with him nearly ten thousand Chinese books.[120] The Bavarian orientalist Karl Friedrich Neumann (1793–1870), who came to Canton to learn Chinese in 1829, sent back about twelve thousand Chinese books.[121]

By the early 1830s, the Qing had been outwitted by their own tricks. Ironically, the creation of the Canton system, with a well-established soft border that cut across the informational and interactional networks in the port, led the Qing to view the foreigners only from the perspective of containing them in Canton. Neither the physical borders of the Thirteen Factories nor the soft borders ever stopped information

flowing out of China, but the Canton system did play a major part in shaping the Qing's understanding of European merchants.

The soft borders equally shaped the British merchants' understanding of China. The Warlike party saw the Canton system, and the Chinese law and order it represented, as an insult to the British national honour. For instance, the word *tizhi* in the Qing official edicts, letters, and memorials was translated by the *Register* as 'dignity' or 'respectability', which were the derived connotations, while the first and direct meaning of the word—'the established law and order of the dynasty'—was ignored. A note from the emperor, which approved the new regulations of 1831, was translated and published in the *Register* with the sentence *'bushi tianchao tizhi fangwei zhishan'* rendered as 'It is all together incumbent not to lose the Celestial Empire's respectability in governing.' The Canton community debated over whether *tizhi* should be translated as 'respectability' or 'dignity'.[122] Either translation had the potential of arousing the patriotic feelings that dovetailed with their sentiment of 'national honour': The Celestial Empire, in demonstrating its 'respectability' or 'dignity', looked down upon the British, thus insulting the British. Insult merited war. The merchants, who represented China from the perspective of their confined space of Canton, controlled British (and to an extent international) perception of the Qing's intent. Ignoring the other half of the meaning—'the established law and order'—enabled the Warlike party to create a narrative that conflated the Canton system, British national honour, and war.

While the Warlike party saw the system as an obstacle to their trade, to the Qing, the Canton system was an institutionalized method of dealing with the European merchants. Because of the Canton system—and not Confucianism, which should be seen as an ideological justification of what the Qing did in shutting out Europeans—the Qing had no idea at all of the arguments, warlike or pacific, underway on their doorstep and the potential power of the British merchants within their jurisdiction. Institutional complacence and entrenched interests compelled the Qing to see the British only from the perspective of the Canton system.

The way in which the British maritime public sphere and the Qing state's sphere interfaced had tremendous impact as tensions built throughout the 1830s. On the one hand, the bureaucratic management of the Canton system was the subject of scrutiny by the British public sphere—as if the *Register* were a British local newspaper criticizing British local government—yet the Chinese authorities had no obligations towards the foreigners. On the other hand, the English newspaper was a place that Chinese informational networks did not reach, and, as a consequence, they had not the slightest grasp of the shape of the public sphere and the potential power it wielded. Yet the Canton system had supreme authority over the foreigners. The consequence of the interaction turned out to be war. In view of the restriction of the Canton system, the Warlike were less to blame, for they had attempted to reach out to the Qing.

4
Intellectual Artillery

When the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China (SDUKC) was founded in Canton on 29 November 1834, its committee declared:

> We are now, then, to make the trial, whether the celestial empire, after it has defeated all efforts to bring it into an alliance with the civilized nations of the earth, will not yield to intellectual artillery, and give to knowledge the palm of victory.[1]

Thus formally began an information war with 'intellectual artillery' at its disposal, aimed to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese in the years before the actual military action of the First Opium War. The foreigners in Canton believed they were barred from further access to China partly because the Chinese had no information on the true character of the Europeans. The 'intellectual artillery' in the form of Chinese-language publications, especially on world geography, was to be used on the Chinese, in the hope that this effort would familiarize them with the science and art of Westerners and thereby cultivate respect and a welcoming atmosphere.

In establishing the soft borders in Canton, the Qing erected an information barrier to prevent foreigners from knowing China and Chinese from interacting with them. In this context, the strategy of deploying intellectual artillery to start an information war was well founded.

The founding members of the society consisted of not just British private merchants but also Protestant missionaries, who played a major role in the establishment and management of the society. The missionaries believed that trade, like the gospel, would benefit the Chinese and bring China into the ranks of 'civilized nations'—as they understood it—meaning the Christian world.[2]

The war metaphor permeated the founding and running of the society. In addition to the wording 'intellectual artillery', the committee pronounced unambiguously that in establishing the society they were 'glad to engage in a warfare' that involved changing Chinese perceptions of the outside world.[3] This war metaphor contributed to the discourse that led to the waging of the military war. The society aimed to 'open China

up' to Europeans, as did the war that was eventually waged. Being an overture to the literal war, the SDUKC was part of that development, rather than an alternative.[4]

Despite their martial language, in establishing the SDUKC, the merchants and missionaries meant well and believed the new knowledge being passed on to the Chinese would benefit them as much as it had the Europeans, particularly at this juncture the British, as Britain was seen as the most powerful nation in the world. They believed the society was a charitable organization spreading civilization and helping China.

Establishment of the society

When the Warlike party advertised for a 'Prize Essay' in 1831 in the *Register*, soliciting Chinese books to introduce free trade doctrines into China, their advertisement included this sentence: 'The prize is given by a gentleman who wishes to patronise the diffusion of useful knowledge in the Chinese language.'[5] This was the earliest record of the concept 'diffusion of useful knowledge' appearing in Canton. Following that, the *Canton Miscellany*, in the same year, in its first issue, argued:

> That the Nations included in the above specified limits, have not yet attained that degree of intellectual and moral culture, which may justly entitle them to the designation of civilized, is, we presume apparent to every one. The Hundreds of Millions of human beings, who inhabit the Ultra-ganges Countries, view all claims of other Nations to equality and reciprocity with contempt, and refuse all intellectual intercourse.
>
> The Evil being apparent, the next thing is to find a remedy. Individual effort is unequal to the Task. Why should not local Societies be formed in India, the Straits and China, for the diffusion of useful knowledge in the Native language, and the promotion of civilization in all the regions from Borneo to Corea and from Arracan to Japan.[6]

The underlying assumption being that India was under British control and in the process of being 'civilized', while the area east of it, the 'Ultra-ganges Countries', was to follow. The author believed that 'the Merchants seem the best men to commence the work'.[7]

The next year, 1832, the *Register* published an article entitled 'Progress Society', which commented that, in China, 'knowledge and civilization have rather decreased than increased for many centuries; and unless a European intercourse of literature take place, they are likely to be stationary or retrograde for many centuries to come'.[8] The article called for the foreign community in Canton 'to set up a Chinese Press, from which Newspapers, Reviews &c., should be issued'.[9]

Up until this point, diffusing 'useful knowledge' was mainly a vaguely understood and self-appointed civilizing mission; establishing the society and printing press was

necessary to fulfil it. The most focused point thus far was imparting free trade doctrines to the Chinese through the 'Prize Essay'.

The call for the 'diffusion of useful knowledge' took a new turn in May 1833 when another call for a 'Chinese Press' in the *Register* clearly spelled out the connection between knowledge diffusion and the image of foreigners that the Chinese supposedly possessed. It stated that the publications in Chinese were to be 'calculated to remove the absurd prejudices of this people, and give them a juster idea of foreigners, their sciences, arts, and discoveries'.[10] Now the spread of the 'useful knowledge' was designed to remove Chinese 'prejudices' about foreigners.

Two weeks later, in answering this call, the Prussian missionary Karl Gützlaff advertised his prospectus of a monthly periodical in the Chinese language in the *Register*, appealing for patronage. Gützlaff presented his idea for a magazine as a counter to the 'high and exclusive notions' of the Chinese by making them 'acquainted with our sciences and principles'.[11] He argued that the 'empty conceit' that stemmed from the lack of information concerning the West on the Chinese side 'has greatly affected the interests of the foreign residents at Canton'.[12] Gützlaff explicitly made the point that the restrictions placed on Westerners were due to inadequate knowledge on the Chinese side. This connection was meaningful to the Canton foreign community because the Canton system, with its tight regulations, had long been a source of grievances.

William Jardine seems to have answered Gützlaff's appeal and underwrote the first six months of the magazine in exchange for Gützlaff's interpreting work and his medical service on board the opium-selling voyage of the clipper *Sylph* along the eastern coast of China, according to Michael Greenberg's research.[13] The *Canton Register* stated that the magazine was 'supported by a public foreign subscription'.[14] In any case, Gützlaff had the funding and in the following two years published the *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* (Eastern Western monthly magazine) with the aim of making the Chinese understand Westerners better. The *Chinese Repository* reported how the Chinese received the magazine:

> The second number of this publication has made its appearance, and the Chinese seem to have obtained a better insight into its nature. They did not at first clearly understand what was meant by a monthly periodical. We have heard many express their qualified approbation of the work. Those few who have done otherwise are for the most part such as are either self-sufficient in their own knowledge, or proud of their own ignorance. We may venture to say that no natives of good sense and unprejudiced minds are against it. How far it will be supported by the Chinese themselves, remains to be seen. The nature of the work is, so far as we know, entirely new to the Chinese around us; a periodical for the diffusion of useful knowledge was, probably, never before published in 'the celestial empire'.[15]

Gützlaff's *Monthly Magazine* was indeed the first Chinese periodical in the Western style published in mainland China. The *Chinese Courier* distrusted the project and reported the doubt of a Chinese scholar on the accuracy of the knowledge printed in the magazine. It then argued that the project actually did a disservice to the foreign community:

> The more we see of the reception of the attempts made by foreigners to conciliate the Chinese or improve their moral conditions, the stronger grows our conviction that we not only labour in vain, but lower ourselves in their estimation by the pertinacity of the endeavour. The prejudices of education here appear to be even more firmly rooted than those of religion among the natives of India.[16]

But opinion such as this did not dissuade the publication and dissemination of the magazine. The efforts momentarily paid off. When the magazine reached its sixth number, the *Register* vividly described its popularity. Some issues 'have been read with eagerness' and 'portions of their contents have been copied and hawked about the streets for sale'.[17] The *Register* then said:

> Parties of Chinese have been observed clubbed together reading and explaining them; and studying the map of the northern constellations. If by means of this and other similar publications we once get a hold of the Chinese mind, we trust we may succeed eventually in task of leading the Chinese government to endeavour to suit its practice more to its theory. The springs of celestial compassion may then overflow to, and fatten foreigners in reality; and we may all rejoice in their invigorating nourishment. We sincerely hope that the indefatigable author of this publication may succeed in his benevolent designs;—and that he may also shortly induce the Chinese to *buy* his works: that will be the surest test of his victory over the *aris focisque* of the Celestial Empire.[18]

The report of the *Monthly Magazine*'s qualified success stirred up the community's interest in the idea of diffusing useful knowledge to the Chinese. The conception of employing 'intellectual artillery' came into focus, and it took on the form of a society when a pamphlet of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (SDUK) that was founded in London in 1826 reached Canton in the winter of 1833.[19]

Facing increasing criticism from other publishers in Great Britain for publishing much cheaper books and magazines aimed at lower-class people, the SDUK decided at their fifth annual meeting that they should counteract these criticisms by launching a media campaign to disseminate pamphlets defending the position of the society. One such pamphlet was sent to Canton.[20] The *Repository*'s editor, the American missionary Elijah Coleman Bridgman (1801–1861) not only obliged by publishing the note and an abstract of the pamphlet but also, on seeing the success of the low-price practice of the SDUK, decided that the *Repository* would reduce its price by one-half from the third volume onwards 'anticipating of course that the number of copies circulated will be more than double'.[21] At its peak, the SDUK's *Penny Magazine*

(1832–1843) alone sold about 200,000 copies every week in 1832. This was just in time for Bridgman to be excited by the figure, although in actuality with its low-price practice the SDUK needed five times this figure to break even.[22]

The SDUKC's inspiration, the SDUK in London, was part of a wider social reform movement that had developed in the first three decades of the nineteenth century. The major force behind the SDUK was Lord Henry Brougham (1778–1868), who had just helped push through the Reform Act of 1832, two years before the founding of the SDUKC. A mild reformer, Brougham viewed the SDUK partly as a provider of educational opportunity to the lower classes and partly as a means to divert radical revolutionary forces that were gathering strength among them.[23] In addition to the affiliation of the SDUKC with the SDUK, a connection between Britain's liberal reformers and the British merchants of Canton also existed through the *Edinburgh Review* (1802–1929), of which Brougham was one of the founders and from which the major Canton newspapers often reprinted progressive ideas.

In sending out pamphlets explaining its position, the committee of the SDUK did not know that these notes and pamphlets posted to Canton would do more than just change the price practice of the *Repository*. It would also, more importantly, play into the affairs unfolding at the margins of the Qing Empire and inspire the forming of a similar society which named itself after the SDUK. They shared the civilizing mission in working for the lower-class of Britain and for the 'semi-civilized Chinese' respectively. In Canton, the reformist idea of 'diffusion of useful knowledge' was intertwined with the merchants' and missionaries' wishes to open China up.

Three appeals for the formation of a similar society were advertised after the SDUK's notes were published. The third appeal urged 'the civilised community living in the suburbs of Canton the establishment of an institution for the promotion of useful knowledge among the Chinese' and then argued:

> It is thought that by the circulation among the Chinese of such books, the study of which will raise them in the scale of human beings, inform their minds, and convey to them juster notions of the people of other countries, will result in the most beneficial effects on their present confined and antisocial rules of thinking and acting. Books on all subjects, except politics, will be distributed; and little doubt is entertained that the study of useful subjects will not interest the minds of the Chinese or that the sale will eventually defray the cost of printing and publication.
>
> In a short time a prospectus will be laid before the public, under the conviction that the enlightened members of the American and British nations will readily follow the example of their countrymen at home, and by proper means, promote this grand object.[24]

The promise of a 'prospectus' 'in a short time' did not come so soon. The plan of an 'institution' was brought to an abrupt end by the arrival of Napier in July 1834 as the first trade superintendent to China. Further delay was ensured in the following

months during the standoff in Canton with Napier's demand to be treated like a British state representative, his being taken ill, his untimely death, and the anger of the Warlike party over his ill treatment by the Chinese and the frustration of their hopes that he would change their situation.

It was not until late November that the whole Napier Affair was brought to an end. Now, with exasperation and discontent, and an even greater sense of community, the society began operations in earnest in late November 1834.[25]

Planning intellectual artillery

When the committee of the SDUKC in their meetings declared that the preparation of 'intellectual artillery' was intended 'to engage in a warfare', it was less than two months after Lord Napier's untimely death. The anguish and dismay among the British community was palpable, especially among the group of merchants associated with the Warlike party surrounding Jardine, Matheson & Co. The rhetoric in Canton was moving towards war as a solution to their confinement, and the funding of the SDUKC was one way they expressed this frustration.

In the five years following the foundation of the society, the merchants and missionaries regularly held meetings in Canton to discuss the plans for the society when the trading season started in early autumn. The regulations of the society stipulated that the annual meeting was held on the third Monday in October. The date of the meeting was rarely followed, but every year they managed to get together.[26] The plans for the operation of the society were discussed in the meeting and then published annually in the *Repository* and less often in the *Register* and the *Press*, and were therefore available to the Canton foreign community, as well as to subscribers of the newspapers and journals in other Asian ports and some in Britain and America.

The meetings were a process through which committee members learned both about the Chinese and about their own interests. The first annual report, published in December 1835, showed that the society had only gotten as far as deciding to publish material on universal geography and world history. They believed these subjects would teach the Chinese that the world was more than the Middle Kingdom and that foreigners were not barbarians.[27]

In the second annual report, the committee formulated a detailed plan covering eight subject areas which the committee deemed necessary to introduce to the Chinese. These were ranked by the society in order of priority: history (including biography), geography (including travel), natural history, medicine, mechanics and mechanical arts, natural philosophy, natural theology, and belles-lettres. There was also another category for 'miscellaneous subjects', which included magazines and other publications.[28]

By the time of the third annual meeting, the committee considered it necessary to examine what was already available in Chinese before they could continue the work of the society. John Robert Morrison in the capacity of English secretary to the society presented his investigation of Chinese knowledge by going through the 'catalogue of works contained in the imperial library at Peking', or the *Siku Quanshu* (*Complete Library of Four Branches of Books*, 36,304 volumes, 1782). Morrison compared the *Complete Library* with the knowledge developed in the West and claimed that the classic branch (*jing*), the first branch of the four, was a 'philosophy, which, leaving alone all speculations concerning the origin and future state of man, confines itself almost wholly to the relations between man and man in this life'. The Bible was the reference point here.

The history and geography branch (*shi*), Morrison said, is 'almost exclusively national . . . while the existence of other nations, and the practical lessons to be learned from the rest of mankind, are almost wholly forgotten'. Morrison was also dissatisfied with the 'useful arts of life', which were a part of the branch known as the collections (*ji*); he reported that only agriculture and weaving were available for study, while astronomical and mathematical sciences were 'chiefly derived from Europeans', referring to the Catholic missionaries working in the court. Thus, he concluded, 'Seeing that so many are the defects of Chinese literature, it becomes our imperative duty to exert our utmost energies to supply their *lack of knowledge*.'[29]

By assuming that the *Complete Library* represented the knowledge of the Chinese in its entirety, the report falls into the discourse of the Confucianist outlook that set out to compile this giant collection in the Qianlong emperor's time (1736–1795). Take the *jing*, for example: Confucian learning may be the only learning listed in this category, but the Daoist classics and the lengthy, translated, well-developed Buddhist canon, which were rather under-represented in the *Complete Library* under the Confucian worldview, were put into the category of *zi* (masters' works), which would have been compatible with what Morrison named the knowledge concerning the 'origin and future state of man'—religion. It would be more justifiable, for instance, for Morrison to have compared Christianity to these writings, since Christianity and Confucianism are rather more compatible in the aspects of their relationships with political authorities and their ideological roles to those powers.

The knowledge in the *shi* department that most concerned the meeting may not have correlated with the knowledge of history and geography of the West—or as the society called it, 'our own knowledge'—but it was sufficient to prove that there was abundant geohistorical information about Westerners, compiled mainly by Jesuits in the seventeenth century, and Chinese-language travel accounts of foreign lands in South East and Central Asia.[30] Had the committee not from the beginning set out to identify the deficiencies within Chinese knowledge, they would have noticed that the

existent information was rich enough for any Chinese reader to learn of the existence and states of the 'outside world', including the West.[31] This might have suggested to the society, to the European community in Canton, and to readers of the Canton print media in the port cities of Asia, Europe, and America that the explanation for the restrictions placed upon foreigners might lie somewhere else, namely in the Qing's state security concerns.

Nevertheless, they believed, or they had to believe, that the deficiency of knowledge of the outside world was the reason trade was confined to Canton, Christianity was banned in China, and the foreigners' every move was watched daily. Thus, presenting knowledge to the Chinese received its justification.

In its fourth year, the committee took great interest in the Chinese book market in order to understand what the Chinese were reading and what books were most popular. The plan was to write books in the form of these popular works with the content replaced with that written by the members of the society.

The first type was the numerous forms of 'Chinese almanacs', or the Yellow Calendar (*huangli* or *tongshu*). Earlier, in the second annual report, the society had noticed the popularity of this type of book and proposed that the society should publish its own almanacs 'intended to replace with useful information, scientific and statistical, the present Chinese Almanacs, which are almost wholly filled with idle prognostications, details regarding propitious and unpropitious days, and so forth'.[32] At the fourth annual meeting, the plan of supplying and replacing was earnestly taken up; the Chinese almanacs were thoroughly studied. John Robert Morrison noticed that the bookstalls, during the time of the year when the meeting was held, 'begin to be crowded' with these books. He reported that the Chinese almanacs varied greatly according to the publishers, but usually they contained a calendar marked with auspicious days and other miscellaneous information that would be useful in the daily life of the Chinese. When they saw that some almanacs contained maps of China, the plan became even clearer. John Morrison commented:

> These items are however so few [almanacs containing maps], that they are hardly worthy of notice, except as an example of what may be introduced in a *purified* almanac, intended like 'the British Almanac' of the English Society whose name we bear, to supply, gradually, the place of the year-books already existing among the people.[33]

Another equally popular and no less attractive type of book that the society wanted to publish was the *Collectanes of Elementary and Useful Information*.[34] This type of book contained materials for elementary education, such as picture dictionaries, and for practical information, such as instructions for writing visiting cards.

Morrison told the committee that improved works of these two types were 'likely to meet with a more ready circulation than the works which your committee has

already published or sent to press, and hence may well serve to introduce these last to the attention of readers'.[35] They wanted to put Western geographic and historical knowledge into the Yellow Calendar and 'Collectanes' that were consulted by ordinary Chinese in everyday life. In this way, information on the West could reach every Chinese.[36]

These ideas, except the geohistorical books and a few others, were never put into practice by the society. When the fourth annual report was presented in the meeting, the opium confiscation in Canton that would lead to a three-year war was less than four months away. Some of the plans, however, would have their influence in the late period of missionary publications in China. Publication of the almanacs, for instance, was carried out by the missionary Divie Bethune McCartee (1820–1900) in Shanghai under the title *Pingan Tongshu*, with four issues appearing between 1850 and 1853 that contained numerous western maps and geohistorical articles.[37]

The longer the society members prepared their 'intellectual artillery', the more they learned about the Chinese, and the more they understood the complexity of the matter of diffusing knowledge. In the 'Proceedings' and its first annual report, the society described China as a country closed to rest of the world due 'chiefly to the apathy, the national pride, and the ignorance of the Chinese, that they have not joined other nations in the march of intellect'. The second year's report expressed, though reluctantly, the possibility that 'we' might learn something from the Chinese:

> We have enumerated advantages arising out of such knowledge as we may impart to the Chinese. On the other hand, we might also, it is not impossible, were we brought into constant intercourse with intelligent and well-informed natives of this country, derive much practical information, and hence receive considerable direct benefit even from them.[38]

The hesitation was necessary to maintain the society's stance at a civilizing high ground that empowered the society, and it shows that the society already sensed that their labour might be entirely in vain. This explains why in its fourth year the society examined the knowledge available in Chinese by going through the catalogue of the *Complete Library*. It is not that before the founding of this society they knew nothing about China but rather largely that the anguish over the Napier Affair was fading as the meetings rolled on year after year, and partly that the works of the society made them look into the Chinese in more detail.

The society, however, could not afford to have a high opinion of the Chinese, for its very existence was, to a great extent, built upon a negative representation of China. The situation is akin to the Protestant missions' opinions concerning China, whereby 'to say something positive about the Chinese would serve to undermine the rationale of the missionary enterprise'.[39]

Preparation for writing, translating, and printing

While analysing the knowledge of the Chinese and devising a publication strategy, the society was also drawing up plans for writing, printing, and distribution. Although British merchants had been trading in China since the early seventeenth century, in the 1830s, thanks partly to the Qing's restrictions, there were only a handful of people who could speak Mandarin or Cantonese. Daily business was conducted in Pidgin. When the society was founded in 1834, there were four people who were able, with the help of Chinese assistants, to write materials in Chinese for publication—John Robert Morrison, Bridgman, Gützlaff, and Robert Thom.

With so few able hands, the results of preparing 'intellectual artillery' were not at all satisfying to the committee. They knew very well that simply being able to write was not enough to attract attention in a Chinese society, where literary style was highly regarded. This problem surfaced in the committee's third annual report. John Robert Morrison commented on a manuscript they had received, saying that the style of the writing was 'necessarily tainted with foreign idioms and adapted to foreign modes of thought and expression'.[40]

From the very beginning, the society attended to the problem of translation. A set of 'Chinese nomenclature' for translating the proper nouns relating to geography, history, and science was proposed in the first annual report. They were aware of the necessity to have unified terms to translate things and names that were hitherto strange to the Chinese reader. The proper nouns of nations, such as Great Britain (Dayingguo), America (Meilige heshengguo), France (Falanxi), and Holland (Helan) for the geographical books, and historical figure names such as George Washington (Huashengdun) and Napoleon (Napuolieng) in the history books were standardized to promote better communication. Neologisms such as *huozhengchuan* (fire steam boat) and *huozhengche* (fire steam car) were coined to name in Chinese for the Chinese these latest inventions of the West. They wished to make their transliterations as close as possible to the pronunciation of the court (or Mandarin) dialect for wider circulation, instead of the Cantonese that surrounded them.

The society also needed the Chinese nomenclature to contest the negative designations of foreigners. Examples given by the American missionary Bridgman of terms to be contested included *hung-maou kwei* (*hongmaogui*), 'red-haired devils', and *keang-koo kwei* (*jianggugui*), 'old-story-telling devils', meaning missionary preachers of the gospel.[41] They preferred that the Chinese call them by names they chose themselves rather than regard them as 'devils'.[42]

Printing was another problem the society faced. They commissioned two movable metallic types. One was made by the Reverend Samuel Dyer (1804–1843), who was inspired by Robert Morrison to come to Asia and specialized in making a movable

type in Penang, and the other was made in Paris by Marcellin Legrand, with the help of Sinologist Jean-Pierre Guillaume Pauthier (1801–1873).[43] By 1839, when the fourth annual report was published, these two movable types were not yet constructed. The society also made an application for the use of the former East India Company's movable type, which was constructed by Peter Perring Thoms (fl. 1814–1851) for publishing Robert Morrison's *A Dictionary of the Chinese Language* (1815–1823).[44]

These moveable types may not have helped the society's publications, even if they had been available in Canton, because a series of events that took place throughout the second half of 1830s prompted the Qing government to reinforce its ban on foreign printing. Lord Napier's appeals to the Chinese public, conveyed via placards posted in the streets surrounding the Thirteen Factories during the summer of 1834, moved the Qing authorities to issue a reinforcing edict banning all Chinese printing houses from undertaking any work for foreigners.[45] Prior to this reinforcement, Gützlaff could, albeit illegally, publish in 1833 his monthly magazine inside Canton city using Chinese printing facilities.[46]

The result of the reinforced control was that the society needed to find alternative printing facilities 'beyond the jurisdiction of the Chinese'. Two places were proposed for this purpose by William Jardine; one was on board the ships moored at Lintin Island where the merchants stocked their opium shipped from India and other smuggled goods. These vessels had their own cannons and guards, and they were beyond the reach of the Chinese government. The other proposed location was the Straits Settlements in Malaya, under the control of the British Empire. In the end, the society's publications were printed in Singapore.[47]

Publications and their impact

With a safe place established in Singapore for printing in the missionary school Anglo-Chinese College, at least eight of the eighteen items proposed for publication (Chart 1, numbers 1–8) were published between 1838 and 1839, before the war started. As they were prioritized, the treatises on history and geography were among the earliest books published. *A General History of the World*, *A Universal Geography*, and *A History of England* were written by Gützlaff, one of the society's two Chinese secretaries in charge of writing in Chinese, who at this time was also the interpreter to the superintendent of British trade. The other Chinese secretary, Bridgman, turned out one treatise on the United States and one chrestomathy for learning Cantonese. These books, along with the society's magazine, were published on the eve of the First Opium War and were the major 'intellectual artillery' of the society's five years of labour.

Chart 1
Proposals and Publications by the SDUKC

	Publications Proposed*	Items Published, Author, and Year	Notes
1	'A general history of the world'	*Gujin wanguo gangjian* 古今萬國綱鑑, by Gützlaff, 1838	Parts of it were published first in *Dongxiyang kao* (Eastern Western monthly magazine); 300 copies were ordered in 1838.
2	'A universal geography'	*Wanguo dili quanji* 萬國地理全集, by Gützlaff, 1838	Parts of it were published first in *Dongxiyang kao*.
3	'A history of the United States'	*Meilige heshengguo zhilüe* 美理哥合省國志略, by Bridgman, 1838	Revised in 1846 and 1862; translated into Japanese in 1864.
4	'The Chinese Chrestomathy in Canton Dialect'	*The Chinese Chrestomathy in Canton Dialect*, by Bridgman, 1838	This book is 'for Europeans: the acquirement of the means of personal intercourse with the Chinese and of diffusing among the latter a knowledge of the English language'.
5	'Aesop's Fables'	*Yishi mizhuan* 意拾秘傳, by Robert Thom, 1838–1839	This item had been published in parts before 1838. Every story is presented in English, Chinese, and romanized Chinese. It is partly for the purpose of language learning.
6	'A history of the Jews'	*Gushi rudiyaguo lidailiezhuan* 古時如氐亞國歷代列傳, by Robert Morrison, 1838	Republication of Robert Morrison's 1815 work; in the last meeting of the SDUKC in 1838, it was clearly stated that this book had been published, but I have seen only the 1815 edition so far.
7	'Chinese magazine'	*Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* 東西洋考每月統計傳 (Eastern Western monthly magazine), edited by Gützlaff and possibly others, 1833–1838	
8	'A treatise on political economy'	*Maoyi tongzhi* 貿易通志 (General account on trade), by Gützlaff, 1840	This was written partly in answer to the call for a 'prize essay' for translating British economic theory (free trade).
9	'A map of the world'	*Wanguo ditu quanji* 萬國地圖全集	This may have been published, but I have not found the map.

* The book titles in the column 'publications proposed' are as given at the meetings of the SDUKC.

Chart 1 (continued)

	Publications Proposed	Items Published, Author, and Year	Notes
10	'A history of England'	*Dayingguo tongzhi* 大英國統志, by Gützlaff	Originally published in 1834. In 1837, it was presented to the society for republication, but in 1838 it was 'accidentally retarded'.
11	'A short treatise on the being of a God'	N/A	Proposed in 1837.
12	'Another notice of the Indian Archipelago'	N/A	Proposed in 1838.
13	'A geographical and astronomical work', entitled 'Yuen teen too shwo' (*Huantian tushuo* 環天圖說)	N/A	Written by John Robert Morrison, but no further discussion or any sign of publication.
14	'Sze Shoo ching wan' (*Sishu jingwen* 四書經文)	N/A	'By a Chinese person who was educated by the Jesuits.' It was supported for publication in the meeting, but no further information of publication exists.
15	'A small work on general geography, in the form of a traveller's narrative of what he had seen'	*Xiyou diqiu wenjian lüe zhuan* 西遊地球聞見略傳, by Robert Morrison, 1819	Originally published in 1819; the society decided to republish, but this had not been carried out by 1838 and was possibly abandoned after the war.
16	'Natural Philosophy'	N/A	To translate Lord Brougham's 'Treatise on the objects, advantages, and pleasures of Science'. There is no further information regarding publication.
17	'Almanac'	N/A	The society did not carry out the plan to publish this. But in 1850–1853, four almanacs were edited by Davie Bethune McCartee in Shanghai entitled *Ping'an tongshu* 平安通書.
18	'A complete set of plates exhibiting the anatomy of the human subject of natural size'	N/A	Proposed by Dr Parker; there was no disagreement, but neither was there further discussion or publication. Benjamin Hobson published *Quanti xinlun* 全體新論 in 1851, which was carried out as the society proposed.

Though these publications by the society were rather late, coming after four years' planning, some were produced at last. The problem of distributing the books to the Chinese then arose. Chinese booksellers were not prepared to risk their businesses by dealing with Europeans, especially after the Napier Affair.[48] The only other option was to sell or distribute the books personally via the members of the society; this was a logical plan, as the missionaries were familiar with this type of direct contact. When Gützlaff published the *Monthly Magazine* by himself, one way of distribution was to give freely to the Chinese who came into contact with foreigners during business transactions.[49] In 1835, 1,000 sets of the two volumes of the 1833 and 1834 magazines were reprinted by the society. These magazines were handed out alongside Christian tracts in Fujian Province when Gützlaff and Edwin Steven undertook their tract-distributing voyage in 1835 that alarmed the Chinese government, prompting another check on Europeans' use of Chinese printing in Canton.[50] It was after this incident that the publication of this magazine was moved to Singapore.

By March 1837, another 1,000 copies of the newly edited two issues of the magazine were sent to be printed. From 1837 onwards, this magazine would be published more or less regularly each month, until about November 1839. All these late printings of the magazines could be distributed among the Chinese communities only in South East Asia, such as Batavia, Singapore, Malacca, and Penang.[51] Even so, the society members hoped these books and the information contained in them would somehow reach China. The American physician missionary the Reverend Dr Peter Parker (1804–1888) gave a personal account of how Gützlaff's magazine was received in Singapore in 1835:

> I have had opportunity to see the estimation in which the magazine of Mr. Gützlaff is held by the Chinese. While at Singapore a question of chronology came up; the inquiry was made, 'do you know any book that will solve it?' 'Yes.' The magazine was produced and the question answered. 'Is this book correct?' All affirmed that it was. I adduce this example to show that the works of Europeans are appreciated.[52]

Bridgman's *Meilige heshengguo zhilüe* (A history of the United States) was completed around the end of 1837 and was published in November 1838. Not only was the treatise circulated in South East Asia, but Bridgman also presented the books to the prominent Chinese, including the Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu, during the opium confiscation crisis of 1839. Bridgman would revise this treatise twice and republish it in 1846 in Canton and in 1862 in Shanghai.[53]

It was the First Opium War that gave the society's publications an impact in mainland China. After the Qing Empire was defeated by the British, scholars such as Wei Yuan, Xu Jiyu (1795–1873), and Liang Tinglan (1796–1861) witnessed or became concerned about the power of the maritime nations, and made efforts to understand these foreigners. When these scholar officials wanted to gather materials to write

treatises on the maritime nations, the publications of the society were available to meet this need.

Upon his arrival in Canton to implement the ban on opium in March 1839, Commissioner Lin employed Chinese translators and interpreters and commissioned the translations of C. T. Downing's *The Fan-Qui in China in 1836–7*; *The Encyclopaedia of Geography* (1834), by Hugh Murray; and English newspapers published in Canton—mainly the *Canton Press* and *Canton Register*. He then asked Peter Parker, who was one of the members of the society, to translate part of the *Elements of International Law* (1836), by Henry Wheaton. Later, he would also ask Parker to help translate a letter written to Queen Victoria.[54] When Lin's opium prohibition campaign was brought to an abrupt end in 1841 by factionalism in the Qing court, he gave these materials, which would probably have included the copy that Bridgman had presented to him, to Wei Yuan and asked him to use them to write a book about the maritime nations.[55]

Wei Yuan published *Haiguo tuzhi* (Illustrated treatise on maritime countries) in fifty *juan* (chapters) in 1842, the same year that the First Opium War ended. Later, in 1847, he would revise and expand it into sixty *juan*, and one hundred *juan* in 1852, adding more materials available in Chinese. *Haiguo tuzhi* resembles an organized scrapbook in that materials from different books were cut and pasted, with minor changes, and sorted by continent and subcategorized by nation. Xiong Yuezhi's research shows that items related to the society occupied a large portion of the 1852 edition; this included fifty-seven entries from Gützlaff's *Wanguo dili quanji* (Universal geography), twenty-six from the *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* (Eastern Western monthly magazine), fourteen from *Maoyi tongzhi* (General account on trade), and twenty-four from Bridgman's *Meilige heshengguo zhilue* (A history of the United States).[56] *Haiguo tuzhi*, in turn, was one of the most important reference books on the subject of world geohistory in China in the second half of the nineteenth century. The expanded edition was presented to the Qing court in 1858. The scholar-officials of the Qing Empire referenced this source when started to learn more about the new world and the power struggles between maritime empires. *Haiguo tuzhi* also eventually made its way into Japan. In 1850 and 1853, it was banned there, but in 1854, after Japan was forced to open its ports to the Americans, it was reintroduced and made an impact on the Japanese reform era.[57]

Xu Jiyu's *Yinghuan zhilüe* (A brief description of the ocean circuit), published in 1848, along with *Haiguo tuzhi*, influenced both Qing China and Japan. Xu wrote the book in his own words after he digested materials that he had collected in Chinese and interviewed foreigners on the subjects of world geography and history. One of the foreigners he consulted several times was George Tradescant Lay (1799–1845), who was one of the most vocal members at the fourth annual meeting of the SDUKC. Xu met Lay when he was treasurer of Fujian, while Lay was in the service of the

British consul at Fuzhou after the war. Lay's Chinese name, Li Taiguo, was mentioned three times in the book.[58]

Liang Tinglan's *Heshenguo shuo* (Accounts on the United States, 1844) and *Lanlun oushuo* (Accounts of London, 1845) also relied heavily upon *Meilige heshengguo zhilue* (A history of the United States) and the *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* (Eastern Western monthly magazine), respectively. At least until the 1880s, these Chinese publications were the main sources contributing to the understanding of the maritime nations in the new situation of the Qing Empire.[59] They were the channel through which the society's publications had their impact upon China.

Convergence of interests and the war metaphor

The existing explanations for the founding of the society, namely those of Fred W. Drake, argue that the foreign community intended 'to open China by peaceful means to trade, Western civilization, and consequently to Protestant Christianity'.[60] Michael C. Lazich made this line of argument explicit by stating that 'the undertaking was seen as a favourable alternative to military engagement'.[61] Both of these aims indicate distaste for belligerence. The events that took place at Canton indicate rather that the opposite was the case when and after the society was established. Both the Warlike party and Protestant missionaries wanted war.

Murray A. Rubinstein went through the issues of the *Chinese Repository*, the major English publication of Protestant missionaries in China at this time. He contended that the missionaries by no means shunned the war arguments but rather that the First Opium War was the war the missionaries wanted. He argued that the Protestant missionaries, with the mission zeal of the early nineteenth century and through their interpretations of the Scriptures, employed a war metaphor for their work in China.[62] They brought the war metaphor into the society. The term 'intellectual artillery' was coined by none other than the American missionary Bridgman who was the chief editor of the *Chinese Repository*.

On the merchant side, the society was established by the same members of the Warlike party in the heat of the aftermath of Napier's death. The preparation of the December 1834 war petition and the founding of the society—the information war—were in fact undertaken in the same month—November 1834—by the same group of people. As a result, the war discourse permeated the establishment of the society. While James Matheson headed to London with the petition to start a campaign for war, the society started its preparation of 'intellectual artillery' in Canton. The petition was signed by about ninety British merchants who included clerks of the firms and captains in Canton, among them William Jardine, James Matheson, James Innes, Richard Turner, Robert Thom, John Slade, and Thomas Fox; all the British members of the society added their names to the petition.[63]

Thus the society's relation to the military war should be revised: rather than offering an alternative, its establishment was part of the war discourse of the British merchants and American missionaries in Canton. And the society, in its own right, constituted an informational war.

To further piece together and theorize the reasons for the society's establishment, it is worth examining the committee membership and their interest in the society. In general, the society ran with John Robert Morrison and Bridgman in charge of its day-to-day operations, while the merchants used their financial weight to sway the direction in which the society was headed. When the society was first founded, Gützlaff as a Protestant missionary alluded to the benefits of an open China in commercial terms in the 'Objects of the Society':

> Our intercourse with China has lately been extended and will, under the auspices of a free trade, expand, until it embraces all the maritime provinces of the empire and considers the flourishing region of the Yangtsze Keang as a fair field for mercantile enterprise. There will be thus a wide door open for the dissemination of truth.[64]

Similarly, Bridgman in the first year's report explicitly points out the commercial opportunities presented by a vast China:

> Such are the wants of man that they are never satisfied: the wants of this nation [China] are great; its natural productions are also great: these have given rise to an extensive commerce, which, so long as those wants continue and those productions are needed, will not cease; and if the first increase as they doubtless will, the latter will do so also; and commerce in the hands of enlightened and philanthropic men will prepare the way for the wide diffusion of useful knowledge.[65]

The benefit of an open China leading to greater commercial opportunity was underlined by the two missionaries of the society: Gützlaff and Bridgman; it served as an acknowledgement of the merchants' needs by the missionaries, as well as calling for their financial support.

Each year, the society selected one president, one treasurer, three general committee members, two Chinese secretaries, and one English secretary. For all five years, the Chinese secretary positions were filled by Gützlaff and Bridgman, while the position of English secretary was held by John Robert Morrison; these three together occupied a total of fifteen among the forty-one committee positions available over five years. These were the three people on the committee who could write articles in Chinese. In addition to Bridgman and Gützlaff, the only missionary on the committee was Parker, who held a position on the general committee once in the third year.

The society's committee was dominated by opium merchants. There were at least ten of them, occupying twenty of the forty-one committee memberships, and most of the time they filled the posts of president and treasurer—the heads of the society.

James Matheson was president for the first year and treasurer for the fourth and fifth years, while his business partner, William Jardine, was president for the second and third years. Together they guaranteed that Jardine, Matheson & Co. had a person in the society's executive positions every single year. When an extra English secretary position was created in the fifth year, it fell to Robert Thom, who was a clerk at Jardine, Matheson & Co. It is safe to say that Jardine, Matheson & Co. exerted great influence on the society. Other opium merchants, such as Robert Inglis and John Cleve Green, also filled the president or treasurer posts, while other opium dealers, including Richard Turner, William Wetmore, James Innes, and Russell Sturgis, all served on the committee. Non-opium merchants included American merchants D. W. C. Olyphant (1789–1851) and his staff member Charles W. King, who were accompanied by former East India Company employees John Robert Morrison and Hugh Hamilton Lindsay.[66] Except the missionaries, Olyphant, and King, the society's committee members were mostly associated with the Warlike party.

Having opium merchants as members of the society did not necessarily mean that it was morally corrupt. In fact, the opium merchants who were at the same time Warlike party members were associated with other charitable organizations that had similar objectives to those of the SDUKC. After Robert Morrison died in the summer of 1834, the Morrison Education Society was founded in his honour in 1836. It was run by missionaries with the financial support of this same group of merchants.[67] When the idea of the Medical Missionary Society was put into practice in 1838, the same group of people again participated.[68] Both societies were founded during the time of the SDUKC, also with the agenda of 'opening China up' alongside their primary medical and educational missions. In an appeal for the establishment of the Medical Missionary Society, the idea of medical training and care as a means to approach 'insular China' was noted.

> And that inquiry after medical truth may be provoked, there is good reason to expect: for, exclusive as China is, in all her system, she cannot exclude disease, not shut her people up from the desire of relief. . . . At any rate, this seems the only open door; let us enter it.[69]

In its second annual report, the SDUKC announced its cooperation with the Morrison Education Society, promising that some Chinese students would be trained in both English and Chinese and that 'these are the persons who must be mainly instrumental in diffusing useful knowledge among the Chinese, their countrymen'.[70] The missionaries who initiated these two societies knew that by upholding the flag of 'opening up China', they could attract financial support from the foreign merchants in Canton. Christian values were also used to appeal to the merchants, but the agenda of 'opening China up' was more attractive to them.

The ambiguous designation 'opening China up' allowed the two main constituents of the society, the merchants and missionaries, to read their own meanings and interests into the proceedings. For the merchants, an open China meant one open to free trade; for the missionaries, it meant a China open to Christianity. In addition to opening China up from the inside, the society aimed to convince the Chinese of the greatness of the British Empire in order to win the proper respect that was believed to be overdue in the design of the Canton system. The war metaphor therefore expressed the Canton foreign community's wishes to break out of their containment by the Qing's Canton system—to open China up for the purposes of extensive trade and free proselytizing.

Asserting Christianity

In the first two years of the society, no Christianity-related items were proposed for publication. When the society's publication plan eventually suggested that this subject area should be introduced to the Chinese, the 'natural theology' of William Paley (1743–1805) was put in seventh place on the list, above only belles-lettres in priority. The Christian mission was questioned at the first annual general meeting in 1835 by the British merchant James Innes in response to the Qing government's ban on Chinese printing houses undertaking any work for foreigners following the tract-distributing trips made by Gützlaff and Steven to Fujian Province earlier in the year. The result of this ban was that the society needed to find alternative printing facilities outside China. While discussing this issue James Innes, a notoriously bad-tempered opium agent in Canton, said:

> No one regrets more than I do the abeyance of the Chinese press in China. It is a misfortune to the cause of truth! But if this meeting views it fairly, and its causes, they will derive from it strength, not weakness. It was by many esteemed doubtful—never by me, whether the thousands of tracts sent among this great people produced an effect or not. So misinformed were we, that we remained in the dark, until a clear lucid, definite fact was arrived at, that these tracts had moved the whole Chinese empire, as avowed by recent edicts from the throne, which presides over so many millions of human beings—all willing, so far as we know, to receive truth, but hitherto barred from it by selfish motives![71]

Considering that proselytization was the very reason the missionaries were willing to risk their lives to break the law of the Qing Empire, that two of the three hands that were able to write materials in Chinese were missionaries, and that the third John Robert Morrison was the son of Robert Morrison, the pioneer of the Protestant mission in China, the Christian voice in the society had been quiet thus far—to say the least. Bridgman had commented on the prospects of publications in Chinese that

'knowledge and science are the handmaids of religion' two months before the foundation of the society.[72] To a great extent, this explains the missionaries' dispositions regarding the society and the diffusing of useful knowledge in China.

Three books concerning Christianity were proposed for publication in the third year of the society, out of fifteen books that had been proposed thus far. All three were drawn from Robert Morrison's early writings, which included *A Short Treatise on the Being of a God*, *A History of the Jews*, and *A Voyage Round the World*.[73]

At the fourth annual meeting, things took a new direction, and the missionaries became more assertive. After the presentation of the annual report, long speeches concerning Christianity were made by Bridgman, Parker, and Lay. One possible reason for the missionaries' new-found confidence was that Lay, a representative of the British and Foreign Bible Society and thus a strong financial backer, had arrived in Canton. In 1815 the Bible Society had paraded its generosity by giving Robert Morrison £2,000 to support his translation, printing, and distribution of the New Testament.[74] It is likely that Lay tipped the balance in favour of the missionaries with his ties to strong financial support. Just three months earlier, the *Register* had noted that the society was 'nearly paralyzed at present for the want of funds'.[75] With highly charged self-confidence, Lay evaluated the society in the ordering of a Christian world:

> As to the rank of this society, we shall soon perceive that it lays claim to no mean relationship and affinity. If the Bible Societies hold the first place, because they propose to give the word of God to every human being; if missionary societies take the second, because their object is to send men to teach all nations the way of salvation; societies like this may fairly come into the third, because they labour to diffuse among all classes of a community that knowledge, which is the best of all worldly gifts—as it is the grammar and interpretation of God's works, an analytic and synthetic account of those very lessons which they teach.[76]

This spelled out how the society was linked to Christianity and justified it as missionary work. It contrasted with the situation hitherto, in which the missionaries, entirely dependent on the support of the merchants, had alluded to commercial interests in the meetings.

Lay promised that when he was back in England, he would 'endeavour to create sober and enlightened views of her [the society's] condition, and, as opportunity shall serve, strive to awaken feeling and sympathy in favour of the praiseworthy and truly excellent undertaking which we are now met to consider'. After this delivery, it was motioned by Bridgman and seconded by Matheson that the society change its regulation that the 'resident members shall include native and foreign gentlemen' instead of 'resident members shall include native and foreign gentlemen *in China*'.[77] This was to welcome Lay's continuing membership and possibly attract others in England to the society. The extension also meant that any further financial support was welcome.

By and large, in its first four years of existence the society was financed by merchants whose profits derived mainly from the opium trade. Adding to the controversy of the missionaries' cooperation with the opium traders, Gützlaff joined the opium ship of Jardine, Matheson & Co. as an interpreter. Gützlaff together with Bridgman and John Robert Morrison all provided their linguistic services either during the war or the signing of the treaty thereafter.[78] Their cosy relations with the private merchants and the British imperial state were characteristic of the Canton era: missionaries could operate only under the auspices of merchants because they were banned by the Qing, while the Qing's policy of disengagement afforded Western nations little choice but to employ the pioneering missionaries' knowledge of China and Chinese.

Following the First Opium War, the fully functioning society, with the high spirits and newly charged energy of its fifth year, disappeared amid the turbulence. After the war, merchants and missionaries were free to live and trade in the treaty ports. The Protestant missionaries gradually established their enterprise, first at treaty ports and then moving inland, preaching Christianity as well as modern Western knowledge.[79]

The information war waged by the missionaries together with the private merchants in Canton represented another form of engagement with Qing China after Lord Macartney's and Lord Amherst's frustrated embassy journeys to Beijing in 1793 and 1816. The diplomatic engagement was formed with the understanding that the Qing Empire was a great world power to be reckoned with, and it was conceived by the EIC, which as a trader and a semi-official institution was on relatively friendly terms with the Qing. The EIC differed from the British private merchants in that the argument for a war was never their central agenda. The private merchants did not have the same well-established access to the British government as did the EIC, and thus they resorted to the activities of the society, along with public campaigning and, later, lobbying to bring the British state to bear on China. The 1830s were the height of British imperial expansion in the East, and the Warlike party wanted this imperial power to come to their aid in Canton. The development of the information war anticipated the military engagement that began in 1839 and provided both the theoretical framework and justification for a military war. The interests behind both wars were the convergent aims of the merchants and missionaries of opening China up to trade and proselytizing.

5
A War of Words over 'Barbarian'

The character *yi* 夷 was used by Qing officials in their memorials, edicts, and other official communication from the mid-eighteenth century as the main word to denote European merchants in Canton. How to translate *yi* was a subject of fierce debate among the British of Canton in the 1830s. When the word was rendered into English as 'barbarian', the Warlike party believed by this designation the Chinese insulted their nation; the name 'barbarian' was a matter of 'national honour'. It added one more reason to start a war against China. In the December 1834 war petition presented in the wake of the Napier Affair, the designation 'barbarian' was cited by the Warlike party as one of the major reasons for a show of British naval force in China, to require 'ample reparation'.

> for the arrogant and degrading language used towards your Majesty and our country in edicts emanating from the local authorities, wherein your Majesty was represented as the 'reverently submissive' tributary of the Emperor of China, and your Majesty's subjects as *profligate barbarians*, and that they be retracted, and never again employed by Chinese functionaries.[1]

The demands on the Chinese to stop calling the British *yi*, as has been well documented, would be proposed in the treaty negotiations of 1842, and eventually the word was banished from Chinese official documents in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin.[2] The forgotten history that this chapter charts is that the equivalence in translation between *yi* and 'barbarian' was made in Canton between 1828 and 1834. More importantly, in 1837 the British merchants backtracked on this translation after long debates that consulted many Chinese teachers and quoted a good number of classical Chinese texts. The British merchants pinned down what they believed to be the correct answer: that *yi* should be translated into English as either 'foreigner' or 'stranger'. But this belated conclusion did not help break the equivalence between *yi* and 'barbarian' or change the argument that cited the naming as one argument for war, both of which gained wide circulation after the 1835 war campaign in London.

