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

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

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In the Middle East, oil wealth has made monarchs and politicians strong and kept citizens weak. Even the Arab uprisings this year have failed to change that.

Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?

Democracy and the Resource Curse

Michael L. Ross

Even before this year's Arab uprisings, the Middle East was not an undifferentiated block of authoritarianism. The citizens of countries with little or no oil, such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, generally had more freedom than those of countries with lots of it, such as Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. And once the tumult started, the oil-rich regimes were more effective at fending off attempts to unseat them. Indeed, the Arab Spring has seriously threatened just one oil-funded ruler—Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi—and only because NATO's intervention prevented the rebels' certain defeat.

Worldwide, democracy has made impressive strides over the last three decades: just 30 percent of the world's governments were democratic in 1980; about 60 percent are today. Yet almost all the democratic governments that emerged during that period were in countries with little or no oil; in fact, countries that produced less than $100 per capita of oil per year (about what Ukraine and Vietnam produce) were three times as likely to democratize as countries that produced more than that. No country with more than a fraction of the per capita oil wealth of Bahrain, Iraq, or Libya has ever successfully gone from dictatorship to democracy. Scholars have called this the oil curse, arguing that oil wealth leads to authoritarianism, economic instability, corruption, and violent conflict. Skeptics claim that the correlation between oil and repression is a coincidence. As Dick Cheney, then the CEO of Haliburton, remarked at a 1996 energy conference, "The problem is that the good Lord didn't see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments."

But divine intervention did not cause repression in the Middle East: hydrocarbons did. There is no getting around the fact that countries in the region are less free because they produce and sell oil.

OIL'S DIRTY SECRETS

Oil has not always been a barrier to democracy. Until the early 1970s, oil-producing countries were no less likely

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to be democratic than any other state. Ironically, this was because until that point, the so-called Seven Sisters, a handful of giant Western oil companies, dominated the global oil industry and collected most of its profits. This meant that the governments of countries with a lot of oil had no more funding, and no more power over their citizens, than the governments of countries without oil.

Starting in the 1960s and early 1970s, however, all this began to change. First, the Seven Sisters lost their stranglehold on the global oil market due to the rise of independent oil companies such as Getty Oil, Standard Oil of Ohio, and the Italian state-owned Eni. Meanwhile, oil-exporting states banded together to create the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, which boosted their leverage over the old and new companies. These developments, along with the Arab oil embargo that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, caused oil prices to jump from $2.50 a barrel in 1972 to about $12 a barrel in 1974. Eager to capture the resulting windfalls, virtually all developing countries expropriated the foreign oil companies operating on their soil and set up national oil companies to manage them.

These nationalizations brought with them massive influxes of new wealth and so were hugely popular; they made the careers of many politicians. Shortly after coming to power in a 1969 military coup, for example, Qaddafi began to nationalize his country's oil industry, which gave him control over a flood of revenue. He then spent it funding his revolutionary agenda and buying off powerful tribal chiefs who might otherwise have been a threat to his rule. The architect of Iraq's oil nationalization was the vice chair of the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Hussein. Saddam's prominent role in the seizure of international oil interests was his "gateway to fame," according to his biographer Con Coughlin. And his control over the resulting torrent of oil money allowed him to eventually displace Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr as Iraq's president.

Nationalization made the governments of oil-exporting countries richer and more powerful than ever before. But it was a mixed blessing for the citizens of these countries. The daunting wealth and economic power that was once held by foreign corporations passed into the hands of politicians. Rulers across the region used some of the oil wealth to fund social programs to improve public services and appease their populations. That helped them survive the wave of democratization that swept the globe in the 1980s and 1990s and chased scores of other dictators out of office.

Since then, control over oil revenue has helped autocrats stay in power in three main ways. First, it has allowed them to buy off citizens by providing them with many benefits with virtually no taxation. The relationship between taxation and representation has always been close: when rulers want to raise taxes, citizens demand accountability. In colonial America, frustrated subjects revolted against Great Britain in part because they had to pay taxes even though they were unrepresented in the British parliament. In the Middle East today, oil-funded leaders typically respond to demands for greater accountability by offering new handouts, lowering taxes, or both—and this usually works. In 2011 alone, for example, Algeria announced plans to invest $156 billion in new infrastructure and cut taxes on sugar; Saudi

Arabia directed $136 billion to increasing wages in the public sector, unemployment benefits, and housing subsidies; Kuwait offered each of its citizens a cash gift of 1,000 dinars (about $3,600) and free food staples for 14 months. Autocrats with little or no oil wealth—Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen—made similar gestures, but their pledges were much smaller and therefore less effective.

Second, autocrats who get most of their funding from national oil industries find it easier to keep their countries' finances secret. Secrecy helps give oil wealth its democracy-repelling powers: citizens are satisfied with low taxes and seemingly generous benefits only when they do not realize how much of their country's wealth is being lost to theft, corruption, and government incompetence. Under Saddam, more than half of Iraq's national budget was funneled through the Iraq National Oil Company, the finances of which were never disclosed. A 2010 survey by the International Budget Partnership found that autocracies in the Middle East that have little or no oil, including Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, release at least some information about their finances; by contrast, oil-rich autocracies, such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia, disclose almost nothing. It is worth remembering that the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia were sparked by the people's growing awareness of government corruption.

Finally, oil wealth allows autocrats to lavishly fund—and buy the loyalty of—their armed forces. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, for example, has given billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to businesses associated with the elite paramilitary Revolutionary Guards. Globally, autocrats without oil wealth spend about two percent of their countries' GDPs on their militaries, whereas their colleagues with oil wealth, who already have much larger budgets, typically spend about three percent. Oil-poor Tunisia, for example, spent $53 per capita on its armed forces in 2008; its oil-rich neighbor, Algeria, spent $141 per capita and had far fewer protests. Some of the world's biggest oil producers, including Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, are also some of its biggest military spenders. This spending has payoffs: when the citizens of Oman and Saudi Arabia took to the streets earlier this year, their armies proved relatively willingly and able to suppress them.

WELL-OILED DEMOCRATIZATION

None of this means that oil will drown the Arab Spring or that the oil states of the Middle East are doomed to dictatorship. Over the last 12 years, Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria have all successfully made the transition to democracy. And all have oil.

But things will not be easy for the Middle East. Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria were only moderate oil producers (Indonesia barely has enough oil to export), and all three opened up politically in 1999 or 2000, shortly after oil prices hit their lowest point in almost 30 years. In fact, the last country with substantial oil wealth to successfully democratize was Venezuela, and that was in 1958. And Venezuela profited from the fact that it had a history of democratic rule and an unusually well-organized labor force, which undermined the military regime's power. But the oil-rich countries of the Middle East are very different. None has had much previous experience with democracy. And most of

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them have a lot more petroleum than Indonesia, Mexico, and Nigeria: Bahrain, for example, makes more than three times as much money from oil per capita as Venezuela did in 1958 (even after adjusting for inflation), Libya six times as much, and Saudi Arabia more than seven times as much. No country with more oil wealth than Venezuela, which in 1958 produced about 2.5 million barrels of oil a day, has ever successfully democratized.

That is not to say that the Middle East's oil-funded rulers could never fall. The spread of the Internet could make it harder for autocrats to conceal government waste and corruption. Meanwhile, oscillating oil prices and government mismanagement could drain their coffers and force them to cut popular subsidies. The shah of Iran's ouster in 1979 followed a similar mixture of corruption that benefited the elite and austerity measures that hurt the lower and middle classes.

Yet even if the Middle East's oil-backed dictators were replaced by elected leaders, the specter of authoritarianism would continue to loom. The region's dictators and monarchs have used oil revenues to finance vast patronage networks, which typically entangle both these regimes' supporters and their potential opponents; these networks make it harder for independent civil-society groups to take root. The lack of civil society would make it tough for new democracies to build sturdy coalitions among the old regime's opponents—coalitions necessary to lead the new governments and fend off a return to authoritarianism.

So long as oil prices remain high, moreover, these funds will be a constant source of temptation. Even politicians chosen through free and fair elections can use large petroleum windfalls to roll back democratic reforms. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, for example, has siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars out of his country's state-owned oil company and poured it into projects that boost his popularity among low-income families and the military. The goodwill he has thus generated among them has allowed him to eliminate checks on his authority: for example, he has replaced disloyal judges on the Supreme Court, imposed new restrictions on the media, and removed presidential term limits. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has behaved similarly.

It is hard to predict whether Iraq will follow a similar course. About 85 percent of the government's revenues come from oil exports, yet despite years of trying, the Iraqi parliament has been unable to pass a new oil law that would set up a legal framework to manage these revenues. Meanwhile, there are signs that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is edging away from democracy: he has taken advantage of the Iraqi constitution's ambiguities to establish personal control over key security institutions, including the Counter-Terrorism Command. Critics charge that he uses these instruments to silence political opponents. His government has also started to generously subsidize journalists with cash and land. And following popular demonstrations in February, security forces reportedly beat and arrested hundreds of journalists, political activists, and intellectuals. The Arab Spring uprisings are a reminder of the virtually universal appeal of democracy. But they should also serve as a reminder that oil wealth is one of the most stubborn obstacles to democratic reform.

ENDING THE OIL CURSE

The oil curse will last only as long as the world buys huge quantities of oil. Aggressive reductions in oil consumption could help reduce prices and hence the flow of money to oil-backed autocrats. The United States alone can have an impact: it is the planet's biggest consumer of petroleum, and in 2009 it burned more than twice as much oil as China, the second-largest market. By reducing its total oil consumption, the United States could help both reduce global oil prices and undermine petroleum-based dictators, even those who sell their oil to China and other autocracies.

Without meaningful cuts in consumption, other measures, such as targeted sanctions, would be less effective. For example, the United States could boycott undemocratic oil producers, but as long as global demand is unchanged, these regimes could easily sell their supplies to less discerning buyers at more or less the same price. Moreover, sanctions against oil-exporting countries are notoriously ineffective. Between 1990 and 2003, the UN Security Council imposed severe restrictions on Iraq's oil sales, but these failed to loosen Saddam's grip on power. More limited sanctions have also failed to dislodge oil-dependent regimes in Iran, Libya, and Myanmar (also called Burma). If global demand for oil grows, sanctions will be even less effective.

The United States and other petroleum importers could also push for greater transparency in oil markets, which would undermine the authoritarians' ability to buy off their citizens and use state funds for graft. In a joint 2010 study, Revenue Watch Institute and Transparency International found that 29 out of 41 oil-, gas-, and mineral-producing countries disclosed only "partial" or "scant" information about their resource revenues. The international community has already taken some important steps to correct this. In 2002, then British Prime Minister Tony Blair launched the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which called on resource-rich countries to publicly disclose their income. Today, the EITI is an independent organization, with some three dozen country members, including Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria. Meanwhile, one provision of the United States' 2010 financial reform law compels companies registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to report what they pay to governments, on a country-by-country and project-by-project basis, for access to oil, gas, and minerals. This requirement will make it tougher for oil-exporting countries to hide their revenues, and hence government waste and corruption, from their citizens.

But more can and should be done. First, the European Union and other oil-consuming regions should follow the United States' lead and require all companies to disclose their payments to foreign governments for access to natural resources. The G-8 endorsed such a measure at its May summit in Deauville, France, but has no power to compel member states to follow through. They must act on their own. Also, the London-based International Accounting Standards Board, which sets accounting procedures for over 120 countries, needs updating. Under the board's current rules, petroleum and mining companies are not required to reveal their payments to foreign governments.

Meanwhile, the international community should encourage oil-producing countries to open up their national oil companies. For example, countries could be encouraged to list their national oil companies on the New York Stock Exchange. By joining the exchange, they would gain access to new investors but would also become subject to the United States' new disclosure standards. The international community should also encourage producers to follow the principles set by the Natural Resource Charter, which was drafted by a group of scholars and practitioners to help citizens and governments use their countries' resource wealth in more socially beneficial ways. Oil-producing countries could give shares in national oil companies or an annual cash dividend to all their citizens, as Alaska has done since the 1970s. If well designed, such schemes could be politically popular and satisfy citizens' demands for sharing in the wealth of their oil-rich countries—and encourage citizens to scrutinize their governments' finances.

Since the 1970s, the oil-producing states have remained far less democratic than other states. In the Middle East, oil wealth has made monarchs and politicians strong and kept citizens weak. So far, even the Arab uprisings this year have failed to change the situation. Meanwhile, thanks to high oil prices, rising global demand for oil, and improved drilling technology, between 15 and 20 low-income countries have recently begun, or are about to begin, exporting oil and natural gas. Most of them are in sub-Saharan Africa. If they mismanage their revenues, they may well fall prey to the oil curse, too. But geology need not be destiny: for both the new oil producers and the old ones, oil is a greater obstacle to democratic reforms when autocrats are able to keep their finances hidden. The money that U.S. consumers send to the oil states helps empower their governments. By reducing U.S. oil consumption and making oil payments more transparent, Americans can start to empower those states' citizens instead.

Europe's Palestine Problem

Making Sure the EU Matters to Middle East Peace

Rory Miller

In the middle of a stalled peace process, one of the few things Israeli and Palestinian officials agree on is that U.S. President Barack Obama deserves much of the blame for the impasse. Israeli policymakers are furious with the demand that Obama made early in his term that Israel freeze settlement construction in the West Bank and with his declaration in May that Israel's 1967 borders should serve as the starting point for peace discussions. Palestinian leaders, for their part, believe that Obama has failed to fulfill the promise he made in his June 2009 Cairo speech to back their legitimate aspirations for statehood, and they are irritated that he has not forced the Israelis to continue the settlement freeze. The recent decisions by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to strike a unity deal with Hamas and press for UN recognition of Palestinian statehood is a sign of how frustrated with Washington he has become.

In the face of this impasse, a variety of international figures are now asking Europe to step in. Arab leaders such as former Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa have called on Europe to take charge of the peace process. In a May meeting with EU officials, for example, King Abdullah of Jordan urged Europe "to intensify efforts with a view to removing the obstacles that impede the resumption of the peace process."

The EU's current political and diplomatic leaders need no encouragement. They already seem to feel that they have both a right and a duty to help solve the conflict. Last year, then French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and Miguel Ángel Moratinos, his Spanish counterpart, said in a joint statement that the EU "must play a role because it is a friend of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority [PA] and above all because its own long-term security is at stake."

There is just one problem: neither the EU nor any of its member states are up to the task. Europe will always play second fiddle to the United States in the Middle East—regardless of how effective or ineffective the U.S. president happens to be. Rather than attempt to influence the

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peace process, a futile practice that will only compound the stalemate, Europe should focus on doing what it does best: fully leveraging its role as the lead donor and key partner to the PA in its state-building process. In doing so, the EU will be in a far better position to promote economic development in the Palestinian territories and foster peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

PREOCCUPIED WITH PALESTINE

There is a broad consensus in Europe that Israeli-Palestinian peace based on a two-state solution is not only vital for the Middle East but, in the words of the former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, "fundamental to [Europe's] own security." European leaders believe that the ongoing strife threatens their economic interests in the Middle East, where the EU is the top external trading partner and a major energy purchaser. They also worry that the conflict is alienating and radicalizing Europe's increasingly assertive Muslims. In recent talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, German Chancellor Angela Merkel underscored the importance of Middle East peace to both Germany and Europe, arguing that ending the stalemate was "more urgent than ever."

Given these views, it is hardly surprising that the European External Action Service, the EU's new de facto foreign ministry, has made finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a "strategic priority." Its head, Catherine Ashton, has frequently emphasized Israeli-Palestinian peace as a key component of regional stability. Various individual EU members, including Germany, the United Kingdom, and, most recently, France, have each proposed their own plans to relaunch the stalled peace process.

European involvement in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is nothing new. Since the Oslo peace process began in 1993, the EU has served as the PA's lead international donor, consistently providing 50–55 percent of its total funding. Together, the European Commission and EU member states contribute about $1.5 billion to the PA every year. Recently, the EU has focused on backing Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's efforts to build and strengthen Palestinian institutions, which is supposed to help pave the way for Palestinian statehood. In 2010, it provided over $430 million for Fayyad's plans, compared with the United States' $200 million and Japan's $100 million. Meanwhile, the EU and Israel have developed a strong trade relationship; the EU is Israel's number one trading partner, with total bilateral trade in 2009 nearing $30 billion.

Despite its substantial financial investment in both Israel and the Palestinian territories, the EU has proved unable to exert any real political power over the peace process. This disconnect between the role the EU craves and the one it actually plays haunts European leaders.

Europe's lack of sway in the Middle East is partly a result of the fact that the EU's 27 member states agree on only one thing: the need for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to end. Beyond that, national interests, local jealousies, and domestic political considerations have prevented the EU from establishing the kind of common policy that would let it have a hand in the peace process. EU member states have, for example, blocked France's attempts to organize peace negotiations, hoping to

stymie that country's desire to remain Europe's leading power in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Europe's Muslim communities are increasingly driving domestic debates and national policies on Israeli-Palestinian issues, forcing local politicians to take their pro-Palestinian views into account.

But the EU's biggest problem is that it has failed to convince both Israel and the Palestinians that it could be a better mediator and sponsor than the United States. From Israel's perspective, Brussels has nothing to offer that compares with what Washington can provide. Successive Israeli governments have viewed the United States as their international protector and thus the only viable intermediary with the Arabs. Israelis see that the United States is often the only country that stands up for them. In February, for example, the Obama administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that condemned Israeli settlement building. And more recently, Washington declared its opposition to the PA's efforts to gain UN recognition in September. Both stands came despite ongoing tensions between Obama and Netanyahu.

It is not lost on Israeli leaders that Europe rarely takes such stands. Indeed, Israelis have distrusted Europe since French President Charles de Gaulle abandoned his alliance with Israel in favor of alignment with Arab states on the eve of the 1967 Six-Day War. Israelis also remain wary of Europe due to rising anti-Semitism across the continent and a perceived insensitivity to Israel's security challenges. Not even Europe's status as Israel's leading trading partner or Israel's aspirations to join the EU have managed to mitigate such suspicions.

Europe's sway also remains limited among Palestinian leaders. Even as PA officials appreciate the EU's rhetorical support for Palestinian rights, they recognize that Europe is unable to pressure or persuade Israel to make concessions. Palestinian policymakers may worry about declining U.S. influence with an intransigent Netanyahu or the Obama administration's lack of a peace strategy. But they recognize that Jerusalem's economic, strategic, and diplomatic reliance on Washington makes the United States the only external party capable of pushing Israel to compromise. That is why, in the last years of Bill Clinton's presidency, the veteran Palestinian politician Nabil Shaath described the U.S.-Israeli relationship, combined with the U.S.-Palestinian relationship, as "best for the peace process." It is also why the Palestinian ambassador to the UN, Riyad Mansour, declared last April that "bold leadership" by the United States would "seriously contribute to a revival of the political process."

THE RIGHT ROLE

What should EU leaders do if they cannot carve out a meaningful political role in the peace process but truly believe that it is, as British Foreign Secretary William Hague recently put it, "too important to be allowed to fail or falter"?

To begin with, they should give up their obsession with trying to compete with the United States. EU policymakers need not measure their international standing in terms of how much leverage they have in the peace process or how much attention Israeli and Palestinian leaders pay to them. Europe is denting only its own self-confidence when it tries, and fails, to match the United States' role in the Middle East.

The EU should also make room for non-European powers to get involved.

MOHAMMED SALEM/REUTERS

Palestinians inspecting the aftermath of Israeli air strikes in the Gaza Strip, March 25, 2011

European leaders have jealously guarded what little role they have in the peace process. By relentlessly promoting the EU as the only legitimate external party besides the United States, they have blocked attempts by other countries, such as Brazil and Qatar, to enter the field and mediate between Fatah and Hamas or back the PA at the UN. Instead of waging turf wars, the EU should act as a role model for rising powers and welcome their financial and political investment in the peace process. It can share its own history of economic development with these countries, working with them to apply those lessons to developing the Palestinian territories.

European policymakers must also stop denigrating the EU's role as financier of Middle East peace negotiations. French President Nicolas Sarkozy recently complained that Europe cannot be the main party "paying for Palestine and yet remain a minor figure politically in the matter," implying that Europe's financial assistance to the Palestinians and its trade ties with Israel are simply a pretext for gaining political influence. Such sentiments underplay the EU's real achievements. It is largely thanks to the EU's financial support for the PA that the UN, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank all have recently declared that Palestinian institutions have become competent enough to run an independent, functioning state. If the Palestinians gain UN recognition in September, Europe will share the credit.

Still, Europe can do better. All too often, EU money has flowed into Fatah-dominated institutions that lack any accountability, engendering corruption and alienating EU taxpayers. In addition, the PA spends much of its EU funding on salaries and operating costs, as well as on strengthening Fatah-controlled security

forces under the guise of reform. Although such support strengthens anti-Hamas forces, it has created a bloated security apparatus and comes at the expense of more long-term capital projects that could create jobs and develop infrastructure.

The EU needs to demonstrate greater vision and ambition in its financing efforts, namely, by turning its attention to developing Palestinian science and technology. Projects like these would help the PA become competitive in a vital sector of the global economy. Yet so far, the EU has devoted only a tiny fraction of its aid to the Palestinian high-tech sector. The EU does currently fund the Palestine Academy for Science and Technology, which coordinates scientific and technological development programs in the Palestinian territories, and specific projects under the European Commission's ESPRIT initiative, which is intended to develop expertise in high-performance computing and networking. But European leaders should build on this existing support by investing in venture capital funds and start-up incubators that can foster some of the hundreds of high-tech companies and thousands of technology graduates based in the Palestinian territories.

Similarly, EU officials should invite more Palestinians to participate in the EU's science, research, and technology "frameworks," programs that support researchers from around the world. Israel enjoys the deepest involvement in these frameworks of any non-EU state, allowing its scientists and engineers to work with the best of their European counterparts. To encourage a more extensive Palestinian role in such cutting-edge research and development, the EU should draw on its experience in exchanging knowledge with Israeli academics. And it should support existing projects that bring together Israeli and Palestinian technology entrepreneurs. It could back Startup Weekend Tel-Aviv, where innovators meet to discuss and market their ideas, and support joint Israeli-Palestinian initiatives, such as when the European Investment Bank recently funded a West Bank venture capital firm founded by Israeli and Palestinian high-tech entrepreneurs. In doing so, the EU could bring the lessons of Israel's phenomenal high-tech success to Gaza and the West Bank.

A NEW EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Only by ramping up and making better use of its aid for Palestinian state building can the EU realize its full potential in the Middle East peace process. Doing so will not be easy. For one thing, the European fiscal crisis has made aid money harder to come by. For another, Europe's obsession with playing a leading role in the peace process has distracted it from its more useful functions in the region.

The EU has a chance to play a more productive role in a conflict to which it is bound by geography, history, culture, and trade. By focusing on state building rather than negotiations, Europe would remove a major source of tension between the EU and the United States and reduce infighting inside the EU itself. Most important, this would allow the EU to redefine its relationship with Israel and the Palestinians. Europe can build on its outstanding economic relationship with Israel by healing mistrust and strengthening diplomatic ties. And it can enhance its support for the PA by funding projects that will have a lasting impact on a future Palestinian state.

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A New Kind of Korea

Building Trust Between Seoul and Pyongyang

Park Geun-hye

On August 15, 1974, South Korea's Independence Day, I lost my mother, then the country's first lady, to an assassin acting under orders from North Korea. That day was a tragedy not only for me but also for all Koreans. Despite the unbearable pain of that event, I have wished and worked for enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula ever since. But 37 years later, the conflict on the peninsula persists. The long-simmering tensions between North and South Korea resulted in an acute crisis in November 2010. For the first time since the Korean War, North Korea shelled South Korean territory, killing soldiers and civilians on the island of Yeonpyeong.

Only two weeks earlier, South Korea had become the first country outside the G-8 to chair and host a G-20 summit, welcoming world leaders to its capital, Seoul. These events starkly illustrated the dual reality of the Korean Peninsula and of East Asia more broadly. On the one hand, the Korean Peninsula remains volatile. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, the modernization of conventional forces across the region, and nascent great-power rivalries highlight the endemic security dilemmas that plague this part of Asia. On the other hand, South Korea's extraordinary development, sometimes called the Miracle on the Han River, has, alongside China's rise, become a major driver of the global economy over the past decade.

These two contrasting trends exist side by side in Asia, the information revolution, globalization, and democratization clashing with the competitive instincts of the region's major powers. To ensure that the first set of forces triumphs, policymakers in Asia and in the international community must not only take advantage of existing initiatives but also adopt a bolder and more creative approach to achieving security. Without such an effort, military brinkmanship may only increase—with repercussions well beyond Asia. For this reason, forging trust and sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula represents one of the most urgent and crucial tasks on Asia's list of outstanding security challenges.

Park Geun-hye is a Member of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

Park Geun-hye

INTRODUCING TRUST

A lack of trust has long undermined attempts at genuine reconciliation between North and South Korea. What little confidence did exist between the two countries virtually disappeared last year, after North Korea destroyed the South Korean naval ship *Cheonan* in March and brazenly attacked Yeonpyeong Island in November. North Korea also revealed that it had constructed a sophisticated uranium-enrichment facility, directly contravening commitments it had undertaken, most recently in the September 19, 2005, joint statement of the six-party talks, to forbid uranium enrichment and abandon its nuclear weapons program.

As one Korean proverb goes, one-handed applause is impossible. By the same token, peace between the two Koreas will not be possible without a combined effort. For more than half a century, North Korea has blatantly disregarded international norms. But even if Seoul must respond forcefully to Pyongyang's provocations, it must also remain open to new opportunities for improving relations between the two sides. Precisely because trust is at a low point these days, South Korea has a chance to rebuild it. In order to transform the Korean Peninsula from a zone of conflict into a zone of trust, South Korea should adopt a policy of "trustpolitik," establishing mutually binding expectations based on global norms.

"Trustpolitik" does not mean unconditional or one-sided trust without verification. Nor does it mean forgetting North Korea's numerous transgressions or rewarding the country with new incentives. Instead, it should be comprised of two coexisting strands: first, North Korea must keep its agreements made with South Korea and the international community to establish a minimum level of trust, and second, there must be assured consequences for actions that breach the peace. To ensure stability, trustpolitik should be applied consistently from issue to issue based on verifiable actions, and steps should not be taken for mere political expediency.

Building trust between competing nations has been accomplished before. The United States and China overcame deep mutual suspicions to establish relations in the 1970s. Egypt and Israel signed a peace accord in 1979 after a gradual process of trust-building between the two sides, and the agreement remains a linchpin of stability for the entire Middle East, even after the change in regime in Egypt earlier this year. In the 1950s, European nations overcame a half century of warfare to create what would later become the European Union.

Although Asia's cultural, historical, and geopolitical environment is unique, the continent can learn from these precedents, particularly Europe's experience. To begin with, Asian states must slow down their accelerating arms buildup, reduce military tensions, and establish a cooperative security regime that would complement existing bilateral agreements and help resolve persistent tensions in the region. In addition, they should strengthen existing multilateral regimes—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, a formal dialogue among 27 nations on East Asian security issues; the trilateral summits through which China, Japan, and South Korea coordinate their shared policy concerns; and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. Together, these efforts would help form a more resilient Asian

security network and build trust and security on the Korean Peninsula. Such endeavors will undoubtedly take time. But if North and South Korea and other Asian countries can institutionalize confidence-building measures, they will bolster the odds that economic and political cooperation can overcome military and security competition.

BRINGING PYONGYANG INTO THE FOLD

To establish trustpolitik on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea should adapt its past strategies toward North Korea. Previous governments in Seoul have alternatively attempted to engage and deter Pyongyang. The ones that have emphasized accommodation and inter-Korean solidarity have placed inordinate hope in the idea that if the South provided sustained assistance to the North, the North would abandon its bellicose strategy toward the South. But after years of such attempts, no fundamental change has come. Meanwhile, the governments in Seoul that have placed a greater emphasis on pressuring North Korea have not been able to influence its behavior in a meaningful way, either.

A new policy is needed: an alignment policy, which should be buttressed by public consensus and remain constant in the face of political transitions and unexpected domestic or international events. Such a policy would not mean adopting a middle-of-the-road approach; it would involve aligning South Korea's security with its cooperation with the North and inter-Korean dialogue with parallel international efforts. An alignment policy would entail assuming a tough line against North Korea sometimes and a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.

HAN JAE-HO/REUTERS

Park Geun-hye in Seoul, August 17, 2007

For example, if North Korea launches another military strike against the South, Seoul must respond immediately to ensure that Pyongyang understands the costs of provocation. Conversely, if North Korea takes steps toward genuine reconciliation, such as reaffirming its commitment to existing agreements, then the South should match its efforts. An alignment policy will, over time, reinforce trustpolitik.

To implement such an alignment policy, South Korea must first demonstrate, through a robust and credible deterrent posture, that it will no longer tolerate North Korea's increasingly violent provocations. It must show Pyongyang that the North will pay a heavy price for its military and nuclear threats. This approach is not new, but in order to change the current situation, it must be enforced more vigorously than in the past.

In particular, Seoul has to mobilize the international community to help it dismantle Pyongyang's nuclear program. Under no circumstances can South Korea accept the existence of a nuclear-armed North Korea. North Korea's nuclearization also poses a major threat to the international community because Pyongyang could develop long-range missiles with nuclear warheads or transfer nuclear technologies and materials abroad. Through a combination of credible deterrence, strenuous persuasion, and more effective negotiation strategies, Seoul and the international community must make Pyongyang realize that it can survive and even prosper without nuclear weapons.

If North Korea undertakes additional nuclear tests, South Korea must consider all possible responses in consultation with its principal ally, the United States, and other key global partners.

Even as Seoul and its allies strengthen their posture against North Korea's militarism and nuclear brinkmanship, they must also be prepared to offer Pyongyang a new beginning. Trust can be built on incremental gains, such as joint projects for enhanced economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance from the South to the North, and new trade and investment opportunities. When I met the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in 2002, we discussed a range of issues, including a Eurasian railway project that would reconnect the Trans-Korean Railway, which has been severed since the Korean War, and link it to the Trans-Siberian and Trans-China lines. Reconnecting the Korean railway would be a testament to mutual development and inter-Korean peace. And if that line were then tied to other regional lines, the effort could help develop China's three northeastern provinces and Russia's Far East—and, in turn, perhaps transform the Korean Peninsula into a conduit for regional trade. Although tensions have delayed further discussions about the railway project in recent years, these could be restarted as a means of building trust on vital security matters.

The rest of the world can help with these efforts. To begin with, strengthening the indispensable alliance between South Korea and the United States should send unequivocal signals to North Korea that only responsible behavior can ensure the regime's survival and a better life for its citizens. The EU is not a member of the six-party nuclear talks, but the model of regional cooperation that Europe represents can contribute to peace building on the Korean Peninsula. Asian countries can devise ways to adopt a cooperative security arrangement based on the model of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the world's largest intergovernmental security organization. The OSCE process of fostering security and economic cooperation could be adapted to Northeast Asia: offering guarantees that North Korea would receive substantial economic and diplomatic benefits if it changed its behavior would reassure its leaders that the regime can survive without nuclear weapons.

Given its role as North Korea's principal economic benefactor and ally, China can play a critical part in prompting Pyongyang to change. Chinese efforts to encourage reforms in North Korea could be spurred by a more cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship. As that relationship deepens, Pyongyang's outlier status will increasingly undermine Beijing's desire to improve its ties with Washington. Conversely, tensions between China and the United States might only increase North Korea's intransigence, allowing it to play the two countries off each other.

Because South Korea maintains both a critical alliance with the United States and a strategic partnership with China, confidence building on the Korean Peninsula would also improve trust between Beijing and Washington, creating a virtuous cycle in which a more cooperative U.S.-Chinese relationship would bolster more positive inter-Korean relations and vice versa. Although North Korea continues to depend heavily on China's economic and diplomatic protection, China's growing

global stature and interest in improving its ties with the United States may limit its support for North Korea if Pyongyang continues to threaten the region's stability. North Korea may finally join the family of nations if it realizes that assistance from China cannot last forever.

MAKING THE RIGHT CHOICE

The dual realities of the Korean Peninsula—prosperity and military tension—have coexisted for the past 60 years. In the midst of war and the bleakest of circumstances, South Korea received critical assistance from the United States and the international community that propelled its economic development and its democratization. Its progress was so fast, in fact, that in 2009 it became the first underdeveloped, aid-recipient country to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee. South Korea adheres to denuclearization, participates in countering the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, and increasingly contributes to global initiatives, such as reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and antipiracy naval operations around the Horn of Africa.

Enduring trust between the international community and South Korea was instrumental to Seoul's development. To achieve the same outcome with North Korea, South Korea should adopt a principle of trustpolitik and an alignment policy. Once the vestiges of the harsh confrontation between Seoul and Pyongyang are overcome, the Korean Peninsula could emerge as a hub for cooperation and economic prosperity. Should the North relinquish its nuclear weapons and behave peacefully, it could work with the South to enhance economic cooperation between the two countries through special economic zones and the free movement of goods and people, gain development assistance from institutions such as the World Bank, and attract foreign investment. Such developments would contribute significantly to the establishment of a more enduring peace on the Korean Peninsula, and they might expedite the peninsula's unification as well as encourage the gradual institutionalization of economic and security cooperation in Northeast Asia. A democratic, unified Korea would be an economic and security asset to the region.

Many assert that in the coming years the Korean Peninsula will face growing uncertainty. But Koreans have shown that they can turn challenges into historic opportunities. In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea chose to develop itself through rapid industrialization. In the 1990s, it expanded and deepened ties with countries and regions with which it had shared little during the Cold War, such as China, eastern Europe, and Russia. Over the last decade, it has emerged as one of Asia's most vibrant democracies. Today, South Korea stands ready to work with the United States and other members of the international community to ensure that North Korea follows the same path.

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

The forces best positioned to capitalize on the Arab Spring are the Islamist parliamentarians, who, unlike al Qaeda, are willing to engage in the messy business of politics.

Al Qaeda's Challenge

The Jihadists' War With Islamist Democrats

William McCants

The Arab Spring and the death of Osama bin Laden represent a moment of both promise and peril for the global jihadist movement. On the one hand, the overthrow of secular rulers in the heartland of the Muslim world gives jihadists an unprecedented opportunity to establish the Islamic states that they have long sought. On the other hand, jihadists can no longer rally behind their most charismatic leader, bin Laden. And the jihadist flagship that he founded, al Qaeda, may lose its relevance in the Muslim world to rival Islamist groups that are prepared to run in elections and take power through politics.

The last time jihadists faced such a crossroads was at the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan and subsequent collapse emboldened jihadist strategists. Convinced that they had defeated a global superpower, they plotted to overthrow secular Arab governments and replace them with Islamic states, with the goal of eventually uniting them under a single caliphate. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union's demise opened up the Arab world to U.S. influence. Having been long constrained by the Soviet presence in the region, the United States quickly asserted itself by spearheading the coalition against the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, thus increasing its military presence in the Arab world. As a result,

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jihadists—and al Qaeda in particular—concluded that Washington now enjoyed virtually unchecked power in the Middle East and would use it to prevent the creation of the Islamic states they desired.

Several established Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, shared this belief with al Qaeda. But al Qaeda rejected the Brotherhood and like-minded groups because of their willingness to work within existing systems by voting for and participating in legislative bodies. Such tactics would fail to establish Islamic states, bin Laden and his comrades asserted, because they involved pragmatic political tradeoffs that would violate the principles of such future states and leave them susceptible to U.S. pressure. Only attacks on the United States, al Qaeda argued, could reduce Washington's regional power and inspire the masses to revolt.

Two decades later, bin Laden's long-sought revolutions in the Arab world are finally happening, and the upheaval would seem to give al Qaeda a rare opportunity to start building Islamic states. But so far at least, the revolutions have defied bin Laden's expectations by empowering not jihadists but Islamist parliamentarians—Islamists who refuse to violently oppose U.S. hegemony in the region and who are willing to engage in parliamentary politics. In Tunisia, the Islamist Renaissance Party leads in the polls ahead of legislative elections in October. In Egypt, the Freedom and Justice Party, the new faction created by the Muslim Brotherhood, is likely to gain a large number of seats in parliament in elections this fall. Should countries that have experienced more violent revolutions also hold elections, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, Islamist parliamentarians are well positioned to compete in those nations as well.

Al Qaeda and its allies will not support these Islamists unless they reject parliamentary politics and establish governments that strictly implement Islamic law and are hostile to the United States. The Islamist parliamentarians are unlikely to do either. Having suffered under one-party rule for decades and wary of rival Islamist parties, the Arab world's Islamist parliamentarians (like their secular counterparts) will be unwilling to support such a system in the future. And although they will certainly seek to implement more conservative social laws, the Islamist parliamentarians will likely come to accept that their countries require the economic and military aid of the United States or its allies.

Unable to make progress in countries where Islamist parliamentarians hold sway, such as Egypt, al Qaeda will instead attempt to diminish Washington's clout by attacking the United States and focus on aiding rebels in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. But even in those countries, it will need to make compromises to work with existing rebel groups, and these groups, like their fellow Islamists elsewhere, may accept some level of U.S. support should they take power. What all this means is that despite the seemingly opportune moment, al Qaeda is unlikely to make much progress toward its ultimate goal of establishing Islamic states in the Arab world.

ISLAMISM RISES

Both al Qaeda and today's Islamist parliamentarians are outgrowths of the Islamism that arose in the nineteenth century as a response to the colonial domination of Muslim lands. Islamists believed that Muslims' abandonment of their faith had made them vulnerable to foreign rule. In response, they advocated for independent Muslim rulers who would fully implement Islamic law, or sharia. A large number of these Islamists adhered to Salafism, a revivalist ideology that sought to purge Islam of Western influence and supposedly improper legal innovations by returning to the religious instruction of the first generations of Muslims, or *Salaf*. Pan-Islamic sentiment intensified after World War I, when France and the United Kingdom created colonies out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Sunni Muslims were further outraged when the new secular government in Turkey abolished the caliphate, a largely symbolic institution that nonetheless had represented the unity of the Muslim empire under a single leader (or caliph) in the religion's early days.

When nationalist movements succeeded in ending the direct rule of foreign powers in the Middle East, beginning when Egypt gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, Islamist activists sought to replace the secular laws and institutions governing the newly independent states with systems based on sharia. Perhaps the most famous of the Islamist organizations of this period was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in the 1920s. Yet when it tried to compete in Egypt's parliamentary elections in 1942, the Egyptian government, under British pressure, forced it to withdraw. Although they failed to achieve their

aims through parliamentary politics, some Brotherhood activists turned to peaceful social activism, whereas others, such as Sayyid Qutb, who was one of the group's most prominent members, developed an ideology of violent revolution. Qutb rejected the idea of man-made legislation and held that Muslim-led governments that made their own law, as opposed to adopting sharia, were not truly Muslim. Qutb encouraged pious Muslims to rebel against such regimes; his writings have inspired generations of Sunni militants, including the founders of al Qaeda.

Islamists continued to focus on domestic matters until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In a burst of pan-Islamic spirit, thousands of young Arab men flooded into Pakistan hoping to battle the Soviets. Among them was bin Laden, who recruited men, procured equipment, and raised money for the cause. His training camps in Afghanistan, and others like it, gave jihadists of all backgrounds a shared identity and mission. In doing so, they served as early incubators of global jihadism. When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan nearly a decade later, the jihadists believed that they had helped defeat a superpower.

Al Qaeda, which was created in 1988, grew out of those camps. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian Islamist who merged his organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with al Qaeda in 2001, explained al Qaeda's mission in 2010 as providing a "base for indoctrination, training, and incitement that gathered the capabilities of the *ummah* [universal Islamic community], trained them, raised their consciousness, improved their abilities, and gave them confidence in their religion and themselves." This base, Zawahiri said, involved "large amounts of participation in jihad, bearing the worries of the *ummah*, and seizing the initiative in the most urgent calamities confronting the *ummah*." In other words, al Qaeda envisioned itself as a revolutionary vanguard and special operations unit working to defend the Muslim world.

BIN LADEN'S DAYS OF PROMISE

Al Qaeda's early years seemed full of possibility. The collapse of the Soviet Union created new opportunities for radicals in the empire's former client states. Islamists took control of Sudan in 1989, and Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 galvanized Islamist political protests in Algeria, culminating in an Islamist victory in the country's

elections the following year. When the secular Algerian military nullified the results and retained power, it only underscored the perceived need for a committed Muslim vanguard.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait turned al Qaeda's attention to the United States. Bin Laden offered to send al Qaeda operatives to Saudi Arabia to help protect the country from attack by Saddam. But the Saudis rejected his proposal and instead invited the U.S. military to lead an assault on Iraq from their territory. The decision insulted bin Laden and raised his fears about the growth of unchecked U.S. power in the Middle East. Bin Laden's concerns grew the following year, when the United States deployed peacekeeping troops to Somalia soon after he had moved al Qaeda's headquarters to Sudan—although he celebrated the U.S. withdrawal following the infamous "Black Hawk down" ambush (in which al Qaeda operatives claim to have participated). By 1993, al Qaeda members began identifying U.S. targets in East Africa, and in 1994 they sent explosives to Saudi Arabia to attack an unspecified U.S. facility.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan in 1996 after Islamist-controlled Sudan expelled him at Washington's behest. He viewed his exile as further evidence that Arab Islamists could not build Islamic states until Western power in the region was diminished. In a public declaration that same year, he announced that he was turning his gaze from Africa to the Persian Gulf and urged Muslims to launch a guerrilla war against U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden not only resented the Saudis for refusing his help in the Gulf War and banning him from the kingdom but also could not tolerate the continued presence of U.S. forces in the country. If jihadists inflicted enough damage on the United States, he argued, the U.S. military would withdraw from Saudi soil, a move that would allow the Islamists to confront the deviant Saudi royal family directly. Although bin Laden did not have the resources to carry out his threat, his statement infuriated the Saudi government, which instructed its clients in Afghanistan, the ruling Taliban, to restrict his activities.

But bin Laden only escalated his rhetoric against the United States. In 1998, in a joint fatwa with the leaders of other militant organizations, he called on every Muslim to murder Americans. Soon thereafter, al Qaeda made good on this threat by bombing the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden later described these attacks in his will and testament as the second of three "escalating strikes" against the United

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States—the first being Hezbollah's bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the third being 9/11—all of which would "lead to the withdrawal [from the Middle East] of the United States and the infidel West, even if after dozens of years."

In fact, 9/11 did not mark the logical culmination of the Lebanon and Africa bombings, as bin Laden suggested. Instead, it represented a subtle but significant shift in al Qaeda's strategy. Before 9/11, al Qaeda had targeted U.S. citizens and institutions abroad, never attacking U.S. soil. The idea behind a mass-casualty attack against the U.S. homeland arose only after the Africa bombings. Two months before 9/11, Zawahiri, who had become al Qaeda's second-in-command, published *Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet*, which offers insight into why al Qaeda decided to attack the United States within its borders. In it, he stated that al Qaeda aimed to establish an Islamic state in the Arab world:

> Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infidel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the *ummah* will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world.

Achieving this goal, Zawahiri explained elsewhere in the book, would require a global jihad:

> It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict. . . . The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. . . . It will impose sanctions on whomever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy.

To confront this insidious alliance, Zawahiri argued, al Qaeda had to first root out U.S. influence in the region, which it could best accomplish by attacking targets on U.S. soil. Zawahiri predicted that

the United States would react either by waging war against Muslims worldwide or by pulling back its forces from Muslim lands. In other words, the United States would either fight or flee. A successful direct strike against U.S. centers of power, he believed, would force this choice on the United States and allow al Qaeda to overcome the obstacles preventing it from rallying the Muslim masses and ending U.S. hegemony in the Middle East: a lack of leadership, the lack of a clear enemy, and a lack of confidence among Muslims. Al Qaeda would soon test that theory on 9/11.

JIHADIST STATE BUILDING

From an operational perspective, the 9/11 attacks succeeded far beyond bin Laden's imagination, killing more than 3,000 civilians and unexpectedly destroying the World Trade Center. But to al Qaeda's dismay, 9/11 did not rally Muslims to its cause. Indeed, the organization lost legitimacy when bin Laden, hoping to avoid angering his Taliban hosts, initially denied responsibility for the attacks. And when the United States retaliated against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, it did so without providing the group with the kind of clear enemy—a large "Crusader" army—the militant Islamists had hoped for. The United States kept its footprint small, using overwhelming airpower and deploying special operations forces and CIA agents to work with allied tribes to depose the Taliban and destroy al Qaeda's base of operations.

Although the U.S. military failed to capture bin Laden, it quickly overran the Taliban and toppled what many jihadists considered the only authentic Islamic state. Afghanistan's fall thus represented a huge blow to al Qaeda, whose professed goal, of course, was to establish such states. The majority of al Qaeda's Shura Council had reportedly counseled bin Laden against attacking the United States for fear of precisely this outcome.

Having failed to rally Muslims to his cause or bog down the U.S. military in a protracted ground war, bin Laden fled to Pakistan and refocused his efforts on the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had been at the forefront of bin Laden's thoughts since 1994, and he now had the resources to launch a major offensive against the U.S. presence in the kingdom. In early 2002, he sent hundreds of jihadists to

Saudi Arabia to organize attacks on U.S. military and civilian personnel in the country. After a year of preparation, bin Laden and Zawahiri impatiently launched these attacks over objections from their Saudi branch that it was not ready. The campaign was a disaster. Although al Qaeda attempted to strike only U.S. targets, it killed many Arab Muslims in the process, turning the Saudi public against the group. In one particularly disastrous example, an al Qaeda attack on a residential compound in Riyadh in November 2003 killed mainly Arabs and Muslims, many of whom were children. After a two-year battle, Saudi forces had stamped out the organization's presence in the kingdom.

Yet al Qaeda's targeting miscalculations were not the only reason for its failure in Saudi Arabia. Despite a series of spectacular attacks, the organization could not compete for attention with the battle in Iraq. The U.S. invasion of that country in 2003 inflamed Muslim opinion worldwide and had finally given jihadists the clear battle they craved. Bin Laden and Zawahiri seized the opportunity to recover from their strategic blunders in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia and to spark an all-consuming battle between the United States and the Islamic world. They hoped that this struggle would rally Muslims to al Qaeda's cause and, most important, bleed the United States of its resources. As U.S. casualties mounted in Iraq, al Qaeda strategists began citing the lessons of Vietnam and quoting the U.S. historian Paul Kennedy on the consequences of "imperial overstretch." By the end of 2004, bin Laden had begun publicly referring to al Qaeda's "war of attrition" against the United States.

Al Qaeda hoped that Iraq would be the first Islamic state to rise after the loss of Afghanistan. In a 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a leader of the Iraqi insurgency who eventually joined al Qaeda and formed the subsidiary group al Qaeda in Iraq, Zawahiri asserted that victory would come when "a Muslim state is established in the manner of the Prophet in the heart of the Islamic world. . . . The center would be in the Levant and Egypt." Zawahiri argued that to expel the United States and establish an Islamic state, jihadists needed "popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries." Zawahiri told Zarqawi that gaining this support would be easier while U.S. forces continued to occupy Iraq. But to preserve their legitimacy after a U.S. retreat, Zawahiri said, jihadists would need to avoid

alienating the public through sectarianism or gratuitous violence. They had to cooperate with Muslims of all ideological and theological stripes as long as they shared the desire for a state dedicated to sharia. Zawahiri warned Zarqawi that if he declared an Islamic state before al Qaeda had built an effective coalition of Muslim groups and garnered popular approval in Iraq, the state would fail and the jihadists' secular and Islamist opponents would take power.

Zarqawi's followers did not heed Zawahiri's advice. Al Qaeda in Iraq declared the founding of an Islamic state soon after Zarqawi was killed in an air strike in 2006, and, as Zawahiri had warned, the group ended up alienating more moderate Sunnis through its brutal implementation of Islamic law and its relentless assault on Iraq's Shiites. It also lost many of its allies in the insurgency by demanding their obedience and then targeting them and their constituencies if they refused to cooperate. Additionally, the fact that al Qaeda in Iraq's so-called Islamic state controlled so little territory earned the scorn of fellow Sunni militants in Iraq and abroad. Al Qaeda had botched its first real attempt at state building. Even if it had followed Zawahiri's counsel, however, al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as the larger organization, would have faced a new threat on the horizon: Islamist parties with the desire and know-how to enter the political system.