The Chinese context of the word *yi* was even more complex. As a naming practice, the *yi* designation was another layer of the Qing's soft border. During the reigns of the Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors, that is, before the 1720s, Europeans were mainly

called 'western ocean people' (*xiyangren*). The use of *yi* to designate Europeans became a standard practice during the Qing time only starting around the 1750s, coinciding with the tightening of controls on Europeans in China. Behind the *yi* designation was the wish to distinguish China from the rest of the world as part of the soft border that drew on a scholar-official intellectual tradition known as neo-Confucianism. This school advocated a non-engagement policy regarding 'strangers' and a Confucian fundamentalism with a hardened moral outlook exemplified by Commissioner Lin and his associates' strict opium eradication policy. The word *yi* to replace 'western ocean people' was bureaucratic language to refer to the *strangers*—the Europeans, particularly the British—who were not educated in the Confucian way and were to be kept outside and quarantined if they came into contact. In Canton the softer border and the neo-Confucian ideology were mutually reinforcing.

The first *yi* debate

The issue of naming started in the East India Company days. After long years of trade in Canton, the EIC—for the first time since James Flint—had an able China hand, George Thomas Staunton, who could read, write, and converse with the Chinese in Chinese. Staunton had accompanied his father on the Macartney embassy to the Qing imperial court when he was twelve and started learning Chinese during the sea journey to China. He was a treasure to the EIC's Canton Factory after he joined in 1798 on account of his linguistic skill.[3] The amicable solving of the 1807 Neptune murder case owed much to Staunton's language skills in negotiation and his understanding of the Chinese legal system and culture.[4]

One of the things Staunton discovered in Chinese documents in 1814 was that the Chinese used the word *manyi* (southern and eastern barbarians) to refer to the British in official communications. The EIC staff then filed a petition to the local magistrate arguing that the designation 'seemed to be pejorative'. The Canton local authorities replied that it was the 'general name for foreigners' and there was nothing pejorative about it.[5] This is the earliest record found of British protesting on the naming issue.

Satisfied with this answer, Staunton later in 1836 would argue that the word *yi* was not insulting and should not be translated as 'barbarian'.[6] Robert Morrison, who succeeded Staunton as translator and interpreter for the EIC, in 1827 described *yi* as a 'dubious word, never used by ourselves'.[7] This cast a shadow on the word *yi*, although he still translated it as 'foreign', consistent with his first translation when he published *The Dictionary of the Chinese Language* in 1823.[8]

Yi came to the attention of the British private merchants in the spring of 1828 in the recently launched *Register*. It began with the Portuguese, who wished to build a road 'for rambling play, and running horses abreast' as the Chinese understood what was going on near a Chinese village on the Macao peninsula. Anxious that this

race track was going to injure the *feng shui*, the local elite sent a petition to the magistrate, which, together with the magistrate's reply, was translated into English and published in the *Register*. The word *yimu* (foreign chief) was used in the edict to designate the Portuguese procurator of Macao. The *Register* translated *yimu* as 'barbarian eye', adding that this was 'insulting', on the basis that it was 'taking only however a part of the head, an eye to see and direct, but not allowing in the figure any brain to control the vision'.[9] This interpretation of *mu* (eye) was capable of arousing a sense of being insulted, but this was not what the magistrate intended. *Mu* here denoted a lower-level official, rather than its literal meaning, 'eye'. This was probably the earliest translation of the word *yimu* in this manner. And *yi* in this context was regarded as an insulting Chinese character.

Upon reading this translation, a reader using the pseudonym X wrote a letter to the *Register* saying that it 'seems harsh to call us, Christians from Europe and America, barbarians'. Yet he thought this was normal, for just as the Greeks and Romans 'called the rest of the mankind barbarians, so the modern Christians of Europe, call the rest of the world "uncivilized" which is equivalent, I fancy, to being barbarian'. His response towards this alleged insulating designation was to 'laugh at them'.[10] In facing the label 'barbarian', X's attitude, unlike that of the editor of the *Register*, was rather relaxed.

Another reader, Z, traced the etymology of the words *yi* in Chinese and 'barbarian' in English. He quoted from an English translation saying that to the Chinese people living in the 'middle kingdom', people from the east were called *yi*, from the west *rong*, south *man*, and north *di*. *Yi* was part of a system of categorizing other peoples.[11] Z then quoted from the Confucian scholar Mencius, who argued that the two sage kings Shun (ca. 2253–2205? BCE) and Wen (ca. 1184–1135? BCE) were from the 'western *yi*' and 'eastern *yi*', respectively, but what really mattered was that they ruled virtuously.[12] In Mencius's usage, *yi* was no longer restricted to the people from the east; it means 'non–Middle Kingdom people' in general. In relating it to two sage kings, this context gave the character *yi* a positive connotation. Yet Z was not comforted by Mencius's words, and he added that the commentator of this passage 'takes pains to explain, that the odium of the word *Ee* [*yi*], must not be applied to them [the two kings]'.[13] Thus, to Z, *yi* remained a negative designation.

Z had a good reason to believe so, for he found 'in the political morality of Confucius, he speaks of expelling bad men from the middle and flowery Chinese nation to the four *yi*, i.e. the "barbarous nations" all around'. 'The *yi* nations therefore contain the refuse of mankind.'[14] Z's reading of the word *yi* was one of the earliest inferences of the Chinese rejecting people from outside the 'Middle Kingdom'. It seems the neo-Confucian interpretation of Confucian teachings in its fundamentalist manner, which emphasized the distinction between the Chinese and the rest, found its way into Z's reading of the word *yi*.

Nor was Z satisfied with the Europeans' treatment of others. He traced the etymology of 'barbarian' back to the Greek *barbaros* and commented on 'how the Christians of Europe have treated the people they deemed barbarians, and savages'. 'Although their religion taught them to call no men common or unclean, they have considered Africans and Indians as an inferior species and deistical sophists have taken the same side as these pseudo-Christians.' He was of the opinion that these designations, both the European and the Chinese, implied that you may 'give a dog a bad name, and then you may kill them'.[15] Z seemed to have written in the context of the movement for the abolition of slavery in the early nineteenth century. The message from Z was clear: that this kind of designation, be it *yi* or 'barbarian', was 'pernicious to the welfare of mankind'.[16]

Less than a year later, in 1829, an edict from the governor-general of Canton, replying to a complaint from British private merchants about the low price of cotton, was translated and published in the *Register*. Two rather contradictory footnotes were inserted into the translation. One read, 'Foreign, or barbarians, is used throughout, instead of the pronoun *We*; *Merchants*, would be better.' The other was confrontational. It read, 'The offensive word E [*yi*], barbarian, is repeated six times in the space of three lines.'[17] These two notes expressing different opinions could have come from the two co-editors of the *Register*. The first one could have been written by Robert Morrison. Morrison was rather hesitant about whether *yi* should be translated as 'barbarians' or 'foreign'. He had translated it as 'foreign' in 1823 and 1827. But during the Napier Affair in 1834, he would translate *yimu*, used by Chinese officials to call Napier, as 'barbarian eye', just like in the 1828 article in the *Register*. Morrison's change of mind reflected the changing relations between the Chinese and British at the time British private merchants became dominant in the port. This determined how the word *yi* was understood and represented in English. Matheson was likely the co-editor who inserted the second note, for he argued that *yi* meant 'barbarian' and was insulting when he took the December 1834 petition back to London to campaign for a war with China, and his opinion was representative of the Warlike party.[18]

Even though ambiguity existed in 1829, the general opinion was shifting towards believing that *yi* meant 'barbarian'. By early 1832, as has been well documented, when the *Lord Amherst* went up the eastern coast to survey the coast and to find trade opportunities, the British confronted local officials on the word *yi* used on this occasion, as it was understood to mean 'barbarian'.[19] When the investigating party led by Hugh Hamilton Lindsay and Karl Gützlaff reached Shanghai, they wrote a letter to the Superintendent of the Maritime Military Defence Circuit Wu Qitai asking for permission to trade for mutual benefit. Wu replied that there was no such precedent for Shanghai as a port for the *yi* to trade and asked the ship to leave immediately.[20] The party did not seem bothered much by the refusal of trade but protested to Wu saying that Britain was not an *yiguo* (barbarian country) but an *waiguo* (foreign country)

and that this wording in Wu's edict injured the 'dignity' (*timian*) of the British. They reasoned that the British possessed unprecedentedly large territory and imperial power and thus should not be called *yi*. In reply, Wu quoted the passage of Mencius about the two sages that Z had quoted, except that Wu took it as evidence that *yi* insinuated nothing sinister.[21]

The party then answered back that Britain was in the west and should not be called *yi* (the original meaning of *yi* was people from the east). The *Record of Laws and Systems of the Qing* (*Da Qing huidian*) was quoted to argue that *yi* was used in it to designate ethnic minorities of China, saying that the British were different from them and that therefore the British should not be referred to as *yi*.[22] They further quoted a passage from the celebrated Song dynasty (960–1279) poet Su Shi (1037–1101) to prove that *yi* did not simply mean 'foreigners':

> The E[yi] and Teih[di] cannot be governed by the same rules of government as those of the central nation. They are like brute creation (like birds and beasts); if liberal rules of government were applied to them, it would infallibly give rise to rebellious confusion. The ancient kings knew this well, and therefore ruled them without laws. This mode of government is decidedly the most judicious mode of governing them.[23]

Su Shi's passage was a key neo-Confucian text that made a distinction between the cultured 'Middle Kingdom' people and the rest of the world. The British certainly had an able hand on board, probably one of their Chinese teachers, in assisting with arguing with Wu. A few days later Wu issued a decree to the *Lord Amherst* with a much softer mode of expression and most importantly used only the term 'the said merchants' (*gai shang*) to denote the British.[24] The *Lord Amherst* left Shanghai two days later. As Lydia Liu argued, had the *Lord Amherst* lingered within his jurisdiction, Wu could have lost his job if not worse, for no foreign ships were supposed to appear in waters other than those of Canton.[25] While begging them to leave, one lower official was in tears in front of Gützlaff and Lindsay; the change from *yi* to *shang* was a move by the bureaucrats to save themselves from trouble.[26]

For the Qing court, more was at stake than the local official's career and life. They regarded the British attempt to establish contact with the coastal Chinese people for trade as a threat to imperial state security and order. Several lower-ranking officials were punished merely because the *Lord Amherst* appeared in their jurisdiction. Repeated nationwide edicts were issued from the court reinforcing the prohibition of contact between the Chinese and foreigners.[27] But the Chinese subjects were falling over each other to make contact with the *Lord Amherst*. This created an unseen bustle along the coast wherever the *Lord Amherst* went. The coastal people went after the British for many different reasons: to trade opium or tea, to beg for money, to satisfy their curiosity, to offer their services as ghost writers for petitioning, and to return a favour done by a certain Westerner to someone's ancestor. The officials along the

coastal area again and again issued decrees lest social order be disturbed, fearing the potential of disorder to lead to rebellion.[28] The distribution of the translated pamphlet *A Brief Account of the English Character*—as described in Chapter 3—on this occasion caused the Daoguang emperor to be alarmed about the breach of the dynastic state security—the Canton system—when he noticed the printing style was Chinese inland.

Studying the *Lord Amherst*'s voyage, Lydia Liu argued that in protesting against the word *yi*, the sovereign desire of the British was injured by this strange moment of mirroring as the British imposed the English meaning 'barbarian' on the Chinese word: the translation was made by the British to their own injury. This 'coloniality of injury . . . found its fullest legal expression . . . in the British justification for war'.[29] Liu's 'injury' was British merchants' 'national honour'. Her argument, although speculation rather than a contextualized analysis, explains well the circumstances in which in the late 1820s and 1830s the last thing the British private merchants, and to an extent the staff of the EIC, expected was to be called 'barbarian' when they arrived in Canton. Rather, from time to time some British merchants called the Chinese 'semi-barbarous' or outright 'barbarian'.[30]

Employing Chinese to fight the *yi* concept[31]

After the confrontation over the word *yi* on the journey to the east coast, Gützlaff seemed to have been fascinated by the idea that Chinese regarded outsiders as barbarians. In the following years he spent a great deal of his creative energy in combatting it. In the manifesto of his Chinese journal, the *Eastern Western Monthly Magazine* (*Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan*), Gützlaff commented that the Chinese 'still profess to be first among the nations of the earth and regard all others as Barbarians'. Gützlaff argued that his magazine would inform the Chinese 'we are not indeed Barbarian'.[32] Gützlaff published a whole series of poems, letters, and short stories in Chinese for the purpose of confronting the word *yi* in the *Eastern Western Monthly Magazine* (*Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan*). These were all in the form of first-person accounts, purportedly by Chinese writers, for the purpose of persuading readers more convincingly.

Gützlaff favoured the epistolary format that was then one of the most popular genres in both France and Great Britain. Twelve letters were printed, allegedly written by Chinese travelling abroad to inform people back in China of the good life they found in the outside world. These included letters from 'A Nephew Abroad to His Aunt', 'A Nephew Abroad to His Uncle', 'The Uncle's Reply to the Nephew', and 'A Scholar Abroad to His Friend'.[33] The letters informed relatives and friends back home about the true life of Westerners, which was anything but barbarian. Gützlaff's work can be seen as part of the Canton Warlike party's informational war, prior to the founding of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China.

A letter entitled 'A Son Abroad to his Father' (*Zi wai ji fu*), for instance, purported to be from Peru's capital, Lima. It first described how on the sea journey the sailor used equipment such as the armillary sphere (*huantianyi*) and an hourglass together with the time of sunrise to measure the whereabouts of the ship in terms of longitude and latitude. The letter related in detail the well-designed modern ship, sophisticated sailing technology, and breadth of geographical knowledge that were used by the Europeans. When 'the son' came to Peru and its capital city, he recounts:

> I used to see the barbarians (*yi*) as people living in insignificant states. When [I] arrived in the country called Peru seeing the broad space, the beautiful city, the impressive people, and the prosperous market, I [was rendered] shameful and speechless. For Chinese had learned only that the barbarians were starving to death and [led] a poor, low-class [life], and we felt sorry for them. I did not expect to come to the city called Lima to see where houses were well situated; streets were wide; [people] behaved according to the five cardinal rules and were well-educated; agriculture and business complemented each other; labourers and entrepreneurs respected each other. Also the government here propagated doctrines making people know rectitude and etiquette.[34]

Peru was made by Gützlaff to conform to Confucian values as if it were a decent Chinese city. The existence of other equally prosperous civilizations outside China and the inappropriateness of the term *yi* were the key messages of this letter. But the historical reality of Peru between the 1820s and 1840s, the time when 'the son' supposedly travelled to that country, was neither Confucian nor prosperous. Newly independent from the Spanish Empire, Peru was in a chaotic state from 1819, which lasted more than two decades. The unstable situation manifested in the fact that between 1821 and 1845 there were twenty-four regime changes and the constitution was rewritten six times.[35] The coming and going of armies, especially in the capital city Lima, made daily life difficult and certainly did not generate the flourishing scene purportedly observed by this Chinese traveller.

The same tactic of portraying a utopian world to Chinese readers can be found in the ten Chinese poems in the form of five-character regular verse allegedly written by a Chinese person living in London and published in Gützlaff's magazine at the beginning of 1834. The poems described the broad streets of affluent London, with bright road lamps in the night, the splendid houses with painted walls and stained glass, the River Thames and its bridges being as marvellous as those of Luoyang in China. There was entertainment by comedy in theatre, high society moving out of London to enjoy the countryside in September, the custom of dressing up for dinner, silver and glass dinner sets, and committed, loving husbands and wives.[36] This was nothing like the wretched London of Charles Dickens's *Oliver Twist*, published five years later in 1839. The London fed to the Chinese reader had no space for the pickpocketing orphans in

the East End, nor any scene like that of the 12-year-old Dickens working in a boot-blacking factory beside the River Thames.[37] It was a utopia painted in words for the Chinese for the sake of combatting the alleged Chinese notion of Western 'barbarism'.

In *General Account of Great Britain* (*Dayinguo tongzhi*), also published in 1834, Gützlaff created a Chinese traveller called Ye Duhua, who went to England and stayed there for more than twenty years, coming back to China to tell his countrymen about his experience. Five chapters of the book each contained a dialogue between Ye and his countrymen explaining one aspect of Britain. The dialogue in the first chapter described the evening when Ye, after arriving back in China, talked to an audience of his compatriots about what he had seen in Britain. One of the audience members, Lin Quande, entered into dialogue with Ye. Lin asked whether it was true that the *yi* were animal-like, eating grass and living in caves, and so on. Ye said to Lin:

> Although we know no geography and history of foreign countries, we can see the foreign guests in Canton who more or less display the dignity of their countries. In terms of artisan skill we can just see from their ships. Albeit they do not know Chinese, they have their own literature which is no different to ours.[38]

Through Ye's first-hand account the book revealed that the British had the same dignity as the Chinese and were equally civilized. These dialogues, poems, and letters about London, Britain, and Peru spoke in first-person accounts as a device to make inroads into the Chinese symbolic system to persuade the Chinese that the British were not barbarians; on the contrary, they were respectable people. But was this a mirage created through translation by the merchants and missionaries tilting at windmills, or was it a genuine pernicious idea held by the Chinese? The British merchants' second round of debates about the *yi* question in their print media, starting in late 1835, rendered their previous work befitting of Don Quixote.

The second *yi* debate

During the campaign for a war in London between 1835 and 1836, Matheson published a pamphlet entitled *The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*. In it Matheson argued that the Chinese 'consider all other inhabitants of the earth (as already intimated) as barbarians'.[39] Lindsay, who led the confrontation in Shanghai in 1832, also in 1836 published a pamphlet entitled *Letter to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China* in London, supporting war. On the *yi* question Lindsay argued:

> I do not hesitate to maintain that these terms are premeditatedly used by the Chinese in the most offensive and insulting sense, and with no object but the deeply rooted one of persuading themselves that all foreigners are beings morally

> degraded and inferior to Chinese, nor can we reasonably expect better treatment so long as this impression is allowed to remain.[40]

To Lindsay, the barbarian question was central to the British position in China and by extension to the prosperity of British commerce. The word *yi* symbolized how *badly* the British were treated by the Chinese. Lindsay's and Matheson's pamphlets published in London, like the December 1834 war petition and the war metaphor employed in the founding of the SDUKC, were written after Napier's funeral. In all these, the anger over China's treatment of Napier and frustration over the dashed hope of reforming trade conditions were apparent.

But Napier's conduct was controversial, as was the war campaign that held his death up as its rallying banner. Not only was there the controversy of petition signed by 'less than half of the British residents in Canton', as the Pacific party argued, but Sinologists in London were appalled at Napier's actions. The *Asiatic Journal* commented that Napier's improper mode of contact with the Chinese government 'has been almost universally condemned at home'.[41] The *Quarterly Review* echoed that the literal translation of *yi* into English as 'barbarian' was largely responsible for making the Chinese 'appear to great disadvantage in the eyes of Europeans' and argued that a more idiomatic translation of 'stranger or foreigner' was more appropriate.[42]

Staunton, who had by now returned to Britain and was active in London political circles, criticized the translation by saying that it 'tends to widen the breach between us and the Chinese'. In his opinion 'the sooner it is abandoned the better'. Neither was Staunton happy with the translation of *yimu* as 'barbarian eye', as he himself was an *yimu* in Canton in the 1810s. Quoting from Robert Morrison's dictionary, he argued that *yimu* should be translated as 'the head or principal person'.[43]

With opinions widely differing in London and the political circumstances not in their favour, Matheson and Lindsay found their campaign was getting them nowhere and there was no sign at all of the possibility of 'ample reparation'. But the idea that the Chinese called the British 'barbarian' was appealing and had more purchase in the print media in 1830s Britain. Despite opposition from Sinologists, the translation after entering public discussion took on a life of its own started to spread around this time. And it has lasted well into the twenty-first century.

As Canton's and London's public spheres were connected, six months later, in September 1835, the article in the *Asiatic Journal* on the *yi* question arrived in Canton and served to ignite a second round of debate. The *Register* started, as it strongly disagreed with the *Asiatic Journal*, insisting that *yi* was an 'insulting and disrespectful epithet'.[44] The *Repository*, alluding to the Italian adage 'traduttore, traditore' (translator, traitor), mockingly commented that if the 'idiomatic translation' were translated back into Chinese, the mandarin would denounce the translator as a traitor who would be 'forthwith dispatched to the cold country'.[45]

In the following two years, the *yi* issue was constantly talked about in the Canton print media, especially in the *Register*.[46] One reader commented that this designation was a 'positive insult' and asked 'our government to do their duty to us here'. This was echoed by the *Register*'s editor, John Slade, who commented that the 'ridiculous pretensions of the black haired people' must be checked and that it was a 'birthright' to ask Britain to rectify this situation for the British in Canton.[47] The designation 'barbarian' became a focal point for part of the British community to vent their discontent and a rallying cry for the Warlike party in their quest for a war. When the second round of debates started in late 1835, the whole Canton foreign community seemed to agree that *yi* meant 'barbarian'. The *Canton Press* did not see the word itself as sufficiently offensive to merit a war, but it agreed on the translation.[48]

Opinion was to take a U-turn in 1837, when the word *yi*, together with the phrase *ziwai shengcheng* that was used in an official document, was published in the newspapers. As the campaign of prohibition against opium consumption and import intensified in mid-1837, it moved into dealing with foreign smugglers. Governor-General Deng Tingzhen (in office, 1835–1840), ordered the expulsion of the three well-known opium traders, William Jardine, Richard Turner, and Lancelot Dent, from Canton (they would not leave until early 1839). The edict on this matter was translated into English and published in the *Register* with the sentence '*gai yi ziwai shengcheng*' translated thus: 'as these said foreigners belong to other countries'.[49] The next week, the editor John Slade stated in an amendment that, having consulted a native Chinese teacher, he now thought this sentence should be translated 'as these foreigners are born and brought up in the depraved principles of uncivilised nations they are an impracticable and untameable race'.[50] This was more like an explanation than a translation. Slade believed he understood the Chinese attitude in using the word *yi* and wanted to teach this point to the community through his English rendering of the six Chinese characters.

John Robert Morrison had translated the same edict in the *Press* three weeks earlier, in which he rendered the sentence merely as 'the said foreign merchants' without paying much attention. Upon seeing the two translations of Slade, Morrison went to ask a native teacher and then rendered the sentence with a slight amendment as 'if the said foreign merchants outrageously produce and create (trouble)'. Morrison translated the term *shengcheng* as 'to produce and create'. Slade responded to this by quoting a long list of examples of *shengcheng* in other Chinese contexts to demonstrate that his translation 'to be born and brought up' was the correct one.[51] Morrison was more likely to be in the wrong here, with *ziwai shengcheng* meaning 'uncultured in the Chinese way', instead of its literal meaning of 'producing'. Morrison's reading does not make sense. Slade's rendering was much closer to how the sentence would be understood at the time: as the political philosophy was dominated by neo-Confucianism, the bureaucrats wanted to make a clear distinction between the Chinese and the rest.

The disagreement between Slade and Morrison generated heat for debates among the Canton foreigners, which came to the boil in the summer of 1837. The following month, the *Register* was full of articles, readers' letters and editorial comments on the *yi* question. Chinese sources such as the ancient *Shangshu* (*Venerated Documents*) and the dictionary *Kangxi zidian* (1716) were quoted; and Mencius's and Su Shi's paragraphs along with other obscure passages relating to the word *yi* were quoted and explained at length in order to pin down the exact meaning. Chinese teachers were consulted and quoted as authoritative.[52]

While the various opinions were voiced on top of each other, Slade started to change his opinion dramatically and believed that the etymology of *yi* fell on both sides and could be translated as both 'foreigners or stranger' and 'barbarian', but that the current usage of the word in official documents was more likely to mean 'foreigners or stranger'—the same opinion as that of the *Asiatic Journal* in 1835. He put this out in the *Register* in July. There were disagreements. Slade then spelled out his opinions ever more clearly than before: 'Upon a balance of the probabilities of the two meanings, we still hold our opinion that *foreigner* is preferable to *barbarian*.'[53] Slade's change of opinion on the translation likely occurred because in translating the term *ziwai shengcheng* he had realized that the key to the question was the *distinction* between the Chinese and non-Chinese in cultural terms. Thus, the difference signalled in the word *yi* did not mean that the British were regarded as 'barbarian'. Slade then further clarified that 'when the two characters *Man E* [*manyi*] are used together, then, indeed, contempt and insult are expressed'.[54] Distinguishing between *yi* and *manyi* sealed the argument, for it put *yi* in a positive light, while *manyi* took the blame—Slade probably did not see the 1814 petition in which the British were called precisely *manyi*.

This discovery did not mean that the British merchants were ready to be called *yi*. The word *yi*, if not offensive, was certainly not respectful to the British imperial sensitivity. One reader referenced an example where the Chinese called mountain tribes 'Too E' (*tuyi*, literally 'soil strangers'). He argued that Europeans were not in the same categories as these people. 'And certainly, we shall all regard it as a sign of better feeling of the Chinese towards us, when they willingly allow the term to go into disuse, which I hope will soon be the case.'[55] This was about making Chinese acknowledge the self-regard of Britain as a mighty and *civilized* nation.

The British merchants in Canton had other reasons to ask for the disuse of the word *yi*. In the same article that reaffirmed the opinion that *yi* meant 'foreigner or stranger', Slade complained:

> We are sinking day by day into deeper contempt. Walking is forbidden, our passage boats are stopped, our ships are driven to the offing, boats carrying despatches are seized, Hong merchants fail and the foreign merchants are robbed;—and all this and more, much more, is borne without remonstrance.[56]

The campaign to drive opium out of China had further tightened the grip on the foreigners and made their trade and lives in Canton more difficult than ever. The roots of the word *yi* might have been uncovered, but the Canton system was restrictive as ever, and China beyond the Thirteen Factories remained inaccessible. The designation was to be blamed, for through it the British were seen as the others who were not to be engaged with. The word still needed to be confronted.

The wishes to expel the word were brought to the negotiating table in 1842 during the war. The interpreters were Morrison and Gützlaff, who had participated in the *yi* debates with different opinions. The only available records on the *yi* question in the negotiations are from the Chinese side. *Yi* was 'not graceful' (*bu mei*), which was cited by the British side as the reason for stopping the use. Mencius's words concerning King Shun and King Wen were again cited by the Chinese negotiator as proof that *yi* contained no negative meaning. After arguing for a while, the two sides could not agree on the issue, and the case was dropped.[57]

The 1837 summer debate was the reason that the British side used the 'not graceful' argument. They did not argue that the term was 'insulting', as the first debate and the war campaign of 1835 had. But this did not make history. The translation 'barbarian' had gone into circulation. The justification before and after the war swayed the *yi* question.

More than three ways of naming

Though *yi* received the attention and notoriety in the English-speaking world, it was only one of the three major ways of designating Europeans during the Qing period, namely the 'western ocean system', 'the *yi* system', and the 'devil (*gui*) system'.[58]

The term 'western ocean' (*xiyang*), together with its two variations—*xi* (west) and *yang* (ocean) as a prefix in making a compound—were the main words used before the 1750s to refer to European people and objects. When a missionary who lived in Canton presented 'western wines' (*yangjiu*) to the Kangxi emperor in 1710, he was referred to as a 'western ocean person' (*xiyangren*).[59] So was the Jesuit who was granted the right to live in a church in Canton in 1707, and the missionary involved in a quarrel with his Chinese landlord in 1715.[60] Made known of the quarrel of 1715 by a missionary serving in the court, the Kangxi emperor ordered the governor of Zhili to investigate with a specific instruction: 'The western ocean people have come to China for nearly three hundred years, and no unpleasant incidents have been seen. If the case does not matter much, [it] can be convicted lightly.'[61]

The merchants coming to trade were also called 'western ocean people'.[62] Every year when the trading season started the Canton governor-general would organize memorials to report the numbers of European ships that had arrived and the types

of goods they carried. The merchants and the staff of the East India Company were called in these memorials 'western ocean people' (*xiyangren*); their ships were named 'ocean ships' (*yangchuan*); their writing system, 'western ocean words' (*xiyangzi*); the enamel they carried to China, *xiyangfalan*; their European cloth, *yangbu*; and their unnameable or unspecified cargo, *xiyangwujian* (western things).[63]

Canton was also the first port of call for Europeans other than missionaries and merchants who visited the Qing court. The governor-general there reported in 1718 the arrival of a 'western ocean mandarin' (*xiyangdaren*), that is, an ambassador, sent by 'the Western Ocean King of Cultivation' (*xiyang jiaohuawang*), that is, the pope.[64] Another embassy sent by the pope in 1725, understood by the Qing to be a tribute, was called the 'western ocean ambassador' (*xiyang shichen*).[65] The Portuguese procurator of Macao was designated 'the western ocean official in charge' (*xianyangren lishiguan*) in a memorial of 1719, as at this time Macao had an ambiguous self-governing status in a far corner of the Qing Empire.[66]

When the negative side effects of the prohibition on Christianity in the 1720s reached the Portuguese in Macao in 1724, the governor-general of Canton made a count of the population there and reported that there were 3,567 western ocean people. He assured the Yongzheng emperor that because the Macao Portuguese had their own livelihoods on the peninsula, they differed from the 'the western ocean men who preach doctrines' (*chuanjiao xiyanren*), the missionaries.[67]

The dominance of the western ocean system in naming Europeans before the 1750s signified a neutral position, if not a welcoming policy, under the early Qing. This was exemplified by Kangxi's 1715 edicts to the Zhili governor asking for leniency on behalf of a missionary, saying that Europeans did not make much trouble. It was also consistent with the laissez-faire policy that opened four ports in 1683.

The character *yi* (夷, the second *yi* used during the Qing; hereafter referred to as 'the second *yi*') that caused trouble in the 1830s was not widely used in the official communication before the 1750s. In its stead was the word *yi* (彝, hereafter the first *yi*), with the same pronunciation and with four times more strokes to write. The first *yi* was not the main designation but rather a narrative variation of the 'west ocean system' in the pre-1750 period. When it appeared, the first *yi* was used to form compounds to name foreign things: 'foreign ships' (*yichuan*), 'foreign people' (*yiren*), 'foreigners from afar' (*yuanyi*), 'foreign merchants' (*yi*), and 'foreign headmen' (*yimu*).[68] The last time the first *yi* is to be found in the available documents dates to 1755. By that time the second *yi* was already commonly used in naming European objects and people.[69] Even though they had vastly different connotations, both the *yi* and western ocean systems were mainly used by scholar-officials.

The coastal communities—whether functionaries of the Canton port or those who had occasional encounters with Europeans—used the 'devil system', *gui* (devil, ghost). Their naming with its ostentatiously displayed negative meanings signified

the troubled relations between the coastal communities and Europeans—particularly, the seamen aboard European ships searching for fresh water and provision on the Chinese coast and going for shore leave in Canton, whose interactions with coastal communities were often characterized by looting, robbing, stealing, rioting, and alcohol-fuelled violence. The term *guilao* (devil, white man) is still widely used among Cantonese speakers (in Cantonese: guãy lõw) half a millennium since the first Europeans landed on Chinese shores.[70]

In addition to these three systems—western ocean, *yi*, and devil—there were the ambiguously placed 'uncultured' (*fan*), 'outside' (*wai*), and 'afar' (*yuan*) that were infrequently used. 'Uncultured' was used commonly to name the tribe peoples outside the Han Chinese civilization. When it came to Chinese-Western relations, 'uncultured' was sometimes used in the official documents to form terms such as 'uncultured people' (*fanren*) in designating Europeans. *Fan* also came together with the 'devil system'—and to a lesser extent with the western ocean and *yi* systems—to form compounds. The most notorious example was *fankwae* (*fangui*, the 'uncultured devils'), used by Canton port functionaries and coastal Chinese to name the Europeans they had encountered.[71]

Less frequently, 'outside' and 'afar' were used by scholar-officials to name Europeans, such as in the case of 'people from afar' (*yuanren*). They were also used to form compounds with both the *yi* and western ocean systems, resulting in terms such as 'afar foreigners' (*yuanyi*) and 'outside foreigners' (*waiyi*). Other mixtures also appeared occasionally in the documents that used words mixing the three systems and the three infrequent words, ending up with combinations such as 'west ocean foreigner' (*xiyang yiren*) and 'the uncultured of afar' (*yuanfan*).[72]

The 'uncultured', 'outside', or 'afar' terms do not merit a system because none of these became the dominant word used in a period or by a community. These words with various connotations may reflect individual official's viewpoints and circumstances of the time when it was use. The less frequent words—'outside', 'afar', or 'uncultured', and both versions of *yi* before the 1750s—functioned mostly as alternatives for narrative variation, as classical Chinese tends to use short sentences and as a result in memorials and edicts the subject would be repeated in each new sentence, becoming repetitive. Thus, 'people from outer countries' (*waiguozhiren*) and 'uncultured guests' (*fanke*) were used to replace 'western ocean people' (*xiyangren*), while 'ships of the uncultured' (*fanbo* or *fanchuan*) were employed in replacing 'ocean ships' (*yangchuan*).[73]

The rise of the second *yi* in replacing the long-used 'western ocean' (*xiyang*) as the leading term happened in the 1750s. As quoted above, the Portuguese procurator was called in 1719 'the western ocean official in charge' (*xiyang lishiguan*) and by 1828 'the foreign headman' (*yimu*). The first appearance of the second *yi* in the Qing documents to be found was in 1718 in the form of 'foreigner' (*yiren*) and 'foreign

ships' (*yichuan*), and in the same document words related to 'western ocean' were used as the main terms to refer to the Portuguese and their ships in Macao.[74] This was an incidental appearance, as 'western ocean' was still the dominant term and the first *yi* was used as a narrative alternative in this period.

By the 1750s, the use of the second *yi* was common. For instance, two memorials to the court in 1755 from Canton and Fujian both used mainly the second *yi*. The governor-general of Canton, in reporting a homicide case in which a British sailor was shot dead by a Frenchman in Canton, used 'foreign people' (*yiren*) to refer to both the French and the British, while the superintendents of trade of the two countries were called 'foreign chiefs' (*yiqiu*) and their ship a 'foreign ship' (*yichuan*).[75] The governor of Fujian employed the same set of vocabulary in addition to the term 'foreign merchants' (*yishang*) to report the arrival of Spanish from the Philippines, who came to Amoy to trade that year. He emphasized that the Spanish behaved well, hinting to the court that Amoy ought to keep the trade. In both memorials, *yi* was used as the major term for Europeans, while 'ocean' (*yang*) and 'outside' (*wai*) were used as narrative alternatives.[76]

During the Flint incident of 1759, the second *yi* was widely used in the memorials from the coastal provinces of Canton, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Zhili in reporting Flint's movements, while 'western ocean' (*xiyang*) and 'outside' (*wai*) were used as narrative alternatives. James Flint was most of the time called a 'foreign merchant' (*yishang*) and the EIC ships 'foreign ships' (*yichuan*).[77] The same model of expression was employed in the memorial that laid down the rules of the Canton system proposed after the Flint case: The Rules for Guarding against Foreigners. 'Western ocean man' (*xiyangren*) appeared only once in this memorial and was used in reference to a missionary who served in the court in the Astronomy Bureau.[78] As the Flint incident was a nationwide case and the court was greatly displeased, these memorials and the many edicts issued by the court to the coastal provinces and published in the *Beijing Gazetteer* (*Jingbao*) had the effect of making the use of the second *yi* widespread, consolidating its role as the leading word in naming Europeans.

When Lord Macartney's embassy landed in Canton in 1793, the related edicts and memorials were all using the second *yi* to designate the emissary and his entourage. Only in very few places in the documents were found the terms 'western ocean' or 'afar', which was made famous by James Hevia's book *Cherish Men from Afar*.[79]

But the word *xiyang* did not yet die. There were moments of great confusion regarding the terms used in the memorials in 1808 and 1809, when the British briefly occupied Macao.[80] The Qing civil and military officials busily reported to the court about the crisis. The term 'western ocean people' (*xiyangren*) was used in great numbers to name the Portuguese, since their nation was called Great Western Ocean (Daxiyang). In these memorials and edicts, *yi* virtually acquired the meaning of 'British', as opposed to the 'western ocean people' (*xiyangren*), the Portuguese.[81]

The gradually diminished numbers of Christian missionaries who came to the court via Macao and served in the Astronomy Bureau were another group of Europeans still called 'western ocean men' in the early nineteenth century—a continuation of the name used since the late Ming period when Christian missionaries first arrived.[82] This indicates that the word *yi* was associated with primarily the British of Canton and the period that the British dominated the Asian seas.

When the British private merchants started their translation of memorials and edicts to publish in their newspapers in the late 1820s, the designation was nearly exclusively the second *yi*. The practice of Catholic missionaries serving in the court was virtually extinct; the Daoguang emperor did not have the chance, as his great-great-grandfather Kangxi had a century prior, to personally know missionaries, converse with them, and learn Western knowledge from them. Nor did Daoguang have the occasion, like Kangxi, to say, 'The western ocean people have been coming to China for nearly three hundred years, and no unpleasant incidents have yet been seen': the Flint incident, the occupation of Macao, quarrels between Europeans in Canton, incidents of deaths of Chinese port functionaries and coastal people at the hands of European sailors (and vice versa), and other negative reports reached the Qing court yearly. The situation had changed. Negative collective memories were recorded and accentuated on both sides. *Yi*'s dominance in naming reflected the changes.

The irony is that after the ban on the word *yi* in 1858, as Fang Weigui has documented, the word *yi* was gradually replaced by 'ocean' (*yang*), 'the west' (*xi*), and 'outside' (*wai*) to form compounds in designating Westerners and things from the West.[83] By force, the old ways of the early Qing returned.

Naming the uncultured

The political-intellectual evolution of the Qing Empire provides another context for understanding the *yi* issue. The dominance of the second *yi* in naming from the mid-eighteenth century was a manifestation of great intellectual changes taking place in the Qing Empire and along with them China's perception of Europeans.

The same pronunciation and four times fewer strokes, indicating that the replacement of the first *yi* by the second *yi* was possibly for the sake of easier and faster writing, as the two characters were interchangeable in the classical text. But it was far more complicated than this. The second *yi* etymologically means 'people from the eastern region', but in its usage as early as in Confucius's time (551–479 BCE), *yi* was lumped together with *di* (northern people) with a negative connotation attached. Confucius's saying in the *Analects* resonated in the ensuing 2,000 years: 'The Yi and Di peoples, even with their rulers, are still inferior to the Xia [the Middle Kingdom] states without their rulers.'[84] Contrasting sharply with this unfavourable pedigree of the second *yi*, the first *yi* had the connotation of auspiciousness. In classical texts it

meant the 'bronze vessel' that was used in grand state rituals, and by extension it has the meaning 'cardinal principles'.

The early Qing official documents were the only place that the first *yi* was used as a generic name for peoples from outside 'China proper'.[85] Appearing alongside the 'western ocean system' in the official documents in the period before the 1750s, the first *yi* was a rather peculiar choice. The most likely explanation is that the scholar-officials of the early Qing period were conscious of the derogatory signification of the second *yi*, for the Manchus were precisely the tribal people from the east, and they were referred to in this manner in Ming official documents.[86] Thus, the scholar-officials of the early Qing skilfully replaced it with the first *yi*. A comparison of court documents from the early Qing and the Ming periods demonstrates the point. In an official document of 1655—the first decade of Qing rule in China proper—for instance, European cannon were referred to using the first *yi* as *hongyi dapao* (the red-haired-stranger's great cannon), while three decades earlier, during the Ming dynasty, in a 1627 official edict the character used in this term was the second *yi*.[87] The replacement was not complete, but it was a common practice.[88] A few instances of the second *yi* appeared in Qing official documents before the 1750s, with a handful of them denoting Europeans while most of them referred to peoples from the north-west and south-west of China proper.[89] In comparison, the first *yi* was more frequently used in this period.

The re-emergence of the second *yi* in official documents after the 1750s meant that the character was no longer associated with the sensitive issue of the Manchus' alien rule over China proper. The Yongzheng emperor's response to the 1728 Zeng Jing (1679–1739) case played a role here.[90] Zeng was a scholar-elite of the early Qing period. Inspired by Ming loyalist ideas, Zeng approached the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, Yue Zhongqi (1686–1754), urging him to rebel against the Qing. Zeng's exhortation to Yue was based on the knowledge that Yue was a descendant of the famed patriot Yue Fei (1103–1142), who was loyal to the Song dynasty in resisting the invasion of the Jurchen dynasty (1115–1234), which was in turn the ancestor of the current Qing dynasty. Yue, rather than acting as the Ming patriot Zheng expected, turned Zeng in.

This case drew the Yongzheng emperor's attention to problematic words like *yi*, through which the Ming loyalists called forth the Confucian distinction between the *yi* (applying to the Manchus) and the Han Chinese, in order to incite rebellion. After Zeng Jing was punished, in 1733 the emperor noticed that self-censorship was common among the literati, who either left a blank space or replaced those words that had been used prior to the 1644 conquest to refer to the Manchus. In addition to the first *yi*, the emperor noticed the displacement of the term *lu* (northern tribes), which as a name for the nomadic tribes would conjure up the image of the nomadic people raiding border towns and taking prisoners. The emperor realized that the

empty space or replacement of *lu* and *yi* actually drew attention to the Manchus' origin, the semantic oddness speaking even louder than just using the words outright. Also, as Lydia Liu argued, Yongzheng understood these words as names of a local region, and their negative connotation was trivial to the more important fact that the Qing held the mandate of heaven. The emperor wanted his understanding of the matter to prevail.[91] For these complex reasons he decreed that unnecessary replacement was a crime of 'great disrespect' (*dabujing*), which was one of the ten unlawful behaviours deemed unpardonable according to the *Great Qing Code*.[92]

At this time, the main designation for Europeans was still the 'western ocean system'; thus, this did not have much impact on names for Europeans. The imperial injunction, nonetheless, gave the second *yi* the chance to come back. Following the Yongzheng emperor's prohibition, the second *yi* resumed its life as the word for people who were not part of the Han civilization, as it had been in the previous two millennia. Yongzheng did not, however, completely kill the first *yi*. The first *yi* still appeared in the memorial sent from Canton in 1752, from Ningbo in 1755, and also in an undated document produced around 1755 to refer to Europeans in Canton.[93] After the British were referenced using the second *yi* in the 1750s, the first *yi* used in this manner then disappeared.

The return of the second *yi* in the 1750s also rode on the tide of an intellectual trend that Kai-wing Chow termed the 'rise of Confucian ritualism'. This school of thought was an extreme form of neo-Confucianism, which started its development in the late Ming period and achieved ascendancy during the Qianlong reign. In searching for 'purism' and 'classicism', the scholar-elite wanted to bring *back* the perceived ideal Confucian world order. Fundamentalist Confucianism in the process became the 'primary approach to ethics and social order'.[94] The passages about the inferiority of Yi and Di peoples and about expelling bad men from the 'Middle Kingdom' mentioned by Z in the *Register* in 1828 were the kind of Confucian texts that the fundamentalist scholar-elite would interpret literally and follow as a doctrine.

On foreign relations, the key idea of this school was to maintain the distinction between the cultured world—China proper—and the rest. It was not so much that the outside world centred on the 'middle kingdom', as the tributary scholarship would argue. But rather the outside world constituted a threat to the order of the cultured world, and these threatening elements were to be kept out. If they must come into the system, they were expected to be assimilated or quarantined to contain their impact, as in the Canton system. *Yi* described these 'strangers', who were seen as unruly and not to be governed in the cultured way, meaning the Confucian way.

Su Shi's passage that was quoted several times by the British merchants of Canton spelled out this principle. It came from Su's well-known essay, 'On the King Does Not Govern the Uncultured' (*Wangzhe buzhi yidi lun*), which most scholar-elites would have studied. Su's *yidi* were no longer the tribal peoples of the Confucian time. The

two words formed a compound expressing a concept that would be best understood as 'the uncultured'. The British were seen as another group of the uncultured, the same as the other peoples surrounding China proper, and this explains why the British were named the same as them, as *yi* or sometimes as *fan*.

Su's idea *buzhi* (not to govern [in the cultured ways]) from the essay was a succinct summary of the neo-Confucian ideas of maintaining distinctions between the culture and the uncultured—especially for the ritualistic sub-school. This was the context when Governor-General Deng came to speak in 1837 the sentence much debated among the British merchants of Canton: 'The strangers were born and raised outside China.' Because the foreign opium traders were not educated in the Confucian way, they did not know the proper moral behaviour and thus were expelled from the realm of the cultured world. There was, in actuality, in this case a degree of condescending benevolence in expelling rather than beheading them—as Chinese opium traders were punished. The British opium traders were seen as naïve in involving themselves in the dishonoured trade and therefore punished differently and leniently.

Both Deng and Commissioner Lin belonged to the neo-Confucian school and were both sent into exile in Xinjiang during the First Opium War. Deng had been in charge of the defence of Fujian Province and Lin of the defence of Canton in 1840, when the British expedition force attacked the coastal cities. The Daoguang emperor was persuaded by the pacific faction in the court, who had earlier advocated opium legalization and now advocated negotiation with the British, that Lin had failed in the opium prohibition policy and caused a British invasion. Lin was dismissed and Deng fell, too, for supporting Lin.

In the frontier land in Xinjiang, in the cold winter of early 1843, Deng invited Lin and others to celebrate Su Shi's birthday by commemorating the poet.[95] The celebration was significant for it took place just after the Qing were defeated by the British and signed the Treaty of Nanking. Through the commemoration, the exiled scholar-officials seemed to be lamenting how low the dynasty had fallen: the distinction between the cultured and the uncultured was broken. The scholar-officials believed that the British were not brought up in the Confucian way; thus, they did not belong to the 'cultured world'. Engagement with them was beneath the Qing.

While they were called by scholar-officials *yi*, British merchants in the 1830s Canton lived a gentleman-like life with as much material comfort as the situation allows—another context to read the 'barbarian' designation. In 1834 there were around 800 Chinese servants in the Thirteen Factories, looking after fewer than 200 foreigners.[96] Whenever the gentlemen went out for a picnic on the island opposite their Thirteen Factories or took dinner in the grand hall under chandeliers, Chinese servants were at their call.[97] Some of the servants intended to learn Pidgin English, business English, in order to find a job in the lucrative Canton foreign trade. The British, together with the Americans, invited Chinese merchants to come to dine

using forks and knives, which was a reverse joke about chopsticks in the Europeans' hands when they attended Chinese dinners in the garden compounds of the Hong merchants.[98] The inventory list of luxurious items for the British merchants' consumption is a long one, including French wines, Scotch whiskey, gin, sherry, champagne, port, hock, tokay and cherry brandy, cashmeres, fine shirts, gentlemen's gloves, drab hats, silver dinnerware, a piano, and so forth. They even brought English cows to supply fresh milk for afternoon tea.[99] They formed the Canton Regatta Club and in the off-trade season would hold gentlemanly boat races. These were such big events that the whole community was there and the results would be published in the *Canton Register*, *Chinese Courier*, and *Canton Press*.[100] They also held horse races in Macao, enjoyed equally by the English gentlemen and the Chinese. The East India Company superintendent Charles Marjoribanks himself participated as a rider.[101] They enjoyed shooting, ballroom parties, Italian operas, and other high-society entertainment in Canton and Macao.

But it was not by material wealth and worldly gains that the scholar-officials judged the British. The lack of a Confucian manner was the problem. In the context of a materially luxurious life in Canton, the designation *yi* spoke volumes about the cultural values that were spelled out by the Confucian scholars. When it was translated into English as 'barbarian', the merchants and missionaries understood the word *yi* from the perspectives of national strength, material advancement, Christian values, and the Enlightenment as Gützlaff's works and the confrontation of 1832 revealed. The two sides were again talking to each other from two parallel worlds. Through his Chinese narrators Gützlaff did tell the Chinese that Europeans practised Confucian moralities, but that was untrue and fell on deaf ears. He also told the Chinese that the British led a materially rich life, but that missed the point.

Yi, as the Warlike party of Canton rightly perceived, was a sign of rejection. The Warlike party, in reinterpreting *yi* as 'stranger' in 1837, came close to realizing that what Qing China wanted was to lock the British out using the Canton system. Once the one-port system was established, the Confucian ideology gained a position in the Canton port. European arrivals could only be named as *yi* to be kept out. In the word *yi*, the ideal Confucian world order and dynastic state security—two mutually reinforcing and potent ideas operating in the system—converged. The *yi* designation became another layer of the Qing's soft boarder.

The rendering of *yi* as 'stranger' did not stop the Warlike party from advocating war or stop the circulation of the name 'barbarian'. In London, the idea that the Chinese considered the British 'barbarians' was flagged in rallying support for war and providing justification after war was declared.[102] From the Canton British merchants' and Protestant missionaries' perspective, in their desire for wider access to China and in the discourse of 'progressive civilization', they saw that China was in isolation and in want of 'civilization'—another type of 'uncultured'.

Both sides saw each other as 'uncultured'. To the Qing the 'uncultured' were to be locked out of China proper, as the Canton system purported to function, especially in its later development during the early nineteenth century. The Warlike party, in contrast, were willingly to start a war to combat the Chinese idea as manifested in the word *yi* and to spread what they believed to be cultured: Western civilization.

The word *yi* was not a neutral designation which belonged to words such as 'outside' (*wai*), 'afar' (*yuan*), and 'western ocean' (*xiyang*) used before the 1750s and after 1858. When *yi* was used to form the term *manyi* (barbarians), it had connotations of contempt. In some official documents, the word *yi* actually meant *manyi*; Qing officials were not immune to discrimination against others. In official documents of the Qing period, as a naming practice *yi* was never far away from discrimination against the British, and this kept the merchants in Canton and some Sinologists of London puzzled and guessing.

6
Reasoning Britain into a War

The year 1834 was not one of great change to the Sino-British relations, as scholars of the Opium War wanted it to be.[1] When Napier went to Canton that year as the superintendent of trade to take over control from the East India Company, both Foreign Secretary Palmerston and Prime Minister Lord Grey (Charles, 1764–1845) instructed him to be acquiescent, meaning not to challenge the status quo of the Canton system. Napier did not follow this instruction, although his three successors did.[2] Napier's challenge to the Canton authorities to change the mode of interaction was a deviation from government policy. If Napier Affair had any impact, it was in the Warlike party's first war lobbying in 1835. But the campaign failed to convince the British government. During the five years after the end of the EIC's monopoly, the British state did not pay much attention to the China trade. Neither did they care much about China's treatment of Napier and his untimely death. The ministers started to think differently about the China trade issue only after the opium crisis of 1839.