THE ISLAMISTS WHO VOTE

Whereas al Qaeda's brutal, sectarian tactics turned the Iraqi populace against it, the Sunni forces willing to engage in parliamentary politics gained the most power. Chief among them was the Muslim Brotherhood, whose Iraqi Islamic Party dominates Sunni politics in Iraq today and regularly supplies one of the country's two vice presidents.

The jihadists, of course, reject this success. Zawahiri has been particularly critical of Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fatouh, a one-time member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's leadership council who is now an independent candidate for president in Egypt. Abou el-Fatouh stated before the Arab revolutions that the Brotherhood would respect the results of any popular election in Egypt and remain in loyal opposition should its opponents win. This idea was anathema to Zawahiri, who argued that a government's legitimacy derives not from the ballot box but from its

enforcement of Islamic law. "Any government established on the basis of a constitution that is secular, atheist, or contradictory to Islam cannot be a respected government because it is un-Islamic and not according to sharia," he wrote in a revision of *Knights* published in 2010. "It is unacceptable that a leader in the Brotherhood evinces respect for such a government, even if it comes about through fair elections."

To be clear, Zawahiri does not oppose all elections; for example, he supports elections for the rulers of Islamic states and for representatives on leadership councils, which would ensure that these governments implemented Islamic law properly. But he opposes any system in which elections empower legislators to make laws of their own choosing. In the second edition of *Knights*, Zawahiri outlined al Qaeda's vision for the proper Islamic state:

> We demand . . . the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its *ummah* chooses its rulers. . . . If they deviate, the *ummah* brings them to account and removes them. The *ummah* participates in producing that government's decisions and determining its direction. . . . [The caliphal state] commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in jihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.

Bin Laden agreed with Zawahiri's take on elections, stating in January 2009 that once foreign influence and local tyrants have been removed from Islamic countries, true Muslims can elect their own presidents. And like Zawahiri, bin Laden argued that elections should not create parliaments that allow Muslims and non-Muslims to collaborate on making laws.

Although al Qaeda's leaders concurred on elections, they differed on the utility of using nonviolent protest to achieve Islamist goals. In bin Laden's January 2009 remarks, he claimed that demonstrations without weapons are useless. This contradicted a statement made by Zawahiri a week earlier, in which he called on Egyptian Muslims to go on strike in protest of then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's blockade of the Gaza Strip. Now that Zawahiri has replaced bin Laden as the leader of al Qaeda, his openness to nonviolent tactics may help

the organization navigate the revolutions sweeping the Arab world. Even so, his hostility toward parliamentary politics cedes the real levers of power to the Islamist parliamentarians.

SPRINGTIME FOR THE PARLIAMENTARIANS

Al Qaeda now stands at a precipice. The Arab Spring and the success of Islamist parliamentarians throughout the Middle East have challenged its core vision just as the group has lost its founder. Al Qaeda has also lost access to bin Laden's personal connections in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf, which had long provided it with resources and protection. Bin Laden's death has deprived al Qaeda of its most media-savvy icon; and most important, al Qaeda has lost its commander in chief. The raid that killed bin Laden revealed that he had not been reduced to a figurehead, as many Western analysts had suspected; he had continued to direct the operations of al Qaeda and its franchises. Yet the documents seized from bin Laden's home in Abbottabad, Pakistan, reveal how weak al Qaeda had become even under his ongoing leadership. Correspondence found in the raid shows bin Laden and his lieutenants lamenting al Qaeda's lack of funds and the constant casualties from U.S. drone strikes. These papers have made the organization even more vulnerable by exposing its general command structure, putting al Qaeda's leadership at greater risk of extinction than ever before.

Al Qaeda has elected Zawahiri as its new chief, at least for now. But the transition will not be seamless. Some members of al Qaeda's old guard feel little loyalty to Zawahiri, whom they view as a relative newcomer. Al Qaeda's members from the Persian Gulf, for their part, may feel alienated by having an Egyptian at their helm, especially if Zawahiri chooses another Egyptian as his deputy.

Despite these potential sources of friction, al Qaeda is not likely to split under Zawahiri's reign. Its senior leadership will still want to unite jihadist groups under its banner, and its franchises will have little reason to relinquish the recognition and resources that come with al Qaeda affiliation. Yet those affiliates cannot offer al Qaeda's senior commanders shelter. Indeed, should Pakistan become too dangerous a refuge for the organization's leaders, they will find themselves with few other

options. The Islamic governments that previously protected and assisted al Qaeda, such as those in Afghanistan and Sudan in the 1990s, either no longer exist or are inhospitable (although Somalia might become a candidate if the militant group al Shabab consolidates its hold there).

In the midst of grappling with all these challenges, al Qaeda must also decide how to respond to the uprisings in the Arab world. Thus far, its leaders have indicated that they want to support Islamist insurgents in unstable revolutionary countries and lay the groundwork for the creation of Islamic states once the existing regimes have fallen, similar to what they attempted in Iraq. But al Qaeda's true strategic dilemma lies in Egypt and Tunisia. In these countries, local tyrants have been ousted, but parliamentary elections will be held soon, and the United States remains influential.

The outcome in Egypt is particularly personal for Zawahiri, who began his fight to depose the Egyptian government as a teenager. Zawahiri also understands that Egypt, given its geostrategic importance and its status as the leading Arab nation, is the grand prize in the contest between al Qaeda and the United States. In his recent six-part message to the Egyptian people and in his eulogy for bin Laden, Zawahiri suggested that absent outside interference, the Egyptians and the Tunisians would establish Islamic states that would be hostile to Western interests. But the United States, he said, will likely work to ensure that friendly political forces, including secularists and moderate Islamists, win Egypt's upcoming elections. And even if the Islamists succeed in establishing an Islamic state there, Zawahiri argued, the United States will retain enough leverage to keep it in line. To prevent such an outcome, Zawahiri called on Islamist activists in Egypt and Tunisia to start a popular (presumably nonviolent) campaign to implement sharia as the sole source of legislation and to pressure the transitional governments to end their cooperation with Washington.

Yet Zawahiri's attempt to sway local Islamists is unlikely to succeed. Although some Islamists in the two countries rhetorically support al Qaeda, many, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, are now organizing for their countries' upcoming elections—that is, they are becoming Islamist parliamentarians. Even Egyptian Salafists, who share Zawahiri's distaste for parliamentary politics, are forming their own political parties. Most ominous for Zawahiri's agenda, the Egyptian Islamist organization

al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), parts of which were once allied with al Qaeda, has forsworn violence and recently announced that it was creating a political party to compete in Egypt's parliamentary elections. Al Qaeda, then, is losing sway even among its natural allies.

This dynamic limits Zawahiri's options. For fear of alienating the Egyptian people, he is not likely to end his efforts to reach out to Egypt's Islamist parliamentarians or to break with them by calling for attacks in the country before the elections. Instead, he will continue urging the Islamists to advocate for sharia and to try to limit U.S. influence.

In the meantime, Zawahiri will continue trying to attack the United States and continue exploiting less stable postrevolutionary countries, such as Libya, Syria, and Yemen, which may prove more susceptible to al Qaeda's influence. Yet to operate in these countries, al Qaeda will need to subordinate its political agenda to those of the insurgents there or risk destroying itself, as Zarqawi's group did in Iraq. If those insurgents take power, they will likely refuse to offer al Qaeda safe haven for fear of alienating the United States or its allies in the region.

Thanks to the continued predominance of the United States and the growing appeal of Islamist parliamentarians in the Muslim world, even supporters of al Qaeda now doubt that it will be able to replace existing regimes with Islamic states anytime soon. In a recent joint statement, several jihadist online forums expressed concern that if Muammar al-Qaddafi is defeated in Libya, the Islamists there will participate in U.S.-backed elections, ending any chance of establishing a true Islamic state.

As a result of all these forces, al Qaeda is no longer the vanguard of the Islamist movement in the Arab world. Having defined the terms of Islamist politics for the last decade by raising fears about Islamic political parties and giving Arab rulers a pretext to limit their activity or shut them down, al Qaeda's goal of removing those rulers is now being fulfilled by others who are unlikely to share its political vision. Should these revolutions fail and al Qaeda survives, it will be ready to reclaim the mantle of Islamist resistance. But for now, the forces best positioned to capitalize on the Arab Spring are the Islamist parliamentarians, who, unlike al Qaeda, are willing and able to engage in the messy business of politics.

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9/11 in Retrospect

George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered

Melvyn P. Leffler

Ten years after 9/11, we can begin to gain some perspective on the impact of that day's terrorist attacks on U.S. foreign policy. There was, and there remains, a natural tendency to say that the attacks changed everything. But a decade on, such conclusions seem unjustified. September 11 did alter the focus and foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration. But the administration's new approach, one that garnered so much praise and so much criticism, was less transformative than contemporaries thought. Much of it was consistent with long-term trends in U.S. foreign policy, and much has been continued by President Barack Obama. Some aspects merit the scorn often heaped on them; other aspects merit praise that was only grudging in the moment. Wherever one positions oneself, it is time to place the era in context and assess it as judiciously as possible.

BEFORE AND AFTER

Before 9/11, the Bush administration had focused its foreign policy attention on China and Russia; on determining whether a Middle East peace settlement was in the cards; on building a ballistic missile

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defense system; and on contemplating how to deal with "rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. At many meetings of the National Security Council, officials debated the pros and cons of a new sanctions regime against Saddam Hussein's dictatorial government in Baghdad; they also discussed what would be done if U.S. planes enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq were shot down. Little was agreed on.

Top officials did not consider terrorism or radical Islamism a high priority. Richard Clarke, the chief counterterrorism expert on the National Security Council staff, might hector them relentlessly about the imminence of the threat, and CIA Director George Tenet might say the lights were blinking red. But Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were not convinced. Nor was Bush. In August 2001, he went to his ranch for a long vacation. Osama bin Laden was not his overriding concern.

Bush's foreign policy and defense advisers were trying to define a strategic framework and adapt U.S. armed forces to the so-called revolution in military affairs. The president himself was beginning to speak more about free trade and remaking U.S. foreign aid. During the presidential campaign, he had talked about both a humbler foreign policy and a reinvigorated defense establishment; how he was going to reconcile those goals was still unclear. But in truth, the president's focus was elsewhere, on the domestic arena—tax cuts, education reform, faith-based voluntarism, energy policy. And then, suddenly, disaster struck.

In response to the attacks, the administration launched a "global war on terror." It chose to focus not on al Qaeda alone but on the worldwide terrorist threat more generally. And it targeted not only deadly nonstate actors but also the regimes that harbored and succored them. To extract actionable intelligence, it resorted to detention, rendition, and, in a few cases, torture.

The administration announced that it was adopting a policy of anticipatory self-defense—essentially, preventive warfare. Bush declared that he would take action to preclude not only imminent threats but also gathering ones, and would act alone if necessary. This approach led eventually to war not only in Afghanistan but in Iraq as well.

The administration also emphasized democratization and the notion of a democratic peace. These became key ingredients of the Bush doctrine, especially after weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not found in Iraq. "We are led by events and common sense to one conclusion," Bush said in his second inaugural address, in January 2005. "The survival of liberty in our land depends on the success of liberty in other lands." Three years after that, as she was about to leave office, Rice also presented this position, saying that she and her colleagues had come to recognize "that democratic state-building is now an urgent component of our national interest."

After 9/11, there was an accelerated buildup of U.S. military and intelligence capabilities. Defense expenditures skyrocketed; counterinsurgency initiatives proliferated; new bases were constructed throughout Central and Southwest Asia; a new military command in Africa was established. The war on terror became the preoccupation of the Bush administration's national security policy.

Alongside its security policies, the administration embraced free markets, trade liberalization, and economic development. It reconfigured and hugely augmented the United States' foreign aid commitments, increasing economic assistance, for example, from about $13 billion in 2000 to about $34 billion in 2008. The administration fought disease, becoming the largest donor to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. It negotiated a deal reducing strategic warheads with Russia, reconfigured the United States' relationship with India, and smoothed over its rocky start with China. And it continued to try to thwart the proliferation of WMD while forging ahead with its work on a ballistic missile defense system. These efforts complemented each other, as the administration was intent on not allowing the proliferation of WMD to stymie its freedom of action in regions deemed important. Nor did it wish to risk the possibility that rogue states might give or sell WMD to terrorists.

Most of these policies—preemption (really prevention), unilateralism, military supremacy, democratization, free trade, economic growth, alliance cohesion, and great-power partnerships—were outlined in the administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, a document composed not in the Office of the Vice President or the Pentagon by neoconservatives but in the office of then National Security Adviser

Rice, largely by Philip Zelikow, an outside consultant, and revised by Rice and her aides before being edited by Bush himself.

September 11, in short, galvanized the Bush administration and prompted it to shift its focus. Fear inspired action, as did a sense of U.S. power, a pride in national institutions and values, a feeling of responsibility for the safety of the public, and a sense of guilt over having allowed the country to be struck. As the White House adviser Karl Rove would write, "We worked to numb ourselves to the fact of an attack on American soil that involved the death of thousands." Reshaping U.S. policy after 9/11 meant resolving the ambiguities and shattering the paralysis that had marked the first nine months of the administration. Before 9/11, the United States' primacy and security had been taken for granted; after 9/11, Washington had to make clear that it could protect the U.S. homeland, defend its allies, oversee an open world economy, and propagate its institutions.

AMERICA'S QUEST FOR PRIMACY

Some observers have compared the impact of 9/11 on U.S. policy to the impact on U.S. policy of North Korea's attack on South Korea in June 1950. Back then, the Truman administration had also been stunned. It had been pondering new initiatives, but the president was still waffling. He had approved the National Security Council report known as NSC-68 but was not quite ready to implement it. The dimensions of a coming U.S. military buildup were uncertain; the global nature of the Cold War still unclear; the ideological crusade still somewhat inchoate. But Dean Acheson, the secretary of state, and Paul Nitze, the director of policy planning at the State Department, knew they had to reconfirm the United States' preponderance of power, recently shattered by the Soviets' first nuclear test. They knew they had to increase the United States' military capabilities, regain the country's self-confidence, and avoid being self-deterred. They knew they had to take responsibility for the operation of global free trade and the reconstruction of the West German and Japanese economies (their successful resuscitation was still uncertain). They knew the United States' supremacy was being contested by a brutal and formidable rival with an ideology that had considerable appeal to impoverished

peoples beginning to yearn for autonomy, equality, independence, and nationhood. In this context, the North Korean attack not only led to the Korean War but also unleashed a major expansion of U.S. global policy more generally.

Whether or not one thinks that such analogies are appropriate, it is incontestable that Bush and his advisers saw themselves as being locked in a similar struggle. And they, too, sought to preserve and reassert the primacy of the United States while they struggled to thwart any follow-up attacks on U.S. citizens or U.S. territory. Like Acheson and Nitze, they were certain that they were protecting a way of life, that the configuration of power in the international arena and the mitigation of threats abroad were vital to the preservation of freedom at home.

Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld did not invent preemptive and preventive war; they have a long history in U.S. foreign policy.

More than Acheson and Nitze, Bush's advisers had trouble weaving the elements of their policy into a coherent strategy that could address the challenges they considered most urgent. It seems clear now that many of their foreign policy initiatives, along with their tax cuts and unwillingness to call for domestic sacrifices, undercut the very goals they were designed to achieve.

Thus, U.S. primacy was ultimately damaged by the failure to execute the occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq effectively and by the anti-Americanism that these flawed enterprises helped magnify. U.S. officials might declare the universal appeal of freedom and proclaim that history has demonstrated the viability of only one form of political economy, but opinion polls throughout the Muslim world have shown that the United States' actions in Iraq and support of Israel were a toxic combination. As liberation turned into occupation and counterinsurgency, the United States and its power were thrown into disrepute.

U.S. primacy was also damaged by the unexpected cost of the protracted wars, recently estimated by the Congressional Research Service to be $1.3 trillion dollars and mounting. It was eroded by the debts that accrued as a result of tax cuts and increased domestic expenditures. Defense spending climbed from $304 billion in 2001 to

$616 billion in 2008, even as the U.S. budget went from a surplus of $128 billion to a deficit of $458 billion. Federal debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 32.5 percent in 2001 to 53.5 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, the U.S. debt held by foreign governments climbed steadily, from about 13 percent at the end of the Cold War to close to 30 percent at the end of the Bush years. U.S. financial strength and flexibility had been seriously eroded.

Rather than preventing peer competitors from rising, the United States' interventions abroad and budgetary and economic woes at home put Washington at a growing disadvantage vis-à-vis its rivals, most notably Beijing. While U.S. forces were bogged down in Southwest Asia, China's growing military capabilities, especially its new class of submarines and its new cruise and ballistic missiles, endangered the United States' supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. trade deficit with China rose from $83 billion in 2001 to $273 billion in 2010, and total U.S. indebtedness to China rose from $78 billion in 2001 to over $1.1 trillion in 2011.

Rather than preserving regional balances, U.S. actions upset the balance in the region that U.S. officials cared most about, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East more generally. The United States' credibility in the region withered, Iraq was largely eliminated as a counterbalance to Iran, Iran's ability to meddle beyond its borders increased, and the United States' ability to mediate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations declined.

Rather than thwarting proliferation, U.S. interventions on behalf of regime change provided additional incentives for rogue nations to pursue WMD. Iranian and North Korean leaders seem to have calculated that, more than ever before, their countries' survival depended on possessing a WMD deterrent (a message that has probably been reinforced by the Obama administration's decision to intervene in Libya in 2011 following Libya's renunciation of its nuclear capability several years earlier).

Rather than promoting free markets, U.S. economic woes spurred protectionist impulses at home and complicated trade negotiations abroad. Efforts to expedite the Doha Round of trade talks faltered, and bilateral trade agreements with Colombia and South Korea stalled.

Rather than promoting liberty, the war on terror coexisted with democratic backsliding globally (at least until the recent Arab Spring).

U.S. war fighting and counterterrorism nurtured Washington's unsavory relationships with some of the world's most illiberal regimes, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Freedom House's 2010 annual report on the state of global political rights and civil liberties, "2009 was the fourth straight year in which more countries saw declines in freedom than saw improvements, the longest continuous period of deterioration in the nearly forty year history of the report."

And rather than thwarting terrorism and radical Islamism, U.S. actions encouraged them. During the war on terror, the number of terrorist incidents rose, and possibly so did the number of jihadists. The U.S. government's own National Intelligence Estimate in 2007 acknowledged that the country lived in a heightened threat environment. A 2008 report on counterterrorism from a respected nonpartisan think tank, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, concluded, "Since 2002–3, the overall US position in the GWOT [global war on terror] has slipped." Although the United States had captured and killed terrorist leaders and operatives, disrupted terrorist networks, seized assets, and built constructive partnerships with counterterrorist agencies abroad, it noted, the gains had been "offset by the metastasis of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the spread and intensification of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, the resurgence of Iranian regional influence, and the growth in the number and political influence of Islamic fundamentalist political parties throughout the world." It is possible that the recent killing of bin Laden will reverse these trends, but many leading experts are skeptical.

Criticism is, of course, easy in hindsight. After 9/11, U.S. officials confronted agonizing challenges and choices. In an atmosphere of extreme fear and real danger, their record included important accomplishments and admirable initiatives. They kept pressure on al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and may well have prevented other attacks on U.S. soil and citizens. They pulled off a major nonproliferation success in getting Libya to abandon its nuclear program, formed a strong relationship with rising powers such as India, and kept relations with China and Russia from boiling over. They reformed and reinvigorated foreign aid, exerted global leadership in the fight against infectious diseases, tried to keep the

Doha Round of trade talks moving forward, and raised the profile of democracy promotion and political reform in ways that may have resonated deeply and contributed to the current ferment across the Middle East.

These successes were outweighed by the administration's failure to achieve many of its most important goals. But critics are wrong to say that the policies that failed were radically new or surprising. They were rooted in the past.

9/11 IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

PREEMPTIVE AND preventive actions were not invented by Bush; his vice president, Dick Cheney; and Rumsfeld; they have a long history in the annals of U.S. foreign policy. A century earlier, President Theodore Roosevelt's "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine was a policy of preventive intervention in the Americas, as were the subsequent U.S. military occupations of countries such as Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Later, President Franklin Roosevelt justified his resort to anticipatory self-defense against German ships in the Atlantic prior to the United States' entry into World War II by saying, "When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him." Some 20 years on, President John F. Kennedy determined that he could not allow a Soviet deployment of offensive weapons about 90 miles from U.S. shores, and he unilaterally imposed a quarantine—essentially a blockade and an act of belligerency—around Cuba during the missile crisis. In Kennedy's view, this was a legitimate preventive step, notwithstanding the fact that it brought the country to the brink of nuclear war. Responding to the threat of terrorism in the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton signed a national security directive declaring that "the United States shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute … individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks." The Roosevelts, Kennedy, and Clinton, along with most of their presidential colleagues, would have agreed with the statement in Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy, which could have been referring to any impending threat, that "history will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action."

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Bush and his advisers, moreover, were hardly alone in seeking regime change abroad in the wake of 9/11. Two weeks after the president's "axis of evil" speech in January 2002, former Vice President Al Gore declared, "There really is something to be said for occasionally putting diplomacy aside and laying one's cards on the table. There is value in calling evil by its name." He continued, "Even if we give first priority to the destruction of terrorist networks, and even if we succeed, there are still governments that could bring great harm. And there is a clear case that one of those governments in particular represents a virulent threat in a class to itself: Iraq. . . . A final reckoning with that government should be on the table." A few days later, then Senator Joe Biden interrupted Powell as he was testifying before Congress. "One way or another," Biden said, "Saddam has got to go, and it is likely to be required to have U.S. force to have him go, and the question is how to do it in my view, not if to do it." Two days later, Sandy Berger, who had been Clinton's national security adviser, insisted in his own testimony that although each part of the axis of evil was an unmistakable danger, Saddam was especially pernicious and ominous, saying that he "was, is, and continues to be a menace to his people, to the region, and to us." Berger continued: "He cannot be accommodated. Our goal should be regime change. The question is not whether, but how and when." And Clinton himself subsequently explained why he supported his successor's decision to invade Iraq: "There was a lot of stuff [WMD] unaccounted for. . . . You couldn't responsibly ignore [the possibility that] a tyrant had these stocks. I never really thought he'd [use them]. What I was far more worried about was that he he'd sell this stuff or give it away."

Conventional wisdom says that Democratic officials might have acted differently after 9/11, and it seems likely that they would have worked more diligently to cooperate with allies in Europe. But the Bush administration's use of force to bring about regime change in countries perceived to be threatening in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks comported with what most Americans believed to be desirable at the time. The administration's military buildup, meanwhile, was neither especially bold nor unprecedented. Its quest to avoid peer competitors resembled the U.S. effort to preserve an atomic monopoly after World War II, achieve military preponderance in the wake of the Korean War, preserve military superiority during the Kennedy years,

regain superiority during the Reagan years, and nurture unipolarity after the Soviet Union's collapse. Clinton's Joint Chiefs of Staff embraced the term "full-spectrum superiority" to describe the country's strategic intentions. It was during the Clinton years, not the Bush years, that the United States started spending more money on defense than virtually all other nations combined. Scholars and practitioners as varied as Andrew Bacevich, Eric Edelman, John Mearsheimer, and Paul Wolfowitz see more continuity than difference in the strategic goals and military practices of all the post–Cold War administrations.

The similarities extend to rhetorical tropes and ideological aspirations as well. It has become fashionable in some circles to excoriate the ideological fervor of the Bush team. But the affirmation of democratic values was hardly new. It was integral to the Wilsonian and Achesonian visions of the world, if not that of Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon. One should recall Kennedy addressing the people of Berlin or launching the Alliance for Progress, President Lyndon Johnson explaining U.S. actions in Vietnam, President Jimmy Carter talking about human rights, and President Ronald Reagan extolling the U.S. role in the world. Their rhetorical tropes resemble Bush's, as do Obama's in his recent speeches. And like his predecessors (and his successor), Bush had little trouble deviating from this message when it suited his administration's strategic or material interests.

The long-term significance of 9/11 for U.S. foreign policy should not be overestimated.

Many argue that U.S. policy after 9/11 was distinguished by its unilateralism. But the instinct to act independently, and to lead the world while doing so, is consonant with the long history of U.S. diplomacy, dating back to President George Washington's Farewell Address and President Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural speech. During the Cold War, U.S. officials always reserved the right to act unilaterally, even while they nurtured alliances. Clinton's last National Security Strategy, and Obama's first, explicitly did the same. There is little doubt that Bush's advisers, inspired by fear and hubris as well as a sense of responsibility and pangs of guilt, had a greater propensity to act unilaterally than did their Democratic predecessors or successors.

But at the same time, they also articulated a desire to strengthen alliances, a goal that was pursued to some good effect after 2005.

Bush is linked even more closely to those who came before and after by his embrace of the open door policy and global free trade. His 2002 National Security Strategy, famous for jettisoning containment and deterrence and embracing anticipatory self-defense, also contained long sections dealing with promoting global economic growth, nurturing free markets, opening societies, and building the infrastructure of democracy. These U.S. policies have a long heritage, dating back to the "open door notes" of Secretary of State John Hay, President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, and Franklin Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter, and they have been a staple of many more recent, if less memorable, statements by Clinton and Obama.

GRAPPLING WITH TRAGEDY

The long-term significance of 9/11 for U.S. foreign policy, therefore, should not be overestimated. The attacks that day were a terrible tragedy, an unwarranted assault on innocent civilians, and a provocation of monumental proportions. But they did not change the world or transform the long-term trajectory of U.S. grand strategy. The United States' quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, its preference for an open door and free markets, its concern with military supremacy, its readiness to act unilaterally when deemed necessary, its eclectic merger of interests and values, its sense of indispensability—all these remained, and remain, unchanged.

What the attacks did do was alter the United States' threat perception and highlight the global significance of nonstate actors and radical Islamism. They alerted the country to the fragility of its security and the anger, bitterness, and resentment toward the United States residing elsewhere, particularly in parts of the Islamic world. But if 9/11 highlighted vulnerabilities, its aftermath illustrated how the mobilization of U.S. power, unless disciplined, calibrated, and done in conjunction with allies, has the potential to undermine the global commons as well as to protect them.

Rather than heaping blame or casting praise on the Bush administration, ten years after 9/11 it is time for Americans to reflect more

deeply about their history and their values. Americans can affirm their core values yet recognize the hubris that inheres in them. They can identify the wanton brutality of others yet acknowledge that they themselves are the source of rage in many parts of the Arab world. Americans can agree that terrorism is a threat that must be addressed but realize that it is not an existential menace akin to the military and ideological challenges posed by German Nazism and Soviet communism. They can acknowledge that the practice of projecting solutions to their problems onto the outside world means that they seek to avoid difficult choices at home, such as paying higher taxes, accepting universal conscription, or implementing a realistic energy policy. Americans can recognize that there is evil in the world, as Obama reminded his Nobel audience in December 2009, and they can admit, as he did, that force has a vital role to play in the affairs of humankind. But they can also recognize that the exercise of power can grievously injure those whom they wish to help and can undercut the very goals they seek to achieve. Americans can acknowledge the continuities in their interests and values yet wrestle with the judgments and tradeoffs that are required to design a strategy that works in a post–Cold War era, where the threats are more varied, the enemies more elusive, and power more fungible.

The bitterness that has poisoned American public discourse in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the wars they triggered should be turned into sorrowful reflection about how fear, guilt, hubris, and power can do so much harm in the quest to do good. This remains the tragedy of American diplomacy that William Appleman Williams, the prominent historian, instructed Americans to confront a half century ago.

TAIWAN

No Small Island

For a country that occupies just over 13,000 square kilometers, Taiwan's geographical size belies its economic clout and political importance in Asia and the rest of the world. Together with Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, Taiwan was among the so-called Asian Tigers that impressed the world with their rapid industrialization in less than a generation following the devastation of the Second World War.

From an agricultural economy with a per-capita gross national product of only $170 in the 1960s, Taiwan catapulted itself from the ranks of the underdeveloped countries in Africa to a hotbed of pioneering technology in the twenty-first century. It now boasts a per-capita GDP of over $35,000.

Because of its contentious political status, Taipei, perhaps like no other government, has had to harmonize its international trade strategy more diligently with its foreign policy to ensure that its de facto allies and trade partners can conduct their business with Beijing effectively.

In recent years, Taiwan appears to have struck that optimum balance in this increasingly integrated world, wherein hard dogma has had to occasionally accommodate practical realities.

So, while staying faithful to its autonomous identity, Taipei has also opted to be less confrontational about it and be more pragmatic in dealing with its much larger, fast-growing neighbor across the Taiwan Strait.

Clearly, that accommodation in diplomacy has allowed Taiwan, already standing on very strong economic fundamentals, to emerge from the 2008 global economic slump virtually unscathed and resume its dynamic performance soon after.

The numbers provide a clearer picture of Taiwan's economic strength, as well as of its improving and more integrated relations with China.

While the global economy recovered in 2009 and posted an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5 percent, Taiwan's GDP surged 10.82 percent, its highest level in twenty-four years, on the back of stronger ex-

CONTINUED ON FOLLOWING PAGES

No small island

ports and more robust domestic demand. And unemployment has sunk to a thirty-year low.

But because of its limited domestic market, Taiwan has prioritized overseas trade relations, especially with neighboring China and longstanding partner, the United States.

A watershed in cross-strait relations, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, or ECFA, was signed by Taipei and Beijing in 2010.

The agreement is designed to reduce tariff and trade barriers between the two sides.

Currently, mainland China is Taiwan's largest export market, followed by Hong Kong, and bilateral trade is estimated at $110 billion.

Because about 42 percent of its goods go across the strait, the Taiwanese government headed by President Ma Ying-Jeou has recognized the need to diversify its export markets if it wants to remain globally competitive in the long run.

With the United States, Taiwan entered into talks for a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, or TIFA.

Negotiations have stalled the past three years, but Taipei remains determined to finalize a free trade agreement (FTA).

"We would like to sign an FTA-like economic agreement with the United States. The importance of doing so is evident, since the United States is one of Taiwan's foremost trading partners," said Foreign Minister Yang Chin-Tien.

"If we do not conclude such an agreement with the United States, Taiwan will be put in a very disadvantageous position, as we will not be able to compete with our main competitors," the foreign minister added.

Home Improvement

While looking further afield to improve trade relations with its neighbors, Taiwan has also launched a multibillion-dollar infrastructure program that is aimed at improving the quality of life, attracting more foreign investment, and making the country the most dynamic trade and transport hub in Asia.

The ambitious plan involves the construction of new roads, high-speed rail links, airports, and seaports, with some projects falling under a build-operate-transfer scheme open to international capital.

Once Asia's tallest building, the Taipei 101 still embodies all the economic and technological achievments of Taiwan in the past several years.

"The Ministry of Transport and Communications has a special mission. Because Taiwan is an island, it is very important to have good air and sea transport networks," said Deputy Minister Yeh Kuang-Shih.

One of the ministry's major projects is the renovation of Taoyuan International Airport's Terminal 1 and Terminal 2.

When the improvements are completed next year, the facility will raise its current annual capacity from 32 million passengers to 37 million, and to 45 million by 2018 with the opening of a third terminal, according to Yeh.

The so-called 18,000-hectare "aerotropolis" in Taoyuan will contain hotels, convention centers, and free trade zones, which play a vital role in the country's economic development program.

Outside of Taoyuan, the government also operates free trade zones around the seaports of Taipei, Kaohsiung, Keelung, and Taichung.

Home-grown banks look across the strait

Amid efforts to internationalize its trade further, Taiwan has not neglected the importance of keeping its domestic economy stable and making it attractive to potential foreign investors.

Among the key pillars that kept the Taiwanese economy strong during the deep and protracted recession from 2007 to 2008 was its stable financial sector and banking industry.

"Our financial structure has been in a stable position because we follow our own regulations. In fact, we have a surplus in our current account every year," stressed Finance Minister Lee Sush-Der.

To make the local economy more attractive to foreign capital, the government of President Ma Ying-Jeou instituted drastic tax cuts.

"We did a lot of tax reform. After 30 years, our flat rate was lowered to just 10 percent. So, a lot of money is coming back already. Corporate income tax was also lowered from 25 percent to 17 percent for all businesses," said Lee.

In the wake of those new measures, the banking sector has experienced a resurgence of activity, with Taipei-based Mega International Commercial Bank reporting impressive profits last year.

While banking giants around the world struggled to get back in the black, so to speak, Mega ICBC posted a 2.44 percent increase in its pretax income last year.

A product of a merger of the International Commercial Bank of China and Chiao Tung Bank in 2006, Mega ICBC has grown to become one of the country's largest financial groups, with 107 local branches, 19 overseas branches, and three representative offices abroad.

As of 2010, the multi-awarded bank had assets of just over $85 billion dollars. Although only fourth in size, Mega ICBC emerged at the top of the industry in terms of profits.

"Our relentless goal is always to be the number one bank in Taiwan through steady and not volatile growth. We'd like to increase our international side," said Chairman Tsai Yeou-Tsair.

"Our bank's specialty is international trade. If a foreign company wants to come to Taiwan, we have very good connections for them. We can advise them, and they can use our network. We have a deep knowledge of industry over the past 60 years," Tsai added.

To remain competitive globally, Mega ICBC is further expanding its operations in China this year and in the Middle East.

According to the bank, it has signed cooperation agreements with Bank of China and Bank of Communication in the first quarter of 2011, and is not ruling out an alliance with other leading Chinese banks.

"Our bank may also be a good bridge for foreign banks and other institutions to get into China," he also said.

Like all players in the local industry, Fubon Financial Holding has staked its future growth on its business with mainland China.

Fubon Financial Holding owns Taipei Fubon Bank as well as the country's second-largest life insurance company and the largest general insurance, property, and casualty insurance company.

Meanwhile, its securities company has secured the third-largest market share.

"China remains our main strategic focus. We have an investment in Xiamen through Fubon Bank (Hong Kong), which was the first Taiwanese bank set up in Hong Kong," said President Victor Kung.

"We also established a general insurance company in China, which is also headquartered in Xiamen. In life insurance, we signed a contract with Nanjing Zijin Investment, and expect to be awarded a life insurance license later this year or early next year," Kung added.

For the Fubon group, Taiwan possesses a competitive edge over other regional players when it comes to business in mainland China.

"We have a certain lead in customer service on the retail side, as well as on small and medium banking. So these are the areas that we could really contribute to the Chinese banking sector," said Kung.

"We already have a lot of Taiwanese clients who are very familiar with mainland China. Through their relationship with us, we can serve as an intermediary—in introducing new foreign parties to them, helping foreign parties enter mainland China through our clients, as well as introducing them to potential Taiwanese joint venture partners operating in China, with us playing the part of corporate financier and adviser," he added.

"Geographically, Taiwan has a strategic location in the center of East Asia, at the heart of Asia. We need to leverage our close affinity with China, so that businesspeople can go to China from Taiwan and set up their business operations in Taiwan, making use of ECFA," Yeh said.

"Another opportunity is the Taoyuan High Speed Rail station, where we have 22 hectares that we would like someone to develop into an industrial zone, focused on medical tourism," he added.

Because of its geographical closeness to mainland China and its strength in various high-tech sectors, Taiwan has been promoting itself as the ideal springboard to enter the massive and potentially lucrative Chinese market for American and other foreign companies unfamiliar with its culture.

For several years now, Taiwan has consolidated its reputation as a hotbed of new technology, whether it was in manufacturing in the 1980s, information technology in the 1990s, biotechnology in the 2000s, and green technology in the present decade.

Today, the Taiwanese economy boasts an impressive, highly diverse profile of pioneering and well-performing industrial sectors, which has kept the country highly attractive to foreign investors.

"We are strong in industrial clusters. We are rich in financial capital. We also have a very talented workforce," said Economic Affairs Minister Shih Yen-Shiang.

"In the last twenty years, we have shifted our capability from OEM to ODM. We now have a lot of strength in design and innovation, and I have strong confidence that Taiwan will go into the own-brand business in ten years. The Chinese market is growing so fast. The domestic market is also growing. That is the basis for building the own-brand business," Shih also said.

Science of Growth, Growth of Science

One of the most common associations to Taiwan's brand has been its sterling reputation in science and technology, whether it is in IT, biosciences, or green energy.

Ensuring that Taiwan does not lose that competitive edge is the National Science Council, the main government agency in charge of promoting and funding science research in the country.

The government strategy to set up science parks and industrial clusters was undeniably vital in Taiwan's meteoric rise as an economic powerhouse and its continued strength, even in the midst of recessions.

In fact, a World Bank study named Taiwan the top knowledge-based economy in Asia, and according to National Science Council minister Lee Lou-Chuang, the country holds a 28 percent global market share in ICT design.

The National Science Council supervises the Central Taiwan Science Park, the Southern Taiwan Science Park, and the Hsinchu Science Park.

Determined to stay at the economic forefront, it has launched programs in agricultural biotechnology, telecommunications, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, disaster reduction, energy, genomic medicine, nanoscience and nanotechnology, e-learning and digital archiving, and semiconductors and integrated circuits.

And among the pioneers of Taiwan's technology sector is Delta Electronics.

Celebrating its fortieth year, the Taipei-based company has grown from a fifteen-man operation to one of the world's largest and reliable providers of power, networking, and wireless solutions.

"Reliability is of extreme importance. We sell our products at a minimum cost but not necessarily at a minimum price. When users buy our equipment, there's less trouble and thus, less service charges. In the process, using Delta is the lowest cost option," said Chairman and Founder Bruce Cheng.

Delta Electronics was also the only Taiwanese company to make CNBC's European Business magazine's list of the Global Top 100 Low-Carbon Pioneers.

"We try to make something that can be used longer. Others say that the more efficient and long-lasting a power source is, the less business you have. This is wrong. To ensure the next generation has enough natural materials to continue, you've got to find economical ways to make energy last longer and, if possible, be reusable at a lower cost," Cheng explained.

With such overall strengths, it is not huge surprise that Taiwan has remained one of the world's most stable economies and a preferred investment destination.

And that combination of pragmatism, financial strength, and technological knowhow will continue yielding bright forecasts and positive results

"We are bullish on the overall economic growth of Taiwan. We are still bullish on the technology industry. We've got some winners in Taiwan, who are nearly impossible to dethrone. In the rapidly maturing tech industry, Taiwan has carved out a very strong position. And that will continue," said Bill Wiseman, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei.

TAIWAN

Taiwanese Education

An overlooked world champion

The National Sun Yat-sen University in Kaohsiung is another of Taiwan's most prestigious schools.

Although Taiwan's economic miracle has been well documented, the primary reason for its present-day leadership in technology and entrepreneurship has often been underreported. The country boasts world-class higher education.

Higher education has been a cornerstone of Taiwan's growth, development, and employment.More than 60 percent of Taiwanese have received higher education, putting the country at number five in tertiary enrollment in the 2009 World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report, which ranked Taiwan sixth out of 133 countries in the category of innovation.

Also, the 2010 Times Higher Education–QS World University Rankings placed nine Taiwanese universities in the top 500, with National Taiwan University figuring in the top 100.

In the same year, a survey of Essential Science Indicators (ESI) had five Taiwanese universities in the top 1 percent of the world's research institutions in sixteen of twenty-one specialized fields of study.

One of those universities was the Hsinchu-based National Chiao Tung University (NCTU).

Founded in 1958, NCTU set up the country's first semiconductor laboratory, which spurred the Taiwanese economic miracle. Today, the school is a research-oriented comprehensive university with nine colleges and 13,000 students, 7,000 of which are graduate students.

NCTU specializes in engineering, semiconductors, photonics, ICT, and computer science.

Its computer science department placed thirty-second in the ESI survey and came in at number 35 in Shanghai Jiao Tong University's Academic Ranking of World Universities for 2010, while its engineering department was ranked 32 and 47 respectively in those same surveys.

"If you look at a list of the top one hundred high-tech companies in the world over the past ten years, around twenty companies will be from Taiwan, and about 60 percent of those were started by NCTU alumni," boasted Dr. Shang H. Hsu, dean of the Office of International Affairs of NCTU.

NCTU has attracted many students because of its close connection to private industry.

"To attract more incoming students from top universities in the United States, we hold two-month international summer programs that include Chinese language and culture courses and, most importantly, internships with local high tech companies in Hsinchu Science-Based Park," Hsu said.

"We want to increase the number of students from the United States, particularly engineering students from first- and second-tier U.S. universities, whose standards are comparable to ours," Hsu added.

NCTU has also been one of the Taiwanese universities selected for partnerships by foreign companies, such as Corning, Intel, IBM, and Microsoft.

"These companies establish research labs on campus. These industry-leading companies have a lot of new ideas but do not know if they are feasible. We do the feasibility studies and share the intellectual property because NCTU has the top and largest intellectual property office in Taiwan," explained Vice President Dr. Jason Yi-Bing Lin.

"We also collaborate with U.S. companies and bring their technology into Taiwan through a domestic company. For example, we recently worked with Telcordia. Once the collaborative research was completed, we approached Taiwan's largest telecom, Chunghwa Telecom, to see if they were interested in implementing the technology," Lin added.

Another of Taiwan's reputable schools is Fu Jen Catholic University (FJU), located on the outskirts of the capital, Taipei.

FJU has eleven colleges and 27,000 students, and its college of management was the very first in the greater China area to receive AACSB accreditation in 2005 and was included in the top five percent of business schools in the world.

Its AACSB accrediation was renewed in 2010.

"Fu Jen is a Catholic university that combines Chinese and Western cultures. We are committed to constructing an excellent, distinctive, and international university in order to become the most distinctive Catholic university in the Greater China Area," said Vice President Dr. Lucia S. Lin.

Highlighting FJU's reputation is its medical school, which has risen quickly to the top, primarily due to its style of instruction.

"Our medical school has now graduated three classes and one of our graduates received the top score in the national exam. This is due to the pedagogy that we use to educate our medical students. We use a comprehensive system of problem-based learning. We ask students to learn collaboratively and from their first year onwards, we divide them into small groups, with each assigned to a tutor who is an MD. It is quite costly, but we invest in our programs," said Lin.

In an economy once known for its strength in original equipment manufacturing, and now displaying a new strength in original design manufacturing, FJU has built up an expertise in fashion and design. In fact, the university will soon launch an all-English-language bachelor's degree in Asian brand and fashion management.

To date, FJU has 185 affiliated schools from 34 countries, including 58 from the United States. This includes the development of six dual-degree programs with American universities, including Temple University, the University of San Francisco, and Texas A&M International University.

Unique to the university, FJU has a triple degree, the joint Master of Global Entrepreneurship and Management, with the University of San Francisco and Universitat Ramon Llull of Spain.

At the end of the one-year, nonstop course, which involves a term in each of the schools, students get master's degrees from all three universities.

But Taiwan is not resting on its current educational achievements.

With an aging population, overcrowding in its universities, and a low birth rate, Taiwan realizes that the future of its higher learning enrollment is growing more dependent on the international students it attracts. This is the reason forty-seven universities have entered into joint or dual-degree partnerships with international counterparts.

According to Dr. Lin Tsong-Ming, political deputy minister of education, "We have to internationalize. International students currently make up about 3.3 percent of the student population, or about 45,000. We want to promote Taiwanese schools more and want to increase that number by 10 percent yearly to around 150,000 by 2020."

Join Fu Jen Catholic University to connect to the world!

A world-renowned university that offers education for a new era

Fu Jen Catholic University strives to provide students with a diversified, holistic, interdisciplinary, and international learning environment, providing a well-balanced division between general education and professional training with a special emphasis on humanistic discipline.

To enhance global competitiveness, the University is devoted to developing further links with educational institutions overseas. Fu Jen Catholic University has established partnerships with 185 sister institutions around the globe, providing an international learning environment through tightened academic exchange and cooperation.

On campus, a wide variety of extracurricular activities and self-learning programs is an integral part of the holistic education at the University. Through these activities and programs, students learn the meaning of democracy, leadership, and a sense of responsibility, becoming ethically and socially sensitive citizens.

Learn global business perspectives with tri-degree MBA program

The University promotes high-quality joint programs and projects with renowned universities overseas as well. The joint Master of Global Entrepreneurship and Management (MGEM), a tri-degree master's program, provides rigorous studies in entrepreneurship and management at three of the following AACSB-accredited institutions: IQS in Spain, Fu Jen Catholic University in Taiwan, and the University of San Francisco in USA.

The well-designed curriculum allows students to immerse themselves in an unmatched multi-national business experience of each city's unique business culture, receiving degrees from all three universities within one year.

"Taiwan Studies" provides path to promising Greater China region

The International Master Degree Program in Taiwan Studies (IMTS) is unique in its academic perspective by emphasizing humanistic spirituality and social compassion. It is the first program aimed at recruiting students who want to understand the Chinese community and pursue their career in the Greater China area.

The program develops students' creativity and strengthens their practice and application abilities through properly designed relevant field trips, workshops, and internships. Courses are all conducted in English and include "Taiwan-specific" aspects. Thus, students will not only have access to professional academic-achievement but will also develop a humanistic spirit, compassion for society, and an awareness of the Taiwanese culture.

Be a part of Fu Jen to enrich your future career

After 85 years of developing since its establishment, the University has cultivated nearly 170,000 outstanding alumni worldwide. Its glorious history and excellent achievements have made this university a favored selection for students from China. In celebration of the 50th anniversary of Fu Jen's re-founding in Taiwan, the faculty and staff strive to reach the goals of internationalization, excellence, distinction, and refinement as one of the top universities in the world!

Fact Sheet

Established by the Catholic Church in 1925

Ranked 38th in the Greater China region (QS2011)

Received AACSB international accreditation in 2005 and the accreditation was renewed in 2010

Comprises 11 colleges, 48 departments, 47 master's programs, 22 in-service master's programs, and 11 doctoral programs, with 23,000 students on campus

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Leaving Afghanistan to the Afghans

A Commander's Take on Security

David M. Rodriguez

In the summer of 2011, I visited the Afghan army's Regional Military Training Center in Helmand Province. The recruits had been there for two weeks, and they looked as strong as any group of U.S. soldiers in basic training. The Afghan drill instructors were as competent, and had the same cocky swagger, as American ones. "Sir, look at all of our volunteers," one drill sergeant proudly said to me. "They're great. We have already won. . . . We just don't know it yet."

To comprehend the United States' progress in Afghanistan, it is important to understand how and where we have focused our resources and what work lies ahead. To be sure, the United States and its coalition partners still have plenty of challenges left to tackle in Afghanistan. However, there are indisputable gains everywhere we have focused our efforts.

In 2009, General Stanley McChrystal, then the commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, with the help of David Petraeus, then the commander of the U.S. Central Command, worked hard to design a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign for Afghanistan that would "get the inputs right," as Petraues often said. The upshot was more resources, troops, and civilian support and better

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command coherence. There are now more Afghan and coalition soldiers in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces alone than there were in all of Regional Command East, the formation responsible for security in Afghanistan's 14 eastern provinces, when I commanded the latter from 2007 to 2008. As 33,000 U.S. troops begin the drawdown, returning to the United States by next summer, 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police will be in place to continue their work. There are clear signs of progress in Afghanistan, and coalition forces have regained the initiative.

The strategy has worked because it sought to match the coalition's goals with available resources. It involved four major concepts. First, use a bottom-up approach founded on good governance, capable security forces, and engagement with local communities. If towns had good leaders and security providers, populations would find local solutions to their local problems, with just a little help from Kabul. Insurgents could no longer exploit popular grievances about security, justice, and a lack of basic services.

Yet coalition troops did not have the resources to carry out a local, bottom-up approach everywhere simultaneously, hence the second principle: certain areas—population and commercial centers and major transportation routes—are more important to the effort than others. The coalition identified about one-third of the country's landmass and one-fourth of Afghanistan's districts as such key terrain. Since then, with much-expanded Afghan security forces, it has focused on securing those places. Meanwhile, the coalition's civilian counterparts have supported the strategy by concentrating their development programs in the key terrain that troops have cleared of insurgents.