But the 1839 opium crisis would have been just another instance of hostility, like the 1784 *Lady Hughes* incident, the 1808 Drury occupation of Macao, the 1820 anti-opium campaign, and the 1830 Mrs Baynes incident.[3] The brief exchange of fire, in September and November 1839, between Qing water forces and the British navy under the superintendent should have been another skirmish—likened to the incidents of 1784 and 1808. But this standoff and skirmish during the opium crisis of 1839 produced war. It was not the opium confiscation crisis per se that mattered much to the Whitehall ministers in taking the war decision. The expedition force was sent and thus the war declared, largely thanks to the Warlike party's lobbying, and in addition to it—as Melancon's study has shown—because of the domestic political crisis faced by the Whig government.

This chapter traces how the argument for war developed in Canton's maritime public sphere became the policy of Whitehall and the reality of the First Opium War. The idea of obtaining a port of their own in the China trade that would be fulfilled in making Hong Kong a British colony was an important motive for war lobbying. Their confidence in winning the war was boosted by the intelligence of the Qing's military

weakness. On top of these, the Warlike party's conviction in British state's obligation in stepping in to change trade conditions underpinned their aggressive actions of lobbying in London. The Warlike party was the major force behind the change in British policy—to wage a war against China.

The right of petition

The Warlike party believed that they had the right to petition both the Chinese and British governments to get the trade conditions and, by extension, the Chinese-British relations they wanted. They saw petitioning as their birthright. This spirit coloured their engagement with the Chinese and their lobbying in London for war in 1835 and then again in 1839.

As early as 1778, the British private merchants of Canton had a taste of petitioning their governments in India and in Britain to come to their aid in the China trade. Throughout the 1770s, the merchants, attracted by the high interest rates at Canton, lent money to the capital-starved Hong merchants. The total sum owed by Chinese merchants to the British merchants amounted to nearly one million sterling, a big portion of which was inflation from compound interest of either 18 or 20 per cent per annum. In the later years of the decade, some merchants' loans went unpaid when several of the Hongs went bankrupt. The private merchants filed a petition in London asking the government to send an embassy to Peking to obtain redress. The government refused the request but referred the case to the EIC. The Court of Directors of the EIC, in turn, asked the supercargoes in Canton to assist the private merchants because, they reasoned, the 'sum as a national object they cannot hesitate a moment to facilitate the business by every means in their power'.[4]

In the meantime, since part of the money loaned was originally gathered by private merchants from India settlements, the creditors of Madras petitioned Madras rear admiral Sir Edward Vernon, who, in response, sent Captain John Alexander Panton aboard the frigate *Sea Horse* to deliver a letter 'demanding justice be done to His Majesty's oppressed Subjects'. The letter duly reached the Canton authorities, who, in turn, informed the Qianlong emperor. The emperor ordered the debt to be repaid to the foreigners.[5] With this imperial pressure, the debt problem was solved by the establishment of the gild house fund in 1782, which obligated Hong merchants to contribute a percentage of their profits to pay off the money owed, making debt their collective responsibility. This way of solving debt issues became a convention until the end of the Canton system.[6]

It is notable that, in the instruction to Canton, the debt was seen by the Court of Directors as 'a national object', while Vernon in Madras saw his action as aiding 'His Majesty's oppressed Subjects'. The relationship between the state and British merchants clearly expressed that the state—or the semi-official EIC—could be mobilized

to relieve the merchants' distress by quoting nationalistic discourse. On top of British national discourse, the idea at work was that Britain was a nation of trade.

Indian Parsees could also petition the British colonial government to come to their rescue. Parsees played a major role in the importing of cotton from India to China, the sales of which in China hit a low in 1819. The price somewhat recovered in the late 1820s. However, in May 1829, when the cotton trade was again declining, forty-four Parsees in Bombay 'being indeed nearly all the native wealth and commercial influence of that side of India' petitioned the governor of Bombay. The British Indian government, in answering, dispatched a letter to the Canton authorities and put pressure on the Select Committee of the EIC to negotiate with the Qing officials for a solution.[7]

Meanwhile, the white British private merchants of Canton, who were also involved in cotton trade, took the matter directly to the Canton authorities. Five companies—including Dent & Co. and Magniac & Co. (the firm inherited by Jardine, Matheson & Co.)—and eleven individuals signed the petition. Not only complaining about cotton trade, the petitioners took this opportunity to pour out their grievances regarding what they believed played a role in the declining cotton trade: the number of Hong merchants was dwindling, port duty was unfair, and extortion was hurting the trade. Thirteen days later, Governor-General Li Hongbing (1826–1832) replied, blaming bad elements among the Chinese for stirring up the petitioners. He then dismissed the complaints as insubstantial.[8] This added to the discontent of early 1830 along with the quay incident, the Mrs Baynes incident, and the death of the jailed Hong merchant Xie Wu.[9]

With sentiment against the Canton authorities running high, in December 1830, the British merchants in Canton filed a petition with Parliament, asking Britain to step in to reach a trading agreement with China. Forty-seven British subjects signed the letter, including seven Parsees. Repeating the grievances that the white British merchants and the Parsees had each presented to the Canton authorities and the British India government, the petition stated that the 'successful termination of the Burmese war and the approximation of British dominion in India to the confines of China are well known in this country' and argued that this knowledge would make the Chinese take the British seriously.[10] (This in fact alarmed the Qing to further constrain British trade.) They also pointed out that, once Vernon's letter of 1778 had been received by the Canton authorities, the debt issues were resolved. The petitioners expected that Qing China would readily receive a protest from the British government with 'deference'.[11] Given the situation in Canton, this statement was either overconfident or a deliberate misrepresentation for the sake of enticing governmental intervention.

Less than six months after the petition was sent, the situation in Canton was further stirred up by the portrait incident of May 1831 when Governor Zhu turned

the back of his chair towards a portrait of King George IV, as explained in Chapters 1 and 2. A petition was then sent to the British India government in Calcutta asking for assistance in obtaining redress for this 'insult' to the king's portrait. In response to the petition, the governor-general of India, Lord William Bentinck (1774–1839), requested Rear Admiral Sir Edward W. C. R. Owen to send a 'vessel of war' carrying a letter to Canton, and the HMS *Challenger* captained by Charles Howe Freemantle (1800–1869) was sent. This is what prompted the *Register*'s article arguing that the situation in China 'AS HISTORY IT WILL NOT BE BELIEVED'—quoted at the opening of the introduction to this book.[12]

Upon arrival at Canton, Freemantle requested permission to deliver the letter to the governor-general of Canton but was refused. After some negotiation, the letter was delivered and arrived at Governor-General Li Hongbing's office. He replied, again rejecting all the British claims, again blaming Hong merchants for the mess, and did not address the question of the portrait. Captain Freemantle was asked to leave, which he did—given the hostility and impasse.[13]

Then the response from Parliament to the December 1830 petition arrived in Canton in September 1832: Britain was not to intervene. The Court of Directors of the EIC in London was behind the rejection because they were concerned that intervention in Canton might jeopardize the smooth flow of tea from China to London.[14]

The Canton British merchants would not easily give up the attempts to subject China to the relations they wanted. They believed justice was on their side. In the years after the end of the EIC, they were more eager than ever in asserting what they saw as their right of petition.[15] This spirit of petitioning the British government would turn into a war petition in 1835 and, again, in 1839.

A minor incident in 1835 illustrates their attitude and dealings with the Canton authorities. On 7 January 1835 at twelve o'clock, a white British merchant came to a Canton city gate and attempted to present a petition on a matter (not recorded) that was deemed too trivial by the Hong merchants to be presented to the governor-general. The petitioner was admitted from the outer gate but was denied entrance beyond the inner gate, so between the two gates he sat. A group of foreign traders came in the afternoon to support him and left him with a supply of 'food and clothing; for the weather was cold'.[16] Six Hong merchants and two linguists attempted several times to snatch the British merchant's petition from his hand or tried to put their hands on the petition before it could be received by the two lower military officials who came to oversee the matter, but to no avail. The Hong merchants wanted the British merchant to conform to the proper petitioning procedure as the Canton system stipulated, which was to have the petition go through their hands before reaching the Canton authorities.

Towards nine o'clock the two military officials who had left returned and were again ready 'to receive the petition from the hands of the petitioner'. The British

merchant told them that '*the mendacity of their country was now so notorious* that he required witness of his own nation to be present'.[17] Two of his countrymen were sent for and arrived. When the petition was about to be handed over, the Hong merchant Mowqua again 'attempted to touch the petition with his finger . . . at this insidious motion the petition was instantly withdrawn and Mowqua was informed that his scheme had failed'. Finally, one of the military officials 'extended his three fingers and received the petition'. An 'answer from the viceroy [Governor-General Lu Kun] was sent to the petitioner just 30 hours after his departure from the city gate; and this answer promised redress of the wrong complained against'.[18]

The private merchants had the mentality of fighting for what they wanted. The nature of the trade shaped their personality, and this differed significantly from the EIC staff in Canton, who behaved like civil servants thinking in institutional modes and did not take the matter into their own hands as much as the private merchants had. This spirit of believing in 'the right of petition' was suffered by both the Qing and British governments. As a community, they were a force to be reckoned with.

An island of one's own

There was one thing the British merchants of Canton—both the EIC staff and the private—wanted: an island, or a port, of their own on the China coast where they could conduct trade with the Chinese. The British talked about it in their travel journals, diaries, and newspapers; requested it in the two embassies; and then attempted to steal the Portuguese settlement of Macao in 1808, just like the Dutch had tried in 1622, without success. But, finally, after the war the British had an island of their own to conduct trade and to govern—Hong Kong. Even better, four additional ports were opened to trade.

Taking possession of an island, or port, was the norm of European maritime trade in the East before the mid-nineteenth century. The origin of this mode of operation came from the Mediterranean maritime world, where port cities or states such as Genoa and Venice thrived. Responsible for bringing this practice to the East, the Portuguese had ports, such as Goa, Colombo, Malacca, and Macao, in a chain of coastal foothold possessions in the Asian maritime world.[19] Spanish Manila and Dutch Batavia were operated, too, in this manner.[20] The fate of Malacca said all; it was first established around 1400 by Malay sultan Parameswara (1344–1414) at a strategic spot for trading between the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Portuguese grabbed it as their own entrepôt in 1511; then the port fell to the Dutch in 1641 when they became the dominant maritime trader of Asia. As they reigned supreme in Asian waters, the British took control of Malacca in 1824.[21]

To own a port within China or close to China was another important competition in the European rivalries. Being the first to arrive in China, the Portuguese expressed

to Ming officials, as early as 1521, their desire for a trading post and obtained Macao in 1557.[22] The Spanish, in 1575, first made their proposal to Ming officials, and in 1598 they were granted El Piñal in the Canton estuary. But, before long, the Portuguese spoiled the Spaniards' gain with the help of the Jesuits in the Ming court. A few years later, the Portuguese of Macao also successfully destroyed the promising prospects of the Dutch being given a port in the Canton estuary by the Ming.[23]

The Spanish established two trading posts in the 1620s, in today's Danshui and Jilong in northern Formosa (Taiwan)—but abandoned Danshui in 1638 because of bad relations with the aboriginal communities there. The Dutch, in 1622, tried to fortify the Pescadores (Penghu) near Formosa but were driven away by Ming water forces. In 1633, they attempted to make Gulangyu (off Amoy) a trading base, without success.[24] The Dutch finally obtained a trading port in the China trade in 1646 by driving out the Spanish who had remained in Jilong, Formosa. They then established Fort Zeelandia as a trading foothold in southern Formosa. But before they had properly settled, the Dutch were driven out of Formosa altogether in 1662 by the Ming loyalist Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong, 1624–1662).[25]

By the time the British dominated the Eastern maritime world in the late eighteenth century, they had already established Bombay and other minor ports and had expanded into inland India from the coastal trading footholds of Fort William (Calcutta) and Fort St George (Madras). They too wanted a trading island or a port of their own in or close to China. The instruction of 1787 to the ill-fated special envoy to China, Charles Cathcart, who died just off Malaya, asked him to obtain 'a small tract of Ground, or detached Island', from the Qing court as a depot where British merchants could live and trade.[26] The same task was taken on by Lord Macartney in his 1793 journey and was not achieved.[27]

To the British, an island of their own meant more than attracting Chinese merchants, goods, and labourers, as Macao, Manila, and Batavia had. It meant the British would have jurisdiction over British subjects to prevent any trouble, like the *Lady Hughes* incident where an English gunner was sentenced to death after he accidentally killed two Chinese nationals. Because these incidents caused many troubles and disrupted the smooth operation of trade, the EIC staff came to believe their lives were in imminent danger and trade would have to be abandoned sooner or later.[28]

Some British merchants had their eye on Macao, where they stayed in the off-trade season. One staff member of the EIC in 1779 believed Macao was neglected by the Portuguese and thus the British had a role to play:

> A place so little valued might perhaps be easily procured form the Court of Lisbon, and should it ever fall into the hands of an enterprising People, who knew how to extend all its advantages; we think it would rise to a State of Splendor, never yet equalled by any Port in the East.[29]

There were opportunities to obtain Macao in 1802 and 1808. In the summer of 1801, the French and the Portuguese signed a treaty that would close all the Portuguese ports to the British. Upon learning this and afraid the British merchants in Canton would not have access to Macao, the British governor-general of India, Richard Wellesley (1760–1842), sent a naval force to Chinese waters in March 1802. The Portuguese refused their landing and informed Chinese officials of the British presence, greatly alarming them. The news soon reached the Beijing court, where two Portuguese missionaries warned the emperor that the British intended to occupy Macao, quoting as evidence the request for an island during the Macartney embassy. However, the British troops withdrew, ending the crisis. The reasons for the withdrawal were twofold: one was the hostility of the Portuguese and the Chinese; the other was that news had reached Canton that the British-French rivalry, which had flared up, had now eased, removing the threat to the British use of Macao.[30]

The EIC's Canton staff, led by John William Roberts, were ready to take Macao in 1808. The Select Committee claimed that they had received creditable intelligence that the French were coming to place 'Macao in a more respectable state of defence' and asked for help from governor-general of India Lord Minto (Gilbert Elliot, 1751–1814), who in response sent Admiral William O'Bryen Drury (d. 1811) with a naval force.[31] The troops peacefully landed in Macao. Chinese officials, upon learning this, stopped British trade in Canton, withdrew Chinese servants from the Thirteen Factories, and restricted provisions for the British merchants. They then gathered soldiers, ready to expel the British by force. The Select Committee urged the admiral to take this opportunity to make Macao a British port. They calculated that once the occupation became a fait accompli, the Chinese would have to accept British control of Macao. But the admiral refused, for this was not his mission. He did not even react when the Chinese fired upon the boat in which he was travelling in from Macao to Canton. Bowing to the strong pressure from the Canton authorities for the troops to leave, the admiral sailed away just before Christmas.[32] The wishes of the EIC staff to have an island of their own in the China trade were unfulfilled.

The record of Drury's expedition was published in 1831 in the *Register*. A reader with the pseudonym A Breakfaster with Drury was dismayed to learn that the admiral did not return fire when his armed boats were fired upon by the Chinese. He disbelieved that a British navy admiral would be so cowardly and urged the editor to research the archives in the English Factory to find out 'the hidden cause of such a cruel *blow* to the honour of the Navy from so brave a man as Admiral Drury'.[33] In response, the *Register* published the transcription of an interview with Charles Marjoribanks, a clerk in Canton in 1808. Marjoribanks confirmed that it was a missed opportunity and expressed regret:

> I think it is one of those lamentable occasions in which the English character was exhibited to great disadvantage in China. A pagoda was built by the Chinese

> upon the occasion, to commemorate the victory they had obtained over the English admiral; they cannot afford to lose an opportunity of that sort.[34]

The British private merchants wanted to think that had Drury returned fire they would have gained an island of their own and all the difficulties of the China trade would have been solved, instead of suffering humiliation after humiliation. Even more than being about trade and avoiding jurisdictional trouble, a port in China controlled by the British addressed the idea of despotism. In the 1830 December petition to Parliament, the merchants of Canton urged:

> Unless through the direct intervention of His Majesty's Government, in communication with the Court of Peking, the Petitioners feel that no material extension of British commerce, or effectual amelioration of the humiliating condition of British subjects in China can be expected; if unattainable by the course suggested, the Petitioners indulge a hope that the Government of Great Britain, with the sanction of the Legislature, will adopt a resolution worthy of the nation, and by the acquisition of *an insular possession near the coast of China*, place British commerce in that remote quarter of the globe beyond the reach of the future *despotism* and *oppression*.[35]

Trade, profits, justice, and the discourse of oriental despotism mingled. The presumed suffering of British subjects under a despotic regime added another reason for the British government to act. On this point, the Warlike party of the private merchants differed from the EIC staff. The private merchants developed a discourse on China that the EIC staff did not articulate—this was partly because, unlike the EIC, they did not have direct access to the imperial state, and they had to rely on nationalistic and civilizational discourse to mobilize the British state to come and solve their China trade issue that they inherited from the EIC. The argument of putting British trade on secure footing could move Britain to intervene as Britain saw itself as a nation of trade and free trade discourse was on the rise, while employing the argument of despotism gave the merchants a sense that justice was on their side.

The Warlike party did not just simply solicit governmental intervention but also studied the coastal islands to see which would be most suitable for their trade—they did their homework, which the EIC had not done. A long article published in the *Register* in 1837 listed the advantages and disadvantages of eighteen islands along the southern and eastern coasts. It concluded, 'We consider Chusan to be the island best fitted for a commercial mart', because the 'advantages of a centrical situation on the coast, communicating with the very heart of China, of anchorages, harbours, fertility, population, climate, are here all united; Ningpo, Hangchoo, Shanghae, and Japan are distant only a few days' sail'.[36]

Hong Kong was the second choice. 'Hong Kong, particularly, has long drawn the attention of foreigners, being a very eligible spot.' It was second because Hong Kong's position was 'almost in the south west corner of the empire. . . . But if ever a settlement

is to be founded in this corner, Hong Kong holds, perhaps the first place for this purpose in the *archipelago*.'[37]

Not everyone in the British Canton community agreed that they should take possession of an island or port. Lindsay, who advocated war in 1835 and again in 1840, in his open letter to Palmerston in 1836, asked to have 'the liberty of trade at two or more of the northern ports'. He opposed 'taking possession of the smallest island on the coast' because he believed that doing so would not be in the interests of 'purely commercial intercourse' of the war.[38] Thus, he adhered to the words he had spoken to the Chinese on his 1832 coastal voyage aboard the *Lord Amherst*: the British were by no means interested in occupying Chinese territories. To Lindsay, taking a port or an island would do harm to the British reputation in China and would jeopardize Britain's trade. But Lindsay, like most members of the Warlike party, believed in the justice of employing a war to force China to allow British trade in other ports outside Canton and to put Britain's China trade in a condition that they believe to be justice.

After the Napier Affair, while the war lobbying was underway in London, an article published in the *Register* in late 1835 argued that the five ports to be opened, in addition to Canton, were Ning-po (Ningbo), Shang-hae (Shanghai), Fuh-choo (Fuzhou), Amoy (Xiamen), and Hang-choo (Hangzhou).[39] The private merchants found a good reason for this particular list: tea and silk, the two major exports, were produced in the regions close to the five ports. Opening these ports to British trade would reduce costs of transportation and greatly increase profits. It was no coincidence that the additional ports opened after the First Opium War were exactly the ones on this list, except for Hangzhou. The decision of which ports were to be used for British trade had been made by the merchants in Canton years before the war started. After all, the private merchants together with some Protestant missionaries living under their aegis were the only group of Europeans who had adequate knowledge and the first-hand experience of these Chinese ports.

It is noteworthy that two years prior to the establishment of the Canton one-port system in 1757, precisely the same argument about Ningbo's proximity to the tea and silk production regions had been put forward in Chinese memorials and edicts. However, at that time, the Canton lobby declared the port's location to be an unfair advantage, which would damage Canton's established livelihood. Thus, Ningbo had to increase its port duty, taking away its perceived unfair advantage.[40]

A similarity existed between the Canton lobby that was behind the Ningbo tax increase and the British war campaigners. The Canton lobby used their court influence to obtain the right of monopoly from the Qianlong court, and the Warlike party used the public campaign and lobbying for a war to achieve their goal of accessing the eastern ports. While the Canton lobby brought maritime coastal defence to the centre of Qing foreign trade policy making, British private merchants fashioned the

discourse of an 'insular China' that must be opened up by British imperial power. The context and end results were hugely different and the two interests even clashed, but the profit motive of the Canton lobby and the Warlike party was the same.

On the eve of the war, Captain Charles Elliot still believed in taking Macao as a British possession. In May 1839, Elliot told Palmerston, 'A garrison of 1,000 good troops, principally artillery, and a few sail of gun-boats, would place Macao in a situation to cover the whole trade with this part of the empire.'[41] James Matheson, who was in China when the war broke out, favoured Formosa, but he was opposed by his trading partner, William Jardine, who was then in London and preferred taking Chusan Island. Jardine persuaded Palmerston 'to instruct Elliot to occupy it'.[42] Chusan's port, Dinghai, was the very first port that the British expedition force landed in and occupied. The military regime administered Chusan on and off for more than five years, twice with the Prussian missionary turned official translator Gützlaff as its magistrate.[43] But Chusan in the end did not become the island of Britain's own.

Hong Kong was the island where the British merchants ended up. They started settling there during the war, and before the treaty was signed they had already started building work.[44] Even though Lindsay disagreed on taking possession of any island, he did contribute to the choice of Hong Kong. In his report on the 1832 voyage to the eastern coasts, he described Hong Kong as 'in all points, both of facility of egress and ingress, and in its perfectly land-locked situation, this harbour can hardly have a superior in the world'.[45]

Britain started like other European nations wishing for a port of its own. But Hong Kong was a different creation from Macao and other Asian ports controlled by Europeans. As the idea of free trade became the dominant political economic theory, the British, when they obtained Hong Kong, did not close it off as other Europeans had done to their ports established in the East in the previous three centuries. Rather, they made it a free port (though not fully) as their second experiment of free trade in the East after Singapore.

From information to intelligence

The Warlike party of Canton not only envisioned a Chinese island and port to be used for British trade—a major motive of lobbying for war—they also provided the military intelligence and war strategy that played a crucial role in the decision to start the war.

Commercial intelligence was an objective stated by Lindsay for the 1832 *Lord Amherst* mission to the eastern coast:

> The Principal object was to ascertain how far the Northern Ports of China might be gradually opened to British Commerce; which of them was most eligible; and

> to what extent the disposition of the natives and the local governments would be favourable to it.[46]

This search for commercial intelligence became also a trip for gathering military intelligence.[47] During the voyage, the party diligently recorded the geographical characteristics and military establishments of the ports they visited. In charge of the survey and the drawing of coastal lines and ports was Captain John Rees, who was said to be one the best captains of Jardine, Matheson & Co. and was experienced in selling opium on trips along the eastern coast. His companion, Gützlaff, described him thusly: 'The commander, an able seaman and surveyor, was anxious to make accurate charts of the different harbours.'[48] In complementing the charts, Gützlaff and Lindsay in their reports sketched the military defences they had encountered. For example, on the island of Nan Gaou (Nan'ao 南澳), they appeared to have an 'imperial army-list', which they compared to what they saw:

> This island, which is half in Canton, and half in Fokien province, is the second naval station of Canton. It is the residence of a tsung-ping-kwan [zongbingguan], or admiral, who has a nominal force of 5,237 men under his command, of which 4,078 belong to Canton, and 1,159 to Fokien. The existence however of these troops, excepting in the imperial army-list, is very doubtful. The defences of the station, as we saw it, consisted in seven or eight small junks, in appearance resembling the smaller class of Fokien trading vessels, and in all respects very inferior to those of Canton. On the island, at the entrance of the bay, are two forts, the upper one mounting eight, the lower six guns: but, as is invariably the case in Chinese fortifications, they are both commanded by heights immediately behind them; up the bay there is another small fort without any guns.[49]

The deteriorating status of the Qing's costal defence was obvious to their eyes. Even worse was the troops of about 500 men they saw assembled along the river near Shanghai city as the *Lord Amherst* approached:

> Most of them had no arms, but a sword and wicker shield, the sword of the most imperfect description, indeed nothing else than a flat bar of iron; the firelocks were generally in a filthy state, and almost corroded with rust: indeed the result of our inspection of his Imperial Majesty's forces at Shanghae, convinced me that 50 resolute and well-disciplined men, or even a smaller number, would have routed a larger force than we saw there assembled.[50]

When he commented that 50 British soldiers were able to take on more than 500 Qing soldiers, Lindsay clearly had military intelligence in mind. Even as they assessed the Chinese soldiers, their surveying exercise was watched in turn by the Qing officials who came into contact with them. One Ma challenged Lindsay that the British did not come for trade as they repeatedly claimed 'but to gain information'.[51] In reply, Ma was taken down to the hold to see the bales of cloth and wool that the ship carried. Ma was not convinced and later told Lindsay:

> We are afraid of you; you are too clever for us. For instance, no sooner does a ship of yours arrive, then out go your boats in all directions, you sound, you make charts, and in a week know the whole place as well as we do.[52]

Ma would be proved to be right in his observation of British activities along the eastern coast. During the 1835 media campaign for war, less than three years later, Lindsay turned his military information into war arguments. His open letter to Palmerston stated, 'The first method which I should suggest, is by a direct armed interference to demand redress for past injuries, and security for the future.'[53] He tried to convince Palmerston that 'a comparatively small naval force would do all that was requisite' and elaborated on the composition of such a force:

> An amply adequate force to compel submission would consist of one line-of-battle ship, two large frigates, six corvettes, and three or four armed steamers, having on board a land force of about six hundred men, chiefly artillery, in order to protect any land operation which might be necessary. The greater portion of this force is already in India, and might be made available with but little expense. For instance, suppose his Majesty's naval force to contribute

	Men
1 Seventy-four gunship	500
1 Large frigate	300
2 Small ditto	320
INDIAN NAVY:--	
2 Corvettes	300
2 Armed steamers	200
CALCUTTA:--	
1 Armed steamer	100
FORCE REQUIRED FROM HOME:--	
1 Large frigate	300
2 Small ditto	320
Land Force	600
Total	2940

> The total numerical amount of this force would not exceed 3,000 men; and inadequate as such must appear, and would certainly be, were it to go to China with objects of aggrandisement, intending to subdue and take possession of any portion of the country, yet I have no doubt but it would be amply sufficient to carry into effect every object we ought to have in view.[54]

The number given by Lindsay in the open letter was not random but an estimation based on what he had known and witnessed: the Chinese coastal defences, the condition of the Chinese troops, and the weaponry they carried. Strikingly, Lindsay's numbers were not significantly different from the first dispatch of the expedition force that gathered in Singapore in June 1840, which consisted of sixteen ships of war,

four armed steamers, one troopship, and twenty-seven transports (small boats), with 4,000 troops.[55]

But these numbers were far short of the total number that was deployed by the end of the war: about 5,300 British troops and nearly 7,000 Indian troops, plus seamen and marines, making the total to upwards of 19,000 troops. The warships in Chinese waters on 1 September 1842—including steamers, hospital ships, and surveying vessels—numbered thirty-seven.[56]

Lindsay's estimation was much better than the 1834 December war petition, which asked for only 'two frigates, and three or four armed vessels of light draft, together with a steam vessel, all fully manned'.[57] The exact military numbers were not the point. The key message was that the war with China could be easily won. This was an attractive fact to the politicians in London in late 1839, at a time when they were facing party political crisis.

In 1830s Canton, not only did military intelligence and the idea of taking possession of an island become established, the infamous 'Jardine plan' was also formed—years before the 1839 decision of the British government to go to war. In the wake of the Napier Affair, dismayed, outraged, and frustrated, the Warlike party genuinely believed the death of Napier and the perceived Chinese insult best afforded fodder for a war campaign that would move the British government into action. While the lobbying for war was taking place in London, the *Register* in Canton published an outline of a war plan in the late spring of 1835. It asked for a British envoy to be appointed in charge of the expedition and then,

> that granted, let him rendezvous his strength off the mouth of this river [Canton], take on board your interpreters, fresh provisions and water (in large quantities), and any native pilots, or *charts* the zeal of your countrymen may furnish you with. So supplied make for Amoy; let all the fleet anchor in shelter inside the bank, but let the line-of battle ship—say the *Caledonia* of 120 guns—piloted by the steamer, let the envoy, receive on her deck a receipt for a letter from William of England to the emperor of China, demanding redress for the insults and injuries done to her honor through Lord Napier, and this receipt from the highest mandarin the envoy must insist on, and if the receipt is not got he is to proceed to bombard the town till got.
>
> I suppose the receipt to be granted and he sails away, letting it be in writing understood that he goes to meet an accredited servant of rank of the emperor's, to settle, without bloodshed, his claims at Teen-sing [Tianjin], or that point of water he consider nearest to Peking.
>
> This operation should be repeated in Lat. 80 off Ningpo, only so changed that the fleet goes *outside* the islands. A frigate, with the envoy on board, and a steamer going to Choo-san.
>
> Once more off Nanking!—And as soon as the gulph of Pe-che-le (shallow water) is approached, a safe anchorage for frigates and line-of-battle ships should be chosen, and the envoy, in a vessel of small draft of water towed by the steamer,

> should proceed to the mouth of the small estuary distant about 12 miles from Peking, where another copy of the letter to the emperor should be sent to the gates of Peking, in the care of an officer, attended by Mr. Gützlaff, and a small select guard of honor, and intimation in writing given that the envoy demands the presence of a man of rank to hear our complaints.
>
> If redress is granted, a specific demand should be made for the destruction of the Bogue forts for the insult by them offered to our flag and that destruction should take place in presence of, and be certified by, a commander of a British cruiser, and a distinct intimation given that, if this is not complied with, England will herself undertake the work of demolition of those forts.
>
> Loo [Lu Kun, the governor-general whom the *Canton Press* praised], as the highest officer insulting Lord Napier, should be stipulation, be degraded.
>
> These things complied with, and security given for the landing of a British envoy, the after treaty on amicable terms is a matter of ease and certainty.
>
> Suppose them not complied with, two or three stations in safe harbours by the largest ships are to be selected along the coast, and the trade of China (perhaps the largest coasting trade in the world) to be absolutely annihilated, taking such other steps of annoyance as a good military judge may consider within his means for intercepting the imperial revenue in its progress to Peking.[58]

This outline of a war plan in 1835 was not far from what happened between July 1840, when the first expedition force arrived, and August 1842, when the treaty was signed. The first port they called at was Canton, and the expedition did proceed to Amoy to deliver the letter. But the port of Dinghai on Zhoushan (Choo-san) was the port they first occupied. Ningbo was bombarded, but Nanjing was spared bombardment because a ransom was paid. The British force did go to Teen-sing (Tianjin) to pressure Peking (Beijing), blockade the Canton port, destroy the Bogue forts, and disrupt the coastal trade. A treaty was demanded and signed as the plan stipulated. The 'ample reparation' was carried out and the wishes fulfilled.

The author of the *Register* article was An Enemy to Half-Measure. The writing style, the pseudonym, and the tone of the narrative suggest William Jardine, who famously supplied Palmerston with the Jardine plan for war in late 1839.[59] Besides having access to published reports and books on China, such as Lindsay's, translated Chinese documents, and the English newspapers and journals of Canton, Jardine was in regular correspondence with captains—such as Rees—of his own company's ships selling opium to the eastern coast. It was not improbable that he personally visited the eastern coast aboard the opium-selling ships, even though there is no record of this. As a result, Jardine and his partner, Matheson, possessed knowledge of China superior to that of the other foreign traders in China. They were more capable than any other British or European to draw up a war plan.

In sharp contrast to the Warlike party's great confidence in subjugating the Qing Empire, the politicians in London were apprehensive about taking on such a long and unprecedented expedition. On 7 April 1840, the first day of the debate on the

China issue in the House of Commons—a debate that would last for three days—Sir James Graham (1792–1861) reasoned:

> It appeared that this would be no little war—nor one which, as some appeared to think, would be terminated by a single campaign. It was one which would be attended with circumstances no less formidable than the magnitude of the interests which were at stake. If a war with China were to take place, it should be remembered that it was a contest which should be carried on at the remotest part of the habitable globe, and where the monsoons would materially interfere with the communications which must be had with this country. It was to be carried on at an immense distance from all our naval stations. The squadrons which should be sent out would be exposed to various dangers. They would arrive at their destination after a long voyage, pent up in crowded transports, and wearied with the fatigues of an element which our land forces abhor, they would come to the scene of action with abated Strength and diminished energies.[60]

Graham's doubt was not just an opposition party's political disagreement but a genuine concern for a war between China and a European country—an action that had never been taken and was not readily imaginable at the time. John Cam Hobhouse (1786–1869), president of the Board of Control in the Melbourne cabinet, raised similar concerns about taking on such an expedition just before the war decision was made.[61]

The Warlike party knew well that there would be great obstacles, such as Graham's, in convincing the politicians and the British public of this point. The article 'War with China' published in 1835 in the *Register* argued, 'At home I think this is so well understood, that a fear of coming to a rupture with so great an empire will always be the strongest argument against adopting vigorous measure.'[62] To the Warlike party it was laughable that the Chinese could have any chance to withstand British military assault. The author asked:

> Can't China wage war with us, we would ask, at sea?—Has it a navy to cope with ours?—Can it meet our well-disciplined troops in the field?—One must be little acquainted with the state of this country to assert such things, and to foresee a dreadful struggle in the event of a rupture. Let us, however, grant all this; can China actually carry on war against us?—Can her fleets disturb our trade?—Her armies invade our territories?—The only evil which can possibly be apprehended from a rupture with China, is a temporary suspension of our trade, which of all things is the least agreeable.[63]

Their superior knowledge of Chinese military capabilities in particular and on China in general assured the Warlike party that the war was easily winnable and there was nothing to lose in starting one. But the Warlike party needed to do more than just articulate the Qing's military weakness, the minimal forces needed from the British government, the advantage of taking an island and opening other ports, and why they deserved these. They needed politicians and other British merchants to add their

weight in persuasion, and the only way to achieve this was to meet face to face with the political power holders in Whitehall to reason them into a war.

Lobbying for a war in London

In late 1834, James Matheson accompanied Napier's widow back to Britain, carrying with him the 1834 December war petition. With his wide connections, Matheson managed to have the Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow merchants' groups send three additional petitions requesting the intervention of Britain in Chinese affairs—in other words, war. This first war lobby would last from mid-1835 when Matheson arrived back in Britain into the summer of 1836 when his lobby was rejected by Palmerston.

Besides the suggestion that Napier had been insulted—and thus British national honour had been tarnished by the Chinese—the three petitions of northern cities emphasized the economic importance of the China trade, that is, British national interests in trading with China. They reasoned that the China trade 'affords employment for nearly one hundred thousand tons of British shipping'. The Chinese markets were a market 'for the manufactures of this country to a large and rapidly increasing amount' and 'for the production of our Indian possessions . . . upward of three millions sterling per annum, which enables our Indian subjects to consume our manufactures on a largely increased scale'. Also 'the value of raw silk imported from China, exceeds one million of pounds sterling per annum, the want of which would greatly paralyse a most important and growing manufacture'. And 'that trade for which they thus solicit protection, employs about six millions sterling of British capital . . . and annual revenue of four to five millions sterling, on the single commodity of tea'. The term 'protection'—meaning British trade being protected by the British government—was used again and again in the three petitions.[64]

Pamphleteering as a key method of public campaign at this time was employed by the Warlike party. Matheson's pamphlet *The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China* described the Chinese as 'a people characterized by a marvellous degree of imbecility, avarice, conceit, and obstinacy. . . . They consequently exhibit a spirit of *exclusiveness* on a grand scale.'[65] The pamphlet by naturalist George Gordon, *Address to the People of Great Britain*, outlined the history of trade in Canton and included many incidents, culminating in the Napier Affair, in which the British merchants are seen to be oppressed by the Chinese: 'Our sovereign himself has, in the person of his representative at Canton, the late Lord Napier, been insulted by the Chinese authorities, and the national flag has been fired upon from Chinese batteries.'[66] Another pamphlet, by James Goddard, favoured a strategy of deploying warships to China as 'tranquil and judicious visits', to demonstrate the power of Britain without actually using it.[67] The missionary voice in the campaign was presented by

the pamphlet *British Intercourse with China* and put the Christian agenda alongside trade by advocating that China be thrown 'open to commerce, to civilization, and Christianity'.[68]

In addition to petitioning and pamphleteering, the Warlike party used lobbying. Lady Napier, in the role of grieving widow, wrote a letter to Palmerston, urging him to meet Matheson and to exact retribution for her husband's death and the insults heaped upon him. Matheson also mobilized other personal networks, and he was duly received by Palmerston.[69]

Their talk, however, was short; Palmerston was not ready to act. He asked Matheson why the merchants were always squabbling with the Chinese government. Matheson replied, because 'we do not receive justice from their government'. Palmerston retorted, 'Ah! You are like the rest, do not know what justice is; you fancy justice is getting it all your own way.'[70] Palmerston was not at all interested in war against China. He had not even read Napier's dispatches nearly one year after Lord Napier's death.[71]

It may seem surprising that when a merchant representing the British trade interests who desperately wanted a war met with Palmerston—the name mostly associated with gunboat diplomacy—Palmerston's answer was negative. But, on the China issue, the power centre in London at this time still had a 'peaceful intention'.[72] There was little thought of waging a war against China. After all, the argument for war was initiated and developed in Canton.

On the contrary, in the meeting with Matheson Palmerston praised Chinese official papers that he believed were 'most just and equitable and would make no bad protocol'.[73] Palmerston had in mind the image of China's great bureaucratic system presented by the Jesuits that was still the norm in understanding China in Britain. His reaction was also likely a personal observation from reading the translated Chinese documents that came with the dispatches from Canton and that were in the EIC files. The paradigm shift in British knowledge of China from that of the Jesuits to that of the Canton British merchants had just started in these years by precisely the campaigns for war.

The Warlike party in Canton watched every movement in London. When they read the king's speech of 1836, which only mentioned France, the United States, and Spain, they wished that China had been included. That would have meant a step closer for the success of their war lobbying.[74]

Less than four years later, when the opium crisis escalated, Melbourne's Whig government was ready. The Bombay merchants had already sent a petition to the British India government, because the opium confiscated was, in many cases, consigned to the Canton agency by them.[75] The campaign in Britain for starting a war was fierce. While they were confined in the Thirteen Factories during the opium confiscation crisis, the British merchants had drawn up a plan to send Robert Inglis,

Hugh Hamilton Lindsay (who had come back to Canton as a private trader), and Alexander Matheson to London with the purpose of lodging a petition. They would meet with William Jardine, who had left Canton in January 1839 under pressure from the Qing authorities during the anti-opium campaign.[76]

The East India and China Associations in Blackburn, Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, and London sent petitions to Palmerston reminding him of the importance of the China trade as outlined in the 1835 petitions.[77] The London merchants also sent a petition in favour of war because they were invested in the opium trade.[78] Manchester, Liverpool, and Glasgow merchants sent in not only petitions but this time also a deputation to see 'H. M. Ministers, calling upon them to take measures for protecting our commerce and our merchants in China'.[79]

Meanwhile, James Matheson, who stayed in Canton, did not sit and watch. Drawing from his experience in the first campaign, he sent letters to Jardine telling him 'to secure the services of some leading newspaper to advocate the cause' and to engage a literary man to draw up petitions.[80] Jardine commissioned the then-best-selling writer Samuel Warren to write a pamphlet, which was called *The Opium Question*, to promote the war campaign.[81] Lindsay, this time round, published a pamphlet entitled *Is the War with China a Just One?* The missionary E. C. Bridgman famously said, 'The time has come when China must bend or break.'[82] At least four other pamphlets advocating war, closely associated with the Warlike party, were published in London in 1839 and 1840 in conjunction with their petitions being published in newspapers and appended to pamphlets.[83] The Warlike party was not going to miss this godsend opportunity to bring the British government to a war that they had desired for years.

One of the partners of Jardine, Matheson & Co.'s London agents, John Abel Smith (1802–1871), Member of Parliament for Chichester, introduced Jardine to Palmerston, the Melbourne cabinet's foreign secretary. Jardine supplied Palmerston with maps of China and the 'Jardine plan'.[84] After the war was won and the treaty was signed, Palmerston wrote to thank John Abel Smith:

> To the assistance and information which you and Mr. Jardine so handsomely afforded to us it was mainly owing that we were able give our affairs naval, military and diplomatic, in China those detailed instructions which have led to these satisfactory results.[85]

Palmerston's letter to Smith was direct proof that Jardine had supplied Palmerston with military intelligence, war strategy, and demands for treaty negotiation ('diplomatic'). That Jardine and his fellow merchants of Canton had superior knowledge of China and first-hand experience with the Chinese made the difference in winning the war and signing the treaty. Jardine's connections enabled him to bring the new knowledge of China the Warlike party had acquired—including China's military weakness, geographical facts, economic structure, and political system, and a new

British perception of China—to the attention of the power centre. This new knowledge centred on starting a war against China.

Glenn Melancon argued that Palmerston reached the war decision on his own before he met Jardine. His arguments are not convincing. Melancon quoted as evidence that Jardine met Palmerston on 27 September, nearly two month after Palmerston had hinted the possibility of starting a war.[86] The available records of this meeting do not mean it was their first meeting. Besides, Jardine did not need to personally convey the idea of war to Palmerston; his business partner MP John Abel Smith and other Radical MPs could have worked in this capacity and were more likely to do this before the cabinet's final decision. Moreover, the cabinet took the war decision on 1 October, three days after Palmerston met Jardine. Above all, Palmerston specifically thanked Jardine and clearly said the expedition was successful 'mainly owing' for the information 'so handsomely afforded'.[87] Jardine played a key role, and the Warlike party's new knowledge of China developed and acquired in Canton was paramount to the war decision. Jardine's war lobby followed a same pattern that has been identified by John Brewer in which merchants in the frontier possessed superior knowledge and they supplied it to the ministers. Lack of information on the government side offered a perfect opportunity for lobbying a course.[88] Jardine was actively searching for an opportunity to put forward his story of China, and he utilized his time with the Palmerston well.

Had Palmerston and the cabinet reached the war decision on their own, they would not have dismissed Charles Elliot who, as the plenipotentiary, had asked so little from China in the Convention of Chuanbi signed in January 1841. Elliot's treaty included these conditions: cession of Hong Kong to Britain, reopening of Canton, and indemnity of 6 million silver dollars. These demands did not fully satisfy the Warlike party. Elliot arrived in Canton with Napier in 1834 and became chief superintendent in 1836. In five years in China he developed his own idea of Sino-British relations, which was to engage China in friendly terms. This explains why he demanded so little. His conception of China differed significantly from that of the Warlike party.

After Elliot was dismissed, Henry Pottinger (1789–1856) was sent for the second phase of the war and further treaty negotiation. The result was the Treaty of Nanking, which asked for four additional ports, 21 million dollars of indemnity, and new trade conditions with low and fixed port duty. Had not the Warlike party supplied the list of demands, the politicians would not have had the slightest clue what to ask for in the treaty. Palmerston might have just ended the war with the Convention of Chuanbi during Elliot's term had not the Warlike party's designs—what ended up as the Treaty of Nanking—been a major force behind the war campaign.[89]

Neither are Melancon's arguments that ministers went to war for the sake of British 'national honour' convincing.[90] James Hevia has pointed out that the honour argument was questionable, as the ministers kept their war decisions secret until the war

began. If Britain had entered into the war for the sake of national honour, there would have been no reason for the ministers to hide or talk about it only when under attack by the opposition.[91]

Instead of taking the words at face value, 'national honour' should be seen as government's justification for war—a rhetoric they learned from the Canton British merchants. The term 'national honour' that appeared in ministerial papers and ministers' private documents came directly out of Warlike party's arguments developed in Canton. If the British political circle did believe Britain's honour was at stake, Britain would have gone to war in 1835 after Napier's death, especially given that Matheson came back to lobby for it. But war did not happen in 1835. Napier's aristocratic background and his connections in the power centre provided more reason for a war of 'honour' when comparing him to the merchants in the 1839 opium confiscation crisis. The merchants were often characterized as pirate-like smugglers who possessed little national honour. In fact, the opium trade and subsequent war were characterized by the British public as a 'national sin' and a 'national crime'—the opposite of national honour, as the next chapter shows. The Pacific party had revealed the talk of national honour for what it was when they commented on the Warlike party's December 1834 war petition that it was 'nothing more than a mercenary design on the credulity of the Foreign secretary'.[92]

A war made in Canton

In 1835, the campaign for war had no impact; in 1839, domestic political circumstances in London happened to favour their case. Although Melancon's main arguments are not convincing, his secondary argument makes a great contribution to the First Opium War historiography, as he contends that the reason for the Whig government to wage the war lay in party politics, as mentioned in Chapter 1.[93] Melancon argued that the Whig government passed bills in early 1839 by narrow margins on two votes on Britain's domestic issues in February and five votes in May. As a result, Prime Minister Lord Melbourne (William Lamb, 1779–1848) resigned. However, the Tory opposition was unable to form a government, and the Whigs remained in power as a weak government. In the summer of 1839, as the opium crisis was unfolding in Canton, 'the Liberal Tories joined the Ultra-Tories in their attacks on the Whigs'.[94] The Whigs needed the Radicals' support. If a war with China was what the Radicals wanted, they would have it.[95]

In addition to a domestic political crisis, the British government was facing other troubles: a diplomatic situation in Mexico with France, a Canadian rebellion, a Jamaican rebellion, the Ireland problem, and Russian expansion in the Middle East. A war with China had little risk of upsetting geopolitics vis-à-vis France or imperial

Russia, but would demonstrate the strength of the government and ward off opposition accusations that the government was weak.[96]

In a time of fiscal crisis—another major attack point of the Tories—the only concern remaining was who would pay for the expedition. Charles Elliot had also promised compensation to the British merchants in 1839 at the time of the opium confiscation. China was to pay for both the war expedition and the opium confiscated. And, with the intelligence that China was militarily weak, all doubts were laid to rest. The decision was made.[97] Instructions to prepare for war were sent out in secret to India in Jardine's fast new ship, the *Mor*, on her maiden voyage.[98] The Warlike party, by now, was closely working together with the Whig government.

With the domestic political crisis taking place in Britain, the opium confiscation of 1839 became not just another stand-off in Canton but the starting point of a military confrontation. The crisis itself was not the origin of the war but the pretext. The war's origin lay in the Warlike party's actions to force the Whig government to respond. With circumstances in their favour, the Warlike party, with the help of the Radicals, had the war they wanted.

As the war decision was made by the Melbourne cabinet, it did not go through Parliament and was not announced to the nation until the summer of 1840. And because they were in the dark about the decision, the opposition Tory party in Parliament continued their attack on the Whig government in late 1839, asking to see correspondence between the Foreign Office and Canton. They wanted to find evidence of the government's incompetence in letting the all-important China trade slip into a regrettable state degenerating to the opium confiscation crisis. This would make the government appear even weaker. After some delay, a 458-page document was published in early 1840; the highly edited correspondence provided little ammunition to the Tories.[99]

The war decision was leaked soon after instructions were sent to India, and rumours of it persisted in early 1840. The Tories tabled a discussion on the issue on 7 April 1840. The question of whether Britain as a nation should attack China was debated, but the debate was primarily an excuse for the Tories to motion yet another vote of no confidence in a bid to bring down the precarious Whig government: the vote was not about whether to have a war with China. At 262 in favour to 271 against, the no confidence bid failed.[100] The Radicals had reached a secret deal to support the Whigs in exchange for the war.[101]

The Tories then stepped up their attack by bringing about an inquiry in the House of Commons on the China question in May 1840, which they framed as 'the Grievances complained of in the Petitions of Merchants interested in the Trade with China'.[102] Unintended by the Tories, the inquiry provided a great opportunity for the Warlike party. Their ideas, opinions, and perceptions, generated in Canton, would

be heard at the power centre not just by ministers but by politicians in general, and further disseminated.[103] In the hearing of the inquiry, William Jardine reiterated his idea of a firm attitude and an assertive policy in dealing with Qing China. He denied any harmful effect of smoking opium. Jardine then described the Chinese government as 'arbitrary', implying that China was a despotic regime that did not deserve civilized treatment.[104] Robert Inglis, in recounting the merchants' ordeal under house arrest during the 1839 opium crisis, added an emotional dimension to the merchants' claims that they had suffered at Chinese hands.[105] The testimony substantiated the Tories' accusation that the government had neglected the China trade. The Whig government suffered yet another injury from a Tory attack.

Going to war was not helping the Whigs. The Tories were equally ready to fulfil the merchants' demands. The Whig government eventually fell on 30 August 1841, exactly a full year before the war was concluded and the treaty signed. The Tory party led by Robert Peel (1788–1850) assumed power and continued the war policy, which they had never seriously opposed.[106] Henry Pottinger's instruction about treaty demands was unchanged, so that the war and treaty were concluded in the track set by the Warlike party and Palmerston, who thus, even though out of power, penned the thanks to Smith and Jardine.

The treaty that was signed mostly fulfilled the Canton Warlike party's demands, which had been spelled out in their newspapers of Canton, pamphlets published in London, and private letters. The $21 million obtained as war indemnity consisted of $12 million for the cost of the expedition, $6 million for the opium confiscated, and $3 million for the debt the Hong owed to the British merchants (several Hong merchants went bankrupt in the 1830s, resulting in huge debt to private merchants unpaid). The Nanking Treaty itself, and the supplementary treaty and trade regulations that followed, was designed specifically to break the one-port Canton system. The island of Hong Kong came under British control—satisfying a desire of the private merchants that could be traced back to the EIC day.

As was envisioned by the Warlike party, four additional ports on the eastern coast were designated for extensive British trade. The Hong system that caused so much trouble was abolished. The British could trade with whomever they wanted in the five ports. Europeans, male and female, were allowed to live in the ports all year round—a wish since Mrs Baynes's days now fulfilled. The long-complained-about trading issues of port tax, port duty, hiring of porters and water pilots, among other things were negotiated and set on the terms the British merchants wanted.[107]

Extraterritoriality, which became an issue after the 1784 *Lady Hughes* incident, was also settled. The British were explicitly granted rights of self-government, while those cases involving both Chinese and foreigners were to be dealt with jointly by the British and the Chinese in a mixed court.[108] The war and the treaty finally achieved

what the Warlike party wanted all along. Even though the final decision to start a war came from the British government in London, its roots were in Canton.