Even in those areas, coalition forces could not let what they wanted to achieve distract them from what they needed to achieve. The third principle, then, was to do only what was required to meet the coalition's objectives. In the spring of 2011, I was traveling with General Shir Mohammed Karimi, chief of staff of the Afghan army. An Afghan soldier asked him when his unit was going to get more GPS devices. "Why do you ask me this?" Karimi responded. "We are a poor country! Get out your maps." He knew all too well that we should not try to build for Afghanistan the equivalent of the United Kingdom's security forces, or Germany's government, or try to achieve Poland's level of development. Afghanistan resides in a rough neighborhood, and the coalition must be realistic about its objectives. At a minimum, the

security forces must keep Afghans safe enough to live basically normal lives. Of course, it is important to monitor trends of violent activity, but such data alone do not tell the whole story. On May 8, 2011, the day after several simultaneous attacks rocked Kandahar City, I traveled there with Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, Afghanistan's minister of the interior, to study the police response. It was apparent that the police had responded well, leaving the people feeling safe enough to resume their everyday lives almost immediately.

The fourth concept of the strategy was that the Taliban and their associates were not the Afghans' only enemy. Venal or incompetent officials alienate the population. Criminal patronage networks have thrived on poorly managed aid dollars. And some of the practices of the coalition forces, such as their early reliance on casualty-heavy air strikes and brutish warlords, created legitimate grievances among the population. Over the past year, the coalition has made preventing civilian causalities a top priority. Coalition troops are experts at the precise application of violence, and they are learning to let an insurgent live to fight another day if the collateral damage from killing him would outweigh the benefits. Casualties caused by the coalition decreased by 20 percent between 2009 and 2010 and were vastly outnumbered by those caused by insurgents.

If the combined Afghan and international civil-military team enabled good leaders, limited the freedom of action of criminal patronage networks, and reformed poor international practices, the insurgency would be much easier to deal with. As U.S. troops depart, and Afghans are handed control, these tasks will become even more important.

THE CAMPAIGN

In 2009, the Taliban enjoyed nearly uncontested control over Afghanistan's southern Helmand and Kandahar Provinces. Drawing on the four principles, that year the coalition and its Afghan partners drafted a military campaign plan for Afghanistan called Operation Omid (*omid* means "hope" in Dari). The coalition hit the Taliban where it hurt, attacking their leaders and their control of territory and people. Soon, Afghan and coalition forces had pacified the central Helmand River valley, which bisects the province. The area around the valley is also rapidly being stabilized.

Next, Afghan and coalition forces drove the Taliban, who seemed unprepared for the forces' strength, out of key terrain in Kandahar Province: Kandahar City and its environs, other densely populated areas, and commercial routes between the two provinces. Meanwhile, troops also expanded the security zone around Kabul, in eastern Afghanistan, and continue to interdict insurgents on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Parts of other central and eastern provinces—Khost, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, and Wardak—have also seen concrete gains in terms of stability.

In Afghanistan's north, insurgents have made headlines, assassinating General Mohammed Daud Daud, northern Afghanistan's chief of police, and General Abdul Rahman Sayedkhili, a provincial police chief. Both men were prominent Tajik leaders. But the region's key terrain—Mazar-e Sharif and the commercial route along the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor—remains secure.

Finally, in Afghanistan's west, Herat City is bustling and ready to initiate the transition to local control. The area has even become stable enough to begin construction on the road to link the western province of Badghis and the northern province of Faryab, which will connect Herat to Mazar-e Sharif.

Thanks to their successes, the Afghan security forces have garnered more popular support countrywide, cultivating people's desire to work with Afghan soldiers and police to defend themselves against the insurgency. As a result, the population is more willing to tip off Afghan and coalition troops about enemy activity. Polling in Helmand has indicated that the number of respondents who believe they are secure has risen fourfold since 2009. The increased scope and tempo of Afghan and coalition operations have helped. For example, by 2011, the combined forces were recovering four times as many weapons caches per week as they had been even the year before.

In other words, the coalition strategy has been a success, and it continues to create the conditions for expanded Afghan control over security. Insurgents face more effective Afghan security forces and a more widespread government presence. They seem to have recognized this change and shifted their strategy accordingly. Insurgents now target those things and individuals who threaten their control over the people: government officials, police stations, and elders of representative community councils. They attempt spectacular attacks, such as the recent one on the

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Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, and frequently wear Afghan army or coalition uniforms, in the hopes of weakening the population's growing faith in Afghanistan's security forces. So far, they have failed.

The goal is for Afghan forces to assume lead responsibility for security by the end of 2014, and they are already on their way to meeting it. At the end of 2010, the army was almost 143,000 strong, surpassing that year's goal of 134,000 soldiers. The force has quickly become one of the country's most respected institutions, but before taking their hand off the back of the bicycle seat completely, coalition forces will still have to help the army develop better leadership, decrease its attrition rate and absences without leave, balance its tribal and ethnic representation, and improve its handling of logistics.

In 2011, 95 percent of all Afghan army units have been partnered with coalition forces, and they are showing steady improvement in providing security and in their ability to independently thwart insurgent attacks. This past year, the Afghan army doubled the number of operations it successfully led. It is gratifying to see the army taking responsibility and doing some things even better than coalition troops, such as avoiding civilian casualties. As one Canadian junior officer told me, "I never leave the forward operating base without my [Afghan] partner. If I do, I am blind, deaf, and dumb."

For many Afghans, the police are the most visible security providers and representatives of the government. By the end of 2010, the Afghan police force boasted nearly 120,000 officers, 11,000 more than its target. It is imperative that the police force continue to develop professionally. For a time, police recruiting and training focused on quantity rather than quality. Only recently has the proportion of adequately trained officers exceeded half. To remedy the force's shortcomings, the coalition has initiated programs to develop leadership qualities and improve literacy. The Afghan National Civil Order Police, Afghanistan's gendarmerie-like force, is the police force's most capable arm. Its recruitment is strong, and officer retention is improving. The force is in constant and effective use, but it should not be overburdened, lest attrition become a problem.

Meanwhile, better security has allowed civilians in the Afghan government to renew their own efforts. There are now significantly more trained civil servants in Afghanistan than there were two years ago. They have been deployed to key terrain districts that have been cleared,

where they provide services to people who have never before had them. Informal representative community councils have emerged, taking the opinions, needs, and desires of the people to the local governments. Those people have begun to hold their local governments more accountable. I have witnessed courageous acts. I'll never forget one 2010 meeting of local officials in Helmand Province. A young man stood before one of the region's major power brokers and, pointing his finger in the man's direction, announced to the room, "This man does not represent me."

Indeed, there have also been notable signs of progress in governance at the district and provincial levels this past year, particularly in the Helmand River valley, which saw a hard-fought contest for control; in Kandahar City and surrounding districts; and in some cities in eastern Afghanistan. These improvements are largely the work of good government officials, professionals who are unencumbered by, or are assisted in, the task of exercising local control. Last year, hundreds of government officials were replaced at the subnational level, the vast majority because someone else was more qualified for the role, showing that the Afghan government recognizes the importance of good leadership and merit-based hiring. Kabul must now supply reliable funding to help these new government officials provide services to the people.

The example of Helmand Province is illustrative. Official assessments show that governance has improved there; almost all the critical civil servant positions there have been filled, which helps ensure that the government will keep providing basic services, including stepping in during disputes and when traditional justice mechanisms fail. This is critical. One of the things that the Taliban offered was a justice system, which, although brutal, was preferable to none.

The 2010 publication of the U.S. military's *Counterinsurgency (COIN) Contracting Guidance*, authored by Petraeus, was accompanied by new initiatives to make the coalition's assistance more transparent. One, Task Force 2010, focused on correcting the coalition's contracting problems. The other, Joint Task Force Shafafiyat (*shafafiyat* means "transparency" in Dari and Pashto), sought to address corruption. As a result of this guidance, coalition forces have been doing a much better job of channeling assistance and construction dollars into the right hands. All companies that compete for contracts worth more than $1 million are vetted, and large contracts are routinely broken down into smaller ones to ensure broader (and fairer) competition. Coalition contracts can also

now be canceled without notice or penalty in the case of wrongdoing and generally include requirements to use local labor, structure salaries fairly, and teach the Afghans those skills that are in greatest demand. In general, the new strategy, bolstered by more resources, has proved to be successful wherever we have focused our efforts.

WHAT'S NEXT?

THE COMING reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan may mean that the coalition will have to find alternative ways to accomplish some of its lowest-priority objectives. But the logic of the campaign will not change. For now, Afghan and coalition troops will continue to concentrate on securing southern Afghanistan, with supporting efforts to expand security in other areas, such as into the northern Helmand River valley, Kandahar City, Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, and Herat and along the Baghlan-Kunduz corridor and the "ring road." In fact, many of these areas are already quite secure, especially Kabul, which is home to one-fifth of Afghanistan's population.

As stability comes to these regions, Afghan and coalition forces will likely move the main effort eastward. There is a lot of work left to be done in the country's east, and Afghan forces, supported by the coalition, will have a tough fight ahead. It is unlikely that they will ever be able to completely deny insurgents a haven, kill all their leaders, or interdict all the routes they use to infiltrate the eastern provinces. Still, Afghanistan should be able to withstand those challenges and avoid falling into the hands of the Taliban or hosting foreign terrorists, and the United States' main interest in the region will thus be met.

In the end, Afghanistan will at least see its densely populated areas and commercial routes better connected. Improved governance will cement and accelerate the security gains and bolster the population's trust in the government's ability to provide for a better future. Short of a significant increase in terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan's neighbors, I am confident that Afghan forces, supported by the coalition, can achieve irreversible gains and successfully secure Afghanistan's key terrain by the end of 2014.

Afghan leaders and soldiers will start to lead more operations, with the coalition providing only advisory or technical support. The Afghan

security forces will be capable of fighting and managing the vast majority of the organizational, administrative, and logistical tasks related to counterinsurgency on their own. Of course, the United States will continue to assist them with intelligence support, air support, medical evacuation, and quick-reaction forces (which will be located increasingly further away) until their own programs develop. I expect that U.S. special operations forces will operate in Afghanistan for some time.

Meanwhile, the police will have to serve the population more effectively, in partnership with Afghanistan's own army. In major urban centers, this is already starting to take place. Afghans are fighters and bring to the security forces significant spirit and capability. Their partnership with coalition troops helps them build up their confidence to use the skills they already have and learn the ones they don't. With the drawdown approaching, the task will be to do all this faster.

To win the race against time, coalition forces will need to address four issues. First, they must figure out how to maximize partnerships with all levels of the Afghan government, so as to create a comprehensive political strategy. The coalition's and the Afghan government's public criticism of each other should stop; constructive talks based on mutual interests should be the coin of the realm. The coalition must be more understanding of the constraints and pressures on the Afghan political leadership, and both must hold each other accountable for actions that clearly run counter to shared interests.

Second, the United States must work with Pakistan to address the challenges that emanate from the Taliban's and other extremist groups' sanctuaries there. If the situation worsens in Pakistan's ungoverned spaces, the Afghan government will have to build even stronger security forces and local communities. It would take time to build them up to a point where they were resilient enough to handle an expanded threat from the other side of the border.

Third, there are several reasons to worry about ethnic tensions within the government and the security forces. Although all Afghan government and security institutions have prescriptions for the balance of ethnicities, better mechanisms are needed to enforce those rules. Stability in Afghanistan depends on the existence of sufficiently fair representation and a sense of ownership among all constituencies.

Finally, the dialogue between the United States and Afghanistan, and between NATO and Afghanistan, must advance. The West's

immediate objectives can best be met if it offers Afghanistan and other states in the region predictability and assurances about its plans beyond 2014. The long-term strategic partnership must be defined in advance to minimize the relationship's volatility.

When I stepped down as commander of the ISAF Joint Command in July of this year, I was certain of having tried to make best possible use of the manpower and funding available. I know the American men and women in uniform and civilian personnel who remain in Afghanistan—and the United States' coalition partners—will continue to meet the goals of the mission. As a result, U.S. troops can begin to return home from Afghanistan knowing that they are drawing down from a position of strength.

We have proved that wherever Afghan and coalition forces focus their efforts, they make progress. And as we go forward, we must continue to be disciplined in allocating resources, staying true to our objectives, and combating all the enemies of the Afghan people. We must continue to support the Afghan security forces and the government, encouraging good leaders and inspiring others to join in helping create a positive future. If we maintain momentum, it is possible to achieve what we desire and what the people of Afghanistan deserve—a country stable enough to ensure a future free of the threat of al Qaeda's return or an insurgent overthrow of the government.

In the future, new wars may emerge in other poorly governed and underdeveloped nations. It is imperative for the U.S. military to learn from its decadelong engagement in Afghanistan, absorbing the lessons of the experience there to avoid having to relearn the same lessons again later. The army must be versatile enough to succeed in regular wars, irregular wars, and wars that combine aspects of both. Those forces that can adapt with the greatest speed will prevail. As a wealthy nation, the United States has tended to rely on technology and cutting-edge equipment to prepare for war. As Americans ponder what we have learned from Afghanistan, we would do well to heed another truism: equipment becomes obsolete, but leadership and people do not. Ultimately, the U.S. military will succeed by cultivating leaders who can think critically, be adaptable, and embrace uncertainty—just as it has done in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's Ethnic Puzzle

Decentralizing Power Before the U.S. Withdrawal

Thomas Barfield

In late 2001, when U.S. forces expelled the Taliban from Afghanistan, the country appeared headed for a breakup. The United States and the rest of the international community feared that Afghanistan's rival ethnic groups would use their regional power bases to pull apart any unitary state, forming in its place independent ministates or aligning with their ethnic brethren across Afghanistan's borders. At the time, such fears seemed credible: NATO troops were still dealing with the fallout from the violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

The Afghans themselves, however, were less concerned about their country dividing. After all, Afghanistan has been a single state for more than 250 years. If the country were going to split, it would have done so in the 1990s, during its protracted civil war. Yet it did not. No Afghan leader of any political stripe or ethnicity endorsed secession at any time during the last century. Nor did any at the start of this one. Although Afghanistan's various ethnic factions disagreed about how the country's new government should be organized and who would wield power within it, they all proclaimed their support for a unitary state.

A decade later, the anxiety of Washington and its allies has reversed itself. If in 2001 the West was afraid that the absence of a strong centralized government in Kabul would prompt Afghanistan's dissolution, by 2011 the West has come to fear that a dysfunctional centralized

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Thomas Barfield is Professor of Anthropology at Boston University and the author of *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*.

government could cause this same outcome. Such a turn of events was caused by several factors, perhaps most of all by many Afghans' dissatisfaction with a centralized national administrative structure that cannot cope with the country's regional diversity or with expectations for local self-rule. The government in Kabul has been further undermined by the country's fraudulent 2009 presidential election, the absence of political parties, poor security, and general corruption.

As a result, the fears of 2001 have come to life, as regional and ethnic ties have taken on an ever-larger role in Afghan politics and society. Networks based on ethnicity have become stronger conduits for patronage and protection and have often merged with criminal syndicates that exploit similar ties. After 2005, when the Taliban insurgency began to reenergize in Afghanistan's largely Pashtun southern and eastern regions, part of its appeal was rooted in this local opposition to the dysfunctional government led by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Yet despite this reality, the United States and its allies seem not to have considered whether a different configuration of the Afghan state and its leadership—one created by the Afghans themselves—might prove more stable and inclusive than the present one. Devolving the political authority to redress the current imbalance between national and local governance is not the first step toward Afghanistan's disintegration but a way to avoid it. Such reforms would solve a dilemma currently standing in the way of peace in Afghanistan: how to create space for dealing with insurgents whose concerns are local rather than national or international. In 2001, Afghans from every region and ethnic group were so eager for peace that they accepted the restoration of a flawed central government. Today, the mood is quite different. Unless the United States and its allies confront—and resolve—the problem of political legitimacy before foreign forces leave the country, the West's efforts to create a stable Afghanistan will fail.

LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION

AFGHANISTAN'S POPULATION of 30 million people is divided into seven major ethnic groups—the Pashtuns, the Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the Aimaqs, the Turkmens, and the Baluchis—and many smaller ones. Although the Pashtuns claim to be the national majority,

most analysts believe they constitute only a plurality of between 40 and 45 percent. However, each ethnic group does constitute the majority in one or more of Afghanistan's regions: Pashtuns in the south and east, Tajiks in the northeast and west, Hazaras in the center, and Uzbeks in the northwest. On the political level, ethnicity in Afghanistan is more descriptive than operational, as most individuals' primary loyalty is local—to kin, village, valley, or region. There is little political cohesiveness within large ethnic groups, except when faced with an enemy ethnic group. Meanwhile, crosscutting ties of intermarriage, bilingualism, and political alliance regularly transcend ethnicity. Among non-Pashtuns, shared location is even more important: different ethnic communities in the same towns and villages often display more solidarity with one another than they do with their ethnic compatriots from other parts of the country. As a result, Afghan ethnic groups have never viewed themselves as fixed nationalities with an overriding commonality and history that would require political unity or a nation-state. Instead, ethnicity in Afghanistan is essentially prenationalist, with ethnic groups holding similar economic and political interests but no common ideology or separatist aspirations. Moreover, the multiethnic state had long been the accepted norm in Afghanistan; it was not some anomaly that needed rectification. Ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan historically centered on which group would dominate the state and subordinate others, not over which group would have exclusive control of a territory.

For most of the time between the sixth century BC, when the Persian Empire was founded, and the mid-eighteenth century, Afghanistan was divided among empires based in Central Asia, India, and Iran. These Turkish and Persian ruling dynasties taxed and administered each region's cities, trade routes, and most productive agricultural areas. They won political support by tying themselves to local elites who became junior partners in government. These regimes ignored the poor mountainous and desert regions, since they would not repay the cost of administration, until they caused trouble. (The proud boast that Afghanistan has never been conquered is true only for these remote regions, not its cities and productive lands.) In 1747, a Pashtun dynasty founded by Ahmad Shah Durrani took control of Afghanistan for the first time, but Durrani followed the same pattern



MIKE REAGAN

as his Turkish and Persian predecessors. Rulers in Kabul appointed governors (often their relatives) to regional cities but let these governors remain largely autonomous.

This pattern changed when Abdur Rahman Khan came to the throne in 1880. Later known as the Iron Amir, Rahman aimed to rule Afghanistan directly, without relying on intermediaries. Before finally subduing the country in 1895, his regime put down more than 40 uprisings and killed more than 100,000 people. He ended the regional political autonomy that had formerly characterized Afghanistan and concentrated all political power in Kabul. The Pashtuns became Afghanistan's politically privileged group, although the Tajiks ran the government's administration. Uzbek, Aimaq, and Turkmen leaders disappeared from public life, even in their home regions; the Hazaras, meanwhile, faced active discrimination. Although all succeeding Afghan regimes emulated Rahman's centralized state, it proved hard to maintain. In the century following Rahman's death in 1901, every one of Afghanistan's rulers either died violently or was driven into exile.

CULTURE WARS

Although ethnic conflict played a role in Afghan politics in the twentieth century, it was never the reason for state collapse. Instead, it was ideology that brought down most regimes. The country was cleaved by an unresolved conflict between the modernizing elites in Kabul and the country's more conservative rural inhabitants. The modernizers assumed that they could change Afghanistan by decree, but they underestimated the military strength and administrative capacity required to accomplish such a task. This conflict first proved fatal in 1929, when the reform-minded Amanullah Khan was overthrown by rural revolts only months after demanding sweeping social and legal changes. Two generations later, in 1978, the same conflict arose when the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan promulgated radical new social and economic policies that alienated rural Afghans. Only a Soviet invasion the next year and a protracted occupation would keep the PDPA in power.

These conflicts did not pit different ethnic groups against one another: Pashtun kings and Communists opposed rural Pashtun mullahs and tribal khans; a progressive Persian-speaking intelligentsia in Kabul opposed conservative Persian-speaking villagers. In both 1929 and 1978, insurgents allied across ethnic and regional lines, citing the common threat to their traditional ways of life and interpretations of Islam. (Although the current insurgency in Afghanistan reflects similar ideological and cultural fault lines, the Taliban have found it more difficult to transcend their rural Pashtun ethnic base.) In Afghanistan, such ideological conflicts are associated with opposition to established regimes, whereas ethnic and regional conflicts emerge in the vacuum after a state collapse. Despite the decade that has passed since the Taliban were driven from power, Afghanistan, at least politically, still remains in this post-collapse era of uncertainty. Therefore, frustrating the Taliban insurgency is less about confronting the Taliban's ideology, which was never very popular in Afghanistan, than it is about creating a more stable and legitimate Afghan state.

If insurgencies topple established Afghan governments, their stable replacements emerge from the crucible of civil war. Rural rebels may stay united long enough to bring down governments in Kabul but

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lack enough internal cohesion to create stable regimes of their own. When faced with a common threat or united in a common goal, such groups readily set aside the disputes that ordinarily divide them, only to rediscover them once the goal has been achieved. This dynamic played out most clearly in the 1929 alliance of conservative Tajiks (from north of Kabul) and Pashtun tribes (from eastern Afghanistan) that overthrew Amanullah. These former allies became enemies when Habibullah Kalakani, the leader of the Tajik faction, unilaterally named himself emir of Afghanistan. For the cause of Pashtun solidarity, the very tribes that had just forced Amanullah from the throne now rallied behind him. After nine months, the Pashtun force defeated Habibullah and installed its own commander, Muhammad Nadir Shah, as ruler of Afghanistan. Restoring the old ethnic hierarchy and jettisoning Amanullah's reforms, Nadir and his heirs governed a peaceful Afghanistan for the next 50 years.

The West's fears about ethnic destabilization reflected recent experiences in the Balkans more than Afghan reality.

On a much longer and larger scale, the mujahideen insurgency against the PDPA that began in 1979 and the civil war that followed that regime's collapse in 1992 matched this pattern. The mujahideen rallied nationwide opposition to the decadelong Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, however, unity among the mujahideen began to fray. Those factions that had aimed to expel the Soviets saw little point in continuing the fight against Najibullah, then the leader of the PDPA. He had already jettisoned the regime's radical communist ideology and now offered arms, money, and local autonomy to those factions willing to leave the resistance. This tactic succeeded well enough until the Soviet Union disintegrated in late 1991, taking with it the outside military and financial support for the PDPA regime. The government collapsed in April 1992. Most former members of the PDPA then joined mujahideen parties based on shared ethnic ties.

The Afghan civil war of the 1990s had no ideological foundation and pitted ethnic- and regionally based factions against one another. With the exception of Abdul Rashid Dostum, the secular Uzbek

militia leader, all the major factional leaders (Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara) were Islamists of one variety or another. Although militia leaders mobilized members of their own ethnic groups to fight, they fought not for the cause of an ethnic group but out of self-interest. Conflicts that appeared ethnic on the surface were, in reality, fights over control of political, economic, and military resources. This fact explains the often bewildering shifts in alliances among different militia groups during the civil war and the striking lack of unity within any single ethnic group.

If there was any overarching ethnic theme in the civil war in the 1990s, it was the attempt by non-Pashtuns to break the century-old ethnic hierarchy that had discriminated against them. They demanded a return to an older pattern of regional autonomy, in which local elites played a significant role in governing their own people and had a say in politics at the national level. The Pashtuns bridled at this assertion of power but could do little to stop it. They were too divided and unable to unite behind a single Pashtun leader. In the past, they had always rallied around scions of the royal Durrani house, a good strategic ploy because both rural Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns accepted the legitimacy of such rulers. But in the 1990s, competing Pashtun mujahideen leaders, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, vetoed this option, since each man wanted supreme power for himself. By 1994, in the absence of Pashtun unity, the civil war reached a stalemate: each faction could hold its own territory but was unable to move beyond it.

The Taliban, a movement led by Mullah Omar and other low-level Pashtun clerics from Kandahar, broke this standoff. As Ibn Khaldun, the Arab social historian, first noted seven centuries ago, religious leaders often prove more successful than tribal ones in uniting large groups in Islamic societies. Calling on God's authority, the Taliban circumvented clan rivalries and united people in the name of religion. In theory, this dynamic should have given the Taliban nationwide appeal, but their leadership and membership remained too overwhelmingly Pashtun for that to happen. Although Taliban victories between 1995 and 1998 gave them control over most of Afghanistan's territory, non-Pashtuns resented the regime's heavy-handed tactics and narrow ethnic chauvinism. They waited for an opportunity to turn against the regime. This moment, of course, would arrive in 2001, when the

United States went to war against the Taliban in response to the 9/11 attacks. Within ten weeks of the beginning of U.S. military operations, the Taliban were expelled from Afghanistan. In the end, not even the Pashtuns in the Taliban's home base of Kandahar proved willing to fight on their behalf.

KABUL'S ARRANGED MARRIAGE

THE FALL of the Taliban left a power vacuum at the national level and restored clout to regional leaders. But none of them opposed the establishment of a new unitary government or sought to break away from it once it had been created. In the months and years that followed the U.S. invasion, the discussions about Afghanistan's future and the architecture of its political system—the 2001 Bonn meetings, the 2002 national *loya jirga* (council of elders), and the 2003 constitutional convention—were marked more by cooperation than by conflict. Equally significant was what did not happen: the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance leaders, who had defeated the Taliban, did not form a government unilaterally; except for some local score settling, the Pashtuns were not penalized for their earlier pro-Taliban sympathies; and no faction took on the role of a spoiler. The agreement to make Karzai the head of state recognized the traditional Pashtun claim to executive power, but the ministries were divided among the different ethnic factions. Although many non-Pashtuns initially opposed Afghanistan's draft constitution because they wanted a less centralized government, the representatives ratified it unanimously because no faction wished to pick a fight. Afghanistan's long tradition of practical politics made these agreements possible; the new government was an arranged marriage, not a love match. Its legitimacy would be judged by its effectiveness. Ironically, the major expected benefit of making Karzai, a Pashtun from Kandahar, president—winning the support of the southern Pashtuns—never materialized, because politics among rival clans in the south divided the community between pro- and anti-Karzai factions to the benefit of the Taliban.

The new government had an exceptionally strong executive, modeled on the constitution that Muhammad Zahir Shah's regime had written in 1964. Afghans in Kabul (many of whom had recently

returned from abroad) argued that this was necessary to prevent ethnic and regional division. They rejected alternative plans, labeling those who favored more regional autonomy and less presidential power as tools of the "warlords" or of ethnic blocs. The international community supported those Afghans in favor of centralization—although the West's fears about ethnic destabilization reflected recent experiences in the Balkans more than Afghan reality. (Moreover, international advisers preferred dealing with a single central government rather than a series of local decision-makers, thus creating even more support for a strong executive power base.)

Like the U.S. constitution, Afghanistan's new constitution made no mention of formal political parties, and Karzai refused to allow candidates to run with any party affiliation or to let parliament organize itself by party. Karzai couched his opposition to political parties in the same rhetoric Zahir Shah had used in the 1960s: parties lead to national discord. But his decision only reinforced nonpolitical ties based on family, region, or ethnic affiliation. For lack of other alternatives, the Afghan parliament soon split into Pashtun and non-Pashtun blocs. Government ministries became ethnic enclaves, spoils that Karzai offered to ethnic leaders in exchange for their political support. At the same time, because Karzai unilaterally made all appointments, even down to the subprovincial level, palace patronage played a larger role than democratic politics in determining who governed at the local level. For regions that had grown accustomed to autonomy over the years, the arrival of Karzai's appointees, who abused their positions or favored one faction over another, created hostility to the central government. When they reemerged in southern Afghanistan in 2005, the Taliban drew on this resentment and on the belief that Karzai did not represent a national government so as much as a family network keen to reward political allies and punish rivals.

BREAKING AFGHANISTAN'S TABOOS

AFGHANISTAN'S VARIOUS domestic problems have now become especially relevant for the United States and its allies as they look to withdraw their forces over the next few years, with the goal of transferring security responsibility to the Afghan government in 2014.

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

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A politically stable Afghanistan could accommodate a Taliban faction in government, whereas a politically unstable Afghanistan could not. Ethnic perceptions will play a role in determining what sort of country will emerge as U.S. and NATO forces begin to pull out. At the moment, non-Pashtun Afghans fear that Karzai will strike a deal with the Pashtun Taliban at their expense. They also believe that such a deal would not represent true power sharing but rather be a harbinger of the Taliban's return. Instead of fighting another bloody civil war, as Afghanistan's non-Pashtuns did in the 1990s, they might instead abandon the unitary state and secede, leaving the Taliban to struggle for power with other Pashtun factions in the south and east. Such a scenario would inevitably destabilize Pakistan's Pashtun-majority regions, making the vast, ungoverned territories that border Afghanistan even more anarchic and therefore fertile ground for various terrorist groups.

But it is not too late for Washington to avoid this scenario. First, the United States should make a greater effort to persuade Karzai to give legal recognition to political parties. At the moment, ethnic and regional networks owe their strength not to popular enthusiasm but to a simple lack of alternatives. Afghanistan's parliament would be far more effective and relevant if its members represented political platforms and agendas instead of geographically or ethnically defined constituencies. Such a reform would also reduce the defects in the existing winner-take-all balloting process, in which candidates run as individuals and the majority of parliamentarians receive less than 20 percent of the vote in their districts. The absence of political parties makes governance in Afghanistan more difficult and less legitimate while providing no offsetting benefit. Allowing any ideological group, including the Taliban, to legitimately and peacefully compete for a place at the national level would do more to ensure the stability of the Afghan government than any backroom deal that Karzai might make with the Taliban on his own.

Second, the United States should encourage the Afghan government to devolve power to provinces and districts so that citizens there can elect their own governors. Karzai currently makes all such appointments, but such authority is not mentioned in the 2004 constitution and could thus be changed through legislation. Once elected, governors

should have the authority to raise local taxes to fund local services, a privilege that also now resides only with Karzai's administration in Kabul. Although it is true that Afghan governments since the late nineteenth century have resisted any devolution of governmental authority as too dangerous, these regimes were all run by kings and dictators. Afghanistan today is a nominal democracy, meaning that people in the provinces are less concerned that Kabul will make decisions they oppose. As one of the oldest democratic federal states in the world, the United States is in a unique position to make the case that in a diverse country such as Afghanistan, such a structure provides for more stability, not less.

Opening up provincial and district governorships to competition would provide the safest form of power sharing with the Taliban. Whereas non-Pashtun Afghans oppose granting the Taliban a role in the national government, they have few objections to former (or even current) Taliban members serving in districts or provinces where they have local support. Allowing the Taliban to serve in a democratic government would likely lead to beneficial fissures within the Taliban, since those who come to hold positions in local government would have less reason to remain loyal to the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan. Participating in a coalition government would put much different pressures on Taliban members from those they faced when they essentially ruled as dictators in the 1990s. The stated goal of the Taliban's central command—seizing power nationwide—would immediately clash with the interests of these local commanders turned politicians. Similarly, the need for these governors to deliver services and patronage to their own districts would increase their incentives to cooperate with those who could provide such aid: namely, the government in Kabul and its international allies. (An example of such a process already exists: some officials in the Karzai government are members of the Hezb-i-Islami, or Islamic Party, even though its leader, Hekmatyar, openly fights against Afghan and Western forces.)

To achieve even these modest goals, the United States and its allies must address a question that is still dangerously taboo: the status of 2014 as a transition date in Afghan politics. According to the Afghan constitution, a president can serve only two consecutive terms, meaning that Karzai must relinquish his office when his second term ends

in 2014. No Afghan ruler has ever stepped down voluntarily, however, and Afghanistan is rife with speculation that Karzai intends to stay on regardless of the constitution. The United States and the rest of the international community should publicly announce their opposition to any extraconstitutional extension of the current presidency, if only to force Kabul's political class to begin considering the consequences of a future without Karzai—and to convince Karzai himself that there is indeed such a future. Here, outside influence is especially important: most Afghans believe that without pressure from his patrons in the West, Karzai will not step down. Such moves from Washington and elsewhere need not be viewed as an attack on Karzai himself; after all, this is a constitutional issue and not a personal one, and Karzai has often argued that the Afghan constitution needs to be respected. Even the inkling that Kabul may have new leadership in 2014 would immediately open up Afghan politics to new ideas and personalities, particularly to the younger generation of Afghans who have so far been excluded from the political process. But the country would not have to wait until 2014 to begin to benefit from this change: after all, Karzai's current objections to political devolution and political parties might soften if he were to realize that someone else would soon wield the strong executive power that is currently his alone.

Along with structural changes such as political devolution and the allowance of political parties, the opening up of the political field in advance of 2014 offers the best possibility of creating a more stable and legitimate Afghan government. If Washington leaves the question of executive power unaddressed until 2014, however, then the much-heralded transition of responsibility to the Afghan government may founder over disputes about the government's legitimacy. Although ethnic and regional groups in Afghanistan have historically mobilized to fight when their interests were threatened, such reactions have been the product of pragmatism rather than any primordial hatred or nationalist ideology. The best way to avoid such conflict—and, thus, to create a more stable Afghanistan—is to address these interests before conflict arises, not after it starts.

The Inevitable Superpower

Why China's Dominance Is a Sure Thing

Arvind Subramanian

To DEBTORS, creditors can be like dictators. Governments in financial trouble often turn to the International Monetary Fund as supplicants, and acting at the behest of its own major creditors, the IMF often imposes tough conditions on them. After the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Mickey Kantor, U.S. trade representative under President Bill Clinton, called the organization "a battering ram," because it had served to open up Asian markets to U.S. products. During the 1956 Suez crisis, the United States threatened to withhold financing that the United Kingdom desperately needed unless British forces withdrew from the Suez Canal. Harold Macmillan, who, as the British chancellor of the exchequer, presided over the last, humiliating stages of the crisis, would later recall that it was "the last gasp of a declining power." He added, "perhaps in 200 years the United States would know how we felt."

Is that time already fast approaching, with China poised to take over from the United States? This is an essential question, and yet it has not yet been taken seriously enough in the United States. There, this central conceit still reigns: the United States' economic preeminence cannot be seriously threatened because it is the United States' to lose,

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and sooner or later, the United States will rise to the challenge of not losing it. China may be on its way to becoming an economic superpower, and the United States may have to share the global stage with it in the future. But, the argument goes, the threat from China is not so imminent, so great, or so multifaceted that it can push the United States out of the driver's seat.

Thus, the economist Barry Eichengreen concludes in his recent history of different reserve currencies, *Exorbitant Privilege*, "The good news, such as it is, is that the fate of the dollar is in our hands, not those of the Chinese." And in December 2010, as he was leaving the White House as President Barack Obama's national economic adviser, Larry Summers said, "Predictions of America's decline are as old as the republic. But they perform a crucial function in driving the kind of renewal that is required of each generation of Americans. I submit to you that as long as we're worried about the future, the future will be better. We have our challenges. But we also have the most flexible, dynamic, entrepreneurial society the world has ever seen." In other words, if the United States can get its economic house in order, it can head off the Chinese threat.

But such views underestimate the probability that China will be economically dominant in 20 years. And they reveal a one-sided, U.S.-centric perspective: that world dominance will be determined mostly by the actions of the United States, not those of China. In fact, the outcome of this race is far more likely to be shaped by China.

THE WORLD IN 2030

Broadly speaking, economic dominance is the ability of a state to use economic means to get other countries to do what it wants or to prevent them from forcing it to do what it does not want. Such means include the size of a country's economy, its trade, the health of its external and internal finances, its military prowess, its technological dynamism, and the international status that its currency enjoys. My forthcoming book develops an index of dominance combining just three key factors: a country's GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the rest of the world. GDP matters because it determines

the overall resources that a country can muster to project power against potential rivals or otherwise have its way. Trade, and especially imports, determines how much leverage a country can get from offering or denying other countries access to its markets. And being a leading financier confers extraordinary influence over other countries that need funds, especially in times of crisis. No other gauge of dominance is as instructive as these three: the others are largely derivative (military strength, for example, depends on the overall health and size of an economy in the long run), marginal (currency dominance), or difficult to measure consistently across countries (fiscal strength).

I computed this index going back to 1870 (focusing on the United Kingdom's and the United States' economic positions then) and projected it to 2030 (focusing on the United States' and China's positions then). The projections are based on fairly conservative assumptions about China's future growth, acknowledging that China faces several major challenges going forward. For starters, its population will begin to age over the coming decade. And its economy is severely distorted in several respects: overly cheap capital has led to excessive investment; the exchange rate has been undervalued, which has led to the overdevelopment of exports; and energy is subsidized, leading to its inefficient use and pollution. Correcting these distortions will impose costly dislocations. To take account of these costs, I project that China's growth will slow down considerably: it will average seven percent a year over the next 20 years, compared with the approximately 11 percent it has registered over the last decade. History suggests that plenty of economies—Germany, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—grew at the pace I project for China after they reached China's current level of development. Meanwhile, I assume that the U.S. economy will grow at about 2.5 percent per year, as it has over the last 30 years. This is slightly optimistic compared with the Congressional Budget Office's latest long-term growth forecast of 2.2 percent, a forecast that the CBO lowers occasionally because of the negative impact of the country's accumulating public and private debt and sustained high unemployment on the U.S. economy.

The upshot of my analysis is that by 2030, relative U.S. decline will have yielded not a multipolar world but a near-unipolar one dominated by China. China will account for close to 20 percent of global GDP

(measured half in dollars and half in terms of real purchasing power), compared with just under 15 percent for the United States. At that point, China's per capita GDP will be about $33,000, or about half of U.S. GDP. In other words, China will not be dirt poor, as is commonly believed. Moreover, it will generate 15 percent of world trade—twice as much as will the United States. By 2030, China will be dominant whether one thinks GDP is more important than trade or the other way around; it will be ahead on both counts.

According to this index and these projections, China's ascendancy is imminent. Although the United States' GDP is greater than China's today and the two countries' respective trade levels are close, the United States is a very large and vulnerable debtor—it hogs about 50 percent of the world's net capital flows—whereas China is a substantial net creditor to the world. In 2010, the United States' lead over China was marginal: there was less than one percentage point difference between their respective indices of dominance. In fact, if one weighed these factors slightly differently, giving slightly less weight to the size of the economy relative to trade, China was already ahead of the United States in 2010.

China's future economic dominance is more imminent and will be both greater and more varied than is currently supposed.

China's ascendancy in the future will also apply to many more issues than is recognized today. The Chinese economy will be larger than the economy of the United States and larger than that of any other country, and so will its trade and supplies of capital. The yuan will be a credible rival to the dollar as the world's premier reserve currency.

What is more, the gap between China and the United States will be far greater than expected. In 2010, the U.S. National Intelligence Council assessed that in 2025, "the U.S. will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished." This is unduly optimistic. My projections suggest that the gap between China and the United States in 2030 will be similar to that between the United States and its rivals in the mid-1970s, the heyday of U.S. hegemony, and greater than that between the United Kingdom and its rivals during the halcyon days of the British Empire, in 1870. In

short, China's future economic dominance is more imminent and will be both greater and more varied than is currently supposed.

STRONG LIKE A BULL

MARTIN WOLF, the *Financial Times* columnist, has used the term "premature superpower" to describe China's unique ability to wield power despite being poor. According to my projections, however, by 2030, China will not be so badly off. Rather, its GDP per capita (in terms of purchasing power parity) will be more than half that of the United States and greater than the average per capita GDP around the world. Still, China's economic dominance will be singular: unlike in the past, when the dominant powers—the United Kingdom and the United States—were very rich relative to their competitors, China will be just a middle- or upper-middle-income country. And can a country be dominant even when it is not among the richest?

There are three plausible reasons for thinking that it cannot. First, a relatively poor country might have to subordinate its hopes of projecting power internationally to its need to address more pressing domestic challenges, such as achieving higher standards of living and greater social stability. Second, it might not be able to reliably raise the resources it needs to project power abroad. Military assets, for one thing, have to be financed, and poorer countries have more difficulty taxing their citizens than do rich countries. Third, a poor country can have only so much influence abroad if it does not have soft power, such as democracy, an open society, or pluralistic values. The leadership that comes with dominance lasts only if it inspires followers: only those who stand for something that commands universal or near-universal appeal are inspiring. Likewise, only a rich country—one on the economic and technological edge—can be a fount of ideas, technology, institutions, and practices for others.

That said, even if dominance is generally inconsistent with poverty, one can be dominant without being among the richest countries. Even a middle-income power, which China is likely to be by 2030, can be internally cohesive, raise resources for external purposes (such as military expenditures), and possess some inspiring national ideals. In fact, despite China's relatively low per capita GDP today, it is already

OECD 50
BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES

OECD Welcomes Second Class of Student Ambassadors

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) congratulates the 2011-2012 class of Student Ambassadors. The student ambassadors were selected by a competitive application process and represent colleges and universities from across the United States and Canada where students and faculty use OECD data and analytical publications in their teaching and research. During their one-year ambassadorships the students will develop and organize on-campus programs and events featuring the work of the OECD. Based on their performance, two finalists will be selected to attend the OECD Forum in Paris in May 2012.

***The 2011-2012 OECD Student Ambassadors**, Top row: Kevin Carney, Trent Kim, Doug Proctor, Steve Karson, Daniel Paly; Bottom row: Jason Elmer, Grace Baranowski, Suril Kantaria Karan Misra; Not Pictured: Shirley Hsieh, Antonia Tsapralis, Anne-Claire Warnet.*

College/University	Student Ambassador
Boston University	**Karan Misra**
Columbia University	**Anne-Claire Warnet**
Dartmouth College	**Suril Kantaria**
Duke University	**Grace Baranowski**
Georgetown University	**Doug Proctor**
George Washington University	**Shirley Hsieh**

College/University	Student Ambassador
Harvard University	**Trent Kim**
University of Michigan	**Kevin Carney**
University of Southern California	**Daniel Paly**
University of Texas, Austin	**Steve Karson**
University of Toronto	**Antonia Tsapralis**
Vanderbilt University	**Jason Elmer**

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dominant in several ways. China convinced the African countries in which it invests heavily to close down the Taiwanese embassies they were hosting. With $3 trillion in foreign reserves, it has offered to buy Greek, Irish, Portuguese, and Spanish debt to forestall or mitigate financial chaos in Europe. ("China is Spain's best friend," said Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in April on the occasion of the Chinese president's visit.) China has also used its size to strengthen its trade and financial relationships in Asia and Latin America: for example, trade transactions among several countries in both regions can now be settled in yuan.

Above all, China's exchange-rate policy has affected economies throughout the world, hurting developing countries as much as the United States: by keeping its currency cheap, China has managed to keep its exports more competitive than those from countries such as Bangladesh, India, Mexico, and Vietnam. Yet these countries have stood on the sidelines, leaving Washington to wage a crusade against Beijing on its own—and for that reason, it has not done so very successfully. China, meanwhile, has been able to buy off the opposition. Although many countries chafe at seeing their competitiveness undermined by an undervalued yuan, they remain silent, either for fear of China's political muscle or because China offers them financial assistance or trading opportunities. Even within the United States, few groups have really been critical. China is a large market for U.S. companies, and so it is the liberal left, not the holders of U.S. capital, that has condemned China's exchange-rate policy, on behalf of U.S. workers.

Even if China is unlikely to muster anytime soon the kind of dominance that naturally inspires or might be necessary to build international systems and institutions like those the United States created after World War II, Beijing is already exercising other forms of dominance. For example, it can require that U.S. and European firms share their technology with Chinese firms before granting them access to its market. And it can pursue policies that have systemic effects, despite opposition from much of the world. Its policy of undervaluing its exchange rate is a classic beggar-thy-neighbor strategy that undermines the openness of the world's trading and financial systems while also creating the conditions for easy liquidity, which

contributed to the recent global economic crisis. Chinese dominance is not looming. In some ways, it is already here.

DROWNING BY NUMBERS

Can the United States reverse this trend? Its economic future inspires angst: the country has a fiscal problem, a growth problem, and, perhaps most intractable of all, a middle-class problem. Repeated tax cuts and two wars, the financial and economic crisis of 2008–10, the inexorable growth of long-term entitlements (especially related to health), and the possible buildup of bad assets for which the government might eventually be responsible have created serious doubts about the U.S. public sector's balance sheet. High public and private debt and long-term unemployment will depress long-term growth. And a combination of stagnating middle-class incomes, growing inequality, declining mobility, and, more recently, falling prospects for even the college educated has created big distributional problems. The middle class is feeling beleaguered: it does not want to have to move down the skill ladder, but its upward prospects are increasingly limited by competition from China and India.

The United States' continued strength comes from its can-do attitude about fixing its economic problems and its confidence that sound economic fundamentals can ensure its enduring economic dominance. Most notably, the United States affords unique opportunities for entrepreneurship "because it has a favorable business culture, the most mature venture capital industry, close relations between universities and industry, and an open immigration policy," according to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, an academic consortium that studies entrepreneurial activity worldwide. In a 2009 survey, GEM ranked the United States first in the world in providing such opportunities. Nearly all the major commercially successful companies that have made technological breakthroughs in the last three decades—Apple and Microsoft, Google and Facebook—were founded and are based in the United States. In fact, it was by finding new and dynamic sources of growth in the 1990s that the United States was able to head off the economic challenge posed by that era's rising power, Japan. Today, optimists argue that the United States can

replicate that experience with China. It is true that if the U.S. economy were to grow consistently at a rate of 3.5 percent over the next 20 years, as it did in the 1990s, investor sentiment and confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency could be buoyed.

But some key differences today should dampen any such hope. The United States headed into the 1990s with far less government debt than it will have in the future. In 1990, the ratio of public debt to GDP was about 42 percent, whereas the COB's latest projected figure for 2020 is close to 100 percent. The external position of the United States was also less vulnerable two decades ago. For example, in 1990, foreign holdings of U.S. government debt amounted to 19 percent; today, they are close to 50 percent, and a majority are in China's hands. In the 1990s, the country was also considerably further away from the date at which it would have to reckon with the cost of entitlements.

And then there is the United States' beleaguered middle class. Over the last 20 years, several related pathologies that have squeezed the American middle class, such as a stagnating median income, have

become more entrenched and more intractable. Even a 3.5 percent growth rate, which would be well above current expectations, may not be adequate to maintain confidence in the U.S. model, which is based on the hope of a better future for many.

In other words, the United States cannot escape the inexorable logic of demography and the fact that poor countries, especially China, are catching up with it. China, which is four times as populous as the United States, will be a bigger economy as soon as its average standard of living (measure in per capita GDP) exceeds one-quarter of the United States'. By some measures, including my own, this has already occurred, and as China continues to grow, the gap will only widen. A resurgent United States might be able to slow down that process, but it will not be able to prevent it. Growing by 3.5 percent, rather than 2.5 percent, over the next 20 years might boost the United States' economic performance, social stability, and national mood. But it would not make a significant difference in its position relative to China in the face of, say, a seven percent growth rate there.

These projections undermine the dominant belief that the United States' economic preeminence is its own to lose. It is China's actions that will largely determine whether the differential in growth between China and the United States is modest or great. China can radically mess up, for example, if it allows asset bubbles to build or if it fails to stave off political upheaval. Or it can surge ahead by correcting existing economic distortions, especially by moving away from an export-intensive growth strategy toward one that develops demand at home. The United States' range of action is much narrower. If the United States is unlikely to grow significantly slower than by 2.0–2.5 percent, it is even more unlikely to grow faster than by 3.5 percent. This is the curse of being at the frontier of economic development: both the potential downsides and the potential upsides are limited.

Even if the United States grows fast—say, by 3.5 percent—other countries, such as China, may grow faster, too, leaving the basic picture of their relative economic power unaffected. In fact, when the pace of technological innovation in leading countries, such as the United States, quickens, the new technologies become quickly available to poorer countries, providing a stimulus to their growth, too. Even more important than producing new technologies is having

the human capital and the skills to use them. According to the National Science Foundation, in 2006 there were nearly twice as many undergraduates in science and engineering in China as in the United States. This differential is likely only to grow. Despite having a considerably worse educational system than the United States, China seems well positioned to absorb new technologies. There were six times as many peer-reviewed scientific publications in the United States as in China in 2002—and just 2.5 times as many in 2008. The ability of rich countries to stay ahead in terms of growth is inherently limited because China is better able to absorb and use new technologies. China's technological sophistication is growing: the United States, Europe, and Japan export very few products that China does not also export. More generally, if growth in the United States slows, China's growth might be unaffected, but if it accelerates, China's growth might, too. Either way, the United States cannot pull away.