Before the Whig government fell, Palmerston wrote to British India governor-general George Eden, the Earl of Auckland (1784–1849), spelling out how he saw the ongoing war in China:

> The rivalship of European manufacturers is fast excluding our productions from the markets of Europe, and we must unremittingly endeavour to find in other parts of the world new vents for the products of our industry. The world is large enough and the wants of the human race ample enough to afford a demand for all we can manufacture: but it is the business of government to open and secure the roads for the merchants. . . . The new markets in China will at no distant period give a most important extension to the range of our foreign commerce.[109]

With the most warlike statesman of the time articulating a positive relationship between trade and politics, merchants trading in China were no longer alone seeking the protection of the government; now, politicians were talking about seeking ways to open markets and leading the way for the merchants. This attitude paved the way for the Second Opium War, since Palmerston would come back to power as the prime minister, leading his own cabinet to wage the second British war against China. As a politician, Palmerston knew precisely where to find political allies and sources for his political power.[110]

The changed attitude of Palmerston was remarkable. In 1835, a war against China was unimaginable to him, but, in the circumstances of late 1839, the first-ever war between China and a European country could be conceived, implemented, and won. The new knowledge of China supplied by the merchants initiated in Canton were primal to this development. Thanks to the lobbying of the Warlike party on the China issue, the British government changed from a quiescent policy to a forward policy. But the British public and the print media in Britain, as the next chapter will show, did not let the war and changes in the British conception of China happen without a fight.

7
The Regret of a Nation

Signing the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 concluded the war, opened Chinese ports to British trade, and established Hong Kong as a British colony, making Plenipotentiary Henry Pottinger a hero among British merchants, especially manufacturers in Liverpool and Manchester. He was greatly praised there, and lavish dinner parties were thrown in his honour.

However, this was not the mood of a part of the general public in Britain. Before the British expedition arrived in China in the summer of 1840, some in London had already named the conflict the 'Opium War'. Anti-war campaigners expressing their anger in the form of petitions, peace meetings, and polemical articles argued that its purpose was to force opium on the Chinese. Some anti-war groups expressed moral outrage against the opium trade and the war in the same way they had opposed the slave trade, while the Peace Society's anti-war rhetoric had a strong undertone of Christianity. The contemporaneous British Afghanistan war ran parallel with the Chinese war, and both were targets of anti-war movements.

The pro-war campaigners—key members of the Warlike party in Canton who were now in London, the northern manufacturers, and supporters of Whig government—wanted the war to be called the 'Chinese War'. They argued that the war's aim was not to force opium on the Chinese but to open the Chinese market to British trade and address the insults heaped on British merchants and officials. In justifying the war, the pro-war campaign peddled the image of an 'insular China' that needed to be opened up, and this became an established way of understanding China, in direct competition with the image of a 'peaceable China' fashioned by the Jesuits and used in the 1830s by anti-war groups in their arguments. History remembers little of the war protests, yet it was the anti-war protesters who ensured that the war was remembered as the Opium War rather than a Chinese war.[1]

The able negotiator of our peace with China

Once the war had been won and the treaty had been signed, the person singled out by Britain's commercial and political circles for celebration was Sir Henry Pottinger. *The*

Times warmly named him 'the able negotiator of our peace with China' as soon as the news of peace in China arrived in London.[2]

On his way back to Britain in the summer of 1844, Pottinger stopped over in Bombay. His arrival was described as 'the signal of great rejoicings'. 'He was welcomed with addresses, and with dinners, balls.' At a 'sumptuous dinner', the white and native merchants of Bombay together presented him with a silver plate to express their gratitude for 'the important benefits which his commercial arrangement with the Chinese Government had conferred upon those interested in the trade with that country'.[3] This was a promising sign of how Pottinger would be received in Britain, at least among the merchants. He conveyed his appreciation at the dinner: 'I thank you most warmly and cordially for your good wishes, and I beg to offer, in all sincerity, mine in return for your individual and collective prosperity and happiness.' He left Bombay on 27 August and headed for home.[4]

Manchester and Liverpool showed the warmest hospitality. Before Pottinger came to their city, the Board of Directors of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Manufactures 'unanimously adopted a congratulatory address' praising him for his feat of fixing China's 'tariff of duties', in language not far from that befitting a saint:

> From the high principles which actuated you in your negotiations with the Chinese authorities, and from the wisdom which they have themselves manifested in the arrangement of their tariff of duties, has arisen an irrefragable demonstration of how much the true interests of the human race would be promoted, were nations, who do not hesitate to boast of superior enlightenment as contrasted with the Chinese, to pursue the same policy.[5]

If free trade were a religion, Henry Pottinger's facilitation of it would have been considered saintly. In Liverpool, on 18 December 1844, at 2 p.m., he walked into the Council Chamber, where the large number of city merchants gathered there 'saluted him with three most heartily cheers'. He was to them nothing short of a hero. Dinner in the splendid ballroom at the town hall followed, and 'the dinner, wines, &c., were creditable to Mr. Sim, of the Waterloo, who supplied the feast'. 'Grace was said before and after dinner by the Rev. Mr. Breaks.' There were numerous cheers, toasts, and speeches throughout the night.[6]

Two days later, Pottinger was on the mail train to Manchester, sitting 'in his private carriage, with Lady Pottinger and suite'. Manchester gave him as many welcomes and great dinners as Liverpool, with musicians and singers in attendance and 'the most enthusiastic cheering'. However, Manchester was more creative in small things:

> On the dinner tickets, price two guinea each, there was a very neatly executed engraving of the signature of the Chinese treaty, Sir Henry, with his staff, secretaries, &c., being represented within an Oriental pavilion holding out the treaty, while the Chinese Commissioner, with his guard of honour, approaches to receive it.[7]

The Manchester merchants also seemed to have more fun than their Liverpool counterparts. After toasting and loud cheers, the mayor of the city rose and addressed the assembly:

> You will recollect that the population of Great Britain amounts to 27,000,000, and if we consider for a single moment an equal trade with a population exceeding 340,000,000 of people, the advantages must be almost wholly upon our side. (Loud cheers.) I have heard an exclamation which proceeded from one of our country manufacturers upon the subject, which I dare say will convey some idea to the minds of gentlemen present of the advantages which we are likely to derive from the extension of our intercourse with China.—'Why,' said the worthy manufacturer, 'all the mills we now have will hardly make yarn to fill them with nightcaps and socks'. (Laughters).[8]

The image of 'nightcaps and socks' was vivid and appealing. Was this not the innocent joy of 'shopkeepers', as the British were called? The accolades continued. The workingmen of Manchester waited at the Queen's Hotel, where Pottinger was staying, and presented him with an 'address' with 10,438 signatures, which were said to have been gathered 'in the short space of 14 hours'. The men wanted to thank him for 'the benefits we have derived from your able services in your negotiations with the Chinese government'. After returning to London, Pottinger penned a thank-you piece to the workingmen that was published in *The Times*.[9]

In London, he stayed at 49 Albemarle Street near Pall Mall, the very centre of the halls and mansions where grand dinners and stately functions were held. On Boxing Day 1844, John Abel Smith, MP, who had introduced William Jardine to Lord Palmerston, presided over a banquet given for Pottinger by London merchants. On the guest list were Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen (George Hamilton-Gordon, 1784–1860) and his predecessor Lord Palmerston. Probably the most exaggerated expression of glory over winning the war and signing the treaty was uttered that night, which declared 'the Chinese free trade tariff as equal in importance to the discovery of America'—a claim that no one would remember or admit to saying the following morning, but which a journalist jotted down and published—if he did not invent it himself.[10]

Eight months after his return to Great Britain, Pottinger was still being entertained at dinners given in his honour by the high society of London.[11] Merchant associations of Liverpool, Manchester, London, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Belfast all presented him with commemorative plates. The celebration culminated in the summer of 1845 when Parliament gave him a pension for life of £1,500 per annum after Queen Victoria added her weight to the recommendation.[12]

Outside the merchant and political circles and high society, a good number of the British public were not feeling celebratory. If anything, most of them detested the celebrations. The *Leeds Times*, which had been consistently vocal against the

war, attacked the pension award, describing the pension given to Pottinger as 'public money—drawn from the overtaxed labourers of England—the only methods of remunerating "distinguished services!"'[13]

An equally sarcastic voice from Scotland called the dinners and parties 'trice happy day' and described the inflated celebrations thus:

> All was peace, harmony, and good fellowship, and the wine sparkled and the cheer resounded; no flaws were detected—no faults, or mistakes, or misunderstandings were alleged. There was not one syllable about opium, or opium eaters, or an opium war. It was the Chinese war that had been so brilliantly closed—and success atoned at once for all errors and covered all deficiencies.[14]

The anti-war campaign that took place across the country from early 1840, although limited in scale, pre-empted the celebrations of 1844 and 1845 by making them appear to the public eye a farcical covering up of injustice. During the war, long before Henry Pottinger returned, many British citizens had decided that this war was an outrage to British national honour and to Christian morality. To them, it was an Opium War, and no other name would do.

Not in the name of my Christian nation

During the war years, starting in early 1841 and lasting for about two years, regular coverage on the war appeared in Britain—sometimes small news items and other times full articles—with headings such as 'Progress of the Opium War' or 'Highly Important News from China'.[15] For London journalists and for politicians, the busiest night in the three years of war probably occurred 10 April 1841, when Parliament voted on the issue. After three nights of debates, the motion of no confidence in the Whig government's actions on China, on the table from the Tory leader Robert Peel, finally came to a vote in the small hours and concluded just before four in the morning. A few hours later, the results were printed in the morning newspapers, which gave a full account of the debates with comments. The Whig government survived yet again by a margin of only nine votes.[16] The London newspapers that did not have journalists and typists waiting to report the outcome, and the newspapers near London printed the results on 11 April. The following week, newspapers and journals across the country relayed the story with added comments that fell on both sides, anti-war and pro-war.

One of the most damning reports for the pro-war campaign in London was a diary entry in a book published in 1841, an extract of which was printed in the *Advocate of Peace* and in the *Asiatic Journal*. It described the street scene on Chusan Island after an expedition force consisting of British troops assembled from India and other Eastern ports had taken the island:

> Chusan, on the 5th of July, 1840. Every house was indiscriminately broken open, every drawer and box ransacked, the streets strewed with fragments of furniture, pictures, chairs, tables, grain of all sorts, &c., &c., For two days the bodies were allowed to lay, exposed to sight, where they fell. The plunder, however, was carried to an extreme; that is to say, did not cease till there was nothing else to take, and the plunderers will, no doubt, be able, on our return to Calcutta, to place at their friends' disposal, and for the ornamenting their houses trophies gained, not from the Chinese soldiers, or from a field of battle, but from the harmless and peaceable inhabitants and tradesmen of a city doomed to destruction by our men of war.[17]

Accounts like this roused sympathy for the Chinese among readers, rather than a desire to celebrate British victory. It fuelled the anti-war campaigns in Britain as the public questioned the British soldiers' unchristian behaviour.

Feelings of indignation over the war plagued the public mind, as had indignation over the slave trade. Before the expedition forces had arrived in China and the news of the war was still a rumour, in February and March 1840 George Thompson (1804–1878), who for most of his life was known for his involvement in the anti-slavery movement, took up the anti-war campaign in the hope that the war could be stopped. He delivered several lectures in northern cities such as Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, York, Darlington, and Glasgow. Thompson's speeches were then published in full or in summary, in newspapers and as pamphlets. Signatures were gathered during his lectures for a petition to Parliament. In Leeds, 3,127 people signed the petition, including the city's Lord Mayor.[18] The petition spoke against both the war and the opium trade with China:

> Your petitioners therefore humbly trust that your Honourable House will approach the consideration of this momentous question, vitally affecting the commercial and manufacturing interests of all classes in this country, the welfare of hundreds of millions of the natives of Asia, and the reputation and usefulness of a professedly Christian people, with minds imbued with the feelings of enlightened humanity, and under the guidance and control of the unchangeable principles of justice and truth; and your petitioners pray, that such measures may be adopted by your Honourable House, as will put an end to a trade, which, in its character and consequences, is so widely and fatally injurious, and avert those dreadful calamities which would inevitably attend a war between Great Britain and China.[19]

Thompson encouraged his audience, and later his readers, to consider the welfare of the whole human race, not just the British, which undercut the 'national interests' and 'national honour' arguments put forward by the pro-war campaign.

However, Thompson's universal humanitarianism was not appreciated by all. While delivering this message to the audience in Darlington, the Chartists of the town, who at the time were campaigning for manhood suffrage and other political

rights of participation, took the opportunity afforded by this gathering to advocate their cause. They disrupted the meeting, arguing 'when the working men get their rights, all the evils of which you now complain shall be immediately swept away'. Sen J Pease replied that the meeting was 'for the benefit of hundreds of millions who had no means of making their condition known except through the medium of a few friends in this county'. 'A plasterer, of the name of Knox', then complained that this meeting was 'to have more sympathy for the natives of China than for their own workmen'. Because of the disruption, the meeting in the town hall was abandoned to the Chartists and moved to the Friends' Meeting House nearby.[20] Universal humanitarianism at that moment clashed with national discourse.

Christian universalism, Enlightenment humanitarianism, and British national identity were also the main arguments in a major meeting on 24 April 1840, at the Freemasons' Hall on Great Queen Street, London. By this time, London's public was quite certain that the expedition troops were gathering in Singapore before heading to China. About three hundred people attended the meeting, 'a large proportion of whom were ladies'. The room was jam packed, and people were still coming in as the chairman, Earl Stanhope (Philip Henry, 1781–1855), began to speak. He was uncompromising, describing the coming war as 'an outrage upon the moral and religious feeling of the country, and disgraceful to the Christian characters'. He believed the 'Chinese had suffered from us the most irreparable injuries'.[21]

Before he could go further, someone requested to have an 'independent chairman', because he believed the Earl was biased. The Earl expressed his displeasure: 'I have had some experience of public meetings, but never before did I see such an exhibition . . . (cheers).' The person replied that if the meeting was public, the side of the 'opium smugglers' should be heard.

Then, Mr Sidney Taylor rose to speak. He felt obliged to explain, after the disruption, why he had come to the meeting: 'not upon party feeling', 'nor upon sectarian interests', 'but upon a question of public morality—(cheers) a question affecting the honour of the British nation—affecting our Christian character—affecting the welfare of three hundred and fifty millions of our fellow-creatures in China'. Alluding to the negative portrayal of the Chinese by the pro-war campaign in the newspapers, Taylor said:

> The nineteenth century had been called the age of intellect, and they heard much of its science, its intelligence, and its civilization. Why, then, in such enlightened times as the present should they unsheathe the sword against the Emperor of China? It was absurd to suppose that the object of the present meeting was to interfere with the commerce of that country in the legitimate sense of the word. Nothing could be a greater sophism than that. In the course of the debate in the Commons it was stated that they sent Bibles and missionaries to China, and that the opium war might be made the means of facilitating that introduction of

> Christianity. (Oh.) A more monstrous proposition he never heard of—instead of missionaries and Bibles they were to be the bearers to the Chinese of opium and blood. It was the very mockery of Christianity itself.[22]

After more address and debate, the meeting came to a motion. The assembly wished to express their dissatisfaction that 'the moral and religious feeling of the country should be outraged' and that 'this kingdom [should be] involved in a war . . . in consequence of British subjects introducing opium into China'. A Mr Robertson interrupted and motioned to amend the resolution to say that the traffic in opium was 'the occasion, not the cause of the war', in effect saying that the war was not an opium war. This received very little support and was voted down by an overwhelming majority.[23] The assembly then resolved that 'a copy of the resolution should be translated into the Chinese language, and transmitted, through Commissioner Lin, to the Emperor of China'. The meeting lasted for more than five hours and was shaped by those who were outraged by both the opium trade and the war.

The details of this gathering were printed the next day in the major national London newspapers: *The Times*, the *Morning Chronicle*, *London Standard*, and the *Morning Post*. Among them, *The Spectator* was the most critical, concluding the report with a condemnation of the war: 'The sin of war in general, and the peculiar sinfulness of a war to force opium upon three hundred and fifty millions of people, were insisted upon with much earnestness.'[24] These London reports were then republished in whole or in summary, some with comments, in more than twenty newspapers across the country, informing many readers about the meeting and its agenda.[25]

From 1840 to 1843, arguments in pamphlets and newspapers proclaimed that the opium trade and the war were 'unjust', an object of 'guilt', a 'shame', 'a national sin', and a 'shame on the honour of England'.[26] This nationalistic discourse was used for the anti-war campaign and by the Chartists of Darlington to express their disappointment in not getting support for their own cause, as much as it was used by the pro-war party to advocate their cause in both Canton and London by arguing the war was for Britain's national honour and national interests.

In the same fashion, Christian universal humanitarian discourse was adopted by the pro-war groups to justify the war. A pamphlet addressed to Lord Palmerston argued:

> To see so many millions of our fellow-creatures, now wrapt in darkness, pursuing the onward march of improvement in morality, science, and arts, but, beyond all, adopting the pure tenets of Christianity, would be a triumph indeed. The temporary inconvenience and trouble they may be put to by the measures now necessary to set ourselves right with them, are as nothing when compared with the repayments we may make them in acts of kindness and benevolence, whenever they are prepared to receive them at our hands.[27]

'Our hands' were those of a nation occupying the high ground of Christian civilization, to be passed on by means of war, even to be regarded as an act of 'benevolence'. Although this may have sounded hypocritical, some people believed it. Both discourses—the national and Christian-centred universal humanitarianism—could be accessed by both pro-war and anti-war camps in their contrary arguments. The discursive forces drew on the same theory of Britain being a Christian nation, with each attempting to impose its own meaning on Christianity and the nation to steer the direction of the government. At stake was the integrity of the nation in this war of words, as it would be in the nation's name that the war was waged. As a war with China became imaginable five years after the Canton Warlike party's first petition in December 1834, Britain, as a nation, was struggling to find a moral ground in matters of both state and religion—to wage war or not, and then to reconcile the fact that the war had been started.

Opium War or Chinese War?

The names Opium War and Chinese War served as another battlefield in the war of words between the pro-war and anti-war camps. Party politics—the fight between the Whig and Tory parties—first ignited the battle of naming.

In the winter of 1839, half a year before the expedition troops were assembled in Singapore, the *Morning Herald*—a strong Tory supporter—noted the Whig government's precarious position and sounded the death knell to accelerate its demise. In late December, one of its propagandist articles recounted 'the memorabilia of the Melbourne administration' and in the list playfully called the war that was then still a rumour 'the opium war against China'.[28] The only basis for this account was the news of opium confiscation in Canton in the spring that year and leaked intelligence that instructions for the preparation for war had been sent to India. News of the skirmishes in the Canton estuary in September and November 1839 between Superintendent of Trade Charles Elliot's warships and Chinese water forces had yet to reach London.

This clever name, Opium War, was picked up and opposed by others. A pamphlet countered, 'Opium has nothing to do with it. It is not an opium war—it is a war to obtain redress for the grossest outrages that have ever before been offered to Englishmen.'[29] This pamphlet was in turn countered by the *Monthly Chronicle*, and then by the *Asiatic Journal*, which argued that the author of the pamphlet 'is not to be trusted'. 'Like most writers upon his side of this question, he is a partizan, and a warm one.'[30]

The Spectator, which was relatively neutral in party politics but took a strong anti-war position, attacked newspapers such as the *Morning Chronicle*, *The Examiner*, and *The Globe* that had opposed the name Opium War, saying:

> The Government writers are labouring strenuously to give a respectable colour to the war with China. It is 'washing the blackamoor white': do what they can—gloss it over as they may—THE OPIUM WAR is the name by which history will hand it down.[31]

In the following months *The Times*, despite being supportive of the Whig government, could not resist the temptation to use the name a few times in its articles, while other newspapers, especially those outside London, took opportunities to use the name emphatically, as *The Spectator* did.[32]

In the House of Commons, the term was first uttered on 7 April 1840 by a cabinet member, Secretary at War Thomas Macaulay (1800–1859). He was trying to argue against what he saw as the public opinion that 'the Government was advocating the cause of the contraband trade, to force an opium war on the public; but he thought that it was impossible to be conceived that a thought so absurd and so atrocious should have ever entered the minds of the British Ministry'.[33]

The pro-war groups preferred to call it the Chinese War. They argued that the country was going to war to open the Chinese market to British trade and to address the insults heaped on British merchants and officials—a matter of national interest and national honour—as the Warlike party of Canton had argued.

Opium War or Chinese War? The nation was deeply divided. Lord Brougham, in the difficult position of being a Whig MP, when called on by a group of anti-war merchants and citizens of Edinburgh to present a petition in Parliament against the war and the opium trade skilfully addressed the meeting in Edinburgh:

> I can only say that it will prove a bitter mortification to those who, for so many years, have been endeavouring to spread amongst them the information, and to inculcate the principles, which it was fondly hoped would make all unlawful wars, that is, wars not waged in self-defence, a thing only known in the past history of national crimes.[34]

This was as far as Brougham could go, indirectly naming it an 'unlawful war' to satisfy the crowd without being seen as directly opposing his government. The term 'national crimes' was ambiguously positioned, neither condemning nor condoning the war.

The anti-war campaigners gave other names to the war, which were even worse than Opium War. The *Leeds Times*, which saw itself as the voice of the British working class, conflated the war question and taxation issue (as they would in 1845 in questioning the £1,500 pension handed to Henry Pottinger), arguing in May 1840 that the war was evidence of 'aristocratic misgovernment, as indicated by aristocratic taxation'. They named it 'the aristocratic opium war with China'.[35]

During the war years, Britain's newspapers also carried detailed reports of war casualties. The assaults at Bogue in the Canton estuary in June 1841 were summarized in part: 'General Sir Hugh Gough calculates the loss of the Chinese in the different

attacks at 1,000 killed and 3,000 wounded. The loss on the British side was 15 killed and 112 wounded, including several highly distinguished officers.'[36] Reporting on British assaults on Ningbo, where large numbers of Chinese were killed—the battlefield was a marketplace and the narrow alleyways of the city, and bodies were piled high or removed to make way for British cannons—*The Spectator* questioned:

> It is impossible to read the accounts of the military operations in China without shame and disgust. It is not war, but sheer butchery—a *battu* in a well-stocked preserve of human beings. . . . Is it a sign of wisdom in the British nation to persist in a struggle which can only weaken it? Is it a sign of humanity to sanction such wholesale butchery of human beings? Is it a sign of morality to do all this in order that a poisonous drug may be smuggled into the markets of China?[37]

This sentiment was echoed a month later in an anti-war meeting in Dublin. The chairman of the meeting, James Haughton (1795–1873), asserted:

> It has been called the Chinese war, but, in history it will go down in characters never to be blotted out, as the *Chinese butchery*. From 15 to 20,000 of that people have been destroyed by us, while the total loss in battle, on the English side, has amounted to but a few men killed, and but a small number wounded—Verity, my friends, the warrior's brows have not been crowned with any laurels in this unholy crusade—this shameful opium war, undertaken to sustain in their iniquitous course a horde of smugglers, who are a disgrace to the Christian name.[38]

The war was now being called 'Chinese butchery'. As an increasing number of such reports on war causalities were printed, readers were embarrassed to learn that the Chinese could not withstand the slightest attack by the British troops. A victory won in this manner was nothing glorious. A sense of unease over the Chinese casualty numbers was spreading. 'National honour' was truly in jeopardy.

The Spectator, as the staunchest anti-war voice, not only named it the Opium War but attacked both the Whig party for launching the war and the Tory party for its half-hearted opposition. The newspaper thoroughly insulted the supporters of the war and accused them of profiteering:

> The Opium War party is strong, as every war party is in this country until a succession of disasters has alarmed and disgusted an overwhelming majority. For note how numerous and influential are the chief gainers by war. The aristocracy—the predominant interest—the class which crowds the Church and the Bar with younger sons and needy cousins—find a vent for family hangers-on in the augmented Army and Navy. The veterans in both services rejoice in the recurrence of active employment; and many youngsters are eager to exchange dull parades and garrison-duty for the rapture of the strife: their motives are not all sordid.[39]

As if these were not offensive enough, *The Spectator* extended its insults to other interest groups, saying that the 'dealers in clothing, arms, and provisions' also found

the war profitable. The single biggest community was 'the general mercantile community', whose natural position *The Spectator* believed 'ought to be for peace' but supported the war. The reason, *The Spectator* argued, was also profiteering:

> Compensation for the opium delivered up to destruction 'for her Majesty's service'—valued, without interest, at about two million and a half sterling—can only be obtained by war: so the Government assures the opium-smugglers and their agents. Upon this assurance a considerable number of London merchants, engaged in the Canton trade, were induced to sign the letter deprecating opposition to the measures of Ministers, which Lord Palmerston used so effectively in reply to Sir James Graham's motion, three weeks ago.[40]

In the media campaign, during and after the war, compensation for confiscated and then destroyed opium was the reason for the existence of many pro-war articles and pamphlets, and even continual governmental support of the war. There were at least five pamphlets on this topic published by the Warlike party and their associates in London. The London commercial circle were throwing their weight behind the pro-war arguments. In this atmosphere, not only was Parliament obliged to debate the compensation issue (it decided that China would pay the compensation), but also the Tory government, which came to power in August 1841 in the middle of the war, was obliged to support the demand for compensation and the war's continuation.[41]

In asking China to pay compensation for the opium destroyed, the pro-war groups shot themselves in the foot. The merchant community could not simultaneously demand compensation and claim that the war was not about opium. This confirmed what the anti-war groups had been arguing all along—that this was an opium war. As *The Spectator* asserted, if this was a war 'whose origin was opium, and whose end is opium', then how could it not be named the Opium War? The newspaper delivered its punchline: 'The War party betrays soreness because of the name by which their marauding expedition to the coast of China is designated. The truth is the libel.'[42]

A well-informed American politician, John Worth Edmonds (1799–1874), who gave a lecture on the war in Newburgh, New York, joined those ridiculing opium compensation:

> And now the British Government demands of the Chinese Empire indemnity for the property thus seized. I will venture to say that this is the first instance in the annals of civilization, (if not the first, it is to be hoped it will be the last,) in which indemnity for smugglers has been demanded at the cannon's mouth.[43]

The Freemasons' Hall meeting in April 1840 used even stronger language: 'that to grant compensation to the smugglers of opium, justly confiscated, would be to "offer a premium for crime"'.[44]

However, when it came to the topic of opening up the Chinese market to British trade, the anti-war arguments became ambiguous. There was a strong general consensus in the 1830s that Britain was a nation of trade; that is, only by expanding trade could the island nation survive. That Britain was a nation of shopkeepers held true. The celebrations in Liverpool and Manchester and the exaggerated sense of achievement in calling the fixing of the tariff 'equal in importance to the discovery of America' bespoke this faith in the maritime trade.

After the war was won in August 1842 and there were no more causality reports, the trade argument seemed more justifiable. When the attendees of the December 1842 Dublin 'peace meeting'—where the war had been called a 'Chinese butchery'—heard the news that the war in China had ended, they took comfort first in the arrival of peace, followed by happiness at the prospect of trading opportunities:

> Let us rejoice in this account; and we have also cause of joy on account of the prospect of improved trade opened up to us by these cessations from strife. The Afghans will now trade with us, and three hundred millions of Chinese will surely give some added occupation to our industrious artisans—so that comfort may soon again visit the abode of many, in which distress has been, alas! too long a visitant.[45]

Similarly, when the news that the treaty had been signed arrived in London, newspapers, rejoicing at the expansion of trade, called it 'glorious news'. The pro-war groups took the opportunity to attack the anti-war campaigns, saying, 'The endeavour to cast obloquy on this war by giving it an odious name, by calling it "The Opium War," was as unpardonable as unwarrantable on the part of the genuine Tory papers, and the unprincipled renegades of the press and in the Parliament.'[46]

The trade argument may have given the war a positive spin, but it was not enough to win over the true-blue anti-war protestors. Commenting on the war's conclusion, the Peace Society lamented, 'Ages will not wipe from the character of Great Britain the deep and damning disgrace of this war.'[47] Remarking on the unanimous vote of thanks in Parliament for the military's service in winning the war, the *Leeds Times* said:

> No; its unanimity was exhibited in rejoicing over successful carnage, committed in an unjust cause—in congratulations of the success of criminal and indefensible wars. It was in profuse gratitude to the Military and Naval Commanders, who, in conducting the Opium War, were the instruments of national crime and injustice.[48]

Even after the war was won and the treaty had expanded British trade, both the Whig and Tory governments and the pro-war groups still had a great deal to fight about in justifying the war. The war of words extended further to the British images of China either as 'peaceable' or 'insular'.

Peaceable China or insular China?

The anti-war movements in Britain gained support partly because the protesters viewed China as a peaceful, idyllic world. As it was stated in the Freemasons' Hall meeting, 'We were now engaged in hostilities with an empire the most peaceable, and also the most populous, which had ever existed in ancient or modern times.'[49] The same image of an idyllic China was supported in America by Edmonds, who argued against forcing Christianity onto the Chinese—one of the pro-war arguments:

> Such is the people—thus simple and unobtrusive, in regard to whom the Christian world is now called upon to imitate the example of Constantine, and with the Cross upon our banner, to conquer and destroy—for the sake of humanity, to force into civilization at the point of the bayonet—and in the name of Him, who proclaim peace on earth and good will to man, to drive into Christianity, by the gleam of our sabres and the thunder of our artillery.

The image of China as 'peaceable' and 'simple and unobtrusive' was built on a series of accounts of China that could be traced back to Marco Polo's (1254–1324) story of the faraway, prosperous land. Juan González de Mendoza (1545–1618) enhanced this view, using Spanish missionaries' reports of China to edit a book-length account of the legendary land of Cathay published in 1585 the book *Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres del gran reyno de la China* which was translated into English in 1588 with the title *The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China and the Situation Thereof*.[50]

The Jesuit missionaries who served in the late Ming and early Qing courts between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries brought the image of the faraway utopian kingdom to perfection. The Jesuits had good reason to do this. They often wrote from the grand imperial palace and gardens, which they had helped to beautify by bringing Western-style architecture to China. The people they mingled with were mostly the elite of Chinese society, who were the least likely to be troubled by poverty or to be beaten down by earning a living. Up to the late eighteenth century, Europe had fallen behind China in material wealth. Their China, thus, was a prosperous country. In addition, the Jesuits' approach to their mission was to fuse Catholicism and Confucianism, which they believed to be a remnant of an old Christian teaching. Their approach provided a strong motive to portray China as an idyllic kingdom with the aura of Eden. The China they fashioned was then talked about by the Enlightenment philosophers, such as Voltaire and Leibniz, who saw China as a kingdom with a rational bureaucratic system presided over by a philosopher king or, at worst, a benevolent autocracy.[51]

The Canton British community was the only European community that had sustained contact with China after the Jesuits. They became a new source of knowledge on China and knew that they were in this unique position: 'It is to the free merchants

and others of Canton, that the world *now* looks for fuller and truer accounts of China than have yet been made public, either in the letters and memoires of the clever Jesuits, or elsewhere.' [52]

From their position in Canton in the 1830s, the Warlike party saw a decaying, corrupt, tyrannical, and backward China that was falling behind civilized Europe.[53] They questioned the Jesuit picture of China: 'Such is the condition of a country, which Europe has hitherto viewed as a model of wisdom.'[54]

The grounds for judging China shifted as Western Europe grew to outperform it in terms of material life and technological improvements, among other things. Just as the Jesuits' memoirs, letters, and books were coloured by their approach to their mission and their experiences in the court of Peking, the negative experiences of the British merchants in Canton's port also coloured their observations. The merchants did not have the luxury of interacting with Chinese literati or conversing with the emperors. Those days were long gone. After the ban on Christianity in the 1720s, Europeans in China, be they missionaries or merchants, were seen and treated by the Qing bureaucratic system as the potential allies of the domestic rebels. The mood in Canton was hostile. In the confined space of the Thirteen Factories, it was obvious that China was shutting them out. Canton's position, along with the confidence in civilizational progress and considering the Warlike party's identity as citizens of the most powerful nation in the world, led to a sharp sense of humiliation. They wanted their nation to open up this *closed* China, to teach the Chinese how to properly treat the British—as the subjects of a great nation and certainly not as allies of Chinese rebels.

The Warlike party of Canton, however, did not invent a new knowledge of China entirely by themselves. John Milton (1608–1674), who distrusted the Jesuits' account of China on theological grounds, had already cast a shadow on the country's image.[55] In the late seventeenth century, negative British perception of China emerged, putting the Jesuits' knowledge of China further into question.[56] Commodore George Anson (1697–1762) received a rather unfavourable impression of the Chinese during his time in Canton in 1743. His crews were robbed, and the mandarins treated his fleet with suspicion, causing him a great deal of inconvenience in supplying the ships. In his well-known book *A Voyage Round the World*, Anson commented, 'In artifice, falsehood, and an attachment to all kinds of lucre, many of the Chinese are difficult to be parallel by any other people.' The compiler of his book knew this description of the Chinese to be 'so contradictory to the character given of them in the legendary accounts of the Romish Missionaries'. To convince readers, a lengthy and detailed description was provided as an account of how Anson and his crews were badly treated in Canton.[57]

The failed Macartney embassy at the end of the century compounded the British perception of China.[58] In 1817, John Murray (1778–1843), the London publisher of

Byron's (1788–1824) poems, was editing a book about the recently returned and frustrated Amherst embassy, and wrote the following to the poet: 'I hope we shall have a war with them.' The book Murray published showed how the embassy suffered at the hands of the Qing officials.[59] Although opinions like these in Britain were slowly growing, they had no direct bearing on the military action taken in 1839–1842.[60] Studies on British perception of China during the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century confirmed that the British had relatively positive imagination of China right before the Opium War.[61] The real source of the new perception of China was the Warlike party in Canton, which advanced the war idea along with their decisive negative perceptions of China.

In the days of the East India Company, requests to change the conditions of interaction were handled through the two embassies, because the EIC's Board of Directors had direct access to the power centre in London. In the era of private merchants, the Warlike party first resorted to war arguments in their own press, and then media campaigns and lobbying in Britain. In addition, their smuggler's identity on the outlying island of Lintin, where they anchored their floating depots for unofficial trade, gave them even more reason to promote a view of China as a corrupt, backward country. The more they disseminated this image of China, the less wicked their opium trade looked. A negative image of China would lend all the more justification for war.

However, this negative perception of the Chinese was not unanimous among the British community in Canton. The Pacific party, along with the majority of Americans, did not see the Canton system as confinement but rather understood it to be the host country's condition for trade. They seemed to share the Jesuits' image of China.

To be sure, the Warlike party, while painting an insular China for the world to see, did not completely dismiss the Jesuits' account. Rather, they used it as part of their war arguments by explaining that the merchants encountered difficulties in Canton due to the local government's corruption. They believed the court in Peking was still a good government as the Jesuits depicted and talked about taking their case to the emperor. Some Warlike party members even tried to reconcile the Jesuit image of China with their own experience by arguing that the real Chinese were under oppression by the Manchu (the Tartar) who presided over the Qing Empire. They thus believed that, once war started, the Han Chinese, who were the majority of the country and oppressed by the Manchu, would join the British in overthrowing the Tartars' despotic regime. This idea was shared by the British expedition forces, who were disappointed when they landed on Chusan in the summer of 1840 to find no sign of Han rebellion against the Manchu—only that they all fought against the British.[62]

In London, the image of a peaceable China prevailed in the first half of the 1830s and it appeared in George Thomas Staunton's argument against the war petition of

1835. He described China as an ancient and tranquil country in good order and said that Britain should not intrude, lest the EIC's China tea trade that sustained the company's profitability be disrupted.[63] When Palmerston met James Matheson the first time (as mentioned in Chapter 6) the image of rational Chinese bureaucracy was alluded to in his reply: 'I have read some Chinese state papers and they are most just and equitable and would make no bad protocol.' Palmerston subscribed to the Jesuits' China, despite being one of the most warlike statesmen of his time.

But 'insular China' was starting to gain popularity in Britain in the second half of the 1830s due to the pro-war campaign, which circulated in London the idea that Britain's 'national honour' had been tarnished by the Chinese. China was depicted as isolated and thus ignorant of the outside world. The Chinese did not know of Britain's greatness, and their isolation led to them mistreating and insulting the British. Commander John Elliot Bingham, whose passage on the battle in Ningbo was quoted by *The Spectator* as evidence of 'Chinese butchery', was now quoted by another newspaper to argue that the insults received from the Chinese were the issue:

> We had a long series of insults to be redressed, among which were—our flag fired upon; the representative of our Government with our merchants imprisoned, their property seized, confiscated, and destroyed, their memorials and representations treated with barbarian ignorance, and their persons expelled from Canton.[64]

The 'insults' described were based on facts well documented in the Canton print media, in translated Chinese official papers, and in the private letters and journals of those who witnessed them. A majority of Chinese officials, in dealing with the foreigners who came ashore, took the high position that the Chinese civilization was the leading, if not the only, civilization in the world, in the manner of fundamentalist neo-Confucianism. This way of thinking was prevalent in Qing officialdom by the early nineteenth century and entrenched among the bureaucrats in charge of the Canton port. The condescending attitude was particularly offensive to those British who were proud of the greatness of the British Empire.

The anti-war camps in Britain, immersed in the idea of a peaceable China, did not choose to understand the interaction from the Canton Warlike party's perspective. They saw the insults listed as a smear campaign run by the pro-war and pro-government press. *The Spectator* and the *Northern Star* both criticized the pro-war groups on this point:

> That is the true question: and the whole aim of the Ministerial press is to excite such a prejudice against Chinese customs as may lead the people of this country to let the war go on. Either this shameful war must go on, or Ministers may have to go out: hence the diligence of the ministerial press in stimulating the people to such hatred of the Chinese as should make them overlook the injustice of the OPIUM WAR.[65]

> The unrighteous quarrel of the 'Shopkeepers' with the Chinese empire has afforded food for all the newspapers during the past week; and, with marvellous ingenuity, the hired hacks of the 'shopkeeping' fraternity have laboured to mystify the whole matter, by talking contemptuously of the Chinese as the 'celestials'—by prating of the injuries which we have received, especially the exceedingly grave fact that a Chinese man actually treated the picture of King George IV with disrespect, by turning the back of his chair towards it! Yes, reader, be astonished at the forbearance of the English nation towards these barbarous 'celestials'![66]

Britain's knowledge of China, nonetheless, was changing. What the editors of *The Spectator* and the *Northern Star* did not know was that the campaign to depict China as 'insular' would be a great success in history. The war left China's image tarnished and peaceable China replaced by insular China, which was first brought into focus by the Warlike party in Canton in the 1830s as the mainstream image.

The negative perception of China became so widespread that by 1847—only five years after the war and treaty—the American missionary Samuel Wells Williams (1812–1884), who lived in Canton during the 1830s, was alarmed by what he had to confront when he published his monumental work on Chinese history, *The Middle Kingdom*. He explained the purposes of his book:

> Another object aimed at, has been to divest the Chinese people and civilization of that peculiar and almost undefinable impression of ridicule which is so generally given them; as if they were the apes of Europeans, and their social state, arts, and government, the burlesques of the same things in Christendom.[67]

From the Jesuits' 'philosopher king' to the 1840s' 'apes of Europeans', the changes in British imagination of China were dramatic, thanks largely to the Warlike party's public campaign and the need for justification after the war.

The working-class sinologist Peter Perring Thoms (fl. 1814–1856) shared Williams's dismay and efforts to rescue China's public image. Shocked by the negative portrayal of China, he conducted a one-man campaign against it, concentrating his efforts on the question of whether the Chinese, in using the word *yi* in naming, had insulted the British by calling them 'barbarians'.

Thoms had gone to China in 1814, working under the East India Company, specifically to assist in the printing of Robert Morrison's *Dictionary of the Chinese Language*. While working as typographer in the EIC's printing house in Macao, Thoms learned Chinese, partly through his typographical work. Three years after coming to China, Thoms was able to write Chinese characters for carving. He published two translation works in the next seven years. When his third translation, *Stories of the Three Kingdoms*, was ready for printing in 1826, his contract with the EIC ended, and he went back to London, where he opened a printing house of his own.[68] In London, Thoms continued to study China and from time to time supplied translated Chinese poems and short stories to London journals.[69]

In fighting the Warlike party's print media campaign of 1835 in London, Thoms published an article in the *Monthly Magazine* rebutting Matheson's and Lindsay's polemical pamphlets point by point, saying that in these pamphlets 'justice is not done to the Chinese'.[70] On the word *yi* that the Warlike party saw as evidence of insult, Thoms argued that 'the Chinese do not attach to it an offensive meaning', thus *yi* did not mean 'barbarian'. He pointed out that during his stay in China he had heard, again and again, the Chinese 'acknowledge our superiority over them, not only in our shipping and merchandise in general, but as an intelligent people'. He then published the article as a pamphlet to further spread his view of China.[71]

As the question of how best to understand *yi* was not solved during the Nanking Treaty negotiations, the Chinese continued to use the word to designate the British in communications in the treaty ports and in Hong Kong after the war. Some British were offended. The Chinese secretary to the Hong Kong colonial government, Walter Henry Medhurst (1822–1885), a prominent advocate of gunboat diplomacy, launched a major attack on the designation in a Hong Kong newspaper, arguing that the word *yi* used in Chinese official documents did not live up to the spirit of the Nanking Treaty.[72] The arguments on the use of *yi* started all over again.

On reading Medhurst's arguments, around November 1851, Thoms was rather concerned. His experience 'attending a Public Meeting in the City of London, where the speaker boldly affirmed that the Chinese called all Europeans barbarians, with other gratuitous accusations' further worried him. He found 'these ideas are very prevalent in England' and determined to put the record straight.[73] Thoms revised his first pamphlet and added new arguments. He then had the foreign secretary, Lord Leveson (Granville George Leveson-Gower, 1815–1891), forward this second pamphlet to the staff of the Foreign Office in China.[74]

This time, however, Thoms mistakenly believed that the word in question was *man* ('barbarians' from the south), causing his one-man campaign to look all the more quixotic. He also wrongly assumed that no complaints about these offensive words had been made before the Napier Affair in 1834.[75]

Seven Foreign Office staff members in China replied, and only one, D. B. Robertson, agreed with Thoms. The other six officials questioned the existence of the Chinese character *man* in any official communication and were inclined to believe that the Chinese did use words such as *yi* to insult the British.[76] Three English newspapers in Hong Kong criticized Thoms' pamphlet, although the main disagreement with Thoms came from Medhurst.[77] Rather unexpectedly for Thoms, the opposition elicited by his second pamphlet only consolidated the Foreign Office's position that *yi* was an offensive designation and made the civil servants on the frontier more determined to obtain official redress for its use.

Despite this disappointing result, Thoms tried one last time. He added comments to the second pamphlet from the seven diplomatic replies and a detailed refutation

of Medhurst. He published the document—his third pamphlet on the *yi* issue—from his own print house in 1853.[78] It seemed nobody was interested. An opinion had been formed, and Thoms had no choice but to end his one-man campaign.

Five years later, the final verdict was delivered. After the British won the Second Opium War (1856–1860), the use of the word *yi* in any official communication was banned by the Treaty of Tianjin. Article 51 read:

> It is agreed that, henceforward, the character 'I' [*yi*] (barbarian), shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese Authorities either in the Capital or in the Provinces.[79]

The prohibition of the word *yi* by an international treaty made it official that China had insulted Britain, specifically, that the Chinese were so isolated and ignorant that they had called the British 'barbarians'. Thus the insular China put forward by the Warlike party in Canton and their pro-war campaign in London as part of their moral justification for the war that produced a negative image of China prevailed, and it would last to this day. In the post-war era, however, the image of a peaceable China was by no means out of circulation. It kept attracting so-called Sinophiles such as Thoms well into the twenty-first century.

Entangled in the pro-war and anti-war discourses, the two knowledge systems—peaceable and insular—were antithetical. Each term described the same remote China with a different focus. While a peaceable China could be either worthy of imitation or left alone and viewed as an idyllic utopia, an insular China was backward and required improvement by Western civilization for trade and profits. The dual viewpoints were both owned by the British, announcing their conflicting identities and ways of engaging the world: one for war and one for peace.

A deep stain on the page of Britain's history

Britain's 'inner opium war' was not yet over. Phrases describing the First Opium War, such as 'the blackest stain on the character of Britain' and 'a deep stain on the page of Britain's history' recurred in the most unexpected places, even when discussing matters of little relevance to the war.[80]

In 1853, a group of high-society ladies, led by the Duchess of Sutherland (Harriet Sutherland-Leveson-Gower, 1806–1868), sent a letter of 'affectionate address' on the issue of slavery, which was styled as 'Women of England to Women of America'. In mentioning the Opium War, the ladies wrote, 'We are taunted with a violation of every principle of international law in the opium war with China.' But what the English ladies got from the women of America was a slap-in-the-face reply: 'We will not talk about Opium War!'[81]

The 'nightcap', spoken of at the dinner party held for Henry Pottinger in Manchester, now became the nightmare of the handloom weavers of 1850s Britain. Once at the forefront of the industrial revolution—before the rest of the country began to industrialize—the handloom weavers of northern England had lost their jobs in those years to the machine looms. They blamed the market that opened in China as a result of the war for fuelling the expansion of industrialization. The social reformer W. B. Ferrand (1809–1889), who was dubbed 'the working man's friend', first attacked the war in a public meeting of handloom weavers, then in an open letter to the Duke of Newcastle-under-Lyme (Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham-Clinton, 1811–1864) urging him to use his influence to protect the weavers:[82]

> So the Whig Government lent the cotton lords the British army and the British navy, and off they went to China to attack an unoffending and undefended race of people. (Loud cries of 'Hear, hear')—who had committed no crime, who had offered no insult to this country, who had broken no treaty—it was, in fact the most unprovoked, unjust, and infamous war England was ever engaged in. (Loud cheers.) So monstrous was it that Sir James Graham stigmatised it as an opium war. I here proclaim it a cotton war. (Tremendous cheering.)[83]
>
> Another race of hand-loom weavers must be immolated on the iron altar of Manchester's cotton god, and upon China the Free-traders now fixed their "evil eye"—a nation of hand-loom weavers as industrious as they were numerous, whose happiest lot was to ply the shuttle, and live at peace apart from the world. The Whig government consented to bind the sacrifice. A British army and navy were dispatched to harbinger Manchester Free-trade—to drag the Celestial Empire in her cotton wake, and from the cannon's mouth to teach the doctrines of her selfish school. The poor Chinese, who had long been members of "The Peace Society", were unprepared for self-defence, yet they seized their rusty matchlocks and gloriously grappled with their Free-trade foes. . . . It was a wicked Manchester Free-trade war, a war scarcely equalled, never surpassed in infamy and disgrace; but it opened 'new outlets' for the productions of the Lancashire power-looms, and now enables the Manchester Free-traders to announce in their organs, that "for China the purchases sum up a large quantity". Who, in the name of humanity, can "sum up the large quantity" of hand-loom weavers who have already "whitened the plains of China with their bones", and the awful number of the doomed?[84]

The terms 'cotton war' and 'Manchester free-trade war' expressed another dimension of the conflict's meaning to the British public. Because they understood that the war had destroyed their livelihood, the handloom weavers found solidarity with the Chinese, who were also seen as victims of the profit-making British free-traders.

The debates on the First Opium War, which continued in the decade after the war, merged with Britain's public opinions of what would be called the Second Opium War. John Bright, a prominent figure in the Anti-Corn Law League, joined the anti-war campaigns. In his constituency of Birmingham, he addressed more than

3,000 people in October 1858 when there was false news that the second war in China had ended:

> The first war was called, and properly called, the opium war. No man, I believe, who has a spark of morality in his composition—no man who cares a farthing for the moral opinion of his country, has ever dared fairly to justify that war (hear, hear). And the war which is just now concluded, if it be even yet concluded, had its origin in the first war, because the enormities committed in the first war formed the foundation, to a great extent, of the implacable hostility which, it is said, the inhabitants of Canton bear to all persons connected with the English name.[85]

Bright made a connection between the two wars and claimed that the Chinese hatred for the British had been aroused by the first and thus led to the second. As with other anti-war arguments, he saw the First Opium War not as a conflict between Britain and China but as a war of injustice.

Bright's anti-war stand was the main reason that he did not return to Parliament in the general election of 1859.[86] His opponent on the war issue was none other than Lord Palmerston, who was now prime minister. In attacking the anti-war campaign during the election, Palmerston played the patriotism card, arguing that the wars were in the national interest, just as the Warlike party had argued in the 1830s in Canton.[87] The pro-war argument, first developed in Canton, was taking root in parts of Britain.

Still, many peace meetings and newspaper articles took issue with the renewed conflict in China.[88] As with the first war, the anti-war movement during the 1850s did not carry weight in Whitehall's decision to go to war. The more the politicians ignored them as diplomats, soldiers, and merchants committed aggressions at the frontiers of the empire, the more the anti-war groups would talk about the opium war. The name Opium War conveyed the frustration of the anti-war campaigners, expressing their anger over the issue.

Beginning with the conclusion of the second conflict in 1860 and continuing to the eve of the handing over of Hong Kong to China in 1997, 'Opium War' became a sign of national regret, a historical admission that 'we' the British have done wrong. The parliamentary debates after the 1860 were full of this indignation, reflecting, to an extent, the public mood regarding the war. Following the anti-war arguments, the parliamentarians called the conflict between 1856 and 1860 'another Opium War', the 'Second Opium War', or lumped the two wars together calling them 'the Opium Wars'. It was in these contexts that the conflict between 1856 and 1860 came to be called the Second Opium War. *The Spectator*'s assertion: 'The Opium War is the name by which history will hand it down' became true not for one but for two wars.