BACK TO SUEZ

Even a resurgent United States could not exercise power and dominance over a rising China. China is already able to do what the rest

of the world does not want it to do. Might it soon be able to get the United States to do what the United States does not want to do? Is another Suez crisis possible?

In 1956, with sterling under pressure because of Egypt's blockade of the Suez Canal, the United Kingdom turned to the United States for financial assistance, invoking their "special relationship." But U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower refused. He was furious that the British (and the French) had attacked Egypt after President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal, just as he was campaigning for reelection as the man of peace who had ended the fighting on the Korean Peninsula. He demanded that the United Kingdom comply with a U.S.-sponsored UN resolution requiring the prompt and unconditional withdrawal of British troops. If it did not, Washington would block the United Kingdom's access to resources from the IMF. But if it did, it would get substantial financial assistance. The United Kingdom agreed, and the United States supported a massive financial package, including an unprecedented IMF loan worth $1.3 billion and a $500 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

Now, imagine a not-so-distant future in which the United States has recovered from the crisis of 2008–10 but remains saddled with structural problems: widening income gaps, a squeezed middle class, and reduced economic and social mobility. Its financial system is still as fragile as before the crisis, and the government has yet to come to grips with the rising costs of entitlements and the buildup of bad assets in the financial system, which the government might have to take over. Inflation is a major global problem because commodity prices are skyrocketing as a result of rapid growth in emerging markets. China has an economy and a trade flow twice as large as the United States'. The dollar has lost its sheen; demand for the yuan as a reserve currency is growing.

Much as in 1956, when Washington was suspected of orchestrating massive sales of sterling in New York to force the British government to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal, rumors are swirling that China is planning to wield its financial power; it has had enough of the United States' naval presence in the Pacific Ocean. Beijing starts selling some of its currency reserves (by then likely to amount to $4 trillion). Investors grow skittish, fearing that the dollar might

collapse, and bond markets turn on U.S. government paper. The United States soon loses its AAA credit rating. Auctions for U.S. Treasury bonds find no buyers. To maintain confidence, the U.S. Federal Reserve sharply raises interest rates. Before long, interest rates substantially exceed growth rates, and the United States urgently needs cheap financing. It turns to oil exporters, but the friendly autocrats of yore have been replaced by illiberal democrats of various Islamic persuasions, ranging from moderate to extreme, and all with long memories of U.S. intervention in the Middle East. Much as for Greece, Ireland, and Portugal recently, seeking help from the IMF seems unavoidable: defaulting on U.S. debt obligations would be fatal to the effort to preserve what is left of the United States' global role.

But by this time, China, already the world's largest banker since 2000, controls the spigot. Although it, too, deems that an IMF bailout is necessary, it has a precondition: the withdrawal of the United States' naval presence in the western Pacific. The request has bite because China, as the IMF's largest contributor and a benefactor to many of its members, can easily block the United States' request for financing. By then, China may even have acquired veto power thanks to the governance reforms scheduled for 2018.

Some will say this scenario is pure fantasy. After all, the United States could easily withhold financing from the United Kingdom in 1956 because doing so had no serious consequences for the dollar or the U.S. economy. But if tomorrow, China sold, or just stopped buying, U.S. Treasury bonds, the dollar would decline and the yuan would appreciate—the very outcome that China has steadfastly been trying to prevent. China is unlikely to suddenly undermine its mercantilist growth strategy and risk large capital losses on its stock of foreign exchange reserves. Others might say that even if China were willing to do so, if the U.S. economy were depressed, the Federal Reserve might be only too happy to buy up any U.S. Treasuries dumped by China.

But all this leaves out that China's incentives might be very different in the future. Ten years on, China might be less wedded to keeping the yuan weak. If it continues to slowly internationalize its currency, both its ability to maintain a weak yuan and its interest in doing so may soon disappear. And when they do, China's power over the United States will become considerable. In 1956, the United Kingdom's

financiers were dispersed across the public and private sectors. But the Chinese government is the largest net supplier of capital to the United States: it holds many U.S. Treasury bonds and finances the U.S. deficit. Leverage over the United States is concentrated in Beijing's hands.

Of course, the prospects of a dollar devaluation would probably be less painful for the United States in this hypothetical future than the prospects of a weakening sterling was for the United Kingdom in 1956. Back then, a devaluation of sterling would have inflicted heavy losses on the currencies of the United Kingdom's former colonies that held large sterling-denominated assets. These colonies would have sold their sterling assets, weakening their economic links with the United Kingdom. Preventing this was important to the government in London in order to preserve what was left of the British Empire. A devaluation of the dollar would be less of a problem partly because the United States' foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars.

A repeat of the Suez crisis may seem improbable today. But the United States' current economic situation does leave the country fundamentally vulnerable in the face of China's inescapable dominance. The United Kingdom was playing with a weak hand during the Suez crisis not just because it was in debt and its economy was weakening but also because another great economic power had emerged. Today, even as the United States' economy is structurally weak, its addiction to debt has made the country dependent on foreigners, and its prospects for growth are minimal, a strong rival has emerged. China may not quite be an adversary, but it is not an ally, either. Macmillan's 1971 prophecy that the United States might decline "in 200 years" betrayed a mechanical interpretation of history: it projected enduring dominance for the United States, much like his own country had enjoyed. But China could accelerate the patterns of history—and make the United States confront its decline much sooner than Macmillan anticipated or even than most people expect today.

Dilma's Highs and Lows

Roberto Stuckert Filho

President **DILMA ROUSSEFF**and the Minister of Mining and Energy, **EDISON LOBÃO**

Brazil is suffering from creeping in. ation that is ever ready to return and a rise in already-high interest rates, and it has also been overrun by corruption accusations—all in the .rst six months of the Dilma Rousseff administration—but it flaunts a lower risk rate than that of the United States and tax revenues beyond record.

By Alexandre Gaspari

When Ms. Dilma Rousseff was elected president of Brazil, many assumed that the first woman ever in command of the country would be a continuation of the past eight years—the administration of her predecessor, fellow partisan Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. However, in her first six months in office, Dilma, as she is known by Brazilians, has braved economic and political challenges that experts claim were bad legacies she inherited from Lula and that may become hallmarks of a rupture between her and one of the most popular presidents in Brazil's history. "Today we see a government with an even more pragmatic, less political mentality than the last one. Surely is the country going to continue to progress," says Jeremiah O'Callaghan, investor relations director at JBS, one of the largest animal protein processing companies in the world.

At the macroeconomic level, Dilma has dealt with the creeping comeback of inflation—which in June reached 6.7 percent over the past twelve months, overshooting the government ceiling target of 6.5 percent—a result of the economic warm-up caused, preponderantly, by the emerging "new" Brazilian middle class. To keep things from getting out of hand, the Central Bank has been nudging up the already outrageously high interest rate (12.25 percent in June 2011) in an attempt to reduce pressure on the currently lavishly abundant credit, with consequences for consumption. "It's a great challenge for Brazil, to lower the interest rates," explains Rodolfo Zabisky of MZ Group.

After a record GNP growth in 2010 of 7.5 percent, the Brazilian economy has been slowing down at a greater rate than expected. The market's forecast for 2011 growth, at 5 percent at the beginning of the year, slumped to a mere 3.9 percent in June, according to Focus, a bulletin issued by the Central Bank. Some are still certain, however, that this is not a cause for worry. "A slower growth ensures sustainability. We overcame a twenty-five-year phase in which the Brazilian economy was called a 'flying chicken,' which hops but doesn't soar," says Caixa Economica Federal vice president Marcio Alves Pinto Percival.

Neither has the first semester been easy for Dilma politically. Upon inheriting from Lula part of his staff and accepting nominations from her predecessor for many high-level posts, the president has managed a no-less-than-rampant political melee for positions by those that backed her candidacy, especially her own PT (Workers' Party) and a ravenous PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party). At the same time, accusations of embezzlement have overthrown her own right-hand man, Chief of Staff Antonio Palocci. Recently, an overbilling scandal also ousted Minister of Transportation Alfredo Nascimento, who was carried over from Lula's administration. The scandal forced Dilma to fire several other secretaries and advisers in the transportation ministry—an agency with a great deal of public works under way, thanks to the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, or PAC), which was founded to support several critical infrastructure projects.

Portraying a known knack for contradiction, Brazil has at the same time enjoyed a remarkably favorable situation in Dilma's first six months. For the first time in history, the credit-default swap rate for Brazil is below that of the United States. This means that for foreign investors, the risk of default today by Brazil is less than the risk of the United States. The Brazilian government reaped record tax revenues in the first semester, around U.S.$300 billion, up 12.68 percent from the first semester of 2010. "Once government revenue is growing, we may resume programs more freely," explains Minister of Agriculture Wagner Rossi.

In spite of these ups and downs, the productive sector continues to believe Brazil's economic development is sustainable. "Looking at the labor issue, I don't think the labor bottleneck in the country is as bad as some say. In the case of building construction, for instance, what is lacking is not skilled labor, but labor willing to work at construction sites. These are two separate problems. One is a personnel bottleneck," states Paulo Skaf, president of São Paulo Industries Federation (FIESP). "The other is when a sector doesn't attract people anymore because there are better work opportunities in industry, trade. It is a sign the economy is doing well."

Rodolfo Zabisky, CEO of MZ Group

Paulo Skaf, President of FIESP (São Paulo Federation of Industries)

Wagner Rossi, Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply

Energy market jittery, but outlook's good

Brazil's energy industry has lived through contradictions of its own during the first six months of the Rousseff administration. The plunge in the sugarcane harvest yield and a stinging increase in sugar prices in the international market undermined the Brazilian domestic supply of ethanol and raised the price of biofuels (not to mention table sugar), contributing to a budding inflation comeback. State-owned Petrobras, the largest company in the country and operator of virtually all oil and gas prospecting and production in the local economic frontier, the pre-salt zone, lost market value after investor doubts about actual debt levels and its capacity to deliver the large investments required in the upcoming years. Furthermore, the well-known difficulties in the environmental licensing of river dams has delayed the construction of the Belo Monte mega-dam on the Xingu River, Pará, also dampening the prospects of any other hydroelectric project coming out this year.

On the other hand, the country continues attracting investment in the sugarcane industry, as seen in the recent association between Royal Dutch Shell and Cosan, the largest sugar and ethanol producer in Brazil, forming the joint venture Raizen. Additional investments have been announced by BP, Louis Dreyfus Commodities (LDC), and Brazilian players Petrobras and Braskem to expand ethanol supplies. These pledges have fueled entrepreneurs' expectations for growth in the market for electric cogeneration from bagasse, the sugarcane pulp fiber remaining after the extraction of the sweet sap. This is likely to boost the amount of bioelectricity generated in the country. Also, development in renewables, notably wind power, maintains a steady pitch; several major companies are entering the local market in force.

If for the oil industry the Brazilian offshore pre-salt formation is a promise still not entirely fulfilled, the announcement of new areas for oil and gas prospecting has encouraged oil companies; the last time ANP (Brazilian National Agency of Petroleum) released new areas was in 2008. Not to mention, there have been significant new gas discoveries by several players, which should increase the supply of energy and promote competition, and hence bring prices—today set by Petrobras alone—down.

The difficulties Brazil faced with the ethanol supply over the first months of 2011 were a direct consequence of a harsh divestment in the alcohol industry spurred by the global financial crisis of late 2008. After all, many projects for new sugar and ethanol mills took a rain check. "We need to resume prior growth levels of new mills and plants per year—once thirteen, currently only three new mills per year. The demand is huge; we've got to get these investments rolling back in again," says Minister Rossi.

The federal government has moved in to try to minimize the problem until sugarcane expansion resumes its pre-crisis pace. One measure, long demanded by ethanol planters, was to shift the product's legal status from an agricultural commodity to a fuel since , fuel is now beingregulated by ANP. "Treating ethanol as a fuel . . . will ensure a greater predictability in supply-demand relations," explains Minister Rossi. Nonetheless, Minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobão has predicted that the country will see trouble with the ethanol supply in 2012, even if factoring in reduced ethanol levels in domestically sold gasoline (from 25 percent to 18 percent), as proposed by President Dilma.

On investments picking up again, the consolidation of Raizen is the best sign today that investors believe in Brazilian biofuels once more, perhaps even for export. After all, the U.S. Senate recently signaled a willingness to slash subsidy to the corn ethanol industry, which would open up the U.S. market for Brazil's product—but only once domestic production generates enough ethanol for Brazilian consumers to spare.

Even if the recovery of the sugarcane industry in Brazil doesn't pull through in the short run, a positive outlook in the middle distance has encouraged bagasse-power entrepreneurs, who have begun to glimpse a comeback. With the prospect of more robust sugarcane crops a reality, the Sugarcane Industry Union (Unica) is pondering potential electricity exports in 2020–2021 around 14,100 megawatts. This is no less than three times the energy that can reasonably be expected from Belo Monte, the controversial river dam which, though designed for an installed capacity of 11,200 megawatts, is likely to produce only around 4,570 megawatts annually.

Bioelectricity, however, is not the only highlight among renewables in Brazil. The country has finally reached the thousand-megawatt mark in wind energy production. This figure is negligible compared to the installed capacities of China, the USAUnited States of America, or India, to be sure, but experts point out that Brazilian wind potential exceeds two hundred thousand megawatts. This may be why wind farms led the projects in the electricity auction promoted last August: 429 projects that churned out 10,935 megawatts.

The success of wind power may also be seen in the large investments from the leading companies in Brazil's electric industry. CPFL Energia, a leading national energy group, has announced a partnership with Ersa Energias Renováveis—creating CPFL Renewable Energies—to manage concessions for wind farms, sugarcane mills, mini hydroelectric dams, and more. Another electric giant, Cemig, state power company of Minas Gerais, has acquired another renewable energy company, Renova Energia. "The focus of Cemig's expansion remains in renewables, including hydro (river dam), wind, and solar power. Cemig has recently invested in the acquisition of three wind farms in Ceará and participates in the Santo Antonio dam on the Madeira River and the mini-dam of Paracambi," confirms the company's investor relations director, Luiz Fernando Rolla.

In the mainstream oil and gas industry, mighty Petrobras has been having a hard time this first semester. The oil company benefited from a law signed at the close of 2010 by President Lula that set the contract model for future pre-salt areas by withholding the state-owned company's role as operator in any group set out to bid for these areas. Suspicion of political interference, not to mention the company's high debt levels, stifled its market value somewhat, and Petrobras dipped below its equity value for the first time since 1999. This fact was aggravated by the oil company's oft-postponed release of its 2011–2015 investment plan and continued pressure from the government to refrain from increasing its 2010–2014 investment of U.S.$224 billion. "Petrobras provides a positive example of state participation in several aspects; in others, less so. As of late, corporate governance has been quite lax," explains Rui de Britto Alvares Affonso, financial and investor relations head at Sabesp, the São Paulo state sanitation company.

The other oil companies, however, have had ample reason to hope for booming business in Brazil. The eleventh bidding round for oil and gas prospecting and production areas has been approved, three years after the last round in 2008. "We'll sure show up on the day of the eleventh round. The current offers are of interest to us. And we want to be the operators," President of BG Group Brazil Nelson Silva told Braszil Energyia Magazine. The British oil company is partnering with Petrobras in several pre-salt areas.

This partnership with Petrobras enables BG Group to become a potential player in the natural gas market in Brazil. Already in control of Comgás, a piped natural gas distributor in São Paulo state, the group is likely to come into possession of a sizable amount of the energy source by 2020. Along with other companies that have recently found large gas deposits in the country—including OGX and a consortium formed by Orteng, Cemig, Codemig, Imetame, and Sipet Agropastoril from Minas Gerais state—the British group could amass enough strength to pry open a market that today is run exclusively by Brazil's state oil company.


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The Middling Kingdom

The Hype and the Reality of China's Rise

Salvatore Babones

By any measure, China's economic growth has been unprecedented, even miraculous. According to the International Monetary Fund, the Chinese economy grew by an average of 9.6 percent per year between 1990 and 2010. At the beginning of the recent global financial crisis, many feared that the Chinese growth engine would grind to a halt. In late 2008, Chinese exports collapsed, triggering fears of political instability and popular revolt in the country. In the end, however, the global economic crisis turned out to be little more than a pothole on the road of China's economic growth. Inflationary pressures may now be building up in China, and China's property bubble may be threatening to burst, but most economists continue to predict rapid growth for the country well into the future. Although their forecasts vary widely, they seem to share the view that China's growth will be fast—if not as fast as it has been—and that this rate of growth will continue for decades. These predictions are at once cautious about the near future (China's performance will not be as extraordinary as it has been) and optimistic about the distant future (they see no end to China's upward trajectory). By coincidence or design, they are moderated extrapolations of current trends.

For example, the Nobel Prize–winning economist Robert Fogel believes that China will grow at an average annual rate of eight percent until 2040, by which time it will be twice as rich as Europe

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(in per capita terms) and its share of global GDP will be 40 percent (compared with 14 percent for the United States and five percent for the European Union). Other economists are slightly more cautious: Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace predict that China will grow by 5.6 percent per year through 2050.

Like many other forecasts of China's continued rise, these projections are based on careful formal economic modeling. But are they convincing? Extrapolating from current trends may make sense when predicting growth in the next year and the year after that, but once the years turn into decades, such assumptions seem more questionable. If my ancestors had invested a penny in my name in 1800 at a real compound interest rate of six percent per year above inflation, that penny would now be worth about $280,000. That does not mean, however, that reliably high-yielding 211-year investments are easy to find. Things change; things go wrong. Past returns are no guarantee of future performance.

When it comes to gauging China's future growth, economic modeling can offer only so much guidance. The models predict future economic outputs on the basis of projected future levels of economic inputs, but future economic inputs are impossible to predict. In the end, there is little to do but extrapolate from current inputs. But inputs, as well as other key features of any economy, change over time. China's economy is evolving rapidly: from subsistence agriculture to smokestack industries to the latest electronics to consumer services. And at some point in the future, perhaps in the not-too-distant future, China's excess growth rates will level out and its economic growth will slow down, returning to rates more like those experienced by comparable countries.

WHEN THE GROWING GETS TOUGH

IT MAY seem foolish in 2011 to even talk about calling a top to the Chinese market. Judging by the Fogel and Dadush-Stancil models, there seem to be no medium-term barriers to China's growth. So long as the country's urban labor force continues to expand, its educational levels continue to rise, and capital continues to move into China, the Chinese economy should continue to grow.

But are things as simple as that? For one thing, economic models tend to downplay the fact that as countries grow, growth gets harder. When economies move up global value chains, graduating from the production of simple manufactured goods to a reliance on the creativity of their citizens to develop new industries, they rise less and less rapidly. It took South Korea 30 years, from 1960 to 1990, to raise its GDP per capita from one-thirtieth of U.S. GDP per capita to one-third—but then it took another 20 years to nudge its way up from one-third to one-half. And South Korea today is still a long way from catching up with the United States. Japan caught up with the West (and by some accounts exceeded it) in the 1980s, but then the bubble burst, and since 1990 its economy has grown by an average of just one percent per year.

What is more, these two states have been vastly more successful than most others. No other medium-sized or large country with a diversified economy has even come close to Japan's accomplishments. Of the four "Asian tigers," the richest two (Hong Kong and Singapore) are cities, and the other two (South Korea and Taiwan) are basically cities-plus and are much farther behind economically. Other poor countries that have become rich are either offshore financial centers or small petro-sheikdoms. None of them is a full-sized country with multiple cities and regions, a large rural population, and competing political constituencies. Even Japan represents a questionable model of a state recently and rapidly catching up to the West, if only because it had already achieved much of its progress before World War II. Like the leading Western countries, it industrialized in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, partly through ruthless colonial exploitation. Its economy was then bombed into oblivion during World War II; thus, its rapid postwar growth was to some extent a return to prewar levels. In other words, there is no example to date of a state taking a very rapid growth trajectory to the top of the world economy, raising doubts about whether China can be the unlikely exception.

China's recent growth is often characterized as the country's natural, deserved return to its historical place in the global economy, but this argument is more clever than correct. According to the late economic historian Angus Maddison, China last reached parity with the West

around the time of Marco Polo. China's subsequent decline relative to the West long predates the Industrial Revolution, Western colonialism, and even China's sixteenth-century inward turn. The overarching story of the past five centuries is not about China's absolute decline so much as about the West's relative advance. European economies grew substantially between 1500 and 1800. According to Maddison, by 1820—before the advent of the railroad, the telegraph, and the modern steel industry, and before the Opium Wars, the colonization of Hong Kong, and the Boxer Rebellion—China's national income per capita was less than half that of the average for European countries. By 1870, it had dropped to 25 percent, and by 1970, to just seven percent. Moreover, considering that Maddison's figures are all estimates based on purchasing power parity, China's position in hard-currency terms looks far worse. According to hard-currency statistics from the World Bank, between 1976 and 1994, Chinese GDP per capita was less than two percent of U.S. GDP per capita, and today it is still under ten percent.

In other words, China's massive economic growth over the past two decades has done nothing more—and perhaps much less—than return the country to its 1870 position (in terms of purchasing power parity). Optimists will see this as further evidence of China's potential: if China is at only 1870 levels, there is still plenty of room for further growth. But pessimists might note that if China could fall from this position in 1870, it might well fall from it again. There is no reason, on the face of it, to expect one outcome or the other; a conservative bet would be that China stays right where it is.

ONE-TIME BENEFITS

ANOTHER REASON that economic models forecasting China's continuing rise are too simplistic is that they tend to ignore both the one-time boosts that helped propel the country in the past and the political, environmental, and structural obstacles that will limit its growth in the future. China is now in a much stronger political and military position vis-à-vis the West than it was in 1870 and seems very unlikely to descend into another century-long ordeal of repeated human and economic catastrophes. But does that necessarily mean it will grow to become the world's richest country?

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A farsighted perspective on the legacy of 9/11



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THE LONG SHADOW OF 9/11: AMERICA'S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Brian Michael Jenkins and John Paul Godges, Editors

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The Middling Kingdom

China's dramatic rise over the past 20 years was propelled by two one-time bonuses: the population's declining fertility rate and its increasing urbanization. Both factors have led to massive increases in economic productivity, but they are finite processes and cannot be counted on in the future. China's fertility rate was already falling well before the first implementation of its draconian one-child policy in 1979. The decline in fertility in the 1970s meant that throughout the 1980s and 1990s, both families and the state could focus their limited resources on a relatively small number of children. Now, these children are in their mid-30s and are actively contributing to the development of the country's human capital and to its GDP. Future generations may be even better educated, but the major gains have already been made. More important, low fertility rates over the past few decades freed up adults, particularly women, to enter the formal labor market. Hundreds of millions of women who would have worked in the home or on the farm are now working in the money economy, boosting the county's GDP figures. This has given China a one-time boost—sustained higher output—but it will not help GDP continue to grow. There is little room for further fertility decline; China cannot move to a zero-child policy.

Forecasts of China's continued fast growth downplay the fact that as countries grow, growth gets harder.

Moreover, there are today comparatively large numbers of workers born in the high-fertility 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s making their way through their careers. Because their parents' generation is dying relatively young and because they have few children, these workers are largely unencumbered by either caregiving or child-rearing duties. Of all the generations of Chinese throughout history, this one is uniquely positioned to pursue work and create wealth. Future generations of Chinese workers will be smaller and will be saddled with the care of ever more elderly relatives. Moreover, fertility rates can only rise going forward, meaning that these workers may have more children to care for as well.

Increasing urbanization is the other one-time bonus that boosted China's economic growth during the past 20 years. Urbanization increases GDP because urban populations are generally more productive

than rural ones and because city dwellers typically work outside the home in paid employment, whereas many people in the countryside engage in unpaid subsistence farming. But like fertility reduction, urbanization is a process with natural limits. China's level of urbanization is still well below that of the West, and urban expansion in China shows no signs of slowing down. (At current growth rates, urbanization in China will not catch up to urbanization in the West or Latin America until the 2040s.) But what form will this expansion take? Huge shantytowns are already forming on the edges of Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese megacities. The Chinese government bulldozes shanties by the hundreds of thousands every year, but it is unclear whether their residents are being relocated or just being made homeless. Whether or not the government wins its war against slum development, the days when urbanization was a boost to economic growth are gone.

STRUCTURAL STRICTURES

IN ADDITION, China is facing political, environmental, and structural barriers that will limit its economic growth in the future. For example, many analysts believe that China will not be able to move up the global value-added chain unless its politics open up. The argument is that high-value-added activities, such as branding, design, and invention, require a kind of free thinking possible only in democratic societies. China may educate hundreds of thousands of engineers, but if it continues to stifle their creativity, they will never succeed at the highest levels of the global economy. China will not reach the top ranks of the global economy (in terms of GDP per capita) until its schools, companies, and people learn to innovate more than they have in the past. This is happening, but China's stifling political culture is hindering the process. It is difficult to imagine a dynamic knowledge economy emerging in a politically repressive one-party state; none ever has before.

The environmental barriers to China's continued growth are better documented. The World Health Organization estimates that air pollution in China kills 656,000 people annually and water pollution another 95,600; China's own Ministry of Water Resources estimates that about 300 million people, two-thirds of them in rural areas, rely

on water that contains "harmful substances." According to *The New York Times*, officials from China's State Council have said that the massive Three Gorges Dam is plagued by "urgent problems" that "must be resolved regarding the smooth relocation of residents, ecological protection, and geological disaster prevention." China is also now the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The great drought and floods that have hit China so far this year may or may not be related to its environmental record, but it is clear that China's ability to monetize its environment to promote economic growth without regard for ecological devastation is coming to an end. China's future growth will have to be cleaner than its past growth; thus, it will be more expensive. Long a densely populated country, China has always had one of the most intensively exploited environments in the world. Today, it has little environment left to exploit.

Still, the greatest barriers to China's continuing rapid economic growth are structural. Until 1980, the country was effectively closed to the world; by 1992, nearly all of urban China had been incorporated into special economic zones open to private enterprise and foreign investment. The incredibly inefficient Maoist economy is gone and has been replaced by some of the most competitive firms in the world. Creating more value than did state industries during the Cultural Revolution was not very difficult. But creating more value than today's efficient Chinese firms do will be much harder.

This difficulty will be exacerbated by major structural changes in the economy. Since 1960, life expectancy in China has risen from 47 years to 74 years, but the number of children per family has declined from more than five to fewer than two. Today's little emperors will spend their most productive years taking care of their parents. And as they do, China's economic activity will have to move away from high-productivity manufacturing and toward low-productivity health services. This shift will further limit China's future growth prospects because productivity is harder to increase in service industries than in manufacturing, mining, or agriculture. In the past, to make the most of their comparative advantage, Chinese producers focused on manufacturing for the world's industrial market. In the future, Chinese service providers will have no choice but to focus on the domestic health-care market, without regard for getting an edge.

CAN-DO OR HAS-DONE?

MANY COMMENTATORS, most notably the political scientists George Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, have warned recently of the "Latin Americanization" of China, specifically its rising income inequality. In 2003, China had just one billionaire (as measured in U.S. dollars); by 2011, according to *Forbes* magazine, it had 115. Yet China is still a poor country: GDP per capita in hard-currency terms is substantially lower in China (under $5,000) than in Brazil, Mexico, and Russia ($9,000–$10,000), the world's three big middle-income countries. But as China catches up to them, its inequality levels are also rising to levels close to theirs.

China shares many features with Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. Sociologists have identified these four countries as belonging to the "semi-periphery" of the world economy, a group of states that are not as rich and powerful as the developed democracies but not as poor as the small countries of Africa, Central America, and Southeast Asia. (Other examples include Indonesia and Turkey.) These countries are characterized by strong states with weak institutions, governments highly influenced by the richest citizens, and mass poverty.

At its current growth rates, China will likely catch up to Brazil, Mexico, and Russia around the year 2020 in terms of per capita GDP. At that point, all four states will have per capita national income levels between $10,000 and $15,000 (in today's dollars). All will also have similar levels of economic inequality—levels far higher than those in the developed countries. Their people will not experience serious hunger or malnutrition, but they will know mass squalor. About 40 percent of these countries' populations will live in large cities, and about 20 percent will live in rural areas, with the rest in small cities and towns. Their fertility rates will have fallen somewhat under replacement levels, and about two-thirds of their populations will be between the ages of 16 and 65. In the face of rapid aging, these countries will need to shift their economies away from growth industries and toward slow-growth health-care services.

All of which raises this question: If in 2020, China will almost certainly face structural conditions nearly identical to those in Brazil, Mexico, and Russia, why should anyone expect it to grow any faster

than them? Brazil and Mexico have belonged to the middle-income league for generations. Russia was in that bracket in the early twentieth century and returned to it immediately after the collapse of communism. China was there in 1870, and it is back there again. Granted, China is bigger than those countries, but there is no reason to think that being big makes it different. Historical statistics show no correlation between a country's size and its economic growth.

The relative position of China in 2020 will look an awful lot like that of China in 1870 and of Brazil, Mexico, and Russia today. There is no particular reason to believe that the China of 2020 will be any more successful than these other states have been. Perhaps China's proactive attitude toward development will allow it to power through the middle ranks of the global income distribution despite a weak civil society, an aging population, and a devastated environment. And having already returned to its nineteenth-century position relative to the West, perhaps China might eventually regain its thirteenth-century superiority over the West. Structure is not destiny. And if China does overcome its limitations, it could provoke a complete realignment of the international system.

But it is more reasonable to see China's famous can-do attitude as more of a has-done attitude: a legitimate pride in recent accomplishments rather than a harbinger of future success. Like other middle-income countries, China will likely continue to grow slightly faster than Western countries, although not as fast as it did between 1990 and 2010 and with much more volatility. But its population will start to fall soon after 2020, whereas the U.S. population will keep rising. The overall size of China's economy is thus likely to remain roughly equal to that of the United States for the remainder of the twenty-first century. This is not to say that China will not become a major world player. Even if it reaches only parity with the United States in terms of overall GDP and attains only about one-quarter of U.S. GDP per capita, it will still be a power to be reckoned with. It will become the second indispensable country.

But given the United States' far greater alliance network and geostrategic position, U.S. hegemony is not threatened by the rise of China. The United States is encircled by long-standing allies (Canada and the countries of western Europe) or stable but weak noncompetitors

(Latin America). China's neighbors are a rich and powerful Japan, rising South Korea and Vietnam, giant India and Russia, and a host of failed or failing states in Central and Southeast Asia. The United States reigns supreme over the oceans, the skies, and outer space; China struggles to maintain order within its own territory. China will, and legitimately should, play an increasing role in Asian and world politics, but it is in no position to dominate even Asia, never mind the world.

Pundits may relish the opportunity to speculate about a post-American future in which the world has to learn Mandarin, but the facts say not in this century. It is time to start treating China like a large but ordinary country. The rest of the world should neither relish nor fear the prospect of Chinese domination. Putting aside the hype and the panic, one should see in China a country that suffered terrible tragedy for 200 years and is finally returning to normal. This is a good thing—for China, for the United States, and for the world. If the international system comes to see China, and China comes to see itself, as an important but not all-powerful participant in the global system, irrational fears will diminish on all sides, and rightly so. Tomorrow's China is more likely to focus on meeting the needs of its own people than on establishing itself as the new global hegemon.

SPONSORED SECTION

China-US Grand Strategy Proposal

December 14th, 2010

A proposed China-US Grand Strategy Agreement for Presidents Hu and Obama was drafted by John Milligan-Whyte, Dai Min and Dr. Thomas P.M. Barnett of the Center for America China Partnership with input from China's former Minister of Foreign Affairs and UN and US ambassadors, former Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, former Military Attaché to North Korea and Israel, former Vice Minister of Commerce and Secretary-General of Boao Forum. Film of meetings supporting the Agreement at the Institute of International Strategic Studies of China's Central Party School, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, China Center for International Economic Exchanges, China Institute For International Strategic Studies, China Foundation for International & Strategic Studies, and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in China's State Council are posted at US-China Relations.net. The Grand Strategy Agreement states:

"U.S.-P.R.C. Presidential Executive Agreement For Peaceful Coexistence & Economically Balanced Relationship

Presidents of U.S. and P.R.C. sign an executive agreement containing each nation's pledge that:

1. U.S. and P.R.C will never go to war with the other;

2. Each will respect the other's sovereignty and distinct political and economic systems;

3. U.S. pledge to eschew regime change in P.R.C. and of non-interference in its internal affairs;

4. P.R.C pledges to continue its economic, social, and political reforms.

Taiwan

Pledged demilitarization of Taiwan situation, to include:

i. Informal U.S. moratorium on arms transfers to Taiwan;
ii. U.S. President's adherence to defense requirements of Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 is achieved through the following alternative means;
iii. P.R.C. reduction of strike forces arrayed against Island;
iv. U.S. reduction of strike forces arrayed against P.R.C. Mainland; and
v. Negotiation and promulgation of confidence building measures between U.S. and P.R.C. militaries.

North Korea

Pledged de-escalation of strategic uncertainty surrounding North Korea nuclear program, to include:

i. U.S. eschews regime change in North Korea;
ii. P.R.C. encourages North Korea to adopt economic reform policies to be implemented on terms appropriate to North Korea's own situation;
iii. North Korea agrees to terminate nuclear program and resume economic cooperation with South Korea; and
iv. U.S. and P.R.C. support peaceful reunification of North and South Korea on terms and timetable determined by North and South Korea.

Iran

Pledged management of relations with Iran to include:

i. U.S. eschews regime change in Iran;
ii. P.R.C to support Iran's peaceful development of its nuclear energy program;
iii. Iran to willingly submit to regular international inspections of its nuclear energy program; and
iv. U.S. to eliminate trade restrictions and promote trade with Iran.

South China Sea & East China Sea

Pledged management of sovereignty disputes to be solved peacefully and bilaterally, to include:

i. P.R.C. sets up multilateral South China Sea Regional Joint Development Corporation with neighboring claimant states; and
ii. P.R.C. pledges to negotiate resolution of all such disputes on the basis of the P.R.C.-ASEAN agreement entitled, "The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea."

ASEAN Economic and Peacekeeping Collaboration

U.S. and P.R.C pledge:
i. Harmonization and coordination of their respective roles in regional economic and security forums;

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China-US Grand Strategy Proposal

ii. Pursuit of peaceful coexistence in their bilateral relations with other Asian nations; and
iii. Promotion of economic stability and growth of ASEAN nations in their multilateral relations within ASEAN, APEC, etc.

Military-to-Military Ties

U.S and P.R.C. pledge to cooperate on international and non-traditional security issues, to include:

i. Lifting of U.S. embargo on military sales to China;
ii. Regular scheduling of joint naval exercises in Asian waters, with standing invitations to other regional navies;
iii. Permanent expansion of officer-exchange program;
iv. Creation of joint peacekeeping force/command in conjunction with other countries within the UN Security Council framework;
v. Expansion of U.S.-P.R.C Maritime and Military Security Agreement to include frequency of U.S. close-in reconnaissance; and
vi. Establishment of joint commission collaborating annually on U.S. and P.R.C. technology sharing and transparency of budget expenditures.

Existing and Future International Institutions and Issues

U.S. and P.R.C. pledge to support continued reform of existing institutions (e.g., UN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, G20) to better reflect the evolving global economy and international issues, to include climate change, Doha Agreement, etc.

Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED)

To implement the new collaborations listed above:

i. SED becomes permanently sitting commission for continuous senior-level communications and collaboration on economic and security issues; and
ii. SED reviews all existing tariffs, WTO complaints, and other trade and economic disputes and issues.

P.R.C. Investment into U.S. Economy

P.R.C. pledges to invest up to 1 trillion USD directly into U.S. companies at direction of U.S. President in exchange for:
i. U.S. removes trade restrictions and high-technology export bans with P.R.C.;
i. P.R.C. commits to purchase sufficient amount of U.S. goods/services to balance bilateral trade on annual basis;
iii. P.R.C. companies' access to U.S. market made equal to that of U.S. companies access to P.R.C. market;
iv. Ownership limit for new P.R.C. investments in U.S.-owned or controlled corporations limited to 45 percent of shares, with additional 10 percent reserved for preferred equity/pension funds on a case-by-case basis and final 45 percent remaining with non-P.R.C. ownership;
vi. U.S. and P.R.C. to facilitate global joint ventures between U.S. and P.R.C. companies, with initial example to involve major U.S. firm, possibly General Motors; and
vii. U.S. and P.R.C. to collaborate in SED on goal of full employment throughout each economy, targeting in particular areas suffering inordinate unemployment or needing special economic growth arrangements.

Other Areas of Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

P.R.C. and U.S. to collaborate:

i. Implementing principles in the Preamble, Article 1 of the UN Charter;
ii. Rehabilitation of failing and failed states seeking assistance;
iii. Combining U.S. and P.R.C. markets, technology and financing to ensure affordable costs for all nations of effective pollution remediation and sustainable energy and financing of globally needed technology; and
iv. Joint space exploration with other UN member states.

No Creation or Operation of "G2" Arrangement

Nothing in this Executive Agreement constitutes, is intended to, nor permits the creation or operation of a "G2", and instead this Agreement:

i. Establishes an improved framework of collaboration among the U.S., P.R.C. and other UN member states;
ii. Neither seeks nor infers any formal alliance between the U.S. and P.R.C.; and
iii. Creates a new U.S. and P.R.C. partnership commitment to the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the UN Charter.

Mutually agreed on the _____ day of _____ 2011.

President Barack Obama President Hu Jintao

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Brazil has emerged as both a driver of growth in South America and as an active force in world politics. A new CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report, chaired by former secretary of energy Samuel W. Bodman and former president of the World Bank James D. Wolfensohn, calls on U.S. policymakers to "recognize Brazil's standing as a global actor, treat its emergence as an opportunity for the United States, and work with Brazil to develop complementary policies."

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Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars

Smarter Policies for Both Sides of the Border

Mark Kleiman

More than a thousand people die each month in drug-dealing violence in Mexico, and the toll has been rising. In some parts of the country, the police find themselves outgunned by drug traffickers and must rely on the armed forces. Meanwhile, the United States suffers from the widespread abuse of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines, and cannabis; violence and disorder surrounding retail drug markets; property theft and violent crime committed by drug abusers; and mass incarceration, including half a million people behind bars for drug offenses and at least as many for crimes committed for money to buy drugs.

Current policies, clearly, have unsatisfactory results. But what is to replace them? Neither of the standard alternatives—a more vigorous pursuit of current antidrug efforts or a system of legal availability for currently proscribed drugs—offers much hope. Instead, it is time for Mexico and the United States to consider a set of less conventional approaches.

Most of the illicit drugs consumed in the United States come through or from Mexico, and virtually all the revenue of Mexican

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drug-trafficking organizations comes from sales to the United States. Thinking of this as a single shared drug problem suggests a shared responsibility for controlling that problem. In the conventional telling, Mexico's role is to limit illicit exports, while the United States should act to shrink demand and domestic production, relying on the standard drug-control triad of enforcement, prevention, and treatment.

The conventional alternative to this conventional wisdom holds that the problem is not drugs but drug laws, and that the solution is therefore legal availability. Since prohibition creates illicit markets, the argument goes, only some form of regulated availability can eliminate the illicit market and the resulting problems. Even under legal availability, say the anti-prohibitionists, prevention and treatment efforts can limit the extent of drug abuse and the damage it causes. Last June's report of the self-appointed Global Commission on Drug Policy—whose signatories included former presidents of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Switzerland, as well as former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan—laid out the anti-drug-war view. But the established understanding and the established alternative share an undue faith in the power of prevention and treatment; the established view also embraces an overoptimistic assessment of the power of enforcement.

A more realistic understanding would take into account the limited capacity of the conventional drug-control triad and the enormous power of markets—licit and illicit—to shape behavior. Policies based on that understanding would aim at changing the incentives facing both drug dealers and drug users, with the goal of reducing violence and disorder and shrinking the U.S. prison population. Of course, more logical policies cannot guarantee better results, and even a better result would not be a solution to the drug problem. At best, Mexico and the United States could end up with a result that would be, in the words of the economist John Kenneth Galbraith, merely "distasteful" rather than "catastrophic." But a bad result is preferable to a worse one.

THE GREAT ASYMMETRY

MEXICO AND the United States do not occupy symmetrical positions in the binational drug situation. The United States is central to Mexico's drug problem, whereas Mexico is incidental to that of the

ALEJANDRO ACOSTA/REUTERS

At the scene of a cartel shooting, Guadalajara, Mexico, February 12, 2011

United States. Before the mid-1980s, when the heavy use of U.S. naval and air power shut off the Caribbean smuggling route from Colombia to the Gulf Coast, Mexico was not the main source or transit country for illicit drugs entering the United States. But the U.S. drug problem was at least as severe then as it is now. By contrast, Mexico's current drug-trafficking problems relate almost entirely to exports to the United States. In other words, if the United States stopped importing drugs, Mexico's drug violence would shrink dramatically. But an end to Mexican exports would, once new routes and sources replaced Mexico in serving the U.S. market, have only a modest impact on the U.S. drug problem.

If stronger Mexican efforts against drug trafficking could substantially reduce drug abuse in the United States, Washington's repeated demands for more vigorous law enforcement in Mexico would have some real basis. But to call on Mexico to make increasing sacrifices for no more potential benefit than redirecting the flow of illicit trade is surely unjustifiable. The upsurge in violence since Mexican President Felipe Calderón began his crackdown against traffickers in 2007 shows how increased enforcement can lead to increased bloodshed.

This line of reasoning seems to support the reply U.S. officials often hear when they demand that Mexico strengthen its antidrug efforts: that the basic problem is not supply from Mexico but demand from the United States, and that it is incumbent on the United States to reduce the quantities of illicit drugs its residents sell, buy, and consume.

But that goal, too, runs directly into some intractable facts. A small minority of drug users in the United States account for about 80 percent of hard-drug (that is, non-cannabis) consumption and an even larger share of the associated costs of drug abuse, including crime. Among heavy users of hard drugs, about 75 percent have at least one felony arrest in the course of a typical year. Hard drugs account for about 80 percent of the revenue of Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. All this means that reducing the demand for cannabis or the demand for cocaine among casual cocaine users cannot reduce the northbound flow of drugs or the southbound flow of drug money. Shrinking the market would require reducing the hard-drug use of about three million people in the United States who are both heavy users of expensive illicit drugs and also active lawbreakers.

The United States' enforcement-prevention-treatment triad has little relief to offer either Mexico or the United States.

The market forces of replacement and adaptation make the drug-dealing industry resilient even in the face of heavy enforcement: the United States sends five times as many drug dealers to prison today as it did 30 years ago, but this has not prevented the 80–90 percent reductions in the prices of cocaine and heroin over that time, which came as a result of falling dealers' wages and increased efficiency in trafficking. Thus, conventional drug enforcement represents a dead end.

Prevention programs, mostly concentrated on schoolchildren, have only limited efficacy: even the best programs produce only modest gains, perhaps reducing the rate of cannabis initiation by age 13 from 12 percent to nine percent. Reducing initiation is not the same as reducing progression to heavy use; no primary prevention program has ever been shown to prevent addiction. Moreover, such programs have long lag times. Even if a massively successful prevention effort for fifth-grade students began next year, it would not

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have any substantial impact on hard-drug use until about 2020. Instead of the current mishmash of problem-specific prevention programs, such as drug prevention, bullying prevention, obesity prevention, gang prevention, and so on, the new U.S. National Drug Control Strategy calls for concentrating on building resilient individuals and communities, addressing the common factors underlying a range of personal and social problems. Although such a course correction is welcome, it remains unclear how it will be implemented or how much good it will do in practice.

Treatment offers benefits for some drug abusers; it more than pays for itself by reducing crime and other social costs of drug use. But simply expanding the availability of treatment is only half the battle: most people who need drug treatment (by clinical standards) do not want it. Even supposedly mandatory treatment programs tend to suffer from high dropout rates; the largest, California's Proposition 36, had (even in the early years of this century, when it had full funding) a completion rate of no more than 25 percent and no measurable effect on criminal activity. The most common path out of substance abuse, taken by more than 90 percent of those who recover, is "spontaneous remission": quitting without formal treatment. The one exception is opiate substitution for heroin addicts—such programs work, and people stay with them. Expanding the availability of substitution could cut into the approximately one-fifth of the U.S.-Mexican drug traffic constituted of heroin. But treatment has little ability to reduce demand in the far larger markets for cocaine and methamphetamines.

Taken together, these facts about drug abuse and the drug trade suggest that the United States' enforcement-prevention-treatment triad has little relief to offer either Mexico or the United States. In fact, some of these efforts, such as eradicating cannabis crops within the United States, actually tend to increase Mexican imports. Moreover, the half million drug dealers now behind bars in the United States constitute a social problem comparable to illicit drug abuse itself. Calls for more intense application of current approaches to drug control meet the philosopher George Santayana's definition of "fanaticism": "redoubling your effort when you have forgotten your aim."

Mark Kleiman

LEGALIZE IT?

If cocaine, heroin, methamphetamines, and cannabis were handled in the United States the way alcohol is handled—in other words, if they were available for sale across the counter in unlimited quantities to any adult, subject only to modest taxes—the illicit markets would disappear and so would their contribution to violence in Mexico. But at what cost in increased drug abuse?

Alcohol is currently the only addictive intoxicant made available on a commercial basis. There are about four times as many active alcohol abusers in the United States at any one time as there are active abusers of all the illicit drugs combined. The cost, in the form of drunken violence (including domestic abuse), illness, accidents, and incarceration, falls on alcohol abusers, their families, and their neighbors. About half of the 2.4 million people behind bars in the United States were drunk when they committed the crimes that put them there. Thus, alcohol accounts for more incarcerations, as well as more substance abuse, than all the illicit drugs combined.

Consequently, even those most eager to "end the drug war" are, for the most part, reluctant to propose full commercial availability on the alcohol model. But as the Global Commission's report illustrates, opponents of prohibition are equally reluctant to specify taxes and regulations that would prevent an upsurge in abuse without generating a problematic set of illicit markets. Prohibition, even imperfectly enforced, keeps illicit drug prices an order of magnitude above free-market levels. Any set of taxes and regulations powerful enough to prevent drug abuse from soaring would create financial incentives for evasion, and thus a need for enforcement, comparable to those created by prohibition. Even if total drug legalization were a good idea in policy terms, it would be politically infeasible: at the moment, it has almost zero political support in the United States.

Most of the halfway steps proposed by drug policy reformers would offer little benefit to Mexico and other source and transit countries. Some of them could actually make the Mexican situation worse. For example, decriminalization—ending arrests of users for simple drug possession—would, if anything, increase the volume of drugs consumed and thus the size of the export market. The reduced

incarceration of users, which would be the main benefit of decriminalization, would be felt in the United States, not in Mexico.

Full commercial legalization of cannabis, or some alternative short of full commercialization, such as lawful production for personal use or by user cooperatives, would shrink the revenue of the Mexican trafficking organizations by approximately one-fifth, according to Beau Kilmer and his colleagues at the RAND Corporation: not a dramatic gain but certainly not trivial. Whether trafficking violence would be reduced by a comparable amount is a question for speculation, with no real evidence either way. Mexican drug traffickers would be left with plenty to fight over and more than enough money to finance their combat.

Cannabis legalization would probably lead to a smaller increase in consumption than would be the case for hard drugs, simply because the current cannabis prohibition is less successfully enforced than the prohibitions against cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines. The benefits of eliminating $10 billion or more in annual illicit revenue and perhaps ten percent of the drug-related incarcerations in the United States might well outweigh the damage from increased abuse.

National cannabis legalization is still a relatively distant prospect in U.S. political terms; the legalization bill introduced last spring in the House of Representatives found only six sponsors. But public opinion has been changing rapidly. In 2010, more than 46 percent of voters in California cast their ballots for full legalization in the state; 45 percent of those responding to a 2011 nationwide Pew survey, meanwhile, supported the legalization of marijuana use, up from 16 percent in Pew's 1990 survey. Still, any relief Mexico might get from such a move is likely to be a decade or more in the future. And cannabis legalization would leave four-fifths of Mexico's current revenue from illicit drug exports untouched.