Speaking in the House of Lords immediately after the second conflict, Earl Grey (Henry George, 1802–1894) described how the wars destroyed China:

> The mouth of the great canal, which in 1842 was so crowded with grain junks that a passage could hardly be made through them, deserted, except by a few Imperial war junks; and cities which were then rich and prosperous, the seats of commerce and industry, almost reduced to heaps of ruins.[89]

Earl Grey further argued that the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), which wreaked havoc in a major part of China with more than 20 million deaths, was 'the direct consequence of the Opium War of 1842, and of the treaty by which it was concluded', a point that was proven by historian Frederic Wakeman in 1966.[90]

Richard Cobden, another major figure—along with John Bright—in the Anti-Corn Law League who was mostly associated with free trade, advocated in Parliament in 1864 'the policy of non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political affairs of Foreign Countries', an attitude that was consistent with his support of free trade. He wanted this policy to be put into practice in relation to China. Cobden quoted as evidence trade figures that increased in the first three years after the treaty of 1842 but had subsequently gone into decline—even to a point lower than in 1835, before the war. In his view, the two wars were not in the true spirit of free trade, as the British state had intervened in the Chinese market on behalf of the British merchants.[91]

The issue that kept parliamentarians coming back to discuss the wars and condemning them was the continued opium trade in China after 1842 and India's reliance on its revenue. The politicians learned that the average yearly import of opium from India to China between 1842 and 1859 was 74,091 chests, three times more than that was confiscated by Commissioner Lin in 1839. Most imports went through Hong Kong, which had become the British opium port in China.[92] It made the first war that had established Hong Kong as a British colony and free trade port, more than ever, an opium war. A parliamentarian affirmed that 'the system by which the Indian Opium Revenue is raised is morally indefensible'. India's reliance on opium revenue would end only in the early twentieth century, generating regret for the opium war far into the next century.[93]

The argument against the name Opium War had its supporters in Parliament, too. And more names, other than Chinese War, were suggested to replace Opium War. Sir Richard Temple (1826–1902) argued in 1889 that the two wars were 'simply wars of tariff' or 'nothing but a war of commerce and international communication—and very justly so'.[94] The well-informed Tory MP Samuel Smith (1836–1906) responded:

> Very well, I will try again. . . . The judgment of history has been passed upon it, and no historian of repute now would deny that our first war was entirely an opium war brought on by smuggling opium into China for 50 years, by defying the Chinese edicts constantly issued against it; and by forcing this opium upon them by traders, we at last brought on that deplorable war. The second war was at bottom and substantially another opium war, brought on by continuing this smuggling trade in defiance of all the edicts of the Chinese Government. I say we

> gained entrance into China for opium purely by force, contrary to the convictions of the people. Until we obtained entrance for it, opium was prohibited in China, the Chinese Government used its whole power to suppress the growth of opium at home, but at last it found it could not resist our pressure to legalise it, and it was vain to attempt to suppress it at home.[95]

Also expressing national regret, George Lansbury (1859–1940), in 1927, claimed that Britain had fought in China 'five opium wars', counting together the major wars and skirmishes since 1839.[96] Facing the rising tide of Chinese nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century, British politicians started to realize how the opium wars were not just a subject discussed among themselves and by the British public. The Chinese equally regretted the wars, but they were also angry:

> He sees, in the first place, the Opium Wars, and the attempts, not only of this country but of other countries, to force opium into his country, and, for that purpose, the securing of treaty ports and other concessions. He understands all about the Opium Wars, and has seen the wringing of concessions and treaty ports from his nation: and he also sees his country coming more and more under the territorial and financial control of foreigners. He sees, too, some of the industries and many of his cities under the control of foreigners. Not only that, but, when he comes face to face with the conditions in such cities as Shanghai, he recognises that they, the Chinese, have no power whatever to remedy those conditions.[97]

Even in the twentieth-century debate on the Vietnam War (1955–1975), a British parliamentarian made the connection: 'I regard it as the most indefensible war since the Opium War.'[98] Opium War became a synonym for national regret regarding war. On the eve of the Hong Kong handover to China, most British parliamentarians were celebrating that, under British rule, Hong Kong had changed from a barren island to a world-renowned port. Lord Monkswell (Gerard Collier, 1947–) reminded them, 'I may not be a very good student of history, but I was amazed to discover that campaigns were mounted by British armed forces to protect capitalist entrepreneurs who were selling opium to the Chinese people. If one thinks of that in the modern context one is absolutely horrified. Therefore, in a historical context, compared with that portrayed over the past 20 to 50 years, Britain's involvement in Hong Kong is not a completely rosy picture.'[99]

The term Opium War, first coined in 1839, has resonated throughout history for more than a century and a half, and its discursive power continues to hold sway. The name was used not only in English but also translated into Chinese as *Yapian Zhanzheng*, which as a naming practice contributed to the evolution in China of a sense of humiliation and injustice, hence the growth of Chinese anti-imperialistic patriotism. The words did not appear from nowhere but were thanks largely to the fight between the Whig and Tory parties in 1839, which gave the pro-war and anti-war arguments in Britain a framework supported by their respective newspapers and

journals. In this condition the name was born, and with it others would join in the discourse espousing their various opinions, including the development of Chinese nationalism.[100]

Partly because the issue of the war was opium, the anti-war campaign gained great support. The opium trade antagonized Christian morality, and the war itself stimulated opposition from the Enlightenment humanitarianism and the peace movements. Both the opium trade and the war were deplored. To the anti-war groups, from Thompson to the Peace Society to *The Spectator*, the war in China had to be called the Opium War because it was caused by the immoral opium trade. The Warlike party; merchants of London, Liverpool, Manchester, and other cities; and the Whig government wanted the name Chinese War to replace it, but to no avail. To them the war was about national honour and national interest as they had argued in Canton. The war created a discourse platform in Britain for various domestic issues and groups to argue their worldview. This discursive order was stirred up by and entangled in the profit order envisioned by the Warlike party of Canton—topic of the following chapter.

The war was ultimately characterized by British national regret. The shortage of nightcaps did not materialize, but a nightmare for British identity did, as Britain fought not one but two opium wars. On this point, the anti-war movement had a substantial historical victory. The name Opium War encapsulated the national regret like no other in British history. The 'blackest' 'deep stain' says it all.

8
Conclusions: Profit Orders of Canton

With its historical complexities, a prime mover can be identified in the interactions between Britain and China in the Canton port during the years leading up to the Opium War: the British Warlike party's wishes to wage a war and their ability to lobby for it. By coincidence that the opium confiscation of 1839 happened at the height of British domestic political fights between the Whig and Tory, it eased the way for the Warlike party to bring the British Empire's military might to bear on the Qing Empire.

What the British merchants wanted by starting a war can be identified as to establish on the Chinese coasts a new 'profit order', which is defined as an economic regime through which the creation of political order and the making of knowledge become mutually reinforcing and that in turn gives rise to a discourse of justice in profit making for a particular group of people.

Before the war, a Chinese profit order—the Canton system—was at work in the port. The major interests taken care of by the system were the Qing ruling dynasty, the high officials, and Chinese merchants. Port functionaries such as customs officers who lived on imposing fees on the ships passing through their stations in the Pearl River were, too, participants of this profit order, though a minor one. Ideologically, the Canton system drew on Confucianism as its source of justification. Shrouding the Canton port, the Confucian-based knowledge system of the bureaucrats identified foreign merchants as the ungovernable strangers (*yi*) and justified the Canton one-port system's trade monopoly and tight political control.

Empowered by the free trade ethos and imperial identity of being the most powerful nation in the world, the Warlike party envisioned a new profit order, in which Britons would trade in the way that they saw as being British entitled them and that they would dictate the terms of interaction instead of subject themselves to the Qing's ways. Creating a narrative that China was in isolation and was to be engaged with through a war, that is, waging a war to open up China, the merchants initiated the demolition of the Chinese profit order, and out of the ruins of the war, a new maritime profit order—the treaty ports—was born, as they desired and according to their design. The clash of the war thus was a clash of two profit orders—including their respective political arrangements, economic gains, and knowledge systems.[1]

The Warlike party's new knowledge of China

In signing the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, the Canton Warlike party's victory was not limited to persuading the British government to wage the war, winning the war, receiving compensation for opium confiscated, reclaiming debts owed by Hong merchants, and gaining the trade conditions they wanted; it also consisted in establishing the new paradigm of British knowledge on China by which the war was justified. China from now on was viewed from the Warlike party's perspectives.

Even though the name Opium War sticks, history has not remembered the Pacific party's image of China which painted the Qing officials according to their ability to govern and praised them for doing their duty, such as suppressing pirates. To the Pacific party, China was just another country and Canton another port, and the trade there was not particularly problematic. Their understanding was echoed in Britain by the leading free trade economist of the Ricardian School, John Ramsay McCulloch, who argued that, even with the Hong merchant system in place, for merchants, Canton was a port as free as Liverpool or New York. This Pacific party's alternative image of China reveals the discursive nature of the Warlike party's knowledge of China. Neither has historiography remembered what *The Spectator* and the *Northern Star* revealed: the smear campaigns led by the Warlike party and their supporters in London that changed the primary British perception of China from peaceable China to insular China.

What history remembers was the Warlike party's negative representation of China. Because trade was confined to Canton, serving the Qing's dynastic state security needs and not the Warlike party's desire for 'free trade', the focus of history for more than a century was on 'insular China'. But Qing China was by no means in isolation. During this period, it not only had intensive interactions with Asian countries, but China's products, such as tea, were sold into the European markets, down to the village level, and were consumed by all walks of life in Britain. At the same time, Qing China was absorbing the impact of opium and the opium trade. By the early nineteenth century, every level of people's lives in the Qing Empire was touched by the drug in some form.[2] The worlds of the East and West were deeply connected by the two commodities—tea and opium, together with other luxury goods—and affected by the economic regimes to which they gave rise. Chinese and European worlds were deeply intertwined long before the war of 1842 that allegedly opened up the isolated China.

Behind the 'isolation' discourse was the fact that the Warlike party wanted to utilize other Chinese ports in addition to Canton and to have direct access—instead of through the Hongs—to the vast Chinese market. The merchants wanted the navy of the most powerful nation in the world to be the means to their ends of opening China up. Thus the term 'opening up' did not mean opening up a 'closed China' but meant in actuality employing British military power to expand and control trade.

History remembers the bureaucrats of Canton—especially the superintendent of customs (*Hoppo*)—to be corrupt.[3] This negative image of the Qing officialdom produced circumstantial justification for the war. Being a prebendal system in which officials were supposed to find the financial solutions to support their offices and, at the same time, send the court a fixed amount of revenue, the Qing's way was not designed for the British merchants' needs. James Fichter has argued that the prebendal system of financing was subject to the emperor's wishes and vulnerable to abuse, allowing much leeway for the official in charge to line his pockets and for foreign traders to evade the port charges. Fichter contends that this loosely managed system, in fact, favoured the foreign traders' wishes to avoid the taxes and to carry on their illicit opium trade.[4] The Warlike party on the one hand exploited the system for profits and on the other argued about its corruption. The Pacific party's admission that, 'deceive ourselves as we please, we are smugglers' was an attack on this hypocrisy.

In like manner, the Hong merchants were understood by the Warlike party to be the official merchants; they being the go-betweens listened to the Qing officials' primary concerns about state security instead of to the British merchants' wishes. Therefore, the Nanking Treaty abolished the Hong, enabling the British merchants to trade with any Chinese merchant in the treaty ports. They were thus not subject to the indirect control of the Qing's Canton system.

Following the Warlike party's narrative of China, the image of China brought into focus was a China that was culturally anti-commercial. Confucianism was to blame because its doctrine placed the merchant class at the lowest level in society, behind the scholars, the peasants, and the artisans. This might be true in official rhetoric, but, in everyday reality, Qing Chinese society was highly commercialized. Although Chinese merchants' wealth accumulation—as was that of the other three classes—was subject to the whim of officials and the court, but the merchants, in reality, did not have a low social status. They commonly used the money earned in business to fund their sons' study for the Civil Service Examination. If the son passed, the family would then be associated with the scholar class. It was not uncommon that the two identities—merchant and official—were in one family. Again, the real issue for the Warlike party was that this *peculiar* Chinese political-economic system did not cater to their needs.

In the Warlike party's image of China, the Qing's tributary system came to the forefront in explaining the Chinese 'all under heaven' ideology, which accepted only tributary relationships with foreign countries. The Canton system, in fact, did not operate under the tributary system, which had, as a prerequisite, the payment of tribute in the court before coming to trade. Not a single merchant operating in Canton was subject to this ritual.

The failed Macartney and Amherst embassies of 1793 and 1816 to the Qing court that each had hoped to change the Canton monopoly, were seen by the Warlike party

as the ultimate examples of China's anti-commerce culture and the Chinese insular mindset at work as China rejected trading and diplomatic relations. The policy of non-interaction for the sake of dynastic state security and the entrenched profit order of Canton trade monopoly were actually the driving force behind the turning away of the embassies.

The Warlike party saw the restrictions of the Canton system as evidence of a closed China. But the system can be seen equally from the officials' perspective as Qing China's effort to keep trade open under the prohibitive political climate of the time—characterized by fear of domestic rebellion and the perceived threat of foreigners joining forces with rebels. Lastly, the notion that the Chinese called the British 'barbarian' was assumed to encapsulate the insular, arrogant Chinese mindset—this notion went into wide circulation after the Warlike party first made the connection in the early 1830s.

Contrary to what the Warlike party argued and history remembers, trade in Canton was actually largely free from governmental intervention. The tightly controlled elements were the interactions that had political implications, that is, those other than trading activities per se. Officials involved themselves very little in the trade, and neither did they regulate the market. At most, they forbade the exporting of gold and silver, limited the amount of silk foreigners could buy, and banned the import of opium. These did not affect the general trade structure in Canton, for not only the ban was limited in scope but also the prohibition policies were never properly implemented. The Warlike party failed to realize that trade and the market in Canton, in its actual operation, was not far from free trade, according to the argument of David Ricardo, as McCulloch had pointed out in his *Dictionary*.

The Warlike party's attacks on the Qing's profit order were first directed at its knowledge system starting in the early 1830s. The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China was a major affront while minor attacks—such as the 'Prize Essay' that spread free trade doctrines, Gützlaff's Chinese narrators who wrote of the utopian England, and missionaries' tract distribution that spread Christianity—also occurred. The war on knowledge and information waged by the merchants and missionaries took place before the military action of 1839 and was part of its formation.

In sum, the unfavourable historical images of China were first developed in the Canton British maritime public sphere by the Warlike party. Behind their desire to expand trade lay free trade discourse and the British imperial identity. Their public campaign for a war made their knowledge of China widespread, and their war victory changed British knowledge of China. The Warlike party's 'we' narrative become *the* narrative of historiography, and the Warlike party assumed the position of being the sovereign master in the history of the encounters.

The Qing Empire and the war

Deconstructing the Warlike party's knowledge of China is not to argue that Qing China was an innocent party in starting the war. On the contrary, the Canton system was a profit order serving a particular group's interests, and the Qing played a major part in bringing about the military confrontation of 1839. The Canton system was at the centre of the conflict, although it was not in the way the Warlike party described.

After having enjoyed a market-induced trade monopoly during the previous decades, the Canton lobby, in the years between 1755 and 1759, secured an imperially sanctioned trade monopoly. In the process they accentuated the dynastic maritime state security argument. But the state security consideration was not entirely an invention of the Canton lobby. Rather, they brought forward this question in an environment where European expansion in the East was growing, coupled with the Qing's increasingly negative perception of the Europeans. Thus, interactions were, starting in the late 1750s, to be systematically regulated to prevent Europeans from learning about any aspect of the empire and, more importantly, to prevent Qing subjects from mingling with foreigners, lest its subjects and foreigners exchanged thoughts and ideas leading to rebellion.

As the Pacific party pointed out in 1837, this Canton system did work for the Qing: with India 'now totally annihilated and merged in the British Empire we must not be astonished to find the Court at Peking resolved not to deviate from a line of policy which has been hitherto so eminently successful'.[5] After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the British East India Company for the sake of trade began its rule in Bengal, a control that would soon expand to most of India. Coincidentally, 1757 was the year the Qing state institutionalized the Canton system of controlling interactions between its subjects and Europeans.

The long and complex process of British rule in India can be traced back retrospectively even further to Thomas Roe's (1581–1644) embassy to the Moghul Empire between 1615 and 1619, during which the British first obtained the right to establish a trading quarter in Surat. And two decades later the British would acquire rights from the Indian authorities in 1639 to build Fort St George (later developed into Madras) and, in 1690, Fort William (later to become Calcutta).[6] Had the British come to China to request the same kind of rights during the second half of the seventeenth century, it would not have been impossible for them to acquire some form of privilege under the reign of the Kangxi emperor, especially in his early years on the throne. But this did not happen because China was yet to become the EIC's major trading concern and the volume of tea trade was not as big and important to the EIC as it would be in the second half of the eighteenth century. The Dutch and Spanish, who had earlier requested a trading foothold from the Ming, were by this time relatively content with their China trade through Chinese sojourners in Batavia and Manila. Also, by the

early eighteenth century, the Spanish and Dutch maritime empires, along with the Portuguese, were weakening, while the British dominated the maritime trade of the East. And, above all, in China there were four ports opened after 1683, allowing Europeans to trade freely, to an extent. The incentive for the British to send an embassy to Kangxi's court was minimal.

While the Moghul Empire was fast disintegrating, affording the EIC opportunity to develop its control over India, the Qing in the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century had a strong bureaucracy to implement the policy of non-intercourse against the real and perceived threat of British expansion in the East, thus maintaining a Chinese profit order in Canton.

After a half century of operation, the state security procedure that the dynasty had built into its bureaucratic control in Canton came to be mechanical, while its justification via Confucian discourse had become the accepted wisdom among its bureaucrats. The Canton system as an institution grew rigid in the early nineteenth century: officials were not to be seen, while the Hong merchants were, in reality, part of the bureaucratic system in maintain a status quo.

This Canton system determined how the Qing understood foreigners. When Commissioner Lin arrived in Canton in 1839, among the first things he did was to collect information on the Westerners in order to implement opium prohibition. He was able to think and act outside of the conventional bureaucracy because he had been sent to Canton with a special mission, instead of a regular Canton appointment. He knew there was insufficient knowledge of Europeans for him to devise a sound policy. Though great, Lin's efforts were in vain; he had little chance to properly understand the British, who were for years talking about war against China right on the doorstep of Canton, with not a single Chinese having a clue. The soft border, erected in the form of an information barrier, more than anything else prevented the Qing from learning the true British state of affairs. There was no proper context for Lin to comprehend the wishes of the British private merchants, let alone the domestic party politics of Britain. The publications of the SDUKC and other translated works could help Lin understand only the geography of the West and the characteristics of the British merchants in Canton, nothing beyond.

The success of the Canton system created an institutional inertia that allowed China to deal with Europeans only within the system. The bureaucrats did not want to know and deal with Europeans in any other way. In sharp contrast to the Qing's disinterest and lack of understanding of the British, the British private merchants in the 1830s knew China well enough to devise a sound war plan to supply to the politicians in London, which was crucial in starting the war. The Qing's policy of containment in the mid-eighteenth century stemmed from a shrewd understanding of internal and external threats to the dynasty's state security, but it backfired; the soft border built up in the process ultimately increased the danger by blinding the Qing

bureaucrats to the external threat they faced. The Qing state's control in the form of the Canton system was a knife that cut both ways: it enabled control of Europeans coming ashore but was, at the same time, the Qing's undoing.

It would take another three decades and the Second Opium War, which brought foreign troops to the gates of the capital, Beijing, for Qing bureaucrats to grasp the military strength of Europeans and the necessity of reform, first in the military and economic spheres and then in the political system, in the last few years of the Qing dynasty at the turn of the twentieth century, even though the Canton system had been abolished in 1842. It took more than a half century to dislodge the institutional inertia created by the Canton system and to undo the knowledge of foreigners and China's foreign relationships that the system produced. The institution of the Canton system—not the 'all under heaven' ideology or tributary system—made the Qing unable to comprehend the Europeans. And this Canton system of trade, political control, and knowledge making—a profit order—was the Qing's contribution to the First Opium War.

Opium war and opium regimes

As Timothy Brook and other historians have argued, after the First Opium War, the unofficial opium imports into China expanded exponentially and gave rise to various opium regimes during the hundred years after 1842. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist party, other warlords of the Republican China, colonial governments of British South East Asia, Chinese overseas underworld communities in South East Asia under British rule, and the Japanese colonial governments which thrived in the opium business in Chinese treaty ports and in their Taiwan colony were the major 'opium regimes' created. They relied on the illicit trade and production for revenue, which in turn were the source of their political power.[7]

The single biggest opium regime was the British Empire. After the First Opium War, the British India government depended more than ever on opium revenue for its day-to-day administration. James Hevia argued that, in order to keep it afloat, the British Empire became a 'global drug cartel'.[8] The world order created by opium trade in the East in this period was similar to the sugar trade that empowered an Atlantic world order involving the slave trade, the cotton trade, and the plantation economy.[9]

Before 1842, the opium trade did not contribute as much to the revenue of the British India government. The British Empire only acquired a 'drug dependency' in the second half of the nineteenth century.[10] To be sure, the British government did not go to war in 1839 to defend the opium trade, although the demand for compensation for the opium destroyed by Commissioner Lin was part of the war agenda and the merchants who lobbied for waging the war were mostly opium traders. The

war became truly an opium war mostly in the conditions created after the war that enabled the spawning of the opium regimes. The opium regimes established after the war were linked up by the trade to become a gigantic global profit order, and the war made a significant contribution to its invention.

Similarly, but in a much small scale, the unofficial opium trade in the Chinese coasts before 1842 was part of the profit-making mechanism of the Qing ruling classes. While the court routinely issued prohibitions against the opium trade and the abuse of opium, local officials received bribes to turn a blind eye. The wealth gained from the opium trade was enjoyed not only by the lower officials directly involved but also by the high bureaucrats, as money travelled up, contributing to the paralysis of the Qing government.

British private merchants were not the only group of people who contributed to the political-economic order created by opium and the opium regimes. In addition to the Qing officials, as British private merchants rightly pointed out, Chinese smugglers carried out the last leg of the opium trade into Chinese markets. But this did not diminish the role played by the private merchants in creating this sub-trade order, an order of profits that loomed large in triggering the war. The Opium War thus created not only the legal trade of the treaty ports but also played a role in the making of the opium regimes—one replaced the Canton system and the other was a continuation of the opium smuggling trade at Lintin.

The state and merchant

Britain's closely woven state-merchant relationship in the China trade after 1839 was not new; the British state was predisposed to the merchant sector's mobilization. The trade-nation identity was well established as early as the mid-sixteenth century and partly explains the failure of the pacific Britons' efforts in stopping the war. As argued in Chapter 7, before and during the war, the anti-war groups in Britain were firm in their stand against opium smuggling; they saw the war as morally indefensible. But after the war was won, in the peace meetings of Dublin, for instance, even though the protestors were still outraged by the war and the opium trade, people were also overjoyed thinking about the trade prospects created by the peace treaty. When this elation combined with the free trade ideology, imperial expansion of trade through war was even less an issue for debate.

What the campaign and lobby for war, and later the war itself, did was to bring the discourse of the British free trade empire to bear on Britain's relations with China. In other words, the Warlike party successfully brought Britain's China trade into the orbit of the British imperial order, with the newly added vigour of free trade discourse. As Palmerston told the Earl of Auckland during the war, 'The new markets in China will at no distant period give a most important extension to the range of our

foreign commerce.' The British state power holders were, by now, actively helping the merchants' search for wealth in China.

Once the floodgate was opened, China could be engaged in war; two more wars would be waged by Britain: the Second Opium War and the Boxer War of 1900, and several other wars by European countries. And after 1842 British representatives in China, in the capacity of consuls (and chargé d'affaires after 1861), worked closely with the British merchant community, catering to their needs in the China trade, although it was a relationship filled with contradictions and conflicts.

During the EIC days, the Court of Directors was able to mobilize the British state to send two embassies to China on behalf of the company to request formal state relations to safeguard trade. Albeit in a different form, what the British private merchants achieved in 1839 was a continuation of the EIC: the state and the merchant sectors worked hand in hand in creating a trade empire. Because of its informal relations with the state, in order to bring in the aid of the state for their aim of creating a new profit order, the private merchants had to develop new British knowledge of China. Conducting their public campaign for five years along with lobbying with the ministers, they took the relation to the level of war.

Compared to the British state-merchant relationship, it was inconceivable that the Qing imperial state would go to war for trade expansion. In general, the Chinese merchants' political—not social—status under the Confucian state ideology was low in regard to their ability to be involved directly in the political power sharing of the empire. China's South East Asian trade, in which they first encountered the Europeans, was set in this context of a relatively weak, if not negative, state-merchant relationship. The Chinese coastal people's trade to Nanyang (South East Asia) was subject to and periodically disrupted by the political climate of the court. Prohibitions on ships going to sea, on Chinese junk trading to Nanyang, and on Qing subjects travelling there were issued periodically. Even though the trade continued under these conditions, the prohibitions did limit and interrupt interactions. Wang Gungwu termed this situation, in contrast to the British, as 'merchants without empire'.[11]

When the Qianlong emperor, in 1741, read the report on the massacre of 1740, in which more than 10,000 Chinese had been killed in Batavia the year before, his comment was that they deserved to die for they had voluntarily left China proper—the cultured country. In comparison, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British merchants were helped by their respective states in their trade expansion in South East Asia, if the state itself was not the merchant, paving the way for later colonial control. The European maritime empires would have seen the massacre in Batavia as a just course for starting a war, but certainly the Qing did not. China was moving along a different track of economic-political establishment from that of the Europeans.

The Canton system was unique within the context of Qing merchant-state relations. It was, perhaps, the furthest the Chinese merchants could come to mobilizing

the Qing state in their desire to pursue wealth. The co-operation among local merchants, provincial officials, and court officials in the second half of the 1750s secured Canton's monopoly in European trade. But this Qing state-merchant relation differed significantly from the EIC monopoly. For one thing, Hongs were heavily burdened by the dynastic state's security directives and were at the mercy of the bureaucrats and the court. The state-merchant relationship in Canton was one of control and submission, including control of foreigners.

By 1755, after more than a century of empire-building in and from China proper after its first conquest in 1644, the Qing dynasty's and the bureaucrats' survival and prosperity were tightly bound together. From the imperial perspective, the Canton system assuaged the political security fears of the Manchurian and Chinese ruling classes and, at the same time, allowed them to extract profits from the Canton maritime trade. The coastal peoples outside of Canton, who had a long tradition and history of maritime trade, were shut out from earning profit from the European trade.

Putting the Chinese and British Empires side by side, the comparison is revealing. The Canton lobby's desire for monopolizing the European trade together with the imperial state security fears shaped the formation of the Canton system on the Chinese side. Behind the Canton system and the Confucianist discourse were the interests of the Qing dynasty, its bureaucrats, and the Canton merchants. On the British side, the British imperial identity and the free trade doctrines shaped the Warlike party's understanding of Chinese-British relations and a desire for starting a war—first knowledge and then military. Hidden in the Warlike party's rhetoric of national interest and national honour was the profit-making agenda of the British merchants and politicians. Discourse was bonded to interests on both the Chinese and British sides.

The Canton system from 1757 for the next eighty-five years dictated China's perception of and relations with the Europeans—in particular their knowledge of the British. The Warlike party in response to the restriction of the Canton system, and with free trade and imperial identity at the backdrop, produced a new knowledge about China, which became, for more than a century after 1842, the viewpoint in understanding China and China's historical foreign relations.

Thus, this book reinterprets the First Opium War as follows: the British Empire, at a pivotal moment, adopted the Warlike party's desire for profit as its major driving force to confront an entrenched profit order—the Canton system—that was propped up by the Qing Empire, which had a stake in it in terms of both profit and state security. Behind the interstate conflict were the Qing's vested interests in the old profit order and the British interests to create a new profit order. Profit order was central to the Chinese-British encounter in Canton, which during the hundred years from the mid-eighteenth century was arguably the most dynamic wealth-creating port in the maritime trading world.

Acknowledgements

It took ten years to finish this book, too long for me to be able to thank everyone who has contributed to it. My colleagues in Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore have been most generous in providing support at the later stages of the book. Gregor Benton read the full manuscript. His encouragement gave me the much-needed push to get the book published. Without him I might not have finished this book as it is. I am especially grateful to Evelyn Hu-Dehart, who suggested the final book title on top of much practical advice and help. She is the most generous of colleagues. Scott Anthony, Els Van Dongen, and Lisa Onaga read parts of the book. I am thankful for their comments. Salvatore Babones read the full manuscript with great attention to the detail and the logic of my arguments. I greatly appreciate his kind help. Some of the research was done while I was working as a postdoctoral fellow at Bristol University. My former colleagues there, especially Maurizio Marinelli and Jeffrey Henderson, were generous in giving their time and advice. My special thanks to Robert Bickers, who has been supportive and has given many advice on academic and research matters on different occasions. I cannot thank more Susan Daruvala and Hans van de Ven, under whose supervision in Cambridge this project began. They were the best advisors one could wish for. Their broad knowledge greatly enriched my exploration of modern Chinese history and their confidence in me inspired me to make a career as a historian. Conversations with Yuan Jing on several occasions over the years gave me much insight into modern China and its historical trajectory. His introduction and letters gave me access to the First Historical Archives of China, where I was able to uncover key documents used in this research. Lars Laamann has been the most helpful colleague. His faith in the value of the work accompanied my research all along the way. The late Sir Christopher Alan Bayly gave insightful advice in exploring how the British public understood the Opium War. The result is Chapter 7 of this book. His kindness and hunger for knowledge inspired generations of students, including me. John Carroll, who shares my interest in the history of Canton, generously lent his digitalized *Canton Register* and *Canton Press*, making revisions of the book much easier, especially when I was writing while travelling. This book also benefited from advice of Kenneth Pomeranz, whom I have never met but

with whom I briefly exchanged emails when I submitted a paper to *Journal of Global History*. His questions posed to the paper are now—I hope—answered by this book. Zhu Marlon, George Kam Wah Mak, Jerry Chang, Kaori Abe, and Lily Chang spent time forwarding source materials that otherwise I would not have been able to access. My thanks also to the many people with whom I have conversed about this project, or who have been generous with their time and advice on academic matters. The list is long and includes T. H. Barrett, Anne Gerritsen, Toby Lincoln, Zhen Yangwen, Naomi Standen, Rebecca Nedostup, Caroline Reeves, Stacey Hynd, Elizabeth Elbourne, Sascha Auerbach, Joe P. McDermott, Zhang Ling, C. K. Lai, Chloë Starr, Nicolas Standaert, Felix Boecking, Vicki Chiu, Chen Szu-Chi, Tan Chee Lay, Isabella Jackson, Hirata Koji, Jon Howlett, Kwong Chi Man, Christian Hess, Julia Lovell, Michael Szonyi, Michel Hockx, Andrea Janku, Mark C. Elliott, Li Yi, Yu Po-ching, Hallam Stevens, Sandra Khor Manikam, Jessica Hinchy, Park Hyung Wook, Miles Powell, Donna Brunero, Goh Geok Yian, Venus Viana, Koh Keng We, Alan Chan, K. K. Luke, and S. R. Joey Long. I am most grateful to the two anonymous readers for their comments and advice. Your understanding and kind words made me feel all the effort worthwhile. Benjamin Charlton read nearly every edition of the chapters and made numerous suggestions over the years. I thank him as a proofreader and a great friend.

This project received financial support from the Prince of Wales Cambridge International Scholarship and the UK Economic and Social Research Council. The wonderful NTU postdoctoral fellowship gave me funding to visit archives and allowed me time to concentrate on writing. I also want to thank the Jardine Matheson Archives and Cambridge Library for granting me access to their rich archives that made this research possible. Liu Hong in the capacity of chair of NTU's School of Humanities and Social Sciences has been most helpful in finding funding for the purchase of books and published archives for the project. Staff of the HSS Library and Chinese Library of NTU, especially Ng Kiak Peng and Ruan Yang, provided much help. Your swift responses sped up everything. Lastly, my special thanks to Richard Tucker, who has been most supportive while this book was gradually taking shape: this is our project.

Notes

Prologue

1. *Correspondence Relating to China*, pp. 446–47.
2 Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, p. 202; Hanes and Sanello, *Opium Wars*, p. 66; Lovell, *Opium War*, p. 93.
3. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 213; Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*.

Chapter One

1. *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831).
2. *Register* 3:13 (3 July 1830).
3. 'The most powerful nation in the world' was an idea often found in the *Register*. For instance, see 'To the Editor of the Canton Register', 8:11 (17 Mar 1835). 'National honour' was also a term commonly used in the *Register*. For example, see 3:24 (4 Dec 1830), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 5:10 (18 July 1832), 6:18 (5 Dec 1833), 7:17 (29 Apr 1834), 8:11 (17 Mar 1835), and 9:6 (9 Feb 1836).
4. Marshall and Williams, *Great Map of Mankind*, pp. 81–82.
5. Other examples of major articles related to war arguments in the *Register* include 6:5 (13 Apr 1833), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834), 8:14 (7 Apr 1835), and 9:39 (27 Sept 1836).
6. *Register* 4:16 (15 Aug 1831). Other similar arguments related to China's vast market can be found in *Register* 1:18 (3 May 1828), 3:25 (18 Dec 1830), 4:16 (15 Aug 1831), 5:1 (2 Jan 1832), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), and 7:39 (30 Sept 1834).
7. Markley, *Far East and English Imagination*, p. 15.
8. For progressive argument, see, for instance, Martin, *Awakening of China*, pp. 155–56; Pott, *Sketch of Chinese History*, p. 134; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 253–54; Graham, *Chinese Station*, p. 18. For the opium argument, see, for instance, Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 65; Collis, *Foreign Mud*; Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, p. 15; Fay, *Opium War*, p. 193; Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*.
9. Marshall and Williams, *Great Map of Mankind*, pp. 22–23 and pp. 85–86. Marshall and Williams noticed the paradigm shift but did not go into the details of how and why.
10. Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library (hereafter, JM), B2/7, letters to and from Captain John Rees; 'Voyage of the *Sylph*' in *Register* 6:7 (18 May 1833), 6:8 (31 May 1833), 6:9 (17 June 1833), 6:12 (5 Aug 1833), and 6:13 and 6:14 (16 Sept 1833).
11. For Matheson's meeting with Palmerston, see *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836). For Jardine's, see PRO, FO 17/35 (26 and 27 Oct 1839); and JM, B6/10, L2240 and 2251.

12. Palmerston to J. A. Smith, Nov. 28, 1842, quoted from Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 83.
13. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 193; Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, p. 191.
14. *Register* 6:12 (5 Aug 1833).
15. For an account of the *Canton Press*, see King and Clark (eds.), *Research Guide*, pp. 46–48.
16. Turner, *British Opium Policy*, p. 84; Pott, *Sketch of Chinese History*, p. 134; Purcell, *China*, pp. 53–54. Melancon argued against it; see *Britain's China Policy*, pp. 133–34.
17. The articles that best summarize this school's thought are in the edited volume Fairbank (ed.), *Chinese World Order*.
18. Martin, *Awakening of China*, pp. 155–56; Pott, *Sketch of Chinese History*, p. 134; Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 253–54; Graham, *Chinese Station*, p. 18; Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 65.
19. Gelber, *Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals*; Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*.
20. Collis, *Foreign Mud*; Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, p. 15; Fay, *Opium War*, p. 193; Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*; Lovell, *Opium War*.
21. For instance, Hevia, 'Opium, Empire, and Modern History'.
22. Marion, *Bases and Empire*, pp. 77–78; Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 195; Platt, *Finance, Trade, and Politics*, pp. 265–67; Purcell, *China*, p. 54; Cain and Hopkins, 'Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas'.
23. Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, pp. 125–35; Mao, *Tianchao de bengkui*, p. 124.
24. Some key works redressing the relations between British imperial metropolis and periphery: Bayly, *Imperial Meridian*, and *Empire and Information*; and Wilson (ed.), *New Imperial History*.
25. For works on British perceptions of China, see for example, Kitson, *Forging Romantic China*; Poter, *Ideographia* and *Chinese Taste*; Hayot, *Hypothetical Mandarin*; Hillemann, *Asian Empire and British Knowledge* and Forman, *China and the Victorian Imagination*.
26. The 1835 figures are taken from 'To the Editor of the Canton Press', *Press* 1:6 (17 Oct 1835). Greenberg provided the 1834 figures; see *British Trade*, p. 185. The 1837 numbers can be found in *Repository* 5:9 (Jan 1837), p. 432. After 1837, the *Repository* provided a yearly census of Canton. In terms of sailors, the record in 1832 shows there were around 1,700 British sailors in twenty-five ships, 240 Americans in fifteen ships, and 50 Netherlanders with two ships. See *Repository* 1:6 (Oct 1832), p. 243.

Chapter Two

1. *Press* 1:21 (30 Jan 1836); *Crito* is a chapter of *Dialogues of Plato* on justice and injustice. The trader seemed to use this pseudonym to make a statement that the Warlike party in advocating the war did not do justice to China.
2. 'To the Editor of the Canton Press', *Register* 9:5 (2 Feb 1836).
3. *Press* 1:21 (30 Jan 1836).
4. *Register* 4:12 (18 June 1831).
5. Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 22–24.
6. For ships to Australia, see JM, B1/3, I28/1, I28/3, and K10; see also Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 94–96.
7. For an account of the agency system, see Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 144–52.
8. For cotton trade, see ibid., pp. 88–92.

9. Silverman, 'Fifty of the Wealthiest People'; Crossen, *The Rich and How They Got That Way*, pp. 172–90; Leitch, 'Green, John Cleve'; Hall, *America's Successful Men of Affairs*, p. 280.
10. Grace, 'Jardine, William', 'Matheson, Sir (Nicholas) James Sutherland, First Baronet (1796–1878)', and *Opium and Empire*; Bruce, *Scottish 100*, pp. 27–30.
11. Greenburg, *British Trade*; see pp. 84–86 for the post–Napoleonic era trade expansion, p. 142 for trade balance between 1829 and 1940.
12. Ibid.; see p. 13 for trading figures in 1830, p. 50 for opium constituting two-thirds of imports, p. 104 for opium as largest commodity.
13. Greenburg, *British Trade*, p. 118 for opium like gold, p. 185 for Jardine, Matheson & Co. See also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 8–36.
14. For Daoguang's anti-opium campaign of 1820, see *QDWJSL-DG*, juan 1, 10–12.
15. For Lintin opium and unofficial trade, see Morse, *International Relations*, pp. 178–84 and Greenburg, *British Trade*, pp. 49–50, 112–13, 136, and 196.
16. *Register* 7:5 (4 Feb 1834), italics in original.
17. For Jardine and Matheson, see Blake, *Jardine Matheson*, pp. 30–41; Keswick, *Thistle and the Jade*, p. 18.
18. *Register*, 8:21 (26 May 1835), also in Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 94.
19. For Medical Missionary Society, see *Register* 9:42 (18 Oct 1836). For subscription for Scotland, see *Press* 3:24 (17 Feb 1837). For Morrison Education Society and the library in honouring Morrison, see *Register* 10:18 (2 May 1837), 10:31 (1 Aug 1837), 11:10 (6 Mar 1838), 11:28 (10 July 1838); and *Press* 2:34 (29 Apr 1837), 2:47 (29 July 1837), 3:12 (25 Nov 1837), 3:26 (3 Mar 1837), 3:32 (14 Apr 1838). For the Ophthalmic Hospital, see *Register* 9:8 (23 Feb 1836), 9:11 (15 Mar 1836), 9:23 (7 Jun 1836), 9:49 (13 Dec 1836), 10:10 (7 Mar 1837), 11:6 (6 Feb 1838); and *Press* 1:27 (12 Mar 1836), 2:3 (17 Sept 1836), 2:11 (19 Nov 1836), 2:17 (31 Dec 1836), 2:42 (24 June 1837), 3:23 (10 Feb 1837).
20. For the seamen's hospital, see *Register* 8:4 (27 Jan 1835), 8:7 (17 Feb 1835), 8:24 (16 June 1835), 8:25 (23 June 1835), 9:39 (27 Sept 1836), 9:48 (29 Nov 1836), 11:1 (2 Jan 1837), 11:15 (10 Apr 1838), 11:26 (26 Jun 1838); and *Press* 1:44 (9 July 1836), 1:47 (30 July 1836), 1:45 (16 July 1836), 1:51 (27 Aug 1836), 2:1 (10 Sept 1836), 2:7 (22 Oct 1836), 3:32 (14 Apr 1838), 3:37 (19 May 1838), 3:40 (9 June 1838), 3:42 (23 June 1838), 3:44 (7 July 1838).
21. Markwick and Lane sub-rented the space from Charles Magniac; see JM, F14/1.
22. The information about Markwick & Lane is gathered from the *Canton Register*: for the books, see *Register* 8:1 (6 Jan 1835); for the post office, see *Register* 7:31 (5 Aug 1834); for the banquet held in the hotel, see *Register* 7:48 (2 Dec 1834); for the subscription list to the hospital, see *Register* 7:1 (7 Jan 1834); for Horsburgh's chart, see *Register* 7:3 (21 Jan 1834); for public meeting, see *Register* 9:47 (22 Nov 1836); for Chamber of Commerce meetings, see *Register* 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), 9:48 (29 Nov 1836); for the *Canton Register* box, *Register* 8:28 (14 July 1835). For other issues related to the company, see *Register* 7:48 (2 Dec 1834), 7:3 (21 Jan 1834), 8:28 (14 July 1835), 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), and 9:48 (29 Nov 1836). Markwick & Lane advertised in the *Register* regularly, for instance, *Register* 2:10 (26 May 1829), 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:6 (17 Mar 1830), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 9:40 (4 Oct 1836). The *Register* was based at No. 3 Creek Hong, annual subscription fee twelve dollars; see *Register* supplement (17 Oct 1832).
23. For the Napier Affair, see Fay, *Opium War*, pp. 67–79; Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*, pp. 40–62; and Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, pp. 127–32. For the account of Lord Napier by the Canton foreign community, see the *Canton Register* issues between June and December

1834. For the Chinese accounts of Napier and related edicts by the Qing authorities, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 2, pp. 1–34.

24. *Press* 1:21 (30 Jan 1836).
25. *Register* 7:41 (14 Oct 1834) and 7:42 (21 Oct 1834). For the black outlining, see Colley, *Britons*, p. 220.
26. *Register* 7:32 (12 Aug 1834), 7:35 (2 Sept 1834), and 8:39 (29 Sept 1835).
27. 'To the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council', *Register* 7:52 supplement (30 Dec 1834).
28. For Waterloo Dinners and reference to them, see *Canton Register* 3:13 (3 July 1830), 6:6 (3 May 1833), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 9:30 (26 July 1836), 9:46 (15 Nov 1836), 10:35 (29 Aug 1837). For the birthday dinner, see, for instance, *Register* 7:35 (2 Sept 1834). For coronation, see *Register* 10:47 (21 Nov 1837), 10:48 (28 Nov 1837), 10:49 (5 Dec 1837); *Press* 3:12 (25 Nov 1837).
29. For research on Scottish celebration in India, see Buettner, 'Haggis in the Raj'.
30. *Register* 7:48 (2 Dec 1834), 8:48 (1 Dec 1835); *Press* 1:13 (5 Dec 1835), 3:13 (2 Dec 1837).
31. For an account of the print media, see King and Clark (eds.), *Research Guide*, pp. 41–48.
32. 'European Periodicals beyond the Ganges', *Repository* 5:4 (Aug 1836), p. 146. For a list of Indian newspapers, see Barns, *Indian Press*, pp. 466–68; and Ogborn, *Indian Ink*.
33. *Register* 1:10 (8 Mar 1828).
34. The *Hobart Town Courier*, 13 September 1828.
35. For newspaper publication of this period, see Barker, *Newspapers and English Society*.
36. *Asiatic Journal*, April 1834.
37. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
38. Cheong, *Mandarins and Merchants*, pp. 145 and 263–71; Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 210 and 207–8.
39. JM, C5/2, p. 1.
40. *Indo Chinese Gleaner*, no. 3 (Feb 1818).
41. King and Clarke, *Research Guide*, p. 41.
42. 'European Periodicals beyond the Ganges', *Repository* 5:4 (Aug 1836), pp. 147–50. This is also recorded in Andrews, *History of British Journalism*, vol. 2, p. 314.
43. 'European Periodicals beyond the Ganges', *Chinese Repository* 5:4 (Aug 1836), pp. 159–60.
44. For British local newspapers in the making of British identity, see Colley, *Britons*, p. 41.
45. *Register* 1:2 (15 Nov 1827).
46. Ibid.
47. JM, B2/2, p. 44.
48. For the Chinese record of the quay incident, see QDWJSL-DG, juan 4, pp. 43–49, and Liang (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 27, pp. 1–15; a summary is in Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 346–51.
49. For English record of the quay incident, see *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831, extra 26 May 1831), 4:11 (6 June 1831), 4:12 (18 June 1831), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 4:14 (15 July 1831); IOR, G/12/246, passim; a summary of the EIC account is in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 278–92; quotation 'To His Excellency the Governor, the Fooyuen, the Hoppo', in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 301.
50. *Register* 4:14 (15 July 1831).
51. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 283–84.
52. *Register* 4:11 (6 June 1831).

53. For the *Register*'s discussion of women in Canton after this case, see 4:10 (13 May 1831), 4:13 (4 July 1831), 5:4 (16 Feb 1832), 5:5 (8 Mar 1832), 7:24 (17 June 1834), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834), 8:22 (2 June 1835).
54. For the *Register*'s report on Xie's case, see 4:2 (17 Jan 1831), 4:10 (13 May 1831), *Register* extra (26 May 1831), 4:11 (6 June 1831), 4:14 (15 July 1831), 4:15 (2 Aug 1831).
55. For the Mrs Baynes incident, see JM/C4/1, pp. 59–60, 77, 159. For the EIC's record, see IOR, FO, G/12/244, passim; for Morse's summary, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 278–92. For the Chinese record, see Liang, *Yue Haiguan zhi*, juan 27, pp. 1–15; and *QDWJSL-DG*, juan 4, p. 40. For Guo's summary, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, pp. 406–29.
56. For the new regulations, see *QDWJSL-DG*, juan 4, pp. 40–42.
57. For petition against the new regulations, see PRO, FO1048/31/43-48.
58. For the reaction of foreigners, see *Register* 3:21 (16 Oct 1830), 3:23 (15 Nov 1830), 3:24 (4 Dec 1830), 4:3 (2 Feb 1831), 4:11(6 June 1831), 4:14 (15 July 1831), 4:15 (2 Aug 1831), 4:16 (15 Aug 1831), 4:17 (2 Sept 1831), 4:19 (1 Oct 1831), 4:23 (1 Dec 1831), 4:24 (19 Dec 1831), 5:1 (2 Jan 1832), 5:1 (2 Jan 1832), 5:17 (3 Nov 1832), 6:2 (24 Jan 1833), 7:52 (30 Dec 1834).
59. 'British Subjects in China: To the Editor of the *Canton Register*', *Register* 4:13 (4 July 1831).
60. 'To the Editor', *Register* 4:14 (15 July 1831).
61. 'To the Editor of the *Canton Gazette*', *Register* 4:15 (2 Aug 1831).
62. 'Treatment of Foreigners', *Register* 4:16 (15 Aug 1831).
63. 'China', *Singapore Chronicle and Commercial Register*, 3 November 1831. These *Singapore Chronicle* and *Bengal Hurkaru* reports were quoted by the *Register*; see *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831), and 6:5 (13 Apr 1833). For discussion in London of the incident, see, for example, *The Times*, 15 March, 12 April, 31 October, and 10 November 1831; and *Bell's Weekly Messenger*, no. 1858 (13 Nov 1831).
64. Brown, *Board of Trade and Free Trade*.
65. Schonhardt-Bailey, *Rise of Free Trade*, vol. 1, p. 12; Cain and Hopkins, 'Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas'.
66. Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 175–84. For the rise of the Manchester merchants, see Philips, *East India Company*, pp. 276–98; and Redford, *Manchester Merchants and Foreign Trade*. For how free trade affected British perception of China, see Tsao, 'Representing China to the British Public in the Age of Free Trade'.
67. Grant's praise of the *Register* was in his bill to Parliament concerning the EIC Charter; see *Register* 6:19 and 20 (26 Dec 1833).
68. 'Free Trade with China', *Register* 7:25 (24 June 1834); 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire' *Register* 7:48 (2 Dec 1834); 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire', *Register* 7:50 (16 Dec 1834).
69. *Register* 7:17 (29 Apr 1834).
70. *Register* 7:39 (30 Sept 1834), italics added.
71. *Register* 7:39 (30 Sept 1834), italics in original.
72. Other issues of the *Register* that directly talked about free trade: 1:31 (9 Aug 1828), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 7:26 (17 June 1834), 7:26 (1 July 1834), 7:27 (8 July 1834), 7:29 (22 July 1834), 7:30 (29 July 1834), 7:48 (2 Dec 1834), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), 8:19 (12 May 1835), 9:49 (6 Dec 1836), 7:25 (24 June 1834), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834).
73. 'Free Trade to China', *Courier* 1 (28 July 1831); 'War with China', *Courier* 7 (8 Sept 1831). The shared position did not prevent the fight between the two editors of the newspapers. While the quarrels with the Chinese went on, the *Courier*'s proprietor William Wightman

Wood and the *Register*'s editor Arthur S. Keating (1807–1838) exchanged aggressive articles in the two newspapers in addition to trading abusive letters and personal verbal abuse. The conflict between them resulted in a challenge of a duel, but it had more to do with the American 'travelling spinster' Harriet Low Hillard, one of the few eligible ladies of the foreign community in China, who lived in Macao and occasionally under disguise ventured to Lintin and Canton. For the fight between the *Courier* and the *Register*, see, for instance, *Courier* 1:28 (9 Feb 1832), 1:29 (16 Feb 1832); and *Register* 5:3 (2 Feb 1832), 6:12 (5 Aug 1833); for the duel, see Hillard, *Lights and Shadows*, pp. 320–22; and Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, p. 112.

74. For instance, 'The Ports of China' and 'Free Trade' *Repository* 1:11 (Mar 1833), p. 456; and 4:12 (Apr 1836), p. 572; 2:8 (Dec 1833), pp. 360–61; 5:6 (Oct 1836), p. 241; 6:1 (May 1837), p. 5; 6:8 (Dec 1837), p. 390; 2:3 (July 1833), p. 128.
75. For instance, *Press* 1:40 (11 June 1836).
76. *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831).
77. Ibid.
78. *Register* 4:12 (18 June 1831).
79. For the book ordered, see JM, B6/10, L638; see also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 74n1; and Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 163.
80. *Zhiguo zhi yong dalüe* [A sketch on the practicalities of policymaking] contains twenty-one pages in double leaves. The publication date is said to be 1839 (Lutz, *Opening China*, p. 339) or 1840 (Oxford Bodleian Library [OBL] Online Catalogue). Karl Gützlaff is attributed by both Lutz and OBL to be the author. But the preface of the book states that it was by Ma Lixun 馬禮遜. (It could be Robert Morrison or his son John Robert Morrison. John used both his own and his father's Chinese names after Robert's death.) Robert Morrison died in 1834, and the preface does not say or suggest that this is a posthumous publication. If it was the father, it could in fact have been published before 1834. Further information is necessary for the exact date of publication and the author to be determined.
81. *Zhiguo*, pp. 3b–4a. The original Chinese read, '任意之貿易真沾潤國也'.
82. *Zhiguo*, p. 16a. The original Chinese read, '但將農、匠、商一均振興，無不利國益民矣'.
83. Aihanzhe (eds.), *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* [Eastern Western monthly magazine]. The republication in 1997 has a comprehensive introduction to the magazine written by the editor Huang Shijian. For the articles about trade, see the Huang edition, pp. 301–2, pp. 314–16, pp. 331–32, pp. 344–45, pp. 359–60, pp. 369–70, pp. 382–83, pp. 393–94, pp. 407–8.
84. Aihanzhe (eds.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 315. The original Chinese read, '通商愈廣，國家愈興'.
85. For the fictional writing, see Aihanzhe, *Dongxiyang kao*, pp. 331–32, pp. 344–45, pp. 359–60, pp. 369–70, pp. 382–83, pp. 393–94, pp. 407–8.
86. See Aihanzhe (eds.), *Dongxiyang kao*, 'Maoyi' [Trade], pp. 314–16; 'Xun xindi' [Searching for newland], pp. 394–95; and 'Gongbanya' [The East India Companies], pp. 418–20.
87. Gützlaff, *Maoyi tongzhi*, pp. 14a–30a.
88. Ibid., pp. 8a–13a; for the term *sanshang*, see p. 11a.
89. For missionaries' Chinese publications of this period, see Hanan, 'The Missionary Novels of Nineteenth-Century China'; for their geohistorical and Christian publications, see Barnett and Fairbank eds., *Christianity in China*.

90. *Maoyi tongzhi* was quoted fourteen times by Wei Yuan (see Xiong, *Xixuedongjian*, p. 120). I will explain more about Wei Yuan and his books in Chapter 4.
91. For the book ordered, see JM, B6/10, L638; see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 163.
92. McCulloch, *Dictionary*, p. 233, italics in original. This passage was reprinted and then repudiated in the *Register* 8:1 (6 Jan 1835).
93. Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, p. 65.
94. *Register* 4:10 (13 May 1831); Collie, *Chinese Classical Work*.
95. Collie, *Chinese Classical Work*, vol. 1, pp. 78–79. Chin Seang (Chen Xiang); Heu Hing (Xu Xing), or Heu Tsze (Xu Zi). Tsze (Zi) was a suffix of respect; Prince Tang (Tengwengong).
96. *Zhiguo*, pp. 2b–3a and 7a–7b; and *Maoyi tongzhi*, pp. 2b–3a and 55b; Aihanzhe (eds.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 314.
97. Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 167.
98. For the petition see PRO, FO 1048/30/5; and *Register Supplement* (18 Dec 1830) and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831); more details in Chapter 6.
99. For the *Press* leaving a space, see *Press* 1:46 (23 July 1836).
100. For the *Register*'s suggestion concerning Howqua, see *Register* 9:30 (26 July 1836).
101. For reports of the incident, see *Register* 8:49, supplement (8 Dec 1835); and *Press* 1:15 (19 Dec 1835).
102. See *Register* 6:5 (13 Apr 1833), 7:46 (18 Nov 1834), 8:1 (6 Jan 1835), 8:10 (10 Mar 1835), 8:28 (14 July 1835).
103. JM, C5/2, pp. 1–3.
104. *Calcutta Courier* (7 Nov 1835), quoted from *Register* 9:10 (8 Mar 1836). For another example of the *Calcutta Courier*'s disagreement on the war position with the *Register*, see *Register* 8:21 (26 May 1836).
105. It seems the *Press* had certain American connections, but thus far I have not been able to find evidence.
106. Franklin, *Account of the Supremest Court*.
107. *Press* 1:1 (12 Sept 1835), 1:3 (26 Sept 1835).
108. For Governor-General Lu Kun, see *Press* 1:4 (3 Oct 1835); for the piracy issue, *Press* 1:16 (26 Dec 1835).
109. For comments on Elliot, see *Press* 3:16 (23 Dec 1837).
110. *Press* 1:45 (16 July 1836).
111. Ibid., italics in original.
112. For the circulation of the *Register* and *Press*, see *Repository* 5:4 (Aug 1836), p. 159.
113. 'Canton Petition to the King', 'To the Editor of the Canton Press', and 'Petition', in *Press* 1:6 (17 Oct 1835). For the *Register*'s version of the analysis of the petitioners, see 'In the Last Number of the Canton Press', *Canton Register* 8:42 (20 Oct 1835); and 'Petition to the King in Council', *Canton Register* 9:28 (12 July 1836). For the *Register*'s analysis of other newspapers, see 'Petition of British Subjects at Canton', 'In Our Columns', and 'Dear Mr. Editor', *Register* 8:5 (3 Feb 1835); 'Petition to the King in Council', *Register* 8:22 (2 June 1835); 'Why Do the Heathen Rage, and the People Imagine a Vain Thing', and 'Dear Mr. Editor', *Register* 8:10 (10 Mar 1835). The number of signatures on the petition in the *Register* was ninety-one, and that which Matheson presented in London had eighty-eight signatures; see Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects*.
114. *Press* 1:6 (17 Oct 1835).

115. Ibid.
116. *Press* 1:7 (24 Oct 1835).
117. *Press* 1:7 (24 Oct 1835).
118. *Press* 3:24 (17 Feb 1837).
119. For approval of Americans, *Press* 1:5 (10 Oct 1835).
120. The pamphlet: *Facts Relating to Chinese Commerce*. See *Register*, 3:20 (2 Oct 1830) for the reaction of the American. For the Americans in Canton in this period, see Downs, *Golden Ghetto*; for the case of Francis Terranova, see Chen, 'Strangled by the Chinese and Kept "Alive" by the British'.
121. *Register* 3:20 (2 Oct 1830).
122. For Jardine's letter, see *Register* 3:20 (2 Oct 1830), 3:21 (16 Oct 1830); also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 73.

Chapter Three

1. For a comprehensive study of the Factories, see Farris, 'Thirteen Factories of Canton'.
2. For the interaction between Chinese merchants and staff of the EIC, see PRO, FO 1048 and FO 233/189; and IOR, G/12 and R/10. For a first-hand account of the Canton system, see Hunter, *Fan Kwae*. Morse's work was seminal in understanding the Canton system; see *International Relations*, pp. 63–93. For the daily transactions of the Canton system, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*.
3. Statistical Department of the Inspectorate of Customs, *Treaties, Conventions*, pp. 352–53.
4. For the Manchu identity and rule in China, see Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*; Elliot, *Manchu Way*; and Rawski, *Last Emperors*. For Qing expansion, see Perdue, *China Marches West*.
5. The following account of what happened between 1755 and 1759 is based mainly on Chinese records, including archives newly published by the First Historical Archive Beijing and fragment EIC records of these years. For previous study, see, for instance, Farmer, 'James Flint versus the Canton Interest'; Morse, *International Relations*, p. 67; van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, p. 14; Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 568–88; and Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, pp. 99–102.
6. For the clearing of the coast, see Wang, *Ming Qing haijiang*, pp. 141–53; for the significance of clearing the coast, see van de Ven, 'The Onrush of Modern Globalization in China', pp. 170–73.
7. Huang, *Yapian zhanzheng qian de dongnan sisheng haiguan*, pp. 21–39. See also Gang, *Qing Opening to the Ocean*, pp. 79–98.
8. Cheong, *Mandarins and Merchants*, pp. 8 and 11. The exact locations of the ports changed from time to time but were in the vicinity. See Huang, *Dongnan sisheng haiguan*, pp. 23–39.
9. Cheong, *Mandarins and Merchants*, p. 322.
10. For the advantages of Canton port, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 13–17.
11. 'Qianlong, 20/5/16 (25 July 1755)', and others in *SLXK*, pp. 354 and 357.
12. 'Qianlong, 20/5/16 (25 July 1755)', *SLXK*, vol. 10, sent to Ningbo, pp. 354 and 356.
13. Ibid., p. 357.
14. 'Qianlong, 21/05/28 (25 June 1756)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1278.
15. Z-QGYGA, pp. 1143, 1177, 1183, and 1203.

16. Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, p. 569.
17. The original 'prohibition' document seems not to have survived, but it was quoted in this memorial: 'Qianlong, 21/r09/10 (2 Nov 1756)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1286.
18. N-SGDZBZG, No. 701001110, the original Chinese read, '周人驥革職效力軍臺乾隆 21 年'. Zhou was in the same year reinstalled and appointed as governor of Guangdong. The reappointment was likely announced before he reached the post station; see A-NGDKDA, No. 054778-001, original Chinese read, '題謝皇上恩命署理廣東巡撫'.
19. 'Qianlong, 20/05/11 (20 July 1755)', in *SLXK*, vol. 10, pp. 353–54.
20. Wu's memorial was quoted in 'Qianlong, 21/07/09 (4 Aug 1756)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1280.
21. 'Qianlong, 21/07/09 (4 Aug 1756)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1280; Grand Council, *Junjichu* 軍機處.
22. 'Qianlong, 22/01/08 (25 Feb 1757)', and 'Qianlong, 22/02/21 (9 Apr 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1590 and 1594–95.
23. 'Qianlong, 21/12/20 (8 Feb 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1299–404, 1467–589.
24. 'Qianlong, 22/07/22 (26 Aug 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1626 and 1628. The original Chinese read, '告之楊應琚去也.
25. 'Qianlong, 22/08/08 (20 Sep 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1629–35.
26. 'Qianlong, 22/08/08 (20 Sep 1757)', 'Qianlong, 22/10/22 (3 Dec 1757)', and 'Qianlong 22/10/22 (3 Dec 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1629–35 and 1636–44. It seems rather puzzling that the two memorials were presented by Yang on the same day on the same topic with minor differences, and they both belonged to the category of 'red vermillion memorial'. The emperor commented on the first, agreeing that the livelihoods of the Cantonese should be taken care of (p. 1635), while he wrote on the second one that the ministers should discuss and report back (p. 1644). Also, the second one has more details of how Yang arrived at Ningbo.
27. 'Qianlong, 22/11/10 (20 Dec 1757)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1654–59.
28. 'Qianlong, 23/02/20 (27 Feb 1758)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1680–85.
29. 'Qianlong, 23/09/25 (26 Oct 1758)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 4, pp. 1697–700.
30. 'Qianlong, 24/r06/22 (14 Aug 1758)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 4, pp. 1747–54.
31. 'Qianlong, 24/6/29 (23 July 1759)', in *SLXK*, p. 114.
32. 'Undated', Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1258–64.
33. 'Qianlong, 21/07/09 (4 Aug 1756)', in Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1280.
34. 'Qianlong, 24/09/04 (24 Oct 1759)', in *SLXK*, vol. 4, pp. 117–25. The irony is that Flint paid a bribe of 5,000 *liang* for the petition on corruption to be presented. See Morse, *International Relations*, vol. 1, pp. 301–5.
35. Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, p. 1466; vol. 4, p. 1886; for the search for Lin, see vol. 4, pp. 1985–89.
36. 'Qianlong 24/09/16 (5 Nov 1759)', *SLXK*, vol. 3, pp. 94–95; for the search of the Wangs, see Z-QGYGA, vol. 4, pp. 1945–46 and 2031–37.
37. See Z-QGYGA, vol. 4, pp. 1990 and 1951–54.
38. See Z-QGYGA, vol. 4, pp. 1990–92, 2169–76, and 2231–34. For British account of Flint, see PRO, FO 233/189, pp. 6, 7, 11, and 13; IOR, R/10/4, pp. 8 and 154, and G/12/195, pp. 24–27.
39. Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1260–61 and 1424–27.
40. This confirms what Paul van Dyke has argued: the Canton system of trade can be traced back to 1700 as the starting point; see *Canton Trade*, p. xiv.

41. For the tea trade, see Wills, 'European Consumption of Asian Production in the 17th and 18th centuries', p. 144; for the tea trade of this period in general, see Mui and Mui, *Management of Monopoly*.
42. For the Jesuit's mission, see Brockey, *Journey to the East*.
43. For Kangxi learning mathematics, see Wang, *Kangxi huangdi*, pp. 41–44. The instruments can now be seen in the Palace Museum in Beijing, which I visited in September 2007.
44. 'Kangxi, 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)', in *KXCHWZPZZHB*, vol. 8, p. 268. The original Chinese read, '西洋來人內若有各樣學問或行醫者必著速送至京中'.
45. Brockey, *Journey to the East*, pp. 43–49 in particular; Spence, *Memory Palace*.
46. Van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, p. 26.
47. '洋貨行規' Borg. Cinese. 439 E, in Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Rome. Also partially quoted in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 1, pp. 163–64.
48. *Mingshi* 明史 [History of the Ming], juan 323, On Lüsong (Luzon), in A-HJQWZLK.
49. 'Qianlong, 07/02/03 (3 March 1737)', in *SLXK*, vol. 22, pp. 803–4.
50. Brockey, *Journey to the East*, pp. 184–203.
51. For the persecution, see Laamann, *Christian Heretics*.
52. For the Sunu clan case, see Brockey, *Journey to the East*, p. 195; and Elliott, *Manchu Way*, pp. 240–41.
53. Cao, 'Qingdai Guangdong tizhi'.
54. For the rebellion of this period, see Naquin, *Millenarian Rebellion* and *Shantung Rebellion*; Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*; and Wang, *White Lotus Rebels*.
55. John King Fairbank exemplified this argument in *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 52.
56. See Chapter 5.
57. For the rules, see Z-QGYGA, vol. 3, pp. 1998–2015.
58. See Chapter 6.
59. For the revision, see 'Jiaqing, 20/04/14 (02 June 1809)', in *QDWJSL-JQ*, vol. 3, pp. 9a–10b.
60. For the memorial, see Liang (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 19–27. For English translations of the regulations, see the *Canton Register* 4:11 (6 June 1831); and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, pp. 293–301.
61. For Lu Kun's revision, see Liang (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 28a–36a.
62. See Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, pp. 332 and 326.
63. The commissioner of customs belonged to the Board of Revenue but the revenue was controlled by the Imperial Household Office (*neiwufu*), as was the appointment; thus, it ended up that most often Manchus were appointed to the lucrative post. See Huang, *Dongnan sisheng haiguan*, pp. 40–95; for the duties of the commissioners, see Chen, *Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants*, pp. 24–29.
64. For a general introduction to the Qing bureaucracy, see Metzger, *Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy*.
65. Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, p. 326.
66. For the Hong merchants, see van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao*; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*; Morse, *Gilds of China*; Liang, *Guangdong shisanhang*.
67. For Poankeequa II, see Chen, *Dongya haiyu yiqian nian*, pp. 309–48; van Dyke, *Merchants of Canton and Macao*, pp. 193–94; Cheong, *Mandarins and Merchants*, pp. 159–64.
68. Cheong, *Hong Merchants of Canton*, p. 302.
69. For instance, Liang (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 29, pp. 28–36.
70. Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 51–53; van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, p. 11; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, p. 302.

71. For linguists, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 77–94.
72. For compradors, see van Dyke, *Canton Trade*, pp. 51–76.
73. *Register* 4:11 (6 June 1831).
74. For the system, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 331–77; and van Dyke, *Canton Trade*.
75. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 1, p. viii. For the change in 1786, see IOR, R/10/33 (Court's letter of 24 March 1786); for a general narrative of the history of early Canton trade, see IOR, G/12/20, pp. 377–80.
76. For tea trade figures and credit flow in Canton, see Chen, *Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants*, pp. 44–53.
77. For the amount of port revenue sent to the court between 1684 and 1844, see Huang, *Dongnan sisheng haiguan*, pp. 419–82.
78. For examples, see 'Proclamations', *Register* 4:19 (1 Oct 1831).
79. 'Hukoukao yi' 戶口考一 [Part one of household registration], *Qingchao wenxian tongkao*. For the twelfth-century record of the mutual responsibility system, see 'The Mutual Responsibility System', in Ebrey (ed.), *Chinese Civilization*.
80. For the 1744 case, see Liang, *Yue haiguan zhi*, juan 28, pp. 2–3; for the 1809 case, see *SLXK*, vol. 3, pp. 56–57 and 104–6. Seeking guarantors was a significant feature in every aspect of the foreign trade in the Qing period, even the construction of oceangoing ships; see Guo, 'Qingdai qianqi haiwai maoyi guanli'.
81. Zhang, 'Cong Hezhou shibian kan Qianlong chao minbian'.
82. Naquin and Rawski, *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century*, pp. 16–17.
83. The foreigners knew the *baojia*, but they did not seem to link it to the Canton system. E. C. Bridgman mentioned this system in 'Notices of China', *Repository* 2:1 (May 1834): 18.
84. For an English record of the appointment of a French consul to Canton, see IOR, G/12/66, p. 190.
85. 'Relations between the United States of America and China', *Repository* 5:5 (Sept 1836): 219.
86. 'Qianlong, 20/09/28 (2 Nov 1755)', in *SLXK*, vol. 12, p. 425.
87. 'Jiaqian, 08/04/14 (21 May1809)', in *QDWJSL-JQ*, vol. 3, p. 6. The Chinese read, '英吉利國素性強橫奸詐聞近年惟法蘭西夷國足與相抗'.
88. 'Circa April 1831', in *SLXK*, vol. 10, p. 362. The original Chinese read, '有英吉利貿易夷人自恃富強'.
89. Song in 1793 had accompanied halfway the embassy's journey south to Canton. In 1811, when Song arrived in Canton as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi and learned that Staunton was in the Thirteen Factories, they renewed their friendship. The EIC capitalized on this friendship to solve a dispute at the time. Three years later the court intervened that terminated the friendship. For Staunton's communication and exchange of gifts with Song between 1811 and 1814, see PRO, FO 1048/11/18-24, FO 1048/11/26, FO 1048/11/35, FO 1048/12/1, FO 1048/12/2, FO 1048/12/8, FO 1048/14/54, and FO 1048/14/66; and IOR, G/12/20, pp. 298–99.
90. This letter to the governor is recorded in the proceedings of Parliament in London; see 'Extract from Mr. C. Grant's Speech June 13th', in *Register* 6:19 & 20 (26 Dec 1833), italics added. The speech shows that Parliament at this point held Qing China in great respect.
91. 'Last Letter from the Honourable Company's Chief at Macao to the Viceroy', *Register* 7:18 (6 May 1834).

92. 'Election of a Chief', *Register* 7:44 (4 Nov 1834). The translation was by the *Register*, hence 'Barbarian Eye' for *yimu*.
93. PRO, FO 82/2462. One of the memorials was translated into English and published in the *Register*, entitled 'Postcript [*sic*] to a Dispatch from the Governor of Canton to the Emperor', *Register* 10:5 (24 Jan 1837).
94. *Register* 10:18 (2 May 1837).
95. PRO, FO 682/2462/47, and FO 682/2462/52. The case was also published in the *Canton Press* 3:3 (23 Sept 1837).
96. For stopping trade during the Napier Affair, see Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, pp. 127–32; for another three occasions of stopping trade, see *Register* 3:25 (18 Dec 1830), 4:1 (3 Jan 1831), 7:1 (7 Jan 1834).
97. *Press* 4:9 (3 Nov 1838). For the establishing and removal of the seamen's hospital-ship, see *Register* 8:4 (27 Jan 1835), 8:24 (16 June 1835), 8:25 (23 June 1835), 9:39 (27 Sept 1836), 9:48 (29 Nov 1836), 11:1 (2 Jan 1837), 11:15 (10 Apr 1838), 11:26 (26 Jun 1838); *Press* 1:44 (9 July 1836), 1:47 (30 July 1836), 1:51 (27 Aug 1836), 2:1 (10 Sept 1836), 2:7 (22 Oct 1836), 3:32 (14 Apr 1838), 3:37 (19 May 1838), 3:40 (9 June 1838), 3:42 (23 June 1838), 3:44 (7 July 1838).
98. Examples of punishment of Chinese in order to force the foreigners to cooperate: in the Flint incident, *Register* 3:17 (25 Aug 1830); in the case of an American petition, *Register* 1:20 (7 May 1828); for Western women in Canton, *Register* 3:23 (15 Nov 1830), and 4:13 (4 July 1831); in the Napier Affair, *Register* 7:33 (19 Aug 1834); in other cases, *Register* 8:11 (17 Mar 1835), 9:47 (22 Nov 1836), 8:2 (13 Jan 1835), and 6:13 and 14 (16 Sept 1833).
99. IOR, G/12/262, pp. 34–35; Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, p. 45.
100. For examples of the British merchants stopping trade, see during 1813–1814: Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 52. During 1829–1830: *Register* 3:2 (19 Jan 1830), 3:3 (3 Feb 1830), 3:4 (15 Feb 1830), 3:7 (29 Mar 1830), and 5:1 (2 Jan 1832); also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 43; Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 20; Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, p. 503. During April 1839, see Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 79.
101. For the first meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, see *Register* 7:33 (19 Aug 1834).
102. For the Chamber of Commerce, see *Register* 7:31 (5 Aug 1834), 7:33 (19 Aug 1834), 7:40 (7 Oct 1834), 7:45 (11 Nov 1834), 7:46 (18 Nov 1834), 7:47 (25 Nov 1834), 7:50 (16 Dec 1834), 8:3 (20 Jan 1835), 8:4 (27 Jan 1835), 8:8 (25 Feb 1835), 8:9 (3 Mar 1835), 8:16 (21 Apr 1835), 8:20 (19 May 1835), 8:44 (2 Nov 1835), 9:15 (12 Apr 1836), 9:16 (19 Apr 1836), 9:20 (17 May 1836); and *Press* 1:30 (2 Apr 1836), and 1:32 (16 Apr 1836).
103. For the General Chamber of Commerce, see *Press* 1:4 (3 Oct 1835), 1:32 (16 Apr 1836), 2:11 (19 Nov 1836), 2:12 (26 Nov 1836), 2:13 (3 Dec 1836), 2:19 (14 Jan 1837), 2:29 (25 Mar 1837), 2:31 (8 Apr 1837), 2:32 (15 Apr 1837), 2:36 (13 May 1837), 3:10 (1 Nov 1837), 3:12 (25 Nov 1837), 3:11 (8 Nov 1837), 3:14 (9 Dec 1837), 3:17 (30 Dec 1837), 3:19 (13 Jan 1837), 3:26 (3 Mar 1837), 3:29 (24 Mar 1838), 3:43 (30 June 1838), 3:49 (11 Aug 1838), 4:10 (10 Nov 1838), 4:13 (1 Dec 1838); and *Register* 9:48 (29 Nov 1836), 9:49 (13 Dec 1836), 10:2 (10 Jan 1837), 10:14 (4 Apr 1837), 10:16 (18 Apr 1837), 10:18 (2 May 1837), 10:19 (9 May 1837), 10:21 (23 May 1837), 10:21 (23 May 1837), 10:22 (30 May 1837), 10:24 (13 June 1837), 10:28 (11 July 1837), 10:44 (31 Oct 1837), 10:45 (7 Nov 1837), 10:46 (14 Nov 1837), 10:48 (28 Nov 1837), 10:49 (5 Dec 1837), 10:52 (26 Dec 1837), 11:2 (9 Jan 1838), 11:12 (20 Mar 1838).

104. Examples of communication between the General Chamber of Commerce and Hong merchants: *Press* 4:13 (1 Dec 1838), 4:14 (8 Dec 1838), 4:15 (15 Dec 1838), 4:16 (22 Dec 1838), 4:17 (27 Dec 1838).
105. *Press* 3:19 (13 Jan 1837); see also *Press* 4:13 (1 Dec 1838) for a letter concerning another plea from the Hong merchants to the chamber.
106. 'Remarks on the Trade of Canton [by Frederick Pigou, Esq. 1754.]', *Register* 8:10 (10 Mar 1835), italics in original.
107. 'Treaty with China', *Repository* 4:10 (Feb 1836), p. 445. Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 45.
108. 'Charles Grant, "East-India Company's Charter"', Hansard, HC Deb. vol. 18 (13 June 1833), col. 709. Also quoted in Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 22.
109. 'Grey to Napier, 10 January 1834', in *Grey's Papers*, GRE/B42/2/5, quoted from Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 37.
110. 'Free Trade to All the Ports of the Chinese Empire', *Register* 7:25 (24 June 1834).
111. 'Instructions to LT.COL. Cathcart, Whitehall, Nov 30th, 1787', in Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 164.
112. For Marjoribanks's pamphlet, see *Register* 5:10 (18 July 1832). For Morrison's Chinese translation and a Chinese account of these voyages, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, pp. 588–622; Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*; Gützlaff, *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China*. For the *Register*'s report on Marjoribanks advocating China's case as an MP in London, see *Register* 7:20 (20 May 1834) and 7:23 (10 June 1834). For discussion of the voyage, see Su, *Ma Lixun*, pp. 113–30; and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 332.
113. For the English text, see *Register* 5:10 (18 July 1832); the original Chinese read, '夫英國朝廷既經有了這多大地方何得復渴開新地乎其所尚者特為養護英民享平安納福而已'; see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, vol. 1, p. 619.
114. For the Chinese letters that the British received during the journey, see Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*.
115. 'Daoguang 12/07/02 (28 July 1832)', *SLXK*, vol. 13, p. 471.
116. 'Daoguang 12/06/01 (28 June 1832)', in *SLXK*, pp. 397–98.
117. 'LE Governor & c to the Hong Merchants', *Register* 1:39 (15 Nov 1828).
118. Ibid.
119. For the forbidding of books and learning Chinese, see *SLXK*, vol. 10, pp. 361–63; for the Chinese teacher killed, see Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, p. 37.
120. Su, *Zhongguo Kaimen*; for Morrison' Chinese teachers, see pp. 43–64; for the Chinese books he brought with him, see p. 123.
121. 'Neumann, Karl Friedrich', *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1911).
122. *Register* 4:12 (18 June 1831). The original Chinese read, '不失天朝體制方為至善'.

Chapter Four

1. 'Proceedings Relative to the Formation of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', in PRO, FO 17/ 89; also partly in *Chinese Repository* 3:8 (Dec 1834), pp. 378–84, italics added. A version of this chapter has been published in *Modern Asian Studies*, see Chen, 'An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton'.

2. For the modernization argument of the SDUKC, which I will not repeat here, see Rubinstein, 'Propagating the Democratic Gospel'; Drake, 'E. C. Bridgman's Portrayal of the West'; and Lazich, 'Diffusion of Useful Knowledge'.
3. 'Proceedings Relative to the Formation of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', in PRO, FO 17/ 89.
4. Hillemann argued that the changing perceptions of China on the British side around this time made war against China imaginable; see *Asian Empire and British Knowledge*, pp. 104–5.
5. 'Prize Essay', *Register* 4:12 (18 June 1831), italics added. See Chapter 2.
6. 'Civilization', *Miscellany*, pp. 11–12.
7. Ibid.
8. 'Progress Society', *Register* 5:5 (8 Mar 1832).
9. Ibid.
10. 'The Press in China', *Register* 6:6 (31 May 1833).
11. 'Prospectus of a Monthly Periodical in the Chinese Language', *Register* 6:10 (15 July 1833).
12. Ibid.
13. Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 139–40.
14. 'Chinese Monthly Magazine', *Register* 7:15 (15 Apr 1834). Greenberg quoted this from the Jardine Matheson Archives, but he did not note the source, because he read uncatalogued documents. Further research is needed to determine Gützlaff's source of funds.
15. 'The Chinese Magazine', *Repository* 2:5 (Sept 1833), pp. 234–36.
16. 'The Chinese Magazine', *Courier* 3:6 (23 Sept 1833).
17. 'Chinese Monthly Magazine', *Register* 7:15 (15 Apr 1834).
18. Ibid., italics in original.
19. For the SDUK, see Smith, *Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*.
20. 'Literary Notices', *Repository* 2:7 (Nov 1833), pp. 329–31.
21. For the SDUK's note and abstract of the pamphlet, see 'Literary Notices', *Chinese Repository* 2:7 (Nov 1833), pp. 329–31; quotation on p. 329.
22. For the circulation of the *Penny Magazine*, see Secord, *Victorian Sensation*, p. 68; and Bennett, 'Editorial Character and Readership of the Penny Magazine'.
23. For Brougham, see Lobban, 'Brougham, Henry Peter'.
24. 'Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Register* 7:26 (1 July 1834).
25. *Register* 7:49 (9 Dec 1834).
26. For the regulations of the society, see *Register* 7:49 (9 Dec 1834).
27. 'First Report of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Repository* 4:8 (Dec 1835), pp. 354–61.
28. 'Second Report of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Repository* 5:11 (Mar 1837), pp. 507–13.
29. 'The Third Annual Report of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Repository* 6:7 (Nov 1837), pp. 334–40, italics added.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. 'Second Report', p. 512.
33. 'Fourth Annual Report of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Repository* 7:8 (December 1838), pp. 399–410, quotation on pp. 400–401, italics added.
34. Ibid., pp. 400.
35. Ibid., pp. 400–401.

36. Ibid.
37. See Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, p. 171.
38. 'Second Report', p. 509.
39. Rubinstein, *Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise in China*, p. 131.
40. 'Third Annual Report', p. 334.
41. 'First Report', pp. 354–55; and 'Third Annual Report', pp. 335–56. For the translated term, see Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 185.
42. The term 'devils' originated in the context of European pirates on the south China coast during the early years of the encounter between China and the West; see Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 96–107.
43. For Samuel Dyer and Legrand working on movable type, see Su, *Ma Lixun*, pp. 191–202.
44. 'First Report', p. 356; 'Second Report', pp. 512–13; and 'Third Annual Report', p. 339.
45. For the English version of the Napier's placard, see 'Interesting to the Chinese Merchants', *Register* 7:35 (2 Sept 1834).
46. 'Chinese Monthly Magazine', *Register* 7:15 (15 Apr 1834).
47. 'First Report', p. 357; 'Second Report', p. 509. For publication in Singapore, see Chng and Zhou, *Jidujiao Chuanjiaoshi*, pp. 272–300.
48. 'First Report'.
49. 'Chinese Monthly Magazine', *Register* 7:15 (15 Apr 1834).
50. For Edwin Steven's account of the voyage to Fuji, see *Repository* 4:2 (June 1835), pp. 82–96. Steven mentioned only Christian books, but when the *Register* complained about the Canton authorities searching for those Chinese who assisted in the writing and printing of the tracts, it alluded to the distribution of the magazine, see 'Freedom of Press in China', *Register* 8:38 (22 Sept 1835).
51. 'First Report', p. 356; 'Second Report', p. 512; 'Third Annual Report', pp. 339–40; 'Fourth Annual Report,' pp. 403–4. For the publication and distribution of the magazine, see Huang, 'Daoyan (Introduction)', in Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*, pp. 3–35.
52. 'First Report', pp. 359–60.
53. For the personal distribution of Bridgman's book, see Lazich, *E. C. Bridgman*, pp. 144 and 154; for Bridgman's revision of the treatise, see Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, pp. 117–18.
54. Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, pp. 220–26; and Su, *Zhongguo kaimen*, pp. 226–32. For the discussion of the letter to Queen Victoria, see Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 91–94.
55. For political factionalism, see Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, pp. 125–35.
56. Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, pp. 255–66. For Wei Yuan, see Barnett, 'Wei Yuan and Westerners'; and Leonard, *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*.
57. Xiong, *Xixue dongjian*, pp. 255–66.
58. Ibid., pp. 226–39.
59. For Xu Jiyu (Hsu Chi-yu), see Drake, *China Charts the World*.
60. Murray Rubinstein explains the society as part of the activities initiated by the foreign community in China to 'overturn its tradition and become a modern, industrial, Christian nation state', seeing SDUKC as one of the earliest attempts to bring the fruits of modernity into China. See Rubinstein, 'Propagating the Democratic Gospel', p. 258.
61. Drake, 'E. C. Bridgman's Portrayal of the West'; Lazich, 'Diffusion of Useful Knowledge', p. 316; also Lazich, *E. C. Bridgman*, p. 120.
62. Rubinstein, 'The Wars They Wanted'.
63. 'To the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council', in Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*.

64. 'Objects of the Society', *Repository* 3:8 (Dec 1834), p. 382; also in PRO, FO 17/9.
65. 'First Report', p. 355.
66. 'Proceedings', pp. 380–81; 'First Report', p. 361. 'Second Report', p. 507; 'Third Annual Report', p. 340; and 'Fourth Annual Report', p. 410. There are three individuals, William Bell, Cox, and Thomas Fox, of whom further study is required to identify their roles in the Canton trade.
67. 'Proceedings Relative to the Formation of the Morrison Education Society', *Repository* 5:8 (Dec 1836), pp. 373–81; also in PRO, FO 17/9.
68. For the founding of the Medical Missionary Society, see Colledge and Parker, *Address and Minutes of Proceedings of the Medical Missionary Society*.
69. 'Suggestions for the Formation of a Medical Missionary Society', *Repository* 5:8 (Dec 1836), pp. 370–73, quotation pp. 372–73.
70. 'Second Report', p. 513.
71. Ibid., pp. 357–58.
72. 'Chinese Magazine', *Repository* 2:5 (Sept 1834), p. 235.
73. 'Second Report', p. 510; 'Third Report', p. 339.
74. Rubinstein, *Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise in China*, p. 135. For translation of the Bible, see Mak, *Protestant Bible Translation and Mandarin as the National Language*.
75. 'Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China', *Register* 11:32 (7 Aug 1838).
76. 'Fourth Annual Report', p. 407.
77. Ibid., p. 408; for the original regulation, see 'Proceedings', p. 383.
78. Lutz, *Opening China*, pp. 90–91 and pp. 99–116; and Lazich, *E. C. Bridgman*.
79. Cohen, 'Christian Missions and Their Impact to 1900', pp. 543–90.

Chapter Five

1. 'To the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council', in Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, p. 131, italics added.
2. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, Chapter 2; Fang, 'Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms'.
3. Staunton, *Memoirs*, pp. 63–65.
4. IOR, R/10/39, ff. 40–41; G/12/154, passim. Staunton, *Memoirs*, pp. 34–35.
5. PRO, FO 1048/14/73. The original Chinese read, '似有輕侮之意'; '外國統稱'.
6. Lydia Liu argued that the British started translating *yi* as 'barbarians' instead of as 'foreigners' in around 1832 and believed that Gützlaff played a major role in it (Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 41–42). This chapter reveals that the *yi* issue started in 1814, and Gützlaff's confrontation with Chinese authorities in 1832 was the end product of the public debate in the *Canton Register* that took place during 1828 and 1829.
7. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 4, p. 152.
8. Morrison (ed.), *Dictionary of the Chinese Language*, 1815.
9. 'Translation of the Petition from the Gentry Balliffs & Co. of Mongha Village, to the Kwanmanfoo, against the New Road', and 'Decision of the Kwanmanfoo on the Mongha Gentry', both in *Register* 1:17 (26 Apr 1828).
10. 'Barbarians', *Register* 1:20 (17 May 1828).
11. 'Epithets Applied to Foreigners', *Register* 1:21 (24 May 1828). The translation was from the *Elements of Chinese Grammar* (1814), by missionary Joshua Marshman (1768–1837).

The system of romanization is different from modern pinyin: *yi* (*Ee*); *rong* (*Jung*), *man* (*Maan*), and *di* (*Teih*).

12. Ibid. The Original Chinese read, '孟子／離婁下，孟子曰：舜生於諸馮，遷於負夏，卒於鳴條，東夷之人也；文王生於岐周，卒於畢郢，西夷之人也。地之相去也 千有餘里，世之相後也，千有餘歲，得志行乎中國，若合符節，先聖後聖，其揆一也'.
13. 'Epithets Applied to Foreigners'.
14. The sentences paraphrased by Z is not Confucius's but comes from *The Great Learning* (*Liji* 禮記 / *Daxue* 大學). The original Chinese read, '唯仁人放流之迸諸四夷不與同中國'.
15. 'Epithets Applied to Foreigners'.
16. Ibid.
17. *Register* 2: 21 (18 Nov 1829), italics in original.
18. Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, pp. 15, 17, 21, and 73.
19. For study of the voyage, see Guo, *Jindai Zhongguo shi*, pp. 605–6; Su, *Ma Lixun*, pp. 113–30; and Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 40–46.
20. Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, pp. 48–50. Wu's official title in Chinese: 欽命江南蘇松太兵備道監督海關. Liu named Wu as admiral (*Clash of Empire*, p. 43), which is not accurate for this was a civil post.
21. Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, pp. 52–54. Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports*, pp. 67–68.
22. Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, pp. 53–54. Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, p. 68. Lydia Liu put the book quoted from as 'Great Qing Code' (*Clash of Empires*, p. 43). This is not how the *Da Qing Huidian* (*Ta-tsing hyway-teen*) is usually translated. *The Great Qing Code* usually refers to the *Da Qing Luli*.
23. For the Chinese petition that quotes this passage, see Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, p. 54. This English translation is from Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, pp. 68–69. Lydia Liu used passage in John Francis Davies's translation (*Clash of Empires*, p. 44), which is identical to the translation in the *Canton Register*; see 'OI Barbaroi', *Register* 6:12 (5 Aug 1833). Liu's argument that the translation of *buzhi* as 'misrule' 'turns Su Shi's words into perfect gibberish, if not a verbal monstrosity', is applicable only to the *Register*'s and Davies's text, not to Lindsay's and to the 1832 confrontation. The complexity of the issue is wanting in Liu's argument.
24. Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, pp. 60–61.
25. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, p. 44.
26. Gützlaff, *Journal of Two Voyages*, p. 234.
27. For the edicts, see *SLXK*, pp. 212–15; for the Canton newspaper's report on this, see *Register*, 5:10 (18 July 1832), 5:13 (3 Sept 1832), 6:2 (24 Jan 1833), 6:3 (16 Feb 1833), 6:4 (20 Mar 1833), 6:8(31 May 1833), 6:19 and 20 (26 Dec 1833), 7:9 (4 Mar 1834), 7:10 (11 Mar 1834), 7:14 (8 Apr 1834), 8:35 (1 Sept 1835).
28. For the Chinese people's reaction, see Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*.
29. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 34 and 69.
30. For examples of 'semi-barbarous', see *Register*, 5:13 (3 Sept 1832), and 5:15 (3 Oct 1832); for 'barbarian', see *Register* 9:1 (5 Jan 1836), and 9:35 (30 Aug 1836).
31. A portion of this section has been published in an article; see Chen, 'Chinese Narrator and Western Barbarians'.

32. For Gützlaff's manifesto, see *Register* 6:10 (15 July 1833).
33. Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*: 'Zi wai ji fu' 子外寄父 [A son abroad to his father], p. 111; 'Zhi wai feng gu shu' 姪外奉姑書' (A nephew abroad to his aunt), p. 201; 'Ru wai ji pengyou shu' 儒外寄朋友書 [A scholar abroad to his friend], p. 221; 'Zhi wai feng shu shu' 侄外奉叔書 [A nephew abroad to his uncle], pp. 241, 251, 360, 371, 396, 408, and 421; 'Shu da zhi' 叔答侄 [The uncle's reply to the nephew], pp. 251 and 360. Gützlaff, E. C. Bridgman, W. H. Medhurat, and John Morrison were all involved in editing this magazine; see Huang Shijian, introduction to Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*, pp. 9–14.
34. 'Zhi wai ji fu', in Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 111. The writing was unconventional, and my rendering attempts to piece together the possible meanings. The original Chinese read, '男向來視諸夷國當小洲，到那國之時，名稱百路，看地方之寬，城邑之美，百姓之盛，市頭之鬧，色沮言塞，暗想至中國因聞夷人如餓鬼貧賤，甚實堪憫，不期而登岸巡遊，城名叫麗瑪，到處矚眺，細看決疑，屋有順便，衢有澗長，使知五倫學問最淵，生齒日繁，農商相資，工賈相讓，且此地之官員推廣立教，使民知禮義。'
35. For the general situation in Peru after its independence, see Bonilla, 'Peru and Bolivia from Independence to the War of the Pacific'; for the economic situation of this period, see Gootenberg, *Between Silver and Guano*.
36. 'Landun shiyong' 蘭墩十詠, in Aihanzhe (ed.), *Dongxiyang kao*, p. 67, also p. 77. These ten poems also appear in Gützlaff, *Dayingguo*, pp. 5–7.
37. For Dickens's childhood, see Forsters, *Life of Charles Dickens*, pp. 23–37.
38. Gützlaff, *Dayingguo*, pp. 3–4. The original text in Chinese was written incoherently. The translation here tries to patch together the meaning from the context instead of following the original word by word. Gützlaff uses abundant idiomatic expressions from traditional popular fiction without knowing exactly what they mean. The whole book very often repeatedly quoted idioms that fit the context oddly, rendering the whole narration rather peculiar. The original Chinese read, '就問其紅毛人為夷，不知有國家帝君乎，已聞知夷猶禽獸，非知五倫之理，若鳥飛獸走，寓穴掘土，任意食草穀，男女亂媾，上無神，下無君也。葉生含笑道，已而已而，恁般說話，令人把老先生冥頑不靈，雖然本國無地理之文，無外國之史，卻看駐廣州的外客，一定露出其國之體面，若論物藝手段，只閱其甲板。尚然不知漢文，卻有本話詩書文章。'
39. Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, pp. 7, 15, and 17; capitals in original.
40. Lindsay, *Letter to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China*, p. 9.
41. 'The Dispute with China', *Asiatic Journal*, March 1835, p. 148.
42. *Quarterly Review*, January 1834, vol. 1, p. 458.
43. Staunton, *Remarks on the British Relations with China*, pp. 35–38; *Morning Herald*, 4 April 1836; *The Times*, 4 April 1836; *Asiatic Journal*, March, April, and May 1835.
44. *Register* 8:39 (29 Sept 1835).
45. *Repository* 4:5 (Oct 1835); also in *Register* 8:44 (3 Nov 1835).
46. For instance, *Register* 8:39 (29 Sept 1835), 8:44 (2 Nov 1835), 9:35 (30 Aug 1836), 9:38 (20 Sept 1836), 9:44 (1 Nov 1836), 9:49 (6 Dec 1836), 10:23 (6 June 1837), 10:24 (13 June 1837), 10:31 (1 Aug 1837), 10:33 (15 Aug 1837), 10:34 (22 Aug 1837), 10:35 (29 Aug 1837), 11:34 (21 Aug 1838); *Canton Press* 1:20 (23 Jan 1836), 1:49 (13 Aug 1836), 2:38 (27 May 1837), 2:39 (3 June 1837), 2:40 (10 June 1837); *Repository* 5:6 (Oct 1836), 6:1 (May 1837).
47. *Register* 8:40 (6 Oct 1835).

48. *Press* 1:20 (23 Jan 1836), 1:49 (13 Aug 1836), 2:38 (27 May 1837), 2:39 (3 June 1837), and 2:40 (10 June 1837).
49. *Register* 10:22 (30 May 1837).
50. *Register* 10:23 (6 June 1837).
51. *Register* 10:24 (13 June 1837).
52. *Register* 10:3 (1 Aug 1837), 10:32 (8 Aug 1837), 10:33 (15 Aug 1837), 10:34 (22 Aug 1837), 10:35 (29 Aug 1837).
53. *Register* 10:34 (22 Aug 1837).
54. Ibid.
55. *Register* 10:35 (29 Aug 1837), by Lexicon.
56. *Register* 10:35 (29 Aug 1837).
57. Zhang, 'Fuyi riji'. Teng translated *bu mei* as 'unrefined'; see Zhang, *Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking*, p. 83.
58. This section is a preliminary survey of the use of the words. It would be worthwhile to conduct a statistical analysis using Digital humanities methods, but until the digitization of the edicts and memorials is complete, this project would need a team and funding to go through all the existing edicts and memorials from this period manually.
59. 'Kangxi, 18/02/49 (03/17/1710)', in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 760; and 'Kangxi, 07/09/1710 (14/r7/47)', in *KXZP*, vol. 3, pp. 5–6.
60. 'Kangxi, 02/06/47 (19/07/1706)', in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 63; 'Kangxi [1715] (undated)', in *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108; 'Kangxi, 02/04/54 (04/05/1715)', in *KXZP*, vol. 6, pp. 121–25.
61. 'Kangxi, [1715] (undated)', in *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108. 'Kangxi, 02/06/47(07/19/1708)', in *KXZP*, vol. 2, p. 63; *KXZP*, vol. 6, p. 108; 'Kangxi, 02/04/54 (04/05/1715)', in *KXZP*, vol. 6, pp. 121–25. The original Kangxi words read, '西洋人到中國將三百年未見有不好處若是無大關從寬亦可'.
62. The term *yangchuan* 洋船 (ocean ships) was also used to designate ships in the domestic coastal trade, as well as the ships engaged in the junk trade with South East Asia in this period, meaning 'ocean-going ships'. This would answer the question of why the Hong merchants were called *yangshang* 洋商. For the use of *yangchuan* to mean 'domestic ocean-going ship', see, for instance, 'YZZP, Y 07/09/03(12/10/1725)', in *GZDYZC*, vol. 5, pp. 99–100 and 243. *Yangshang* was used to designate this group of Chinese merchants as far back as the Ming dynasty. Before the 1750s, European merchants were named mainly *xiyangren*. It was not, as Lydia Liu has argued, that a need to distinguish led to the Hong merchants being named *yangshang* (ocean merchants) while the Western merchants acquired the name *yishang* 夷商 (*yi* merchants); see Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 35–36. *Yi* became the main word for Europeans started in the 1750s. The linguistic distinction before the 1750s was between *yang* (ocean going) and *xi* (western), not between *yang* and *yi*, and after the 1750s between *hangshang* 行商 and *yishang*.
63. For *yangchuan* 洋舡, see 'Kangxi, 10/08/55 (09/25/1716)', in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 356; for *xiyangzi* 西洋字, see 'Kangxi, 15/06/59 (19/07/1720)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 703; for *xiyangwujian* 西洋物件, see 'Kangxi, 16/09/55 (30/10/1716)', in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 441; for *xiyangfalan* 西洋法藍, see 'Kangxi, 28/09/55 (11/11/1716)', in *KXZP*, vol. 7, p. 451; for *yangbu* 洋布, see 'Kangxi, 16/r6/60 (29/07/1721)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 822.
64. For *xiyangdaren* 西洋大人 and *xiyangjiaohuawang* 西洋教化王, see 'Kangxi, 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 268.
65. 'Yongzheng, 12/02/04 (15/03/1726)', in *YZZP*, vol. 5, p. 610.
66. 'Kangxi, 09/01/58 (21/031717)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 382.

67. For *chuanjiao xiyangren* 傳教西洋人, see 'Yongzheng, 29/10/02 (14/12/1724)', in *GZDYZC*, vol. 13, pp. 392–93.
68. For instance, *yichuan* 彝舡, see 'Kangxi 27/07/57 (23/08/1718)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 268; for *yiren* 彝人 and *yuanyi* 遠彝, see 'Kangxi, 09/01/58 (21/03/1717)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 38; for *yichuan* 彝船, see 'Yongzheng, 28/06/03 (06/08/1725)', in *SLXK*, p. 132; for *yi* 彝商, see 'Kangxi, 10/04/59(16/05/1720)' in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 668; for *yimu* 彝目 (headmen), see 'Kangxi, 15/05/58(02/07/1719)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 489.
69. For the last instance of the 彝 *yi*, see 'Qianlong, 11/05/20 (20/06/1755)', in *SLXK*, p. 190.
70. Liu has documented how the Chinese people on the street called Europeans 'devil' in the decades after China was defeated in the First Opium War and other wars; see *Clash of Empires*, pp. 99–107.
71. See Hunter, *Fan Kwae*.
72. For *xiyang yiren*, see, for example, *D-QZQQXYTZJ*, pp. 78–80, 85, 88, 91, 121, 160, 163, 166, 172, 236, 254, 364, and 384; for 'the uncultured of afar', see *SLXK*, vol. 10, p. 354.
73. For *yuanren* 遠人, see 'Kangxi, 11/07/61 (22/08/1722)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 912; for *waiguozhiren* 外國之人, see 'Yongzheng, 29/10/02 (14/12/1724)', in *GZDYZC*, vol. 13, p. 393; for *fanke* 番客, see 'Kangxi, 10/08/55 (25/09/1716)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 356; for *fanbo* 番舶, see 'Kangxi, 12/08/58 (25/09/1719)'; for *fanchuan* 番船, see 'Yongzheng, 20/04/04 (21/05/1726)', in *GZDYZC*, vol. 5, p. 828; for *xiyangchuan* 西洋船 and *yangchuan* 洋船, see 'Yongzheng, 20/04/04 (21/05/1726)', in *GZDYZC*, vol. 5, p. 828; for *yangchuan* 洋舡, see 'Kangxi 10/08/55 (25/09/1716)', in *KXZP*, vol. 8, p. 356.
74. PRO, FO 1048/17/54.
75. 'Qianlong, 11/10/20 (01/12/1755)', in *SLXK*, pp. 227–28.
76. 'Qianlong, 15/11/20 (04/01/1756)', in *SLXK*, pp. 228–29.
77. For Flint incident–related memorials and edicts, see *SLXK*, pp. 50–53, 62–68, 86–88, 107, and 164.
78. 'Qianlong, 25/10/24 (14/12/1759)', in *SLXK*, pp. 165–66.
79. For the Macartney-related memorials and court edicts, see Diyi Lishi Dang'anguan (ed.), *Yingshi Magaerni*.
80. For a narrative of the case, see Wood, 'England, China and the Napoleonic Wars'; and Chapter 6 of this book.
81. For the memorials, see *QDWJSL-JQ*, passim.
82. 'Qianlong, 25/10/24 (14/12/1759)', in *SLXK*, p. 166. See also 'Qianlong, 24/09/33 (04/11/1768)', in *SLXK*, pp. 225–26; and 'Qianlong, 21/02/34 (28/03/1769)', in *SLXK*, p. 469.
83. Fang, 'Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms'.
84. *The Analects*, 8:3. The original Chinese read: 夷狄之有君不如諸夏之亡也; translation adapted from Slingerland, *Confucius Analects*, p. 18.
85. *Yi* (彝) is now used as the name for an ethnic minority people from the south-west of China in the Yunnan region.
86. For examples, A-NGDKDA, 033544, 033617, 033720, 034133, 034511, 034532, 034540, 034659, 034723, 034814, 035055, 035854, and 201475.
87. A-NGDKDA, 039773-001 (1627), 035776-001(1655).
88. For other examples of the Ming's using of the second *yi* to name Europeans, see A-NGDKDA, 201523-001 (the Dutch), 201859-001 (the Dutch), 035749-001 (the Dutch), 034563-001, 201861, 034739, 033943, 201513, 201673. For other examples of the Qing's

use of the first *yi*, see A-NGDKDA, 038203, 037031, 150407, 03977, 037869, 038193, 132193, 119954, 277586, 074467, 072455, 149894, and 075790.