A NEW HOPE

THE FUTILITY of conventional drug-control approaches does not mean there are no attractive options. If policymakers are willing to adjust their strategies to reflect both the limits of the possible and the relative importance of various goals, then there could be smaller illicit

drug markets, less drug-related violence, and fewer people behind bars. Reducing the number of casual drug users should be a far lower priority than reducing the number of criminally active heavy users of hard drugs; decreasing violence is not only more feasible but also more vital than decreasing the flow of drugs.

Antidrug tactics should be chosen to make the best use of scarce resources, especially the capacity to punish. The sheer volume of the current illicit drug traffic, combined with the market's tendency to adapt to enforcement and replace the drugs, dealers, and even dealing organizations taken out of action by the authorities, makes routine drug law enforcement an exercise in shoveling sand against the tide. But if the United States concentrated its enforcement efforts against dealers selected for their contribution to violence and disorder, it would be possible to issue convincing threats against that subcategory of offenders. When deterrent threats are sufficiently credible and clearly communicated, they do not need to be carried out very often.

The majority of drug dealers are not violent—and this variability creates a strategic opportunity.

Coerced treatment for drug abusers is not very successful, both because drug treatment itself is not very successful and because the coercion is generally more nominal than real. But the idea of focusing on criminally active, chronic high-dose users of expensive illicit drugs makes good sense. Although they constitute a small minority of all users, they account for the bulk of the market in terms of volume and revenue, and they frequently find themselves under the supervision of the criminal justice system. Also, felony probationers and parolees with illicit drug abuse problems make up roughly half the population of active hard-drug abusers in the United States. Once these users come under supervision, there is no need to allow them to continue their drug use.

Those on probation or parole are already forbidden to use illicit drugs. But that mandate is not effectively enforced. The threat of probation or parole revocation is too severe (and expensive) to be carried out often and not swift or certain enough to change behavior dramatically. As a result, most violations go unpunished. By reducing the severity of the punishment for breaking the rules, it is possible to

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

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

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dramatically increase its swiftness and certainty—and swiftness and certainty matter more than severity in changing behavior.

Frequent or random drug testing, with a guaranteed short jail stay (as little as two days) for each incident of detected use, can have remarkable efficacy in reducing offenders' drug use: Hawaii's now-famous HOPE project manages to get 80 percent of its long-term methamphetamine users clean and out of confinement after one year. The program more than pays for itself by reducing the incarceration rate in that group to less than half that of a randomly selected control group under probation as usual. HOPE participants are not forced to receive drug treatment; instead, they are required to stop using. About 15 percent fail repeatedly, and that small group is ordered into treatment, but most succeed without it. Fewer than ten percent wind up back in prison.

These impressive results have led to similar efforts in Alaska, Arizona, California, and Washington State; where the HOPE model is faithfully followed, the outcomes are as consistent and positive as those in Hawaii. The U.S. federal government is set to sponsor four new attempts to reproduce those results. If HOPE were to be successfully implemented as part of routine probation and parole supervision, the resulting reduction in drug use could shrink the market—and thus the revenue of Mexico's drug-trafficking organizations—by as much as 40 percent. The potential gains on both sides of the border justify the attempt, despite the daunting managerial challenges.

ALL ILLICIT MARKETS ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL

ALTHOUGH ANTIDRUG law enforcement has little capacity to shrink the volume of drugs sold, it has a great, but largely latent, capacity to reduce the damage done in the process. Assigning priority to violence reduction would reshape U.S. and Mexican enforcement efforts, albeit in different ways: the United States would have to change its approach to retail dealing, whereas Mexico would need a new strategy for handling the country's six large-scale trafficking organizations. Yet the basic goal would be the same on both sides of the border: to reduce the levels of violence caused by the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs.

Mark Kleiman

All illicit markets pose the threat of violence and disorder, but they are not all equally violent and disorderly. Flagrant retail dealing—stranger-to-stranger transactions in public places or sole-use trafficking locations such as crack houses—is especially troublesome compared to discreet dealing in private settings or multiuse locations. When an area is taken over by flagrant dealing, the conduct of the dealers, the buyers, and the robbers who come to prey on them can force ordinary residents off the streets and drive legitimate businesses away. Violence among and against dealers is intertwined with the feuding of street gangs; in neighborhoods plagued by such problems, routine drug law enforcement imposes enormous costs but has nothing to offer in the way of either reducing violence or shrinking the market.

Yet the majority of drug dealers are not violent—and this variability creates a strategic opportunity. By focusing drug-dealing arrests, prosecutions, and prison terms on the most violent individuals and groups, governments can achieve the double benefit of incapacitating the worst actors and deterring the rest—not from drug dealing (an incarcerated or deterred dealer will merely be replaced) but from violence, or from the flagrant dealing practices that give rise to violence and disorder. The goals are to suppress violence and to force the market into a more orderly mode, perhaps ultimately to home delivery arranged by telephone or the Internet, and thus make the affected neighborhoods once again fit places to live and do business. The experience of the last several decades has shown the futility of arrests and incarceration in shrinking drug volumes; demand-reduction programs such as HOPE are the best means to that end. More creative law enforcement can at least shrink violence and disorder. The same methods that characterize routine law enforcement—gathering intelligence, developing informants, and deploying undercover agents—can be used to identify and build cases against the most violent dealers. In fact, other market participants may even prove eager to give them up simply for self-protection. The main challenge here is not operational but managerial: violence-minimizing enforcement leads to fewer arrests and smaller drug seizures, so law enforcement officials who want to encourage such a strategy will need to adjust their performance metrics accordingly.

Shutting down an entire retail drug market ridden by violence will require a different process. Stranger-to-stranger drug dealing is what

the economist and game theory analyst Thomas Schelling calls a "focal point" activity: buyers will come only where they expect to find dealers, and dealers will locate only where they expect to find buyers. Both sides benefit when their numbers overwhelm the police. Once established, such a market is stable, but if the pattern of expectations that holds it together is disrupted, there is no natural mechanism to bring it back into existence.

With half a million drug dealers already crowding U.S. prisons, market-disruption strategies must avoid making dozens or hundreds of arrests and adding to the problem of mass incarceration. David Kennedy and his colleagues at the National Network for Safe Communities have developed a promising tactic. The Drug Market Intervention strategy, first employed to great success in 2004 in High Point, North Carolina, identifies all the active dealers in a flagrant market area, builds cases against them, arrests and prosecutes a handful of the most violent players, and warns the rest, publicly and simultaneously, that anyone who does not stop dealing is headed to prison. By forcing all the dealers to stop at the same time, the intervention causes the market to disappear literally overnight, and the police make only a handful of arrests in the process. (This is another application of the principle that a credible threat rarely needs to be carried out.) Focusing U.S. domestic drug law enforcement on reducing violence and disorder could allow a very substantial cutback in the overall level of drug arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations. Neither the availability of drugs nor the level of drug abuse in the United States would change dramatically if the current number of drug dealers behind bars were cut in half.

KEEPING SCORE

Mexico's different problem calls for a different strategy: creating disincentives for violence at the level of the largest trafficking organizations. Those six organizations vary in their use of violence; total violence would shrink if market shares changed in favor of the currently least violent groups or if any group reduced its violence level. Announcing and carrying out a strategy of violence-targeted enforcement could achieve both ends.

Mark Kleiman

The Mexican government could craft and announce a set of violence-related metrics to be applied to each organization over a period of weeks or months. Such a scoring system could consider a group's total number of killings, the distribution of its targets (among other dealers, enforcement agents, ordinary citizens, journalists, community leaders, and elected officials), its use or threat of terrorism, and its nonfatal shootings and kidnappings. Mexican officials have no difficulty attributing each killing to a specific trafficking organization, in part because the organizations boast of their violence rather than trying to hide it. At the end of the scoring period, or once it became clear that one organization ranked first, the police would designate the most violent organization for destruction. That might not require the arrest of the kingpins, as long as the targeted organization came under sufficiently heavy enforcement pressure to make it uncompetitive.

The points of maximum vulnerability for the Mexican trafficking organizations might not even be within Mexico. U.S. law enforcement agencies believe that for every major domestic distribution organization in the United States, they can identify one or more of the six dominant Mexican trafficking organizations as the primary source or sources. If the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration were to announce that its domestic target-selection process would give high priority to distributors supplied by Mexico's designated "most violent organization," the result would likely be a scramble to find new sources.

Removing an organization would not reduce total smuggling capacity; someone would pick up the slack. But the leaders of the targeted trafficking group would, if the program were successful, find themselves out of business. The result might be the replacement of more violent trafficking activity by less violent trafficking activity. Less happily, it could lead to a temporary upsurge in violence due to the disruption of existing processes and relationships. But in either case, if the destruction of the first designated target was followed by an announcement that a new target-selection process was under way using the same scoring system, there would be great pressure for each of the remaining trafficking groups to reduce its violence level to escape becoming the next target.

The process could continue until none of the remaining groups was notably more violent than the rest. In effect, such a strategy would

condition the traffickers' ability to remain in business on their willingness to conduct their affairs in a relatively nonviolent fashion. This does not mean any sort of explicit negotiation or "treaty" with Mexico's trafficking organizations. Trafficking, even nonviolently, would remain subject to enforcement. But highly violent trafficking would be the target of differential enforcement.

Of course, such an approach would face many challenges: agreeing on a set of metrics, collecting accurate data (especially if some organizations tried to carry out violent actions intended to implicate their rivals), keeping tabs on sourcing relationships, and maintaining sufficient publicity and transparency to avert accusations of corruption. But unlike the conventional approach of enforcement, prevention, and treatment, targeting violence at least has logic behind it. And unlike legalization, it would not cause a huge increase in drug abuse and has a political chance of being adopted. In the absence of another plausible way out of the current situation, it might be worth trying.

In 2010, as Antonio Maria Costa was leaving his post as executive director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, he remarked on the implausibility of either "a drug-free world" or "a world of free drugs." Liberating the debate over drug policy from the grip of those twin chimeras might allow the makers of drug policy on both sides of the Rio Grande, and throughout the rest of the world, to seek a set of policies less destructive than those of the past 40 years.

Palestine Goes to the UN

Understanding the New Statehood Strategy

Khaled Elgindy

Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and chair of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), plans to call on the United Nations in September to recognize a Palestinian state and admit it as a full member of the organization. This strategy marks a dramatic shift in the Palestinians' approach to the conflict with Israel: they are not seeking to revive the moribund peace process; they are seeking to bypass it altogether.

Following the collapse of direct negotiations last fall, Abbas and his Fatah-dominated leadership launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign to secure broad international recognition of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders as a prelude to applying for formal UN membership this fall. If the Palestinian bid to get full UN membership in September is defeated in the UN Security Council—a U.S. veto is all but assured—the PA says it is prepared to take the matter to the General Assembly. Initially, the plan was to seek a two-thirds majority vote there to obtain a nonbinding resolution under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure, which allows the General Assembly to act when a lack of unanimity on the Security Council prevents it from fulfilling its "primary responsibility" of maintaining "international peace and security." The PA has since backed away from this option

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and is now planning to seek a simple majority in the General Assembly, which would allow Palestine to be recognized as a "nonmember state" of the UN, alongside Kosovo, Taiwan, and Vatican City.

The Palestinians' UN strategy has been buttressed by two ongoing developments, both of which have now become essential to its success. The first is Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's so-called state-building plan, which he launched in August 2009 with the aim of laying the institutional foundations of a future Palestinian state within two years. Although it was not envisaged as a diplomatic initiative, the plan has given Abbas certain strategic advantages, including an internationally endorsed deadline and specific criteria for statehood. The second, more crucial precondition for Palestinian statehood is national unity. Progress toward this has already been achieved through a reconciliation agreement signed in early May that was designed to formally end a debilitating four-year split between Fatah and Hamas. The deal has yet to be finalized, let alone implemented, and it has provoked strong opposition from Israel and raised serious concerns in Washington. But without a unified polity, the Palestinians' bid for statehood will not be credible.

Meanwhile, Abbas' UN strategy threatens to put the Palestinian leadership on a political and diplomatic collision course with Israel, the United States, and perhaps the broader international community. Even as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has dismissed the outcome of any UN vote as "meaningless," his government has been preparing for what Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has called "an impending diplomatic tsunami." U.S. President Barack Obama has warned the Palestinians that "efforts to delegitimize Israel will end in failure." The United States, along with key European and other powers, insists that a Palestinian state will be created only through direct negotiations.

Yet the move does not merit a direct confrontation. In going to the UN, the Palestinians are seeking not to obtain statehood but to gain full UN membership as an existing state. Since last year, some 120 countries have recognized a "state of Palestine" drawn along the 1967 borders. Meanwhile, Abbas, other Palestinian leaders, and various international legal experts have argued that Palestine already is a state because it meets the four criteria for statehood prescribed by international law: it has a permanent population (Palestinians), a specific territory (the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as defined by the 1967 lines), a government (the PA), and the ability to enter into relations with other countries (through the PLO). In any event, UN membership requires the approval of the Security Council, and the United States will surely veto the Palestinians' bid. Thus, Abbas' gesture is largely symbolic.

This is not to say that it is an empty gesture, however, as the Palestinians are also eyeing some concrete benefits. They hope to pressure Israel and the United States to engage in more equitable negotiations, whether these take place before, after, or instead of the UN vote. This is a central objective for Abbas and the Fatah-dominated PLO leadership, because their political survival hinges in no small measure on both credible peace negotiations and a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

PEACE PROCESSING

THIS STRATEGY did not come about in a vacuum or overnight. Its roots lie in the belief, long held by ordinary Palestinians and more recently adopted by the Abbas leadership, that two decades of "peace processing" have failed to realize Palestinian national aspirations and have helped prolong and deepen Israel's occupation while weakening Palestinian political institutions. Twenty years after the launch of face-to-face talks between Israel and the PLO, the West Bank is more cantonized, Gaza's population is poorer and more besieged, and Israeli settlers are more numerous and bolder than ever.

The decision by Abbas and Fatah to resort to a UN bid for statehood, as well as the decision to pursue a reconciliation agreement with their political rival, Hamas, was born of profound despair. Two mutually reinforcing trends, the failure of U.S.-led mediation efforts and Fatah's own increasingly precarious domestic political position, have led Palestinian leaders to conclude that although they have done everything that was asked of them—from security and institution building to continued peace talks—the United States and its international partners have failed to live up to their end of the bargain. The Palestinians' disenchantment has been in the making for many years, but it has accelerated considerably under the Obama administration.

Palestine Goes to the UN

The idea of seeking a UN Security Council resolution recognizing a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, was floated as early as November 2009. Obama seemed sympathetic at first, but Abbas, who could not afford another round of failed peace talks, spent the next 18 months avoiding U.S. entreaties to resume direct negotiations. He wanted clear terms of reference and a commitment from Israel that it would halt the construction of settlements in the West Bank. After a time, weakened to the point of paralysis, he agreed to engage only in indirect "proximity" talks. Then, in September 2010, relenting to U.S. pressure, he agreed to direct talks.

But soon after that, two decisive events convinced Abbas and Fatah that they needed to radically change course. The first was the rapid collapse of the September 2010 talks after Washington failed to secure even a partial moratorium on settlement construction from Israel. The Obama administration's reluctance to use its substantial leverage with Israel to secure a construction freeze dashed any remaining hopes among Palestinians that Obama might do better than his predecessors. As if to confirm their disappointment, in February 2011 the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Israeli settlements. The vote was a sort of dry run for the UN vote in September, and for Abbas, the U.S. veto was the clearest indication yet of both the Obama administration's unwillingness to pressure Israel on even matters of long-standing U.S. policy and its inability to appreciate Palestinian political needs. A month later, Abbas' foreign minister, Riyad al-Malki, announced, "The current peace process, as it has been conducted so far, is over."

In going to the UN, the Palestinians are seeking not to obtain statehood but to gain full UN membership as an existing state.

The second clarifying moment for the Palestinian leadership occurred at the onset of the Arab Spring, following the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February. The loss of Mubarak, the PA's most powerful Arab ally and chief political patron, was especially jarring for Abbas. Even before the Arab uprisings, senior Palestinian officials had privately acknowledged that the PA's legitimacy was

"hanging by a thread": the PA's parliament, the Palestinian Legislative Council, has not met since 2007, and Abbas, whose term technically expired in January 2009, has been ruling largely by decree. In January of this year, after al Jazeera and *The Guardian* released hundreds of leaked documents detailing controversial concessions by the PLO to Israel, the slow seepage of the Palestinian leadership's legitimacy became a full-blown hemorrhage. Amid the wave of popular protests sweeping the region, it was forced to reassess its political priorities. It could no longer ignore public opinion.

Chief among the Palestinian people's demands was national reconciliation, which seemed to them a prerequisite to ending the Israeli occupation. Young Palestinians across the West Bank and Gaza took to the streets calling for an end to the political division between Fatah and Hamas, a self-inflicted schism that had become a source of intense collective shame. (The PA is mainly an administrative body, whereas the PLO, of which Fatah is the dominant faction, is recognized internationally as the legal and diplomatic representative of the Palestinian people—which is the reason that Hamas' exclusion from the PLO has persistently undermined the PLO's claim that it represents all Palestinians.) With little prospect of a credible negotiation process with Israel and the winds of change blowing at his back, Abbas and Fatah saw no choice but to end their four-year feud with Hamas, even if doing so meant that the U.S. Congress would likely cut aid to the PA and the government would probably face an international boycott. It was a necessary move. The reconciliation agreement may not have been in the cards when Abbas first decided to go to the UN, but it has helped eliminate another hurdle to his bid: a still-divided Palestinian polity would not have been a credible candidate for statehood.

GAMBIT OR GAMBLE?

Some characterize the Palestinians' UN bid as an attempt to achieve statehood unilaterally or to delegitimize Israel. It is neither. In fact, it is not even the Palestinian leadership's preferred course of action. Abbas and Fatah would much rather engage in a credible negotiation process and avoid a power-sharing arrangement with Hamas. Unlike Hamas, whose street credibility is based on resistance, Fatah's

credibility derives from the promise of bringing about change through peace negotiations.

Having borne the brunt of repeated failures in the peace process, the PA's primary aim now is to regain some badly needed political leverage, mainly by forcing a shift in the cost-benefit calculations of Israel and the United States. Palestine's admission into the UN would, in Abbas' view, transform the Israeli-Palestinian conflict into a matter of one UN member state violating the sovereign rights of another. That could give the Palestinians access to various international forums and mechanisms, such as the UN's human rights bodies, the International Court of Justice, and even the International Criminal Court, and offer them new avenues to seek redress. Even though UN membership is unlikely in the near term, Abbas hopes that further internationalizing the conflict will broaden the Palestinians' international support base and reaffirm the primacy of international norms, particularly their claim to the 1967 lines as the basis for a Palestinian state. Several western European states, such as France and Spain, have indicated that they might support the Palestinians' UN bid if peace negotiations have not resumed by September. Such support would dramatically increase the political value of even a nonbinding resolution by the General Assembly.

Abbas' UN strategy also dovetails neatly with Fayyad's state-building plan. Fayyad's proposal has given Abbas two strategic advantages. The first is to have established a crucial two-year deadline for statehood, a deadline that has since been officially endorsed by the Quartet (the European Union, the UN, the United States, and Russia) and is conveniently set to expire on the eve of the vote in the UN General Assembly in September. More important, the successful completion of the plan would help eliminate Israeli, U.S., and international pretexts for not moving forward on the diplomatic track and overcome the kind of stonewalling that the PA experienced during the difficult days of the al Aqsa intifada, when Israel and the United States preconditioned negotiations on security. A September 2010 report by the World Bank effectively certified the PA's progress on this front, finding it "well positioned to establish a state at any time in the near future." That the criteria applied to make that determination were based largely on political considerations mattered little to either Abbas or his Western backers. So long as the situation remained calm and

the PA was seen as opposing terrorism, the international community was prepared to overlook fundamental deficiencies, such as the absence of a functioning legislature or of formal mechanisms of accountability. That way, no formal obstacle would stand in the way of full Palestinian statehood, except the Israeli occupation.

Since the Arab Spring, Abbas has also come to see national unity as the surest, and perhaps the only, way to shore up the PA's sagging legitimacy. Reconciliation would give him a means of both containing Hamas (once inside the political process, he hopes, the group will do less damage than it could when it was outside) and enhancing his negotiating position (like his American and Israeli counterparts, he could invoke public opinion to resist making unpopular compromises). Moreover, when Abbas agreed to the reconciliation deal, he structured it in a way that created the fewest possible obstacles to future peace negotiations with Israel. As head of the PLO, he would retain the negotiations portfolio, and if the proposed consensus government came to be, he would be working with nonfactional technocrats and no members of Hamas. The matter of how, or when, Hamas might join the PLO, was put off indefinitely.

Thus, far from negating the possibility of peace negotiations, the Palestinians' UN gambit is a strategy aimed at strengthening their negotiating posture vis-à-vis Israel and the United States while improving the domestic standing of Abbas and his colleagues. Its goal is more to level the playing field than to change the game itself. Palestinian leaders from Abbas on down repeatedly refer to the UN option as a measure of last resort and seldom mention it without stipulating their preference for direct bilateral negotiations with Israel. They have even hinted at the possibility of resuming talks and abandoning their UN bid in return for something less than their usual preconditions—namely, either that Israel refrain from "creating new facts on the ground" (a looser standard than requiring a full settlement freeze) or the principles that Obama laid out in his May 19 speech (which are at best only partial terms of reference).

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Professor Timothy Taylor is Managing Editor of the *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* a quarterly academic journal produced at Macalester College and published by the American Economic Association. He received his master's in Economics from Stanford University. At Minnesota, he was Teacher of the Year for Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs master's degree students.

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but rather from a whole new generation that wants to upend the entire old order. Although the PLO may have once represented the "revolution," in the newly emerging fault lines of the Arab Spring, it is very much in the camp of old-guard Arab regimes. A full-blown Palestinian Spring has not yet come, but recent protests—those of March 15, May 15, and June 5, along with the demonstrations held regularly in Silwan, Naalin, Nabi Saleh, and other communities opposing the encroachment of Israeli settlements and the separation barrier—are an indication of what the future may hold. If Palestinians mobilize on an even larger scale in the future, they are as likely to direct their anger at their leaders as at Israel. Unlike Abbas and Fatah, they are not wedded to the two-state solution, and they are certainly not wedded to the peace process. Like their counterparts in other Arab countries, they are more loyal to principles and ideals than to ideological and factional affiliations; they seek not statehood but freedom, not negotiations but rights. They want to redefine the Palestinian national movement and forge a new national consensus that goes beyond the factional, the parochial, and the ideological.

The Palestinian leadership's UN bid is partly a response to this threat, too. The chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, offered this blunt rationale for it: "We're doing this to preserve the two-state solution . . . so that our people won't say we failed." A UN vote will not end the occupation of Israel or remove the settlements. But as Erekat intimated, the main point is to preserve the option of a two-state solution, which is rapidly being foreclosed by ever-expanding Israeli settlements and other "facts on the ground" (such as checkpoints, restrictions on movement, and land confiscation), until Israel and the United States can pursue it more seriously. And since the two-state solution is inextricably linked to the current Palestinian leaders' political relevance, this is also a way for them to ensure their own survival.

These motivations may explain why neither Abbas nor other Fatah leaders are eager to reform the PLO: allowing Hamas and other factions to join the umbrella group would end their monopoly on power. It may also explain why they have chosen their current UN strategy rather than other options that might have given them as much, if not more, leverage over Israel and the United States. Had such leverage been their only goal, they could have exploited several easy opportunities,

most obviously the release in 2009 of the Goldstone report, which was the result of a UN-commissioned investigation into war crimes that Israel allegedly committed during the Gaza war in the winter of 2008–9, and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a campaign designed to isolate and punish Israel culturally, economically, and politically. But when the Goldstone report came up for review before the UN Human Rights Council in October 2009, Abbas succumbed to Israeli, U.S., and international pressure to postpone a vote endorsing it, even though similar pressure had failed to make him back down before. Likewise, the PA has sought to distance itself from the growing BDS movement, going to great lengths, for example, to distinguish its own limited calls to boycott companies operating in Israeli settlements from the much broader cultural, economic, and political boycott advocated by the movement. The Palestinian leadership has never seriously pursued rights-based strategies of this kind, except in the most opportunistic and tactical way, largely because these are incompatible with a negotiated two-state solution: Palestinian leaders cannot very well sit down and negotiate with people they boycott or seek to have prosecuted as war criminals. In much the same way, the UN bid cannot be said to be driven by a desire to delegitimize Israel. For a leadership that believes its political future depends on a negotiated two-state solution, that approach would be self-defeating, if not self-negating.

A GAME OF CHICKEN

The Palestinians are determined to press ahead with their membership application at the UN and to seek a General Assembly resolution supporting their claim to a state drawn along the 1967 borders. Whether either of these initiatives will succeed, and within what timeframe—it could take months, or even years, for the Security Council to vote on the question—is unclear. But it seems increasingly unlikely that the Palestinians will ever return to the old peace process. As desperate as they may appear, they are not yet suicidal. And so barring some new groundbreaking diplomatic initiative by the United States, which seemed increasingly unlikely at the time of this writing, in July, the Palestinians have every reason to make good on their promise

to take the statehood issue to the UN. The Quartet failed to arrive at a consensus in time to prevent the Palestinians from submitting their formal application to the UN secretary-general by July 15.

Whether the UN bid is a success, pursuing it has already borne fruit. For the first time in many years, it is the Palestinians, rather than the Americans or the Israelis, who have set the agenda. Obama probably would not have declared that the 1967 lines should define the borders of Israel and Palestine, as he did earlier this year, if the Palestinians had not threatened to go to the UN. The UN bid has also played well back home, helping stanch the PA's hemorrhaging legitimacy, if only temporarily. And the Palestinians have also won strong Arab support, including official backing from the Arab League, Egypt's transitional government, and Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, the plan entails some serious risks. It remains unclear how the Palestinians intend to proceed after the UN vote, particularly in the not unlikely event that it is defeated. Abbas and his close advisers have laid out a series of possible scenarios: an international trusteeship over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Israel's resumption of its full responsibilities as an occupying power, the dissolution of the PA, and others. But with neither the nature nor the sequence of these options fully explained, these ideas have done little more than expose the lack of a coherent plan and the lack of cohesiveness within the Palestinian leadership.

The two-state solution is inextricably linked to the current Palestinian leaders' political survival.

Another substantial risk for the Palestinians is alienating Israel and the United States, both of which have seemed determined to defeat their UN bid even before it gets to a vote and might punish the Palestinians if the vote does take place. The U.S. Congress has already said that it will cut off U.S. financial assistance to the PA if either the UN bid or the Palestinian reconciliation agreement goes through. And various Israeli officials have threatened to annex parts of the West Bank or cancel existing agreements with the PLO. Israel might also try to derail the Fatah-Hamas unity deal by, for example, provoking Hamas into a new military confrontation. Although Palestinian leaders are mindful of these risks, they have not articulated how they plan

to overcome Israeli and U.S. opposition or avoid a possible resurgence in violence should the UN measure fail.

The bid also risks unduly raising the expectations of the Palestinian people. Should it fail or be defeated, the credibility of the PA and the PLO at home would be undercut. With negotiations with Israel already at a dead end, many Palestinians might conclude that no peaceful options remain. Frustration might be channeled into mass mobilizations, such as those seen throughout the Arab world this year, or they might take on the more violent forms prevalent during the previous decade. Whether this frustration targets Palestinian leaders or Israel will depend on the extent to which Palestinians believe that their leaders are acting on behalf of Palestinian national interests rather than Israeli, U.S., or Western wishes. To help mitigate this risk, Abbas and his colleagues will need to ensure that they secure something substantive if they do agree to abandon their UN bid.

This game of chicken presents some serious risks for Israel and the United States as well. Defeating a UN vote on Palestinian statehood might represent a kind of victory for both countries in the short term, but the long-term consequences could prove far more costly for them than for the Palestinians. Having identified Palestinian statehood as a vital national security interest, Washington would again be in the awkward position of voting down its own stated policy if it actively worked to prevent or defeat the UN vote, particularly at such a sensitive moment in the history of the Middle East. And that might further undermine its international standing. Israel would likely face even greater international isolation than it does now, particularly if it carried through with its threats to cancel previous accords or unilaterally annex all or parts of the West Bank. Either move could backfire by hastening the PA's collapse, which would probably mean the end of the two-state solution and with it the end of any hope that Israel could be both Jewish and democratic.

Although the United States may have legitimate concerns over key elements of this Palestinian strategy, it stands to gain little from a direct diplomatic confrontation with the Palestinian leadership. This is partly because there may be little it can do to prevent there being some vote at the UN, whether in the Security Council or the General Assembly. But more important, defeating the measure without offering

an alternative course of action, other than a return to the status quo, could so undermine the already shaky Palestinian leadership as to accelerate its eventual demise—and with it, the demise of the two-state solution itself.

Thus, rather than viewing the Palestinians' UN bid and the Fatah-Hamas unity deal as threats to a moribund peace process, the United States should see them as an opportunity to reset a severely outdated approach to resolving the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It should seek to preempt the UN vote by working with other key international actors—including the current members of the Quartet; regional stakeholders, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia; and possibly other states—to develop a bold, new initiative that spells out the requirements for a comprehensive resolution to the conflict (the outlines of which are already known) and then marshaling broad international support for it. This initiative should spell out the endgame by establishing clear and unequivocal parameters for resolving all of the conflict's core issues. And it should create a new framework for overseeing a credible negotiation process that is based on internationally accepted negotiating terms and is designed to end the Israeli occupation and create a Palestinian state within a firmly established timeframe. Short of this kind of bold initiative, even if the U.S. government does convince the Palestinians to abandon their UN bid, it will only have succeeded in delaying, rather than preventing, a more serious crisis down the road.

The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood

Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt

Eric Trager

The protesters who led Egypt's revolt last January were young, liberal, and linked-in. They were the bloggers who first proposed the demonstrations against Hosni Mubarak on Twitter; the Facebook-based activists who invited their "friends" to protest; and Wael Ghonim, the 30-year-old Google executive who, after Egypt's state security agency detained him for 12 days, rallied the crowds to hold Tahrir Square. Far from emulating Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, they channeled Thomas Paine, calling for civil liberties, religious equality, and an end to Mubarak's dictatorship. Their determination, punctuated by the speed of their triumph, fueled optimism that the long-awaited Arab Spring had finally sprung—that the Middle East would no longer be an autocratic exception in an increasingly democratic world.

The political transition following their revolt, however, has dulled this optimism. The iconic youths of Tahrir Square are now deeply divided among nearly a dozen, often indistinguishable political parties, almost all of which are either too new to be known or too discredited by their cooperation with the previous regime. Concentrated within the small percentage of Internet-using, politically literate Egyptians, their numbers are surprisingly small.

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood, which largely avoided the limelight during the revolt, is seizing the political momentum.

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The Brotherhood is Egypt's most cohesive political movement, with an unparalleled ability to mobilize its followers, who will serve it extremely well in a country still unaccustomed to voting. To understand the sources of the Brotherhood's political strength, and the reasons why it is unlikely to temper its ideology, it helps to take a close look at its organizational structure and the nature of its membership. From January through March of this year, I interviewed nearly 30 current and former Muslim Brothers in an attempt to do just that. Whereas Egypt's liberal and leftist political parties are nearly as easy to join as parties in the West, becoming a full-fledged Muslim Brother is a five- to eight-year process, during which aspiring members are closely watched for their loyalty to the cause and are indoctrinated in the Brotherhood's curriculum. This intricate system for recruitment and internal promotion produces members who are strongly committed to the organization's purpose, enabling its leaders it to mobilize its followers as they see fit.

The Muslim Brotherhood is relying on this system to build a single political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, to which it will direct its millions of members and admirers. And when it emerges from Egypt's parliamentary elections this fall with significantly increased electoral power, if not an outright plurality of the vote, it will use its enhanced position to move Egypt in a decidedly theocratic, anti-Western direction.

STARTING YOUNG

The Muslim Brotherhood's internal cohesiveness and ideological rigidity derives from its highly selective membership process. Local members scout for recruits at virtually every Egyptian university. These recruiters begin by approaching students who show strong signs of piety. "Certain members of the Muslim Brotherhood are supposed to meet and befriend new students and engage them in very normal, nonpolitical activities—football, tutoring—stuff that appeals to everyone," Amr Magdi, a former Brother, told me. Magdi was recruited during his freshman year at Cairo University's medical school but ultimately left the group due to ideological reservations. At first, recruiters do not identify themselves as Muslim Brothers and simply try to build relationships with their targets in order to scrutinize their

religiosity. "This is what makes us different from political parties," said Khaled Hamza, who edits the Muslim Brotherhood's English-language Web site. "We are an ideological grass-roots group, and we use our faith to pick members." According to Hamza, the process of recruitment can last a full year. Brothers frequently cite these early interactions as the reason they ultimately joined the group.

The Brotherhood also targets children for recruitment, starting around age nine. "It focuses on Muslim Brothers' kids in particular," said Mosab Ragab, 23, a leading Muslim Brotherhood youth activist whose father and uncles belong to the group. "The focus of my house was for me to follow my father, and sometimes he advised me to sit with certain people." Like other Muslim Brothers, Ragab was won over by this early exposure to the organization, and he officially enrolled when he turned 16.

In some circumstances, aspirants seek out the organization on their own. Typically, these Brothers-to-be were raised in religious families and came across the organization in the course of their study. Even in these cases, however, prospective members are carefully vetted before being admitted. "I was in [religious] Azhari schools since kindergarten. I demanded to join the Muslim Brotherhood," said the youth activist Anas al-Qasas, 28. "I went to my uncle [a Muslim Brother], and . . . he took me to another man, a teacher, who was a sheik. . . . When someone wants to join the [Muslim Brotherhood], a man comes to guide him."

This careful recruitment procedure helps the organization ensure that it invests only in young men who are already inclined toward its Islamist ideology. But recruitment is just the beginning of a much longer, multistage process that turns a hopeful new member into a Muslim Brother.

BECOMING A BROTHER

When an aspirant is first admitted into the Muslim Brotherhood, he becomes a *muhib*, "lover" or "follower." During this period, which typically lasts six months but can last as long as four years, the *muhib* enters a local *usra*, or "family," a regular meeting group where his piety and ideology are closely monitored. "At the *muhib* level, they try to educate you and improve your morals," Islam Lotfy, 33, another leading Muslim Brotherhood youth activist, told me. "If there is no improvement, they won't take you."

The *usra*, which consists of four to five people and is headed by a *naqib*, or "captain," is the most basic, but arguably most essential, unit of the Muslim Brotherhood's hierarchy. *Usra*s meet at least once a week and spend much of their time discussing members' personal lives and activities. This allows the Muslim Brothers to monitor their young colleagues' adherence to the organization's rigorous religious standards and to build group unity. "The main concept for [the organization] is the brotherhood of Islam," said Mohamed Abbas, 26, a Muslim Brotherhood youth leader active during the revolt. "The *usra* is about solidarity."

After the leader of an *usra* confirms, through observations or written exams, that a *muhib* prays regularly and possesses basic knowledge of the major Islamic texts, the *muhib* becomes a *muayyad*, or "supporter." This stage can last for one to three years. The *muayyad* is a nonvoting member of the organization and must fulfill certain duties set by his superiors, such as preaching, recruiting, or teaching in mosques. He also completes a more rigorous curriculum of study, memorizing major sections of the Koran and studying the writings of the group's founder, Hasan al-Banna.

In the next phase, an aspirant becomes *muntasib*, or "affiliated." The process lasts a year and is considered the first step toward full membership. A *muntasib* "is a member, but his name is written in pencil," says Lotfy. *Muntasib*s can work in one of the official Muslim Brotherhood divisions, such as those that run programs for professionals, laborers, university students, or children. *Muntasib*s also study the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and Koranic commentary and start giving a portion of their earnings, typically five to eight percent, to the organization.

Once a *muntasib* satisfies his monitors, he is promoted to *muntazim*, or "organizer." This stage typically lasts for another two years, during which time the *muntazim* must memorize the Koran and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and can assume a lower-level leadership role, such as forming an *usra* or heading a chapter of multiple *usra*s. Before he can advance to the final level—*ach 'amal*, or "working brother"—the loyalty of the *muntazim* is closely probed. "They might test you by acting like state security and giving you wrong information, to see whether you talk," said Ragab, who is not yet a *muntazim* but has had the process described to him by more senior colleagues. Advancement to the final level also requires superiors' confidence that the *muntazim* will follow

the directives of the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership. "It is about your knowledge, thinking, commitment to do duties, and how much ability you have to execute the orders given to you, like participating in demonstrations or conferences," said Mohammed Habib, the Brotherhood's former second-in-command.

After he becomes an *ach 'amal*, a Muslim Brother can vote in all internal elections, participate in all of the Brotherhood's working bodies, and compete for higher office within the group's hierarchy. He continues to meet weekly in his *usra* and is tasked with fulfilling *dawa*, the "call" to a more Islamic way of life, which is often done through the provision of social services, especially to communities in need.

The rudiments of this recruitment system date back to the Muslim Brotherhood's founding in 1928. But my conversations with members suggested that the process started to be formalized only in the late 1970s, when it became an important tool for ensuring that the state security services could not infiltrate the organization, which is precisely what happened to most other opposition groups and parties under President Anwar al-Sadat and Mubarak. (Under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ruled from 1956 to 1970, domestic opposition groups were decimated and Brotherhood leaders were incarcerated for decades.) "It's possible for a [state security] agent to become a *muhib*, but he won't move up," Ali Abdelfattah, a leader of the group in Alexandria, told me. "You have to be patient to become a *muayyad*. And if you're an agent, you won't be patient enough."

The Brotherhood's recruitment system produces a membership strongly committed to the organization's purpose.

Even if Mubarak's fall yields a more democratic political environment, the Muslim Brotherhood is not likely to scrap this vetting system, which the organization's leaders view as essential to ensuring its members' purity of purpose. "The Muslim Brotherhood recruits people by convincing them and [incorporating them into] the structure," said Mohamed Saad el-Katatny, the former head of the organization's parliamentary bloc, who recently left his position in the group's leadership to lead the Brotherhood's new party, the Freedom and Justice Party. "They do not have any business interests. They just want to serve the religion. Our structure is so

strong. When you start, you are active—you do not run after authority. You just work for the religion and work until Judgment Day."

DEPLOYING THE SOLDIERS

THE BROTHERHOOD'S recruitment system virtually guarantees that only those who are deeply committed to its cause become full members. Meanwhile, its pyramid-shaped hierarchy ensures that these members dutifully execute the aims of its national leadership at the local level.

At the top of the hierarchy is the Guidance Office (Maktab al-Irshad), which is comprised of approximately 15 longtime Muslim Brothers and headed by the supreme guide (*murshid*). Each member of the Guidance Office oversees a different portfolio, such as university recruitment, education, or politics. Guidance Office members are elected by the Shura Council, which is comprised of roughly 100 Muslim Brothers. Important decisions, such as whether to participate in elections, are debated and voted on within the Shura Council and then executed by the Guidance Office. Orders are passed down through a chain of command: the Guidance Office calls its deputies in each regional sector, who call their deputies in each subsidiary area, who call their deputies in each subsidiary populace, who call the heads of each local *usra*, who then transmit the order to their members. The chain also works in reverse: *usra*s can pass requests and concerns up to the Shura Council and the Guidance Office.

This type of transmission system enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to communicate reliably and discreetly despite intense police scrutiny under the previous regime. And in the post-Mubarak political environment, the Brotherhood's unique organizational capacity is allowing its leaders to communicate with its members nationwide—with reasonable certainty that orders will be obeyed, given the immense commitment that becoming a Muslim Brother entails. No other Egyptian opposition group can count on the type of breadth or depth of the Muslim Brotherhood's networks.

The efficiency of this system proved pivotal during the anti-Mubarak revolt. The Muslim Brotherhood initially avoided direct involvement in the demonstrations, which began on January 25, because the state

security agency had threatened to arrest Mohammed Badie, the Brotherhood's supreme guide, if its members participated. But the following day, the Guidance Office yielded to the demands of its younger members and decided to make it "obligatory" for Brothers to join the protests on January 28—dubbed "Friday of Rage" by organizers—and sent the message through the hierarchy. "My *usra* leader called me and told me pretty early," said the Muslim Brotherhood youth activist Amr el-Beltagi. "Most of the people found out through the telephone. All emergencies go by phone because it is faster."

Although the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian demonstrators were not affiliated with any political movement, this order from the Muslim Brotherhood seems to have helped catalyze the revolt's early triumph over the Central Security Forces, which Mubarak reportedly removed from the streets after the successful protests of January 28. As noontime prayers ended at mosques across the country that day, a handful of activists gathered at each entrance, and their numbers gave ordinary worshipers the confidence to confront Mubarak's police forces. Many of those activists were reportedly Muslim Brothers.

THE BROTHERHOOD BLOC

In the months since Mubarak's resignation, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to demonstrate its unique capacity to mobilize supporters. Protests continue to be held in Tahrir Square on most Fridays, and those protests that are endorsed by the Muslim Brotherhood draw substantially larger crowds than those that are not. The Muslim Brotherhood displayed its influence during the March 19 referendum on Egypt's proposed constitutional amendments, which set up earlier elections: it broke with most other opposition groups in supporting the amendments, which passed with a whopping 77 percent of the vote. The outcome all but ensured that parliamentary elections would be held this fall, thereby benefiting the Brotherhood over still-forming liberal and leftist parties.

As the parliamentary elections approach this fall, leaders of the Brotherhood are therefore highly confident about their chances. Although the group initially promised to run in only 30 to 40 percent of Egypt's electoral districts, in May it announced that it would run

NASSER NASSER/AP

At a Muslim Brotherhood rally, Cairo, May 18, 2011

candidates in just under half of all constituencies. Three prominent former Guidance Office members—Mohamed Morsy, Essam el-Erian, and Katatny—are running the Freedom and Justice Party and will serve as important links between the nominally independent party and the Brotherhood proper. And the Brotherhood will use its hierarchic network to choose candidates on a district-by-district basis, as it has done in the past.

Unless the Mubarak regime's National Democratic Party is resurrected under a different name (it was officially outlawed in April, and there have been proposals to ban its former parliamentarians from running), no other party will have anything close to the network of committed supporters that the Muslim Brotherhood has. The Brotherhood thus stands to win the vast majority of the seats that it contests, making a parliamentary plurality highly likely. But the organization is not stopping there: in recent months, it has encouraged certain independents to run for parliament as well, promising them the Muslim Brotherhood's support. "They say, 'We want to offer our services without any agenda,'" said one activist approached by the Muslim Brotherhood. It is not known how many independents have been encouraged to run this way, but the phenomenon demonstrates the Brotherhood's determination to win decisively.

Eric Trager

The Brotherhood's establishment of a legalized party (under Mubarak, the Brotherhood's members ran for, and served in, parliament as independents) has not occurred without major bumps. Some of its most prominent members view the organization's insistence on supporting only the Freedom and Justice Party, rather than allowing Muslim Brothers to choose any Islamic party, as too limiting. "Any Muslim Brother who wants to compete in politics is fine," Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fatouh, a former Guidance Office member who may be forming his own Islamic party and is running for president, told me in March. "Back in al-Banna's time, this is what was allowed: people could be in the Saadist Party, the Wafd Party, or others. . . . [The Muslim Brotherhood] should be a civil Islamic organization, as it was since al-Banna in 1928."

The Brotherhood will move Egypt in a theocratic, anti-Western direction.

Others see the formation of a political party as a distraction from the organization's greater priority: the long-term Islamization of Egyptian society through the provision of social services. This view seems particularly pronounced among Muslim Brotherhood youth activists, who held a conference without the Guidance Office's approval to publicize this position in late March. "We want the Muslim Brotherhood to be a religious group, and not to be in policy," said Ahmed Hassan, a physician who attended the conference.

These internal tensions have led a number of analysts to argue that in due time, the Muslim Brotherhood will split into several political factions. These pundits predict that prominent older leaders, such as Abou el-Fatouh, will draw away significant numbers of supporters, while disaffected youth activists will reject the Guidance Office's orders on how to vote. These tensions, they argue, could undercut the Muslim Brotherhood's ability to mobilize support.

My discussions with a dozen attendees of the March youth conference suggested that such a split is unlikely. Although some prominent Muslim Brotherhood youth activists, particularly the leaders of the revolt, vowed not to support the organization's official party, most conceded that they would ultimately obey the Guidance Office. "I'm going to support Freedom and Justice, because it's the official party of the group," Mohamed el-Gabaly, 31, told me. In fact, disagreements

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over the Muslim Brotherhood's political future appear to be isolated, affecting only a relatively small group of individuals. The youth conference, although noteworthy for the fact that it was held without the Guidance Office's permission, attracted only a few hundred attendees. "This is just a small group," said Mohamed Abdul Quddus, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood journalist. "Thousands of youth support the Guidance Office and the Muslim Brotherhood."

The Muslim Brotherhood youth activists who split from the organization to form Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masry (the Egyptian Current Party) in late June should be viewed in this light. According to its leaders, the new party is "not a Brotherhood party or a party of the Brotherhood youth," and most Muslim Brothers are therefore unlikely to see it as a realistic alternative to the Freedom and Justice Party. The ability of Hizb al-Tayyar al-Masry to have a long-term impact will depend on its members' ability to draw from, or replicate, the Brotherhood's nationwide networks. But that cannot happen immediately.

WINNING THE 81 MILLION

WASHINGTON SHOULD view the recent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood with concern. Despite the Brothers' insistence that their goals are "moderate," they seem to define this word differently from how one would in the West. To Muslim Brothers, the word, as Hamza, the editor of the group's English-language Web site, put it, simply means "not using violence, denouncing terrorism, and not working with jihadists."

Yet the Muslim Brothers that I interviewed invariably carved out important exceptions to this vow of nonviolence. "We believe that Zionism, the United States, and England are gangs that kill children and women and men and destroy houses and fields," former Supreme Guide Mohammed Mahdi Akef told me. "Zionism is a gang, not a country. So we will resist them until they don't have a country." Muslim Brothers added the conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq to the list of those in which violence is permissible. And true to this principle, when U.S. Navy SEALS killed Osama bin Laden, the Muslim Brotherhood called the action unjust and referred to the al Qaeda leader with the honorific "sheik."

Meanwhile, the Brotherhood's recent alignment with several anti-Western political parties suggests that Egyptian policy will become more hostile to the United States. In June, the Brotherhood formed the National Democratic Alliance for Egypt with over a dozen other political parties, including the Salafist Nour Party, the Nasserist Karama Party, and the liberal Wafd Party. The extreme diversity of the coalition makes its survival doubtful. Yet its parties have managed to agree on one thing: that Egypt should assume a foreign policy that is often inimical to U.S. interests. Following the alliance's June 21 meeting, for example, it released a statement announcing that it wanted to "open a strategic dialogue with Iran and Turkey . . . and review the settlement process with Israel, on the basis that it is not a real peace in light of the unjust aggression and violation of the Palestinian right to self-determination." Sentiments like this indicate that in post-Mubarak Egypt, the Brotherhood hopes to improve relations with the United States' greatest regional nemesis, Iran, and denigrate the Camp David accords with Israel, one of the United States' greatest diplomatic achievements.

The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood will also likely mean that the next Egyptian government will be less ready to cooperate with the United States. It will also likely draw closer to the Iranian-led bloc that resists U.S. influence and will reduce cooperation on security matters with Israel. Indeed, these shifts are already materializing, as the ruling Supreme Military Council, apparently unnerved by the rising power of the Brotherhood and popular discontent with Mubarak's foreign policy, has renewed relations with Tehran, a regime that once named a street after Sadat's assassin. It is also why the government has reopened the border with Gaza, which had been closed since Israel's August 2005 disengagement. Although even a Muslim Brotherhood–ruled Egypt would not likely declare war on Israel, the Brotherhood's leaders have made clear that the organization intends to support the "resistance" in Gaza. This support will likely translate into greater funding for Hamas, leading to a likely uptick in Israeli-Palestinian hostilities.