89. For examples, A-NGDKDA, 013033, 070473, 013939, 016268, 020536, 050961, 052242, 070478, and 194596.
90. For studies of Zeng Jing's case, see Spence, *Treason by the Book*, and Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 83–87.
91. Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 85–86.
92. For the edict, see A-NGDKDA, 127538, *Qing Shilu*, *Yongzheng*, juan 130, pp. 21–23. The original Chinese read, '窮鄉僻壤咸使聞知' and '將此等字樣空白及更換者照大不敬律治罪'. Lydia Liu saw the changes simply as a response to the Zeng Jing case (*Crash of Empires*, p. 85), but in fact this practice started in the early Qing.
93. *D-QZQQXYTZJ*, vol. 1, pp. 177–78; *SLXK*, pp. 353–54; PRO, FO 233/189, f. 10; A-NGDKDA, 075790, 076863, 077763, and 079383.
94. Chow, *Rise of Confucian Ritualism*, p. 8.
95. Lin, *Lin Wenzhong gong riji*, p. 442.
96. Hunter, *Fan Kwae*, p. 143.
97. Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp. 2, 8, and 16. See also 'Public Dinner at the British Factory', *Register* 5:2 (16 Jan 1832).
98. For the dinners, see Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp. 7–12.
99. For their luxurious items, see the advertisements in Canton English newspapers, especially from Markwick & Lane, who supplied the Canton foreign community with daily goods. For instance, in *Register* 2:10 (26 May 1829), 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:6 (17 Mar 1830), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 9:40 (4 Oct 1836).
100. For the Regatta Club, see, for examples, *Register* 3:16 (18 Aug 1830), 5:17 (3 Nov 1832), 5:18 (16 Nov 1832), 5:19 (3 Dec 1832), 10:28 (11 July 1837), 10:47 (21 Nov 1837), 8:45 (10 Nov 1835), 8:47 (24 Nov 1835), 8:49 (8 Dec 1835); *Press* 2:44 (8 July 1837), 2:45 (15 July 1837), 2:46 (22 July 1837), 3:11 (8 Nov 1837), 3:33 (21 Apr 1838), 3:37 (19 May 1838), 3:39 (2 June 1838), 4:9 (3 Nov 1838), 4:10 (10 Nov 1838), 4:12 (24 Nov 1838), and 4:11 (17 Nov 1838); also Hunter, *Bits of Old China*, pp. 276–80.
101. For instances of the report on horse racing, see *Register* 2:11 (2 June 1829), 3:12 (15 June 1830), 4:6 (17 Mar 1831), 4:8 (2 Apr 1831), 4:8 (2 Apr 1831), and 8:19 (12 May 1835).
102. See Chapter 6.

Chapter Six

1. Fay, *Opium War*, pp. 67–79; Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, pp. 51–62; Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*, pp. 40–62.
2. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 36.
3. For the 1820 anti-opium campaign, see *QDWJSL-DG*, juan 1, pp. 10–11.
4. For the debt issue, see Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, pp. 44–49; Pritchard, *Crucial Years*, pp. 199–212; Chen, *Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants*, pp. 24–29 and 192–211; Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 20–21; quotation from Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 44.
5. IOR, G/12/19, pp. 39–46; R/10/8, pp. 38 and 124; G/12/65 and G/12/66, throughout. 'Captain Panton's Memorial to the Viceroy', quoted from Pritchard, *Crucial Years*, p. 207.
6. The fund was the origin of the idea of modern deposit insurance. See Grant, *Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking*.

7. *Register* 4:1 (3 Jan 1831); see also Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 177.
8. For the petition and reply, see *Register* 2:21 (18 Nov 1829).
9. For the incidents, see Chapter 3.
10. For the petition, see *Register* supplement (18 Dec 1830) and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831).
11. *Register* 4:2 (17 Jan 1831).
12. *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831); see introduction.
13. For the dispatch of the man-of-war from India, see *Courier* 1:21 (15 Dec 1831), 1:22 (22 Dec 1831), 1:23 (29 Dec 1831), 1:24 (5 Jan 1832), 1:25 (12 Jan 1832), 1:26 (19 Jan 1832), 1:29 (16 Feb 1832), 1:30 (23 Feb 1832); and *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831), 4:24 (19 Dec 1831), 5:1 (2 Jan 1832), 5:2 (16 Jan 1832), 5:3 (2 Feb 1832). For a summary of the exchange, see Morse, *Chronicle*, vol. 4, pp. 286–91.
14. *Register* 5:13 (3 Sept 1832) and 5:14 (17 Sept 1832).
15. 'Right of Petition', *Register* 8:2 (13 Jan 1835).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., italics in original.
18. Ibid.
19. Pearson, 'Merchants and States', p. 106.
20. For Batavia, see Blusse, *Strange Company, Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*.
21. Headrick, *Power over Peoples*, pp. 63–64 and 83.
22. Wills, *China and Maritime Europe*, p. 29.
23. Blusse, 'Brief Encounter at Macao', pp. 657–60.
24. Wills, *China and Maritime Europe*, pp. 68–69; Andrade, *Lost Colony*, p. 43.
25. Wills, *China and Maritime Europe*, pp. 52–53, 45–46, and 72.
26. 'Instructions to Lt. Col. Cathcart, Nov, 30th 1787', quoted from Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 164.
27. 'Instructions to Lord Macartney, Sept, 8, 1792', quoted from Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 238.
28. Chen, 'Strangled by the Chinese and Kept "Alive" by the British'.
29. Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, p. 68. Another example was voiced by the EIC's inspector of teas Samuel Ball in 1816. Ball recommended the Select Committee in Canton to open a second port in China. See 'Observations on the Expediency of Opening a Second Port in China', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 6:1 (1841), pp. 182–21.
30. For archival records of the 1802 expedition, see IOR, G/12/195, pp. 208–45. For a narrative of the two cases, see Wood, 'England, China and the Napoleonic Wars'; and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 2, pp. 357–88. The two Portuguese missionaries were Alexander de Govea (1787–1807) and Joseph-Bernard d'Almeida (1728–1805). For the Chinese records of their petition, see PRO, FO 233/189, pp. 168–69.
31. IOR, G/12/195, pp. 246–47, and R/10/32; PRO, FO 233/189, p. 15.
32. IOR, G/12/195, pp. 246–47, and R/10/32; PRO, FO 233/189, p. 15; Fu, *Documentary*, pp. 343–44 and 369–77; Xu (ed.), *Da zhong ji*, pp. 213–36; Z-QGYGA, pp. 3698–827. For a narrative of the case, see Wood, 'England, China and the Napoleonic Wars'; and Morse, *Chronicles*, vol. 3, pp. 83–99.
33. *Register* 4:22 (15 Nov 1831).
34. *Register* 4:21 (1 Nov 1831), 4:22 (15 Nov 1831), and 4:23(1 Dec 1831).
35. For the petition, see *Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons*, p. 526. See also *Register* supplement (18 Dec 1830), and 4:2 (17 Jan 1831). The texts of the

two were slightly different. The quotation is from the *Third Report* because it is clearer. My thanks to Grace Spampinato for pointing out the difference to me.

36. 'Chinese Islands', *Register*, 10:1 (3 Jan 1837), 10:2 (10 Jan 1837), and 10:3 (17 Jan 1837).
37. Ibid. The other fifteen islands they reviewed were Haenan, Formosa, Loo Choo, Hong Kong, Namao, Tangsoa, Kinmun, Heamun, Nan-jih, Haetan, Taechoo, Chusan, Tinghae, Tsung-ming, Yun-tae Shan, Shan-tung, Quelpaert, and Bonin.
38. Lindsay, *Letter to Lord Palmerston on British Relations with China*, pp. 7–8. For an earlier discussion in Canton on taking possession of an island, see, for instance, 'Commerce with China', *Register* 6:4 (20 Mar 1833).
39. *Register* 7:51 (30 Dec 1834) and 8:2 (13 Jan 1835).
40. See Chapter 3.
41. *Correspondence Relating to China*, p. 406.
42. Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 213.
43. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 319; Liam D'arcy-Brown, *Chusan*, pp. 66–69 and 213–14.
44. Fay, *Opium War*, pp. 324–38.
45. Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, p. 1.
46. Lindsay, advertisement, in Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*. Lindsay called them northern because they were north to Canton.
47. Hsü, 'Secret Mission of the Lord Amherst on the China Coast, 1832'.
48. For Captain John Rees's opium-selling trips, see JM, MS JM/C13 (June 1839–Nov 1840, Letters to the China coast); for Gützlaff's account, see *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China*, p. 159. See also Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, p. 100. For a general account about Rees, see Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 141.
49. Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, pp. 8–9.
50. Ibid., pp. 190–91.
51. Lindsay and Gützlaff, *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China*, p. 131.
52. Ibid. See also Hsü, 'Secret Mission of the Lord Amherst', p. 248; for Gützlaff's account of Ma, see *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China*, p. 213.
53. Lindsay, *Letter to Palmerston on British Relations with China*, p. 4.
54. Lindsay, *Letter to Palmerston on British Relations with China*, p. 13.
55. Morse, *International Relations*, p. 262.
56. Martin, *China*, vol. 2, p. 82.
57. *Register* 7:52 supplement (30 Dec 1834).
58. 'What Steps Should the Expected Strength from England Take?' *Register* 8:14 (7 Apr 1835).
59. For the so-called Jardine Plan, see Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, pp. 191–95; Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, pp. 82–83; Fay, *Opium War*, pp. 190–95; and Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*, pp. 104–7.
60. Hansard, vol. 53, 7 April 1840, pp. 702–3.
61. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 105.
62. *Register* 8:8 (25 Feb 1835).
63. Ibid.

64. For the Glasgow, Liverpool, and Manchester petitions, see Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, pp. 121–28. See also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 553–69. For Liverpool's petition, see also *Register* 9:46 (15 Nov 1836); and *Press* 2:11 (19 Nov 1836).
65. Matheson, *Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China*, p. 1. For the authorship of this pamphlet, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 292n32, italics in original.
66. Gordon, *Address to the People of Great Britain*. Gordon's pamphlet was published by the same publishers as Matheson's: Smith, Elder & Co., which was Matheson's stationary supplier in London. The pamphlet was authored by A visitor to China; the *Register* points out that it was written by George Gordon; see *Register* 9:33 (16 Aug 1836). George Gordon went to China to find out the secret of tea planting and processing. Gordon's tea trips in 1834 and 1835 to Fujian Province were aboard the opium-selling ship of Jardine, Matheson & Co.; he was accompanied by two missionaries, Gützlaff and Stevens. For Gordon's tea trips, see Fay, *Opium War*, p. 205.
67. Goddard, *Remarks on the Late Lord Napier's Mission to Canton*, quoted from *Repository* 5:6 (Oct 1836), p. 250.
68. A Resident in China, *British Intercourse with China*, quoted from *Repository* 5:6 (Oct 1836), p. 253.
69. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 41. The *Press* stated that the petition was 'under the shield of Lady Napier to be presented to the king', *Press* 1:1 (12 Sept 1835).
70. *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836). The content of this article matches fully to the historical circumstances. Given the proud nature of Matheson, it would be beneath him to lie about the meeting. Thus I believe this record can be read as a faithful copy of the conversation took place. Matheson was dubbed as C.R. (Canton Resident). Matheson probably met Palmerston around 1 August; see JM, B1/10, f. 18. For Matheson's campaign in London, see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, p. 30.
71. *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836).
72. Melancon, 'Peaceful Intentions'. For Napier's personal belligerent attitude, see Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 35.
73. *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836).
74. *Register* 9:21 (24 May 1836), and 9:26 (28 June 1836).
75. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 189.
76. JM, C5/4, pp. 35–47; 'Memorial to the Rt. Ho. Viscount Lord Palmerston from the British Merchants', *Repository* 8:1 (May 1839), p. 32, 8:5 (Sept 1839), p. 266. See also Fay, *Opium War*, p. 190.
77. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 192. For the East India and China Association's petition to Palmerston, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 393–95.
78. 'Communication from Certain Merchants of London, Relative to Measures Adopted against China, 1840 (255)', *House of Commons Parliamentary Papers*, www. parlipapers. chadwyck.co.uk (consulted 3 August 2011).
79. JM, B6/10, L2240; see also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 386–87. For the East India and China Association's petition to Palmerston, see Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 393–95.
80. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 191.
81. Lim and Smith, *West in the Wider World*, vol. 2, p. 214.

82. For Bridgman's comment, see *Repository* 9:2 (May 1841), p. 296. See also Fay, *Opium War*, p. 210; Lindsay, *Is the War with China a Just One?*
83. Warren, *Opium Question*; Lindsay, *Is the War with China a Just One?*; Slade, *Narrative of the Late Proceedings and Events in China*; A Resident in China, *Rupture with China*.
84. For Jardine's letter to Palmerston, see PRO, FO 17/35 (26, 27 October 1839). For Jardine meeting Palmerston, see JM, B6/10, L2240 and 2251. See also Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 386–68 and 410–12; Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 102; Greenberg, *British Trade*, pp. 168, 170, and 191–95; Beeching, *Chinese Opium Wars*, p. 108; Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, pp. 82–83.
85. Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 83. See also Chang, *Commissioner Lin*, p. 194; Greenberg, *British Trade*, p. 214; Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 43–44n107 and 407n164.
86. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, p. 102.
87. Ibid., p. 105.
88. Brewer, *Sinews of Power*, p. 232.
89. Morse, *International Relations*, pp. 270–73 and 298–318; *Repository* 10:1 (Jan 1841), pp. 62–64.
90. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, Chapters 8 and 9.
91. For Hevia's discussion, see 'Opium, Empire, and Modern History', pp. 308–11. Hevia argued that the national honour argument might be plausible but it should not be taken as the major reason of the war.
92. *Press* 1:6 (17 Oct 1835).
93. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, Chapters 8 and 9.
94. Ibid., p. 88.
95. Ibid, pp. 88 and 139.
96. Ibid., pp. 88–95.
97. Ibid., p. 105.
98. Fay, *Opium War*, p. 194; Le Pichon (ed.), *China Trade and Empire*, pp. 390 and 477.
99. *Correspondence Relating to China*.
100. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol. 53, pp. 669–949; See also 'House of Commons', *The Times* (8, 9, 10 Apr 1840).
101. Melancon, *Britain's China Policy*, pp. 123–24.
102. *Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China*, p. iii.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid., p. 111; *Sussex Advertiser*, 18 May 1840.
105. *Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China*, pp. 1–36.
106. Tsang, *Modern History of Hong Kong*, p. 17.
107. For the treaties, see Inspector General of Customs, *Treaties, Conventions*, pp. 351–403.
108. For the extraterritoriality issue, see Cassel, *Grounds of Judgment*.
109. Webster, *Foreign Policy of Palmerston*, pp. 750–51.
110. For Palmerston's foreign policy, see ibid.

Chapter Seven

1. The only scholar who mentions in passing the anti-war movements is Melancon, in *Britain's China Policy*, pp. 117–18.

2. *The Times*, 28 February 1843.
3. *The Times*, 3 October 1844.
4. Ibid.
5. *The Times*, 22 November 1844.
6. *The Times*, 19 December 1844.
7. *The Times*, 23 December 1844.
8. Ibid.
9. *The Times*, 23 and 30 December 1844.
10. *Bradford Observer*, 26 December 1844.
11. *The Times*, 9 June and 26 July 1845.
12. 'Sir Henry Pottinger (3, 13, and 16 June 1845)', House of Commons Debates, Hansard, vol. 80, pp. 1384–85; vol. 81, pp. 476 and 614.
13. *Leeds Times*, 7 June 1845.
14. *Caledonian Mercury*, 16 December 1844.
15. *Hereford Journal*, 13 October 1841; *The Spectator*, vol. 13 (1840), p. 1085.
16. *The Morning Post*, 10 April 1840; *London Standard*, 10 April 1840; *Morning Chronicle*, 11 April 1840; *Northern Liberator*, 11 April 1840; *Staffordshire Gazette and County Standard*, 11 April 1840; and *The Spectator*, 11 April 1840.
17. William Jay, 'National Honor: A Plea for War', *The Advocate of Peace*, 4:10 (Sept 1842), pp. 225–30; *The Asiatic Journal*, vol. 33 (Sept–Dec 1840), p. 349.
18. *The Leeds Mercury*, 22 February 1840; *The Sheffield and Rotherham Independent*, 28 March 1840; *The York Herald and General Advertiser*, 29 February 1840; *Report of a Public Meeting and Lecture at Darlington . . . on China and the Opium Question* (1840); and Fry, *Facts and Evidence Relating to the Opium Trade*.
19. *Report of a Public Meeting and Lecture at Darlington*, p. 6.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. *The Spectator*, 25 April 1840.
22. *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1840.
23. *The Spectator*, 25 April 1840.
24. Ibid.
25. *The Times*, 25 April 1840; *The Morning Chronicle*, 25 April 1840; *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1840; *The Examiner*, 26 April 1840; *Caledonian Mercury*, 27 April, 1840; *Dublin Evening Mail*, 27 April 1840; *Taunton Courier*, 29 April 1840; *London Standard*, 30 April 1840; *Fife Herald*, 30 April 1840; *Bradford Observer*, 30 April 1840; *Bath Chronicle and Weekly Gazette*, 30 April 1840; *Essex Standard*, 1 May 1840; *Western Times*, 2 May 1840; *The Northern Star and Leeds General Advertiser*, 2 May 1840; *Northern Star*, 2 May 1840; *Bucks Herald*, 2 May 1840; *Sheffield Independent*, 2 May 1840; *Yorkshire Gazette*, 2 May 1840; *Leeds Mercury*, 2 May 1840; *Caledonian Mercury*, 2 May 1840; *Leamington Spa Courier*, 2 May 1840; *Birmingham Journal*, 2 May 1840; *Carlisle Journal*, 2 May 1840; *Westmorland Gazette*, 9 May 1840. Soon after the meeting in Freemasons' Hall, Earl Stanhope, in the capacity of the chairman the Total Abstinence Society of Cupar, presented his society's petition against the war to the House of Lords, which was also published by a number of newspapers. See *London Standard*, 12 and 13 May 1840; *Morning Chronicle*, 12 May 1840; *The Morning Post*, 12 May 1840; *The Morning Post*, 13 May 1840; *Leamington Spa Courier*, 16 May 1840; *Leicester Journal*, 22 May 1840; *Blackburn Standard*, 20 May 1840; *Fife Herald*, 14 May 1840; *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 15 May 1840; *London Standard*, 16 May 1840.

26. 'Shame on the honour of England', in *The Morning Post*, 2 December 1839; 'guilt' and 'national sin' in Montagu, *Voice for China*, p. 12; 'indignation' and 'unjust war' in *Hampshire Advertiser & Salisbury Guardian*, 11 January 1840 and 9 October 1841.
27. A Resident in China, *Rupture with China*, p. 27.
28. *London Standard*, 1 January 1840 (quoted from the *Morning Herald*, which means it was published in the last days of 1839). This is the earliest record of the designation 'opium war' that I have found. It is possible that there were earlier uses of the name in the London print media.
29. The pamphlet was entitled *Outlines of China, Historical, Commercial, Literary, Political* and was first published as articles in *The Atlas*. The quotation is from *Monthly Chronicle*, vol. 6 (1840), p. 118; and is in *The Asiatic Journal* 32 (1840), p. 285.
30. *The Asiatic Journal* 32 (1840), p. 285.
31. *The Spectator*, 28 March 1840.
32. *The Times*, 25 April and 1 May 1840.
33. 'War with China', Hansard, Deb, 7 April 1840, vol. 53, p. 716.
34. *The Morning Post*, 23 May 1840.
35. *Leeds Times*, 23 May 1840.
36. *Sussex Advertiser*, 11 October 1841.
37. *The Spectator*, 29 October 1842; *The Advocate of Peace*, 5:1 (Jan 1843), pp. 6–8.
38. *Freeman's Journal* (Dublin), 2 December 1842, italics added.
39. *The Spectator*, 2 May 1840.
40. Ibid. The opium compensation issue has been argued most effectively by Peter W. Fay; see *Opium War*, pp. 192–95.
41. 'Opium Seized by the Chinese', Hansard, Deb, 24 March 1840, vol. 53, pp. 6–12; 'Address to the Crown-Compensation for Opium Seized by the Chinese', Hansard, Deb, 17 March 1842, vol. 61, pp. 759–97. The five pamphlets are Warren, *Opium Question*; A Resident in China, *Remarks on Occurrences in China*; *Statement of Claims of the British Subjects Interested in Opium Surrendered to Captain Elliot at Canton for the Public Service*; *Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China*; and *Opinions of the London Press*.
42. *The Spectator*, 2 May 1840.
43. Edmonds, *Origin and Progress of the War*, p. 12. See also Ruskola, *Legal Orientalism*, p. 129.
44. *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1840.
45. *Freeman's Journal*, 2 December 1842.
46. *Hereford Times*, 3 December 1842.
47. 'Chinese War', *The Advocate of Peace*, 5:1 (Jan 1843), p. 8.
48. *Leeds Times*, 25 February 1843.
49. *The Morning Post*, 25 April 1840.
50. St. André, 'Sight and Sound', p. 70.
51. For works on Jesuit mission activities, see Brockey, *Journey to the East*. For their perception of China and its spread in Europe, see Mungello, *Curious Land*. For British perceptions of China, see Marshall and Williams, *Great Map of Mankind*; and Markley, *Far East and the English Imagination*.
52. *Register* 7:25 (24 June 1834), italics in original.
53. These perceptions are frequently printed in the *Canton Register*; see, for instance, *Register* 3:24 (4 Dec 1830), 3:25 (18 Dec 1830), 5:15 (3 Oct 1832), 9:1 (5 Jan 1836).
54. *Register* 7:17 (29 Apr 1834).

55. Markley, *Far East and English Imagination*, p. 90.
56. Marshall and Williams, *Great Map of Mankind*, pp. 22–23 and 85–86.
57. Anson, *Voyage Round the World*, pp. 518–19.
58. Marshall and Williams, *Great Map of Mankind*, p. 141.
59. Murray, *Letters*, p. 207. See also T. H. Barrett, 'The Opium War, by Julia Lovell', in *The Independent*, 7 October 2011.
60. The Catholic churchmen in the Philippines and Mexico also debated whether a war with China was a 'just war' given China's refusal to convert to Christianity and trade, and its punishment of Chinese converts. See Spence, *Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*, p. 44.
61. Kitson, *Forging Romantic China*; Porter, *Ideographia* and *Chinese Taste*; Hayot, *Hypothetical Mandarin*.
62. D'Arcy-Brown, *Chusan*, pp. 81 and 184.
63. Staunton, *Remarks on the British Relations with China*.
64. Bingham, *Narrative of the Expedition to China*, p. 2; *Bucks Herald*, 12 November 1842.
65. *The Spectator*, 28 March 1840; reprinted in *Yorkshire Gazette*, 4 April 1840.
66. *Northern Star*, 4 April 1840.
67. Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, p. xiv.
68. The other two translations were Chinese romance: *The Affectionate Pair* and *Chinese Courtship in Verse*; see Su, *Ma Lixun*, pp. 99–102.
69. Thoms' translations were published mainly in the *Monthly Magazine* and also in the *Asiatic Journal*.
70. *The Monthly Magazine*, May 1836, pp. 401–14.
71. Ibid.
72. *Overland Friend of China*, 23 August 1852. The author of this supplement according to Thoms was Medhurst. For John Frances Davis and Keying (Qiying 耆英)'s exchange on this, see PRO, FO 682/1979/92. See also Thoms, *The Emperor of China v. the Queen of England*, p. 32; Harris, 'Medhurst, Sir Walter Henry (1822–1885)'.
73. Thoms, *Emperor of China v. the Queen of England*, p. 16.
74. Thoms, *Remarks on Rendering the Chinese Word Man 'Barbarian'*.
75. Ibid., p. 21. Dilip Basu (in 'Chinese Xenology and the Opium War') accepted Thoms's incorrect assumption, and Lydia Liu in turn, based on Dilip Basu's research, assumed, though cautiously, that there were no complaints about the word *yi* or *yimu* before the Napier Affair (Liu, *Clash of Empires*, pp. 48–49). In fact, there were several confrontations before 1834, as shown in Chapter 5 of this book.
76. The seven staff were W. H. Medhurst, Dr Bowring, John T. Meadows, D. B. Robertson, Charles A. Sinclair, Henry Parkers, and W. H. Pedders.
77. *Overland Friend of China*, 23 August 1852; see also Medhurst, *Remarks Touching the Signification of the Chinese Character E*; Harry Parkes, *Observations on Mr P. P. Thoms' Rendering of the Chinese Word* 蠻 *Man*.
78. Thoms, *Emperor of China v. the Queen of England*, p. 6.
79. Inspector General of Customs (ed.), *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*, p. 419.
80. Allen, *Opium Trade*, p. 52; *York Herald*, 29 November 1856.
81. *Kendal Mercury*, 15 January 1853; *Lloyds Weekly Newspaper*, 16 January 1853; see also *A Letter to the Duchess of Sutherland and Ladies of England*.
82. For Ferrand, see Ward, *W. B. Ferrand*.
83. *The Morning Post*, 20 May 1850.

84. *The Morning Post*, 27 January 1852.
85. *London Standard*, 30 October 1858.
86. Wong, *Deadly Dreams*, pp. 458–59.
87. Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, p. 467.
88. *Leeds Times*, 10 January 1857; *London Standard*, 17 March 1857; *Morning Chronicle*, 22 January 1859; *London Daily News*, 9 February 1859; *Leeds Times*, 2 October 1858; *North Wales Chronicle*, 14 May 1859; *Newcastle Journal*, 22 October 1859; *Leeds Mercury*, 24 December 1859; *Lincolnshire Chronicle*, 13 January 1860; *The Morning Post*, 14 July 1860; *London Standard*, 14 July 1860; *Cork Examiner*, 18 July 1860; *Dundee, Perth, and Cupar Advertiser*, 17 July, 14 December, and 22 December 1860; *Leeds Intelligencer*, 3 November 1860; *Leicestershire Mercury*, 17 November.
89. 'China, Address for Papers', House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1861, Hansard, vol. 161, pp. 558–59; 'Commons Sitting, Indian Opium Revenue', 30 June 1893, Hansard, vol. 14, p. 597.
90. 'China, Address for Papers', House of Commons Debates, 19 February 1861; Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*.
91. 'Affairs of China, Resolution', House of Commons Debates, 31 May 1864, Hansard, vol. 175, pp. 918 and 933.
92. 'India and China, the Opium Traffic, Resolution', House of Commons Debates, 25 June 1875, Hansard, vol. 225, p. 575.
93. 'The Opium Trade, Observations', House of Commons Debates, 4 June 1880, Hansard, vol. 252, pp. 1248, and 1276; 29 April 1881, Hansard, vol. 260, pp. 1496 and 1513. 'Indian Opium Revenue', House of Commons Debates, 30 June 1893, Hansard, vol. 14, p. 596.
94. 'The Opium Trade with China', House of Commons Debates, 3 May 1889, Hansard, vol. 335, pp. 1178–79; 'The Indian Opium Traffic', House of Commons Debates, 10 April 1891, Hansard, vol. 352, p. 310.
95. 'The Indian Opium Traffic', House of Commons Debates, 10 April 1891, Hansard, vol. 352, pp. 326–27.
96. 'Sir A. Chamberlain's Statement', House of Commons Debates, 10 February 1927, Hansard, vol. 202, p. 384.
97. 'Shanghai Defence Force', House of Commons Debates, 16 March 1927, Hansard, vol. 203, p. 2139.
98. 'Lords Sitting Address in Reply to Her Majesty's Most Gracious Speech', House of Commons, Debates, 3 November 1971, Hansard, vol. 325, p. 129.
99. 'Hong Kong', House of Commons Debates, 12 June 1997, Hansard, vol. 580, p. 1043.
100. For the relations between Opium War and Chinese nationalism, see Lovell, *Opium War*, pp. 292–332.

Chapter Eight

1. Fairbank has studied the transformation from Canton system to treaty ports, but he did not take into account the role of knowledge making. Thus he identified it as a modernization process of opening up the closed China; see *Trade and Diplomacy*, p. 5.
2. Zheng, *Social Life of Opium in China*, p. 205; Sanello and Hanes, *Opium Wars*; Paulès, *Histoire d'une Drogue en Sursis: L'opium à Canton*; and 'Opium in the City'.
3. The seminal argument on Hoppo was in Fairbank, *Trade and Diplomacy*, pp. 49–50.

4. Fichter, *So Great a Proffit*, pp. 225–27.
5. *Press* 3:24 (17 Feb 1837).
6. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador*, p. 28.
7. Trocki, *Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy*; Baumler (ed.), *Modern China and Opium*; Brook and Wakabayashi (eds.), *Opium Regimes*; Slack, *Opium, State, and Society*; Paulès, *La Chine des Guerres de L'opium à Nos Jours*; and *L'opium: Une passion chinois*.
8. Hevia, 'Opium, Empire, and Modern History', p. 314.
9. Ibid., pp. 311–12.
10. Ibid., p. 311.
11. Wang, 'Merchants without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourning Communities'.

Glossary

baojia 保甲
baoshang 保商
bumei 不美

Chin Seang 陳相 (Chen Xiang)
chuanjiao xiyanren 傳教西洋人
Cohong 公行 (Gonghang)

dabujing 大不敬
Da Qing huidian 大清會典
Daxiyang 大西洋
Dayingguo 大英國
Dayingguo renshi lüeshuo 大英國人事略說
Deng Tingzhen 鄧廷楨
di 狄
Dinghai 定海
Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan 東西洋考每月統紀傳

Falanxi 法蘭西
fan 番 or 蕃
fanbo 番舶
fanchuan 番船
fangfan waiyi guitiao 防範外夷規條
fangfan yiren zhangcheng 防範夷人章程
fanke 番客
fanren 蕃人
fooyun 撫員 (Fuyuan)
Fuheng 傅恒

gai shang 該商
gai yi ziwai shengcheng 該夷自外生成
ganjie 甘結
gong 貢
gongsuo 公所
gouyin 勾引
guilao 鬼佬
Guangdong jiangjun 廣東將軍
Guangdong xunfu 廣東巡撫
Guangzhoufu 廣州府

Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志
hangshang 行商
hanjian 漢奸
Helan 荷蘭
Heshenguo shuo 合省國說
Heu Hing 許行 (Xu Xing)
Heu Tsze 許子 (Xu Zi)
hongmaogui 紅毛鬼
hongyi dapao 紅彝大砲／紅夷大砲
Hoppo 戶部 (Hubu)
huaji 話計
huangli 黃曆／皇曆
huantianyi 渾天儀
Huashengdun 華盛頓

huozhengchuan 火蒸船
huozhengche 火蒸車

ji 集
jianggugui 講古鬼
Jiaqing 嘉慶
jing 經

Kangxi 康熙
Kangxi zidian 康熙字典
Ke'erjishan 喀爾吉善
kurouji 苦肉計

Lanlun oushuo 蘭倫偶說
liangguang zongdu 兩廣總督
Liang Guofu 梁國富
Liang Tingnan 梁廷枏
Li Guanghua 黎光華
Li Hongbin 李鴻賓
Lin Huai 林懷
Lin Quande 林全德
Lin Xing 林興
Lin Zexu 林則徐
Li Shiyao李侍堯
Li Taiguo 李太郭
Liu Yabian 劉亞匾
Li Yongbiao 李永標
lu 虜
Lu Kun 盧坤
Luoyang 洛陽
Lüsong (呂宋)

Ma Lixun 馬禮遜
man 蠻
manyi 蠻夷
maoyi 貿易
Maoyi tongzhi 貿易通志
Meilige heshengguo zhilüe 美理哥合省國志略
Mencius 孟子 (Mung-tsze; Mengzi)
min 民
mingjun 明君
muhua yuanlai 慕化遠來

Naerjinge 納爾經額
Nanhai 南海
Napoliweng 拿破戾翁
Neiwufu 內務府

Pan Youdu 潘有度
Panyu 番禺
Ping'an tongshu 平安通書

qian 錢
Qianlong 乾隆
Qingfu 慶復
qinshou 禽獸

renyi zhi maoyi 任意之貿易
rong 戎
rouyuan 柔遠

sanshang 散商
Shangshu 尚書
Shao Zhenghu 邵正笏
shengcheng 生成
Shennong 神農
shi 史
Shun 舜
Siku Quanshu 四庫全書

taipan 大班 (daban)
Tengwengong 滕文公
Tianjin 天津
tianxia 天下
tidu 提督
timian 體面
tixu 體恤
tizhi 體制
tongshang 通商

tongshi 通事
tongshu 通書
tuyi 土夷

wai 外
waiguo 外國
waiguozhiren 外國之人
waiyi 外夷
Wang Shengyi 汪聖儀
Wangzhe buzhi yidi lun 王者不治夷狄論
Wei Yuan 魏源
Wen 文
Wu Bingjian 伍秉鑑
wu caineng 無材能
Wu Jinsheng 武進陞
Wu Qitai 吳其泰

Xiangshan 香山
Xie Wu 謝五 (Woo-Yay 五爺)
xiguo 西國
xiyang 西洋
xiyangdaren 西洋大人
xiyangfalan 西洋法藍
xiyang jiaohuawang 西洋教化王
xiyangren 西洋人
xiyangren lishiguan 西洋人理事官
xiyang shichen 西洋使臣
xiyangwujian 西洋物件
xiyang yiren 西洋夷人
xiyangzi 西洋字
Xu Jiyu 徐繼畬
Xu Xing 許行

yangbu 洋布
yangchuan 洋舡；洋船
yangjiu 洋酒
Yang Tingzhang 楊廷璋
Yang Yingju 楊應琚
Yapian zhanzheng 鴉片戰爭
Ye Duhua 葉櫝花
yi 夷
yi 彝
yichuan 彝舡 or 彝船
yichuan 夷船
yiguo 夷國
Yili 伊犁
yimu 彝目
yimu 夷目
Yinghuan zhilüe 瀛寰志略
yinshui 引水
yiqiu 夷酋
yiren 彝人
yiren 夷人
yishan 彝商
Yongzheng 雍正
yuan 遠
yuanfan 遠番
yuanren 遠人
yuanyi 遠彝
yuanyi 遠夷
Yue Fei 岳飛
Yue haiguan jiandu 粵海關監督
Yue Zhongqi 岳鐘琪

Zeng Jing 曾靜
Zheng Chenggong 鄭成功
Zhiguo zi yong dalüe 制國之用大略
Zhili 直隸
Zhongxiang 中祥
Zhou Renji 周人驥
Zhoushan 舟山
Zhu Guizhen 朱桂楨
zi 子
zishi fuqiang 自恃富強
Zi wai ji fu 子外寄父
ziwai shengcheng 自外生成
ziyou maoyi 自由貿易
zongbingguan 總兵官
zongshang 總商

Bibliography

Notes on sources

The main sources of this research are English-language newspapers, journals, and pamphlets; Chinese-language pamphlets and books published by the Canton foreign communities; and related Chinese and English archives. Most of the English newspapers are housed in the British Library (Colindale London) and can now be found in various online databases. The English pamphlets along with Chinese publications of the Canton foreign community were consulted in Cambridge University Library, SOAS Library, Oxford Bodleian Library, and Leeds University Library. Most of them are now also available on the Internet.

The letters and other official documents related to the East India Company are held in the British Library and the National Archives, UK (NAUK, Kew). Protestant missionaries' archives are in the SOAS Library, while most private merchants' related documents are in the Jardine Matheson Archives (Cambridge University Library).

Ming and Qing dynasty official documents that are held in the National Palace Museum and in the Academia Sinica can be accessed from their websites. There are also a good deal of the archives related to Canton that are published in various collections. I visited the First Historical Archives of China two times for unpublished official documents. The Hong merchants' communications with the EIC staff of Canton are housed in the NAUK, which also contains a good number of Qing official documents in the collection. I also used a few Jesuit collections housed in the Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana, Roma.

Abbreviations

A-NGDKDA—Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 中央研究院歷史語言研究所. *The Archives of the Grand Secretariat* (Niege daku dangan 內閣大庫檔案; www.ihp.sinica.edu.tw).

A-HJQWZLK—Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 中央研究院歷史語言研究所. *Scripta Sinica Database* (Hanji quanwen zhiliaoku 漢籍全文資料庫; www.hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw).

Courier—The *Chinese Courier and Canton Gazette*

DGMZ—Daoguang mi zou 道光密奏 [The secret edicts and memorials of the Daoguang emperor].

DGZP—Daoguang zhupi 道光硃批 [Edicts and memorials with the Daoguang emperor's vermilion comments].

D-QZQQXYTZJ—Diyi Lishi Dang'anguan 第一歷史檔案館, ed., Qing zhongqianqi xiyang Tianzhujiao zai hua huodong dangan shiliao 清中前期西洋天主教在華活動檔案史料 [Documents on Catholic missionaries' activities in China during the early Qing and mid Qing]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003.

EIC—East India Company

GZDYZC—Gongzhongdang Yongzheng chao couzhe 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 [Edicts and memorials of the Yongzheng period from the Palace Archive]. Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1979.

IOR—India Office Record, British Library, London

JM—Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library

JQZP—Jiaqing zhupi 嘉慶硃批 [Edicts and memorials with the Jiaqing emperor's vermilion comments].

KXCHWZPZZHB—Kangxi chao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian 康熙朝漢文硃批奏摺彙編 [Chinese edicts and memorials from the Kangxi period, with red vermillion]. Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1985.

KXZP—Kangxi zhupi 康熙硃批 [Edicts and memorials with the Kangxi emperor's vermilion comments].

Miscellany—Canton Miscellany

N-SGDZBZG—National Palace Museum Taipei—史館檔傳包傳稿目錄索引資料庫 [Database of biographical packets and drafts from the archives of the Ch'ing Historiography Institute] (www.npm.gov.tw).

PRO, FO—Public Record Office, Foreign Office, in the National Archives, Kew, London, UK

Press—The *Canton Press*

QDWJSL-DG—Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan 北平故宮博物院, ed., *Qingdai waijia shiliao: Jiaqing chao* 清代外交史料：嘉慶朝 [Qing foreign relation archival source materials: Jiaqing court], 1932.

QDWJSL-JQ—Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan 北平故宮博物院, ed., *Qingdai waijia shiliao: Daoguang chao* 清代外交史料：道光朝 [Qing foreign relation archival source materials: Daoguang court], 1932.

QLZP—Qianlong zhupi 乾隆硃批 [Edicts and memorials with the Qianlong emperor's vermilion comments].

Register—The *Canton Register*

Repository—The *Chinese Repository*

SDUK—The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge

SDUKC—The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China

SLXK—Shiliao Xunkan 史料旬刊 [Journal of historical source materials]. Taipei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1963; first published 1930–1931.

YZZP—Yongzheng zhupi 雍正硃批 [Edicts and memorials with the Yongzheng emperor's vermilion comments].

Z-QGYGA—Zhongguo guji zhengli yanjiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, ed., *Qinggong Yue Gang Ao shangmao dang'an quanji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集 [The full collection of archives from the Palace of the Qing on trade concerning Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao].

Dates of memorials and edicts

1. K29/10/02 (14/12/1724), for instance: "K" stands for Kangxi emperor's reign, thus K29/10/02 means the 29th day of the tenth month in the second year of the Kangxi emperor's reign. The dates in brackets are the responding dates of Gregorian calendar (dd/mm/yyyy).
2. "r" in the month means an intercalary month in the lunar calendar such as in Q25/r06/24—this indicates that there were two sixth months in that year and this was the second one.
3. Emperor's reign: D—the Daoguang; J—the Jiaqing; K—the Kangxi; Q—the Qianlong; Y—the Yongzheng.

Selected bibliography

Abu-Lughod, Janet L. *Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Agnew, John, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal Malden, eds. *A Companion to Political Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

Aihanzhe 愛漢者 (Karl Gützlaff, Elijah Coleman Bridgman, Walter Henry Medhurst, and John Morrison), eds. *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan* 東西洋考每月統計傳 [Eastern Western monthly magazine]. Canton and Singapore: 1833–1839; republished and edited by Huang Shijian 黃時鑒. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997.

Allen, Nathan. *The Opium Trade: Including a Sketch of Its History, Extent, Effects, Etc., as Carried on in India and China*. Lowell, MA: J. P. Walker, 1853.

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.

Anderson, Gerald. *Biographical Dictionary of the Christian Missions*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998.

Andrade, Tonio. *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Andrews, Alexander. *The History of British Journalism: From the Foundation of the Newspaper Press in England, to the Repeal of the Stamp Act in 1855*. 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley, 1859.

Anson, George. *A Voyage Round the World, in the Years MDCCXL, I, II, III*. London: Printed for the author; by John and Paul Knapton, 1748.

Antony, Robert, and Jane Kate Leonard, eds. *Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Appadurai, Arjun, ed. *Globalization*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2001.

———. *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

Arrighi, Giovanni. *Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century*. London and New York: Verso, 2007.

———. *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times*. London and New York: Verso, 1994.

Barker, Hannah. *Newspapers and English Society 1695–1855*. Harlow: Longman, 2000.

Barnett, Susanne Wilson. 'Protestant Expansion and Chinese Views of the West'. *Modern Asian Studies* 6:2 (1972): 129–49.

———. 'Wei Yuan and Westerners: Notes on the Sources of Haikuo t'u chih'. *Qingshi wenti* 清史問題 (*Ch'ing shih wen t'i*) 2:1 (November 1970): 1–20.

Barnett, Suzanne Wilson, and John King Fairbank, ed. *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Barns, Margarita. *The Indian Press: A History of the Growth of the Public Opinion in India*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1940.

Basu, Dilip K. 'Chinese Xenology and the Opium War: Reflections on Sinocentrism'. *The Journal of Asian Studies* 73:4 (November 2014): 927–40.

———. 'Ch'ing Documents Abroad: From the Public Record Office in London'. *Qingshi wenti* 清史問題 2:8 (1972): 3–30.

Baumler, Alan, ed. *The Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse than Floods and Wild Beasts*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007.

———. *Modern China and Opium: A Reader*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Bayly, Christopher Alan. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.

———. *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

———. *Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780–1830*. London and New York: Longman, 1989.

Bays, Daniel, ed. *Christianity in China, from the Eighteenth Century to the Present*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Beeching, Jack. *The Chinese Opium Wars*. London: Hutchinson, 1975.

(*QDWJSL-DG*) Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan 北平故宮博物院, ed. *Qingdai waijia shiliao: Daoguang chao* 清代外交史料：道光朝 [Qing foreign relations archival source materials: Daoguang court], 1932.

(*QDWJSL-JQ*) Beiping Gugong Bowuyuan 北平故宮博物院, ed. *Qingdai waijia shiliao: Jiaqing chao* 清代外交史料：嘉慶朝 [Qing foreign relations archival source materials: Jiaqing court], 1932.

Bellamy, Richard Paul, ed. *Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth-Century Political Thought and Practice*. London: Routledge, 1990.

Bello, David. *Opium and the Limits of Empire: Drug Prohibition in the Chinese Interior*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2005.

Bennett, Scott. 'The Editorial Character and Readership of the Penny Magazine: An Analysis'. *Victorian Periodicals Review* 17 (1984): 127–41.

Bethell, Leslie, ed. *The Cambridge History of Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Bhabha, Homi K. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge, 1994.

———, ed. *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge, 1990.

Bickers, R. A. 'The Challenger: Hugh Hamilton Lindsay and the Rise of British Asia, 1830s–1860s'. *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 22 (December 2012): 141–69.

———. *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832–1914*. London: Penguin UK, 2012.

Bingham, John Elliot. *Narrative of the Expedition to China: From the Commencement of the War to Its Termination in 1842*. London: H. Colburn, 1843.

Blake, Robert. *Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999.
Blusse, Leonard. 'Brief Encounter at Macao'. *Modern Asian Studies* 22:3 (1988): 647–63.
———. *Strange Company, Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1986.
Bonilla, Heraclio. 'Peru and Bolivia from Independence to the War of the Pacific'. In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, Vol. 3, edited by Leslie Bethell, 539–82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Bowen, H. V. *The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Brewer, John. *Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688–1783*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Bridgman, Elijah Coleman. *Brief Memoir of the Chinese Evangelist Leang Afa*. London: Religious Tract Society, 1835.
———. *The Death of the Righteous: A Funeral Sermon, Occasioned by the Death of the Right Honourable Lord Napier* (preached at Canton, 26 October 1834). Canton: Printed at the Office of the Chinese Repository, 1834.
———. *Description of the City of Canton: With an Appendix Containing an Account of the Chinese Empire, Chinese Weights and Measures, and the Imports and Exports of Canton*. Canton: 1834.
———. *Glimpses of Canton: The Diary of Elijah C. Bridgman, 1834–1838*. New Haven: Yale Divinity School Library, 1998.
———. *Mei li ge he sheng guo zhi lüe* 美理哥合省國志略 [A brief geographical history of the United States of America]. Singapore, 1838.
———. *Obituary of the Rev Edwin Stevens*. Canton, 1837.
Bridgman, Elijah Coleman, and Samuel Wells Williams, eds. *The Chinese Repository*. 20 vols. Macao or Canton, 1832–1851.
Bridgman, Gillett, ed. *The Pioneer of American Missions in China: The Life and Labors of Elijah Coleman Bridgma*. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1864.
Britton, Roswell S. *The Chinese Periodical Press, 1800–1912*. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1933.
Brockey, Lian Matthew. *Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China, 1579–1724*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
Brook, Timothy. *The Confusions of Pleasure: Commerce and Culture in Ming China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
———. *Geographical Sources of Ming-Qing History*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1988.
Brook, Timothy, and Gregory Blue. *China and Historical Capitalism: Genealogies of Sinological Knowledge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Brook, Timothy, and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
Brown, Lucy. *The Board of Trade and the Free Trade Movement, 1830–1842*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958.
Brown, Michael. *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015.
Bruce, Duncan A. *The Scottish 100: Portraits of History's Most Influential Scots*. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2000.
Buettner, Elizabeth. 'Haggis in the Raj: Private and Public Celebrations of Scottishness in Late Imperial India'. *The Scottish Historical Review* 81:212 (Oct. 2002): 212–39.
Burnham, James. *The Managerial Revolution*. New York: John Day Company, 1941.

Byrd, Cecil K. *Early Printing in the Straits Settlements, 1806–1858*. Singapore: Singapore National Library, 1970.

Cai Wu 蔡武. 'Tantan *Dongxiyang kao meiyue tongjizhuan*: Zhongguo jingnei diyi zhong xiandai qikan' 談談東西洋考每月統紀傳：中國境內第一種現代中文期刊 [Discussion the *East West Monthly Magazine*: The first Chinese modern journal on the mainland]. *Guoli Zhongyan Tushuguan guankan* 國立中央圖書館館刊, April 1969, 23–46.

Cain, Mead T. 'The Maps of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge: A Publishing History'. *Imago Mundi* 46:1 (1994): 151–67.

Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins. *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688–1914*. London and New York: Longman, 1993.

———. 'The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–1914'. *The Economic History Review* 33:4 (November 1980): 463–90.

Canton Miscellany. Canton: 1831.

Canton Press, The, ed. W. H. Franklyn (1835), and Edmund Molle (1835–1844), Canton, Macao, or Hong Kong, 1835–1844.

Canton Register, The, ed. William W. Wood (November 1827–February 1828), James Matheson & Robert Morrison (February 1828–1830), Arthur S. Keating (1830), and John Slade (December 1833–1846). Canton, Macao or Hong Kong, 1827–1846.

Cao Wen 曹雯. 'Qingdai Guangdong tizhi zai yanjiu' 清代廣東體制再研究 [Revisiting the Canton system of trade in the Qing dynasty]; first published in *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 2 (2006): 82–96.

Carroll, John. 'The Canton System: Conflict and Accommodation in the Contact Zone'. *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 50 (2010): 51–66.

———. *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Cassel, Kristoffer Pär. *Grounds of Judgment: Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth Century China and Japan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Chang, Hao 張灝. *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Searching for Order and Meaning (1890–1911)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Chang, Hsin-pao. *Commissioner Lin and the Opium War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Chang, His-t'ung. 'The Earliest Phase of the Introduction of Western Political Science into China'. *Yenching Journal of Social Studies* 5 (July 1950): 1–29.

Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

———. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Chen, (Anthony) Kuo-Tung 陳國棟. *Dongya haiyu yiqian nian* 東亞海域一千年 [A thousand years of the East Asia ocean]. Jinan: Shandong huabao chubanshe, 2006.

———. *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760–1843*. Taipei: The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990.

Chen, Song-Chuan, 'Chinese Narrator and Western Barbarians: Protestant Missionaries' Narrative Strategy in their Geographical Writings, 1819–1839'. In *Studies in Christianity and Chinese Society and Culture*, edited by Peter Tze Ming Ng and Wu Xiaoxin, 391–422. Hong Kong: Centre for the Study of Religion and Chinese Society, 2008.

———. 'An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton: The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China, 1834–1839'. *Modern Asian Studies* 46:6 (October 2012): 1705–35.

———. 'Strangled by the Chinese and Kept "Alive" by the British: Two Infamous Executions and the Discourse of Chinese Legal Despotism'. In *A Global History of Execution and the Criminal Corpse*, edited by Richard Ward, 199–219. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Chen Xulu 陳旭麓. *Chen Xulu xueshu wencun* 陳旭麓學述文存 [Essay collections of Chen Xulu]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990.

Cheng, Pei-kai, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan D. Spence, eds. *The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection*. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1999.

Cheong, Weng Eang 張榮洋. *The Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade*. London: Curzon, 1997.

———. *Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine Matheson & Co., a China Agency of the Early Nineteenth Century*. London: Curzon Press, 1979.

Ching, Julia, and Willard Gurdon Oxtoby. *Discovering China: European Interpretations in the Enlightenment*. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1992.

Chow, Kai-wing 周啟榮. *The Rise of Confucian Ritualism in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994.

Chng, David 莊欽永, and Zhou Qinghai 周清海. *Jidujiao chuanjiaoshi yu jinxiandai Hanyu xinci* 基督教傳教士與近現代漢語新詞 [Christian missionaries and modern Chinese neologism]. Singapore: Youth Book Co., 2010.

Chung, Tan. *China and the Brave New World: A Study of the Origins of the Opium War, 1840–1842*. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1978.