Precisely because the Muslim Brotherhood's success in the elections this fall is likely to push Egyptian foreign policy further away from U.S. interests, the Obama administration needs to combat the

Brotherhood's influence on two fronts. Prior to the elections, it must communicate clear "redlines" to Egypt's current military leaders and relevant political parties about the kinds of behavior that it is unwilling to accept. Specifically, it should promise to recognize the outcome of any Egyptian election, but only if those elected commit to not participating in conflicts beyond Egypt's borders. Such a statement would blunt the Brotherhood's accusations that the United States is interfering in Egyptian affairs, as Washington would be exchanging noninterference in Egyptian affairs for the Brotherhood's noninterference in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Meanwhile, even after the elections, Washington should continue to aid liberal groups through various nongovernmental organizations, focusing in particular on training leaders outside Cairo. A great deal of the Muslim Brotherhood's strength lies in its near monopoly of influence in many countryside areas. The United States and progressive Egyptian groups can only combat this influence by introducing liberal ideas and teaching people how to organize politically. Moreover, at every opportunity, the United States should declare its hope that Egypt will become the religiously open country for which the protesters in Tahrir Square fought. It must speak up whenever Egypt's Christians are attacked, as they have been several times in recent months. Such attacks are a harbinger of more intolerance and violence.

Washington will have no choice but to work with whoever comes to power in Cairo. The United States must therefore ensure that the Muslim Brotherhood's rise is a temporary setback and that clear limits are set on the amount of damage the organization can do to U.S. interests. And it must simultaneously seek to make Egypt's domestic political scene more competitive. To do all this, the United States will need to be clear about the nature of the Brotherhood as an organization. The estimated 600,000 people who fill the Brotherhood's ranks are deeply committed to the organization and not likely to moderate their views. U.S. policy must therefore focus on the other 81 million Egyptians, who are largely unmobilized and uneducated. They are political free agents, and given the religiosity of Egyptian society, the Brotherhood can easily win their allegiance if the United States fails to act quickly to support the alternative—the liberal vision for which the youths of Tahrir Square fought so valiantly.

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



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Commanding Democracy in Egypt

The Military's Attempt to Manage the Future

Jeff Martini and Julie Taylor

Many of the iconic images from Egypt's revolution depict the Egyptian military supporting the uprising in Tahrir Square. As soldiers joined demonstrators and allowed them to scrawl "Mubarak Leave" on the sides of their tanks, the protesters became convinced that the military would protect the revolution and move Egypt toward democracy. The Egyptian army's top commanders pledged to do just that. The day after Hosni Mubarak fell, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the military body now governing the country, vowed to "ensure a peaceful transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows an elected civilian authority to take charge of governing the country." Yet the SCAF's attempts to curtail dissent and the democratic process have fueled doubts about its true intentions. Will the military fulfill its promise to support democracy? Or will it seek to replace Mubarak's rule with its own or that of a friendly autocrat?

Thus far, the evidence suggests that the SCAF does not want to continue ruling the country after Egypt's parliamentary elections this fall, nor does it want to return the country to a single-party system. But that should provide little comfort to those hoping to see Egypt become a full democracy, in which the military is subordinate to civilian rule. Above all, the generals are determined to preserve stability and

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protect their privileged position. They recognize that ruling the country directly threatens their position by potentially provoking instability, exposing them to public criticism, and dividing their ranks. And they want to avoid being blamed for Egypt's growing economic and social problems, such as double-digit inflation and unemployment, continued labor unrest, and a rise in crime. As a result, the SCAF is eager to hand power over to an elected government—but only to preserve its power and perks, not out of some deep-seated belief in democracy.

Indeed, the SCAF's endorsement of democracy has been tepid at best. The generals have tried 7,000 people, including bloggers, journalists, and protesters, in closed military trials since the revolution. In May, General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of the SCAF, said that the military should be granted "some kind of insurance" under Egypt's new constitution "so that it is not under the whim of a president," and he insisted that the military not be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. In July, the military announced that it would adopt guidelines governing the drafting of the constitution, proposals for which may give it the legal basis to intervene in Egyptian politics under a broad array of circumstances, including to protect the secular nature of the state. The generals, then, seem to be seeking not a genuinely open and representative political system for Egypt but rather one that will allow them to retain the final say over the country's foreign policy and avoid civilian oversight. The elected government, in their vision, would carry the burden of day-to-day rule—and bear the brunt of any public displeasure.

Yet the generals may find that democracy, once unleashed, is difficult to control. If elections are held, a president or parliament hoping to rein in the military may eventually outmaneuver it. And if the scope of democratization falls short of the protesters' demands, the Egyptian people may become less willing to accept the generals' interference in political affairs. The United States, for its part, should help liberal forces in Egypt by exploiting the military's preoccupation with its image and publicly pressuring the generals to embrace democracy.

A SELECTIVE REVOLUTION

MANY EGYPTIANS were surprised when the military first declared that it would not intervene in the country's revolution and then forced

Mubarak out of office. Since 1952, when a group of army officers seized power, all of Egypt's rulers have come from the military and have relied on it for support. In return for their loyalty, the generals enjoyed access to profitable business and land deals. Almost no one thought that they would jeopardize their special relationship with the regime by supporting the protests.

Yet the break between the generals and Mubarak was not so sudden. Over the past decade, the regime had begun to balance its reliance on the armed forces by cultivating a class of crony capitalists. The generals felt their influence slipping away as Mubarak disregarded their economic interests, ignored their advice on ministerial appointments, and organized a campaign to transfer power to his son against their wishes. Although the military did not to seek to overthrow Mubarak, this year's demonstrations gave it an opportunity to restore its central position. Since ousting Mubarak and ascending to power, the SCAF has deftly channeled lingering public outrage over corruption toward those who have threatened its own power, such as Mubarak's business cronies and members of his formerly ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).

The Egyptian military wants to preserve its power and perks.

The generals now hope to create a system of carefully shaped democratic institutions that will preserve their power and reduce the chances that any single political group can challenge them. The SCAF's decision to legalize banned political parties and allow the formation of new ones can, to some extent, be understood in this light. Although the move did represent a concession to popular demands, it also diffused political power—something that clearly benefits the military. In another example of this trend, although the SCAF has moved only slowly to bring Mubarak and his officials to trial, it has aggressively targeted members of the business elite, such as Ahmed Ezz, a steel magnate and former leader of the NDP who gained from Mubarak's privatization campaign and has threatened the military's political position.

The generals understand, of course, that they cannot operate as if the revolution never happened, and they realize that they risk further unrest if they fail to meet some of the protesters' demands. Thus, the SCAF has instituted presidential terms limits, strengthened judicial

oversight of elections, and created a more transparent process for the registration of political parties. It has also promised not to run one of its own in the country's presidential race and to maintain the long-standing policy whereby military and internal security personnel—up to 1.5 million people—abstain from voting. Yet the military ultimately wants an Egyptian government that does not threaten its position. It is attempting to build a system more democratic than Mubarak's but still beholden to its interests, betting that in a desire for stability, many Egyptians will accept this compromise.

THE MILITARY'S KIND OF DEMOCRACY

THE SCAF HAS carefully directed the course of Egypt's transition by empowering political forces that do not oppose its dominance or are too vulnerable to try. It has courted two main partners: the established opposition parties, such as the Wafd Party, which have criticized the military on certain policies but have demonstrated loyalty by not questioning its right to rule, and, more important, the Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, who share the SCAF's desire to limit the growth of liberal forces (albeit for different reasons) and have considerable power to mobilize the street.

The military's insistence that parliamentary elections take place this fall, less than a year after Mubarak's ouster, is the clearest indication yet that it intends to work with these groups to shape Egypt's future. Although the generals rightly claim that the sooner elections are held, the sooner they can return to their barracks, the compressed timetable is making it hard for new political forces to get off the ground. Even more dangerous, perhaps, is the new electoral law put in place by the SCAF that maintains a system of single-member districts for half the seats in the lower house of Egypt's parliament (the other half will be chosen based on a party-list system). Although it may seem like a minor technicality, this law is harmful to Egyptian democracy. For one, it will aid local power brokers. These officials typically ran as independents under the prior regime, only to join the NDP after the election to secure patronage for their districts. A system of single-member districts will cement this kind of pattern by reducing campaigns to competitions over which

DYLAN MARTINEZ/REUTERS

At Tahrir Square, Cairo, February 12, 2011

candidate can best win resources for his region. The military prefers this to proportional representation, which would foster party identification by allowing voters to choose between parties campaigning on national platforms. It would also introduce Egyptians to new political forces that might challenge the SCAF's authority, particularly in less developed areas of the country where local power brokers still rule.

The military is also working to secure its influence over parliament by maintaining a provision that reserves half the seats in the lower house of parliament for what the electoral law calls "farmers" and "workers." First adopted by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser as a means of empowering the masses, the provision eventually came to

be used by retired military officers and internal security personnel as a way to enter government, by qualifying as farmers or workers. Indeed, Amr Moussa, a presidential candidate who has served as Egypt's foreign minister and as secretary-general of the Arab League, has conceded that "in reality 90 percent of the 'farmers'" are former military officers. On taking office, these legislators typically joined the parliament's Defense and National Security Committee, the only body in the Egyptian government that even nominally supervises the military, further diluting what little civilian oversight there was.

Since the revolution, the generals have sought to maintain control over key instruments of power, especially provincial governorships, to complement their top-down control. Governors are appointed by the regime and oversee all local development projects, making them central players when it comes to distributing patronage. In the Mubarak era, roughly three-quarters of the governors came from the military or the internal security and intelligence services. After the revolution, many expected the SCAF to increase the number of civilian governors. Yet just the opposite has occurred. In April, the transitional government actually increased the number of posts held by former military or security officers. In the face of popular criticism, the military is now considering allowing governors to be directly elected, but it has yet to make a final decision.

Meanwhile, the SCAF has wasted no opportunity to justify the continuation of the security state. It has played up the threat of a counterrevolution, of supposed efforts to create divisions between the people and the army, and of the prospect of a "foreign hand" interfering in Egypt's internal affairs. After 15 people were killed and two churches burned in sectarian violence in Cairo this past May, the SCAF warned that Egypt's security and economic problems "are the result of . . . internal and external enemies of the state" seeking to "create disunity between the army and the people and internal divisions within the Armed Forces itself." The military has also stoked fears of foreign conspiracies by claiming to have broken up a ring of Egyptians spying for Israel and by arresting an American-born Israeli citizen, Ilan Grapel, who is accused of inciting sectarian violence and urging protesters to use violence against security forces. The military has also found willing allies among parts of the media, which have questioned

whether the "shaky hands" of civilian leaders can impose law and order in such unstable times. Although some of these security concerns are legitimate, this coverage has conditioned the public to believe that handing power to civilian leaders risks destabilizing the country.

BROTHERHOOD AND ARMS

In their efforts to maintain control of Egypt, the generals have been aided by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood helped build public support for the March referendum that mandated elections this fall and has reliably backed the SCAF in the months since. For example, when critics accused the military police of using live ammunition on April 8 to clear Tahrir Square of protesters pressing for a civilian-led transition, and the SCAF claimed that the bullets had come from counterrevolutionary snipers intent on driving a wedge between the people and the army, the Muslim Brotherhood's leader, Mohammed Badie, endorsed this conspiracy theory and condemned all attempts to "bring about division or subversion between the people and its army."

The Brotherhood has also supported the generals by calling certain protests against the SCAF illegitimate. For example, the Brotherhood boycotted a second "Day of Rage" in late May, organized by youth groups to protest the SCAF's insistence that elections come before the drafting of a new constitution. Brotherhood members organized pro-government demonstrations and called the youth's event "the Friday of Subversion." Even when it did join protests against the generals in early July, the Brotherhood agreed to participate only after youth groups dropped their public demand for a faster transition to civilian control and agreed to focus instead on speedier trials for former officials and security personnel accused of killing protesters during the revolution. And when youth demonstrators chanted for the removal of Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, leader of the SCAF, the Brotherhood called on the protesters to "appreciate the role of the military in protecting the revolution rather than criticizing it."

The SCAF views the Muslim Brotherhood as an attractive partner not because of any ideological affinity but because the party is both

publicly popular and legally vulnerable. On the one hand, the Brotherhood has been able to mobilize the public in favor of government initiatives, such as the constitutional referendum, and quiet things down or organize counterdemonstrations when the protesters' demands have crossed the military's "redlines." On the other hand, the generals' fear of an Islamist takeover may lead them to crack down on the Brotherhood should it outlive its usefulness. To do so, the SCAF may target the Brotherhood's new political party, the Freedom and Justice Party. According to election laws, political parties in Egypt must demonstrate that their base extends beyond a religious affiliation. Freedom and Justice has recruited token support from elements in the Coptic community, but its base is overwhelmingly Muslim. In addition, the Brotherhood has only nominally separated itself from the party, raising questions about whether the Brotherhood has truly separated its religious work from politics. The Brotherhood's leaders understand that to cement its place in Egyptian politics, they must convince the military that they pose no threat to the basic order, which makes them keen to demonstrate their loyalty.

But the informal alliance between the SCAF and the Brotherhood may prove dangerous to the generals in the long run. In exchange for its support, the Brotherhood is being given a voice in the country's politics. But it remains the junior partner in the relationship. The Brotherhood could eventually seek greater authority over the country's affairs, leading to a confrontation with the military. The generals do not fear an Iranian-style coup on the part of the Brotherhood as much as its growth into a political force, like the Islamist Justice and Development Party (known as the AKP) in Turkey, which could gradually wrest power from the armed forces. The Brotherhood's 600,000 devoted members could then pose a significant threat to the military's control.

THE IMAGE CONTEST

ARMED WITH its alliances with Egypt's established parties and the Muslim Brotherhood for now, the SCAF will not allow a full democratic transition in Egypt. Even if those arrangements fall apart, the military is likely to hold enough power to keep internal and external

opponents at bay. How, then, can liberal Egyptians and the international community convince the SCAF to embrace democracy?

The United States, in particular, appears to wield a great deal of influence over the military. Washington's most obvious leverage is the $1.3 billion in aid that the United States provides the Egyptian military each year, estimated to cover up to 80 percent of its procurement costs. Additionally, to strengthen Egypt's faltering economy, the White House has offered $1 billion in debt relief and $2 billion in private-sector investment. The United States also helps Egypt attract international aid: in May, the Obama administration convinced the G-8 to commit billions of dollars to Egypt's development. The United States could pressure the SCAF by threatening to withhold any of this financial assistance.

Obama should use as leverage the Egyptian military's preoccupation with its reputation.

Yet the United States' capacity to advance democratization in Egypt remains limited. To begin with, U.S. strategic interests could interfere with hopes for reform. The United States works closely with Egypt to preserve regional security, relying on safe passage through the Suez Canal and over Egyptian skies to conduct military actions in the Middle East and beyond. Securing this cooperation with Egypt requires maintaining good relations with the SCAF, which would not appreciate U.S. pressure to democratize. Even if the United States were to vigorously campaign for democracy, it would still have limited power to shape events on the ground given the weakness of liberal democratic parties in the country, the reverence for the military in Egyptian society, and popular distrust of U.S. intentions. Even the $1.3 billion in security assistance buys little clout, since the generals view it as a reward for maintaining peace with Israel, an attitude that the United States can do little to change.

That said, the United States can still promote democratization in Egypt by exploiting the generals' concern for their image. As the protesters' admiration for the armed forces during the revolution illustrated, the military enjoys a sterling reputation in Egyptian society as a symbol of unity and the protector of the people. Although Egypt's forces were humiliated in the 1967 war with Israel, their early success in the 1973 war

restored the country's dignity and set the stage for the return of the Sinai Peninsula. Since then, by carefully cultivating and protecting its own mythology, the Egyptian military has maintained unparalleled popularity, with public approval ratings hovering around 90 percent.

But this steady diet of praise has made the generals hypersensitive to criticism. For example, when over 1,000 people died in a ferryboat accident in the Red Sea in 2006, critics accused the military of failing to deploy quickly enough to rescue them. Rather than submit itself to public examination, however, the military reportedly tampered with the parliamentary investigation that followed and made sure that it did not receive any of the blame. In the postrevolutionary era, the SCAF has demonstrated the same aversion to public criticism. When the transitional government held its first public meeting with youth groups after the revolution, a military spokesperson, sounding hurt and mystified, revealed that the SCAF had documented 23 instances of its being chastised on television and questioned whether such negative coverage represented a good use of press freedom. The SCAF has also summoned journalists critical of its rule to appear before military tribunals for, among other things, reporting that military police fired on protesters and subjected female demonstrators to virginity tests. The generals have prosecuted some of these journalists using a long-standing regulation that criminalizes "insulting" Egypt's armed forces. The ambiguity of what constitutes insulting gives the military wide authority to target media and opposition figures who challenge it.

The United States can take advantage of the military's intense preoccupation with its reputation. For starters, Washington should openly praise the SCAF when it promotes democratic reform. The United States should have publicly backed the generals after they took measures in March to strengthen judicial oversight of elections, and again in June when they upheld judicial independence by supporting the courts' decision to dissolve municipal councils. By endorsing such efforts in the future, the United States can give the generals a taste of the support that they will receive from the international community if they truly liberalize.

But when the SCAF stands in the way of democratization, the United States should voice its disappointment—at first privately but then, if need be, openly. When the generals violate democratic principles, the

Obama administration must criticize them. In late June, for example, Egyptian internal security forces injured more than a thousand protesters demanding compensation for the families of those killed in the revolution. The White House should have forcefully condemned the SCAF and urged it to conduct thorough investigations. Instead, a State Department spokesperson expressed his belief that "the Egyptian military really set itself apart as sort of a paragon of professionalism during the events of Tahrir Square . . . and it is incumbent on them now to carry that spirit forward in a transparent manner to adhere to rule of law." This subdued response was a missed opportunity.

The United States must also prevent the SCAF from hiding behind its relationship with Washington. For example, when General Shahin insisted that the military receive special protections under the new constitution, he justified his position by arguing that the U.S. military is given the same privileges under U.S. law—an obvious falsehood. The Obama administration should have publicly disputed Shahin's disingenuous comparison by noting that in the United States, unlike Egypt under current SCAF rule, military budgets are in the public domain, national security issues are subject to congressional oversight, and, most important, the military executes, rather than makes, national security policy.

Such tactics, of course, are risky for the United States. One of the few points of broad agreement in Egypt today is that the country should assert its independence from Washington. The Egyptian people could interpret public criticism from the United States as an attempt to meddle in Egyptian affairs, provoking a backlash and strengthening the SCAF's hand. In addition, should U.S. pressure directed toward the military fail to change the generals' behavior, it would jeopardize U.S. credibility and threaten to undermine cooperation between the two countries.

Even so, the Obama administration can avoid these potential pitfalls. Rather than lecture the generals about what they should do, the White House should question whether the generals are honoring their stated commitment to democratization. The military is gambling that its mythic status in Egypt and public fears of instability will allow it to create a political system to its liking. The United States should raise that bet and use as leverage the generals' concern for their image in order to support a democratic future for Egypt.

Tokyo's Transformation

How Japan Is Changing—and What It Means for the United States

Eric Heginbotham, Ely Ratner, and Richard J. Samuels

The earthquake and tsunami that struck northeastern Japan on March 11, 2011, caused almost unimaginable damage and misery. In a surge of floodwater that lasted just two minutes, Japan lost nearly as many people as a proportion of its population as the United States did during the entire Vietnam War. The subsequent meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear reactors deepened the crisis.

But some see a silver lining to these dark tragedies. After 20 years of economic stagnation, the crisis could bring the Japanese together, catalyze much-needed reforms, and reverse decades of malaise. Many in the United States predict that the disaster will give a welcome boost to the U.S.-Japanese alliance. In an interview with Japan's national public television network on March 22, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed, "Our alliance, which was already strong and enduring, has become even more so." Indeed, the U.S. response to the disaster showcased its lasting commitment to Japan, as well as the unique logistical and material capabilities that the U.S. military forces stationed in the Pacific can provide. In what was dubbed Operation Tomodachi (Operation Friendship), the United States

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mobilized some 20,000 service members to assist with relief activities. It was the largest joint operation in the history of the alliance, and it generated widespread public support in both countries.

Despite the warmth of that the moment, however, deeper trends portend a far less certain future for the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Japan is undergoing profound changes aimed at empowering the political leadership at the expense of its historically preeminent bureaucracy. But rather than bringing about a clean transfer of institutional authority, the reforms have triggered battles among politicians and between politicians and bureaucrats, creating a power vacuum and undermining the government's ability to make policy. Complicating matters further are Japan's piecemeal policymaking institutions, a hypercompetitive media environment, and an increasingly dire fiscal outlook. The result has been uncertainty and gridlock, which are affecting alliance policymaking and are unlikely to disappear in the years ahead.

These hurdles will not cause a fundamental rift in the U.S.-Japanese alliance. But they will make it more complicated, which will require Washington to become more flexible and creative in its dealings with Tokyo. Engaging the new Japan effectively will mean deepening interactions with a wider array of political and nongovernmental actors, including in the media and the private sector, while continuing to work closely with traditional contacts in the bureaucracy. And when Japan's politics create new roadblocks—as they inevitably will—the United States should explore alternative policies. Safeguarding the U.S.-Japanese alliance must remain a top priority, but Washington should also be prepared to work more closely with other partners in the region.

BEYOND THE "1955 SYSTEM"

THERE IS little question that Japan remains a linchpin of the United States' strategy in Asia. It is the United States' fourth-largest trading partner, behind Canada, Mexico, and China. Japan has cooperated with the United States in recent multilateral military efforts, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and in antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden, where Japan recently built a small military base. The country is a pillar of the United States' military presence in

Asia, home to 66 U.S. military bases and 35,000 U.S. airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines.

Both countries have common interests in the stability of East Asia, freedom of navigation, deterring potential aggressors, and maintaining U.S. involvement in regional affairs. The security environment is evolving rapidly, and demands that both countries be more responsive are rising accordingly. In particular, the continued development of China's military capabilities will require adjustments. To cite but one example, the United States will need to protect its military installations in Japan and elsewhere in the region against increasingly accurate Chinese ballistic missiles. To do so, it will need to build hardened aircraft shelters, disperse its aircraft over a larger number of bases, and adjust its mix of fighter jets and support aircraft. In the years ahead, these adjustments may require revising long-standing basing agreements and operating practices.

Yet the flexibility necessary to update the alliance is currently in short supply in Japan. The Japanese system of governance remains in the middle of a profound and messy transition. Although these reforms—opening up the political system and strengthening political control over the bureaucracy—may ultimately improve Japan's policymaking process, in the meantime they have resulted in policy gridlock and confusion. Political reforms are always difficult, but the impasse in Japan's political system has proved more protracted and disruptive than many observers had predicted.

For most of the years since the end of World War II, Japanese politics had been dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP ruled first for 38 years, from 1955 to 1993, and then returned with coalition partners for an encore between 1994 and 2009. During this time, parties fought election campaigns primarily on promises of constituent services, and the LDP's collusive and sometimes corrupt relationship with the businesses that supplied those services gave it an important advantage.

Meanwhile, under the so-called 1955 system, which dates to the formation of the LDP and its consolidation of power, the bureaucracy enjoyed an extraordinarily strong hand in policymaking. With only a handful of political appointees in the bureaucracy, political oversight was weak at best. Almost by default, bureaucrats drafted most legislation

and defended it on the floor of Japan's parliament, the Diet. For all its imperfections—and there were many—the 1955 system was predictable and generally responsive to U.S. needs.

Things began to change in the early 1990s, after the economy collapsed and popular anger at government mismanagement grew. Responding to popular demands, Japan's first (short-lived) non-LDP government since 1955 undertook major electoral reforms designed to make Japanese politics more transparent and competitive. Meanwhile, the number of political appointees in the system was increased, enhancing the power of politicians over the bureaucracy. The government also adopted provisions to ensure that elected officials, not bureaucrats, would defend legislation on the floor of the Diet.

Reforms were slow to take hold, but eventually, a decade later, the Democratic Party of Japan emerged as a viable center-left alternative to the LDP, and change began to accelerate. The DPJ redoubled efforts to assert more political control over the bureaucracy; in its 2009 campaign manifesto, it promised to shift Japan's political system "from government delegated to the bureaucracy, to politician-led government." After it won control of the government later that year, the party ended the regular interagency summits of top officials during which policy had once been set without political oversight. The DPJ also sought to strengthen the role of the Cabinet Office, where the chief cabinet secretary coordinates policymaking with representatives from each of the ministries and agencies.

These moves have weakened Japan's old bureaucratic order, but the politicians' ability to make policy remains limited. Diet committees are still short on professional staff, and new policymaking offices lack clear mandates and authority. Bureaucrats have pushed back, often successfully, in an effort to retain their prerogatives. And although the number of political appointees in the bureaucracy has risen, the total remains fewer than 100, compared to over 3,000 in the U.S. system. Political volatility—Japan has had six prime ministers in the last five years—has also stunted Japan's political reform and contributed to policymaking gridlock.

Meanwhile, the country remains hamstrung by ongoing fiscal and budgetary problems. Japan's public debt now amounts to 225 percent of GDP and by that measure is the highest in the world. And

reconstruction after the earthquake is imposing additional demands on Japanese finances. The country's defense budgets have long been flat, and Japanese leaders have had to repeal social programs, raise taxes, and make substantial cuts to overseas development assistance as the country struggles to cope with the March 2011 disaster. Japan's stalled governance reform and intractable fiscal problems are also affecting the U.S.-Japanese alliance. The most obvious instance of that, although by no means the only one, concerns U.S. basing issues.

BASE WRANGLING

U.S. BASES OCCUPY about 19 percent of the land on the main island of Okinawa, in Japan's southernmost prefecture. They are also home to about half the U.S. military personnel in Japan, despite the fact that the island accounts for less than one percent of the country's landmass. The bases there have long been a point of contention between the United States and Japan because of their size, and because of the crime, noise, and safety risks associated with them. In 1995, the United States and Japan entered into negotiations to relocate some U.S. forces off Okinawa and reduce the bases' burden on local communities.

The Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, in southern Okinawa, was a central part of the negotiations. Since 1945, when the base was built, the surrounding city of Ginowan had grown to the edge of Futenma's runway, and flights in and out of the base had been posing increasingly large accident risks and noise problems. Highlighting the urgency of the issue, in August 2004, a U.S. Marine Corps helicopter crashed and burned on the grounds of a local university. In 2006, the two sides finally agreed to close the runway at Futenma and open a new one at a base farther north on Okinawa. The move was just one part of a larger transformation designed to relocate some 8,000 U.S. marines from Japan to Guam with Japanese financial support.

Before the plan could be put into action, however, Japan's new politics intervened. Responding to popular sentiments that Tokyo had for too long played a subservient role in the alliance, the DPJ pledged in its 2009 election campaign to create a "more equal alliance" with the United States. Soon after becoming prime minister, the DPJ's Yukio Hatoyama reopened the Futenma negotiations, promising to

move the base off Okinawa. To assert his leadership, Hatoyama reportedly excluded bureaucrats from the Foreign and Defense Ministries from taking part in the decision-making. He did not consult them before announcing that he was reopening the Futenma issue, and he barely conferred with them during the subsequent negotiations.

With the bureaucracy sidelined, political infighting in Tokyo soon broke out, both within the three-party DPJ-led governing coalition and between the DPJ and the opposition LDP. By April 2010, when the United States made clear that it objected to renegotiating the deal (and then Chinese provocations gave him more pause), Hatoyama had realized that reopening the negotiations had been a mistake. But by the time he signaled his willingness to back down, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), a member of the governing coalition, was adamant that the base be moved.

U.S. rescue efforts during Operation Tomodachi highlighted the positive role that U.S. forces can play in Japan.

As Hatoyama wavered, the SDP's leader, Mizuho Fukushima, launched a one-woman political campaign against him. She visited Okinawa to seek the support of the prefecture's governor, Hirokazu Nakaima, against the agreement and lobbied tirelessly in the media for her position. In the end, when Hatoyama made an about-face and came out openly in support of a modified version of the original relocation plan, the SDP left the coalition. Three days later, in early June, Hatoyama announced his resignation. In the meantime, however, Fukushima's antibase campaign had raised hopes in Okinawa, and it had unwittingly proved that in the new political environment, a small party such as the SDP (which had only 12 members in parliament) could alter the dynamics of an important defense issue.

The local and national politics of the Okinawa basing issue now mix in complicated ways. Nakaima had originally supported the 2006 agreement, but the media spotlight that followed visits to Okinawa by Fukushima and Hatoyama, along with the tough antibase position taken by Nakaima's opponent in Okinawa's upcoming gubernatorial election, forced the governor's hand. He reversed course and came out against the agreement in September 2010. Underscoring the extent

to which politics overshadowed strategy, Nakaima's announcement came in the middle of a mounting crisis with China over the disputed Senkaku Islands—precisely a time when the deterrent value of U.S. troops in Japan should have been most apparent.

Where all this leaves the U.S.-Japanese alliance is unclear. At a meeting of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee in June, Japanese Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto, Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, U.S. Secretary of State Clinton, and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that the Futenma runway would not be relocated on schedule. U.S. Marine aircraft will therefore continue to use the base, posing a serious safety risk for the surrounding town. The impending introduction of the MV-22 Osprey, with its early history of technical problems, will only exacerbate local concerns.

The delay in the Futenma move also puts the broader 2006 basing agreement in jeopardy. As Gates said in February, "We really can't go forward on Guam . . . until we have clarity on what happens on Okinawa." Futenma is a harbinger of Japan's increasing unpredictability.

THE PEOPLE'S BUDGET

A SECOND MAJOR storm in the alliance is brewing, this one over Japan's financial support for U.S. forces in the country. Historically, the creation and approval of Japan's national budget were administrative functions, conducted by the Ministry of Finance. The process was largely invisible to the public. Starting in 2009, the DPJ dramatically increased the transparency of budgeting by introducing so-called budget review panels. The panels are made up of members of parliament and leaders from industry, the media, and academia—few of whom are specialists in the budgetary matters they are being asked to assess. The panels' rules and procedures are largely improvised, and the proceedings are streamed live over the Internet, at times garnering hundreds of thousands of hits a day.

The panels have improved transparency, but they have also provided a platform for grandstanding in the media. Last year, Renho Murata, a politician and television personality, relentlessly questioned Japanese defense bureaucrats about their spending requirements and managed

to force the Ministry of Defense to charge admission to army recruitment centers that house combat simulators and other "entertainment" designed to attract recruits. Of the 17 defense budget items reviewed by the panels in the last budget cycle, only one was passed as proposed. The days in which bureaucratic decisions would translate directly into military budgets and policy are long gone.

During the public budget debates in the spring of 2011, the issue of financial support for U.S. forces in Japan, which Japan has been paying since the 1978, became something of a political lightning rod. In 2010, Tokyo provided $3.3 billion to Washington for everything from utilities on U.S. bases to the construction of new facilities on Guam. Some of this money also pays for amenities such as bowling alleys and snack bars, which have become associated with U.S. extravagance. The majority of these funds fall under the category of "host-nation support," although most Japanese derisively refer to them as "the sympathy budget." When the United States requested that Japan raise its level of host-nation support during bilateral discussions this January, Japanese defense officials responded with an unusually public rebuttal. Their comments suggested an increasingly zero-sum view of support for the United States, on the one hand, and for Japan's own military requirements, on the other.

The debate over Japan's host-nation support was brought to an abrupt close after a Chinese fishing trawler crashed into a Japanese coast guard vessel in September 2010. Following the arrest and detention of the fishermen, the incident escalated into a major diplomatic row with China. As anger toward Beijing grew, Japanese public opinion tipped back in favor of the United States. Early this year, Tokyo agreed to maintain fiscal support for U.S. bases at the 2010 level. Nevertheless, many Japanese government and media sources have indicated that without the crisis with China, financial support would almost certainly have been cut substantially.

The earthquake and tsunami earlier this year are likely to have mixed effects on the debate over Japan's host-nation support for the United States. On the one hand, U.S. rescue efforts during Operation Tomodachi highlighted the positive role that U.S. forces can play in Japan and reinforced pro-American sentiment. On the other hand, the disaster and the need for reconstruction will surely diminish popular

support for base realignments that would cost Japan billions of dollars. Moreover, positive sentiments toward the alliance cannot address the larger problems in Japan's policymaking system, the health of which remains crucial to an enduring U.S.-Japanese strategic relationship.

A REGIONAL STRATEGY

THE CHANGES in Japanese politics did not begin with, and they will not end with, the 2009 election of the DPJ government or the March 2011 disaster. The U.S.-Japanese alliance, once characterized by relatively predictable bureaucratic interactions, will become increasingly complicated thanks to the vagaries of Japan's new politics. As the U.S. military adjusts to this new reality, it will need to continue expanding its circle of interlocutors in Tokyo. Operation Tomodachi demonstrated the salutary effects of breaking down the traditional division of labor, in which the U.S. embassy deals with Japanese politicians and bureaucrats while the U.S. military deals with uniformed Japanese officers.

Washington must also begin to tailor its alliance goals in response to Japan's political priorities and constraints. Conventional wisdom in Washington holds that cooperation will remain difficult as long as the DPJ stays in power. But the DPJ's early flirtation with China has ended, and the party's interests overlap with those of the United States in many areas. It openly appreciates the legitimacy of the Japanese military and wants to expand Japan's ability to conduct international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Mainstream Japanese media outlets, for their part, have even discussed reorienting the Japanese Self-Defense Forces as a "global disaster relief force." The United States should offer equipment and training to support these efforts. At the same time, it should seek to ensure that this does not detract from Japan's war-fighting capabilities.

The Japanese government is also considering loosening its long-standing restrictions on weapons exports, in the hopes of expanding cooperation with the United States on building high-tech arms, reviving its defense industry, and reducing the costs of developing new weapons systems. Tokyo's decision in May to allow the United States to export the jointly developed Standard Missile-3 Block IIA,

whose primary purpose is to intercept ballistic missiles, was a positive step in this direction. But the two sides could certainly do more.

Beyond adjusting the way they manage the alliance and finding new areas for cooperation, U.S. strategic planners should also be realistic about how long it may take for a fully functional set of policymaking institutions to consolidate in Japan. As difficult as it will be to reach agreements on the relocation of U.S. bases and other areas of cooperation, implementing those agreements will be even harder.

In the meantime, the United States should decide which bases and assets are most vital. The Kadena Air Base, for example, is particularly critical for deterrence against China and North Korea in Taiwan and South Korea. It also helps with a wide spectrum of other functions, including humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations, and provides some of the best access to parts of Southeast Asia. In terms of potential operations in response to a crisis over Taiwan, the closest alternative U.S. air bases are several times the distance away. On the other hand, although the U.S. Marine Corps' presence in the region is extremely important, its particular location in the western Pacific is less critical, as long as training facilities and infrastructure are adequate. Wherever they are based, the marines would deploy out of garrison for any conceivable mission.

> The United States should welcome the changes that will ultimately make Japan more democratic and dynamic.

U.S. Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.), Carl Levin (D-Mich.), and Jim Webb (D-Va.) recently proposed moving the U.S. Marine Corps aircraft based at Futenma to Kadena and dispersing other U.S. Air Force assets now at Kadena to Guam or elsewhere in Japan. This proposal is refreshing and creative but problematic. The aircraft at Futenma are primarily transport helicopters designed to support the Marine Corps infantry on the ground in Okinawa; they contribute little to U.S. combat airpower. More important, if moved to Kadena, the U.S. Marine aircraft would occupy space needed for additional fighters, bombers, and combat-support aircraft in the event of hostilities. Alternative solutions to the Futenma impasse should certainly be explored, but this should be done without compromising the Kadena Air Base's unique benefits.

Nevertheless, it is true that the current U.S. military footprint in Okinawa has long been unsustainable. The United States should continue working to relocate its marines off Okinawa to Guam (or elsewhere), as both sides agreed to do in 2006. This move would entail no significant loss of operational effectiveness in most contingencies, and it would be welcomed in Okinawa, reduce political pressure in Tokyo, and ultimately enhance the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Japan will continue to be an indispensable U.S. ally, but Washington must remember that the two countries' relationship is just part of the overall U.S. strategy in Asia. The United States should enhance its arrangements with South Korea, Australia, and other partners in Southeast Asia. Pursuing improved access and basing agreements with these other countries would allow the United States to maintain its most important deployments in Japan while reducing the total size of its footprint there. A more dispersed regional posture would also reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces and complicate the political and military calculations of potential adversaries.

As Washington reacts to Japan's political volatility and policymaking gridlock, any proposed changes to the United States' military presence must also take into account operational considerations and alliance strategy. In making such changes, Washington should not punish—or even appear to punish—Japan for the newfound unpredictability and volatility of its politics. Indeed, it should, on the whole, welcome the changes in governance that will ultimately make Japan more democratic and dynamic. The United States has both national interests in Japan and a moral obligation to support it during tough times, not just flush ones. But in an era when every country's defense budget faces severe constraints, it is increasingly important for Washington to define its essential goals in Asia and focus its attention and resources accordingly.

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Bill Clinton and Paul Farmer touring a hospital, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 18, 2010

Paul Farmer's apt medical analogy for Haiti's condition after the 2010 earthquake is "acute-on-chronic": an urgent crisis occurring in the context of persistent social dysfunction.

Review Essay

Haiti's Rise From the Rubble

The Quest to Recover From Disaster

Paul Collier

Haiti: After the Earthquake. BY PAUL FARMER. PublicAffairs, 2011, 456 pp. $27.99.

The catastrophic earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, was the 9/11 of humanitarian disasters. The death and misery that resulted were beamed out to a global television audience, unleashing public sympathy on an unprecedented scale. More than half of all U.S. households donated to the relief operation. But whereas the government responses to the nearly 3,000 killed on 9/11 have ensured that that event has remained at the center of global attention for the decade since, memories of the more than 200,000 Haitians slain by the earthquake, and of the approximately 4,000 more who died of cholera after it, have quickly faded.

To his discussion of this receding tragedy, Paul Farmer brings passion, medical expertise, and a long and intimate engagement with Haiti. His account of the year following the earthquake works on three levels: personal, practical, and analytic. Farmer's wife is Haitian, and so among the thousands whose lives were in jeopardy were his own relatives and friends. Reflecting these ties, his book is laden with anecdotes and emotion, as is surely appropriate: mass tragedies need to be distilled through detail down to a scale to which one can relate. Thus, Farmer's readers meet a 25-year-old woman named Shilove, representative of a generation of young migrants who escaped rural isolation for Port-au-Prince. There, the hope of arrival met the reality of a jerry-built tenement. Caught in the quake, trapped

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under concrete, her leg crushed, she managed to crawl into the street before passing out. Two days later, she was found by a nongovernmental organization (NGO) worker, and her leg was bandaged up, uselessly. Then, a passing priest took her to a hospital, where she received the only medical intervention that could save her life: amputation. At least hers was not an amputation performed in the street without anesthetic. She was more fortunate than some.

Readers will wince, but such human appeals are also a spur to action. Farmer is not just personally engaged; he is a practitioner, twice over. A charismatic doctor, in 1987 he founded Partners in Health, a public health NGO operating in 12 countries that by the time of the quake had established ten hospitals in Haiti. Its triumphs, frustrations, and direct experiences with life-and-death emergencies had given Farmer a window onto the problems and possibilities of delivering health care. Unlike many NGOs, Partners in Health works closely with the official system—in Haiti, the Ministry of Health, which, like most of Haiti's other ministries, was reduced to a pile of rubble by the quake. Farmer's practical work for Haitians had also brought him into association with former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who shared his passionate concern and respect for Haitian society. By the time of the quake, Clinton was the United Nations special envoy for Haiti and Farmer had become his deputy. Farmer got to watch the international community in action from a high vantage point and see firsthand how the potential for collective action was hobbled by procedure and division.

Farmer also brings to bear his abilities as a professor of public health at Harvard Medical School to analyze both Haiti's health crisis and its wider socioeconomic problems. His apt medical analogy for Haiti's condition is "acute-on-chronic": an urgent crisis occurring in the context of persistent social dysfunction. The chronic condition amplifies the acute condition, constrains responses to it, and is itself so debilitating that it must be treated if the country is to recover from the acute condition. And let there be no doubt: in Haiti, the social dysfunction stems from government failure.

AID FROM THE OUTSIDE

It was failures of governance that explained why the earthquake was so devastating: a larger shock in Chile weeks later was far less lethal thanks to superior building standards there. Poor governance in Haiti has also hamstrung the response to the disaster. A state that was incapable of meeting social needs even before the earthquake saw its limited capacity smashed at the same time as needs exploded. To make matters worse, an election loomed, contributing to the paralysis. Politically, the post-earthquake year was dominated not by the tasks of relief and reconstruction but by a protracted presidential campaign, one mired in corruption, the legacy of which has been the further alienation of citizens from their government.

Given the urgency of Haiti's needs and the weakness of its institutions, the only option was hands-on international assistance, but even this faced an insuperable difficulty. Farmer argues that the origins of government failure in Haiti were hostile external interventions, first by France in the colonial era and then by the United States, the most recent instance being U.S. involvement in the murky exile of

President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004. A democratically elected populist politician with a large following among the poor, Aristide was ousted by gang-related violence and has since blamed his loss of power on the intervention of the United States, which facilitated his exile. Thus, both deep history and recent events have left Haitians with a widespread suspicion of external intervention, which has severely constrained even benign assistance.

The conjunction of crushing needs and the state's incapacity created fertile ground for NGOs: even before the quake, there were around 10,000 of them in the country. Farmer, who ran one himself, is highly critical of the way they often bypassed the Haitian government completely. "Government officials had no way to provide oversight or coordinate their work," he writes, calling the coordination of NGOs one of the "biggest challenges in health care provision." The problem, as Farmer points out, is that NGOs will never be big enough to meet Haiti's nearly endless needs—for example, half of all Haitian children get no schooling—and yet in doing their work, they often end up undermining the government. They hire away its best people, and more fundamentally, their prominence teaches citizens to look to them for services rather than to pressure the government to provide them.

This tension between wanting to replace an ineffective state and trying not to further undermine it is a common one faced by outside actors in dealing with fragile states such as Haiti, but here again, the earthquake turned Haiti's problem from chronic to acute. Motivated by an unprecedented wave of global sympathy, governments pledged nearly $10 billion for relief and reconstruction. But donors were unwilling to hand this cash over to the Haitian government, a distrust Farmer criticizes. His model of successful recovery from social disaster is Rwanda, a country he knows well, and one where international donors' supportive attitude toward the government in the wake of the 1994 genocide helped build an effective state. The challenge in Rwanda was arguably more daunting: the sheer scale of the catastrophe there was even larger than the one in Haiti, and the country most surely had fewer opportunities for development.

But the crucial factor that separates the two countries is their governing elites. Since 1994, Rwanda has been governed by a cohesive, dedicated, and competent team whose members have eschewed patronage and corruption. Haiti's governing elite, in contrast, has been nothing short of venal. What Farmer fails to acknowledge is that this elite would have been equally venal had donors been more supportive; it would just have had more to steal. Although Farmer's attribution of the origins of dysfunction to the history of malign external interference is reasonable, it does not follow that if only donors were to rely on domestic political processes, all would come out right. I know Haiti far less well than Farmer does, but Haitian reformers whom I greatly respect, such as the former prime minister and civil-society activist Michèle Pierre-Louis, argue the opposite: that change cannot be generated solely from within. Malign intervention in the past may have driven Haiti into a trap of dysfunction. Although this has made future benign intervention more difficult, it has also made it necessary.

Donors' apprehensions about handing money over to the Haitian state were well founded: the government was manifestly

in no position to manage either relief or reconstruction. Indeed, giving huge sums to the Haitian government would likely have triggered the type of rent-seeking behavior that typically follows oil discoveries in fragile states. Yet the business-as-usual alternative was even less attractive: a frenzy of uncoordinated activity by NGOs and donor agencies that were disconnected from Haitian society. That approach is hard to resist. The combination of need, publicity, and money that followed the quake is believed to have spawned around 5,000 new NGOs. Before the disaster, the legacy of NGOs' activity was already strewn all around Haiti in the form of useless projects; Farmer gives the poignant example of $30 million abandoned windmills.

BUILDING BACK BETTER

The immediate challenge facing Haiti in 2010 was figuring out how, practically, to convert $10 billion in aid into a transformative recovery. "Building back better" became the catch phrase. Although the task was daunting, it was not particularly complicated. People needed to be rehoused in locations that were less prone to earthquakes, and these locations needed to provide jobs and social services. This meant essentially establishing new cities. The first phase would be building homes and infrastructure, a process that would generate construction jobs. The second phase would be an evolution in employment from the temporary task of construction to more sustainable jobs, underpinned by a base of firms producing light manufactures for export to the U.S. market (to which Haiti was granted privileged access). Such urban growth is common in successful developing societies around the world, and $10 billion

devoted to pump-priming could spur a lot of it.

But the more fundamental challenge was finding a decision-making structure to actually set these actions in motion. Neither the Haitian government nor the zoo of NGOs and development agencies looked promising. Although this dilemma is normal in fragile states, where conditions are typically chronic but not acute, it is rarely resolved, because outsiders find the reality too uncomfortable to be squarely faced. Instead, donors lurch from turning a blind eye to acting outraged, to bypassing governments by funding NGOs, to occasionally suspending aid. In Haiti, the acute-on-chronic crisis made this reality unavoidable.

The result was a potentially far-reaching innovation, one that could serve as the prototype for aid in fragile states: the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, a hybrid organization jointly run by the government of Haiti and the international community that has, albeit only temporarily, the authority to act on its own. Its two leaders are the outgoing Haitian prime minister, Jean-Max Bellerive, who, as a former minister of planning, understands the core task, and Clinton, whose long commitment to Haiti is much appreciated locally. The commission was set up to break the logjam of dysfunction, tell donors what to fund, tell NGOs what to do, and provide the necessary authorizations on behalf of the government. In the longer term, it will need to evolve into something fully Haitian that can supersede those parts of the state that are essential yet, realistically, beyond reform.

Unsurprisingly, the commission has created many enemies. Although the Haitian government has gone along with the commission, it has done so only reluctantly; government ministries see it as a threat to their own power and ability to plunder, and they have publicly criticized the commission as an encroachment on Haitian sovereignty. Yet prickly assertions of sovereignty are an inadequate response to reasonable concerns. Realizing this, the government of Rwanda, when it was managing its reconstruction, took the initiative and proposed to donors that they share power in the financial kitchen. By both reassuring donors and forcing a degree of responsibility onto them, the Rwandan government gradually built the conditions for expansive donor support.

Internal posturing has not been the only problem the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission has run into. International agencies and NGOs see it as a threat to their unaccountable power. Their opposition delayed the commission's establishment and has impeded its actions at every turn. Given these obstacles, it is fair to ask if the commission was a mistake. The answer lies in its track record, and one simple indicator here is the clearance of rubble. As Farmer says, this was the most urgent and straightforward reconstruction priority, yet there has been little progress. In fact, a construction-sector NGO did act with appropriate urgency, bringing in a giant rubble crusher. But the equipment was held up in Haitian customs for five months. This inordinate delay was due not to inefficiency: it was the deliberate outcome of self-serving domestic lobbies indifferent to the public interest. Alongside clearing the rubble, new homes were needed, yet to this day, people are still living in tents. The key impediment has been not material but legal: unresolved disputes about land titles have frozen

building activity. Across the spectrum, essential actions have been frustrated by the predatory behavior of narrow interest groups, and frustration has begotten cynicism. The only solution is decisive authority. Far from abusing Haiti's sovereignty, the commission has been too cautious.

It has, however, done enough to demonstrate why some such decision-making structure is necessary. For example, the commission succeeded in attracting to the country the world's largest garment firm, which committed to bringing 20,000 jobs to a new city to be built on the northern coast, away from the earthquake zone. Winning this investment required sophisticated coordination. Donors had to be persuaded to provide funds for assigned parts of the necessary supporting infrastructure. The U.S. Congress had to be persuaded to improve market access for Haitian-made garments. The Haitian government had to provide the necessary permission and regulatory framework. In the aftermath of an earthquake, a cholera epidemic, and a deeply flawed election, attracting this investment was no small achievement. Predictably, despite being precisely the type of development that Haiti now needs, this very project is being opposed by a ragbag of romantic NGOs arguing that a garment plant would harm the environment. As Farmer wryly notes, "critics are too numerous to count in all Haitian endeavors."

Haiti should not be a fragile state. It is in a good neighborhood, surrounded by prosperity and peace. It abounds in opportunities, including producing light manufactures for the vast and proximate North American market, developing horticultural exports such as mangoes, and even tourism. The commission is the right solution to the "acute-on-chronic" conundrum: Haiti urgently needs massive foreign finance but has a governing system that is unfit to handle it. Now that there is a newly elected government—President Michel Martelly took office in May—the commission needs renewed authority. At last, the political building blocks are in place for the decisions that can begin to realize Haiti's potential. As that happens, the governing elite will start to smell the opportunities of economic progress more strongly than the opportunities for public plunder, and the need for shared authority will pass. The earthquake triggered a moment of global concern in which Haiti received pledges of appropriately massive support. Since the quake, attention has receded. By bringing Haiti's appalling tragedy back to the world's attention, Farmer's passionate book should help get those pledges honored.

Review Essay

Invading Afghanistan, Then and Now

What Washington Should Learn From Wars Past

Jonah Blank

The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers. BY PETER TOMSEN. PublicAffairs, 2011, 912 pp. $39.99.

"As the result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormous force, and of the expenditures of large sums of money," the secretary of state observed, "all that has yet been accomplished has been the disintegration of the State . . . and a condition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country." A highly decorated general, recently returned from service in Kandahar, concluded, "I feel sure that I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us." The politician was Spencer Cavendish, Marquis of Hartington, the British secretary of state for India. The general was Sir Frederick Roberts, who eventually became a field marshal and the subject of three ballads by Rudyard Kipling. The year was 1880. As U.S. President Barack Obama tries to wind down the longest war in U.S. history, while leaving behind some measure of stability, he would be wise to keep in mind this bitter truth: most of Afghanistan's would-be conquerors make the same mistakes, and most eventually meet the same disastrous fate.

All serving consuls and prospective invaders interested in avoiding such an end would do well to read Peter Tomsen's magisterial new book, *The Wars of Afghanistan*. A career U.S. diplomat, Tomsen served as Washington's special envoy to the Afghan resistance in 1989–92, an experience that gave him almost unrivaled personal insight into Afghanistan's slide from anti-Soviet jihad into civil war. His account of the country's political dynamics before, during, and after this

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period is exhaustively researched, level-headed, and persuasive. Throughout the book, he highlights two lessons that most of Afghanistan's invaders learn too late: no political system or ideology imposed by an outside power is likely to survive there, and any attempt to coax political change from within must be grounded in a deep knowledge of local culture and customs.

In Afghanistan, legitimate authority has traditionally been highly localized, a product of consensus rather than brute force, and firmly anchored in tribal, clannish, and kinship structures. Afghanistan only developed the barest bones of a centralized state in the twentieth century, and even today, Kabul's control over the country's periphery remains tenuous at best. These attributes make Afghanistan a difficult country for foreign military planners to occupy. Then again, as former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, under whose tenure the United States began its operations in Afghanistan, might have put it, you go to war in the country you have, not the country you want.

Tomsen compellingly argues that these salient features of Afghan political life will not disappear anytime soon. His conclusions about how Washington might stabilize Afghanistan, given the country's decentralization and independent culture, range from the uncontestable (better understand local practices) to the slightly contestable (do not hope to centralize power) to the problematic (reinvent the U.S. relationship with Pakistan). Whether one agrees with Tomsen, however, there is no denying that his descriptions of Afghanistan's society and politics are a valuable foundation for any discussion of how the country should be governed.

DÉJÀ VU ALL OVER AGAIN

Although the British and Soviet wars in Afghanistan may be the closest analogues to the United States' experience today, Tomsen starts his tale from the beginning. He usefully summarizes 3,000 years of Afghan history, during which the Greeks, the Romans, the White and the Black Huns, the Mongols, the Moguls, the Persians, and the Turkmens all tried to dominate the land. Every campaign eventually came to naught, either because the invader paid insufficient attention to local culture or because he sought to impose centralized control on ferociously independent tribes and clans. The pattern was basically the same each time: a brutally competent conqueror sweeps through Afghanistan, wreaking enough carnage to terrify all his enemies into submission, but he soon finds himself mired in a swamp of tribal customs and feuds that he does not begin to comprehend. When he loses enough in men and gold, he retreats—not infrequently with fewer limbs than he had when he arrived.

Unlike previous invaders, the British troops that marched into Afghanistan in 1839 did not come to conquer; such a goal would have been far too expensive for the frugal bureaucrats back home. Instead, they aimed to place a puppet on the Afghan throne, or at least to establish a buffer between British India and the expanding tsarist Russia. The newly installed monarch would govern far more justly than his ousted rival: his British patronage was proof of his enlightenment. The British, much like the Soviets and the Americans decades later, were amazed to discover that Afghans did not believe in their benevolence. Suspicion quickly flared into

insurgency, and when the British pulled out of Kabul in 1842 with a convoy of 16,000 troops and camp followers, only a single survivor (the assistant surgeon William Brydon) reached the border town of Jalalabad alive. Still, the lesson did not sink in. The British intervened in Afghanistan again in 1878 to compel the Afghan emir to at least accept a British diplomatic mission, and within just two years, they were left with some 3,000 dead or wounded. The Third Anglo-Afghan War, waged just after World War I to repel an ill-advised Afghan raid into British-held territory, lasted barely three months but killed 236 Britons in action. In each case, the colonial power arrived with increasingly modest goals—and left with those goals only barely met.

At first, some Afghan city dwellers may have welcomed the Soviet invasion of 1979 as a respite from half a decade of coups and near coups, and those in the countryside may barely have known that it was happening. But any warm or neutral feelings were quickly swept away by the Soviets' attempts to impose their communist ideology and their conducting of a counterinsurgency campaign through carpet-bombing. By conservative estimates, more than one million Afghans were killed during the decadelong Soviet presence in the country—many times the number of Afghans who have died as a result of the NATO-led war since 2001.

Tomsen, a Russian speaker who served as a political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Moscow immediately prior to the Soviet invasion, makes clear that there is no moral equivalence between the Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s and the ongoing U.S.-led campaign there. He points out, however, that the Soviets made the same core mistakes that have haunted invaders before and since them: they attempted to impose a centralized order on a highly decentralized nation, and they displayed complete ignorance about the realities of Afghan society. There were few nations in the 1970s less ripe for a Marxist-Leninist revolution than Afghanistan. The country had no proletariat; indeed, it had little capitalist structure of any kind.

Yet even as communism failed to catch on, Moscow refused to jettison its ideological framework and instead tried to shore up its puppet government by patching together the two rival factions of the ruling national communist party. The Khalq faction was overwhelmingly made up of members of the Ghilzai Pashtun tribes, and the other, the Parcham faction, was mostly made up of Tajiks and Durrani Pashtuns, the Ghilzais' traditional foes. The feud between the two groups was coated with a thin veneer of socialist rhetoric,

but it was really only a continuation of centuries-old tribal struggles. The result was a government in Kabul wholly uninterested in governance, utterly removed from the day-to-day concerns of the Afghan people, and consumed with petty struggles over the spoils of rule. Meanwhile, the government simultaneously parroted and plotted against its foreign patron. If this doesn't sound familiar, it should.

THE ENEMY WITHIN

To a specialized reader, the most valuable parts of Tomsen's book are those in which he recounts what he actually witnessed. His recitation of the political maneuvering of the Soviet era in Afghanistan may strike some as overly detailed: the Ghilzai warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar betrays the Tajik warlord Burhanuddin Rabbani, Rabbani betrays the Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, Dostum betrays everyone, and so on. But it is precisely with such detail that Tomsen breaks the most new ground. For this reason alone, *The Wars of Afghanistan* should have a place among the indispensable books on the topic.

The general reader will also find much to ponder in Tomsen's firsthand accounts. It is here that Tomsen most fully articulates his criticisms of the United States' own Afghanistan strategy, which he sees as having been remarkably static over the last few decades. Of the Clinton administration, he writes that the White House seemed not to have had any policy at all, "only a strategy that [was] marginally adjusted in reaction to events." (The critique also applies, in varying degrees, to every modern U.S. administration before and since.) As the United States' war in Afghanistan went from cold to hot, Washington made the same mistakes again and again.

According to Tomsen, another recurrent problem has been the United States' incoherent implementation of its policy, with every White House failing to enforce unified action across all branches of the government. Tomsen describes the CIA, in particular, as having conducted a foreign policy of its own, sabotaging U.S. attempts to build a unified moderate Afghan front and instead channeling support to Pakistan-based extremists. Meanwhile, U.S. presidents have been unwilling to devote sufficient time, attention, and political capital to formulating an effective Afghanistan policy. Most damaging of all, Tomsen argues, the United States has essentially outsourced its strategy to Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), funneling billions of dollars and military equipment to rabidly anti-American military officers and their jihadist proxies. The result, he argues, is that the United

States has been continuously hoodwinked as Pakistan has taken the money for nothing in return.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, for example, praised the anti-Soviet mujahideen as "the moral equivalent" of George Washington and looked the other way as the ISI funneled most of the American money and arms to Hekmatyar and other incompetent, anti-American figures while sidelining more capable and more broadly representative ones, such as the resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. Tomsen is kinder to George H. W. Bush, who appointed him as special envoy to the region, than to other U.S. presidents, but he writes that he himself lacked the bureaucratic support to rein in the CIA when it undermined agreed-on policies, such as supporting the development of a moderate and broad-based government. During Bush's tenure, Tomsen writes, the agency continued to call all the shots, and money kept flowing to the ISI. Clinton made a few diplomatic feints, such as limited outreach to the ISI-backed Taliban, and lobbed a few cruise missiles when the Taliban continued to shelter al Qaeda, but he otherwise largely ignored Afghanistan. And even after 9/11, George W. Bush failed to wrest power from the CIA, the Pentagon, and the ISI. Tomsen sees traces of promise in Obama's 2009 decision to renew top-level emphasis on Afghanistan, but he is skeptical that such a commitment will work without a wholesale reexamination of U.S. policy. In sum, Tomsen sees most outside potentates, whether politiburo chairmen or presidents, as making the same set of errors.

UNCOMMON COMMON SENSE?

Trying to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors, today's war planners have settled on a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy that is supposed to create enough security to help a civilian government establish legitimacy among the local populace. Observers with longer memories will recall, of course, that the principles of counterinsurgency have been discovered many times before: by the British in Malaya, the French in Algeria, the United States in Vietnam and the Philippines, and even the Soviets in Afghanistan. And discovering (or rediscovering) a principle is easier than implementing it. Ten years into the current counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, the military piece of the mission seems to have progressed far more rapidly than the civilian portion. Troops have pacified the major cities enough to allow for the formation of a central government. But the government of President Hamid Karzai seems to have little more popular support than did that of the Soviet puppet (and eventual light-post adornment) Muhammad Najibullah. As General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, candidly noted in his 2009 assessment of U.S. progress in Afghanistan, the military piece of counterinsurgency can do little more than provide the time and space for a civilian government to take root. It remains to be seen whether in 2014, by which time U.S. troops will have withdrawn from their combat role in Afghanistan, the Afghan government will resemble a stable oak or a flimsy reed.

Tomsen's policy recommendations are the flip side of his critique. He calls on the Obama administration to ensure a coherent policy by relegating the U.S. military and intelligence agencies to "policy-implementing, not policymaking." He also urges the administration to stay

engaged in Afghanistan for the long haul but to "de-Americanize the Afghan war across the board as rapidly as possible" by disentangling the United States from Afghan governance and development, finding Afghan moderates worth backing, and helping the Afghan regime build its governance capacity so long as its practices are "honest and effective." If some of Tomsen's recommendations are common sense (who could object to greater policy coherence?), others are somewhat contradictory (how should one stay engaged enough to back moderates and build the regime's capacity, all while shifting responsibility for security to Afghan forces?). The government in Kabul may not inspire much confidence today, but Tomsen avoids the question of what the United States should do if Afghan politics are as corrupt and dysfunctional in 2014 as they are in 2011.

Tomsen also urges a get-tough approach with Pakistan: "The most valuable contribution that America can make to Afghan peace," he writes, "lies not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan." In addition to enforcing existing conditions on military aid more strictly, Tomsen argues, Obama should threaten to designate the country a state sponsor of terrorism if the ISI does not cut its ties to militants. Some readers will wholeheartedly endorse Tomsen's call, even if following it might lead to a severing of relations between the United States and Pakistan. Others will question the wisdom of trading a potential disaster in Afghanistan (a country of 40 million people and of dubious strategic interest to the United States) for a potential disaster in Pakistan (a nation of 185 million and with the world's fifth-largest nuclear arsenal). Even those who share Tomsen's intense frustration may scratch their heads trying to figure out what leverage the United States could possibly hold over the Pakistani military as long as the Pentagon remains so logistically dependent on it: half the supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan (and almost all the lethal equipment, from ammunition to the weapons that fire it) are transported daily by the convoys that come through the Khyber Pass and Spin Boldak, a town right on the border with Pakistan.

And even those who agree with the basic elements of Tomsen's approach will remain hungry for a fallback option if his approach fails. "Afghanistan is an unpredictable place," Tomsen writes. "Things almost never turn out as planned, especially when the planning is done by foreigners." How should U.S. policy deal with this problem? If the Afghan National Security Forces are unable to provide security by 2014, should the United States delay the withdrawal of its troops indefinitely? If the Karzai regime fails to address corruption and poor governance, should the United States continue to give it money? And if Pakistan continues to be "fireman and arsonist," which Tomsen says it has been consistently over the past three decades, should the United States disengage from it completely and accept the consequences? As bad as things are now, they could easily get much worse.

Inevitably, any book with the breadth of *The Wars of Afghanistan* will have a few nits for the picking, but there are two reasons to read Tomsen's book carefully. First, it is extremely well written; an entire career spent drafting State Department cables miraculously failed to grind down the author's narrative spirit. Second, and more important, Tomsen has often been

right in the past—even, or especially, when many others were wrong.

Before 9/11, for example, he was in favor of cooperating with the two moderate mujahideen leaders Massoud and Abdul Haq when the U.S. government was against doing so. He was against working with the decidedly nonmoderate Hekmatyar and Hamid Gul, the ISI head who helped create several of the worst terrorist groups still operating in the region today, when Washington was for it. He was also right to sound the alarm about an obscure figure named Osama bin Laden at a time when the U.S. government was turning a blind eye to the ISI's support for him. Tomsen writes of the al Qaeda chief's sanctuary in Pakistan, "[Pakistani President Pervez] Musharraf and the ISI practiced plausible deniability concerning bin Laden's whereabouts. They knew exactly where he was." This is a bold claim, and much more so for having been written long before the May 2 U.S. raid in Abbottabad that killed bin Laden.

It is also worth quoting at length a prediction Tomsen made while testifying to Congress in 2003:

> The stunning American-led military victory in Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban-al Qaeda regime has not been followed up by an effective, adequately funded reconstruction strategy to help Afghans rebuild their country and restore their self-governing institutions. The initial enthusiasm genuinely felt by the Afghan people that peace was returning has clearly faded. . . . If present trends continue, five years from now Afghanistan is likely to look very much like it does today: reconstruction stagnation, a weak central government starved of resources, unable to extend its influence to the regions where oppressive warlords reign, opium production soars, and guerrilla warfare in Afghan-Pakistani border areas generated by Pakistan-backed Muslim extremists continues to inflict casualties on coalition and Afghan forces.

Today, he writes, even this take is overly optimistic.

Given Tomsen's track record, Americans should give a respectful hearing to his call for a thorough policy reformulation—something beyond tweaks to troop numbers and counterinsurgency tactics. And given the merits of his book, they should heed his warning not to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Review Essay

Groundhog War

The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

Bing West

Restrepo. DIRECTED BY SEBASTIAN JUNGER AND TIM HETHERINGTON. Outpost Films, 2010, 93 min.
Armadillo. DIRECTED BY JANUS METZ. Fridthjof Film, 2010, 105 min.

In the decade after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, U.S. movie studios released more than 200 war movies. During World War II, 65 percent of Americans saw at least one movie a week. Theaters showed newsreels with patriotic music prior to the feature film, delivering both information and entertainment to the American public to boost the collective commitment to winning the war.

In the 1960s, weekly movie attendance fell to less than ten percent of the population; television became Americans' principal entertainment medium, as well as their window onto the war in Vietnam. And as the war escalated, so did the negative tone of the nightly broadcasts: this was the era of network television news that stressed, "If it bleeds, it leads," an attitude that, in contrast to the movies of the 1940s, helped erode public morale.

After the Vietnam War, the Pentagon concluded that it was self-defeating to let cameramen ride military helicopters so that they could capture 30 seconds of gory footage and then broadcast it without context. Thus, beginning with the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 and then continuing in the war in Iraq, the U.S. military allowed correspondents onto the battlefields only if they embedded with military units. This practice created bonds between correspondents and soldiers that mitigated the journalists' impulse to focus on covering the violence and carnage alone.

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Embedding also helped limit regular nightly news broadcasts about the wars. Considering the large overall number of units deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, firefights were relatively rare; in fact, most U.S. units experienced long periods of boredom. And for many networks in a television news industry already battered by financial losses, the cost of embedding camera crews in remote locations where nothing visually memorable happened for months at a time proved too expensive and unsustainable.

At the same time, the soldiers themselves emerged as both actors and producers. Inexpensive digital technology has allowed U.S. troops to take cameras into battle, record firefights, and upload these scenes onto the Internet. In doing so, today's soldiers are able to present their points of view to an audience that is both larger and more fragmented than others in the past. The Internet is now full of clips that show firefights, replete with all the sound and fury of battle. So it goes, too, for the other side: Islamist militants post macabre videos of beheadings or combat clips featuring insurgents shooting and yelling much in the way that U.S. troops do. The result has been a deluge of videos that show off the risk and danger faced by the fighters but not much of the suffering inflicted on combatants and civilians.

Meanwhile, in the decade since 9/11, Hollywood has produced not a single popular war movie about Afghanistan. Digital video has supplanted film, and documentaries have replaced scripted dramas. Shot with hand-held cameras and distributed via small theaters or online, these documentaries have shaped the narrative of twenty-first-century irregular warfare. None will attain the epic stature of *Victory at Sea*, a series on naval warfare during World War II released in the early 1950s, because the current conflict in Afghanistan is not a string of titanic battles leading up to a world-altering conclusion. The conflict is, rather, a pastiche of brief clashes in valleys and farmlands. Much like the Indian Wars in the American West in the 1870s, the war in Afghanistan is defined by small-unit dramas in varying locales.

Two documentaries released in the last year convey the nature of modern combat and illustrate how the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan differs from previous wars. The first is *Restrepo*, directed by Sebastian Junger, a journalist and author, and Tim Hetherington, a photojournalist who was killed in Libya in April. The film follows a U.S. Army platoon as it holds an outpost in the Korengal Valley, in northeastern Afghanistan, near the Pakistan border. The second is *Armadillo*, directed and shot, respectively, by two Danish filmmakers, Janus Metz and Lars Skree; it features a Danish army platoon in an outpost in the farmlands of southern Afghanistan. Both films concentrate on battle and the attitudes of the platoons, showing Western soldiers confronting a wily enemy.

Taken together, the films show how advanced technology and scholarly thinking do not always translate into victory on the battlefield. U.S. and NATO soldiers have access to precision firepower and astonishing technologies that can track anyone moving. They are akin to starship troopers set down on an alien planet where the tribes are a thousand years less advanced. At the beginning of the documentaries, the soldiers dutifully proclaim a

A scene from a firefight in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley, from the documentary Restrepo

counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes winning the commitment of local tribes. Yet in practice, the films show the reality of grim daily patrols focused on confronting an invisible enemy, while the villagers stand on the sidelines. Neither documentary suggests that such U.S. and NATO patrols, as the fulcrum for counterinsurgency, result in any tribal support for the Afghan government in Kabul.

DOMINANCE ≠ INVINCIBILITY

Restrepo and *Armadillo* are named, respectively, after the two outposts where the films' action takes place—two small, isolated bases representative of many others. Bristling with machine guns and mortars, these forts are virtually impregnable. Any sprinkling of enemy fire invites devastating counterbarrages, especially in *Restrepo*, in which hostile fire is met by heavy U.S. air and artillery attacks, with white phosphorous shells setting fire to the hillsides. From their remote bases, U.S. and NATO soldiers live in siege-like conditions, with Taliban fighters prowling within sight of the forts. The soldiers know the enemy is watching, and local villagers are standoffish and unhelpful. Mines lurk underfoot; an air of incipient danger surrounds every patrol. Near the start of *Armadillo*, a Danish soldier warns a group of newly arrived troops, "Ten Taliban might attack 40 of you; they're not afraid."

And yet from forts such as these across northeastern and southern Afghanistan, coalition patrols are expected to drive back the Taliban—and thus, in theory, protect the Pashtun population, a fundamental goal of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy. The scenes of fighting in Afghanistan in both films are quick, intense, and, in some ways, opaque. Bullets snap past the camera with no enemy in sight. Soldiers

shout, point vaguely, and unleash a torrent of return fire. All seems chaos; then, after a few minutes, the firing ceases. Because Taliban fighters tend to be terrible marksmen, the episodic skirmishes of *Restrepo* and *Armadillo* sound and feel like noisy computer war games and appear to inflict no damage. Compared with those of the Vietnam War, the casualties in Afghanistan have been light: over a decade, almost 60,000 U.S. soldiers were killed in Vietnam, whereas the war in Afghanistan, as of June 2011, has left 1,600 dead. The United States and the Taliban are such an extreme mismatch militarily—U.S. forces possess overwhelmingly devastating firepower and the ability to target enemies both day and night using overhead imagery—that Taliban fighters shoot only fleetingly. Often, they have little chance to even mount an attack: in *Armadillo*, video from cameras mounted on NATO drone aircraft shows insurgents taking positions behind compound walls, only to be quickly obliterated by artillery. Airborne surveillance and exact striking power prevent any enemy from sustaining a large presence for more than a few hours; as such, it is hard to envision a terrorist safe haven anywhere inside Afghanistan.

Yet as these films also show, military dominance does not mean invincibility. The viewers of *Restrepo* and *Armadillo* know that sooner or later someone will be hit; no infantry platoon emerges unscathed from Afghanistan. In a scene in *Restrepo* reminiscent of Apache attacks in old Hollywood Westerns, the U.S. platoon climbs a wooded ridgeline, knowing that insurgents lurk nearby. The soldiers listen to intercepts of Taliban radio traffic that suggest the enemy fighters are getting closer. Suddenly, Sergeant Larry Rougle is shot and killed. His assailants dart away before the rest of the platoon can react. The soldiers are stunned. One breaks down in tears, while Dan Kearney, the angry captain, searches for a target to hit. But the wraith-like Taliban have already faded away. Unencumbered by armor, the hardy insurgents trek swiftly along back trails, slipping back and forth from Afghanistan to Pakistan. U.S. forces, with surprisingly few helicopters, lack the mobility to control the mountains.

Throughout history, armies have been brutal in their efforts to pacify those local communities that have resisted foreign occupation. On the American frontier in the nineteenth century, settlers responded to Native American raids by attacking the fighters and their food supplies, tribes, and villages. In the nineteenth century, the British occupying force in Afghanistan retaliated for the occasional killings of their administrators by razing villages along the Afghan-Indian frontier. Today, the goal of the United States and its allies is not to punish but to win over the tribes that support the enemy. In both films, the soldiers' forbearance is shown time and again: thus, in *Armadillo*, the platoon commander cautions his troops, "We're also here to help these poor people."

PEOPLE FROM THE MOON

The primary mission of counterinsurgency is to form a protective, mutually beneficial bond with the local population. In Vietnam, this was achieved through combined platoons of U.S. troops and village militias; in Afghanistan today, U.S. Special Forces are doing much the same with village militias, albeit on a much smaller scale. The preponderance of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, however, have been trained as fighters, not advisers.

The films show the U.S. and Danish soldiers to be hopelessly, almost comically separated from the day-to-day activities of the insular Islamic communities they seek to win over. The strained talk—dialogue would be an overly generous description—between the soldiers and local villagers borders on parody. The soldiers mean well, constantly proffering money in the hope of receiving some modicum of cooperation that never materializes. In *Armadillo*, teenagers openly mock the facial features and intelligence of a well-intentioned Danish soldier. Many Afghans see foreign troops "as people who've just landed from the moon," Metz, *Armadillo*'s director, told a reporter.

Kearney, the company commander in *Restrepo*, offers to give fuel for the entire winter to a village if it will turn in just one machine gun to U.S. forces. An Afghan interpreter translates the proposal from English into Dari, another man translates that into Pashto, and then a tribesman translates that into the local dialect. The tribal leader sniggers; a trade with foreign infidels is inconceivable. I will "make you guys richer," Kearney pleads. "I'll flood this whole place with money."

Among other restrictions, NATO's rules of engagement forbid patrols from entering civilian compounds, except in extreme peril or when Afghan soldiers have entered first. In *Restrepo*, U.S. soldiers are left standing outside houses, expressing suspicion as residents proclaim their innocence of colluding with the Taliban. Insurgents walk among the farmers without fear of betrayal. In *Armadillo*, suspected insurgents drive around the district on motorcycles, indistinguishable from civilians. As a Danish soldier says, "You can't tell who's who."

Both the U.S. and the Danish soldiers began their deployments hopeful that their good intentions would win over the Afghans they came in contact with. The troops in *Armadillo* are particularly sympathetic: "Give [food] to the children as a sign of goodwill," one urges. But in short order, the Danish soldiers are surrounded by demanding youngsters whenever they set out on patrol—an apt metaphor for how Western largess has created a culture of entitlement in Afghanistan. Inundated with entreaties for money day after day, the Danish troops grow suspicious of the loyalties and intentions of the Afghans around them. By the end, the soldiers have become cynical or flatly dispassionate.

Indeed, the locals do not cooperate, partly out of fear. In Vietnam, the local population was committed on both sides, with 200,000 members of the pro-U.S. South Vietnamese Popular Force guarding their villages against an estimated 80,000 Vietcong. The 11 million ethnic Pashtuns of northeastern and southern Afghanistan largely dislike the Taliban but rarely fight them; fewer than 100 self-defense militias have formed among thousands of villages. In *Restrepo*, a local explains why his family refuses to even answer the Westerners' questions: "If we let you know about Taliban, we will get killed." A mullah in *Armadillo* echoes the same belief: "If I talk, they'll cut my throat."

This mutual suspicion and alienation between the troops and the local tribes complicates hopes that U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, which requires soldiers and marines to be nation builders as well as warriors, can be effectively implemented. This strategy is vastly more ambitious than during the Vietnam War, when the United States' focus was on destroying the

Vietcong guerrillas and beating back the North Vietnamese regular army.

Although the lethal precision of U.S. weaponry has increased exponentially since the 1960s, the application of this firepower has become remarkably restrained. During the Vietnam War, about eight Vietnamese civilians were killed in the course of battle for every one U.S. soldier. In Afghanistan, this ratio has fallen to two Afghan civilians killed for every one Western soldier, largely because the U.S. and NATO coalition has imposed the strictest rules of engagement in the history of warfare. Soldiers are instructed to return fire only when they have positively identified an enemy and when nearby civilians are safe. Knowing this, Taliban fighters remain hidden or seek cover among the farmers. Both films show soldiers hesitating, debating, or refraining from shooting at the enemy out of concern for civilians. In *Armadillo*, a Danish soldier does not call for fire against three plainly suspicious Afghan men until one finally reveals a weapon.

In Vietnam, U.S. troops focused strictly on fighting, in the belief that the war would be decided on the battlefield and not by the ballot box. But in Afghanistan today, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine gives equal weight to security and the promotion of good governance, economic development, and the rule of law. These priorities make U.S. soldiers essentially responsible for building a nation among unreceptive and recalcitrant Islamic tribes—an impossible mission for foreigners. In *Restrepo*, in the middle of tense negotiations between Afghan locals and the U.S. soldiers, the village elders and Afghan army soldiers pause to pray together on the roof of a bunker, leaving the U.S. troops to watch. The U.S. soldiers stand on one side; the Afghans on the other.

"A COOL FEELING"

In both *Restrepo* and *Armadillo*, the soldiers deal with the resulting claustrophobia of living "inside the wire" with martial camaraderie. In barracks that resemble a locker room, the troops goof around, play loud music, lift weights, and swap tales of past firefights. On camera at least, they do not much complain about the danger, the boredom, or the red tape that they face. They carry themselves with a quiet pride and look forward to the crucible of battle. In contrast to the troops in World War II and the Vietnam War, there are no reluctant draftees among today's fit and highly skilled soldiers. All U.S. troops on the frontlines in Afghanistan are two-time volunteers: first, they decided to join the military; then, they chose the infantry and near-certain combat.

At both outposts, the leadership is more consensual than inspiring. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and enlisted troops share the same cramped quarters and the same risks in the field. They train, deploy, bond, and fight as a pack. Commanding officers offer no exhortations about progress or winning, only the demand that the platoon remain diligent and tactically proficient, never to be caught off-guard. In both films, the soldiers pace themselves like long-distance runners, choosing when to be aggressive. They know their enemy will likely get off the first shot: they show respect for but not fear of the Taliban.

And when a platoon does take losses, each soldier killed receives individual recognition—in Afghanistan more than in any previous war. In *Restrepo*, the platoon held a memorial service for the fallen

Sergeant Rougle, who was on his sixth combat deployment in seven years; more honors were rendered when his casket was placed on a plane bound for the United States; and a large ceremony was later held at Arlington National Cemetery.

When U.S. and NATO forces do confront the enemy in Afghanistan, it is in quick, episodic bursts of violence. Although the soldiers respond to attacks with fusillades of fire, rarely do they see their attackers or discover enemy bodies after the fact. In one particularly tense scene in *Armadillo*, Danish soldiers trap some Taliban fighters in a canal only a few feet away from their position. The platoon's commander shouts for his troops to throw a grenade. Two soldiers then fire full rifle clips into the insurgents. Back at their outpost, the Danish soldiers joke triumphantly: "We finished them off," one says, before riding a dirt bike around the tiny compound. When *Armadillo* was released in Denmark, this clip of normal warrior behavior stirred public criticism, with people citing the human rights of the enemy—an indication of the gulf between the norms of the primal battlefield and the peacetime attitudes of a contented society. When a Danish soldier in *Armadillo* sums up his feelings after a successful firefight by saying, "Making a difference is a cool feeling," he is talking about killing the enemy, not winning hearts and minds.

DOLLARS AND BULLETS

The U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in order to destroy al Qaeda and drive out the Taliban government that had sheltered the group. This first phase worked: within a few months, both al Qaeda and the Taliban had fled into Pakistan. Rather than pursue them, the U.S. and

NATO militaries undertook a second phase, choosing to remain in Afghanistan for the long haul in order to build a democratic nation there. The theory went that the West would offer protection and tangible goods, such as jobs, to the Afghan people and the people would reject the Taliban once and for all. Dollars would replace bullets, and development projects would replace shooting the enemy: enter the new military doctrine of economic determinism.

But as *Restrepo* and *Armadillo* show, money does not buy commitment. The handouts have bred opportunism rather than patriotism or a desire for self-improvement. In Iraq, insurgent gangs dominated by al Qaeda brutalized local Sunni tribes and imposed harsh Islamist rules. In response, the Sunni tribes rebelled in 2006 and 2007 and joined forces with U.S. troops. In contrast, the Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan have clung to their culture and, believing the Taliban will eventually return to power, have avoided close association with the U.S.-led coalition. In the meantime, the entire Afghan hierarchy—from President Hamid Karzai and his coterie down to village elders—has sought to squeeze as much wealth as possible from the foreigners while they are there.

As shown in *Restrepo* and *Armadillo*, the soldiers were winning no hearts and minds. Their earnest efforts and offers of development assistance failed to persuade the Afghan people to assist them. After a decade of lavish aid, the Afghan government has also not established a bond of trust with the Pashtun tribes, nor has it deployed an army sufficiently motivated or well led to defeat the much smaller guerrilla force. In some ways, *Restrepo* and *Armadillo* are the Groundhog Day of the Afghan war, in which life repeats anew every morning: platoons venture out on patrol, attempt to talk to impassive villagers, are occasionally fired on, shoot back, and then return to base, day after day.

The platoons in *Restrepo* and *Armadillo* act as their own tribes, confident in their warrior skills and psychologically distant from their senior leaderships. Since 2001, not one person among the past nine successive U.S. commanding generals in Afghanistan and past two U.S. secretaries of defense has changed the war's five key premises: total domestic control for Afghan officials, billions of dollars for projects to woo the local tribes, a war of attrition to drive back the Taliban, toleration of Pakistan as a sanctuary for the enemy, and a slow buildup of Afghan forces to fight their own war. In essence, politicians and policymakers in Washington have handed the war over to those generals who have embraced nation building as a military mission.

U.S. President Barack Obama has pledged to steadily withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan and end the U.S. combat mission by 2014. Regardless of how the war turns out, the military lessons learned will be negative; the conflict has dragged on far too long to be considered a strategic success. Unlike in the years after World War II, the generals of this day will not gain in historical stature. The popularity of the idea of counterinsurgency as nation building reached its zenith when Iraq was stabilized in 2008. At the time, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency warrior-intellectuals were in vogue. As happened to their predecessors after the Vietnam War, however, their concepts of war fighting will come to be rejected by the younger generation of company-grade officers who

had to execute a flawed doctrine. No matter their skills and good intentions, foreign troops cannot persuade the people of another nation to reject insurgents in their midst. The people must convince themselves—and be willing to sacrifice for that conviction.

After the United States and the United Nations handed full sovereignty to Karzai and his top officials in 2002, the U.S. military could only coax them to pursue, rather than directly institute itself, competent military and civilian leadership in Afghan institutions. Meanwhile, a strategy that rested on persuading the people to turn against the insurgents failed to win the commitment of the tribes. U.S. and NATO soldiers went on patrols until they were shot at and then returned fire discriminately. With Pakistan as their sanctuary, the Taliban controlled the tempo of the war. At the level of the rifle company, counterinsurgency as nation building became a Sisyphean mission. In 2010, the U.S. military pulled out of a string of outposts in the mountains, including Restrepo. "You can't force the local populace to accept you in their valley," Captain Mark Moretti, the company commander, said. "You can't make them want to work with us." With that as an epitaph to a five-year-long mission to hold a firebase, it is clear that the overall strategy should change.

By the time Lieutenant General John Allen, the war's tenth commanding general, took over in Kabul this past July, U.S. counterinsurgency strategy had indeed devolved. In a speech in June, Obama explained that his administration's goals in Afghanistan no longer were full-fledged nation building or counterinsurgency. Instead, the goal of U.S. and NATO forces was to prevent the reemergence of a safe haven for al Qaeda and its affiliates. This new emphasis was loosely termed "counterterrorism," to capture the focus on fighting, as distinct from counterinsurgency, which is based on protecting the population. Allen's strategy will focus on placing Afghan security forces in the lead and not, as shown in *Restrepo* and *Armadillo*, doing the fighting for them.

Washington's national security goal is to prevent the reemergence of a safe haven for al Qaeda inside Afghanistan. Today, no such safe haven is possible, thanks to U.S. special operations raids, a network of informants, and U.S. surveillance capabilities. A force of around 20,000 U.S. soldiers can prevent a safe haven indefinitely, as long as the Afghan army controls the cities and highways (which makes the cohesion of the Afghan army a key part of the U.S. and NATO drawdown).

When waging war in the future, U.S. military leaders will likely limit their objectives and their resources—as befits a superpower that has been living beyond its bountiful means. In terms of counterinsurgency more narrowly, the most effective missions will be limited to the battlefield: detecting and destroying insurgent camps and safe havens and training and advising indigenous security forces. The United States is unlikely to try to defeat an insurgency by building a nation again. Before leaving office in July, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates put it bluntly: "Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined."

Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Human Rights in the Twentieth Century. EDITED BY STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 366 pp. $90.00 (paper, $28.99).

This important collection brings together historians attempting to chronicle the contested path Enlightenment ideas about human rights took as they made their way across the centuries and into the heart of contemporary world politics. The authors are united in the conviction that the rise of human rights around the world was historically contingent and politically contested. The American and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth century generated a language of human rights, but this was eclipsed in the nineteenth century by the rival concepts of nation, race, class, and civilization. Hoffmann and his colleagues argue that it was only in the conflicts and crises following World War II that human rights became a universal moral ideal. Several chapters look at postwar Europe and the connections there among political unification, Cold War anticommunism, and the emergence of a European human rights regime. Others take up decolonization and the internationalization of human rights. Even though colonial states had their own perspectives on human rights, by using these norms as moral and political tools to pressure Western states into granting them independence and supporting their development, they joined the global human rights regime. As several authors in this book argue, the United States has also used the language of universal human rights, in its case to bolster its own hegemonic legitimacy.

Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. BY MICHAEL BARNETT. Cornell University Press, 2011, 312 pp. $29.95.

One of the most striking features of world politics in the last 200 years was the rise of humanitarianism, the sustained efforts by outsiders to save lives and help those too weak to help themselves. Barnett paints an expansive portrait of that ascent, breaking it down into three distinct ages. From the nineteenth century to World War II, humanitarian intervention existed as part of colonialism, commerce, and Western "civilizing" missions. During the Cold War, it became part of the East-West struggle and the worldwide movement toward state sovereignty and

national development. The end of the Cold War gave birth to an ambitious project of liberal humanitarianism that was tied to globalization and the spread of liberal democracy and human rights. Barnett's point is that humanitarianism is a "creature of the world it aspires to civilize," rather than some sort of abstract ideal that unfolds amid the chaos and violence of world politics. In making that argument, he includes rich details about the visionaries, missionaries, transnational activists, UN agencies, and democracies that intervened in such places as Nigeria, Cambodia, and Kosovo. Barnett is a realist in that he sees geopolitics and self-serving motives at every historical turn, but he is also an idealist, taking seriously the "ethic of compassion" that informs people and governments.

Why Niebuhr Now? BY JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS. University of Chicago Press, 2011, 152 pp. $22.00.

The theologian and philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr rose to prominence in the 1940s and 1950s with his writings and lectures on the struggles between the United States' liberal democracy and its fascist and totalitarian challengers. In recent years, American political figures on both the right and the left (including President Barack Obama) have rediscovered him. This little book by the late historian Diggins seeks to explain Niebuhr's continuing appeal. He tracks Niebuhr's intellectual journey as a critic of Christian idealism and the radical left, a champion of an imperfect social justice, and an advocate of foreign policy realism. Niebuhr grounded his philosophy in a sober view of the limits of reason and collective action and the elusiveness of mankind's quest for, as he put it, "perpetual peace and brotherhood for human society." During the Cold War, he fashioned a distinctive realist view of the United States' mission, urging both activism and restraint, moral conviction and humility. It was a Christian realism in which U.S. foreign policy would seek justice and show mercy, always aware that conflict and misery are inherent in the human condition. Niebuhr's vision is attractive in part because of the world-weary assumptions on which it is based: no one should expect too much from science, modernity, or the goodwill of others.

Religion and International Relations Theory. EDITED BY JACK SNYDER. Columbia University Press, 2011, 232 pp. $89.50 (paper, $27.50).

Until 9/11 and the war on terrorism, few scholars systematically explored how religious beliefs and movements shape global politics. In this impressive volume, a group of mostly younger academics does just that. Snyder argues that religion can alter the basic patterns of international relations: who the actors are, what they want, what capacities they have to attract support, and what rules they follow. Islamic groups, Christian fundamentalists, and the Falung Gong all impinge on world politics in various ways. Religious movements can reinforce state authority or undermine it, and religion can reinforce the territorial boundaries of states or mobilize loyalties that cut across borders. Timothy Samuel Shah and Daniel Philpott trace the rise and fall of secularism in international relations. Monica Duffy Toft explores the connections between religion and war, arguing that religion, not unlike nationalism, can help its devotees

rationalize self-sacrifice in support of a larger community. Il Hyun Cho and Peter Katzenstein argue that Confucianism in East Asia survived the region's modernization and is now an important tool for bolstering state authority and regional identity there.

Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-first Century? BY DAVID FISHER. Oxford University Press, 2011, 320 pp. $45.00.

If moral clarity about decisions to wage war ever existed, it is certainly missing today. As the wars of conquest and territorial defense that marked earlier eras have given way to "wars of choice," limited military actions, and humanitarian interventions, the moral principles that leaders might wish to invoke when contemplating the use of military force have become increasingly murky. In this thoughtful treatise, a former British defense official provides a welcome restatement of the "just war" tradition in the context of current security challenges. In part, the book is a survey of religious and secular thinking about morality and war. But Fisher's main interest is in identifying the changing moral choices and circumstances that confront contemporary would-be war-makers. Preemptive war, humanitarian intervention, strategic bombing, torture—Fisher probes these and other controversial areas of modern-day warfare, arguing for the relevance of just war principles. The book eloquently makes clear that no one, from the soldier in the trenches to the commander in chief, can escape moral choice. The only question is whether one's choices are worthy and well reasoned.

Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. BY G. JOHN IKENBERRY. Princeton University Press, 2011, 392 pp. $35.00.

International orders guide how major powers interact with one another and with less powerful states: how they cooperate and compete in trade and security and when and why they respect one another's sovereignty. Ikenberry's important book tackles this complex subject, giving readers a deep understanding of the factors that determine the type of international order. As Ikenberry explains, orders can be built on balance (as was the case in Europe for centuries), command (as the British Empire was), or consent (as he argues today's U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order is). After World War II, the United States built and deepened this liberal hegemonic order, and Ikenberry delineates the ways in which it has served everyone's interests—including those of the rising powers. Today, however, somewhat ironically, the order is becoming "the victim of its own success," as those powers are beginning to threaten U.S. dominance and as the growing acceptance of intervention in states' internal affairs erodes Westphalian norms of sovereignty. Ikenberry argues that it is time to rebuild the order, and he provides solid grounds for confidence in the durability of its core. The specific form of the reworked liberal order, he explains, will depend on many factors, including the preferences of not only the United States but also China and India. While acknowledging that the future international order is hard to predict, *Liberal Leviathan* is a valuable guide to understanding the factors that will determine its eventual shape.

CHARLES GLASER

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding—and How We Can Improve the World Even More. BY CHARLES KENNY. Basic Books, 2011, 256 pp. $26.99.

From time to time, it is useful to stand back from the weekly reports of crises around the world and ask how the human race is really doing. Kenny, a World Bank economist, does this magnificently in this well-written book. Its main message is simple: that quality of life has improved greatly almost everywhere over the past century, even in places (such as Africa) where per capita incomes have stayed relatively flat. Looking at improvements in that measure, which is favored by economists, is in fact a poor way to gauge improvements in overall living conditions. Infant and maternal mortality have plummeted, and people today enjoy better nutrition and protection against disease, more education, better access to infrastructure, and greater personal freedom than ever before. To be sure, there is much room for improvement. But making progress need not be vastly expensive, since it mainly involves transmitting ideas and information. Kenny offers a lighthearted critical survey of what economists have had to say about the determinants of economic growth, but he argues that growth, although important and desirable, should not be the main objective.

Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet. BY DAVID G. VICTOR. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 392 pp. $40.00.

According to Victor, the Kyoto Protocol's target-based approach to climate-change negotiations is fatally flawed, as is the UN-based process by which 193 governments are expected to reach agreement on a complex issue that touches every economy. Drawing on the history of successful international negotiations, Victor counsels greater patience; the term "urgent," he says, is overused in public discussions of climate change. He argues that a smallish club of the major greenhouse gas emitters (including, of course, China and the United States) should undertake serious negotiations on actions to be taken, not just targets to shoot for. Victor also contends that existing technologies are not likely to limit climate change significantly, and so a major collaborative effort to develop new ones is called for. Given past emissions, some climate change is inevitable, putting a premium on strategies of adaptation. But adapting to climate change, in Victor's view, will primarily be a local challenge, dependent on local circumstances, not an issue for a grand global bargain.

Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens. BY NICHOLAS SHAXSON. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 272 pp. $27.00.

This book is a vigorous and well-researched polemic against financial deregulation and the offshore tax havens around the world that have come into widespread use in recent decades. Shaxson, a British journalist, especially attacks the remnants of the British Empire—Bermuda, the Cayman

Islands, the Channel Islands, and the like—and their supporters in the City of London and in the British political establishment, but their American fellow travelers also get a drubbing. He makes clear that "offshore" is a misnomer, since many ostensibly offshore practices have been adopted onshore in the United Kingdom and the United States. The U.S. state of Delaware and the British-controlled island of Jersey receive special scrutiny, and in the author's view, the legislatures of small jurisdictions such as these are in effect for hire by major outside financial interests. Many of them enshrine client secrecy in law, which, not surprisingly, attracts wealthy people and companies (and criminal organizations) wanting to evade taxes and disagreeable regulations. Shaxson is not impressed with efforts during the past decade, seemingly led by the U.S. government, to make this global system more accessible to law enforcement agencies. Influential Americans, especially in finance, have too great a personal interest in preserving and even enlarging the gaping holes in the existing systems of taxation and regulation.

Banker to the World: Leadership Lessons From the Front Lines of Global Finance. BY WILLIAM R. RHODES. McGraw-Hill, 2011, 288 pp. $25.00.

As a senior officer at Citigroup, Rhodes has been at the center of international banking for the past 30 years, especially when debt restructuring was involved. In *Banker to the World*, he reminisces about his challenging, and sometimes harrowing, experiences, organizing the book around eight lessons that he derived from them. These include the value of prompt, decisive action and of knowing the culture, history, and customs of the people on the other side of the negotiating table. Rhodes covers the debt restructurings of Nicaragua (1980), Mexico (1982), Brazil (1983), Argentina (1992), South Korea (1998), and Uruguay (2002) and the nonrestructuring by Argentina (2001). He also recounts Citibank's successful efforts to engage in eastern Europe after the fall of communism and to reengage in China, a market its predecessor entered in 1902. For those interested in the operational side of international finance, this is an absorbing read.

Energy: Perspectives, Problems, and Prospects. BY MICHAEL B. MCELROY. Oxford University Press, 2009, 424 pp. $75.00.

This book, written by a Harvard physicist for people who remember some of their high school physics and are unfazed by numbers, provides quantitative answers to most of their questions about energy. It presents a whirlwind history of humans' relationship with energy sources, which at first was mostly wood and brawn, with help from domesticated animals, wind, and water. All that changed when Abraham Darby discovered how to make coke from coal in 1709 and when, soon after, Thomas Newcomen invented the steam-driven pump. These two technical leaps ushered in the age of coal-generated steam power—and the age of fossil-fuel dependency. McElroy's book includes an extensive discussion of the physics and geology of coal, oil, and natural gas, along with useful chapters on nuclear energy, electricity, transportation, climate change, carbon capture, and ethanol (which, McElroy points out, will do nothing to mitigate climate change if it is made from corn but could be helpful if it could be made economically from cellulose). The book has a

clearheaded discussion of a low-carbon energy future.

Military, Scientific, and Technological

LAWRENCE D. FREEDMAN

A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism. BY DANIEL BYMAN. Oxford University Press, 2011, 496 pp. $34.95.

The rules of terrorism and counterterrorism have been written around Israel's struggle for statehood and security. As Byman reminds readers in this comprehensive, balanced, and sharply written history, Jewish militants relied on force from the start to push the British out and keep the Arabs at bay. As the security threat took new forms, the Israelis remained determined not to even hint at weakness. And as Byman shows, they enjoyed some notable successes in disrupting Palestinian terrorist campaigns, especially in the early years of this century. Targeted assassinations have now become established as a legitimate counterterrorist tactic beyond Israel, despite misgivings about their legality and effectiveness. Undertaken with sufficient ruthlessness and regularity, they can do serious damage to a militant organization. But they can also prompt retaliation, and whatever the operational gains that targeted killings reap, they can involve severe political costs. Byman makes a similar judgment about the physical barrier separating the Palestinians from the Israelis; an operational case for it can be made, but the political downsides are substantial. Indeed, Israel's persistent security predicament suggests that when it comes to counterterrorism, as with other aspects of strategy, the core problem is the failure to integrate the military and the political.

Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-set of Modern Terrorists. BY ALESSANDRO ORSINI. TRANSLATED BY SARAH J. NODES. Cornell University Press, 2011, 296 pp. $29.95.