Clarke, John James, ed. *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Clayton, George A. *Jidu shengjiao chuban geshu shumu huizuan* 基督聖教出版各書書目彙纂 [Catalogue of Christianity publications]. Hankou: Shengjiao shuju, 1918.

Clunas, Craig. *Superfluous Things: Material Culture and Social Status in Early Modern China*. Cambridge: Polity, 1991.

Cohen, Paul A. *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti Foreignism, 1860–1870*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.

———. 'Christian Missions and Their Impact to 1900'. In *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 10, *Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911*, 543–614. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.

Colledge, T. R., and Peter Parker. *Address and Minutes of Proceedings of the Medical Missionary Society*. Canton: Chinese Repository, 1838.

Colley, Linda. *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

Collie, David. *The Chinese Classical Work Commonly Called the Four Books*. Translated and illustrated with notes, 2 vols. Malacca: Printed at the Mission Press, 1828.

Collis, Maurice. *Foreign Mud: Anglo-Chinese Opium War*. London: Faber and Faber, 1946.

Correspondence Relating to China: Presented to Both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty, 1840. London: Printed by T. R. Harrison, 1840.

Costin, W. C. *Great Britain and China, 1833–1860*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937.

Cranmer-Byng, J. L., ed. *An Embassy to China: Lord Macartney's Journal, 1793–1794*. London: Routledge, 2000; first published 1963.

Crawfurd, John. *Chinese Monopoly Examined*. London: James Ridgway, 1830.

Crossen, Cynthia. *The Rich and How They Got That Way: How the Wealthiest People of All Time—from Genghis Khan to Bill Gates—Made Their Fortunes*. New York: Crown Business, 2000.

Crossley, Pamela Kyle. *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

———. *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Crouch, Archie R. *Scholars' Guide to China Mission Resources in the Libraries and Archives of the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Curtin, Philip D. *Cross-Cultural Trade in World History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Daily, Christopher A. *Robert Morrison and the Protestant Plan for China*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013.

D'Arcy-Brown, Liam. *Chusan: The Opium Wars, and the Forgotten Story of Britain's First Chinese Island*. Kenilworth, Warwickshire: Takeaway, 2012.

Daunton, Martin, and Rick Halpern. *Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600–1850*. London: UCL Press, 1999.

Davis, John. *Chinese: A General Description of the Empire of China and Its Inhabitants*. London: C. Knight, 1836.

Davis, Walter W. *Eastern and Western: History, Thought, & Culture 1600–1815*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993.

Denemark, Robert A., Jonathan Friedman, Barry K. Gills, and George Modelski. *World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Derrida, Jacques. *Acts of Religion*. Translated by Gil Anidjar. London: Routledge, 2002.

Diyi lishi dang'anguan 第一歷史檔案館, ed. *Yingshi Magaerni fanghua dangan shiliao huibian* 英使馬嘎爾尼訪華檔案史料彙編 [The archival source materials of the Lord Macartney embassy]. Beijing: Guoji wenhua chuban, 1996.

(D-QZQQXYTZJ) Diyi lishi dang'anguan 第一歷史檔案館, ed. Qing zhongqianqi xiyang Tianzhujiao zai hua huodong dangan shiliao 清中前期西洋天主教在華活動檔案史料 [Documents on Catholic missionaries' activities in China during the early Qing and mid Qing]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003.

Downs, Jacques M. *Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784–1844*. Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1997.

Drake, Fred W. *China Charts the World: Hsu Chi-yu and His Geography of 1848*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.

———. 'E. C. Bridgman's Portrayal of the West'. In *Christianity in China: Early Protestant Missionary Writings*, edited by Suzanne Wilson Barnett and John King Fairbank, 89–106. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Duara, Prasenjit. *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

Durbin, John, ed. *Worlds Together Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World from the Mongol Empire to the Present*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002.

Ebrey, Patricia Buckley, ed. *Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook*. New York: Free Press, 1993.

Edmonds, John Worth. *Origin and Progress of the War between England and China: A Lecture Delivered before the Newburgh Lyceum, Dec. 11, 1841*. New York: The Lyceum, 1841.

Elliot, Mark C. *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Elman, Benjamin A. *From Philosophy to Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1984.

———. *On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Engelfriet, Peter M. *Euclid in China: The Genesis of the First Translation of Euclid's Elements Books I–VI* (Jihe yuanben, Beijing, 1607) *and Its Reception up to 1723*. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1998.

Facts Relating to Chinese Commerce in a Letter from a British Resident in China to His Friends in England and Remarks on British Relations and Intercourse with China. London: J. M. Richardson, 1829.

Fairbank, John K. ed. *The Cambridge History of China Late Ch'ing*, Vols. 10 and 11, *1800–1911*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

———, ed. The *Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.

———, ed. *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974.

———, *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969; first published 1953.

Fang, Weigui 方維規. 'Yi, Yang, Xi, Wai and Other Terms: The Transition from "Barbarian" to "Foreigner" in Nineteenth-Century China'. In *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*, edited by Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, 95–123. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

Farmer, Edward L. 'James Flint versus the Canton Interest (1755–1760)'. *Papers on China* (17) (1963): 38–66.

Farrington, Benjamin. *Francis Bacon: Philosopher of Industrial Science*. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1951.

Farris, Johnathan. 'Thirteen Factories of Canton: An Architecture of Sino-Western Collaboration and Confrontation'. *Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum* 14 (Fall 2007): 66–83.

Fay, Peter Ward. *The Opium War, 1840–1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975.

Feng Erkang 馮爾康. *Yongzheng zhuan* 雍正傳 [Biography of the Yongzheng emperor]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1985.

Fichter, James R. *So Great a Proffit: How the East Indies Trade Transformed Anglo-American Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Fletcher, Joseph. 'The Funeral Discourse Occasioned by the Death of the Rev Robert Morrison, Delivered before the London Missionary Society at the Poultry Chapel, February 19, 1835'.

Forbes, Robert Bennet. *Letters from China: The Canton-Boston Correspondence of Robert Bennet Forbes, 1838–1840*. Mystic, CT: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1996.

———. *Personal Reminiscences: To Which Is Added Rambling Recollections Connected with China*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1882.

Forman, Ross G. *China and the Victorian Imagination: Empires Entwined*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Forsters, John. *The Life of Charles Dickens*. London: C. Palmer, 1928.

Foucault, Michel. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

———. *Power/Knowledge: Select Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, and Kate Soper. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.

Frank, Andre Gunder, and Barry K. Gills. *The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?* London: Routledge, 1993.

Franklin, Benjamin. *An Account of the Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz., the Court of the Press*. 3rd ed. London: H. Colburn, 1818.

Fry, William Storrs, *Facts and Evidence Relating to the Opium Trade with China*. London: P. Richardson, 1840.

Fu, Lo-shu, compiled, translated, and annotated. *A Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations, 1644–1820*. Tucson: Published for the Association for Asian Studies by the University of Arizona Press, 1966.

Gallagher, John, and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade'. *The Economic History Review* 6:1 (1953): 1–15.

Gang, Zhao. *The Qing Opening to the Ocean: Chinese Maritime Policies, 1684–1757*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013.

Gao Mingkai 高名凱, and Liu Zhengdan 劉正埮. *Xiandai Hanyu wailaici yanjiu* 現代漢語外來詞研究 [A study on loanwords and hybrid words in modern Chinese]. Beijing: Wenzi gaige chubanshe, 1958.

Gelber, Harry G. *Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: England's 1840–42 War with China and Its Aftermath*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004.

Gerth, Karl. *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.

Girardot, Norman J. *The Victorian Translation of China: James Legge's Oriental Pilgrimage*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Goddard, James. *Remarks on the Late Lord Napier's Mission to Canton; in Reference to the Present State of Our Relations with China*. London, 1836.

Godwin, Christopher D. 'Writing Foreign Terms in Chinese'. *Journal of Chinese Linguistics* 7:2 (June 1979): 246–67.

Goody, Jack. *Capitalism and Modernity: The Great Debate*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.

Gootenberg, Paul. *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Gordon, George. *Address to the People of Great Britain: Explanatory of Our Commercial Relations with the Empire of China, and of the Course of Policy by Which It May Be Rendered an Almost Unbounded Field for British Commerce*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1836.

Grace, Richard J. 'Jardine, William (1784–1843)'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. 'Matheson, Sir (Nicholas) James Sutherland, First Baronet (1796–1878)'. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. *Opium and Empire: The Lives and Careers of William Jardine and James Matheson*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014

Graham, Gerald S. *The Chinese Station: War and Diplomacy, 1830–1860*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

Grant, Frederic Delano Jr. *The Chinese Cornerstone of Modern Banking: The Canton Guaranty System and the Origins of Bank Deposit Insurance 1780–1933*. Boston: Brill, 2014.

Great Britain Admiralty. *Papers Relating to the Proceedings of Her Majesty's Naval Forces at Canton*. London: Harrison and Sons for the Houses of Parliament, 1857.

Greenberg, Michael. *British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800–42*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Guo Menglang 郭孟良, 'Qingdai qianqi haiwai maoyi guanli zhong de jujie xianxiang' 清代前期海外貿易管理中的具結現象 [The phenomenon of guarantors in the management of overseas trade during the first half period of Qing dynasty]. *Zhongguo bianjiang shi yanjiu* 中國邊疆史地研究 [The history and geography of China's borders], 12:2 (2002): 89–95.

Guo Shuanglin 郭雙林. *Xichao jidangxia de wanqing dilixue* 西潮激蕩下的晚清地理學 [The later Qing geography, under the sway of the Western tides]. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2000.

Guo Tingyi 郭廷以. *Jindai Zhongguo shi* 近代中國史 [Modern Chinese history]. 2 vols. Taipei: Commercial Press, 1979; first published 1941.

Gützlaff, Karl Friedrich August. *An Appeal to Christians in Behalf of China*. Canton: Chinese Repository, 1833.

———. *China Opened, or a Display of the Topography, History, Customs, Manners, Arts, Manufactures, Commerce, Literature, Religion, Jurisprudence, etc. of the Chinese Empire*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1838.

———. *Dayingguo tongzi* 大英國統志 [General account of Great Britain]. Malacca: Mission Press, 1834.

———. *Gujin wanguo gangjian* 古今萬國綱鑑 [A brief history of the thousands of countries ancient and modern]. Singapore, 1838; reprint, Ningbo, 1850.

———. *Journal of a Residence in Siam: And of a Voyage along the Coast of China to Mantchou Tartary*. Canton, 1832.

———. *Journal of Three Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831, 1832 & 1833, with Notices of Siam, Corea, and the Loo-Choo Islands*. London: Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1834.

———. *Journal of Two Voyages along the Coast of China, in 1831 & 1832*. New York: John P. Haven, 1833.

———. *The Life of Taou-Kwang, Late Emperor of China: With Memoirs of the Court of Peking; Including a Sketch of the Principal Events in the History of the Chinese Empire during the Last Fifty Years*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1852.

———. *Maoyi tongzhi* 貿易通志 [General account on trade]. Singapore, 1840.

———. *Missionary Travels in China, to Distribute Bibles*. Bristol: Printed at John Wright's Steam-Press, 1839.

———. *A Sketch of Chinese History, Ancient and Modern: Comprising a Retrospect of the Foreign Intercourse and Trade with China*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1834.

———. *Wangguo dili quanji* 萬國地理全集 (or *Wangguo ditu quanji* 萬國地圖全集), [Complete geography of thousands of nations]. Singapore, 1839.

(*GZDYZC*) *Gongzhongdang Yongzheng chao couzhe* 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺 [Edicts and memorials of the Yongzheng period from the Palace Archive]. Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1979.

Habermas, Jürgen. *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity, 1989.

Hall, Henry. *America's Successful Men of Affairs: The City of New York*. New York: New York Tribune, 1895.

Hanan, Patrick. 'The Missionary Novels of Nineteenth-Century China'. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 60:2 (December 2000): 413–43.

Hancock, Christopher. *Robert Morrison and the Birth of Chinese Protestantism*. New York: T&T Clark, 2008.

Haneda, Masashi. *Asian Port Cities, 1600–1800: Local and Foreign Cultural Interactions*. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Hanes III, W. Travis, and Frank Sanello. *The Opium Wars: The Addiction of One Empire and the Corruption of Another*. Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2002.

Hao, Yen-p'ing 郝延平. *The Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The Rise of Sino-Western Mercantile Capitalism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

———. *The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Harris, C. A. 'Medhurst, Sir Walter Henry (1822–1885)', rev. T. G. Otte, first published 2004; online edition, January 2008.

Harrison, Henrietta. *Inventing the Nation: China*. London: Arnold, 2001.

Hayot, Eric. *The Hypothetical Mandarin: Sympathy, Modernity, and Chinese Pain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Headrick Daniel R. *Power over Peoples: Technology, Environments, and Western Imperialism, 1400 to the Present*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012.

———. *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Hevia, L. James. *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.

———. *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.

———. 'Making China "Perfectly Equal"'. *Journal of Historical Sociology* 3:4 (December 1990): 379–400.

———. 'Opium, Empire, and Modern History'. *China Review International* 10:2 (July 2003): 307–26.

———. 'The Ultimate Gesture of Deference and Debasement: Kowtowing in China'. *Past and Present*, supplement 4 (2009): 212–34.

Hillard, Harriet Low. *Lights and Shadows of a Macao Life: The Journal of Harriett Low, Travelling Spinster*. Edited by Nan P. Hodges and Arthur W. Hummel. Woodinville, WA: History Bank, 2002.

Hillemann, Ulrike. *Asian Empire and British Knowledge*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Hopkins, A. G. *Global History: Interactions between the Universal and the Local*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

———, ed. *Globalization in World History*. London: Pimlico, 2002.

Hostetler, Laura. *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Hsü, Immanuel C. Y. 徐中約. 'The Secret Mission of the Lord Amherst on the China Coast, 1832'. *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 17:1/2 (June 1954): 231–52.

Huang Guosheng 黃國盛. *Yapian zhanzheng qian de dongnan sisheng haiguan* 鴉片戰爭前的東南四省海關 [The customs of the four south-eastern provinces before the First Opium War]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2000.

Huang, Pei. *Autocracy at Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723–1735*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974.

Huch, Ronald K. *Henry, Lord Brougham: The Later Years, 1830–1868: The 'Great Actor'*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1993.

Hunter, William C. *Bits of Old China*. London: K. Paul, Trench, & Co., 1885.

———. *The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825–1844, by an Old Resident*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1882.

Huters, Theodore. *Bringing the World Home: Appropriating the West in Late Qing and Early Republican China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005.

Inspector General of Customs. *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*. Shanghai: Pub. at the Statistical Dept. of the Inspectorate General of Customs, 1917.

(A-NGDKDA) Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 中央研究院歷史語言研究所. *The Archives of the Grand Secretariat* (內閣大庫檔案; www.ihp.sinica.edu.tw).

(A-HJQWZLK) Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica 中央研究院歷史語言研究所. *Scripta Sinica Database* (漢籍全文資料庫; hanchi.ihp.sinica.edu.tw).

Jardine, Matheson & Co. *Jardine, Matheson & Company, a Historical Sketch*. Hong Kong: Jardine, Matheson, 1960.

Jenkins, Walter. *Bryant Parrott Tilden of Salem, at a Chinese Dinner Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944.

Johnston, Ron, and Paul J. Cloke, ed. *Spaces of Geographical Thought: Deconstructing Human Geography's Binaries*. London: Sage Publications, 2005.

Joseph, Gilbert M., Catherine C. Le Grand, and Ricardo D. Salvatore, ed. *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations*. Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1998.

(*KXCHWZPZZHB*) *Kangxi chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian* 康熙朝漢文朱批奏摺彙編 [Chinese edicts and memorials from the Kangxi period, with red vermillion]. Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1985.

Keswick, Maggie, ed. *The Thistle and the Jade: A Celebration of 150 Years of Jardine, Matheson & Co*. London: Octopus, 1982.

Kidd, Samuel. *China*. London: Taylor & Walton, 1841.

———, ed. *Tianxia xinwen* 天下新聞 [Universal gazette]. Malacca: Anglo-Chinese Press, 1828–29.

Kim, Hodong. *Holy War in China: The Muslim Rebellion and State in Chinese Central Asia, 1864–1877*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

King, Frank H. H., and Prescott Clark, eds. *A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers, 1822–1911*. Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1965.

Kitson, Peter J., *Forging Romantic China: Sino-British Cultural Exchange, 1760–1840*. Cambridge University Press, 2013

Klein, Thoralf, and Reinhard Zöllner, eds. *Karl Gützlaff (1803–1851) und das Christentum in Ostasien: Ein Missionar Zwischen den Kulturen* (Collectanea Serica). Sankt Augustin: Monumenta Serica, 2005.

Kuhn, Philip A. *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.

———. *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Kutcher, Norman. *Mourning in Late Imperial China: Filial Piety and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Laamann, Lars Peter. *Christian Heretics in Late Imperial China: Christian Inculturation and State Control, 1720–1850*. London: Routledge, 2006.

Lackner, Michael, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, eds. *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

Lackner, Michael, and Natascha Vittinghoff, eds. *Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

Lake, Peter, and Steve Pincus. 'Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England'. *Journal of British Studies* 45 (2006): 270–92.

Latour, Bruno. *We Have Never Been Modern*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Latourette, Kenneth Scott. *A History of Christian Missions in China*. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929.

Lay, George Tradescant. *The Chinese as They Are: Their Moral, Social, and Literary Character: A New Analysis of the Language; with Succinct Views of Their Principal Arts and Sciences*. London: W. Ball and Co., 1841.

Lazich, Michael C. 'American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China'. *Journal of World History* 17:2 (June 2006): 197–223.

———. 'Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China: The Canton Era Information Strategy'. In *Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China*, edited by Michael Lackner and Natascha Vittinghoff, 305–27. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

———. *E. C. Bridgman (1801–1861): America's First Missionary to China*. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000.

Leitch, Alexander. 'Green, John Cleve'. *A Princeton Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978; online edition (http://www.princeton.edu), accessed 10 May 2010.

Leonard, Jane Kate. *Wei Yuan and China's Rediscovery of the Maritime World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Leonard, Jane Kate, and John Watt, eds. *To Achieve Security and Wealth: The Qing Imperial State and the Economy, 1644–1911*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

Le Pichon, Alain, ed. *China Trade and Empire: Jardine, Matheson & Co. and the Origins of British Rule in Hong Kong, 1827–1843*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

A Letter to the Duchess of Sutherland and Ladies of England: In Reply to Their 'Christian Address' on the Subject of Slavery in the Southern States, Julia Gardiner Tyler, Harriet Elizabeth Georgiana Sutherland (Duchess of Sutherland). Richmond, VA: Southern literary messenger Press, 1853.

Levenson, Joseph. *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate*, Vols. 1–3. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬. *Guangdong Shisanhang kao* 廣東十三行考 [A study on the Canton Thirteen Factories]. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999; first published 1937.

Liang Tingnan 梁廷枏, ed. *Yue haiguan zhi* 粵海關志 [The customs history of Guangdong]. Canton, 1839.

Lim, Richard, and David Kammerling Smith. *The West in the Wider World: Source and Perspectives*, Vol. 2, *From Early Modernity to Modernity*. Boston: Bedford, 2003.

Lin, Man-houng 林滿紅. *China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.

Lin, Yu-Sheng. *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Anti-Traditionalism in the May Forth Era*. Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.

Lin Zexu 林則徐. *Lin Wenzhong gong riji* 林文忠公日記 [Diary of Lin Zexu]. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1962.

Lindsay, Hugh Hamilton. *Is the War with China a Just One?* London: James Ridgway, 1840.

———. *Letter to Lord Palmerston on the British Relations with China*. London: Saunders and Otley, 1836.

Lindsay, Hugh Hamilton, and Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff. *Report of Proceedings on a Voyage to the Northern Ports of China in the Ship Lord Amherst*. London: Fellowes, 1833.

Liu, Lydia H. *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making*. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2006.

———, ed. *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999.

———. *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900–1937*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Lobban, Michael. 'Brougham, Henry Peter, First Baron Brougham and Vaux (1778–1868)'. In *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. 7, edited by H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, 357–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004,

Lodge, David, ed. *Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader*. London and New York: Longman, 1988.

London International Exhibitions, Illustrated Catalogue of the Chinese Collection of Exhibits for the International Health Exhibition. London: William Clowes and Sons, 1884.

London Missionary Society. *Council for World Mission Archive, 1764–1940*. London: Library of the School of Africa and Oriental Studies, University of London, 2014.

Lovell, Julia. *The Opium War*. London: Picador, 2011.

Lutz, Jessie G. *Opening China: Karl F. A. Gützlaff and Sino-Western Relations, 1827–1852*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2008.

MacPherson, Duncan. *Two Years in China. Narrative of the Chinese Expedition, from Its Formation in April, 1840, to the Treaty of Peace in August, 1842*. London: Saunders and Otley, 1843.

Madancy, Joyce. *The Troublesome Legacy of Commissioner Lin: The Opium Trade and Opium Suppression in Fujian Province*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2004.

Mak, George Kam Wah. *Protestant Bible Translation and Mandarin as the National Language of China*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016.

Malcolm, Elizabeth L. 'The Chinese Repository and Western Literature on China 1800 to 1850'. *Modern Asian Studies* 7:2 (1973): 165–78.

Man-Cheong, Iona. *The Class of 1761: Examinations, State, and Elites in Eighteenth-Century China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Mann, Susan. *Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750–1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987.

Mao Haijian 茅海建. *Tianchao de bengkui* 天朝的崩潰 [The collapse of the celestial dynasty]. Beijing: Joint Publishing, 1995.

Marchant, Leslie Ronald. *Guide to the Archives and Records of Protestant Christian Missions from the British Isles to China: 1796–1914*. Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1966.

Marion, George. *Bases and Empire: A Chart of American Expansion*. New York: Fairplay Publishers, 1949.

Marjoribanks, Charles. *Letter to the Right Hon. Charles Grant, President of the Board of Control: On the Present State of British Intercourse with China*. London: J. Hatchard, 1833.

Markley, Robert. *The Far East and the English Imagination, 1600–1730*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Marshall, Peter James, and Alaine M. Low, eds. *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 2, *The Eighteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Marshall, Peter James, and Glyndwr Williams. *The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in the Age of Enlightenment*. London, Melbourne, and Toronto: J. M. Dent & Son, 1982.

Marshman, Joshua. *Elements of Chinese Grammar: With a Preliminary Dissertation on the Characters, and the Colloquial Medium of the Chinese*. Serampore: Printed at mission press, 1814.

Martin, Robert Montgomery. *China: Political, Commercial, and Social; in an Official Report to Her Majesty's Government*, 2 vols. London: James Madden, 1847.

Martin, W. A. P. *The Awakening of China*. New York: Doubleday, 1907.

Masini, Federico. *The Formation of Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution towards a National Language: The Period from 1840 to 1898*. Berkeley: Journal of Chinese Linguistics (Monograph Series, no. 6), 1993.

Mateer, Ada Haven. *New Terms for New Ideas: A Study of the Chinese Newspaper*. Shanghai: Presbyterian Mission Press, 1922.

Matheson, James. *The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China: Together with an Outline of Some Leading Occurrences in Its Past History*. London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1836.

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *The Communist Manifesto*. Translated by Samuel Moore. London: Penguin Books, 1967; first published 1888.

McCartee, D. B. *Xishi laiyi lüelun* 西士來意略論 [Sketch on the intentions of the Westerners]. Shanghai: Meihua shuguan, 1867.

McCulloch, John Ramsey. *A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical and Historical of Commerce and Commercial Navigation*. London: Longman, 1832.

McNeill, John Robert, and William H. McNeill. *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2003.

McNeill, William Hardy. *The Global Condition: Conquerors, Catastrophes, and Community*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.

———. *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

———. *A World History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Medhurst, Walter Henry (the missionary). *China: Its State and Prospects: With Especial Reference to the Spread of the Gospel*. London: John Snow, 1838.

———, ed. *Chinese and English Dictionary*. Batavia: Parapattan, 1842–1843; rev. Shanghai: Mission Press, 1847–1848.

———. *Desultory Account of the Malayan Archipelago*. Shanghai: Mission Press, 1849.

———. *Dili biantong lüezhuan* 地理便童略傳 [Geographical catechism]. Malacca: Anglo-Chinese Press, 1819.

———. *Dong xi shiji hehe* 東西史記和合 [A comparison history of the East and West]. Batavia: Mission Press, 1829; repr. Malacca: Mission Press, 1833.

———. *The Foreigner in Far Cathay*. London: Edward Stanford, 1872.

———. *Journal of a Tour along the Coast of Java and Bali*. Singapore: Mission Press, 1830.

———. *Journal of a Tour through the Settlements on the Eastern Side of the Peninsula of Malacca*. Singapore: Mission Press, 1828.

———. *Memorial Addressed to the British and Foreign Bible Society on a New Version of the Chinese Scriptures*. London: Hackney, 1836.

———, ed. *Texuan cuoyao meiyue tongjizhuan* 特選撮要每月統紀傳 [The monthly magazine]. Batavia, 1823–1826.

———. *Yaoluoba zonglun* 咬羅吧總論 [General geohistory of Java]. Batavia: Mission Press, 1824.

Medhurst, Walter Henry (consul). *Remarks Touching the Signification of the Chinese Character E 夷, Elicited by P. P. Thoms' Attempt to Shew that the Chinese Do Not Call Europeans Barbarians*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Register, 1852.

Melancon, Glenn. *Britain's China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National Honor, 1833–1840*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.

———. 'Peaceful Intentions: The First British Trade Commission in China, 1833–5'. *Historical Research* 73:180 (December 2002): 33–47.

Metzger, Thomas A. *The Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communication Aspects*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973.

Millward, James A. *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759–1864*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Milne, William, ed. *Cha shisu meiyue tongjizhuan* 察世俗每月統紀傳 [The Chinese monthly magazine]. Malacca: Mission Press, 1815–21.

———, ed. *Indo-Chinese Gleaner*. Vol. 1 (1818)–Vol. 3 (1822). Malacca: Anglo-Chinese Press, 1818–1822.

———. *Memoirs*: *Compiled from Documents Written by the Deceased, to Which Are Added Occasional Remarks, by Robert Morrison*. Malacca: Mission Press, 1824.

———. *Quandi wanguo jilüe* 全地萬國紀略 [Sketch of all the countries in the world]. Malacca: Anglo-Chinese Press, 1822.

———. *A Retrospect of the First Ten Years of the Protestant Mission to China: Now, in Connection with the Malay, Denominated the Ultra-Ganges Missions Accompanied with Miscellaneous Remarks on the Literature, History, and Mythology of China*. Malacca: Anglo-Chinese Press, 1820.

———. *Some Account of a Secret Association in China: Entitled 'the Triad Society'; Communicated by the Rev. Robert Morrison*. London: Royal Asiatic Society, Cox and Baylis, 1825.

Mokyr, Joel. *The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress*. Oxford: Oxford University, 1990.

Montagu, Horatio. *A Voice for China: Which Must Be Heard, Demonstrating That the War with China Arises Out of Our British National Opium Smuggling*. London: Nisbet, 1840.

Morrison, Eliza, ed. *Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison*. London: Longman, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1839.

Morrison, John Robert. *A Chinese Commercial Guide: Consisting of a Collection of Details and Regulations Respecting Foreign Trade with China*. Canton: Albion Press, 1834.

Morrison, Robert. *Chinese Miscellany: Consisting of Original Extracts from Chinese Authors, in the Native Character; with Translations and Philological Remarks*. London: S. McDowall for the London Missionary Society, 1825.

———. *Dialogues and Detached Sentences in the Chinese Language: With a Free and Verbal Translation in English. Collected from Various Sources; Designed as an Initiatory Work for the Use of Students of Chinese*. Macao: East India Company's Press by P. P. Thoms, 1816.

———, ed. *Dictionary of the Chinese Language*. Macao: East India Company's Press, 1815–1822.

———. *Familiar Lectures on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians*. Malacca: printed at the Anglo-Chinese Press, 1818.
———. *Horae Sinicae, Translations from the Popular Literature of the Chinese*. London, 1812.
———. 'The Knowledge of Christ Supremely Excellent: The Means and the Duty of Diffusing It among All Nations.' Being a Discourse Delivered before the London Missionary Society, in Surry Chapel, May 11, 1825.
———. *Memoir of the Principal Occurrences during an Embassy from the British Government: To the Court of China in the Year 1816*. London: 1819.
———. 'A Regard to the Affairs of Others: A Discourse'. Delivered at Hoxton Academy Chapel, February 6, 1825.
———. *View of China for Philological Purposes: Containing a Sketch of Chinese Chronology, Geography, Government, Religion & Customs, Designed for the Use of Persons Who Study the Chinese Language*. Macao: East India Company's Press, 1817.
———. *Weiguo shilüe* 外國史略 [A short history of foreign countries].
———. *Xiyou diqiu wenjian lüezhuan* 西遊地球聞見略傳 [A voyage round the world]. Malacca: printed at the Anglo-Chinese Press, 1819.
———. *Zhiguo zhiyong dalüe* 制國之用大略 [A sketch on the practicalities of policy making]. 1839? or 1840? (This could be written by John Robert Morrison.)
Morse, Hosea Ballou, ed. *The Chronicles of the East India Company, Trading to China 1635–1834*, Vols. 1–5. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926–1929.
———. *The Gilds of China, with an Account of the Gild Merchant or Co-Hong of Canton*. London and New York: Longmans, Green, 1909.
———. *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*. 3 vols. London: Longmans, 1910.
Mui, Hoh-cheung, and Lorna H. Mui. *The Management of Monopoly: A Study of the English East India Company's Conduct of its Tea Trade, 1784–1833*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984.
Mungello, David E. *Curious Land: Jesuit Accommodation and the Origins of Sinology*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1985.
Murdoch, John. *Report on Christian in China, with a Catalogue of Publications of 1882*. Shanghai: Hoi-Lee Press, 1882.
Murray, John. *The Letters of John Murray to Lord Byron*. Edited by Andrew Nicholson. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2007.
Nandy, Ashis. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Napier, Priscilla Hayter. *Barbarian Eye: Lord Napier in China, 1834; The Prelude to Hong Kong*. London: Brassey's, 1995.
Naquin, Susan. *Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
———. *Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
Naquin, Susan, and Evelyn S. Rawski. *Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
(N-SGDZBZG) National Palace Museum Taipei—史館檔傳包傳稿目錄索引資料庫 [Database of biographical packets and drafts from the archives of the Ch'ing Historiography Institute] (www.npm.gov.tw).

Needham, Joseph. *Science and Civilisation in China*, Vol. 1, *Introductory Orientations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954.

Needham, Joseph, and Francesca Bray. *Science and Civilisation in China*, Vol. 6, *Biology and Biological Technology*, Pt. 2, *Agriculture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Ogborn, Miles. *Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the English East India Company*. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007.

O'Sullivan, Ronnie Leona. 'A History of the London Missionary Society in the Straits Settlements c. 1815–1847'. PhD thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1986.

Owen, David E. *British Opium Policy in China and India*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934.

Oxnam, Robert. *Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Obio Regency, 1661–1669*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

The Opinions of the London Press Respecting the Amount of Opium Compensation Offered by Her Majesty's Government. London, 1843.

(*QDWJSL-DG*) *Qingdai waijiao shiliao: Daoguang chao* 清代外交史料：道光朝 [Historical source materials of Qing diplomacy: Daoguang period]. Beijing: Beiping gugong bowuyuan, 1932.

(*QDWJSL-JQ*) *Qingdai waijiao shiliao: Jiaqing chao* 清代外交史料：嘉慶朝 [Historical source materials of Qing diplomacy: Jiaqing period]. Beijing: Beiping gugong bowuyuan, 1932.

Qing Shilu 清實錄 [Veritable records of the Qing]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986.

Qingchao wenxian tongkao 清朝文獻通考 [Encyclopaedic histories of Qing institutions, 1644–1785]. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936.

Qin Guojing 秦國經. *Zhonghua Ming Qing zhen dang zhinan* 中華明清珍檔指南 [Guide to Chinese Ming-Qing precious archives]. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1994.

Quaison, Serafin D. *English Country Trade with the Philippines, 1644–1765*. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966.

Packard, Jerome L. *New Approaches to Chinese Word-Formation: Morphology, Phonology and the Lexicon in Modern and Ancient Chinese*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1998.

Pagden, Anthony. *European Encounters with the New World from Renaissance to Romanticism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.

———, ed. *Facing Each Other: The World's Perception of Europe and Europe's Perception of the World*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000.

———. *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995.

———. *Worlds at War: The 2500-year Struggle between East and West*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Parkes, Harry. *Observations on Mr P. P. Thoms' Rendering of the Chinese Word* 蠻 *Man*. Canton, 1852.

Paulès, Xavier. *La Chine des Guerres de L'opium à Nos Jours*. Paris: La Documentation française, 2013.

———. *L'opium: Une Passion Chinoise*. Paris: Éditions Payot, 2011.

———. *Histoire d'une Drogue en Sursis: L'opium à Canton, 1906–1936*. Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 2010.

———. 'Opium in the City (1923–1936): A Spatial Study of Canton Opium Houses'. *Modern China*, 35:5 (September 2009): 495–526.

———. 'In Search of Smokers: A Study of Canton Opium Smokers in the 1930s'. *East Asian History*, 29 (June 2005): 107–28.

Pearson, M. N. 'Merchants and States'. In *The Political Economy of Merchants Empires: State Power and World Trade, 1350–1750*, edited by James D. Tracy, 41–116. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Percival, Janet. 'The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 1826–1848: A Handlist of the Society's Correspondence and Papers'. London: The Library, University College, Occasional Papers, No. 5, 1978.

Perdue, Peter C. *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005.

Pfister, Lauren F. *Striving for 'The Whole Duty of Man': James Legge and the Scottish Protestant Encounter with China*, 2 vols. Frankfurt am Main; New York: Peter Lang, 2004.

Philips, Cyril Henry. *The East India Company 1784–1834*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1940.

Platt, D. C. M. *Finance, Trade, and Politics: British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.

Polachek, James M. *The Inner Opium War*. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992.

Pomeranz, Kenneth. *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Pomeranz, Kenneth, and Steven Topik. *The World That Trade Created: Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present*. London: M. E. Sharpe, 2006.

Pong, David. *A Critical Guide to the Kwangtung Provincial Archives Deposited at the Public Record Office of London*. Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1975.

———. *Shen Pao-chen and China's Modernization in the Nineteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Porter, Andrew N., and Alaine M. Low, eds. *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 3, *The Nineteenth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Porter, David. *The Chinese Taste in Eighteenth-Century England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

———. *Ideographia: The Chinese Cipher in Early Modern Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University press, 2001.

Pott, F. L. Hawks. *A Sketch of Chinese History*. Shanghai, Hong Kong, Yokohama, and Singapore: Kelly & Walsh, 1908.

Pritchard, Earl Hampton. *The Crucial Years of Early Anglo-Chinese Relations, 1750–1800*. Washington, DC: Pullman, 1936.

Purcell, Victor. *China*. London: Ernest Benn, 1962.

Rawski, Evelyn Sakakida. *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979.

———. *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China. London: Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 5 June 1840.

A Resident in China. *British Intercourse with China*. London: Edward Suter, 1836.

———. *Remarks on Occurrences in China, since the Opium Seizure in March 1839*. London: Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper, 1840.

———. *The Rupture with China, and Its Causes, Including the Opium Question, and Other Important Details: In a Letter to Lord Viscount Palmerston Secretary for Foreign Affairs*. London: Sherwood, Gilbert and Piper, 1840.

Review of the Management of Our Affairs in China, since the Opening of the Trade in 1834 with an Analysis of the Government Despatches from the Assumption of Office by Capt. Elliot, on the 14th Dec, 1836, to the 22d of March, 1839. London: Smith, Elder, 1840.

Rhoads, Edward. *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000.

Ridley, Jasper. *Lord Palmerston*. London: Constable, 1970.

Rubinstein, Murray A. *The Origins of the Anglo-American Missionary Enterprise in China, 1807–1840*. London: Scarecrow Press, 1996.

———. 'Propagating the Democratic Gospel: Western Missionaries and the Diffusion of Western Thought in China, 1830–1848'. *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica* 11 (July 1982): 251–72.

———. 'The Wars They Wanted: American Missionaries' Use of *The Chinese Repository* before the Opium War'. *American Neptune* 48 (Fall 1988): 271–82.

Ruskola, Teemu. *Legal Orientalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.

Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

Sargent, A. J. *Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

Sassen, Saskia. *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Saussy, Haun, ed. *Comparative Literature in an Age of Globalization*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

———. *Great Walls of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.

Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl, ed. *The Rise of Free Trade*. 2 vols. London: Routledge, 1997.

Schwartz, Benjamin. *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Secord, James A. *Victorian Sensation: The Extraordinary Publication, Reception, and Secret Authorship of Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Semmel, Bernard. *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Shattock, Joanne, and Michael Wolff. *The Victorian Periodical Press: Samplings and Soundings*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982.

(*SLXK*) *Shiliao xunkan* 史料旬刊 [Journal of historical source materials]. Taipei: Guofeng chubanshe, 1963; first published 1930–1931.

Silverman, Rachel Emma. 'Fifty of the Wealthiest People of the Past 1,000 Years'. *The Wall Street Journal*. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mill-1-timeline.htm. Accessed 6 December 2014.

Sivasundaram, Sujit. *Nature and the Godly Empire: Science and Evangelical Mission in the Pacific, 1795–1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Skinner, George William. 'Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China', Pts. 1, 2, and 3. *Journal of Asian Studies* 24:1 (November 1964): 3–44; 24:2 (February 1965): 195–228; 24:3 (May 1965): 363–99.

Slack, Edward R. *Opium, State, and Society: China's Narco-economy and the Guomindang, 1924–1937*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.

Slade, John. *Narrative of the Late Proceedings and Events in China*. Canton: Canton Register Press, 1839.

———. *Notices on the British Trade to the Port of Canton; with Some Translations of Chinese Official Papers Relative to That Trade*. London: Smith, Elder and Co, 1830.

Slingerland, Edward, ed. *Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 2003.

Smith, Adam. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776.

Smith, Harold. *The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge 1826–1846: A Social and Bibliographical Evaluation*. Halifax: School of Library Service, University Libraries, Dalhousie University, 1974.

Smith, Richard J. *Chinese Maps: Images of 'All under Heaven'*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

———. *Mapping China and Managing the World: Culture, Cartography and Cosmology in Late Imperial Times*. London: Routledge, 2013.

Sparke, Matthew. *In the Space of Theory: Postfoundational Geographies of the Nation-State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005.

Spence, Jonathan D. *The China Helpers: Western Advisers in China, 1620–1960*. London: Bodley Head, 1969.

———. *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution 1895–1980*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981.

———. *The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1984.

———. *The Search for Modern China*. London: Hutchinson, 1990.

———. *Treason by the Book*. New York: Viking, 2001.

Spence, Jonathan D., and John E. Wills, eds. *From Ming to Ch'ing: Conquest, Region and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century China*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

St. André, James, 'Sight and Sound: Representing the Chinese Language, 1630–1740'. In *The Chinese Chameleon Revisited: From the Jesuits to Zhang Yimou*, edited by Yangwen Zheng, 61–84. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014.

Standaert, Nicolas, ed. *Handbook of Christianity in China*, Vol. 1, *635–1800*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001.

Statement of Claims of the British Subjects Interested in Opium Surrendered to Captain Elliot at Canton for the Public Service. London: Pelham Richardson, 1840.

Statistical Department of the Inspectorate of Customs. *Treaties, Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States*. New York: AMS Press, 1973; first published 1917 in Shanghai.

Staunton, George Thomas. *Memoirs of the Chief Incidents of the Public Life of Sir George Thomas Staunton*. London: L. Booth, 1856.

———. *Notes of Proceedings and Occurrences during the British Embassy to Peking in 1816*. London: printed by H Skelton, 1824.

———. *Remarks on the British Relations with China*. London: E. Lloyd, 1836.

Stokes, Eric. *The English Utilitarians and India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Struve, Lynn A., ed. *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Su, Ching (Su Jing) 蘇精. *Ma Lixun yu Zhongwen yinshua chuban* 馬禮遜與中文印刷出版 [Robert Morrison and Chinese printing]. Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 2000.

———. 'The Printing Presses of the London Missionary Society among the Chinese'. PhD thesis, School of Library and Information Studies, University of London, 1996.

———. *Shangdi de renma: shijiu shiji zai hua chuanjiaoshi de zuowei* 上帝的人馬：十九世紀在華傳教士的作為 [The foot soldiers of God: The deed of the missionaries in China in the nineteenth century]. Hong Kong: Jidujiao Zhongguo zongjiao wenhua yanjiushe, 2006.

———. *Zhongguo kaimen: Ma Lixun ji xiangguan renwu yanjiu* 中國開門：馬禮遜及相關人物研究 [China opening up: A study on Robert Morrison and other people]. Hong Kong: Jidujiao Zhongguo zongjiao wenhua yanjiushe, 2005.

Sun, Ge. 'How Does Asia Mean?' *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 1:1 and 1:2 (2000): 13–47; 319–41.

Sun, Shangyang 孫尚揚 and Zhong Mingdan 鍾鳴旦 (Nicolas Standaert). *1840 nian qian de Zhongguo jidujiao* 1840 年前的中國基督教 [Christianity in China before 1840]. Beijing: Xueyun chubanshe, 2004.

Teng, Ssu-yü 鄧嗣禹. *Chang Hsi and the Treaty of Nanking*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944.

Teng, Ssu-yü, and John K. Fairbank, eds. *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1932*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Third Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons, Appointed to Enquire into the Present State of the Affairs of the East-India Company, Together with the Minutes of Evidence, Accounts and Papers Laid before the Committee, and an Index. London: Printed by order of the Honourable Court of Directors, 1832.

Thompson, George. *Report of a Public Meeting and Lecture at Darlington . . . on China and the Opium Question*. Durham: Printed by J. H. Veitch, 1840.

Thoms, Peter Perring. *The Affectionate Pair, or the History of Sung-Kin: A Chinese Tale*. London: Printed for Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1820.

———. *Chinese Courtship in Verse; to Which Is Added an Appendix, Treating of the Revenue of China, &c &c. . . .* London: Parbury, 1824.

———. *A Dissertation on the Ancient Chinese Vases of the Shang Dynasty from 1743 to 1496 B.C.: Illustrated with Forty-Two Chinese Wood Engravings*. London: Author, 1851.

———. *The Emperor of China v. the Queen of England; a Refutation of the Arguments Contained in the Seven Official Documents Transmitted by Her Majesty's Government at Hong-Kong*. London: P. P. Thoms, 1853.

———. *The Present Position and Prospects of Our Trade with China*. London, 1836.

———. 'The Present Position and Prospects of Our Trade with China'. *Monthly Magazine*, no. 5 (1836): 401–14.

———. *Remarks on Rendering the Chinese Word Man 'Barbarian', Showing That the Chinese Do Not Call Europeans Barbarians*. London, 1851.

Tomlin, Jacob. *Missionary Journals and Letters: Written during Eleven Years' Residence and Travels amongst the Chinese, Siamese, Javanese, Khassias, and Other Eastern Nations*. London: James Nisbet and Co., 1844.

Torbert, Preston M. *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662–1796*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Trocki, Carl A. *Opium, Empire, and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750–1950*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Tsang, Steve. *A Modern History of Hong Kong*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

Tsao, Ting Man. 'Representing China to the British Public in the Age of Free Trade, c. 1833–1844'. PhD dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2000.

———. 'Representing "Great England" to Qing China in the Age of Free Trade Imperialism: The Circulation of a Tract by Charles Marjoribanks on the China Coast'. *Political Matters* 33 (2005): 178–95.

Turner, Frederick Storrs. *British Opium Policy in China and India*. London: S. Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1876.

Van de Ven, Hans. 'The Onrush of Modern Globalization in China'. In *Globalization in World History*, edited by A. G. Hopkins, 167–95. London: Pimlico, 2002.

Van Dyke, Paul A. *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700–1845*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005.

———. *Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-Century Chinese Trade*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011.

Wakeman, Frederic. *The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China*, 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

———. *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839–1861*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Waley-Cohen, Joanna. *Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758–1820*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization*. London: Verso, 1995.

———. *The Modern World-System*, Vol. 1, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

———. *The Modern World-System*, Vol. 2, *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750*. New York: Academic Press, 1980.

———. *The Modern World-System*, Vol. 3, *The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s*. San Diego: Academic Press, 1989.

———. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004.

Wang, Chen-main. *The Life and Career of Hung Ch'eng-ch'ou (1593–1665): Public Service in a Time of Dynastic Change*. Association for Asian Studies Monograph. Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies, 2000.

Wang, David Der-wei, and Shang Wei, eds. *Dynastic Crisis and Cultural Innovation: From the Late Ming to the Late Qing and Beyond*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2005.

Wang, Gungwu. *Anglo-Chinese Encounters since 1800: War, Trade, Science and Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

———. 'Merchants without Empire: The Hokkien Sojourning Communities'. In *The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750*, edited by James D. Tracy, 400–422. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Wang Jiajian 王家儉. '19 shiji xifang shidi zhishi de jieshao ji qi yingxiang' 十九世紀西方史地知識的介紹及其影響 [The introduction and impact of the Western geo-historical knowledge in the nineteenth century]. *Daluzazhi* 大陸雜誌 [Journal of the Mainland] 38:6 (June 1963): 14–24.

Wang Rigen 王日根. *Ming Qing haijiang zhengce yu Zhongguo shehui fazhan* 明清海疆政策與中國社會發展 [The development of Chinese society and the coastal frontier policy in the Ming and Qing]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 2006.

Wang Wei 王薇, et al. *Kangxi huangdi quan zhuan* 康熙皇帝全傳 [Biography of the Kangxi emperor]. Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 1994.

Wang, Wensheng. *White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates: Crisis and Reform in the Qing Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Ward, John Towers. *W. B. Ferrand: The Working Man's Friend, 1809–89*. East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2002.

Warren, Samuel. *The Opium Question*. London: James Ridgway, 1840.

Watt, John R. *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

Webster, Anthony. *The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 1790–1860*. Woodbridge and Rochester: The Boydell Press, 2009.

Webster, Charles Kingsley. *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830–1841: Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*. London, G. Bell, 1951.

Wheaton, Henry. *Elements of International Law*. London: B. Fellowes, 1866.

White, Lynn Jr. *Medieval Technology and Social Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

Wilkinson, Endymion Porter. *Chinese History: A Manual*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1998.

———. 'Chinese Merchant Manuals and Route Books'. *Qingshi wenti* 清史問題 2:9 (1973): 8–34.

Will, Pierre-Étienne, R. Bin Wong, and James Lee. *Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650–1850*. Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1991.

Williams, Samuel Wells. *The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Education, Social Life, Arts, Religion, etc., of the Chinese Empire and Its Inhabitants*, 2 vols. New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1848.

Williamson, A. Robert. *Eastern Traders: Some Men and Ships of Jardine, Matheson & Company and Their Contemporaries in the East India Company's Maritime Service; A Collection of Articles*. Ipswich: Hadden Best, 1975.

Wills, John E. *China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

———. 'European Consumption of Asian Production in the 17th and 18th Centuries'. In *Consumption and the World of Goods*, edited by John Brewer and Roy Porter, 133–47. London: Routledge, 1993.

———. 'Maritime Europe and the Ming'. In *China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800*, edited by John E. Wills, 24–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

———. 'Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Qing Dynasty Foreign Relations'. *The American Neptune* 48 (Fall 1988): 225–29.

Wilson, Kathleen, ed. *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Wong, J. Y. *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856–1860) in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Wood, Denis, with John Fels. *The Power of Maps*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Wood, Herbet, J. 'England, China and the Napoleonic Wars'. *Pacific Historical Review* (1940): 139–56.

Wood, William W., ed. *The Chinese Courier and Canton Gazette*. Canton, 1831–1833.

Wright, F. Arthur. 'The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas'. In *Studies in Chinese Thought*, edited by Arthur F. Wright, 288–93. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Wylie, Alexander. *Memorials of Protestant Missionaries to the Chinese, Giving a List of Their Publications, and Obituary Notices of the Deceased, with Copious Indexes of 1867*. American Presbyterian Press; repr. Taipei: Cheng wen Publishing Company, 1967.

Xiong, Yuezhi 熊月之. 'Liberty, Democracy, President: The Translation and Usage of Some Political Terms in Late Qing China'. In *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*, edited by Michael Lackner, Iwo Amelung, and Joachim Kurtz, 69–93. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

———. *Xixue dongjian yu wan Qing shehui* 西學東漸與晚清社會 [The eastwards diffusion of Western knowledge, and the late Qing society]. Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994.

Xu Dishan 許地山, ed. *Da zhong ji* 達衷集 [Arriving at the inner truth]. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1931.

Xujiahui cangshulou Ming Qing Tianzhujiao wenxian 徐家匯藏書樓明清天主教文獻 [Archives of Catholicism in Ming-Qing China from the Hsu-chia-hui Repository of Books], compiled and edited by Nicolas Standaert, Ad Dudink, Yi-long Huang, and Pingyi Chu. Taipei: Fu-ren University Divinity School, 1996.

Yang, C. K. *Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.

Zaret, David. *Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-Modern England*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Zhang Xi 張喜. '*Fuyi riji*' 撫夷日記 [Journal of pacifying the yi]. In *Yapian zhanzheng* 鴉片戰爭 [The First Opium War]. Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguang she, 1954.

Zhang Zuoliang 張佐良 'Cong Hezhou shibian kan Qianlong chao minbian de zhengfu duice' 從河州事變看乾隆朝民變的政府對策 [Understanding Qianlong government's policy on rebellion: The Hezhou case]. First published in *Xueshu yanjiu* 學術研究 [Academic Research] 11 (2007): 110–15.

Zheng, Yangwen. *The Social Life of Opium in China, 1483–1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

(Z-QGYGA) Zhongguo guji zhengli yanjiu hui 中國古籍整理研究會, ed. *Qinggong Yue Gang Ao shangmao dang'an quanji* 清宮粵港澳商貿檔案全集 [The full collection of archives from the Palace of the Qing on trade concerning Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao]. Beijing: Zhongguo shudian, 2002.

Zhong Shuhe 鍾叔河. *Zouxiang shijie: Jindai Zhongguo zhishi fenzi kaocha xifang de lishi* 走向世界：近代中國知識分子考察西方的歷史 [Towards the world: A study on how the modern Chinese intellectual understood the history of the West]. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2000.

Zou, Zhenhuan 鄒振環. *Wan Qing xifang dilixue zai Zhongguo* 晚清西方地理學在中國 [Western geography in China during the later Qing]. Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2000.

Index

References to charts are denoted using *c*.