Mastermind: The Many Faces of the 9/11 Architect, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. BY RICHARD MINITER. Sentinel, 2011, 288 pp. $25.95.

Are terrorists mad, bad, or a combination of the two? It takes a special sort of mind to prepare to kill large numbers of people on the basis of a highly speculative political analysis. Orsini's remarkable book gets as close as any to understanding this sort of thinking. Although it can be hard going at times, with dollops of pedantic sociology, the book is sustained throughout by stark and candid quotes from past members of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group active in the 1970s. The Red Brigades were animated by a simplistic Marxism, and Orsini is at pains to stress the importance of ideology in legitimating terrorism. It is not hard to recognize similar tendencies in other groups: the conviction that the group has a vanguard role that enables its members to see the struggle with unmatched clarity, the belief that unswerving devotion to the cause creates a right to do anything for it, and a readiness to deny the humanity of all opponents. Although Orsini does not compare his leftist terrorists with Islamists, he does show elements of the same mindset in past Marxist groups and also in contemporary neofascists.

Whereas Orsini manages to paint a disturbing portrait of a vicious group, Miniter looks at one of the key figures in al Qaeda, Khalid Sheik Mohammed. Mohammed was a pioneer of mass-casualty terrorism, involved in both the 1993 and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, and he proved his "toughness" by beheading the bound journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002. Miniter's research is meticulous, and his revelations about Mohammed's time in the United States are interesting, but the portrait of Mohammed remains shallow. That might be because Mohammed himself is shallow; his motivations appear more secular than spiritual, bound up with a sense of the injustice faced by his native Baluchistan in Pakistan and by the Palestinians. Miniter uses Mohammed, who was waterboarded, to attempt to assess the pros and cons of extreme interrogation techniques. The United States might gain valuable intelligence from it, he concludes, but in doing so abandons the moral high ground.

Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth. BY FREDERICK KEMPE. Putnam Adult, 2011, 608 pp. $29.95.

Coming 50 years after 1961, with Berlin now the capital of a unified German state, Kempe's compelling, lively (and unusually well-illustrated) account is a reminder that the city was once at the heart of a crisis that almost turned the Cold War hot. The awkward division of Germany in 1945 left West Berlin as a Western strategic outpost behind the Iron Curtain and a bolthole for Germans stuck in the communist East. The crisis grew as more and more of them escaped during the first half of 1961, in part because they feared that the Soviet Union and its East German clients might succeed in controlling the city. The crisis ended with the construction of the Berlin Wall, leaving East Germans stuck but making possible an uneasy coexistence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Kempe demonstrates the interplay of character and calculation as he describes how the main protagonists, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and U.S. President John F. Kennedy, tried to manage a conflict that seemed to have no resolution other than war but was not really worth a war. Some irritating muddles on the associated conflict over Cuba aside, this is a skillful work of Cold War history.

Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament. EDITED BY CATHERINE M. KELLEHER AND JUDITH REPPY. Stanford University Press, 2011, 432 pp. $80.00 (paper, $27.95).

The idea that nuclear weapons can and should be completely eliminated has achieved a degree of interest and credibility that it has not enjoyed since the first decade of the nuclear age, not least because of some high-profile supporters. This means that it is also starting to get high-level academic attention. Kelleher and Reppy have collected an impressive group of scholars who assume the objective of a nonnuclear world and then explore how this might be achieved and what it might mean. The chapters cover individual countries and a range of practical, institutional, and conceptual problems. *Getting to Zero* contains plenty of unavoidable skepticism, and readers will not finish it sure about the way ahead, but the book moves the debate to a more serious level.

The United States

WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War. BY AMANDA FOREMAN. Random House, 2011, 1,008 pp. $35.00.

Foreman's instructive history of the American Civil War from the perspective of the United Kingdom is a fascinating addition to the literature on the war. The competition for British support was one of the major drivers of events in both the Union and the Confederacy. The hope that "King Cotton" would force the British to recognize and support the Confederacy was one reason that many Southerners believed their rebellion could win; the United Kingdom's decision to honor the North's initially porous blockade of Confederate ports cut the South off from the foreign markets and supplies without which it could not long survive. Foreman looks at the conflict through four sets of eyes: those of the British politicians and officials who tried to avoid offending either side while pursuing what they saw as their country's interests in the war, those of the Confederate and Union diplomats and agents in the United Kingdom, those of the British subjects who for various reasons joined or were dragooned into the armies of the contending parties, and those of the British foreign correspondents and writers who covered the war. The result is an illuminating and engaging book that casts new light on figures such as U.S. Senator Charles Sumner, U.S. Secretary of State William Seward, and the Confederate leader Jefferson Davis.

Malcolm X: A Life of Reinvention. BY MANNING MARABLE. Viking Adult, 2011, 608 pp. $30.00.

Malcolm X, a smalltime street hustler who made it big first as a fiery apostle of racial antagonism in the Nation of Islam and then as a promoter of Black Power and pan-Africanism after his conversion to orthodox Sunni Islam, remains a key figure in the development of African American politics today. Marable performs a signal service in providing a fresh look at the man and replacing the simplified version of his life presented in *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* with a more complex and accurate portrait. Marable asserts that the real life of Malcolm X was sadder and more complicated than the airbrushed version Malcolm's collaborator, the journalist Alex Haley, put forth in the posthumously completed autobiography. What emerges from Marable's book is the story of an angry young man's desperate quest for a legitimate and powerful father figure in a hostile world. (Malcolm's own father was likely killed by white vigilantes.) Elijah Muhammad of the Nation of Islam was Malcolm's first father-hero; African politicians such as Moise Tshombe and Kwame Nkrumah filled the void when Muhammad was found wanting. Malcolm himself remains a compelling figure, even as the causes to which he devoted himself become less relevant; Marable's thoughtful and well-written book helps one understand why.

Full Spectrum Diplomacy and Grand Strategy: Reforming the Structure and Culture of U.S. Foreign Policy. BY JOHN LENCZOWSKI. Lexington Books, 2011, 230 pp. $70.00 (paper, $29.95).

Lenczowski has written a quirky book that

is part polemic and part prescription. He charges that the United States has lost sight of two vital elements of foreign policy: grand strategy and what he calls "full spectrum diplomacy." The specialized and technocratic mindset of the functionaries populating the U.S. government, Lenczowski holds, has reduced the country's foreign policy to a set of unrelated initiatives and negotiations. Blindly tunneling bureaucrats in many different offices dig industriously, but U.S. foreign policy as a whole has no shape. In Lenczowski's view, hard-power enthusiasts underestimate the importance of soft power, and soft-power proponents shy away from frankly using all available forms of power to advance U.S. interests. He argues that a less dysfunctional relationship between the two sides could be found during the early years of the Cold War, when public diplomacy, economic aid, military policy, and cultural interventions (such as the CIA's support for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an anticommunist group) worked together as part of an effective strategy to combat communism. The comparison with today, Lenczowski acknowledges, is not exact, and some of his examples and prescriptions will strike readers as far-fetched. Nevertheless, the core concerns he addresses are vital.

Religion, Terror, and Error: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Spiritual Engagement. BY DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, JR. Praeger, 2011, 283 pp. $49.95.

In places as different as Bosnia, Côte d'Ivoire, Europe, Indonesia, and Nigeria, competition among religious groups and identities intensifies and sharpens ethnic and territorial rivalries. Some of the foreign policy actors whose actions disturb the United States the most (al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Iran) are motivated in part by religion. In many sub-Saharan countries where governments are weak and poorly placed, religious entities are often the only organizations with a national reach. For these reasons and more, U.S. policymakers must come to grips with religion in new and more fruitful ways. Johnston recommends ways that the U.S. foreign policy apparatus can minimize the harm religion can do and, where possible, integrate a deeper religious understanding into both the development and the execution of its strategy. He calls for a group of "religion attachés," similar to the labor attachés who have served in many U.S. embassies since the early days of the Cold War, and for teaching Foreign Service officers more about religion throughout their careers. The second recommendation seems more urgent; if political officers, heads of mission, and senior State Department personnel do not fully appreciate the importance of religion, then his proposed religion attachés are unlikely to be used well.

Demonic: How the Liberal Mob Is Endangering America. BY ANN COULTER. Crown Forum, 2011, 368 pp. $28.99.

Coulter's latest book, a fiery and often ad hominem polemic against all things liberal, provides important clues about what the "Fox nation" is thinking and feeling as the political season heats up. For Coulter, modern American liberalism is directly descended from the violent mob rule of the atheistic French Revolution; in the antiwar group CodePink, she sees echoes of the crowds heckling Marie Antoinette on the way to the guillotine. By way of contrast, Coulter's conservatives are perfect cavaliers whose scrupulous

respect for private property, small government, and the rule of law reflects the God-fearing tradition of the Founding Fathers. The depiction of the American left as a howling Jacobin mob is part of a venerable tradition in American politics; Coulter reproduces core arguments that Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists made against the Jeffersonian Republicans in the 1790s. This is reassuring, since it suggests that the partisanship and bitterness of the present day is no more threatening to the country than many past episodes of polarization.

Western Europe

ANDREW MORAVCSIK

Europe 2020: Competitive or Complacent? BY DANIEL HAMILTON. SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011, 150 pp. $22.50.

Hamilton has made something of a career of stating an obvious truth that most observers willfully ignore: Europe is the world's largest economic power. In most respects, such as trade, investment, research, and development assistance, Europe dwarfs China and India and continues to surpass the United States. Yet the generally anti-government bias of most economic analyses, the tendency to treat Europe as a set of small countries rather than as a whole, and salient events such as the recent euro crisis lead many to question whether the European model is sustainable. This data-rich volume evaluates Europe's global competitive position and suggests ways to strengthen it. The advice is sensible: European policymakers should focus on services, knowledge-intensive sectors, and green technology and work collectively through the EU to liberalize markets, streamline regulations, and promote innovation. To be sure, the recommendations are somewhat technocratic. For example, liberalizing immigration laws, promoting intergenerational equity, and deregulating public services appear as economic objectives, not as contested social and political issues. Yet this optimistic prognosis is an important corrective to the prevailing pessimism.

Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union. BY R. DANIEL KELEMEN. Harvard University Press, 2011, 378 pp. $49.95.

The EU has developed an adversarial rights-based legal system much like the U.S. one. Kelemen, a political scientist, argues that this is not because Europe copied the United States but because the two have faced similar challenges. The decentralized nature of the EU means that when leaders seek to liberalize markets and enact common regulations, they often must do so by granting individual rights and privileges that will ultimately be enforced by courts. As a result, EU law, like U.S. law, is both transparent and legalistic, formally defined yet subject to constant adjudication. Kelemen traces parallel trajectories in antitrust law, disability rights, and securities regulation. Sometimes resulting from economic interests and sometimes from normative beliefs, the legal system that has emerged in the EU is a complex one firmly grounded in European society. This book is more synthetic than analytic, building on two decades of work by many scholars, but it serves as a useful introduction to the subject. And by demonstrating the flexibility

and sophistication of European law, it poses a challenge to skeptics who, perhaps encouraged by recent headlines, believe that the EU is an insubstantial and inessential organization likely to collapse in the face of economic crisis.

Streetlife: How Cities Made Modern Europe. BY LEIF JERRAM. Oxford University Press, 2011, 352 pp. $35.00.

The history of Europe over the past century has unfolded in, and remains inscribed in, the public spaces of its cities. Based on this premise, this original and engaging book offers a unique, street-level view of European history. Politics have played out on the European street through strikes, revolutions, and coups but have ultimately achieved bourgeois tranquility. Culture—opera, jazz, nightclubs, soccer stadiums, cinemas, television studios—has become essentially urban. Cities have spawned new lifestyles, from novel sexual mores to complex ethnic and racial identities. The mass planning of cities to achieve environmental, epidemiological, ideological, and aesthetic objectives has become a model for state intervention in the economy as a whole. Indeed, perhaps the greatest danger facing European cities today is that government policy threatens the creativity, diversity, and chaos that define the continent's identity.

European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2010. BY JUSTIN VAÏSSE AND HANS KUNDNANI. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2011, 156 pp. Free online.

Commentators argue endlessly about whether the EU's foreign policy is a success or a failure. Vaïsse, a foreign policy analyst at the Brookings Institution, and Kundnani, a former journalist working for the European Council on Foreign Relations, assembled a team of researchers in an effort to get beyond such "glass half empty or half full" debates. They assign numerical ratings to the annual performance of EU foreign policy and intend to update them every year. The strength of the exercise lies in the details: 80 separate issues are rated on the extent to which EU member states agree on a policy, the resources committed to the issue, and the outcome. Its weakness lies in the media-friendly aggregation of scores into a single number and a letter grade (A to F) for each issue. This oversimplifies. Is unity is a component of success, or are some issues better handled by a vanguard of leading countries? Does grading Europe down for failing to devote massive resources and political will to difficult areas with nearly intractable tradeoffs, such as climate change or Chinese human rights, simply penalize politicians for setting sensible priorities? Readers should ignore the grades and focus on the subtler virtues of this pioneering experiment in foreign policy analysis.

Muslims in the West After 9/11: Religion, Politics, and Law. EDITED BY JOCELYNE CESARI. Routledge, 2009, 254 pp. $150.00 (paper, $39.95).

Is conflict between the West and Islam the result of mistaken ideas about the Islamic world? Do Europeans (and Americans) portray Islam as static, monolithic, and reactionary? This volume, edited by a French researcher at Harvard, examines whether such "cultural talk" triggers Western overreaction and inflames Muslim opposition both inside and outside Europe and the United States. It is something of a grab bag of perspectives, heavier on

speculation than on hard sociological, economic, and political data. Yet the general tendency—oddly enough, given the premise of the book—seems to disconfirm the notion that Western perspectives on Islam matter much. One contribution finds such hostile stereotypes mainly among extremists. Another points out that European efforts to combat terrorism have been largely successful. Still another points out that such views are more prevalent in the United States, where Muslims have been more fully integrated than in Europe. One comes away with the impression that the integration of minorities reflects a far more complex range of factors than cultural stereotypes.

The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe. BY DAVID MARQUAND. Princeton University Press, 2011, 224 pp. $24.95.

Marquand has had a long and distinguished political and academic career: he has been a member of the British parliament, an adviser to the European Commission (the EU's executive body), and an honorary fellow at Oxford University. In that time, he has tended to support political causes—notably the British Social Democratic, New Labour, and Liberal Democratic movements—only to turn on them later. He has also supported European integration, and in this book he turns on it, too. He does so for a reason that has led many other Europeans to reject integration: he cannot tolerate its ambiguity. The EU's unique structure, half state and half international organization, has facilitated success and growth for over a half century—longer than most nation-states in the world today have existed. Yet now, Marquand believes, only transforming the EU into something more like the United States, with stronger central institutions and direct democratic representation, can save it from dissolution. In the end, Marquand gives no reason why this will—or, indeed, should—take place. Perhaps what Europe needs instead is a new, more decentralized vision. Yet the mere fact that so many books of this kind are written testifies to the controversy over the meaning of the European experiment.

Western Hemisphere

RICHARD FEINBERG

Mañana Forever? Mexico and the Mexicans. BY JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA. Knopf, 2011, 320 pp. $27.95.

Although not all readers will accept Castañeda's core thesis—that Mexico's drive toward modernity is being delayed by traditional cultural characteristics that have proved counterproductive—*Mañana Forever* is brimming with lively observations on all things Mexico. A former foreign minister, Castañeda settles scores with the intellectual and media elites who frustrated his efforts to update Mexican foreign policy. Castañeda wants to ramp up the North American Free Trade Agreement, turning it into a full-fledged regional economic union with a single currency (in effect, dumping the peso for the greenback). But first, he maintains, Mexicans must rise out of their backward-looking defensive crouch, rewrite their history books, and stop denigrating the United States; it is high time, he says, for Mexicans to improve their self-esteem and build a more cooperative

civil society. Castañeda pins his hopes on his country's modernizing middle class, and he imagines a Mexico bound together by a new respect for the rule of law and competitive economics, and yet one that still honors its rich regional diversity. Some of the better passages take the reader into Mexican homes and neighborhoods about which Castañeda, a peripatetic public intellectual, speaks authoritatively from firsthand experience.

Redeemers: Ideas and Power in Latin America. BY ENRIQUE KRAUZE. Harper, 2011, 560 pp. $29.99.

This collection of erudite biographical essays is held together by the singular worldview of its author, one of the leading members of Mexico's literati. Krauze's long, loving ode to his mentor and friend the Nobel Prize–winning writer Octavio Paz could stand on its own as a major contribution to the literature on Paz and twentieth-century Mexico. In it, he traces the poet-philosopher's journey from his father's Zapatista faith back to his grandfather's nineteenth-century antireligious liberalism. In other sketches, Krauze savages Argentine First Lady Evita Perón, the Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara, and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez for the cults of the great leader and the authoritarian military caudillo that they have led, "a distant echo both of Moorish sheiks and Christian warlords." The liberal Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa compares favorably, in Krauze's sketch, to the Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez, whose journalism "did not practice magic realism so much as socialist realism." Krauze finds value in the originality and complexity of the Cuban independence fighter José Martí and in the brilliance of the Peruvian philosopher of indigenous Marxism José Carlos Mariátegui. Throughout, Krauze warns against the temptations to seek redemption through revolutionary violence, heroic martyrdom, and political absolutism. He also helps readers understand the two separate strains of anti-Americanism in Latin America—"the abstract ideological disdain of the Southern Cone and the grievance-fueled resentments of the Caribbean"—that are very much alive today.

International Migration in Cuba: Accumulation, Imperial Designs, and Transnational Social Fields. BY MARGARITA CERVANTES-RODRÍGUEZ. Penn State University Press, 2009, 344 pp. $75.00.

Cubans today are leaving home in search of more promising lives in the United States and elsewhere, but for most of the preceding 500 years, Cuba was a destination—for emigrants from Spain and other unstable European lands and from nearby Caribbean islands, as well as for African slaves and Chinese "coolies." Cervantes-Rodríguez recounts this compelling human drama with the passion and sweep of neo-Marxian world-historical analysis and her own memories as the granddaughter of Spanish immigrants to Cuba who fled the country because of Fidel Castro's repression of immigrant entrepreneurship. Along with the many fascinating historical connections she draws, readers will learn that that the transfer of remittances and business skills among immigrant family members to aid the development of small enterprises, in both Cuba and their countries

of origin, has a long tradition. Cervantes-Rodríguez praises the Obama administration for allowing Cuban Americans to return to Cuba and send cash to their island-bound relatives and criticizes the Cuban government for maintaining unusual travel restrictions, even as it now exports professional labor to accumulate scarce foreign currency.

Inter-American Cooperation at a Crossroads. EDITED BY GORDON MACE, ANDREW F. COOPER, AND TIMOTHY M. SHAW. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 320 pp. $90.00.

The editors of this comprehensive compendium of essays have assembled top experts to offer the latest thinking on Latin American integration schemes—their modest strengths, persistent weaknesses, and prospects for change and renewal. Their assessment is not encouraging. From the unfinished agenda of economic, trade, and energy integration to the limited progress of subregional arrangements such as Mercosur and the North American Free Trade Agreement, the volume uncovers both strategic and tactical hurdles that raise larger questions of self-identity and common interests. Given the vast disparities within this diverse region, which encompasses both major economies and vulnerable island states, the pan-American dream has never felt more distant. As governments experiment with new and more varied institutional arrangements at both the presidential and the technocratic levels, including partnerships with countries outside the hemisphere, the regional order seems to be best described as one of diffuse multipolarity. To preserve its influence in such a system, the United States will have to navigate Brazil's ambitions to lead South America and China's race to secure resources in a way that will mitigate conflict and protect long-standing U.S. interests.

THEODORE J. PICCONE

Shifting the Balance. EDITED BY ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL, THEODORE J. PICCONE, AND LAURENCE WHITEHEAD. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 193 pp. $24.95.

The three distinguished editors of this collection have produced a balanced overview of the Obama administration's Latin America policy. The volume describes the high hopes that Barack Obama's election engendered throughout the region and skillfully lays out why the honeymoon is waning: although Obama has significantly altered U.S. policy in the region, the change has been less than Latin America (and these writers) would have liked. The chapters written by non-U.S. scholars are particularly lucid and should help readers understand why Latin Americans feel so disillusioned with the United States. The book eschews a hemisphere-wide grand strategy in favor of engagement on select issues, a more modest approach than one usually finds in books about U.S. policy. Even as policymakers in Washington confront unprecedented challenges to U.S. interests around the world, attempt to revive a sputtering U.S. economy, and brace themselves for the upcoming presidential election, they would do well to heed this book's spot-on recommendations for U.S. policy toward the restless region to their south.

SALLY SHELTON-COLBY

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion After Communism. BY BRIAN D. TAYLOR. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 392 pp. $95.00.

It may be pointless to say that had Vladimir Putin read this book he would have done a better job of building the strong state he desired while serving the broader public good. Yet it is not too much to suggest that readers would be hard-pressed to find a more subtle and lucid account of why his effort to strengthen the state's coercive arm failed to dent corruption, protect property rights, or advance the rule of law. This is by far the most thorough and systematic study of Russia's so-called power ministries, charged with administering the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of force. The basic fact that scarcely a quarter of the Russian population thinks the police protect the public interest, rather than their own self-interests or those of their masters, and a trove of similar facts reflect the surface detritus of the Russian leadership's effort to build state capacity without considering the factors rendering the effort ineffective and, indeed, counterproductive. The idea of a state that works—Taylor calls it "state quality"—flows from Taylor's remarkably rich and productive tour through the best of the theoretical work on the state, which he refines even further. This lends great depth to his detailed probing of Russian agencies' inner workings, performance, and impact.

Constructing Grievance: Ethnic Nationalism in Russia's Republics. BY ELISE GIULIANO. Cornell University Press, 2011, 256 pp. $45.00.

In studies of nationalism, the dogs that do not bark—places where clear ethnic self-identification and frustrations do not lead to separatism or violence—get short shrift. One such case is Tatarstan, one of 16 autonomous republics in Russia where nationalism swelled in the tumult following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But it soon faded, as it did in the few other areas like it, and Giuliano sets out to explain why. Her answer, after she collates a variety of political and economic data on the 16 regions, comes down to economics and political entrepreneurship. It is not structural socioeconomic conditions, as is often assumed, that fuel separatism, she finds, but the immediate fear of unemployment or lost opportunity, anxieties that nationalist leaders skillfully cast in a narrative favoring national independence. When the underlying fear eases, the nationalist mobilizers lose their appeal. The book provides a neat explanation for outcomes in the Russian case with obvious and important policy implications for those managing multiethnic societies, but it leaves one wondering how far it goes in explaining outcomes elsewhere.

A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan. BY ARTEMY M. KALINOVSKY. Harvard University Press, 2011, 320 pp. $27.95.

The Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979 and the imbroglio that followed

were seminal events in the Cold War's last years. Others have told the story of how the decision was taken, the war conducted, and the international politics of it handled, but the details of the war's painful ending have remained obscure. Kalinovsky goes over the whole story briefly and then, with a large cache of archival material, firsthand accounts, and interviews, takes the reader deep inside the Soviet decision-making process as first Mikhail Gorbachev's aging predecessors and then Gorbachev and his circle struggled awkwardly to settle on an exit strategy that would not bring the roof down. Listening to their tortured internal arguments, watching the KGB and the Soviet military battle each other, witnessing the confusion stirred by half-clear, shifting strategies, and seeing how the hopes of salvaging some fragment of stability in this ravaged country strung out the inevitable outcome and led to an ongoing entanglement even after the last Soviet soldier had left should have a haunting familiarity.

The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe. BY JAMES MARK. Yale University Press, 2011, 344 pp. $65.00.

Historical memory—both the collective memory of a society and an individual's memory—matters everywhere, but never more so than in communities where sorting out the past bears directly on navigating a turbulent present. Such has been the case in the former socialist societies of central and eastern Europe. Mark systematically explores the past as processed in the present in countries from the Baltics to Romania. Not surprisingly, in these places the history of the communist period is mediated by political agendas and individual self-interest. He focuses on both the macro level (competing political parties, history commissions, institutes of national memory, and physical memorials) and the individual level (oral histories reconstructed from personal interviews). Both categories are largely organized around ex-Communists and anticommunists, who, after the early muddled period of transition, have come to hold very different views of the fall of communism in 1989. For the first group, 1989 is a closed book, opening the way to a fresh start. For the second, it is an incomplete break, leaving an opening for elements from the past to creep back in. But the role of history in this battle, fought out in both the political arena and scarred personal psychologies, is far more intricate, and Mark traces these complexities with skill.

Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. BY GERARD TOAL AND CARL T. DAHLMAN. Oxford University Press, 2011, 488 pp. $39.95.

In the miasma of violence that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Bosnian war (1992–95) offered the most sharply outlined instance of its excesses, because it was, in its purpose and effect, ethnic cleansing. Radovan Karadzic, then the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and the president of the Republika Srpska, made that clear in 1992, when he articulated six "strategic goals" in the unfolding Bosnian tragedy. Although the forces under the Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic and their auxiliary elements were not the only guilty parties (the Croatian military and the Bosnian government forces share in the blame), they were more responsible than any other group for driving two million Bosnians from their homes, an

effort that was intended to shatter Bosnia's basic form and redraw it along ethnoterritorial lines. They largely succeeded. As the authors of *Bosnia Remade* demonstrate in their painstaking assessment of the 1995 Dayton accord, which was designed to reverse this success, although sizable numbers of the displaced have recovered their homes or been compensated, the more fundamental imprint of the war persists in the attitudes prevalent in the country's now-partitioned parts. What gives perspective to the authors' analysis is the long haul of history in which they situate it.

Romanov Riches: Russian Writers and Artists Under the Tsars. BY SOLOMON VOLKOV. Knopf, 2011, 304 pp. $30.00.

The theme of writers and the regime is familiar in Russian history, but Volkov brings a fresh, voluptuous quality to it by featuring the personal entanglement of tsars—from Peter the Great's father, Alexis I, to Vladimir Lenin, the first of the Soviet "tsars"—with certain authors, artists, and composers. Up until the early nineteenth century, these were principally writers, often poets, such as Gavrila Derzhavin, Catherine the Great's favorite, or Vasily Zhukovsky, a leading literary figure in Alexander I's era. Later, beginning with Nicholas I, composers and artists also made their entrance into the royal court, preoccupied as it was with art's utility in embellishing the imperial order and, before the century's end, with its capacity play to the people's rising sense of nationalism. The intriguing element in Volkov's book is not so much the choice of the celebrated (Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, Leo Tolstoy, and Anton Chekhov by the last two tsars), the shunned (Modest Mussorgsky in Alexander III's day and Maxim Gorky in Nicholas II's), and the enfants terribles (Alexander Pushkin for Nicholas I). Rather, it is the time the emperor or empress took to influence an opera's title or scene, alter a stanza of poetry, or secure the election of someone as an honorary member to the Imperial Academy of Sciences.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

The Shift: Israel-Palestine From Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict. BY MENACHEM KLEIN. Columbia University Press, 2010, 144 pp. $30.00.

This dense little book, a fact-filled account of Israel and the Palestinians since the June 1967 war, treats not peace-process politics but actual developments on the ground. Klein traces the emergence of an overall Israeli "control system" that deals differently with five distinct Palestinian groups: citizens of Israel (about 20 percent of Israel's population), the 260,000 residents of East Jerusalem, the 2.4 million who live in Gaza, and, in the West Bank, the 500,000 who live to the west of the separation barrier and the 3.3 million who live to the east. Since 1967, the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation has turned into what it was before 1948: an ethnic conflict, not a border struggle. But now, the initiative lies overwhelmingly with the stronger party, Israel. Klein even likens Israeli control of the Palestinians to colonialism, with striking comparisons to Algeria under French rule. He hits another hot button in arguing cogently that the system amounts to apartheid, but a softer apartheid than

prevailed in South Africa. Clearly, getting back to borders should be the goal. But, Klein writes, "Israelis and Palestinians find themselves trapped between what is unachievable today—the two-state solution—and what can never be achieved—a unitary non-ethnic democracy."

Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril. BY KING ABDULLAH II OF JORDAN. Viking Adult, 2011, 368 pp. $27.95.

This worthy addition to that distinctive genre of books written by political leaders still in office is part autobiography, part political history. King Abdullah stresses the dominant presence of his father, King Hussein, throughout his life, notes the formative influence of his schooling (Deerfield Academy in the United States and Sandhurst in the United Kingdom), records his many years of soldiering, and provides an insider's view of the Jordanian royal family (including a circumspect account of King Hussein's deathbed decision to change the succession from Abdullah's uncle, Hassan, to him). The narrative is enriched by numerous firsthand accounts and appraisals of other political leaders, including Americans, Israelis, Palestinians, and Iraqis. The book, which went to press before the Arab uprisings, ends with a plea to seize the "last best chance" for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. The Hashemites of Jordan, long conditioned to ingratiate themselves with or defend themselves against stronger outsiders, are accustomed to explaining themselves to others. It is a family tradition: King Abdullah's *Our Last Best Chance* follows King Hussein's *Uneasy Lies the Head* (1962), both of which appeared after ten years on the throne.

Are Muslims Distinctive? A Look at the Evidence. BY M. STEVEN FISH. Oxford University Press, 2011, 408 pp. $99.00 (paper, $27.95).

All too many scholars of Islam and Muslims, Fish insists, ignore empirical evidence. (He names names.) Having thus gotten the reader's attention, Fish proceeds to show what these scholars have been missing, carefully compiling and discussing available quantifiable data on the attitudes and actions of Muslims on such subjects as religiosity, tolerance, corruption, crime, political violence, terrorism, social inequality, and democracy. He gives due attention to the potential for incomplete, inaccurate, or corrupt data. A devotee of statistical analysis, Fish has made a real, and largely successful, effort to make his findings accessible to the innumerate. His rich and diverse conclusions tear holes in the "otherness" arguments concerning Islam and Muslims, even while allowing that faith and its followers their distinctiveness.

How Pakistan Negotiates With the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster. BY HOWARD B. SCHAFFER AND TERESITA C. SCHAFFER. U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011, 210 pp. $45.00 (paper, $13.50).

This book, one in a U.S. Institute of Peace series on cross-cultural negotiations, sets out how Pakistan's distinctive history, geography, and political culture have shaped its approach to negotiating with the United States. It then describes the asymmetric interactions of the governing institutions that produce Pakistani foreign policy, covering the military (including the intelligence service), career diplomats and the bureaucracy, and politicians—an

effort that makes clear how much the military dominates. The book also tracks U.S.-Pakistani negotiations from the time of Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan (who ruled from 1958 to 1969) to the present. Pakistan's perception of India as an existential threat warrants a separate chapter on Indian-Pakistani negotiations, which highlights the contrasting styles Pakistan uses when negotiating with India versus when negotiating with the United States. Schaffer and Schaffer, seasoned specialists, have put to good use their many interviews with American and Pakistani officials in showing that cultural cues are important. Even so, the question they raise remains: "Can two countries whose tactical goals overlap but whose strategic priorities diverge significantly negotiate a reliable basis for cooperation?"

Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography. BY M. SÜKRÜ HANIOGLU. Princeton University Press, 2011, 280 pp. $27.95.

The age-old European tendency to refer to the Ottoman Empire as "Turkey" obscures how revolutionary a change it was when remnants of that venerable empire became the Republic of Turkey following World War I. The coup de grâce was administered not by the victorious Allies, who were content to leave a truncated Ottoman Empire in place, but by an Ottoman general, Mustafa Kemal, who adopted the richly symbolic title Atatürk (meaning "father of the Turks"). Atatürk does not lack for biographers, most of whose books are adulatory, but none has so thoroughly brought to life the ideological climate that molded the man as has Hanioglu. And few have presented Atatürk with such objectivity. Hanioglu's Atatürk is a product of Young Turk nationalism, Enlightenment secularism, and scientism. Hanioglu depicts a pragmatic Atatürk who could use Islamic or socialist symbolism as needed (one chapter is titled "Muslim Communism?") but who was, most of all, a zealot pushing a surcharged agenda of a secularizing, modernizing Turkish nationalism. The many top-down changes that Atatürk imposed in religion, language, dress, and even the arts make for fascinating reading today. Nearly nine decades after the end of the Ottoman era, Turkey and the post-Ottoman Middle East are still digesting and resisting the ideas of Atatürk.

Asia and Pacific

ANDREW J. NATHAN

Worse Than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia. BY THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN. Princeton University Press, 2011, 318 pp. $70.00 (paper, $24.95).

Christensen takes a fine-grained look at several key episodes during the Cold War in Asia, including the Korean War, the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958, and the Vietnam War. He uses them to refine existing theories of alliance politics and coercive diplomacy. One lesson is that weakly coordinated alliances send out mixed signals that court miscalculation by the rival camp, as was the case with the murky U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Taiwan in 1950 and the uncoordinated Soviet and Chinese responses to General Douglas MacArthur's Inchon landing the same year. Another lesson is that internally divided alliances generate competitive escalation among

their members, as was the case in the 1960s with China and Russia, each of which sought to outdo the other in Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. Even though rivals feel more threatened when an alliance is monolithic, a unified enemy can be easier to deal with than a divided one. Sometimes, a strong alliance system can trigger conflict, as was the case in 1954 when the United States spearheaded the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. That act motivated Mao to launch artillery attacks in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to deter the United States from signing a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Christensen suggests that in the past decade, during part of which he served in the U.S. government, the United States has made its signaling to Beijing credible by making its commitments to Taipei and Tokyo clear.

Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. BY STEPHEN P. COHEN AND SUNIL DASGUPTA. Brookings Institution Press, 2010, 223 pp. $34.95.

Cohen and Dasgupta argue that India lacks a security strategy and hence a rudder for its military modernization. The civilian authorities believe in "strategic restraint," which is too vague a concept to guide military planning. The land forces have configured themselves primarily for a surprise attack against Pakistan that is unlikely to be authorized, while remaining unprepared for the more immediate task of fighting domestic insurgencies. The air force spends more money than its rivals in Pakistan and China yet is falling further behind them. The navy is the highest-quality service and has the largest potential area of operation, but it has not decided which of many possible missions to prioritize. The authors attribute these dysfunctions to a lack of military expertise among government leaders, a failure of coordination among relevant civilian ministries and agencies, and rivalries among the services over missions and money. They trace the roots of these flaws to choices made before and since independence, and they see little prospect for change. If they are right, India is on track to violate the rule that rising affluence brings rising military power.

China, the United States, and Global Order. BY ROSEMARY FOOT AND ANDREW WALTER. Cambridge University Press, 2010, 352 pp. $90.00 (paper, $32.99).

Are the two most powerful states in the world moving toward the creation of a functioning global order? Or are international norms and institutions just a new arena for the old game of realpolitik? Foot and Walter compare U.S. and Chinese compliance with five sets of norms, governing the use of force, mutual surveillance of macroeconomic policy, nuclear nonproliferation, climate change, and global financial flows. With careful attention to detail, the authors are able to show that China's compliance has increased as its economy has become more interdependent with the rest of the world, although in selective ways that reflect particular economic and security interests. Although the United States created the initial institutions, it has performed inconsistently, unable to rein in important domestic constituencies that have an interest in seeing certain norms violated. In both Beijing and Washington, compliance seems to be strongest when the distribution of its costs and benefits is perceived as fair. But this is a hard equilibrium to achieve, given the asymmetries

of power, culture, and development that mark the international system.

The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy in the Twenty-first Century. BY BERNARD D. COLE. 2nd ed. Naval Institute Press, 2010, 416 pp. $36.95.

This is the authoritative guide to the part of the Chinese military that most worries the West: the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Since the first edition of Cole's book was published a decade ago, the PLAN has made the transition from a coastal defense organization to a nascent blue-water force. Its signal strengths are its submarines and its antiship cruise missiles, both of which were acquired with an eye to a possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan. The navy is close to fielding one aircraft carrier, presumably the first of many, and has built a large naval base on Hainan Island, which signals Beijing's commitment to defend its sweeping claims in the South China Sea. All the while, the Communist Party's top-to-bottom control of the service has remained vigorous. In Cole's judgment, the PLAN is still far from being able to dominate the U.S., the Japanese, the Indian, or even the South Korean navy. But it already has enough strength to seize the initiative in selected scenarios. As for its future, farther shores beckon, since China depends on sea-lanes that reach all the way to the west coast of Africa. The naval ambitions of political leaders in Beijing are unknown, but there is no end in sight to the PLAN's development.

Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? BY PAUL MIDFORD. Stanford University Press, 2011, 272 pp. $75.00 (paper, $24.95).

Midford challenges two pieces of conventional wisdom about Japan: that the public is pacifistic and that the elites are nonetheless moving the country toward the offensive use of force. According to his research of public opinion polls since the 1950s, the public has been consistent: it believes in the use of force for defensive purposes but distrusts the military's ability to act wisely in the national interest, and it fears entrapment by the U.S. alliance in wars of the United States' making but favors the use of the military for beneficent missions such as disaster relief. In Japan's democratic system, public opinion matters. At crucial moments, it has limited the ability of what Midford calls "hawkish elites" to join Washington in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although North Korean belligerence and the rise of China have increased public support for territorial defense, they have not increased support for intervention. The book does not explore variations in attitudes across categories of respondents, which might have provided insight into politically salient cleavages.

Collective Killings in Rural China During the Cultural Revolution. BY YANG SU. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 320 pp. $27.99.

Su adds a new chapter to the doleful register of twentieth-century mass killings by revealing the previously unknown story of some 1.5 million innocent deaths that occurred in China's rural villages in 1967–68. The Cultural Revolution was not just an urban phenomenon, as previously believed. People classified as coming from bad "class backgrounds" were murdered in groups, often whole families at a time, in front of mass meetings. The slaughter was especially intense in Guangdong and Guangxi, southern provinces with histories

of clan conflict. The perpetrators were "ordinary men," anxious to demonstrate their fealty to Mao's line on class struggle and filled with panic about a supposed counterrevolutionary conspiracy that had in fact been fabricated by the leaders in Beijing. Although the state did not carry out the killings or order them, it created the lawless environment that made them possible. Su tells a heart-rending story and contributes new insights to the burgeoning academic literature on contentious politics and genocide.

Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies. BY ALFRED STEPAN, JUAN J. LINZ, AND YOGENDRA YADAV. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011, 336 pp. $60.00 (paper, $30.00).

In this nuanced analysis, three leading political scientists ponder the mystery of how democracies that contain strong, territorially concentrated minorities can manage not just to hold together but also to inculcate strong loyalty to national institutions. Their research demonstrates the vigor of both national and subnational identities in India and other countries with similar political systems, such as Belgium, Canada, and Spain. The institutions that give political leaders the best chance to promote cohesion include asymmetric federalism (granting different powers to different territorial units), the strong protection of individual rights, and parliamentary government. The authors show how other institutional frameworks that give too little autonomy to territorially concentrated subgroups (as in Sri Lanka) or too much (as in Yugoslavia) tend toward secessionism and civil war. And they argue that U.S.-style federalism should be

avoided in all "robustly multinational" societies because of its legislative malapportionment, indivisibility of executive power, and plethora of veto points. Since few countries in the world are homogenous nation-states along the lines of France or Japan, these arguments have broad practical relevance.

The Impact of China's 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. EDITED BY JEAN-PHILIPPE BÉJA. Routledge, 2010, 272 pp. $140.00.

The 14 chapters in this volume provide a sweeping overview of the gains and setbacks in China since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis. The fundamental changes have been the shift to a politically circumscribed market economy and the consolidation of the communist regime. This phantasmagoric formation, which Barry Naughton describes in his chapter as a harsh and "elite-dominated form of state capitalism," has produced two decades of explosive economic growth—without democratization. The state has instead suppressed the history and memories of the June 4 massacre, strengthened the patriotic education of Chinese youth, expanded the policing of the population, and made little progress toward the rule of law. Chapters on foreign policy argue that Chinese leaders are wielding their newly gained economic power to shape international norms and institutions (such as those concerning human rights) and pressure Western countries and companies for political concessions. These trends have even adversely affected the democracy movement in Hong Kong. The authors trace the origins of these changes to Chinese leaders' responses to the June 4 crisis and their determination to avert another Tiananmen-style protest. Although a few contributions cover the changing strategies of political and intellectual dissent and new types of citizen activism, by and large the volume offers little hope that China will move toward democracy anytime soon.

GUOBIN YANG

Africa

NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE

The New Scramble for Africa. BY PÁDRAIG CARMODY. Polity Press, 2011, 240 pp. $69.95 (paper, $24.95).

Season of Rains: Africa in the World. BY STEPHEN ELLIS. Hurst, 2011, 224 pp. £16.99.

The past decade or so has witnessed the most comprehensive and sustained period of economic growth in Africa since the 1950s. Various factors help explain this, but pride of place probably goes to the much more favorable international prices that have recently prevailed for most of Africa's commodity exports, thanks in part to the surge in Asia's purchasing power. In turn, high commodity prices have encouraged foreign direct investment in Africa, particularly in the oil and mining sectors. (Particularly noteworthy is China's rapidly increasing investment in the region.) These two books try to make sense of all these developments. Carmody's argues forcefully that the current trends evoke the late-nineteenth-century scramble for Africa, during which a handful of European powers carved up the continent in pursuit of its natural resources, and his book is full of arresting anecdotes and provocative claims about the nature of the competition. Carmody tends to view

international economic relations as a zero-sum game, and as a result, he sees the competition for resources by outsiders as bad news for the region.

Ellis' carefully argued book is both more nuanced and more challenging. Ellis is attentive to the changes that have marked Africa in recent years, and he concedes that meaningful economic growth has resulted in higher standards of living. He puts Africans at the heart of his view of the continent, a group that is strangely absent from Carmody's account. In Ellis' telling, Africans have become masters at making the most out of their subaltern position in the global economy, manipulating and benefiting from investment and foreign aid for decades. Still, he argues, many of the structural constraints on African growth remain ensconced today. For instance, political elites in the region are too self-regarding and state structures too weak for the current boom to result in sustainable economic growth and alleviate poverty. He is deeply suspicious of the idea of progress, castigating those in the development business who believe that Africa will ineluctably follow in the footsteps of the West and soon turn toward democracy or capitalism. Ellis' book will not please readers looking for a simple takeaway or straightforward policy recommendations, but his in-depth knowledge makes it essential reading for anyone seeking to understand Africa's evolution.

Africa in the Time of Cholera: A History of Pandemics From 1817 to the Present. BY MYRON ECHENBERG. Cambridge University Press, 2011, 230 pp. $85.00 (paper, $27.99).

These days, cholera is largely an African disease, with over 95 percent of all cases worldwide over the past two decades occurring in Africa. In his informative history of the seven cholera pandemics that have hit the continent since 1817, Echenberg shows that this was not always so. Epidemiologists agree that cholera originated in South Asia. Its arrival in Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century was testimony to the region's growing insertion into global economic and social systems, as successive pandemics followed trade routes, colonial armies, and African Muslims making pilgrimage to Mecca. Back then, cholera was one of the most devastating diseases known, killing millions. But over time, the virulence of dominant strains of the disease have abated, and mortality rates have dropped sharply, particularly since a highly effective oral rehydration therapy was mastered. Echenberg argues that the 5,000–7,000 cholera deaths every year in Africa represent a failure to provide public sanitation systems and access to clean water, often in failing states that are riven by civil war. Indeed, in 2006, four countries accounted for three-quarters of all cases on the continent: Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe. BY DANIEL COMPAGNON. University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, 368 pp. $39.95.

At Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, the country's future seemed rosy, with a vibrant agricultural export sector, sub-Saharan Africa's highest literacy rate, and an impressive new president, Robert Mugabe, who seemed to genuinely desire reconciliation with the white minority he had fought as a Marxist guerrilla leader. When the present crisis began to unfold in the late

1990s, some observers wondered why Mugabe had changed. Compagnon's devastating analysis of the regime argues that the country's collapse was in fact the predictable outcome of the methods and approach Mugabe has always followed. Organized violence against political enemies has been part of the arsenal of his political party, ZANU-PF, since the early stages of the independence struggle. Likewise, Zimbabwe's recent economic collapse was the inevitable result of three decades of crony capitalism and outright corruption. An excellent chapter on the land expropriations of white farmers carefully deconstructs the regime's rhetoric and methods, arguing that the violent abuses in the process were never random but rather the result of Mugabe's political calculations. In its detailed knowledge of the country and accumulated evidence, Compagnon's book stands out as the best account of the crisis to date.

Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink. BY JOHN CAMPBELL. Rowman and Littlefield, 2011, 216 pp. $29.95.

Part diplomatic memoir, part layman's introduction to the country, Campbell's book provides an excellent snapshot of Nigeria today. Campbell recounts key events in the country during his terms there as an American diplomat, including a spell as U.S. ambassador from 2004 to 2007. On several occasions, Campbell comments on U.S. timidity, notably Washington's hesitancy to publicly voice its concerns about Nigeria's deplorable levels of corruption or about the fraud and violence that have marred recent elections. Thankfully, in retirement, Campbell has none of this diplomatic reticence, and his book is a lively and sometimes highly critical analysis of the country's political class, which is usually more interested in lining its pockets than in responding to the needs and aspirations of Nigerians. Campbell also draws a keenly observed portrait of recent elite politics, ending with President Umaru Yar'Adua's death in 2010 and the emergence of the current head of state, Goodluck Jonathan.

FOR THE RECORD

Peter Orszag's essay "How Health Care Can Save or Sink America" (July/August 2011) misstated the name and description of a project focusing on evidence-based improvements in hospitals. It is the Premier QUEST initiative, a voluntary effort among hospitals.

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ForeignAffairs.com Top Ten

The top-ranking online articles from summer 2011.

1. *Pakistan's Middle Class Extremists.* BY BLAIR, FAIR, MALHOTRA, AND SHAPIRO. Policymakers believe that economic development is a key to ending terrorism. But Pakistan's poor are not supportive of militant groups. *ForeignAffairs.com/Blair_Pakistan*
2. *Turkey's Maturing Foreign Policy.* BY MUSTAFA AKYOL. The AKP's reaction to the Arab Spring seemed haphazard, but the party was actually learning to balance its regional interests with its values. *ForeignAffairs.com/Akyol_Turkey*
3. *Why Food Price Volatility Doesn't Matter.* BY CHRISTOPHER B. BARRETT AND MARC F. BELLEMARE. High prices are not the same as unstable ones. Policies aimed at curbing volatility—export bans and subsidies for farmers—won't help those who need it. *ForeignAffairs.com/Barrett_Food*
4. *Avoiding the Next Eurozone Crisis.* BY LORENZO BINI SMAGHI. The EU's current framework cannot prevent or manage fiscal problems effectively. This does not mean that it is too late to build one that can. *ForeignAffairs.com/Smaghi_Eurozone*
5. *Saudi Arabia's Yemen Dilemma.* BY BERNARD HAYKEL. With Saleh gone, Riyadh's options for maintaining its influence would only get more difficult. *ForeignAffairs.com/Haykel_Saudi*
6. *America's Weak Recovery.* BY ALAN S. BLINDER. The U.S. economic recovery has already been slow. Now, Congress is likely to cut spending and raise taxes, and the Fed is in no mood to lower interest rates. *ForeignAffairs.com/Blinder_America*
7. *Letter From Kabul.* BY FOTINI CHRISTIA. Obama has said that Afghanistan is ready to stand on its own. But where he sees success, Afghans see fragility. *ForeignAffairs.com/Christia_Letter*
8. *Obama's Nuclear Upgrade.* BY KEIR A. LIEBER AND DARYL G. PRESS. The Obama administration has proposed a major campaign to modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This effort is vital. *ForeignAffairs.com/Lieber_Nuclear*
9. *Same Netanyahu, Different Israel.* BY DANIEL LEVY. Israel has undergone profound demographic changes since Netanyahu first addressed the U.S. Congress 15 years ago. Obama must adjust to these shifts. *ForeignAffairs.com/Levy_Netanyahu*
10. *The Limits of Election Monitoring.* BY SUSAN HYDE AND JUDITH G. KELLY. When Egypt and Tunisia hold elections this fall, international election monitors must resist pressure to validate the results. *ForeignAffairs.com/Hyde_Election*